

***The Role of Political Branding in the success of the Economic
Freedom Fighters (EFF)***

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Abstract

Much has been written about the political mediatisation of society, often through the lenses of the media, its institutional rules and processes. These studies have focused on either side of the debate, choosing to look at the media itself, or its influence on the political subsystem and vice versa. This has resulted in the formation of a gap in the literature around the issue of the relationship between media and governance particularly in the political branding area.

This thesis focuses on political branding in South Africa and explores the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)'s “brand image” amongst voters in the last national elections 2014.

The thesis thus is considered an exploratory study that uses in-depth interviews combined with primary qualitative and a preliminary secondary quantitative research. The data from the different research methods were thematically analysed by the researcher through the projective technique analysis of political branding in South Africa.

The main objective of this thesis is to consider how the EFF used the media function within the current commercial media spheres to shape and influence political branding in South Africa. In addition, this thesis will look into how the EFF positioned itself on top of the current political dynamic in South Africa. The thesis ends with a number theoretical reflections and directions for future empirical research to explore the relation between media and governance in depth in dealing with South Africa as a society in transition. It also acknowledges its limitations.

Key Words: communication, politics, branding, marketing, mediatisation, EFF, Voting, Public Perception

Thesis Statement:

South African politics is currently experiencing a set of new dynamics in its politics; which included the birth and death of some political parties and the rise of political branding as a corner stone in the national elections.

This thesis investigates the phenomenal rise and influence of the EFF¹ in South African politics, and aims to analyse how they in became the third largest political party within a year of their launch. Broadly, this thesis seeks to address issues of political branding among the political parties, by exploring both campaigns and public perceptions.

Structure:

This thesis begins with an introduction which explains what was studied and how it was studied as well as introducing the subject matter. From there it moves into the theoretical framework which details both the theories of political communication and branding which were used to understand the topic. The third chapter covers the existing literature from political branding in South Africa as well as general political branding studies and attempts to set a baseline for this study. The fourth chapter details what methodology was used in an attempt to get the results that appear in the fifth chapter. The sixth chapter discusses in detail these results and then the thesis finishes off with a conclusion which sums up and provides topics for future discussion.

This thesis aims to answer key questions around political branding and mediatisation in South Africa. These include whether the EFF's branding was a success, whether the EFF's branding exercise can be used as a successful case study the future and whether the party's successful media strategy is sustainable and a useful model for political parties in the future. Furthermore, this thesis hypothesizes that the EFF successfully implemented commercial branding practices and principles which they used to take their brand from a social movement to one of the largest political parties in South Africa. It is assumed therefore that they successfully used branding to create a new political party and grow its identity and brand to a level where it is now commonplace in the South African political party which a clear brand identity and position in the marketplace. This was done through the use of clever strategic branding tools and through the use of a consistent brand message and

¹ The EFF is the 3rd largest political party in South Africa having won over a million votes in the South African general election of 2014. The party was formed in 2013 by Julius Malema and his allies after his expulsion from the ANC. The party is based around the principle of economic emancipation and is rooted in socialist principles.

position which served to strengthen the brand and help the party gain a foothold in the political market and then strengthen its position to where it is today.

Chapter 1: Introduction

A lot of academic research on the levels of transformation of media and politics has focused on how media reflects/constructs news, from different points of view. A lot of research has been dedicated to the visibility and prominence of political topics in the media, their cognitive effects (framing) and impact on the citizens' agenda (de Vreese, 2005; de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko & Boomgaarden, 2006). Other important topics of research have been the creation of a monolithic public sphere (Koopmans & Statham, 2010), the communicative and democratic deficit (Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007) and the lack of a common policy strategy (Trenz, 2004). Nevertheless, little is still known about how political parties brand themselves in the media.

In the general context of the economic downturn, internal problems of African National Congress have generated a constant decrease of trust and enthusiasm towards the current politics and media in South Africa. However, the clear lack of any meaningful party development in South Africa, highlights not only the dearth of effective parties but also the weakness of democracy promotion efforts

This thesis focuses on the EFF in an attempt to analyse and understand the media's representation of the EFF's branding during the 2014 national election which was considered a key political moment in South Africa which generated significant interest.

This thesis seeks to understand how the EFF has positioned itself in the South African political market and how they have utilized this new role in mobilizing the public and redefining the political currencies through the cognitive appreciation of the party and the behavioural changes through voters' turn out and the actual casting of votes that quickly made EFF the third biggest party in South Africa. Against this backdrop, this thesis aims to explore the uniqueness of the EFF's position as the 1st party that have positioned themselves to the far left of the ANC.

Political marketing and branding:

In this section, the thesis aims to offer some insights on the many parallels between politics and everyday branding, especially that in many incidents South African parties do not always abide by the traditional rules of branding. This parody of success that is domesticated and localized must be carefully assessed and put in perspective to provide people with a clear, distinctive vision. Instead of offering South Africans with real understanding, open engagement, a relevant and distinctive proposition and a clear and unequivocal vision, they make shallow promises and slugging off" political opponents.

The justification might be related to fact that political branding is a rather new phenomenon in South Africa although it remains an extension of the traditional branding concept. Branding emerged from marketing concepts and methods that have been employed in politics since the 1970s (Scammel, 2007). While a brand image is essentially a more developed version of service marketing's key concern for reputation its qualitative research techniques are essentially an extension of the type of methods long used in political advertising research (Scammel, 2007).

Political brands are thus defined as political representations that are located in a specific pattern, which can be identified and differentiated from political representations (Nielsen, 2013 as cited in Nielsen and Larsen, 2014). Political branding is a holistic and often complicated concept and reflects the complete experience that voters have in the political sphere (Milewicz and Milewicz, 2014). What this means for political parties and politicians is that their brand is often impacted upon by other entities such as the media, opposition voters and political action groups (Milewicz and Milewicz, 2014).

The concept of a political brand uncovers the underlying strategic concerns of efforts to maintain voter loyalty through communication strategically designed to provide reassurance, uniqueness (clear differentiation from rivals), and consistency of values, and emotional connection with voters' values and visions of the good life (Scammel, 2007).

As for the South African case, one can argue that the idea of political branding in South Africa can be traced back to the first democratic election in 1994 when for the first time parties were able to compete freely and fairly for the electorate's votes. While the ANC presented their brand in two parts; namely hearing and telling in which they used marketing and branding devices to both listen to the electorate and spell out their ideas the National Party focused their branding around their leader, FW de Klerk (Lodge, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994; Giliomee, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994). Political branding

in South Africa can also trace its roots back to the establishment of "brand Mandela²" who was the 1st South African political leader to develop an international brand around his name which united a nation and inspired people to come together.

This thesis will thus explore branding research questions such as how competitive has South African political branding been over time, why did the EFF's brand perform like this and how did their brand change over time, what are the factors which determined the political branding performance of the EFF and how can such information be used to establish a political agenda which promotes greater branding competitiveness.

The EFF and Branding

In terms of branding the EFF most closely resembles the launch of a new mass consumer product; this is due to their use of branding tactics such as having an instantly recognizable name, a straight forward ideology and a single minded focus (Mackay, 2014).

The EFF's use of the revolutionary symbolism particularly the colour red is a stroke of professionalism. The EFF has built its brand around being a champion of the poor. This segmented target market views other political parties as outsiders. While the EFF brand can be described as a challenger brand amongst the poor they are seen as being one of them.

In addition, they have successfully established themselves on social media channels and continue to dominate the online political social media space through their use of revolutionary rhetoric and angry statements.

History of EFF:

The acronym EFF stands for one of the most successful political brands in contemporary African politics. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) set out initially to establish structures and branches across the country, as well as prepare the party for the 2014 National Election. Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu met with an assortment of politically like-minded individuals in Soweto in July 2013 and by September they were an official political party (Robinson, 2014).

² During Apartheid brand Mandela was intertwined with the struggle for freedom and as the struggle went on his brand grew stronger, gaining international recognition after he was sentenced during the Rivonia trial. After his release from prison he was able to take his place as a world icon and his brand power grew as he assumed the presidency of South Africa. Today the brand is as powerful as ever with a clothing label, a foundation, several charities and many other commercial enterprises as well as a national day all in his honour

As a result of a vigorous and cogent elections campaign which showed how a clever media strategy, fluid branch structures and effective central organization could overcome the pitfalls of electoral infancy and a powerful ANC counter-offensive on the campaign trail the EFF quickly positioned itself as a rigorous player in the South Africa political landscape obtaining the third highest number of votes in the election (Robinson, 2014).

Their campaign included several high profiles marketing and branding initiatives; including the establishment of a trademark dress code of worker's overalls and red berets. This trademark dress code correlated the party's appearance with its ideological values as a revolutionary and labour party and cemented their status as a party for the people by the people. The party also made use of online marketing to communicate with their supporters and potential voters, these online marketing channels allowed them to campaign without having to spend money.

The EFF introduced a founding statement and an election manifesto which were both important documents as traced the background to the formation of the party as well as establishing their principles and plan of action. Much of the contents of these documents can be traced back to the ANCYL policies under Malema during his leadership from 2008 to 2012 (Robinson, 2014).

That being said, this thesis is cognizant of the problems faced in researching this topic and researching the party. These problems include the fact that the long term future of the EFF is extremely uncertain and the fact that the party has not proven itself beyond one election. There is also a level of uncertainty especially amongst political analysts as to whether the EFF's policies are politically viable as they have not yet been proven in governance.

Concepts and definitions:

In this section, the researcher will attempt to explain and contextualize the conceptualization of this thesis which is based around the branding concept in politics as well as concepts which are frequently used within South African political branding such as history and identity. It is also important to consider concepts such as positioning and target markets with particular emphasis on the local context and with reference to the EFF.

It is thus pertinent to highlight that the thesis is grounded on the concepts of political branding. As defined by (Lilleker, 2005) political branding centers on the logos and symbols party's use to define themselves as well as their ethos, ideology and beliefs. (Lilleker, 2005) argues that political parties possess branding equity which is made up of their competence in office and the public's perception of their policies and key spokespeople and representatives at a local level.

When it comes to political branding a differentiation needs to be made between political slogans and political narratives. While a political slogan is defined as a political party's distinctive phrase or motto a political narrative is defined as the story behind a political party, its history, beliefs and even personality (Dictionary.com; Gibson, 2014). While political parties seek to craft narratives their voter base can relate to slogans are created to be memorable and catchy (Gibson, 2014).

In the case of the EFF, it has identified a target market to the left of the ANC which has been let down by the ruling party and feels left behind by the promises that were made in 1994. According to an IPSOS survey the EFF's supporters are comprised largely of black unemployed young people who live in rural areas and have very little post-high school education (Harris, 2014). The EFF successfully reached out to this specific segment of the electorate and this paper examines that process as well as the brand image the party has created for itself.

Furthermore, within the context of South African politics the concepts of history, identity and symbolism are extremely important especially when looking through a political branding lens. The African National Congress has made history and its role in the struggle a cornerstone of its branding strategy alongside the symbolism of Nelson Mandela and its strong liberation identity. This is important because for the first time a split has formed in the ANC in which the new party claims and uses the ANC's history against the party. The EFF has emerged literally from the heart of the ANC and like the ruling party lays claim to exactly the same concepts of history, symbolism and identity. However, where they differ is that the EFF argues that the ANC has abandoned its leftist roots and betrayed its own legacy and history, even going as far to argue that everything the ANC has done since 1994 has taken the struggle backwards.

Aims of this thesis:

The aim of this thesis is to explore the political marketing and more specifically a political branding lens mechanism that was used by EFF in launching its brand and positioning its self at the center stage of South African politics. It aims to map how the EFF has been redefined and positioned from just a vibrant social movement into a powerful political party that is positioned as South Africa's 2nd largest opposition party. This thesis thus aims to provide a comprehensive study on how political marketing and branding has changed political communication in South Africa and what affect the EFF had on that change.

Statement of the problem

EFF approaches politics as an outsider trying to upset the system, it is quick to identify conventions that stand in its way and to speak out against them or simply ignore them.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

In chapter 2, the research aims to offer a conceptualizing understanding of the issue under study. To serve this goal, the chapter will build on the political communication theories of agenda setting, priming and framing in an attempt to create a holistic model for evaluation of the Economic Freedom Fighters and its branding as well as its successes.

These theories were conceptualized as a way of helping the researcher not only understand the research question of how the EFF built a successful brand and how they achieved this brand success during the elections but also as a follow on from the literature under review. The literature speaks of how building a successfully brand can be the key to electoral success, how beneficial brand recognition is and how setting the agenda and framing the debate can lead not only to brand success but also help your numbers at the polls. Through the analysis of these branding theories and political communication theories the researcher was hoping to answer the question of the EFF's success and whether the success achieved by case studies in the literature were applicable to the case of the EFF.

Brand experience is perceived as sensations, feelings, cognitions, and behavioral responses evoked by brand-related stimuli that are part of a brand's design and identity, packaging, communications, and environments. An overview of current political scene in South Africa suggests that the pre- and post-1994 endeavor to engage directly and explicitly with the differences that constitute this rainbow nation seem to be declining. Political branding among different parties exploits human sameness are generally speaking more morally dubious than those that engage with human differences.

Political Branding

According to the American Marketing Association a brand is defined as a name, term, sign, symbol or design intended to identify goods or services of one seller or a group of sellers and to differentiate them from their competitors (Heding, Knudtzen and Bjerre, 2008).

Brands are comprised of various characteristics including physical features, emotional assets and cultural associations as well as a brand identity (Balikcioglu, 2010). The brand identity is defined as a program which integrates all visual and verbal elements of the brand (Balikcioglu, 2010).

At the same time Keller, 2002 argues that branding principles can be applied beyond selling and providing a service and can be used for people, places, organizations and ideas and virtually every setting where consumer choice is involved (as cited in Smith and French, 2008). Because political parties are organizations where politicians seek to exchange ideas and promises for electoral support we can therefore apply the principles of branding to the political process.

Political brands are defined as political representations that are located in a pattern, which can be identified and differentiated from political representations (Nielsen, 2013 as cited in Nielsen and Larsen, 2014). A political brand is therefore an associative network of interconnected political information which is held by the voter in their memory and accessible when stimulated (Smith and French, 2008; Keller, 1993 as cited in Smith and French, 2008). In their everyday life voters use cognitively efficient strategies for coding mass amounts of complex data into shortcuts which can then be used in their decision making; this is then applied to the political process by voters who view political parties as brands which then helps simplify their decision on who to vote for (Guzman and Sierra, 2009).

Political branding is based around the assertion that political parties, candidates and causes can be managed as products and around the dynamic interplay of strategically orientated managerial elements and consumer orientated elements (Kotler and Kotler, 1999, Shama, 1976 as cited in Milewicz and Milewicz, 2014; Milewicz and Milewicz, 2014).

Political branding is a holistic and often complicated concept and reflects the complete experience that voters have in the political sphere (Milewicz and Milewicz, 2014). What this means for political parties and politicians is that their brand is often impacted upon by other entities such as the media, opposition voters and political action groups (Milewicz and Milewicz, 2014).

Branding also plays a key role in the formation of new parties or the re-branding of parties as voters are constantly forced to negotiate between loyalty to existing parties and the novelty of new parties while attempting to make sense of complex policy information (Needham, 2005).

Agenda-setting, priming, and framing research generally has been examined under the broad category of cognitive media effects. As a result, studies often either examine all three approaches in a single study, or employ very similar research designs, paying little attention to conceptual differences or differences in the levels of analysis under which each approach is operating.

In this thesis, the researcher will aim to revisit agenda-setting, priming, and framing as distinctively different approaches to effects of political communication with what Dietram A. Scheufele proposed. The argument against more recent attempts to subsume all three approaches under the broad concept of agenda-setting and for a more careful explication of the concepts and of their theoretical premises and roots in social psychology and political psychology (Scheufele, 2009).

Though there are insufficient tools for conceptualizing the practice of political branding in South Africa, the chapter will attempt to offer some type of conceptualization of the brand orientated party and try to outline a model of political branding in South Africa.

The notion of **agenda setting** refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (based on relative placement or amount of coverage) and importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences (McCombs and Shaw, 1972 as cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). At the same time the notion of priming refers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987 as cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). This occurs when news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating performance of leaders and governments and is often considered an extension of the Agenda Setting theory (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007).

By making some issues more salient in people's mind (agenda setting) mass media can also shape the considerations that people take into account when making judgements about political candidates or issues (priming) (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). This thesis looks at the way in which the Economic Freedom Fighters not only set the media agenda and continue to set the media agenda but also how the party identifies the key issues that the media determines to be salient and then focuses in on setting themselves at the forefront of these issues thus placing themselves firmly in the public eye.

The **theory of framing** involves selection and salience of key issues and is a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issues is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration (Entman, 1993; Tankard et al, 1991). Frames define

problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies and provide a process model that recognizes them as outcomes of interaction between interested sources and media organizations, journalists and audiences (Scheffle, 1999 as cited in Mcquail).

Brand positioning is described by (Ries and Trout, 2000) as not what you do to a product but rather what you do to the mind of the prospect. The aim of brand positioning is to position your product in the mind of the prospective customer so that instead of creating something new and different you manipulate what is already there and ultimately re-tie the connections that already exist (Ries and Trout, 2000).

In branding terms, the concept of a **“brand image”** creates value for the consumer in a variety of ways (Aaker, 1991). A brand’s image helps consumer’s process information, differentiates the brand from competitors, generates reasons to buy, gives consumers positive feelings and provides a basis for brand extension (Aaker, 1991). The brand image of a politician is influenced by the corporate brand of the political party and the political climate that he or she operates in; however, as individuals they still have an element of control over their personal brand image through how they service their electorate (Phipps, Brace-Govan and Jevons).

Branding explains how parties and politicians approach campaigning and governing. It is thus imperative to mention here that branding is “crucial to strategy” (O’Cass and Voola 2011) because it helps in providing conceptual framework to distinguish between the functional perceptions and the emotional attractions (Scammell 2007: 187) of leaders and parties. It is thus “the primary mechanism” that could identify different competitors and build voter awareness.

However, there is a problem because numerous researchers (French and Smith 2010: 460; Keller 2002; Reeves et al 2006) have found that commercial branding concepts, tools and practice often do not translate directly into the political science discipline or into the practice of politics.

While most voters, political parties and the media argue that the EFF’s branding and marketing message is based around the premise that the ANC has abandoned their historical mandate the truth goes far deeper and is far more extreme than this. Within the EFF the belief is that their core branding message is revolutionary in nature and consists of a radical kind of socialism that demands a profound restructuring of the fundamentals of the country. They argue that the ANC and its leaders are “in bed with white monopoly capital” and like the DA argue that president Zuma is ethically corrupt. In addition, the EFF is trying to usurp the ANC’s revolutionary and anti-Apartheid credentials which they are attempting to lay claim to.

There is a case to be made that a large part of the core branding narrative around the EFF's formation is based around the conflict and history between Zuma and EFF leader Julius Malema and that the conflict is hardwired into the EFF's brand. Using its unique firebrand rhetoric, the EFF has attempted to set the agenda on issues such as land reform, however this is nowhere near prominent enough to define the EFF's public image. Their attempted portrayal of Cyril Ramaphosa as a murderer for his role in the Marikana massacre has also failed to shape their brand image and identity.

In every instance where the convention is overturned, the EFF is reinforcing its political brand proposition as a champion of the poor. The EFF has been able to narrow down its target, and use its narrow focus to influence the market, by speaking to the young, unemployed and marginalized. This is backed up by an IPSOS survey which stated that the EFF's supporters are comprised largely of black unemployed young people who live in rural areas and have very little post-high school education (Harris, 2014).

Chapter 3: Literature Review

This chapter attempts to contribute to the literature on social movements, political marketing and branding in post-apartheid South Africa.

There are a number of subthemes that the chapter will address; including a brief historical background, political branding in SA, the rise of politicians as brands, technological advances and the use of social media in politics, social media and political branding, political branding ensures political success and finally some of the learning outcomes that have emerged from the historical background and the previous studies discussed.

To serve this goal, this chapter addresses a number of important issues that haunt contemporary debates about the organization such as EFF and politics in South Africa. Some may argue that, in the wake of the rise of populist nationalists such as Julius Malema, revolutionary talk has not completely been replaced by rights talk. Moreover, among many sectors of society there is a noticeable and growing discontent with the “progressive constitution” of the country. This sentiment is often accompanied by a nostalgic longing for the order, law, and personal security that in many of the contemporary older generation’s memories characterized the then apartheid South Africa (Dlamini, 2009).

The South African political landscape has never been so shaky, there is something emerging out of the shattered visions, deferred dreams and unfulfilled promises. The political milieu has never been so conducive for innovative and fresh ideas to emerge and take the country forward to the new world of possibilities (The Democracy Development Program, 2014).

Branding is the result of marketing consistency (Van der Westhuizen, 2003). A successful brand encapsulates an expectation, based on a record of characteristics that reflects loosely one or more aspirational values (Van der Westhuizen, 2003). Whereas these characteristics may include beliefs and idiosyncrasies, these need to be expressed consistently (Van der Westhuizen, 2003). If branding is introverted, focusing on the nature of the brand, marketing is extroverted and is related to way in which branding is achieved (Van der Westhuizen, 2003). Branding relates to the ‘what’ (the product) question (Van der Westhuizen, 2003).

Elections are the all-important 'moment of purchase' in political branding when voters make their decision (Mackay, 2014). If political marketers spend time after elections ensuring that their voters feel good about themselves for having chosen them, they would not have faced continuous hard battles to win over people's trust again during elections (Mackay, 2014).

Brief historical background

The history of political marketing can be traced as far as the early 20th century. However, the field has rapidly developed since the 1980's. There have been several key developments and research done on the subject that has informed our understanding. The first part of this literature review will deal with those.

One of the formative academics to write on this new phenomenon was Stanley Kelly Jr. In his 1962 book titled "*Elections and Mass Media*" Kelly discussed the rise of mass media with particular reference to the 1960 American Election in which live Television debates were used for the first time. Kelly was also the first academic to realise the importance of mass media allowing politicians to transmit messages quicker than before (Kelley, 1962). This argument was taken up later by Kotler, 1982 who argued that campaigning has always had a marketing character and that the new methods of political marketing marked an increased sophistication and acceleration of their use.

The big academic moment for political marketing came in 1969 when Kotler and Levy published a paper arguing that marketing should no longer focus purely on the marketing of companies and products but rather expand its definition and scope to include the marketing of Elections. (Kotler and Levy, 1969) argued that candidates are marketed as well as soap and therefore politics should be included in the marketing mix. This idea was taken up by Avraham Sharma in 1975 who argued that marketing concepts should be widened in order to accommodate the marketing of ideas and non-profits alongside the marketing of economic goods and services (Sharma, 1975).

The Rise of Politicians as brands

Candidates and politicians have risen above their political parties to become brands on their own, brands which have their own traits and values and which voters follow and identify with (Guzman and Sierra, 2009). A politician's brand is built around three pillars, namely the politicians' physical attributes, personality and benefits he or she promises to the electorate (Guzman and Sierra, 2009).

Professionalization of politics

The roots of the professionalization of politics lie in several innovations by political parties in Britain and America in the late 19th and early 20th Century. These include the Midlothian Campaign of 1880 which succeeded in attracting considerable press interest, the first newspaper interview with a public figure in America in 1859, the first political press release in America in 1907 and the 1929 general election in Britain which featured several political marketing firsts including the first use of an advertising agency, the first recorded telephone canvass and the first time film was used in a campaign (Boorstin, 1962 as cited in McNair, 2011; Hanham, 1978 as cited in Wring, 1997; Hollins, 1981 as cited in Wring, 1997; Swaddle, 1990 as cited in Wring, 1997).

While these attempts at professionalization were sporadic and uncoordinated the birth of mass media gave rise to a greater era of professional political marketing. In the 1930 American election radio was used for the first time while the first political public relations consultancy was established in 1933 under the name of Campaigns Inc. (Wring, 1997). These new mediums, namely TV and Radio were used by politicians in their campaigns with increasing frequency and General Eisenhower's 1952 presidential campaign is attributed with being the first campaign to employ a professional advertising company to design television advertisements as well as employing a professional marketer to create a unique selling proposition for the candidate (McNair, 2011).

These early developments paved the way for the 1960 American election in which Television campaign finally hit the mainstream with the introduction of the televised debate between the two candidates (Kelley, 1993; Kraus and Davis, 1981 as cited in McNair, 2011). These developments signified the rise of professionals within a political party who on behalf of a candidate used 'free media' events to set the agenda, appeal directly to a mass audience and to demonstrate their superiority over an opponent (McNair, 2011).

One of the most significant developments of the professionalization of politics came with the election of Margaret Thatcher as the leader of the Conservatives in 1976. Thatcher set out to not only become Prime Minister but also to rejuvenate her party's organization and image after defeat in the previous two elections (Wring, 1997). This was done through the development of a close working relationship with Saatchi and Saatchi which saw the party's communications and marketing being driven by the party's communications director, a Saatchi executive and Thatcher herself (Wring, 1997).

Clinton's 1992 campaign resembled some of the best run marketing organizations in the country with pollsters, professional staff and strategists who used market research, focus groups and new technologies to determine which states to target with adverts, how to best communicate their

message of change to the American people and to generate statistical snapshots of the twists and turns of the campaign (Newman, 1992). The Clinton campaign mastered the marketing concepts that one first needs to understand the customer's needs and then develop a product to suit those needs (Newman, 1992).

