Unravelling corporate crimes within listed companies: a multi-case study of selected South African and German companies

Yingwane, Themba Trevor

Unravelling corporate crimes within listed companies: a multi-case study of selected South African and German companies

Thesis / Dissertation

2026

Publisher

University of Cape Town

Department

Department of Commercial Law

Faculty

Faculty of Law

Abstract

This study offers critical insight into the influence of director–shareholder relationships on the emergence of corporate criminogenic practices, with particular reference to the Steinhoff, Volkswagen, and Wirecard cases. It further interrogates the potential of shareholder activism as a mechanism for curtailing such practices. The study employs a doctrinal methodology, systematically analysing case law, statutory frameworks, and governance structures in relation to the selected case studies. The research also adopts a quasi-hybrid approach, integrating both meta-analysis and case-law analysis derived from doctrinal and qualitative methodologies, respectively. The study demonstrated that Steinhoff, Volkswagen, and Wirecard managers engaged in criminogenic practices autonomously, without shareholders' influence. This phenomenon was primarily influenced by micro-drivers such as avarice, pathogenic narcissistic characters, and intricate corporate structures, as well as macro-drivers such as unfavourable relationships with stakeholders, ambiguous regulations, and auditors' deficient scepticism. Accordingly, the injurious managerialism culture further enabled managers to pursue profit maximisation without regard for consequences, to appease shareholders, as highlighted by the annual report syndrome. Similarly, the involvement of the majority shareholders on the supervisory board or as CEO potentially compromised their oversight role and moral judgement, as accentuated by shareholder risk theory. Moreover, the study found that shareholder activism can contribute to curtailing corporate criminogenic practices, especially when they apply decisive shareholder activism. These results make a unique contribution to the existing knowledge within corporate law and governance (including shareholder activism), corporate crime, compliance, and ethics literature. The study further sparks a discourse on the potential of shareholder activism in curtailing corporate criminogenic practices.