

The Middle Kingdom in Africa: A quantitative study of support for the
China model.

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Abstract

This paper provides a quantitative empirical study of support for the China model in Africa. Using comprehensive and previously unpublished data from Afrobarometer's sixth round (2014-2016) the paper offers the first large-n (n= 46741) multicountry (n=31) empirical evaluation of support for the Chinese model of development. The paper is structured around two research questions. First, what is the rate of preference in Africa for the China model? Second, what are the determinants that underlie this preference?

The China model is a contested construct. An extended literature review is therefore employed to establish where the construct fits within existing literature and then identify the key features that can be measured by my model. The pursuing analysis has two main sections; one descriptive and one explanatory. The descriptive section seeks to establish what the rate of support for the China model is in Africa. This section also provides a summary of sentiments in Africa towards the Chinese engagement. This summary of sentiments is included for two reasons. Firstly, because no consensus exists on the tonality of sentiments towards China in Africa this topic is of interest in and of itself. Secondly, because, as the model will show, these attitudes are intimately linked to respondent likelihood of choosing the China model for development.

The explanatory section utilizes a multilevel regression model to explore why Africans pick the Chinese model over other development models. The regression employs a broad set of variables on individual priorities for development, values on democracy and views on the Chinese engagement in the respondents own country. At the national level the model includes measures on country characteristics such as development level and regime type. The model also investigates the effect of an aggregate Chinese 'footprint' in individual African nations. This footprint consists of Chinese trade, foreign direct investment and development assistance. The data on Chinese FDI and AID is collected from innovative open-source research projects based in the United States.

The paper finds considerable support for the China model in Africa. China was the second most popular choice of development model after the United States. In ten of the surveyed countries it was the dominant choice. The descriptive section finds that Africans are on average positive towards the Chinese engagement on the continent. The multilevel regression model finds that respondents who offer positive evaluations of China's engagement in their own country are much more likely to choose the Chinese model for development. Individual values on democracy and individual preferences on development are not found to influence choice of development model. The likelihood of respondents choosing the Chinese model decreases as a country's level of development increases. Respondents nested within freer societies are, surprisingly, more likely to choose the Chinese model of development. Increased Chinese presence in the form of aid and foreign direct investment is found to make respondents less likely to choose the China model. While increased imports from China increases the chance that respondents will choose China as their model for their country's development.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world.

Napoleon Bonaparte on China

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting

Sun Tzu

1.0 Introduction

China's growing presence in Africa has raised both concern and enthusiasm. It has sparked a debate sprinkled with fancy terms such as neo-colonialism, Beijing consensus, soft power and world systems. In Africa China represents an alternative approach to development and aid. At times the country takes a contrary stance to Western donors and arguably undermines their efforts to promote good governance and democracy on the continent. The so-called China model¹ has become a popular catchphrase for a broad set of policies that goes against the established Washington Consensus. The Chinese approach is put forth as an alternate path to modernity and development. But, if some commentators are to be believed, its popularity is a direct threat to Africa's future as it undercuts progress made over the past decades.

This paper provides the first ever empirical evaluation of preference for the China model of development in Africa. It is structured around two fairly simple research questions. Firstly, what is the rate of preference in Africa for the China model? Second, what are the determinants that underlie this preference? The paper uses previously unpublished data from the Afrobarometer survey to measure individual Africans' support for the Chinese model. Multilevel modeling techniques are utilized to root out explanatory factors at both individual and national level. A broad set of data has been collected to measure the national level variables. The paper offers an analysis of impact of factors such as regime type, development level and the national level footprint of the Chinese engagement measured through aid, foreign direct investment and Chinese imports. The use of multilevel modeling techniques

¹ The paper uses China model, Chinese model and Chinese model of development interchangeably. Please see section 1.1 for discussion around defining a distinct Chinese model for development.

allows for an exploration of effect of both macro and micro level variables, as well as the synergy between them.


While the questions raised by this paper are straightforward the implications of the answers to them are complex. Empirical finding such as these hold potential consequences for both literature on the so-called China model, for the debate on the Chinese engagement in Africa, and for the discussion around China's rising soft power.

Chapter one of the paper is structured as a broad literature review and it outlines current scholarship on the Chinese model and shows its origins within international relations debates. The chapter situates this paper within the larger body of literature on shifting power within international relations, soft power and African development. Lastly the chapter explores how the rise of the China-model holds consequences for African development and how it relates directly to rivaling theories of modernization. Chapter two goes through the research questions, presents the model, hypotheses and method for testing these hypotheses. Chapter three outlines the findings to my descriptive questions and displays the level of support for the China model in Africa. Importantly, the chapter also provides an overview over African sentiments towards China. This is done for two reasons. Firstly, no consensus exists on the tonality of African sentiments towards China. These findings are therefore interesting in and of themselves. Second, as the paper will show; sentiments towards Chinese intervention in individual countries are intimately connected with respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model of development. Chapter four discusses the results of the modeling and how we should interpret the multilevel logistic regression model. Chapter five discusses the impact of the papers findings on the study of China's engagement in Africa, the notion of an alternative Chinese model of development and the China's soft power on the continent. The paper then ends with a brief summary.

1.1 Problem and literature review

This paper is exploring unknown territory. No article has previously empirically measured support for the China model in Africa. The study of a unique Chinese development model is not established within Political Science and while it has received some attention as a separate development paradigm in International Relations and International Political Economy there has been relatively few papers written on the topic. So while the China model has become a

popular topic for discussion, no consensus exists on what it is. Often the China model is defined by what it is not, a version of the Western modernization paradigm, rather than what it is. Nor for that matter is there any agreement over what theoretical framework should be used to analyze it. This necessitates a lengthy literature review that ties the dots together and places the China model within a broader scope of literature. The review explains how the seemingly relativistic China model can be broken into components that we can test in the regression model outlined in the research design section (chapter two).



Think of this literature review like an inverted pyramid; it shows how the debate around the China model fits with the ‘big picture’ debate of shifting power within international relations. In particular it will demonstrate how the model belongs within the realm of soft power. The review will show that the discourse and debate

around the Chinese model emerged from the literature on rising Chinese soft power. Arguments over the China model’s impact in African are in essence discussions on how growing Chinese soft power shapes the African development trajectory. A summary of the rapidly expanding role of China in African development is therefore included. After establishing where the paper belongs within the broader body of literature it will review the limited research that has been done on public perception in Africa towards the Chinese intervention on the continent. The chapter ends by pinpointing the exact contribution of this paper within the much broader debate outlined above.

Big picture

China’s engagement in Africa can be seen at a number of levels of abstraction; from a global macro trend to a process manifested in individual actors. Hailed by some as one the most important geopolitical developments on the African continent since the end of the Cold War² it has attracted great attention from international relations scholars and analysts. It is treated like one of the hot potatoes in global affairs. The questions are many and exceedingly difficult to answer. Are we faced a new scramble for Africa and a second era of colonialism? Or is this

² Alden, Oliveira, *China Returns to Africa: Anatomy of Expansive Engagement*, Working Paper. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/c2621b804f018b31b083f43170baead1/WP-51_Alden-Large-SoaresdeOliveira_China_Africa_Engagement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
 Large, *Beyond ‘Dragon in the Bush’: The Study of China-Africa Relations*, African Affairs, 2008

a win-win relationship among equal partners? Is China advancing its own development paradigm? And is it shaping Africa in its authoritarian image? ³

China, Africa and future world order

A key reason for our lacking ability to answer these questions has been political sciences inability to understand the Middle Kingdom. China's rise and rapid advancement on the global stage collides head on with some of the key ideas developed by the political science discipline over the past decades. The country and its political system simply does not fit with most preexisting models. China is on the move and developing quicker than most have anticipated. But along the route to 'modernity and prosperity' it is avoiding some of the mandatory add-ons that development was supposed to entail. Despite predictions by leading scholars of China succumbing to democracy after the Tiananmen Square uprisings, China did not get swept away by democratizations 'third wave'.⁴ While regime theory stipulates that authoritarian systems are inherently unstable, China is not brink of chaos. Rather, we seem to be witnessing an expression of authoritarian resilience. Over the past fifty years, scholars have disputed totalitarian regimes ability to adapt to modernity. China seemingly can. It has proven that an authoritarian state not only can scrape by in the modern world, it can prosper. China may be a unique case, but as Andrew Nathan highlights there may also be a more disturbing possibility; "that authoritarianism is a viable regime form even under conditions of advanced modernization and integration with the global economy."⁵ Much of the concern around the China model relates to fears that China might spread its authoritarian system to the world.

Critically, the authoritarian system in China is not static. Rather, it evolves to meet the changing political landscape. Andrew Mertha has shown how more actors have gained influence in the policy making process in China under the label *Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0*.⁶ There is seemingly no regime revolt occurring, rather a slow evolution of the current rule under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Despite the worry of some commentators of

³ For examples see:

Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa*, Polity Press 2011

Moyo, *Winner Take All: China's Race for Resources and What it Means for the World*, Basic Books, 2012

The Economist, *The New Colonialists*, March 2008

Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/10853534>

⁴ For an example see multi-author symposium on Chinese democracy in *Journal of Democracy*, January 1998

⁵ Nathan, *Authoritarian Resilience*, *Journal of Democracy*, vol 14, no 1, 2003

⁶ Mertha, "Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0": *Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process*, *China Quarterly*, Vol 200, 2009

China's immanent collapse,⁷ China INC is seemingly running quite well. Notwithstanding a drop in economic growth ('only' to around seven percent a year) the country has yet to tear itself apart in social revolt.

China then represents a problem, or put more kindly an exception to the rule, for deterministically minded social scientists. Seemly we are have not faced with "the end of history" and the conclusion of "mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" according to Fukuyama.⁸ Rather we are faced with an alternative way of development and possibly even an alternative world system.

China's rise brings uncertainty for global strategists and worry over whether China will be a status quo power or a revisionist state that challenges the existing world order. As highlighted by Andrew Nathan there is growing concern that as China's powers grow, it will strive to "remake the world in its authoritarian image."⁹ China, in this respect represents a challenge to the existing world order. The country is already asserting a more confident image, be that in its actions in its backyard in the South China Sea, or at the levels of international organizations with the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. While China at present does not pose a direct threat to the established world system and its foreign policy according to Nathan remains "essentially defensive", there is no guarantee that it will remain so in the future.¹⁰ If the risk analysts at Eurasia Group are to be believed China will soon go from being a free-rider and rule-taker within the international system to being a confident rule-maker. A country that asserts its responsibly, but also claims its rights.¹¹ China's policy of regime-type neutrality and non-intervention in other states domestic affairs may well change if its strategic position is enhanced. Nathan points out that while China at present is not actively seeking to promote authoritarian rule, its existence and success might still place it as a form of role model and in a supporter position for an authoritarian alternative to democratic rule and development.¹²

⁷ Shambaugh, *The coming Chinese crack up*, Wall Street Journal, March 2015. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198>

⁸ Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*, Penguin, 1992

⁹ Nathan, *China's Challenge*, Journal of Democracy, Vol 26, no 1, 2015


¹⁰ Nathan, *China's Challenge*, Journal of Democracy, Vol 26, no 1, 2015

¹¹ Eurasia Group, *Top Risks 2016*, Available at:

<http://corporate.eurasiagroup.net/item-files/Top%20Risks%202016%20FINAL.pdf>

¹² Nathan, *China's Challenge*, Journal of Democracy, Vol 26, no 1, 2015

China as the new superpower?



Source: PEW 2015 Spring Attitudes Survey

At its greatest level of abstraction some see China’s engagement in Africa as part of a larger rivalry for global dominance between the United States and China.¹³

Building on ideas put forth by international relations scholars such as John Mearsheimer, who predicts that China cannot rise peacefully, they argue that China will inevitably end up in competition with the United States.¹⁴ This understanding frames Chinese influence in Africa, and rest of the world, according to a zero-sum game where what China gains of influence, the American’s lose. According to this line of thinking, China’s engagement in Africa holds huge potential consequences for geopolitics and future world order. A somewhat simplistic understanding would be that China fuels its rise and economic growth on African resources.

According to the Ian Bremmer, China is the only country in the world that truly has a global strategy; a strategy directly

¹³ Nesbitt, *American vs China in Africa*, *Asia Times* (Online), December 7th 2011 Available at: <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ML07Ad03.html>

¹⁴ Mearsheimer, *Why China’s Rise will not be peaceful*, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf> Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton and Company, 2001

challenges the US led world order.¹⁵ Whether or not one believes that China will rule the world¹⁶, one does not need a far stretch of the imagination to see the country represents a considerable challenge to the existing world system on certain key areas. It presents an alternative economic model, what Bremmer calls state-capitalism. It promotes an alternative value and philosophical outlook based on Confucian ideas.¹⁷ It is a shining beacon of authoritarian success. And importantly, it represents an alternative method of development that seemingly goes directly against the established Western development agenda.

Power

Deeply intertwined to discussions around the future of the world system is the debate around power and growing Chinese influence. A vital component of the discussions revolving around China's engagement in Africa is an argument over whether the engagement represents a fundamental shift in international power relations. While China is yet to rival the United States in military might its economy has, despite the present cool-down, grown by double digits for more than two decades. This has led many to predict that China will soon overtake the US as the world's dominant economy.¹⁸ China is at present recognised as a partial power when it comes to the classic metrics of state influence. International relations scholars stress however that dollars and tanks are not everything when it comes to accumulating power. While China is making measurable advances in economic and military power, an increasing body of literature is also focusing on an area where China is perceived to have an Achilles Heel; soft power. China's rise an alternative and the discourse around global power transitions is as much a result of growing Chinese soft power as it is the country's economic or military muscle.

Joseph Nye coined the term soft power in the 1990s and defines it as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, eliciting positive

¹⁵ Bremmer, *Superpower; Three Choices for America's Role in the World*, Penguin, 2015

Bremmer: “Only one country with a global strategy”


Available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/only-one-country-with-global-strategy-2015-5>

¹⁶ Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, Sec. Edit, Penguin Group, 2012

¹⁷ Inglehart, Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Cambridge University Press, 2005

¹⁸ The Economist on the many predictions for China's economy. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/17733177>

attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”¹⁹ Soft power then is the power of attraction. It is the ability to shape actions through the attractiveness of your values and your way of life. Shuan Breslin writing for Chatham House on the rise of Chinese soft power offered a more politics relevant definition of soft power as “the idea that others will align themselves to you and your policy preferences because they are attracted to your political and social system, values and policies.”²⁰ In other words, if you have the ability to attract you have the ability to get the outcomes that you want within the international arena. Nye argues that soft power has become increasingly important in the 21st century. Globalization and the growing influence of information technology means that soft power has increased in relative importance to hard power.²¹



From: Nye. *The Future of Power*, 2011

The increasing importance of soft power and the fact that soft power can lead to hard gains is not lost on Chinese decision makers. China is investing heavily in its soft power. It was raised to presidential level in 2008 when Hu Jintou stressed the importance of strengthening Chinese appeal around the globe. President Xi has echoed the call for increasing China’s soft power.²² According to David Shambaugh China is trying to buy their way to soft power and investing billions dollars a year with an expectation of getting a return.²³ The Beijing Olympics and world-wide spread of Confucius Centers should therefore be seen as part of a wider strategy to raise the country’s appeal. Soft power has become a crucial component of Chinese overseas strategy. Joshua Kurlantzick highlights how China is now using soft power as an active

¹⁹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, 2011

The concept was established by Joseph Nye in:

Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, 1990

Further developed in:

Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, 2004

²⁰ Breslin, *The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of Governance?*, *International Affairs*, 87, 2011

²¹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, 2011

²² Nye, *The Limits of Chinese Soft Power*, Project Syndicate, June 2015. Available at:

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-civil-society-nationalism-soft-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-07>

²³ Shambaugh, *China’s Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect*, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2015

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push>

foreign policy tool.²⁴ This is partly due to a generational change within the Chinese leadership. The fifth generation of rulers under Xi Jinping, are less technocratic than their predecessors. While previous generations of Chinese leaders have come from engineering and natural science backgrounds, large parts of the current Politburo have advanced degrees from the humanities. As Andrew Scobell outlines, this puts them in a better position to recognize that goals can be reached by employing the synergies between hard and soft power.²⁵

The contours of a distinct Chinese model can be seen in official policy statements. As China grows more influential on the international stage more attention is given to its expressions of vision and sense of self. Xi Jinping's articulation of a 'Chinese Dream' gained widespread coverage in Western media. The Chinese Dream is a collection of policy objectives with the intended goal of advancing China's standing as a world power through increases in prosperity, promotion of social stability and ensuring a higher quality of life for citizens.²⁶ China's campaign for soft power is part of a larger project to internationalize the voice of China in order for it to spread into popular consciousness and influence policy makers attempting to weigh the consequences of China's rise. Breslin sees it as an "attempt to promote a preferred Chinese idea of what China is and what it stands for, including an emphasis on the historical roots of current thinking, identity-formation and policy design to correct misconceptions among overseas audience about Chinese motivations and intentions."²⁷

Some observers, like Scobell, argue that China's soft power is limited as the country suffers severe drawbacks to its appeal due to its poor standing on human rights, limited cultural exports and its conflicts with Tibet and Taiwan.²⁸ Prominent international relations scholars contend that China cannot rival the United States when it comes to soft power due to the inconsistencies of its domestic political system. Joseph Nye reasons that the country will never be a soft super power until we "see real changes in China's domestic political

²⁴ Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, Yale University Press, 2007

²⁵ Scobell, *Introduction*, in: Scobell(edit) and Mantas (edit), *China's Great Leap Outward; Hard and Soft Dimensions of a Rising Power*, Academy of Political Science, 2014

²⁶ Chase et al, *China, Inside and Out: A Collection of Essays on Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Xi Jinping Era*, RAND Corporation, 2015

²⁷ Breslin, *The Soft Notion of China's 'Soft Power'*, Chatham House Asia Programme Paper, 2011


²⁸ Scobell, *Introduction*, in: Scobell(edit) and Mantas (edit), *China's Great Leap Outward; Hard and Soft Dimensions of a Rising Power*, Academy of Political Science, 2014

system.”²⁹ These scholars make the assumption that soft power somehow will be capped for countries that are undemocratic or have a poor human rights record, a notion that will later be challenged by the findings of the paper.

