

The rise of populism within the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa: A theoretical case study of anti-establishment, economic inequalities and a cultural backlash

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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

Populism is on the rise in many developed and developing countries and uprooting established party systems. In South Africa, research has shown that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) can be seen as our turn towards populism, but what fuels the rise of the party? This dissertation argues that an anti-establishment stance entices citizens to vote for the EFF and economic inequalities and a cultural backlash makes our society fertile ground for a populist party. In this theoretical case study, international populism theory from especially Inglehart and Norris is applied to the local context to show why the aforementioned factors can explain the rise of populism.

Acknowledgements

The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.

- Martin Luther King, Jr

Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing.

- John Stuart Mill

When they go low, we go high.

- Michelle Obama

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Chapter 1: Introduction

On 20 January 2017 Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States of America (USA). Just a few months before his inauguration very few credible pollsters would have predicted a win for the businessman turned politician. It's no hyperbole to say his election sent shockwaves through the world¹ and many people had a deep psychological reaction to the event.² French Ambassador to the USA at the time Gerard Araud foretold of a new world order.³ "A world is collapsing before our eyes," he said. "After Brexit and this election, everything from now on is possible. It's the end of an era, that of neoliberalism."

Araud was encapsulating a feeling of despair. Just a few months before Trump's victory, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to exit the European Union, upending the status quo and release waves of consequences that Inglehart and Norris refer to as "profound and catastrophic".⁴ More than it being exclusively symptomatic of the domestic situation in the UK, it was a strong indication of the rise of populism in Western democracies.

Across the Western landscape populist leaders like Marine Le Pen (France), Geert Wilders (Netherlands) and Nigel Farage (UK) have been altering established political patterns and have upended societies in significant ways. This wave of populism is by no means the first indication of populism on the global stage. Over the past 150 years populism has grown from a small group in Russia and a broad, but an unorganised group in the USA to a global phenomenon.⁵

¹ *World Reactions to US Presidential Election*, ABC News, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/photos/world-reactions-us-presidential-election-43399207/image-hong-kong-43406580> (accessed 20 December 2018).

² *A quarter of college students could develop PTSD because of the 2016 election, a new study suggests*, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/24/quarter-college-students-could-develop-ptsd-because-election-new-study-suggests/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b5afdf01b61a (accessed 20 December 2018).

³ *World Reacts to Trump's Election Win: 'It's the End of an Era'*, NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/world-reacts-trump-s-election-win-it-s-end-era-n681031> (accessed 20 December 2018).

⁴ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," Unpublished working paper in Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Papers, (2016), 6.

⁵ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (USA: Oxford University Press, 2017), 40.

However, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump has brought the phenomenon to the foreground. The UK is a leader in Europe and the USA is perceived as a bastion of freedom, democracy, and liberal values. If political analysts did not foresee these substantial transformations in the most powerful nations, what are the chances of it spreading and impacting many other democracies?

Inevitably this question is raised within the local context. In 2015 research from Mbete has shown that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) can be seen as South Africa's turn towards populism.⁶ However, observing the *presence* of the phenomenon and *understanding* the motivating forces behind its rise, are divergent academic and practical exercises. Research has shown that the EFF is populist, but this dissertation aims to understand *why*. A detailed outline of the research question will follow shortly.

Is it thus possible that populism can spread in South Africa similar to the extent of many other developing and developed countries? If so, *how* is this possible? Can we simply blame politicians for the spreading and displaying of populist rhetoric and tendencies, or are there bigger societal influences at play that make a society vulnerable to populism not only spreading but also being influential and ultimately being the prevailing ideology? Are there lessons to be learnt from other countries where the theoretical perspectives are more advanced, and how can the local context benefit from these international theories?

It is within this *context* that the current research is conducted. Populism is not merely an *alternative* ideology within a democracy. Many researchers such as Bryder⁷, Bang and Marsh⁸, Mudde and Kaltwasser⁹ and Müller¹⁰ are all in agreement that populism is a threat to liberal democracy. Müller argues that “populist should be criticised for what they are – a real danger to democracy.”

⁶ Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” *Journal of African Elections* 14, 1(2015), 35.

⁷ Tom Bryder, “Populism – a threat or a challenge for the democratic system?” Unpublished working paper on University of Copenhagen website, (2009), 14.


⁸ Henrik Bang and David Marsh, “Populism: A major threat to Democracy?” *Policy Studies* 39, 3(2018), 352.

⁹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 95.

¹⁰ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 102-103.

This research is essentially an attempt to identify the prominent and inconspicuous causes of populism within the EFF in South Africa, not only from the perspective of the political parties but also examining the factors present in society that would make us susceptible to populism.

The methodological process that will be followed is as follows:



In terms of the organisational structure of this dissertation the logical flow will be as follows:

- **Chapter 1: Introduction**

This chapter will discuss the research question, hypothesis, literature review, and problem statement. Ultimately it will raise the central issues, problems, or gaps that this dissertation aims to address.

- **Chapter 2: Theoretical framework**

The second chapter delves into the theoretical framework of populism, with a specific focus on anti-establishment, economic inequality, and cultural backlash. This theory will then be used to answer the questions raised in chapter one.

- **Chapter 3: Research Design**

This chapter combines the questions, problem statement, and issues from chapter one with the theoretical framework and sets out a road map for *how* the issues will be resolved.

- **Chapter 4 (Anti-establishment), chapter 5 (economic inequality) and chapter 6 (cultural backlash)**

These practical chapters will apply research design that was set out in chapter three and apply theoretical foundations to the practical circumstances of South Africa.

- **Chapter 7: Conclusion**

The final chapter will present the main insights gained and how it relates to the question, problem statement, and issues raised in the first chapter. Theoretical insights will be weaved into a coherent new anti-establishment theory and recommendations for future research will be made.

1.1 Research question and hypothesis

The central question of this dissertation is:

Why is populism on the rise in the form of the EFF for the years 2013-2018?

In essence, this dissertation aims to understand the reasons for the support of the populist EFF. Mbete's research has already established that the EFF is indeed South Africa's turn towards populism; now the aim is to interrogate relevant and neglected reasons behind this rise in populism.

What would constitute "neglected reasons"? Simply put, these are factors that the current research has not examined and will be pointed out in the literature review below. With regards to "relevant reasons", it is a value judgement based on observation of the political landscape. It is impossible to examine *all* the neglected reasons, but to narrow the scope of this thesis, we will look at reasons that the author felt are relevant to the local context. As will be indicated in the research design, this subjective approach does pose a risk to reliability and validity but also offers advantages – all of which will be addressed in the research method.

The timeframe of 2013 to 2018 was chosen for the following reasons:

The EFF was formed in 2013 as direct opposition to the ruling party. It is for this reason that the start date of this dissertation was chosen as 2013. The end-date of 2018 was determined based on the fact that Jacob Zuma stepped down as president of South Africa. It will be shown

in chapter four that he was a significant part of the EFF's rebellion against the establishment, thus fuelling support for the party. When he vacated office the EFF lost a significant subject of its anti-establishment stance. 2018 is also the last year before the general elections of 2019, thus chronologically a valid demarcation.

The parameters of the central question have now been established and subsequently, this dissertation will answer the following secondary questions:

1. How prominent is opposing the ruling party a factor in the rise of populism within the EFF?
2. Are there conditions in society – specifically the economic circumstances of supporters and a hostile attitude and anxiety towards minorities – that can lead to support for the populist EFF?

Both of these secondary questions relate to the reasons behind the rise of populism pertaining to the EFF. The first one sets the scene for supply-side factors (reasons for populism originating from within political parties) and the second one sets the scene for demand-side factors (reasons for populism originating from within society).

1.1.1 Hypothesis

Simplistically the hypothesis is an “educated guess” of what the answer to the research question will be. It must be a.) testable, b.) falsifiable and c.) specifies the variables that can be measured.

In light of these basic criteria, a hypothesis for this research is:

Populism in on the rise pertaining to the EFF, mainly because of an anti-establishment stance, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash that is present in society. These reasons were present in the years 2013-2018.

This hypothesis is testable because it can indeed be seen if these factors are present in the context of the EFF (both internally and externally). These reasons are not foreign to the existing research (thus testable) and are not concepts that can't be examined. The hypothesis is also

falsifiable: One can, for instance, indicate that the supporters of the EFF are not economically worse off than the elite if the indicators point out there is no economic inequality. Lastly, this hypothesis identifies the variables that can be measured: anti-establishment, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash.

It is perhaps an opportune time to now indicate what is meant by all three of these concepts. All three will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, but a basic, rudimentary understanding is necessary at this point to understand the meaning of the hypothesis. Explanations for the concepts are:

- An *anti-establish* sentiment refers to being against the elite.¹¹ This concept will be interrogated in chapters two and four, but the theory argues that voters support populist parties, because the party portrays an anti-establishment stance.
- *Economic inequality* is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism.¹² It postulates that supporters of populist parties are economically worse off. This concept will be interrogated in chapters two and five.
- The *cultural backlash thesis* refers to the reaction against cultural change – a notion of “them” changing “our” culture; “they” are infringing in “our” space.¹³ This is then seen as a reason for supporting a populist party. Chapters two and six will elaborate on this concept.

Now that the central and secondary questions have been outlined, it’s imperative to show how the existing research has attempted to answer these questions – if there is an attempt at all.

1.2 Literature review

Very few scholars have conducted research on populism in South Africa. Most of the current research was written before the formation of the EFF in 2013 and therefore doesn’t focus on this political party and falls outside the scope of the current dissertation. Mathekgá’s research, for instance, focusses on the ANC during the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, and the subsequent

¹¹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

¹² Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 2.

¹³ Robert Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 42.

change of leadership to Jacob Zuma.¹⁴ At that time there was a “resurgence of populism” in the form of Zuma from *within* the establishment.

Vincent’s research also illustrates the populist tendencies within the ruling party, specifically pertaining to the time when Malema was the leader of the Youth League.¹⁵ This gives us a perspective of the “outsider” that emerged from within the establishment to become a “maverick”, as Barr would refer to it.¹⁶ This concept is interrogated in chapters two and four with reference to the anti-establishment sentiment. Malema had populist tendencies whilst he was part of the establishment and Vincent alludes to this. This might have contributed to the *formation* of the EFF, but it remains irrelevant to the current dissertation due to it falling outside the timeframe.

Considering the timeframe of the existing research, it is thus understandable that the EFF is left out of much of the existing research – they didn’t exist at that time and could therefore not be analysed.

After the formation of the EFF researchers such as Mbete¹⁷ and Hurt and Kuisma¹⁸ have analysed the importance the party plays in our political context. Inevitably, it often lacks focus and depth, with a more holistic framework required.

It will be shown below how the existing literature does not answer the central or secondary questions of this dissertation.

¹⁴ Ralph Mathekga, “The ANC ‘Leadership Crisis’ and the age of Populism in Post-apartheid South Africa,” in Joelen Pretorius (ed.), *African Politics: Beyond the Third Wave of Democratisation* (Cape Town: Juta, 2008), 131.

¹⁵ Louise Vincent, “Seducing the People: Populism and the Challenge to Democracy in South Africa,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 29, 1(2011), 4.

¹⁶ Robert Barr, “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics,” *Party Politics* 15, 1(2009), 34.

¹⁷ Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 35.

¹⁸ Stephen Hurt and Mikko Kuisma, “Undermining the ‘Rainbow Nation’? The Economic Freedom Fighters and Left-wing Populism in South Africa,” Unpublished working paper for 66th Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, (2016), 2.

It can be argued that the existing research:

1. lacks international context;
2. has limited theoretical orientation; and
3. fails to recognise, integrate, and discuss relevant factors.

Each of these three observations will be henceforth be deconstructed to illustrate how the current research will fill the theoretical and practical gaps and ultimately enhance our understanding of populism in the South African context.

Observation 1: The current research lacks relevant international theoretical context

Mbete argues that the EFF fits into the global pattern of rising populism and examines it through the lens of the political style approach.¹⁹ She, however, exclusively uses Moffitt and Tormey's approach (which will be briefly explained in the next chapter) to analyse the local context. Whereas this might be useful to a certain extent, it doesn't account for the *complexities* of the local context and how parallels can be drawn between different international theories and the South African situation.

Hurt and Kuisma also uses this approach but expands on it with the economic strategy of the EFF.²⁰ However, their approach gives prominence to the supply-side: The EFF has adopted their economic policies and that is the driving force for populism. It does not account for the demand side: Can the economic inequality in society lead to support for the populist EFF?

Both Mathekga and Vincent's arguments almost exist within a vacuum. With the exception of brief mentions of the work from international scholars, both local theorists attempt to analyse the manifestation of populism as a phenomenon that is almost unique to our context. There is very little attempt to apply international theory, creating the impression that South African conceptions about populism is unique and voided from the global context.

¹⁹ Sithembile Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's Turn Towards Populism?" 35.

²⁰ Stephen Hurt and Mikko Kuisma, "Undermining the 'Rainbow Nation'? The Economic Freedom Fighters and Left-wing Populism in South Africa," 14.

The present research will argue that populism in South African not only *follows* international trends, but theories of populism can indeed be *applied* to the local context. Theoretical concepts of anti-establishment, economic inequalities, and a cultural backlash can indeed be used as a map to analyse the local context. In particular, international theory from Inglehart and Norris will form the backbone of the economic inequality and cultural backlash discussion. Anti-establishment theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr, and Hartleb will be consolidated to form a coherent theory of the local context.

Furthermore, as useful as Moffitt and Tormey’s approach is, this study will utilise the ideational approach. Besides Mudde and Kaltwasser, other international researchers such as Stanley, Akkerman, and March have all adopted this approach, making it the most dominant approach in the field.²¹ In essence, this view defines populism as follows:

*A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.*²²

In the next chapter, the rationale behind choosing this approach will be explained, but to identify gaps in the existing literature, it’s imperative to note that the current dissertation will apply international theory to the local context and show that the rise of populism pertaining to the EFF can’t be understood in a vacuum.

Mbete rightfully equates “the people” to “black Africans”, or “the powerless black majority”, to the working class (evident of the ideational approach) but that is where the applicability ends. She mentions the ideational approach, but dismisses it, saying there is a “wide variety of populist organisations that do not fit the archetype in [this category]”.²³ She finds the approach problematic because of its “simplistic rather than holistic terms”, claiming it’s “emotive politics”, and that populism seems to be merely a convenient label used to discuss those whose

²¹ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation* (California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 18.

²² Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

²³ Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 37.

politics we do not agree with”.²⁴ Mbete thus uses the concept of “the people”, but fails to properly interrogate the ideational approach.

Hurt and Kuisma’s research, however, recognises the three elements of the ideational approach (“the people”, “the elite” and the “general will”), but it does not extensively expand on these concepts and how it relates to especially the anti-establishment stance.²⁵

Mbete’s failure to provide substantial evidence for her claims renders her assumptions moot and Hurt and Kuisma do not interrogate any of the three abovementioned concepts. The current dissertation will illustrate how the ideational approach can indeed be applicable to our context, especially with reference to an anti-establishment stance. As seen below, this dissertation will also consider populism in South Africa in more holistic terms than any of the current research, proposing that a label of being “simplistic” is indeed a fallacy.

Observation 2: The current research has a limited theoretical orientation

The vast majority of the current research focusses on supply-side arguments to explain populism within the South African context, but this is by no means a full account of the causes of the phenomenon. With the exceptions of brief mentions, none of the South African research acknowledges the demand-side factors, especially that of economic inequality and a cultural backlash.

Beinart comes closest to an alternative explanation when he refers to popular protests post 1994.²⁶ Whilst this account implicitly recognises populism originating from within society, it mentions it fleetingly and does not apply any demand-side theory to our situation. It also falls outside the timeframe of this dissertation. Hurt and Kuisma also recognises this, but similarly to Beinart do not delve into a discussion, neither is it applicable to the EFF.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Stephen Hurt and Mikko Kuisma, “Undermining the ‘Rainbow Nation’? The Economic Freedom Fighters and Left-wing Populism in South Africa,” 8-9.

²⁶ William Beinart and Marcelle Dawson, *Popular Politics and Resistance Movements in South Africa*, (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2010), 21-2.

Demand-side theories are often neglected in analysis and Mudde and Kaltwasser explains: “Many people reduce populism to an elite-driven process, centred on charismatic leaders, who have the ability to enchant [trick] the masses.”²⁷

However, as Mudde and Kaltwasser point out, populism is found in societies across the political spectrum, even without the presence of a populist leader. “[The activation of populist attitudes] depends on specific sets of conditions, under which ordinary people might become fervent populists.”²⁸ It is for this reason that it is important to incorporate the demand-side argument in understanding why there is support for a populist party.

This dissertation will show that demand-side factors are not only relevant but *essential* in understanding populism in South Africa. Furthermore, Mbete’s supply-side argument centred around the political style approach, which is limited in its scope. It does not account for anti-establishment, for instance. It has minimal reference to other supply-side lenses through which one can look at the situation, one of which is an anti-establishment stance within opposition parties. Her criticism of the ideational approach as “simplistic” is problematic within this context, since a single theorist from the political style approach, can, be seen as rudimentary and indeed a lack of acknowledgement for the larger context.

Observation 3: The research fails to recognise, integrate and discuss relevant factors

It has already been established that the existing research is selective in its approach and there are several neglected areas that the current research dissertation will delve into, two being the cultural backlash in society and the economic inequalities that are present. These are key aspects of several international theories and it is virtually non-existent in local research.

In essence, the cultural backlash thesis builds on the “silent revolution” theory of value change and can be seen as anti-globalisation. The rise of progressive values, such as LGBT rights, gender equality, and inclusiveness with immigration and accepting refugees, are often pushed back at.

²⁷ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 109.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

According to Inglehart and Norris, there are two main characteristics of the cultural backlash: a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.²⁹ Betz³⁰ argues that the reaction to racial minorities is often expressed in the form of a.) open racism and b.) xenophobia.

Ample research exists on xenophobia (such as that from Claassen, Solomon and Kosaka and Dumani) and open racism (such as Nyar and reports from the South African Human Rights Commission) in society, but the present research will take it a step further. It will illustrate how these concepts and phenomena can't be studied in isolation but are symptomatic and causally linked to the rise of populism within the political opposition in the form of the EFF.

The economic inequalities will be studied through a similar lens. Economic inequality is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism, Inglehart and Norris argue.³¹ There are many indicators of inequality and this research will focus on income, race, unemployment, education, and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet). Each one's manifestation within the local context will be addressed. Currently, researchers such as Makgetla and reports from Statistics South Africa indicate economic inequality, but no existing research has linked this phenomenon to support for the populist EFF.

Naturally, these concepts (cultural backlash and economic inequality) are complicated ones, especially in our context. Apartheid and colonialism both had severely detrimental effects on society; our definition of populism will be different from other countries, but according to Mudde a working definition would have a thin veneer of overlap in each situation.³² This dissertation will thus clearly indicate how the concepts of economic inequality and a cultural backlash are relevant to support the populist EFF, something with the existing research has failed to do.

²⁹ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," 14-15.

³⁰ Hans-Heorg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), 15.

³¹ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," 2.

³² Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 342.

1.3 Problem statement

A problem statement is the description of an issue currently existing which needs to be addressed. It is usually a short statement “about an area of concern, a condition to be improved upon, a difficulty to be eliminated, or a troubling question that exists in scholarly literature, in theory, or within existing practice that points to a need for meaningful understanding and deliberate investigation”.³³ Furthermore, the statement does not offer a solution to the said problem but merely highlights the issue that is to be examined.

In light of this theoretical knowledge and the abovementioned literature review, the problem statement for this research is as follows:

The current research into populism pertaining to the EFF is lacking in its international theoretical context and its theoretical orientation, and it fails to recognise, integrate, and discuss relevant factors. There is subsequently little information into the party’s anti-establishment stance, or the economic inequality and cultural backlash present in society. This leads to an insufficient understanding of why the EFF has been enjoying support for its populist stance and rhetoric during the years 2013-2018.

1.4 Conclusion on the way forward

In this chapter, an outline of the research rationale, the central research question, and the hypothesis was presented. A literature review was conducted to highlight key shortcomings in the current research and problem statement was derived to frame the central issue of the dissertation.

In the next chapter, an overview will be given of the theoretical foundations underpinning the three central concepts of anti-establishment stance, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash. This will, in turn, be practically applied to the local context in chapter four (anti-establishment), chapter five (economic inequality), and chapter six (cultural backlash).

³³ Anonymous, *Organising Your Social Sciences Research Paper*, University of Southern California, <https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/introduction/researchproblem#:~:text=A%20research%20problem%20is%20a,for%20meaningful%20understanding%20and%20deliberate> (accessed 02 July 2019).

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

In 1967 the London School of Economics held a large conference with the lofty aim of “defining populism”.³⁴ Despite two days of deliberation, debate, and attempting to form a coherent theory, the forty-three participants could not agree on a definition. More than five decades later, we might have more published work on the subject that shines a light on pivotal areas, but we still do not have a universally accepted definition of the ideology, or even agree that it is indeed an ideology.

However, there is little uncertainty amongst most theorists and political analysts that there has been a surge in populism in many countries during the past few years, altering established political environments and uprooting the status quo.³⁵ This is, nevertheless, where the accordance ends; the reasons for said political shifts are divergent and broad, and even a precise definition, just like in 1967, eludes us.

This chapter provides the theoretical foundation on which the rest of this dissertation will be built upon. First, a discussion of the definition of populism will follow. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s influential ideational approach will be covered in-depth, as this is the lens through which we also approach the South African context. This will be followed by a concise discussion of the general causes of populism. Since the focus of this research is on anti-establishment, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash, these causes will receive detailed attention in this analysis, and the theories set out in the method will be explained. Ultimately, the theory will then form the underpinning of the practical analysis of the South African context, which is to follow in the next few chapters.

2.1 Towards a definition

Despite a metaphorical multifurcation in defining populism, it is by no means futile to attempt establishing the parameters of a definition or to assume that scholars have not made great strides towards defining populism. Mudde and Kaltwasser acknowledge that the term’s broad

³⁴ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 7.

³⁵ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 2.

usage “creates confusion and frustration”, but that it is indeed possible to arrive at an interpretation that is “broadly shared, but far from hegemonic”.³⁶

In this chapter, an outline will be given of the contestation around the topic, specifically pertaining to ascertain a definition, which will be followed by a discussion of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s ideational approach. In essence, they define populism as:

*A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.*³⁷

This approach and subsequent definition are widely-recognised to encapsulate the core concepts of populism and many scholars have attempted at elucidating their approach, enriching the overall theoretical framework.³⁸ Müller, for instance, also sees populism as two antagonistic groups, but it is ultimately a “moralistic imagination of politics”.³⁹ “The people” are seen as morally pure; “the elite” is corrupt and morally inferior. This antagonism to the existing establishment, argues Vincent, includes values, hierarchies or orthodoxies and regardless of the lens through which we view a particular context, the antagonism will always be present.⁴⁰ In this research, arguments will thereafter be raised as to why the ideational approach is the preferred one.

It is perhaps also prudent to distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism. The encompassing term “populism” is used to describe both sides and in the ideational approach does not make a significant, underlying distinction between the two. In general, left-wing populism is populism combined with left-wing politics (such as socialist ideals and state intervention) and right-wing populism is populism combined with right-wing politics (such as

³⁶ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 1.

³⁷ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

³⁸ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 18.


³⁹ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 19.

⁴⁰ Louise Vincent, “Seducing the People: Populism and the Challenge to Democracy in South Africa,” 3.

tradition and a market-economy). This creates the scope for a left-leaning politician such as Julius Malema and a right-leaning one such as Donald Trump to be labelled “populist”.

Over the past 150 years populism has grown from a small group in Russia and a broad, but an unorganised group in the USA to a global phenomenon.⁴¹ What theorists saw in the 1800s, we are seeing in contemporary times; we just can’t settle on what exactly it is we are seeing.

Schematic representation of defining populism:



2.1.1 Different interpretations

It has already been established that “populism” is a convoluted term, but to what extent is it swathed in disagreement, and in which aspects of the current theories would one find this

⁴¹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 40.

disagreement? Wiles even describes these disagreements as to the ground for “derision and hostility”.⁴²

As stated above, this research will follow the ideational approach in defining populism, and whilst it is the most popular approach, it is by no means the *only* approach. Moffitt argues there are other lenses through which the concept can be studied: political logic, strategy, discourse, and style. It should be noted that the literature refers to different terms for these approaches, but in essence, the underlying meaning stays the same.

2.1.1.1 Political logic

Within this approach, populism is seen as an emancipatory force. Liberal democracy is considered an inherently poor and ineffective system and through populism, a society can move closer to radical democracy, through conflict (whether physical or otherwise) and mobilise neglected sectors of society.⁴³ It could be argued that this concept is potentially too broad to allow meaningful application. Essentially, it can be applied to *any* political context.⁴⁴

2.1.1.2 Strategy

One must be short-sighted to not notice that there is often a notion in the popular media that portrays politicians as inherently dishonest and hungry for power. The so-called “strategy approach”, in reference to populism, plays on this concept and states that “a personalistic leader seeks [...] power based on direct, unmediated, institutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers”.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, the usability of this definition is limited. Moffitt highlights a few problems, first of which is that it doesn’t account for manifestations that we would not refer to as “populism”.⁴⁶ Secondly, and arguably one of the strongest criticisms, is that populism can thrive in highly organised environments, and not just in instances of low institutionalism.⁴⁷ Thirdly, Moffitt

⁴² Peter Wiles, “A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism,” in Ghita Ionesco and Ernest Gellner, (eds.), *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 166-179.

⁴³ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 3.

⁴⁴ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 25.

⁴⁵ Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,” *Comparative Politics* 34, 1(2001), 14.

⁴⁶ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 20.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

raises the arduousness of defending this position in the face of the absence of stylistic and ideational components of populism.⁴⁸ Lastly, an important stumbling block to this approach having universal appeal is that it offers no explanation of the referent of “the people”. It solely concentrates on the leader.⁴⁹

2.1.1.3 Discourse

The approach that views populism as a *discourse* of “the people” against “the elite” or oligarchy has gained significant popularity recently. Moffitt describes this approach quite accurately: “Here, rather than being a feature of a set of political beliefs, populism is seen as a particular mode of political expression, usually evident in speech and text.” In contrast to the abovementioned approaches, this one sees populism as a constant state of fluctuation, it’s not an “either/or” situation, but rather a “more/less” situation.⁵⁰ The strength of this approach lies in its gradational quality, and the importance of speech and rhetoric in populism; the message is, after all, often what the media reports on and what voters react to. Nonetheless, it still does not account for the performative and aesthetic elements of populism, which is notorious for attracting charismatic and controversial leaders.⁵¹

2.1.1.4 Political style

Mudde and Kaltwasser allude to the so-called “performance” aspect of populist parties.⁵² There is often an aversion to a political convention with “amateurish” and “unprofessional” behaviour present; often little regard is held for dress code or language manners and the leaders position themselves as different from the elite. They are courageous enough to stand up against the establishment and truly represent “the people”.

Moffitt expands on this by citing “bad manners” as a key element, also referred to as a “tabloid” style of politics.⁵³ Moffitt strongly argues that the stylistic approach is the most effective one, and even the ideational approach, which is to follow, is to “thin” and “empty”.⁵⁴ He claims that

⁴⁸ Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 40.

⁴⁹ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 21.

⁵⁰ Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,” *Weatherhead Working Paper Series* 13, (2013), 8.

⁵¹ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 22.

⁵² Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 4.

⁵³ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 44.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 49.

rhetoric and style are often more important than substance in populism, and that style can affect and interact with content, drawing to the conclusion that we should not see this approach as superficial. However, defining a political approach exclusively based on the style and rhetoric alone, provides no account of the underlying concepts and issues, even if the style plays such a pivotal role in the approach.

2.2 Populism as an ideology

It is palpable that populism is predominantly seen as an ideology in the literature⁵⁵, and its strength lies in its ability to transcend different political contexts, especially if the definition is succinct – not so minimalistic as to exclude certain case studies, but to be analytically useful in permitting differentiation.⁵⁶ It has to, after all, converge the views and stances of Marine le Pen in France, Donald Trump in the USA, Hugo Chávez from Venezuela, and ultimately Julius Malema from South Africa.

Mudde and Kaltwasser have been instrumental in this regard with their “thin-centred” definition, cited earlier in this chapter. Besides Mudde and Kaltwasser, other international researchers such as Stanley, Akkerman, and March have all adopted this approach, making it the most dominant approach in the field.⁵⁷

According to them, an ideology is “a body of normative ideas about the nature of man and society, as well as the organisation and purpose of society”.⁵⁸ Examples of an ideology are socialism, nationalism, and liberalism and they map the political and social world to an extent that we can make sense of complex phenomena.⁵⁹ Unlike “thick-centred ideologies”, a “thin-centred ideology” does not possess the same level of “intellectual refinement and consistency”.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 30.

⁵⁶ Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 30.

⁵⁷ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation* (California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 18.

⁵⁸ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

⁵⁹ Michael Freedon, *Ideology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2.

⁶⁰ Michael Freedon, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” *Political Studies* 46, 4(1998), 750.

Mudde argues thin-centred ideologies such as populism do not offer specific views on political-institutional and socio-economic issues the same way a full-scale ideology does.⁶¹ Populism is thus accompanied by a “host ideology”, such as socialism. In Nazi Germany, for example, populism was used in conjunction with nationalism; the two were interconnected, but the latter was the foundation on which the former was built. In South Africa, the EFF itself identifies with socialism⁶², even though opinion-shapers are arguing that they are leaning more towards fascist principles.⁶³ For this research, the focus is not on the “host ideologies”, but on populism as a thin-centred ideology.

Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that this allows populism to take on many different shapes, but the core principles always relate to a particular setting in a contingent manner that’s not based on *if*, but rather *how*. Simply put: The core principles will always be present, but how they will present themselves in a specific political climate is dependent on the localised environment.⁶⁴

The implication is that populism can be applied to a wide variety of situations, bearing the core concepts (“people”, “elite” and “general will”) in mind, as well as how they relate to other concepts within a particular concept.⁶⁵ It can be seen as a “mental map” with which to interpret the political world and, simply stated, one could use this map to identify the core concepts, which coexists with many other ideologies.

Moffitt argues that the thinness of this ideology makes it susceptible to lose conceptual validity and usefulness.⁶⁶ He also points out that it implies a transitory phenomenon: it will either fail or transform into a full ideology, with the initial stages filled with “subtypes” of populism all reliant on full-body concepts closely aligned to the morphology of populism, but that would ultimately overshadow populism and become the dominant ideology. Whilst this might be the

⁶¹ Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 30.

⁶² *EFF Statement on Karl Marx’s Birthday*, EFF Online, <https://www.fffonline.org/5-may-2016-eff-statement-on-karl-marx> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁶³ Vishwas Satgar, *The EFF’s wrecking ball politics is fascist rather than left*, Mail and Guardian <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-04-the-ffs-wrecking-ball-politics-is-fascist-rather-than-left> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁶⁴ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

⁶⁵ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

⁶⁶ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 19.

case it is never a matter of “transforming” or “morphing” into the latter. Populism is still present; it is partly *because* of this thin-centred ideology that authoritarianism can thrive. It’s a parallel action, and not one of replacement, as Moffitt argues.

Another critique against the ideational approach is that the scope is too prodigious and could subsequently apply to all political actors and situations, but Mudde and Kaltwasser’s rebuttal accentuate the existence of non-populism.⁶⁷ Their definition includes what is to be defined and exclude everything else, and on this basis, they pose elitisms and pluralism as divergent views. Finally, Espejo reasons that this approach does not take a so-called “blind-spot” into account: “While Mudde’s definition is useful for distinguishing among party ideologies within settled electoral systems, it has a blind when dealing with popular mobilisations that lead to a constitutional crisis.”⁶⁸ These mobilisations occur outside the established (legal) channels within a political system where a significant proportion of the population believes the government to be illegitimate, and faith in the institutions is lost. In such a situation, Espejo believes the movement would have to appeal to “the people” and express the general will to have a liberal democracy, hence there is no differentiation between populism and a liberal-democratic movement.

One can refute this reasoning by accentuating that Espejo assumes that populism and the fight for democracy share common components such as “the people” and “general will”, but how one defines these terms will determine whether it is populist or not. As will be discussed shortly, populists see “the people” in a particular way and define who belongs to that group; this is removed from the fight of a democratic movement whose definition would be far more inclusive.

In light of these criticisms, it is probably apt to end off with the advantages of using an ideological approach, before discussing the use of the core concepts.

Firstly, the thin-centred ideology goes accord with the pliability of populism in the real world where populism goes hand-in-hand with other ideologies such as nationalism, fascism,

⁶⁷ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 7.

⁶⁸ Paulina Espejo, “Power to whom? The People Between Procedure and Populism,” in Carlos de la Torre, *The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global perspectives* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 63.

socialism, and agrarianism.⁶⁹ The utility of this approach lies with its practicality: One could recognise and identify the populism of Trump and Chávez with this thin-centred approach, whilst acknowledging nationalism and conservatism present in the former and socialism in the latter.

There is also little discrimination in the type of mobilisation and leadership within the ideational approach. Populist leaders and organisations have come in various forms, from the more structured confinements of a Le Pen in France and Julius Malema in South Africa, to a more ground-up movement present in Latin America. They do, however, all claim to be the *vox populi*.⁷⁰

Important to the current research, an ideational approach allows us to account for both supply and demand-side arguments, whereas existing accounts focus exclusively on the supply-side: the style, rhetoric, and organisation of the political parties and leaders.⁷¹ Embracing a more holistic approach is comprehensive and takes more factors into account; it aims to explain the interaction between the supply and demand-side arguments and the vital role that both sides play in understanding the phenomenon. Moffitt is thus wrong to argue that populism is hollow and not well-developed.

Despite the differences between the approaches to populism, there is consensus that it is essentially “the people” versus “the elite”. Barr underscores “us versus them” and states it is universally accepted in most discussions on populism.⁷² Other researchers such as Stanley, Akkerman, and March have all adopted this approach, making it the most dominant approach in the field.⁷³

⁶⁹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 19.

⁷⁰ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 19.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁷² Robert Barr, “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics,” 31.

⁷³ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 18.

Schematic representation of the ideational approach:

People	Elite	General will
<p>Three interpretations of how populist often view “the people”:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The people as sovereign 2. The people as forgotten 3. The people as a nation <p><i>Also includes: What separates “the people” from ordinary appeal to the people (page 38).</i></p>	<p>Four interpretations of the elite:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The elite’s power is for their own benefit 2. The elite are not real politicians 3. The elite is part of the faulty system 4. The elite is foreign 	<p>“The people” are passive: Government is not in interest of general will.</p> <p>= symbolic representation</p> <p>= employ common sense</p> <p>= not against representation</p>

People vs Elite is essential in anti-establishment theory.

2.2.1 The people

The concept of “the people” is abstract and researchers such as Müller argue the construction of “the people” is ultimately a fictional exercise.⁷⁴ Laclau embraced the vagueness of the term, pointing out that populism’s power lies within this nebulous construct: The capacity for the term to embrace different constituencies with variance in demands creates a shared identity that forms a large base for mobilisation.

According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, virtually all manifestations of populism embraces at least one, if not all three, of the following concepts of “the people”: the people as sovereign, the common people, and people as the nation.⁷⁵ The distinction between “the people” and “the elite” is still present in each interpretation, but in a different format: political power, socioeconomic status, and nationality respectively.

2.2.1.1 The people as sovereign

The first concept of the people as sovereign is firmly entrenched in the words of former US President Abraham Lincoln: “a government of the people, by the people and for the people”. It is in direct opposition to Plato’s aristocracy and the notion is closely linked to the French Revolution where the aim was to set up a democratic order. Even though the people are in charge, they elect leaders to represent them; these are the ones with political power, but there

⁷⁴ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 19-20.

⁷⁵ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 9.

are a stern warning and implication: The ultimate source of power in a democracy lies with the people and in populist terms, if they feel their representatives are not succeeding in fulfilling their demands, the struggle begins to “give the government back to the people”.⁷⁶ In South Africa the EFF has repeatedly evoked the Freedom Charter’s call for the people to govern and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people.”⁷⁷

2.2.1.2 The people as a group that is forgotten

Mudde and Kaltwasser’s second manifestation of “the people” is often cited in the literature, with the cornerstone being economic status and specific cultural traditions meshed to form the group.⁷⁸ Populist leaders and parties latch onto the markers considered “inferior” by the dominant culture; they focus on those who are excluded due to their socioeconomic and sociocultural status. In the USA Trump focussed on the forgotten coal miners, the ones who were excluded from an economy that was turning towards clean energy. In Argentina Perón spoke to marginalised groups, the so-called “shirtless ones” (*descamisados*) or “blackheads” (*cabecitas negras*); and in South Africa Malema proclaims he is for the black South Africans whose “humanity has been taken away by an evil system of capitalism that produces racism. Blacks are not human. Blacks are subhuman.”⁷⁹

This meaning of the people aims to mobilise and unite the “angry”, “forgotten” and “silenced” against the common enemy, the elite. A critique and distrust of organisations, parties, and institutions accompany this notion, hence there is a distrust of and attack on traditional media, as we have seen in the USA and South Africa.⁸⁰

2.2.1.3 The people as a nation

The last interpretation of “the people” refers to the national community of a political context, but it is more convoluted than simply regarding the population living within a particular region

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷⁷ *The Freedom Charter*, SA History, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/freedom-charter> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁷⁸ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 10.

