"Whether God exists"

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dc.contributor.advisorBrown, Campbellen_ZA
dc.contributor.advisorRichmond, Alasdairen_ZA
dc.contributor.advisorRitchie, Jacken_ZA
dc.contributor.authorOstrowick, John Men_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-03T14:15:18Z
dc.date.available2017-10-03T14:15:18Z
dc.date.issued2017en_ZA
dc.description.abstractThis thesis presents inductive and probabilistic arguments for and against theism. The thesis claims that the only compelling evidentialist argument for theism is the cosmological argument from Richard Swinburne. Swinburne's argument is examined from a Bayesian perspective, and it is found that we can't fix the prior probabilities that Swinburne needs, not even by his appeal to simplicity. We then explain that this undermines P-inductive arguments, in particular, the cosmological argument. Then we consider whether theism offers a good explanation for the universe, or has a high likelihood, even if God is not simple. We find that there is no good reason to say that theism explains the universe better than competing theories. We therefore conclude that there is no C-inductive argument from cosmology to theism either. We then debate the physicalist explanations of the universe, which turn out to not help the atheist. We might feel that this leaves us in an argumentative stalemate, but in the final chapter, we turn to the problem of evil. We discuss the possible existence of gratuitous evils (evils which achieve no good ends). We then argue that the most plausible response to gratuitous evil is Skeptical Theism, that is, that we are unable to know God's intentions. But that stance undermines the cosmological argument which requires that we know God's intentions. We then conclude that, given that the cosmological argument is the most compelling evidential argument for theism, and that it fails, that the theist should abandon natural theology. Therefore, holding the fideist/voluntarist position, or that God is in fact indifferent to us, are found to be stronger stances.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationOstrowick, J. M. (2017). <i>"Whether God exists"</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25499en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationOstrowick, John M. <i>""Whether God exists"."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25499en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationOstrowick, J. 2017. "Whether God exists". University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Ostrowick, John M AB - This thesis presents inductive and probabilistic arguments for and against theism. The thesis claims that the only compelling evidentialist argument for theism is the cosmological argument from Richard Swinburne. Swinburne's argument is examined from a Bayesian perspective, and it is found that we can't fix the prior probabilities that Swinburne needs, not even by his appeal to simplicity. We then explain that this undermines P-inductive arguments, in particular, the cosmological argument. Then we consider whether theism offers a good explanation for the universe, or has a high likelihood, even if God is not simple. We find that there is no good reason to say that theism explains the universe better than competing theories. We therefore conclude that there is no C-inductive argument from cosmology to theism either. We then debate the physicalist explanations of the universe, which turn out to not help the atheist. We might feel that this leaves us in an argumentative stalemate, but in the final chapter, we turn to the problem of evil. We discuss the possible existence of gratuitous evils (evils which achieve no good ends). We then argue that the most plausible response to gratuitous evil is Skeptical Theism, that is, that we are unable to know God's intentions. But that stance undermines the cosmological argument which requires that we know God's intentions. We then conclude that, given that the cosmological argument is the most compelling evidential argument for theism, and that it fails, that the theist should abandon natural theology. Therefore, holding the fideist/voluntarist position, or that God is in fact indifferent to us, are found to be stronger stances. DA - 2017 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2017 T1 - "Whether God exists" TI - "Whether God exists" UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25499 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/25499
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationOstrowick JM. "Whether God exists". [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 2017 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/25499en_ZA
dc.language.isoengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subject.otherPhilosophyen_ZA
dc.title"Whether God exists"en_ZA
dc.typeDoctoral Thesis
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoral
dc.type.qualificationnamePhDen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceThesisen_ZA
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