A problem for soft power enthusiasts is that it is a difficult enterprise to weight and measure it. How much soft power does a country have? Is it possible to measure any form of power before it is applied and results in a change in behavior? Although we cannot definitively weigh an entity of soft power that is floating around in the cosmos we can attempt to estimate it through proxies.³⁰ One way of measuring soft power, as frequently used by Nye, is to look at opinion poll data. If survey data from PEW is to be believed, China is making soft power headway in Africa. Key insights from PEW’s 2015 Spring Global Attitudes Survey is not just that the world believes that China will surpass the United States. China also receives generally favourable views around the world. The most favourable assessments are found in African countries where China is seemingly getting great soft power returns to their investments.

African countries surveyed by PEW provide particularly favourable ratings, with median of 70, the highest of the continents surveyed. However, the survey has somewhat of a limited scope, as PEW only reached nine African countries (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda).³¹ Afrobarometer data used in

Medians with a favorable view of China



Source: PEW 2015 Spring Attitudes Survey

²⁹ Carnegie Council address by Joseph Nye, February 10th 2011. See transcript available at: <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20110210/index.html>

³⁰ See for example the Global Soft Power Rankings produced by the Institute for Government (UK). Uses a very large amount of metrics including expert panels and surveys. Their 2012 report ranks China as number 22, after small countries like Sweden, Norway and Belgium. Available at: <http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-work/better-policy-making/foreign-policy-soft-power-and-national-security>

³¹ PEW Spring 2015 Global Attitudes Survey. Full data access: <http://www.pewresearch.org/data/> China results available at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/2-views-of-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/#poor-marks-for-china-on-human-rights>

this paper will offer us a more comprehensive sampling (n=31).

While support for China is seemingly high in developing states, analysts differ on what sources that drive these positive evaluations. Shaun Breslin notes that China's rise as an alternate economic trading partner appears to be "the major source of attraction" for other developing countries. However, he notes that it is challenging to separate out what are hard material factors such as economic support and trade from "softer attraction to values and worldviews."³² In other words, it is difficult to establish whether China's positive evaluations (and thereby presumably its soft power) stems from the country's actions and hard exchange of trade and aid rather than attraction to their way of life. The papers use of multilevel modelling will address whether it is the Chinese footprint in hard material terms or individual values that determines respondents support for the China model.

The emergence of the China model literature

Notions of Chinese soft power are intimately linked to the rise of the China model-discourse in academic literature. As Breslin outlines, early impressions of Chinese model were often intertwined and connected "by those who saw the emergence of Chinese ideas and practices that might reconfigure power relationships in such a way as to undermine the position of the United States in East Asia and Africa, and ultimately to challenge both the political (liberal democratic) and economic (neo-liberal) bases of the global order."³³ One of the greatest alarmists on the rise of the China-model, Stephan Halper, warns us that the greater Chinese ambition is to construct a "network of likeminded states that challenges the West not militarily and economically, but conceptually and politically."³⁴ The rise of the China-model is seen as a product of rising of Chinese soft power. As Matt Ferchen notes on the rise of the China-model-discourse; rivalry amongst "economic models is a battle of political ideologies".³⁵ Political ideologies are firmly placed within the realm of soft power. So while

³² Breslin, *The Soft Notion of China's 'Soft Power'*, Chatham House Asia Programme Paper, 2011

³³ Breslin, *The 'China model' and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of Governance?*, International Affairs, 87, 2011

³⁴ Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, Basic Books, 2010

³⁵ Ferchen, *Whose China Model is it anyway? The contentious search for consensus*, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 20, 2013

the China-model question primarily digs into the preference for and popularity of the Chinese method for development this is underlined by a growth of Chinese soft power. If the model is popular, one can see it as a proxy for rising Chinese soft power in Africa. This is by no means purely an academic excise. Top level American officials have made voiced concern over how the Chinese model of state capitalism is used as an instrument of soft power in Africa.³⁶

Before I dissect the China model into its various components, a brief discussion on the discourse is needed. Firstly, it should be made clear that no consensus exists around what the China model is, or what policy recommendations it entails. Secondly, while the idea of a Chinese development model has become a popular theme in academic literature and a frequent topic for discussion in the world opinion pages, there is great disagreement around whether there actually is such a thing as a ‘China-model’. The following section will show that despite the seeming relativism of the concept key analytical features can be extracted, operationalized and measured.

There have been several attempts at capturing a distinct Chinese development model on paper. Perhaps the most influential articulation was the ‘Beijing Consensus’. The notion of a ‘Beijing Consensus’, as an alternative to the Western led ‘Washington Consensus’, was given flight by Joshua Ramo in his 2004 essay for the Foreign Policy Center. In it he described a Chinese model for development that involves a "commitment to innovation and constant experimentation."³⁷ Ramo’s version of the China model is one that places China in a new position within the international system. He sees China as making a path for other developing nations that make them truly independent. Importantly, it offers an alternative route to modernity that does not go through the hurdle filled track established by the Washington Consensus. Ramo describes the Beijing Consensus as simply three theorems; the value of innovation, new measures of progress like “quality of life” rather than GDP, and above all stability. In this form the ‘Beijing-way’ is much closer to Deng Xiaoping’s “groping for stones to cross the river”, rather than Milton Freedman’s shock policy.

While Ramo struck a popular cord, the notion that China represents an entirely different approach to development has received harsh criticism by China scholars. Shaun Breslin has criticized the components of the Chinese model highlighted by Ramo as aspirations and ideals

³⁶ Wall Street Journal, *In Africa, U.S. Watches China’s Rise*, September 2011. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903392904576510271838147248>

³⁷ Ramo, *Beijing Consensus*, Foreign Policy Centre 2004

rather than true depictions of the Chinese experience and development practice.³⁸ Scott Kennedy debunked Ramo's concept as the 'myth of the Beijing Consensus'. "Although ambitious", Kennedy writes "the original conception of the BC is not up to the task of being a worthwhile competitor" to the established Washington Consensus. This is not due to the Western approaches' superiority or worthiness, but rather because the Beijing Consensus as formulated by Ramo is a "misguided and inaccurate summary of China's actual reform experience." While Kennedy notes that there are elements of the Chinese development experience that merits close study, they do not add up to a distinct development alternative. He also highlights that there is little evidence that the Chinese decision makers themselves believe that there is such a thing as the Beijing Consensus. Viewed as a foreign creation, Chinese leaders have not yet embraced the idea of a Beijing Consensus and have therefore not promoted it actively as an ideological alternative.³⁹ ⁴⁰ Matt Ferchen writing on the Beijing Consensus literature stresses the importance of not seeing the Chinese political system as a monolithic entity. The Chinese development experience is varied both across regions within China and across time.⁴¹

Thereby, the notion put forth by Ramo that China has a complete development package ready for export is at best controversial. However, as Breslin argues the existence of a 'China model' may not be dependent on it offering a comprehensive blueprint for development. Rather it may lie in the fact that it has become a metaphor for 'different'. Despite all the inconsistencies "China provides an important example of an alternative to the neo-liberal project that had come to dominate developmental discourse in the first part of the millennium." In this respect, what the China model is and whether it truly represents the Chinese development experience is less important than what it is not. "It feeds into, and is itself fed by, an emerging sense of 'Chinese exceptionalism' – an idea that China is fundamentally different from other countries, with some sort of global duty and responsibility

³⁸ Breslin, *The 'China model' and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of Governance?*, *International Affairs*, 87, 2011

³⁹ Kennedy, *The myth of the Beijing Consensus*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol 65, 2010, pp. 461–77

⁴⁰ Chinese leaders appear so reluctant to promote an explicit alternative that the Economist wrote that the Beijing Consensus is to keep quiet about the Beijing Consensus.

The Economist, *The Beijing Consensus is to keep quiet*, May 2010. Available at:

<http://www.economist.com/node/16059990>

⁴¹ Ferchen, *Whose China Model is it anyway? The contentious search for consensus*, *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 20, 2013

to promote an alternative to the dominant global order.”⁴² In this respect, the Chinese model exists regardless of whether it truly represents a complete alternative to the Western led development agenda. Ideas matter, even if they do not represent absolute truth or accurately reflect historical reality. As Joseph Nye has eloquently illustrated, people’s perceptions can translate from a soft power resource into hard impact. Framing the way people view their world can have very real implications. Ramo was not blind to this effect. Although he never writes the words soft power, he argues that China is “building the greatest asymmetric superpower the world has ever seen, a nation that relies less on traditional tools of power projection than any in history and leads instead by the electric power of its example and the bluff impact of size.”⁴³

The authoritarian alternative

Despite the seeming relativism of the concept, the literature around the Chinese development model contains key building blocks that make up the foundation of the model. One is the authoritarian and state driven path to development. As Andrew Nathan has alerted us to, China is a role model for and supporter of authoritarian regimes.⁴⁴ Martin Jacques states that China has "obvious appeal" among the more authoritarian governments of the world.⁴⁵ As discussed in the introduction, China's ability to deliver staggering levels of economic growth while at the same time remaining controlled by a single party defies the predictions of development theory and sends a powerful message those who see democracy as prerequisite for modernity. Bruce Bueno de Mesquite and George Downs point out that China has demonstrated to the world that a state can enjoy the benefits of economic development and at the same time steer clear of political liberalization.⁴⁶

China’s spectacular rise and its new role as development partner for pre-industrialized societies puts the China model it right at the center of the international development debate. The Chinese experience provides an important clue for the “chicken and egg question” of international development; the primacy of economic growth vs governance and democracy. The debate boils down to two central questions: What comes first (known as the problem of

⁴² Breslin, The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of Governance?, *International Affairs*, 87, 2011

⁴³ Ramo, *Beijing Consensus*, Foreign Policy Centre 2004

⁴⁴ Andrew Nathan, *China’s Challenge*, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 26, no 1, 2015

⁴⁵ Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, Sec. Edit, Penguin Group, 2012 , page 426

⁴⁶ de Mesquita, Downs, *Development and Democracy*, *Foreign Affairs*, 84, 2005

sequencing)? And what is the link between regime type and economic growth? Western donors and researchers have argued that there exists a link between democratic rule and economic prosperity and, as a result, they have tied African aid funds to programs that promote governance and political liberalization.⁴⁷ These programs are intellectually supported by the theories of academics like Joseph Siegle, Michael Weinstein and Morton Halperin who promote the notion of democracy first, development later. They argue that democratic transitions should be supported prior to economic expansion in developing states as democracies consistently outclass non-democracies on most metrics of economic and social well-being.⁴⁸ To these scholars China's actions in Africa may represent a problem. The Middle Kingdom has a poor track record when it comes to promoting good governance. Arguably it is undermining some of the effort made by Western donors by providing an alternative for regimes that would otherwise be forced to bow to Western adjustment programs.⁴⁹

However, causal relationships are difficult to identify within the social sciences and it might be that the link between democracy and economic prosperity happens in reverse. Modernization theorists like Seymour Lipset and Ronald Inglehart argue that economic development proceeds democratic rule.⁵⁰ For scholars who propose that modernisation and economic development pave the way for democracy, China might be good news for Africa as long as it leads to long term economic development.

Authoritarian control stretches beyond restrictions on electoral and civil rights; it also implies a specific type of economic governance. The Middle Kingdom is promoting a new economic policy that mixes market and state. The Chinese concept of a managed economy is clearly expressed in president Wen Jiabao's 2008 interview with Fareed Zakaria:

⁴⁷ Brown, *Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa*, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol 17, No 2, 2005

⁴⁸ Siegle, Weinstein, Halperin, *Why Democracies Excel*, Foreign Affairs 8, 2004

⁴⁹ Thompson, China's Soft Power in Africa: From the "Beijing Consensus" to health diplomacy, China Brief, Vol 5, 2005

⁵⁰ Lipset, *Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*, American Political Science Review, 53, 1959

Inglehart, Welzel, *How Development leads to Democracy*, Foreign Affairs, April 2009, Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-03-01/how-development-leads-democracy>

“We have one important piece of experience of the past thirty years, that is to ensure that both the visible hand and invisible hand are given full play in regulating the market forces.”⁵¹

This approach is different from untethered capitalism promoted by the U.S. and different from the centralized planned economy of the old Soviet Republic. In his book *The End of the Free Market*, Ian Bremmer argues that “authoritarian governments everywhere have learned to compete internationally by embracing market driven capitalism.” However, if authoritarian states completely resolve their hold over the economy, then market forces will decide winners and losers from economic growth. In the long run, they would risk enabling those who might use wealth to challenge political power. Authoritarian governments, such as China, have consequently invented a form of hybrid regime, or new state capitalism, which allows for the use of the economy for political purposes. This will sound very familiar to China observers who have illustrated how politics, party and business are tightly knitted in the Middle Kingdom.⁵² Bremmer sees China as the world’s foremost practitioner of state capitalism. He argues that the system of state-capitalism would have posed a far potent threat had it not been for China’s explosive growth and economic dynamism. In this sense free-market capitalism is being undermined by the Chinese model of economic governance.⁵³

This approach to economic growth is also reflected in Chinese ventures abroad. In Africa Chinese private and public investments are often difficult to separate and the Chinese model for development assistance may include a mix of private and public efforts.⁵⁴ To Bremmer it represents a potential cause of friction within the international system. Importantly the use of state-capitalism is inherently political. It is a “form of bureaucratically engineered capitalism...a system in which the state dominates markets primarily for political gain.”⁵⁵ Free market defenders therefore see China’s hybrid system as a direct challenge to the existing economic order and as inefficient system that creates non-Pareto optimal outcomes. They also recognize that while the long term economic effects may be negative, the short term

⁵¹ See CNN Transcript

Available at: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0809/28/fzgps.01.html>

⁵² McGregor, *The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers*, Penguin Books, 2012

Kurlantzick, *Why the ‘China Model’ isn’t going away*, The Atlantic, March 2013. Available at:

<http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-the-china-model-isnt-going-away/274237/>

⁵³ Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, Portfolio Penguin Group, 2011

⁵⁴ Strauss, Saavedra, *Introduction: China, Africa and Internationalization*, The China Quarterly, Vol 199, 2009

Brautigam, *The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Oxford University Press, 2010

⁵⁵ Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, Portfolio Penguin Group, 2011

temptation for leaders in the developing world may be substantial. In this respect the proliferation of the Chinese development model and China's growing presence and influence abroad represents a considerable challenge to the existing capitalist order.

It is important to note that not all scholars share this notion that China bringing something new and different. Randall Peerenboom has an experience of “deja vu all over again”. China’s development pattern he argues is not all that unique.⁵⁶ State developmentalism has previously been a model for country development in other Asian societies such as South Korea and Taiwan. Shaun Breslin finds that it is ahistorical to see the Chinese model as such a deviation from the norm when it shares similarities to previous Asian models and even earlier American and European state-guided systems of development.⁵⁷

However despite this, the discourse presents China as new alternative. The media enjoys presenting China as something new and different. It may be ahistorical, but perceptions do not necessarily reflect reality. For developing countries China offers an alternative path to modernity. It is an alternative to the Western lead system of international development and an alternative to the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ and its neo-liberal route to prosperity. And the debate around the best approach to development has accelerated in the wake of the global financial crisis.⁵⁸

Essence of a China model

The discussion above illustrates that while a concept of a China model may be too relativistic to define the specific policy recommendations for development two key features can be identified: authoritarianism and promotion of economic growth over governance.

This paper theorizes that there is a link between this narrative and individual preferences. This can be tested with the survey data. Firstly, we can investigate the link between priorities for development and choice of development model. China is on the whole seen as great economic trading partner for Africa; a partner that does business and builds infrastructure for any country regardless of regime type. Conversely, respondents are also likely to know that China deals with any partner without any conditionality attached to democratic reform. If

⁵⁶ Peerenboom, *China Modernizes: Threat to the West of Model for the Rest?*, Oxford University Press, 2008

⁵⁷ Breslin, Shuan, *The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of Governance?*, *International Affairs*, 87, 2011

⁵⁸ Breslin, Shuan, *The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of Governance?*, *International Affairs*, 87, 2011

respondents attach great relevance to governance they are less likely to be attracted by the Chinese model of development. Questions from the Afrobarometer allow me to probe whether those who find governance to be a priority are less likely to choose the Chinese model. On the other hand we can investigate whether respondents who say that economic growth is a priority are more prone to choosing the China-model for development. Value questions on democracy and authoritarian rule included in the questionnaire allows us to investigate the link between values and choice of development model. What country do respondents who value democracy and human rights choose as model for their country's development? Certainly, if China is the authoritarian alternative we expect respondents who value democratic rights and rule to be less likely to point to China as a model for their country. Furthermore, the paper investigates whether respondents more likely to choose the Chinese model if they come from an authoritarian country.

The importance of unlocking answers to these questions is underlined by the growing impact that China has on African development. As the next section demonstrates, there is little doubt that China will play a critical role for the future of Africa. Wide spread support for the Chinese model can alter the trajectory of development for the continent.