Professionalization is now firmly entrenched in modern politics. Examples of this include the creation of campaign units within parties, the use of consultants and the use of market intelligence to design various aspects of party behavior, image and policies (Mair et al, 2004 as cited in Lilleker, 200; Lilleker, 2005).

Since 1994 political parties in South Africa have campaigned with increased sophistication and professionalization.

The 1994 election presented voters, for the first time, with the choice of voting for the newly unbanned African National Congress as well as previous governing party the National Party. The Democratic Party also contested the election as well as a host of smaller parties. The ANC's campaign was based around two key aspects, namely hearing and telling (Lodge, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994).

The National Party focused their 1994 campaign on their leader FW de Klerk who they positioned as being a competent and able leader and a person who could be trusted to deal with the problems and challenges of post-apartheid South Africa (Giliomee, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994). The NP and De Klerk focused their efforts on their press coverage as well as meetings and rallies in the most important parts of South Africa (Giliomee, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994). The party also used telephone canvassing to access townships which were inaccessible to the party and broadsheet newspaper adverts (Giliomee on Reynolds, 1994).

While political marketing was extremely primitive in this election there was sufficient evidence of it. The ANC, NP and DP all employed professional advertising agencies to market their campaigns (Reynolds, 1994). Marketing techniques were adopted by the ANC who targeted leaflets at certain sub-groups and targeted each speech that was given to ensure that the correct language, clothing and traditions were chosen that appealed to the audience listening to the speech (Lodge, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994). In the election radio advertising was extremely expensive and only the ANC, NP and DP were able to afford it (Silke and Schrire, 1994 in Reynolds, 1994).

While the 1999 election showed significant progress in the advancement of political marketing and professionalization voters were left disappointed by the blatant opportunism demonstrated by the

parties during the campaign (Camay and Gordon, 1999). While voters expected substantive policy debates and manifestos aimed at identifying problems and presenting solutions they got empty rhetoric and appeals to their baser instincts as well as manifestos which were aimed at appealing to the widest possible array of people (Camay and Gordon, 1999).

The ANC campaigned on the same premise as 1994 using the slogan: “a better life for all” and promised increased service delivery, continuity and increased pace of change and transformation (Camay and Gordon, 1999). The main aim of this campaign was to attack the ANC, stand up for individual rights and morality, deliver equal justice, tackle unemployment and abolish race based policies in favour of merit while proposing that the DP was the only real alternative political party (Camay and Gordon, 1999).

This campaign was criticised heavily by the newspapers like the Mail and Guardian and foundations like the Helen Suzman Foundation who argued that attacking the competency and integrity of a black led government was unlikely to win trust amongst black ANC voters because of their optimism that things would change for the better (Mail and Guardian, 1999 and Helen Suzman Foundation 1999 as cited in Camay and Gordon, 1999).

During the election parties opted for basic branding rather than specific policy issues and used catchy slogans and party leader’s faces on their posters (Camay and Gordon, 1999). Parties also made use of traditional political marketing techniques such as rallies, public and house meetings, door-to-door canvassing as well as radio advertising (Camay and Gordon, 1999). While the NNP made use of telephone canvassing the DP spent 60% of its budget on radio advertising which they believed was important due to radio’s ability to reach remote rural areas (Camay and Gordon, 1999). While parties largely used tried and tested campaign methods the larger parties used email and fax communication in order to communicate with the media on a daily basis (Camay and Gordon, 1999).

While the 1994 and 1999 elections were primitive and experimental South African professional and modern politics came to the fore in the 2004 Election. The ANC employed marketing agency Ogilvy and Mather to find cost effective ways in which the ANC could get its message across which included an SMS competition and bus advertising across the country (Lodge, 1994 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004). The party also embarked on an extensive market research campaign in which they hired a professional company and supplemented it with their own internal research (Lodge, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004).

The newly formed Democratic Alliance also had a professionally orientated and well-designed election strategy and campaign in which they presented their solutions to the most pressing

problems facing the country while highlighting the ANC's weaknesses and failure to deliver on the promise of 1994 and 1999 (Booyesen, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004). The party once again utilised radio advertising and held joint rallies with the IFP, a key electoral partner (Booyesen, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004).

The 2004 election was also the first time a new party was launched prior to the election and managed to generate significant support which would pave the way for the launch of Cope prior to the 2009 election and the EFF in the 2014 election. The new party was founded by Patricia DeLille and called the Independent Democrats (Hoeane, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004). The party targeted the youth vote through its innovative campaign tools which utilised both old and new political marketing techniques including campaign rallies, radio and print adverts, SMS, email and a bright and colourful website (Hoeane, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004).

During the election the majority of parties based their marketing around a strong national poster campaign which was then complemented with billboards, murals and in the case of the ANC, moving media (Davis, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004). As with the previous elections the ANC and DA employed radio and newspaper advertising albeit in different guises with the ID advertising on radio but not in the newspapers due to the lack of funds (Davis, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004). While the ANC advertised in almost every newspaper in South Africa the DA advertised only in newspapers which were popular with minorities; in terms of radio advertising both the DA and the ANC spent most of its budget on black radio stations with the rest going to white and diverse stations (Davis, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004). The ANC also made use of TV in an attempt to get free airtime in local news bulletins (Lodge, 2004 in Piambo and Nijzink, 2004).

The 2009 election was also significant in that COPE, the 1st party to split from the ANC, was born (Booyesen, 2009). COPE attempted to lay claim to being the 1st legitimate opposition party to the ANC, one which would break through the racial-political mold of the ANC support and have growth potential beyond the low race-class ceiling of other parties (Booyesen, 2009).

However, in reality COPE were marked by the lack of funds, internal disarray and inexperienced staff right from the beginning which prevented them from organizing rallies and meant that they had no print or ad presence during the campaign (Booyesen, 2009). In addition, they only managed to put up billboards late in the campaign and failed to take advantage of the offer for free radio adverts on the SABC because they lacked the funds to produce the adverts (Booyesen, 2009). Their campaign was marked by a low key presence which was matched by uneven and poor campaigning which lacked market research to establish their precise constituency and target groups (Booyesen, 2009).

In the 2014 National Election the ANC based their campaign around the slogan together we can move South Africa forward which combined with an uninspiring and long winded manifesto looked back on the ANC's achievements over the past twenty years and offered the National Development Plan as a way forward (Butler, 2014). The ANC employed Ogilvy to manage their advertising and produce their TV commercials (Butler, 2014). Their campaign used the history of the party as a central theme and in the build-up to the election the party celebrated its 100th year anniversary as well as the 20th anniversary of the 1994 elections (Butler, 2014). A key campaign message was that life is better today because of the ANC (Butler, 2014).

The ANC's campaign lasted for an entire year and consisted of door-to-door canvassing, public meetings, fundraising, voter education and a demanding schedule of public appearances for the ANC's top six (Butler, 2014). The ANC tailored their appeals to specific constituencies and target groups which allowed them to penetrate every aspect of society from burial societies to police stations, churches and taxi ranks (Butler, 2014). In addition, branches were encouraged to identify key issues and target specific segments of the population (Butler, 2014).

The Democratic Alliance's campaign and manifesto was based around two key elements; the first was their slogan together for change, together for jobs while the 2nd was their Know your DA campaign (Jolobe, 2014). Their campaign was based around the fact that the country had gone backwards under Jacob Zuma in addition to presenting their solutions to the problems while highlighting their success in the Western Cape (Jolobe, 2014).

The party employed advertising agency Saatchi and Abel to come up with an impressive social media and TV campaign which included two television adverts attacking Jacob Zuma and the failures of the ANC (Jolobe, 2014). After the adverts were banned by the SABC they went viral on YouTube cementing Mmusi Maimane's status as heir apparent of the party (Jolobe, 2014). The party's Know Your DA campaign sought to highlight the party's liberal and progressive roots while discarding its National Party roots in an attempt to do away with the label of a white party (Jolobe, 2014).

The smaller parties struggled to make much of an impact in both the polls, the media and in their marketing. They used traditional techniques such as posters, rallies, public meetings, walk-about, public meetings, interviews, press releases and radio and TV events (Afrika, 2014; Piper, 2014). These were supplemented with an attempt at social media interaction (Afrika, 2014). However, their campaigns were consistent with previous years where they received minimal media coverage and

made the news for all the wrong reasons while at the same time struggling to adapt and adopt new technologies (Piper, 2014; Afrika, 2014).

Technological advances and the use of social media in politics

The preamble for the use of social media in politics started in America in 1994 when Diane Feinstein, from California, launched the first political website (UNCP, 2013). The first use of email in an election campaign appeared in the Minnesota campaign of independent candidate Jesse Ventura in 1998 (UNCP, 2013).

In South Africa the ANC launched their website in 1997 (Whois, 2013) while the Democratic Alliance launched theirs in 2001 (Whois, 2013). Both these websites served largely as information sharing for their members and supporters. The ANC first used email as a means of communication in 2001 when it launched ANC today which featured a weekly newsletter from the president. In response the DA launched SA Today in 2003, a weekly letter from then party leader Tony Leon (Chuma, W. 2006).

Prior to the 2004 American election Democratic nominee Howard Dean made extensive use of online tools including blogging, email, forums and a social network called Meet-up. Meet-up enabled people to organize campaign enthusiasts for online meetings and in-person meetings across the country (Blossom, 2009).

Blogging was first used by politicians in the 2004 American election and the 2005 British election with bloggers given access to the Republican and Democratic conventions for the first time (Ferguson and Griffiths, 2006; Graf and Dar, 2004; Cone, 2003 as cited in Drezner and Farrel, 2004; Drezner and Farrel, 2004; UNCP, 2013). The 2004 American election was also the first time that citizens used blogging platforms to obtain their election information (Chadwick, 2009; Saad, 2005 as cited in Gueorguieva, 2007).

The 2006 American elections brought two new social media outlets into political communication. In the election, politicians to register voters and recruit campaign volunteers used a relatively new social network called MySpace for the first time. Both Republicans and Democrats also used it as an online media base (Gueorguieva, 2007). The following year both Barack Obama and John Edwards took to a new social network called YouTube to launch their 2008 presidential campaigns. The network had been used before in political communication but this was the first time it featured in the strategy of both political parties (Gueorguieva, 2007; Chadwick, 2009).

The 2008 American Election was a watershed election for social media and political communication. During the election studies showed that people used social media to share videos, obtain campaign information, share campaign news, exchange political views, encourage others to vote as well as making online donations (Kushin and Yamamoto, 2010; Smith and Raine, 2008 as cited in Kushin and Yamamoto, 2010).

Following Barack Obama's use of social media in the 2008 American election political parties in South Africa started using social media in the 2009 national election. The two major parties and the new party, the ANC, the DA and COPE used several different social media channels including blogging, Mig33, Twitter and Facebook during the course of their respective election campaigns (Bankole et al, 2010; Walton, 2010; Mafirakurewa, 2009).

In a study done on the use of blogs for political campaigning in the election Bankole et al (2010) discovered that blogging was still in its infancy with very few participants making use of the platform for posting election related content. Furthermore, they found that political parties preferred other online tools to get their message across (Bankole et al, 2010). Mobile social media was also used in the campaign with the ANC's Youth League using a mobile social media channel called Mig33 to comment on political events, mobilize large crowds for rallies and announce very online chats with African National Congress leaders (Walton, 2010).

The 2011 Local Government election was the second election where social media featured prominently in South African politics, however this time on a slightly larger scale. During the election, social media was used by both the ANC and the DA in order to allow the public to interact with party leaders, ask questions, and voice their opinion and as a back channel for speeches (Meditla, 2011; Houston, 2011).

Social media and Political branding

In the 2014 South African National Elections online technologies were heavily used by both the political parties and the media. While the IOL and Times Live had dedicated election sections the Mail and Guardian had a Soapbox online space which allowed all parties to put forward their positions on policy and governance issues (Duncan, 2014). However, these spaces were merely used to publish their own stories and stories from SAPA with interaction confined to the comments highlighting the fact that the mainstream media just saw online as an extension of their traditional space (Duncan, 2014).

Prior to the 2014 Elections there were signs that the parties had not internalized the interactive nature of social media and were using it merely to broadcast party information rather than engage in dialogue (Duncan, 2014). In terms of websites the ANC linked their social media for comments but did not allow actual comments on their site; in addition, the multimedia and social media interfaces did not work well and this reduced the effectiveness of the website (Duncan, 2014). Similarly, the DA's website did not allow for user comment and did not link to its social media; however, the main site did link to a number of secondary sites which gave them a more commanding presence (Duncan, 2014). The Agang website was clean and easy to use with a Twitter and Facebook feed which allowed for easy tracking of social media activities and likes while the COPE and IFP websites lacked inspiration and the EFF website was impressive which was befitting of a youth inspired party (Duncan, 2014).

Duncan, 2014 argued that the parties have not managed to harness the dialogic nature of social media which would have allowed them to interact more with their supporters and create a space where their supporter's voices could have been heard in an unmediated fashion.

Political branding ensures political success

In their study on the creation, development and demise of a political brand White and Chernatony, 2002 studied the British New Labour party in order to understand the use of political branding as means of establishing party values and winning political support. They concluded that while the brand was an essential element in the modernization of the party it failed when the party failed to deliver on certain electoral promises (White and de Chernatony, 2002). The brand promise, although vague, sought to allay fears, reassure and convince the electorate that Labour would provide a new kind of government; however, discrepancies between promises and performance led to voter cynicism and ultimately a decline in turn-out during the following election (White and de Chernatony, 2002).

A crucial element of any political system is the involvement of voters or consumers, yet with an increase in voter apathy this group is often ignored in traditional studies (Phipps, Brace-Govan and Jevons, 2008). In their study on the role of the consumer in political branding Phipps et al, 2008 found that a politician's brand equity could be separated from the political party's corporate brand equity, whereas the consumer played a much larger role in the development of a politician's brand equity than that of the party (Phipps et al, 2008).

Constant, 2014 undertook a qualitative study in an attempt to understand how young people's relationships with brands affect their relationships with politics and to find out whether youth political apathy could be connected to the rise in branding. The findings suggested that rather than political apathy there was a sense of skepticism and a feeling that their voices were being ignored by political parties whereas they described brands as helping with their self-improvement and the stabilisation of their identity (Constant, 2014).

In their study on whether a party brand influences a voter's propensity to vote for a particular party Nielsen and Larsen, 2013 found that the political brand of different parties appears to have an effect on voting behavior even after a number of other relevant explanatory variables from political science have been held constant. Their study uncovered that conceptually the political brand helps voters internalize public sentiments circulating in the political sphere by working as a heuristic which pushes them in the direction of political parties which currently have an aura of likeability or momentum (Nielsen and Larsen, 2013).

According to Smith and French, 2009 it is axiomatic that political parties are organizations where politicians seek to exchange ideas and promises for electoral support. Their key argument was that parties are brands because they act as brands to consumers (voters) who attach meaning to party names and symbols over time which then allows them to differentiate and vote for one party over another (Smith and French, 2009).

Their study also found that consumers have knowledge structures of political parties in much the same way as they do about brands and that these consumers have an innate motivation to learn and decide about brands, both to know where and where not to spend their money (vote/not vote) and how to cope with the increasingly complicated world they live in (Smith and French, 2009).

Other scholars who have studied political branding have found that elections are seen as a moment of sale: the point of choice where voters employ knowledge they have about candidates or party's to make a choice and how branding is used by voters to differentiate political parties and project a certain identity (Needham, 2005 as cited in Marsh and Fawcett, 2011; Scammel, 2007 as cited in Nielsen and Larsen, 2013; Smith and French, 2009 as cited in Nielsen and Larsen, 2013; Smith, 2009 as cited in Nielsen and Larsen. 2013).

In a study on personality traits students seek in their political leaders Smith, 2009 found that honesty, uniqueness and personality were the most desired traits while these traits were found to

have a greater impact in the political branding field than they do in the commercial branding field (As cited in Marsh and Fawcett, 2013).

When talking about the field of political branding two attributes act as the common denominator, identification and differentiation (Nielsen, 2015). For Nielsen, 2015 a political brand is political representations that are located in a pattern which can be identified and differentiated from other political representations.

Learning Outcomes

This chapter has traced the history and development of political marketing and branding and has highlighted its use and growth through the years. This is important because it provides an important benchmark with which to analyse the EFF's presence and use of branding. In addition, this chapter has traced the development of some important concepts which will help in the analysis of the EFF's branding strategy.

This thesis will attempt to compare and contrast the EFF's branding in relation to some of the studies shown here as well as look at where the party went wrong and what they were successful in.

Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter aims to understand the phenomenal success of EFF and its political branding strategies in the last national elections 2014. The chapter follows an exploratory approach that uses in-depth interviews combined with some secondary quantitative research. The data from the different research methods will be thematically analysed by the researcher. In order to do this, the researcher undertook both a primary qualitative study as well as a preliminary secondary quantitative study in order to understand the branding and communication practices of the party.

These methods were adopted in order to understand and answer the primary research question which was centered around the Economic Freedom Fighter's brand image during the 2014 Election and how they successfully built a political brand for themselves.

In the early planning stages, other methods of data collection were considered. However, surveys were impractical for time-pressed the sample and the format would not have allowed for probing questions. A focus group was logistically impossible: organizing a group of politicians and media to come together at any one time was prohibited by the nature of their work. Also, focus groups would not have provided the desired depth as 'the information obtained in focus groups reflects group opinions and attitudes rather than hidden beliefs' (Berger, 1998).

The research was not able to find sufficient literature on projective technique analysis of political branding in South Africa. Though there is urgent need to understand the analytical process. The thesis aims to fill in this gap, by providing illustrative guides that can be used to analyse and interpret findings generated from qualitative projective techniques. In that regard, projective technique can be defined as an unstructured and indirect form of questioning that encourages respondents to project their underlying motivations, beliefs, attitudes or feelings regarding the issue of concern (Lilienfeld, Wood, Garb, 2000).

The rationale underlying most projective techniques is the projective hypothesis (Frank, 1948; see also Sundberg, 1977). According to this hypothesis, respondents project aspects of their personalities in the process of disambiguating unstructured test stimuli. As a consequence, the projective technique interpreters (researcher) can ostensibly “work in reverse” by examining respondents’ answers to these stimuli for insights regarding their personality dispositions. Hence, the key question was how did media personnel and politicians explain and project the success of political branding and EFF in the last national elections.

Bearing the above in mind the researcher undertook a series of interviews as well as a pilot study of EFF shadow presence on social media platforms, particularly their Facebook page and Twitter account. In addition, a secondary analysis was done using quantitative data obtained from a variety of sources which dealt with the EFF’s electoral performance as a whole. While not a complete quantitative study the preliminary findings were useful for analysis. The purpose of these methods was to properly answer the questions that the thesis posed around whether or not the party had achieved success and whether they had used best practices successfully in order to launch themselves from a social movement into the third largest party in South Africa. Apart from the reasons above these were chosen in order to properly understand a range of opinions around the topic as well to see first-hand if the party had achieved success and whether or not they were using best practices when it came to online and social media branding.

In terms of qualitative analysis, the following aspects were considered: types of posts that the party, frequency of posts, manner in which people were responded to, the use of imagery and branding across the channels, the language that was used in both the posts and responses, the use of visuals as opposed to text, the sharing of information between channels and between the official pages and the leadership and the networks that have been built up through these channels. The analysis also included a look at the way in which the channels were linked to the EFF’s official website as well as how it connected with traditional media stories and events. The way in which these online channels connected with the offline activities of the party during the election was also analysed and looked into in order to understand their campaign in a holistic manner.

Interviews

This methodological approach applies the tenets of Holstein and Gubrium's 'active interview' (1995). The qualitative interviews explored the uncharted territory of the particular and unique context surrounding the emergence of EFF as new political player that has dominated the political scene as an example of a successful political branding strategy. Interviews were conducted in such a way that within the interview setting, the interviewer and the respondent were engaged in the 'production of knowledge' (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).

Interviews were conducted following a semi-structured format. The flexible nature of the semi-structured interview is a benefit to mutual narrative construction. However, the interview poses 'a persistent set of problems to be controlled' (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). Flexibility requires constant reflection on one's own influence over the process; simultaneously, it allows for more control over the data.

Planning the interviews required great attention to the process, especially the two building blocks of good interviewing: the recruitment of respondents and the interview topic guide (Gaskell, 2000).

Each interviewee signed an agreement to be interviewed for ethical clarity including permission for the interview to be recorded and for the use their names. These can be found in the appendix.

Interviews were conducted in three different ways, namely email, face-to-face and via telephone and Skype conversations. While face-to-face was the preferred method various factors prevented many of the interviews from being conducted in this manner. These factors included issues such as finding a convenient time for both the researcher and the interviewee and the fact that the researcher and interviewee were often based in different cities or countries. Where face-to-face interviews were conducted they were recorded and then transcribed before being analysed. Telephonic and Skype interviews were conducted when the researcher and the interviewee managed to find a suitable time for the interview and if neither method was feasible email interviews were conducted.

In the case of telephonic and Skype interviews these were recorded and transcribed before being analysed while the email interviews were adapted into a format which would make the analysis easy and then analysed. In the case of follow-up questions to both telephonic and face-to-face these were done using an email interview due to the time constraints of both parties. Each interview was transcribed in its entirety. Though this 'necessarily imposes an interpretation on speech' (Fairclough, 1992), it was necessary in order to properly review the texts during later stages of analysis.

Copies of the letters of consent from interviewees are included as appendix.

The data presented later on in this thesis is based on an inductively grounded theoretical approach. While this means that research and analysis are an ongoing part of the process, 'the combination of flexibility and control inherent in in-depth interviewing techniques fits grounded theory strategies for increasing the analytic incisiveness of the resultant analysis' (Charmaz, 2003).

The questions

As stated above the questions were based on the two chosen subsets. While those involved with political communication were asked questions around branding's role in political communication the branding experts were asked questions around the EFF's brand and the success of it. In the case of face-to-face and to a lesser extent the telephonic interviews there was a high degree of flexibility when it came to the questions as often questions arose as a follow-up rather than following a rigid structured approach. This was not the case with the email interviews as the questions were sent by the researcher and returned by the interviewee. In addition, time constraints and the availability of the email interviewees often did not allow for a follow-up interview.

There were initially twenty-four questions however, the researcher has reconsidered the questions and categorized them into twelve broad questions:

1. Do you believe that branding has influenced new politics?
2. What is the political dynamics of parties in South Africa?
3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?
4. What made the 2014 elections different to elections that came before?
5. What made the 2014 elections in South Africa a case study of political branding?
6. Compare the campaigning techniques, narrative and political branding of main parties in South Africa in 2014 elections?
7. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the current mediatized politics in South Africa?
8. Explain the context of the South African politics that gave rise to the EFF?
9. How has the birth of the EFF changed power relations in South Africa?
10. Do you think the EFF achieved success in the 2014 elections?
11. What is the role of political leaders in branding and how does Julius Malema contribute to the EFF's brand?

12. What is effective and ineffective about the EFF's brand?

The full questions plus the interview transcripts can be found in the addendum

The sample

Though there is 'no one method for selecting respondents' (Gaskell, 2000), the primary goal was a diverse sample, and diversity was prioritized over ease of access. In some cases, the researcher waited weeks for the chance to perform interviews with respondents.

The interviewees

The researcher interviewed the following people:

Maynard Manyowa

Alistair Mackay

Kameel Premhid

Anthony Butler

Dr Rushil Ranchod

Martin Slabbert-Capper

Andrew Gasnolar

Nic Borain.

Solly Moeng

Stephen Grootes

Steven Friedman

Ron Irwin

Glenda Nevill

Richard Poplack

Qaanitah Hunter

Angus Mackenzie

Daniel Silke

For interviewees biographies, consent and contact details please see appendix.

The content analysis

For the researcher it was important to understand both opinions of the EFF as well as first-hand documented analysis of one of the party's most important communication channels, the online social media space. With this in mind the researcher referred to relevant empirical evidence as secondary methods to understand how EFF used its multiple platforms for communication.

The content analysis was conducted on the party's social media channels, namely their Facebook page (<https://www.facebook.com/economicfreedomstruggle>) and their Twitter account (<https://twitter.com/EconFreedomZA>) from the 1st of March 2014 until the 7th of May 2014 and included all posts and tweets prior to the 2014 national election. The analysis included research on the EFF's online presence as a whole which incorporated their website as well as the personal social media account of their leaders.

According to (Krippendorff, 2004) a content analysis is research technique used to make reproducible and valid results about data. This research tool is used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts (Gökçe, 2006).

After the initial primary analysis was carried out on the EFF's social media channels a smaller secondary quantitative analysis was conducted on data that was collected during the elections which analysed the EFF's performance across social media, traditional media and their election results. While this data was meant to be comprehensive it was found to be useful in a largely qualitative study. The social media data was provided by Apurmac Media, a digital marketing company, who analysed the growth of both the EFF's and Julius Malema's social media channels from the 1st of March until the election on the 7th of May.

The analysis of the election results was conducted on data from the official online elections website (elections.org.za) as well as data collected and analysed by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg in the book *Election 2014: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects* edited by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg and Roger Southall. The traditional media analysis was conducted on data that was collected and analysed by Jane Duncan in the same book.

Chapter 5: Research Findings

In this chapter, the researcher aims to offer a detailed reflection of the methods, primary and secondary; which included interviews, social media qualitative analysis and a preliminary secondary social media quantitative analysis. This section covers the findings of these studies in an effort to delve into the branding of the EFF during the 2014 elections. Ultimately this section paints a picture of how the EFF managed to brand themselves and what elements of that branding was effective and ineffective and how that brand was communicated across both traditional and online media.