⁷⁹ Nico Gous, *Black people do not have human rights: Malema*, Times Live, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-21-black-people-do-not-have-human-rights-malema> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁸⁰ *SA editors' forum condemns Malema's 'inflammatory' attack on eNCA*, eNCA, <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sa-editors-forum-condemns-malemas-inflammatory-attack-on-enca> (accessed 28 March 2018).

as “the people”. The parameters of the latter are determined in certain civic or ethnic terms, even when it seems to be a collective.⁸¹ For example “the people of France” according to a populist leader such as Le Pen is not simply people living in the country but excludes legal immigrants, refugees, and those who came to the country to “steal” the jobs of the ordinary, hard-working French citizens. In South Africa Malema has repeatedly referred to black people as the only true citizens and emphasising that the country is not the home of white people.⁸²

2.2.1.4 Tying all three together

In all three of these constructions of “the people”, argues Müller, there is a core claim of populism: Only some of the people are really the people. For instance, in the Brexit vote in the UK populist Nigel Farage claimed it was a “victory for real people”, but that implies the 48% of the British electorate who voted to stay in the European Union are less “real”.⁸³ The same goes for the EFF, as can be seen in the above example.

So, what separates populism from an ordinary appeal to the people? Is it necessarily when one criticises the elite? Müller argues that these two factors are not sufficient; populist leaders claim that a *part* of the people *is* the people and that only the populist party or movement represents the true people.⁸⁴ Fighting for the plight of “the people” is not populism *per se* but fighting for a section of the people and only legitimising them as true people, is a sign of populism.

2.2.2 The elite

Less has been written about “the elite” than “the people”, but Mudde and Kaltwasser argue the former is presented as homogeneous; they are the corrupt elite who is against the prosperity of the people, and in essence, most populists definitions of “the elite” hinges on a moral evaluation, as mentioned with “the people”.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 11.

⁸² *We welcome white people, even though it's not their home – Malema*, Politicsweb, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/we-welcome-white-people-even-though-its-not-their-> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁸³ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 21-22.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

⁸⁵ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 11.

2.2.2.1 The elite's power is for their benefit

It's not just the political establishment who is considered morally bankrupt, but also the economic, cultural, and media elite. The variation is that perceived power is not important, but the notion that the power is *exclusive* and to the benefit of the *few* is a central concept.⁸⁶ This excludes those in power who are sympathetic to the cause of the populist, and obviously, it also precludes the populist with power – they are after all not there for their own benefit, but to represent the will of the people. This is why it is acceptable for the billionaire Trump to have a cabinet full of billionaires, and why alternative news sources such as *Breitbart* and *Fox News* are not viewed in the same antagonistic way as, for example, *CNN* or *The New York Times*. To the same token Malema has said his own lavish lifestyle does not bother his supporters.⁸⁷

Populists can also redefine “the elite” once they are in power because the qualifiers for “the elite” are not situational in nature, but rather moralistic.⁸⁸ Former Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar and Chávez from Venezuela both continued their attack on the elite, even when they were in power, claiming sinister outside forces were still holding a grip on the people and positioned them as illegitimate powers.

It would be a misconception that populists are necessarily anti-elitist per se, especially when *they* are part of the elite.⁸⁹ The distinction here would be that they are the “proper” elite who will not betray the trust of the people.

2.2.2.2 The elite are not “real politicians”

History is filled with examples of populist leaders claiming the system is against them, or “rigged”. Consider Victor Orbán who lost the Hungarian elections and claimed, “the nation cannot be in opposition”, the Tea Party claiming the president (who with empirical evidence won most of the votes) is “governing against the majority”, or Geert Wilders from the Netherlands calling the Dutch parliament “fake” with “fake politicians”⁹⁰.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁸⁷ *Malema: My money is nobody's business*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Malema-My-money-is-nobodys-business-20110720> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁸⁸ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 12.

⁸⁹ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 30.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

2.2.2.3 The elite is part of the faulty system

Populist parties often present the elite as being representative of a faulty system. The implication is that the system allows the elite to maintain their privileged positions. For instance, both right-wing and left-wing populists can relate to a vague socialist element: an attempt to move beyond classes, to do away with the current connection between the political and economic elite. This is not necessarily anti-capitalist; they just believe capitalism in its current form (thus the system) is benefiting the few to the disadvantage of the many.

In the current system, the elite is being constructed as working *against* the economic interests of the country. In Germany, the opposition party Alternative for Germany (AFD) is accusing government (the establishment) of putting EU interests above those of Germany and in Latin America populists have a long history of accusing the elite of siding with the interest of the United States above those of the individual countries.

Müller agrees with this sentiment and claims that populism can often be aligned with a form of a *system* of “producerism”; the pure people are hardworking, and the corrupt elite does minimal work only when it benefits their interests (linking to the previous concept).⁹¹ Malema has even called out black billionaires Patrice Motsepe and Cyril Ramaphosa for “selling out their black skin” out of self-interest.⁹²

2.2.2.4 The elite as foreign

Finally, Mudde and Kaltwasser are of opinion that the elites are often not just seen as *representing* foreign power, they are considered to *be* foreign themselves.

This stance is more prevalent in Latin America as seen in the case of Bolivia where president Evo Morales made a distinction between “pure” people and the corrupt “European” elites. This approach was also evident in Nazi Germany where the ruling party viewed Jews to not only steal the jobs of ordinary Germans but to also be foreign, a race that is not pure and does not belong in Germany.

⁹¹ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 23.

⁹² Marvin Meintjies, Motsepe, *Ramaphosa "sold their black skin" to become rich: Malema*, Times Live, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2015-11-26-motsepe-ramaphosa-sold-their-black-skin-tobecome-rich-malema> (accessed 28 March 2018).

Resnick argues that Malema and the EFF have equated “the elite” with white people (a racial interpretation).⁹³ “Even highly competent white South Africans with liberation credentials have been criticised by [Malema] for bureaucratic positions that should have instead gone to ‘an African child’.” Even the predominantly black leadership of the ANC is seen as representatives of the “white monopoly capitalism”, thus making them part of “the elite”.⁹⁴

In South Africa white people are thus viewed to be foreign by the EFF (as we have seen earlier), but in this regard, reference is not made to black people who are grouped with the elite.

2.2.3 The general will

The last core concept of populism highlights the relevance of the general will. Philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work can shed light on this concept. He postulated a difference between the general will (*volonté générale*) and the will of all (*volonté de tous*), with the former referring to the general and common interest of a group of people and the latter denotes the simple sum of particular interests. Many populists employ Rousseau’s concept of the general will, claiming a representative government is aristocratic in nature and the people are treated like passive entities.⁹⁵

2.2.3.1 Symbolic representation

The difference, however, between Rousseau’s concept of the general will and the populist’ conception of it, is that the former requires participation by the people and the latter conjures up the identity of the real people, hence making it a symbolic representation.⁹⁶ Both populist representation and democratic representation make moral claims, but the latter’s claims can be empirically verified; the populist leader will persist even after being disproven. In the USA for example, Donald Trump persists with his argument that illegal immigrants voted for his opponent without any concrete evidence.

⁹³ Daniele Resnick, “Populism in Africa” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 112.

⁹⁴ Masego Rahlaga and Dineo Bendile, *Malema: ANC is in bed with White Monopoly Capital*, EWN, <http://ewn.co.za/2015/10/27/Malema-ANC-is-in-bed-with-white-monopoly-capitalism> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁹⁵ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 17.

⁹⁶ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 29.

In South Africa Malema has made many accusations such as the one that all private schools with white people are racist.⁹⁷ He also claimed that the 2014 election was rigged and that the ANC had *lost* in Johannesburg and all of Gauteng.⁹⁸ There's simply no empirical evidence for these claims, but Malema has repeated similar claims on several occasions.

Political theorist Nancy Rosenblum's concept of "holism" is firmly within the realm of populism, argues Müller: It is possible for the people to be one and all of them can have one true representative.⁹⁹ Another aspect of populism enshrined in this notion comes to the fore – it is essentially anti-pluralism and based on a *pars pro toto* argument.

2.2.3.2 Common sense

Instead of the rational, evidence-based process that is entrenched in democracy, populism often employs "common sense": "By appealing to the general will of the people, populism enacts a specific logic of articulation, which enables the formation of a popular subject with a strong identity ('the people') which is able to challenge the status quo ('the people')." ¹⁰⁰ From this perspective, populism is seen as a means to give power to those who feel left out; the people who are not considered part of the elite. Furthermore, if it is presented as common sense, it makes opposing it much more difficult. Who would want to argue with the "common sense" of the general will of the people?

2.2.3.3 Not against representation

It is imperative to note that populists are not *against* representation; they are just endorsing a particular version. As long as they are in power, the representation is fair and just and to the benefit of the people.¹⁰¹ This may seem like they espouse a democratic representation, but in essence, it is a symbolic representation of the "real" people, and if it fails at the polls it is often

⁹⁷ Malema at his fiery finest at EFF birthday bash, Business Live, <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-07-29-malema-at-his-fiery-finest-at-eff-birthday-bash> (accessed 28 March 2018).

⁹⁸ Matuma Letsoalo, 'The ANC does not win elections, it steals them', Mail and Guardian, <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-12-01-the-anc-does-not-win-elections-it-steals-them> (accessed 27 December 2018).

⁹⁹ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 21-22.

¹⁰⁰ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 18.

¹⁰¹ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 21-22.

not because their message did not resonate with the majority, but the majority has not yet dared to speak out.¹⁰²

Müller described this representation as “meta-political illusion”.¹⁰³ Firstly, a truly democratic government realises it is there to serve *all* the people of the country, not just constituents. Secondly, even the whole people constantly change; people are born, people die, people change their views and opinions, etc. The completely coherent, singular “popular will” is thus a fantasy, one that a populist leader will not acknowledge. Instead, they often employ referenda (such as Brexit) that allows for once-off participation. Continuous participation is a cornerstone of democracy and a danger to a populist party or movement as it implies that “the people” can change its mind and stance on issues.¹⁰⁴

2.3 Causes of populism

The electoral successes of populist parties are open to a multitude of reasons and interpretations. It’s often impossible to provide a singular cause when there are so many factors at play. The degree of importance of a specific facet might differ in various political contexts, but the success of a populist party can never be singular in origin. Inglehart and Norris argue all the possible explanations can be divided into three broad categories: the electoral rules, supply-side arguments, and demand-side arguments.¹⁰⁵ Mudde groups the first two together as the “internal supply-side” and the “external supply-side”, but in essence, the concepts refer to the same scenarios and procedures.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Ibid., 27.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 28.


¹⁰⁴ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 29.

¹⁰⁵ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 2.

¹⁰⁶ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 232.

Schematic representation of the causes of populism:

Causes of populism



In this chapter, a brief overview will be given of the three arguments and how each one can be seen as a legitimate cause of populism. Since this research focusses on anti-establishment (a supply-side argument) and economic inequality and a cultural backlash (both demand-side arguments), these concepts will receive attention in this analysis. The theory will then form the underpinning of the practical analysis of the South African context, which is to follow in the next few chapters.

2.3.1 Electoral structures

Democracy is often thought of as an unambiguous phenomenon, but in reality, there are many forms of democracy.¹⁰⁷ One just has to compare South Africa and the United States to see the stark comparison: The latter has an electoral college system, whereas we use the popular vote, but both are seen as a legitimate form of democracy. If the USA changed its system to align with ours prior to the 2016 presidential election and voters cast their ballots similarly to what it was, Hillary Clinton would probably have been president. This simple, but practical example illustrates how the rules of the electoral process can help or hurt a populist candidate.

¹⁰⁷ Andrew Heywood, *Politics* (Cape Town: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 93.

Norris outlines these structural changes, saying: “Electoral laws and regulations structure opportunities for party competition within each country. Far from being neutral, these can provide formidable constitutional, legal and administrative barriers . . .”¹⁰⁸ Factors that are at play include those in the nomination stage, the campaign stage, and the election stage.

During the nomination stage party registration fees or deposits, as well as a requirement to get a certain number of signatures. Some countries also have legal bans on extremist organisations that advocated violence or use terrorist tactics.

Furthermore, minor parties, which are most often the case with populist parties initially, tend to perform better in egalitarian conditions of party competition where there is equal access to direct public funding and open media attention.¹⁰⁹ In contexts where public resources (both financial and material such as media airtime) are more tightly controlled and manipulated to favour the dominant parties, populist parties are less like to breakthrough.

The effective vote threshold is often imperative to the electoral success of populist parties (as mentioned above in the case of the USA). Proportional representation has been linked to radical parties’ success, especially where the electorate is grouped into electoral units or constituencies.¹¹⁰

2.3.2 Supply-side arguments

Traditionally, the supply-side arguments have been the focus of theoretical explanations of political populism. These are reasons that focus on the political party and its leader and how they exploit the socio-economic and cultural issues in society.¹¹¹ Berman shares this sentiment and says populist parties should not be seen as “hapless victims of their economic or demographic environments but as . . . the active shapers of their fates”.¹¹²

It is within this paradigm that theorists have argued that leaders and parties play an important part in their electoral success. Factors that encompass the supply side include leadership, party

¹⁰⁸ Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 83.

¹⁰⁹ Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, 83.

¹¹⁰ Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, 207.

¹¹¹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 104.

¹¹² Sheri Berman, “The Life of the Party,” *Comparative Politics* 30, 1(1997), 102.

organisation, and the positioning of an ideological stance. The latter encapsulates the anti-establishment stance, which will be discussed in detail.

2.3.2.1 Leadership

The impact of leaders' personalities and how it translates into voting, has long been a focus for some political analysts. King notes that the impact of personalities "will be the greatest when voter's emotional ties to parties are their weakest . . . and when voters can discern few other grounds – whether grounds of performance or policy".¹¹³ The current research on populism acknowledges the presence of these circumstances and emphasises the charisma as a pertinent characteristic of a populist leader.¹¹⁴

Mudde argues that this charisma is often paramount in the breakthrough phase, whilst organisational structures (discussed below) are more important for persistence.¹¹⁵ Research also points out that charismatic leaders almost always have polarising personalities "because the symbolic logic of charisma hangs upon binary coding and salvation narratives".¹¹⁶ This means voters are either in favour of or against their stances and some commentators have noted that this can be seen as "refreshing" within a political context – they are unapologetically not looking for the favour of all the people.

Using "charisma" as a cause of populism does pose a conceptual problem, however. What is considered "charismatic", and who decides what constitutes charisma? Van der Brug et al refers to the "inherent tautological nature" of the concept, but others argue it should not be viewed in absolute terms.¹¹⁷ Charisma is not a definite list of characteristics, but rather how an electorate receives and perceives a certain leader. Eatwell refers to this as the "charismatic

¹¹³ Anthony King, "Do leaders' Personalities Really Matter," in Anthony King (ed.), *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcome of Democratic Elections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 41-42.

¹¹⁴ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 261.

¹¹⁵ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 262.

¹¹⁶ Philip Smith, "Culture and Charisma: Outline of a Theory," *Acta Sociologica* 43, 2(2000), 103.

¹¹⁷ Wouter Van der Brug, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, "Why some anti-immigrant parties fail, and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support," *Comparative Political Studies* 38, 5(2005), 524.

bond”; it all depends on political culture and how susceptible that culture is being influenced by what they perceive to be a charismatic leader.¹¹⁸

Besides being charismatic, other aspects of a leader that could appeal to a constituency are bad manners (which includes theatricality) and a sense of extraordinariness.¹¹⁹ Moffitt explains that coarse discourse is an essential part of populist rhetoric and that sets you apart; you are not simply another politician part of the decorum of the establishment.¹²⁰ The political style approach (discussed earlier in this chapter) is pertinent to this aspect of leadership.

The term “bad manners” often refers to the language used by populists, but can also refer to political incorrectness, the use of slang and self-presentation (even in fashion) that goes against the “usual practices of respectable politics”.¹²¹ Populists present themselves as “closer to the people” because they don’t use the formal language of other politicians; the implication being they are “telling it like it is” versus establishment politicians who are restrained and formal in their approach.

Mbete’s research is paramount to understanding this aspect of supply-side arguments within the South African context. The EFF was formed out of a crisis after Malema was expelled from the ruling ANC Youth League.¹²² The Marikana massacre, anti-government protests spurring up across the country, the Nkandla saga, and the capturing of the state by the Gupta family were all crisis’s that the EFF (and indeed other opposition parties) has latched unto. The EFF’s disdain for Parliamentary decorum and their theatricality is indicative of their “bad manners”.¹²³

Populists often expand this view and portray themselves as the embodiment of perfection, sometimes quite literally. They present themselves as tough, daring, and decisive; Ostiguy even

¹¹⁸ Roger Eatwell, “The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 7, 2(2006), 142.

¹¹⁹ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 51-52.

¹²⁰ Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 58.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 38.

¹²³ Ibid., 39.

refers to them as metaphorically having “big balls”.¹²⁴ Abdalá Bucaram from Ecuador has even referred to his opponent’s “watery sperm” and Chávez has made crude sexual jokes about former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

2.3.2.2 Party organisation

The enigma of a charismatic leader may be important for electoral performance, but Mudde argues the internal leadership and party organisation is the other side of the coin that analysts often neglect.¹²⁵ He suggests that party organisation is vital to populist parties, not to the formation, but rather the sustainability and persistence of the parties.¹²⁶ Carter, however, believes party organisation is crucial to the electoral success of populist parties, and not merely the continuation and long-term prospects.¹²⁷ Albeit a difference of opinion on the role of party organisation, there is a consensus about the aspects that constitute party organisation, of which three of the main ones will henceforth be discussed.

Firstly, Eatwell distinguishes between “centripetal charisma” and “coterie charisma”, with the former referring to the appeal of the leader to the electorate and the latter emphasising the “leader’s appeal to an inner core”.¹²⁸ This can prevent factions from splitting the party and it can keep members disciplined.

Secondly, populist parties tend to have a minimalistic organisational structure with few members whose roles are hierarchical and centred around the charismatic leader.¹²⁹ This is, however not always the case as parties are often distrustful of academics and making their internal workings public is sometimes not an option.

Thirdly, Segert notes that populist parties often employ the principle of “democratic centralism”, with a strong authoritarian and centralist structure.¹³⁰ Some parties do not even

¹²⁴ Pierre Ostiguy, “The High-Low Political Divide: Rethinking Populism and Anti-populism,” Political Concepts: Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series, (2009), 38.

¹²⁵ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 263.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 264.

¹²⁷ Elisabeth Carter, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 64.

¹²⁸ Roger Eatwell, “The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 7, 2(2006), 2.

¹²⁹ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 267.

¹³⁰ Dieter Segert, “Der tschechische Allparteienpopulismus: Post-sozialistische

pretend to uphold democratic values and let go of the façade completely, whilst others (perhaps required by the laws governing the registration of political parties, such as in Germany) have a relatively democratic constitution. Even though this is not a universal truth, many of these parties have little transparency and democratic values entrenched in the practical running of the party.

2.3.2.3 Ideology

Most scholars refer to the ideological stance of a populist party and how they frame or present that to voters as the key factor in achieving electoral success.¹³¹ As mentioned in previous chapters, populists position themselves against the mainstream or established politics of the day. This anti-establishment stance is a key supply-side factor that will be discussed below.

2.4 Anti-establishment

As mentioned previously, populists position themselves as against mainstream or established politics of the day, to advance the interests of previously excluded or alienated sectors.¹³² As mentioned before, the theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr, and Hartleb will be consolidated to form a coherent theory of anti-establishment within the EFF. The detail of this theory will be discussed below and will be applied in chapter four.

- *Mudde and Kaltwasser's* ideational approach will be applied throughout the study, especially concerning the anti-establishment argument. Within this framework “the people” are pitted against “the elite”, thus creating an anti-establishment stance.
- *Barr's* concepts of the “outsider” or “maverick” breaking away from the establishment, lends further interpretation to anti-establishment sentiment. A so-called “crisis of representation” is present if the ruling party’s (establishment) actions lead to a breaking down of linkages with voters, creating an anti-establishment stance. This will be explained in more detail in chapter four.

Instabilität als Grundlage für eine populistische Versuchung in Parlament und Regierung”, in Susanne Frölich-Steffen and Lars Rensmann, (eds.), *Populisten der Macht: Populistische Regierungsparteien in West- und Osteuropa* (Wien: Braumüller, 2005), 193-194.

¹³¹ George Marcus, “Emotions in Politics,” *Annual Revision of Political Science*, 3(2000), 36.

¹³² Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 288.

- *Hartleb's* characteristics of an anti-establishment party are also very useful and he describes traits that are common amongst anti-establishment parties. In chapter four it will be explained fully and applied to the local setting.

2.4.1 Ideational approach: Mudde and Kaltwasser

Roberts rightfully points out that almost all conceptions of populism encapsulate some aspect of this antipathy towards the establishment, in essence pitting “the people” against “the elite”.

This space is often created by the failure of established parties to effectively address the concerns of certain voters. As Roberts put it: “Populism thrives where mainstream parties are in crisis, or at least where they exclude or ignore major currents of opinion that are denied institutionalised channels of expression.”¹³³

Mudde and Kaltwasser’s work on the ideational approach is essential in this discussion and the three interpretations of “the people” and the four of “the elite” that have been discussed earlier in this chapter forms the backbone of this section. It would be redundant to repeat the argument of “the people” versus “the elite” when it was addressed a few pages ago, but it does indicate one important element: Anti-establishment is such a strong element of populism that it is encapsulated in the very definition of the phenomenon. This also contributes to the development of the new theoretical framework for anti-establishment. Previously, the elements of the ideational approach were not incorporated as functionally into anti-establishment theory, but this research does exactly that and thus contributes to the current literature.

It should however be accentuated that it’s not just a push against established political parties (although it nearly always includes them), but also the so-called extensions of the parties, for example, public institutions, the private sector, the cultural elite, etc. In South Africa the scenario is often in the form of an inverse: The ruling establishment (ANC) is seen as an extension of the white, capitalist, imperialistic minority.

¹³³ Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 288.

Before we continue attempting to identify anti-establishment as a cause for populism, it's perhaps sagacious to briefly pause and interrogate the definitions of concepts such as "outsiders" and "anti-establishment".

2.4.2 Outsiders versus mavericks: Barr

Barr emphasises the rise of populism within "contexts of high public discontent", but also explains a more nuanced version of the so-called outsider status.¹³⁴ He considers an "outsider" as someone truly independent; someone who emerged from outside the establishment and enters the space to create an alternative.

Novelty is not a requirement for the status of "outsider", one can be on the periphery of the system for a very long time – so long as you are not considered to be part of the nation's "effective" parties.¹³⁵ The problem with this conceptualisation lies within the definition of "effective". Would this amount to voter percentage, or steering the national conversation? Often populist parties receive a relatively small percentage of the vote (8.3% of the vote for the EFF in the 2016 Local Government Elections) but can be very effective in policies and the conversation (petitioning against Jacob Zuma and standing in the epicentre of the "land expropriation without compensation" debate).¹³⁶

Barr henceforth introduces a new category, called a "maverick". This is someone, like Julius Malema, who was previously part of the establishment but has since broken away.¹³⁷ It is also important, argues Barr, to differentiate between "anti-establishment" and "anti-politics". He considers the latter to be a challenge to the political system as a whole; the crisis of representation is not caused by the establishment, but by the system through which they rule.¹³⁸

Anti-establishment appeals can be labelled as "semi-loyal" opposition.¹³⁹ These outsiders or mavericks advocate for the dismantling of the status quo, but not of the political system of

¹³⁴ Robert Barr, "Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics," 30.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 33.

¹³⁶ Sam Mkokeli and Ntando Thukwana, *Julius Malema: 'The EFF is in charge — the ANC is following us'*, Business Day, <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-08-20-julius-malema-the-eff-is-in-charge--the-anc-is-following-us/> (accessed 27 December 2018).

¹³⁷ Robert Barr, "Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics," 34.

¹³⁸ Robert Barr, "Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics," 32.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

democracy per se. They might offer alterations and eventually edge towards authoritarianism (such as in Venezuela), but their presentations are to give the power back to the people; thus keeping the system intact. The EFF, for instance, do not advocate for the fall of democracy, but rather a different version of it where the state controls the resources; the people still elect a government.

2.4.3 Breaking down linkages: Barr

The next logical step would be to dissect the “crisis of representation” that would allow outsiders and mavericks to appeal to these voters. Lawson refers to the relationship between political actors and constitutes a linkage.¹⁴⁰ What would cause the linkage to essentially break down?

Lawson, and subsequently Barr, identifies four different linkages: clientelistic (the exchange of material benefits for support), directive (selective benefits to a targeted group), participatory (supporters play a role in government) and electoral (only exchange during specific points in time, such as during elections).¹⁴¹

Whereas a breakdown in these linkages can alienate citizens, it's not holistic. Not providing social grants (clientelistic) or tax cuts for the rich (directive) might cause the citizens to relocate to the populist organisations, but linkages are not always a direct *quid pro quo* relationship. Many voters never interact with the government in a meaningful way but are still supporters of the establishment.

A fifth linkage, representational, can thus be introduced. This is an extended version of the participatory linkage but without direct interaction. Many citizens only interact during elections, but this does not mean that they are not symbolically invested throughout the tenure of an established party. They still want their interest to be represented – they expect their limited participation to *last*, not just when they are interacting, but also during the times when they are not interacting.

¹⁴⁰ Kay Lawson, “Political Parties and Linkage” in Kay Lawson, (ed.), *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), 5.

¹⁴¹ Kay Lawson, “When Linkage Fails” in Kayeter Merkl and P, (ed.), *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organisation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 35.

This brings us to the research of Roberts who suggests performance failures on the part of the establishment is a key factor in migrating support towards populist parties.¹⁴² Many other researchers such as Mudde and Kaltwasser, Halkjelsvik and Moffitt also agree on this approach, albeit in different varieties.¹⁴³

Citizens are more likely to have confidence in, and maintain linkages to the establishment, if their perception of the ruling party is positive. If they feel their interests are being represented and that government is effective, responsible and capable, voters will likely have a strong linkage with the establishment.¹⁴⁴ These linkages break down in times of crisis, whether it be systemic corruption, prolonged economic hardships or a generally-perceived incompetent leadership. These performance failures create political capital for populist parties who can appeal to the plethora of disconnected and alienated voters. In Venezuela, it was corrupt politicians who squandered the country's oil wealth and in South Africa systemic corruption within the ANC with special emphasis on its then-President Jacob Zuma alienated many voters from the ruling party.

In chapter four it will be argued how the breaking down of linkages with the establishment can be traced to six specific events:

1. Declining voter support for the ANC
2. Firing of Nene
3. Nkandla
4. Corruption charges against Zuma
5. Marikana
6. Protest action

¹⁴² Kenneth Roberts, "Populism and Political Parties," in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 292.

¹⁴³ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 99.; Albertine Halkjelsvik, "From Anti-establishment Social Movement to Successful Political Party Following the Emergence of the Five Star Movement in Italy, Thesis for Master's Degree at University of Bergen, (2016), 26; Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 119-121.

¹⁴⁴ Kenneth Roberts, "Populism and Political Parties," in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 292.

2.4.4 Characteristics of anti-establishment party: Hartleb

The failure of the establishment to govern effectively and represent the interest of the people might cause a crisis of representation and thus an anti-establishment sentiment amongst voters, but the process is more dynamic than the linkage between the ruling party and voters weakening. Populist parties don't apathetically wait for the disconnection and the subsequent convergence to them; they actively promote the anti-establishment stance, sometimes to such a degree that it might even be stronger than the effect of the weak performance of the government on voters. Simply put: Without populist parties and organisations using an anti-establishment strategy, many voters would become despondent and either vote for another mainstream party or opt-out of the democratic process.

It is thus imperative to an analysis of anti-establishment to realise that the supply-side is not a unipolar process; populism can rise amongst the electorate both due to the mainstream parties and the populist parties.

How would a populist party utilise the ineffectiveness of government? What would the anti-establishment characteristics of a populist party be? Take note, the degree of the ineffectiveness of government is not always relevant, although the greater the ineffectiveness, the more *likely* it is to garner support for a populist party.

Hartleb argues populist parties are more often defined by what they are not than what they are.¹⁴⁵ He proposes that the following are characteristic of a party's anti-establishment stance:

1. the construction of "the people" as homogenous and a front-line against the political, cultural and economic elites;
2. an image of being the so-called underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media);
3. a claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable establishment);
4. the simplification or trivialisation of issues that are often more complex than relates to the establishment;

¹⁴⁵ Florian Hartleb, "Here to stay: Anti-establishment parties in Europe", 41.

5. often a claim to represent the “silent majority”, the people who input are stifled by the establishment;
6. the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues – “we are exactly the opposite of the establishment” notion; and
7. aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective”).

Hartleb adds that anti-establishment parties often form fairly quickly, and often without solid leadership structures in place.¹⁴⁶ Their representatives on the ground have not undergone proper training, resulting in the parties being enveloped in a scandal. When the media exposes these scandals, it often strengthens the party’s position as an outsider – the media is seen as being in cahoots with the establishment, thus not treating the populist party fairly.

In chapter four evidence will be presented as to how, the EFF in South Africa fits the criteria of an anti-establishment, populist party. In many respects, they fit the mould of Hartleb's theoretical perspective.

2.5 Demand-side factors

Populist parties can devise and implement many ways to gain support, but in many cases, developments in the mass electorate must facilitate this populist rhetoric and strategies. Mudde refers to it as “the perfect breeding ground”¹⁴⁷ and Norris argues that the right circumstances must be present to fuel the popularity of populists.¹⁴⁸ In essence, demand-side factors are those events and change happening and taking place in society that would allow the populist message to resonate with voters. Mudde divides the demand-side into three categories:

- macro-level explanations (including economic inequality and a cultural backlash);
- meso-level explanations; and
- micro-level explanations.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴⁷ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 201.

¹⁴⁸ Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, 129.

2.5.1 Macro-level explanations

Nedelcu explains that structural or macro-level arguments are “among the most powerful demand-side explanations” and they refer to broad economic, social and historical processes which take place at the global or national level.¹⁴⁹

Mudde argues that modernisation, the presence of a crisis, an authoritarian legacy, economic inequality and a cultural backlash are all plausible macro-level arguments that have yielded empirical results after being applied to various political contexts.¹⁵⁰

In almost all prominent studies of developed countries modernisation is directly linked to the rise of populist parties, which are generally opponents of the process.¹⁵¹ Norris argues that populist supporters are perceived as the “losers of modernisation”; they low-skilled, low-wage casual workers with minimal job security and are “forgotten” in the process of modernisation.¹⁵² Mudde, however, is not convinced that the modernisation-thesis is a valid explanation: “How does the macro-level process of modernisation exactly lead to the micro-level action of voting for a populist party?”¹⁵³

The underlying argument of the crisis thesis is that a “crisis” on the macro-level leads to populist support, but many authors have vague interpretations of what constitutes a “crisis”.¹⁵⁴ Most accounts focus on an economic crisis, but a refugee or political crisis can also be present.

2.5.1.1 Economic inequality

Economic inequality is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism, Inglehart and Norris argue.¹⁵⁵ Globally, the economic inequalities perspective has mostly been applied to developed countries where industrialisation has reshaped the workforce and resulted in greater income inequality, especially in conjunction with the rise of the knowledge economy.

¹⁴⁹ Harry Nedelcu, “Anti-establishment Radical Parties in 21st Century Europe,” 99.

¹⁵⁰ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 202.

¹⁵¹ Harry Nedelcu, “Anti-establishment Radical Parties in 21st Century Europe,” 99.

¹⁵² Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, 132.

¹⁵³ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 203.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹⁵⁵ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 2.

In the 2016 election in the USA, the economically marginalised, coupled with the decline in industries such as coal and manufacturing, has partially led to populist support for Trump.¹⁵⁶

2.5.1.1.1 International context

The argument, however, is not confined to post-industrialised, wealthy societies; in Venezuela, the politicisation of the inequality in the social and economic spheres has led to populist support for Hugo Chávez. Falling oil prices and ever-increasing public debt, has undoubtedly trickled down to the lives of citizens with 50.4% living below the poverty line in 1998.¹⁵⁷ In Western countries, the origins of these inequalities often occur as a result of globalisation, but there is by no means an exclusive causality to this argument. In Greece, for example, the global financial crisis created unprecedented unemployment in the country which rose to 25% in 2015 when the populist party Syriza was voted into government.¹⁵⁸

2.5.1.1.2 Local context

There is ample research to illustrate the inordinate economic inequalities in South Africa, which can be directly linked to the “separate development” policy of apartheid. For instance, figures from Statistics South Africa's states that during the quarter of October to November 2017, the national level of unemployment stood at 26.7%.¹⁵⁹ An estimated 30% of the black workforce was unemployed, but actively looking for a job, compared to just 6.7% of the white workforce. Recent data from the World Bank shows that South Africa is the most unequal society in the world with the top 1% of South Africans that own 70.9% of the country's wealth and the bottom 60% only controls 7% of the country's assets.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 1


¹⁵⁷ Kevin Voigt, *Chavez leaves Venezuelan economy more equal, less stable*, CNN, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/06/business/venezuela-chavez-oil-economy/index.html> (accessed 26 March 2018).

¹⁵⁸ Jon Stone, *Syriza: Everything you need to know about Greece's new Marxist governing party*, Independent, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/syriza-everything-you-need-to-know-about-greece-s-new-marxist-governing-party-10002197.html> (accessed on 26 March 2018).

¹⁵⁹ *Quarterly Labour Force Survey – QLFS Q4:2017*, Stats SA, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10884> (accessed on 26 March 2018).

¹⁶⁰ Fiscal policy, poverty and redistribution in South Africa, World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/South%20Africa/za-south-africa-economic-update-fiscal-policy-redistribution-unequal-society-infographic.pdf> (accessed 16 April 2018).

Schematic representation of economic inequality



The present research will argue that the above-mentioned scenario of our socioeconomic context can be understood within the economic inequality thesis. The origins of our economic inequality are expectedly different from, say Venezuela, but the argument does not require a singular cause to be applicable. As has been proven in the cases of diverse nations such as the USA and Venezuela, the presence of the resulting economic inequality can be the fertile ground for populism to grow in society.

2.5.1.1.3 Applicable theory: Inglehart and Norris

In 1960, one of the fathers of political sociology Seymour Lipset argued that the appeal of fascism in Weimar Germany could be ascribed to an authoritarian reaction to the economic hardships of modernity.¹⁶¹ He described how small entrepreneurs, merchants, shopkeepers, manufacturers and small-scale farmers were pushed aside by industrialisation and suffered economically, giving rise to extremist movements.

¹⁶¹ Seymour Lipset, "Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics" in Daniel Bell, (Ed.), *The Radical Right* (New Brunswick, Transaction Publisher, 1960), 490.

Reverberating and refining this original argument, Inglehart and Norris have expanded the range showing that populism often resonates with the “low-skilled, blue-collar underclass”.¹⁶² Those with little or no income are susceptible to populist policies and rhetoric, and even the employed with minimal job security often support populist parties. These people are also more vulnerable to social risks and very often depend on welfare from the state.

Whilst these conditions are appalling at the best of times, it’s not sufficient to comprise the economic inequality argument; there must be a stark comparison between the so-called “winners” and “losers” of the economy.¹⁶³ Some part of the society must be perceived as the “economic haves” and some part as the “economic have-nots”. There is an in-group solidarity present amongst the former, making the latter feel like outsiders.¹⁶⁴

Betz suggests that the economically marginalised often blame ethnic minorities and migrant populations for their dismal conditions.¹⁶⁵ The underlying sentiment is one of resentment; a ‘they are the reason why we don’t have jobs or adequate welfare services’ approach is often followed. This fuels a cultural backlash, which will be explained in chapter six.

This also implies an inadequate response from established parties to alleviate socio-economic hardships.¹⁶⁶ They are not just seen as *perpetuating* the problem by not acting decisively, but significant in *being* the problem. The “elites” are equated to the “haves”, and it is often seen as a singular cause of economic inequality; contextual circumstances are left out of the picture in this antagonistic, inimical and unmodulated approach. In essence, supporters of populist parties have lost faith in mainstream parties to adequately and effectively respond to the mounting economic crisis.

¹⁶² Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 10.

¹⁶³ Simon Bornschieer, *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 35.

¹⁶⁴ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 11.

¹⁶⁵ Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 40.

¹⁶⁶ Kirk Hawkins, Madeleine Read and Teun Pauwels, in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 350.

2.5.1.1.3.1 Evidence in local context

What evidence would support this argument in a particular context such as South Africa? Inglehart and Norris argue the support for populist parties (in our case mostly the EFF) would be “concentrated among the economically marginalised sectors”; they would be considered “losers” in the economy.¹⁶⁷ Generally, unskilled workers, the unemployed, and those lacking tertiary education will support populist parties. Households with few material gains (such as housing and transport) are also more likely to support a party such as the EFF. Antithetically, the “elite” minority will generally be employed, earn significantly more, are more educated and have the necessary resources in their households.

As mentioned before there are many indicators of inequality and this dissertation will focus on income, race, unemployment, education and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet). Each one’s manifestation within the local context will be addressed below, and how it is likely to relate to populist support.

1. **income** (international theory shows those with less income are likely to support a populist party such as the EFF)
2. **race** (in the USA white people are more likely to support a populist party, but in SA it will be shown that it is overwhelmingly black people who support the EFF)
3. **unemployment** (supporters of a populist party are more likely to be unemployed, similar to EFF supporters)
4. **education** (international theory also shows that those who are less educated are more likely to support a populist party such as the EFF)
5. **resources** (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet) (supporters of populist parties such as the EFF have generally fewer resources)

2.5.1.1.4 Criticism of economic inequality theory

It should be noted that scholars such as Mudde and Thieme are sceptical of exclusively using the economic inequality thesis to explain populism.¹⁶⁸ After all, the ideology has arisen in egalitarian societies such as Denmark and Sweden, and the theory seems “too vague” to explain a specific phenomenon. Modernisation, argues Nairn, will undoubtedly give rise to different

¹⁶⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 12.

¹⁶⁸ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 204.

cultural and political mobilisation – it’s just that this mobilisation is populist in some cases, liberal nationalist in other cases and even non-nationalist in other societies.¹⁶⁹

The current dissertation keeps these concerns in mind but will argue why the economic inequality thesis is indeed relevant in South Africa, specifically with regards to the rise of populism. It is also by no means the *only*, or even the most *important*, explanation of populism in our context, but remains relevant to support for the EFF. This takes us back to the thin-centred ideology that was discussed earlier; the core concepts of “the people”, “the elite” and the “general will” are present within this approach, and it does not exclude the use of additional theories to explain populism.

