Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability

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dc.contributor.advisorButler, Anthonyen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorBanda, Raymond Loratoen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-30T03:52:22Z
dc.date.available2014-07-30T03:52:22Z
dc.date.issued2007en_ZA
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 79-85)
dc.description.abstractThe central purpose of this paper is to assess whether the South African intergovernmental fiscal relations system enables provinces to achieve preference matching, efficiency and accountability. In the final analysis the paper contests that the system does not enable preference matching because of centralized policy making, provincial over reliance on national transfers to finance their expenditures and the fact that the system was not necessarily crafted for purposes of preference matching but national unity and the need to address the imbalances of the past.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationBanda, R. L. (2007). <i>Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Political Studies. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/3799en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationBanda, Raymond Lorato. <i>"Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Political Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/3799en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationBanda, R. 2007. Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability. University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Banda, Raymond Lorato AB - The central purpose of this paper is to assess whether the South African intergovernmental fiscal relations system enables provinces to achieve preference matching, efficiency and accountability. In the final analysis the paper contests that the system does not enable preference matching because of centralized policy making, provincial over reliance on national transfers to finance their expenditures and the fact that the system was not necessarily crafted for purposes of preference matching but national unity and the need to address the imbalances of the past. DA - 2007 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2007 T1 - Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability TI - Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/3799 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/3799
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationBanda RL. Intergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountability. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Political Studies, 2007 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/3799en_ZA
dc.language.isoengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDepartment of Political Studiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subject.otherPublic Policyen_ZA
dc.titleIntergovernmental fiscal reform in South Africa : preference matching, efficiency and accountabilityen_ZA
dc.typeMaster Thesis
dc.type.qualificationlevelMasters
dc.type.qualificationnameMPhilen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceThesisen_ZA
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