

**ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF) IN UGANDA: A  
JIHADI-SALAFI MOVEMENT OR LOCAL POLITICAL  
MOVEMENT IN DISGUISE?**

By

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since 1996, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has waged a campaign of terror in Uganda and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has resulted in a number of fatalities and continues to threaten the security of the region. From its inception, the objective of the ADF has been to overthrow the Ugandan government and establish an Islamic state governed by a Salafi interpretation of Islam. This study seeks to document the history of the ADF and to locate its position within contemporary Salafi debates. It does so by answering the following questions: (1) what do we know about the ADF? (2) How did the ADF emerge in Uganda? (3) Is the ADF Jihadi-Salafi movement or local political movement in disguise? This study utilises interviews, as well as archival and ethnographic approaches to research. Findings suggest that the ADF is a Jihadi-Salafi militant movement, which was originally established under the name Salafi Jihad Council (*SaJiCo*). However, the initial failure to stand alone and the Busitema defeat forced them to join other non-Muslim rebel groups to form the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). In addition, this study confirmed that, persuasive rhetoric of ADF leader, Jamilu Mukulu in addition to a long history of economic, social and political marginalisation of Muslims in Uganda by colonial and post-colonial governments, played a significant role in the creation and recruitment strategies for the Movement.

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## **DEDICATION**

.

To my beloved wife, Sharifa and our baby 'Princess' Latifa, together with her fellow children,  
who are to inherit the world we make.

## ACRONYMS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ATR	African Tradition Religion
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
FWI	Field Work Interview
IBEACO	Imperial British East Africa Company
IS/ISIS	Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISO	Internal Security Organisation
IUIU	Islamic University in Uganda
KCCA	Kampala City Council Authority
MGL	Multiple Grenade Launcher
MSAU	Muslim Students Association of Uganda
MUMSA	Makerere University Muslim Students Association
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
SaJiCo	Salafi Jihad Council
UMEA	Uganda Muslim Education Association
UMFF	Uganda Muslim Freedom Fighters
UMSC	Uganda Muslim Supreme Council
UMYA	Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly
UPDF	Uganda Peoples Defence Force

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## GLOSSARY

<i>Ahl al-Hadith</i>	The people of Hadith or <i>Ahl al-Athari</i> meaning people who follow the sayings and actions of the Prophet and his righteous companions.
<i>Al-Salaf al-Salih</i>	‘Pious predecessors’ of the Prophet Muhammad.
<i>Amir</i>	Denotes a ruler, a leader, or any one in authority.
<i>Aqida</i>	Doctrinal creed, referring to the essential and core components of the Islamic belief system.
<i>Bid’a</i>	Heretical or deviant innovation, <i>Ahl al-bida'e</i> is used in reference to innovators.
<i>Buganda</i>	A sub-nation and the largest kingdom in Uganda.
<i>Bunyoro</i>	This is a kingdom and the second largest in Uganda.
<i>Da’wah</i>	Missionary work for inviting others to Islam.
<i>Jahali</i>	Literally means ‘ignorant’; <i>jahiliya</i> denotes ‘ignorance’
<i>Kabaka</i>	The title given to the King of Buganda.
<i>Katikkiro</i>	The title given to the prime minister of Buganda.
<i>Madrassa</i>	Usually used in reference to an Islamic school for children.
<i>Manhaj</i>	The methodology employed to achieve an idea.
<i>Mawlid</i>	Festivals that mark the birthday anniversary of Prophet Muhammad.
<i>Omukama</i>	The title given to the king and leader of Bunyoro.
<i>Ridda</i>	Apostasy; a <i>murtadd</i> is an apostate.
<i>Sahawa,</i>	Awakening, it refers to revivalist movements in the Middle East.
<i>Shirik</i>	Denying the oneness of God or engaging in polytheism. A <i>mushrik</i> is a polytheist.
<i>Takfir</i>	Excommunication of other Muslims.
<i>Taqlid</i>	Blind imitation, especially in following religious scholar’s opinions.
<i>Tawhid</i>	The doctrine of the oneness of God, the core component of Islam and the single most important factor within Salafism.

## ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Political Boundary Map of Uganda.

Table 1: Illustrates the appeals to *pathos* found in the *Muslim Massacre in Mbarara* (MMM) audio.

Table 2: Illustrates appeals to *ethos* found in *Muslim Massacre in Mbarara* (MMM) audio.

Table 3: Illustrates the executive committee for Salaf Jihad Council in 1994.

Table 4: Illustrates the national executive committee for Salaf Foundation in 1994



## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Overview

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is one of the oldest but least-known militant groups in Uganda. Currently operating along the eastern borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the ADF has carried out numerous acts of terrorism in both Uganda and DRC. Besides their stated goal to purify Islam from innovations (*bid'a*), the ADF aspires for a new Uganda, governed by Islamic laws. Established officially in 1996, the ADF has unfortunately received little attention in spite of its long history and the high count of atrocities committed. This thesis is therefore, an attempt to document and interpret the rise of this Muslim militant movement and its recent developments using both interviews and archival research. This thesis also explores audiotapes recorded by ADF leadership that persuaded many young Muslims to join the movement.

The thesis is organised into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which contains information about the thesis in general, particularly its structure and a summary of the individual chapters. It also covers the theoretical framework that aided in the inception of this thesis, as well as the research gap it aims to fill. It concludes with three research questions raised because of the theoretical background and the identified gap.

Chapter two covers the review of the literature. It commences with a discussion of the term 'Salafism' and the debate surrounding it. It explores the origin of the term, the similarities and differences as well as the major three categories in the 'Salafi' political discourse; the purists, politicians and jihadists. The chapter further engages with the theoretical framework. In

this way, two methodologically related theories are discussed, namely; Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Persuasion/rhetoric theory. CDA is used to read through the audio messages of ADF leadership, while persuasion/rhetoric is used to identify persuasive tactics used by the ADF to recruit fighters.

Chapter three discusses the methodology used, including a section on materials and procedure. Chapter four covers information on the ADF with a brief survey of the history of Islam in Uganda. Finally, chapter five is the concluding section of the thesis, which includes conclusive remarks, personal thoughts and recommendations.

## **1.2 Theoretical Background**

The news of the ADF became public in 1996 (Pehle & Speyer 2015, 2). Previously, the group was carrying out clandestine military activities under the earlier denomination of the Salafi Foundation (New Vision, 1995). In the early 1990s, many Salafi youths who later joined this movement had already experienced several violent confrontations with other non-Salafi Muslims and the Police. These events resulted in serious casualties on both sides, leading to arrest of more than 400 Salafi youths, including their leader, Jamilu Mukulu (Abbey 1991; Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1192). Upon their release in 1994, most of them fled to the forests in Western Uganda and declared a war against the Ugandan government, interpreting the government's interventions and imprisonment as "state interference in Muslim affairs" (Titeca and Vlasenroot 2012, 158).

The ADF advocates for a strict interpretation of Islam and constantly challenges the traditional Islamic scholars. Additionally, the ADF calls for the establishment of an Islamic

state which is similar to other Jihadi-Salafi movements such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. Salafists, as observed by Meijer (2009, 1) believe in purity of religion. They advocate for strict adherence to the texts of the Qur'an and Hadiths. They claim to be the followers of the first generation of Muslims (the "pious forefathers", *al-Salaf al-Salih*) and regard their methodology (*manhaj*) as the only correct pathway for a 'true' Muslim (Meijer 2009, 4). Since 1996, the group has persistently continued its activities, which involve killings, abduction of civilians and continuous clashes with Ugandan armed forces.

Despite the long period of the ADF's existence and its violent activities, little is known about the group, especially in the academic circles. This lack of sources on the ADF was my first inspiration for the inception of this research. Although, their existence pre-dates Nigeria's Boko Haram and Somalia's Al-Shabab, the ADF, has remained largely, if not entirely unstudied by the international academic community.

### **1.3 Research Gaps**

In contrast to other Muslim militant groups that aspire towards the establishment of 'Islamic states', studies on the ADF are still minimal. This is very striking, as the ADF has been active since early 1990s, being possibly one of the first examples of Islamist militant movements in sub-Saharan Africa. The ADF pre-dates Somalia's Al-Shabab (active since 2006) and Nigeria's Boko Haram (active since late 2000s), both of which have received ample attention in the international media as well as in academic scholarship.

Furthermore, in the academic field of religious studies, and particularly, in the field of Islamic studies, the existing literature on the topic of Salafism in Africa includes very little mention

of Uganda. It is upon this background that an academic study on the rise of this militant Islamic movement in Uganda is needed. This study will add to the scanty literature on this movement which has been largely ignored by the academicians and the international community. As ADF members claim to be followers of the Salafi School, this dissertation will also attempt to clarify the ideology of the movement and locate it within the spectrum of contemporary Islamic revivalist movements.

#### **1.4 General Objective and Questions**

This study forms an attempt to document the history of a case study of Muslim militant movement in Uganda, the ADF. This will be done by answering the following questions

1. What do we know about the ADF?
2. How did the ADF emerge in Uganda?
3. Is the ADF a Jihadi-Salafi religious movement or a local political movement in disguise?

#### **1.5 Scope of the Study**

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in Uganda, the prime target of the ADF. Ugandans continue to be the primary recruits of the movement, and most of the defectors from the movement reside in the country. Former fighters of the ADF were the respondents in semi-structured interviews for this study. Besides interviews, archival research in the Kampala City Council Authority (KCCA) Library as well as the Makerere University Main Library was conducted. Both libraries are located in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda.

## 1.6 Some of the Sources that Frame this Study

To answer the three questions that guide this study, the researcher used both primary and secondary sources. The newspapers examined were *The New Vision* (est. 1986) and the *Daily Monitor* (est. 1995). Both papers have been in existence since the initial stages of the movement. *The New Vision* is the official newspaper controlled by the Ugandan government and has the largest circulation in the country. It has been in existence since 1986. The paper reported the events related to the rise of the ADF before its inception in early 1990s. The publication has access to classified information from state security agents, as such, many engagements between the ADF and government troops especially in western Uganda and in the Rwenzori Mountains, were recorded by the paper. However, since this is a government-owned newspaper, the privately owned *Daily Monitor*, was used as a way of corroborating information. The *Daily Monitor* besides being an additional source of information is also critical of the Ugandan government.

In terms of secondary sources, there are some articles that have been published on the ADF, especially in the field of security studies. Although none of these are particularly insightful from the point of view of interpretation and theory, but some of them do provide useful information. For instance, Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot (2012), as well as Kristof Titeca and Fahey Daniel (2016), give a background overview of the movement's history. Christopher R. Day (2011) gives an account on the movement in his article "The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda". David H. Shinn (2007) also has a portion on the movement in his article "Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn". Finally, Abdi Chande (2000)'s article "Radicalisation in East Africa" completes the meagre spectrum of available secondary sources on the documentation of the Allied Democratic Forces in Uganda.

Moreover, to better understand the context of the contemporary Salafi narrative, including its history, doctrine, and the organisation, this study used a variety of sources. Specifically, Shiraz Maher's (2016) book on Salafi-Jihadism, as well as the works of Quintun Wickotrowicz (2006), Andrea Brigaglia (2015), and Thomas Hegghammer (2009), were used in discussing the differences between Salafi and non-Salafi Islamic militant groups. Henri Lauzière (2008) provided the historical background for the emergence of Salafism as an intellectual and religious movement and the different connotations of this term in Islamic discourse. Other sources include Roel Meijer (ed.2009) on global Salafism, Terje Ostebo (2008) on African Salafism and Alex Thurston (2015) on Salafism in Nigeria.

### **1.7 Thesis Overview**

This master's mini-dissertation is organised into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter consists of a literature review in which Salafism is analysed in detail. Chapter three discuss the methodology used for data collection, the results from this collection and analysis of the material. Chapter four covers the ADF movement in detail. Finally, chapter five provides a detailed discussion of the study and offers some conclusions and recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a discussion of Salafism in detail, including the academic debates surrounding the movement. The definition of the term, its origin, as well as differences and similarities within the trend and its major categories are explored. The chapter further discusses the theoretical framework that guides this study beginning with Critical Discourse Analysis theory (CDA) and concluding with Persuasion and rhetorical theory.

#### 2.2 Salafism

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the ADF, the centrepiece of this study, claims to be part of the Salafi trend. Between 1994 and 1995, they performed their activities under the guise of the Salafi Foundation. However, before getting into details of the ADF movement, it is important to discuss the Salafi trend in general. It is important to note that discussing Salafism completely and exhaustively in a single chapter hardly does justice to this phenomenon. As such, this study only provides a glimpse of this broad, complex subject.

As far as literature on the Salafi debate is concerned, there has been ample studies on Salafism since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Prior to this incident, academic studies focused primarily on the term ‘fundamentalism’, especially after the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat allegedly committed by followers of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Meijer 2009, 1). Olivier Roy (2002) attempted to discuss Salafism on a global scale but he also analysed it as a neo-fundamentalist movement, lumping it together with other movements such as *Hizb al-Tahrir* (ibid).

### 2.1.1 Understanding Salafism

Linguistically, the term *Salaf* in Arabic literally refers to “that which precedes” (*Lisan al-Arab* in Wright 2012, 8). However, in a religious context, the term is used in reference to the first three generations after Prophet Muhammad (Ali 2015, 1). These three generations maintain a high status among Muslims since they had first-hand information from the Prophet and his companions. The three generations that came after Muhammad include; his companions, their followers, and the followers of their followers.<sup>1</sup>

Salafis often extend the literal meaning of the term to be one of the core principles of their religious belief. Some Salafi writers such as Nasir al Din al-Albani argues that the first three generations of Muslims represent the pure form of Islam before the Muslim community was exposed to philosophical ideas and philosophers ideologically divided Muslims (Wright 2012, 8). Moreover, Nasir argues further that, they had their own system based on the strict following of Quran and Prophet Muhammad’s traditions (*sunna*). This practice to the the Salafis- represents the only ‘correct’ version of Islam which should be followed by all Muslims (ibid).

Similarly, Qadhi (2014, 2) observes that, within the modern context, the term Salafi has come to designate an Islamic methodology (*manhaj*) that aspires towards the emulation of Prophet Muhammad through the practices and beliefs of the first three generations. This is because, they were the closest to the period of Muhammad and the era of revelation, that best embodies the Prophetic tradition or *sunna* (Qadhi 2014, 2).

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<sup>1</sup>This is from the hadith that says: “The best amongst the people, are those living in my century (generation), and then those coming after them, and then those coming after the latter” (Bukhar 57, 2). The term *Salafi* is also used in the Quran with similar linguistic meaning. It says “and we made them a people of the past (*salafan*) and an example to later ages (Quran: 43:56).

Similar to Sufis who openly acknowledge that Sufism was unknown to the first Muslims and it was later chosen as a reference to an old type of Islamic piety, Salafis also concede that Salafism was not known among early Muslims (Lauzière 2008, 67). Additionally, throughout the history of Islamic literature, there is no clear definition or even presence of the term Salafism in the original sources of Islam. In fact, no verse from the Quran that mentions the word besides ‘*salafan*’<sup>2</sup>, which refers to its linguistic interpretation.

In their defence, Salafis frequently refer to one hadith that mentions the term *Salaf*. It is found in the book of *Sahih* Bukhari (Vol. 8, hadith no. 58885) and in the book of *Sahih* Muslim (Vol. 34, hadith no. 6004). This ‘authentic’ hadith claims that the Prophet called himself *Salafi* while speaking to his daughter Fatimah; “So be afraid of Allah and be patient, for I’m your first *Salaf* (predecessor).”<sup>3</sup> However, both the hadith and the Quranic references do not identify a specific group within a community as ‘Salafis’. As argued by Lauzière (2008) and others, if Salafism existed in the early stages of Islamic history, it would have required more time to develop since “...information had to be sifted, Hadiths and reports had to be assessed and ultimately subjective choices had to be made” (Lauzière 2008, 36). Nevertheless, many Muslim groups, not only those that were opposed to Sufism and the idea of *Ilmu al-Kalam* (‘science of discourse’) <sup>4</sup> schools have used the term. Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111

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<sup>2</sup> The Quran states: “We made them a precedent (*salafan*) and an example for the later people” (Q43:56).

<sup>3</sup>The hadith is narrated by Aisha, a wife of the Prophet, in her conversation with Fatimah, a daughter of the Prophet. Aisha asked Fatimah why she wept and then laughed later. Fatimah responded that it was a secret conversation with her father (i.e. the Prophet) who told her: “Gabriel had a habit of revising the Quran once a year with me, but now had done it twice. This made him aware that soon he will die, so he told me; *fa’tiqi llaha wa-sibiri, fai’nni nie’ma salafu laki*” (so fear Allah and be patient, you will be my first *Salaf* (predecessor) and I wept” (Bukhari, Vol. 8, No. 58885 and Muslim vol. 31, No. 6004).