2.5.1.2 Cultural backlash

In his 1977 seminal work, *The Silent Revolution*, Inglehart warns of a cultural value change that was happening in society. In an industrialised society, there was an increasing emphasis on the need for “belonging”, leading to the rise of “elite-directed political mobilisation.”¹⁷⁰ More than 30 years later he published an article in 2008, based on the intergenerational change happening in society and indeed found that the “silent revolution” is becoming ever-present.¹⁷¹

Today, the phenomenon is more prominent than ever before: A nostalgic reaction (especially amongst older sectors of the electorate) who feel forgotten and left behind by the so-called progressive cultural tides.¹⁷² They have traditional values and norms and tend to feel overlooked in their yearning for belonging to their group. In a multicultural, postmodern society, identity is paramount for them and retaliation is often seen as the only way to confront these seismic changes.

Whereas this general theory might not entirely be relevant for every society (including South Africa), some form of the cultural backlash thesis is present in most theories examining the

¹⁶⁹ Tom Nairn, “Breakwaters of 2000: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalisation,” *New Left Review* 214, (1995), 205.


¹⁷⁰ Robert Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 5.

¹⁷¹ Ronald Inglehart, “Changing Values Among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006,” *West European Politics* 31, 1-2(2008), 145.

¹⁷² Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 13.

causes of populism. According to Norris the cultural backlash thesis described by Inglehart is mainly present in developed countries¹⁷³, but their concept of “cultural protectionism” is more common than economic approaches and is present in nearly every populist society. A *manifestation* of the cultural backlash is thus present in nearly every country with radical or populist support. Inglehart and Norris argue that “cultural values, combined with several social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent and parsimonious explanation for voting support for populist parties”.

Schematic representation of the cultural backlash



2.5.1.2.1 Demographics: Inglehart and Norris

In essence, the group experiencing the cultural backlash is more likely to feel like “they have become strangers from the predominant values of their own country”.¹⁷⁴ In a Western context this group is older white men who were the cultural majority during the 1950s and 1960s and now “their dominance and privilege [has] eroded. The silent revolution of the 1970s appears to have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today.”

¹⁷³ Pippa Norris, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1-4.

¹⁷⁴ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 3.

Inglehart and Norris note there are four important demographic indicators of populist supporters: Age, education, gender, religion, and ethnicity.¹⁷⁵ There is “a large body of empirical evidence” to indicate that post-war developments have triggered a cultural backlash among:

- the older generation;
- predominantly men;
- the less educated sectors; and
- the ethnic majority in a country.¹⁷⁶

This dissertation will show that we follow the same lines on gender and education, but in the South African context, it’s typically the younger population who support a populist party such as the EFF. In other countries, such as Austria young people are also increasingly supporting populists, and in Italy, the populist Five Star Movement won the youth vote in 2018. It will be shown through demographic data how local supporters of the populist EFF are generally young, black men with little education.

How will it be shown that supporters of the EFF follow this demographic profile? Research from Ipsos and Wazimap will be used to illustrate that EFF supporters are generally younger, black men who are less educated. According to Inglehart, this cohort is more likely to experience a cultural backlash and if one can indicate this group is supporters of a populist party, they are more likely to experience a cultural backlash.

2.5.1.2.2 Hostile attitude toward minorities: Inglehart and Norris

As mentioned before, hostility is often felt towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities. These feelings of resentment are not only linked to material factors but also generally low levels of existential security. For example, in Italy, the migrants and refugee minorities are seen as a threat, not only to job security but also not national identity.¹⁷⁷ Within this context, it is understandable that a populist party such as the Five Star Movement gained the majority of the votes in the 2018 elections.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 16.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 15.

Betz explains that especially in Europe the reaction to immigrants and refugees is “an outburst of xenophobia and open racism”.¹⁷⁸ Open-mindedness towards migrants, refugees and foreigners are seen as part of the establishment and De Cleen even argues that populism and nationalism have always been closely related; some of the most prominent examples of populism can firmly be placed within the realm of nationalism (many Latin American countries) and vice versa.¹⁷⁹ Stewart goes as far as referring to populism as “a kind of nationalism”.

Measuring the cultural backlash in the local context is complex and a multitude of sources will be used. Insights from the Institute of Race Relations, the Human Sciences Research Council and other researchers will be used to show general open racism against minorities (research from Nyar and the SA Institute of Race Relations). Especially white and Indian South Africans are subjected to open racism and it will be shown that especially EFF supporters experience this cultural backlash against the racial minorities.

Research from Claassen, Dumani and Solomon and Kosaka will be referred to when discussing xenophobia. This dissertation will indicate the presence of xenophobia in South Africa. EFF supporters do express xenophobia, but it will be shown how this element of the cultural backlash is less prominent in the local context.

Social media comments from Twitter and media articles will substantiate it from a supporter point of view, as well as first-person comments from EFF supporters (more detailed information on this will follow in chapter six).

2.5.1.2.3 Anxiety around pervasive culture

There is also a cultural backlash against Western values, with the latter perceived as a threat to “our” way of living (anxiety that the minority culture is dominant). Malema encapsulated this sentiment when he said: “This country is still in the hands of the colonial masters. This country

¹⁷⁸ Hans-Heorg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 60.

¹⁷⁹ Benjamin De Cleen, “Populism and Nationalism,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 344.

is still in the hands of white people. This country is controlled from London. White minorities be warned.”¹⁸⁰

In South Africa it can be argued that this anxiety manifests itself as a backlash against Western values. The latter is seen as a threat to “our” way of living. Not only is minority culture seen as *different*, but as *foreign* and not part of “us”.

As mentioned, there is a fear or anxiety that African culture is eroded by the pervasive minority cultures from especially white and Indian South Africans. This results in the latter groups not being seen as South African and the “us” versus “them” narrative is a strong indicator of this phenomenon.

In a country with black people being the majority, one would naturally expect their culture to be the dominant one, but many years of oppression under first colonialism and then apartheid created a space where black people’s culture is indeed significantly less prominent than Western culture, embodied by white South Africans.

Existing research, social media posts on Twitter, media articles and first-person comments will be used to illustrate the backlash from EFF supporters against the “other”, “foreign” minority.

2.5.2 Meso-level explanations

Very little research has been done on the meso-level, which Eatwell defines as “the level concerned with local organisations to which individuals belong, or through which they gain knowledge and norms, such as the family, school or party.”¹⁸¹ Some studies show that populist radical right supporters often originate from a populist radical right family, but for practical reasons, this thesis has been difficult to study on a broader and more representative level.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ SA still in hands of colonial masters: Malema, eNCA, <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sa-still-in-hands-of-colonial-masters-malema> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

¹⁸¹ Roger Eatwell, “The Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism: The Primacy of Politics,” in Paul Hainsworth, (ed.), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins of the Mainstream* (London: Pinter, 2000), 350.

¹⁸² Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 218.

The influence of schools, churches, and other organisations has been poorly researched and Mudde argues more resources should be invested in studying the meso-level, as the social context is closer to the individual than macro-level explanations.¹⁸³

2.5.3 Micro-level explanations

Many studies have been done on the micro-level, which assesses the individual and how his or her personality and psycho-social make-up translates to voting behaviour. One of the main traits that researchers have illuminated is a populist radical attitude.¹⁸⁴ The logic is that the vote for a populist party is not a “protest vote”, but rather an “affirmation vote”. The ideologies of the populist party go accord with the political attitude of the voter.

Dehousse argues that the preoccupations of the populist voters can be encapsulated in one word: insecurity.¹⁸⁵ The argument is that populist parties are mainly supported by insecure people; their insecurity is a result of the macro-level developments (economic crisis, refugees, etc.) and they are susceptible to the simplistic messages of the populist party. Ultimately, they are being protected against the changing world with their identity clearly defined and promoted.

2.6 Conclusion and the way forward

In this chapter a theoretical understanding of populism and its causes, specifically pertaining to anti-establishment, a cultural backlash and economic inequalities were provided. A brief definition and the different interpretations were provided to motivate why populism is better suited to be seen as an ideology.

It was argued that populism as an ideology is the best lens through which to view the current research and henceforth the concepts of “the people”, “the elite” and “general will” (all three integral parts to the ideational approach) were discussed.

The second part of this chapter dealt with the causes of populism, specifically supply- and demand-side arguments. The general supply-side theories were briefly mentioned, but the specific focus was put on anti-establishment as a cause of populism as this is one of the key analytical points of this research.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 219.

¹⁸⁵ Renaud Dehousse, “Introduction,” in *Europe and the Crisis of Democracy: Elections in Europe: 1999-2002* (Paris: Notre Europe, 2002), 4.

In chapter four the theoretical framework provided in this chapter will be applied the opposition EFF politics in the South African context, thus merging the theory and case study to ultimately form a new, coherent theoretical approach. (This approach will be outlined in chapter seven.)

The demand-side causes of populism were divided into three strata: macro-, meso- and micro-levels, each widening in scope about the origin of the cause. The last two levels were briefly discussed, and the macro-level got detailed attention since the causes of economic inequalities and a cultural backlash are (together with anti-establishment) key concepts in this research. This basic theory with regards to economic inequalities and a cultural backlash will respectively be applied to the South African context in chapters five and six.

In the next chapter, an outline will be provided as to how the research question (presented in chapter one) will be answered, based on the theoretical approach (stipulated in this chapter). This will serve as a roadmap for the rest of the dissertation.

Chapter 3: Research methodology

The first chapter of this dissertation discussed the primary research question (and the secondary questions). A literature review highlighted the gaps in the current literature to arrive at a problem statement.

The previous chapter laid out the theoretical foundations with which the research question will be answered, as well as the problem statement addressed.

Now that the abovementioned gaps have been identified, and it was illustrated what the contribution of the current dissertation will be, the focus shifts to how this dissertation will go about addressing the research shortcomings and subsequently answer the central research question.

3.1 The case study

The research will be conducted from a qualitative perspective. To answer the central question, the theoretical case study method will be utilised. According to Stake case study research “run the gamut from the most microcosmic to the most macrocosmic levels of political phenomena”.¹⁸⁶

The dependent variable (what is being tested) of this study is the concept of populism within the EFF and the independent variables (what is manipulated to test the dependent variable) would include anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash.

The concept of a case study has an extensive range and especially in the social sciences, the scope is significantly bigger than in natural sciences. A “case study” does not have to be a person. Stake argues it can be a “bounded system” – an institution, a country, a programme or even a population.¹⁸⁷ Yin echoes this sentiment when he explains that “how” and “why” questions are explanatory and difficult to confine to a constricted approach.¹⁸⁸ They are “likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the preferred research methods”.

¹⁸⁶ Robert Stake, *Multiple Case Study Analysis* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2006), 65.

¹⁸⁷ Robert Stake, *Multiple Case Study Analysis*, 66.

¹⁸⁸ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (London: Sage, 2009), 8.

The current research aims to understand *how* and *why* populism is present within the EFF in South Africa. This inquisitive, explanatory nature of the central question makes the case study method the favourable one – not just in terms of being congruous with the parameters of *how* and *why*, but also fit the criteria of focusing on a central unit (in this case South Africa).

Jolobe argues that the strength of the case study lies in its nature to accommodate a manifold of evidence such as “documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations”.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, this research will make use of current theories and applying them to the South African context. Other sources include existing research on the subject, social media posts from Twitter, media articles, evidence reports, documents, speeches, and calculated inferences to draw conclusions, form arguments and ultimately answer the central research question.

The limitations and the critique of the case study design does not go unnoticed. Individual cases and single objects or entities are seldom the focal points for social inquiry, and it is exactly within this premise that the critique lies, according to Stake.¹⁹⁰

Stake’s counterargument is the distinctiveness of research in the social sciences. “In the social science(s), most case studies feature: descriptions that are complex. Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case.”¹⁹¹

Implied in the above argument is the distinctive nature of a case study; its colossal scope of reference, its holistic nature, and its application render “generalisation” in the traditional sense of scientific inquiry moot.

An analysis of anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash in South Africa, is limited in the sense that it is only a few of many perspectives and thus can’t be generalised as a universal, *inexhaustible* theory of why populism is on the rise in the country. These three concepts might be the overarching factors, but it is by no means the *only* factors at play.

¹⁸⁹ Zwelethu Jolobe, “Getting to Codesa: An analysis on why multiparty negotiations in South Africa began: 1984-1991,” Thesis presented for Doctoral Degree at the University of Cape Town, (2014), 7.


¹⁹⁰ Robert Stake, *Multiple Case Study Analysis*, 73.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

However, by covering a vital or core part of the subject, it can't help but be a good representation or generalisation.

The benefits gained from a case study analysis outweighs possible criticism regarding the lack of generalisation. The method for each of the three independent variables will henceforth be outlined below and will serve as a guide and roadmap for the practical application in chapter four (anti-establishment), chapter five (economic inequalities) and chapter six (the cultural backlash). It will all be brought together in the final chapter where conclusions will be drawn, and recommendations will be made for future research.

As a roadmap for this dissertation, the following schema should be useful. It maps out the three central concepts, what international theory will be used and how it will be measured in the local context.



3.2 Anti-establishment

As mentioned before, the theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr and Hartleb will be consolidated to form a coherent theory of anti-establishment within the EFF and therefore the local context. The detail of this theory was discussed in chapter two and will be applied in chapter four.

- *Mudde and Kaltwasser's* ideational approach will be applied throughout the study, especially concerning the anti-establishment argument. Within this framework “the people” are pitted against “the elite”, thus creating an anti-establishment stance.

In this theoretical approach three interpretations of “the people” will be applied:

1. The people as sovereign
2. The people as a group that is forgotten
3. The people as a nation

The four elements of “the elite” that will be applied are:

1. The elite’s power is for their benefit
 2. The elite are not real politicians
 3. The elite is part of the faulty system
 4. The elite is foreign
- *Barr's* concepts of the “outsider” or “maverick” breaking away from the establishment, lends further interpretation to anti-establishment sentiment. A so-called “crisis of representation” is present if ruling party’s (establishment) actions leads to a breaking down of linkages with voters, creating an anti-establishment stance. This was explained in chapter two.

In chapter four it will be argued how the breaking down of linkages with the establishment can be traced to six specific events:

1. Declining voter support for the ANC
 2. Firing of Nene
 3. Nkandla
 4. Corruption charges against Zuma
 5. Marikana
 6. Protest action
- *Hartleb's* characteristics of an anti-establishment party are also very useful and he describes traits that are common amongst anti-establishment parties. In chapter four it will be explained fully and applied to the local setting.

The main characteristics of an anti-establishment party that will be applied to the EFF include:

1. The construction of “the people” as homogenous and a front-line against the political, cultural and economic elites;
2. an image of being the so-called underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media);
3. a claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable establishment);
4. the simplification or trivialisation of issues that are often more complex than relates to the establishment;
5. often a claim to represent the “silent majority”, the people who input are stifled by the establishment;
6. the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues – “we are exactly the opposite of the establishment” notion; and
7. aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective”).

Ultimately the argument is that a significant number of citizens lose their trust in the establishment and are available to be swept up by populist parties and movements.¹⁹²

¹⁹² Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 137.

How will this then be applied to the local context? As mentioned earlier theoretical case studies use a variety of documents and this discussion on anti-establishment will utilise speeches, media articles, policy documents, statements, social media posts and research reports and outputs.



The three anti-establishment theories will then be incorporated into a single anti-establishment theory that will possibly serve as a newly-formed theory on the issue.

3.3 Economic inequality

This case study research will cite relevant studies on economic inequality, but to argue that it's relevant as a demand-side factor to facilitate the rise of populism, we need to demonstrate that the supporters of a populist party (the EFF) are economically marginalised.

The main international theory that will be utilised is that of Inglehart and Norris where they indicate:


- a.) the typical supporter profile; and
- b.) the key indicators of economic inequality.

This theoretical perspective will be applied to the local context. We will thus look at both the macro (general supporter profile) and micro (specific indicators pertaining to supporters).

Research from Ipsos breaking down the supporter profile of EFF supporters will be used¹⁹³ to illustrate the voter profiles of EFF supporters. This will be followed by data from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa and Media Monitoring Africa (Wazimap). By breaking downwards where the EFF has had electoral success one can get a picture of their staunch supporters.

Five aspects of economic inequality, as indicated by Inglehart and Norris, will be discussed, namely:

1. Income
2. Race
3. Unemployment
4. Education
5. Resources



These economic indicators will be analysed and compared to that of “the elite” – white, DA supporters (a detailed explanation on this rationale can be found in chapter five). This comparison is important because it’s not economic hardships that drive populism, but rather the *inequality*.

What outcome will validate the economic inequality argument as support for populism in South Africa? The EFF strongholds will be economically marginalised, and an analysis of the five indicators will show their dire circumstances. Antithetically, the DA strongholds will be economically more prosperous with the abovementioned indicators forming a stark contrast with those of EFF strongholds.

¹⁹³ *The supporter profiles of SA's three largest parties – Ipsos*, Politicsweb, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-supporter-profiles-of-sas-three-largest-partie> (accessed 17 April 2018) .

3.4 Cultural backlash

The cultural backlash argument is germane to analyse populism in South Africa, but it is no easy task to accomplish. Resnick argues that Malema and the EFF have equated “the elite” with white people (race).¹⁹⁴ The identity displacement, the “us and them” stance and the antagonistic view of racial minorities are all indicators of a cultural backlash.

The main international theory that will be applied, is the cultural backlash thesis from Inglehart and Norris. They identify two elements of the cultural backlash theory:

1. a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and
2. anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.¹⁹⁵

Additionally, research from Inglehart and Norris has shown that in Western countries the cultural backlash is strongest among:


1. the older generation;
2. mostly white people;
3. particularly men; and
4. less educated sectors.¹⁹⁶

As the manifestation of the cultural backlash is different in South Africa (and indeed in many other countries), supporters of the populist EFF will generally be younger (antithetical to Western democracies), black men who are less educated.

¹⁹⁴ Daniele Resnick, “Populism in Africa” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 112.

¹⁹⁵ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15.

¹⁹⁶ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 3.



Measuring the cultural backlash in society involves a multitude of sources. The demographics of the EFF will be analysed via research from Ipsos in the form of the supporter profile.

Insights from the Institute of Race Relations, the Human Sciences Research Council and other researchers will be used to show general open racism against minorities (research from Nyar and the SA Institute of Race Relations), and research from Claassen, Dumani and Solomon and Kosaka will be referred to when discussing xenophobia.

Social media comments from Twitter and media articles will substantiate it from a supporter point of view, as well as first-person comments from EFF supporters (more detailed information on this will follow in chapter six).

3.5 Conclusion and the way forward

In the next chapter, anti-establishment will be applied to the local context. Firstly, a discussion on “the people” versus “the elite”, will allude to the anti-establishment sentiment and policies expressed by the EFF. It will be shown how each of the three interpretations of “the people” (“the people as sovereign”, “the forgotten ones” and “political context”) can contribute to the anti-establishment populist context.

Similarly, the concept of “the elite” will also be addressed. The establishment is considered part of the elite and several relevant aspects that tie in with the anti-establishment sentiment will be discussed, for example, the elite being portrayed as not “real” politicians and calling for a change to the current political system.

Barr’s definitions of “outsiders” versus “mavericks” will furthermore be applied to the local context to indicate positioning towards the establishment, as well as how a crisis of

representation forms when the linkages between voters and the establishment break down. Several factors led to the anti-establishment stance of local voters, such as the Firing of Nene, Nkandla and Marikana amongst others.

Lastly, Hartleb's characteristics of a populist, anti-establishment party will be practically applied to the EFF – it will be argued that they are a populist, anti-establishment party to its core and that these anti-establishment characteristics can be applied to the them.

Chapter 4: Anti-establishment

Many observers agree that anti-establishment parties have grown substantially in the past few decades.¹⁹⁷ Not surprisingly, this phenomenon coincides with a rise in populism, and as discussed before, populist parties often position themselves against the mainstream parties.

Returning to Mudde and Kaltwasser's central definition of populism, it is imperative to understand that there is a divide or separation between "two homogenous and antagonistic camps", namely "the people" and "the elite", with the latter being equated to the establishment and its extensions.¹⁹⁸

In this chapter, the theoretical foundations of anti-establishment, as discussed in the previous section, will be applied to the South African context. This will be achieved in reference to the EFF, emphasising that international populism theory can indeed be applied to the local political landscape (thus expanding the current limitations of local theory).

The international theory that will be applied include:

- *Mudde and Kaltwasser's* ideational approach;
- *Barr's* concepts of the "outsider" or "maverick" breaking away from the establishment;
- *Barr's* so-called "crisis of representation" and the subsequent breaking down of linkages; and
- *Hartleb's* characteristics of an anti-establishment party.


Firstly, a discussion on "the people" versus "the elite", will allude to the anti-establishment sentiment and policies expressed by the EFF.

¹⁹⁷ Florian Hartleb, "Here to stay: Anti-establishment parties in Europe", 41.

¹⁹⁸ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

Schematic representation of the ideational approach:

People	Elite	General will
<p>Three interpretations of how populist often view “the people”:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The people as sovereign 2. The people as forgotten 3. The people as a nation <p><i>Also includes: What separates “the people” from ordinary appeal to the people (page 38).</i></p>	<p>Four interpretations of the elite:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The elite’s power is for their own benefit 2. The elite are not real politicians 3. The elite is part of the faulty system 4. The elite is foreign 	<p>“The people” are passive: Government is not in interest of general will.</p> <p>= symbolic representation</p> <p>= employ common sense</p> <p>= not against representation</p>


 People vs Elite is essential in anti-establishment theory.

This will be followed by applying the general anti-establishment theory (as discussed in chapter two), as well as the conceptual parameters. Barr’s concept of linkages will also form part of the analysis and ultimately Hartleb’s characteristics of a populist party will form a core part of the discussion.

Speeches, policy documents, manifesto’s and statements made in the media will be analysed and used as evidence to support the anti-establishment stance of the opposition.



4.1 Ideational approach: the people

Previously, Mudde and Kaltwasser’s three conceptualisations of “the people” have been discussed, namely the people as sovereign, the people as “inferior” and the people as the

national community.¹⁹⁹ All three will now be discussed concerning the specific South African landscape regarding the anti-establishment sentiment of the EFF.

4.1.1 First interpretation: the people are sovereign

The very first “freedom” or “right” in the Freedom Charter is “The people shall govern!” and refers to the right to vote, the right of people to take part in the administration of the country and the abolishment of all bodies of minority rule that “shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government”.²⁰⁰ In essence, it’s the sovereignty of “the people” that establishes a democratic political order.

In the EFFs founding manifesto, it states it draws inspiration for “a radical, working-class interpretation of the Freedom Charter”²⁰¹ and subsequently on the 62nd anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter, the party proclaimed that document “has since been betrayed and abandoned by the ANC government”.²⁰² It goes on to say:

*With the Gupta Capture phenomenon, the people no longer govern. Those who have been elected have sold the people's mandate in exchange for corrupt money and properties in Dubai; essentially, the people do not govern under Zuma's ANC. The EFF is the only political party prepared to realise the true aspirations of the Freedom Charter.*²⁰³

Resulting from the above, it can be argued that the EFF believes “the people” are not in control of the country anymore; the ANC has no mandate to govern and the establishment (the ANC and what it represents) has failed the people of South Africa. The implicit warning is that the ultimate source of power lies with the people and that the establishment has betrayed them, leading to a government that will ultimately be given back to the people.

¹⁹⁹ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 11.

²⁰⁰ Congress of the People, *Freedom Charter* (Kliptown, 1955).

²⁰¹ Economic Freedom Fighters *EFF Founding Manifesto* (2013), 7.

²⁰² Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, Only the EFF government will realise the aspirations of the Freedom Charter, Official EFF website, <https://www.EFFonline.org/single-post/2017/06/26/ONLY-THE-EFF-GOVERNMENT-WILL-REALISE-THE-ASPIRATIONS-OF-THE-FREEDOM-CHARTER> (accessed 29 May 2018).

²⁰³ Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, Only the EFF government will realise the aspirations of the Freedom Charter, Official EFF website, <https://www.EFFonline.org/single-post/2017/06/26/ONLY-THE-EFF-GOVERNMENT-WILL-REALISE-THE-ASPIRATIONS-OF-THE-FREEDOM-CHARTER> (accessed 29 May 2018).

4.1.2 Second interpretation: The forgotten ones

The second interpretation of “the people” is one who has economic and cultural status as a cornerstone. Populist leaders and parties latch onto the markers considered “inferior” by the dominant culture; they focus on those who are excluded due to their socioeconomic and sociocultural status. This meaning of “the people” aims to mobilise and unite the “angry”, “forgotten” and “silenced” against the common enemy – the elite or establishment.

This manifestation is so ubiquitous in the South African context; it is not difficult to find examples, especially concerning the EFF. Below are some instances of framing “the people” as the “forgotten” ones or even constructed as being ostracised from society. These statements were made by EFF leaders:

- “[Black people’s] humanity has been taken away by an evil system of capitalism that produces racism. Blacks are not human. Blacks are subhuman.”²⁰⁴
- “We are fighting for black people. Why is it only the black community which is left in poverty, are we a cursed nation, are we a defeated nation, are we a hopeless nation? Why are we rejected, why are we killed when we speak the truth?”²⁰⁵
- “We are not going to allow anyone to use the colour of our skin to humiliate us, to exclude us. We are black we are proud; we are black we are beautiful. We are black, and we are not ashamed of being black.”²⁰⁶
- “Black people remain a conquered nation 20 years into democracy.”²⁰⁷

²⁰⁴ Nico Gous, *Black people do not have human rights: Malema*, Times Live, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-21-black-people-do-not-have-human-rights-malema> (accessed 28 March 2018).

²⁰⁵ Molaole Montsho, *WATCH: EFF only party fighting for black people in SA – Malema*, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/watch-eff-only-party-fighting-for-black-people-in-sa-malema-14746880> (accessed 29 May 2018).

²⁰⁶ Koketso Motau, *Malema: We make no apology for what EFF members did at H&M stores*, EWN <http://ewn.co.za/2018/01/13/malema-we-make-no-apology-for-what-eff-members-did-at-h-and-m-stores> (accessed 29 May 2018).

²⁰⁷ *EFF leads latest anti-government protest*, MoneyWeb, <https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/eff-leads-latest-anti-government-protest/> (accessed 29 May 2018).

In the following section, it will be demonstrated that the EFF equates “black people” to “the people” (thus a racial interpretation of “the people”) and from the statements above it is clear that the party and its leaders frame black people as “being conquered”; they are the “rejected” ones who are considered to be “subhuman”. The party defines “the people” as those being sidelined, humiliated or excluded. In turn, the establishment promotes the values of the minority or elite, or rather those who are not viewed as the “real” or “true” people.

4.1.3 Third interpretation: A national context

The last interpretation of “the people” refers to the national community of a political context, but it is more convoluted than simply regarding the population living within a particular region as “the people”. The parameters of the latter are determined in certain civic or ethnic terms, even when it seems to be a collective.²⁰⁸

In South Africa, Malema and the EFF have repeatedly referred to black people as the only true citizens and emphasising that the country is not the home of white people.²⁰⁹ In November 2016 Malema appeared in court after being charged with contravention of the 1956 Riotous Assemblies Act, and after the proceedings he addressed supporters:

*This is our continent; it belongs to us . . . We are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now... The rightful owners of the land are black people. No white person is a rightful owner of the land here in SA and whole of the African continent.*²¹⁰

Malema’s stance is indicative of defining “the people” in ethnic terms (black people in this instance). South Africa “belongs” to black people, he argues, and they are the “rightful owners” of the country. White people are seen as “foreigners”, not real citizens of South Africa.

²⁰⁸ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 11.

²⁰⁹ *We welcome white people, even though it's not their home – Malema*, Politicsweb, <https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/we-welcome-white-people-even-though-its-not-their-> (accessed 28 March 2018).

²¹⁰ Neo Goba and Nomahlubi Jordaan, *EFF does not want the slaughter of white people ‘for now’, Malema says*, Business Day, <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-11-07-eff-does-not-want-the-slaughter-of-white-people-for-now-malema-says/> (accessed 29 May).

According to Malema “[the government] must be prepared to expropriate the land of *our* people, which was forcefully stolen from *them*”.²¹¹ In the construction of “our” people he is implying the land belongs to black people, and thus they are the true citizens of the country. This is further emphasised in his statement that “they” (white people) stole “that land was illegally acquired during the colonial era and it is now in the hands of ‘colonial settlers’ and ‘land thieves’”.²¹²

The ANC (establishment) is seen as being protective of white people and promoting their interest. Koekemoer argues the EFF sees the intention of the ANC as “toothless African nationalism” that tries “to suppress the black nation in protection of white interests”.²¹³ Despite some reconciliatory remarks such as “we want white people, there is no problem with white people”²¹⁴, it is evident that the majority of the party’s statements defines black people as the only “people” or true citizens of the country. Koekemoer sees this as the manifestation of two nations – black and white²¹⁵ – but this does not account for the overwhelming *exclusionary* language of the EFF, such as “illegally”, “they”, “thieves” and “rightful owners”.

It’s clear from these statements that Malema views black people as the “true citizens” and white people as “foreign” or “visitors”: “We will not chase white people to the sea. We will share the land piece by piece. And you can’t own bigger than us... you are a visitor. Visitors must behave. They must know that the land belongs to people of South Africa... indigenous people of South Africa.”²¹⁶ This sentiment also manifests itself in the supporters of the EFF, as will be indicated in chapter six when discussing the cultural backlash. In this regard anti-establishment also manifests itself as a demand-side argument.

²¹¹ Economics Freedom Fighters, EFF Official Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/economicfreedomstruggle/posts/full-speech-of-the-cic-julius-malema-in-reply-to-sona-in-parliament-18-june-2014/424683854339419/> (accessed 29 May 2018).

²¹² Anja Koekemoer, “How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation,” (Master’s thesis presented at Stellenbosch University, 2017), 67.

²¹³ Anja Koekemoer, “How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation,” (Master’s thesis presented at Stellenbosch University, 2017), 67.

²¹⁴ Amanda Khoza, *There will be no bloodshed over land, whites are as natural to SA as ‘trees and mountains’* – Malema, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/there-will-be-no-bloodshed-over-land-whites-are-as-natural-to-sa-as-trees-and-mountains-malema-20180412> (accessed 29 May 2018).

²¹⁵ Anja Koekemoer, “How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation,” 69.

²¹⁶ *All white people are visitors in SA* – Malema, The Citizen, <https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1337702/white-people-are-visitors-in-sa-malema/> (accessed 09 July 2018).

Many theorists would rightfully claim that most political parties will appeal to “the people” and that they are true representatives of them, but as have been explained before, Müller argues that populist leaders claim that a *part* of the people *is* the people and that only the populist party or movement represents the true people.²¹⁷

Fighting for the plight of “the people” is not populism *per se* but fighting for a section of the people and only legitimising them as true people, is a sign of populism. This is a way to distinguish the morally pure and real people from the immoral people who do not belong. Whatever the host ideology is, this moralistic determination is distinctive of how populists view “the people”.²¹⁸

4.1.4 Three interpretations: Criticism

Applying the three interpretations to the South African context one can understand sovereignty, marginalisation and a national community as manifestations of populism. Criticisms of each of these interpretations from the EFF are raised below.

It can be construed as disingenuous to claim that the ANC (establishment) does not represent “the people”, after all, 53.9% of voters supported the party in the 2016 Local Government elections.²¹⁹ They *chose* the ANC government and does indeed consider it “a government of the people, by the people and for the people” (the first interpretation). The EFF got 8.1% of the votes – indeed a minority of “the people”.

Regarding the manifestation of “the people” as the so-called “forgotten” ones, it is the EFF who does not consider the successes of the establishment. Even though the pace of transformation has been slow and inadequate, there are many examples of black people who can indeed not be considered “forgotten” in South Africa.

In 2012 almost 80% of all workers in the public sector were black Africans, with 87% of senior management positions filled by the same group. This is a significant turnaround from 1994

²¹⁷ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 22-23.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

²¹⁹ *2016 Municipal Election Leaderboard*, IEC Website, <https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx> (accessed 29 May 2018).

when 95% of positions were occupied by white people. These black people are indeed not part of the EFF, nor can they be labelled as “forgotten ones”.

Similarly, in the private sector in 2017, total employment equity placements stood at 56%, up from 48.4% in 2016 and 39% in 2015.²²⁰ By the end of 2013, one in every four senior managers were black.²²¹ Whilst these figures are based on economic status, it does not paint a picture of a “forgotten” group.

Whilst our society still has to transform on many levels (economically, socially, culturally) one can’t disregard the progress the establishment has made by uplifting millions of black people. Surely these citizens can’t all be lumped in with the “forgotten ones” – these are black people who do not fit the description of this interpretation of “the people”.

As mentioned, this does not ignore the fact that black people are still disproportionately disadvantaged (as will be discussed in the following chapter), but it does have implications for defining “the people” exclusively as black people who are excluded from society. A non-populist appeal would be to acknowledge the challenges still faced by the majority of black citizens, but also recognising the black citizens who *have* overcome the challenges and see them as part of “the people”, and not simply an extension of the establishment or elite.

A counter-argument to this interpretation and criticism is that the EFF is often referring to the historical and structural disenfranchisement of black people, and not solely focus on the present success of black people. Therefore, it can include black professionals in its interpretation of “the people” – in this sense it is thus not a materialistic approach, but rather a cultural and societal approach. Stated otherwise: The EFF acknowledges that black people can be “forgotten” by the establishment even if they are successful.

²²⁰ *Jump in transformation in South Africa’s private sector*, Business Tech, <https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/221797/jump-in-transformation-in-south-africas-private-sector/> (accessed 09 July 2018).

²²¹ Ferial Haffajee, *What if There Were No Whites in South Africa?* (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2015), 10.

4.2 Ideational approach: The elite

As mentioned in the previous section all conceptions of populism encapsulate some aspect of this antipathy towards the establishment, in essence pitting “the people” against “the elite”, and this determination is based on a moral evaluation. This anti-establishment stance has four elements:

- The elite’s power is for their benefit
- The elite are not “real politicians”
- The elite is part of the faulty system
- The elite as foreign

4.2.1 The elite’s power is for their benefit

As mentioned in chapter two the elite is often portrayed as being in power for their benefit. They govern for the few, not the many. The EFF has viewed the ANC elite as governing for their own benefit. “The government is caring only about themselves. They don’t care about you,” Malema told supporters in 2013.²²² In 2018, he accused President Ramaphosa of being a person who only took up the presidency of the country “to clinch business deals”. His interest “as a billionaire” was “to have access to world leaders to clinch deals with them. Cyril Ramaphosa is worth billions. Why is he giving money to where money is? Why is he not sharing half of his billions with the poor people of the country?”²²³

The EFF has also called on the Guptas to leave South Africa, saying the country could not be held to ransom by a “corrupt cartel” with “mafia” tendencies.²²⁴ They even equated Zuma and the Guptas in their lexicon, by amalgamating the two words in “Zupta”. The implication is that the state is captured – it’s looted to the benefit of those in power.

²²² ANC doesn’t care about you – Malema, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC-doesnt-care-about-you-Malema-20130711> (accessed 28 January 2019).

²²³ Baldwin Ndaba, Malema accuses Ramaphosa of being interested in deals only, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/news/malema-accuses-ramaphosa-of-being-interested-in-deals-only-15277553> (accessed 28 January 2019).

²²⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410> (accessed 14 July)

As has been shown in chapter two, the critique of the elite *excludes* those in power who are sympathetic to the cause of the populist, and obviously, it also precludes the populist with power – they are after all not there for their own benefit, but to represent the will of the people. An example of this is Malema’s own lavish lifestyle (expensive cars, watches, clothing) which has been in the spotlight many times. To these, he said: “How are you going to inspire them when you are also going to stay in a shack?”²²⁵ The assumption is that as the leader he is there at the benefit of “the people” – he doesn’t live a lavish lifestyle because he *wants* to (unlike the establishment); it’s so that he can successfully execute his job as the leader.

It can be assumed that by having this wealth, they deem it appropriate – unlike the undeserved wealth of the establishment these political leaders’ wealth is legitimate, as they represent the interests of the people.

Furthermore, after the 2016 Local Government Elections, the ANC did not receive a much-needed majority in key municipalities such as Johannesburg Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay. In the first two, the EFF held the balance of power and was dubbed the “kingmakers”; the DA needed their support to govern. Even with drastically opposing ideologies, the EFF considered the DA the “lesser of two evils” and gave the party its support in council meetings. “The ANC will not get a single vote from the EFF,” Malema said during a press conference. “We will vote for the opposition because the ANC must be removed from power.”²²⁶ Malema defended this decision by saying the party has heard the plea of South Africans and will “move in that direction”.

It can be argued that this was an unprecedented move in South African politics. Two parties whom it seems are worlds apart, worked together to the benefit of “the people”, as an action directly opposed to the establishment. This is even more significant when one takes into account that the white leaders and voters of the DA are the exact “elite” the EFF is against. At this time, they made an active choice against the political elite in favour of the cultural, social and economic elite (represented by the white minority).

²²⁵ Malema defends lavish lifestyle, News 24, <https://www.news24.com/elections/news/i-cant-inspire-poor-while-living-in-a-shack-malema-20140422> (accessed 14 July 2018).

²²⁶ Alec Hogg, Malema smashes conspiracy rumours: EFF will vote with DA – lesser evil than ANC, Biz News, <https://www.biznews.com/undictated/2016/08/17/malema-smashes-conspiracy-rumours-eff-will-vote-da/> (accessed 14 July 2018).

