The new South African Parliament : an evaluation of parliament's oversight function of the executive

Master Thesis

1999

Permanent link to this Item
Authors
Supervisors
Journal Title
Link to Journal
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Publisher

University of Cape Town

License
Series
Abstract
The aim of this study is to evaluate how the new and democratically elected South African Parliament as an institution has been able to hold the executive accountable for their activities. Accountability of the rulers has been identified as a central element In democratic government. In representative democracies there are two major models of government: presidential and parliamentary government. These two models have different methods for dealing with the issue of legislative oversight. Literature shows that this function is more effective in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, since the presidential model provides a stronger constitutional framework for legislative oversight. The model that can be used to analyse South Africa is closely linked to the parliamentary model. However, the role of the President, the sovereign Constitution, and the anti-defection clause makes South Africa more of a hybrid-parliamentary model. As South Africa can be linked to the parliamentary model, this implies that Parliament will not be able to hold the executive effectively accountable. There are other non-constitutional factors that have an impact on Parliament's oversight function. In South Africa, the non-constitutional factors that have been in place in these five first years of democracy enhance the consequences of the parliamentary model. This means that these factors add to the existing provisions for ineffective accountability of the executive by Parliament. These are the large majority of the ANC, the strict internal discipline of the ANC, the weak opposition in Parliament, the lack of resources and staff in Parliament, and the lack of capacity, experience and expertise by the MP's. As the example of Sarafina 2 shows, these factors, and especially the large majority of the ANC in Parliament, add to the inability of the new South African Parliament to effectively hold the executive accountable.
Description

Bibliography: leaves 66-68.

Reference:

Collections