<sup>4</sup>Ilm ul-Kalam literary means ‘science of discourse’ or Islamic scholastic theology, which was established in an attempt to understand faith and religion by logical reasoning instead of relying only on the revealed text. See: Wolfson, A. Hurry. 1976. *The Philosophy of the Kalam*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

CE) for example frequently makes strong references to the term *Salaf* in his famous book written in twelfth century *Ihya Ulum al Din (Revival of Religious Sciences)*.

### 2.1.2 Origin of Salafism

Historically, some scholars (such as Frank Griffel [2015]) attribute Salafism and *Salafiyya* to Muslim reformists of the nineteenth century; Jamal al-Din al-Afghan (d. 1897 CE), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935).<sup>5</sup> This is rooted in the work of the French scholar of Islam and Sufism, Louis Massignon<sup>6</sup> (Lauzière 2016, 92). His work has been repeatedly invoked and become scholarly dogma in explaining the origin of Salafism (Lauzière 2010, 374). Lauzière argues that the Arabic word *Salafiyya* was never used as an abstract noun meaning ‘Salafism’ prior to the 1920s. He asserts further that it was only used by Muhammad Abduh late in his life and had positive connotations. It was not used as a noun or a label as argued by Griffel (2015, 202). Instead, *Salafiyya* was used as a reference to Sunni theological groups that differed from the Ash’aris (Lauzière 2016, 90). In other words, they never called themselves Salafis in the same way the term has been used since approximately the 1960s.

On this note, Meijer (2009) argues that Salafi trend is reflected in the teachings of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), Taqi al-Dini ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) and later adopted by

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<sup>5</sup>See for example: Hourani, Albert. 1983. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. *Arabic thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fakhry, Majid. 1983. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. *A History of Islamic Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, and Brown L. Carl. 2000. *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 140-141. For another perspective, see for example: Weismann, Itzhak. 2001. *Tate of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus*. Leiden: Brill.

<sup>6</sup>Louis Massignon’s work on *Salafiyya* first appeared in a French journal of which he was the director; *Revue du Monde Musulman* Vol. 36 in 1919. From that stage, the claim continued to reappear in many other works including those of the British Orientalist, Sir Hamilton Gibb. 1947. *Modern Trends in Islam*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Muhamad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d.1791) who allied with the Saudi family to form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1744 (Meijer 2009, 4; Mardini 2013, 20). Ibn Hanbal is said to have lived in a period when Islamic ideas had become diverse. Groups like Mu'tazilites were calling for a rational interpretation of the Islamic texts. He openly objected this ideology calling it *bid'a* and called for literal textual interpretation. In fact, the Hanbalis affiliated themselves to the people of hadith (*ahl al-hadith*) and *ahl al-athar* i.e. those who follow what has been inherited from the prophet and his companions (Watt 1994, 39; Mardini 2013, 5). They called for strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith and persistently rejected any interpretation of these sacred texts, other than the interpretations by early generations of the pious Muslims. It is from Ibn Hanbal's creed that later Ibn Taymiyya adopted some of his ideas that were given to Salafi trend after the establishment of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's school (Lacroix 2009, 59).

Following Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab began as a reformer who was interested in reviving the society. He believed that the *Ummah* (society) had become ignorant of the true teachings of their religion and immersed in a state of *jahiliya* (ignorance) which he believed to be the root cause of its political decline since Islam's golden age (Meijer 2009, 4). He believed that the only way to regain salvation and glory (*'izze*) was by the re-assertion of absolute monotheism (*tawhid*) as the basis of true creed. To achieve this goal, he condemned all actions that involve use of intermediaries to God, veneration of tombs of saints (*al-auliya*) and regarded them as polytheism/*shirk* (Mousalli 2009, 4). Eventually, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his movement flourished when the Saudi government made it the official creed of the Kingdom (Al-Rasheed 2002, 39). Today, the Salafi trend is widely divided with internal tensions, which sometimes lead to violent confrontation.

### **2.1.5 Typologies within Salafism**

In his article “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Wiktorowicz (2006) categorized Salafism into three major groups, namely; the ‘purist’, the ‘politico’, and the ‘jihadist’ (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208). His aim and argument, was to provide the composition of Salafi movement to help readers better understand the connection between notorious groups like Al-Qaeda to “similar minded non-violent fundamentalists and what sets them apart” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 207). Since his publication in 2006, Wiktorowicz’s categorisation has been used and accepted by some scholars with occasional efforts to refine. For example, Muhammad Hafez (2007) accepts the distinctions but rejects the label “purist”. He prefers instead the term “apolitical” or “conservative” (Hafez 2007, 65). Nonetheless, Wiktorowicz’s categorisation will be used to guide this study to help understand how Salafi actors manifest themselves in the political arena. The three categories are briefly discussed below:

#### **Puritan Salafism**

Wiktorowicz defines ‘Purists’ as those who emphasize non-violent methods of *da’wa* (mission), purification (*al-tasfiya*) and religious education (*al-tarbiya*). They generally say no to partisan politics and view it as “a diversion that encourages deviancy” (ibid. 208). They call for mandatory respect and obedience to rulers, “a classical Sunni principle” (Brigaglia 2015, 185). The examples of this category are the scholars of the Saudi official clerical body known as the Council of Senior Scholars (*Majlis Hay’at Kibar al-‘Ulama’*). This body advises the House of al-Sa’ud in private and avoids any public opposition to the government. This category is what Shiraz Maher (2016, 10) labels “quietist-advisors who prioritise *al-tasfiya wa-l-tarbiya* (purification and education over politics)”.

## **Politico Salafism**

In contrast to ‘quietist-advisors’, ‘Politico-Salafists’ call for the application of Salafi creed into politics. They view the creed as the only just system for humanity that allows divine revelations of the right to rule (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208). A close example is the Saudi Awakening movement (*sahawa*) that composed of a group of scholars who came out openly to challenge the Saudi government and asked for reform. Such category is directly engaged with political processes, lobby and campaign for “organic change in accordance with Islamic precepts” (Maher 2016, 10). Maher call them “activist-challengers” who air out their political disagreements with the rulers in public (Maher 2016, 10). Its members include, Saudi’s Islamist public intellectuals; Safar al-Hawali and Salaman al-Auda, Tunisian Rashid Ghannouchi and Qatar based Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (ibid, 189).

Politico-Salafists/activist-challengers may call for political actions towards contemporary issues, but they are so critical on declaring revolution or violence. They can be active in accordance with Islamic precepts and can easily participate in peaceful demonstrations, international boycotts and sometimes take political positions in secular governments but not easily declare violent actions (Wiktorowicz 2006, 222). Indeed, as observed by Maher, their belief in maintaining social order and unity makes them reject radicalism and any type of revolutionary approaches (Maher 2016, 10). In fact, many Salafis who could be described as Political-Salafist, during the 2011 Arab uprisings, were critical of the uprising for causing unrest in the region and advocated for peace and coexistence.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See: Lacroix, Stephane. 2014. Saudi Islamists and Arab Spring. *LSE*, Issue 36.

## Salafi-Jihadists

Jihadists in contrast, take up military alternative and argue that “current context calls for violence and revolution’ to establish an Islamic State (Wiktorowicz 2006, 225). Maher calls them “violent-rejectionists” (2016, 11). This category does not reconcile with the notion of modern state. They view it as a “heterodox affront to Islam whereby temporal legislation usurps God’s sovereignty” (ibid). They call for radical change of the modern system by confronting the agents of such governance. Once al-Qaeda declared: “We believe that the ruler who does not rule in accordance with God’s revelation, as well as his supporters are infidel apostates...armed and violent rebellion against them is an individual duty on every Muslim” (ibid). The main examples of this category is al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, Boko-Haram and IS. In fact IS has superseded al-Qaeda by not only rejecting constitutional politics or international system but by enacting laws that defy civilization standards such as the revival slavery.<sup>8</sup>

Additionally, similar to Politico-Salafists, Salafi-Jihadists disagree completely with the ‘purists’. To them, ‘purists’ are representatives of rulers. They call them *al-ulama al-Sulta* which means ‘scholars of power’ or rulers (ibid, 227). Jihadists view these scholars as civil servants especially ‘purist’ Saudi scholars, and speak in their master’s language. For that reason, they show no respect to ‘purists’ scholars. Bin Laden once said:

“The fatwa of any official alim (religious scholar) has no value for me. History is full of such ulama (clerics) who justify *riba* (usury), who justify the occupation of Palestine by the Jews, who justify the presence of American troops around *Haramain*

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<sup>8</sup> See: Otten Cathy. 2017. Slave of ISIS: The Long Walk of the Yazid Women. *The Guardian*, July 25. Accessed on August 24, 2017 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/25/slaves-of-isis-the-long-walk-of-the-yazidi-women>.

*Sharifain* (the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia). These people support the infidels for their personal gain. The true ulama support jihad against America” (in Rubin & Rubin 2004, 262).

Additionally, Salafi-Jihadist also dispute within their ranks, the issue of ‘proper’ jihad. For example, Abu Muhammad al-Maqidisi<sup>9</sup> believe that scholars like him - the intellectual guardian of jihad-Salafi movement - should guide the fighters, whereas the fighter themselves believe that their actual combat experience and practical knowledge gives them greater insight in jihad than the “bookish scholars (Wagemakers 2016, 502). Indeed, this is where Wiktorowicz’s model fall short. With this contestation, the model becomes too broad to capture the relationship between different actors within Salafi trend.

In conclusion of this part, it is clear that beyond the headlines, the Salafi trend and its adherents a far from constituting a unified bloc. It is a broad community reflecting varied positions on many important elements in religion. Apple literature has been produced and this is just a glimpse on the broad topic.

### **2.3 Theoretical framework**

In this section, I provide the theoretical framework of the study. The study is theoretically guided by two theories. That is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Persuasion/rhetoric theories. Both theories are important in examining the content of ADF sermons in order to identify the motive behind their activities. Additionally, the theories help in identifying how

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<sup>9</sup>Al-Maqidisi is a Jordanian scholar hailed by many jihadist movements for his support of ‘pure’ Jihad waged by certain fighters. He became an enemy of Saudi regime after calling for a violent overthrow of the Saudi monarchy in 1989 in his book: *al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fi Kufur al-Dawula al-Sa’udiyya* (The Obvious Proof of the Infidel Nature of Saudi Regime). See for more: Wagemakers, Joas. 2012. *A Quietist Jihad: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

these sermons appeal to the desires of the young Muslims in Uganda. The historical section (chapter four) uses a combination of ethnography and archival work.

### **2.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)**

Chilton (2004) and Garner (2007), observe that religion make up a central part of human existence but less attention has been given to religious discourse (spoken and written), in the Critical Discourse Studies. Furthermore, Wijesen (2013) also affirms that, it is through CDA that a gap between theoretical and scientific approaches can be bridged and called up on religious studies scholars to undertake a multidisciplinary approach by incorporating CDA into their studies. Thus, in an attempt to examine the process of interpreting biblical texts by religious scholars on the issue of women leadership in churches, Kim (2016) stresses the usefulness of CDA in analysing the religious texts. Kim argues that using CDA, we can see how religious texts are used to assume and formulate a unified mental model to control the beliefs of the audience (Kim 2016, 58).

Rooted from linguistic studies, CDA views language as form of social practice (Janks, n.d; Fairclough, 1995). As argued by Philips (2002), our access to reality is through language. “With language we create representation of realities that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality” (in Lui 2015, 67). Thus since language (both in writing and speech) comes with both cohesion and coherence (Titscher et al., 2000), CDA performs the duty of analysis in order to provide a complete picture of a given phenomenon.

Indeed, religious actors use both sermons and texts to reach the targeted audience. These sermons are self-consciously rhetorical and worthy of literal consideration. This indeed,

makes them open to “extensive linguistic and discursive in an immediate and direct way” (Tayob n.d, 1). Moreover, CDA seeks to reveal in this case how religious discourses are constructed such that a particular indoctrinating perspective can be “expressed delicately and covertly” (Lui, 2015, 103). However, one main concern with CDA is its deficiency in the analysis of social practice. Jorgensen and Philips (2004, 69) argue that because CDA possesses both discursive and non-discursive elements it is inevitable that it will not help analysing social practices. Thus, they propose to support CDA with other theories.

### **2.3.2 Persuasion and rhetoric theory**

Persuasion is an attempt to influence a person’s belief, attitudes, intentions and behaviour (Seiter and Gass 2010, 33). Indeed, with persuasion, human beings have been motivated to war, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, genocide, racism, hysteria, religious intolerance and extremism, mass suicide and many other forms of unreasonable and uncontrolled behaviours (Kurbalija, 2010). Through rhetorical sermons and preaching, politicians, religious leaders, charismatic individuals have influenced behaviours, motives, and attitudes of people. This prompted American writer Dale Carnegie (d.1955) to advise;

“When dealing with people, remember you are not dealing with creatures of logic. We are dealing with creatures of emotion, creatures bristling with prejudices and motivated by pride and vanity” (Carnegie 2005, 33).

Thus with regards to persuasion and rhetoric theory, Daniel O’Keefe (2004, 31) observes that the systematic thinking about persuasion formerly begun as early as fifth century B.C.E by Greek scholars especially Aristotle. He argues further that persuasion is doing an important role in the daily life of individuals. Moreover, O’Keefe (2004, 32) identifies the most

fundamental function of persuasion to be attitude change. He argues that changing people's mental state, as a precursor to behavioural change is the most important goal in persuasion. He observes further two main concerns of attitude change: valence and extremity. In this case, valence as a criterion to define emotions is concerned with positive or negative attractiveness of an argument. In other words, with persuasion, religious preaching can lead to 'negative' valence such as anger and fear or 'positive' one such as joy (Frijda 1986, 207). Whereas extremity, according to O'Keefe is simply a measurement of how personally involved an individual is with an argument (O'Keefe 2004, 32).

Furthermore, O'Keefe identifies other additional properties to the attitude change, which are grouped all together under the "attitude strength" (O'Keefe 2004, 32). He argues that attitude strength is made up of persistence, resistance, impact on information processing and judgements and impact on behaviour. He argues that stronger attitudes are more persistent and more likely to affect such process and behaviour than weaker attitudes (ibid.). In this regard, it does not matter whether or not an individual or group of individuals have the same opinion about something, it is more like that, and the strength of their attitudes is not on the same level (Anaya 2015, 11). In that way, persuaders are also more likely to focus on individuals with weaker attitude strength in addition to valence and extremity (ibid).

Besides attitude, O'Keefe (ibid) identifies mental state as another hotspot in persuasion theories. He observes that mental state includes normative considerations in which "descriptive norms" may incorrectly influence individuals to do or not to do something based on what individual thinks everyone is doing (ibid, 33). This can automatically lead to individuals do something which they would not have done, in order not to be considered out of character. In this case persuaders often concentrate on counteracting these

‘misconceptions’ of descriptive norm in order to convince them on the merits of engaging in certain activities (Anaya, *ibid*).

Another important element in mental state is the subjective norm. In this way, individuals are more receptive to the opinions of important people in their lives (O’Keefe 2004, 33). It is theorised that parents for instance, have higher chances to influence their children towards certain behaviour than it can be with strangers. However, this of course may vary from family to family.

Furthermore, using rhetoric tactics, a writer or speaker strives to persuade and motivate individuals in specific situations (Anaya 2015, 12). Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014, 3) asserts that rhetoric skills do not operate unless there is an “insight” which entails with the proper empathy of the individual being persuaded. Thus in possession of the insight, the speaker utilises that chance to exploit the “ideological, personal and contextual elements” in the rhetoric (*Ibid*, 13). In this regards, rhetoricians use rhetoric devices and appeal to two main elements: *pathos* and *ethos* (Anaya 2015, 12).

*Pathos* is an appeal to emotions. It is defined as a way of convincing an audience to an argument by creating emotion response. *Ethos* on the other hand is an appeal to ethics. It is defined as a way of conceiving some of the character or credibility of the persuader (Anaya 2015, 12). To this regard, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014, 88) observes that not only these modes of rhetoric appeals affect individual’s attitude and choice, but can influence biasness detected by emotions (in case of *pathos*) and in some cases even change an audience’s mind on a previously biased topic. Religiously, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) argues that “the

enduring motive power exercised by the sacred texts of all major religious traditions” are often implemented by rhetoricians to align themselves with religious audiences (ibid, 88).