4.2.2 The elite are not “real politicians”

It would be a misconception that populists are necessarily anti-elitist per se, especially when they are part of the elite.²²⁷ The distinction here would be that they are the “proper” elite who will not betray the trust of the people. Voting for the populist leader or party would be the “morally correct” outcome of an election and if this does not happen, the real winners are considered illegitimate.²²⁸

Later in this discussion, it will be shown how the EFF accused the establishment *system* of being against them and that the votes are rigged. This is an indication that the election outcome is considered illegitimate – the implication being the outcome of the vote is not correct as it is not morally correct. The party has also called both Zuma and Ramaphosa “illegitimate presidents”, even though democratic processes were followed in electing both of them.²²⁹

4.2.3 The elite is part of the faulty system

As mentioned in chapter two, the elite is often being constructed as working against the economic interests of the country, and that doing away with the current connection between the political and economic elite, is the best way forward. This is not necessarily anti-capitalist; they just believe capitalism in its current form is benefiting the few to the disadvantage of the people. In this regard, the EFF has stood out.

Malema has accused Ramaphosa on several occasions of being in the pockets of “white monopoly capitalists” and has even referred to him as “not black enough and he has done everything in his life to please white people”.²³⁰ The party has even called the ANC “an organisation of black elite”²³¹, implying that the current *system* is benefiting the few. It’s important to distinguish between the party and the system. The EFF believes the *system* endorsed by the ANC is the reason why we have inequality in South Africa.

²²⁷ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 30.

²²⁸ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*, 30.

²²⁹ Makhosandile Zulu, *EFF calls Ramaphosa’s election ‘illegitimate’*, The Citizen, <https://citizen.co.za/news/1820931/eff-calls-ramaphosas-election-illigitimate/> (accessed 14 July 2018).

²³⁰ Mxolisi Mngadi, *Everything Ramaphosa does is to please white people – Malema*, News24 <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/everything-ramaphosa-does-is-to-please-white-people-malema-20170725> (accessed 14 July 2018).

²³¹ *ANC an organisation of black elite: Malema*, Official EFF website <http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/anc-an-organisation-of-black-elite-malema/> (accessed 14 July 2018).

In a statement, the party said it is “the only party in parliament that represents this agenda and seeks the socialist overthrow of capitalism through the attainment of economic freedom in our lifetime”²³², a clear indication that they want to do away with the economic system of capitalism.

In the party’s constitution, it is also stipulated that they are proponents of socialism: “The EFF is radical, leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialistic . . .”²³³

Indeed, the EFFs stance is radically different from the current system. As mentioned before they support nationalisation of key economic sectors with the state controlling the assets and land. They believe the current establishment and the system within which it operates are not to the benefit of the people, but the elite. Unlike some other populist leaders such as Donald Trump, the EFF *does* believe in the abolishment of capitalism. There is not a particular version of this system that they think can be successful.

4.2.4 The elite as foreign

Finally, Mudde and Kaltwasser are of opinion that the elites are often not just seen as *representing* foreign power, they are considered to *be* foreign themselves. In South Africa white people are viewed to be foreign by the EFF (as we have seen earlier), but in this regard, reference is not made to black people who are grouped with the elite. The black elite might not be seen as “real” black people (as seen previously concerning Ramaphosa), but they are still considered citizens of the country.

4.3 Outsiders versus mavericks

Anti-establishment signals a locus extraneous to the mainstream political landscape, but it would be imprecise to view the latter as the origin of all populist figures. An outsider, as Barr states it, is someone who is truly independent and has entered the arena as an alternative to the establishment;²³⁴ and a maverick was previously in the nucleus of the establishment but has since broken away.²³⁵

²³² Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, *Only socialism will end the strife of the working class – EFF*, Politicsweb, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/only-socialism-will-end-the-strife-of-the-working-> (accessed 15 July 2018).

²³³ Floyd Shivambu (ed.), *The Coming Revolution* (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2014), 77.

²³⁴ Robert Barr, “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics,” 30.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

In the South African context, there aren't any prominent examples of populists who can be labelled as true outsiders. Malema and other prominent EFF members such as Floyd Shivambu and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi all emerged from the ANC, or rather the ANYL to be exact.

In late 2011 Malema was suspended for five years from the ANC and a few months later he was expelled from the party because of his call for the nationalisation of mines and the seizing of land from white farmers.

At first, Malema still had loyalty towards the ANC, proclaiming he “will die in the ANC”²³⁶, but soon that loyalty faded in June 2013 he announced the formation of the EFF, claiming the ANC is now “committed to a right-wing, neo-liberal and capitalist agenda which has kept [the] majority of our people on the margins of South Africa's economy”.²³⁷

This turn away from the ruling party established him as a maverick and Mudde and Kaltwasser argues that whilst he previously was a dominant “populist voice of opposition within the ANC”, he now continued his rhetoric and policies outside the establishment and claimed they are upholding the status quo he is rebelling against.²³⁸

4.4 Crisis of representation: Linkages breaking down

As mentioned in chapter two, Laclau argues established systems often break down when there's a “crisis of representation” – ultimately a significant number of citizens lose their trust in the establishment and are available to be swept up by populist parties and movements.²³⁹ They might opt out of the democratic process, but they are also susceptible to the rhetoric and policies of “extra-systemic actors”. The latter claims to be an “outsider” (or as we have learnt, a “maverick”); they are not part of the crisis of representation caused by the establishment, thus the only true representation of the disillusioned citizens.²⁴⁰

²³⁶ *I won't form new party – Malema*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/I-wont-form-new-party-Malema-20150430> (Accessed 29 May 2018).

²³⁷ Faranaaz Parker, *Julius Malema launches party political platform*, Mail & Guardian, <https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-11-malema-launches-party-political-platform> (Accessed 29 May 2018).

²³⁸ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 39.

²³⁹ Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, 137.

²⁴⁰ Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 290.

Barr's references to linkages are particularly useful here.²⁴¹ This is firmly placed within the supply-side, but instead of the populist party being implied, the actions of the establishment party create an opportunity for the populist party to exploit this and subsequently point out how the establishment is responsible for breaking its links with voters.

There are several reasons why the linkage between voters and an established party would break down (as discussed in chapter two), but one is of particular relevance to the South African context: representational linkage. Before continuing to discuss this, a closer look at the four main linkages and how the establishment has worked to maintain them will follow.

Clientelistic linkages (in the forms of social grants) are well-maintained by the establishment in South Africa. The ANC government might have faced legal and ethical challenges with regards to social grants, but it has always ensured that those who need social grants, get them. The number of social grants in South Africa has increased exponentially over the past 23 years, from an estimated 4 million in 1994 to more than 17 million in 2017. A report from Child Watch has shown that grants (particularly the child grant) mostly reach poor households²⁴² and that they have been instrumental in "poverty alleviation over the post-apartheid years"²⁴³.

The establishment has also been relatively proactive in maintaining directive linkages, such as selective benefits to targeted groups. Research from Arendse and Stack has shown that "there is no precedent elsewhere for a policy change that adds a new wealth tax to the estate duty and donations that already exist in South Africa" and that our "estate duty and donations tax systems compare favourably with similar systems used in several other countries internationally".²⁴⁴ The implication is that substantial tax cuts to wealthy are not on the cards

²⁴¹ Kay Lawson, "When Linkage Fails" in Kayeter Merkl and P, (ed.), *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organisation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 37.; Robert Barr, "Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics," 35.

²⁴² Leila Patel, Tessa Hochfeld, Jacqueline Moodley and Reem Mutwali, "The Gender Dynamics and Impact of the Child Support Grant in Doornkop, Soweto," Research report from the University of Johannesburg, (2012).

²⁴³ Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Hayley McEwen and Charlotte Koep, "Employment and Inequality Outcomes in South Africa," Unpublished report from the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) and the School of Economics, University of Cape Town, (unknown year).

²⁴⁴ Jackie Arendse and Lilla Stack, "Investigating a new wealth tax in South Africa: Lessons from international experience," *Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences* 11, 1(2018), 4.

and that we on par with similar economies; a direct taxation benefit to the wealthy is thus not a significant breakdown of the linkage.

Similarly, research from Mabugua, Fofanab and Chitiga-Mabuguc has shown that “government has committed to increasing economic growth and reducing poverty and inequality. Tax policy has been the most important instrument at its disposal to meet these objectives.”²⁴⁵ It can also be argued that Zuma’s announcement (and directive) that the government will subsidise free higher education for poor and working-class can strengthen the link the ruling party has with supporters.

Some researchers such as Isaacs, argue that the VAT increase in 2018 will harm the poor and lower income-earners the most.²⁴⁶ This directive might cause a breakdown of the linkage between the establishment and some of its supporters, but thus far it has not been measured.

The third linkage, participatory linkage, has been shaky for the most part. One just has to consider the tripartite alliance between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP. Murmurings of waning workers’ support for the ANC²⁴⁷ have been present for many years and recently the SACP broke the linkage by contesting local elections under its own banner.²⁴⁸ The establishment has, for the *most* part, tried to maintain this participatory linkage, by appointing alliance members into cabinet positions (Blade Nzimande and Thulas Nxesi) and consulting them on changes and policies. During the latter part of the Zuma presidency, the ANC did considerable damage to these linkages by axing SACP members from cabinet and not consulting them on the changes made.²⁴⁹ This resulted in the SACP withdrawing support from the ruling party as mentioned before.

²⁴⁵ Ramos Mabugua, Ismael Fofanab and Margeret Chitiga-Mabuguc, “Pro-poor Tax Policy Changes in South Africa: Potential and Limitations,” *Journal of African Economies* 24 2(2015). li73-ii105.

²⁴⁶ Gilad Isaacs, *Lifting the lid on a VAT increase*, Wits University website, <https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/in-their-own-words/2018/2018-02/lifting-the-lid-on-a-vat-increase.html> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁴⁷ Alexander Beresfort, “Comrades ‘Back on Track’? The Durability of the Tripartite Alliance in South Africa,” *African Affairs* 108, 432(2009), 391.

²⁴⁸ *SACP breaks alliance ranks in local election*, BusinessLive <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-11-29-sacp-breaks-alliance-ranks-in-local-election/> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁴⁹ Mia Lindeque, *Alliance with ANC currently at its lowest*, EWN, <http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/27/alliance-with-anc-currently-at-its-lowest-sacp-cosatu> (accessed 30 May 2018).

The establishment has generally been maintaining electoral linkages and during the 2016 Local Government Elections the party spent more than R1 billion on its campaign²⁵⁰ and many debates raged about so-called “food parcels for votes”²⁵¹. It’s more convoluted to give concrete evidence for this link, but it can be argued that at least by the *perception* of circumstantial evidence the establishment does seem to maintain electoral linkages.

Whilst all these linkages have played a significant part in maintaining support for the establishment, one other linkage, representational linkage, has broken down to such an extent that it can be argued it is one of the core reasons why support has been shifting to a populist party such as the EFF. As mentioned before performance failures on the part of the establishment is a key factor in migrating support towards populist parties.²⁵² Many other researchers such as Mudde and Kaltwasser, Halkjelsvik and Moffitt also agree on this approach, albeit in different varieties.²⁵³ As Roberts put it: “Populism thrives where mainstream parties are in crisis, or at least where they exclude or ignore major currents of opinion that are denied institutionalised channels of expression.”²⁵⁴

4.4.1 Voter support

Perhaps the biggest indicator that supporters moved away from the establishment is probably the decline in the ANC’s election results since its height in 2004 when it stood at 70% to 65.9% in 2014. An Ipsos survey in late 2017 showed the governing party’s support dropped to just 47%.²⁵⁵ According to Everatt the “ANC in Gauteng was sitting on 53% in the polls [in 2014]

²⁵⁰ Amogelang Mbatha, Arabile Gumede and Mike Cohen, *ANC’s R1bn election budget dwarfs all of its rivals combined*, Fin24, <https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ancs-r1bn-election-budget-dwarfs-all-of-its-rivals-combined-20160803> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁵¹ *Why we hand out free food parcels and t-shirts at events: ANC*, BusinessTech <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/123933/why-we-hand-out-free-food-parcels-and-t-shirts-at-events-anc/> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁵² Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 298.

²⁵³ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 99.; Albertine Halkjelsvik, “From Anti-establishment Social Movement to Successful Political Party Following the Emergence of the Five Star Movement in Italy,” 26.; and Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*, 119-121.

²⁵⁴ Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 292.

²⁵⁵ *ANC could drop to below 50%. It’s all down to undecided voters, says survey*, City press, <https://city-press.news24.com/News/anc-could-drop-to-below-50-its-all-down-to-undecided-voters-says-survey-20170831> (accessed 30 May 2018).

and won with 54%. Two years later this dropped, catastrophically, to see the ANC with just 41% of polled Gauteng voter support, just before the 2016 elections.”²⁵⁶ Even if one were to compare municipal elections with each other, the ANC received 54% of the 2016 votes, which is a considerable decrease from 62% in 2011.²⁵⁷

The party also lost control of key metros in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay. Everatt’s research shows three factors were on the minds of voters: the firing of Nhlanhla Nene as finance minister, the Constitutional Court ruling on Nkandla; and the corruption charges against Zuma.²⁵⁸ The current research will argue that these, in conjunction with the Marikana tragedy, an increase in protests and state capture, are all contributing factors that broke down the linkages the establishment had with its supporters.

4.4.2 Firing of Nene

The firing of respectable finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015 sent shockwaves through the country. Not only did Zuma’s decision to get rid of the finance minister sent the markets into turmoil²⁵⁹, but public opinion was also swinging against the establishment.

In an initial online survey 71% of respondents “most strongly disapproved” of the move²⁶⁰, and just before the 2016 elections research from Everatt confirmed this: “While a quarter (23%) of respondents said this had not affected their decision of which party to vote for at all, firing Nene made 41% of voters at least re-think which party they would vote for.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ David Everatt, *New survey data shows Zuma cost the ANC dearly in the 2016 election*, WITS, <https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/in-their-own-words/2017/2017-04/new-survey-data-shows-zuma-cost-the-anc-dearly-in-the-2016-election.html> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁵⁷ Oliviu Lannegren and Hiroshin Ito, “The End of the ANC Era: An Analysis of Corruption and Inequality in South Africa,” *Journal of Politics and Law* 10, 4(2017), 55.

²⁵⁸ David Everatt, *New survey data shows Zuma cost the ANC dearly in the 2016 election*, WITS, (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁵⁹ Xola Potelwa, *South African Markets Rattled as Zuma Fires Finance Minister*, Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-10/rand-plunges-in-longest-losing-streak-in-two-years-as-nene-fired> (accessed 15 July 2018).

²⁶⁰ Duncan Alfreds, *Online survey signals SA’s disapproval of Nene firing*, Fin24 <https://www.fin24.com/Tech/News/online-survey-signals-sas-disapproval-of-nene-firing-20151211> (accessed 15 July 2018).

²⁶¹ David Everatt, *New survey data shows Zuma cost the ANC dearly in the 2016 election*, WITS, (accessed 15 July 2018).

The ruling party simply “noted” and “respected” Zuma’s decision, but did not agree with the public outcry that it was an attempt to “capture” the treasury.²⁶² It’s clear from public opinion that the linkage between voters and the establishment broke with this action.

4.4.3 Nkandla

Security upgrades to Zuma’s private homestead have been a contentious issue in South African politics, culminating in the Constitutional Court ordering him to repay R7.8 million for upgrades he unduly benefited from.

In an Ipsos survey, more than 42% of South African felt taxpayers should not be held liable for the costs and when broken down by political party allegiance, the results showed 67% of DA supporters and 56% of EFF supporters were against taxpayers funding Nkandla. Only 34% of ANC supporters felt the same way.²⁶³ Everatt’s research shows that 54% of Gauteng voters reported the Nkandla ruling has an impact on their voting choice.²⁶⁴ With this in mind, the argument can again be made that the linkage between the establishment and the voters has been broken; indeed, this crisis has caused the establishment to lose support.

4.4.4 Corruption charges against Zuma

Zuma is facing 18 charges of corruption, money laundering and racketeering and the saga have been in-and-out of courts for many years. Everatt’s research shows 38% said it had “some” impact and 18% said it had a “significant” impact on their voting choice. That means that in total 56% cited the corruption charges as having an impact on their decision of who to vote for, thus breaking the linkage between the establishment and its voters.

4.4.5 Marikana

The Marikana massacre, which took place on 16 August 2012, is widely considered to be the most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 1960. On many levels, this indicated a crisis from within the establishment. The most prominent official involved was Cyril Ramaphosa, currently president of South Africa. The Farlam report found

²⁶² Mpho Raborife, *Taxpayers should not pay for Nkandla – survey*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/taxpayers-should-not-pay-for-nkandla-survey-20160209> (accessed 15 July 2018).

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ David Everatt, *New survey data shows Zuma cost the ANC dearly in the 2016 election*, WITS, (accessed 15 July 2018).

that he did not play a role in authorising the massacre, but that he could have likely defused the situation.²⁶⁵ “Mr Ramaphosa was one of those who used his influence to discourage resolution of the dispute through negotiation.”²⁶⁶

Then police minister Nathi Mthethwa was also not completely absolved, but one of the most damning findings was that inquiries should be held into the fitness of police leaders, National Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega and North West Police Commission Zukiswa Mbombo. “The leadership of the police, on the highest level, appears to have taken the decision not to give the true version of how it came about that the ‘tactical option’ was implemented on the afternoon of 16 August and to conceal the fact that the plan to be implemented was hastily put together without [public order policing] inputs or evaluation,” the report found.²⁶⁷

*With regard to those members of the South African Police Services, who in firing shots at the strikers may have exceeded the bounds of self and private defence and the delay in conveying medical assistance ... the failure to stop the operation after scene one and the possible liability of senior officers in the South African Police Services, the shooting of strikers by various members of the South African Police Services.*²⁶⁸

There is strong evidence in the report that the establishment (or at least its extensions in the form of the police service) is at least partly responsible for the killings. Gumede argues that “the violent explosion at Marikana is an indication that ordinary South Africans are rapidly losing faith in the democratic institutions and social contract arrangements that underpin the 1994 post-apartheid South African democratic social contract . . . and if democratic institutions and ‘legitimate’ institutions do not become more responsive, accountable and democratic

²⁶⁵ Ian Farlam, “Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report on Matter of Public, National and International Concern Arising Out of the Tragic Events at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana in the North West Province,” Unpublished report, (2015).

²⁶⁶ David Bruce, *Marikana: A summary and analysis of the Farlam report – CASAC*, Politics Web, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/marikana-a-summary-and-analysis-of-the-farlam-repo> (accessed 15 July 2018).

²⁶⁷ Ian Farlam, “Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report on Matter of Public, National and International Concern Arising Out of the Tragic Events at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana in the North West Province,” Unpublished report, (2015), 516.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 546.

quickly, ordinary people will increasingly look to new ones, including populists ones, or seek answers in violence.”²⁶⁹

Gumede furthermore argues the ANC has experienced a decline in its moral credibility and Marikana is the point “where it appears the ANC government’s ‘struggle’ credentials and past exemplary struggle record, may no longer be enough to persuade constituencies to follow one or the other action”.²⁷⁰ This is significant in light of a Institute of Justice and Reconciliation’s (IJR) SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey that showed that there had been a 13% increase in the proportion of citizens who believed the government did not care about “people like them.”

Nieftagodien proposes that the Marikana massacre led to the rise of the EFF²⁷¹ and the party acknowledges the political power of this and calls it “a turning point”.²⁷² “The EFF was born in the wake of the Marikana massacre,” writes Nieftagodien, “which caused a firm line to be drawn between those who were for and against the status quo”.²⁷³

4.4.6 Protests

The presence of protests against the establishment can be seen as an indicator of lost support. Research has indicated that the frequency of community protests has increased from 106 in 2005 to 471 in 2012 and 375 in 2017.²⁷⁴ For the period as a whole, there has been a marked decline in the *proportion* of orderly protests, with a peak of 50% in 2006 and only 17% in 2016. Between 2013 and 2016, 90% of civic protests were considered violent and during the first part of 2016, that figure reached 95%.²⁷⁵ We are thus not only experiencing an increase in protests but also in the turmoil that they cause.

²⁶⁹ William Gumede, “Marikana: a crisis of legitimacy in the institutions that form the foundations of South Africa’s 1994 post-apartheid political settlement,” *Social Dynamics* 41, 2(2015), 328.

²⁷⁰ William Gumede, “Marikana: a crisis of legitimacy in the institutions that form the foundations of South Africa’s 1994 post-apartheid political settlement,” 337.

²⁷¹ Noor Nieftagodien, “The Economic Freedom Fighters and the Politics of Memory and Forgetting,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 114, 2(2015), 446.

²⁷² Floyd Shivambu (ed.), *The Coming Revolution*, 44.

²⁷³ Noor Nieftagodien, “The Economic Freedom Fighters and the Politics of Memory and Forgetting,” 446.

²⁷⁴ Peter Alexander, Carin Runciman, Trevor Ngwane, Boikanyo Moloto, Kgothatso Mokgele and Nicole van Staden, “Frequency and turmoil - South Africa’s community protests 2005–2017,” *SA Crime Quarterly*, 63(2015), 35.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 38-39.

Whilst it would be incorrect to deduct that all of these protests were opposing the establishment, research from Morudu looked at protests throughout the country's 234 local municipalities and isolated only those protests that were attributed to service delivery.²⁷⁶ It found that "protests tend to increase with declining provisions of basic services like housing, electricity, sewerage and sanitation, refuse removal, schools and hospitals". This is a strong, albeit not definitive, indication that citizens are dissatisfied with the establishment's performance.

4.5 Characteristics of populist parties

Thus far it has been shown that many factors are influencing an anti-establishment attitude from voters, but most of these either originate from within the establishment (due to its decisions, policies, and attitudes) or within the minds of supporters (generally a loss of confidence in the establishment due to crises and hardships). Populist parties, however, also promote an anti-establishment stance, sometimes to such a degree that it might even be stronger than the effect of the weak performance of the government on voters.

What would the characteristics of such a party be? Hartleb argues populist parties are more often defined by what they are not than what they are.²⁷⁷ In chapter two these characteristics were outlined and henceforth it will be applied to the South African situation.

***Characteristic one:** An anti-establishment party constructs "the people" as homogenous and a front-line against the political, cultural and economic elites.*

Earlier in this chapter, it has been shown that the EFF presents its concept of "the people" (namely black South Africans) as homogenous. It does not account for black South Africans who do not agree with their policies (from voting percentages, it's clear that less than 10% of voters support their policies and what they stand for).

²⁷⁶ Hlabi Morudu and Jamie Halsall, "Service delivery protests in South African municipalities: An exploration using principal component regression and 2013 data," *Cogent Social Sciences* 3, 1(2017), 1.

²⁷⁷ Florian Hartleb, "Here to stay: Anti-establishment parties in Europe", 41.

Research from Nhlapo, Anderson and Wentzel shows that in 2014, 86% of older Africans and 83% of young Africans supported the ANC.²⁷⁸ This is far removed from a homogenous “people” who are against the establishment; these people indeed *support* the establishment.

Characteristic two: The anti-establishment party is considered an underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media). This relates to the so-called ‘silent majority’ whose input is stifled by the establishment.

Malema and the EFF frequently present themselves as the underdog and claim as much in press statements: “The conditions of the black man remain underdog [sic]”.²⁷⁹ It should be noted that claiming to be the underdog and highlighting inequality and the disadvantages faced by black people is different from claiming to be excluded from the establishment. The former is raising legitimate concerns, whereas the latter implies being stifled by the establishment.

In 2018 the party claimed its leadership has received death threats over its policies, but they added the following: “The ruling party is known for internal political killings to suppress its own members and activists, and it looks like they now intend to export the political killings to other political parties.”²⁸⁰ With this statement, the EFF is directly accusing the establishment of (literally) silencing the party and its leaders. Similarly, Malema has claimed that he is under attack by the “kleptocratic state” after his email account was allegedly hacked.²⁸¹

Despite their failure to provide concrete evidence, the party maintained that “the IEC is colluding with the ANC to prevent the reality that the ANC might go below 50% in

²⁷⁸ Mosidi Nhalapo, Barbara Anderson and Marie Wentzel, “Trends in Voting in South Africa,” Unpublished Report from the Population Studies Centre, (2017).

²⁷⁹ EFF Statement on the Steve Biko Day Commemorations, EFF Website, <https://www.EFFonline.org/copy-of-12-sep-16-eff-on-jacob-zuma> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁸⁰ The Economic Freedom fighters statement on covert plans to assassinate commander in Chief Julius Malema, EFF website, <https://www.EFFonline.org/single-post/2018/04/17/THE-ECONOMIC-FREEDOM-FIGHTERS-STATEMENT-ON-COVERT-PLANS-TO-ASSASINATE-COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF-JULIUS-MALEMA> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁸¹ Malema: I’m under Attack by kleptocratic state, EWN, <http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/24/malema-i-m-under-attack-by-kleptocratic-state> (accessed 29 May 2018).

Gauteng”²⁸², and this is the portrayal of the establishment as not only stifling the EFF but preventing them from legitimating gaining access to government.

The EFF has also, on numerous accusations, attacked the media as extensions of the establishment. In 2018 Malema accused television network ENCA of “perpetuating and defending white privilege”²⁸³ and that the “white-owned media houses have taken a position” on land expropriation²⁸⁴. These statements are indicative of their perception that the establishment and the media are in essence “against” the party.

Characteristic three: Anti-establishment parties claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable establishment).

Mbetse points out that the EFF “mark themselves as the practitioners of a kind of low politics that is opposed to the high politics of the elite”²⁸⁵. This is manifested in their dress code (red berets, overalls, and the clothes of domestic workers) and its use of military language from the days of the liberation struggle (“Commander in Chief”), which appears to out of place in a democratic dispensation.

The party does this consciously to affiliate itself with “the people”. Malema acknowledged as much when he was asked about their dress code: “To you proper is white, to you proper is European. We are not white; we are going to wear those uniforms. We are defying colonialist decorum. We are not English-made. We are workers, and we are going to wear those clothes and we are unapologetic about it.”²⁸⁶

²⁸² *Election Uproar: EFF accuse IEC of rigging Gauteng results*, eNCA, <https://www.enca.com/elections-2014-south-africa/election-uproar-eff-accuse-iec-rigging-gauteng-results> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁸³ *Malema stands by his claims that eNCA promotes ‘white privilege’*, Citizen, <https://citizen.co.za/news/news-eish/1862381/malema-stands-by-his-claims-that-enca-promotes-white-privilege/> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁸⁴ *Live EFF briefs media from its HQ*, News24 <https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-eff-briefs-media-from-its-hq-20180308> (accessed 30 May 2018).

²⁸⁵ Sithembile Mbetse, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 39.

²⁸⁶ Verashni Pillay, *Malema: We're not white, we're going to wear those uniforms*, Mail and Guardian, <https://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-04-malema-we-are-not-white-we-are-going-to-wear-those-uniforms> (accessed 31 May 2018).

Furthermore, their disdain for parliamentary procedures and rules (and even challenging the very legitimacy of those rules) is also indicative of the party's claim to be unorthodox.²⁸⁷ There are many examples of them disrupting parliamentary proceedings, and even being violently removed from the chambers. It can be argued that the party aimed for this disruptive, unconventional strategy and Malema explains it as follows: "This strategy is the one that is going to win us votes in 2019 to remove the ANC. A kleptocracy must be removed from government and you don't do it by giving it red roses. You remove it through the programme of action that will win society over and expose the shenanigans of this kleptocracy."²⁸⁸

Characteristic four: An anti-establishment party often proposes the simplification or trivialisation of more complex issues.

Early in 2018 Malema reacted to a white journalist joining a SABC radio station (an extension of the establishment) by saying they must stop "whiteness from taking over the only platform of black people before it's too late".²⁸⁹ It can be argued that this position simplifies and exaggerates the situation: It's *one* appointment within an organisation that has transformed in many aspects. It's this oversimplification of a more nuanced picture that characterises an anti-establishment party.

Some of the EFF's central policies are the expropriation of land without compensation and the nationalisation of mines, banks and other strategic sectors. To the party, these issues are not intricate with many aspects to it; it refers to these issues as "non-negotiable" in its founding manifesto with no discussion on the economic, cultural, or social impact of the issues.²⁹⁰

The party has acknowledged that its policies have been inspired by policies implemented in Zimbabwe and Venezuela. The former's rapid land expropriation without compensation and

²⁸⁷ Sithembile Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's Turn Towards Populism?" 39.

²⁸⁸ LISTEN: Malema, Ndlozi defend EFF behaviour at Sona, ENCA, <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/listen-malema-ndlozi-defend-eff-behaviour-at-sona> (accessed 31 May 2018).

²⁸⁹ Michael Bratt, *Grootes to join SAfm? SABC responds to Malema's accusations of 'whiteness'*, TheMediaOnline, <http://themediainline.co.za/2018/03/grootes-to-join-safm-sabc-responds-to-malemas-accusations-of-whiteness/> (accessed 31 May 2018).

²⁹⁰ EFF statement on land expropriation, voter registration and restoration of the rule of law, EFF website, <https://www.fffonline.org/single-post/2018/03/08/EFF-STATEMENT-ON-LAND-EXPROPRIATION-VOTER-REGISTRATION-AND-RESTORATION-OF-THE-RULE-OF-LAW> (accessed 16 July 2018).

the latter's nationalisation of especially the oil industry helped formed the EFF's own policies.²⁹¹ Whilst Scoones' research has indicated limited success of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe²⁹², the work of many others such as Moyo²⁹³, Hawkins²⁹⁴ and Sibanda²⁹⁵ indicate that the programme led to many economic hardships. 750 000 jobs were lost between 1998 and 2011 and hyperinflation caused the government to desperately print money and switch currencies.²⁹⁶

The infrastructure and technologies around the agricultural industry also collapsed, and by 2006, "there were between 1.9 and 4 million 'food-insecure' people. The question is not on which side of the debate one stands, but that the topic is not *simplistic* in nature. There is little acknowledgement from the EFF that their economic policy is based on complicated issues with a potential colossal impact on the economy.

Characteristic five: *The anti-establishment party has an image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues.*

The EFF often portrays itself as a party that does not play by the same rules as the establishment, even if it means breaking the law. Malema has repeatedly called on people to illegally occupy the land, during so-called "land grabs".²⁹⁷ "It [land grabs] is what the Freedom

²⁹¹ Floyd Shivambu (ed.), *The Coming Revolution*, 26-27.

²⁹² Ian Schoones, *Zimbabwe's land reform ten years on: new study dispels the myths*, TNI, <https://www.tni.org/en/article/zimbabwes-land-reform-ten-years-new-study-dispels-myths> (accessed 16 July 2018).

²⁹³ Simbarashe Moyo, "A Failed Land Reform Strategy in Zimbabwe. The Willing Buyer Willing Seller," *Public Policy and Administration Review* 2, 1(2014), 67-68.

²⁹⁴ Jack Lewis, *Don't be fooled: Zimbabwe's land reform is no success*, Groundup, <https://www.groundup.org.za/article/done28099t-be-fooled-zimbabwee28099s-land-reform-no-success/> (accessed 16 July 2018).

²⁹⁵ Nkanyiso Sibanda, "Where Zimbabwe Got It Wrong – Lesson for South Africa: A Comparative Analysis of the Politics of Land Reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa," (Master's Thesis Presented at Stellenbosch University, 2010).

²⁹⁶ Jack Lewis, *Don't be fooled: Zimbabwe's land reform is no success*, Groundup, (accessed 16 July 2018).

²⁹⁷ *This land belongs to us, says Malema as he renews land grabs call*, IOL <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/this-land-belongs-to-us-says-malema-as-he-renews-land-grabs-call-15125569> (accessed 17 July 2018).

Charter says and if any court finds me guilty then it will have to find the Freedom Charter an illegal document,” Malema has said on occasion.²⁹⁸

He has also shown disdain for the law by not showing up for court appearances, claiming he is “not scared of prison because of the land question”.²⁹⁹ This is an indication of a taboo-breaker, a party that does not bow to the conventions, decorum and ultimately laws of the establishment.

Breaking these taboos often lead to polarising issues. The EFF’s national spokesperson Mbuyiseni Ndlozi has acknowledged that this is the party’s aim. Polarisation, or put differently, the colonial contradiction, must therefore not be monitored or even postponed,” he writes on the party’s website. “It must be driven to its logical conclusion, which is the defeat of the colonial economisation of blackness.”³⁰⁰

Characteristic six: Anti-establishment parties often show aggression towards political adversaries (‘the establishment uses consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective’).

The EFF has, on several occasions, displayed violence against its adversaries, or has threatened with violence. Early in 2018, Malema tweeted: “We will never be told by any fool on how to fight against our oppression particularly those who have never been at the picket lines. There’s no formula on how you should fight the oppressor.” This suggests that the party sees violence as legitimate and part of their fight against oppression.³⁰¹ There are many examples of the party promoting or engaging in violence:

²⁹⁸ Amanda Khoza, *Defiant' Malema seeks High Court order to declare land invasion charges unconstitutional*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/defiant-malema-seeks-high-court-order-to-declare-land-invasion-charges-unconstitutional-20170704> (accessed 27 July 2018).

²⁹⁹ *Malema a no-show at KZN land-grab trial*, eNCA, <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/malema-a-no-show-at-kzn-land-grab-trial> (accessed 17 July 2018).

³⁰⁰ *Do Politicking And Campaigning Have To Be Polarising?*, EFF website, <http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/politicking-campaigning-polarising/> (accessed 17 July 2018).

³⁰¹ Amil Umraw, *Has The EFF Resorted To A Culture Of Violence*, Huffington Post, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/17/has-the-eff-gone-back-to-its-violent-ways_a_23335886/ (accessed 17 July 2018).

- In an online opinion piece, Ndlozi argues for the use of violence by black people, claiming “the path of decolonisation requires nothing less”.³⁰² This followed after Malema yelled “fighters attack” during a student gathering where the EFF had reportedly not book the venue.
- Early in 2018 party members protested outside a high school over its language and admissions policy. The protest turned violent, with police using stun grenades and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.
- The party has also decided to vote to remove Nelson Mandela Bay mayor Athol Trollip because he is white. “So, these people, when you want to hit them hard – go after a white man,” Malema said after their decision was made public. “They feel a terrible pain because you have touched a white man. We are starting with this whiteness. We are cutting the throat of whiteness.”³⁰³
- In July 2018 Malema posted a video on social media of controversial U.S. activist Louis Farrakhan in which he calls on black people to use violence against white people to rectify injustices. “There is no freedom without the shedding of blood; I'm sorry to say this, nonviolence is not going to bring the land back to us, our unity will keep us from having to fire a shot . . .” Farrakhan says in the video, to which Malema responded with “amen”.³⁰⁴

Besides these six characteristics, Hartleb is of view that anti-establishment parties often form fairly quickly, often without solid leadership structures in place. This is indeed the case with the EFF. Merely a year after he was expelled from the ANC, Malema started the EFF.³⁰⁵ He,

³⁰² Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, *In defence of black violence*, Daily Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-08-31-in-defence-of-black-violence/#.W03ReGM67-Z> (accessed 17 July 2018).

³⁰³ Ahmed Areff, *We are cutting the throat of whiteness' – Malema on plans to remove Trollip*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-are-cutting-the-throat-of-whiteness-malema-on-plans-to-remove-trollip-20180304> (accessed 17 July 2017).

³⁰⁴ Queenin Masuabi, *Malema Causes Stir With 'Violence Against Whites' Video Tweet*, Huffington Post, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/07/09/malema-causes-stir-with-violence-against-whites-video-tweet_a_23477467/ (accessed 17 July 2018).

³⁰⁵ Molaole Montsho and Karabo Ngoepe, *Belligerent Malema launches EFF*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/A-giant-is-born-Malema-20131013> (accessed 17 July 2018).

and other leaders were part of the ANC Youth league but had to suddenly create structures for a political party, one that contested in national elections shortly after. It will be a mistake to equate the hasty formation of a party as a marker for an anti-establishment party, but this is usually, according to Hartleb, accompanied by their ability to “turn markers of exclusion of the people into attributes of their supporters”³⁰⁶.

4.6 Conclusion and way forward

This chapter addressed anti-establishment as a characteristic of populism, especially located within the supply-side. The EFF interprets the people as sovereign (and that power resides with the elite); the EFF equates “the people” to the forgotten ones in the second interpretation, and they also have a racial interpretation of the context of the nation. In contrast, the political ANC elite has been described as being there for self-interest and not to the benefit of “the people”.

The establishment’s own failure, and a subsequent crisis of representation, showed that it’s not only opposition parties that drive the anti-establishment notion, but often failures from the ruling party, lead to an anti-establishment sentiment. Finally, the response to the crisis of representation was discussed in connection with the EFF as an anti-establishment party.

Barr’s definitions of the locus of origin helped to frame the role players, linkage research contextualised waning ANC support and Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party gave insights into the EFF as a populist party.

4.6.1 Contribution to literature

In this discussion, it was also refuted that South African politics has a uniquely local interpretation of the presence of populism (observation 1 in the literature review). This dissertation shows that we do not function in a vacuum and anti-establishment’s theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr and Hartleb were applied to the local context, showing that international theory can indeed be applied to populism within South Africa.

It was also shown how this dissertation applies the ideational approach and give attention to the much-neglected aspect of anti-establishment (observation 2 in the literature review). The

³⁰⁶ Francisco Panizza, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 415.

EFF as a populist party is analysed within this context and Hartleb's characteristics of an anti-establishment party is applicable – something that has not been done in the local context.

In the final chapter a *detailed* discussion will be presented, together with a new consolidated framework for understanding anti-establishment theory. It will be shown specifically how the practical application of anti-establishment discussed in this chapter fill the gaps in the existing research on populism in South Africa.

4.6.2 The next chapter

In the following chapter, the argument will be broadened even more with a focus on economic inequalities. The locus is now shifted to society, thus the demand-side factors. Historically, and certainly in the South African context theorists have almost exclusively focused on the supply-side and how political parties drive populism, but the next chapter will show how economic inequality can play a substantial role in the rise of populism in South Africa.

Chapter 5: Economic inequality

By most measures, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world.^{307, 308, 309} More than two decades after the end of apartheid the country still struggles with rising poverty³¹⁰, slow economic growth³¹¹ and has been downgraded to credit junk status³¹².