Questions were asked about the general role of branding in South Africa, its use in the 2014 elections and its use by political parties. An analysis was conducted on the social media channels of the EFF during the election; this was used to understand how they communicated their brand online and how they sold their party to potential voters.

A secondary analysis on existing election data was carried out to determine how the EFF grew their brand and how well they did in terms of votes during the election. This was done in order to understand the context within which their brand performed and whether it was effective or not.

Political branding usually uses logos, colours and trademarks, just like any other commercial entity. It is no doubt that the EFF's red beret is a brand in itself. But now in the digital age, representatives of those parties have room to become personal brands creating a sort of a brand within a brand. Politics and the power of consumerism is on the rise, though voters/consumers are both volatile and changing.

In order to provide a complete perspective of their branding the researcher had to consider several points of view as well as an analysis of their social media channels. This was done to offer a complete 360-degree view of the brand and how they communicated their message and offering to the electorate and how it was perceived. Ultimately both the interviews and analysis considered the

notion of success in terms of establishing a brand and getting it to a point where it was universally recognizable across the broad electorate that we have in South Africa.

To map some of the pertinent problems related to generally South African politics and specifically political branding in South Africa might related to ideas of intersectionality, colonization and militarized culture. It is important to add here that the idea of primordial societies is a hurdle blocking many of the political objectives in South Africa.

In this volatile situation, it is also important to revisit the relationship between a political product, placement and promotion politics. Political decisions are related to candidate's selection, while the political price is not.

Section 1: Interviews

1. Do you believe that branding has influenced new politics?

In reference to question (1), most of the respondents emphasized the importance of branding on political parties to a great extent. They have also confirmed the increasing power of political branding in South Africa.

Slabbert-Capper, 2015 emphasized how political parties have become smarter with how they market themselves in line with the changing face of communication and media as well as a more sophisticated electorate which has forced parties to change the way they do things and to be clearer about their brand offering. While Premhid, 2015 suggested that South Africa is following the footsteps of the model of 'Americanization' of politics, where slick marketing and branding set the norm. In contrast, Irwin, 2015 acknowledges that political branding focuses on the importance of history and narrative which contributes to the party's credibility and helps create your party's brand story which combined with the added element of emotions creates an overall brand experience.

Silke, 2015 argues that South African politics needs to move away from allegiances of the past which were directed by emotions into more rational structures where people vote for the best candidate not just the one belonging to the same race. Silke, 2015 adds that as the bonds of allegiance to the old orders start to fray at the edge branding will take its rightful place as a core aspect of a political party's attractiveness.

While there is some level of agreement of branding's place in South African politics there is a sense of caution when it comes to the role of its implementation.

2. What is the political dynamics of parties in South Africa?

When it comes to the second question, the interviewees sentiments are that the ANC's strength is based on the history of the party/movement and the narrative it has built around this although this seems to be diminishing (Ranchod, 2015; Slabbert-Capper, 2015, Irwin 2015). However, the ANC is facing a new trend of continuous criticism for its failures, internal politics, erosion of institutional accountability, the failure to adapt and move into the future, corruption, nepotism, looting and mismanagement (Ranchod, 2015; Manyowa, 2015).

The DA's strength is reflected in its large national presence, the fact that they are consolidating key metros, have a fair (if not contested) track record on provincial governance and are using its black leadership figures to transcend the perceived racial barrier (Ranchod, 2015; Slabbert-Capper, 2015). However, the DA is heavily criticized for the lack of authenticity, unimaginative and contrived and raised questions around trust of the candidate and the party (Ranchod, 2015). Ranchod, 2015 argues that a potential shortfall is its brand fragility as minority interest, particularly white party and in order for the party to move forward they will need to convert and retain black support as well as entrench its support with its non-traditional voting base

The political dynamics of the EFF seem very different. For Ranchod, 2015 the EFF's visceral, raw and emotion-orbiting politics which was antagonistic to the ANC in a way that the DA and other opposition parties cannot be was a positive element of their campaign which resonated with some of the electorate. In a similar vein Slabbert-Capper, 2015 argues that the EFF's success was primarily concerned with managing to catch the attention of the public and the media while spinning a narrative that is controversial and playing their audience. In contrast, Mackay, 2015 perceives the EFF's success as being linked to the anti-establishment brand of the people approach.

On a different note, Manyowa, 2015 suggests that that EFF's strength revolves around a strategy which involves the empowerment of black people, standing up to the ANC's manipulation of the democratic processes and addressing the issues of white privilege, black marginalization and unequal distribution of wealth. In contrast Ranchod, 2015 and Slabbert-Capper, 2015 suggest that a shortcoming of the EFF is that their campaign has a sell-by-date which they will need to overcome in order to prove that they are a viable oppositional force.

While the political dynamics are certainly shifting all three of the major parties are still struggling to create that perfect packaged product.

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

South African political brands inclined to venture into the cultural and political debates that have permeated the political landscape. Political branding has exploited the cultural diversity and the continuous discontent of the public for being continuously shut down by authorities.

Borain, 2015 argues that branding in South African politics is important when we talk about the importance individual voters attach to the use of symbols, colours, slogans and leaders as well as the degree to which these are reflective of their lived or aspirational experience.

Nonetheless, such branding success is more evident in urban more than rural areas (Butler, 2015; Hunter, 2015). In addition, there seems to be a greater emphasis on spectacle branding which is supported by the media and in turn places a far greater emphasis on political branding (Ranchod, 2015; Irwin, 2015). Furthermore, Butler, 2015 and Hunter, 2015 argue that it is part of the fabric of society and is what sells the party to voters and helps differentiate them from other parties.

Despite the fact that the ANC, DA and the EFF used similar tactics there were certain differences between them. ANC has placed a significant emphasis on positioning themselves as post-liberal party and as the party of Nelson Mandela, while the EFF plugged into the social contradiction and identity that already existed in South Africa (Ranchod, 2015; Borain, 2015; Slabbert-Cooper, 2015). The DA has a very sophisticated and well run political machine which kicks into action for every election ensuring that the DA's positioning is clever and its message consistent (Slabbert-Cooper, 2015).

Ranchod, 2015 favours political personality arguing that party leaders have become short-hand for political understanding in South Africa. Contrastingly, (Irwin, 2015) views the dominance of all ideas related to political party branding without any particular emphasis on political leaders and their brands. Election campaigns are times when parties invest greater resources into their branding which despite the fact that rhetoric and imagery are present are not given any real value (Ranchod, 2015).

According to Moeng, 2015 parties present offerings based on what they think people want to see and hear, playing on people's emotions rather than the value they can offer and that as long as people don't think they have a clear choice it will be like this. Mackenzie, 2015 adds that political sentiment in South Africa is greatly associated with a party's brand, with less importance assigned to the manifesto, policy platform and leadership of the party.

While there is evidence of political branding in South Africa it is most certainly at an infancy stage.

4. What made the 2014 elections different to elections that came before?

The question speaks to the circumstances; political environment and campaigning that made this election different and unique to those that had come before.

To start with, the 2014 elections allowed for the first time the space and eagerness to revisit the ANC establishment as a result of the ailing economy, poor quality of leadership and the patronage network that Zuma presides over (Silke, 2015). Manyowa, 2015 identified two key issues: DA's growing influence and the birth of the EFF which introduced a new key player who would ultimately alter the dynamics of power. Slabbert-Capper, 2015 highlighted the loss of popularity of ANC in real numbers and that for the 1st time there was an alternative on the ballot box for young black voters.

Grootes, 2015 argues that what made these elections different was that South Africa is moving away from race based voting and towards class based voting where the upper classes continue to vote for the ANC and the lower classes have switched to voting for the EFF.

What we have seen is that a large number of people who voted for COPE in 2009 have switched to the DA and we now have a split in the black middle class where the conservatives are voting for the DA and the more militant voting for the EFF (Friedman, 2015).

Ranchod, 2015 highlighted two key changes: the first has to do with these elections being more competitive and the second relates to a growing uncertainty in the marketplace and more to play for. This has left the voters open to persuasion and therefore how parties are able to engage, interact and market themselves to specific group's matters considerably.

While these changes may not have reflected at the ballot box there was sense that these elections were the beginning of a series of elections which would re-define South African politics.

5. What made the 2014 elections in South Africa a case study of political branding?

In the 2014 elections South African political parties used branding to increase their presence and visibility. On the one hand, those already in power like ANC and DA assessed their existing presence for weaknesses and possible takeovers by rivals and then used branding to determine consolidation and expansion strategies. On the other hand, EFF staked its claim as a government-in-waiting, which is claim often made by the official opposition.

Neville, 2015 argues that branding has found its way into South African political parties as a result of the news becoming visual, being able to be immediately identified by something you wear, a certain colour or combination of colours, a style of poster, the fonts used and the tone of the message which

have all been used by political parties to differentiate themselves. Examples of this include the sea of party colours you see at party rallies (Neville, 2015).

Neville, 2015 argues that the EFF attempted to convince young voters that the party their parents voted for no longer had value to them while the DA attempted to convince born-frees that they were a party of equal opportunity.

Mackay, 2015 acknowledges that South African parties are achieving a certain level of success with the way they have used political branding particularly in their social media and guerrilla marketing. An example of this was the way in which the DA used Twitter Town Halls during the election (Mackay, 2015).

For Slabbert-Cooper, 2015 the ANC were slow to awaken to the possibilities of branding. Furthermore, the DA borrowed heavily from the USA in copying Obama's style, the ANC used Mandela's image, while EFF borrowed heavily from the revolutionaries of the past such as Che Guevara with their berets and the use of the communist colour, red (Manyowa, 2015; Irwin, 2015).

Moeng, 2015 argued that the bulk of the election was driven by emotion and not values and that as long as people don't think they have a clear choice this will be the status quo. In addition, Ranchod, 2015 argues that the fact that people would rather not vote than vote for a party other than the ANC suggests that opposition parties are not having success in changing voter behaviour through branding or other means.

Certain key elements of political branding were apparent in these elections. These were used by the political parties in an attempt to retain their voting base and expand and offer a space for new voters.

6. Compare the campaigning techniques, narrative and political branding of main parties in South Africa in 2014 elections?

The three main parties in the 2014 election, the ANC, DA and the EFF, all campaigned extremely hard in the run-up to the elections using a mix of branding, marketing techniques and attempting to offer voters different narratives to their opponents.

In South Africa, all parties used posters and regalia as a basis of spreading their message in addition to political rallies, TV advertisements and sending their leaders across the country to spread the message of their party (Hunter, 2015). Social media platforms were also used effectively for the 1st time with the DA outperforming their rivals and the ANC having to play catch up.

The ANC's tactics were lauded for the management of the "Good Story to tell" campaign (Poplack, 2015), though it was criticized for its weak strategy that depended on a problematic presidential candidate (Premhid, 2015). ANC was also described to be entrapped in traditional wisdom of using previous tactics that had proven to work in earlier elections campaigning on the basis on what they had delivered (Butler, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Martin, 2015; Manyowa, 2015).

According to Moeng, 2015, ANC followed a defensive tactic to justify and explain flaws of the government, which when combined with the negative press they received left them on the back-foot for the most of the elections.

The DA ran a slick election campaign which included punchy adverts, world-class pollsters, clever online branding and tapped into the now standard and globalized notions and rhetoric of 'change' and 'hope' (Ranchod, 2015; Moeng, 2015). They also made effective use of SMS campaigns, billboards on highways and even utilized airplane advertising (Neville, 2015).

However, DA's campaign was criticized for an incomprehensible platform and not achieving as much of a breakthrough as was predicted (Poplack, 2015; Premhid, 2015). In addition, the party failed to redefine its restoration of image as white party label and DA campaign lacked authenticity bearing striking similarities to the Obama and Labour campaigns in terms of rhetoric, style and overall feel; in addition, their campaign was too complicated for the electorates to grasp (Premhid, 2015; Irwin, 2015; Ranchod, 2015, Manyowa, 2015).

In contrast, the kind of improvisation that EFF's campaign followed seemed to be unstructured and incomparable to the DA and the ANC's (Manyowa, 2015). However, it was by far the most powerful and influential building up its core branding on the euphoria and high emotion of the marginalized populations (Manyowa, 2015). The EFF made use of spectacle branding which got them media coverage (Irwin, 2015; Mackenzie, 2015). Furthermore, their campaign was dependent on their grassroots organization which involved knocking on doors in an attempt to get out the vote (Butler, 2015; Premhid, 2015).

The big difference in the EFF's campaign was its single focused message of 'economic freedom in our lifetime' which when compared with the other party's mass amounts of policy positions which were communicated to different electorate sectors was extremely effective and consistent (Neville, 2015). In addition, they rode the bandwagon of pre-existing grievances, focused on militant and radical talk, used the failings of the ruling party as their core message and provided an important outlet for the disaffection in the body politic (Ranchod, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Borain, 2015; Premhid,

2015). The EFF campaign was a lot more radical and youth focused and campaigned around the unequal distribution of wealth in society (Hunter, 2015; Manyowa, 2015).

EFF used a face for their brand, the party leader, Julius Malema who is a master political strategist, and identified the opportunity for the party to tap into large levels of frustration amongst young black South Africans (Butler, 2015; Slabbert-Capper, 2015; Mackenzie, 2015). Malema effectively played the role of the persecuted and his voters came to his defense, he had a simple message and his voters bought into it and understood it (Slabbert-Capper, 2015).

While similar traditional campaign tactics were used by all three of the main parties they all campaigned quite differently.

7. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the current mediatized politics in South Africa?

This question examines where the EFF have positioned themselves and how they have used this position to attract a voting base.

Question (7) revolved around the EFF's positioning which aimed to re-ignite South African political discourse, by capturing the left wing of the political spectrum, a space which has been uncontested for the last 20 years (Ranchod, 2015) In addition they have attempted to build alliances with smaller parties and personalities to ensure their dominance in this space (Ranchod, 2015).

EFF has positioned itself on the far left of the political spectrum which is ideologically debatable but irrefutable from a branding point of view (Poplack, 2015; Moeng, 2015; Mackenzie, 2015). This has differentiated the party from the ANC and the DA who now inhabit a centre, right position despite protestations to the contrary (Poplack, 2015). Though, ideologically the loose Marxist-Leninist ideology has not achieved wide support with the poor, working or unemployed South Africans (Mackenzie, 2015).

The EFF have branded themselves as the champions of black South Africans, young revolutionary upstarts and have focused on redistribution, revolution, economic liberation, wealth redress, empowerment and being the underdog (Borain, 2015; Mackay, 2015; Irwin, 2015; Manyowa, 2015; Premhid, 2015; Slabbert-Capper, 2015). The EFF positioned the party as a pro-poor worker's party through their actions, dress and symbolism (Mackenzie, 2015; Irwin, 2015). According to Slabbert-Capper, 2015 the EFF have put in a lot of effort to show they care about the South Africans who are still stuck in poverty even though we live in a free country.

8. Explain the context of the South African politics that gave rise to the EFF?

Question (8) highlights the need to unpack the context that gave rise to the EFF. What changes in the political dynamics of South Africa allowed the EFF to form and come together to create a brand new party as well as achieve over a million votes.

There was the dissatisfaction and the frustration at the ANC amongst the electorate which combined with Malema's personal agenda and his personal following which continued to follow him after his expulsion (Manyowa, 2015; Premhid, 2015; Butler, 2015). For Mackay, 2015 the context of these elections provided a myriad range of factors; including a stagnant economy, a president without a vision, rising unemployment, a palpable sense that the post-1994 progress has slowed or stopped and a huge amount of anger directed at the government, more so than in previous elections, as a result of them not seeming to care about the citizen's demands.

For Slabbert-Capper, 2015 the EFF draws its support from the millions of people who no longer feel that they have a political home in ANC. Prior to the formation of the EFF there was a sense of frustration with the status quo amongst excluded groups of people and the EFF used this to position themselves as an uncompromising, radical and pro-poor movement championing the poor and marginalized better than any other party in South Africa (Mackay, 2015).

Manyowa, 2015 argued that the socio-political landscape was always going to be problematic because negotiated settlements tend to crumble after 20 years and the EFF was born around this time. The problem will always be transformation and compensation without threatening stability (Manyowa, 2015).

Grootes, 2015 correlates the growing number of unemployed desperate people and the eagerness of the South African voting blocks to find someone to represent their struggle for equality and establishment of self-contained society with Julius Malema's willingness to be this person. Furthermore, Slabbert-Capper, 2015 argues that the ANC has been trading on its liberation credentials for years, however frustration at the social and economic problems have made people look elsewhere for political answers and that is why the EFF is so popular.

For Mackay, 2015 the emergence of the EFF is as a result of the huge levels of inequality and the slow transformation of our economy which has been predicted by analysts for some time. Butler, 2015 argues that more than just the issues in the country but also the factional politics in the ANC, a key part of the anti-Zuma faction precipitated the breakaway.

The local and political context for the birth of the EFF was clearly evident in large numbers of disaffected youth who were put off by the ongoing factional fights and internal politics within the ANC

and its alliance partners as well as the fact that they did not seem to care for the poor and the youth segments of the electorate (Neville, 2015). With many of these young voters not ready to cross over to the 'white' party of the DA there was fertile ground for the seeds of a new party to be planted that would fight loudly and vocally for the youth, the workers and the poor (Neville, 2015).

9. How has the birth of the EFF changed power relations in South Africa?

Question 9 looks at what changes the EFF have brought to the political landscape since their formation and how this was actively demonstrated.

EFF has offered a new discourse that revisits the post-Apartheid social, power and economic relations, which left the non-black community jittery (Manyowa, 2015). This is warranted by the rise in Black Nationalism since the formation of the EFF which threatens to disband the entire negotiated settlement (Manyowa, 2015). (Grootes, 2015) confirmed the argument that political power relations have changed in that suddenly for the first time parliament is at the centre of life in South Africa as a result of the EFF shining a light and bringing our attention to the subject.

For Mackay, 2015 the EFF's disruption of power relations in South Africa is exemplified in Gauteng where the ANC struggled to become more responsive to citizens needs in order to regain popularity while at the same time refusing to toe the party line in certain circumstances. This has resulted in loss of power and support (Mackay, 2015).

However, for Premhid, 2015 the key to the EFF's success was their ability to fill in the void among the disenfranchised groups in the political market that are inclined to be too far left for the DA to gain as supporters, and have exploited this for their political gain. These people have existed in South Africa during and after Apartheid and have seen elites continue to form at their expense; the EFF identified this and used it to sustain themselves (Premhid, 2015).

Friedman, 2015 argued that EFF have reinforced social and power relations in South Africa. For Friedman, 2015 the exclusive club of people that run the country and economy now consists of both white and black people. Friedman, 2015 argues that the EFF is about is not about getting new people into the club it is about how resources are divided up within the club which effectively places them as a party for middle class people who feel that they have not gotten enough in the past 21 years and want more.

For Moeng, 2015 the birth of the EFF has given a voice to the underdogs in numerous ways and has changed social dynamics, given people on the ground more courage and helped them look the president in the face and say no more. We now have a political landscape in which disgruntled ANC

voters and youth voters who don't see the ANC as a real political home have found a party they can identify with (Slabbert-Capper, 2015).

In addition, Manyowa, 2015 and Slabbert-Capper, 2015 argue that significance of the EFF is that they have prioritized matters of transformation and focused on the incessant bad governance, poor policy choices, corruption, theft and the lack of accountability from the ANC which the DA could never raise due to accusations of being racist and wanting to bring back Apartheid.

Silke, 2015 argued that the DA's moderate centrist market orientated policies are not something for the ANC to get upset about and instead we have and will continue to see the ANC become more populist especially in terms of their policy proposals as they continue to pander to the EFF's economic vision and worldview in order to bolster its dwindling voter base.

10. Do you think the EFF achieved success in the 2014 elections?

Question (10) aimed to attempt to track EFF's levels of success in the elections. EFF proved to be a master of political marketing, by applying some fundamental marketing principles, and some clever guerrilla-marketing tactics.

Though EFF did not achieve an equal or better percentage of the votes as COPE their victory is of "greater political consequence" (Mackenzie, 2015).

For some of their interviewees the success of the EFF lay in the fact that they very little time to prepare, faced intense opposition, had less established political machinery than their competitors, no formal registration drive and were still recovering from expulsion from the ANC (Mackenzie, 2015; Poplack, 2015; Borain, 2015; Butler, 2010; Slabbert-Capper, 2015; Mackay, 2015).

Despite the fact that both COPE and the EFF were born as a result of expulsion from the ruling party, there were different dynamics at play (Ranchod, 2015). EFF brought along a new kind of level of organizational coherence which allowed them to mount a serious campaign that gained momentum throughout the election (Manyowa, 2015; Slabbert-Cooper, 2015).

The EFF strategically used branding gimmicks (Mackay, 2015; Irwin, 2015) such as the choice of a bold red colour that was not only impactful but gave the party an instant narrative and recognition. Such guerrilla marketing tactics were very successful in mobilizing the public (which connected the party branding with a sense a proletariat power. Furthermore, the EFF had a very strong media narrative and strong personalities that took centre stage in attracting headlines (Premhid, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Ranchod, 2015).

EFF has used a very focused and simple message: “We understand your (publics) frustrations, anger and exclusion.” The EFF’s empathy about the conditions of average people’s lives enabled the party to appear as genuine ‘customer’-champion.

11. What is the role of political leaders in branding and how does Julius Malema contribute to the EFF’s brand?

Question (11) explains the role of political leaders in the current debate of branding in politics with a focus on Julius Malema.

There is a consensus among interviewees that the political system in South Africa reflects a voting behavior that favours party brands over politicians’ (Poplack, 2015; Premhid, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Manyowa, 2015). However, parties need to have a leader behind whom the party rallies and whose brand is as important as the parties’ brand (Poplack, 2015; Premhid, 2015; Hunter, 2015; Manyowa, 2015). For Borain, 2015 and Ranchod, 2015 the use of the leader figure is an overstated idea in South African politics, though the media tend to overemphasize the importance of the leader’s brand.

The leader brand has become short-hand for what the party stands for and often plays a sense-making role for the electorate as people will often not know the parties manifesto but will know what its leader stands for (Ranchod, 2015). Hunter, 2015 supported the argument that political personalities are important in branding within the South African landscape because it helps establish a face for the party alongside their demeanor. For Hunter, 2015 the party they represent and the role they play in that party are also significant.

According to Poplack, 2015 party leaders contribute immensely to the concept of branding in South Africa; he gives the example of how the DA has changed its tack slightly behind Mmusi Maimane. Premhid, 2015 added that party leaders epitomize the party given that they often fashion it in your own image. Mackay, 2015 gives the example of how Helen Zille was interchangeable with the DA and the massive focus on Malema as to how important leaders are to the concept of branding in South African politics.

Neville, 2015 argued that Zuma was ANC’s weakest point in the campaign due to the fact that there was a disconnection between him and the ANC’s stated anti-corruption stance which was too much for voters in urban areas. On the other hand, Borain, 2015 and Hunter, 2015 perceived the situation in an opposite way, by complimenting Zuma’s ability to speak beautifully in his own tongue, dance

attractively, sing well and get the crowd moving which combined with his wit and charm speak to the supporters on the ground and can override this negative brand image.

The Malema brand was essential to the EFF campaign built a brand around him and he was the face and voice of their campaign (Poplack, 2015). The party used Malema's firebrand power to fill the gaps in their party machine/structure/message (Premhid, 2015). He was also effective in playing the victim which his voters identified with especially the young, unemployed and frustrated (Slabbert-Capper, 2015). For Neville, 2015 Malema hugely affected the EFF's campaign but largely in a positive way, being responsible for 80% of the party's success. Malema has given the EFF a huge amount of momentum and has attracted a lot of media attention for himself and the party (Borain, 2015; Butler, 2015).

Malema's no holds barred, rough, uncompromising and in-your-face attitude and tactics have been adopted by the party and it has become extremely difficult to disassociate Malema with the EFF (Hunter, 2015 ; Ranchod, 2015).

The Julius Malema brand is an integral part of the EFF's overall brand and it is extremely difficult to disassociate the two brands.

12. What is effective and ineffective about the EFF's brand?

There is an argument to be made that the brand that the EFF built had both effective and ineffective elements in the build-up to the 2014 elections.

According to Ranchod, 2015 the EFF were effective in successfully positioning their brand as counterpoint to perceptions of elitism that affect both the DA and the ANC. In addition, they branded the ANC as corrupt and sell-outs and the DA as white party of capital while placing their brand as a brand of the workers and the disenfranchised and Marikana was critical to this (Ranchod, 2015).

Despite the fact that this brand characterization opened the door for political parties to deem them illegitimate, antagonistic to the principles of democracy and having policy vagueness the EFF and Malema's brand were given quite a favourable run in the media (Ranchod, 2015). According to Mackenzie, 2015, the core message of EFF was basic; it was a primal protest against the status quo and corruption that exists in South Africa and this resonated with the frustrations a lot of South Africans have.

There was consensus amongst some of the interviewees that the EFF's ability to build a successful brand and a simple platform was extremely effective (Irwin, 2015, Premhid, 2015 and Manyowa,

2015). This was based around the creation of a really simple platform which was based around being anti-Zuma and fighting for the workers (Irwin, 2015). This allowed them to steal the sympathy the electorate has for the ANC while at the same ensuring that they are instantly recognized through the iconography of berets and overalls (Irwin, 2015).