In the theoretical framework that make the basis of this thesis, regarded both persuasion/rhetoric theory and CDA as essential in understanding the messages that are echoed by Islamists movements. By the use of these two theories, reading through the sermons of ADF leadership becomes possible.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter discusses the methodology used by the researcher. The methods adopted were helpful in obtaining the answers for the questions that guide this research and hence drawing the conclusion and recommendations. The study employed a combination of historical and ethnographic qualitative research methods using persuasion theories. The three questions are: What do we know about ADF, how ADF emerged in Uganda, and is ADF a Jihad-Salafi movement or political movement in disguise.

#### **3.2 Material**

This study used archives, particularly newspapers published in Uganda from late 1980s to present. This is the period in which ADF has been active in the region. The study further uses the recorded sermons of the ADF's leaders. In this case, persuasion/rhetoric tactics were analysed to help in reading through sermons recorded by ADF leader.

##### **3.2.1 Archives**

Archival research was instrumental in gathering information about the history of the movement. The major materials used in this stage were the newspapers published during the initial stages of the movement. Two newspapers were identified with relevant information for the study. These include;

a. *The New Vision*

*The New Vision* newspaper is one of Uganda's oldest newspapers. The *New Vision* was established in 1955 by the colonial government with the name *Uganda Argus* (Chibita, 2006). When the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) came in power in 1986, the paper's name was changed to *New Vision*. Thus by the time ADF activities started to unfold in early 1990s, the paper was in place to report the happenings.

b. *The Daily Monitor*

*Daily Monitor* was established in 1992. It is a privately owned paper with independent editors and journalists. Since its inception, the paper has been critical of government mandates. In numerous occasions, its premises have been raided by the government security agencies for different political reasons. The paper covered most of the stories on ADF.

### **3.2.2 Audio Recordings**

There were many sermons recorded by Jamilu Mukulu, ADF leader, for persuasion purposes. However, his tape recordings were banned in the country by the government. This made it difficult for the researcher to have access to many of them. The researcher was only able to get one audio relevant to the study for analysis. Recorded in local language (Luganda) with the title "*Okutta kw'Abasilamu e Mbarara* ('Muslim Massacre in Mbarara'-MMM). The audio was first released in early 1990s from one of Jamilu Mukulu's seminars, which he used to hold throughout the country. The message in it resonates clearly with his jihad agenda.

### **3.3 Procedure**

This section describes the primary research, data collection and analysis.

### **3.3.1 Primary research**

Primary research involved literature review in the library and perusing through newspapers as well as interviews with former members of the movement. This was important in responding to question one, which requires both historical and ethnographic analysis thus understanding the background, growth, organisational culture, current trend and future possibilities of ADF. Another source was the audio sermon of ADF leader, which was collected from one of the informants and analysed through persuasive/rhetoric analysis. This approach was essential to answer part of Research Question two and three.

### **3.3.2 Data collection**

#### **a) Archival Research and Interviews**

Data collection, precisely, started with archival research. This was not only important in identifying important dates in the history of the movement, but also getting the discussion of the public in media during that time. In this case, the focus was put specifically on stories published about ADF since its inception in early 1990s as well as articles in newspapers on Muslim wrangles of late 1980s to date. Most of the archival research was conducted in Uganda at Kampala City Council Authority (KCCA) Public Library and Makerere University Main Library.

Archives helped in refining interview questions. Indeed, from the library, the researcher could comfortably take on the interviews with clear picture of the situation before and after the insurgents. Semi-structured interviews ensued with former members of the movement and later with one member at Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) who was also an active

Salafi member in 1980s. This was the early stages of the movement before some of its members started violence in early 1990s. Respondents related stories and situations they were faced with before and after joining the movement. They explained how they joined the movement as well as their personal challenges in the movement until their final decision of quitting.

Among the interviewees was a close associate of the movement's leader. He was his personal friend and finance manager responsible for all finances and merchandise of the movement. He was in direct connection with the financiers and contributors, both local and international as well as those from within East Africa. Other three were movement's '*ulamas*' and field commanders. Two live in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and the other in Uganda. They had important information on the history of the movement from its inception as a *dawa* (missionary) group in Uganda to militancy. Additionally, was the interview with the member of *kikosi feka-feka* (destabilising wing). This group was responsible for planting bombs in Kampala<sup>10</sup>, assassination of government officials, army officers among others. They had been also in prison at least once or more. They all refused recording on 'safety' grounds but allowed taking notes, except one who lives in Dar es Salaam. They also preferred anonymity of which I had no objection to since I was interested in the information given.

Lastly, three other respondents were also interviewed. These ones were older in age and had been active in Salafi activities before violent elements appeared in the movement. The first is Sheikh Saliman al-Faris who is a 'retired' Salafi preacher and activist. In his 70s he retired

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<sup>10</sup> See for example: Els De Temmerman. 2007. Uganda: ADF Rebellion: Gorilla to Urban Terrorism. The Newvision, May 21. Accessed on Feb 16, 2017 from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200705220110.html>.

from public appearance and can only be found at his home mosque, which is named after his name for congregational prayers. He had information on the history of Salafism in Uganda and the public life of ADF leader before his conversion to Islam. The second is Haji Nsereko Mutumba who is currently the spokesperson of UMSC. He was also an active member of the Salafis in Uganda during their initial stages. Lastly, Sheik Sulaiman Kakeeto who is currently the Amir (leader) for another faction of Salafi group under the organisation known as Uganda Muslim Tabliq Community (UMTC). He has been active in Salafi activities and had a lot to share.

#### **b) Audio Sermons**

Audio MMM was critically analysed by listening to it several times using persuasive/rhetoric tools to identify evidences of appeals to *pathos* and *ethos*. As earlier stated, *Pathos* (appeals to *emotions*), refers to a way of convincing an audience to an argument by creating emotion response. Whereas, *ethos* (appeals to *ethics*), refers to a way of conceiving some of the character or credibility of the persuader.

The audio is nearly 40 minutes, with a clear rhetoric message directed to his audience. He starts with reminding Muslims how non-Muslims hate them. He then reminds the audience of Prophet Muhammad's engagements with 'disbelievers' in Macca and how they plotted to kill him. There upon he divulges into the topic of Muslim massacre in Mbarara (Western Uganda) after the fall of Amin. In it, he narrates the story of a pregnant woman whose stomach was ripped open, with a machete and foetus crudely torn out. He reminds them, "You think those Christian neighbours love you so much, wait when the tables turn, they will disdain you". Mukulu's approach is quite similar to that of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. As argued by

Thurston (2015), Boko Haram uses a mixture of exclusivism and victimisation in their rhetoric to mobilise Muslim youths into their militant activities. Indeed, analysis of the audio MMM reveals presence of appeals to both *pathos* and *ethos*. The tables below illustrate the findings.

**Table 1: Illustrates the appeals to pathos found in the MMM audio**

No.	Appeals to <i>Pathos</i>
1	“your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats”
2	“perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance”
3	“Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know them and what they conceal in their breasts”
4	“if an opportunity rises, wait, even your ‘Aunt’ will cut your throat”

Source: Field Data (2016)

From table one, the first example “*your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats*” and “*perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance*”, are emotional appeals that target attitude change. He reminds Muslims of the atrocities done by Christian mobs in Western Uganda in 1979. Using the term ‘goat’, he appeals to degrading emotions. In other words, he is persuading his audience not to wait, but rather get ready to fight. In this way, he persuades the audience to change their attitudes towards fighting so that they do not fall prey again, like what happened in 1979. This attitude change builds on victimisation to trigger militant actions.

Moreover, “*perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance*”, in this statement, there is an indication that the current regime led by President Museveni knows the perpetrators but does not come to take action. By doing this, he is persuading his audience to hate the regime and get ready to fight it. This rhetoric persuasion meets the needs of the persuader using concrete evidences that cannot easily be challenged. Indeed, such persuasion

prepares the audience for sacrifice and fearlessness and changes their attitude towards the desired goals of the speaker.

Similarly, “*Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know them and what they conceal in their breast*” and “*if an opportunity rises, wait, even your ‘Aunt’ will cut your throat*”, which are the third and fourth example. They also conform with character that appeal to *pathos*. The speaker in these examples appeals to attitude change towards their non-Muslim relatives. In Uganda, almost in every family there are people of different religions (African Tradition Religions [ATR], Catholics, Muslims and Protestants) who usually live side by side in peace.

Thus in his persuasive tactics, Mukulu mentions the dangers even within family relations. Mentioning that someone’s aunt can surrender her sister or brother’s son or daughter, is to point to the highest level of treachery a woman can do within the family. This is so, because, in Uganda, aunties and uncles occupy positions similar to mothers or fathers<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, this was an appeal to *pathos* to have his audience change their attitude towards close non-Muslim relatives including parents. Indeed, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) affirm that the main purpose of *pathos* is to “denote all kinds of emotional influence on the audience, potentially affecting attitude or choice” (Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 87).

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<sup>11</sup>An example, in Buganda culture and language, a Father is called “Taata”. His children must call his brother also “Taata. The same with mother whom they call “Maama”, her sister should be called “Maama”. It is intended to strengthen family bonds. See: Onyango, O. Eria. n.d. Ugandan Traditional Cultural Values. Accessed on July 28, 201 from [https://www.academia.edu/1937342/Ugandan\\_Traditional\\_Cultural\\_Values](https://www.academia.edu/1937342/Ugandan_Traditional_Cultural_Values).

**Table 2 illustrates appeals to *ethos* found in MMM**

No.	Appeals to <i>ethos</i> in MMM
1	“and they will not cease from fighting you until they have made you renegades from your religion, if they can”
2	“O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn your backs to them”
3	“And if those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper”

Source: Filed Data (2016)

In order for the audience to give credibility to the speaker, Mukulu, recites a verse in Quran (2:217), which is in example one: “and they will not cease from fighting you until they have made you renegades from your religion, if they can”. With this example, the speaker aligns himself first to his audience, and presents himself to be part of those who are being fought by the ‘non-believers’. This indeed, coincides with what Hyde’s (2004, 13) observation that for successful appeal to *ethos*, the speaker “must appear to share personal similarity with the audience” (Hyde 2004, 13).

Moreover, examples two and three; “O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn your backs to them” and “And if those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper” appeals to *ethos*. Cockcroft and Cockcroft observe that, the “emotive power exercised by the sacred texts of all major religious traditions should be recognised as a form of *ethos*” (Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 88). Indeed, the speaker supports his words with religious text of the Quran to align himself with his “religious audience” (Anaya 2014, 14) and achieve the symbolic status of the representative of ‘authentic religion’ in the eyes of his audience.

### **3.5 Limitations**

The researcher encountered numerous challenges during the course of the study. First, ADF is a sensitive issue in Uganda and the East African region at large. Being a Muslim youth it is

even worse since most of the group's members are affiliated to Islam. Many innocent youths have been arrested in Uganda in suspicion of being ADF members later to be found innocent. Moreover, few individuals can freely give information to strangers about ADF. This sensibility antagonised the earlier plan to have many interviews especially with former members of the movement. This could help in acquiring variety of information from different people and angles. Although the research questions were clearly explained, but still many prospects expressed reluctance at speaking on behalf of the movement, whilst others felt uncomfortable to speak about their engagements since it may result into security problems with either the government or ADF itself. One respondent for example told the researcher frankly, "the first time I saw you, I thought that you are Mukulu's agent sent for a mission" (Field Work Interview-FWI, 2016). It was after presenting introduction letter from the department of religious studies-UCT and university students card.

Additionally, some demanded facilitation in monetary terms, which I instantly declined on ethical grounds. In this case, I had to explain my stand and politely left such respondents. I had also planned to collect information from the active members of ADF. However, it proved difficult due to security reasons. In this case, I decided to stick to the former members but with careful conclusions especially on their negatives against the movement. For security purposes, the respondents who accepted the interview, especially the former combatants preferred anonymity.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 ADF IN UGANDA

#### 4.1 Introduction

As seen earlier in chapter one, ADF is a rebel movement that has been in existence since 1996. What is not contended is that, this movement is an Islamic extremist group that uses terrorism with little regard to civilian causality. From the data collected, it is important to unveil the historical events that took place in Uganda in regards to Ugandan Muslims before, during and after colonialism. Thus in response to the three research questions, i.e; 1) what do we know about ADF, 2) how did it emerge in Uganda, 3) is ADF a Jihad-Salafi movement or political movement in disguise - this section, addresses the historical circumstances that created the group. This will take us one journey back, to understand the history of Islam in Uganda, followed by a detailed account on the rise of ADF and its current developments.

#### 4.2 History of Islam in Uganda

The arrival of Islam in Uganda dates back to 1844 in the central (Oded, 1974, 39) whilst in the north, it is said to have spread in early 1800s, because of the stationing of Sudanese soldiers led by Emin Pasha (ibid, 150). These soldiers settled in the West Nile sub-region due to developments in Sudan, during the era of the Mahdi movement. In the central region, historians trace the roots of Islam to the arrival of Arab traders from the East African coast. The first Muslim trader to arrive in central Uganda was Ahmad bin Ibrahim, who introduced Islam to the Buganda King Suuna I (Oded, 1974, 39). Apolo Kaggwa<sup>12</sup> narrates:

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<sup>12</sup>Apolo Kaggwa was a major intellectual and political leader in Uganda under British rule. He served as *katikilo* (Prime Minister) of Buganda under Kabaka Mwanga (r. 1884 -1897) and then Kabaka Dauda Chwa (r.1897 - 1939) between 1890 and 1926. He grew up in the king's palace as a young page during Kabaka Muteesa and had accepted Islam before converting to Christianity after the arrival of missionaries in early 1880s. See:

“Medi<sup>13</sup> Ibulaim rebuked Kabaka Suna for killing people every day saying: “there is Katonda [the creator god or Allah] who created us and you too, and he gives you this kingdom to rule your people.” Suna replied: “I know there are many balubale [spirits] who gave me this kingdom.” Ibulaim went on preaching, but Suna paid no attention, till finally he [the Kabaka] said: “Who is this Katonda you go on talking about? Is he greater than I?” Ibulaim said: “He is above and he will raise all whom he loves.” therefore Suna asked to ‘read’ and read four chapters of the Qur’an before Ibulaimu left for good” (King, Kasozi, & Oded 1973, 3).

In 1856, King Suuna I died before completely embracing Islam and was subsequently succeeded by his son Muteesa I. Unlike his father, Muteesa was keen to adopt the new religion. However, what should be noted here, he embraced the new religion while holding on his traditional beliefs. He did this primarily, to establish strong ties with Arab traders who had weapons which could be used to strengthen his kingdom, while maintaining support from traditional chiefs (Robinson 2008, 158).

Nonetheless, in early 1860s, Muteesa adopted Islam and publicly identified himself as a Muslim. He learnt to read the Quran, studied both Swahili and Arabic. Buganda sources affirm that Muteesa was an apt student<sup>14</sup>. In a very short period, he became fluent in Arabic and memorised some parts in the Quran. He further spread the religion to his subjects starting

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Etheredge, Laura. 2008. Sir Apolo Kagwa: Prime Minister of Buganga. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, December 15. Last updated Dec. 15, 2008. Accessed from, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Apolo-Kagwa>.

<sup>13</sup>Usually in Buganda, Ahmed and Muhammad are shortened to *Medi*.

<sup>14</sup>While describing Kabaka’s enthusiasm for Islam, Ham Mukasa a Muslim in the early days of Muteesa’s reign, who later became a Christian, said, “He was diligent in everything he was learning. This is why he was able to learn Muhammad’s religion and to speak Swahili” (Mukasa, Ham. 1938. “*Simuda Nyuma* [Forward Ever, Backward Never.” London: S.P.C.K).

with the chiefs. Ham Mukasa who was a young page at the time narrated, when Muteesa accepted Islam, he called on his chiefs and said: “there is only one God; called the Great, God the omnipotent, *Hakibalu*...I want you all to study this religion” (Mukasa 1938, 14). He assured them further that this God is greater than *balubale*, the spirits which Muteesa and his subjects used to worship. As expected, all Chiefs responded in affirmative and said, “you sir, have more wisdom than we, in understanding difficult things such as these. If you appreciate and accept them, so do [us]. Let us embrace the religion; since you are there to teach us to know all and understand about God” (ibid). He started teaching them the new religion and some of what he had learnt.