China's role in African development

The debate over the Chinese model and its impact comes at a crucial time. China is playing an ever more important role in Africa and many experts believe that the continent is at a tipping point. While academic haggle over what constitutes a development model China is rapidly increasing its presence in Africa and playing an ever more important role for the future of the continent.⁵⁹

The Chinese faith in a strong central government, one that yields control over both the political realm and the market, affects the country's approach to development. China's engagement in Africa challenges the narrative on modernization, the role of aid and the future of the African continent. African leaders look to China for more than just trade and investment; they look to China for guidance. African decision makers want to learn from the Chinese experience and replicate its success. As an example, the South African government has sent delegations to China to study the use of Special Economic Zones and how these can

⁵⁹ This paper focuses primarily on the political effects of the increased Chinese participation. A considerable body of literature exists also sub-fields such as environmental consequences.

be implemented to aid African industrial development.⁶⁰ According to research by Deborah Brautigam, China has invested in at least seven of these "economic and trade cooperation zones" spread out in six African countries.⁶¹ On a global scale China is asserting a more influential position in international development and promoting a shared vision for growth along with the other BRICS nations. Xi Jinping asserted the more active Chinese role during the 2013 BRICS summit in Durban South Africa.

*“We should jointly participate in the setting of international development agenda, fully harness the productivity and material resources accumulated in the past, fulfil the UN Millennium Development Goals, narrow the North-South gap in development, and make global development more balanced”.*⁶²

For African countries this offers a strong ally in the fight against poverty and underdevelopment. Zhang Chun highlights how China and Africa have converging long term visions for development. Xi's '*Chinese dream*' and the African Unions '*Agenda 2063*' share overlapping policy positions and shared goals.⁶³

The growing African interest in the Chinese experience comes at a key moment in history. Analysts are predicting an African boom and renaissance. The headlines are turning. From being the Economist's hopeless and lost continent it is now the hopeful and rising continent.⁶⁴ The most positive observers are predicting that the *Next Africa* will change the way people think about the continent. The long-standing narrative of an Africa detached from the global economy and ravished by conflict and corruption is waning. Over time we will witness the “transforming an emerging continent into a global powerhouse.”⁶⁵ As Robert Rotberg puts it

⁶⁰ Mail and Guardian, *State of the Nation: Zuma adopts China model*. Available at: <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-03-zuma-adopts-chinese-model>

⁶¹ Bräutigam, Xiaoyang, *China's Investment in African Special Economic Zones: Overview and Initial Lessons*, In Farole, Akinci (eds), *Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions*, The World Bank, 2011

⁶² Xi Jinping's keynote speech at the Fifth BRICS Leaders Meeting, *Work Hand in Hand for Common Development*, Durban, South Africa, 2013

Available: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_665694/t1027968.shtml

⁶³ Zhang Chun, *Shaping China-Africa co-operation on Post-2015 Agenda*, in The China Monitor Special Edition, *FOCAC VI: African initiatives toward a sustainable Chinese relationship*, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch

⁶⁴ The Economist, *The Hopeless Continent*, May 2000

Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/333429>

The Economist, *Africa Rising: A hopeful continent*, March 2013

Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august>

⁶⁵ Bright, Hruby, *The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse*, Thomas Dunne Books, 2015

“Africa is no longer the ‘basket-case’ of yore.” It is no longer the continent of despair and the endless drain of development resources to no avail. Africa is on verge of becoming a competent agent in global affairs. Rotberg is in good company in believing that the sum of transformations ongoing in Africa will lead to a brighter future. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), numerous consultancies, and seasoned analysts, firmly believe that sub-Saharan Africa is on the verge of a breakthrough.⁶⁶

But while the future may look bright, many analysts claim that the present is still quite bleak, and that it holds a number of challenges. There is no guarantee that the positive trend will continue for Africa, and the current progress might be more fragile than it looks. Tom Burgis highlights that Africa is both rich and poor at the same time. Africa holds about 30 per cent of the world’s reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals. The continent also accounts for about 14 per cent of the world’s population. Yet, its share of “global manufacturing stood in 2011 exactly where it stood in 2000: at 1 percent.”⁶⁷ Sadly, this metric has not improved much since. Burgis argues that the African development miracle is in reality a mirage. Resources account for 66 percent of Africa’s exports, and little added value comes in return.⁶⁸ Africa’s future then is largely tied into commodities, and as Moyo shows in *Winner takes All* the surge in commodities has both potential upside and considerable downsides.⁶⁹ The latest downturn in the Chinese economy has sparked fear that demand for African resources may dwindle in the future. China and Africa’s economic faith appear to be deeply intertwined.⁷⁰ China has become dependent on African resources and commodities to fuel its growth. Africa on its side has rapidly become dependent on Chinese trade and investment. A research paper from the IMF finds that sub-Saharan African countries may expect a 0.6 percentage point drop in

⁶⁶ Rotberg, *Africa Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant Opportunities*, Polity Press, 2013
IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa; Building Momentum in a Multi-Speed World*, 2013
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2013/afr/eng/sreo0513.pdf>

And for notes on how the region is tied to commodity prices see 2015 outlook. Available at:
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/afr/eng/pdf/sreo0415.pdf>

McKinsey & Company, *McKinsey on Africa: A continent on the move*, June 2010

⁶⁷ Burgis, *The looting machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth*, Public Affairs, 2015

⁶⁸ Burgis, *The looting machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth*, Public Affairs, 2015

⁶⁹ Moyo, *Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and What it Means for the World*, Basic Books, 2012

⁷⁰ An extreme example is South Africa the currency (ZAR) and it is direct link to movements on the Chinese stock market.


See Bloomberg, *South African Rand Weakens to Record Low on China as Stocks Fall*, 7th January 2016

Available at:

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-07/rand-weakens-as-south-africa-stocks-drop-on-china-induced-rout>

export growth for every one percentage point decline in Chinese domestic investment growth. This effect is perceived to be even greater in resource-rich places like Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and South Africa.⁷¹ A prolonged cool-down in China could therefore have dire consequences for economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Martin Jacques ties the rapid Chinese advance in Africa to China’s ever-growing need for raw materials to fuel its economic growth. The launch of the ‘Going Global’ strategy in 2001 was according to Jacques “primarily intended to foster a closer relationship with commodity-producing countries and thereby secure the raw materials the country urgently required for its economic growth and huge program of urbanisation.”⁷² Chinese trade with Africa has seen an explosive growth in recent years. As the graph below highlights Chinese-African trade accounted for a mere 40 billion in 2005. In 2014, however, exchange between China and the continent had risen more than fivefold, to 222 billion dollars.



State owned companies are at the heart of the Chinese government’s foreign trade strategy. China’s state-owned energy companies ensure that the state secures access to the energy it requires. With few political restrictions, lavish subsidies from the central government and the

⁷¹ Drummond, Liu, Estelle, *Africa’s Rising Exposure to China: How Large Are Spillovers Through Trade?*, IMF Working Paper, November 2013

⁷² Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, Sec. Edit, Penguin Group, 2012, 411

full political support of the Chinese state these firms operate with considerable comparative advantages against their Western rivals.⁷³

China represents both an opportunity and a challenge for Africa. On one hand, China provides a huge market for African commodities. China is also a considerable provider of foreign direct investment. A recent report produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit finds that Africa is China's predominant investment destination. The numbers are substantial, China invested nearly twenty billion dollars in 2013 and, importantly, Chinese decision makers have announced plans for a significant increase. The report stipulates that while investment in infrastructure makes up a considerable portion of investment, energy and mineral resource extraction attracts most of the FDI.⁷⁴ Chinese AID to Africa has received growing attention in recent year despite the fact that little hard evidence has been available due to Chinese secrecy. The narrative in the West has been that China is flooding Africa with development funds, often directing the money to authoritarian regimes. Mosies Naim described it as "toxic" funds directed at rogue regimes.⁷⁵ President Obama in an interview with the BBC said China "been able to funnel an awful lot of money into Africa, basically in exchange for raw materials that are being extracted from Africa."⁷⁶

Researchers from the AidData project (description in methods chapter) argue that this narrative does not hold water. Claims that China has a preference for the autocratic and corrupt or for the resource rich are not supported by their data. Furthermore, AidData finds that Chinese development assistance tends to be allocated toward poorer countries. When comparing a broader set of finances that includes "other official financing" and "vague official financing", funds that have less than the 25 percent grant element stipulated by the OECD, they find that the United States and China are nearly matched in terms of absolute numbers.⁷⁷ While the narrative of Chinese predominance in Africa might be overestimated,

⁷³ Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, Portfolio Penguin Group, 2011, page 1-24

⁷⁴ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Playing the Long Game: China's investment in Africa*, A Mayor Brown Report, 2014

The report is built on data from the American Enterprise Foundation. Described in detail in the methods section.

⁷⁵ Naim, *Rogue Aid*, Foreign Policy, October, 2009


<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/>

⁷⁶ BBC News, *Full transcript of BBC interview with President Barack Obama*, 24th July, 2015

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33646542>

⁷⁷ Odokonyero, Ijjo, Marty, Muhumuza, Owot Moses, *Sub-national Perspectives on Aid Effectiveness: Impact of Aid on Health Outcomes in Uganda*, AidData Working Paper 18, AidData, 2015

the figures show that China is among the largest contributors of development assistance to African countries. Statements from the Chinese Export-Import Bank indicating that China would provide one trillion dollars' worth of financing to Africa by 2025 should be taken with a certain degree of reservation, but indicates intentions for growing engagement.⁷⁸



It is not just the absolute numbers that matter; many have expressed enthusiasm over China's efficient *method* of assistance. As highlighted in a 2008 World Bank report, China cheaply and

efficiently builds much of Africa's infrastructure.⁷⁹ The rapid pace of project advancement, from planning to completion is unmatched by other development partners who frequently weight down projects with bureaucracy and conditionality. The enthusiasm for the Chinese way of doing business is also reflected among the African populous and university elites. As Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong finds there is considerable enthusiasm on African continent for the Chinese way.⁸⁰ However, concerns remain around whether the approach undermines other development agendas. Worries arise around whether the Chinese approach could weaken or even reverse some of the progress made on governance and democratic transition.⁸¹ China's non-intervention policies and its willingness to cooperate with autocratic rulers fuels concern that while its short economic impact might be positive, the political

See also: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/20/many-in-the-west-fear-chinese-aid-to-africa-theyre-wrong-heres-why/>

⁷⁸ Brautigam urges us not to view China as an aid superpower. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/03/dont-get-excited-china-is-not-the-new-aid-superpower>

South China Morning Post, *China to provide Africa with US\$1tr financing*, 18th November 2013. Available at: <http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1358902/china-provide-africa-us1tr-financing>

⁷⁹ World Bank, *Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier*, Washington, D.C., 2008

⁸⁰ Sautman, Hairong, *African Perspectives on China-Africa Links*, The China Quarterly, Vol 199, September, 2009

⁸¹ Kurlantzick, *Why the 'China Model' is not going away*, The Atlantic, March 2013. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-the-china-model-isnt-going-away/274237/>

repercussions might undermine long-term development.⁸² China's willingness to trade with any partner has set of fears that it may escalate conflicts. China's supply of weapons Sudanese government that were used to kill civilians in Darfur is one example frequently cited by critics.⁸³ Development economists like Robert Rotberg stress that the growth in Africa has not purely been the result of the rise in commodity prices. It has also at least in part been the product of "fundamental shifts in governance and leadership", as well as the rise of a potent African middle class.⁸⁴ Delivering quick, but uncritical aid that props up ruling elites may reverse these positive trends. Furthermore, while China completes impressive projects in record time little skill is transferred to African workers who partake,⁸⁵ fuelling speculation that the Chinese engagement may lead to a short term upside, but little in terms of lasting change on the African continent.

"Broad brush overview": What we know about African public perception towards China

Despite this explosive growth in relations relatively little academic public opinion research has been conducted on China in Africa. As Strauss and Saavedra have highlight, much of what has been published to date has been "broad brush overview or opinion piece", with little appreciation for the complexities and nuance. The African continents 54 states and countless ethnic identities and societies are clashed together under the broad label of 'Africa'.⁸⁶ Almost no public opinion research has been conducted that looks specifically at African sentiments towards the Chinese engagement. As a result speculation has often taken the place of solid data. 'China in Africa', is rather than the product of a single force enacting a causal change to a single variable, an incredibly complex process of millions of individual actors. It holds consequences for the individual lives of millions and raises important questions for anthropologists and international relations scholars alike. The developments at macro-level

⁸² Example on cooperation with rogue regimes:

Esteban, *The Chinese Amigo: Implications for the Development of Equatorial Guinea*, *The China Quarterly*, 199, 2009

⁸³ Bloomberg, *Oil for China, Guns for Darfur*, 14 March 2008, Available at:

<http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-03-14/oil-for-china-guns-for-darfurbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice>

⁸⁴ Rotberg, *Africa Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant Opportunities*, Polity Press, 2013

⁸⁵ Rotberg, *China's economic slowdown threatens African progress*, *The Conversation*. Available at:

<https://theconversation.com/chinas-economic-slowdown-threatens-african-progress-49544>

⁸⁶ Strauss, Saavedra, *Introduction: China, Africa and Internationalization*, *The China Quarterly*, Vol 199, September 2009

depend on, and interact with, developments at the micro-level.⁸⁷ While the construct of ‘China-Africa’ offers useful analytical properties one should recognize the complexities of the process. Any analysis that seeks to understand the underlying causes must therefore also utilize a holistic form of analysis that bears in mind the various levels and how they interact. This paper aims to tie the macro and micro levels of abstraction together and answer the largest of questions with the smallest of data. It does not aspire to capture all facets of the phenomena, but by being data driven and counting the voices of Africans in 31 separate nations it seeks to provide an empirically supported analysis. By utilizing both national level data and individual survey responses it hopes to say something valuable about one of the largest trends in global affairs.

The lack of public perception research stands in stark contrast to recent years’ steeply expanding academic interest for Chinese engagement in Africa in a broad sense. The topic has been raised in numerous books and articles that have covered everything from qualitative studies of migrants to grand theories of international relations.⁸⁸ Underlying all of these contributions is a heated debate around the “true nature” of the relationship. Terms such as neo-colonialism, a second scramble for Africa and resource depletion are frequently mentioned. China in Africa is now a hot topic in both academic and media writing. China is on one hand seen a welcome competitor to the aid based system of the West, tipping the balance of the global economic system more in favor of African countries by giving them increased bargaining power. However, China is also seen as an exploiter of African economies with little vested interest in the continents long term development. Concerns around cooperation with rogue regimes undermining human rights, degradation worker rights and wages as well as damaging the local economies by creating a tsunami of cheap Chinese produced commodities has been frequently raised in much of the literature.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ McNamee, *Africa in their Words; A study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola*, Discussion Paper, Brenthurst Foundation, 2012/03

Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, Sec. Edit, Penguin Group, 2012

⁸⁸ For examples see:

Turner, *Rethinking the Peripheral; A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Oxford University

Nye, *Is the American Century Over; Global Futures*, Polity Press

⁸⁹ See for example:

Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa*, Polity Press, 2011

Michel, *When China met Africa*, Foreign Policy, 1 May 2008;

Askouri, *China’s Investment in Sudan: Destroying Communities*, Pambazuka News, 2006

Economy, Monaghan, *The Perils of Beijing’s Africa Strategy*, International Herald Tribune, 2 November 2006

There have been a number of contributions that deal with China's soft power in Africa.⁹⁰ However, due to a lack of data there have been few attempts to *quantify* how much of headway China is making in winning over "hearts and minds" on the continent. Consequently, there have been few attempts to seek out the determinants of Chinese soft power in Africa, although a number of potential sources have been identified.⁹¹

These shortfalls have partly been due to the aforementioned lack of solid public opinion data. There have been few attempts at continent-wide data collection on African public opinion towards China and, henceforth, little empirical research addressing African perceptions of Chinese involvement. The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) has been asking comparative questions about the Chinese intervention, but with a limited coverage of African countries. Further, PEW surveys have also probed questions on China, but again with limited coverage.⁹² Individual research papers have employed survey techniques for data collection. One example is the aforementioned study in *China Quarterly* by Sautman and Hairong who survey two hundred and fifty respondents in universities across nine African countries.⁹³ While the study offers valuable insights into perceptions among university elites its findings cannot be generalized to the broader public. The Afrobarometer first included a question on China in the fourth round of surveys in 2008. Round six of Afrobarometer promises to offer the most comprehensive broadside of questions on China yet, with a total of six questions relating to opinions regarding Chinese involvement in their given country. Importantly, this round of the Afrobarometer includes the first large-n data on preference for development model which allows for a quantitative analysis of support for the China model.

The few that have written research based on empirical data have indicated that there is a distinct gap between the media's frequent representation of large scale anti-Chinese sentiments and what they find to be a more positive tone.⁹⁴ Leading academics and

LaFraniere, Grobler, *China Spreads Aid in Africa, with a Catch*, The New York Times, 22 September 2009

⁹⁰ See for example:

King, *China's Aid and Soft Power in Africa* (African Issues), James Currey, 2013

Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, Yale University Press, 2007

⁹¹ Cooke, *China's Soft Power in Africa, in Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States*, 2009

⁹² The limited survey data available on African perceptions of China is summarized in Max Rebois article: *Rebol, Public Perceptions and Reactions: Gauging African Views of China in Africa*, Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol 9, 2010

⁹³ Sautman, Hairong, *African Perspectives on China-Africa Links*, The China Quarterly 199, 2009

⁹⁴ Pew Research Center, *Global Unease with Major World Powers: 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, 27 June 2007

Tortota, *Early Impressions: Africans on US, Chinese Leadership*, 9 November 2006

policymakers have questioned what we truly know about the African public's perception of China.⁹⁵ Due to the lack of sufficient survey data, current research into public perception towards China in Africa has been mostly qualitative in nature. These papers have tended to rely on interviews and focus-groups. While they provide a valuable contribution, little can be said with authority about the bigger trends.⁹⁶ Research has speculated about what is driving the negative perceptions without explaining why they think it is relevant to probe these negative sentiments. Due to the lack of rigorous quantitative data collection researchers have been unable to determine whether these sentiments represents a deeper underlying tendency of resentment towards the Chinese or whether it is merely anecdotal in nature.

