Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality

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dc.contributor.advisorBrooks, Daviden_ZA
dc.contributor.authorBak, Nellekeen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-12T11:16:32Z
dc.date.available2016-01-12T11:16:32Z
dc.date.issued1987en_ZA
dc.descriptionBibliography: pages 230-233.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractThe problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call "self-deception" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from "weak" to "hard" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of "weak" to "hard" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of " deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationBak, N. (1987). <i>Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationBak, Nelleke. <i>"Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationBak, N. 1987. Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality. University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Bak, Nelleke AB - The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call "self-deception" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from "weak" to "hard" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of "weak" to "hard" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of " deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible. DA - 1987 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 1987 T1 - Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality TI - Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationBak N. Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1987 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339en_ZA
dc.language.isoengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.subject.otherPhilosophyen_ZA
dc.titlePhilosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationalityen_ZA
dc.typeMaster Thesis
dc.type.qualificationlevelMasters
dc.type.qualificationnameMAen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceThesisen_ZA
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