To affirm his strong belief of Islamic faith, Muteesa ordered for the construction of a large mosque in the capital in which he led prayers as Imam and head of Muslims in the country. In the mosque, he appointed caretakers and commanded his subjects to frequently take important supplies such as cows, goats, (for meat), bunches of Bananas and other foodstuffs (Oded 1974, 69). In 1867, Muteesa officially observed Ramadan and from that year he strictly kept the ritual. When he was unable to fast e.g. during Busagala war of 1868, Muteesa compensated the days he missed in the later days and commanded even his subjects to do the same. By late 1860s, Islam had become the official state religion of the Buganda Kingdom, with significant number of converts (ibid).

So enthusiastic of his new religion, Muteesa sent a mission to his historical rival, *Omukama*<sup>15</sup> Kabalega (r. 1870-1899), the King of the neighbouring kingdom, Bunyoro which was rejected. This made Muteesa sad and said,

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<sup>15</sup>Omukama is the title given to the King of Bunyoro Kingdom, western Uganda. See for more details: Stokes, Jamie. 2009. “*The encyclopaedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East*”. New York: InfoBase Publishing, vol. 1 pp. 506-509.

“I am very sorry that brother of mine has rejected the religion of God and has trusted in his own dignity and his gods alone. I regret that he thinks only in terms of this present life to which he compares the life to come. Let it be so, but I feel sorry for him to remain in the ancient customs of the balubale whom we called gods while there is the true God, the creator. You, my subjects, however, persevere in the religion” (Mukasa 1963, 17).

Mutesa’s reign is remembered to have been autocratic. One incident, in particular, as recorded by Oded (1974, 77) is related to a group of Muslims who had complained to the King because he had refused to undertake the Muslim ritual of circumcision in favour of the custom (ibid)<sup>16</sup>. When these Muslims refused to pray behind him, he sentenced them to death by burning leading to death of more than seventy of the culprits (ibid, 160). It should be noted here that there is controversy among the four main Muslim legal schools on circumcision<sup>17</sup>. According to Shafi’i school, the ritual is compulsory. However, the school waive to a person who embraces Islam and feels afraid of the consequences. Moreover, they contend that it is not a condition for validity of person’s profession of accepting Islamic faith or the performance of religious duty (Al-Sabbagh 1996, 16).

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<sup>16</sup>In Buganda, the King’ blood is never willingly shed (Oded 1974, 77).

<sup>17</sup>Some scholars such as shaf’i, Ahmad Ibn Hanbali make it compulsory, while Malik, Abu Hanifa and many other scholars maintain it to be *sunna* (permissible but not obligatory). The famous hadith quoted is the *fitra* (human nature) hadith. The Hadith says: “Sound human nature is in five things: Circumcision, removal of pubic hair, plucking of armpit hair, trimming of the moustache, and cutting of the nails” see details on this topic; al-Sabbagah, Muhammad Lutfi. 1996. Islamic Ruling on Male and Female Circumcision. Cairo: *World Health Organisation*.

It was while these controversies were raging, that the British explorer, Henry Stanley arrived in the mid-1870s. Although, British missionary and author Rev. Robert Ashe in his book *Two Kings of Uganda* (1889, 40) and in *Chronicles of Uganda* (1894, 55), argue the opposite, other books such as *African Holocaust* by J.F. Faupel (1964), and *Bassekaba ba Buganda* ('Buganda Kings') by Apolo Kagawa (1901) all agree that the incident happened shortly after the arrival of Stanley. Therefore, it is difficult to rule out the influence of Stanley's presence for Kabaka's decision of killing Muslims. This is also evidenced in Stanley's letter, which appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of November 15, 1875<sup>18</sup>. Stanley wrote: "I have indeed, undermined Islam so much here that Mtesa has determined henceforth, until he is better informed, to observe the Christian Sabbath as well as the Muslim Sabbath" (Stanley 1899, 164).

Indeed, Stanley's visit changed the whole dynamics of Islam in Buganda. The king became aware of the existence of another powerful foreign religion. He learnt that this religion (Christianity) possess people with technical superiority, greater force, wider resources and more wealth compared to Arabs and that he can even utilise such advantages. His confidence strengthened with the arrival of Christian missionaries to Buganda in 1877 (Oded 1974, 221).

Bringing with them resources and arms that were superior in comparison to those from the Arabs, once again, Muteesa welcomed the new visitors and allowed them to preach and spread their religion. Missionaries attempted to convert him to their religion. However, there is no strong evidence for his serious acceptance of the Christianity as seen with Islam. To

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<sup>18</sup>Stanley said that, after his long conversation with the king, he found him so open to the possibilities of Christianity. He immediately sent a letter to the queen requesting for missionaries. By June 1877, missionaries had started arriving in Uganda. See the letter in details and more about his exploration work in Africa in; Stanley, M. Henry. 1899. *through the Dark Continent*. London: George Newness, (p. 164).

keep the balance, he remained undecided to which religion to follow but later towards his death, he confessed to be a Muslim<sup>19</sup>. The introduction of Christianity to the kingdom however, marked the beginning of religious conflicts in the years that followed.

#### **4.2.1 Muslim-Christian Hostilities (1888-1892)**

In 1884, Muteesa died of smallpox. Prior to his death, religious scuffles between Muslims and Christians had already started in the kingdom. Both religions wanted influence over the king and the Buganda kingdom. Religious identity was now more clearly than ever attached to the state. The identity of the king, and particular customs such as circumcision or baptism was vital for kingship (Robinson 2004, 164). Both Muslims and Christians supported Mwanga, Muteesa's son who had no religious affiliation but with hope from each religious group that he will convert to their religion.

It is argued that Muslims quickly approached Mwanga and warned him that Europeans and Christians wanted to take over his kingdom since some of the converts had started disobeying his orders (ibid). To avoid loss of his leadership, in 1885, Mwanga arrested Christians and killed those who refused to renounce their faith (Faupel 2007)<sup>20</sup>. He became sceptical with

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<sup>19</sup>Oded (1975, 285) recorded this incidents in detail. He writes; "On June 30, 1880 the Kabaka got up very early in the morning in an unusually jovial mood and ordered all his chiefs to be summoned immediately. When they were all seated, he informed them that he was happy because of a dream he had the previous night. He saw the moon surrounded by ten other moons. The central moon suddenly grew bigger and bigger and when it attained an enormous size all the others made obeisance to it. At that time, Muteesa was seated on his throne in the assembly hall. Then two angles unexpectedly appeared to him and with a look of anger, which made him, tremble asked him why he had stopped reciting "Allah Akbar." They ordered him to say these words if he wished to retain his kingdom and to prosper. Muteesa immediately began to recite "Allah Akbar" and then he woke and realised that all this was a dream."(Oded 1975, 285)

<sup>20</sup>Kabaka Mwanga succeeded in killing 30 young Christians in 1885 for defying his orders. Indeed, these martyrs were honoured by Pope John Paul II's visit in 1969 and in 1993, as well Pope Francis visit in 2015. See: Faupel, F. J. 2007. *African Holocaust: The Story of Uganda Martyrs*. Nairobi: Pauline's Publication Africa, (a revised edition. First published in 1964). Muslim Martyrs see: Katumba, Ahmed and Welbourn, B. F. 1964. Muslim Martyrs of Buganda. *The Uganda Journal*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 151-163.

Muslims also and conspired to kill also their leaders. However, the plan did not prosper. The plot linked to Muslims and immediately fought Mwanga with support from Christian survivors (ibid).

Eventually, Mwanga fled the kingdom and his brother prince Kiwewa was crowned. Unfortunately, he did not enjoy the throne for long. Muslims who were strong in number and arms wanted him to be Muslim. He had to convert and accept circumcision. However, out of fear, he coincided with Christians and plotted to eliminate Muslims. Muslim found out the plan and war erupted again. Kiweewa was captured and arrested, making him rule for only three months. Christians who fought on his side were also forced to leave the kingdom (Twaddle 1972, 54).

After this victory, Muslim proceeded to crown Kalema another son of Muteesa. He had accepted Islam and circumcision. They quickly named him Rashid, and started an Islamic state with “a radical reordering of society along Islamic lines” (Ward, 1991). This victory persisted between 1888 and 1890. In early 1890s, Rashid Kalema’s rule was challenged by local Christians who with direct support from European missionaries (mainly Protestants). Reports affirm this battle was funded by Charles Stokes a British trader who supplied the Christian army with arms and ammunitions (Oded 1975, 308). Since they needed a king from Muteesa’s children as per the custom, they again asked Mwanga who had sarcastically accepted Christianity and became their standard-bearer. By late 1889, Christians managed to defeat their Muslim counterparts (Robinson 2004, 164).

The battle resulted in quite a number of scores from Muslims and many others arrested, and their property burnt to ashes. Osman Wamala, a Muslim survivor laments in an interview:

“After the defeat, Arabs locked themselves up following the example of Mackay and Mapera<sup>21</sup>, and these Europeans were in the end allowed free passage to their friends by the Muslims. But our enemies massacred the Arabs; they were burnt at their rest house at Natete, though they were guests in the country” (King, et.al 1973, 12).

Muslims who survived regrouped in Kijungute, today’s Western Uganda under another son of Muteesa, Nuh Mbogo. Rashid Kalema, their Muslim kabaka had succumbed to smallpox in the course of the struggle (Robinson 2004, 164).

Britain at this time had also dominated the area against any other contender and it was not too soon that Uganda would be declared a British protectorate in 1894 (Savege 1961, 81). Moreover, Captain Fredrick D. Lugard<sup>22</sup> (d. 1945) the representative of the Imperial British East African Company (IBEACO) in Buganda supported the Christian parties especially the Protestants to consolidate their control of the kingdom (Robinson 2004, 165). As principal administrator in the region, he allocated all positions of bureaucracy and provinces to particular leaders based on religious affiliation and Muslims<sup>23</sup> did not fare well in the new

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<sup>21</sup>This is the Luganda name of the catholic French White Father, Fr. Simeon Lourdel *mon pere*

<sup>22</sup>Fredrick Lugard was employed as British military administrator of Uganda. He was instrumental in calming down the Protestant-Catholic conflicts of early 1890s. This Protestant-Catholic conflict allegedly was fuelled up by one of the French catholic priests, Father Achte in his letter published in Europe. He wrote: “*The fight with Muhammedan was hardly over, before it became needful to begin another and far more arduous battle with the Protestants. It seemed to us to be the most opportune time to make an energetic forward movement towards the extension of Catholicism, and stirring up the dogmatic zeal of the Catholic chiefs. I will inspire the Catholic army with courage*” (in McDermott P. 1893. *British East Africa: A History and Formation of the Imperial British East African Company*. London: Chapman and Hall, (p.162). IBEACO transferred the administration rights of the territory to British government in 1893 and in 1894, Buganda became officially the British Protectorate and incorporated into broader Uganda.

<sup>23</sup>Lugard had successfully persuaded Muslims to surrender their weapons and return peacefully something, which Christian did not like. However, Christian missionary A. M. Mackay had earlier sent a letter to England containing useful information about the state of affairs in Uganda and had warned them about the threat from Muslims. He wrote: “*the Arabs in Karema’s train (meaning the defeated exiled Buganda Muslims), have intimated their intentions to invite aid of the Mahdi’s troops in Upper Sudan to enable them to take position of*

arrangement (ibid). Similar pattern continued with other British authorities that came after Lugard. It is recorded that once Sir Harry Johnston, a special commissioner for Britain in Uganda between r. 1899-1901, wrote to a Residential Commissioner (RC) in Busoga (Eastern Uganda) confirming colonial administration's stand in relation to Muslims that;

“It is not in the interest of the British government that Mohammedanism should receive any more adherents than we can help in Uganda as Muslims are proverbially difficult to manage and are always in their heart opposed to the administration of Christian power” (in King et.al 1973, 15).

Consequently, all the influential positions in the country fell in the hands of Christians. They controlled almost everything including education - the central tool for social development. In case of deficiency, they could call in money from fellow Christian friends in Europe and America to build schools and to teach their children science and technology (King et al 1973, 22). Muslims had no rescue in addition to their internal differences. In fact, after his visit to Uganda in 1953, 1963 and 1964, Joseph Schacht (1965) wrote:

“it was expressed to me, the Muslims had been reduced to the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water....in present Uganda, the Muslims as a group do not play any considerable part in Public life...they are the least educated group, they are out of white-collar jobs” (Schacht 1965, 96).

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*both [B]Unyoro and [B]Uganda. I scarily think that the fanatical dervishes who have seized Emin Pasha's province will be any more tolerant towards Muscat Arabs than they have been to Egyptians. At any time unless the Imperial British East African Company are prompt in securing some definite understanding with [B]Uganda, and are in position materially to aid the present government there, that country with all its valuable dependences may soon fall again into the hands of either the Arabs or the Mahdis” (in McDermott P. British East Africa, p.123).*

This situation continued prior to, and after independence<sup>24</sup> and the various post-colonial governments did nothing to solve the situation. The loss of Muslim powerful status within the ruling class, coupled with a lack of Western education led to a shift in their social and economic status. They largely resorted to work as butchers, taxi and bus drivers, and shopkeepers. In fact, by the time Uganda gained its independence in 1962, there were only two Muslims with bachelor's degrees in the country, the late Abubakar K. Mayanja (1929-2005) and Ally K. Kirunda (b. 1935) (Sengendo, 2004).

The colonial government also implemented the Buganda agreement of 1900 that allocated land and counties to government, religious institutions, their individual collaborative chiefs and the Kabaka in favour of their religious allies (Kateregga, 2012). Protestants and Catholics received their share, the chiefs and the king, and nothing was left for the 'Muhammedan'. The only share they could claim was given to "Prince" Nuh Mbogo. It was on this land that Mbogo gifted his co-religionists with the opportunity to build a Mosque. Moreover, in the allocation of the counties, out of the eighteen counties that make up Buganda kingdom, Muslims were allocated one small, impoverished and arid county (Kateregga, 2012). This discrimination according to Mazrui (1971), Kateregga (2012) and Chande (2008), denied Muslims access to wealth and socio-economic development and sowed widespread ill feeling towards their fellow citizens and the government. Muslims became "second class citizens" (Kiyimba, 2012), under subsequent governments following their failed attempt to establish a

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<sup>24</sup>Uganda independence in 1962 and colonial government handed over powers to Ugandans. The first ceremonial president Sir Edward Muteesa, and Milton Obote became the Prime Minister similar to British system of governance. Obote changed this system later in 1966 who became both president and prime minister.

state controlled along Islamic lines. The situation continued in the same direction until the rise of General Idi Amin in 1971 (Kiyimba, 2012; Chande, 2008).

#### **4.2.2 Amin's Regime**

The coming to power of Idi Amin was seen by Muslims in Uganda as a second chance to regain their glory. Amin took over power through a coup-d'état in January 1971 and immediately changed the politics of the country (Oded 1974, 313). Initially, his objective, method and behaviour did not reflect a person ready to change the status of his co-religionists. However, after 1972, the story changed to sway his efforts to favour Muslims (Kasumba 2015, 19). With no regard to public opinion, Amin embarked on a campaign to rejuvenate Muslim identity in the country. Muslim titular leader Badiru Kakungulu, who had just been released from the prison, sent him a congratulatory letter saying, "We Muslims have added reasons to feel grateful for your Excellency, since under the previous regimes our religion had been debased to a play thing and we had been denied the most elementary freedom of worship" (Kasumba 2015, 15).

One of the earliest points on his agenda as a Muslim president was to redress the religious imbalances created by both colonial and post-colonial governments. He started by uniting Muslims under a centralised governing body, the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) and putting all Muslim groups under his authority (Kateregga,2012; Oded 1974, 315). Muslims had been divided since the death of their first leader Prince Nuh Mbogo. Although never turning physically violent, their resentment had even caught the attention of the

colonial government (Kasumba 2015, 10).<sup>25</sup> Amin allocated 12 acres of land for UMSC in the middle of the city. While officially handing it over to Muslims, Amin proudly stated,

“The top, and undeveloped area, of Old Kampala Hill, which I have personally inspected, covers an area of 12 acres.....This will enable the supreme council to build its Headquarters there, housing the Secretariat of the council, and the offices..... I would also like to have on this land a Mosque and a Jaamiu-Esalaamia..., which I hope in time, will have branches in other parts of Uganda. The standard of this institution is equivalent to that of a university. This institution will be open to persons from other parts of the world, especially Africa, Asia and Latin America... I have played my part in trying to put religious affairs in order. I have done it for the church of Uganda and I have done it for the cause of Islam in this country. ...I say to all Moslems in this country; it is all yours. Do not let slip the wonderful opportunities...” (Amin, 1972)<sup>26</sup>

He went further to promote Muslim education in both Islamic and secular sciences. He laid the foundation for the establishment of the Islamic University in Uganda (IUIU), and various Muslim teachers’ training colleges and schools. Moreover, with the official Muslim population of less than six percent (Bozdogan, et al. 2007, 181), Uganda became a full member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which allowed the country to receive financial assistance to build mosques, schools. Furthermore, his openness to support the Palestine struggle, led to strengthen his politico-social and economic bond with the Arab

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<sup>25</sup>Kasumba (2015) and Kateregga (2012), attribute the problem to Christians led by Sir Apolo Kaggwa, the famous katikkiro of Buganda during early colonial times. For more read Kasumba, Yusuf. 2015. Islamophobia in Uganda and Kateregga, Badru. 2015. “Causes of Muslim Wrangles in Uganda”

<sup>26</sup>The speech was shared by UMSC spokesperson during fieldwork, Jan 2017.

world and the Middle East. In 1972, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia visited Uganda. This visit strengthened the relationship between Uganda and Saudi, an alliance that opened doors for young Muslim students to study at the Islamic University in Medina (Chande 2000, 355). A Great numbers of young Muslims of all levels went for Islamic studies in a University known for being the architect of Salafism.