One Afrobarometer paper, based on the fourth round of the survey, has been written on continent wide perceptions of China in Africa. Gadzala and Hanusch from Oxford University, find that African perceptions against China are nearly equivalent to those held against the West.⁹⁷ The paper utilizes multilevel modeling to estimate the effect of both individual values and national level economic data. The article finds that increasing Chinese imports yield more negative African sentiments, while foreign direct investment has a negligible impact on public perception. Interestingly the paper finds that Africans who attach value to democracy and human rights are overall critical to the Chinese influence in their country. While this paper represents an effort at utilizing quantitative data from a comprehensive research survey it is never the less hampered by the fact that the fourth round of the Afrobarometer merely contains a single question on China. Furthermore, Gadzala and Hanusch choose to focus on rather abstract measures of economic impact and general attitudes towards human rights. The

Sautman, Hairong, *African Perspectives on China-Africa Links*, The China Quarterly 199, 2009

⁹⁵ Carnegie Endowment, *China's Africa strategy: a new approach to development and diplomacy?*, 12th December, 2006.

Available at: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=941>

⁹⁶ Turner, *Rethinking the Peripheral; A Study of Chinese Migrants in Lesotho*, Oxford University

Tanga, *The Contribution of Chinese Trade and Investment Towards Poverty Alleviation in Africa: Evidence of Divergent Views from Lesotho*

Brenthurst Foundation Special Report, *Fueling the Dragon; Natural resources and China's development*, August 2012

Media:

Increased hostility towards Chinese traders, IRIN News, September 2012. Available at:

<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96266/southern-africa-increasing-hostility-towards-chinese-traders>

"Sinophobia" on the rise in Lesotho, The China Africa Project, February 2013. Available at:

<http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/lesotho-south-africa-chinese-migrants-sinophobia-textiles/>

⁹⁷ Gadzala, Hanusch, *African Perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging Popular Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants*, Afrobarometer Working Paper 117

Later published as Oxford Development Studies, Vol 40, 2012

two economic variables chosen, FDI and trade balance, surely represent solid descriptive variables when measuring macroeconomic impact. However, when it comes down evaluating the impact on individual perception it seems unlikely that the average person would be tapped into the latest statistic on trade balance. Contrary to the paper by Gadzala and Hanuch, *this* paper seeks to test for the impact of people's *perceptions* of their respective countries economic development, rather than the true statistic. In addition FDI, trade and AID is employed as collective measure of the Chinese footprint in individual countries. This is a much broader dataset then the one employed by Gozala and Hanuch and the open-source collection methods allow for greater accuracy.

1.2 Contribution of the paper

New survey data covering thirty one countries allows for the first comprehensive evaluation local public opinion in Africa towards the Chinese involvement on the continent. Quantitative empirical research on public opinion within Africa towards the Chinese has so far been close to none-existent. The few research papers that have been written on the topic have used small samples or been of a qualitative nature. So while many proclaim to know the true nature of African sentiment towards the Chinese, few have been able back their claim with solid empirical data. This type of research is sorely needed to inform the debate surrounding China in Africa and help turn media reports and academic literature away from speculation and dogma.

The paper utilizes a more extensive set of data then what has previously been available to researchers. The Afrobarometer contains a question on the preferred development model which allows for the first empirical testing of support for a Chinese model of development. Beyond just outlining and quantifying the level of preference for the China model in Africa this paper aims to go one step further and seek out the explanations for this choice. In addition to metrics collected from the survey this paper employs innovative open-source measures of foreign direct investment and Chinese aid (see section 2.10 for more details on data).

Chapter 2

Research Design

2.1 Research Questions

This study travels into unknown waters as no empirical evaluation of support for the China model has yet been published. Existing literature provides clues as to what might shape respondent evaluations, but due to lacking data no statistic evaluation has been performed. In order to seal this gaping hole in knowledge the paper seeks to address two main research questions. Firstly, a descriptive question; what is the rate of support for the Chinese model in Africa? Secondary and following, an explanatory question; what factors determines this support?

2.2 Research design

The paper proposes a relatively simple but efficient research design. To provide background the paper will first outline, through the use of descriptive statistics, respondents attitudes towards the Chinese model in Africa. Because no consensus exists around the tonality of sentiments towards to Chinese engagement the paper will offer a presentation of the China related questions included in Afrobarometer round six. After establishing what African perceptions of China are, a multivariate regression model will be constructed in order to seek out explanations for these attitudes. This model is shaped as an exploratory analysis where the variables are included in a block-by-block setting that shows the effect of one block while controlling for the previously entered variables. The use of multilevel modeling (MLM) allows for an exploration of variations among both individuals and individuals within countries.

2.3 Levels of Analysis

The paper employs two levels of analysis. First, an individual level where respondents are treated as independent of any higher level order. Second, a model where individual respondents are nested within countries. A two-level model is needed as we want to test whether respondents within countries are more similar to each other than respondents between countries. In this sense respondents are nested within countries that have characteristics that shape their responses to the survey questions. Their residuals are correlated - they are not

independent as would be assumed by standard logistic regression. The multilevel approach allows us to explore between country variations and in country variations.

2.4 Cases or Units

The analysis covers 31 African countries. Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This comprehensive sample offers a wide range not only in terms of geographical spread, but also by country characteristics such as regime type, demographics and development level.

46741 individual respondents have been recorded by the Afrobarometer across these countries. Multi-country weighting is employed to balance out the difference in sampling. (This leads to n=37197 when analysis is run.)

2.5 Descriptive section

As noted in chapter one there is no consensus on the tonality of public opinion in Africa towards China. The purpose of the descriptive section is to support the main explanatory analysis (chapter four) by outlining just how popular the Chinese model is in Africa. In addition it will provide an overview over findings from the China related questions in Afrobarometer round six. It will outline summary statistics and analysis of missing values for these questions. A summary of these questions is included because they are intimately linked to choice of development model (this will be demonstrated by the multilevel regression model in chapter four).

The key topic of chapter three is the overall tonality of African sentiments towards China in Africa. Two rivaling hypotheses have been brought forward by existing literature.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Survey research has found positive perceptions. See for example: Sautman, Hairong, *African Perspectives on China-Africa Links*, The China Quarterly 199, 2009
Theoretical work suggests that China's soft power is capped and that sentiments are negative: Nye, *The Limits of Chinese Soft Power*, Project Syndicate, June 2015. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-civil-society-nationalism-soft-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-07>
Scobell, *Introduction*, in: Scobell(edit) and Mantas (edit), *China's Great Leap Outward; Hard and Soft Dimensions of a Rising Power*, Academy of Political Science, 2014

H1: Empirical. Previous surveys: *Africans are on average positive towards the Chinese intervention on the continent.*

H2: Theoretical. Chinese soft power is capped because of authoritarian rule: *Africans are on average negative towards to the Chinese intervention.*

2.6 Explanatory section

The explanatory analysis seeks to root out what it is that determines respondents' choice of development model. The examination employs two levels of analysis; individual and country. As the paper is the first to explore this topic empirically, the model is structured like an exploratory analysis. Variables are selected to fit blocks that match themes within the literature. These themes are theories of what shapes respondents views of China. They are; priorities for development, values (on democracy, authoritarianism and human rights), evaluations of China, country characteristics and 'Chinese footprint'. The blocks are entered in to the model one block at a time to test for their effect while controlling for the effect of previous blocks. At national level (macro) the previous macro blocks are removed due to limitation of statistical power. All of these components have their respectful hypotheses. They are measured by the data and are finally tested in the model. Several alternative model designs could be explored with the same set of data, but as the paper sets out as the first of its kind the one-by-one exploration seems the most natural to the author.

The model contains six levels. First, I employ two control variables, education and experienced poverty. They are included in the model because I want to explore people's evaluations while controlling for the two factors. Choice of development model is a complex thing. In order to choose a role model you must have a certain level of understanding of both what is occurring in your own country, but also know something about key actors and states in international relations. Poverty is highly correlated with education level, but the two constructs are not the same. Poverty can limit people's access to information and it is therefore important that the model controls for this variable.

Second, as demonstrated in the literature review section one of the key characteristics of the China model is its focus on economic growth and infrastructure building. This contrary to the Western focus on good governance. The paper seeks to address this topic by measuring whether respondents who prioritize economic growth are more likely to choose the Chinese

model for development. Likewise, the model measures whether individuals who consider governance a key priority are less likely to choose the China model.

Third, as highlighted by Andrew Nathan China represents an alternative to the democratic development model and the country is a role model for authoritarian growth. Can we find differences between respondents who express support for democracy and those who embrace authoritarian rule? Previous research has investigated the relationship between political and moral values and their impact on perceptions about Chinese involvement.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the notion that democratic values and attitudes towards human rights makes Africans less positive to China has frequently been presented by Western media.¹⁰⁰ Data from the Afrobarometer allows us to probe whether there is a connection between values and likelihood to choose the China model. Nye frequently stresses the importance of values for a country's attractiveness.¹⁰¹ The survey contains questions on democracy, autocracy and human rights that offer a unique opportunity to probe whether respondent values determine their evaluations of the Chinese model. The sixth round of the survey does not ask questions directly related to China and human rights and democracy, but several questions serve as measures of their attitudes towards these issues in general.

The fourth block tests the importance of evaluations of China's actions in the respondents' own country. Are Africans who view China's actions within their own country in a positive light more likely to choose the Chinese model? Respondents who consider the Chinese engagement to be helping their country could be more prone to adopt the China-model. An important component of this block of variables is evaluations of China's power. This stems from the debate around the rise of China as a world power and the importance of strength in international relations. Stephen Halper links the rise of Beijing Consensus and Chinese soft power to the rise of China's economic and military power.¹⁰² The different forms of power are intertwined. Evaluations (a soft power entity) are shaped by the growth of hard power resources. In an anarchic international system the realist approach to international relations

⁹⁹ Gadzala, Hanusch, *African Perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging Popular Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants*, Afrobarometer Working Paper 117
Later published as *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol 40, 2012

¹⁰⁰ See for example:

Okeowo, *China in Africa: The New Imperialists?*, *The New Yorker*, June 2013,
Available at: <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-africa-the-new-imperialists>

¹⁰¹ Nye, *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, 2011

¹⁰² Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, Basic Books, 2010

would have us believe that accumulating power is the most important attribute for securing your states survival and prosperity.¹⁰³ I propose that evaluations of power will shape Africans likelihood for choosing the Chinese model as respondents would want to choose a model for country development that strengthens their nation. A fruitful approach for this analysis to take, therefore, is to investigate the linkage between evaluations of Chinese power and preference for the Chinese model. Are respondents who view China to be more powerful more likely to choose the Chinese model of development? If respondents consider China to have a lot of impact and influence in their country, are they then more likely to choose the China-model?

Block five moves on to national level variables. On the national level I test whether country characteristics make respondents nested within countries more likely to choose the Chinese model. First, I investigate whether living under authoritarian rule makes respondents more likely to prefer the Chinese model. In this section I want to evaluate whether individuals nested within authoritarian societies are more likely to choose the Chinese model for development. Second, I test whether respondents are shaped by their countries level of development. China is itself a developing country and is seen as a role model for developing states. As countries get richer and more developed there is reason to believe that China will not have the same level of attraction as a role model and that respondents would look to other countries as model for development.

The last block includes a composite measure of ‘Chinese foot print’ in individual African nations. Does the level of interaction with the Chinese in everyday life make Africans more likely to choose the China-model as they have been exposed to the Chinese way of life and business? The block contains a proxy measure of the Chinese ‘footprint’ in individual African countries; FDI, aid and imports. It creates a palpable measure for how much exposure African states have to China, and thereby also an expected average exposure to individual respondents. It is assumed that if the country as whole has more interaction with China respondents in that country are on average more likely to experience interaction with the Chinese. This is not the same as direct interaction; there is no measure of how often people talk to the Chinese or if they live in proximity. I would ideally like to use migration data to in

¹⁰³ See for example:
Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, 1979

order to have a measure of person-to-person interactions. However, at present no reliable data is available.¹⁰⁴

2.7 Hypotheses

The paper puts forward the broad categories mentioned above and tests them in six main groups of hypotheses and a number of sub-hypotheses within the respective categories. (Main factors in driving preference for the 'China-model'). The paper will control these variables against the null-hypothesis. The model is structured so that the first blocks are controlled for at later stages. This implies that when I get to hypothesis six (country characteristics) I am testing the effect while controlling for all the variables above.

H0: *None of the selected variables yield a statistically significant impact to the dependent variable.*

Micro - Individual level

H.1. Control variables. *Level of education and poverty alter the respondents' likelihood of choosing the China-model of development.*

H.2.1 Economic growth. *Respondents who value economic growth and infrastructure construction are more likely to choose the Chinese model of development*

H.2.2 Governance. *Respondents who value governance are less likely to choose the Chinese-model of development*

H.3. Personal values on human rights and democracy *shape African perceptions of the China model*

H.4. Evaluations of China. *Evaluations of China's power, influence and impact in the respondent's home country shape their likelihood of choosing the Chinese development model*

¹⁰⁴ Little reliable data is available on Chinese migration to Africa. A figure frequently cited is one million total. The author has obtained Barry Sautman's most updated table (see appendix). It has not been utilized for analysis as Sautman stresses the difficulties of getting accurate data.

Macro - National level

Chinese footprint

H.5.1. FDI. *The amount of foreign direct investment per capita from China shape African likelihood of choosing the China-model*

H.5.2 Aid. *The amount of aid given per capita by China shape African perceptions about the Chinese model.*

H.5.3 Chinese imports. *The amount of import from China per capita shape African perceptions of the China model*

Country characteristics

H.6.1 Level of development. *The higher the level of country development the less likelihood that respondents choose the Chinese-model of development*

H.6.2 Authoritarian rule. *Respondents who live in authoritarian societies are more likely to hold preference for the Chinese-model of development*

The Argument

The paper makes an explicit goal of not selecting a favorite among the hypotheses chosen. Rather it aims to explore potential reasons why respondents might chose the China model over other models for development. The main aim is to empirically evaluate what perceptions are and seek to uncover their main drivers. All the chosen explanatory variables stem from the current literature and have frequently been presented as potential sources of attraction to the Chinese way. The current debate largely lacks an “African voice” and is all too often based on speculation rather than solid data. A key premise therefore is to not have the answer before the question is tested.

2.8 Model Summary

<i>DP: China vs Other</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
		Micro
Controls	Q97 Scale of poverty	<i>Education of respondent</i> <i>Scale estimated based on experienced poverty</i>
Priorities for development	Governance Economics and infrastructure	<i>Respondents who think governance is a priority</i> <i>Respondents who think economic development and infrastructure is a priority</i>
Values	Q31 Q32 Q77 Scale of authoritarian rejection	<i>Government getting things done vs people have influence</i> <i>Choose leaders through elections</i> <i>Attitudes on humanitarian intervention vs sovereignty</i> <i>Scale based on question on authoritarianism</i>
Views on China	China scale Q81A Q80B	<i>Respondent evaluations of Chinese intervention in their country</i> <i>Respondent evaluation of level of Chinese influence in their economy</i> <i>Respondent evaluations of most influential country</i>
		Macro
Country characteristics	Human Dev. Index Freedom House	<i>Country score on the Human Development Index</i> <i>Average Freedom House score</i>
Chinese footprint	Imports AID FDI	<i>Imports from China per capita</i> <i>Aid per capita</i> <i>Foreign direct investment per capita</i>

2.9 Data and measurement

Dependent variable

Our dependent variable comes from the Afrobarometer. Question 80A asks; *"In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country?"* The respondents are read a list of five options. The United States, China, Former Colonial Power (varies in between countries), India or South Africa. They can also reply *"none of these"* and record a verbatim answer that is later coded by the surveyor. A table of all recorded responses and their frequencies has been included in the appendix (1.0).

The dependent variable has been given some treatment in order for it to provide analytical clarity. It has been recorded as a dichotomous categorical variable, a dummy variable; 'China vs other'. This implies that during the analysis I will be looking at why people choose the

Chinese model compared to all other models included in the survey. The binary coding enables us to run a multilevel logistic model for categorical outcomes. 'China vs other'. The purpose of the paper is to explore why Africans choose the Chinese model over all other models; respondents who answered that they do not know or refused to answer have therefore been dropped from this analysis. Respondents who were unable to identify a model for development cannot help us explain why Africans choose China over other models.

China vs other

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Other	24782	66,6	73,3
	China	9036	24,3	26,7
	Total	33818	90,9	100,0
Missing	System	3379	9,1	
Total		37197	100,0	

Most of the respondents were able to name a country they consider as role model for their states development. Among the 9.1 percent who did not we find significant and high correlation with lacking education (-.183, p<.001) and significant correlation with experienced poverty (.39, p<.001). See section 2.12 for conceptual discussion of what is meant by 'model'.

