Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings

dc.contributor.advisorShutte, M F Nen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorGiddy, J Pen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-14T08:39:57Z
dc.date.available2015-07-14T08:39:57Z
dc.date.issued1994en_ZA
dc.descriptionBibliography: p. 175-179.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractIt is argued in this thesis that much modem and contemporary moral philosophy has been subjectivist, and that this is largely due to the theory of knowledge that has accompanied the increasing dominance of modem science in the determination of our thought-patterns. The expansion of standards of rational enquiry beyond the confines of empiricism, in the way that B.Lonergan has done, is a necessary part of any adequate contemporary restatement of ethical naturalism. Two different approaches to the Aristotelian tradition in ethics are discussed: in the one judgments of value are based on a particular human psychology; in the other they are related to the standards of excellence associated with social roles. Two contemporary writers - P. Simpson and A. Macintyre respectively - are taken as representative of these approaches. Neither account, it is argued, is fully successful: the metaphysical psychology of Simpson fails to take into account variations in social and cultural contexts; while the communitarianism of Macintyre remains to some extent unjustified. The basis for a more adequate defence of ethical naturalism is given in Lonergan's account of the normative structure of human self-determination. Two further writers are used to develop this argument. H.Meynell argues that morality is largely a matter of promoting the happiness not just of oneself and one's group, but of people in general, and that this can be objectively specified. R. Johann contends that there is a further necessary condition for moral goodness, viz. the commitment to the realisation of personal community. This is justified, I argue by way of conclusion, because human persons are radically dependent on a certain kind of influence of other persons for the development of their capacity for self- determination.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationGiddy, J. P. (1994). <i>Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationGiddy, J P. <i>"Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationGiddy, J. 1994. Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings. University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Giddy, J P AB - It is argued in this thesis that much modem and contemporary moral philosophy has been subjectivist, and that this is largely due to the theory of knowledge that has accompanied the increasing dominance of modem science in the determination of our thought-patterns. The expansion of standards of rational enquiry beyond the confines of empiricism, in the way that B.Lonergan has done, is a necessary part of any adequate contemporary restatement of ethical naturalism. Two different approaches to the Aristotelian tradition in ethics are discussed: in the one judgments of value are based on a particular human psychology; in the other they are related to the standards of excellence associated with social roles. Two contemporary writers - P. Simpson and A. Macintyre respectively - are taken as representative of these approaches. Neither account, it is argued, is fully successful: the metaphysical psychology of Simpson fails to take into account variations in social and cultural contexts; while the communitarianism of Macintyre remains to some extent unjustified. The basis for a more adequate defence of ethical naturalism is given in Lonergan's account of the normative structure of human self-determination. Two further writers are used to develop this argument. H.Meynell argues that morality is largely a matter of promoting the happiness not just of oneself and one's group, but of people in general, and that this can be objectively specified. R. Johann contends that there is a further necessary condition for moral goodness, viz. the commitment to the realisation of personal community. This is justified, I argue by way of conclusion, because human persons are radically dependent on a certain kind of influence of other persons for the development of their capacity for self- determination. DA - 1994 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 1994 T1 - Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings TI - Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationGiddy JP. Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1994 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414en_ZA
dc.language.isoengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subject.otherPhilosophyen_ZA
dc.titleEthics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writingsen_ZA
dc.typeDoctoral Thesis
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoral
dc.type.qualificationnamePhDen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceThesisen_ZA
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