Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience

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dc.contributor.advisorUliana, Enricoen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorAnkude, Edem Komlaen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-10T09:09:45Z
dc.date.available2014-11-10T09:09:45Z
dc.date.issued1997en_ZA
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliography.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractThe use of free cash flow has been a source of conflict between shareholders and managers. This conflict derives from the agency relationship between shareholders and managers in that decisions taken by managers (as agents) affect the shareholders (as principals). The decisions of managers may not always be in the interest of shareholders. The interests of shareholders will be served if actions of managers lead to the maximisation of the total value of the company. The free cash flow theory suggests that managers have the tendency to misuse surplus cash resources. Any use of free cash flow that is not value maximising could result in losses to shareholders. These are termed the agency costs of free cash flow. It is believed that managers will think and act as shareholders if they own significant proportions of the equity capital of companies. This dissertation examines the effects of the agency relationship on the utilisation of free cash flow.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationAnkude, E. K. (1997). <i>Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Department of Finance and Tax. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9518en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationAnkude, Edem Komla. <i>"Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Department of Finance and Tax, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9518en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationAnkude, E. 1997. Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience. University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Ankude, Edem Komla AB - The use of free cash flow has been a source of conflict between shareholders and managers. This conflict derives from the agency relationship between shareholders and managers in that decisions taken by managers (as agents) affect the shareholders (as principals). The decisions of managers may not always be in the interest of shareholders. The interests of shareholders will be served if actions of managers lead to the maximisation of the total value of the company. The free cash flow theory suggests that managers have the tendency to misuse surplus cash resources. Any use of free cash flow that is not value maximising could result in losses to shareholders. These are termed the agency costs of free cash flow. It is believed that managers will think and act as shareholders if they own significant proportions of the equity capital of companies. This dissertation examines the effects of the agency relationship on the utilisation of free cash flow. DA - 1997 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 1997 T1 - Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience TI - Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9518 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/9518
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationAnkude EK. Agency costs of free cash flow : the South African experience. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Department of Finance and Tax, 1997 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9518en_ZA
dc.language.isoengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDepartment of Finance and Taxen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Commerceen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subject.otherFinancial Managementen_ZA
dc.titleAgency costs of free cash flow : the South African experienceen_ZA
dc.typeMaster Thesis
dc.type.qualificationlevelMasters
dc.type.qualificationnameMComen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceThesisen_ZA
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