For the majority of the interviewees the EFF's logo, dress, brand tone, colour scheme and slogan were extremely effective. Mackay, 2015 emphasizes that the EFF's branding has been effective and has got-ten them a lot of attention while sending a strong message of representing the working class, stating that they are of the people and are for the people which have been mimicked by other parties like the DA who created their own blue berets.

For Manyowa, 2015 and Neville, 2015, the EFF's logo was profound and extremely effective in that it took elements of the ANC's logo namely the spear and used some of the ANC's colours combined with the silhouette of a mine shaft to underpin a key message, the nationalization of mines, and used a fist to signify black power.

The red colour scheme used by the EFF was not only attention grabbing but also stood out and made a tremendous impact because there is no way you can forget someone in a red beret and uniform (Irwin, 2015; Manyowa, 2015). Their colour scheme which was borrowed from the ANC gave their voters a sense of security while promising something new (Neville, 2015). Their brand tone was unique and had elements of fighting, strength, being outspoken and being champions of the poor while their promotional items were very clever and instantly recognizable as well as helping the party generate many column inches of media and providing unity amongst workers (Neville, 2015; Manyowa, 2015).

According to Manyowa, 2015, their campaign statements like "we are taking the land had a massive populist effect which when combined with their jargon and use of titles like "commander in chief" resonated well with their cause, to liberate the country. For Friedman, 2015 their ability to get media attention was quite effective as it allowed them to become the party of choice for a lot of frustrated middle class voters (Moeng, 2015).

EFF effectively defined their target market as disaffected youth and were relentless and successful in pursuing this segment of voters (Neville, 2015). Their social media, in which they were relentless and scathing in their commentary, was another effective part of their strategy (Neville, 2015).

Grootes, 2015 and Slabbert-Capper, 2015 argued that their symbols, the use of the colour red and their uniforms were extremely effective which helped their branding stand out and formed a part of their identity.

However, Manyowa, 2015 suggested that EFF's visual media was ineffective as imagery was used to portray bawlers with little brains, which is problematic because the South African middle class is big and very influential. Furthermore, Premhid argues that they lacked message discipline and used outdated communist language which was problematic. Their releasing of all their policies at the same time, not in manifesto format was also ineffective as each policy competed with the other for airtime (Premhid, 2015). This was touched on by Neville, 2015 who argued that their lack of clearly defined policy was an ineffective element of their campaign.

According to Friedman, 2015, the EFF's use of the "Winnie Mandela tactic" proved to be ineffective as they devoted a huge amount of grassroots networking to a small amount of space, namely Marikana, and came away with only 52%. Grootes, 2015 expands on this stating that their organization was extremely ineffective and that if one of their top leaders quit the party it would most likely fall apart.

For Premhid, 2015 the fact that the EFF have not successfully developed their brand was an ineffective element of their campaign. To add to this Maynard, 2015 argues that while the EFF wanted to build a liberator brand they have ended up with a brand of 'motor mouths' in addition to questions around whether or not their brand is respectable.

In conclusion the EFF effectively created a brand that stood out in the political marketplace however there were some questions around the respectability and the development of this brand.

Section 2: Social Media Qualitative Analysis

The increasing use of social media by political parties in South Africa raised many unresolved questions on how these new media actually perturbed the political landscape (Smyth & Best, 2013); Do they fundamentally enhance democracy or are they simply the totems of a younger elite (or both)? (Smyth & Best, 2013); Are they a genuine threat to entrenched power structures or are they more likely to be exploited by those same structures (or both)? (Smyth & Best, 2013). However, the key question remains; what effect does social media have on politics and what potential does it have to be distinct from other forms of media (Smyth & Best, 2013).

This part of the MA explores these questions by focusing on the use of social media during national elections. Elections are a boom time for discourse on social media in many African nations, as citizens review their electoral choices, encourage each other to vote, and report what they are

seeing (Smyth & Best, 2013). Elections therefore serve as an excellent lens on the broader phenomenon of social media and politics (Smyth & Best, 2013).

Importantly however, the thesis doubts the level of challenge that political branding can cause the other well-established party brands like the ANC and the DA particularly in terms of online branding. There are also questions around the effectiveness of online branding and its ability to influence and affect voting patterns; this is particularly poignant in the case of a new political party.

To serve this goal, the thesis aims to develop an explanatory model that looks to ascertain a direct linkage between the increases in Information and communication technologies, political branding and increased in political dynamics in South Africa. While all of these measures are broad and abstract, Shirazi, 2008 has worked on the same direction and suggested that ICT expansion will certainly result in a positive impact on democracy and freedom as well as the reduction of the digital divide.

The concept of social election monitoring tends to stipulate enthusiasm in some camps and skepticism in others, which revisits topics, such as reliability and accessibility, making frequent appearances. This section seeks to inject a measure of nuance into some of these discussions by reviewing some encouraging signs of the apparent robustness of the social monitoring system in South African politics that appeared in the data.

This thesis aims to analyse the social media activity of the EFF prior to the 2014 elections, by considering both Twitter and Facebook platforms from the (March 1-May 7).

Social media and events

One of the biggest roles of the EFF's social media was to inform, broadcast and campaign through election events on the campaign trail. This was done on both their Twitter and Facebook page, albeit quite differently.

On their Twitter channel they maintained a very active presence keeping supporters abreast of when and where an event would be taking place and then broadcasting from the event including the build-up, the arrival of the EFF leadership and live tweeting speeches that were taking place. An example of this was how before an event they would tweet out a picture of the setup followed by the arrival of the EFF leadership and then live tweet the speeches and pictures from the event (“#Seshego stage

set for the #EFF elections rally in Limpopo, Polokwane #EFFManifesto #VoteEFF”) (“CIC #Malema arrives to rapturous applause, ululations and other beautiful stuff like that and so on #EFFManifesto #Seshego”).

On their Facebook page the majority of posts were put up once the event had taken place. These posts often included pictures and videos of cheering crowds or poignant moments in the speeches from the day. (“CIC Julius Malema at Walter Sisulu University in Mthatha giving a lecture on Chris Hani. Lecture in session packed and overflowing”).

They also often included a short video of the moment that Julius Malema arrived at the event and often served to make a political statement and further the party’s agenda. An example of this is a video they posted of the party receiving a blessing from the Khoisan chief in the Western Cape. This served their agenda of fighting for marginalized and excluded groups of people. (“The Khoi priest says a prayer before their chief gives a message of sodality to EFF rally in Western Cape”).

Hashtags

The most popular hashtag used by the EFF was #VoteEFF which was used in most of their election tweets (“EFF government will invest considerably on research and development. Ours will be a technologically advanced economy #VoteEFF”). It was also used by supporters to echo their support for EFF though the support was evolving. The EFF’s tweets can be clustered into three phases, the beginning of the campaign, during the campaign and at the end of the campaign.

First, at the beginning of the campaign the party used #EFFManifesto during their manifesto launch event which highlighted their key pillars through the live tweeting of the presentation of the manifesto (#Malema: We want you to have a house with a bathroom that has a shower. You know shower mos #EFFmanifesto”).

Second, during the campaign the hashtag #MalemaQandA was used successfully on both Facebook and Twitter whenever Julius Malema held an online question and answer session. This tag allowed people to track the conversation, user’s questions and Malema’s answers and got the topic trending on Twitter (“CIC @Julius_S_Malema will again have an hour long Q&A online tomorrow at 12:00. #MalemaQandA #VoteEFF”).

Third, at the end of the campaign #TshelaThupaRally was used as the name of their final rally, this received quite a bit of attention particularly around the fact that the ANC attempted to disrupt the event (“Withdrawal comes after EFF printed posters, paid buses. This is clearly political. EFF will be making urgent court application #TshelaThupaRally”).

In addition, another popular hashtag they used at the end of the campaign was #EFF20Goals. This was used to list their core goals that they hoped to achieve if they were elected to govern (“Transform the state into a people driven state and government accessible to the people. #EFF20Goals”).

Behind the scenes coverage

EFF used their Twitter channel to provide behind the scenes coverage of their election campaign. Tweets were used to show support for the party and to give their supporters a behind the scenes look at their events (“CIC arrives to a resounding 10 000 strong crowd”) and to allow supporters to follow the leadership on the campaign trail (“CIC Malema arrives to rapturous applause” and “EFF leadership will meet a delegation of international investors tomorrow”).

This Twitter coverage started before the event with a tweet setting the scene. An example of this was before their elections rally in Mpumalanga where they tweeted “stage set for the #EFFMpumalanga Elections rally” with an accompanying picture and then moved to broadcast the event in picture and through live tweeting of speeches.

The party live tweeted all speeches that were given during the election campaign. These were mainly given by Julius Malema but other leaders speeches were also live tweeted during important events (“#Malema: Give more money to elderly will be giving more money to all of you. We know that they take care of you. #VoteEFF #Marikana”).

Candidate announcements

EFF used twitter to announce who their candidates were for the election as well their top ten candidates and their provincial province premiers

They also used the opportunity to introduce their 1st member of a provincial legislature who had defected from the DA (“Messie Kennedy from the DA and now representing EFF in the Limpopo Legislature □ #EFFCandidateList”). This was accompanied with a photo of Messie.

Towards the end of March their rallies and events started focusing on their provincial elections (“Malema: salutations to our Premier Candidate Commissar Mandisa Makesini, who after speaking I felt no need to speak because she was good”) (REMINDER: PRESS ALERT: EFF Free State Provincial Elections Rally Tomorrow, 22 March 2014 [LINK TO WEBSITE](#)”).

Court Cases

Twitter was particularly important in terms of the number of court cases they were involved in during the campaign as well as to spin them into electoral opportunities. They presented statements from Malema and other leaders to justify their appearances in court as well as to broadcast their hopes for the outcome of the court process.

An example of this was when they challenged the R600 000 deposit that the IEC expected them to pay to register to contest the elections, they used Twitter to attack the other parties and ultimately call the integrity of the IEC into question (“EFF is at the Pretoria High Court to challenge the R600K deposit required by the IEC”) (“#Malema: The ANC prints its t-shirts through state procurement. We were there. We know these things”).

Linking to their website

EFF maintained a very active presence on Twitter they also developed a website which was used for party news, press releases, detailed information about events, political education and as an information repository. All of this information was then linked from their website to their Twitter account in order to keep their supporters and the general public informed.

They linked all of their press releases and press statements as well as their press advisories with a summary of the most important information on their Twitter profile. These included the most salient points of a speech or releases as well as any important information about logistics surrounding a campaign event. This was important as it served as a space to keep both supporters, members of the media and the general public in the loop with the latest developments of the party.

An example of this was “EFF statement of solidarity and support for the AMCU Strike: Link to website” and “REMINDER: PRESS ALERT: EFF Free State Provincial Elections Rally Tomorrow link to website”

Political statements and moments during the campaign

The EFF used visual media to amplify their message. An example of this was when the party was fighting the IEC in the constitutional court Malema visited the cell where the Treason Trial prisoners were held and had a photo opportunity. The photo was accompanied with the tweet: “CIC visits Mandela treason trial cell in same court of EFF vs. IEC. On wall are inscriptions of the Freedom Charter”. This spoke to the heart of their case as well as attempted to position the party as being all about constitutionalism, fairness and equal access.

In another instance the party visited Thabo Mbeki’s mother and had a photo opportunity which sent a very strong anti-Zuma message. On Twitter they posted a picture of Malema with her with the text: “CIC meets former President Mbeki’s mother and on Facebook they posted a video of him listening to her.

Press releases

As already mentioned the party posted a tweet with the most important details of their press release on Twitter with a link to the full release on their website. These included both statements and event announcements (“EFF statement on the #SharpevilleDay”) (“PRESS ALERT: EFF will hand over all the IEC required compliance details at IEC offices tomorrow, 13h00”).

On Facebook the party chose to limit their posting of press releases and other text based status updates and only posted two press releases. Unlike Twitter the party posted their full releases copied and pasted from their website. These were often accompanied with an image that related to the content of the release. An example was the press release they released to call on Wits University to recognize the EFF student command on Campus with a picture of the EFF electoral truck on campus and all relevant contact details.

Linking to traditional media

The EFF used traditional media to suit their own agenda and in order to create new agendas and frame the debate differently by picking up on a traditional media story that related to the party or its opponents and framing it in a way that suited their agenda. An example of this is when the Sowetan published an article about Zuma being booed and they used this to humiliate and criticize Zuma and shift the agenda in their direction (“President Jacob Zuma booed again – Sowetan Live. The people of SA are showing this guy the door”).

They used Twitter to spin the political agenda by answering accusations from the Sunday Times solely on Twitter and turning it into an opportunity to attack the newspaper and the ruling party. This demonstrated their disdain for traditional media as they linked its agenda with that of the ruling party and then re-framed the debate and the political agenda to suit the party’s agenda (“#Malema: Sunday Times sends journalists to follow us around to look for native stories. They haven't found anything and they report on shoes”).

In a similar vein to their Twitter page the party looked for moments when they could link to traditional media and spin the story to suit their agenda on their Facebook page. Although they did not do this as frequently on Facebook as they did on Twitter they did use it. This was largely used to further their agenda and often used to attack Jacob Zuma and the ANC government as being corrupt and unable to govern (“Thank you to the people of South Africa, particularly Gauteng for telling the man that he should go”). With a link to the Sowetan story that Zuma was booed again at an event.

When the SABC banned their election TV adverts they used online video social media YouTube to show their supporters the advert. Furthermore, they promoted the advert across their other social networks. This resulted in a very clever marketing ploy as the YouTube advert garnered over 200 000 views as a result of the media coverage it received (“SABC has banned EFF Elections Advert because of eTolls. They’ve touched us on the wrong side. We’re going for them”). With a link to the YouTube video.

Topical news stories

The EFF used twitter to domesticate and prioritize topical news stories, important days of the year and topical weeks during the campaign. These included Israel Apartheid Week which they used to attack their opponent’s stance on Israel (“#Ndlozi: Helen Zille must be asked what their policy is on apartheid. #IsraelApartheidWeek”).

They also used the Sharpeville Commemoration to attack the ANC's "good story to tell" campaign by listing all the problems that the country is facing under the ANC government likening it to being as bad as it was during the time of Sharpeville ("Malema: the land is the beginning and end of the revolution. Without it there is no good story to tell #SharpevilleDay").

They also used this to promote their working relationship with the PAC and tie themselves to the PAC's history of struggle and how they, as a party, were continuing this struggle ("Malema: PAC represents that history of unbroken struggle to restore the dignity of black people. And we are joining them #SharpevilleDay").

Attacking the government

While the party used their Twitter channel to attack the other parties and the ANC in particular it also used the channel to launch several attacks on the ANC and its role as a ruling party. Whenever the government investigated something or the public protector made a finding they used this for their own agenda launching a series of statements attacking the ruling party ("EFF calls on Head of IEC to be removed following the national treasury forensic investigation report"). With a link to their press release on their website.

They also used these news stories to re-state their position on the matter and ensured that they turned the agenda from what the government was doing wrong to what they would do right if they were given the chance to govern. Everything they did was to further spectacle such as when the public protector released a report on Nkandla and they used this to launch a march on a police station to lay a criminal charge against Zuma ("If your government becomes a lawbreaker, it invites each man to take the law into his own hands" #NkandlaReport").

Advertising and selling of their merchandise

One of the ways that the party brought in money for its campaign was through the sales of its merchandise. They used Twitter as a space to advertise that their merchandise was on sale and advise people where they could get it from ("EFF merchandise available at affordable prices: red berets, overalls, dresses, caps.... Call and get yours in bulk").

They also used it to advertise the launch of their books as well as the launch details, advising their followers when and where their leaders would be discussing the books in the traditional media

space. (“#EFFBookLaunch ‘The Coming Revolution’ will soon be at bookstores near you”) (“This is the book Commissar @FloydShivambu with speak about with @chrisvick3 on @powerfm987 between 18h00 and 19h00”). This was accompanied with a picture of Floyd and the book.

On their Facebook page they posted one or two event posters where their leaders were speaking, debating or hosting an event. They encouraged their supporters to attend in their numbers to show force (“Commissar Floyd Shivambu will be discussing the coming revolution in UKZN tomorrow between 2 and 5 PM. Fighters in the vicinity should attend as per the poster below”). This had the event poster below the caption.

Campaign watchdogs

Their Twitter channel also played quite an important role in being a campaign watchdog. They used it to highlight various infractions by the ANC during their campaign using images to show how the ANC burnt down their marques, disrupted their rallies and tried to prevent them from campaigning. They used this to create a powerful narrative around this claiming that the ANC were immoral and running scared while positioning them as always doing the right thing (“In Soweto our billboard was completely destroyed by ANC hooligans as it is with many of our posters across the country”). (“We will continue to do everything in our power to protect our events, our members and our right to exist”).

In the last two to three weeks before the election the ANC ramped up their efforts to disrupt the EFF’s campaign which was then documented and tweeted out in order to portray the ANC as being scared of the EFF (“ANC hooligans covered #EFF posters with their unsightly posters. Their fear manifests in political intolerance”).

Furthermore, the ANC’s refusal to let the EFF use a stadium after the lease was already signed provided the party with further political capital against the ruling party (“Here are the receipts showing that the EFF paid the required amounts to use Lucas Moripe Stadium for #TshelaThupaRally”).

In the final few days of campaigning their focus shifted to ensuring a “free and fair” election with Malema making an appearance and speaking to the media at the IEC centre calling out the ANC’s irregularities as well as informing supporters of how to prevent ANC intimidation and ensure EFF

representation at voting stations (“Our marquee that was petrol bombed by ANC hooligans in Thokoza” with a picture) (“We call on the IEC to act with speed and decisively against the ANC”).

Marches

When the SABC decided to ban their TV adverts the EFF turned this into a political opportunity and used the decision for political capital by organizing a march to the SABC just eight days before the election took place. This march furthered the spectacle of the party and helped it gain valuable campaign momentum going into the final week.

The march provided the EFF with an opportunity to live tweet thousands of people supporting them in their protest through the use of videos and pictures which showed off their statements, chants and insults against the SABC and the ruling party (“Police confirm that now the #EconomicFreedomMarch is above 40 000 people” with an accompanying picture).

Twitter chats and engagement with followers

With a month to go before the election the party held its first online Twitter chat with party leader Julius Malema. They hosted an additional two more before the end of the campaign. These took place during a work day over lunchtime and lasted for an hour. They took place on both Facebook and Twitter.

They sent out pre-announcements prior to the chat and then tweeted a picture of Malema seated at his computer waiting to take people’s questions. The questions and answers were mainly focused on policy solutions but also sometimes light hearted and entertaining (“CIC @Julius_S_Malema will again have an hour long Q&A online (Twitter and Facebook) tomorrow at 12:00. #MalemaQ&A #VoteEFF”) (“CIC is now on for the online chat on twitter @Julius_S_Malema and the EFF Official Facebook Page let’s get started”).

On Facebook each post had over 1000 comments consisting of questions, comments, attacks and jokes. Julius Malema attempted to answer as many of them as he could in the allotted time. They received a fair amount of engagement on each post that they put on their page. This was amplified by the fact that every post was shared by their supporters who also liked and commented in great numbers.

In the final days before the election they also for the first time outside of their Twitter chats began engaging with their followers by answering questions and providing their proposed solutions.

Final week

The final week of campaigning was intense for the EFF with a final rally, events and appearances every day and a whole host of Twitter activity. They live tweeted their final rally, created #EFF20Goals which they used to re-state their manifesto in easy tweet sized chunks and placed their manifesto in tweets which people could understand and visualize. This aimed to re-affirm what people would be voting for if they voted for the EFF.

Furthermore, their leaders continued campaigning around the country and this was covered and highlighted on their Twitter channel. They ended their campaign where it started at Marikana where they re-affirmed their commitment to mine workers using them as an example of what was wrong with South Africa and how they would fix it. This was published on Twitter and repeated for effect.

The final 24 hours of their campaign was spent attempting to convince people to vote for the EFF but also ensuring that people were not intimidated by the ANC. They did this through tweeting tips to their supporters and ensuring that they knew who to contact in case of ANC violations and issues at polling booths.

They also showed some signs of what they would do in parliament through tweets about bringing their protest politics into parliament and how they would turn their goals and manifesto into action. One of the biggest things was shining the spotlight on ANC corruption and vandalism and turning the narrative and agenda in their favour.

Unlike their Twitter account they did not ramp up their activities in the final week of their campaign and instead posted just twice on Facebook. The first post was of the crowd at their final rally which showed a packed stadium and a sea of red and the final picture was of the elections counting board when the party went past one million votes.

Section 3: A preliminary quantitative analysis of online activism of South African national elections

This sub-section of the chapter on EFF has been motivated to explain the evolving role of new media in political dynamism. Though the findings shared here are secondary research, they are very important in contextualizing the new political landscape in South Africa.

Social media in South Africa played a significant role in shaping and affecting the political culture and enhancing political activism. It is thus being increasingly used to mobilize citizens, provide a space for blowing the whistle on any deviations in the government, while archiving and documenting government violations; including corruption, abuses and fraud.

This MA thesis aims to revisit the levels of implementations of democratic values of social media in South Africa in reference to the global standards regardless of their government's view of the event, provided the proper access exists (Diamond, 2010). To serve this goal, the thesis aims to map how these social media tools actually improved political branding and the activated democracy in South Africa.

Trends both online and in general society emphasize change and re-affirm or contrast the previous prevailing agenda of how online users deal with elections and other pertinent issues. The attempt to quantify these trends can never be generalized, though it can serve as indicators to explain the current status quo of any given issue that is studied (Greben, 2007). Trends are usually defined as progressive changes in a particular phenomenon. However, trends are often characterized, by more than one variable at particular discrete time intervals. In such cases a trend analysis becomes more complex and ambiguous.

The research weighed related items and aspects that could help address this rather complicated and multifaceted matter such as the partisan politics and political branding. It also unpacked concerns about the integrity of electoral administration and the quality of democracy in South Africa.

The EFF, the youngest political party in South Africa, was able to receive more than one million of the votes cast in the election, which positioned it in 3rd place among all political parties in South Africa, second only to the ANC and the DA.

There were many attempts to make sense, in a quantitative manner, of the elections' results, in particular the social and traditional media attempted to understand the abrupt political gain and EFF shadow presence.

This section aimed to critically analyse the available data. During the 2014 National Election, Apurmac Africa, a digital advertising sales and marketing company conducted a study on the growth of political parties and politicians' social media between (March 1, 2014-May, 7, 2014). Besides, other studies were published on the South African Elections website as well as an analysis done by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg in the book: Election 2014: The campaigns, results and future prospects. This was supplemented with information from the EFF's elective conference. The section also refers to the media coverage analysis which came from studies done by Media Monitoring Africa and Media Tenor which appeared in Jane Duncan's chapter on the media coverage of the elections in the book Election 2014: The campaigns, results and future prospects.

Elections results

At a national level the EFF managed to obtain 1.1 million votes, which equated to (6.35 percent) of the total national vote and gave the party 25 seats in the National Assembly (elections.org.za, 2014). The party managed to eclipse the DA as the official opposition in both the North West and Limpopo where it got 13.21 percent and 10.74 percent respectively, managing to capture 5 and 6 seats in each province's legislature (elections.org.za, 2014).

Apart from the EFF's success in the North West and Limpopo the party managed to make in-roads in Gauteng where it won 40.29 percent of the National Ballots in the province (Faull, 2014). In addition, the party managed to achieve 10.13 percent of the vote in Johannesburg and 11.51 percent of the vote in Tshwane which helped reduce the ANC's support to just 52 percent in Johannesburg and 49 percent in Tshwane (Faul, 2014).

Highlighting the importance of this Julius Malema, in his political report at the EFF's elective conference, remarked that the ANC's power in the three Gauteng metros and Nelson Mandela Bay were at risk in the 2016 local government elections (Magubane, 2014). At the conference Malema remarked: "[In 2016] we know the ANC will lose Johannesburg," said Malema, "we know they'll lose Tshwane, we know they'll lose Ekurhuleni" (Malema, 2014 as cited by Poplack, 2014). This was echoed in the party's organizational report at the same conference where the three Gauteng regions were earmarked for potential growth as a result of the 2014 Elections (Magubane, 2014). According to the report: "The ruling party in particular should start packing their goods in Tshwane,

Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipalities” (EFF Organizational Report, 2014).

EFF media coverage

In the build up to the 2014 Elections the EFF received a fair amount of media coverage. According to Media Tenor the EFF made up 4 percent of the coverage between the 1st of January and the 31st of December 2013 (Duncan, 2014). According to the MMA the EFF accounted for 12 percent of the media coverage between the 7th of March and the 30th of April 2014 (Duncan, 2014). On a personal level Julius Malema accounted for the greatest volume of media statements between January and March 2014 according to Media Tenor (Duncan, 2014). In terms of newspaper coverage, the MMA found that the Sowetan newspaper gave the EFF the most coverage of any newspaper with 17 percent of their election stories covering the party (Duncan, 2014).

In terms of overall media coverage during the build-up to the election Media Tenor found that the majority of stories covered event based issues with a particular focus on internal party politics (Duncan, 2014).

EFF Party growth on social media

At the beginning of March 2014 the EFF had 61 000 Facebook fans and 37 000 Twitter followers which was pretty impressive considering that the party was only launched 6 months prior in October 2013 (Apurmac Media, 2014).