Research indicates that the injustices of apartheid have created a society in which prosperity is directly linked to our efforts to address the lasting and crippling legacy of the system.³¹³ Reports from Statistics SA has shown that more than 50% of SA's population is living in poverty and the number of people living below the 2015 poverty line of R441 per person per month, or in extreme poverty, increased to 13.8 million in 2015.³¹⁴ It's striking that for about 76% of the population poverty is a constant threat in their daily lives.³¹⁵

Besides a high unemployment rate, which will be discussed later, the labour market is also sharply divergent: A small number of people are in the formal sector receive high salaries and

³⁰⁷ Siviwe Feketha, *South Africa world's most unequal society – report*, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/south-africa-worlds-most-unequal-society-report-14125145> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³⁰⁸ Jason Beaubien, *The Country With The World's Worst Inequality Is ...*, NPR, <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/04/02/598864666/the-country-with-the-worlds-worst-inequality-is> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³⁰⁹ Kgomotso Modise, *SAHRC: SA is the most unequal Country in the World*, EWN, <https://ewn.co.za/2018/07/12/sahrc-sa-is-most-unequal-country-in-world> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹⁰ *Poverty on the rise in South Africa*, StatsSA, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹¹ Ingé Lamprecht, *Why economic growth continues to disappoint*, MoneyWeb, <https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/why-economic-growth-continues-to-disappoint/> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹² Lynley Donnelley, *Global credit ratings agency has downgraded South Africa to junk status*, Mail & Guardian, <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-25-global-credit-ratings-agency-has-downgraded-south-africa-to-junk-status> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹³ Martine Mariotti and Johan Fourie, "The economics of apartheid: An introduction, *Economic History of Developing Regions* 29, 2(2014), 113.

³¹⁴ Lameez Omarjee, *More than 50% of SA's population is living in poverty*, Fin24, <https://www.fin24.com/Economy/more-than-50-of-sas-population-is-living-in-poverty-20170822> (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹⁵ World Bank, "Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa," Unpublished report from the World Bank, (2018), 19.

a large number of people have employment in the informal sector with extremely low wages and income.³¹⁶

Furthermore, the overall economy slipped into a technical recession during the second quarter of 2018, with a 2.6% contraction in the first, and 0.7% in the second quarter.³¹⁷ In 1995 the country's GDP grew by almost 8% and mostly kept steady after that until the global recession hit the country in 2008 and the economy contracted by 6%. Since 2014 the GDP has systematically declined, hitting the second-lowest point since 1994.³¹⁸

Flowing from the abovementioned macro context is an inherent inequality in South African communities that's often traceable to the injustices of apartheid.

As mentioned before, economic inequality is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism.³¹⁹ The economic inequalities perspective has been applied to both developed countries (recently in the USA) and developing countries (Venezuela, Brazil). For this theory to be applicable it is not just sufficient to show economic hardships in general, but the *inequality* in economic prospects is key in fuelling populism.

In chapter two, many indicators of economic inequality, such as little or no income and unemployment, were mentioned and discussed populism. This chapter will expand on each of these concepts and will essentially follow a two-fold process:

- Five aspects of economic inequality will be discussed, namely: income, race, unemployment, education and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet). The local context and manifestation of each of these will be expanded on to ultimately understand how prevalent the problem is and the implication and ramifications of each indicator.


³¹⁶ World Bank, "Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa," Unpublished report from the World Bank, (2018), 19.

³¹⁷ *The economy shrinks by 0,7% in Q2: 2018*, Stats SA, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=11507>, (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹⁸ *South Africa GDP Growth Rate*, Trade Economics, <https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/gdp-growth>, (accessed 15 November 2018).

³¹⁹ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash," 2.

Economic inequality



= showing that supporters of populist parties are economically worse off

- As mentioned before, it is necessary to show these economic hardships being present amongst those who support a populist party. In South Africa, this research will examine the economic circumstances of those who support the EFF (“the people”) that is in stark contrast to the DA supporters (“the elite”). An explanation of this rationale will follow.

As seen in chapter two, Resnick argues that Malema and the EFF have equated “the elite” with white people (race). Malema’s stance is indicative of defining “the people” in ethnic terms (black people in this instance). South Africa “belongs” to black people, he argues, and they are the “rightful owners” of the country. In essence, white people are seen as “foreigners”. Even the predominantly black leadership of the ANC is seen as representatives of “white monopoly capitalism”, thus making them part of “the elite”.

Betz’s³²⁰ argument that the economically marginalised often blame ethnic minorities for their dire circumstances is applicable in South Africa.

³²⁰ Hans-Heorg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 40.

If this thesis is to be applied within the local context, supporters of the EFF will fall within the “economic have-nots” (or “the people”) category and the ethnic minority into the “economic haves” (or “the elite”) category.

What outcome will validate the economic inequality argument as support for populism in South Africa? The EFF strongholds will be economically marginalised, and an analysis of the five indicators will show their dire circumstances. Antithetically, the DA strongholds with majority white citizens will be economically more prosperous with the abovementioned indicators forming a stark contrast with those of EFF strongholds.

Why are the DA strongholds with white citizens considered representatives of “the elite”? The party’s electoral support mostly comes from racial minorities that tend to be much wealthier than the black majority (thus creating inequality). In the 2014 national elections, the DA got almost 93% of the white vote³²¹ and only 1% of white people live in poverty³²², compared to 64% of black people and 41% of coloured people respectively.

The DA does have the most diverse voter profile of all the major political parties, but at the same time, the party has, by far, the majority of *white* voters. This conglomeration of white voters (within the DA) makes it conceptually comparable to the black majority within the EFF. One could *theoretically* use the Freedom Front Plus who has almost exclusively white voters, but a significant minority of the total white voters compared to the DA. There is thus an argument to be made that the comparison is fairer when one compares the DA to the EFF, rather than the FF+ to the EFF. The comparison here is thus not so much between the two *parties* per se, but between “the people” (EFF) and “the elite” (DA).

Although coloured people is also considered a racial minority, comprising 9% of the population, they are *not* included in “the elite” in the South African context due to their high rate of poverty and indeed they are not included in EFF’s interpretation of “the elite”. White people, however, is included in their interpretation and the party has, on many occasions come

³²¹ Jeanne van der Merwe, Xolani Mbanjwa and Carien du Plessis, *X still drawn along racial lines*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/elections/news/x-still-drawn-along-racial-lines-20140511> (accessed 12 November 2018).

³²² Statistics South Africa, “Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 and 2015,” Unpublished report, (2017), 69.

out against the “white DA”. When comparing the macro environment, one thus has to be cautious in one’s analysis. Although DA voters comprise of the vast majority of white people, coloured and Indian people (and to a far lesser extent a minority of black people) also vote for the party in significant numbers. This has to be considered when analysing inequality in South Africa. An even more detailed justification will be included in the micro-level discussion of the different wards below – and it will be illustrated how the DA strongholds contain mostly white people (“the elite”).

5.1 Indicators of inequality in SA

As mentioned before there are many indicators of inequality and this research will focus on income, race, unemployment, education and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet). The relation of each to populist support is as follows:

- **income** (international theory shows those with less income are likely to support a populist party such as the EFF)
- **race** (in the USA white people are more likely to support a populist party, but in SA it will be shown that it is overwhelmingly black people who support the EFF)
- **unemployment** (supporters of a populist party are more likely to be unemployed, similar to populist EFF supporters)
- **education** (international theory also shows that those who are less educated are more likely to support a populist party such as the EFF)
- **resources** (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet) (supporters of populist parties such as the EFF have generally fewer resources)

5.2 Understanding the local context

It is imperative to understand that South Africa is a complex society and the populist EFF is not the party of government. They do not have the majority of the support and thus it would be incorrect to look at the bigger picture and not zooming in on the party’s support. For instance: The majority of South Africans are black, and the majority of poor South Africans are black. They do not, however, support the EFF, but rather the ANC. The same parallel can be drawn in other countries such as France. The majority of French citizens do not support the populist *Front National*, but one has to zoom in on the supporters of the party to get a closer picture of the reasons for the support of populism.

Furthermore, the majority of South African citizens are poor, unlike the majority of French citizens. Economic inequality is thus never the only factor influencing support for a populist party. If that was indeed the case most of the poor, black supporters of the ANC would rather support the EFF. It does, however, indicate a *vulnerability* of this group to eventually switch their support to that of the EFF. Economic inequality is thus not the *only* factor influencing support for populism and it does not exclude *future* support for populism.

Why the need to raise this argument? The practical application below will indicate that the EFF supporters are indeed economically marginalised, and the DA supporters are generally economically prosperous.

Indeed, in other countries where populism has taken root, supporters are economically marginalised, and systematically more economically vulnerable voters move over to the populist side. This is not to say that it will inevitably happen in the SA context, but it does indicate the potential for it to happen. One of the reasons why one would study the demand-side causes of populism is to identify these causes and not to postulate why they have not progressed to include all the *potential* supporters who fit the voter profile.

5.3 Practical application of economic inequality

In the following section, a practical application of the economic inequality will give insight into the support for the populist EFF. First, research from Ipsos into the general supporter profiles of the three major parties will be discussed. Special attention will be given to the EFF versus the DA supporter profiles to interrogate the economic inequality of their voters.

Whilst this will give a general picture of the supporter profiles and their respective economic circumstances, it's limited in scope and not indicative of the local, micro picture of economic inequalities. To achieve an analysis on this level, data from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for the 2016 Local Government Elections will be utilised. An analysis of the economic environment and specifically the five above-mentioned indicators in respectively EFF and DA strongholds will indicate the “economic haves” (DA) and the “economic have-nots” (EFF), to illustrate that supporters of populist parties (“the people”) are considered economically marginalised and “forgotten” compared to those of elitist parties who are economically prosperous.

5.3.1 Economic inequality: The macro picture (overall party support)

Research from Ipsos³²³ shows that there are indeed significant differences in the economic composition of respectively EFF and DA voters. This study was conducted on a randomly selected sample of South Africans and one should bear in mind that the profile of a typical voter for each party is perhaps not the quintessential data of those voters, but it does give a general snapshot of the voters. Even with strict scientific rigour lacking in the methodology of this study (for example a random sample of 3 564 South Africans were approached, as opposed to actual voters), the general information is useful as a genesis from which more detailed data will be explored.

According to the study, only 22% of EFF supporters have full-time employment, compared to 43% of DA supporters. 18% of DA participant supporters are unemployed (with a further 6% being discouraged work-seekers) and 40% and 5% of EFF supporters are respectively unemployed or are discouraged job-seekers. The highest monthly income group for EFF supporters is R2 500 – R4 900 (19%) and R20 000+ for DA supporters (21%). Furthermore, 18% of DA supporters have tertiary education, compared to 6% of EFF supporters. Lastly, about half of DA supporters are white and 99% of EFF supporters are black.

One can note that there are indeed significant economic differences between the supporters of the DA and EFF. The typical EFF supporter is black (racial inequality is thus at play), less likely to be educated and earn less per month than the average DA supporter. Despite caution that must be exerted with the results, an overall picture emerges that supporters of the populist EFF are economically worse off than that of “elite”, white DA supporters. In the next section, this statement will be explored with more rigour and detail.

5.3.2 Economic inequality: The micro picture (wards)

There are 278 municipalities in South Africa, comprising 8 metropolitan, 44 district and 226 local municipalities.³²⁴ The metropolitan and local municipalities are further divided into 4 392

³²³ Mari Harris, *The supporter profiles of SA's three largest parties* – Ipsos, PoliticsWeb, <https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-supporter-profiles-of-sas-three-largest-partie> (accessed 13 November 2018).

³²⁴ *Local Government*, South African Government, <https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/local-government> (accessed 16 November 2018).

wards.³²⁵ For the purpose of this research, an analysis will be done for the EFF and DA strongholds in especially the wards to get a more accurate, micro picture.

The EFF won no municipalities in the 2016 Local Government Elections but the party did achieve above 50% support in three wards: ward 26 in Madibeng Local Municipality in North West (57.82%), ward 45 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (50.61%) and ward 13 in Polokwane Local Municipality (51.18%).

The EFF also gained 40%+ in 18 wards: ward 32 in Madibeng Local Municipality (40.28%) in North West; wards 2, 3, 24, 28, 31, 32, 37, and 38 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (40.87%, 42.81%, 46.52%, 46.28%, 41.83%, 44.36%, 42.68% and 46.96% respectively); wards 3, 100 and 102 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (45.21%, 40.68% and 45.95%); and wards 10, 11, 12, 17, 25 and 26 in Polokwane Local Municipality (41.19%, 44.71%, 40.39%, 40.23%, 44.65% and 45.42% respectively).

All 21 of these abovementioned wards can be interpreted as significant support for the EFF. These communities support the EFF quite substantially (both in Public Representative votes and Ward Councillor votes).

The DA's biggest support base is in the Western Cape and in 2016 the party got 63.3% of the vote in the province. In the City of Cape Town, the party won 67% of the vote.³²⁶ Due to having the majority support in the province, the Western Cape will naturally be the focal point as being representative of the party's support, specifically on establishing the "economic haves", in contrast to the "economic have-nots" of the EFF.

Having said that, Gauteng is the party's second-biggest support base with it achieving 37.23% of the 2016 results. Gauteng is considered the economic hub of South Africa³²⁷, so it would be unwise in an analysis of "economic inequality" to avoid this province in the analysis.

³²⁵ Marianne Merten, *LGE 2016: #Ivoted, the Numbers and the Rules*, Daily Maverick, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-02-lge-2016-ivoted-the-numbers-and-the-rules/> (accessed 16 November 2018).

³²⁶ *City of Cape Town*, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/municipality-CPT-city-of-cape-town/> (accessed 20 November 2018).

³²⁷ *Results for: GDP by province*, StatsSA, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?s=gdp+by+province&pg=17> (accessed 20 November 2018).

It would be a massive undertaking to analyse every ward the DA has received the majority of the vote in these two provinces and will certainly be beyond the scope of this research. The purpose, after all, is to establish *anthesis* to EFF wards. The criterium that was used for the latter was strongholds of the party. In the context of their support, it could be ascertained that it would translate into wards where the party received 40%+ of the support. A fair comparison of DA strongholds in the Western Cape would be to look at wards where the party achieved 95%+ of the support. This may seem like a high threshold, but one has to realise that the DA's support is very strong in the Western Cape and what's "strong" for the EFF is not necessarily "strong" for the DA. In the context of Gauteng, a fair threshold is 88%+ of the support in a particular ward.

There are 11 wards in the Western Cape where the DA gained more than 95% of the support (both public representative and ward votes). If one were to consider the next bracket of support (90%+) 44 wards are to be analysed. That's more than double the EFF wards that were analysed and it could be argued that by adding the 90-94.99% bracket one is not advancing the argument of economic inequality significantly. Thus, for the purpose of this research, the 11 wards in the Western Cape where the DA achieved more than 95% of the support will be analysed.

The same argument can be presented for Gauteng where the DA has achieved 88%+ in 14 wards. The next bracket of support (85%+) there would be 42 wards and adding these will result in a far more substantial analysis of the DA than the EFF. Therefore the 14 wards in Gauteng where the DA gained more than 88% of the support will be analysed. This results in 21 wards that will be analysed for EFF support and 25 wards being analysed for DA support. This seems representative of both parties' strongholds and is fair in comparison.

The DA strongholds in the Western Cape are wards 5, 21, 70 and 103 in the City of Cape Town (95.6%, 95.6%, 95.4% and 95% of the votes respectively); wards 4 and 15 in the Drakenstein Local Municipality (95.6% and 96.7% votes respectively); wards 7 and 22 in the Stellenbosch Local Municipality (96.7% and 95.6%); and wards 3, 7 and 13 in the Overstrand Local Municipality (97.5%, 97.2% and 97% of the votes in each ward).

The DA strongholds in Gauteng are wards 44, 69 and 82 in the City of Tshwane (88.7%, 89.2% and 88.9% of the votes respectively); wards 83 and 126 in the City of Johannesburg (88.2% and 89% respectively); wards 18 and 21 in Mogale City Local municipality (89.2% and 89.4%

of the votes); wards 2, 3 and 14 in Midvaal Local Municipality (90.6%, 91.5%, and 94.7%); and wards 18, 19, 27 and 28 in the City of Ekurhuleni (89.6%, 92.8%, 91.9% and 90.5% of the votes respectively).

Regarding the DA wards being representative of white people (“the elite”), below is a table depicting the percentage of the total population of each DA stronghold that white people comprise. It is clear that the majority of all the wards are white people, thus representative of the EFF’s interpretation of “the elite”.

Ward	White people as % of population
City of Cape Town ward 5	73%
City of Cape Town ward 21	86%
City of Cape Town ward 70	80%
City of Cape Town ward 103	81%
Drakenstein Local Municipality ward 4	75%
Drakenstein Local Municipality ward 15	75%
Stellenbosch Local Municipality ward 7	85%
Stellenbosch Local Municipality ward 22	76%
Overstrand Local Municipality ward 3	82%
Overstrand Local Municipality ward 7	89%
Overstrand Local Municipality ward 13	90%
City of Tshwane ward 44	80%
City of Tshwane ward 69	83%
City of Tshwane ward 82	69%
City of Johannesburg ward 83	76%
City of Johannesburg ward 126	63%
Mogale City Local municipality ward 18	84%
Mogale City Local municipality ward 21	82%
Midvaal Local Municipality ward 2	81%
Midvaal Local Municipality ward 3	84%
Midvaal Local Municipality ward 14	94%
City of Ekurhuleni ward 18	64%
City of Ekurhuleni ward 19	69%
City of Ekurhuleni ward 27	81%
City of Ekurhuleni ward 28	67%

For the purpose of this analysis data from various instruments were used. Wazimap³²⁸, an online data collection tool compiled by non-profit organisation Media Monitoring Africa, was the key portal for data. The election results of the 2016 Local Government Elections was provided by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).³²⁹ All other economic data via Wazimap had Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) as an origin, with the 2011 Census³³⁰ results or the 2016 Community Survey³³¹ as a basis.

Addendum A contains the detailed information of the EFF strongholds and addendum B contains the details of the DA strongholds. This information will henceforth be discussed in relation to the economic situation and the different indicators of inequality.

5.3.1.1 Income

The average household income provided in Addendum A and B was calculated “finding the median income band, and then using the middle of that band's income. For example, if the median income band is ‘R153 801 - R307 600’, then we use R230 700 as the average household income.”³³² This is not a comprehensive indicator of disposable income, but it does provide an opportunity for a fair *comparison*, which falls within the realm of usability for this study. The purpose of this research is to provide the contrast between the “have’s” and “have nots” and the median household income is thus a suitable measure. Additionally, a breakdown of all the income brackets is provided for each ward to get an even more detailed picture.

In graph A, a comparison between the 25 DA strongholds and the 21 EFF strongholds in terms of median annual household income, is provided. This provides a visual snapshot of the income inequality between the two parties’ strongholds and it’s clear that the DA wards have a significantly higher disposable income than the EFF wards.


³²⁸ *About Wazimap*, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/about> (accessed 22 November 2018).

³²⁹ *Municipal election results*, Official IEC Website, <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-elections-results/> (accessed 22 November 2018).

³³⁰ Statistics South Africa, “Census 2011,” Unpublished report, (2012).

³³¹ Statistics South Africa, “Statistical Release: Community Survey 2016,” Unpublished report, (2016).

³³² *How can I use the ‘Average annual household income’ and ‘Monthly income’ figures?*, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/help#faq-average-hh-income> (accessed 23 November 2018).



Out of all the EFF wards, the highest annual disposable income is R57 300 (7 wards) with the middle being R29 400 (9 wards) and the lowest being R14 600 (4 wards). The average income in ward 26 in Polokwane is R2 400, but this outlier can likely be ascribed to the fact that this ward is firmly situated in a university context (the University of Limpopo). 48% of households have no income and the average age of residents is 22. This fits the profile of young students who earn little to no income and it would not be a fair comparison to include this ward.

Contrary to this, the highest income in DA wards is R461 000 (2 wards), the middle group earns R230 700 (18 wards) and the lowest income is R115 100 (4 wards). Similar to the EFF, the DA has one outlier ward: ward 7 in Stellenbosch. The average household income here is R29 400, but this ward is associated with Stellenbosch University and other tertiary institutions. The average age is 23 and 43% of residents earn no income. One can thus discard this ward for the purposes of the income analysis.

As previously stated, the poorest 10% of households earn less than R10 000 per year with the top 10% earning R265 000 per year.³³³ From these averages, it's clear the EFF is much closer to the bottom 10% of households with R36 205* as an average. The DA is much closer to the richest 10% with an average of R230 625**.

³³³ Neva Makgetla, "Inequality in South Africa," 15.


* $(R57\,300 \times 7) + (R29\,400 \times 9) + (R14\,600 \times 4) = R724\,100 / 20 \text{ wards} = R36\,205$

** $(R461\,000 \times 2) + (R230\,700 \times 18) + (R115\,100 \times 4) = R5\,535\,000 / 24 \text{ wards} = R230\,625$

Looking at the more detailed income break-down, DA strongholds have at least 1% of households in each ward who earns more than R2.5 million per household per year. This figure is indicative of economic prosperity, compared to the EFF wards where no households were earning above R2.5 million annually.

In graph B the averages of the different income groups are presented. Almost 26% of the households in EFF strongholds earn R40 000 – R75 000 annually, whilst 21% of DA strongholds earn R300 000 – R600 000 annually. A further 18.1% of EFF households earn only R20 000 – R40 000 per year, whilst an average of 12% of DA households earn R600 000 – R1.2 million annually.

It's thus fair to deduct that Inglehart and Norris's hypothesis that supporters of populism generally have a lower income, can indeed be applied to the South African context. From the above analysis, the wards where the EFF has strong support are earning significantly less than the wards with strong DA support. This illustrates the “haves” versus the “have-nots” and the “elite” versus “the people”, concepts that were discussed before.




Graph B

5.3.1.2 Race and inequality


Race is still an important barometer for inequality in the South African context. Now that the income inequality in EFF and DA strongholds has been established, it's imperative to indicate the racial make-up of these strongholds.

It's clear from graph C that the majority of EFF strongholds (98.3%) consist of black people and as seen in graph D the majority of DA strongholds (78.1%) consist of white people. The

latter might be more diverse, but the polarity of the support base of the two parties is quite striking and noteworthy.



Graph C



Graph D

If one is to look at the Makgetla’s research presented earlier that the median household income in 2015 was R2 900 (R34 800 annually) for black people and R20 000 (R240 000 annually) for white people, the current data (R36 205 for EFF wards and R230 625 for DA wards) supports the national trend that black people earn significantly less than the white minority.³³⁴

According to Stats SA, whites earn 5 times more than black South Africans.³³⁵ In this instance the average household in a DA ward (which is 78% white) earns 6.4 times more than the average EFF ward (which is 98% black), outstripping the Stats SA figure by 1.4 times.

It is thus logical to conclude that supporters of the populist EFF (the “people” or “have-nots”) are mostly poor and black, and the supporters of the DA (the “elite” or “haves”) are mostly economically prosperous and white. Contrary to the USA and many European countries with strong populist parties where white people are often seen as “the people”, the forgotten ones who are economically marginalised³³⁶, the local context shows a similar division along racial lines, but instead of white people seen as marginalised, black people are economically marginalised.

³³⁴ Neva Makgetla, “Inequality in South Africa,” 15.


³³⁵ *Whites earn 5 times more than blacks in South Africa: Stats SA*, BusinessTech, (accessed 13 November 2018).

³³⁶ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15.

5.3.1.3 Unemployment

Unemployment remains an important driver of economic inequality. As mentioned before, an estimated 30% of the black workforce is unemployed, but actively looking for a job, compared to just 6.7% of the white workforce.³³⁷ Black people are disproportionately disadvantaged and comparing EFF and DA strongholds, this trend is discernible. In graph E it's clear that the employment rates in DA wards are significantly higher than those of EFF wards.


The highest employment rate in an EFF stronghold is 59.6% in ward 32 in Rustenburg, whilst the highest employment rate in a DA stronghold is 79.5% in ward 126 in the City of Johannesburg. This is an almost 20% difference in the employment rate.




Disregarding ward 26 in Polokwane (EFF stronghold) and ward 7 in Stellenbosch (DA stronghold), for reasons discussed earlier, the lowest employment rate in an EFF stronghold is 28.5% in ward 28 in Rustenburg, whilst the lowest employment rate for a DA ward is 47.3% in ward 3 in Overstrand. Again, disregarding the abovementioned predominantly student wards, the average employment rate of an EFF stronghold is 46.24% and 67.4% for a DA stronghold, that's a 21.16% difference in averages.

³³⁷ Ramaphosa right about 'big difference' between black & white unemployment in SA, AfricaCheck, (accessed 13 November 2018).

In graphs F and G respectively, the unemployment and discouraged work-seeker rates are visually presented. The employed rate mentioned earlier is important to gauge economic status, but this does not give an indication of the unemployment rate (for example, the elderly receiving pensions are not included in the employment rate, but it also does not mean that they do not get an income).



The highest unemployment rate in an EFF stronghold is 34.4% in ward 100 in the City of Ekurhuleni and the highest unemployment rate for a DA stronghold is 6.1% which is ward 13 in Overstrand. Similarly, the highest rate of discouraged work seekers is 7.4% for the EFF in ward 11 in Polokwane and 1.7% for the DA in ward 3 in Midvaal. The average unemployment rate of an EFF stronghold is 21.13% and only 3.5% for a DA stronghold.




With the national unemployment rate standing at 27.5%, the EFF strongholds are much closer to this than the DA strongholds and with the EFF wards being 98%+ black and the DA wards 78%+ white, the narrative of the economically marginalised “have-nots” versus the economically prosperous “haves” comes to the foreground. The theory that supporters of populism are facing significantly higher unemployment rates compared to the elite minority thus stands.

5.3.1.4 Education


As mentioned before, Inglehart and Norris argue that populist supporters are generally less educated – something that is closely related to economic prosperity.³³⁸ Just over 3.3% of blacks aged between 18 and 29 attended university in 2016, compared to more than 17% of whites.³³⁹ In the current research, this theoretical perspective is confirmed. From graph H one can see that DA strongholds have significantly more university education, compared to the relatively low numbers in EFF wards. The highest and lowest rates of university education in DA strongholds are 54% (ward 22 in Stellenbosch) and 11% (ward 3 in Midvaal) respectively, with the EFF being 24% (ward 12 in Polokwane) and 0% (several wards). The average DA ward has 30.83% university-educated residents and the average EFF ward has only 4.4% of university-educated residents.

³³⁸ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 12-15.

³³⁹ Alex Mitchly, *Racial disparities persist at universities – StatsSA*, News24, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/racial-disparities-persist-at-universities-statsa-20170531> (accessed 13 November 2018).



Similarly, those who have completed a grade 9 or higher in DA strongholds are significantly higher than those in EFF wards (see Graph I). The average percentage of people who have completed grade 9 or higher in a DA stronghold is 88.68% and 64.08% in an EFF stronghold.



Conversely, this implies that 11.32% of residents in DA strongholds do not have an education higher than grade 9 and 35.92% of residents in EFF strongholds do not have an education of grade 9 or higher.

Another possible indicator of education status is the percentage of school-aged children being in school. This indicates future poverty alleviation, as primary education is the

gateway to tertiary education and ultimately the job market. On average 86.59% of school-aged children in EFF wards are in school and 89.51% of school-aged children in DA strongholds are in school.


The lowest and highest level of this measure in an EFF stronghold is 61.5% (ward 38 in Rustenburg) and 97.9% (ward 12 in Polokwane) respectively and in a DA stronghold 52.7% (ward 4 in Drakenstein) and 95.4% (ward 69 in the City of Tshwane). Ward 4 in Drakenstein Local Municipality is likely an anomaly; when one looks closer at the data provided by Stats SA, 42.8% of people in the ward did not indicate this measure, and only 4.5% of school-aged children were reportedly not in school. A possible speculative explanation could be that data gathering was problematic in this ward in this regard, as all other economic indicators are consistent with patterns we have seen thus far for DA strongholds.

In summary, the data from the education status of EFF and DA strongholds is an affirmation of the theoretical perspective that supporters of populist parties are generally less educated and this, in turn, has an adverse effect on economic status.


5.3.1.5 Resources

Lastly, material resources such as housing, transport, water and sanitation and internet access are important indicators of inequality in South Africa. It's impossible to provide a detailed account of all resources in this research, but key differences (or in rare instances, similarities) will be pointed out.

According to statistics cited earlier, the vast majority of white South Africans (99%) live in formal housing and only 76% of black people live in formal housing. It is visually striking in graph J that there is virtually nobody in DA strongholds who live in informal settlements, compared to very scattered results for EFF strongholds. The highest rate of people living in shacks in an EFF stronghold is 98.3% (ward 38 in Rustenburg) and 1.8% in a DA stronghold (ward 22 in Stellenbosch). The average for EFF wards is 30.733% and 0.496% for DA wards. This difference is prodigious and indicative of the economic inequality between support for a populist party and the economic "elite".




Similarly, DA strongholds own more houses (either fully paid or in the process of being paid off). An average of 62.42% of DA wards in this study own houses, compared to an average of 27.41% of residents in EFF wards (see graph K for a breakdown). Homeownership is an important indicator of economic wealth, so one can deduct that EFF supporters in strongholds are economically worse off than DA supporters in their strongholds.




Access to reliable and affordable transport is essential for economic prosperity, with individuals having to get to work daily. As mentioned earlier, black people own significantly

fewer motor vehicles than white people, resulting in them a.) having less economic opportunities and b.) spending more on public transport that is generally unreliable.

In this research, an average of 87.62% of residents of DA strongholds own a motor vehicle, whilst only 17.25% of residents of EFF strongholds own a motor vehicle. Graph L provides a visual representation of car owners and it's clear that residents in DA wards own more cars and it would be logical to deduct that they have significantly more economic opportunities.



In a global, digital context, access to the internet, is an important economic driver. An average of 73.02% of residents of DA strongholds have access to the internet, whilst only 30.49% of residents of EFF strongholds have internet access. This can have several implications: Besides knowledge about work opportunities, internet access allows people to gain access to jobs, to do research, to advance your economic situation, and to connect to communities around the country and the world. Graph M provides a visual representation of internet access in DA and EFF strongholds.



Access to a flush toilet and refuse removal are indicative of the level of service delivery, but economically prosperous citizens can often afford to pay for their own services when government fails. It is for this reason that access to these basic services can be an indication of economic prosperity. With regards to this, the current research shows the following:

- On average, 97.63% of residents in DA wards and 57.26% of residents in EFF wards have access to a flush toilet. The lowest rate for an EFF stronghold is Ward 38 in Rustenburg Local Municipality, with only 0.5% of residents who have access to a flush or chemical toilet. Ward 13 in Overstrand Local Municipality, a DA stronghold, is the lowest of that party with 93.1%.
- On average, 96.72% of residents in DA wards and 68.47% of residents in EFF wards have access to refuse removal. The lowest rate for an EFF stronghold is Ward 10 in Polokwane Local Municipality, with only 0.6% of residents who have access to refuse removal. Ward 22 in Stellenbosch Local Municipality, a DA stronghold, is the lowest of that party with 86.4%.

It is thus fair to add the inequality in resources to the weight of the argument that supporters of populist parties are economically worse off than the “elite”. In the local context, the EFF strongholds have significantly fewer resources than DA strongholds.

5.4 Conclusion and the way forward

This chapter aimed to ascertain whether supporters of populist parties are economically marginalised, compared to the “elites”. A detailed analysis was done of 21 EFF strongholds and 25 DA strongholds in terms of analysis of five economic indicators: income, race and inequality, unemployment, education and resources.

Overwhelmingly, all indicators show that supporters of the EFF are economically worse off than DA supporters. Supporters from EFF strongholds earn significantly less, they are mostly black, face more unemployment, are less educated and have fewer resources than mostly white DA supporters, thus the elite.

5.4.1 Contribution to literature

In terms of the shortcomings of the existing research, it is evident that this chapter on economic inequality focusses on a neglected aspect of economic inequality and realises the relevance of it (observation 3 in the literature review). Similarly, it also utilises a demand-side approach (observation 2 in the literature review) and incorporate international theory from especially Inglehart and Norris (observation 1 in the literature review). A more detailed approach will follow in chapter seven, with a precise analysis of how this research on economic inequality fills the gaps in the current literature.

It is, however, important to note that there are shortcomings with the methodology of this research. In the ideal world, one would sit down with every EFF voter and get a detailed account of their economic situation. This would be contrasted with gathering information from every “elite”, white voter (mostly DA voters, but surely there are white voters from other parties as well). Instead, this is limited to strongholds of the two parties.

If one is to look at the DA strongholds, only wards with 88%+ support were used, but the threshold for EFF wards were 40%+. This decision has been explained before, but it still casts a shadow over the remaining voters in each of these wards. In 18 of the 21 wards, the EFF did not get the majority of the vote, yet the economic indicators for the entire ward were utilised.

Despite these challenges, it's fair to deduct that Inglehart and Norris's economic inequality argument as a cause for populism, stands in the South African context. Our history might be different and the causes for this inequality might not be the same as a developed country such

as the USA, but the existence of this inequality is sufficient to conclude that supporters of the populist EFF are economically marginalised.

5.4.2 The next chapter

In the following chapter the phenomenon of a “cultural backlash” will be examined. In conjunction with economic inequality, the cultural backlash falls within the realm of demand-side explanations for populism. The theory set out in chapter two will be applied to the local context.

According to Norris the cultural backlash thesis described by Inglehart is mainly present in developed countries, but “cultural protectionism” is more common than economic approaches and is present in nearly every country with radical or populist support. In essence, this explanation centres around a social-psychological phenomenon: the regression of values and the erosion of cultural identity. The two main characteristics of the cultural backlash are a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms. Betz argues that the reaction to racial minorities is often expressed in the form of a.) xenophobia or b.) open racism.

In South Africa, the anxiety of the cultural erosion process is expressed in an aversion to so-called “Western values” and a cultural alienation that ultimately devised society in a “us and them” approach.

Chapter 6: A cultural backlash

Economic inequality is an important driver of support for populist parties, but Inglehart and Norris argue it is by no means an exclusive or exhaustive explanation.³⁴⁰ The rise in populism, they argue, can in large part be seen as “a reaction against progressive cultural change”.

This backlash is an extension of, what Inglehart calls the “silent revolution”. In 1977 in his seminal work *The Silent Revolution*, he postulated that the post-war era had high levels of existential security that ultimately “led to an intergenerational value shift among Western publics”.³⁴¹ A more detailed description of this will follow in the next section of this chapter. This “value shift” and “reaction against culture change” can be seen as the “cultural backlash”. According to Inglehart and Norris, there are two main characteristics of the cultural backlash:

1. a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and
2. anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.³⁴²

Betz³⁴³ argues that the reaction to racial minorities is often expressed in the form of a.) open racism or b.) xenophobia. Bustikova suggests that this hostile attitude can be attributed to resentment against minorities that have managed to extract policy concessions.³⁴⁴

Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris note there are four important demographic indicators of populist supporters: Age, education, gender, religion, and ethnicity.³⁴⁵ There is “a large body of empirical evidence” to indicate that post-war developments have triggered a cultural backlash among:

- the older generation;

³⁴⁰ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 2.

³⁴¹ Pippa Norris, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1.

³⁴² Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15.

³⁴³ Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 40.


³⁴⁴ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 15.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

- predominantly men;
- the less educated sectors; and
- the ethnic majority in a country.³⁴⁶

It's imperative to note that whereas this general cultural backlash theory might not entirely be relevant for every society (including South Africa), some form of the cultural backlash thesis is present in most theories examining the causes of populism. The cultural backlash thesis described by Inglehart is mainly present in developed countries, but “cultural protectionism” is more common than economic approaches and a *manifestation* of this is present in nearly every country with radical or populist support. Inglehart and Norris argue that “cultural values, combined with several social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent and parsimonious explanation for voting support for populist parties”.³⁴⁷

In this chapter, a more detailed account of the cultural backlash theory will be given, specifically on the characteristics and “measuring” of the phenomenon within the local context. Theory from Inglehart and Norris will be applied to the South African situation.




Given the research topic, it is important to show that the cultural backlash is strongest among populist supporters. It will be argued that the demographic profile indicators of Inglehart and Norris apply to the local context, but the manifestation will be different: Supporters of the populist EFF will generally be younger (antithetical to Western democracies), black men who are less educated. Data from EFF strongholds will be used for this demographic detail.

In South Africa, it will be argued that there is indeed a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants (especially citizens from other African countries) and ethnic and racial minorities

³⁴⁶ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 3.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

(specifically white and Indian people who are portrayed as the “other”). It will also be shown how there is an anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms (“African culture” versus “European culture” and a sense of alienation).



Measuring the cultural backlash is no straightforward task. In the ideal research scenario, one would gather all the supporters of populist parties and interview each person extensively to gauge the extent to which the cultural backlash is present. Unfortunately, this is realistically and practically not possible, and a different method must be utilised to come as close as possible to determining the presence of a cultural backlash.

One possible method is to interview a representative sample of populist supporters and after thorough content analysis of the interviews, one could extrapolate the presence of a cultural backlash. This would, however, limit the research to the practicalities of a.) sourcing subjects (sampling) and b.) ensuring reliability and validity. At best this would be a segmentation of the backlash and a more holistic picture will be required.

Instead, this research will follow a complex method that is by no means without bias and errors, but it does attempt to give a more holistic picture within the spirit of qualitative research. The main argument will be built around existing research, media reports and social media

comments on Twitter, and this will be entrenched and reinforced by first-person comments (more on this below). The contribution of each resource in building this argument will thus be:

6.1.1 Existing research

As mentioned before there is virtually no research about the presence of the cultural backlash in the South African context. There is, however, research on the different *characteristics* of the cultural backlash: a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.³⁴⁸

Racism against ethnic minorities, particularly white and Indian people, is present in the local context, and research from the Institute of Race Relations, Nyar, the Human Sciences Research Council, and others will be used to form the cultural backlash argument. Media reports will then be added to indicate the presence amongst EFF supporters and this will further be entrenched by first-person comments (as discussed below).

