Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation

dc.contributor.authorAtkins, Peter
dc.contributor.authorPrasad, Gisela
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-19T09:30:43Z
dc.date.available2016-02-19T09:30:43Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.updated2016-02-12T09:41:06Z
dc.descriptionI'm not sure how to cite this. This study is part of Peter Atkins’ Master’s dissertation at the UCT Energy Research Centre.
dc.description.abstractOne of the intentions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was to use markets to allow the developed countries to supplement their own greenhouse gas reduction efforts with carbon reductions made in developing countries by purchasing carbon offsets. By these means, it was hoped, global greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced and developing countries would benefit through incoming carbon revenue and technology transfer. This has worked for China and India, which together account for 88% of all CDM carbon credits issued so far, but it hasn’t worked for Africa which has only a miserly 1% of the issued credits. The main reasons for this disparity are thought to be the high transaction costs of the CDM and the long and complicated registration, validation, monitoring and verification processes. The costs are around R400 000 to R2 000 000 per project (CCWG, 2009) . In addition it can take up to three years to get carbon revenue, if the project is one of the lucky 13% of projects to make it through to the end (see Appendix A – CDM Pipeline analysis). Partly in response to these CDM shortcomings, the voluntary carbon market has emerged. The voluntary carbon market has many players using many different standards and rules and regulations. Unfortunately, the CDM-like standards used by the bigger voluntary carbon market registries also incur high transaction costs and long lead times and therefore don’t work for typical, small African poverty alleviation projects with low greenhouse gas emission reduction potential. This has encouraged the development of small, agile carbon registries using simplified standards, which better fit the African projects. One such small registry and one of its poverty alleviation projects are analysed in this paper.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationAtkins, P., & Prasad, G. (2013). <i>Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation</i> University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Engineering & the Built Environment ,Energy Research Centre. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17146en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationAtkins, Peter, and Gisela Prasad <i>Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation.</i> University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Engineering & the Built Environment ,Energy Research Centre, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17146en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationAtkins, P ; Prasad, G. (2013). Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation. Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Working Paper AU - Atkins, Peter AU - Prasad, Gisela AB - One of the intentions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was to use markets to allow the developed countries to supplement their own greenhouse gas reduction efforts with carbon reductions made in developing countries by purchasing carbon offsets. By these means, it was hoped, global greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced and developing countries would benefit through incoming carbon revenue and technology transfer. This has worked for China and India, which together account for 88% of all CDM carbon credits issued so far, but it hasn’t worked for Africa which has only a miserly 1% of the issued credits. The main reasons for this disparity are thought to be the high transaction costs of the CDM and the long and complicated registration, validation, monitoring and verification processes. The costs are around R400 000 to R2 000 000 per project (CCWG, 2009) . In addition it can take up to three years to get carbon revenue, if the project is one of the lucky 13% of projects to make it through to the end (see Appendix A – CDM Pipeline analysis). Partly in response to these CDM shortcomings, the voluntary carbon market has emerged. The voluntary carbon market has many players using many different standards and rules and regulations. Unfortunately, the CDM-like standards used by the bigger voluntary carbon market registries also incur high transaction costs and long lead times and therefore don’t work for typical, small African poverty alleviation projects with low greenhouse gas emission reduction potential. This has encouraged the development of small, agile carbon registries using simplified standards, which better fit the African projects. One such small registry and one of its poverty alleviation projects are analysed in this paper. DA - 2013 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town KW - Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) KW - poverty alleviation LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2013 T1 - Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation TI - Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17146 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/17146
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationAtkins P, Prasad G. Leveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviation. 2013 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17146en_ZA
dc.languageengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentEnergy Research Centreen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Engineering and the Built Environment
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subjectClean Development Mechanism (CDM)en_ZA
dc.subjectpoverty alleviationen_ZA
dc.subject.otherKyoto protocol
dc.subject.otherClimatic changes
dc.subject.otherGreenhouse gas mitigation
dc.titleLeveraging carbon revenue for poverty alleviationen_ZA
dc.typeWorking Paperen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceResearch paperen_ZA
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