Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa

dc.contributor.authorSeekings, Jeremy
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-22T14:09:09Z
dc.date.available2016-05-22T14:09:09Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.date.updated2016-05-22T14:07:15Z
dc.description.abstractThe poor benefit greatly through redistribution through the budget in South Africa: Poor children attend public schools in large numbers and poor households benefit from a public welfare system that is exceptional in comparative terms. Trade unions have championed these apparently pro-poor policies, even though the trade union movement is not a movement of the poor in South Africa (there are very few union members in the poorest half of the population). Trade unions' record in acting as a movement for the poor is shaped by their primary objective of looking after their members' interests. In education, teachers and unions engage with the state as the employer more than as the provider of a social service. Teachers' unions were primarily responsible for securing more expenditure on poor schools in the mid-1 990s, but this was the result of increased salaries. Self-interest has led teachers and their unions to oppose, block or impede some reforms that would improve the quality of schooling for poor children. In welfare reform, trade unions have championed the cause of the basic income grant, which is in the interests of the poor. A close analysis suggests that organised labour is also acting here in part out of self-interest. The socialisation of welfare costs will reduce the burden on working people and would deflect criticism of union-backed policies that, arguably, contribute to an economic growth path characterised by high wages but low employment. In previous work I argued that post- apartheid South Africa entailed a double class compromise, between capital, labour and the poor. The evidence from these areas of social policy suggests that this argument overstated the power of the poor and underestimated that of organised labour.en_ZA
dc.identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262301
dc.identifier.apacitationSeekings, J. (2004). Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa. <i>Review of African Political Economy</i>, http://hdl.handle.net/11427/19756en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationSeekings, Jeremy "Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa." <i>Review of African Political Economy</i> (2004) http://hdl.handle.net/11427/19756en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationSeekings, J. (2004). Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in post-apartheid South Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 31(100), 299-312.en_ZA
dc.identifier.issn0305-6244en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Journal Article AU - Seekings, Jeremy AB - The poor benefit greatly through redistribution through the budget in South Africa: Poor children attend public schools in large numbers and poor households benefit from a public welfare system that is exceptional in comparative terms. Trade unions have championed these apparently pro-poor policies, even though the trade union movement is not a movement of the poor in South Africa (there are very few union members in the poorest half of the population). Trade unions' record in acting as a movement for the poor is shaped by their primary objective of looking after their members' interests. In education, teachers and unions engage with the state as the employer more than as the provider of a social service. Teachers' unions were primarily responsible for securing more expenditure on poor schools in the mid-1 990s, but this was the result of increased salaries. Self-interest has led teachers and their unions to oppose, block or impede some reforms that would improve the quality of schooling for poor children. In welfare reform, trade unions have championed the cause of the basic income grant, which is in the interests of the poor. A close analysis suggests that organised labour is also acting here in part out of self-interest. The socialisation of welfare costs will reduce the burden on working people and would deflect criticism of union-backed policies that, arguably, contribute to an economic growth path characterised by high wages but low employment. In previous work I argued that post- apartheid South Africa entailed a double class compromise, between capital, labour and the poor. The evidence from these areas of social policy suggests that this argument overstated the power of the poor and underestimated that of organised labour. DA - 2004 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town J1 - Review of African Political Economy LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2004 SM - 0305-6244 T1 - Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa TI - Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/19756 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/19756
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305624042000262301
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationSeekings J. Trade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Review of African Political Economy. 2004; http://hdl.handle.net/11427/19756.en_ZA
dc.languageengen_ZA
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentCentre for Social Science Research(CSSR)en_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.sourceReview of African Political Economyen_ZA
dc.source.urihttp://www.tandfonline.com/toc/crea20/current
dc.subject.otherTrade unions
dc.subject.otherSocial policy
dc.subject.otherClass compromise
dc.subject.otherPost-Apartheid
dc.titleTrade unions, social policy & class compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africaen_ZA
dc.typeJournal Articleen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceArticleen_ZA
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