It was soon crowned as the 2nd largest political party on Facebook and the 4th largest political party on Twitter (Apurmac Media, 2014). They were sending out over 100 Tweets a week and had over 2000 people talking about them on Facebook (Apurmac Media, 2014).

By the time the Elections came the party had grown their online support to 82 000 Facebook fans and 41 000 Twitter followers and had climbed to the 3rd biggest Facebook page and maintained their position as the 4th largest political party on Twitter (Apurmac Media, 2014). While Agang maintained the 3rd spot on Twitter the EFF had closed the gap from 5000 followers to 2000 followers as a result of a sustained and active campaign (Apurmac Media, 2014).

The EFF managed to send out over 100 tweets every week with the exception of the 2nd week in March when they sent out 85 and then successfully managed to ramp up their campaign in the final 2 weeks of campaigning when they sent 220 and 207 tweets respectively (Apurmac Media, 2014). However, while they managed to keep up with the ANC and the DA for most of the campaign they were completely overtaken in the final 2 weeks (Apurmac Media, 2014). In the 2nd last week of campaigning the ANC sent 458 tweets while the DA sent 634 and in the final week the ANC sent 480 tweets while the DA sent 734 tweets (Apurmac Media, 2014).

In the Facebook space the DA dominated the conversation followed by the ANC (Apurmac Media, 2014). The EFF managed to be the 3rd most talked about political party on Facebook over the election campaign particularly in the final 2 weeks when they tallied 8 percent and 7 percent of the conversation which was double that of Agang (Apurmac Media, 2014).

The party managed to grow at an average of 1.44 percent per week on Twitter and 1.61 percent on Facebook with their best Twitter growth coming in the 2nd week of March and their best Facebook growth coming in the 3rd week of March (Apurmac Media, 2014). While their best Twitter growth was 2.36 percent their best Facebook growth was at 15.26 percent, way above their average (Apurmac Media, 2014). In this week they managed to grow their following on Facebook by over 12 000 fans (Apurmac Media, 2014).

The growth of Julius Malema's personal social media accounts

While the EFF's growth on social media was impressive Malema's growth was even more impressive. By the beginning of March 2014 Malema had amassed 10 000 Facebook fans and 423 000 Twitter followers (Apurmac Media, 2014). While he had the largest following of any politician on Twitter his Facebook page could not compete with Helen Zille's who had 10x the amount he did (Apurmac Media, 2014).

By the time the elections came Malema had grown his Twitter support to 439 000 and his Facebook support to 11 000 and was still the leading politician on Twitter and the 2nd largest on Facebook (Apurmac Media, 2014). Despite the fact that he was the leading politician on Twitter he struggled to keep up with the volume of tweets that were being sent and was overshadowed by Helen Zille and even Mamphela Ramphela during the final week (Apurmac Media, 2014). Despite this he did manage to increase his tweets from 11 per week at the beginning of March to over 100 in the final

week of the campaign yet this paled in comparison to Helen Zille's 634 tweets (Apurmac Media, 2014).

Malema's Facebook grew at an average of 0.53 percent with his biggest growth coming in the last 2 weeks of the campaign when he registered 1.76 percent and 2.42 percent respectively (Apurmac Media, 2014). Over the campaign his Twitter account grew at an average of 0.23 per-cent with his biggest week coming in the 2nd week of March when he grew by 0.88 percent as a result of the 1st Question and Answer session (Apurmac Media, 2014). In the final week of the campaign his account grew by 0.68 percent (Apurmac Media, 2014). In the final week of the campaign he dominated the Facebook space with 2.53 percent of the conversation being about him, the most of any politician (Apurmac Media, 2014).

Since the election Malema has gone on to dominate the Twitter space amassing 922 000 followers with Helen Zille 2nd on 800 000. Jacob Zuma has 394 000 and Mamphela Ramphele has 74 000. New DA leader Mmusi Maimane is sitting in 4th place with 220 000 followers. In the Face-book space Helen Zille is still in 1st place with 283 000 fans while Malema's fan page has grown to 21 000 fans. New DA leader Mmusi Maimane has 65 000 fans on Facebook.

While the researcher has done his best to offer an analysis which not only answers his research questions but also supports the theory and literature one needs to bear in mind that qualitative research does not and cannot promise reliability and replicability but instead aims to contribute to the understanding of a particular phenomenon. In this case the phenomenon of how the EFF, a brand new party did so well, in the 2014 Elections and how they successfully built a brand which helped them achieve this success.

Conclusion

In conclusion this chapter looked at the EFF's election campaign holistically, which emphasised that it was clear that EFF not only created a highly recognizable brand but also a brand which has been effectively communicated using online social networks. The party managed to capture the imagination of the media often earning headline stories throughout the campaign. With heavy competition from the DA and the ANC, both with bigger budgets and with strong narratives the EFF has carved a space for its brand and crafted a unique narrative which allows them to stand out from the rest of the parties.

Chapter 6: Discussion

Section 1: Branding and politics

The role of branding in South African politics

The role of branding in the 2014 South African politics had a profound effect on the results of the elections. For example, the external environment that has informed the South African political marketplace and the actual parties themselves and their opening up to the notion of branding had led to branding becoming commonplace and important to political success.

Several developments in the South African political marketplace have brought about an increase in branding's use. One of these is the "Americanization" of politics in which slick marketing and branding are the norm (Premhid, 2015; Poplack, 2015). This was seen in the DA's 2014 elections campaign which bore a striking similarity to the Obama and Labour campaigns in terms of rhetoric, style and overall feel (Poplack, 2015; Premhid, 2015; Irwin, 2015; Ranchod, 2015).

However, there is also a sense that political parties have become smarter, the political marketplace has become increasingly competitive and communication has moved from traditional to newer forms of media with social media playing an increasingly important role. There is also a feeling that the voters in South Africa are abandoning their past allegiances and voting for the best candidate rather than the one that is of the same race.

There is no doubt that branding plays a role in the communications and representation of a party's presence. However, there is a level of doubt around whether these branding techniques have a profound impact on the electorate which leads to change in their voting patterns. What is important is that as voters become less attached to race-based voting patterns branding will become more important in South African politics.

Branding and political leaders

Political leaders also play an important role in the branding process. This is interesting in a political market like South Africa where voters vote for party's rather than individuals yet the leaders still play a vital role. This is even more important in the case of the EFF where for the first time we have seen a party created entirely around its leader and his brand and following with the party being fashioned in his image and his world outlook.

While parties are the most important element in the South African political system the examples of Julius Malema and Jacob Zuma as leadership brands within that system provide some insights. While Jacob Zuma potentially damaged the ANC's campaign the Malema brand was an essential component of the overall EFF brand. This was seen in their use of him as their face and voice as well as their use of his firebrand power to get them media attention and drive their momentum. Whereas the Malema brand was thoroughly intertwined with that of the EFF and his personality drove its supporters the fact that the Zuma brand damaged but did not bring down the ANC is important to consider.

Party leaders are an important component of the overall party brand. They play a sense making role for the electorate as to what the brand stands for and have become shorthand for the values and ideals of the party. Furthermore, they provide an important totem pole which the party and its supporters can rally around.

Using branding to campaign

While there is evidence to suggest that all three of the main political parties namely the ANC, DA and the EFF used branding techniques to campaign there is some concern around the success of these techniques and its implementation especially as a result of external factors such as the media. As with any campaign the aim of these branding techniques was to get the party's message out to its existing voters and target new voters.

Both the DA and the ANC used an element of narrative branding in their campaigns. While the ANC based their campaign on their historical narrative of what they delivered before the DA based their campaign around a narrative of successful governance in the Western Cape. Both parties used these narratives as basis on what they would do if selected to govern.

In terms of branding mechanisms, the DA's use of pollsters, SMS campaigns, billboards and even airplane advertising helped it create a unique, slick and polished brand which resembled branding campaigns seen in America and Europe. The party also adopted the global notions and rhetoric of hope and change. However, this was heavily criticized as being too complicated for the electorate, lacking in authenticity and bearing way too much similarity to the Obama and Labour campaigns. At the same time the ANC were criticized for a weak branding strategy which constantly saw them on the back foot having to explain their problematic presidential candidate, flaws of government and negative press.

The branding of the EFF as a commercial entity

The EFF have successfully gained mass recognition in the political marketplace and stand out with their unique offering which is based on Marxist principles. In addition, they successfully managed to convince over a million people to buy what they were selling and vote for the party. Furthermore, they have built up an organizational structure which allowed the party to brand and market themselves effectively using online media, event and spectacle branding.

The EFF's brand was based around several key principles. The first was a unique identity which incorporated their logo, dress, brand tone, colour scheme and slogan. This identity was eye catching, familiar, attention grabbing and helped signify the key messages of the party as well as their values and ideals. Secondly they had a simple platform. Their brand was based around being anti-Zuma, anti-corruption, fighting for the working class and extremely antagonistic. Thirdly they identified with the working class and tapped into the frustrations of the vast majority of South Africans who are unemployed and have lost faith in the ANC government. These principles helped them gain media attention, create headlines and most importantly secure over a million votes.

However, their brand was not without flaws. They struggled to counter the perception that the party was all about the antagonism, that they lacked message discipline, struggled to clearly define their manifesto and spewed outdated communist rhetoric instead of solid policies. There were also questions around the respect of the brand and their ability to create an effective political organization needed to sustain such a brand.

While not perfect the EFF successfully built a brand which has become widely recognized in the political marketplace as a brand which not only is unique but also offers a simple and effective message.

The EFF's brand position

An important element of a political party's overall brand is the way in which it positions itself in the political marketplace. The EFF entered the political market with a unique position to the left of the ANC focusing on principles and ideals that had long been forgotten by the ruling party and aiming to capture a segment of the electorate that felt they had been ignored by the ANC.

EFF positioned themselves on the left of the political spectrum in an attempt to go after a space which has been uncontested in democratic South Africa. This has allowed it to differentiate itself from both the DA and the ANC who find themselves on the centre, right of the political spectrum. While there are arguments to be made about whether the EFF's ideology matches up to its position they have successfully positioned their brand in this space.

Section 2: The 2014 Elections

The political dynamics of South Africa prior to and during the Election

Prior to the 2014 Elections, South Africa experienced a fresh aspect of political dynamism by a new black African party (EFF). The expulsion of Julius Malema alongside several of his Youth League colleagues had left the ANC open to factionalism and for the first time under real threat of losing their electoral position. The EFF emerged as a rising opposition party that stood with the majority of the poor against corruption, the unpopularity of Jacob Zuma and the greater socio and economic issues in the country which meant that there was potential for a shift in the political dynamics of the country at the polls.

There was also a strong sense of discontent amongst a large voting block of particularly young voters who have all but abandoned the ANC but cannot bring themselves to vote for the DA as a result of their perception as a white party. These voters were too looking for a new political home.

This discontent and dissatisfaction provided fertile ground for the emergence of a new political party which could offer different solutions, a more radical approach and target these issues and groups. Using his personal agenda for power Julius Malema emerged as the leader to represent these people sweeping all their concerns into an uncompromising, radical and pro-poor movement which would target this dissatisfaction and champion their cause.

With the arrival of the EFF power relations have certainly shifted in South African politics. The EFF have slotted themselves into a gap in the political market and are disrupting the dynamics that were previously at play. They have offered a new and alternative discourse which re-looks at the post-Apartheid social, power and economic relations, have given a voice to the voiceless and offered a political home for those disgruntled ANC voters.

Regardless of the questions around where they fit and what they bring the fact that they have prioritized and shone a spotlight on transformation, incessant bad governance, poor policy choices, corruption, theft and lack of accountability from the ANC has allowed them to play a leading role in shifting the political power dynamics in South Africa. Furthermore, their ability to be antagonistic and raise these sensitive issues is a powerful tool which has been reserved for the DA in the past but often failed due to accusations of being racist and wanting to bring back Apartheid.

The EFF's election campaign

The EFF ran their election campaign on a shoestring budget basing almost their entire campaign around a branding strategy which saw the colour red feature prominently in their campaign and crafted a narrative around their dress code which included worker's overalls and berets. These berets became so popular and iconic that they were able to sell them to help fund their campaign. EFF built their election campaign around creating a brand which would not only achieve success but also earn the party recognition in a tightly contested political marketplace.

The EFF invested heavily in creating their own narrative, selectively choosing elements of history that they could use for their campaign. They focused on antagonism and spectacle as well as their single message of economic freedom in our lifetime. These elements combined together to push the party into mass media and onto headlines throughout the campaign. They successfully rode on the euphoria and high emotions of neglected and marginalized groups.

They focused their campaign on a radical, militant tone which attacked their opponent's failings and provided a space for disaffected segments, particularly the youth to call home. They managed to identify issues that no other party was campaigning on and not only set the agenda on these issues but spun the media narrative to suit themselves. These issues included new and pre-existing grievances like the unequal distribution of wealth in society.

The man that brought their entire campaign together was Julius Malema. He was central to their campaign branding and successfully identified and initiated the opportunity for the EFF to tap into the large levels of frustration amongst South Africans, particularly the youth. Once identified he built the EFF's election campaign around it crafting a simple and easy to understand message which voters bought into.

Their election campaign was simple and straight forward, they effectively used spectacle branding to get the party recognized and used political stunts and gimmicks to get themselves into the media and into the minds of the electorate. They identified a strong colour with deep political associations and re-invented political paraphernalia which aided them in building a narrative and a history around their campaign and saw them set the trend in dress code and outspokenness which allowed them to generate headlines. While the campaign was successful in that the party managed to win the third highest amount of votes and achieve mass recognition in a limited time there are some doubts as to whether this can be repeated in future elections and further studies will ultimately prove whether these doubts were correct.

The success of the EFF in the 2014 Election

The success was based off the back of a single-minded and very successful election campaign which saw its leaders travelling across South Africa campaigning which combined with a mass online effort helped them achieve the success they did.

In terms of numbers the party managed to obtain 1.1 million votes equating to 6.35 percent in the National Assembly or 25 seats. The party managed to beat the DA in the North West and Limpopo and was a factor in bringing the ANC down to between 49% and 52% in Tshwane, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. These three metros as well as Ekurhuleni have been earmarked by Malema and the EFF for possible takeover in this year's local government elections and it will be interesting to see what happens.

Their success was based around a strong media narrative which focused on a simple message, effective branding gimmicks and strong leadership personalities. They managed to pull their message, their identity and their beliefs into one singular election campaign which competed at the highest level and did particularly well.

In terms of branding the EFF achieved remarkable success in the 2014 election. Starting from nothing they established a brand name and identity and created several branding mechanisms which earned them recognition and got over a million people to buy into their brand and vote for them. When people talk about South African political brands the EFF are mentioned alongside the ANC and the DA with a recognizable colour, identity and message that resonated with a group of people who shared their values. On an electoral level there some doubts over whether the EFF's performance can be determined a success with the party achieving similar results to COPE and running a very single minded election campaign anchored around a small minority of people.

What key elements of branding were found in the 2014 election

Key elements of branding that were present in the 2014 election included the fact that most parties were easily identifiable and had gone with specific looks, colours and techniques to make their clothing and branded materials stand out from their rivals. The biggest use of this was the different colours but it was also seen in fonts, styles of posters, the tone of their messages and the fonts that they used.

That being said the 2014 election was also a fertile space for branding to appear. News has become very visual in South Africa and social media and guerilla marketing is being used as innovative and unique branding elements. One of the key elements of branding is imagery which was ever-present in the election with the ANC using Mandela's image, the DA borrowing heavily from Obama's style

and the EFF borrowing from revolutionaries of the past. Branding was also more apparent due to the fact that for the first time there was more uncertainty in the marketplace, more to play for and voters were more open to persuasion.

How the EFF used social media

The EFF used their social media channels to broadcast news, engage with supporters, attack their opponents, set the agenda and provide a behind the scenes look at life on the campaign trail.

One of the key elements of this campaign was the way in which they cleverly used Twitter to offer their supporters a behind the scenes look at their campaign events including the live tweeting of their leader's speeches and the use of visual media to paint a picture of what was actually going on.

Being a brand new party with a brand new brand they needed to get their brand message across in as many ways as possible. They did this through the use of events which they live broadcast on their Twitter channels and then did an event overview after it had finished on their Facebook page.

Social media branding tools

The EFF made use of several social media branding tools including hashtags, live social media chats, a Twitter diary and videos and images which were used with the ultimate aim of getting their brand message as well as their policies out to as many people as possible.

They used hashtags on Twitter to group the different stages of their campaign and to allow their supporters and the media to follow their campaign events easily. These hashtags were also used to show support for the party.

In the month before the election the party leadership and Julius Malema in particular began an intense period of campaigning. To allow supporters to follow their leader's movements and for the media to keep alert the party put out a weekly diary of appearances for Julius Malema on their website and tweeted a link to it.

This served to keep their supporters in the loop as to where and when they could see Malema and also when they should watch TV or listen to the radio in order to hear from their leader. These appearances were accompanied by the live tweeting of any statements or speeches as well as his

appearances. In addition to a full schedule of almost daily engagements and travelling across the country he also managed to keep supporters in-touch via his own personal Twitter account

Another social media branding tool they used is they created bite-sized chunks of their manifesto using visuals and easy wording. This was tweeted out during the final week of the campaign to re-affirm what people would be voting for.

The growth of their social media channels

In order to reach as many people as possible the party relied on growing their following rapidly using catchy hashtags, spectacle branding and ensuring that their agenda was at the forefront of social media conversations.

Despite the fact that they only launched in October 2013 they had already amassed 61 000 Facebook fans and 37 000 Twitter followers by the start of March 2014. As a result of an intensive campaign which saw the party sending out over 100 tweets a week reaching a high of 220 tweets in the last week of the campaign they managed to close the gap on Agang on Twitter.

Despite their best efforts, however, they could not keep up with the amount of tweets being sent by the ANC and the DA, both of whom had professional communications teams. Putting it in context the EFF did remarkably well to maintain a consistent social media campaign.

As mentioned above they put more effort into their Twitter account as opposed to their Facebook page. However, they still managed to grow their support by over 20 000 during the election campaign and overtook Agang as the 3rd most popular page. They were also the 3rd most talked about political page generating 7 percent of all conversation in the final week of the campaign. While Agang employed a professional communications staff the EFF managed to achieve massive publicity and managed to grow their page using a shoestring communications team.

Furthering the agenda

The EFF brand was a new brand to South African politics and needed to make an impact with their own agenda. They used political moments in the campaign to further this agenda and this was broadcast across their social media. Every event was an opportunity to further this agenda and

included court cases that they were involved in, the announcement of their candidates and even their election events.

The party used visual media to amplify their message, pictures and videos of poignant moments were tweeted out and placed on their Facebook page and spoke to whatever they were doing at the time but also contained an element of their party message or values. Each moment was carefully coordinated and carefully constructed to ensure that they got maximum mileage from it.

One of most important moments of their campaign was at the end one they held an event in Marikana where the EFF was born, this symbolized their commitment to the community, set their agenda and helped them create a narrative around their brand. They were criticized in the interviews for focusing too narrowly on this community and failing to make a meaningful impact, however this notion will become more apparent as they compete in future elections.

Julius Malema

As we have seen before Julius Malema was extremely important to the EFF's campaign and this was replicated on their social media pages. On his individual social media channels Malema's echoed the rhetoric and style of the party which helped propel him to the highest number of followers of any politician on Twitter. As was seen with the party in general Malema struggled to maintain a presence on Facebook.

While his style and rhetoric got him followers he was unable to keep up with the volume of tweets sent by his opponents. While he did manage to increase his tweets sent per week over the campaign he was overshadowed by Helen Zille and even Mamphele Ramphele in the final week of the campaign. What was interesting is that he dominated the Facebook space in the final week of the campaign where the majority of people were talking about him amongst politicians.

Another important element of Malema's importance to the EFF was their social media chats which connected both accounts across Facebook and Twitter. These were given a specific hashtag and largely advertised by the party. The questions and answers were mainly focused on policy solutions but also sometimes light hearted and entertaining.

These chats were one of the biggest drivers of the EFF's engagement across their channels due to the high numbers of questions, comments, shares and retweets that each response generated.

The popularity of these chats is demonstrated in the fact that Malema received his biggest growth in the 2nd week of March when the Twitter chats were launched.

Traditional Media

The EFF's brand positioning and brand message meant that they rejected and were antagonistic to all forms of traditional media. Where they did engage they used the traditional media to suit their own agenda and often spun the stories to create new agendas and frame the debate differently so that it attacked their opponents or suited their agenda.

One of the pivotal moments in this relationship was when the SABC banned their elections TV advert. They saw this as an opportunity and released the advert on YouTube generating mass amounts of views, media coverage and support. They also furthered their agenda by turning it into a March just days before the election which allowed them to demonstrate the support for their agenda and allowed them to gain momentum.

This aggressive pursuit of media headlines and spectacle branding helped the party grab 12% of the share of the media coverage during the build-up to the elections. However, in stark contrast and perhaps due to this form of campaigning the Sowetan newspaper was the only newspaper that really presented the EFF's agenda and gave them a space to campaign. This highlights their reason for going after social media as a way to get their brand across.

Linking to their website and the role of the press release

As we have seen the EFF's relationship with the traditional media was frigid at best. They also were a brand new party and needed to find a way to communicate their news, announcements, event information and to educate people about their brand. This was the role of their website which was then linked to their Twitter offering their supporters and the general public with their agenda and event information.

This was particularly important in the case of their press releases, statements and advisories which were housed on their website but put out on social media. This way their supporters and the general public could obtain the most important information but also visit the website for a more detailed report. Whereas on Twitter they were forced to limit their posts they posted the full text on their Facebook page.

This strategy paid off in the fact that Julius Malema accounted for the greatest volume of media statements in the build-up to the election.

Attacking the government

As part of their branding strategy which was anti-Zuma and fiercely antagonistic towards the ANC in both its role as a political party and the ruling party in South Africa. Their strategy was simple; whenever the government slipped up, whenever corruption was reported and whenever Zuma was booed they boosted this across their channels.

They cleverly spun their agenda while at the same time attacking the government by stating their position on the issue which was usually a polar opposite to what had happened and make sure that they furthered their use of spectacle branding in an attempt to generate media headlines and gain the public's attention and ultimately their support.

Advertising and selling of their merchandise

As discussed previously the EFF's brand identity was particularly strong. The way in which they dressed and the way in which they spoke and what they stood for were all appealing, easy to sell and high in spectacle. While this helped get the party attention it also helped the party fund its election campaign.

The party used their social media channels to advertise where people could buy EFF merchandise and to promote the importance of wearing it in support of the party. They also ran an extended campaign around the launch of their book which detailed their policies, formation and plan of action. In order to drive people to their physical events they ensured these were sufficiently covered across their channels.

Campaign watchdogs

Due to Twitter's characteristics as a platform where immediacy is one of its primary drivers the EFF were successfully able to utilize this in their role as a watchdog against campaign infractions by the ANC. They used visual media to full effect and mobilized their supporters to alert the party to any instances of ANC wrong doing which was then pushed out across their channels and helped them create a powerful narrative as standing up to the dominance of the ANC.

They also focused their efforts on ensuring that all of their supporters were able to vote and portrayed themselves as a benevolent force which was protecting the voters against ANC injustice. They used every opportunity to show up the ANC and to highlight their efforts towards ensuring a free and fair election.

By shining a bright light on ANC corruption and disruptions they presented an alternative which they committed to upholding. However, whether this was carried out was debatable as there were report of EFF disruptions and infractions which came back to haunt them on social media.

Social media issues

However, with the exception of when Julius Malema held his question and answer session these comments went unanswered and the shares unacknowledged. This resulted in a page which was getting a lot of attention and talkability but very little real engagement. The same was the case with their Twitter page which received very little real engagement.

In the final days before the election they also for the first time outside of their Twitter chats began engaging with their followers by answering questions and providing their proposed solutions.

Conclusion

In conclusion this thesis set out to find out how the EFF managed to successfully win over 1 million votes and become the 2nd largest opposition party in South Africa in a very short time. This thesis placed a successfully branding campaign as a leading driver of this and a very useful tool in spreading your message and attracting people to vote for your party.

Through the use of clever Guerilla branding tactics, a sustained social media presence and a communications strategy which centered on getting the party into the headlines as often as possible they were able to successfully launch their brand and market it with minimal funding and some intense opposition.

Most importantly they created a very simple brand with a very simple message which revolved around being a viable alternative to the government and highlighting their failures at every opportunity. Their brand message was simply anti-Zuma and fighting for the marginalized who had gained little post-Apartheid. They used emotions, a certain language tone and several symbols to get their messages across.

One of their most striking symbols was the way in which they dressed to symbolize who they were fighting for and what they planned to do to get themselves heard. This unique dress code pushed their brand right to the forefront of South African politics and created instant brand recognition. Furthermore, the way in which they borrowed from history to create their own unique narrative and history resonated across the scope of voters.

In terms of positioning themselves the party placed itself on the left of the ANC, a space which has not been contested in post-Apartheid South Africa and a space in which they had a unique selling point unlike their main opponents who occupied the centre right position.

In hindsight the party achieved a fantastic result for its short, sharp and unique brand and managed to get quite a large number of people to vote for them. The real test is going to come this year when they compete in the local government elections and will have to prove that they can achieve results as well as prove their potential for delivery and become known as a brand that can go beyond rhetoric and move into a position of governance. This will be a true test of how strong the EFF's brand is.