Explanatory variables

As mentioned the multilevel logistic regression model employs two levels, macro and micro, with several blocks on both levels. At individual level (micro) the model enters variables according to the four following blocks: 1) Control variables 2) Priorities for development 3) Attitudes and values towards democracy and authoritarianism 4) Views on China's engagement in the respondent's country. The macro-level is national level data and it encompasses measurements of foreign direct investment, aid, trade, the Freedom House Index and the Human Development Index.

Individual level data - Afrobarometer

All data at micro level (individual) data used for this paper comes from round six of the Afrobarometer survey series. The dataset used for this paper is an early access set of relevant variables for the first thirty two available countries. It was provided under a written agreement with Afrobarometer. The data has not yet been publicly released and the author would like to

point out that there may be minor differences to later released data. Swaziland was dropped from the sample as respondents in that country were not asked questions on China.

Afrobarometer is an African-led, non-partisan research project that has measured countries' social, political, and economic atmosphere since 1999. In its sixth survey round (2014-15), it is covering 35 countries. Afrobarometer is funded by the UK Department of International Development (DFID), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and World Bank.

"Afrobarometer uses national probability samples designed to meet the criteria of a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. The goal is to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of being selected for an interview. This is achieved via using random selection methods at every stage of sampling and sampling at all stages with probability proportionate to population size (PPPS) wherever possible to ensure that larger (i.e., more populated) geographic units have a proportionally greater probability of being chosen into the sample.

Samples usually include either *1200 or 2400 cases (2400 for South Africa)*. With a sample size of $n=2400$, the margin of error is $\pm 2.0\%$ at 95 percent confidence level."¹⁰⁵

Control variables

The study will include two control variables in the regression model. These variables measure the respondent's level of education and a scale of experienced poverty. The variables are interesting in and of themselves and not only included to act as control variables. Education was chosen because it allows us to control for the effects of schooling on respondents evaluations of the Chinese engagement. Poverty was selected because it is assumed that respondents who live in poverty are less likely to have opinions about international cooperation and models for development as poor conditions deprive them of the information needed to form an opinion.

¹⁰⁵ All information regarding Afrobarometer Survey was collected at: www.afrobarometer.org For information on sampling and coding see *Round Six Survey Manual*, May 2014. Available at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/survey_manuals/ab_r6_survey_manual_en.pdf

Education is measured through a self-report question in the Afrobarometer. It is assumed that respondents offer an honest reply when they are asked: “*What is your highest level of education?*”¹⁰⁶

<i>Factor Matrix^a</i>	
	Factor
	1
Q8a. How often gone without food	.687
Q8b. How often gone without water	.626
Q8c. How often gone without medical care	.739
Q8d. How often gone without cooking fuel	.571
Q8e. How often gone without cash income	.705

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

a. 1 factors extracted

The Afrobarometer contains five questions that ask respondents how often they have gone without food, water, medical care, cooking fuel or cash income. These five questions arguably represent a scale for experienced poverty. Respondents who score higher on the questions live lives of less material wellbeing. A factor analysis was explored after the data was found to be in a suitable format. The scale was subjected to maximum likelihood analysis and direct oblim rotation using SPSS. The analysis yielded a Keiser Mayer Olkin value of .832 and the Bartlett's test came out as statistically significant

($p < .001$).

One factor with an eigenvalue of more than one was extracted. This factor explained 44.653 percent of variance. Reliability analysis revealed a Cronbach's Alpha of .797 and no increase if any of the items were dropped. The table shows the factor loadings.

Priorities for development

Block two of the model contains two variables that have been constructed from question 60 of the Afrobarometer. It asks respondents what the most important problems are facing their country that government should address. The surveyor then records up to three verbatim responses and codes them accordingly. The Gov and Econinfra variables are categorical measures of whether the respondents mentioned a topic related to governance or economics and infrastructure respectively. The variables make no difference of the order of replies or if

¹⁰⁶ For all questions see Afrobarometer questionnaire, round six. Available at: <http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/questionnaires>
 Q97: *What is your highest level of education?*
 Q8A-E: Over the past year, how often, have you or anyone in your family:
 A: *Gone without food to eat?*
 B: *Gone without enough clean water for home use?*
 C: *Gone without medicines or medical treatment?*
 D: *Gone Without enough fuel to cook your food?*
 E: *Gone without a cash income?*

the respondent mentioned several topics within the same category. As respondents are asked to list priorities but not order them, it is assumed that respondents make no distinction in level of priority for listing one versus listing three.¹⁰⁷

Value questions

The survey contains a number of questions that measure people’s values on democracy. The paper will not utilize the direct question on democracy as it is assumed that people answer it with a simple heuristic of “democracy is good” rather than an evaluation of system of rule. The indirect questions included in the survey are therefore used instead.

<i>Factor Matrix^a</i>	
	Factor
	1
Q28c. Reject one-man rule	.744
Q28a. Reject one-party rule	.579
Q28b. Reject military rule	.517

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

a. 1 factors extracted. 4 iterations required.

The survey asks respondent three questions that together form a scale of authoritarian rejection. Respondents are asked if they approve or disapprove of one-party rule, army rule or one man rule on a five point scale. A factor analysis was run using SPSS. After the questions were subjected to maximum likelihood analysis and direct oblim rotation the scale yielded a Kaiser Mayer Olkin value of .636 and a Bartlett's test that was significant (p<.001). One factor with an eigenvalue above one was extracted. The factor explained 38,561% of variance. The

factor has a Cronbach's Alpha score of .631 during reliability tests and no increase will occur if any of the items are dropped from the scale.¹⁰⁸

In addition to the scale on authoritarian rejection three more variables have been included in the value section of the model. Q31 and Q32 asks respondents to evaluate two statements and choose the one that is closest to their view. They can either agree or partly agree with the statement. They can also decline to offer an answer; in which case they are dropped from the sample. Q31 asks respondents whether they find that it is more important to have a government that gets things done or that the government is accountable to its citizens. Q32 probes how important elections of public officials are to respondents. These two questions

¹⁰⁷ Q60: *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?*

¹⁰⁸ Q28: *There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?*

- A: *Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.*
- B: *The army comes in to govern the country.*
- C: *Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.*

arguably reveal values on democracy held by the people answering the survey. Q77 probes values on human rights versus sovereignty and asks respondents to choose between statements that take opposite views on intervention in the name of human rights.¹⁰⁹

Views on China’s engagement in the respondent’s country

The forth block contains variables measuring the respondents evaluation of China’s engagement in their country. Q81A asks the person surveyed to rate the amount of economic influence that China has in his or her country on a four point scale (none to a lot). Q81B and Q81E arguably represent a scale for evaluations of China’s economic and political impact in the respondent’s country.

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.643	2

Both questions ask the person surveyed to rate on a five-point scale whether he or she finds China to have a positive or negative impact. The variable ‘China Scale’ was computed by combining these two variables. Since we only have two items factor analysis will not yield a valid outcome. The reliability test gives us a Cronbach Alpha of .643.¹¹⁰

Influence China vs other

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Other	23667	63,6	73,4
	China	8583	23,1	26,6
	Total	32251	86,7	100,0
Missing		4946	13,3	
Total		37197	100,0	

The country influence variable is a categorical coding of Afrobarometer’s Q80B. The question asks respondents what country that has the most influence

¹⁰⁹ Q31: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
 Statement 1: *It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.*
 Statement 2: *It more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.*
 Q32: Statement 1: *We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections.*
 Statement 2: *Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders.*
 Q77: Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion?
 Statement 1: *The governments of each country in (respondent’s part of Africa) have a duty to try to guarantee free elections and prevent human rights abuses in other countries in the region, for example by using political pressure, economic sanctions or military force.*
 Statement 2: *Each country in this region should respect the independence of other countries and allow them to make their own decisions about how their country should be governed.*
¹¹⁰ Q81B: *In general, do you think that China’s economic and political influence on X is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven’t you heard enough to say?*
 Q81E: *In your opinion, does China’s economic development assistance to X do a good job or a bad job of meeting the country’s needs, or haven’t you heard enough to say?*

in their country. It differs from Q81A in that it is more comprehensive and grasps both a political and economic dimension. The variable has been coded as China vs other.

Respondents who choose China make up 23.4 percent (27 percent among people who offer a reply) of the total. (See chapter three for discussion on make-up of answers.) Missing value analysis reveals that respondents level of education is highly correlated with a non-reply (-.184, $p < .001$). Experienced poverty makes respondents less likely to offer an answer to the question (.04, $p < .001$).¹¹¹

Macro: National level

Country characteristics

The country characteristics block is made up of two separate components. The first is a measure of development level. This variable allows for an investigation of whether a countries level of development will change the likelihood of respondents seeing China as role model for development. The second variable is a measure of regime type. As China is presented as the authoritarian development alternative the model should investigate the link between regime type and choice of development model.

Human Development Index

The paper utilizes the Human Development Index as a measure of a countries level of development. Compared to a univariate GDP measure the HDI measure offers additional factors of development that would have been missed if the paper simply employed a one-dimensional approach to development. The HDI is a composite of income per capita, educational level and life expectancy. All data is drawn from the 2013 report.¹¹²

Freedom House Ranking

In order to evaluate whether living in an authoritarian state influences the likelihood of choosing the China-model for development the paper utilizes the Freedom House *Freedom in*

¹¹¹ Q80B: *Which of the following do you think has the most influence on Zambia, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

¹¹² See Human Development Report. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report>

the World report and data to measure the level of civil liberties and political rights in Africa. Freedom House employs expert panel surveys and “findings are researched after a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of in-house and consultant regional experts and scholars.” The variable used in our model is the average of the civil liberties and political rights measures provided by Freedom House' 2013 report.¹¹³

Chinese “footprint”

The last block contains three variables that together make up an aggregate Chinese footprint in the countries surveyed. It seeks to investigate whether the total level of imports, foreign direct investment and aid alter respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model.

AidData

Chinese aid to Africa is the opposite of transparent. Contrary to traditional donors China regards aid to Africa as a state secret and will not release individual country data on development assistance. Furthermore, the Chinese government will not disclose its definition of aid and considerable amounts could therefore fly under the radar. In order to overcome these challenges AidData, based at the College of William and Marry, has recently developed a set of open source data collection methods to track project-level Chinese development finance to Africa. The data is collected using media reports and tracks Chinese aid to Africa down to the level of the specific project. Importantly the dataset also contains a precise geographical location.

Aid Data uses the so-called Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF), a new methodology, which leverages open-source information on development finance by non-transparent, non-Western donors. It utilizes open source data such as news reports, government documents and scholarly publications to work its way around secrecy and provide high reliability data for academic and journalistic purposes.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Data and report available at:

<https://www.freedomhouse.org/reports>

¹¹⁴ See Tracking Chinese Development Finance

<http://china.aiddata.org/>

Strange et al, *AidData's Methodology for Tracking Underreported Financial Flows: Version 1.1*, AidData, 2013

The paper utilizes the 1.1 dataset that tracks Chinese development finance in Africa from 2000-2011. All projects listed under official finance are summarized to measure the total amount of aid during the period to individual countries. The data has been calculated in per capita terms to offset for country size. In order to counter the biases of outliers the numbers have been log-transformed.

FDI

Measuring Chinese foreign direct investment has also proven to be notoriously difficult. The African Development Bank has noted problems with measuring Chinese FDI to Africa as large portions of investment is channeled through Hong Kong and other intermediates.¹¹⁵ The Economist Research Unit and Deborah Brautigam (a leading China-Africa scholar) have utilized and recommended a database compiled by Dereck Scissors at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).¹¹⁶ The China Global Investment Tracker works its way around the problem of intermediates and secrecy by using open sources such as corporate reporting, government reports and news outlets. These open sources discuss final destination of the investment and thereby avoid the problem of intermediate destination. The use of data from the tracker comes with a number of reservations in mind. Firstly, the tracker only records projects of \$100 million or above. Secondly, and critically, the methodology for how the Enterprise Institute collects and codifies data has yet to be published in a publically available methodology paper. The author upon emailing Dereck Scissors was informed that no such paper exists. However, Scissors indicated that the institute will answer any questions regarding methodology.¹¹⁷ After some clarifying questions on the method employed for collecting and vetting the data and considering that it has been recommended and employed by leading scholars in the field the author has decided to employ the data in the analysis.

The data used for the analysis is the sum of FDI from the beginning of the database 2005 until the base year of 2013.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ African Development Bank on Chinese investment. Available at:

<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working%20126.pdf>

¹¹⁶ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Playing the Long Game: China's investment in Africa*, A Mayor Brown Report, 2014

¹¹⁷ See appendix 1.3 for summary of email questions

¹¹⁸ www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker

Trade

Data on Chinese trade with Africa are drawn UN Comtrade.¹¹⁹ The data used to compute the trade variable is total imports from China from 2005 to 2013. In order to control for differences in country size the trade data has been recorded in per capita terms. Furthermore, to avoid having outliers dominate our results the trade variable has been logged so to create a normal distribution.

Per capita measures

All trade, aid and investment data have been calculated in per capita terms to control for variations in country size. 2013 demographic data has been used as base year. Population data was obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.¹²⁰

Other data used: PEW

Data from PEW's Spring 2015 Global Attitudes Survey has been used as a reference point throughout this paper and its data serves as basis of some of its figures. The survey data has not been included in the regression model, but functions as a valuable reference point for the descriptive discussions on perceptions of the Chinese.¹²¹

2.11 Definitions, delineations and limitations

In order to enable a discussion around a social phenomenon as large as the one described under the label "China in Africa" the paper needs to make employ some simplifying terminology and constructs for analysis. These simplifications do not, however, come without reservations or reflections. The author recognizes that the process known as "China in Africa" is the product of an unfathomable amount of choices made at the individual level. While the process is complex the resolution of the data allows for analysis of grand trends while recognizing the plurality of individual choice.

¹¹⁹ UNCOMTRADE. Available at:
<http://comtrade.un.org/>

¹²⁰ World Bank Data. Available at:
<http://data.worldbank.org/>

¹²¹ PEW Spring 2015 Global Attitudes Survey. Full data access:
<http://www.pewresearch.org/data/>

"Africa"

Africa is often treated as singular unit rather than a diverse set of fifty-four countries with varying degrees of Chinese involvement. Chris Alden eloquently illustrates that it is problematic to oversimplify the picture and solely talk about one unified African continent when we are in fact dealing with fifty four different countries with a varying culture, language, geography, resources and various forms of political organization.¹²² Most authors on the field fail to mention that China has bilateral relations with individual African countries and multilateral relations to the African continent. The paper still utilizes the concept of “Africa” as it is not without analytical meaning. James Ferguson has argued that the label is not without utility. He points to the fact that anthropologist and others who denounce the use of the term ”Africa” have put themselves on the sidelines and become bystanders to the broader discussions about the continents position in the world. The term “Africa” is meaningful as long at as it is used by Africans themselves and the fact that it features prominently in the literature makes it a very real entity when evaluating the broader themes of global economics and politics.¹²³ The use of disaggregated data collected from thirty one individual African country’s aids in seeing the diversity between African nations, and identify broader trends where they exist. While African continent is immensely diverse, it is still possible to identify tendencies across national boundaries when it comes to perceptions of Chinese involvement.

"China"

‘China’ is much more of a monolithic entity then ‘Africa’, but the Chinese intervention on the African continent is not driven by one actor. The Chinese involvement in Africa is often presented as homogenous and driven forwards by a unison player with a clear and determined strategy for its involvement. This perception fails to appreciate the complexity of Chinese political and economic structures. Few authors emphasize the diversity of Chinese engagement. Nor do they point out that much of the movement is driven by individuals, rather than a ‘grand design’ steered by Beijing. The Chinese government does have a strategy for

¹²² Alden, Christopher, *China and Africa: The Relationship Matures*, Strategic Analysis, 2012

¹²³ Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World*, Duke University Press, 2006

Africa. They have established an official forum for Sino-African relations and they do, through their diplomacy, actively work to implement their strategy on the continent.¹²⁴

However, despite the massive efforts of the Chinese state apparatus, and its comparatively much firmer grip on most parts of society and the economy than most Western governments, it is a far leap to claiming that China is speaking with only one voice in Africa.

One of the growing trends in the relationship is the ever increasing importance of private Chinese enterprises. Alden and other scholars like him have argued that these enterprises must be seen as different from that of the state.¹²⁵ Chinese involvement on the African continent is driven by a multitude of actors and just because they have passports from the same state does not imply that they have the same motivations and ambition. Private individuals, settlers, business men and women, small and medium size companies as well as the larger state-owned corporations play an important role in the development of relations. Zhang Chun points out that the evolution of the Sino-Africa relationship shows a “trend of diversification of actors and interests.” Besides from official state actors like the Ministry of Commerce, the Foreign Ministry and other central governmental ministries and agencies, a large variety of other actors like “state-owned companies, provincial agencies, province-owned companies, private companies and even individuals have a role”.¹²⁶ According to Vice Minister Wang Chao state owned companies do not dominate China’s investment in Africa. Rather, it is small and medium sized businesses that make up more than 85 percent of the 2000 Chinese companies that operate in Africa.¹²⁷ The discourse in Western media and academic journals frequently paints a black or white picture of the Chinese involvement in Africa as either “partner” or “exploiter”.¹²⁸ Reality is much more nuanced.

Despite these important reservations; in the realm of soft power the idea of China as a construct still matters. Respondents identify China as an entity and label Chinese-actors under that singular umbrella. While reality might be more nuanced, evaluations are made of these actors as one whole entity; “China”.