Overall, Amin's era was the time for Muslims to flourish again in Uganda. Conversion to Islam was encouraged and highly praised by the president.<sup>27</sup> Every year, *mawlid* (festival marking the anniversary of the Prophet's birthday) celebrations were officially organised under the patronage of special envoys from the army. Reports were brought to the President from various *mawlid* celebrations with lists of new converts (Oded 1975, 315). On April 11, 1978, however, the eight years of Muslim glory was again challenged, when Amin was ousted by Tanzanian troops (Acheson-Brown 2001, 9).

#### **4.2.3 The Bloody Vengeance**

“*Twaheza omuti, amataaju naganyu*” (we have cut the tree [Amin], the branches [Muslims] are yours). This statement is attributed to the fighters who ousted Amin in April 1979 (Kiyimba 2012). Following the statement, an incident reported to have happened in June, 1979, when a mob of Christians armed with spears and machetes rounded up Muslims in Western Uganda and tied their hands behind their backs. They were then assembled at River Rwizi, and mercilessly butchered, with an Imam's head cut into three pieces before being thrown into the river (ibid). Unforgettable on this day, is an incident that occurred to Madiya Nakitende, a seven month pregnant mother. Her stomach was sliced by angry men, foetus

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<sup>27</sup>The first page of the *Voice of Uganda*, noted on Dec. 11, 1972 “four hundred fifty five people were converted to Islam during one *mawlid* which was held at the Simba Battalion Camp at Mbarara.”

removed and her remains thrown into the river. Her story was narrated by her mother a witness who survived by throwing herself into the river (ibid.). Between March and June 1979, 67 Muslims were killed in the sparsely populated Sheema district (ibid).

Similar events occurred in the northern parts of the country, such as in Arua, Koboko and Yumbe districts. In these areas, victims were both Muslims and non-Muslims from Amin's tribesmen of Kakwa/Nubi tribe (Chande 2008, 105). Irrespective of their political involvement with Amin, many lost their lives and/or properties by troops, angry neighbours and mobs. Even UN aid agencies could not grant them support as their guilt was implicitly assumed (Virmani 1996, 251). The most widely documented incident is the Ombaci massacre, for which a truth and reconciliation program has recently commenced.<sup>28</sup> Here, soldiers raided various villages in Arua and Yumbe, killing indiscriminately. They then sought those who had taken refuge at the St. Joseph Community College and at the adjacent church. More than 2,000 people were massacred by random firing and torture (Erima, 2015). In this climate of violence, persecution and mistreatment, many Ugandan Muslims and Amin's tribesmen went into exile in the forests of DRC (then Zaire) and Sudan, not to return until early 1990s (Chande 2008, 105).

### **4.3 Setting the Stage for ADF**

Amidst the political turmoil of the post-Amin years, some Muslim youths who had travelled to Middle East for studies in Islamic sciences had started to return. They were mostly from Saudi Arabia. The returnees seemed to be more vibrant and ready to articulate their newly acquired knowledge and identity not only to Muslims but also to those in power (Chande

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<sup>28</sup>For more detail about the truth and reconciliation project see; JRP Field Note, "It was only the Guns speaking, with a pool of blood flowing: The Ombaci Massacre June 24, 1981". (Gulu: Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2014).

2000, 355). Salafism is the dominant theology officially recognised by the Saudi government. The returnees had been trained in the similar theology. Their methodology or *manhaj* (as seen in Chapter two) is opposed to traditional Islam that was being practiced in Uganda by then. The theology preaches a stricter form of Islam with strong criticism of traditional Sufi practices such communal *dhikr* (remembrance of God) and *shafa'a* or intercession (Maher 2016, 14).

At the same time, in the early 1980s, the country also witnessed the arrival of *Jamaat al-Tabligh*. This movement originates from the Deobandi school of Indo-Pakistan and their preaching is directed to grass-root Muslims to 'correct' their practices and bring them in line with the 'right' Islamic teachings. The movement requires its members (mostly male) to leave their homes in small groups for varying periods, to teach and invite others to join the movement (Janson 2014; Metcalf, 1996).<sup>29</sup> Although the Salafi and Deobandi schools have substantial differences, many Salafis in Uganda became activists within the ranks of the Tabligh movement, later parting ways to start their own movement (Chande 2000, 3). For this reason, local Salafis in Uganda are called, '*abatabuliki*' literary meaning the '*Tablighs*' (FWI with Salman, Jan 2017).

They also utilised the young educated Muslims who were active in Muslim Students Associations (MSAs) especially Makerere University Muslim Students Association (MUMSA), Muslim Students Association of Uganda (MSAU) and Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly (UMYA). MUMSA represents all Muslim students of Makerere University, while MSAU unites all Muslim students in Uganda in institutions of higher learning. Then UMYA

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<sup>29</sup>Metcalf, Barbara. 1996. Islam and women: the case of the tablighi jama'at. *SEHR*, vol. 5, issue 1; also more detailed account of the movement see; Marloes Janson, "Islam, youth and modernity: the Tabligh Jama'at in Gambia" London: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

unites all Muslim intellectuals. For this reason, it is not a coincidence that the main members in UMYA have either been leaders in one of the two aforementioned associations. These elites with members such as Imam Kasozi<sup>30</sup>, Abasi Kiyimba<sup>31</sup>, Husein Kyanjo<sup>32</sup> were active in raising awareness of the current happenings in the Muslim world to the Muslim youths of Salafi trend in mosques during late 1980s and early 1990s (FWI, December 10, 2016).<sup>33</sup>

Salafis intensified their activities that included preaching against what they assumed to be *bid'a*. This tempted the old folks (*bazeyi*) to deny them access to main Mosques. For that reason, they began conducting their activities in open places and in some few mosques that allowed their teachings (FWI, January 15, 2017). By late 1980s, the movement had gained support from young Muslims in central and eastern parts of Uganda. “Whenever, the *bazeyi* chased us in their mosques, we looked for another space to teach our people. We called it open university, travelled in every part of the country preaching the sunna of the prophet” (ibid).

Important to note is the group’s involvement in the inter-religious debates. This had remarkable effects so much so that in 1984, a Church catechist Steven Kyagulanyi converted

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<sup>30</sup>Kasozi, is currently the vice chairman UMYA and Imam at Mawanga Mosque, Munyonyo (Kampala suburb). He is also a sociology lecturer at IUIU.

<sup>31</sup>Kiyimba is the current chairperson of UMYA and Professor of literature at Makerere University-Kampala.

<sup>32</sup>Kyanjo graduated from Makerere University in late 1980s. He was active in MUMSA, MSAU and UMYA. He joined active politics and served as opposition Member of Parliament for two terms (2005-2010) and (2011-2015) where he served as a shadow minister for presidency. He was very vocal and critical to the government. In August 2014, *Daily Monitor* described him as “one of the brightest lights of 9<sup>th</sup> parliament” and “most vicious figures”. He is now suffering from dystonia, which he said was a poison he got in his parliamentary trip to Johannesburg South Africa. See: Mpagi, M. Charles. 2014. Kyanjo Opens Up on his ‘Poison’ Scare. *The Daily Monitor*, May 3, from <http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/Life/MP-Kyanjo-opens-up-on-his--poison--scare/689856-2302658-1py936/index.html>, retrieved on July 23, 2017.

<sup>33</sup>See also Mukisa, Farahan. 2015. Recounting Attack on Uganda Muslim Supreme Council Headquarters. *The Daily Monitor*, August 4.

to Islam. Kyagulanyi was later to be called Jamilu Mukulu the founder of ADF movement. After his conversion, he immediately began learning Islam with the local Salafi sheikhs. They later applied for scholarship for him in Saudi Arabia, where he took a two-year Arabic language course. When he returned home, he started preaching right away. His charisma and rhetoric made him to receive huge number of followers especially from the youths (FWI, 2017).

The Salafi mission came to its pivotal moment upon the increased Muslim leadership wrangles at UMSC. It is important to not to forget that, the fall of Amin led to collapse of UMSC leadership as well as Muslim unity in the country (Kateregga 2012). Tribalism took up its course again, between Baganda and non-Baganda tribes each claiming leadership. In late 1980s, it was between Sheikh Rajab Kakooza (Buganda) tribe and Sheikh Saad Luwemba (Busoga). Salafis supported Kakooza not only because he was from Buganda but also because he had also studied Islamic sciences extensively compared to his counterpart. He studied in Pakistan and Medina University for high school and undergraduate respectively as well as in Egypt's al-Azhar for post-graduate studies. Luwemba had not gone much far in education compared to Kakooza. Besides that, youths accused Luwemba of being a follower of Shia branch of Islam.

The two sheikhs went into numerous court battles each one claiming to be the legitimate leader of Ugandan Muslims. Finally, the magistrate court confirmed Luwemba and ordered Kakooza to quit UMSC headquarters. This event was the catalyst that transformed the first generation of reformist Salafis in Uganda, led by Jamilu Mukulu, into a full-fledged jihad-Salafi movement (Chande 2000, 356). For Mukulu and Salaf youths, Kakooza was better than

Luwemba. In fact, they used to say '*tetuyinza kujawo mulwadde ate netussawo omufu*' (loosely meaning 'we cannot replace a sick (Kakooza) for a dead (Luwemba)' (FWI, 2017).

#### **4.3.1 Attack at UMSC**

Exploiting Muslim political and religious fragmentation, on Wednesday March 22, 1991, more than 500 Muslim youths attacked the UMSC headquarters and took it over (Abbey 1991). The attackers claimed for the need to rescue Muslim independence from government interests and to purify the National mosque from the leadership of 'non-Muslims'. It should be noted that, the March 1991 attack at UMSC was the second time. They had tried to occupy the premises previously in 1990, only to leave after government intervention. Hajat Syda Bbumba (treasury manager in Uganda Development Bank but later became a government minister) on behalf of the government had successfully convinced the youths to vacate UMSC peacefully, with a promise that the government would solve their discomfort with the Muslim leadership in an amicable manner as soon as possible. However, sources from the interviewees affirm that the plan was already unveiled in 1989 in Bombo (21Km from Kampala along Kampala-Gulu Road) at Haji Kadara mosque, in a secret meeting of Salafi top leaders from all over the country. The meeting had resolved, among other things, to elect their own leader who will be different from the UMSC leader, and to establish a jihad wing which will take over the country from non-Muslims, but which would start with cleansing the UMSC headquarters from "people of *bid'a*".

Those who attended the meeting include, among others: Yunus Kamoga;<sup>34</sup> Jamilu Mukulu; Muhammad Kiggundu; Abdulkarim Sentamu;<sup>35</sup> my interviewee (name withheld on request).

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<sup>34</sup>Prior to full engagement into Salafi leadership, Kamoga was a businessperson in Kampala and locally trained salafi.

They elected leaders like Yunus Kamoga as an official Amir (*amir* known by the public) and Jamilu Mukulu as speaker, but also as the secret Amir for the jihad wing. As the head of Jihad wing, according to the Bombo meeting Jamilu Mukulu became the overall Amir for all Salafis in Uganda, a decision that later led to a huge controversy among Salafis when Kamoga, the official Amir for the public, renounced violence and plans for jihad.

During preparations for the second attack of UMSC, both Kamoga and Jamilu - the two leaders - had addressed the angry youths in a lecture that lasted for two hours at Nakasero mosque, the main Salafi mosque in Uganda. In his address, Mukulu reminded the youths about the mismanagement of Muslim properties spearheaded by leaders of UMSC. He appealed to his followers to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Islam. He reminded the youth about the incident at UMSC in 1990, and that they were assured by the government not be victimised after withdrawing from UMSC. However, later Kamoga was sued for damaging UMSC property, which was tantamount to dishonouring the agreement (FWI, 2016).

Using persuasion and rhetoric tools, Mukulu informed the angry youths that the government was planning to grant the Muslim headquarters - the only prime property Muslims own in the city-to “non-Muslim Shias using Sheikh Luwemba” (FWI, 2016). This ‘moved’ the angry youths who viewed Shi’ism as a greater enemy to Islam than anything else (ibid). In fact, almost all Salafis share this view globally. Jihad-Salafis such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabab apply this animosity by killings and bombing of Shia mosques (Cockburn 2015, 2). Whereas non-violent ‘Purists’, make them the main subject of their criticism as the case with Saudi-Iran conflict. Thus on their march to the UMSC, youths were chanting *Allah Akbar*

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<sup>35</sup>He is a Medina graduate and hadith specialist. He avoided main leadership but he was the most learned among the salafis. He was so respected within salafi ranks, so much so, that when they broke away as we shall see, all the factions continued to respect him.

(Allah is great) and saying “we cannot accept such ruling, how can Luwemba ‘*omukubi webitabo*’ (‘fortune-teller’) and a Shia, who believes in *Mawlid*, and ‘*okwabya enyimbe*’ (traditional funeral ceremonies) be our leader?” (Nsereko, 2017).

On this fateful day, youths occupied the UMSC Mosque and headquarters kicked out the acting mufti Kakooza. The government engaged and pleaded with the youths to respect the judgement and vacate the premises unconditionally, but all was in vain. The occupation lasted for three consecutive days. As Mukulu was engaged in other duties, Kamoga, Sentamu, Kiggundu and other Salafi leaders finally accepted government demands. However, Mukulu, who missed the meeting, rejected the proposal. He immediately rushed and addressed the youths about the plot that will let their struggle and sacrifice yield to nothing. He cautioned them not to take heed of anyone including Kamoga and Sentamu who will try to change their intentions. He lamented, “This is either victory or martyrdom” (FWI, 2017).

Mukulu further scoffed at Salafi Amir (for general public), Kamoga and Sentamu (their respected hadith scholar) for taking such decision without consulting him, the overall leader. Because according to Bombo meeting, Jamilu Mukulu, the Amir of Jihad wing had to be consulted for any decision that involves fighting. Because he was the overall Amir for all Salafis in Uganda, according to the meeting. At this moment, “many of us decided to remain with Jamilu Mukulu, willingly or unwillingly to avoid falling among the ‘hypocrites’ who disobey the commander of the Muslim army” said one of the interlocutors who was part of the movement since its inception in 1989.

The situation intensified and eventually, the government responded as expected by sending riot police (Abbey 1991; Young 2015, 186), which failed to force the youth out of the UMSC

headquarters (FWI, 2017). At the end of the confrontation, four police officers, one attacker and four canine dogs were killed (Ssegawa 2015). Later, the government reinforced the police with a military police who later overpowered the Salafi youths, leading to the arrest of over 400 youths including Jamilu Mukulu, Muzafar Mulinde, among others (FWI 2016). Other leaders such as Kamoga, Sentamu, Kiggundu were not arrested as they had previously accepted government proposal and vacated the premises.

#### **4.3.2 Rebellion Plan Hatches**

While in prison, Mukulu met Joseph Lusse, a businessperson, who had been arrested on treason charges. He advised Jamilu to turn his group into an armed force. However, this was just an additional trigger to Mukulu, since he had already endorsed the ‘master plan’ for an ‘Islamic Uganda’ in the Bombo meeting few months before attacking and occupying UMSC headquarters. . In this case, the prison was the hatching centre. In fact, the group had started training some youths using Kiguuddu’s garden in Namagoma. According to my interlocutors, during the day, youths under training, could pretend to be engaged in brick making project, while at night military training take course. This training had already started in early 1990 few months after Bombo meeting.