Linking back to the literature and theory this thesis demonstrated that with a successful branding campaign electoral success can be achieved. By using theories like Agenda Setting to place your brand front and center in the media contributes significantly to your electoral success. As was demonstrated in the literature building a political brand allows a party to carve a space for itself in the political landscape and ensure that people easily identify and associate with them.

The importance of both branding theory and the history of political branding as demonstrated in the literature is furthered by the achievement of the EFF. The EFF created a very successful brand image, brand position and made use of branding devices to create a unique and easily marketable political brand which then was able to achieve electoral success. Through this the researcher understands that there is a gap in the research in terms of branding success of political parties in elections which is directly tied to the main limitation of this study which is that the EFF were only able to be observed for one election. As branding becomes more prevalent and the party competes in further elections it will provide for a much better body of information which can be analyzed.

Research limitations/implications

The thesis acknowledges several limitations that resulted from the primarily focus on qualitative research, which includes findings cannot be generalizable to the wider population. Additionally, it is important to note that the researcher had limited experience of conducting focus group discussions combined with different media and political actors, and this can be considered a limitation. The researcher was still able through self-learning and development to enhance his professional “effective depth interviewing” training that goes some way in addressing this limitation.

Practical implications

This thesis provides an illustrative guide and insight into the analytical process that can be used to analyze and interpret findings generated from qualitative projective techniques. This can be used by academics with little experience of projective techniques. It is thus believed that the thesis offers fresh understanding of the external image of political brands. The thesis argues that this approach provides a more efficient ability from the traditional qualitative projective techniques that facilitated greater expressive insight that may remain hidden if traditional direct data collection tools were used.

Social implications

The thesis provides some understanding into how to analyze subjective meaning such as feelings, attitudes, perceptions and associations revealed through projective techniques. Within this context, respondents were to express themselves with greater detail and discussion compared with direct questioning. This research presents greater insight in managing and analyzing expressions generated from this non-intrusive approach that can encourage open disclosure with less hesitancy, verbally less demanding and suitable to overcome emotional, language and cultural barriers.

Originality/value

This thesis adds to the under-researched and undefined practice of analyzing projective expressions in particular with political branding and the specifics of political culture in South Africa. This research could be used as a foundation for future studies and a point of reference for people with limited knowledge of projective technique analysis within the lens of political branding in Africa.

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Addendum 1: Interviewees

Maynard Manyowa is a social media expert, social/political/business analyst and a web entrepreneur. Contact: mkmanyowa@gmail.com

Alistair Mackay is a writer, branding expert and a political analyst who has spent time working and observing SA politics. Contact: alistair.charles.mackay@gmail.com

Kameel Premhid is lawyer, writer, and analyst and is currently studying an MSC in Higher Education at Oxford. He has also worked extensively in South African politics. Contact: kameel.premhid@gmail.com

Anthony Butler is a politics lecturer at UCT, a columnist, author and analyst. Contact: anthony.butler@uct.ac.za

Dr Rushil Ranchod is a post-doctoral fellow in the Education and Skills Development programme at the Human Sciences Research Council. He holds a MA in International Political Economy and an MPhil in African Studies. Contact: rushil.ranchod@gmail.com

Martin Slabbert-Capper is a media and communications practitioner who has worked in marketing, advertising, PR and Politics as well as in radio and TV broadcasting. Contact: msslabbert@gmail.com

Andrew Gasnolar is a state law advisor and has experience working in party politics and NGO's across the world and is a member of the Mandela Rhodes Foundation, having served as their director. Contact: andrew.gasnolar@gmail.com

Nic Borain is an independent political analyst focusing on Southern Africa, particularly South Africa and specializes in examining political and policy risks for financial markets. Contact: nic.borain@gmail.com

Solly Moeng specializes in holistic Brand Management and Strategic Marketing & Communication and heads up brand management agency Don Valley. He is completing his PHD at UCT. Contact: solly@donvalley.co.za

Stephen Grootes is the host of the Midday Report on Talk Radio 702 and 567 CapeTalk, and the Senior Political Correspondent for Eyewitness News. He is also an author and writer for the Daily Maverick. Contact: stepheng@ewn.co.za

Steven Friedman is an academic, newspaper columnist and journalist. He directs the Centre for Study of Democracy at Rhodes University and the University of Johannesburg. Contact: sef53@mweb.co.za

Ron Irwin is a professional lecturer in Media Studies and production and the author of the novel Flat Water Tuesday. Ron has extensive branding knowledge having previously contributed as a brand management consultant and writer as well as a lecturer in the UCT School of management studies. Contact: ronald.irwin@uct.ac.za

Glenda Nevill is a journalist, editor and communicator with 25 years' experience working in media. Having previously worked at the Sunday Times and as an editor of the Big Issue and the Property Magazine she is currently editor of The Media Online. Contact: glenda.nevill@cybersmart.co.za

Richard Poplack is an author, journalist and senior contributor for the Daily Maverick as well as several publications across the world. Contact: richpop@me.com

Qaanitah Hunter is a political journalist at the Sunday Times newspaper and has previously worked for the Mail and Guardian, New Age Newspaper and as a contributor for ANN7. Contact: qaanitah@gmail.com

Angus Mackenzie works as a political analyst for the Democratic Alliance and has held numerous positions in the party. Contact: angusm@da.org.za

Daniel Silke is a political analyst, futurist, key note speaker and an author. He delivers workshops, talks and seminars on the state of the economy, politics and trends around the world. Contact: info@danielsilke.com

Addendum 2: Interview transcripts

Interview with Angus Mackenzie

1. What is your profession and line of work?

I am a political operative employed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) as the party's Analyst. In this role I assist with the design, field work and analysis of all quantitative and qualitative research conducted by the party's Research Directorate. I advise on party strategy, policy and communications.

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

The EFF's success in the 2014 General Elections was considerable. There was very little time from the EFF's foundation and the Elections, and that they managed to achieve the result they did is very impressive. Although the EFF did not achieve the same proportional support as COPE in 2009 the fact that they came so close, with less established political machinery and less time to prepare, indicates far greater political consequence than COPE's result.

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

Political branding is an essential and fundamental aspect that influences how South Africans vote. Political sentiment in South Africa is greatly associated with a party's brand, with less importance being assigned to a party's manifesto and policy platform, and the leaders of a party. South Africans often assign perceived personality traits to political parties. These conceived attributes connect on an emotional level that has the propensity to be more influential to the majority of South Africans than other influences such as leadership approval, or the logic of policy comparison. A Party's perceived brand could be the most important aspect that influences a South African's political affiliation.

4. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

As the EFF had little time to fund and develop the party machinery that is afforded to the ANC, and to a lesser extent the DA, their inability to directly contact voters – which is the staple in South African politics – is understood. Considering this limitation their ability to congregate very large crowds to events is especially impressive. The EFF's political reach through flyers, posters, billboards, canvassing, direct online and telephonic marketing, and paid media advertising in print, radio and television was weak compared to the ANC. And the EFF could not compete with the ANC and the DA in a sustained get out the vote campaign. However, these weaknesses were negated by

the EFF's exceptional coverage by journalists in all forms of media. This was almost entirely determined by the EFF's Leader Julius Malema who drove the EFF's message through earned media.

5. Do you think the EFF has developed a successful brand?

Yes, exceptionally so and as the prime example is that now South Africans associate the colour red with the EFF much to the curmudgeon of the communists who have owned that colour since 1917. The red berets, the red overalls in Parliament, the red maids' outfits all serve as an immediate visual cue of protest. Both the DA and the ANC were caught unaware of the relevance of such instinctual communication.

6. Do you think the EFF effectively convey their brand message to their supporters?

Again yes. The EFF's core message is basic – a primal protest against the status quo and the corruption that exists in South Africa – and this taps into the frustration that many South Africans have. This frustration is increasingly boiling over causing violent protest as can be seen by service delivery protests, and the violent and sometimes deadly union strikes. The EFF's extremist nature corresponds with the anger of their supporters

7. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by other political parties?

The EFF has attempted to position itself as a pro-poor, workers party. The party has positioned itself further left than the centre left ANC, and centrist DA, however its claimed and loose Marxist-Leninist ideology has not achieved wide support with the poor (working or unemployed) South Africans.

8. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

Yes. The use of red, the sign of Communism, its attire of overalls and maid's uniforms, and insignia depicting signals of: Pan-Africanism (a green African continent); mining (a mine shaft); and African traditional resistance (a spear) all distinguish the EFF as being in extreme, perhaps violent, opposition to the status quo.

That the purpose of these devices was to change voters' political views is debatable. It is my opinion that they are being used not to change voters' behaviour but to create a political entity that reflects the anger of some South Africans that was not reflected by the ANC, DA or the smaller South African parties.

9. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?

The personal characteristics of EFF leader Julius Malema is the primary attraction to EFF supporters. His radicalism and outspokenness congregates those that are angry to the failures of the ANC, however these attributes also revolt voters who are more tempered and hopeful for South

Africa's future. His unpunctuality, and lack of coherent solutions did not dissuade his core supporters, but again these are not admired by the majority of South Africans and limit the acceptance for most South Africans. And his racist diatribe severely damages the EFF's brand felt by all population groups in South Africa.

10. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

No, definitely not. Especially in Africa the cult of personality exists where images of leaders are adorned in all methods of campaigning. This is not specific to Africa either. There have been many instances of leader's wielding immense political power through their brand, and this has resulted in terrible consequences: Peron in Argentina, Suharto in Indonesia; even in more established democracies fanaticism develops through some of its leaders, like Reagan in the USA.

Actually the EFF's reliance of a hegemonic leader is unusual in South African politics as South African political parties base their communication more upon the brand of a party, rather than the leader. The NP's brand was apartheid, the ANC's brand is primarily opposition to apartheid and South African rights equality, and the DA brand (in all its previous guises) is creating a liberal South Africa.

11. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

More and more in South Africa a political party's leader is defining that party's brand. South Africans now derive more of their perception of the values and personality of a political party from its leader, than previously where history, delivery and ideology made more of a brand impact. A party's brand is far more dependent upon the perception of its leader now in post Mbeki South Africa.

This poses a conundrum that many parties have not addressed, for promoting the values of their leaders will have more of an effect than before. The unpopularity of Zuma is a great hindrance to the ANC's brand and contributes greatly to a widespread opinion that the ANC is corrupt. The IFPs steady decline in popular support is directly linked to the aging irrelevance of its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Conversely the youthful, intelligent, and exuberant new DA leader Mmusi Maimane can perhaps change the DA's brand weakness of being white and conservative.

12. What do you think are the EFF's biggest brand strengths and weaknesses?

Ironically the EFF's brand strength is also its greatest weakness: Extremism. There are many in South Africa who have not seen their lives improved under ANC rule, and a few of these have become so angry by this reality that they defer rationality to primal revolt. No political party has been able to harness these feelings into solid support until the EFF came into being, and it is from here where the EFF derives its fervent support.

The irony lies in that there are not that many South Africans who hold such extremist views. For all of South Africa's turbulent history our capability for diplomacy and compromise is unique. South Africa does not want revolution. Most South Africans want calm considered attention to the problems that exist in our country, and the EFF's brand is an anathema to the hope that so many South Africans hold that "together, we can make South Africa better"

Interview with Anthony Butler

1. What is your profession and line of work?

Academic. Professor of politics

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections? Very impressive for a new party with limited resources. (Public funding goes to parties in proportion to previous election results.)

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

Quite important in urban areas, much less so in rural areas and former bantustans.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

The ANC and EFF were very dependent on grass roots organization – knocking on doors to get people registered, and then out to vote on the day. The DA was also very effective at this in Gauteng and W Cape. The ANC is almost always positive in its campaigns and this seems to work for it. In 2014, however, the ANC found it hard to campaign on performance and the manifesto was very muddled.

5. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

Very focused on the party leader. Claiming the ANC's heritage (especially the Freedom Charter) as its own.

6. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

Jane Duncan's overview of content analysis (in the Southall and Shulz-Herzenberg election volume) suggests that EFF got quite a lot of positive coverage – surprising, perhaps, given how dumb their policies are. But they have a lot of professional organizers (from the ANC Youth League) and succeeded in capturing media attention.

7. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

This question is too broad to answer.

8. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

Yes, the big parties hired advertising and marketing specialists, and conducted lots of focus groups to assess the impact of their messaging.

9. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?

He attracted a lot of media attention.

10. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

No. In fact SA's political system is broadly parliamentary (people vote for a party not for a president) and party loyalties are swayed by individual leaders only to a limited degree. In presidential systems (where there is a direct election of the president) the leader is obviously much more the focus of attention. Nevertheless, the ANC has always campaigned at national level around its president (Mandela, Mbeki). Zuma is a rather polarizing figure – he is very popular in KZN and Mpumalanga, but becomes less popular as one moves west and into most urban areas. The ANC is perhaps unsure how to use him in the Cape provinces in particular, and in Gauteng.

11. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

I don't understand this question I'm afraid!

12. In your opinion what was good and bad about the EFF's election campaign? Please can you give me some specific examples? E.g. their social media was brilliant but their posters were terrible. Combination of media-friendly speeches and community level organization (at least in some parts of the country, such as Limpopo and Gauteng, where membership was strong)

13. Do you think the social and power relations have changed in South Africa since the EFF was formed? Why or why not? How so?

No

14. Do you think the local and political context of South Africa contributed to the birth of the EFF? Well, yes. The EFF is a breakaway from the ANC (and especially its youth league). The non-ANC faction of the EFF has been purged from it. The breakaway was precipitated by factional politics in the ANC -- it was a key part of the anti-Zuma faction. EFF also focused on economic issues -- especially youth unemployment -- in ways the ANC had failed to do

15. What was it about the context of these Elections that allowed the EFF to establish themselves and achieve the result they did?

Dissatisfaction with the ANC leadership; electors willing to switch party allegiance;

16. How would you describe the EFF's voice in SA politics? I.E. What kind of power have they acquired and what is the source of this power?

They may soon hold the balance of power in many big metros and this will provide them with leverage to extract political concessions and access to public resources (jobs and tenders)

17. What made these elections different from the previous elections and what was the political climate like before, during and after the election?

The election was not especially distinct from previous elections. In the previous election in 2009, another ANC breakaway, COPE, achieved a very similar showing to EFF in 2014. Cope was also a product of ANC factional politics.

18. What have the EFF brought or not brought to the SA political scene?

Greater engagement with youth issues in a country with a very young population (about half under 25)

19. What would you say are the EFF's core and peripheral elements? I.E. Would you say that the core elements are more about populism while the peripheral elements are more like offering solutions and how has the media understood and interpreted this

I don't understand the question

20. What difference does it make to SA politics that the ANC now has an opposition party that is not affected by the same issues as the DA? (White only party, apartheid baggage etc.)

This has happened before in previous ANC breakaways -- UDM and Cope -- so it is nothing new

Interview with Steven Friedman

1. In your opinion what was effective and ineffective about the EFF's election campaign?

Effective was their ability to get media attention. They are in fact rather focused on getting media attention. They are a media driven party. They were pretty effective at getting media attention and this made it possible for them to become the party of the choice for a lot of frustrated middle class voters.

Ineffective: Their grassroots organizing. The key is networks. You have to have networks on the ground which will deliver votes to you and they didn't have that. As an illustration of that they what I call the Winne Mandela tactic – As far as grassroots networks you devote a huge amount of effort to a small amount of space – they put an immense effort into the Marikana area – because they were trying to get beyond middle class base. Look at results from Marikana they got 52% in Marikana which sounds impressive but when you consider that most of the people families got killed by police in which they devoted months of organizing. This was a pretty poor effort given the amount of energy they put in and they just shaded the UDM in the area.

Good at spectacular media events and drawing attention to themselves in media and a lot worse in building a constituency outside of the middle class

2. Do you think the social and power relations have changed in South Africa since the EFF was formed? Why or why not? How so?

No, not at all. They have reinforced social and power relations in SA. Past dependence – Douglas North - If you think of SA in 1994 as a country and an economy run by a club consisting of purely white people, what has happened over the last 20 years is that the club has taken in new members, new black members however the club is still there and it is still quite exclusive. What the EFF is about is not about getting new people into the club it is about how resources are divided up within the club. So in a sense they represent people who are in the middle class who do not think they are getting enough out of the changes in the last 21 years and obviously want more. But that is as I say all about dividing the resources within the insider group and it does change the fact that there is a very large outside group.

3. Do you think the local and political context of South Africa contributed to the birth of the EFF?

The obvious way in which they were formed is Internal ANC politics. If Zuma did not drive the youth leadership out they would still be there. They did not leave; they were asked to leave. I think that is important in terms of political analysis because despite the ANC's declining credibility in some quarters we are still in a situation where change in ballot box will depend on splits in ANC and this is very good example of that.

After that why did it not simple become just a group of disenchanting people? 1st they had a network of connected politicians, took part of ANC youth league network with them and that meant they had some kind of network with which to operate. Secondly they were a reflection of something going on in society because they got a lot of votes from frustrated middle class people who were angry to a certain extent at what they saw as government corruption and their treatment in business and in the professions. There is a very strong current that they have tapped into a group of black people who have the qualifications that their parents and grandparents did not have yet they are still encountering the same racial attitudes that their parents and grandparents did. I think a lot of those people voted for the EFF.

4. What made these elections different from the previous elections and what was the political climate like before, during and after the election?

Not really no, in a sense it was a re-run with a different cast of the previous general election. In the previous election the people that left the ANC were unhappy with the new leadership group from a middle class perspective. A large number of people who voted for Cope in 2009 switched to the DA last year. The conservative wing of black middle class went to DA and more militant went to EFF. Continuation of what happened in 2009.

5. How would you describe the EFF's voice in SA politics? I.E. What kind of power have they acquired and what is the source of this power?

They are a media party. They get a lot of media and a lot of attention. You can compare them to the AWB in the last years of Apartheid because everybody said that because of the size of their meetings there was a resurgence of the right wing but what we found out was that getting people to meetings and marches is not the same as getting people to ballot boxes.

They have a great ability to get people to a march or a protest or into a hall but not to get people to ballot box. You cannot criticize the EFF without being ridiculed or attacked and this is where they draw their power from and it is a very interesting power to have.

A lot better at drawing attention to themselves than framing the debate. While they would say they put Nationalisation on the agenda, 1st of all they don't support it, I have had this debate with Floyd Shimvambu and secondly can we really say that there is mainstream support for Nationalization, there isn't. Pay back the money would have been carried by the DA if the EFF had not been invented.

There is an aura around them that politics has not been the same since they arrived and I question that. I am not sure if politics is all that different despite the fact that they do have all this attention and this gives them a certain level of power.

6. What would you say are the EFF's core and peripheral elements? I.E. Would you say that the core elements are more about populism while the peripheral elements are more like offering solutions and how has the media understood and interpreted this

The best way to understand them is of them as a media party. It is not an exaggeration to say that they are a political party which is just a large media event and this is the core of what they do. Their electorate/voter base is not solid and by that I mean political party loyalty in this country is very firm. You mostly recognize ANC/DA voters. There are not many people who are core EFF voters. Their voters are not the type of who will vote EFF election after election. They don't have a strong support base outside of the core people that they brought from the ANC youth league. There are not a whole bunch of voters out there who are EFF not matter what.

7. What difference does it make to SA politics that the ANC now has an opposition party that is not affected by the same issues as the DA? (White only party, apartheid baggage etc.)

Well this is what everyone expected. I am not sure this is the case. Because race is so important in SA the term left wing and right wing have different meanings. The EFF are not a left wing party. A left wing party would be up there in parliament saying here are 43 examples of poverty and inequality that you have not dealt with. What they have been doing in parliament, is like a noisy version of the DA. They are not raising issues that they DA has not raised. If you had a party which was peppering government ministers with questions about why people don't have this and this in this area, then that would be the case.

Interview with Glenda Neville

1. Do you believe that branding has influenced modern political communication?

Yes. News moves so fast, and gets tired so soon, that political parties have had to become masters of the soundbite, the instant message, use immediately identifiable colours so viewers, audiences, to know who they are. We live in a world of brands in which YOU are identified by the brands YOU identify with. Political parties endlessly compete to build membership, they have to 'sell' themselves and their policies to voters. So yes, they have to build their brands just like any other 'product' so as to sell themselves.

2. In South Africa do you think political parties have started incorporating branding into their communications?

Yes, I do. In an age where news has become so visual, not just on TV but even on radio via broadcasters' websites, being able to be immediately identified by something you wear, a certain colour or combination of colors, a style of poster and the fonts used, the tone of the messaging – all of these factors are used by political parties to differentiate themselves, and also to allow supporters to nail their colours to the mast so to speak. Look how the DA refers to a 'sea of blue' or the 'black, green and gold' of the ANC.

3. Do you think the EFF has developed a successful brand?

The EFF have been particularly smart in developing their brand, and the iconography associated with their brand. While red is a colour used by political parties and worker organisations on the left of the spectrum for ages (Cosatu, SACP) the EFF's use of the instant identifiable beret, and the attendant 'I want that now' factor, was genius. But beyond the beret, the EFF has developed a certain tone in its communications, the party stays on message (perhaps because they don't have too many yet as opposed to the ANC who have so many that it's confusing what their policies are half the time), they are social media savvy and have used social media extensively to develop their brand. After all, they want the youth onside, and that's where the youth 'hang out', so to speak. But they back it up with experiential action too, such as the march for economic freedom personified by Julius Malema walking the whole way with his followers.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

For the first time, parties used social media platforms, and some are MUCH better than others at this. As an aside, I once worked for an ANC MEC in the provincial legislature before the DA took over in 2009. When I suggested we start using Twitter, I was dismissed. "Our people don't use Twitter", I was told. The DA was already using the medium effectively. The ANC had to play catch up. SMS was used effectively by the DA too, particularly the 'Jacob Zuma is a thief' SMS that landed

them in court – a case which they subsequently won. Then of course, they (DA) also used billboards on the highway near the much-loathed e-tolls. Great move. And even hired an airplane to reinforce the message with banners during rush hour traffic. The fact that the ANC lost a substantial share of the Gauteng vote could be testament to the effectiveness of those campaigns.

The ANC have always been effective at doing the door-to-door

5. What was effective and ineffective about the EFF's election campaign?

The EFF took the fight right to the ANC. It held rallies on the same day, in the same areas as the ANC. They went door-to-door. They had a defined target market – the disaffected youth – and they were relentless in pursuing this market, and did it successfully.

They were much better on social media than the EFF, helped by the fact that the so-called 'black Twitter' are mostly onside and relentless in their scathing commentary. Sentletse and Dali Mpofo stand out in particular.

Perhaps the one ineffective thing was their lack of clearly defined policy, but even that didn't seem to matter as the singular message – economic freedom in our lifetime, but whatever means – was what this market wanted to hear.

6. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

That single message was the differentiator. The 'economic freedom in our lifetime' message. Other parties all had a mass of policy positions that they try to communicate to different sectors. The EFF's power lay in that consistency. This is what we stand for. Full stop. Like the DA, they also had the Jacob Zuma bogeyman to use and Malema's intimate knowledge of Zuma was a powerful weapon in the EFF's hands too. Unlike the DA, who could always just be dismissed as coconuts and racists who don't like a black man like Zuma in power, the EFF was able to say 'You're corrupt, you stole our money, your party has had its day' without being labelled racist and without the threat that the DA will 'bring apartheid back'.

7. What do you think of the EFF's

a. Logo

Effective. Takes elements of the ANC – the spear – and even, cheekily, ANC colours. Uses the silhouette of the mine shaft to underpin a key message – nationalization of the mines. And the fist signifying black power.

b. Slogan

Again, powerful in its simplicity. Economic freedom in our lifetime. Promises much without saying how it will be achieved – except for the mines!

c. Colour Scheme

Cheeky. Borrows from the ANC. Gives a sense of security, but also promises something new.

d. Brand tone

Fighting. Strong. Outspoken. Champions of the poor.

e. Promotional items – Berets, overalls

Very clever. Instantly recognisable whether in parliament or on the street. Generated many column inches of media. Worker unity far more than what Cosatu manages to do these days.

8. Do you think brand positioning can be applied to politics?

Yes. If you're selling yourself to a target audience, you need a brand and a position.

9. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

The ANC tried to dismiss them as having 'stolen' their slogan. That they were mere pretenders to the ANC thrown and powered by people disaffected by the ANC's treatment of them. Cosatu said they'd stolen their colours. The DA said they were policy poor and all about the rhetoric. Holomisa and Buthelezi dismissed them as callow youths.

10. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

Of course. There's a fantastic story about how Jacob Zuma tried to threaten some villagers in Limpopo with their ancestors' wrath if they didn't vote ANC. A very patriarchal and patronizing move. The villagers retaliated by painting all the huts in the village blue and voted DA. (that was the last local elections but highlights how branding can be used to illustrate a point.) The EFF had to convince young voters that the party their parents vote for no longer had value for the youth. The DA had to tell those born-frees they were the party of equal opportunity. Branding, from posters to op-eds in broadsheets, had to help move voting blocks from the ANC to other parties.

11. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of different parties?

12. Do you think the leader figure is an important branding tool in politics locally and overseas?

It's vital. That's why the DA were clever enough to realise that as powerful as Helen Zille was, if it was ever to attract black voters it had to change its leader. Obama's 'Yes we can' had to be one of the best campaigns ever and it was about him as much as his politics. I think the ANC using Zuma was the weakest point in their campaign. The disconnect between him and the ANC's oft stated anti-corruption stance was too much for voters in urban areas.

13. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

They have to live their message. Which is hard to do all the time. One misstep, and you've had it on social media. Ask Zille! Her 'education refugees' comment hurt her and her party. As before, Jacob

Zuma is the antithesis of much of the ANC's stated policy, and this disconnect is hurting them. He certainly doesn't live the brand message of non-sexism, non-racism, we're all equal. In fact, the country knows there's one set of rules for Zuma, and another for the rest of us.

14. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign? Hugely. Malema IS the EFF. I'm sure he is 80% responsible for the party's success in its first election that it contested.

15. Do you think the EFF effectively convey their brand message to their supporters?

Yes, they do. They LIVE their message. They've even managed to overcome residual skepticism of the ANC Malema who's love of riches and money and bling was renowned and support him through his troubles with the taxman. To overcome that took some political mastery.

16. Do you think the local and political context of South Africa contributed to the birth of the EFF?

Of course. The youth were clearly disaffected with the ANC and its alliance partners who certainly don't come across as being concerned about the poor and the youth. Quite the opposite. The ongoing factional fights and internal politics has to be off-putting to many young voters. 'They don't care about us'. Plus, many are not ready to cross over to the 'white' party of the DA. (Be interesting to see if Maimane can change this perception in the next elections.) So there was fertile ground to be planted with the seeds of a new political party that would fight, loudly and vocally, for the youth and for workers.

Interview with Kameel Premhid

1. What is your profession and line of work?

I am a student at the University of Oxford. I have a background in law and politics.

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

Mediocre. They had a strong media narrative behind them prior to their launch and, unlike other breakaways from the ANC, had very strong personalities too. None of that caused as much damage as the pundits predicted. Their behavior since then, it would seem, is to ensure their relevance and create a base. Whether they are successful remains to be seen.

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

Increasingly so – the ‘Americanization’ of politics all around the world has meant that slick marketing and branding is de rigor and the norm. A good example of this would be the shameless borrowing of the Obama campaign template by Mmusi Maimane and the DA in 2011 and 2014.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

I am not sure how many parties you need. I think the ANC had a weak strategy, given their problematic presidential candidate. Tactically, they were superior in turning out the vote and minimizing the damage they suffered. The DA had a strong strategy on paper and performed well, tactically. Barring a few social media incidences by peripheral figures, it was a good campaign but not as much of a breakthrough as predicted. The EFF were untested and could only go up. That being said, they failed to do as much damage as was anticipated.

5. How would you compare the EFF’s election campaign against other parties’ campaigns during the election?

Confused and personality driven. The movement, in its infancy at least, seemed more like a cult than anything else.

6. Do you think the EFF has developed a successful brand?

In the sense that they have one, yes. In terms of what it stands for, no.

7. Do you think the EFF effectively convey their brand message to their supporters?

Yes, to their supporters/base. They do so say good things that may attract others but they lack message discipline and coherence to start attracting people outside their vague target market.

8. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

Themselves and the media – revolutionary challengers to the ANC (although not quite in practice).
By the DA – as dangerous demagogues, with themselves as the responsible opposition. The ANC attempted to paint them as being disaffected former members but failed to keep up a consistent line (varying between taking them seriously and ignoring them altogether)

9. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

I am not sure what the question is asking.

10. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

Marginally. Voting, by the majority, in South Africa is motivated by a myriad of factors (history, socio-economics, and race). The media is a peripheral one.

11. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?

Positively, they used his firebrand power to fill in the gaps in the party machine/structure/message

12. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

Not at all, although the system in place does determine the extent to which the leader is prominent.

In our quasi-federal, pseudo-centrist system, the leader is concomitantly important.

13. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

Significantly. In many respects they come to epitomize the party given that they fashion in their own image.

Interview with Martin Slabbert-Capper

1. What is your profession and line of work?

[I have been a freelance broadcast journalist for the past 20 years. Between 2000 and 2008 I worked as senior media liaison officer at the Democratic Alliance's parliamentary office, where I also acted as spokesperson for the then leaders Tony Leon and Helen Zille. My current full time job is Account Manager at a Cape Town based public relations and crisis communications agency.]

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

[Considering the short time they had in which to campaign (they were only started in July 2013) and the intense opposition they faced from other corners – the ANC claimed they were bankrolled by ZANU-PF and the FF+ tried to get the IEC to block their registration as a contestant in the 2014 Elections – they did brilliantly. To be able to send 25 MPs to Cape Town after your first election campaign is something to be proud of. The test now however will be how they translate this success into the local elections in 2016, and whether they can realistically challenge the DA for the Official Opposition position in 2019. Many new parties have entered the political arena with a big fanfare and with huge excitement among the electorate, only to self-destruct. AGANG-SA and COPE are examples, while others are wracked by infighting to this day. It is all good and well to make an impact and to get people to notice you - but then what? What's next? That question sums up the challenge for the EFF, going into the 2016 polls.]

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

[The Democratic Alliance has always had a very sophisticated and well run political machine that kicks into action for every election. Its positioning has always also been clever, and its messaging consistent. The ANC as the biggest kid on the block has had its size and the power of patronage counting in its favor, which explained why other smaller parties have always had to battle for a fair share of the public spotlight. I remember one of my campaign colleagues remarking towards the end of the 2004 elections how the ANC managed to get more people at their last election rally than we as the DA managed to get at all our campaign events combined. The ANC has branded and marketed itself as the party of liberation; the party of Nelson Mandela, that delivered democracy to the nation. This is a powerful card to play, but it might be reaching its expiration date. The EFF could position itself in direct contrast to the ANC as the party that is standing up to the formidable abstinence of the ruling party and its unwillingness to realize that the lives of ordinary South Africans have not materially improved yet.]

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

[As alluded to above, the ANC has offered "more of the same" while opposition parties have latched onto the reality that it cannot be business as usual. This explains I think why the ANC has again lost a large percentage of its support and why it came the closest yet to losing control of Gauteng province.]

5. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

[Julius Malema is a master political strategist, and he has identified for his party the opportunity to tap into the large levels of frustration among especially young black South Africans. "They are out to keep us down" seems to be the hidden narrative for the EFF, and the public understand that. Julius' long running battles with SARS might actually have been to his and his party's political benefit - as long as he could play the role of the persecuted, his voters would come to his defense. It was a simple message, and the voters understood it and bought into it.]

6. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

[The EFF positioned itself as the young revolutionary upstarts, and have gone to a big effort to show that they care about the South Africans who are still stuck in poverty even though we live in a free country. Other parties however have tried to paint them as reckless rabble rousers, with no real impact to make. I am not convinced that the media had a clear idea of what to make of the party, and whether or not they were to be treated as a serious player at the time.]

7. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

[The ANC's legacy as the party that destroyed apartheid will stay with it forever I think, but it does not seem to realize the need to adapt and move into the future. The DA has shown it can be a government in waiting, but it needs to properly re-engineer itself as a party for a rainbow nation. During the 2014 election campaign, the party used its black leadership figures to transcend this perceived racial barrier to show it is not a 'white' party anymore. (It would elect its first black leader about a year later.) The EFF has managed to catch the attention of the public and the media, and knows how to play to the audience. It must show that it can go past mere grand-standing and shouting, to make a real impact.]

8. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

[Yes, but not all parties. The smaller ones (who are now no longer represented in parliament) did not realize the need to advertise and to properly market their message. Without the clear marketing of

what their unique selling point, voters had no motivation to support them. Election campaigns are in essence massive job interviews - and if you as a party cannot sell yourself properly to your market and do decent marketing, they won't vote for you. The EFF's chants of #PayBackTheMoney has probably been its most successful marketing campaign, which identified with friends and foes alike.]

9. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?
[As in reply 5, I think he plays the 'victim' and the 'persecuted' like a pro. And his voters identify with that, especially the young, unemployed and frustrated.]

10. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

[No I don't think so. Instead, I think South Africa is discovering the power of a strong political brand, what it means, and how to use it to the party's best interest.]

11. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

[If the leader understands the importance of strong branding (as with Helen Zille, Mmusi Maimane, Julius Malema) and practices this understanding, it benefits the party's prospects at the polls. But if the leader (such as Jacob Zuma) does not grasp the power of branding, the party will feel it at the polls.]

12. Do you believe that branding has influenced modern political communication?

[The changing face of communication and media has forced political parties around the world to be smarter with how they market themselves. The electorate has become more sophisticated, which has forced parties to change their ways of doing things and be clearer about their brand offering.]

13. In South Africa do you think political parties have started incorporating branding into their communications?

[Yes, the DA and the EFF have grasped the power of marketing while others are slowly waking to its possibilities.]

14. What do you think of the EFF's

- a. Logo
- b. Slogan
- c. Colour Scheme
- d. Brand tone
- e. Promotional items – Berets, overalls

[Answering them all together: I think it stands out clearly, and I am particularly impressed with how their use of overalls (especially in parliament) and berets have become part of their identity. This

explains why there has been so many attempts to block them from wearing their overalls to legislature meetings - and I am glad these attempts failed.]

Interview with Maynard Manyowa

1. What is your profession and line of work?

I am Political and Social Analyst

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

Considerable. For a party contesting in its first elections, it performed admirably well. Beyond expectation

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

I would say it is massive, in that the successful parties ride on big brands. The ANC keeps using Mandela's image for example, to ride on his legacy and create the image that voting otherwise would be a betrayal of Madiba.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

ANC = used the same tactics of before. Promise the people freebies, ride on Mandela, and use the fair improvement of the black's lifestyle to lure voter loyalty

EFF = promised freebies as well, but rode on the unequal distribution of wealth in society.

DA= used the WC as the key example of just how successful DA governance is in South Africa. It was effective, but they fail to shake of the label of a white party

5. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

The EFF's campaign was the fieriest and feisty by all accounts. Whilst it was not as structured and methodical as DA and ANC, it rode on the euphoria and high emotion of marginalized populations.

6. Do you think the EFF has developed a successful brand?

Yes, they have. Whether the brand is respectable or not is another thing. Initially the EFF wanted to achieve the label of the 'liberator brand', and they had sympathy from even the middle class. But they ended up stuck with the brand of 'motor mouths'

7. Do you think the EFF effectively convey their brand message to their supporters?

They convey the message. But their supporters take it the wrong way. They believe in combative politics, not progressive politics. While the EFF wants to argue for economic liberation

8. What were the strong and weak elements of the EFF's brand in the 2014 elections?

Their strong points were black marginalization, which is systematic. White privilege, and the fact that they have been no efforts to redress the unequal distribution of wealth.

Their weak points are obviously they haphazard demeanor, violence, corruption scandals, and reckless statements.

9. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

Themselves: EFF positioned itself as the economic liberator, "The Robert Mugabe" of South Africa, with promises of indigenization, empowerment, and wealth redress

Other Parties: They positioned the EFF as a threat to progress, hell bent on turning the SA economy into "another Zimbabwe"

10. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

ANC: Corruption is a big problem within the ANC, and all that comes with it. Nepotism, Looting, Mismanagement, and Zuma Worship.

ANC has also perpetuated white privilege. That is a fact. The racist tensions you see in society are just borne out of the racism rampant in SA's economy.

Zulu domination and bad management. The ANC cannot speak out against Zulu despicable, like Xenophobia, and the KING.

Pros – not any at the moment

EFF: Violence, Corruption, and infighting have destroyed the brand EFF. Reckless statements have cost them support from the middle class, who would rather have a functional economy than a banana republic

Pros – Empowerment of blacks, Standing up to ANC manipulation of democratic processes

11. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

Yes, definitely especially by ANC and DA. The former used Mandela's image probably more than Zuma's own. Perhaps to shy away from his problems with scandals. The DA placed lots of black people on their banners in an effort to change the perception of a white party.

12. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign? Malema's conduct definitely cost the party a huge chunk of its support. He has gained a reputation for being foul mouthed, and plain crazy. Despite making sense, he seems to be a bad leader.

13. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

No, it is done in most places. What is unique is that voters vote for a party, not independent legislators.

14. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

They reinforce perceptions of good. Especially Mandela, in his capacity as a leader. Zuma as well.

Interview with Nic Borain

1. What is your profession and line of work?

I analyse South African policy, politics and regulation in as far as it impacts (or might impact) on economic growth or on specific equities and bonds. My clients are, generally, fund managers, especially long-only pension funds here and abroad who might want to purchase or sell particular financial instruments impacted upon by changes or potential changes in the policy/politics/regulation realm.

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

Excellent. From a standing start, still recovering from expulsion from the ANC, with little or no resources, a small group of individuals spun nothing much into a national campaign and gained 6% of the vote.

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

If branding refers specifically to levels of recognition of symbols, colours, slogans and leaders, not much. If branding refers to the meaning individual voters/consumers attach to the same and the degree to which those things (symbols, Colours etc.) are recognizably reflective of the individual's lived (or aspirational) experience then I think branding is important. Marketing can move the needle slightly, but only if the brand is reflective of the identity (or potentially reflective of the identity) of the voter. You can brand and market a pig's ear in South African with the biggest budget in the world and it's still not going to be a silk purse.

That doesn't mean marketing and branding are irrelevant. EFF did a magnificent job of both, but primarily plugging into a social contradiction and identity that pre-existed red T shirts/overalls and doeks

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

(Too much big a question, not enough time ...)

5. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

Energetic, excellent opportunism, jumping on bandwagon of preexisting grievances (Marikana, land invasions) and presenting themselves as leading 'representatives' on those issues (even when this was a myth). They made similar branding/marketing advances with statues issue, but this also exposes them to the young, poor, black voters and the defected black intelligentsia they are trying to appeal to as opportunistic and not to be taken seriously. It's a fine line and they have crossed it a

couple of times, including with taking the excellent strategy of disruption of parliament around Pay Back the Money too far, and making themselves look truculent and divisive at the SONA.

6. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

ANC tried to portray them as equally corrupt, disrespectful and possibly linked to a third force. DA tried to portray them as having a legitimate point (pay back money) but their methods and their integrity was questionable ... i.e. the Julius has money to pay back. EFF presented a problem for the DA because of the energy and noise they were able to generate in parliament. DA probably played it as best as they could by remaining calm and 'reasonable', aligning with the EFF when the abuses of house rules crossed a certain line, but aligning against the EFF when they pushed it too far. The EFF tried to portray itself as champions of the poor, champions against government corruption and champions of black South Africans dispossessed by whites (mines and land). It's an easy and simple sell, avoiding any of the complexities that go along with the real compromises an actual government might have to make. Thus they are not presenting themselves effectively as a serious alternative – more like a fun, cheeky, irreverent, critic ... a strategy that can only take you so far.

7. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

(Too much ...)

8. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

(Answered I reckon?)

9. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign? Hugely. Not only is he a master tactician, he is undoubtedly the best 'political' speaker in South African politics at the moment. I am not sure if they would have anything like the momentum without him.

10. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

No I think it is quite widespread – but can easily be overstated as a prime cause of winning or losing. You can win with a wooden leader who speaks badly on a public platform (Nelson Mandela) if the electorate backs or admires or knows him for other reasons. You can win with a naff like Cameron or lose with a naff like Miliband. I don't think Maimane is going to radically transform the voter profile of the DA, but I think he will make a difference.

11. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

Moderately. The voters need to see themselves in the leader or admire them for some additional characteristic. We are still mired in 'identity' politics or even 'racialized' politics, although we are gradually moving away from that. The ANC would be extremely unlikely to elect a non-black African as its presidential candidate. It is unsurprising that the DA has moved to Maimane for the same reason. Zuma was an asset, speaks beautifully when in his own tongue, dances attractively, sings well and can really get the crowd moving. This makes a difference, but not a decisive one. The 'Zuma brand' is hugely damaged by Nkandla and Gupta's and all the marketing in the world isn't going to change that. Nelson Mandela came across very poorly on public platforms but was beloved by everyone for his ideas, his sacrifice, his strength in negotiations, his personal interactions with everyone ... so he remains a huge brand asset, as does the ANC itself, as "the party of liberation". Mandela's brand value grows, but I think the ANC's is declining slightly.

Interview with Qaanitah Hunter

1. What is your profession and line of work?

I work as a political reporter for the Mail & Guardian newspaper.

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

The EFF did well in terms of headline grabbing. But did not fare as well in terms of elections results in comparison to another breakaway party from the ANC (Cope) performed in the previous elections.

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

Political branding is part of the fabric of society in a democratic South Africa. Political branding is what sells the party to the voters and what differentiates between supporters.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

All political parties used posters and regalia as the basis of spreading their messages.

The ANC told its "good story", the DA used the Western Cape as the prime example of how they would govern and the EFF used militant and radical talk. They all used political rallies, TV advertisements and their leaders travelled all of the country to spread the message of the party. It was only their messages that was different. In terms of content, the ANC focused on what it has delivered while all opposition parties used the misgivings of the ruling party as their core message.

5. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

The EFF election campaign somewhat mirrored the ANC's one. A similar formula of holding rallies in townships and bussing in people to garner support. Although the EFF's campaign was a lot more radical and focused or appealed more to young people.

6. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

Please further explain this question.

7. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

This is a very broad question. In what aspect do you refer to? (Failed to obtain a follow-up interview)

8. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

Absolutely. This is shown significantly in the increase in votes that the DA received. By using Mmusi Maimane as the face of its campaign, it shifted perception that the DA was a white only party.

9. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?

Malema is charismatic and has a larger than life personality. Most of the EFF supporters are loyal to Malema's firebrand personality than the party itself.

10. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

No. It is a practice all around the world where party leaders become the face of campaigns.

11. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

They each have their own personal brand which differentiates them in the 'market' - i.e. amongst the electorate. Their personalities and demeanor plays a role but the parties they represent and the role they play in the parties also form a significant part. Some politicians 'formal brand' may be different to what they represent on the ground. While President Jacob Zuma has developed a notorious brand known for bad leadership. On the ground, amongst his supporters, his wit and charm over ride that.

Interview with Richard Poplack

1. What is your profession?

I'm an author and a journalist.

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

Given that they were barely six months old as a political party and had no formal registration drive, I'd say they performed astonishingly well.

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

I would argue that South African political parties have an enormously sophisticated perception regarding branding. All three of the major parties (I consider the EFF a major party) understand that their party is a product, and must be sold as such.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

I thought the ANC's Good Story to Tell was outstandingly managed. I thought the DA did a horrible job with its incomprehensible platform. And I think I've already been clear on the EFF.

5. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

They've positioned themselves on the far left, which is ideologically debatable but irrefutable from a branding point of view. They have very clearly differentiated themselves from the ANC and DA, who now clearly inhabit a centre right position, despite their protestations to the contrary. The media helped the EFF, and other political parties seemed powerless to define the EFF—a very dangerous position for an opponent to be in. It is imperative in politics to never allow your enemies to define themselves. The ANC and DA failed in this regard.

6. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?

He was essential. The brand was built around him. He was the face and the voice. Without him, this would likely never have happened.

7. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

Not in the least. But our non-representational democratic system demands from political parties a leader behind whom the party rallies.

8. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

Immensely. I think we've already, in a few short weeks (days?) seen how the DA has changed its tack slightly behind Mmusi Maimane.

Interview with Rushil Ranchod

1. What is your profession and line of work?

I am a research specialist working in at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), a statutory research council that undertakes policy relevant social science research. My PhD focused on the political marketing of the African National Congress. I continue to research in this area, even though my primary activities have centered on research communication and evidence-based policymaking.

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

I think they did pretty well – they didn't come close to meeting their own target of 50%, but it was more bluster than anything close to a scientific estimate.

The past two elections have given rise to a 'third party' (COPE in 2009) that have obtained a relatively similar vote share of between 6-7%. The context of the emergence of these parties is different; there are different dynamics at play even though both were effectively breakaway formations from the ANC.

If we look at what happened to the other challenger of this election – Agang – then I think the EFF's level of success becomes more impressive. Agang were buried in internal squabbles before the election even took place, while the EFF built on and gained momentum through the campaign. So while they didn't have the necessary party infrastructure grounded to undertake a full on campaign, there was a level of organizational coherence that allowed them to challenge well in the political sphere.

Also, I think its achievements at the provincial level are more impressive. It was elected as the official opposition in 2 provinces which is important as base from which it can consolidate its national level influence. (Perhaps not as important as Cope's – it won the official opposition title in 5 provinces – but nevertheless, Malema's support base was consolidated in provinces that have traditionally been sympathetic to him, North West and Limpopo).

3. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

I think it has been and continues to be a critical, if under-acknowledged feature of our politics. It's not something new – it was characteristic of apartheid era politics as well. I can speak of the ANC more authoritatively; they placed significant emphasis on how the party was positioned in the liberation era political 'marketplace' and invested a significant amount of thinking into their brand.

I think now, however, there's been an increased emphasis on spectacle in South Africa politics, supported by greater mediatisation and this has prompted much more emphasis on branding and marketing. As political/electoral outcomes become more uncertain, this tendency will deepen. I also think that due to this, political personality is becoming increasingly important. Party image remains critical, but party leaders are becoming an important short-hand for political understanding in SA. Election campaigns are clearly the times when parties invest greater resources into marketing, augmenting some of their (political) propositions through the brand. My sense is that it is 'politics as usual' between campaigns. The rhetoric and imagery are there, but they aren't given real meaning and value.

4. How would you evaluate the tactics and strategies used by the different political parties in the 2014 Elections?

The ANC campaigns strongly – its election machine is formidable. The opaque party funding environment in South Africa coupled with its control of the state apparatus function to set it apart from other parties. Having said that, if I compare it to the 2009 campaign, in 2014, its strategy was rather lackluster, unimaginative, and dull. But I think circumstances necessitated that. Unlike the political milieu of the previous campaign, I think it was compromised by its leadership figures, internecine politics and general political circumstance under the incumbent administration.

The DA has a very slick operation, punchy ads, brought in world-class pollsters like Stanley Greenberg, and tapped into the now standard and globalized notions and rhetoric of 'change' and 'hope'. But I think therein lies its problem – the campaign lack authenticity or me. It was a carbon copy of many of the elements that characterize campaigns in the post-Obama campaign environment. I was in the UK earlier this year when the general election campaigns were going on – the similarities between the Labour campaign and the DA's were uncanny in terms of rhetoric, style and overall feel.

The EFF pushed the envelope, which I think is their core political value proposition. Against the sanitized soundbites of the DA and the empty rhetoric of the ANC, the EFF were ballsy in what they said, how they said it, and also where they said it. Strategically, it was an adept approach – its puts a clear distance between them and the ANC and the DA. It also provided an important outlet for disaffection in the body politic. To understand the significance of political branding and marketing, one must understand the political environment and culture of the times i.e. what it is informed by and also what it speaks to/for. I think one of the EFF's achievements is that it gave people voice, an outlet that has been lacking in South Africa for a while now.

5. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

I think I've answered this in the paragraph above. But to add, I think they displayed great strategic knowledge of the political marketplace – they were never going to win or even get 50% of the vote, they knew that. But what they did, was to re-ignite South African political discourse in an important, if somewhat basal, manner.

What is also important to consider is that in doing this, they are also able to build on a tradition of politics that has great historical resonance. Malema, Shivambu and others were bred on ANCYL politics. They are able to lay claim to a historical tradition of contestation is associated with Mandela, Sisulu and others who, in historical retellings, were at the forefront of energizing the ANCYL at an important time in anti-apartheid and ANC history. I think there is symbolic power there that has /may be utilised effectively.

The EFF also captured the left wing of the political spectrum. As other parties, including the ANC, have contested over the center-/right space, the EFF emerged as an important and politically threatening leftists force. This space was not in play for the past 20 years – their existed no real threat on the left. The EFF made an important play for that, building up alliances with smaller parties and indeed personalities (Andile Mngxitama, notwithstanding the more recent problems) to lend it political and intellectual credibility.

6. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

To add to what I said above, they successfully positioned themselves in counterpoint to perceptions of elitism that affect both the ANC, DA and I suppose at the time, Agang. The ANC would be branded as sell outs and corrupt, the DA as a 'white' party of capital (I suppose they would share the status of the party of capital with the ANC) and Mamphele Ramphela was similarly handmaiden to all of this.

Contrarily, the EFF positioned themselves as the party of the workers, the disenfranchised. Marikana was critical to their positioning and their rhetoric. Think of their dress also – it's a kind of a sartorially directed revolution. The red jumpsuit and beret are powerful political symbols. But they may also easily translate into political gimmickry. Nevertheless, it communicates a significant political message when juxtaposed to the trappings of state office.

I think the EFF's self-positioning also opens doors for political parties to characterize them as illegitimate, as antagonistic to the principles of democracy, as displaying policy viciousness given their claims to nationalization and expropriation.

By way of the media, I think that they weren't pilloried in the way I would have anticipated beforehand. There is some work done on this somewhere, and I think that Malema had quite a favourable run in the media compared to Zuma and Zille.

7. In your opinion what are the pros and cons of the different political parties?

The ANC: History and culture of the party/ movement are a pro. The liberation dividend is still a significant (if diminishing) political tool. The social and economic gains since 1994 should not be under-estimated, even though insufficient. The cons: incumbency – you'll always get blamed for failures. Internal politics, erosion of institutional accountability – the list is long. These are a real test to the strength and endurance not only of the brand, but to the history, culture and identity of the party.