¹²⁴ *China- Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation*, Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, August 2013

¹²⁵ Alden 2012

¹²⁶ Chun, Zhang, *The Sino-Africa Relationship: Towards a New Strategic Partnership*, LSE IDEAS Special Report; Emerging Powers in Africa

¹²⁷ ‘Vice Minister Wang Chao Addressed in China-Africa Small and Medium Enterprises Trade & Economic Exchanges and Investment Cooperation Seminar, ‘MOFOCOM, September 9, 2010.

¹²⁸ Summary of the debate: Alden, Christopher, *China in Africa: Partner, competitor or hegemon?* Zed Books, 2007

Blair, *Why China is trying to colonise Africa*, The Telegraph, 31.August 2007

“Model”

The Afrobarometer asks its respondents; “In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country?” It is important to emphasize that this wording gives us certain limitations. Firstly, we cannot assume that individuals who respond to the survey read this question in any particular way. Interpretations of ‘model’ may vary from respondent to respondent. The “Beijing Consensus” sees the Chinese model of development as an alternative approach to development with strong state intervention leading the way. This is in direct competition with to the “Washington Consensus” and its neo-liberal approach. While the paper recognizes that a number of the respondents might be thinking along those lines, the question does not provide enough information in order to make strong conclusions on the matter. It might be that some of the respondents are in favor of only some of the components of outlined by Ramo or that they may interpret the Chinese model completely differently. The paper will therefore not equate support for the Chinese model of development to support for the Beijing Concuss. We can’t assume that this implies support for the Beijing Consensus, nor that it entails complete support for all aspects of Chinese development. For example very unlikely that people have detailed knowledge of China’s development. Even if they do, they are unlikely to believe their country should blindly copy all aspects of China’s development. Anyone who has read Frank Doikotte’s book on *Mao’s Great Famine* during the ‘Great leap forward’ campaign would know that there are have been grave mistakes in China’s path to development.¹²⁹ In the implications chapter (6) I will return to a thorough discussion of what this implies and how we can read the results.

But while respondent are unlikely to have detailed knowledge about what the China model entails it is fair to assume that they know a fair amount about China in Africa. Paper does not depend on respondents having detailed knowledge.

"Aid"

As pointed out by the aforementioned AidData Working Paper it is tricky to distinguish between Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its more commercially-oriented investments. The Chinese government’s secrecy around foreign aid and their

¹²⁹ Dikotte, *Mao’s Great Famine*, Bloomsbury, 2011

willingness to mix business with development assistance make categorical distinctions difficult. Chinese aid is not aid in the strict OECD definition and the country's model for development is based on ideas of helping through mutual gains. As Deborah Brautigam has pointed out "foreign aid, investment, and trade are not really distinct categories" for China. They are politically bound together under a set of intricate financial arrangements.¹³⁰ The majority of China's officially supported finance is according to Brautigam not actually ODA, but other financial flows.¹³¹ The AidData project works its way around this problem by using open source data to track active projects. Its database distinguishes between official finance and other financial flows.¹³² The FDI data from American Enterprise Institute tracks investment from source to destination. While this does not guarantee overlap between projects and financial flows it is fair to assume that they are distinct categories and that they can be measured with relative accuracy.

Limitations

Due to limitation and requirements for relative brevity the author has had to make some tough choices with regards to the depth of analysis. The paper is unable to offer a breakdown and analysis according to stratified social subgroups. Exploring the difference between people in different occupations and with different belonging to parties within individual countries would likely unlock explanations for Chinese support in some countries. Furthermore, the author would greatly have enjoyed including analysis of the effects of migration, media use and media framing. However, these data are simply not available at the time of writing.

It is important to highlight that the paper does not rely on people to put any particular content to the notion of a China model. Rather it seeks to explore the covariation between the selected variables to see if there are patterns in the type of respondents who tend to choose the China model. Regardless of what content people interpret into the Chinese way of development it represents an advance for Chinese soft power and China as an alternative world system.

¹³⁰ Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Oxford University Press, 2010

¹³¹ Brautigam, *Aid 'With Chinese Characteristics': Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime*, *Journal of International Development*, 2011

¹³² Dreher et al, *Chinese "Aid" to Africa: Be Careful Comparing Apples and Dragon Fruits*, AidData, October 2015. Available at:

<http://aiddata.org/blog/chinese-aid-to-africa-be-careful-comparing-apples-and-dragon-fruits>

2.12 Method of Control

Criteria of acceptance and rejection

The criteria of acceptance of the model is, as according to Carl Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations*, that we can reject the null hypothesis and detect a relationship that is statistically shown not to happen by chance itself. This does not imply final proof, just that the null hypothesis is unlikely.¹³³ As mentioned earlier; the direction of the relationship is not the central them. The output of the regression model will show which of the hypotheses comes closest to representing reality. If the regression model shows that we can significantly predict the dependent variable, choice of development model, from our key independent variables then the model is accepted.

¹³³ Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Routledge Classics, 2002

Chapter 3

What do Africans think about China?

The purpose of the descriptive section is to outline just how popular the Chinese model is in Africa as well as to provide an overview over findings from the other China related questions in the survey. Seeing that the literature is so polarized in its presentation of African public opinion on China it is necessary to outline the findings of the Afrobarometer survey. The sixth round provides the most comprehensive sampling and coverage of China-related-questions currently available. Chapter three will serve as a summary of African sentiments towards China. As described in chapter two, two main hypotheses have been advanced by the literature:

H1: Empirical. Based on previous surveys: *Africans are on average positive towards the Chinese intervention on the continent.*

H2: Theoretical. Chinese soft power is capped because of authoritarian rule: *Africans are on average negative towards to the Chinese intervention.*

This chapter finds that contrary to the alarmist reports from various media sources Africans are on average very positive to the Chinese involvement on the continent. They view the political and economic impact as positive and consider Chinese aid to be of assistance in developing their country.

Q81b. China's influence: positive or negative

		Percent
Valid	Very negative	6,4
	Somewhat negative	8,7
	Neither positive nor negative	7,3
	Somewhat positive	35,4
	Very positive	28,5
Total		86,4
Missing	Missing	,0
	Don't know / Haven't heard enough	13,6
	Total	13,6
Total		100,0

3.1 China is perceived to be a positive influence

The data from Afrobarometer supports the notion that China is well perceived in African countries. 63.9 percent of respondents rate China's influence in their country as somewhat or very positive when it comes to politics and economics

(74 percent if we only count those who offered a response.)¹³⁴ These positive sentiments hold true for a number of stratified categories. Evaluations of China are not correlated with education or the occupation of the respondents. Neither is there a relationship between living in an authoritarian society and evaluations of the Chinese. However, respondents from more developed countries (measured by HDI) are more likely to give less favorable evaluations of the Chinese engagement (-.167, $p < .001$).

Although the majority of respondents could offer an opinion a large proportion (13.6 percent) of Africans interviewed did not offer answers to the question. Analysis of the missing group reveals that a non-reply is correlated with poverty (.07, $p < .001$) and highly correlated with level of education (-.213, $p < .001$). Put differently, respondents who are poor and who have low levels of education are more likely to say that they have not heard enough to say, or that they do not know.

Positive evaluations of Chinese development assistance are also found in the Afrobarometer data. Q81E of the survey asks respondents to evaluate the impact of Chinese aid on a five-point scale.¹³⁵ A majority of respondents, 57.1 percent, find that China does somewhat of a good job or a very good job at meeting their countries development needs. While western discourse might paint Chinese development assistance as “rouge aid”¹³⁶, Africans value its contribution to development.

¹³⁴ Q81B. *In general, do you think that China's economic and political influence on X is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?* Afrobarometer Questionnaire round six

¹³⁵ 81E. *In your opinion, does China's economic development assistance to X do a good job or a bad job of meeting the country's needs, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

¹³⁶ Naim, *Rouge Aid*, Foreign Policy, October, 2009
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/15/rogue-aid/>

3.2 Economic factors identified as key

The survey asks respondents two questions, Q81C and D, on what they think contributes to positive and negative evaluations of China. African evaluations of the Chinese seem mostly not to be driven by political factors. When asked what contributes to positive evaluations respondents list two main categories. Economic factors such as infrastructure construction and business investment, and the quality or cost of Chinese products. The investments made in infrastructure construction and business investment make up nearly half of all respondent replies with 48 percent. The cost or quality of Chinese products is also listed as a key explanation with 23.3 percent. Political factors are only mentioned by slightly more than 10 percent of respondents and cultural factors are a mere curiosity with less than a percent of respondents identifying an appreciation of Chinese people, culture and language.¹³⁷

When it comes to negative sentiments, the poor quality of Chinese products stands out with 35.7 percent. This may seem counterintuitive considering that a large amount of respondents identified Chinese products as a driver of positive sentiment, but the wording of these questions hides a distinction in price versus quality. For many respondent negative sentiments are related to quality while it can be assumed that positive sentiments are driven by price. In fact the two Chinese product related answers are correlated (.157, $p < .000$) indicating that many respondents find the price of Chinese products positive and the quality

Q81c. Positive image of China

		Percent
Valid	None of these	2,2
	China's support for the country in international affairs	6,3
	Non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries	4,6
	China's investment in infrastructure in the country	31,7
	China's business investment	16,3
	The quality or cost of Chinese products	23,3
	An appreciation of the Chinese people, culture and language	1,7
	Some other factor	,7
	Total	86,8
Missing	Missing	,0
	Don't know / Haven't heard enough	13,1
	Total	13,2
Total		100,0

Q81d. Negative image of China

		Percent
Valid	None of these	4,6
	China's extraction of resources from Africa	10,4
	Land grabbing by Chinese individuals or businesses	7,5
	China's willingness to cooperate with undemocratic rulers	3,9
	Taking jobs or business from the locals	14,6
	The quality of Chinese products	35,7
	The behavior of Chinese citizens in the country	6,0
	Some other factor	1,2
	Total	83,8
Missing	Missing	,0
	Don't know / Haven't heard enough	16,2
	Total	16,2
Total		100,0

¹³⁷ Q81C. Which of the following factors contributes most to positive image of China in X, or haven't you heard enough to say? Afrobarometer Questionnaire round six
Q81D. Which of the following factors contributes most to negative images of China in Zambia, or haven't you heard enough to say? Afrobarometer Questionnaire round six

negative. The other most prevalent answers were that the Chinese are stealing jobs (14.6 percent), extraction of natural resources (10.4 percent) and land grabbing (7.5 percent). The behaviour of Chinese citizens was also identified as a driver of negative sentiments, but only by 6 percent of respondents. Following, economic variables form African perceptions of the Chinese engagement. Economic impact dominates the narrative around China’s engagement in the respondent’s country. Political influences seemingly play a secondary role along with cultural values or norms.¹³⁸

3.3 China is seen as influential

Q80b. Country with most influence

		Percent
Valid	None of these have much influence	1,5
	United States	23,0
	China	23,1
	Former Colonial Power	25,6
	India	2,2
	South Africa	5,4
	International organizations	4,8
	Some other country or organization	,5
	France	2,2
	Total	88,2
	Missing	Missing
Don't know / Haven't heard enough		11,8
Refused		,0
Total		11,8
Total		100,0

The Afrobarometer survey contains two questions that ask respondents to evaluate the level of Chinese influence in their country. Q80b asks respondents to gauge what country has the most influence in their state.¹³⁹ 23.1 percent of respondents point to China (26.6 percent if we only look at respondents who named a country). This puts The Middle Kingdom on par with the United States and the former colonial powers.* The former colonial power category is a collective term and in the questionnaire the respective former colonial power is inserted. This implies that China is identified as the single most important country right ahead of the US. While the country average is high, the span is great. From only 1.9 percent of respondents in Tunisia to 62.3 percent of respondents in Zimbabwe, who identify

China as the most influential country, there is a range of 60.4 points. However, if central tendency is measured by median the number remains high (27.1 percent). A complete list of responses has been included in the appendix for reference.

¹³⁸ It should be noted that these questions are vulnerable to “pluralistic ignorance” bias as they ask respondents to weigh the opinions of others. Social psychology tells us that people often hold false beliefs about the opinions and perceptions of others. See for example. Krech, Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*, McGraw-Hill, 1948

¹³⁹ Q80B. *Which of the following do think has the most influence on Zambia, or haven't you heard enough to say?* Afrobarometer Questionnaire Round six

* France is counted as a former colonial power in countries where it previously had colonies. 2.2 percent of respondents outside of former French colonies identify France as the most influential.

Question 81A asks respondents to rate how much influence China has on their country’s economy. 42.7 percent of Africans find that China has a lot of influence on their countries economy. While 27.8 percent finds that China has some influence.¹⁴⁰ It is thereby fair to conclude that China is perceived as highly influential in Africa by the respondents.


3.4 The Chinese model is popular

In this sample of thirty one African countries, an average of 26.7 percent of respondents say that they prefer the Chinese development model. As we can see from the table below there are, however, significant variations in between countries. In Cameroon more than half of all respondents who answered the question replied that they preferred the Chinese model compared to all others. In Ghana only 17.9 percent of respondents said the same. This large between country variation indicates the relevance of the multilevel model and highlights that there are variations to explore between countries and not just between individuals. What we can establish from just the descriptive data is that China offers a very popular model for development. For respondents in the thirty one countries only the United States is on average more popular with 31.2 percent of respondents saying that they would chose the US as model for development. In a third of the countries China is a more popular choice than the United States. The former colonial powers come in at a distant third place with 13.8 percent on average. Interestingly only about one in ten respondents identified a fellow African country. 10.3 percent of respondents identify South Africa as their preferred development model. A breakdown of respondents’ choice has been included in appendix a long with a table comparing the US to China (appendix 1.0).

		Model for country development
		China
Country	Algeria	21,1%
	Benin	28,8%
	Botswana	27,2%
	Burkina Faso	21,3%
	Burundi	19,8%
	Cameroon	50,4%
	Cape Verde	22,5%
	Cote d'Ivoire	26,7%
	Egypt	37,7%
	Ghana	17,9%
	Guinea	23,2%
	Kenya	25,9%
	Lesotho	22,1%
	Liberia	25,0%
	Madagascar	24,2%
	Malawi	19,1%
	Mali	36,6%
	Mauritius	13,7%
	Namibia	22,2%
	Niger	29,6%
	Nigeria	27,4%
	Senegal	30,5%
	Sierra Leone	22,9%
	South Africa	29,9%
	Sudan	37,7%
	Swaziland	24,0%
	Tanzania	39,4%
	Togo	20,4%
	Tunisia	25,5%
	Uganda	22,2%
	Zambia	34,6%
	Zimbabwe	20,9%

*Swaziland included for reference

¹⁴⁰ 81A.How much influence do you think China’s economic activities in X have on our economy, or haven’t you heard enough to say? Afrobarometer Questionnaire Round six



Preference for Chinese model of development by geography. Source AB

Most respondents have named a country they find to be a model for country development. Only 9 percent of the respondents refuse to offer an answer or say that they don't know. The missing category is correlated with poverty (.04, $p < .001$) and low levels of education (-.185, $p < .001$).

3.5 One big “China-construct”?

Arguably the questions on China could make one scale or measurement of “affect towards China.” Were this to be true the later regression model would have components of the same construct on both sides of the equation and be invalid. However, this is analytically and statistically incorrect.

The questions used for the regression model measure different analytic constructs. The dependent variable measures preference for China as a development model. Question 81B and 81E probes whether respondents find that China is helping their country and if they consider China to be a positive or negative impact. 80B and 81A measure perceived levels of Chinese

influence. This is different from evaluation of whether it is positive or negative. Importantly, there is also a distinction between the two influence questions. One probes the total level of influence were as the other deals specifically with economic influence. Bivariate correlations between the two is only .116 ($p < .000$). This holds true even when a binary recode has been done so we can compare those who consider China to have a lot of economic impact to those who see China as the overall most important country.¹⁴¹

That respondents consider these questions as probing different themes and constructs is supported by the variations in the Afrobarometer data. None of the China related questions are correlated at levels that would indicate that they are measuring the same underlying construct. The single largest correlation occurs between choice of development model and choice of country with most influence (.320, $p < .000$). This implies that the two items are closely tied together, respondents who choose China for development model are more likely to choose China as the most influential country, but they are different constructs and recognized as such by respondents. When reliability analysis is run it only yields a mediocre Cronbach Alpha of .485. The paper therefore considers the questions on China to be measuring different things and judging by the statistics so do respondents. The two questions that do measure the same construct, brought together as the China_scale, have been debated in chapter two.

Correlations of China related questions

		Model: China vs other	Influence: China vs other	Q81a. China's influence on economy	China_scale
Model: China vs other	Pearson Correlation	1	,320**	,136**	,161**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,000	,000	,000
	N	33818	31552	31094	29497
Influence: China vs other	Pearson Correlation	,320**	1	,136**	,019**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,000	,001
	N	31552	32251	30211	28765
Q81a. China's influence on economy	Pearson Correlation	,136**	,136**	1	,341**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000		,000
	N	31094	30211	32364	30132
China_scale	Pearson Correlation	,161**	,019**	,341**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,001	,000	
	N	29497	28765	30132	30537

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

¹⁴¹ Teste to see whether they are suitable as a scale reveals a Cronbach Alpha of just .206 implying that the two questions are poor candidates for one «influence» scale. They are therefore kept as two separate variables in the model.

3.6 Chapter conclusion

The analysis of data from Afrobarometer round six reveals that most Africans perceive China in a positive light when it comes to economic, political and development assistance impact. Furthermore, most Africans see China as having considerable influence on their country. These sentiments provide an important background for the discussion on why Africans choose the Chinese model for development. As chapter four will demonstrate that respondent evaluations of Chinese impact in their own country is intimately linked to their choice of development model. This form of analysis is important as the data reveals that the Chinese development model is a very popular choice in the surveyed countries. Overall in our sample it is comparatively popular to the United States. In ten out of the thirty one countries it is the majority choice.