Similarly, there is ample research on xenophobia in South Africa and inputs from Claassen, Dumani, and Solomon and Kosaka will amongst others be applied. The reasons for xenophobic incidents will be prominent in the discussion, especially those relevant to the cultural backlash theory.

Social media posts from Twitter indicating xenophobia from the supporters of the EFF will be incorporated. Lastly, first-person comments will be added for context to indicate xenophobia on a personal level and how it is reflected in the narrative.

It's no easy task to indicate, present and explain the anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms in South Africa, but this research will attempt to establish the presence of this amongst supporters of the EFF – there is a fear or anxiety that African culture is eroded by the pervasive minority cultures from especially white and Indian South Africans. This results in the latter groups not being seen as South African and the “us” versus “them” narrative is a strong indicator of this phenomenon.

³⁴⁸ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15.

It's important to distinguish between legitimately wanting your culture to be included and experiencing a cultural backlash. There's little disagreement amongst theorists that years of apartheid and colonialism pushed Western culture and ideals to the foreground in South Africa, and that reform is needed in this regard. It is unsustainable to have minority cultures as the dominant ones without trying to advance the culture of the majority.

However, where the culture of minorities is seen as "foreign" and where the anxiety and anger towards the minorities are prominent, it's indicative of a cultural backlash. In this chapter research from Heleta³⁴⁹, Bazana and Mogotsi³⁵⁰ and others will indicate the need for reform of especially the higher education sector. This will establish the presence of legitimate concerns over the continued dominance of Western culture.

However, many people have expressed anger towards especially the white minority because of the presence of a dominant Eurocentric, Western culture. A selection of these opinions will be weaved into the discussion and comments from EFF supporters on Twitter indicating the cultural backlash will form the backbone of this section. It will be shown that the cultural backlash is especially strong amongst supporters of the EFF and comments from the supporter website (as discussed below) will add to the personal narrative.

6.1.2 Media coverage

Understandably, the media tends to report the happenings of political leaders more than that of its supporters. In this section, the focus must, however, be on the supporters, as the subject at hand is a cultural backlash from within society (demand-side argument).

Two tools were used to analyse media coverage of populist supporters: The search function of Google News³⁵¹ and the search function of PressReader³⁵². The former is an aggregator of

³⁴⁹ Savo Heleta, "Decolonisation of higher education: dismantling epistemic violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa," *Transformation in Higher Education* 1, 1(2016), 1-8.

³⁵⁰ Sandiso Bazana and Opelo Mogotsi, "Social identities and racial integration in historically white universities: A literature review of the experiences of black students," *Transformation in Higher Education* 2, 0(2017), a25.

³⁵¹ Google News, <https://news.google.com/?hl=en-ZA&gl=ZA&ceid=ZA:en> (accessed 10 December 2018).

³⁵² PressReader, <https://www.pressreader.com/> (accessed 10 December 2018).

online news and the latter is an aggregator of print news. The latter included community newspapers across South Africa to get a more community orientated, micro approach.

Twitter was also used extensively to determine the presence of a cultural backlash. All of the comments used to substantiate the argument came from supposed supporters of populist parties. There are concerns about the validity and reliability of these online comments with the central question being the actual authenticity of a so-called “supporter”. How can one be sure the comments are indeed made by supporters? Several measures were taken to ensure the comments utilised in this argument are made by supporters of the EFF, namely:

- All comments used in this research were in reply to a tweet by a political party or figure and is thus not likely to be unelicited or irrelevant
- The profile of each user was scrutinised to find evidence for support of the political party. Some profiles had a very clear indication in the description that person x is a supporter of or activist for the specific party, other had explicit support in the language used in the tweets and such significant, implicit support (wearing regalia, constantly retweeting and showing support, etc.) that they could be included in the discussion.

The limitations of using Twitter comments are considered: There’s anonymity on social media and no certainty that comments are made by actual supporters. Twitter has a limited number of users in South Africa and, likely, many supporters of populist ideologies are not present on this platform. The advantage, however, is that it is possible to search for *relevant* comments.

There is immediate evidence of the specific aspect under investigation and it is possible to gauge many different opinions – significantly more than what would have been possible during in-person interviews.

6.1.3 First-person comments

The above-mentioned resources will essentially provide a solid argument for the presence of a cultural backlash, but it does allude to the personal narrative. To fill this need, this research will look at first-person comments made on an EFF supporter website,

www.economicfreedomfighters.org.³⁵³ This website describes itself as “not the official EFF website, it is a supporter website”³⁵⁴, and can thus be seen as a conversation platform for supporters of the party. “Comment and express your feelings on issues around EFF,” it urges readers.

The website has almost 1 000 comments on all the different pages, has almost 22 000 people liking its Facebook page³⁵⁵ and 8 000 people following it on Twitter³⁵⁶. One can thus deduct that the website does have a substantial following and it would give a general snapshot of the conversation EFF supporters has.

For this research, an analysis will be done on *relevant* comments expressed on the website. Some of the comments were simply praising the EFF or seeking help to set up structures on the ground and these were not considered for this research. The comments that are used to build the argument is presented in addendum C. A total of 31 comments were selected and will selectively be used in the argument.

It is crucial to understand that these comments are used to *supplement* and *strengthen* the argument, not to be the nucleus of it. Existing research and media reports can often, due to the nature of it, not account for personal narrative, and comments from EFF supporters can add immense value to indicating the presence of the cultural backlash.

It should be noted that there are intrinsically many errors with this method. There is no guarantee that the comments are indeed made by populist supporters or that it is made by a person. In the era of artificial intelligence, some accounts are automated to propagate a certain agenda³⁵⁷ and one should be cautious of this phenomenon when interpreting the data. Furthermore, the vast majority of EFF supporters are not present on this website, nor do they

³⁵³ *About*, Official EFF Website, <http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/about-eff/> (accessed 12 December 2018).

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ *Facebook Page of the EFF*, Facebook,

<https://www.facebook.com/EconomicFreedomFightersEFF> (accessed 12 December 2018).

³⁵⁶ EFFNewsDaily, Twitter, https://twitter.com/EFF_Supporters (accessed 12 December 2018).

³⁵⁷ Zoey Chong, *Up to 48 million Twitter accounts are bots, study says*, CNET, <https://www.cnet.com/news/new-study-says-almost-15-percent-of-twitter-accounts-are-bots/> (accessed 10 December 2018).

comment on it. The number of comments and the substantial following on social media does, however, indicate it to be of value.

An advantage of this tool is that it does allow a personal narrative to surface, without dealing with all the practical, logistical, and theoretical implications of interviews. Even though it is not scientifically vigorous, it indicates the presence of the cultural backlash, which is the aim of this chapter. On its own, it is definitely not sufficient to establish the presence of the cultural backlash, but in conjunction with the existing research, media reports, and tweets it is a valuable tool to achieve this goal.

6.2 Cultural backlash in SA

As mentioned in chapter two, the cultural backlash theory essentially explains the socio-psychological phenomenon of regression of values and erosion of cultural identity. This indicates a time when one's culture was not under threat and higher levels of existential security. Essentially, "existential security" refers to the feeling that survival is secure enough to be taken for granted.

Globally, the era post-WWII was essentially characterised by a threefold process of existential security:

- materialist values were eroded;
- economic and physical security was a priority; and
- individual free choice and self-expression were given a primary place in the decision-making hierarchy.³⁵⁸

Norris argues that this "rise of Postmaterialist values is just one indicator of a much broader cultural shift that has brought greater emphasis on environmental protection, peace movements, sexual liberalization, democracy and human rights, gender equality, cosmopolitanism, and respect for the rights of homosexuals, immigrants, handicapped people, and ethnic/racial minorities."³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ Pippa Norris, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*, 1.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

This generational shift in values has, however, triggered a “counter-revolutionary retro backlash, especially among the older generation, white men, and less educated sectors, who sense decline and actively reject the rising tide of progressive values, resent the displacement of familiar traditional norms, and provide a pool of supporters potentially vulnerable to populist appeals”.³⁶⁰ Norris cogently explains the manifestation of this phenomenon in the USA as follows:

*For many older people, same-sex marriage, women in authority, and an African-American President were disorienting departures from the norms they had known since childhood; they felt they had become strangers in their own land. The process of cultural change was reinforced by largescale immigration, rising educational levels and urbanisation. And the pace of cultural change can be accelerated or weakened by period effects associated with shifts in economic conditions and population migration.*³⁶¹

In essence, the group experiencing the cultural backlash is more likely to feel like “they have become strangers from the predominant values of their own country”.³⁶² In a Western context this group is older white men who were the cultural majority during the 1950s and 1960s and now “their dominance and privilege [has] eroded. The silent revolution of the 1970s appears to have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today.”

Today, the cultural shift is more prominent than ever before: A nostalgic reaction from those who feel forgotten and left behind by the so-called progressive cultural tides. This part of the electorate has traditional values and norms and tend to feel overlooked in their yearning for belonging to their group. In a multicultural, postmodern society, identity is paramount for them and retaliation is often seen as the only way to confront these seismic changes.

An application to the local context will follow, but it will also be illustrated how convoluted the South African scenario is. Similar to some other developing countries, we do not follow

³⁶⁰ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 3.

³⁶¹ Pippa Norris, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*, 2.

³⁶² Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 3.

the same pattern as many Western countries. In Venezuela (a developing country), for example, there is a cultural retaliation against Eurocentric values, beliefs and groups.

Contrary to Western countries, and even many developing countries, South Africa has a complex history with race. Apartheid and colonialism have created an extremely unequal society and has led to the white minority not only leading the economic sphere but also dominating the cultural environment. It is thus not a straightforward task to indicate the presence of a cultural backlash.

In the USA for example, black people (the minority) was marginalised, enslaved and oppressed, whilst the white majority held an economic, social and cultural dominance. The successes of the civil rights movement (an organised effort by mostly black Americans to end racial discrimination and gain equal rights under the law) changed society fundamentally.

Equal rights, minority rights and liberalism prevailed to such an extent that Barack Obama became the first African American president of the USA in 2009. As discussed earlier many older white men, who are generally uneducated and conservative retaliated against the cultural changes and this led to the cultural backlash.

In SA, the majority of citizens were oppressed, marginalised and dehumanised by the minority. Especially during apartheid (1948-1994) the so-called “white culture” was dominant and it can be argued that some people are experiencing a backlash against the continuation of the dominance of Western, white, Eurocentric culture. In our context, it’s not as clear-cut as to say that any retaliation against the dominant culture is evidence of a cultural backlash. Many South Africans feel democracy brought freedom, but not economic, social and cultural freedom. Attempts to transform the dominant culture can thus be indicative of restitution.

A cultural backlash is however present in the local context where there are racism and xenophobia. These are not phenomena that are associated with a *normal* restoration of cultural balance. These phenomena are aimed at the minority groups (white people, Indian South Africans and foreigners) who are portrayed as “they” – their cultures and even presence is not included in the conception of a South African identity. Instead of building the dominance of the “forgotten” culture (and thus decreasing the prominence of the minority cultures), the very *presence* of the minority cultures is seen as a threat to “our” way of life. It is *because* these

cultures are dominant and present that the majority is not advancing economically, socially and culturally.

Malema encapsulated this sentiment when he said: “This country is still in the hands of the colonial masters. This country is still in the hands of white people. This country is controlled from London. White minorities be warned.”³⁶³

6.3 Application: Demographics

As mentioned before, research has shown that in Western countries the cultural backlash is strongest “among the older generation, white men and less educated sectors”³⁶⁴. As the manifestation of the cultural backlash is different in South Africa (and indeed in many other countries), supporters of the populist EFF will generally be younger (antithetical to Western democracies), black men who are less educated.

A closer look at the research from Ipsos³⁶⁵ shows that 67% of EFF supporters are male, compared to 51% of the DA supporters and 48% of the South African population. A more nuanced version of the data from Wazimap³⁶⁶ shows that on average 56.7% of EFF strongholds are males, compared to 48.08% of DA strongholds. This goes accord with the international theory that populist supporters experiencing the cultural backlash are *generally* men.

Similarly, Ipsos’s research indicates that 34% of DA supporters are 35-49 years old, with 19% being between 50 and 59-years-old. On the contrary, 44% of EFF supporters are 18-24 years old and 29% are 25-34 years old. According to Wazimap the average age for an EFF stronghold is 27.4 years old and 37.4 for a DA stronghold.

In the previous chapter, it was already shown that EFF supporters are generally less educated. The average DA stronghold has 30.83% of university-educated residents, compared to only

³⁶³ Giordano Stolley, *Malema not calling for the slaughter of whites, for now*, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/malema-not-calling-for-the-slaughter-of-whites-for-now-2087713> (accessed 19 December 2018).

³⁶⁴ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 3.

³⁶⁵ Mari Harris, *The supporter profiles of SA's three largest parties – Ipsos*, PoliticsWeb, (accessed 13 November 2018).

³⁶⁶ Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/> (accessed 12 December 2018).

4.4% for EFF strongholds. Furthermore, 98.3% of EFF strongholds were black residents, compared to 12.3% of DA strongholds.

In the local context, it is thus fair to extrapolate that populist EFF supporters who generally experience the cultural backlash are generally young, black men who are less educated.

Inglehart and Norris argue that “value change is strongly predicted by birth cohort, education, and sex. If the cultural backlash thesis is true, then the argument predicts that the strongest support for populist parties will be among the older [white] generation, men, those lacking college education...”³⁶⁷

Considering the age and race inversions, the South African scenario follows the international theoretical context of the demographics of the populist supporters experiencing a cultural value change and is thus evidentiary of the cultural backlash.

6.4 Application: Hostile attitude towards minorities

A hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities is a key component of the cultural backlash. Betz³⁶⁸ argues that the reaction to racial minorities is often expressed in the form of a.) open racism and b.) xenophobia.

6.4.1 Open racism

Previously in this chapter an interpretation was given of the cultural backlash in the local context and henceforth “racism” will be addressed as a manifestation of the cultural backlash. It is imperative to realise that this discussion is not a general discussion of racism in South Africa; rather it is one of racism towards minorities. There’s ample research³⁶⁹ to suggest that there’s still institutionalised racism towards the majority – but that falls outside the scope of this thesis. It is therefore not a denial of the existence of racism in the general context, but rather homing in on a specific aspect to establish relevance to the topic at hand.

³⁶⁷ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” 16.

³⁶⁸ Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 40.

³⁶⁹ South African Human Rights Commission, “Research Brief on Race and Equality: 2013-2017,” Unpublished report, (2017).

The Institute of Race Relations' 2018 annual report on the state of race relations in the country reveals that "61% of black respondents now agree that South Africa is a country for blacks rather than whites, while only 38% disagree".³⁷⁰ According to the report, this suggests that "ANC and EFF rhetoric castigating whites and demanding a major shift in the ownership and management of the economy may be having a significant impact on black opinion". When asked the question of whether they have ever experienced racism, 53% of white people answered "yes", compared to only 23% of black people.

In the same study, 23% of black people also said they don't believe that, even with better education and more jobs, differences between the races will disappear, indicating the root of racism is not exclusively situated in the economic domain, but rather in the social and cultural domain. In comparison, 16% of white people and 1% of Indian people feel the same way. The report effectively concludes quite strongly that:

*There are many ideologues in the ruling party and the EFF with a vested interest in playing up racial incidents and portraying the repugnant words or conduct of the few as representative of the many. These ideologues also seek to identify white racism – and the white privilege this supposedly sustains – as the key reason for persistent poverty and inequality within the country. This perspective is politically useful, of course, because it distracts attention from the ANC's many policy failures over the past 24 years.*³⁷¹

Research from the Human Sciences Research Council³⁷² affirms these findings from the Institute of Race Relations. Their annual South African Social Attitudes Survey shows that "in contrast to black adults, white and Indian adults were found to be less optimistic about race relations". Only 7% of black South Africans feel that race relations had worsened in the country in the time leading up to this 2016 study, compared to 40% of white people and 32% of Indian South Africans.

³⁷⁰ Institute of Race Relations, "Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope 2018," Unpublished report, (2018), 8.

³⁷¹ Institute of Race Relations, "Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope 2018," Unpublished report, (2018), 11.

³⁷² *The longer walk to freedom: making sense of attitudes towards race relations in South Africa*, Human Sciences Research Council, <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/general/longer-walk-to-freedom> (accessed 15 December 2018).

Interestingly, many participants in this survey showed concern that their racial group is under threat from other racial groups. 61% of the participants believe that people of other race groups “were trying to get ahead economically at the expense of their own group” and 53% that “the traditions and values that are important to people of their race group are under threat because of the influence of other races”. This can be indicative of a cultural backlash – there is a fear that other races are eroding your values, creating the “us” versus “them” construct.

Similarly, according to research from Nyar, the “post-apartheid context has paradoxically seen a deepening of anti-Indian racism” and “popular sentiment and discourse often see Indian South Africans singled out for blame particularly in terms of causing suffering and harm to black Africans”.³⁷³ She further argues: “Along with other vulnerable minority groupings such as migrants and ‘foreigners’, Indian South Africans tend to serve as scapegoats for the socio-economic ills.”

Nyar’s findings are affirmed by research from the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation³⁷⁴ that delved into the experiences of Indian South Africans in the form of semi-structured interviews. One of the key themes emerging from the interviews is “the widespread and multi-faceted nature of anti-Indian racism. Indian South Africans emerged as a singular focus of hatred and resentment from the majority of the focus groups. Indian South Africans were broadly interpreted by focus group participants as being racist, resistant to integration, and not ‘real South Africans’ i.e. not belonging to South Africa.”³⁷⁵

Resulting from this overarching research it’s clear that white and Indian South Africans experience racism that makes them feel like South Africa is not their country, that they do not belong. They experience more racism and are less optimistic about race relations in the country. This is a strong indication of the presence of the cultural backlash. In general, there’s hostility toward racial minorities and per cultural backlash theory, these groups are alienated from society.

³⁷³ Annsilla Nyar, “A critical Examination of Anti-Indian Racism in Post-apartheid South Africa,” (Doctoral Thesis presented at the University of Witwatersrand, 2016), 11.

³⁷⁴ Fiona Anciano-White and Johnny Selemani, “Rethinking Non-Racialism: Reflections of a Selection of South African Leaders,” *South African Journal of Political Studies* 39, 1(2012), 149-169.

³⁷⁵ Annsilla Nyar, “A critical Examination of Anti-Indian Racism in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 160.

The next step in affirming the element of racism within the cultural backlash thesis is looking at media coverage of, especially EFF supporters. The methodology of this was discussed earlier in this chapter. To be relevant to the central focus of this research it must be shown that the supporters of populist parties have this hostile attitude towards the racial minorities. There are many examples of EFF supporters displaying racist and hostile attitudes towards minorities:

- In 2013, during the launch of the EFF in Marikana, supporters showed banners portraying slogans such as “a revolutionary must become a cold killing machine motivated by pure hate”, “honeymoon is over for white people in South Africa” and “we need to kill them like they killed us”.³⁷⁶ Cameron Modisane, an EFF supporter, said these banners were paid for by local branch members. “Our greatest enemy within EFF is white monopoly capital.”
- Luvuyo Menziwa, an EFF Student Command member, posted racially inciteful comments on social media in 2016³⁷⁷. In the post on Facebook, Menziwa listed five reasons why he hated white people – white privilege, dominance, monopoly capital, arrogance, and superiority. He said: “F*ck white people. Just get me a bazooka or AK-47 so I can do the right thing and kill these demon-possessed humans.”
- In January 2018 EFF supporters protested outside a Johannesburg school and chanted “white man you must die” and “shoot to kill the *Boer* (farmer)”.³⁷⁸
- On Human Rights Day in 2018, EFF councillor Mampuru Mampuru reportedly posted on social media that black people should unite, because “there are less than five million

³⁷⁶ EFF 'killing' banner causes outrage, News24, <https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/eff-killing-banner-causes-outrage-20131014?cpid=1> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁷⁷ Lerato Tshipe, EFF student leader suspended after 'kill whites' post, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/eff-student-leader-suspended-after-kill-whites-post-2062924> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁷⁸ Afriforum wants EFF to answer over alleged anti-white chants, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/afriforum-wants-eff-to-answer-over-alleged-anti-white-chants-12785728> (accessed 14 December 2018).

whites in South Africa vs 45 million of us. We can kill all these whites within two weeks.”³⁷⁹

- In June 2018, Malema has lashed out against South African Indians³⁸⁰ saying the majority of them are racist. “The majority of those Indians see us as subhuman,” he said. Subsequently, EFF supporters agreed. “Majority of Indians are racist, they will get a distinction when it comes to racism,” said EFF supporter @EFFexplained on Twitter. “Indians are the worst pay masters of them all. I know what am talking,” another supporter (@CaiphusMkhize) tweeted.
- In late 2018, an active EFF member threatened Adriaan Basson, editor of News24 on Twitter calling for the slaughter “white animals” and to kill “people like” Basson.³⁸¹

A closer look at supporter website comments shows several instances of racism and intolerance towards racial minorities. Some examples are:

- **Comment 3:** “This is Africa, for Africans, not for Basterds!” – concerning white people.
- **Comment 18:** “White monopoly capital that captured South Africa State of governance since the arrival of the Whites led by the world-known Criminal, a Jan van Riebeeck.”
- **Comment 20:** “The whites still run everything... like dirty puppet masters.”

³⁷⁹ Nico Gous, *EFF councillor ‘loves’ his white friends and would never call for their genocide*, TimesLive, <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-21-eff-councillor-loves-his-white-friends-and-would-never-call-for-their-genocide/> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁸⁰ ‘Indeed the majority of Indians are racist’ – Malema sticks to his guns, CityPress, <https://city-press.news24.com/News/indeed-the-0majority-of-indians-are-racist-malema-sticks-to-his-guns-20180625> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁸¹ *EFF member threatens to kill Adriaan Basson in ‘support’ of Mngxitama*, Citizen, <https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/social-media/2048978/eff-member-threatens-to-kill-adriaan-basson-in-support-of-mngxitama/> (accessed 14 December 2018).

- **Comment 28:** “Don’t fear white people when they get angry for you criticising them, they are pretenders. White people have no conscience. White people try to feed of your self-esteem because they have no credibility as humans.”
- **Comment 29:** “You white people are Evil, you are Satan himself, and you are the reason why there is no peace in the world”

It is clear from the above-mentioned research, media reports and supporter comments that there is evidence of Betz’s concept of “open racism”³⁸² against minorities – both white and Indian South Africans.

Several of the opinions expressed by EFF supporters go beyond the notion of a “hostile or intolerant attitude” – calling for the killing of white South Africans (explicitly expressed in many of the media articles and comments) is indeed open racism bordering on hatred for this racial group. Some comments eluded to white people not “belonging” in South Africa (which will be expanded on later in this chapter) and being “evil” with “no credibility as humans”.

Similarly, Indians are perceived as “racist” and “the worst paymasters”. Other instances of open racism include: “F*ck white people”, “demon-possessed humans”, “Basterds” and “dirty puppet masters”

It is thus fair to conclude that there is open racism towards white and Indian South Africans as racial minority groups. This is characteristic of some EFF supporters, proving that the cultural backlash thesis is partially (at least for now) applicable in the local context.

6.4.2 Xenophobia

As Betz has stated, xenophobia is the second manifestation of the hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities. In the discussion below, it will first be shown how xenophobia is present in the South African context and then how it arises from especially supporters of the populist EFF.

³⁸² Hans-Heorg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 40.

According to Solomon and Kosaka, xenophobia is “the fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers” that is often embodied in “discriminatory attitudes and behaviour” and it often results in “violence, abuses of all types and exhibitions of hatred”.³⁸³

Claassen is of opinion that South Africa is “one of the most hostile destinations in the world for African migrants”.³⁸⁴ In May 2008 a total of 62 people were killed in widespread attacks targeting foreigners, and in 2015 tensions flared up again and seven people were killed.³⁸⁵

The 2008 attacks started in Alexandra township in Johannesburg when locals attacked migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, killing two people and injuring 40 others.³⁸⁶ Soon after the violence spread to other Gauteng settlements such as Diepsloot where “a Mozambican man was burned alive while bystanders laughed”³⁸⁷, and the xenophobic violence reached KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, and the Western Cape.

The 2015 attacks started in Durban and spread to Johannesburg, after which it cropped up across the country. Local looted foreign-owned shops (including those of citizens from Pakistan and Bangladesh) and attacked immigrants in general. Hundreds of people had to relocate to police stations and the Malawian authorities subsequently “began repatriating their nationals”³⁸⁸, similarly to the Kenyan government’s actions.

Research from Claassen has shown that these attacks were not caused by “small bands of provocateurs or criminals”, but rather “widespread participation” for violence against

³⁸³ Hussein Solomon and Hitomi Kosaka, “Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, Narratives and Recommendations,” *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* 2, 2(2017), 5.

³⁸⁴ Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” Unpublished Paper by Afrobarometer, (2017), 1.

³⁸⁵ David Sim, *South Africa xenophobia: Anti-immigrant violence in Durban and Johannesburg*, IBTimes, <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/south-africa-xenophobia-anti-immigrant-violence-durban-johannesburg-photo-report-1496588> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁸⁶ *South African mob kills migrants*, BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7396868.stm> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁸⁷ Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe and Eric Worby, (eds.), *Go Home or Die Here*, (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008), 1.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

foreigners.³⁸⁹ Dumani concurs that we are “a highly xenophobic society [...] which does not naturally value human rights of non-nationals”³⁹⁰.

A national survey conducted in 2007 indicated that more than 80% of South African citizens feel the government should “severely limit immigration into the country from troubled African countries.”³⁹¹ Almost 10 years later, research from Afrobarometer showed “more than one in five South Africans would like the government to deport all foreigners, irrespective of their legal status”.³⁹²

Following xenophobic violence in Rustenburg in 2018, the Human Science Research Council released data that indicated that “62% of the adult population agreed with the statement that immigrants increased crime in 2008, and in 2016, 66% of the general public agreed with the statement”.³⁹³

Why are we so violent towards foreigners in South Africa? Several theorists have attempted to answer the question and in general, it eludes to a cultural backlash being present in the South African society.

Claassen³⁹⁴ lists six reasons that could explain xenophobia in the local context: resource competition (such as access to jobs and housing); poverty (poverty is linked to outgroup aggression); relative deprivation (rising expectations of one’s circumstances); frustrations with government (insufficiency of government to provide basic services); mobilisation (the extent to which individuals are connected to the community); and a symbolic threat (fear that cultural and national identity might be changed).

Both Claassen and Dumani³⁹⁵ refer to the term “scapegoating” in explaining xenophobia in the local context. This refers to the phenomenon when one turns your anger about hardships (such

³⁸⁹ Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” 1.

³⁹⁰ Nomsa Dumani, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” Unpublished CERS Working Paper, (2015), 4.

³⁹¹ Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe and Eric Worby, (eds.), *Go Home or Die Here*, 3.

³⁹² Matthias Krönke, “Trends in attitudes toward foreigners in South Africa, 1997-2011,” Unpublished Paper by Afrobarometer, (2015).

³⁹³ *Are South Africans xenophobic?*, HSRC, <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-jan-march-2018/are-south-africans-xenophobic> (accessed 14 December 2018).

³⁹⁴ Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” 3-5.

³⁹⁵ Nomsa Dumani, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” Unpublished CERS Working Paper, (2015), 3.

as unemployment, lack of resources, or government's performance) towards foreigners and make them the primary cause of your problems. Solomon and Kosaka argue scapegoating is a global phenomenon that is prominent in many countries undergoing transitions post-colonialism.³⁹⁶ It is often associated with the politics of the dominant groups following independence [and has] to do with a feeling of superiority”.

In the local context, South Africans would thus feel frustrated by poor economic circumstances, poverty, unemployment, lack of resources, government ability to deliver services, etc. and this is manifested into xenophobia. These concerns do not need to be substantiated by facts and often the facts point to the opposite scenario.^{397, 398} The mere perception is enough to cause retaliation and backlash against foreigners.

Apartheid's legacy can also not be ignored. The system's extreme focus on boundary maintenance has probably affected people's ability to tolerate differences³⁹⁹ and with the abolishment of apartheid, South Africans were suddenly exposed to the “previously unknown”, as there was no history of incorporating “others” into “our” society.

A common thread through all the reasons is the fear of “the other”. The hostile, intolerant and often violent attitude towards migrants is almost always accompanied by a dislike for or hate of foreigners. This is prevalent in the cultural backlash thesis.

It is very challenging identifying South Africans who express xenophobia. As shown earlier a significant portion of South Africans hold xenophobic views. Claassen's research has shown that 37% of Asian South Africans oppose foreigners moving into their neighbourhood, compared to 34% of black people and 26% of white people. 37% of black people are also opposed to foreigners operating a business in the area, with 31% of white and 26% of coloured

³⁹⁶ Hussein Solomon and Hitomi Kosaka, “Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, Narratives and Recommendations,” 6.

³⁹⁷ Kate Wilkinson, *ANALYSIS: Are foreigners stealing jobs in South Africa?*, AfricaCheck, <https://africacheck.org/2015/04/17/analysis-are-foreigners-stealing-jobs-in-south-africa/> (accessed 15 December 2018).

³⁹⁸ Kate Wilkinson, *ANALYSIS: Are foreigners stealing jobs in South Africa?*, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/south-africa-xenophobic-violence-migrants-workforce> (accessed 15 December 2018).

³⁹⁹ Nomsa Dumani, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” Unpublished CERS Working Paper, (2015), 10.

reporting the same. Although coloured residents express less xenophobia than other races, levels of xenophobia are consistently high amongst all races.⁴⁰⁰

Since xenophobia is characteristic of the cultural backlash, this research from media reports, social media and the EFF supporter website will show that the supporters are indicative of the cultural backlash being present in our society:

- In 2014 the United Nations' Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Programme laid the blame for xenophobic attacks at the door of EFF supporters in Mamelodi. The agency provided evidence that supporters of the party are behind the attacks on Somalis and their shops.⁴⁰¹
- In the EFF supporter website comments, comment 7 can be construed as xenophobic: "I would like the EFF to help us as greater Gauteng business forum in our fight to reclaim our economic rights. we want foreign nationals like Ethiopians, Somalis, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis to stop operating tuckshops and wholesales and return to refugee camps or home of origin and leave the wealth of RSA to South Africans."

This is indicative of the cultural backlash thesis as a manifestation of hostile or intolerant attitudes towards migrants. As seen before, xenophobia present amongst all South African races, and this hostile attitude is often embraced by the supporters of the EFF, albeit less than open racism.

Together with the research on racism, it would be fair to suggest that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the first manifestation of the cultural backlash is indeed present in our local context. In the next section, there will be a focus on the anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.

⁴⁰⁰ Christopher Claassen, "Explaining South African Xenophobia," Unpublished Paper by Afrobarometer, (2017), 16.

⁴⁰¹ Ntando Makhubu, *EFF behind Mamelodi attacks – UN agency*, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/eff-behind-mamelodi-attacks-un-agency-1708293#.U7PLtVJZqUk> (accessed 15 December 2018).

6.5 Application: Anxiety around pervasive culture

As discussed before, research from Inglehart and Norris suggests that the cultural backlash is present when there is an anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding the cultural norms of the majority. In South Africa it can be argued that it manifests itself as a backlash against Western values. The latter is seen as a threat to “our” way of living. Not only is minority culture seen as *different*, but as *foreign* and not part of “us”.

As mentioned, there is a fear or anxiety that African culture is eroded by the pervasive minority cultures from especially white and Indian South Africans. This results in the latter groups not being seen as South African and the “us” versus “them” narrative is a strong indicator of this phenomenon.

In a country with black people being the majority, one would naturally expect their culture to be the dominant one, but many years of oppression under first colonialism and then apartheid created a space where black people’s culture is indeed significantly less prominent than Western culture, embodied by white South Africans.

Before continuing with the discussion, it is perhaps sagacious to consider the semantic implications of the term “black culture”. There is by no means an assumption that there is a universal “black culture” in South Africa that is the dichotomy of “white culture”. Furthermore, there is a difference between “self-identity” and cultural identity”⁴⁰². The former can be seen as the traits and characteristics that define who *you* are and the latter “identification with specific values and, in this way, at least, partial membership in the groups representing these values”⁴⁰³. Hauser successfully argues that cultural identity is not fixed, but rather fluid on a continuum.

It is for these reasons that the complexities of “black culture” are acknowledged and by no means is there a suggestion that black people have a uniform culture; similarly, there’s no implication that white people have a uniform culture. It is, however, relevant to this research to point out the *alienation* of cultures. The Constitution gives freedom to all cultures present in

⁴⁰² Sandiso Bazana and Opelo Mogotsi, “Social identities and racial integration in historically white universities: A literature review of the experiences of black students,” a25.

⁴⁰³ Robert Hauser, “Cultural Identity in a Globalised World? A Theoretical Approach Towards the Concept of Cultural Identity,” Unpublished Working Paper, (unknown), 8.

South Africa, but the anti-backlash thesis would proclaim that “white culture” and “Indian culture”, are not seen as *South African* by populist supporters. The perceptions of white and black cultures are thus at play and a detailed analysis of complexities of culture falls outside the scope of this research.

There are legitimate concerns about decolonising South African society and institutions. Heleta has shown that “whiteness” is a common lived experience of the black majority, and that it is understandable that activists want to disrupt this “whiteness in society, the economy, and at universities. The whiteness they are trying to disrupt has been imposed since colonial times as a ‘symbol of purity’ and has defined ‘what it means to be civilised, modern and human’. This whiteness is still engaged in daily open and/or subtle racism and marginalisation of black people.”⁴⁰⁴

Considering the presence of white culture dominating, there has been a shift in South Africa to transform society. Dladla’s research alludes to this change:

This can be seen in a recent rise of movements which have come into being to challenge the prevailing marginality of African philosophy – both in the university and in society, as well as the polity. Examples of such movements include the Economic Freedom Fighters’ party...

Significantly, Dladla mentions the EFF. Whilst the need for reform has been indicated supporters of the EFF have been very vocal in not only *promoting* “African philosophy” but *alienating* “white philosophy” and viewing it as foreign.

However, Nyamnjoh is of opinion that “social movements often face the danger of becoming the very thing they are fighting against”⁴⁰⁵. She argues that during the #RhodesMustFall movement, for instance, white students were seen as “illegitimate voices” and this “withholding of recognition from whites can lead to a “one-sided recognition [that] excludes the other.”⁴⁰⁶ This leads to a sense of alienation and ultimately self-alienation.

⁴⁰⁴ Savo Heleta, “Decolonisation of higher education: dismantling epistemic violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa,” 1-8.

⁴⁰⁵ Anye Nyamnjoh, “The Phenomenology of ‘Rhodes Must Fall’: Student Activism and the Experience of Alienation at the University of Cape Town,” *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 39, 1(2017), 256-277.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 268.

Unfortunately, some groups like AfriForum and trade union Solidarity have canvassed their message of a “white genocide” on the world stage.⁴⁰⁷ These conservative groups have propagated that especially white farmers are targeted and killed in South Africa, even though the facts portray a different picture.⁴⁰⁸ Van Zyl-Hermann refers to these attempts as national populism aiming to “create spaces in which white privilege, power, and identities are maintained”.⁴⁰⁹

Amid this false narrative, it is thus understandable that the legitimate cultural backlash has been lost in the discussion of populism in South Africa. It is important to discern between conservative efforts disinformation and unnecessary panic, and the cultural backlash that is present in society.

Thus far it has been illustrated how a cultural backlash is present in the *general* South African society, but to be relevant to this research it must be shown that it is present amongst supporters of the populist EFF. Henceforth social media comments and first-person comments from the supporter website will be utilised to affirm the presence of the cultural backlash, specifically pertaining to the anxiety that the dominant culture is eroding black culture and thus creating a “us” versus “them” narrative.

In September 2018 the EFF tweeted from its official account: “DP @FloydShivambu responding to AfriForum in Parliament. He told them that the fact of the matter is that white people came into South Africa as colonial settlers.” Some of the responses to this from supporters were:

- “They are foreigners, this is not their Land, No White was African, Africa belongs to Blacks (K*ff*rs) that's what they call us, but they came and lived with k*ff*rs, the time will come for them to reap what they sow.” – @MathewsLebogan1

⁴⁰⁷ Farouk Chothia, *South Africa: The groups playing on the fears of a 'white genocide'*, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45336840> (accessed 19 December 2018).

⁴⁰⁸ Kate Wilkinson, *FACTSHEET: Statistics on farm attacks and murders in South Africa*, AfricaCheck, <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-statistics-farm-attacks-murders-sa/> (accessed 19 December 2018).

⁴⁰⁹ Danelle, van Zyl-Hermann, “Make Afrikaners great again! National populism, democracy and the new white minority politics in post-apartheid South Africa,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41, 15(2018), 2673-2692.

