Does the watchdog bite: a comparative study of the judiciary as an accountability mechanism on high executive power in Malawi, Namibia and Seychelles

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2026

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University of Cape Town

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This thesis examines the evolution of constitutional review powers in Malawi, Namibia, and Seychelles following the adoption of rights-based democratic constitutions in the 1990s. It investigates whether the courts in these jurisdictions have developed a coherent set of norms and principles to hold the President and Cabinet accountable for their use of high executive power. Despite their similar constitutional frameworks, significant differences emerge in how these courts have navigated their expanded roles. The study highlights that while the courts have established standards for reviewing executive conduct, there is variability in the predictability and clarity of their jurisprudence. A comparative analysis, including a case study on judicial responses during the COVID-19 pandemic, reveals that Malawi exhibits a robust but unpredictable jurisprudence, Namibia demonstrates emerging standards with largely predictable outcomes, and Seychelles faces systemic challenges that hinder effective judicial review. The findings underscore the necessity of contextual factors—such as judicial independence and public faith in the legal system—in embedding these powers effectively. This research contributes to the understanding of how legal frameworks can promote accountability and supports ongoing academic inquiry into the evolving relationship between the judiciary and executive power in modern African democracies.
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