Why CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency service

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dc.contributor.authorBarkan, Joel D.
dc.contributor.authorMattes, Robert
dc.coverage.spatialAfricaen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-01T13:19:04Z
dc.date.available2014-10-01T13:19:04Z
dc.date.issued2014-07-07
dc.description.abstractSince 2002, constituency development funds (CDFs) have been established in nine African countries, and another two countries have created “approximations” of CDFs in that they address the perceived need by members of the legislature for budgeted funds to spend on the development of the districts they represent. Thus, just under one-quarter of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted some type of CDF. In this paper, we consider three alternative explanations for the apparent popularity of CDFs. Using data from the African Legislature Project and Afrobarometer, we find that the best account of the rise of CDFs is that while MP rightly perceive the need to maintain close contact with their constituents, they wrongly believe that their constituents look to them mainly for “pork.” Instead, African constituents’ primary expectations of their MP is that they regularly visit the district to learn what is on their minds, and to then quite literally “re-present” or transmit these views back to the central government via the legislature. In other words, while citizens desire stronger representation of their needs at the centre, MPs respond by delivering services and favours at the periphery (i.e. the district) thinking mistakenly that the CDFs are the answer to what the public wants. We also find little evidence of “good governance” advocates that CDFs lead to increased corruption or entrench MPs in office.en_ZA
dc.identifier.apacitationBarkan, Joel D., & Mattes, R. (2014). <i>Why CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency service</i> (CSSR Working Paper Series ; 337). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Democracy in Africa Research Unit. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7906en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitationBarkan, Joel D., and Robert Mattes <i>Why CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency service.</i> CSSR Working Paper Series ; 337. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Democracy in Africa Research Unit, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7906en_ZA
dc.identifier.citationBarkan, J.D. & R. Mattes. 2014. Why CDFs in Africa?: Representation vs. Constituency Service. CSSR Working Paper No. 337. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.en_ZA
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-77011-324-4en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Working Paper AU - Barkan, Joel D. AU - Mattes, Robert AB - Since 2002, constituency development funds (CDFs) have been established in nine African countries, and another two countries have created “approximations” of CDFs in that they address the perceived need by members of the legislature for budgeted funds to spend on the development of the districts they represent. Thus, just under one-quarter of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted some type of CDF. In this paper, we consider three alternative explanations for the apparent popularity of CDFs. Using data from the African Legislature Project and Afrobarometer, we find that the best account of the rise of CDFs is that while MP rightly perceive the need to maintain close contact with their constituents, they wrongly believe that their constituents look to them mainly for “pork.” Instead, African constituents’ primary expectations of their MP is that they regularly visit the district to learn what is on their minds, and to then quite literally “re-present” or transmit these views back to the central government via the legislature. In other words, while citizens desire stronger representation of their needs at the centre, MPs respond by delivering services and favours at the periphery (i.e. the district) thinking mistakenly that the CDFs are the answer to what the public wants. We also find little evidence of “good governance” advocates that CDFs lead to increased corruption or entrench MPs in office. DA - 2014-07-07 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2014 SM - 978-1-77011-324-4 T1 - Why CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency service TI - Why CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency service UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7906 ER - en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11427/7906
dc.identifier.vancouvercitationBarkan Joel D, Mattes R. Why CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency service. 2014 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7906en_ZA
dc.languageengen_ZA
dc.publisher.departmentDemocracy in Africa Research Uniten_ZA
dc.publisher.facultyFaculty of Humanitiesen_ZA
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Cape Town
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSSR Working Paper Series ; 337en_ZA
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subject.lcshRepresentative government and representationen_ZA
dc.subject.lcshEconomic development projectsen_za
dc.subject.lcshAfrica--Politics and governmenten_ZA
dc.titleWhy CDFs in Africa?: representation vs. constituency serviceen_ZA
dc.typeWorking Paperen_ZA
uct.type.filetypeText
uct.type.filetypeImage
uct.type.publicationResearchen_ZA
uct.type.resourceWorking paperen_ZA
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