Furthermore, Jamilu identified some Salafi members in the prison who had served in the National Resistance Army-NRA (currently called UPDF). These included Kigozi Swaib alias Kasangaki to avail the jihadists with military skills. Jamilu unveiled his plans saying, “Comrades, you know we cannot oust *ahl-bidaa* (‘innovators’ i.e. Sufi sheikhs), they have government support and if we are to succeed, we should start with the government” (FWI, 2016).

Other Salafis who survived the arrest, remained indoors hiding, while others including Kamoga –the Amir, and their respected hadith scholar Abdulkarim Sentamu fled into exile for fear of government arrest that followed UMSC attacks. The salafi community was left with no leader and their mosque was now occupied by the *bazeyi* (elders)-their main rival by then. Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto<sup>36</sup> a member and Salafi preacher had been in Riyadh for studies during the UMSC attacks. On his return in 1992, few of the Salafis re-organised and asked Kakeeto to act as their Amir. Kakeeto narrates:

“When I finished studies in Saudi Arabia and returned, I found so many problems here (i.e in Salafi community). More than 400 tablighs[salafis] were in prison and Nakasero Mosque (Salafi mosque), was occupied by elderly(non-Salafis). Those few who were not arrested had relocated to Katwe-Kinyoro mosque in Kisenyi, that is where they had their prayers. Others stayed indoor, in fear of being arrested because the situation was so fragile. Sheikh (Sulaiman) Ssesanga suggested that we mobilise people [salafis] to go back to Nakasero mosque. From there we would also mobilize

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<sup>36</sup>Sheik Sulaiman Kakeeto is now the leader of Uganda Tabliq Community (UTC), a salafi group that was formed in 1992 by the youths who survived UMSC arrests in 1991 and other Salafi returnees who had not been in the country during the attacks. However, in 1995, UTC also split out due to leadership wrangles within Salafi scholars in the country. Some members of the group such as Sheikh Abdulkarim Sentamu, Sheikh Abdulkarim Sekimpi, among others asked Kakeeto to resign and make way for new leadership but he refused. They decided to break away from him and formed another salaf group called the jamu’at al-Dawa al-Salafiyya and Sheikh Sekimpi became their acting Amir (Amir al-Umma). In 2008, Yunus Kamoga returned from exile, joined Sekimpi’s team. He was immediately reinstated as their Amir. In 2011, Kamoga and his team forcefully occupied Nakasero Mosque, which houses UTC headquarters and chased away Sheikh Kakeeto. To prevent violence between the two factions, the government intervened and requested the two parties to choose a neutral imam. However, Kakeeto was not allowed by Kamoga’s team to occupy his offices again. He was only accepted to pray in the mosque. His offices are now located few meters away from Nakasero mosque. In 2015, the two factions agreed to bury their differences and work together for common goal. See for more: Kiggundu, Joseph, and Ssenakbirwa Al-Mahd. 2011. Kakeeto thrown out as Muslims foil Nakasero Mosque Demolition. *The New Vision*, January 13. Accessed on August 29, 2017 from <http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/2466686-1088982-format-xhtml-ljm54cz/index.html>, on Kamoga’s return see: Olita, Rauben and Tebajjukira, Madinah. 2008. Kenya Deports Uganda Muslim Cleric. *The New Vision*, December 1. Accessed on August 29, 2017, from [http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\\_vision/news/1175918/kenya-deports-ugandan-muslim-cleric](http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1175918/kenya-deports-ugandan-muslim-cleric).

resources to help those in prison and their families. The main challenge then was there was no leader; they approached me and asked me to become their leader. I turned down the offer because the group they wanted me to lead was comprised of aggressive people; I told them that I am naturally mild and could not match the pace of their aggressiveness. They continued pushing me, Sheikh Muhammad [Yunus] Kamoga and Sheikh Abdul-Karim Ssentamu had exiled themselves in Kenya. They both wrote persuading me to become the Amir. With too much pleading from several people, I accepted. The uphill task ahead of me was primarily to solicit assistance for people in prison and their families and to get a lawyer who can take up the case of prisoners. With help from Muslims, we got a lawyer and he took the case, they started releasing the prisoners slowly. The prisoners would walk from Luzira (maximum) prison to Nakasero Mosque, from where we would give them aid to their home” (FWI, 2017).

At this moment, Salafi was getting a new face and approach under Kakeeto’s leadership. In a bid to become autonomous from UMSC, Salafis also registered their organisation as Uganda Tabliq Community. They owned their mosques and conducted programs with Nakasero Mosque as their headquarters. Furthermore, Kakeeto with his team agreed on means to end tension with UMSC leadership. Kakeeto narrates:

“I opted for a liberal approach and I went to UMSC and met the Mufti Saad Luwemba and requested to work with him. Luwemba thought I was looking for another way of overthrowing UMSC again...we talked for very long time and he finally accepted to work with us. I requested him to allow the deputy Imam of the UMSC to come from

our side, he accepted and we sent there, Sheikh Abdu Mubiru, the rest remained at Nakasero as our base” (ibid).

After successfully reconciled with UMSC, Kakeeto and his team turned to the government. They wanted an instant end to the tension between Salafis and the government. The government was still sceptical of all Salafi youths. They opted to ask the government to recognise their presence as Muslims youths with an autonomous leadership similar to UMSC. This recognition required the government to grant the Amir a vehicle, and a VIP passport. Kakeeto recounts:

“I was the Amir of the country but riding on a bicycle whenever I needed to attend any function. The board members of Nakasero resolved to meet the president, and request him to give our Amir a vehicle, and a VIP passport, a Bus to transport our Imams, among other things. He welcomed our move to work with government; he gave us a vehicle, double cabin and a VIP passport. Our relationship with the president and the government improved drastically” (FWI, 2017).

When the news of a reconciliation program reached Salafis in prison, Mukulu immediately snubbed the move. To them such alliance with non-Muslim president and ‘Luwemba’ (whom they branded to be a Shia) could not be accepted. Jamilu as recounted by one of the informants “had another plan for us” (FWI, 2017). It should be noted that, besides rejection of *bid’a*, and takfir, the concept of ‘*al-wala’ wa-l-bara’*’, is one of the necessary characteristics for jihad-Salafists (Maher 2016, 13). The concept refers to loving and hating for the sake of Allah. In jihadist understanding, ‘*al-wala’ wa-l-bara’*’ requires one to ally only with the Salafis whenever they are found against disbelievers even if it is against their own relatives. Interestingly, later, Jamilu also accepted alliance with non-Salafi and non-Muslim groups,

which lead to the formation of what today known as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as we shall see in few paragraphs to come.

Mukulu was released in 1994 with his indoctrinated team and reunited with other detainees who preceded his release. They formed a more radical group and immediately started preaching hate messages against Museveni and mainstream Salafis. They further defied Kakeeto's leadership that had charted a new path for the Salafi movement. Kakeeto had denounced violence and helped establish the Salafi movement as an autonomous religious group with its own mosques (FWI, 2016).<sup>37</sup> Mukulu immediately denounced Kakeeto's moderate policies, and in August 1994 formed his own movement, the *Salafi Foundation*, which initially drew followers from youths who had spent time in prison (FWD, 2017).<sup>38</sup>

Sheikh Kakeeto recounts:

“When the last group came out of the prison, they started abusing us that we are pagans. They were led by Sheikh Jamilu Mukulu. Whenever they came to Nakasero Mosque to pray, they would stand aside and wait until we finish our Salah [Muslim daily obligatory prayer], then they would pray alone saying we cannot pray with pagans. We reached a point and asked them to leave our mosque if we are not Muslims, so that they can pray in a place where there are Muslims. They refused. Sheikh Abdulkarim [Sentamu] was the leader of Imams; we sat and resolved to flog them if they come back. They came back during Isha' prayer, our boys were ready with lashes, when they were in the middle of prayer, and the boys flogged them, and

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<sup>37</sup>Also, see: Chande, “Radicalism and reform in East Africa”, p. 356.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

rushed, never to come back. When these people left Nakasero, they set up their base at Mengo from where they continued to launch verbal attacks against us” (FWI, 2017).

#### **4.3.3 Formation of Salaf Jihad Council (Sajico)**

Mengo, a Kampala suburb, became the centre for Mukulu and his activities. Faithful to his objective, Mukulu started to put his recruitment plan into action (FWI, 2017). It was at Mengo (Kampala), in August 1994, that a national executive committee was elected. Jamilu Mukulu retained his previous position as the overall Amir and head of the Jihad wing. They further agreed to name the jihad wing as Salafi Jihad Council, under the leadership of Jamilu Mukulu. This is an interesting fact, because “Jihadi-Salafis” is usually considered to have been adopted as a self-appellation by militant Salafi movements, only a term is used only at a later stage, and reluctantly. According to Hegghammer (2010), most Jihadist movements refrain from using this term: “if we examine the jihadist literature more closely, the term is not nearly widely used as a self-appellation as often assumed. For starters, some of the actors most closely associated with the term, have themselves distanced from it” (Hegghammer, 2010: 252).

Based on the outcome of my fieldwork, we can conclude that Jamilu Mukulu’s movement might have been one of the first, or perhaps even the first, Salafi-Jihadist movements to use the term as a self-appellation. This claim is supported by an interview conducted on January 5, 2017, with an informant who was an active member of the movement since its inception (FWI, 2017). Moreover, most studies on Islam in Africa tend to see African Muslims as mere recipients of ideas developed elsewhere. This findings of my thesis, on contrary, and similar to what has been done by Chanfi Ahmed (2015), in his study of the contribution of West Africans to early Salafism in Medina. Indeed, both findings demonstrates the agency of

African Muslims and their capacity to appropriate and develop the language of Muslim theology in ways that, in this particular case, are even precursors of similar developments in the rest of the Muslim world. The table below illustrates the rest of the members of the jihad committee.

**Table 3: Illustrating Salaf Jihad Council**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>
Jamilu Mukulu	Amir/Chief of Staff
Ismail Buikwe	Deputy Amir/in charge of morals and prayers (dawa)
Swaibu Kigozi alias Kasangaki	Director of Intelligence
Muhammad Kasira	Member
Abdallah Yusuf	Member/in charge for acquisition of arms and purchase

Source: *Field Data, 2017*

The table illustrates top leadership of Salaf Foundation of 1994.

**Table 4: Illustrating national executive committee for Salaf Foundation in 1994**

<b>No.</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>
1	Jamilu Mukulu	Overall Amir/Chief judge
2	Muzafar Mulinde	Amir public affairs (similar to Kamoga)
3	Abdalla Yusuf	Chief Prosecutor
4	Ismael Buikwe	Amir Da'wa
5	Sharif Mukyotala	Treasurer
6	Idris Mugalula	Advisor

Source: *Filed Data 2016*

In addition to the above, the National Executive Committee for the Salaf Foundation had other coordinators in the different districts all over Uganda. These coordinators could assist in recruitment exercises to boost operations for the Salaf Jihad Council. According to my informant, the recruiters were instructed to do their work based on both ideological and financial persuasion tactics.

Interestingly, besides having experienced killers and assassins organised in command structure ready for rebellion, this committee acted as a fully-fledged government in selected areas, where the implementation of strict Sharia laws was expected to be enforced by all abiding members. In the presence of Jamilu Mukulu, the chief judge, Abdallah Yusuf used to be in charge of executing penalties for offenses that requires punishments like flogging (80 lashes for fornication, and 40 lashes for alcohol-drinking). The Council limited itself to flogging and refrained from executing penalties like amputation and stoning) in order to avoid attracting the attention of the government. Several instances of flogging of unmarried members of the group who confessed fornication occurred according to my informants. All this was carried in their mosque in Mengo (FWI, 2016). For adulterers, a record was kept. They were to be stoned at a later stage when the country acquire Sharia laws.

On this note, one of my respondent recalls, “We had a special book in which all names of those who confessed adultery were noted. They had made *tawba* (repentance) and were asking us (leaders) to cleanse them from sins. Therefore, we decided to keep a special book with names of all offenders promising them that when we would establish an Islamic state, the Sharia law will take its course as required. And indeed, we stoned some of them later who joined our Islamic state in the DRC forests” (FWI, 2016).

Besides implementing Sharia law, the Council also operated its own meat abattoirs under the supervision of representatives of the national executive committee. This was because the group believed that any meat slaughtered by other Muslims was not to be considered *halal* (lawful). In Uganda, Muslims operate all public abattoirs, and the UMSC is responsible for coordinating the Muslim butchers who operated in these abattoirs. Having delegitimized the

leadership of the UMSC as “un-Islamic”, it was natural for the Council to also establish its separate informal abattoirs.

To improve their economic status, Sharif Mukyotara, their treasurer, who owned shops in Kampala city, reserved one of the rooms for the group’s official work. They went ahead and started a business dealing in importation of cars and spare parts. Mukulu ordered some youths to start armed robberies aimed at boosting their business. They targeted small and large-scale businesses and shop owners. Highway robbery was cheered in which some innocent lives were murdered in due course. “We killed many innocent lives in this initial stage” regretted one of the interviewees as tears dropped. “It was really *jahali* [ignorance]” (FWI, 2016). Members also targeted armed police officers and security guards for gun collection plans. The weapons were to be used in the jihad against the Ugandan government. In fact, during my archival research, I encountered numerous stories of anonymous robberies against business stores, and banks, as well as murders of police officers, being recorded in the *New Vision* and the *Daily Monitor* newspapers between 1994 and 1997. It is possible that at least some of these events are to be connected to the activities of the Mukulu’s men.

#### **4.3.4 Rebellion Plots Link**

With the idea of transforming Uganda into an Islamic state at the back of their minds, Mukulu and his group found Buseruka as a suitable ground for training. Buseruka is an area in Western Uganda (in Hoima district) with a thick and impenetrable forests. Hoima town is approximately 225km from Kampala and Buseruka is 40km away from Hoima town. February 25 1995, is the day recounted by Brig. Godfrey K. Taban, a UPDF commander of the second division, who commanded the first attack against Salaf Training Camp in

Buseruka. On this day, the UPDF smashed Mukulu's training camp, killing one hundred and capturing only twelve. Brig. Taban narrates:

“There was a young man who was grazing cattle in the area and had seen people training. In the area, there was a cave in the lower plains of Hoima. The people training had asked the man to supply them with milk. The boy became our contact and guided our people to the exact location. He was taken to Masindi (a nearby district) where Kashaka was the commander. When the Mzee (President Museveni) rang me to prepare a force of two companies (about 300 soldiers), we readied a well-prepared force for operation under the late Emanuel Ruuija. The herdsboy was the guide and was picked from Hoima. The forces found Mukulu's men on parade. Going down from the uphill to the valley was not easy, because the rebels could see you from their camp below. When our forces attacked, many rebels were put out of action, some were captured and Mukulu escaped with some men via Lake Albert into DRC. The forces also captured some ammunition including guns, but also Quran and pamphlets in Arabic with ADF doctrine.” (Ssegawa, 2015).<sup>39</sup>

Contrary to Brig. Taban's narration, one of my interviewee, who was also one of the twelve people captured by Brig. Taban's brigade, does not believe that Mukulu was present in the camp at the time the Buseruka incident took place. He rather confirms the alternative reports according to which Mukulu was always in Kampala recruiting (FWI, 2017). Another member of SaJiCo (ADF), whom I interviewed in Kampala on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2017, confirms this argument too. This member said:

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<sup>39</sup>This interview is recorded in monitor newspaper see: Account of the UPDF General who ordered first Attack on ADF. *The Daily Monitor*, August 7, 2015.

“I was one of the few who received news of Buseruka attack within the SaJiCo camp that was operating in Kampala. Of course, it was not a surprise because security agents had arrested one of our members, Abdulkarim Lukolero, while transporting food to Buseruka camp. On receiving the news of Lukolero’s arrest, Sheikh (Mukulu) fled to Kenya just a day before the Buseruka incident. He completely knew that government will immediately target him for arrest, since Lukolero was known to be member of the Salaf Foundation” (FWI, 2017).

The Buseruka incident prompted the government to start arresting members of Salafi Foundation/SaJiCo, including Sheikh Muzafar Mulinde, the Salafi Foundation Amir.

“Those of us who survived security arrest kept on hiding. Hassan Waliggo, who had survived the Buseruka attack, returned from Congo, informing us that Sheikh (Mukulu) was in Congo and has ordered all SaJiCo/Salafi foundation members to join him as soon as possible. On hearing this information, we all left, leaving out only those who were responsible for the recruitment project” (FWI, 2017).