Chapter 4: Explanatory analysis: What explains African choice of development model?

Chapter three has established that Africans evaluate China in a positive light. Importantly Africans also view China as a viable model for their country's development. When asked to choose model for their country's development China is the second most popular after the United States. So what explains respondents' choice of development model? The table below

<i>DV: China vs other</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Education	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Poverty	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Governance		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Econ & infra		-0.09** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
People influence			-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Elections			-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sov vs human rights			0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Auth. reject.			0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
China scale				0.42*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)
China infl. econ				0.13*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
China most infl.				1.63*** (0.03)	1.69*** (0.03)	1.63*** (0.03)	1.75*** (0.03)
Freedom House					-0.08*** (0.02)		
HDI						-0.92** (0.33)	
Total Imports							0.13** (0.05)
AID							-0.26*** (0.03)
FDI							-0.33*** (0.09)
Cons.	-1.19*** (0.03)	-1.10*** (0.04)	-1.00*** (0.06)	-3.43*** (0.10)	-3.12*** (0.12)	-3.07*** (0.19)	-1.78*** (0.24)
Var.cons							
Country	0.10** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.09)	0.26*** (0.08)	0.90* (0.42)
<i>N</i>	41877	41877	40570	33873	33873	33873	33873
<i>AIC</i>	48295.59	48287.75	46825.74	35695.12	35674.65	35567.49	35439.15
<i>BIC</i>	48330.16	48339.61	46911.84	35804.71	35792.67	35685.52	35574.04

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

outlines the models findings. The multilevel model was calculated using STATA 14 melogit function.

4.1 Model findings

The model is structured according to the blocks outlined in chapter two. The analysis is run by adding one and one block, or layer, to the prior variables included. This implies that the model controls for the effect of all previously entered variables. The national level data (micro) is added in separate blocks, removing previously entered national level variables. This is done for two reasons. Firstly, it is theoretically interesting to see the effect of the two national characteristics (FDI and Freedom House Scores) and Chinese footprint as separate entities. Second, limitations of statistical power apply to the national level data as the sample only includes thirty one countries to explore variations in between. The reason for adding all the footprint variables together is to explore combined effect of all these variables as they theoretically make up one construct.

The table includes two measures of ‘model fit’; AIC and BIC. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) can be seen as relative measures of model quality comparing them to each other. No consensus exists around exact interpretation of these two entities, but they both indicate better fit when values drop. The table shows that all the blocks improve model fit. The ‘China-block’ contributes the strongest improvement when it is added to the regression.

The model shows that some of the explanatory variables have a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable, meaning that the model helps explain why Africans choose China as a development model compared to other nations. We can therefore reject the stated null-hypothesis.

Education is a significant predictor for choice of the Chinese model. The more education a respondent has the more likely she is to choose the Chinese model. The effect however is limited, but the impact is significant for all versions of the model (.04 to .07, $p < .000$).

Experienced poverty does not make a significant impact to the dependent variable except from in model 4 and 5. However, the effect size is almost non-existent. Poverty is therefore found not to be an important predictor for respondent’s choice of development model when controlling for education.

Respondents' priorities for development offer small difference in explaining the dependent variables. Both explanatory variables offer significant impact at several versions of the model and both show negative relationships with the dependent variable. This implies that individuals who consider governance a key priority are less likely to choose the China model. However, the hypothesized dichotomy between the two variables did not materialize. Respondents who prioritize economic growth are also less likely to Chinese model for development. This presents a bit of a puzzle. In model 2, were we only control for the effect of education and experienced poverty, priority of economic factors and infrastructure makes respondents less likely to choose the Chinese model (-.09, $p < .01$). Prioritizing governance yields a non-statistically significant impact in this model. Governance becomes important as we start controlling for the other variables (values, evaluations of China, country characteristics and Chinese footprint), but the effect size is small. Block two therefore offers little insight into what shapes choice of development model. Instead of the hypothesized dichotomy the finding lends support to the notion that respondents who are conscious about their preferences for how development should proceed shun away from China. The finding offers a puzzle for future research to explore.

The block on values offers one of the papers greatest surprises. Values on democracy, authoritarianism and human rights do not explain respondents' choice of China as model for development. Only the question on peoples influence over politics yields a statistically significant impact. However, it only does so for two versions of the model. In these versions it has a very small effect size (-.04, $p < .001$ and -.02, $p < .01$). The key finding, therefore, is that on the whole values are not an important determinant of Africa's choice of development model.

Evaluations of China's engagement and influence the respondent's country, block four, greatly shape the likelihood of choosing the Chinese model. Respondents who report positive evaluations of Chinese impact on politics, economics and aid are much more likely to choose China as their model for development (.41 to .44, $p < .001$). Africans who view China as influential are also more likely to pick them as role model. Respondents' who think China has a lot of impact on their countries economy are more prone to choosing China (.05 to .06, $p < .001$). Those who consider China to have the *most* influence of all countries are much more likely to choose the Chinese model (1.65 to 1.76, $p < .001$). The forth hypothesis is therefore

supported by the model. Evaluations of China's power, influence and impact in the respondent's home country shape their likelihood of choosing the Chinese development model.

Block five introduces national level variables. Respondents nested within well developed countries are much less likely to choose China as their development model. A country's level of development is a significant predictor with substantial impact on choice of development model (-.92, $p < .01$). Regime type also matters. The model shows that a country's level of authoritarianism also predicts respondent's choice of model for development. Higher Freedom House scores are associated with less likelihood for choosing the China model for development (-.08, $p < .001$). This is a puzzle because the coding of Freedom House scores dictate that as countries get more authoritarian scores go up. In other words, the model shows that the more democratic and free a country is, the more likely it gets that its citizens choose China. The link between regime type and development level is an old favorite of social science literature and a second model was run to explore this relationship more in-depth. When the model is tweaked to run the two variables together to see the effect of each while controlling for the other, the effects only grow. While controlling for development level the adverse effect of Freedom House scores swells (-.31, $p < .001$) indicating that China has a stronger pull on respondents from democratic

		Level of Democracy China
		Rated 6 or higher on 10-point scale
		Percentage of respondents
Country	Algeria	80,2%
	Benin	72,6%
	Botswana	63,8%
	Burkina Faso	71,6%
	Burundi	75,3%
	Cameroon	68,7%
	Cape Verde	60,9%
	Cote d'Ivoire	75,6%
	Egypt	67,3%
	Ghana	64,6%
	Kenya	67,3%
	Lesotho	55,9%
	Liberia	46,5%
	Madagascar	67,5%
	Malawi	57,7%
	Mali	61,7%
	Mauritius	46,8%
	Morocco	72,1%
	Mozambique	67,0%
	Namibia	64,6%
	Togo	68,4%
	Nigeria	84,4%
	Senegal	60,8%
	Niger	59,4%
	South Africa	46,7%
	Sudan	65,1%
	Swaziland	75,3%
	Tanzania	66,9%
	Uganda	67,7%
	Guinea	67,7%
	Tunisia	67,7%
	Zambia	56,3%
	Zimbabwe	66,3%
	Sierra Leone	57,8%

countries, even when we control for development level. Development level meanwhile becomes ever more important (-3.59, $p < .001$), when we are controlling for regime type.¹⁴² This puzzle will be explored in more detail in section 4.2.

The variables measuring Chinese footprint show that the more engagement China has in a country the less likely respondents are to choose the Chinese model for development. However, the variables included in the block are pulling in separate directions. Higher levels of import lead to more positive evaluation (.13, $p < .01$), however the effect size is somewhat limited. More aid and foreign direct investment lead to less likelihood of respondents choosing the Chinese model. These variables yield quite strong effect sizes. AID (-.25, $p < .001$) and FDI (-.21, $p < .001$). The “footprint block” arguably makes up two components. Increased imports from China do not necessarily imply increased interaction between Africans and Chinese. Rather it means more of the cheap Chinese products which are favored by the African populous (as demonstrated in chapter three). Increased AID and FDI on the other hand implies actual interaction with Chinese through their projects. A higher rate of FDI and AID could therefore be a proxy for increased interaction between the Chinese and ordinary Africans. The present data cannot answer the question of whether the lower probability for choosing the China model is due to increased interaction or because the projects and investments themselves are unpopular. It therefore presents an opportunity for the design of future research.

The outcome of the model yields several interesting insights and two large puzzles. Firstly why do values on democracy and human rights not determine choice of development model in Africa? After all this was found to be significant by previous research. Second, why does more liberal and democratic rule increase the likelihood of respondents choosing the Chinese model?


4.2 On democratic understanding; China the democracy?

One key reason for why authoritarian rejection and value questions such as human rights do not explain African preference for the China-model of development might lie in the fact that Africans on average do not view China as being an authoritarian country. To the contrary a majority of surveyed Africans interpret China as being democratic. Data from round five of

¹⁴² See appendix 1.5 for model printout

the Afrobarometer, which covered all of the countries included in the round six sample, reveals that a large proportion of respondents, 65.5 percent on average, rate China as six or above when asked to rate the level of democracy in China on a ten-point scale. At the time of the survey, 2013, China received a non-free ranking and the worst and second worst scores for political rights and civil liberties respectfully by Freedom House.¹⁴³

African evaluations of China’s human rights record are available from PEW’s Spring 2015 survey. Of the nine African countries surveyed a median of 60 percent of respondents say China respects the personal freedoms of its people. This puts Africa in a league of its own as it is the only continent where a median of more than half the respondents give China a good human rights scorecard. Sadly the PEW sampling of African countries is not as comprehensive as the Afrobarometer, but in light of African evaluations of democracy in China it is fair to assume that Africans view China to be far less authoritarian than independent observer groups.



This should not be interpreted as a lacking understanding of democracy or as a lack of demand for democratic rights. Previous research based on Afrobarometer data finds that democracy is a recognizable construct to most Africans interviewed. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi find that support for democracy in Africa is widespread, if somewhat shallow. Furthermore, Africans tend to give positive descriptions about democracy when promoted to offer

a definition. The African view on democracy is both instrumental and rights based as

¹⁴³ See Freedom House 2013 report. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013>

“Africans value democracy both as an end in itself and as a means to improve governance and welfare.”¹⁴⁴

In some respects African evaluations of Chinese democracy and its human rights record is a victory for Chinese soft power. Chinese official rhetoric blurs the picture and presents the country as democratic. Its representatives talk about the "Chinese democracy". Xi Jinping's outlines the Chinese Dream as the goal of building a “prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized country.” A firm goal that is to be realized by the People’s Republic of China’s centennial in 2049.¹⁴⁵ The declaration from the sixth Forum on China-African cooperation expresses support for “advancing democracy.”¹⁴⁶ It may very well be that Joseph Nye is right about his assumptions that China authoritarian rule should cap the country’s soft power at a threshold,¹⁴⁷ but what Nye overlooks in this instance is that soft power is the result of perceptions, not hard realities. China may very well be autocratic in every objectively measurable way, but if the country is perceived to be democratic it will receive the same rewards as countries that are truly democratic. Data presented in this paper and the subsequent model output suggests that China is not faced with a soft power deficit in Africa due to its authoritarian rule. Rather it faces soft power gain due to its perceived democratic values and human rights record.

We should be careful not to equate support for the Chinese model with support for authoritarian policies or authoritarian models for development. Rather, Africans view China as a democratic state that represents an alternative development model to the West. As highlighted in chapter three, African evaluations of the Chinese seem not be driven by political factors. When asked what contributes to positive evaluations of China, Africans mostly list economic reasons. The model reveals that that one of the drivers of Africans’ choice of development model is evaluations of the Chinese engagement in their own country.

¹⁴⁴ Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, 2005

¹⁴⁵ Chase et al, *China, Inside and Out: A Collection of Essays on Foreign and Domestic Policy in the Xi Jinping Era*, RAND Corporation, 2015

¹⁴⁶ Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, December 2015.

Available at: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dwjbzjhys_1/hywj/t1327960.htm

See also The Economist for an explanation for why «human rights» and «democracy» carry the same conceptual meaning in the West as it does in China. Available at:

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-21>

¹⁴⁷ Carnegie Council address by Joseph Nye, February 10th 2011. See transcript available at:

<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20110210/index.html>

Meaning that if they think China is a positive influence they are more likely to opt for the Chinese model. Critically evaluations of power and influence also matters as respondents are more likely to choose China as role model for development if they perceive the Chinese as having a lot of influence in their country. Seemingly there is some attraction also in classic realist terms.

4.3 Role model for democracies?

The first puzzle is tied to the second. It seems counterintuitive, as the model shows, that respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model increases as regimes get more democratic. As shown by the Afrobarometer (R5) data China is perceived as a democracy by most Africans. Perception in this case is reality. The Chinese ‘democracy’ may well be perceived as an alternative type of democratic rule and respondents may be drawn towards China for its other attractive attributes. But this is only part of the answer and does not explain why respondents in democratic states are *more* likely to choose China. One plausible explanation is that Chinese involvement in authoritarian states is seen as benefiting the ruling class or elite. The benefits of aid and trade in authoritarian states tend to advantage a small ruling class rather than the broader public. In a democracy aiding the state is aiding the public as the nation is ruled by the people. While this may provide parts of the answer, unpacking the data further leads to a more complex picture. Bivariate analysis shows that regime type is not directly tied to evaluations of whether China is a positive or negative influence. Freedom House scores are not correlated with questions asking respondents to rate the merits of the Chinese impact in their own country. Even more perplexing is the fact that regime type is positively correlated with choice of model for development in bivariate analysis. Respondents are on average more likely to choose the China model for development if they live in authoritarian states (.064, $p < .000$). It is only when we control for the individual level variables that the relationship changes direction. This provides us with a puzzle and more research is needed before we can conclude on the relationship between regime type and support for the Chinese model.

Chapter 5

Consequences for the literature

The findings outlined in the previous chapters hold important consequences for the debate around the Chinese engagement in Africa and for discussions around the China model. Empirical findings should replace the speculation that has fuelled much of the literature on China in Africa. The paper has established that China is perceived in a positive light by African respondents. Furthermore, China is seen as role model for development by a large portion of Africans. While meta-debates on what constitutes a developmental model are important, we need to recognize China is perceived as a viable alternative regardless of whether or not academics can agree on its integrity as a developmental alternative.

Importance of the China model debate underlined

It is beyond the scope of this paper to conclude on the merits of the Chinese involvement in Africa. Whether the increasing Chinese influence is transforming African nations into more democratic or authoritarian states is too early to call. As I have argued in chapter two the process of “China in Africa” is a complex social phenomenon. In the end Chinese investment and development assistance in Africa is not either good or bad. One way to measure the Chinese impact is to measure its influence on the “hard” material wellbeing of inhabitants in these countries. The metrics here would be well-known entities like HDI, GDP, education, inequality. In this arena China should be judged on the merits of its impact in individual African communities rather than to get an a priori stamp of malicious because it comes from an authoritarian regime. We should judge the Chinese rather a posteriori when we have evidence and experience to weight its impact.

However, for those who argue that the African renaissance is built on deeper transformations of political culture and of sound governance increased Chinese influence in both hard and soft power raises some complex long term questions. What happens to norms over time as Chinese influence grows? And what impact does China have on development of democracy and human rights? In the realm of soft power the support for Chinese model should cause at least some concern.

Matt Ferchen has argued for the importance of placing the China model on the research agenda.¹⁴⁸ The findings of this paper support that notion. Due to lacking data researchers have so far focused on debating whether such a thing as a China model really exists. This paper finds that in Africa it does. Not only is China an alternative; on the African continent it is the second most popular choice of development model after the United States. In a third of our sampled countries it is the dominant choice. The debate needs to shift from abstract discussions on whether China truly represents an alternative, to concrete discussions about what it entails that such a large proportion of the African population identify China as the preferred model for their country's development. If academic literature ignores this development we will fail to grasp an important dynamic shaping the future of Africa. A more assertive China can shape Africa in its image. Seemingly the door is open for growing Chinese involvement and influence. Not only in terms of hard exchange of trade and aid, but also on the softer exchange of ideas. African leaders are looking to China for advice and guidance on how to develop. According to the Afrobarometer data they are doing so with considerable popular support. For those invested in the long term development of the African continent, winning the "war of ideas" may be even more important than some race for dominance in terms of absolute numbers in trade and aid. In the long run these figures are also dependent on the convictions of African leaders and publics.

The popularity of the Chinese model is part of, and as the regression model has showed; partly product of, a broader trend of Chinese popularity on the African continent. Chapter three has outlined surprising findings on the rate of popular support towards China in Africa. Research based on anecdotal evidence and media reports often claim that Africans are skeptical to the growing Chinese influence.¹⁴⁹ Findings outlined in chapter three disputes this notion and indicate that these anecdotes do not reflect the broader trend. China is perceived as a positive influence on the political, economic and development arena in African states. Furthermore, China is viewed as a key player on the African continent with significant influence in individual African countries. Positive sentiments found in the Afrobarometer data mirror the tonality found by previous quantitative research and supports the notion that

¹⁴⁸ Ferchen, *Whose China Model is it anyway? The contentious search for consensus*, Review of International Political Economy, Vol.20, 2013

¹⁴⁹ See for example:

Asian News, *Chinese thrown out of Africa*, January 2008 Available at:

<http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=11266>

Craig Trimberg, *In Africa, China's trade brings growth, unease*, Washington Post, 13 June 2006

Africans on the whole are quite positive to the growing Chinese influence on the continent.¹⁵⁰ This does not imply that all is rosy red in the China-Africa relationship. Respondents indicate reservations on several key areas like extraction of natural resources and depletion of jobs, but the overall tone is positive rather than negative.