- “That's nothing but the truth. They came here to oppress us.” – @BKgaedume
- “That white kid is bluffing if it's a war they want let's give it to them, I am not a violent person and I don't promote violence but if I have to apply my skills I will for free # highly trained assassin.” – @Raymond65554926

In March 2018 the party tweeted:” Malema: Chinese are like Indians. They think they're close to whiteness. When they practice racism they even become worse than whites. There are even Blacks who mimic whiteness. All of this needs to be confronted. #MalemaOnTouchHD.” Some of the responses included:

- “That's true keep on talking Juju until our sisters stop using creams and fake accents.” – @LungaAuthor
- “That's true, CIC, Chinese are racist, they exploit, black people. I really don't know why focus is only on whites...” – @Tobela22561604
- “Indians are the worst. They need to be dealt with urgently.” – @ka_madesi
- “They think they r better than us.” – @BhekiNt55904883

Some general, relevant comments from EFF supporters on Twitter are also collated:

- “That's all you know because you want to kill African culture which will never happen and replace it with European one which will never be allowed ... You can go back to Europe and display your Caucasian mentality of undermining other people's culture... Not here...” – @GENNOTO
- “Before the 'White Man' arrived, #Africa had a thriving culture & an interlinked trade network North South East & West. Not only did the White Man take the Land they destroyed African Culture & Trade & Killed Millions.” – @CharlieFrederix

- “I do support what @EFFSouthAfrica is doing. Black people are tired. We’ve been conforming to white culture. Letting racists get to us. Viva EFF.” – @DearBheki
- “Show me a country in Africa which the white man didn't destroy, they destroy people's culture, languages, etc. @EFFSouthAfrica” – @MoraAfrika

In these comments made by EFF supporters, it is evident there’s an anxiety that the dominant, minority culture is eroding the majority culture. There is clearly frustration with a foreign culture and a yearning to write “our own history”, and this in turn elicits a return to being “proud to be black”. True to the cultural backlash thesis, some comments portray white people as foreigners (“they are foreigners”, “no white was African” and “our country”). As mentioned before the alienation is also present in the language: “*them* respect *us*”; “*they* are here to oppress *us*” and “*that* white kid”. This created the “us” versus “them” narrative.

It’s not only the white minority who are the adverse subjects of the cultural backlash thesis; minorities such as Indians and Asians also experience the effects of this alienation. It especially surfaces in the divisive language: “*they* need to be dealt with urgently”, “*they* exploit black people” and “*they* think they are better than *us*”. It’s evident that the retaliation against minorities is not limited to white people and this goes accord with the open racism explained earlier in this chapter.

Lastly, one also sees the presence of a pure cultural retaliation against racial minorities in the comments from EFF supporters. The “white man” is accused of wanting to “kill African culture”; they should rather “go back to Europe” and not “undermining other people’s culture”. This anxiety experienced over the dominant culture is manifested in the yearning for a time “before the white man arrived” when black people had “a thriving culture”. Now, white people have “destroyed African culture” and “black people are tired” of simply “conforming to white culture”.

These sentiments are also expressed in the first-person comments from EFF supporters:

- **Comment 1:** “Our land still belongs to the white man including its wealth and economy.”

- **Comment 2:** “Try reading the history of these people, (whites) and you will get a better understanding of these Euros.”
- **Comment 3:** “Immorality and hatred are what your pink skin (called themselves whites) does to our people and economy. Ignorant is they devil deeds they’ve brought and enforced into our land. Stop coming with your Holandirism in here, “this is Africa, for Africans, not for Basterds!”
- **Comment 5:** “Do you know how blacks are still treated and undermined in corporate by whites. don’t just commend to protect your stay in SA.”
- **Comment 12:** We must get back our land! These Europeans came to our country and stole the land, cattle, and raped our women! They need to pay reparations! They NEVER brought cattle and land to our beautiful country. They brought their corrupted bible and tricked us into accepting nonsense.”
- **Comment 25:** “They have robbed us our culture, land, identity, made us be inferior to our own complexion e.g. where there is a black person something must go wrong, they taught us to say that when one of us fails in their shit-stem. We have to emancipate ourselves from mental slavery e.g. speaking EngliSHIT with a shit-stem ascent and down looking our brother and sisters who can speak EngliSHIT It’s a revolution time EFF is a vanguard of Azania. Amandla we are not going to be slaves in our fathers land.”
- **Comment 28:** “We must catch these white people and confront them on international laws. Let us expose them and make them deal with the truth, according to African Law.”
- **Comment 29:** “Look, lie to yourself all you want, but Africa, belongs to Africans, that you can never change, you are the only settler in Africa our land, ok???”

There is a cultural backlash present amongst supporters of the populist EFF. The overarching implication is that South Africa exclusively belongs to black people and not ‘the white man’

(comment 1). The “us” versus “them” construction come to the foreground in many first-person inputs: “these Euros” in comment 2; “our land” and “Bastards” in comment 3.

Comment 25 explicitly encapsulates the essence of the cultural backlash. There is a sense of “us” versus “them” (“they”) who have taken away “our” culture (“robbed us of our culture”). Besides the implicit alienation, there is a more direct attempt to create distance and imply that white people are foreign to South Africa: “This is Africa, for Africans, not for Basterds!” in comment 3; “don’t just commend to protect your stay in SA” (comment 5); and “Africa, belongs to Africans” and “you are the only settler in Africa our land” in comment 29.

6.6 Conclusion and way forward

In this chapter, it was shown that there is indeed a manifestation of a cultural backlash present amongst supporters of the EFF in South Africa. It was illustrated how supporters of the EFF are expressing open racism against racial minorities, the groups at which their retaliation is aimed at. Similarly, they also feel “foreign” in their own country and blame the dominant culture of minorities for eroding their culture. The process through which these cultures became dominant is perhaps of less significance to the argument; the only necessity is the presence of cultural protectionism encompassed in a backlash against this dominance, and the wanting a return to a time when the majority felt valued and that their culture was indeed recognised and in a prominent space.

Unlike Western supporters of populist parties, it is not the same people who experienced cultural dominance and subsequently retaliation in our local context. In the USA, for instance, older white Americans who felt their cultural values promoted during the 1950s and 1960s, are the very same people who retaliated against the progressive cultural tides in the 1970s and ultimately ended up supporting populist politicians in the 2000s. The children of this group would also have grown up within this environment and immediate contact with their family frustrations makes it significant that there is consistency in the group who experienced both the dominance and subsequent retaliation.

In South Africa, it is impossible to have a similar situation. The people who experienced cultural dominance in a pre-Colonial era are certainly not alive anymore and many generations have come and gone since that period. What is important is the *recalled* memory or even *implied* memory of that period.

Even though South Africans who support the EFF were not alive during a time when their cultural values dominated, they feel an intimate association with their forefathers who did experience this dominance. The fact that it can be counted in centuries, rather than decades, probably makes the retaliation even stronger; this is inter-generational anger, frustration, and retaliation that is manifesting. Even though there is no certainty on the feeling and cultural stance of the pre-Colonial cohort of South Africans, the *impression* of cultural dominance is important to the current cohort.

This impression might be attributed to a few factors. Firstly, it is possible that it is passed along through family history and that there is still a recollection of the once-dominant culture of black South Africans. Secondly, through education one can deduct that many black citizens learnt about the time predating Colonialism and thus feels a cultural affiliation with that period.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the current black youth of South Africa is frustrated with democracy not bringing them economic, social, or cultural freedom. They are either old enough to have experienced the injustices of apartheid, or the effects are very visible in their families and everyday lives. It is evident that white, minority culture was dominant during apartheid and the dawn of democracy brought the promise of a reversal of this dominance. This promise has not realised, and it is highly likely that this cultural protectionism and backlash is fuelled by the frustration of a lack of change. In this instance, it is not so much an association with a pre-Colonial time-period of cultural dominance, but rather the *implied* memory of a time when black people did not feel like foreigners in their own country.

This is accompanied by instances of xenophobia. As pointed out, foreigners are often seen as scapegoats for economic and cultural frustrations, and this group is thus amalgamated with white and Indian South Africans into being the focus of the cultural retaliation. In this chapter, it was shown how supporters of the EFF display xenophobic tendencies. The blame for a lack of cultural dominance is also placed on the shoulders of immigrants, and not just those of racial minorities.

Anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko famously remarked that “joint culture” is possible in South Africa. “Sure it [the joint culture] will have European experience because we have whites here who are descended from Europe. We don’t dispute that. But for God’s sake, it must have

African experience as well.”⁴¹⁰ He also famously suggested that “a country in Africa, in which the majority of people are African must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African in style”.⁴¹¹ These statements from Biko encapsulates the frustrations experienced by those exhibiting the cultural retaliation, but instead of working to find solutions within a multiracial, human rights-centred and culturally accommodating setting, the frustrations, anger, and anxiety are so extreme that a cultural backlash portraying open racism, xenophobia and a sense of disowning cultures are seen as the only viable solution to establish cultural relevance and rightful dominance.

6.6.1 Contribution to literature

Addressing the gaps in the existing research, it was shown that supporters of EFF display the cultural backlash (observation 1 in the literature review), thus applying the international theory of Inglehart and Norris to the local context.

The presence of the cultural backlash in South Africa is also indicative of demand-side factors (observation 2 in the literature review). The current research does very little to acknowledge relevant demand-side factors, but this dissertation shows that there is a cultural backlash that’s present within society.

Lastly, it was indicated how the current research on open racism and xenophobia can be relevant and incorporated into cultural backlash theory (observation 3 of the literature review). This again illustrates how this dissertation fills the gaps in the current research, thus incorporating relevant factors (such as open racism and xenophobia) into the theory of populism. A more detailed explanation of the contribution to the literature will follow in the next chapter.

⁴¹⁰ *How racially divided South Africans can find their common humanity*, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-racially-divided-south-africans-can-find-their-common-humanity-57136> (accessed 20 December 2018).


⁴¹¹ Simpiwe Sesanti, *Ask what is African, not who is an Africa*, IOL, <https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/opinion/ask-what-is-african-not-who-is-an-african-1196405> (accessed 20 December 2018.)

6.6.2 The next chapter

In the last chapter, a comprehensive precis of anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash will be given in connection to support for populism amongst the EFF in South Africa. The goals, hypothesis, and observations set out in the first chapter will be revisited and it will be shown how this research is confirmation of the theoretical perspectives set out in the second chapter. Conclusions will be drawn and recommendations for further research will also be made.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Throughout this research dissertation, it has been emphasised that populism is a complex, thin-centred ideology that can manifest itself in a multitude of ways. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s definition was instrumental in guiding the argument in the local context and Inglehart and Norris’ theoretical work on the causes of populism cemented a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Essentially this dissertation followed the following pattern:



The main aim of the dissertation was to show that populism is on the rise within the EFF due to anti-establishment (chapter four), economic inequality (chapter five), and a cultural backlash (chapter six). The last two phenomena illustrated the demand-side causes of populism in South Africa, whereas the anti-establishment sentiment is mostly present in the political party sphere, thus the supply-side of the argument.

This conclusion will present the main insights gained from each of these research areas and how it does indeed relate to the crux of the current research question. The central, basic question of this dissertation, as stated in chapter one, is:

Why is populism on the rise in the form of the EFF for the years 2013-2018?

After addressing this question, recommendations for future research will be made and it will be shown how the roadmap set out in chapter one was threaded through the research.

7.1 Key insights: Anti-establishment

In chapter four it became evident that anti-establishment politics coincides with the rise of populism and that the EFF indeed position themselves as anti-establishment. Returning to Mudde and Kaltwasser's⁴¹² central definition of populism, it is imperative to understand that there is a divide or separation between "two homogenous and antagonistic camps", namely "the people" and "the elite", with the latter being equated to the establishment and its extensions.

7.1.1 Mudde and Kaltwasser

This ideational approach from Mudde and Kaltwasser was central for the analysis of anti-establishment: Essentially, opposition parties claim they are for "the people" and against "the elite" and that this is an expression of the "general will".

7.1.1.1 The people

Three concepts of "the people" were applied: sovereignty, marginalisation, and a national community.

Firstly, the EFF often employs the "people as sovereign" construct with the claim that the current establishment is not governing for the people; this is not a government where the people are in charge, but one where the establishment governs for the benefit of "the elite".

The EFF also utilises the second interpretation that "the people" are "forgotten" and "marginalised" In chapter four it was demonstrated that the EFF equates "black people" to "the

⁴¹² Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

people” (thus a racial interpretation of “the people”) and from the statements provided it was clear that the party and its leaders frame black people as “being conquered”; they are the “rejected” ones who are considered to be “subhuman”.

The last interpretation of “the people” refers to the national community of a political context, but as we have seen it is more convoluted than simply regarding the population living within a particular region as “the people”. Malema and the EFF have repeatedly referred to black people as the only true citizens and emphasising that the country is not the home of white people. In essence, white people are seen as “foreigners”, not real citizens of South Africa.

7.1.1.2 The elite

These concepts of “the people” are pitted against “the elites”, thus creating the anti-establishment stance. The determination as to who belongs in which category is often based on a moralistic judgement. Furthermore, “the elite” is presented as homogenous and the economic, cultural, and media elite are seen as extensions.

The EFF views the ANC elite as governing for their own benefit. Their interest is “to have access to world leaders to clinch deals with them”. The EFF has also called on the Guptas to leave South Africa, saying the country could not be held to ransom by a “corrupt cartel” with “mafia” tendencies.⁴¹³ The implication is that the state is captured – it’s looted to the benefit of those in power. This critique of the elite *excludes* those in power who are sympathetic to the cause of the populist, and obviously, it also precludes the populist with power – they are after all not there for their own benefit, but to represent the will of the people.

Another interpretation is that the EFF sometimes sees the elite ANC government as illegitimate. The party has also called both Zuma and Ramaphosa “illegitimate presidents”, even though democratic processes were followed in electing both of them.⁴¹⁴

The elite is also often being constructed as working against the economic interests of the country, and that doing away with the current connection between the political and economic

⁴¹³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410> (accessed 14 July)

⁴¹⁴ Makhosandile Zulu, *EFF calls Ramaphosa’s election ‘illegitimate’*, The Citizen, <https://citizen.co.za/news/1820931/eff-calls-ramaphosas-election-illigitimate/> (accessed 14 July 2018).

elite, is the best way forward. In the local context, the EFFs stance is radically different from the current system. They support the nationalisation of key economic sectors with the state controlling the assets and land and believe the current establishment and the system within which it operates are not to the benefit of the people, but the elite. Unlike some other populist leaders such as Donald Trump, the EFF *does* believe in the abolishment of capitalism. There is not a particular version of this system that they think can be successful.

Lastly, Mudde and Kaltwasser are of opinion that the elites are often not just seen as *representing* foreign power, they are considered to *be* foreign themselves. In South Africa white people are viewed to be foreign by the EFF (as we have seen earlier), but in this regard, reference is not made to black people who are grouped with the elite. The black elite might not be seen as “real” black people (as seen previously concerning Ramaphosa), but they are still considered citizens of the country.

7.1.2 Barr (“outsider” versus “maverick”)

In chapter four it was also shown how one does not need to originate from outside the establishment to be considered anti-establishment. An “outsider”, as Barr states it, is someone who is truly independent and has entered the arena as an alternative to the establishment; and a “maverick” was previously in the nucleus of the establishment but has since broken away. Malema and other EFF leaders originated from within the establishment ANC, thus making them mavericks.

7.1.3 Barr (crisis of representation)

As mentioned in chapter four, Laclau argues established systems often break down when there’s a “crisis of representation” – ultimately a significant number of citizens lose their trust in the establishment and are available to be swept up by populist parties and movements. There are several reasons why the linkage between voters and an established party would break down (as discussed in the previous chapter), but one is of particular relevance to the South African context: representational linkage.

It was argued that representational linkage (the notion that government is performing well and representing you as a citizen), has broken down to such an extent that it is perhaps one of the core reasons why support has been shifting to a populist party such as the EFF. As mentioned

before performance failures on the part of the establishment is a key factor in migrating support towards populist parties.

There were several “crises of representation” that led to the breaking down of the representational linkage:

- a decline in support for the ANC;
- the firing of the respected Finance Minister Nene;
- Zuma’s homestead in Nkandla;
- the corruption charges against Zuma;
- the Marikana massacre; and
- service delivery protests flaring up countrywide.

7.1.4 Hartleb

In chapter four it was shown how the EFF is the only party that is populist in its *nature* and not just certain *aspects* of it. It is therefore the only party that applies anti-establishment sentiments at the core of its political framework and not isolated applications of some characteristics of an anti-establishment party. Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party were used and applied to the EFF in the local context.

The first key-finding is, as an anti-establishment party, the EFF constructs “the people” as black South Africans who are homogenous and a front-line against the political, cultural, and economic elites (ANC, “white monopoly capital”).

Secondly, the EFF positions itself as an underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like “the people” are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media). This relates to the so-called “silent majority” whose input is stifled by the establishment. The ANC, the media, and other sectors of “the elite” are pitted against the EFF.

The EFF also claims to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable ANC establishment). They are unapologetic about not being “proper” like the “white, colonialist decorum” that is expected of political parties.

Furthermore, as an anti-establishment party, the simplification or trivialisation of more complex issues is also characteristic of the EFF.

The anti-establishment EFF also has an image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues. They don't play by the rules and even encourage their supporters to break the law (land grabs for instance).

Lastly, the EFF often show aggression towards political adversaries ("the establishment uses consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective"). Many examples of the EFF portraying violence against the establishment were provided in chapter four and is indicative of the aggression towards political adversaries.

7.1.5 A coherent anti-establishment theory

In chapter four anti-establishment theory was discussed in relation to the local context. As can be seen from the aforementioned discussion, several theorists (Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr, and Hartleb) were incorporated. Subsequently, this dissertation aims to form a coherent anti-establishment framework when discussing a populist party. This can be utilised in future research. The outline below is not new per se as it builds on the work of previous theorists, but it does provide a coherent framework, something that is missing from the current literature.

Populism is a complex phenomenon and anti-establishment is a strong supply-side argument for the presence of it. The process that can essentially be followed to discuss the anti-establishment sentiment include:

1. Identify the role players
2. Apply the ideational approach
3. Identify the crises of the establishment
4. Illustrated how the populist party exploit the crises

Each of these steps will subsequently be discussed to form a coherent theoretical perspective.

7.1.5.1 Identify role players

Firstly, it might be apt to identify the role players when looking at anti-establishment as a supply-side argument for the presence of populism. The two central questions one should ask, are:

- i. Who is the populist party?
- ii. Who is the establishment?

Determining the populist party is no easy task, but Mudde and Kaltwasser's definition can be used as a guideline. A party that promotes this definition of populism, is likely to be a populist party.

*A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.⁴¹⁵*

What would constitute the establishment is no easy task. As we have seen, the establishment is not simply the governing party – in fact, it might not be the governing party at all. Mudde and Kaltwasser's characteristics of the elite can be applied here:

1. The elite's power is for their own benefit
2. The elite are not real politicians
3. The elite is part of the faulty system
4. The elite is foreign

It is important to note that the establishment is not simply those within the political establishment, but also those in the cultural, economic, and media establishment.

Lastly, Barr's definitions of an "outsider" and "maverick" should be applied to determine the perspective of the populist party:

⁴¹⁵ Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, 6.

1. *Outsider*: A populist leader who is completely independent of the establishment and is seen to have originated from outside the parameters of the establishment.
2. *Maverick*: A populist leader who has originated from within the establishment but has since turned against the establishment.

7.1.5.2 Apply the ideational approach

Now that the key elements (a populist party and the establishment) have been identified the central concepts of Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational approach must be applied. Pitting "the people" against "the elite" is an essential part of anti-establishment.

In this theoretical approach three interpretations of "the people" can be applied:

1. The people as sovereign
2. The people as a group that is forgotten
3. The people as a nation

These can then be juxtaposed to those belonging to the elite or establishment, as has been discussed before.

7.1.5.3 Identify the crises of the establishment

It's imperative to realise that populist parties are not simply anti-elitist: There's almost always a breakdown of linkages/bonds between the establishment and their supporters. The 5 linkages that Barr identifies are:

1. **Clientelistic linkages**: in the form of aid such as social grants
2. **Directive linkages**: such as selective benefits to targeted groups
3. **Participatory linkages**: providing a chance to be part of structures
4. **Electoral linkages**: rewards during an election time
5. **Representation linkages**: the extent to which voters feel they are adequately represented

A significant break-down in any of these linkages would constitute loss of support and an opportunity for a populist party to use in their anti-establishment stance. An analysis of each of these must thus be done to determine the extent of the crises.

7.1.5.4 Illustrated how the populist party exploit the crises

In conclusion, after the crises have been determined it can be illustrated how the populist party utilises and exploits the crises to ultimately position themselves as for “the people”, compared to the establishment that is against “the people”. Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party are particularly useful in this regard.

1. the construction of “the people” as homogenous and a front-line against the political, cultural and economic elites;
2. an image of being the so-called underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media);
3. a claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable establishment);
4. the simplification or trivialisation of issues that are often more complex than relates to the establishment;
5. often a claim to represent the “silent majority”, the people who input are stifled by the establishment;
6. the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues – “we are exactly the opposite of the establishment” notion; and
7. aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective”).

The abovementioned framework hopefully provides a new, coherent theory in identifying anti-establishment as a reason for the rise in populism.

7.2 Key insights: Economic inequality

The aim of chapter five was to ascertain whether supporters of populist parties (“the people”) are economically marginalised, compared to the “elites”. A detailed analysis was done of 21 EFF strongholds and 25 DA strongholds in terms of five economic indicators: income, race and inequality, unemployment, education, and resources. These indicators originated from Inglehart and Norris’s theory of economic inequality.

Overwhelmingly, all indicators show that supporters of the EFF are economically worse off than DA supporters. Supporters from EFF strongholds earn significantly less, they are mostly

black, face more unemployment, are less educated, and have fewer resources than mostly white DA supporters.

Concerning *income*, EFF supporters earn significantly less than DA supporters. Concerning the strongholds analysed during this research, almost 26% of the households in EFF strongholds earn R40 000 – R75 000 annually, whilst 21% of DA strongholds earn R300 000 – R600 000 annually. A further 18.1% of EFF households earn only R20 000 – R40 000 per year, whilst an average of 12% of DA households earn R600 000 – R1.2 million annually.

We have seen *race* also plays a big part. According to this research, the majority of EFF strongholds (98.3%) consist of black people and as seen in graph D the majority of DA strongholds (78.1%) consist of white people. The latter might be more diverse, but the polarity of the support base of the two parties is quite striking and noteworthy. Income is thus still unequal amongst different race groups.

Furthermore, *unemployment* is an important driver of economic inequality. Black people are disproportionately disadvantaged and comparing EFF and DA strongholds, this trend is discernible. The employment rates in DA wards are significantly higher than those of EFF wards. The average unemployment rate of an EFF stronghold is 21.13% and 3.5% for a DA stronghold.

Another important indicator is *education*. DA strongholds have significantly more university education, compared to the relatively low numbers in EFF wards. The average DA ward has 30.83% university-educated residents and the average EFF ward has 4.4% of university-educated residents. 11.32% of residents in DA strongholds do not have an education higher than grade 9 and 35.92% of residents in EFF strongholds do not have an education of grade 9 or higher.

Lastly, material *resources* such as housing, transport, water and sanitation, and internet access are important indicators of inequality. There is virtually nobody in DA strongholds who live in informal settlements, compared to very scattered results for EFF strongholds. The average for EFF wards is 30.733% and 0.496% for DA wards. Similarly, DA strongholds own more houses (either fully paid or in the process of being paid off). An average of 62.42% of DA wards in this study own houses, compared to an average of 27.41% of residents in EFF wards. Lastly,

in this research, an average of 87.62% of residents of DA strongholds own a motor vehicle, whilst only 17.25% of residents of EFF strongholds own a motor vehicle.

These economic differences between the two parties are prodigious and indicative of the economic inequality between support for a populist party and the economic “elite”. It’s not surprising that economic inequality is perhaps the most widely held reason for the support of populism and the thesis can indeed be applied to our local context. Not only do EFF supporters experience severe economic hardships, but the contrast with white DA supporters is striking. The latter is by far more economically prosperous and conjures up the “haves” versus the “have-nots”.

7.3 Key insights: Cultural backlash

The cultural backlash theory essentially explains the socio-psychological phenomenon of regression of values and erosion of cultural identity. In chapter six it was shown how a cultural backlash is present in the local context and is manifesting itself as a hostile or intolerant attitude toward ethnic minorities or foreigners (in the form of open racism and xenophobia respectively), and anxiety, and perhaps even anger, that the dominant culture of the minority is suppressing the culture of “the people”.

These phenomena are aimed at the minority groups (white people, Indian South Africans and foreigners) who are portrayed as “they” – their cultures and even presence is not included in the conception of a South African identity. Instead of building the dominance of the “forgotten” black culture (and thus decreasing the prominence of the minority cultures), the very *presence* of the minority cultures is seen as a threat to “our” way of life. It is because of these cultures – that the majority is not advancing economically, socially, and culturally.

Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris’s theory provided an analysis of the demographics of the group who usually experiences a cultural backlash. These indicators were adopted for the local context.

7.3.1 Demographics

EFF supporters who experience the cultural backlash are generally young, black men who are less educated. Considering the age and race inversions, the South African scenario follows the

international theoretical context of the demographics of the populist supporters experiencing a cultural value change.

7.3.2 Hostility towards minorities

Inglehart and Norris showed that hostility is often felt towards racial minorities and this manifests itself as open racism and xenophobia, according to Betz.

7.3.2.1 Open racism

The evidence presented in chapter six found that there is evidence of Betz's concept of "open racism"⁴¹⁶ against minorities – especially white and Indian people. Several of the opinions expressed by EFF supporters go beyond the notion of a "hostile or intolerant attitude" – calling for the killing of white South Africans (explicitly expressed in many of the media articles and comments) is indeed open racism bordering on hatred for this racial group. Some sentiment eluded to white people not "belonging" in South Africa and being "evil" with "no credibility as humans".

7.3.2.2 Xenophobia

Xenophobia is present amongst an array of supporters from the EFF. This is indicative of the cultural backlash thesis as a manifestation of hostile or intolerant attitudes towards migrants. Together with the research on open racism, it would be fair to suggest that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the first manifestation of the cultural backlash is indeed present in our local context.

7.3.3 Anxiety against the dominant culture

It is also evident that especially EFF supporters experience anxiety that the dominant, minority culture is eroding the majority culture. There is clearly a frustration of a foreign culture and a yearning to write "our own history". True to the cultural backlash thesis, some comments portray racial minorities as foreigners – reiterating the "us" versus "them" narrative.

7.4 Analysis: Tying it all together

It's imperative to understand that these three causes – anti-establishment, economic inequality, and the cultural backlash – do not function within a vacuum with each silo having a different

⁴¹⁶ Hans-Heorg Betz, *Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe*, 40.

outcome. Instead, an amalgamation of the three causes examined in this research creates a fertile breeding ground for the rise of populism.

A citizen might incorporate the cultural backlash in his or her own decision making, rhetoric, and practices, but their comfortable middle-class existence (and thus economically being much closer to the economic elite), might not convince them (whether consciously or unconsciously) to vote for a populist party such as the EFF. Likewise, a poor South African might be won over by an anti-establishment argument and the presence of these two factors (economic inequality and anti-establishment) might be enough to sway his support to a populist party such as the EFF.

Populism is indeed a complex phenomenon and it would trivialise the research from many respected analysts if one were to provide a universal approach. The best argument one could potentially make is that:

1. The more economically marginalised South Africans feel, the more they are *likely* to support the EFF.
2. The stronger the presence of a cultural backlash with the feelings of resentment and anxiety, the more *susceptible* a citizen is to the populist rhetoric of the EFF.

Each setting will thus unfold differently. Just like there is no infallible profile of someone who will support fascism or socialism, there is no uncontested profile of *all* the supporters of a populist party. At best one can allude to a *typical* supporter of an ideology. Whilst there will always be individuals and groups who, for a platitude of reasons, do not fall into the typical profile, it is fair to deduct that the majority of supporters will suit the profile.

7.4.1 Key findings

The anti-establishment stance of a populist party such as the EFF should be closely monitored. It has been shown that they are not simply criticising the government but is anti-establishment in their stance. Like in so many contexts across the globe, the establishment is presented as “the elite”, that’s essentially “evil” and not on the side of “the people”. Political parties should take more care with their rhetoric and actions – in no society is it healthy to present the government (and its extensions such as the media and parastatals) as “the other”. The ANC has

experienced many crises and there is legitimate cause for concern but pitting “the people” against them in an attempt to create “the other” is a vivid sign of populism.

One of the key deductions that can be made from this research is to focus on demand-side factors in society. Populism can only thrive if society is susceptible to populist rhetoric, policies, and tendencies from political parties.

Economic inequality is also deeply concerning in our society and the rise of populism will probably not dissipate until the inequalities are addressed. The difference in economic wealth and resources between some black and white South Africans is striking and the divide is more than simply materialistic: It inherently drives a cultural separation that is proving to be very strong. It’s not difficult to understand the frustrations felt by many South Africans turning towards populism. The ANC government has been in power for more than 20 years and the representational linkage between it and the voters has broken down significantly. Turning towards the “alternative” who does not “fit the system” and is a “taboo breaker” can be seen as a desperate attempt to gain relevance and to improve your economic wellbeing.

Open racism towards minorities has become toxic and should be addressed. Too often it is disguised under the “transformation” umbrella (correcting the injustices of apartheid and colonialism), but as we have seen from the current research, these ethnic minorities are often seen as *foreigners* in South Africa. Apartheid and colonialism have led to grave injustices and there is legitimate cause to address these injustices. However, as a society, we should recognise the legitimate transformation attempts from the attempts to ostracize racial minorities.

The cultural backlash is particularly strong in the local context with not only racial minorities in South Africa being seen as “the other” but also foreigners. In a democracy, the rights of minorities are protected, and populism can be seen as a danger to these rights.

7.5 Research aims

In chapter one the hypothesis of this research was set out as:

Populism in on the rise pertaining to the EFF, mainly because of an anti-establishment stance, economic inequality amongst supporters, and a cultural backlash that is present in society. These reasons were present in the years 2013-2018.

This hypothesis is testable because it can indeed be seen if these factors are present in the context of the EFF (both internally and externally). These reasons are not foreign to the existing research (thus testable) and are not concepts that can't be examined. The hypothesis is also falsifiable: One can, for instance, indicate that the supporters of the EFF are not economically worse off than the elite if the indicators point out there is no economic inequality. Lastly, this hypothesis identifies the variables that can be measured: anti-establishment, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash.

Following the preceding discussion, it is clear that the hypothesis was proven to be valid. This was a theoretical case study to affirm the presence of these three phenomena and subsequently, the method was successful in validating the hypothesis and answering the central research question:

Why is populism on the rise in the form of the EFF for the years 2013-2018?

Answers to the secondary questions that were also provided:

1. *How prominent is opposing the ruling party a factor in the rise of populism within the EFF?* It was shown extensively in this dissertation that there is indeed a strong anti-establishment stance within the EFF.
2. *Are there conditions in society – specifically the economic circumstances of supporters and hostile attitude and anxiety towards minorities – that can lead to support for the populist EFF?* Economic inequalities and a cultural backlash are emanating from within the society and it leads to support for the populist EFF. This argument was made extensively in this and previous chapters.

7.6 Contribution to the current literature

In the first chapter, three observations regarding the current literature on populism in South Africa were made and discussed, to address these shortcomings. During each of the themes (anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash) it was shown how the particular chapter addressed these observations, and as a precis, this is how this research as a whole addressed the observations and subsequently contributed to the literature:

Observation 1: The current research lacks relevant international context

The current research doesn't account for the complexities of the local context and how parallels can be drawn between different international theories and the South African situation. Most arguments exist in a vacuum. With the exception of brief mentions of the work from international scholars, local theorists attempt to analyse the manifestation of populism as a phenomenon that is almost unique to our context. There is very little attempt to apply international theory, creating the impression that South African conceptions about populism is unique and voided from the global context.

The dissertation argued that populism in South African not only *follows* international trends, but theories of populism can indeed be *applied* to the local context. Theoretical concepts of anti-establishment, economic inequalities and a cultural backlash can be used as a map to analyse the local context. In chapter two and four, it was shown how the ideational approach fit the local context with Mudde and Kaltwasser's definition and the expansion thereof applying to the South African context. Barr's concepts of "outsider" versus "maverick" were applied, together with reasons why there is a crisis of representation; with reasons why the ANC's linkage to the voters have broken down were cited. Lastly, Hartleb's characteristics of an anti-establishment party were discussed and applied to the EFF.

In chapter five, theory from Inglehart and Norris were applied to the local context to show that economic inequality is indeed present in the SA situation. The general voter profiles and a micro ward breakdown of EFF strongholds were done in terms of 5 key indicators to show that populist supporters are part of the "have nots", compared to the elite establishment who are the "haves".

In chapter six, Inglehart and Norris's cultural backlash theory was applied to supporters of the EFF. This chapter showed that open racism and xenophobia are indicative of a hostile attitude towards racial minorities and that supporters of the populist EFF experience and anxiety towards the pervasive culture.

The international theories concerning the reasons for populism thus proved to be useful and this dissertation considered populism in South Africa in more holistic terms than any of the current research.

Observation 2: The current research has a limited theoretical orientation

The vast majority of the current research focusses on supply-side arguments to explain populism within the South African context, but this is by no means a full account of the causes of the phenomenon. With the exceptions of brief mentions, none of the South African research acknowledges the demand-side factors, especially that of economic inequality and a cultural backlash.

Populism is found in societies across the political spectrum, even without the presence of a populist leader. This dissertation showed in chapters five and six that demand-side factors are not only relevant but essential in understanding populism in South Africa. Economic inequality and a cultural backlash are two of the most prominent causes of populism worldwide and this dissertation illustrated its relevance in our context.

Observation 3: The research fails to recognise, integrate and discuss relevant factors

It has already been established that the current research is selective in its approach and there are several neglected areas that this dissertation delved into, one being the cultural backlash in society (chapter six). This is a key aspect of several international theories and it is virtually non-existent in local research.

Ample research exists on xenophobia and racism, but chapter six took it a step further. It illustrated how these concepts and phenomena can't be studied in isolation but are symptomatic and causally *linked* to the rise of populism within the political opposition. Similarly, none of the current theorists explicitly linked economic inequalities to populism – as was done in chapter five. This research recognised and integrated these factors in international theory and applied it to the local context.

7.6.1 Addition to research: Anti-establishment theory

Previously, in this chapter, it was indicated what a coherent anti-establishment theory would potentially look like. Whilst this still needs refinement, this dissertation adds to the current literature by providing a coherent theory of anti-establishment. None of the current local or international research has presented the theory of anti-establishment in a coherent fashion that can be a blueprint for a local context.

Indeed, this framework consists of the work of many theorists, but alone they only address a *part* of the anti-establishment stance. This current dissertation wanted a more holistic picture and saw the potential to amalgamate different theories. Future research can dissect this framework even more and can advance our understanding of anti-establishment.

7.7 Future research

There is little question that more in-depth research about populism in South Africa is needed. Substantial focus should be placed on demand-side factors, specifically the cultural backlash. There is an opportunity to examine *how* this backlash starts and how it manifests itself on a personal level. Structured interviews with a representative sample would be of immense value.

An important follow-up study would also look at how the EFF is dominating the narrative and policy of the ruling ANC. In what way is the EFF “forcing” ANC to become more populist? How big of danger is it if a substantial number of ANC voters have populist tendencies and attitudes?


The meso and micro contexts also require analysis and these spheres are often neglected, not just in the local context, but also in the bigger international context. What contribution do organisations such as the church and community centres play in fostering populist support? Also, what individual personality type would typically support a populist party, and what would contribute toward such support?

One can also look at the impact of populism on our democracy. In the introduction to this research, it was shown that populism is inevitably a danger to democracy and a study of the local context would shed light on this aspect. Is populism hurting our democracy and, if so, in what way?

