The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive

Simple item page
dc.contributor.advisorSchrire, Roberten_ZA
dc.contributor.authorMonstad, Torillen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-03T03:30:29Z
dc.date.available2014-12-03T03:30:29Z
dc.date.issued1999en_ZA
dc.descriptionBibliography: leaves 66-68.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this study is to evaluate how the new and democratically elected South African Parliament as an institution has been able to hold the executive accountable for their activities. Accountability of the rulers has been identified as a central element In democratic government. In representative democracies there are two major models of government: presidential and parliamentary government. These two models have different methods for dealing with the issue of legislative oversight. Literature shows that this function is more effective in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, since the presidential model provides a stronger constitutional framework for legislative oversight. The model that can be used to analyse South Africa is closely linked to the parliamentary model. However, the role of the President, the sovereign Constitution, and the anti-defection clause makes South Africa more of a hybrid-parliamentary model. As South Africa can be linked to the parliamentary model, this implies that Parliament will not be able to hold the executive effectively accountable. There are other non-constitutional factors that have an impact on Parliament's oversight function. In South Africa, the non-constitutional factors that have been in place in these five first years of democracy enhance the consequences of the parliamentary model. This means that these factors add to the existing provisions for ineffective accountability of the executive by Parliament. These are the large majority of the ANC, the strict internal discipline of the ANC, the weak opposition in Parliament, the lack of resources and staff in Parliament, and the lack of capacity, experience and expertise by the MP's. As the example of Sarafina 2 shows, these factors, and especially the large majority of the ANC in Parliament, add to the inability of the new South African Parliament to effectively hold the executive accountable.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationMonstad, T. (1999). <i>The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Political Studies. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9878en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationMonstad, Torill. <i>"The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Political Studies, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9878en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationMonstad, T. 1999. The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive. University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Monstad, Torill AB - The aim of this study is to evaluate how the new and democratically elected South African Parliament as an institution has been able to hold the executive accountable for their activities. Accountability of the rulers has been identified as a central element In democratic government. In representative democracies there are two major models of government: presidential and parliamentary government. These two models have different methods for dealing with the issue of legislative oversight. Literature shows that this function is more effective in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, since the presidential model provides a stronger constitutional framework for legislative oversight. The model that can be used to analyse South Africa is closely linked to the parliamentary model. However, the role of the President, the sovereign Constitution, and the anti-defection clause makes South Africa more of a hybrid-parliamentary model. As South Africa can be linked to the parliamentary model, this implies that Parliament will not be able to hold the executive effectively accountable. There are other non-constitutional factors that have an impact on Parliament's oversight function. In South Africa, the non-constitutional factors that have been in place in these five first years of democracy enhance the consequences of the parliamentary model. This means that these factors add to the existing provisions for ineffective accountability of the executive by Parliament. These are the large majority of the ANC, the strict internal discipline of the ANC, the weak opposition in Parliament, the lack of resources and staff in Parliament, and the lack of capacity, experience and expertise by the MP's. As the example of Sarafina 2 shows, these factors, and especially the large majority of the ANC in Parliament, add to the inability of the new South African Parliament to effectively hold the executive accountable. DA - 1999 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 1999 T1 - The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive TI - The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9878 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/9878
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationMonstad T. The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Political Studies, 1999 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9878en_ZA
dc.language.isoengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDepartment of Political Studiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subject.otherDemocratic Governanceen_ZA
dc.titleThe new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executiveen_ZA
dc.typeMaster Thesis
dc.type.qualificationlevelMasters
dc.type.qualificationnameMSocScen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceThesisen_ZA
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
thesis_hum_1999_monstad_t.pdf
Size:
4.58 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
Masters