#### **4.3.5 Formation of Allied Democratic Forces**

Prior to Buseruka incident, the Salafi fighting group was not called ADF. It was known within their own circles as *SaJiCo* (Salaf Jihad Council). However, in DRC, Salafis found other dissidents of Ugandan origin. These included National Army for Liberation of Uganda (NALU) among others. With consent and support from Mobutu Seseko (d. 1997) the DRC president by then, Mukulu and his team formed an alliance with NALU in Bunia, eastern DRC in June 1995 (FWI, 2017). Formed in 1986, NALU is a composition of both political movements and marginalised populations in Western Uganda who shared opposition to Museveni’s government (Prunier 2004, 383). They largely operated across the border in

DRC's Beni and Lubero territories where its members shared ethnic ties and longstanding political and economic links with DRC's Nande community (Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1193). They had carried out some attacks between 1990 and 1992 in Uganda but remained an ineffectual fighting force until their alliance with Mukulu hence formation of ADF.

Immediately after the alliance, Salafi-Jihadist youths dominated the force. Now the question rises. Salafis believe in *al-wala wa al-bara'*, how can they form alliance with non-Salafis, and more so non-Muslim. This requires a little of explanation. I asked my respondents this similar question and received divergent answers. One interviewee said;

“We were weakened by Buseruka attack and the arrest of our members in Kampala. We could not put up any resistance. We had no weapons, even no food to feed...just know we had nothing! Here, we had to pretend first, as non-Muslims to fit in the NALU camp or people who do not have any Islamic agenda, but just people who were fed up of Museveni's government. This could help us fit in their ranks. We called this camouflaging. We started drinking alcohol, eating pork to make sure that no one can recognise our identity. However, one or two members remained with their identity strategically to take up the role of converting us to Islam. So, after few weeks, one by one started 'converting' day until we were all back to our normal days. But we did all what a non-Muslim does.....unfortunately, some members got addicted, and some were later executed for indiscipline cases caused by drug addiction” (FWI, 20016).

Analysis of the above quote raises some answers to the question, why Salafis make alliance with non-Muslims to the extent of even hiding their identity. It seems alliance was permissible considering their status at the time. However, later when other Salaf members

from Kampala joined them, their number increased which gave them audacity to reveal their identity. In fact, on the sixth, January 2017 interviewee, when asked about this question, he said, “we allied with them, but they were under our control”. He affirmed, “We do the alliance with non-Muslims as long as the top leadership remains in us, this gives us room to command the rule of Islam within the camps and enhance conversion” (FWI, 2017).

By mid-2000s, former NALU diehards had either left the movement or converted to Islam and remained with ADF Salafis (Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1193). Moreover, by early 2000s, the ADF had established a well-organised society in the forest, Northeast of Beni that borders Uganda with DRC. Amidst regular military operations by both Uganda army, ADF leadership maintained a series of ‘sharia-governed’ camps that contained mosques, schools, health centres, courts, police force, an internal security force, and a prison (ibid). They also maintained regular relations with local business and political leaders as well as contacts with national and international financiers. All this in pursuance of overthrowing the Ugandan government and establishing of an Islamic state.

Over the past decades, ADF’s threat to the Kampala government has reduced. According to the United Nations Security Council report of 2014, ADF now has concentrated on maintaining cohesion within the members with harsh punishment to anyone who escapes. The leaders are now more focused on survival in DRC than overthrowing Ugandan government. They have ceased making public proclamations, stayed away from social media and tightly control movement within the camp, allowing very few members to travel outside their ‘controlled territories’ (UN Security Council, 2014). This has reduced the number of escapees and by 2014, just before a major military operation, ADF force was estimated to be

between 1600 to 2500 men, women and children (Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1194). In April 2015, Jamilu Mukulu was arrested in Dar es Salaam Tanzania where he was living since June 2014.

In general, ADF has been generally weakened but not defeated. Chances of regrouping and rebuilding are many, with Mukulu or without him. It has more commanders who typically do not involve into combat operations but help them survive the attacks (FWI, 2017). Although the government hailed Mukulu's arrest as "the latest in the string of victories we have registered against ADF", the group continues to freely operate in DRC. Funded by mainly UK Salafis of Ugandan origin, ADF remains a great threat to peace in the region (Bagala, 2015).

#### **4.4 ADF Infamous incidents**

##### **4.4.1 First ADF Attack**

On November 13, 1996, about 600 ADF armed with rifles launched their first 'official' attack on three main locations; Mpondwe, Karambi and Bweera. They overpowered the Uganda army that guards this boarder and occupied the area for three uninterrupted days. Under the command of Abdullah Yusuf, Kasangaki and one of my interviewee, ADF continued progressing with hope of capturing Kasese District. "We never wanted to go back in DRC. Our plan was to cut off Kasese district and establish a base where we could easily get supplies using the Kasese airbase" (FWI, 2017). "We zealously fought hoping Kasese to fall into our control" (ibid).

However, UPDF re-organised and responded mercilessly killing more than two hundred, and capturing eleven. Many of the ADF fighters committed suicide to avoid captivity "Our boys had grenades to die with rather than surrendering to the enemy" (FWI, 2017). The army also

recovered about 96 SMG guns, five RPG, 2 LGs, 20 hand Grenades, 22 pieces of 40mm MGL (Multiple Grenade Launcher), among others (Ssegawa 2015). Finally, UPDF forced ADF rebels to retreat to DRC. However, on their way, they planted landmines, which later maimed many peasant farmers of the area.

Having lost Kasese base, ADF began carrying out terror attacks in Kampala and other major cities in Uganda. They mainly targeted government officials, army officers and sometimes civilians. Grenades and bombs started to explode from bars, restaurants and public buses. In response, the government security agencies embarked on indiscriminate arrest of suspected members of ADF. Many Muslims went missing and extra-judicial tortures in what the security agencies called 'safe houses' became the norm of the day. The situation worsened after the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bomb attacks on the two American embassies in August 1998. Uganda CID, ISO and FBI employed all torture measures as a means of forcing the suspects to affirm their connection with ADF. "They could hung and tie you upside down then mercilessly beat you up as well as immersing you into a tank of water plus threats of executions" recalls one of the respondents (FWI 2016, 2017). They were denied to seek any justice and journalist who came out to report about such activities were intimidated<sup>40</sup> (Taylor, 1998).

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<sup>40</sup>Kevin Aliro is one of the victims who was intimidated by security agents for publishing a story on the torture in the *daily monitor* in 1998. The story entitled "*Safe Houses-Return to Shadows*" was narrating 14 year old boy of Somali origin who was detained for one month with intensive torture late to be found innocent. See: Cliff Taylor, "Ugandan abuses bring regime of fear back to heart of Africa", *Independent*, 12 November 1998. Accessed July 26, 2017, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ugandan-abuses-bring-regime-of-fear-back-to-heart-of-africa-1184381.html>

#### **4.4.2 Kichwamba Massacre**

Abduction of civilians was another tactic used by ADF. The most haunting was the Kichwamba Technical College attack that left more than 80 students burnt in dormitories while kidnapping more than one hundred. The attack according to my interviewee who happened to be one of the field commanders at that time aimed at getting more reinforcement for their army. He also denied burning students in dormitories. He said, it was UPDF that burnt the dormitories only to accuse ADF as propaganda tool to tarnish its record (FWI, 2017). However, Joab Kiganda Jr now 37yrs, one of the survivors recounts;

“The first week of June 1998, we received information that ADF rebels had camped at the top of Mountain Rwenzori in a forest. We told a UPDF officer in charge of security in Uganda Technical College Kichwamba. He told us that they had enough security and we should not get scared, that they would repulse them if they come. On Sunday evening (June 7, 1998), my friend Ivan who was a cubical mate woke me up to go for preps. I told him that I was tired and wanted to sleep.... In an hour’s time we heard gun shots along Bundibujjo Road, the rebels were chanting songs, and sounded like they were in big number. The UPDF resisted for about 10 minutes but they were overpowered. The first thing the rebel did when they reached our campus was to burn the school lorry. I saw them myself, they shot at the transformer and at the generator and the power went off. I was peeping through the window as it was coming close to 6:30am and the darkness was clearing.

The rebels first camped between dormitories.... They were speaking English, Luganda, Rutooro, and Swahili asking students to come out...We could hear a lady commander giving orders. They told students to come out because they had come to liberate us but students refused. They started shooting indiscriminately. They started

burning three dormitories.... A big number of students were abducted.... They (rebels) were standing on doors guarding the burning dormitories as others took the abducted students. The number of rebels was large and they were dressed in green army uniforms. The rebel guarding our dormitory had been put off by the soot which was enveloping the area. We opened and escaped through Kahaya South route to the school farm. We were many students fleeing and when the rebels saw us they shot at us and one of our friends was killed. The operation took about one hour. We could now only view the burning dormitory and our abducted colleagues being taken uphill on the opposite mountain as it was getting to 7:30am” (Basime, 2015).

In August 1997, a similar incident had happened in St. John Seminary, a catholic institute that trained future priests. Many who dared to escape were killed, while others were abducted. ADF also attacked a prison in Katojo, Fort Portal in which more than 360 prisoners were freed in 1999 and others abducted (IRIN, 1999).<sup>41</sup>

#### **4.4.3 Killing of Muslim Clerics**

On Friday, April 23, 2012, shortly after his Friday Question & Answer session and *Isha* (late evening) prayers, at around 9:00pm, Sheikh Abdulkarim Sentamu was shot dead by unknown gunmen at William Street Mosque in Kampala city (The Observer, 2012). In one of his last public appearances, Sentamu had earlier informed his audience about intimidations he received, unless he stopped “speaking about Jihad”<sup>42</sup> Ugandan security pointed out on ADF

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<sup>41</sup>See more on abduction by an escapee Baluku who was abducted from St. John seminar: “*TUWAYE: Baluku eyawambibwa aba ADF*” on [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvB3OEmuZ\\_I](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvB3OEmuZ_I) retrieved on July 26, 2017.

<sup>42</sup>See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aekSyYLBWEQ>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPdQc1Cajkg> accessed on September 8, 2016. This is a full video of Ssentamu’s last public appearance, few minutes before his death.

as the primary suspects (Chimpreports, 2012). Sentamu's murder was only a prelude to the death of other scholars in Uganda. After his death, many Salafi clerics that are opposed to the Salafi version of Mukulu have been gunned down in similar incidents (World Bulletin, 2015). In 2014, Dr. Abdulkadir Muwaya, leader of Shia community, was also murdered on Christmas Eve at his home in Mayuge district, Eastern Uganda (Kakamwa, 2014). He was known for supporting lots of poor families and the spreading of Shia doctrine in the county through his involvement in charitable programs that supports poor families in logistics and finance.

Concisely, this section has attempted to provide the historical background of the ADF movement. From here, it can be deduced that pre and post-colonial social and political events had a lot to do with the creation of ADF. These deductions are going to be elaborated more in the next concluding chapter. Even though, Mukulu is in prison, ADF is still a strong force and remain a threat to regional peace and security.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Conclusion

The study has attempted to document and interpret the rise of ADF, a Muslim militant movement operating in Uganda as well as its recent developments. The documentation has been aided by both interviews and archival research with particular focus on newspaper articles published on the movement since its inception. The thesis also has explored into audiotapes recorded by ADF leadership that persuaded many young Muslims to join the jihad agenda. Three questions guided this study: 1) what do we know about ADF? 2) How did ADF emerge in Uganda? 3) Is ADF jihad-Salafi movement or a local political movement in disguise? This concluding part, presents three broad conclusions based on the questions.

##### *1) What do we know about ADF?*

To understand ADF, it is necessary, firstly to establish the strategic environment in which the movement developed and in which it continues to operate. Like many other countries in Africa, effects of colonialism left the country and its people caught in religious and/or ethnic conflicts. In Uganda, as seen in chapter four, the colonial government that favoured some religious factions against others planted the seeds of conflict. In their own writings, colonial administrators became sceptical of Islam and Muslims and worked hand in hand with Christian chiefs to prevent their progress. Religion (Christianity) became an important condition for acquiring formal 'secular' education, jobs or any political office in the country. Consequently, Muslims in the country became second-class citizens in their own motherland.

In 1971, a Muslim president Idi Amin took over power and opened up new opportunities for his co-religionists, which had been denied by other leaders. Having united Muslims under one leadership (UMSC) with headquarters, he further established Muslim schools, technical institutes and a university. Favouring Muslims, Amin also helped in politicising religion similar to his predecessors. In 1978, he was ousted and forced into exile. Once again, Muslims had to pay for the 'mistakes' in his presidency. This included the massacre and victimisations which continued by the successive regimes.

It was in late 1980s when young Muslims who had gone for further studies in the Middle East returned in the country. With the ideas of 'politicised Islam' in mind, they began teaching in the mosques and streets of Kampala. Adherence to purist interpretation of Quran and Hadith drove their movement to direct confrontation with those who did not follow their understanding. Jamilu Mukulu, the leader of ADF, converted to Islam and joined this *Salaf* movement. Within a short period of time and after two years of study in Saudi Arabia (an equivalent to Diploma in Arabic Studies), started preaching in mosques, seminars and sometimes in streets. Given his rhetoric and persuasive tactics, by 1991, he could command a force of more than 500 Muslim youths to fight the police, killing four and their dogs and take over the mosque that led to their arrest until 1994.

Sadly, after Mukulu's prison term, ADF started terrorising Ugandans especially in Kampala, Kasese villages in Western Uganda and Eastern DRC. With the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Uganda, Mukulu chose the pathway of jihad-Salafism to develop his political ambitions. In this way, Salafism became a justifying tool for Mukulu's political desires. Moreover, in retrospect of the historical Muslim socio-political grievances, Mukulu organised a force that was almost able to seize Kasese district. A group of more than 1500 fighters took

over three towns in Kasese for more than three days, leading to 55 civilian deaths in a sparsely populated area, and causing about 2500 people to flee their homes. Residents of the affected areas are still suffering from the effects of the dreadful attack<sup>43</sup>. Since then, the movement has been going into hiding and resurfacing at times.

Similar to Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko haram in Nigeria and ISIS in Iraq and Syria, ADF utilises harassment of government forces and murders, abductions of civilians including schoolchildren in the west and south-eastern parts of Uganda and in the Beni province of eastern DRC. These abductions are said to be used as a reinforcement option for ADF. This strategy gradually culminated in the 1998 Kichwamba Technical College attack, which left 80 students dead, and more than 100 abducted. Between February 1998 and December 1999, the movement abducted about 200 schoolchildren.<sup>44</sup> However, with a strong will power from government forces (UPDF), ADF was forced to relocate its activities into DRC, leading to the eventual arrest of its leader Jamilu Mukulu in 2015.

The recent killings of Muslim clerics that begun in 2012 has been linked to the group. It is difficult however to ascertain the validity of this claim since ADF have neither admitted nor denied the allegations. However, according to ADF defectors interviewed by the author, jihad campaign can target anyone who speaks against the group's ideology. Therefore, since the assassinated scholars were vocal against ADF and they had had received several admonitions warning from Mukulu, makes these allegations to have some degree of legitimacy.

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<sup>43</sup>See for example: "Mpondwe Struggles to Recover after Insurgency". *The Monitor*, February 20, 2010. Retrieved on July 29, 2017 from <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/864904/-/wikbk0/-/index.html>

<sup>44</sup>See for more: Democratic Republic of Congo-Complex Emergency. *USAID FACT SHEET #1*, Fiscal Year (FY), 2017, January 6, 2017. Accessed on July 29, 2017, from [https://scms.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/drc\\_ce\\_fs01\\_01-06-2017.pdf](https://scms.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/drc_ce_fs01_01-06-2017.pdf)

2) *How did ADF emerge in Uganda?*

The leader of ADF, Jamilu Mukulu is a charismatic and an eloquent speaker. Through his charisma, majority of Muslims even those who do not adhere to Salafism sympathised with him. He could also get monetary support from them as *dawa* contributions for the ‘dawa’ seminars he used to conduct across the country. Few years after his conversion to Islam, he had gained popularity and enough support to direct youths into military activities.

Moreover, analysis of Mukulu’s sermons reveal his persuasive tactics, which were used as the recruiting tool. Analysis of the audio MMM revealed presence of appeals to both *pathos* and *ethos*. In the audios, he presented the injustices endured by Muslims after the overthrow of Amin. The tables below illustrate the findings.