Addendum A: EFF strongholds

Ward 26 in Madibeng Local Municipality (North West)⁴¹⁷


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R29 400
Employed	51.8%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	86%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	48%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	16.7%	31.86%
University education	0%	4%
School-aged children in school	65.9%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	83.5%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	22%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	93%	86%
Computer	2%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	77.9%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	13.1%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	3.9%	48.09%
Access to the internet	11.7%	26.6%



⁴¹⁷ Madibeng ward 26, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63702026-madibeng-ward-26-63702026/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 32 in Madibeng Local Municipality (North West)⁴¹⁸


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R29 400
Employed	54.5%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	91%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	64.2%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	32%	31.86%
University education	2%	4%
School-aged children in school	88%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	37%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	28.9%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	90%	86%
Computer	6%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	84.7%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	15.1%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	16%	48.09%
Access to the internet	23%	26.6%



⁴¹⁸ Madibeng ward 32, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63702032-madibeng-ward-32-63702032/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 45 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴¹⁹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R29 400
Employed	38.4%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	77%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	43.3%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	21.6%	31.86%
University education	0%	4%
School-aged children in school	80.8%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	37.5%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	16%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	93%	86%
Computer	7%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	85%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	57.7%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	84.3%	48.09%
Access to the internet	30.1%	26.6%



⁴¹⁹ Rustenburg ward 45, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703045-rustenburg-ward-45-63703045/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 2 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²⁰


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R29 400
Employed	47.8%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	85%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	62.9%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	30.9%	31.86%
University education	1%	4%
School-aged children in school	91.6%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	29.2%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	37.5%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	86%
Computer	9%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	91.3%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	8.9%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	95.9%	48.09%
Access to the internet	29%	26.6%



⁴²⁰ Rustenburg ward 2, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703002-rustenburg-ward-2-63703002/#service_delivery (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 3 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²¹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R29 400
Employed	48.3%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	83%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	47.8%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	24.8%	31.86%
University education	1%	4%
School-aged children in school	88.6%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	11.8%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	16.4%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	92%	86%
Computer	7%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	81%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	13.3%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.3%	48.09%
Access to the internet	16.6%	26.6%



⁴²¹ Rustenburg ward 3, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703003-rustenburg-ward-3-63703003/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 24 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²²


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R29 400
Employed	39.6%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	92%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	40.6%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	15.4%	31.86%
University education	0%	4%
School-aged children in school	77.4%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	42%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	4.4%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	94%	86%
Computer	2%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	70.1%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	81.9%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	66.7%	48.09%
Access to the internet	23.5%	26.6%



⁴²² Rustenburg ward 24, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703024-rustenburg-ward-24-63703024/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 28 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²³


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R14 600	R29 400
Employed	28.5%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	68%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	56.6%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	29.4%	31.86%
University education	1%	4%
School-aged children in school	90.9%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	28.9%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	11%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	91%	86%
Computer	11%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	93.6%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	32.2%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.1%	48.09%
Access to the internet	22.6%	26.6%



⁴²³ Rustenburg ward 28, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703028-rustenburg-ward-28-63703028/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 31 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²⁴


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R29 400
Employed	54.7%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	80%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	53%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	19.3%	31.86%
University education	0%	4%
School-aged children in school	80.6%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	48.6%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	17.1%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	89%	86%
Computer	3%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	63.6%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	30.2%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	16.1%	48.09%
Access to the internet	12.1%	26.6%



⁴²⁴ Rustenburg ward 31, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703031-rustenburg-ward-31-63703031/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 32 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²⁵

Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R29 400
Employed	59.6%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	82%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	63.8%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	33%	31.86%
University education	3%	4%
School-aged children in school	86.1%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	29.7%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	17.4%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	93%	86%
Computer	12%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	63.8%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	73.7%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	61.1%	48.09%
Access to the internet	23%	26.6%



⁴²⁵ Rustenburg ward 32, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703032-rustenburg-ward-32-63703032/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 37 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²⁶


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R29 400
Employed	48.6%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	76%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	60.5%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	26.4%	31.86%
University education	1%	4%
School-aged children in school	75.6%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	32.3%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	14.8%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	90%	86%
Computer	5%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	95.2%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	78.2%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	58.9%	48.09%
Access to the internet	17.5%	26.6%



⁴²⁶ Rustenburg ward 37, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703037-rustenburg-ward-37-63703037/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 38 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)⁴²⁷


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R29 400
Employed	57.3%	37.12%
Formal sector workers	83%	68%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	39.5%	56.94%
Completed matric or higher	7.9%	31.86%
University education	0%	4%
School-aged children in school	61.5%	89.22%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	98.3%	20.5%
Household fully owned or paid off	11.4%	50.7%
Resources		
Cell phone	83%	86%
Computer	0%	14%
Water from a regional or local service provider	0.4%	73.63%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	0.5%	46.16%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	5%	48.09%
Access to the internet	15.4%	26.6%



⁴²⁷ Rustenburg ward 38, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703038-rustenburg-ward-38-63703038/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 13 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴²⁸


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R14 600
Employed	40.8%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	75%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	72.6%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	48.9%	30.93%
University education	8%	6%
School-aged children in school	88.4%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	2.7%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	60.8%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	94%	88%
Computer	20%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.7%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.3%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.8%	19.86%
Access to the internet	48.9%	24.53%



⁴²⁸ Polokwane ward 13, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504013-polokwane-ward-13-93504013/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 10 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴²⁹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R14 600	R14 600
Employed	34%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	67%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	70.3%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	35.5%	30.93%
University education	3%	6%
School-aged children in school	96.3%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	20.7%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	30%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	92%	88%
Computer	10%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	49.4%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	2.8%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	0.6%	19.86%
Access to the internet	20.4%	24.53%



⁴²⁹ Polokwane ward 10, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504010-polokwane-ward-10-93504010/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 11 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴³⁰


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R14 600
Employed	47.2%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	73%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	85.7%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	58.1%	30.93%
University education	12%	6%
School-aged children in school	97.1%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	10.1%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	52.8%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	97%	88%
Computer	25%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.8%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	86.2%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.9%	19.86%
Access to the internet	47.4%	24.53%



⁴³⁰ Polokwane ward 11, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504011-polokwane-ward-11-93504011> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 12 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴³¹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R57 300	R14 600
Employed	49%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	81%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	86.7%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	68.9%	30.93%
University education	24%	6%
School-aged children in school	97.9%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	1.8%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	65.8%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	88%
Computer	42%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	96.1%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.5%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.7%	19.86%
Access to the internet	51.6%	24.53%



⁴³¹ Polokwane ward 12, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504012-polokwane-ward-12-93504012> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 17 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴³²


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R14 600
Employed	44.6%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	71%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	83%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	60.2%	30.93%
University education	17%	6%
School-aged children in school	95.5%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	7.9%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	57.6%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	88%
Computer	30%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.2%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	91.4%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	94.5%	19.86%
Access to the internet	42.4%	24.53%



⁴³² Polokwane ward 17, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504017-polokwane-ward-17-93504017/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 25 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴³³


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R14 600
Employed	35.7%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	73%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	82.2%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	62.2%	30.93%
University education	18%	6%
School-aged children in school	95.8%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	5.8%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	50.6%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	88%
Computer	28%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.8%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	85.2%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	94%	19.86%
Access to the internet	51.7%	24.53%



⁴³³ Polokwane ward 25, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504025-polokwane-ward-25-93504025> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 26 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)⁴³⁴


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R2 400	R14 600
Employed	15%	27.41%
Formal sector workers	88%	66%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	49.6%	59.37%
Completed matric or higher	43.7%	30.93%
University education	10%	6%
School-aged children in school	96.6%	94.53%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.8%	5.09%
Household fully owned or paid off	11.6%	56.49%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	88%
Computer	42%	12%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.2%	62.89%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.3%	23.04%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	99.4%	19.86%
Access to the internet	81.2%	24.53%



⁴³⁴ Polokwane ward 26, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504026-polokwane-ward-26-93504026/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 3 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng)⁴³⁵


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R29 400
Employed	49%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	80.7%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	46.7%	50.82%
University education	1%	11%
School-aged children in school	86.9%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	54%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	16.2%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	93%
Computer	8%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	95%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	80.5%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	90.6%	89.9%
Access to the internet	25.8%	45.97%



⁴³⁵ Ekurhuleni ward 3, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700003-ekurhuleni-ward-3-79700003/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 100 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng)⁴³⁶


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R14 600	R29 400
Employed	47%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	86%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	76.8%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	43.3%	50.82%
University education	3%	11%
School-aged children in school	90.8%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	5.7%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	12.6%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	88%	93%
Computer	6%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	92.3%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	84.2%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	87.8%	89.9%
Access to the internet	23.1%	45.97%



⁴³⁶ Ekurhuleni ward 100, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700010-ekurhuleni-ward-10-79700010/> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Ward 102 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng)⁴³⁷

Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R14 600	R29 400
Employed	48.4%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	76%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	77.9%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	42.2%	50.82%
University education	1%	11%
School-aged children in school	86.3%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	57.1%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	20.7%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	93%	93%
Computer	6%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	91.7%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	70.5%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	73.3%	89.9%
Access to the internet	23.3%	45.97%




⁴³⁷ Ekurhuleni ward 102, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700102-ekurhuleni-ward-102-79700102> (accessed 19 November 2018).

Addendum B: DA strongholds

Ward 5 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)⁴³⁸


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	60.8%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	85%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	82.2%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	62.2%	40.79%
University education	17%	7%
School-aged children in school	93.3%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.2%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	75.3%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	94%	88%
Computer	73%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.1%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.8%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.7%	90.59%
Access to the internet	75.2%	43.45%



⁴³⁸ City of Cape Town ward 5, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100005-city-of-cape-town-ward-5-19100005/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 21 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)⁴³⁹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	71.1%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	86%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	94%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	95.4%	40.79%
University education	41%	7%
School-aged children in school	93.3%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.4%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	69.1%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	97%	88%
Computer	84%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.7%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	99.1%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.9%	90.59%
Access to the internet	80.7%	43.45%



⁴³⁹ City of Cape Town ward 21, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100021-city-of-cape-town-ward-21-19100021/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 70 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)⁴⁴⁰


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R461 000	R29 400
Employed	70.6%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	90%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	91.7%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	85.1%	40.79%
University education	48%	7%
School-aged children in school	92.4%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.4%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	67.3%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	97%	88%
Computer	84%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	95.9%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.6%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.5%	90.59%
Access to the internet	82.2%	43.45%



⁴⁴⁰ City of Cape Town ward 70, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100070-city-of-cape-town-ward-70-19100070/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 103 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)⁴⁴¹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	76.8%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	86%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	93.8%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	79.3%	40.79%
University education	24%	7%
School-aged children in school	88.8%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.9%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	57.9%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	97%	88%
Computer	75%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.6%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.2%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	99%	90.59%
Access to the internet	77.3%	43.45%



⁴⁴¹ City of Cape Town ward 103, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100103-city-of-cape-town-ward-103-19100103/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 4 in Drakenstein Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴²


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R115 100	R29 400
Employed	59.2%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	82%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	85%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	75%	40.79%
University education	33%	7%
School-aged children in school	52.7%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.3%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	45.3%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	89%	88%
Computer	65%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.1%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.7%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.9%	90.59%
Access to the internet	67.7%	43.45%



⁴⁴² Drakenstein ward 4, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10203004-drakenstein-ward-4-10203004/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 15 in Drakenstein Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴³


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	70.2%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	76%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	91.9%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	80.3%	40.79%
University education	34%	7%
School-aged children in school	90.4%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.4%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	57.4%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	88%
Computer	73%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	95.7%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	96.5%	90.59%
Access to the internet	65.4%	43.45%



⁴⁴³ Drakenstein ward 15, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10203015-drakenstein-ward-15-10203015/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 7 in Stellenbosch Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴⁴


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R29 400	R29 400
Employed	42.6%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	86%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	89.8%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	87.5%	40.79%
University education	54%	7%
School-aged children in school	77.1%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.2%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	34.8%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	98%	88%
Computer	90%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98.8%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	99.1%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	99.6%	90.59%
Access to the internet	87.2%	43.45%



⁴⁴⁴ Stellenbosch ward 7, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10204007-stellenbosch-ward-7-10204007/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 22 in Stellenbosch Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴⁵


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	59.1%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	80%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	86%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	79.1%	40.79%
University education	54%	7%
School-aged children in school	90.9%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	1.8%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	65.1%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	88%
Computer	81%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	94%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.8%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	86.4%	90.59%
Access to the internet	82.2%	43.45%



⁴⁴⁵ Stellenbosch ward 22, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10204022-stellenbosch-ward-22-10204022/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 3 in Overstrand Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴⁶

Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	47.3%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	82%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	76.4%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	69%	40.79%
University education	33%	7%
School-aged children in school	91.2%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.1%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	64.9%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	92%	88%
Computer	74%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	93.3%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	99%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	93.7%	90.59%
Access to the internet	73.2%	43.45%



⁴⁴⁶ Overstrand ward 3, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10302003-overstrand-ward-3-10302003/> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 7 in Overstrand Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴⁷


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R115 100	R29 400
Employed	62.1%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	82%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	89.4%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	72.1%	40.79%
University education	18%	7%
School-aged children in school	91.9%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.1%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	59.6%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	92%	88%
Computer	66%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	93.8%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	95.3%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	94%	90.59%
Access to the internet	63.8%	43.45%



⁴⁴⁷ Overstrand ward 7, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10302007-overstrand-ward-7-10302007> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 13 in Overstrand Local Municipality (Western Cape)⁴⁴⁸


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R115 100	R29 400
Employed	57.7%	50.06%
Formal sector workers	80%	78%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	90%	69.5%
Completed matric or higher	78.1%	40.79%
University education	35%	7%
School-aged children in school	87.6%	87.2%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.7%	17.43%
Household fully owned or paid off	64.7%	50.29%
Resources		
Cell phone	90%	88%
Computer	68%	33%
Water from a regional or local service provider	92.5%	91.15%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	93.1%	89.58%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	92.9%	90.59%
Access to the internet	68.6%	43.45%



⁴⁴⁸ Overstrand ward 13, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10302013-overstrand-ward-13-10302013> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 44 in the City of Tshwane (Gauteng)⁴⁴⁹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	74.8%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	91.2%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	83.8%	50.82%
University education	46%	11%
School-aged children in school	95.3%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.4%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	61.7%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	93%
Computer	74%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	95.8%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.3%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.1%	89.9%
Access to the internet	77.8%	45.97%



⁴⁴⁹ City of Tshwane ward 44, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79900044-city-of-tshwane-ward-44-79900044/> (accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 69 in the City of Tshwane (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁰


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R461 000	R29 400
Employed	77.2%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	83%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	93.1%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	84.6%	50.82%
University education	41%	11%
School-aged children in school	95.4%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.6%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	64.4%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	93%
Computer	74%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.9%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.3%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.3%	89.9%
Access to the internet	78.9%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁰ City of Tshwane ward 69, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79900069-city-of-tshwane-ward-69-79900069> (Accessed on 21 November 2018).

Ward 82 in the City of Tshwane (Gauteng)⁴⁵¹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	55.8%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	77.6%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	72.3%	50.82%
University education	45%	11%
School-aged children in school	84.9%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.3%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	49.2%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	97%	93%
Computer	75%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.3%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.7%	89.9%
Access to the internet	76.2%	45.97%



⁴⁵¹ City of Tshwane ward 82, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79900082-city-of-tshwane-ward-82-79900082> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 83 in the City of Johannesburg (Gauteng)⁴⁵²


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	73.6%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	91.7%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	76.7%	50.82%
University education	29%	11%
School-aged children in school	92.8%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.4%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	66.9%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	94%	93%
Computer	69%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.3%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.7%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.2%	89.9%
Access to the internet	67.2%	45.97%



⁴⁵² City of Johannesburg ward 83, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79800083-city-of-johannesburg-ward-83-79800083> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 126 in the City of Johannesburg (Gauteng)⁴⁵³


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	79.5%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	82%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	92.6%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	80.3%	50.82%
University education	34%	11%
School-aged children in school	92.9%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	1.4%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	64.4%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	93%
Computer	76%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	96.2%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.5%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.7%	89.9%
Access to the internet	80.3%	45.97%



⁴⁵³ City of Johannesburg ward 126, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79800126-city-of-johannesburg-ward-126-79800126> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 18 in Mogale City Local Municipality (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁴


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	69.5%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	91.1%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	74.1%	50.82%
University education	22%	11%
School-aged children in school	85%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.3%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	60.2	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	93%
Computer	64%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	96.8%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.7%	89.9%
Access to the internet	69.1%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁴ Mogale City ward 18, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74801018-mogale-city-ward-18-74801018> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 21 in Mogale City Local Municipality (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁵


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	63.3%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	78%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	77.5%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	65.7%	50.82%
University education	23%	11%
School-aged children in school	94%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.4%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	64.2%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	94%	93%
Computer	65%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	98%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.3%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	98.5%	89.9%
Access to the internet	70.4%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁵ Mogale City ward 21 Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74801021-mogale-city-ward-21-74801021> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 2 in Midvaal Local Municipality (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁶


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	67.3%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	84%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	88.4%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	69.3%	50.82%
University education	22%	11%
School-aged children in school	93.7%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.7%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	67.3%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	93%
Computer	60%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	83.9%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	94.7%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	96.7%	89.9%
Access to the internet	61.4%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁶ Midvaal ward 2, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74202002-midvaal-ward-2-74202002> (Accessed on 21 November 2018).

Ward 3 in Midvaal Local Municipality (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁷


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R115 100	R29 400
Employed	60.7%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	89%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	89.7%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	60.2%	50.82%
University education	11%	11%
School-aged children in school	87.7%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.5%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	57.9%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	94%	93%
Computer	52%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	96%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	95.4%	89.9%
Access to the internet	52.2%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁷ Midvaal ward 3, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74202003-midvaal-ward-3-74202003> (Accessed on 21 November 2018).

Ward 14 in Midvaal Local Municipality (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁸


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	68.1%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	82%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	93.1%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	70.8%	50.82%
University education	19%	11%
School-aged children in school	94.8%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.3%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	65.9%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	93%
Computer	64%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.2%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.7%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.9%	89.9%
Access to the internet	67.3%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁸ Midvaal ward 14, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74202014-midvaal-ward-14-74202014> (Accessed on 21 November 2018).

Ward 18 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)⁴⁵⁹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	75.5%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	90.7%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	77.8%	50.82%
University education	28%	11%
School-aged children in school	92.2%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.3%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	59.8%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	93%
Computer	71%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.4%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	98.2%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.9%	89.9%
Access to the internet	77.8%	45.97%



⁴⁵⁹ Ekurhuleni ward 18, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700018-ekurhuleni-ward-18-79700018> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 19 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)⁴⁶⁰


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	73.3%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	79%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	89.9%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	76.2%	50.82%
University education	30%	11%
School-aged children in school	93.5%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.5%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	59.6%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	96%	93%
Computer	70%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	97.1%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.7%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	97.4%	89.9%
Access to the internet	76.3%	45.97%



⁴⁶⁰ Ekurhuleni ward 19, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700019-ekurhuleni-ward-19-79700019> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Ward 27 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)⁴⁶¹


Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	72.1%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	80%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	89.8%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	73.3%	50.82%
University education	25%	11%
School-aged children in school	92.6%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.2%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	67%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	93%
Computer	68%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	96.9%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.8%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	96.1%	89.9%
Access to the internet	72.5%	45.97%



⁴⁶¹ Ekurhuleni ward 27, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700027-ekurhuleni-ward-27-79700027> (Accessed on 21 November 2018).

Ward 28 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)⁴⁶²

Indicator	Info	Province
Income		
Annual household income	R230 700	R29 400
Employed	73.3%	50.59%
Formal sector workers	84%	77%
Education		
Completed grade 9 or higher	90.4%	77.27%
Completed matric or higher	76.9%	50.82%
University education	28%	11%
School-aged children in school	93.4%	90.35%
Housing		
Living in informal dwellings (shacks)	0.6%	17.77%
Household fully owned or paid off	65.5%	41.59%
Resources		
Cell phone	95%	93%
Computer	70%	30%
Water from a regional or local service provider	96.4%	93.52%
Access to flush or chemical toilets	97.4%	85.69%
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company	96.4%	89.9%
Access to the internet	74.6%	45.97%



⁴⁶² Ekurhuleni ward 28, Wazimap, <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700028-ekurhuleni-ward-28-79700028> (Accessed 21 November 2018).

Addendum C: Comments from supporter website

<http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/>

1. thamsanqa says:

July 30, 2013 at 10:04 am

Economic Freedom Fighters might actually be what black south Africans need. The question that remains to be seen is how is the organisation planning to address issues pertaining to land redistribution. how are they planning to ensure that south Africa is returned to the black man including wealth, land and other resources raging from agriculture to mining including manufacturing and technology. our land still belongs to the white man including its wealth and economy. What is the organisation political ideology...

2. henry Itaylor says:

August 9, 2014 at 1:03 am

I would say amen to your statement ALLY, that is what we call in America demonization, it is to make Malema look like the bad guy. try reading the history of these people, (whites) and you will get a better understanding of these Euros.

3. Andrew S Seleke says:

June 2, 2014 at 2:03 pm

As a foreigner as you'd just discribed yourselfie, why didn't you uses those foreign mind in your foreign_country, cause we Azanians/ZA we fully believes in him(Malema) and in what he says. Imorality and hatred is what your pinkskin(called 'emslves-whites)does to our people and economy. Ignorant is they devil deeds they've brought and enforced into our land. If you say Malema is nor different fro' your capitalist broers, why he've been expelt together with other fighters fro' your capitalists' favour policies of the anc – Stop coming with your Holandirism inhere, "this is Africa, for Africans, not for basterds!

4. Andrew S Seleke says:

June 2, 2014 at 2:04 pm

As a foreigner as you'd just discribed yourselfie, why didn't you uses those foreign mind in your foreign_country, cause we Azanians/ZA we fully believes in him(Malema) and in what he says. Imorality and hatred is what your pinkskin(called 'emslves-whites)does to our people and economy. Ignorant is they devil deeds they've brought and enforced into our land. If you say Malema is nor different fro' your capitalist broers, why he've been expelt together with other fighters fro' your capitalists' favour policies of the anc – Stop coming with your Holandirism inhere, "this is Africa, for Africans, not for basterds!
YES, I SAID SO!!!

5. Jeremia Maraba says:

June 5, 2014 at 3:53 pm

If you don't know wht to say just shut up, EFF if for sophisticated and educated people of this land. A person who claims to be educated but uninformed wil comend lk u do. Do you know how blacks are stil treated and undermined in corporate by whites. don't just commend to protect your stay in SA.

6. nu_sa says:

August 24, 2018 at 11:13 am

We are dreaming if we think we will get any land back. White privalge will always use thier connections to make sure it never happens.

Lodged this week in the High Court of Cape Town was a reply to the Eviction Application by the City of Cape Town to have a coloured man and his family of 5 evicted from their home in the nice 'white neighbourhood' of Devils Peak. It seems clear that the City are acting on behalf of his neighbour a Verwoerd. The City of Cape Town allege he built a house and didn't follow the proper process but his reply clearly shows he did and also shows how his Verwoerd neighbour has used her friends at the city of Cape Town to bring an application to have him evicted from her 'nice white area' using Taxpayers money.

So as much as I dream and the EFF talk of a day when we can really call this country our own, it won't happen in my lifetime because we are still being oppressed by Verwoerd long after the evil man himself is dead. His legacy is kept alive by his family. I know because I work for the family. They are POWERLESS to stop the still POWERFUL Verwoerds and the City of Cape Town. I was a DA voter but after this I am now EFF!

7. KALUSHI JOHANNES MOSEHLA says:

July 22, 2013 at 9:23 pm

i would like the EFF to help us as greater gauteng business forum in our fight to reclaim our economic rights. we want foreign nationals like ethiopians,somalis,pakistanis and bangladeshis to stop operating tuckshops and wholesales and return to refugee camps or home of origin and leave the wealth of RSA to south africans. fear not to contact us on 011 039 5163/084612 0600 to arrange a proper meeting.

8. ally says:

October 9, 2013 at 7:42 pm

Taylor,I think your opinion would add value to your people in your native land since you know better about righteousness.I never heard CIC Malema speaking a language of discrimination and self enrichment to the nation.Perhaps hearing aid could help you...Malema and EFF are not discriminative to anyone but he tells the truth which some of you doesn't wanna hear because you're benefiting from the corrupt monopolious governance of the ruling party. Truth need to be told that as much as you come here RSA to sneeze that kind of mucus of "I'm better than South Africans" I personally hate your tendency cos EFF is an antidote of the gashing wounds we suffered from those two crocodiles you consider government. One last thing we don't need your opinion keep it in your bag,pack it and go back to your native country to heal them because it looks more like you ran away from home or you were hired to open that big chimney of yours to insult our commander and the intire south africans for the benefit of your country men,agh sies uyanyanyisa.Viva EFF viva Malema Viva

9. lukhanyo Nqothole says:

December 29, 2013 at 11:56 pm

I hereby imploring you not to make suggestions without facts,most of EFF members are educated and not as you say it without substance.You are a foreiner i will advise you to keep your oppinions to yourself,because you are just enjoying this country for free and what are you contributing to our soceity.

Let me tell you Malema will be supported by many of us and those who want their stolen land back,so that we will try and reverse what colonisation and appartheid done to our land and nation.

You have no vision and lack knowledge ofd what we endure during those years,if South Africans or government don't change the way,they operate.South Africa would look the same as other african countries.Listern,See are you deaf and blind can't you hear the cries of the

masses.I think you should be ready to run because,we will not back down until justice is served.ALUTA!CONTINUA!

10. Lukhanyo Nqothole says:

November 4, 2013 at 11:31 pm

Fighters,youth and middle age come in all your masses let's rally with Malema and stop this monopoly syndrome none-sense vote EFF change is necessary and essential.It is imperative for us to decide for our future taking our land back from the hands of the FOWLERS.Zim has done it,so we can too and if we need to be hungry to get it so be it in any case we are in hunger nothing new but we can change that ma-Afrika join EFF or if you scared – you can be aswell a secrete voter for EFF and those who not scared like me lets parade with pride because we mean business and enough is enough(How long shall we struggle and be label in our own land).Viva!EFF!Viva!Phambili!Commissar Malema!Phambili!Lizaduduma lidlule-the bones of our fore fathers are shaking now seeing what they died for will materialise and those who are still dreaming of a banana country must forget or vanish and this shall come to pass, we the government in waiting is REALITY. Warning to the cowards or Softies NEVER STAND BEFORE THE WHEEL OF REVOLUTION(UNGAMI PHAMBI KWEVILI LOMZABALAZO AND ABABUKELI BASENGOZINI)Viva!.

11. Howard says:

August 25, 2014 at 1:46 pm

Reply to Mary: from Mr. S. Ebrahim. [Mary Blige [mary blige (bible@live.co.za)]]

E-mail of the 14th Dec 2008.

A response to your stupid accusations:

Mary, there is no other way that I may address you! If I do it in any other way, then it will be a grievous sinful act to address any offspring of the evil Christian invaders of my country. It is sad to state that there is no way that I could become part of the ignorant fools who were under duress, who had the audacity to make an agreement without my consent and let the invaders who murdered hundreds of thousands of indigenous people of my country, and raped our women, and stole our land and properties and are still today in possession of it, and made them illegally free from punishment they so badly deserve! That includes every European and British subjects that enjoys pleasure in the blood of my people, in my country! Then you have the audacity to tell me that you are a person who is 'someone who thinks' I regard it a righteous deed to inform my people of the contents of the evil book called the Bible. You must understand that it was Constantine who created the Bible so that his subjects will suppress all other peoples who do not follow his ideology as stated in his fabricated book. It is his followers who invaded my country to suppress my people.

12. howard says:

September 15, 2016 at 6:05 pm

We must get back our land! These europeans came to our country and stole the land, cattle and raped our women! They need to pay reparations!

They NEVER brought cattle and land to our beautiful country. They brought their corrupted bible and tricked us into accepting nonsense.

13. Bathandwa says:

September 2, 2018 at 10:03 pm

Fighters

I thought EFF would be dead by now but instead it grows by leaps and bounds. because of the fact that it breaks away from ANC like cope and others, but it is build on the strong

foundation. I used to be a PAC member I voted for the party in 2004, 2009 and in 2014 I voted DA, I would love to join EFF and vote for them come 2019. I live in Vredenburg. I support the land expropriation without compensation. I would return to my home town Mount Ayliff EC. I always hatred ANC with passion I new deep down that they are sell outs. Malema exposes them more clearly because he himself was raised and breed by the Got them party. The man speak my language, he remains me of the black consciousness leaders the likes of Steve Biko, Robert Mangaliso Sobukhwe. I would like to wear the red shirt and actively canvass for the real liberation
Viva Fighters VIVA
Inform me 078 189 2423

14. Mokgethi says:

June 6, 2018 at 7:46 am

There is a place in Northern Cape Province called ASKHAM. This place need EFF to come and put this white people here in their place. There is too much racism here. There are still place where black or coloured are not allowed to go to.
Please EFF we need you here.

15. Fred says:

February 23, 2018 at 11:41 am

Wow sir you are worst than a white racist ignorance is the Lord's biggest sin.

16. SalaGahle says:

August 27, 2018 at 9:16 am

Thing is Simon. What do you think that is going to translate into?. Malema's may just be the voice. But the masses he speaks to carry out the will of that voice. Whether he is saying genocide or not, the racial thing is becoming so sensitive at the same time – that is exactly what is going to happen. Genocide of some sort.... Because 'white' African technology and knowledge was more worldly than the tribal 'black' African society way back in the past. The people with the lesser quality knowledge became bullied. While it was not genocide – apartheid was a very 'incorrect' regime and did not help South Africa. Apartheid has not been abolished. It exists now in the form of BEE. Against whites. While it was originally introduced to correct the 'headstart' white people had gained through an apartheid regime. It is now becoming something more and I don't think we will ever see the end of it. Even then that is not enough. The inactivity of the ANC and the bad service they have been giving SA in all forms is being blamed on the colonial era and therefore the 'white' Africans. This whole land expropriation thing has also run out of control. The ignorant masses seem to think that with the death of all the white farmers they will just get hand-outs of free land. To anyone who thought they were going to get 'free' low cost houses – ask them how many bribes they had to pay to get themselves on the list for low cost housing and then actually get into the house without someone else having taken it first. Do they really think the land is going to be handed out for free?

17. Kyra says:

January 1, 2018 at 4:07 pm

Hi

I just love this forum and today I would like to throw something in the works...controversial. fortunately in EFF land 'controversial' is acceptable. I was out on the streets in April with posters in regard "The Guptas must go" but I have been thinking lately.....who is really behind the Gupta saga. When the FBI or the CIA get involved I go Whoa! what is going on

here, they are the worst and now they are trying to fit the saviour shoe by ‘investigating’ the Guptas....think again. I asked myself the question “If I was tjommies with the President’s son and I could see opportunities towards self-enrichment, what would I do?” and if I am brutally honest with myself, I may have taken that opportunity. The Guptas never had an agreement with us to uphold governance with integrity – ZUMA and the ANC did and they failed us abysmally! Should they be held accountable – YES but more so the ANC. What I am seeing lately is a massive ‘attack’ on the Guptas only, and the ones who really failed us are still in office with the FBI investigating, and Peter Hein stepping in as another saviour. Companies are closing their doors to the Guptas but still sing to the ANC. There is such a thing as a white minority monopoly that has nothing to do with race or colour, it has to do with a global elite that is very alive in this country who couldn’t care less about the people of South Africa or Africa for that matter, the same people who have been the global puppetmasters for centuries. I just feel we might be taken hostage by the Gupta – Scapegoat saga while the real enemy continues to manipulate and control. Who introduced the Guptas to Bell Pottinger? We have to take back control of our country, for us and our children sake and we are not the only ones....Palestine....Hawaii and many more, who didn’t have Guptas but strangely enough our paths are similar. They have been regarding us as them (apart from, collateral damage) for too long, it is time for us to take the fight to them! But we have to take off blinkers and see them for what they are! We see the Guptas, we see the ANC but somehow we don’t see the massive elephant in the room – the hidden agendas.

18. Tsekane says:

January 1, 2018 at 5:22 pm

Yes, true, the hidden Agenda’s white monopoly capital that captured South Africa State of governance since the arrival of the Whites led by the world known Criminal, a Jan van Riebeck. We have resources they do not have, therefore will attack Africa and get concerned about South Africa and Nigeria more so Zimbabwe that gave them a middle finger years ago. Over above all of this, we should be aware that if they get a weak leadership which seeks to wine and dine with them on the expense of Africans then we will fall and remain captured by one or another group continuously as Zuma and cronies did then brainwash our minds with false non existent belief that we are busy with Radical Economic Transformation while we are not.

If Zuma and the Guptas were indeed on Radical Economic Transformation Agenda – What was the GUPTA WEDDING GUESTS DOING BY LANDING ON OUR REVERED STRATEGIC MILITARY SAFETY POINT in WATERKLOOF AIR BASE? AS ATUL GUPTA RESPONDED IN HIS WORDS “We only wanted the best for our child marriage day”

Treating SA as Thrash – then Zuma and cronies still with these guys calling them His friends!

19. matshaya says:

September 4, 2014 at 4:25 pm

you people of Azania you must recall where do we come from, that means the agendar of the eff is beyond these people who thought a revolution is to protect these individuals who are looting state resources because you are benefiting on that you keep having non-sense comments,here we facing a battle of having 13percent of land, having 5percent of wealth, 87percent of land white minority belonging, 95percent wealth is in their hands why? ask your self if you are an African.

20. sam says:

October 22, 2013 at 4:44 pm

I am an indian...my family started the first cooperative for black people in sophiatown. It was successful and many people benefited...when verwoerds bstards took leadership...they dissolved it and took everything...today large multinationals are on our land..as a family we never recovered..we were reduced to poverty.the banks prey on the poor...today govt cuts our services...they would never dare do that to white people...i see in my industry...the whites still run everything...like dirty puppet masters...my vote will go EFF...I will sign up...things must change...

21. TSIETSI MOKHOEEA says:

April 29, 2016 at 3:10 pm

Radical economic transformation is the solution to S A ,and only the EFF can lead us truly .Ruling party cannot be trusted ,they sold the revolution.

22. sthembele mgala says:

August 30, 2013 at 12:22 pm

I fully support radical changes in South Africa if EFF can bring back the needs of masses of this country more special for those who were disadvgance by the system of white minority Phambili EFF!!!!

23. Lavhelesani Dangale says:

April 19, 2018 at 12:00 pm

good day, i feel that the ruling party picked up where the apartheid regime left off by failing black people from earning the same salary as white people mostly in private sectors. a black graduates are so much exploited, i'm bagging the EFF to look into this matter. the reason why salary is confidential, is because whites dont want us to see how much they are paying them selves.

i beg the one and only part i can trust EFF to look into this matter

24. Makgwale says:

December 11, 2013 at 10:44 am

I am not surprised at your sentiments, they are motivated buy selfishness, freedom to you means that you should remain comfortable and advantaged while the rest of the majority remains at the bottom, freedom to you means that I should ignore that your forefathers policies put my black people in unbearable conditions, freedom to you means that you should keep dictating terms to me, and forever have dominance on me, the thought of us being par with you on all levels, to you does not mean freedom. I suggest you rethink your motives, introspect, and ask yourself what motivates you, and next time do not use demeaning words (we don't think) to address us.

25. oeketsi Eric Maseko says:

September 17, 2013 at 7:13 pm

Sons and daughter of Azania let us not be confused more than we are, nb: they have robbed us our culture, land, identity, made us to be inferior to our own complexion e.g where there is a black person something must go wrong , they taught us to say that when one of us fails in their shit-stem.

We have to emancipate ourselves from mental slavery e.g speaking EngliSHIT with a shit-stem ascent and down looking our brother and sisters who can speak EngliSHIT

It's a revolution time EFF is a vanguard of Azania .Amandala we are not gonna be slaves in our fathers land.

26. East Afrika says:

September 8, 2018 at 11:34 pm

Capitalism is the white fantasy mentality of replacement of the way the individual Afrikan Human & even the white resurrected primate & virus animated corpse is created to think of self and of reality, with Colonization Mutant Primate Virus thought of itself and reality. So capitalism is the colonial self optimism and colonial self love of the Mutant Primate Virus, about resources and values, land, water, food, women, self validated in colonial thought and using Higher Emotion of colonial self-aggression to get it. This means the Mutant Primate Virus Races will be violent to you then cause you to think violent of each other and portray you as violent and in need of colonial validation logic education. So, what White Races teach as economics even in their universities is the justification of sociopathic behaviors of robbery with violence and the starvation, military aggression, deprivation, sexual exploitation and enslavement of victims of the robbery. This is a belief Virus gives the Mutant Primate and they identify themselves as emotionally validated intellectually by this sociopathic and dissociated behavior called capitalism.

Capitalist Currency

In the colonial mindset of the virus, the Mutant Neanderthal prints paper then by emotional validation to colonize it violently identifies itself as owner of all resources & existence by the printed paper through self love and self optimism as the only logic curriculum that it's victims must acquire and demonstrate as a value, in order to share in the currency it printed. So to the White Races, printed and other currencies are permission to exist that the White Mutant Primate Virus gives to Afrikans and it's own kind, if Afrikans agree to be encoded logically into colonial self identification.

27. East Afrika says:

October 16, 2018 at 1:56 am

Black people have a Free Will right of identification with the land and with whatever needs they have and with production of those needs. White people don't have any power, they just want to distract you from believing in yourselves and in what you can do independently. They want you to fear going against them. The son's and daughters of Shaka and the Khoisan cannot be made to fear ignoring whites. Afrikans do not owe white people a living. A white run country was and with their black puppets, is, absurd, illogical, impossible, unreal, unusable, unworkable and useless to Afrikans.

28. East Afrika says:

November 10, 2018 at 2:04 am

The white man wants to be protective in the sense that he does not feel that badly if he offends black people. The white man is pleasantly deceptive. When criticized, he tells himself and others, "It is black people, not me." The White man is deflecting, projecting, externalizing and feeling relieved of the black problem. White people want to convince relevant parties themselves that their offenses against black people on land and historical injustice is justified, non-existent or that they are the victim rather than the perpetrator, they try to escape responsibility. White people turn their envy into arrogance, so that they cannot feel inferior. In the short run, it works pretty well. In the long run, they leave a trail of deception that needs to be investigated. We must catch these white people and confront them on international laws. Let us expose them and make them deal with the truth, according to Afrikan Law.

Don't fear white people when they get angry for you criticising them, they are pretenders. White people have no conscience. White people try to feed of your self esteem because they have no credibility as humans. by pretending to be confident they think they are organized and safe. Afrikans, never be attracted to white people and their charisma which is fake.

29. wiseman says:

November 12, 2018 at 5:06 pm

wow, so much food for thought,I couldnt agree more on most of what you just said, but i hate to bring this news flash, to you, that notion about land belonging to the khoi san? mate?where is the proof? the one you white people created and fed to the ignorant black people? Look, lie to yourself all you want, but Africa, belongs to Africans, that you can never change,you are the only settler in Africa our land, ok?? now get that in to you head, secondly, the great inventors you just wrote about, how many of them had companies again? my point is, yes, they did invest stuff, right?but that alone wasn't and still isn't enough for trade to take place, that is my point, or maybe i should give you an example with tomas edison the thief, (dont care about misspelling his name) what the hell did he do?by the mere fact that he was a business man we know him, he sold peoples ideas, to the rest of the world that is, now you need to understand the fact that, it is through such transactions money goes around, not by the mere fact of creating something, secondly,I dont care about who invented what,when, and why, all i care about is having this white people taking us for a ride on the expense of our minerals and our land, that Mr, I care about, you white people are Evil, you are Satan himself, and you are the reason why there is no peace in the world, you are the reason there is global warming, earthquakes, and guns,and wars, you, white people are the people who are trying by all means to destroy our planet.all those inventions, what greater good where they for?? global warming?

30. Marang waga Mananyetso says:

November 19, 2013 at 11:02 pm

Thank you for a friday, the 15 Nov 2013 professional seminar. i wasnt sure about policies and values of EFF, But now im going to cast my vote next year by voting for this party "Party ya batho". EFF is going to rule until the people of SA are free from this white monopoly.

One more thing – Please start intruding or branding EFF with new faces(front leaders) not only of Commander in Chief. We need to show the people that EFF doesnt belong to Mr. Malema only but the people of SA.

Amandla ma fighters

31. ITANI RASTAMAN says:

August 7, 2014 at 9:07 am

PLEASE GIVE A BLACK MAN WHAT IS BELONG TO HIM BEFORE IS TOO LATE BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO TAKE IT THE WAY THEY DID TO US IN 1913

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