Why do people look to China?

As demonstrated by the model in chapter four; positive evaluations of China's engagement in the respondent's respective countries are closely tied to their likelihood of choosing the Chinese model of development. It cannot be established from the model which way this relationship goes (i.e. the causal direction), but it seems fair to assume that perceptions of the Chinese influences peoples' choice of development model. If so, one of the most important drivers is evaluations of the Chinese impact in the respondents own country. This makes intuitive sense. It is not the actual Chinese footprint, but how they perceive the Chinese impact that matters. The model reflects this. If anything it shows that an increased Chinese footprint decreases respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model.

The model finds that individual values are non-significant in predicting respondents' choice of development model. This finding put the paper somewhat at odds with the work of Gadzala and Hanusch who find that values on human rights and democracy are important predictors for perceptions of China's Africa engagement. It is important to note that the paper uses a different dependent variable; Gadzala, Hanusch use a question that asks respondents how much help they think China is in their country. One could question whether the dependent variable used by Gadzala and Hanusch actually taps into a purely descriptive question that asks respondents to rate the level of help in economic terms. The question on development model grasps a broader dimension. This papers dependent variable also taps into a normative aspect that explores the direction respondents would like their country to be heading in. Furthermore, a close look at Gazala and Hanuch's model reveals that the effect size of respondent values is miniscule (-0.01). It is only when values on democracy is run the vis-à-vis analysis with evaluation of Western states that they have gain some effect size.¹⁵¹ Bearing in mind the Afrobarometer data (R5), which reveals that most Africans perceive China to be

¹⁵⁰ Sautman, Hairong, *African Perspectives on China-Africa Links*, The China Quarterly 199, 2009

¹⁵¹ Gadzala, Hanusch, *African Perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging Popular Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants*, Afrobarometer Working Paper 117. Later published as Oxford Development Studies, Vol 40, 2012

democratic, it is interesting that respondent values should yield a statically significant impact at all. This paper finds that when it comes to choosing *development model* values do not distinguish those respondents who choose the Chinese model compared to those who choose ‘other’.

Importantly the national level variables reveal that some countries are more susceptible to Chinese influence than others. The model shows that China is role-model for less developed states. As country development level increases, the likelihood of respondents choosing the China model decreases. This finding makes intuitive sense and is what would be expected as China is itself a developing country. Richer countries prefer to model themselves the more highly developed Western states.

While some of the findings make intuitive sense, others findings are less so. The paper offers support to Kurlantzick’s notion that increased Chinese soft power has made the Chinese model of development popular even free nations in the developing world.¹⁵² It finds that respondents nested within free and democratic states are more likely to choose the China model. The fears of alarmists like Kurlantzick and Halpern seems therefore to be grounded in some truth.

Understanding the African choice of development model is important

It may be that Shaun Breslin is right in assuming that the Chinese model is a metaphor for different rather than a specific set of policy prescriptions for development success. The model reveals that Africans do not tie China to any specific type of development path. Governance versus economic and infrastructure development does not shine out like the anticipated dichotomy. Rather, it seems that the Chinese model is popular because of a broader trend of Chinese popularity. People who view China as positive and powerful want to emulate its success. Skeptics like Stephan Halper may be right about the China model’s popularity and, if one believes the thermometer analogy, China’s is accumulating considerable soft power. However, as this paper shows it is too early to equate this with support for authoritarian rule or growing state intervention in development. As shown in chapter four; rather than promoting its authoritarian worldview China is seemly projecting a democratic mirage. What specific components of the so-called “China-model” that Africans are attracted to, other than

¹⁵² Kurlantzick, *Why the ‘China Model’ is not going away*, The Atlantic, March 2013. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-the-china-model-isnt-going-away/274237/>

a general favorability of 'China', is difficult to root out. This may be an indication that the notion is relativistic and like all mirages it dependent on the perspective of the individual viewer.

The data then reveals little demand in Africa for sudden authoritarian resurgence. The paper finds greater support for the notion of authors like Joshua Kurlantzick who argue that gradual policy shifts may over time undermine democracy. In this sense the threat may be that of ignorance and creeping reform rather than sudden authoritarian shock. Kurlantzick has argued that the increasing eagerness of African leaders to seek Chinese policy design and solutions could eventually help undermine democracy in vulnerable countries.¹⁵³ Increased concentration of resources and power in the hands of the state and its *elites* is happening while the "democratic Chinese model" acts as the wool over the eyes of African publics. Ignorance can in this case be as dangerous as informed consent. If Africans blindly support wider Chinese engagement without conditions the developmental-Pandora's Box may reveal problems later on.

Other authors have warned of the frailty of *individual* democratic support in developing nations and how the appeal of the China model could over time shift them in a more authoritarian direction. The Economist Intelligence Unit's worldwide survey of global democracy finds that the global financial crisis "has increased the attractiveness of the Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism for some emerging markets".¹⁵⁴ In Southeast Asia Wibowo's analysis of a decade of survey data reveals that many people in Southeast Asian share a willingness to abandon some of their democratic values for higher growth and a return to state-directed economic system that China is the main promoter of today.¹⁵⁵ Yun-han Chu analysis of Asian Barometer data finds that "authoritarianism remains a fierce competitor of

¹⁵³ Kurlantzick, *Why the 'China Model' is not going away*, The Atlantic, March 2013. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-the-china-model-isnt-going-away/274237/>
Kurlantzick, *Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government*, Yale University Press, 2013

¹⁵⁴ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat*, 2010. Available at: https://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf

¹⁵⁵ Wibowo, *China's soft power and neoliberal agenda in Southeast Asia*, In Li M (ed), *Soft power : China's emerging strategy in international politics*, Lexington Books, 2009

democracy in East Asia.” Chu finds that this is due in no small part to the great success of China.¹⁵⁶ Future research should investigate whether this is the case in Africa as well.

Consequences for the soft power literature

If Joseph Nye is right about opinion polls being the ‘thermometer of soft power’ then China is seemingly seemingly a soft power giant in Africa. It is worth noting that cross continental research by PEW indicates Africa is somewhat in a league of its own when it comes to positive evaluations of the Chinese. However, with PEWs limited sampling it is difficult to generalize and compare on an intercontinental scale. The findings of this paper challenge some of preconceived ideas around soft power. The data indicate that in Africa China does not suffer a soft power loss because of its autocratic rule. Perception is reality. China is perceived as democratic and can therefore harvest the democratic bonus that Nye claims exists for liberal democracies.

The fact that China is making soft power headway in Africa and that the Chinese model is a component of that development has not been lost on policy makers on the ground. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Hormats has made it clear that “the model of state-led capitalism is being used as an instrument of China's soft power" in Africa. To Hormats it is part of a greater notion “that China's economic model is successful and can be used elsewhere.”¹⁵⁷ Future academic research needs to take these concerns seriously and devote more of its pages to exploring the effects of Chinese soft power.

The road ahead

The findings of this paper support the notion that there is a need for an increased focus of academic literature towards the Chinese model. Time series data collected through repeated surveys is needed to measure the long term tendencies. This paper shows that China has established itself as a major soft power in Africa. However, as questions on China are only sporadically included in surveys it cannot be established whether this is a trend over time. Furthermore, future research needs to unpack further how Africans view the Chinese and their alternative. This paper offered some of the answers through its exploratory analysis, but

¹⁵⁶ Yun-han Chu Yu-tzung Chang Fu Hu , *Regime Performance, Value Change and Authoritarian Detachment in East Asia*, Working Paper Series: No. 8, 2003

¹⁵⁷ Wall Street Journal, *In Africa, U.S. Watches China's Rise*, September 2011. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903392904576510271838147248>

additional detail level analysis is needed. As China's presence grows in Africa scholarly work is sorely needed to debate its consequences.

Summary

The paper has found considerable support for the China model in Africa. China was the second most popular choice of development model after the United States. In ten of the surveyed countries it was the dominant choice. Chapter three showed that Africans are on average positive towards the Chinese engagement on the continent. This finding supports the conclusions of the limited body of previous research that has empirically measured African public perceptions towards the Chinese.

The multilevel regression model employed in chapter four demonstrated that respondents who offer positive evaluations of China's engagement in their own country are much more likely to choose the Chinese model for development. Individual values on democracy and individual preferences on development are not found to influence choice of development model. Respondents nested within 'freer' societies are, surprisingly, more likely to choose the Chinese model of development. This finding supports claims made by scholars like Kurlantzick and Halpern who argue that the China model is seen as attractive even to respondents living in democratic countries. The likelihood of respondents choosing the Chinese model decreases as a country's level of development increases. Increased Chinese presence in the form of aid and foreign direct investment is found to make respondents less likely to choose the China model. In contrast, increased imports from China are found to increase the likelihood that respondents will choose China as their model for their country's development.

Chapter five shows that one is mistaken to suggest that the popularity of the China model in Africa implies support for authoritarian rule. The Chinese democratic mirage is blurring the picture and attracting respondents across the value spectrum. The paper concludes that further research is needed to explore the effects of increasing Chinese soft power in Africa.

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Appendix

1.0 Frequencies Dependent variable

Q80a. Model country for development

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	None of these	662	1,8	2,0
	United States	11594	31,2	34,3
	China	9036	24,3	26,7
	Former Colonial Power	5145	13,8	15,2
	India	832	2,2	2,5
	South Africa	3816	10,3	11,3
	We should follow our own country's model	1869	5,0	5,5
	Nigeria	14	,0	,0
	Ghana	11	,0	,0
	Côte d'Ivoire	14	,0	,0
	Botswana	26	,1	,1
	Botswana	5	,0	,0
	Ghana	37	,1	,1
	Germany	12	,0	,0
	France	70	,2	,2
	Senegal	35	,1	,1
	Germany	44	,1	,1
	Turkey	23	,1	,1
	Japan	17	,0	,1
	Malaysia	12	,0	,0
Other	561	1,5	1,7	
Total		33835	91,0	100,0
Missing	Missing	18	,0	
	Refused	1	,0	
	Don't know	3343	9,0	
	Total	3362	9,0	
Total		37197	100,0	

China vs other

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Other	24782	66,6	73,3
	China	9036	24,3	26,7
	Total	33818	90,9	100,0
Missing	System	3379	9,1	
Total		37197	100,0	

After recode into binary

1.1 Factor analysis and scale extractions

2.1. Outlook scale

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.			.832			<i>Reliability Statistics</i>	
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	50694,514	<i>Goodness-of-fit Test</i>			Cronbach's	
	df	10	Chi-Square	df	Sig.	Alpha	N of Items
	Sig.	.000	663,740	5	.000	.797	5

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2,775	55,498	55,498	2,233	44,653	44,653
2	,663	13,255	68,753			
3	,619	12,378	81,131			
4	,484	9,672	90,804			
5	,460	9,196	100,000			

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Q8a. How often gone without food	4,73	15,190	,598	,753
Q8b. How often gone without water	4,59	14,551	,551	,768
Q8c. How often gone without medical care	4,63	14,511	,643	,738
Q8d. How often gone without cooking fuel	4,90	16,334	,506	,780
Q8e. How often gone without cash income	3,73	13,661	,607	,750

1.2 Scale of authoritarian rejection

<i>Reliability Statistics</i>		<i>KMO and Bartlett's Test</i>	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy	.636
.631	3	Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square 13890,323 df 3 Sig .000

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,746	58,204	58,204	1,157	38,561	38,561
2	,705	23,491	81,695			
3	,549	18,305	100,000			

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Q28a. Reject one-party rule	3,70	3,768	,430	,548
Q28b. Reject military rule	3,58	3,713	,400	,597
Q28c. Reject one-man rule	3,87	4,089	,506	,460

1.3 Email correspondence between author and David Scissors at American Enterprise Institute

- 1) On sources and data collection

"We use media and government reports to identify transactions for research. However, the vast majority of transactions are substantiated by corporate reporting. So there is no trouble with intermediaries, as the firms report the true destination for investment. A decade ago, this was primarily off-line documentation. Now it is largely on-line, though frequently only in Chinese."

- 2) On methods for avoiding duplication

"We review every transaction every six months. There are probably duplicate transactions at any time but they don't survive multiple reviews."

- 3) On criteria of acceptance and rejection

“For tractability, size must be \$100 million (effectively \$95m) or higher. There must be a credible open-source link we can share indicating the elements included in the tracker: date, company, amount, country, sector.

We include transactions when they are fully specified (project, amount, etc.) and there is confirmation money is being spent. This, of course, can lead to including a transaction which fails to be completed. Such transactions are then moved to our troubled data subset.”

1.4 Tables

Country	Erez	Average Freedom House Score		Country	Influence China vs other	
		Mean	China vs other			%
			China			
		Mean	Row N%			
	Cape Verde	1,00	22,5%	Tunisia	1,9%	
	Ghana	1,50	17,9%	Cote d'Ivoire	3,1%	
	Mauritius	1,50	13,7%	Liberia	7,8%	
	Benin	2,00	28,8%	Togo	8,4%	
	Namibia	2,00	22,2%	Burkina Faso	10,8%	
	South Africa	2,00	29,9%	Mali	13,0%	
	Botswana	2,50	27,2%	Senegal	13,3%	
	Lesotho	2,50	22,1%	Burundi	13,4%	
	Senegal	2,50	30,5%	Guinea	14,9%	
	Sierra Leone	2,50	22,9%	Malawi	15,4%	
	<u>Early Erez</u>			Cameroon	15,7%	
	Tanzania	3,00	39,4%	Benin	17,7%	
	Liberia	3,50	25,0%	Niger	17,9%	
	Malawi	3,50	19,1%	Algeria	22,7%	
	Niger	3,50	29,6%	Uganda	26,6%	
	Tunisia	3,50	25,5%	Mauritius	27,1%	
	Zambia	3,50	34,6%	Madagascar	28,0%	
	Burkina Faso	4,00	21,3%	Sierra Leone	29,1%	
	Kenya	4,00	25,9%	Botswana	29,5%	
	Nigeria	4,50	27,4%	Cape Verde	29,9%	
	Togo	4,50	20,4%	Nigeria	35,2%	
	Uganda	4,50	22,2%	Namibia	35,6%	
	Burundi	5,00	19,8%	Egypt	35,8%	
	Cote d'Ivoire	5,00	26,7%	Ghana	36,3%	
	Egypt	5,00	37,7%	Lesotho	37,3%	
	Guinea	5,00	23,2%	Kenya	41,8%	
	Madagascar	5,00	24,2%	Tanzania	46,4%	
	<u>Not Erez</u>			South Africa	49,9%	
	Algeria	5,50	21,1%	Sudan	53,7%	
	Cameroon	6,00	50,4%	Zambia	56,1%	
	Mali	6,00	36,6%	Zimbabwe	62,3%	
	Zimbabwe	6,00	20,9%			
	Sudan	7,00	37,7%			

1.5 Model with both country characteristics

<i>DV: China vs other</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Education	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Scale_poverty	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Gov. priority		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Ecoinfra priority		-0.09** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
People influence			-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Choose elections			-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sovr. vs human rights			0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Scale Auth. Reject			0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
China_scale				0.44*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.02)
China inf. econ				0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
China most infl.				1.65*** (0.03)	1.76*** (0.03)
Human_Dev					-3.59*** (0.38)
Average F.H					-0.31*** (0.02)

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

1.6 Migration data courtesy of Barry Sautman

Country	Ohio U. Database 2001	Estimates, 2006-2015
Algeria	2,000	35,000-50,000 (2010)
Angola	500	40,000-70,000 (2009-2010)
Benin	---	4000 (2010)
Botswana	40	10,000 (2010)
Burkina Faso	---	1,000 (2007)
Burundi	---	200 (2010)
Cameroon	50	2500 (2008)
Cape Verde	---	3000 (2011)
Central African Rep.		300 (2012)
Chad	---	300 (2008)

Congo (Brazzaville)		15,000-20,000	(2013)
Congo (Demo. Rep.)	200	12,000	(2015)
Cote d'Ivoire	200	10,000	(2007)
Equatorial Guinea	----	2000-4000	(2008)
Egypt	110	10,000	(2015)
Ethiopia	100	30,000	(2014)
Gambia		300	(2012)
Ghana	500	50,000 10,000	(2013) (2015)
Guinea	---	5000	(2007)
Kenya	190	7,000 10,000 40,000 50,000	(2014) (2015) (2015) (2015)
Lesotho	1000	5,000	(2012)
Liberia	120	600	(2006)
Libya	500	3,000	(2011)
Madagascar	30,000	70,000-100,000	(2011)
Malawi	40	2,000	(2007)
Mali	---	2000	(2009)
Mauritius	40,000 (ethnic Chinese)	30,000+ 6,700 (Chinese Citizens)	(2008) (2010)
Morocco	--	1,000	(2015)
Mozambique	700	7,000-12,000	(2007)
Namibia	---	4000	(2008)
Niger	20		
Nigeria	2000	20,000	(2012)
Reunion	25,000	30,000	(2010)
Rwanda		700	(2014)
Sao Tome & Principe	100		
Senegal	--	2,000	(2010)
Seychelles	2,000		
Sierra Leone	20	400-500	(2008)
South Africa	30,000	over 300,000 500,000	(2015) (2015)
Sudan	45	24,000	(2012)
Swaziland	90	300	(2006)
Tanzania	600	10,000	(2008)
Togo	50	4,000	(2010)
Tunisia	---	2,000	(2011)
Uganda	100	10,000	(2012)
Zambia	150	6000-7000	(2008)
Zimbabwe	300	10,000	(2013)