**Table 4 illustrates the appeals to pathos found in the MMM audio**

No.	Appeals to <i>Pathos</i>
1	“your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats”
2	“perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance”
3	“Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know them and what they conceal in their breasts”
4	“if an opportunity rises, wait, even your ‘Aunt’ will cut your throat”

Source: Field Data (2016)

From table 4, the first example “*your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats*” and “*perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance*”, are emotional appeals that target attitude change. He reminds Muslims atrocities done by Christian mobs in Western Uganda in 1979. Using ‘goat’, he appeals to degrading emotions. In other words, he is persuading his audience not to wait but rather get ready to fight. In this way, he persuades the

audience to change their attitudes towards fighting so that they do not fall prey again, like what happened in 1979.

Moreover, “*perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance*”, in this statement, there is an indication that the current regime led by President Museveni know the perpetrators but they do not care to take action. By doing this, he is persuading his audience to hate the regime and get ready to fight it. This rhetoric persuasion meets the needs of the persuader using concrete evidences that cannot easily be challenged. Indeed, such persuasion prepares the audience for sacrifice and fearlessly and change their attitude towards the desired goals of the speaker.

Similarly, “*Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know them and what they conceal in their breast*” and “*if an opportunity rises, wait, even your ‘Aunt’ will cut your throat*”, which is the third and fourth example. It also conforms with characters that appeal to *pathos*. The speaker in these examples appeals to attitude change towards their non-Muslim relatives. In Uganda, almost in every family there are people of different religions (African Tradition Religions [ATR], Catholics, Muslims and Protestants).

Thus in his persuasive tactics, he mentions the dangers even within family relations. Mentioning that someone’s aunt can surrender her sister or brother’s son or daughter, is the highest level of treachery a person can do within the family. This is so, because, in Uganda, aunts and uncles occupy positions similar to mothers or fathers<sup>45</sup>. Therefore, this was an

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<sup>45</sup>An example, in Buganda culture and language, a Father is called “Taata”. His children must call his brother also “Taata. The same with mother whom they call “Maama”, her sister should be called “Maama”. It is intended to strengthen family bonds. See: Onyango, O. Eria. n.d. Ugandan Traditional Cultural Values. Can also be accessed from [https://www.academia.edu/1937342/Ugandan\\_Traditional\\_Cultural\\_Values](https://www.academia.edu/1937342/Ugandan_Traditional_Cultural_Values), retrieved on July 28, 2017.

appeal to *pathos* to have his audience change their attitude towards close non-Muslim relatives including parents. Indeed, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) affirm that the main purpose of *pathos* is to “denote all kinds of emotional influence on the audience, potentially affecting attitude or choice” (Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 87). Furthermore they also influence biases dictated by emotions and can change even the audience’s on a previously biased topic (ibid, 88).

**Table 5 illustrates appeals to *ethos* found in MMM**

No.	Appeals to <i>ethos</i> in MMW
1	“and they will not cease from fighting you until they have made you renegades from you religion, if they can”
2	“O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn your backs to them”
3	“And if those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper”

Source: Filed Data (2016)

In order for the audience to conceive speaker’s credibility, the speaker recites a verse in Quran (2:217), which is in example one: “*and they will not cease from fighting you until they have made you renegades from you religion, if they can*”. With this example, the speaker align himself first to his audience, and presents himself to be part of those who are being fought by the ‘non-believers’. This indeed, coincides with what Hyde (2004, 13) observes that for successful appeal to *ethos*, the speaker “must appear to share personal similarity with the audience” (Hyde 2004, 13). Moreover, examples two and three; “*O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn your backs to them*” and “*And if those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper;*” appeals to *ethos*. Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) observe that, the religious appeal to of *ethos*, that bear “emotive power exercised by the sacred texts of all major religious traditions should be recognised as a form of *ethos*”

(Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 88). Indeed, the speaker supports his words with religious text of the Quran to align himself with his audience.

Many Muslims in Uganda perceived ADF as a retaliation to marginalisation and injustices that were done to Muslims since the colonial period. The above analysis proves the role of Muslim discontent with the ‘Christian’ regimes. Muslims are the less advantaged in the country with poor education, economically struggling, no access to ‘white-collar’ jobs among others. For this reason, such persuasive rhetoric directly appeals to their realities. This helped him to influence youths into violence.

3) *Is ADF a Jihad-Salafi Movement or a local Political movement in disguise?*

Looking at the results as seen from archival research, interviews and audio recording of Mukulu’s sermons, the indication that the movement is motivated by Jihad-Salafi ideology is evident. Since its inception, ADF focused on anti-Sufi approach and advocated for literal understanding of Islam. The group used the Salafi ideology and practice and its recruiting strategy mainly targeted Salafi audience. However, due to its belief in physical jihad, the mainstream salafis in Uganda refer to them as *khawarij* derogatively, and present them as those who deviated from the correct path. This dynamic is similar to what observed by Thurston (2015) in the divide between mainstream salafis and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Additionally, ADF is similar to other Jihad-Salafi idealised groups such as Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Al-Shaba, ISIS and al-Qaeda among others. They call for violence and armed rebellion against Christian-led governments but also to their fellow Muslims. Also looking at their history, they started life as political and active-challengers of UMSC leadership. They first approved only acts of civil disobedience to bring about change in the administration of

Muslim affairs in the country. However, when the government jailed them in 1991 for protest, they turned into armed resistance. This is similar to Islamic Salvation Front (abbreviated as FIS due to its official French name, Front Islamique du Salut) in Algeria. FIS started by contesting elections with general protests and civil disobedience. This changed in 1993 to armed resistance when the military officials annulled their electoral success (Maher 2016, 10).

Similarly, the Egyptian *Takfir wal Hijra* group, also initially begun as quietist-rejectionists. Their members withdrew from society and moved to wholly isolated communes in the mountains (ibid, 11). However, when the government moved against them, they changed into perhaps jihadist/violent-rejectionists leading to taking a former government minister hostage and eventually killed him. This is also the same with Boko-Haram under Yusuf Muhamad. It started activities peacefully before the 2009 government clampdown, in which estimated 800 of its members were killed. After that attacker, also their leader by then Mohammed Yusuf was later killed while still in Nigerian police custody. It was from there that the group resurfaced as a full-fledged rebel and terrorist Muslim militant group (Brigaglia, 2012).<sup>46</sup>

## **5.2 Final thoughts and Recommendation**

This study has attempted to analyse the emergence and development of ADF in Uganda. The study has presented various attempts by Muslims in Uganda to regain political force right from the pre-colonial times to post-colonial era. It is clear that the attempt has been fuelled by the desire to rejuvenate Muslim identity in social, economic and political arenas from marshes where colonial and neo-colonial political situations had dumped them for decades. It

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<sup>46</sup> See more on Boko Haram: Brigaglia, Andrea. 2012. Ja'far Mahmoud Adam, Mohamed Yusuf and al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflection on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria. *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, Issue No. 11.

is the same idea that ADF have in mind but with an added ingredient of ‘pure’ Islam as practiced by *al-salaf salih*.

Unfortunately, Ugandan government has not done enough to address these grievances. The government either is keeping a blind eye or still failed to find a sustainable solution to these Muslim demands that continue to enrage them. One of the main Muslim leaders of Uganda, Mufti Zubair Kayongo (d. 2015), once argued that all Muslims should shun government functions as an act of protest over what he called “marginalisation.”(Otege, 2011) His anger stemmed from the fact that the ministerial positions offered to Muslims were considered “too few” (ibid). Kayongo and his committee of Muslim clerics resolved: “We are aggrieved and extremely dissatisfied with the way President Museveni distributed ministerial posts as we hardly got any influential positions beside one Cabinet minister and four state ministers despite enlarged cabinet.” (ibid). Such discontentment keeps on building in the hearts of many Muslims and can easily descend into violence.

Further, it is not a surprise that when the government reported its decision to close down some informal Islamic schools (*madrasas*) and mosques that were identified to be recruiting cells for ADF, many Muslims clerics opposed the action as a systematic tactic to stop the teaching of Islamic religion in Uganda.<sup>47</sup> Much has been done, especially by the government, to eradicate the ADF and its activities in the country. For that reason, it is until when Muslim grievances receive decisive attention (especially some degree of social justice), that Islamism will be checked.

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<sup>47</sup>See: UGO Uganda. 2013. “Muslims criticize Police crackdown on Madarasa schools”, *UGO Uganda*, August 9. Accessed on August 7, 2017 from <http://news.ugo.co.ug/muslims-criticizepolice-crackdown-on-madarasa-schools/>

Furthermore, Ugandan government has been accused of continuous violation of human rights especially with Muslim youths suspected to be members of ADF. In fact, the president came out openly and advised his security agencies to desist from torturing suspects, which he said is unnecessary and wrong. He confirmed that torture to extract evidence might unfairly target a wrong person later to find out that the person was innocent.<sup>48</sup> His comment came in after 13 ADF suspects of which all were Muslims appeared in courts with horrific injuries including gaping wounds on their knees and ankles, which they said were as a result of police beatings.<sup>49</sup> They were all walking in difficulty as they limped to court, half-naked as they expose wounds on the arms and chest, which impelled the few present family members to break into tears. Such inhuman actions may do little to solve the problem. In some instances, wrong suspects may be forced to plead guilty just to avoid the continuous torture leaving the perpetrators free. It can also force others to join such movements. Moreover, in others instances it may be used as evidence by the recruiters to convince more youths into acts of violence hence escalating the dilemma.

Additionally, the government should work hand in hand with Muslim theologians who are versed with the Islamic knowledge to mitigate ADF ideology. It should be noted that ADF ideology together with other Islamist movements as observed by al-Yaqoub (2015) is based on a system of misconceptions that split the Islamic sacred texts from their context. This ideology further uses tricks that make selective use of whatever elements of the Sharia that satisfy their “twisted minds” (al-Yaqoubi 2015, 1). In order to counter such ideology, well-

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<sup>48</sup> Read full letter directed to all security agencies in Uganda on: [https://www.scribd.com/document/348514238/President-Museveni-Writes-to-Uganda-Security-Chiefs-AGAINST-TORTURE#from\\_embed](https://www.scribd.com/document/348514238/President-Museveni-Writes-to-Uganda-Security-Chiefs-AGAINST-TORTURE#from_embed), accessed on august 30, 2017.

<sup>49</sup> See more on this story: Luwama, Siraj. 2017. Vedio: Kaweesi Murder Suspect limp to Court. *The Daily Monitor*, May 5. Accessed on August 30, 2017, from <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Tortured-Kaweesi-murder-suspects-limp-court/688334-3915328-11gfdchz/index.html>.

versed scholars in Islamic sciences need to have decisive response. At this moment in Uganda, even if ADF disappears (given now their leader is in prison), while its ideology still prevails, it will give birth to new and sometimes even more radical groups. Government should provide logistics in form of research funds, facilitation of workshops in the country that aim at addressing Muslim youths against extremism as well as promoting scholars that teach moderate interpretation of Islam.

Additionally, Muslim scholars need to devise all possible mechanism that can help to educate youths extensively the teachings of Islam. It is clear from the interviews that no single member of ADF had ever studied Islamic sciences to a substantial level that affirms his/her credibility in Islamic scholarship. Jamilu Mukulu for example, the ADF leader and spiritual advisor, after converting to Islam, he studied for only two years in Riyadh in an intermediary stage that teaches non-Arab students Arabic. After that completing that level, he went back to Uganda and started preaching and gained popularity. That is why many of his colleagues who stayed and completed the University level (in Medina or Riyadh) never joined him after their return.

Moreover, other spiritual leaders of the group, I interviewed also confessed, that they did not even complete *thanawi* level (equivalent to high school in normal secular studies). They quitted school to join the movement after being persuaded by Jamilu's rhetoric sermons at Nakasero mosque. In fact, other Salafis including Jamilu's teachers who rejected violence were far ahead of him in terms of Islamic religious education. They had completed studies from Islamic university in Medina. In fact, no single graduate from Medina or from any Middle-Eastern university has ever joined ADF since its inception in 1996. Recruits were mostly youths who had studied some bit of secular studies and a little bit of Islamic sciences

from local sheikhs. Those are the ones, who were later persuaded by Jamilu's rhetoric Jihad sermons to join his jihad group. For that reason, Ugandan scholars need to unanimously and unabashedly, refute ADF actions by providing evidences that repudiate the group's claims. Literatures and lectures should be prepared that engages deeply into ADF ideology and replace it with moderate Islam that accepts co-existence and tolerance. The government, through its counterterrorism units can support the initiative. In the process, the ideology will be defeated which will eventually lead to peace particularly in Uganda.

On the other hand, Muslims especially the Jihad-Salafi youths in Uganda and elsewhere need to use their senses and reconsider their *da'wa* strategies. The utopia of an Islamic state or having a world that have uniform way of thinking need to be checked. The Quran its self clearly states the fact that the whole world will not be Muslims. "*And if it was the will of your Lord*", the Quran confirms to Muhammad, "*All who are on earth would have believed. Will you then compel them to believe against their will*" (Q 10:99).

Another verse not only refer to lack of faith but variety of faith, explaining that his diversity is exactly what God desired for humanity: "*And We have sent down the Book [Qu'an] to you with truth, confirming and conserving the previous Books....We have appointed a law and practice for every one of you. Had God willed, He would have made you single community, but He wanted to test you regarding what has come to you. So compete with each other in doing good actions. Everyone will return to God and He will inform you regarding the things about which you differed*" (Q5:48). Indeed this striking verse confirms clearly that Islam is a religion among other religion and their difference can only be reconciled in the afterlife.

Lastly, if sacred texts (Quran and Hadiths) is not enough for Islamists to learn that Islam is not religion of terror but rather a religion of mercy, love and compassionate, let them learn from history. Historically, most of the time violent activities have produced more harm to Muslims than good. In Uganda for example, Muslims had existed with Museveni's regime in peace and harmony with less government interventions. Muslims in Uganda freely preached their understanding of Islam without any interferences from the government. Jamilu Mukulu himself and his team travelled in almost all parts of the country teaching his version of Islam before turning into violence.

However, when he declared the intention of rebellion, the government responded as expected. Arrests, torture, extra-judicial killings started targeting mainly Muslim youths suspected to be part of Jamilu's jihad scheme. This resulted to government censorship of Muslim sermons and closing of some Muslim informal schools (*madrasas*) and mosques. If Jamilu had intended to promote Islam in Uganda through violence, unfortunately, he mistakenly led to its collapse because *madrasas* (promoters of Islamic sciences and Muslims) could no longer operate.

This is the same mistake followed by ISIS, Boko haram, and al-Qaeda and other Islamist movements. They failed to understand, and still consider violence as the only mean for the contemporary daunting affairs of Muslims and Islam. Rather as concluded by al-Yaqoubi, they have turned to be the "most dangerous enemy Islam has ever seen" (al-Yaqoubi, 2015, 1). Indeed, a lot can be said which is beyond the scope of this study. However, simple glimpse on the statics in terms of Muslim losses after 9/11 attacks in United States is enough

to understand the outcomes of perpetrating violence. As a result, the he attacks left about 3000 and 6000 deaths and serious injuries respectively.<sup>50</sup>

The reason for this catastrophic mayhem was the need to free the *umma* (Muslim world) from western invasion and imperialism. In reiteration however, the US and its allies bombed Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya among others. According to Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs report released in 2015 estimated 149,000 deaths in Afghanistan.<sup>51</sup> Also about 10.1 million Afghan and Iraqi people are still living as refugees and internally displaced persons in grossly inadequate conditions. That is only Afghanistan, for Iraq, the figure exceed 400,000 since 2003<sup>52</sup>. These are mostly innocent Muslim children and women. What has Islam and Muslims gained in all these violent activities? In my thought and opinion, perpetrating violence causes even more violence. The best solution is to chant the humanist slogans that aim at tolerance and co-existence, not hatred and bigotry.

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<sup>50</sup> Plumer, Brad. 2013. Nine Facts about Terrorism in United States since 9/11. *The Washington Post*, September 11. Accessed on August 30, 2017, from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-in-the-united-states-since-911/?utm\\_term=.95da52dc67ca](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-in-the-united-states-since-911/?utm_term=.95da52dc67ca).

<sup>51</sup> Taylor, Adam. 149,000 people have died in war in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2001. *The Washington Post*, June 3, 2015. Accessed on August 30, 2017 from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-says/?utm\\_term=.09aa0d1c4664](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-says/?utm_term=.09aa0d1c4664).

<sup>52</sup> Sheridan, Kerry. 2014. Iraq Death Toll Riches 500,000since Start of U.S-Led invasion, New Study Say. *Huffpost*, January 23. Accessed on August 30, 2017, from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/iraq-death-toll\\_n\\_4102855.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/iraq-death-toll_n_4102855.html).

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