The DA: pros: opposition politics comes with the freedom to contest and criticize; they also have a large national presence, are consolidating in key metros and have a fair (if contested) track record on provincial governance. Cons: it is vulnerable to being labelled as a minority interest (particularly) white party. Converting black support and more critically retaining black support will be key to its survival. Its success going forward cannot depend on the swing – it needs to build support, entrench

support with its non-traditional base. A critical issue is that it lacks authenticity – as a voter and an analyst, I question a strategy that seeks to give me a diluted Obama-esque candidate (Maimane) and wants me to “believe” that he’ll give me “hope”. It’s dull, unimaginative and so contrived. And critically, it raises questions around trust – about the candidate, the party, etc. I also wonder to what extent they DA ‘gets’ South Africa? To what extent it understands politics in this country at the cultural level? It also raises more fundamental questions about how far we have moved as a nation: can we reconcile white (wo-) men shouting down black (wo-) men in Parliament? Have we matured as a country to that point yet? This raises important questions that require much more reflection and consideration. The implications are of both political and strategic consequence.

The EFF: they are antagonistic to the ANC in a way the DA and other opposition cannot be. If the DA undertakes ‘legislatively based’ opposition grounded on procedural and judicial opposition politics, the EFF’s is visceral – it exposes a rawer, and emotion-orbiting politics that I think resonates with some. For want of a poor analogy: if the DA does it by the book, the EFF does it by the fist. I think that both are effective in their own way (although I’m not necessarily condoning it). But I think in the context of South Africa today, these very distinct approaches may still work for different constituencies. The con: the approach of the EFF has a sell-by-date. They must prove themselves as a viable oppositional force that moves beyond the rhetoric. The 2016 elections will be an important barometer of whether the EFF has squandered its political capital. Another con is that it is increasingly associated with the Malema-Shivambu double act, and to a (much) lesser extent Mbuyiseni Ndlozi. How it handles its internal politics will also determine whether it can kick on as an opposition party.

8. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter’s behaviors?

I think it was, but we have to disaggregate who exactly ‘voters’ are? The youth voter may differ from the older voter, the rural from the urban and the middle-classes from the lower classes.

These elections were more competitive than previous elections, and we can see that there is growing uncertainty in the political marketplace; there is more to play for. The result is that more voters are open to persuasion and therefore how parties are able to engage, interact and market themselves to specific group’s matters considerably.

The increasing competitiveness of elections is also seen through the extent to which parties take their campaigning seriously. The ANC's election budget is massive compared to other parties. But I think in this past election, the issue was also securing existing support as opposed to converting new voters. The much vaunted youth segment stayed away from the elections, so I think none of the parties really achieved behavioural change for this demographic.

I think the DA and EFF (and perhaps the smaller parties) tried more to peel off voters from the ANC. But there is a tendency in SA for ANC voters rather to abstain from voting rather than to vote for an opposition party. The election turnout/participation stats bear this out – increasing numbers of voters eligible to vote remained out the process. While there are multiple factors underlying this, there is a tendency amongst ANC voters to stay away from the voting booth, rather than vote for an opposition party.

9. How do you think the personal characteristics of Julius Malema affected the EFF campaign?

It was critical to the campaign – EFF to my mind, is Malema writ large. It's a personality driven party which while problematic, doesn't mean it's not effective. The political history of Malema – a no holds barred, rough, and uncompromising, in your face type, etc. – seems to be the approach the party has adopted and utilizes to strategic effect. It is hard to dissociate Malema from the EFF; more than any other party, he has come to embody the existence and approach of the EFF.

10. Do you think the use of the leader figure in political party branding is unique to South African politics?

No, not at all. Our electoral system actually de-emphasizes the figure of the leader, but I think that we have regarded the leader brand as an important short-hand for what the party stands for. There are many reasons for this, but the turn to personality as a shorthand for party brand is a feature of politics, ours and more globally.

I also think that the leader figure for small parties like the EFF, COPE and the UDM plays a large role in sense-making for the electorate. They may not know about the manifestos of the party, but they will know what the idea of 'Julius Malema' stands for; or 'Terror Lekota' for that matter (although it does seem that they have a bit part in the larger political scene).

11. How do you think political party leaders contribute to the concept of branding in South African politics?

I think I've answered this above. They are the proverbial short-cuts – emotively, conceptually, and politically – to understanding a party and invest notions of what the party is with how they are seen. I think this is more common for new parties whose emergence and validity centers on a leadership figure or a small band of leaders (although this didn't work out too well for COPE).

I think for more established parties however– the ANC and the DA – the leadership figure is important, but the historical investment of meaning and value in the brand means that the brand may endure despite its association with a specific leader/s. We saw in the last general, that in Gauteng for example, the ANC remained a strong brand amongst those polled, but the Zuma brand put a significant brake on whether people would vote for them; the Zuma brand as well as other factors such as the general state of the political economy, e-tolls, service delivery etc.

For the DA, I think the Zille brand was well-established and well-cultivated. The story of the DA is impressive too – starting from a low base of 2% of the vote to consolidating its support and building a strong oppositional brand. What they do in the Western Cape will be critical to their future; as well as how they perform in the 2016 local elections. That campaign will be less about the feel-good story, the history, the personalities (this goes for all parties), it's going to turn on competence, track record and deliver. In the Western Cape, Zille can lay a strong claim to that as the Premier candidate.

The Maimane brand is a little more dubious, given questions around his authenticity. I think the DA brand remains strong within the overall political marketplace, especially amongst its supporters. The question is whether that brand image translates for those it is looking to convert or persuade.

Interview with Daniel Silke

1. Do you believe that branding has influenced modern political communication?

Yes, well I think the EFF is a very good example of a new political entity that has been able to largely get their branding correct. More established political parties have taken a back seat in comparison. Both DA and ANC have used branding extensively but I have seen nothing quite like the effectiveness of the EFF's branding in last 18 months. As new political entity it is possibly only political entity since 1994 that has successfully branded itself in the marketing sense of the word through name identification, colour scheme, uniforms in parliament. All of these factors as well as the branding of Malema as leader. All of these have been incredibly successful campaigns. EFF have bought into the importance of marketing and branding and have extended this into the political realm very successfully leaving the others ruing in their wake.

2. How important is marketing and branding in South African politics?

I think it has become more important. Political parties becoming more like a consumer product. As we in society become more used to choice, as South Africans move away from being locked into political allegiance of past which were directed by emotion and history. Branding can supplant traditional emotional historical ties that an individual has psychological with a political party. As choice becomes more of an option and as bonds of allegiance to old orders start to fray at the edge branding takes rightful place as a core aspect of a political party's attractiveness

3. Do you think the social and power relations have changed in South Africa since the EFF was formed? Why or why not? How so?

The EFF have offered South Africans a choice. The NB aspect is that the leader comes from the belly of the ANC. This is the hallmark of successful opposition parties in SA. They are going to born from within the ANC. Credibility and credentials notwithstanding the question marks around Malema this offers the EFF something that very few political parties have managed to use, historical legacy within the Anc. In a sense the EFF have plugged into a discontentment within a certain segment of the ANC electorate. The EFF are a Populist revolutionary style party and this has usurped aspects of populism and revolutionary rhetoric within the ANC. The EFF has disrupted the ability of the ANC to appeal to that segment of the electorate. When it comes to populist protest/rabble rousing the EFF have certainly disrupted the ANC. Used these tactics in parliament and outside in their protests. The EFF is the ultimate political disruptor of SA politics currently.

4. Do you think the local and political context of South Africa contributed to the birth of the EFF?

I think the EFF tap into a legitimate discontent amongst a segment of the electorate. The segment of the support of the EFF is very varied; I am yet to see any research on who voted EFF. There is quite a wide range of people from urban to rural who like the EFF. There are a number of different

electoral segments in SA. The ANC itself has managed to keep groups relatively cohesive in 20 years. The pressures of a flagging economy, high unemployment, low growth rate and all social ills in country will eventually provide the ANC a pressure cooker environment in which disaffection will boil over and the EFF was quite timely placed itself to take advantage of this discontent. Marikana was used as a catalyst for the inception of the EFF. Marikana was the seed that bore the EFF to a degree certainly. Interesting area to explore – what degree what the EFF was able to ignite an interest around that issue and feed that into the discourse of disaffection of the ANC. It was not only populist rhetoric about economic freedom and inequality and redistribution but also attacking the ANC on its policing and its suppression of expression and this is something that the EFF used effectively at that stage and helped kick start the party.

5. What made these elections different from the previous elections and what was the political climate like before, during and after the election?

Every election is different because a lot happens in 5 years in a country. 2014 elections SA were certainly questioning the ability of the ANC to take the country forward, questions around ailing economy and quality of leadership. 2014 election brought all of these together including economic decline and question marks around Zuma including his patronage network which Zuma presides over. When you have these 2 powerful forces, economic decline and way in which leadership is structured you have a window of opportunity to opposition parties. EFF brought into the window and were able to exploit that to some degree of success. However, EFF only got 6% of popular vote, in percentage terms this is not so significant so real test will not be 1st election but rather 2nd election or perhaps in an interim stage what it will do in next year's election. Context of SA is that most new political parties have done relatively well in their 1st outing but then failed in the 2nd one.

6. How would you describe the EFF's voice in SA politics? I.E. What kind of power have they acquired and what is the source of this power?

They have some power. Have been to direct the political discourse in SA quite remarkable. For a 6% party they have been able to take populist notions of Malema on Land, nationalization, reversing private sector control on economy and all these issues that they hold dear and filter these into the public discourse. They have done this with protest politics. They have taken protest politics from outside parliament into parliament. Up until the EFF we practiced a very rigid style of politics in parliament. EFF arrival changed entire nature of parliament. The EFF's willingness to use disruptive tactics and to be manhandled or bring parliament to a standstill has changed the political discourse in SA. So they have done it in parliament but they will need to translate it into growing support at the polls. They have passed the 1st test at changing nature of debate However, their ultimate test will be whether they can up the percentage of the vote. If not a lot of their energy and the energy they

have created will dissipate. They need additional electoral successes to bolster protest politics they practice

7. What difference does it make to SA politics that the ANC now has an opposition party that is not affected by the same issues as the DA? (White only party, apartheid baggage etc.)

DA and ANC caught off-guard by the rise of the EFF. Malema has a powerful ability to direct the political discourse which is a great talent for any leader to get right. All political parties want to direct debate. For the ANC There are a number of factors here. 1st is the fact that the EFF tapped into the populist freedom charter-ish type of view of economic policy and the way forward in SA which really upset the ANC – goes to the heart of historical attachment of the ANC toward more populist policies and this has upset and unnerved the ANC no end

The DA's moderate centrist market orientated policies is not something for the ANC to get upset about.

The EFF has had an unnerving effect on the ANC. For this reason, we have seen the ANC become more populist at least in terms of its policy proposals over the last few years. The ANC has largely pandered I would argue more to the EFF's view on the world than the DA's. You could argue that the ANC fears the EFF more than the DA. The ANC is a lot more prepared to pander to the EFF's economic vision of the world rather than the DA's to shore up its dwindling voter core.

8. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

Everybody in the media loves the EFF because it sells papers and its great stuff. The media have been the EFF's best friends. The media have largely been more interested in the EFF's disruptions rather than being a critical voice about the EFF. They have gotten away with murder when it comes to economic policy and their intellectualizing of economic policy in SA the media have allowed this to occur because it's fun and a great read and exciting. I think the media has not been critical enough and even for analysts we have all liked the EFF because it has given us something to talk about We are all ready to criticize the ANC, how much criticism has there been of the EFF in any great depth.

Their positioning is clear and narrowly focused. They have not strayed from their populist messages and in fact have honed them relatively well and have intellectualized them to an extent. The Daily Maverick now has a Floyd column. This is part and parcel of the EFF moving beyond the populist rhetoric.

The EFF have been narrowly focused. They have honed in on demands and issues. Successful narrowly focused. Might be too narrow from an electoral point of view, might only appeal to certain

segment. Focusing and choosing high visible targets and putting forward distinct plans that are relatively easy to articulate but nuts and bolts highly problematic for SA going forward
Highly successful, narrowly focused, don't stray from their critical message. Point of all opposition parties and EFF in particular is that they are a 6% party, easy to make a noise on populist issues.

Interview with Solly Moeng

1. What do you think the level of political branding is in South Africa?

Except for the DA and the ANC for a lot of political parties they don't think in terms of branding, they do stuff in reaction to what they think will be right. EFF are opportunistic in branding, do stuff and apologize afterwards. No indication that there is a lot of thinking ahead before they throw things out

2. Do you think South African political parties achieved success in terms of their branding in the 2014 election?

There was a lot of talk of online, Twitter, Facebook. Everyone running around trying to do right thing. The only party that is organized in this regard is the DA – dedicated team throughout all the time of researchers and others – ensure consistency in positioning and messaging and statements. They make mistakes but on the whole they are good. ANC is running around trying to justify and explain a lot of thing, some of it is difficult to explain/justify. On the back foot because of the negative press received by the president because of corruption. There does not seem to be impact on concern of the ANC brand. Zuma has brought ANC brand into disrepute many times but no one is arguing with this/trying to change this/think differently. Everyone thinking about which side bread is buttered. Electorate - Consumer/product – bulk of it driven by emotion. Not driven by values. Politics in SA not driven by values. Campaigns not value driven. This is what we will present because this is what people want to see. As long as people don't think they have a clear choice it will be like. In SA people don't think brand names.

Julius Malema has grown over time. Malema has done a lot of careless things but has apologized for a lot of stuff too and people don't acknowledge this. As he gets older and older maybe he listens to people around him who says do this and don't do that. He is becoming more image conscious. If you listen to this guy he is very smart.

3. What impressed you most about the EFF?

They have known how to look at weaknesses of main adversary – The ANC and exploit/capitalize these weaknesses (Marikana/Nkandla) using these things to bolster their own image – very opportunistic – know their target market – Malema very good customizing messaging to who he is speaking to/who is sitting in front of him. He knows how to speak language that goes to heart of people and make ANC angry. In my view is that he will continue to grow if he does not do stupid things. When I observe him today there seems to be a level of maturity compared to 5 years ago. He is aware that he is now in parliament and the media are watching his every move and statement and everything he says goes out to everyone. He is more image conscious today than he was 5 years ago. Malema has also surrounded himself with some clever people who say the right things. Dali

Mpofu is not stupid. They have some anger but say what needs to be said. They have seen the gaps and weaknesses in the ANC and will continue to exploit those gaps/weaknesses.

4. In terms of targeting did the EFF identify a weakness/gap in the political market or the ANC? A bit of both. 1st of all ANC because that is giant that is occupying much of the space. If they are going to carve themselves a space in SA political arena they have to distinguish themselves from the ANC. They are children of ANC and know what is going on in the ANC and have been privy to internal conversations and know what tricks the ANC is cable of. They need to master this knowledge and use it to their advantage. They also have ambition to be the main opposition party although they do not have the resources unless a Mugabe type figure is willing to give them money. Resources will always be a factor them. If they do the right thing they have the potential to reach the numbers.

5. Was the EFF's brand a purposeful creation or did it emerge as an ad-hoc exercise? I don't think it was ad-hoc. I don't think it was as well planned as the DA's campaign but these guys knew what they wanted. Some of the noises they are making they were already making in youth league. In SA which is so diverse you cannot rule from the right or left, you will be immediately drawn to the centre because you will try to appeal to the most people. They were too much to the left of the ANC particularly on the land issue, it was an embarrassment for the ANC because they could not be seen as so left. So they jumped out of the ANC to champion these issues but real politek will push them to the centre, as they become more mainstream they have to start talking to farmers and business but real politek will push them to the centre, maybe not right to the centre but certainly to the right of where they are. They came into the political arena with clear issues. How they wanted to be seen. Malema came in with a clear idea that there are elements of emancipation have not been won and ANC is too shy to do it, no one is going to do it and they are going to be guys who are going to bring economic emancipation to the people.

6. They have positioned themselves in a specific way. Do you think they have positioned themselves well for now and for the future?

There will always be a level of opportunism. They cannot drop the idea of economic liberation but they can change the way they fight battle. They Will realize that they need to talk to people they considered enemies before – farmers, Afrikaans, business, capitalists. They have to talk to these people to get money to do the things they want to do. I don't see the party abandoning economic liberation but they will add other issues, they cannot be a one issue party. Floyd has just graduated. They are young chaps who study and read. They are very smart guys to listen to and as they grow their brand will change, if they want to be the main opposition party and eventually take over from the ANC they have to take on more issues that appeal to more people. If you look at ANC now they

are beginning to talk more and more about economic emancipation – BEE codes. They are trying to take away the issue from the EFF. If the ANC does not address this the EFF will be seen as the main party in terms of economic empowerment.

7. What do you think of the strong and weak elements of brand?

They know how to be opportunistic. They have really used the Nkandla issue but they have to be less aggressive. Nkandla is becoming their issue which is unfortunate. They need to be seen as not just fighting one issue. They need to start looking for new areas with which they can take votes away from the ANC. Malema has been fairly silent on Maimane, interesting to see how Malema plans to position himself against Maimane going forward. The core of the EFF won't change but their brand will evolve. They need to be less angry but they have been very angry but if they want to appeal more people they need to fight the same issues with a different tone. It is going to be interesting to see how they change their tone while still appealing to the people that got them where they are today. They are not going to win next election by using Nkandla. They are going to have to find something else that touches the heart of people.

8. How do you think they will do in next year's election

Tone will be better, not youthful and angry. Not going to change overnight. They will continue to fight the ANC.

9. Have they professionalized/refined their brand offering or is it still raw?

It is better than it was when they came in but it will not lose the rawness. Someone has to be angry otherwise they might as well go back to the ANC. There will always be an element of left win radicalism while they try to appear clever on other issues they cannot focus on one issue otherwise they will become too boring. They will find new ways and new points of opportunism otherwise Maimane is he is clever will occupy that space. They have managed to steal quite a bit of media space from the DA since they came to parliament.

10. What did you think of their branding merchandise?

That is going to stay, I don't see it going away. It is what makes them. It is very smart. It has become a symbol. The ANC were scared when COPE was formed and they won't tell you but they are scared of the EFF. I think the EFF is capable of taking a lot more away from the ANC.

11. Do you think the leader figure is an important branding tool?

Because ANC has been riding emotional wave up until now that is going to die, singing old liberation songs, remind people how it was in the 80's. Now people are looking at how people are behaving, Maimane is much more refined and attractive leader. Does not seem too angry and he is not extreme. DA is centre of political landscape. Malema and EFF is more attractive from a sound bite point of view especially in terms of overseas media. I don't see them being ignored but I don't see

them losing significance but it is up to them to decide where they see themselves in the future. They need to take on more stuff and issues if they want to be main party. Service delivery, corruption. They need to take more stuff onto their plate.

Malema is really good. He knows what to say, knows the lingo. You cannot push him into a corner He is a smart leader but he needs to be careful what he is associated with.

He needs good communication people around him. He needs advisors who will tell him what he cannot say. There is no indication that is being done properly. With Zuma people won't advise him because they are scared and this puts the ANC on the back foot.

12. Are the EFF's Fortunes tied to Malema?

Short term it seems so. However, there are some sharp young leaders coming up but I think they need someone with broader appeal who does not have the image luggage. Malema is strong leader and smart guy and has some way to go. Political parties tend to be tied to the leader. I don't think the EFF is ready to give over leadership. Anyone else will come up with a rebrand of what the EFF stands for. I think Malema should stay as leader for foreseeable future.

13. How important is unified brand message and has it been conveyed successfully?

I think people do understand. While they are driven by economic liberation. They do ask good questions in parliament and push the ANC into a corner and I think those things will help them reach out to more people. Economic liberation is their core thing and there are issues around it which need to be addresses. They need to get rid of the anger because at some point people will get tired of it. There market entry brand has been the anger which has allowed them to gain attention from the media, a lot more people have become interested in what is happening in parliament. They have had an impact, they arrived at a right one time because of Nkandla. EFF used issues around anger. They are going to have to work on their tone but have to distinguish themselves from the ANC, the ANC have the resources to kill off the EFF

14. What do you think the future holds for the EFF?

I think the EFF will still be around in 2019. The Maimane factor is going to be interesting to watch. People more willing to vote for the DA. The EFF need to be aware that they are competing against both the ANC and the DA. A lot is riding on the Maimane factor. I don't see the EFF disappearing from the political landscape and it would be sad if it does. The ANC thinks everything belongs to them. Rules of parliament geared towards ANC. The DA spends a lot of money in court because they are too polite in parliament. The EFF does not have money to go to courts. Something has to change culture and rules of parliament where the ANC seems to get away with whatever they want. The EFF is the only party that is questioning everything, the DA wont. The EFF will question the fundamentals and I believe that the fundamentals need to be questioned.

15. In your opinion what was good and bad about the EFF's election campaign? Please can you give me some specific examples? E.g. their social media was brilliant but their posters were terrible. Right – spotlight on things that other people were not putting the spotlight on, something like Nkandla. These guys decided not to do it the traditional route which would have been to politely ask questions in parliament. The EFF did not have access to DA money to take issues to court so they made a lot of noise which was totally untraditional and I think this worked for them. Also there uniform. Basically they came in often something different, said we are going to be different to everyone else not only in what issues we focus on but also on how the issues are dealt with.

16. What have the EFF brought or not brought to the SA political scene?

People are now more interested in what is going on in parliament. Pure entertainment or not. They use those plays to bring attention to real issues.

17. Do you think the social and power relations have changed in South Africa since the EFF was formed? Why or why not? How so?

Underdogs have been given a voice in a lot of ways. Marikana – if it was only ANC the story would have been killed long ago because they are out to protect powerful guys. These guys have changed social dynamics, give people on ground more courage to look president in the face and say this far but no further.

18. Do you think the local and political context of South Africa contributed to the birth of the EFF?

There is a point when the level of gatvolness gets to a point where people cannot take things anymore. Was going to happen one way or another. That is how splinters are formed. If you have a sufficient amount of people in a structure that are not getting joy or one person who is very strong, take Malema who is a natural leader and managed to get people to follow him. The alliance is not going to last forever. They could not take it anymore. Politics being politics people are out to take care of themselves. We cannot be naïve to think Malema did not do this to get something for himself but many people benefitted from this. I benefit from this as a South African because I get joy watching a party in parliament who are getting in Zuma's face.

19. What made these elections different from the previous elections and what was the political climate like before, during and after the election?

It is not like it happened suddenly. When Zuma was fired the cracks began to show. Cracks began to show after Zuma case and Polokwane. Mbeki made it clear that he would not support a Zuma presidency. Mbeki alienated other members of alliance. Zuma brought them back into the fold. By election there were 2 camps. Mbeki nostalgias and people who were ready to have their turn. Malema brought a following from when he was in ANC, he also spoke young people's language and this appealed to them.

20. What difference does it make to SA politics that the ANC now has an opposition party that is not affected by the same issues as the DA? (White only party, apartheid baggage etc.)

It can achieve many things. Firstly it can make the ANC appear to be the lesser of the devils. Being the country we are as I said before you cannot rule from the far left or far right. Anyone that comes from those extremes will only make some people happy not all people. EFF comes in with extreme left views and ANC counters with constitutional democracy and says you cannot do it. Also it makes it hard for the ANC because they cannot go too far left of centre but at the same time someone on extreme left is saying you should be doing this, this is what you promised when we were a part of your party,

21. How would you describe the EFF's voice in SA politics? I.E. What kind of power have they acquired and what is the source of this power?

Malema is an attractive figure. You cannot put him in a corner. He is a smart and courageous guy. He is careless sometimes. He says what he knows that the bulk of his followers will want him to say. However he is not inventing issues, he is latching onto real issues. Not all his solutions are practical but all people in opposition politics make certain promises. I do not think the EFF would nationalize anything if they won an election, it is all rhetoric. What keeps them powerful they are saying that they understand people issues and the ANC won't because they are in bed with big businesses? There is a lot of excitement because the people now have someone to speak on their behalf. They have managed to create a space for their brand in the minds of the people.

22. What would you say are the EFF's core and peripheral elements? I.E. Would you say that the core elements are more about populism while the peripheral elements are more like offering solutions and how has the media understood and interpreted this

They have to be mindful of the things that got them there in the 1st place. Their challenge is to kill the perception that they are a one issue political party. They have started asking questions about the mining sector etc... In the press conference afterwards they raised the other issues that they spoke of. They also have to be careful that they don't become like other parties. They have to maintain excitement while not getting themselves in too much trouble and getting themselves thrown out.

23. What was it about the context of these Elections that allowed the EFF to establish themselves and achieve the result they did?

ANC has been in power too long. They take things for granted and people are beginning to see through the ANC. There are people who won't publically say it but they did not vote ANC or even did vote for EFF. Things are changing for the ANC, the test will come in the next elections because it is very hard to move away from the ANC because this is where you and your parents grew up and often you are branded as traitor. Also you need somewhere to move to, it is up to people like

Maimane and Malema to make a political home for these people. There are opportunities for political parties to make themselves visible but if they do not take this people will move away from the ANC and just not vote or even stay in ANC. The ANC is very smart. They know which issues to target and will go after this in the build up to the elections.

Interview with Ron Irwin

1. Do you believe that branding has influenced modern political communication?

While brand recognition and brand knowledge has been carried across from commercial marketing sales has translated into votes. In addition, political branding focuses on the importance of history and narrative whereas history gives you credibility and a narrative to tell your supporters. Going forward whatever a party does adds to this narrative.

Within political branding there is an added element of emotion with political parties appealing to voter's emotions in order to secure votes. In order to be successful in political branding you have to have top of head recognition and it is important to remember that people vote for a party brand not personalities so it is pointless to trash political leaders/personalities

2. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Elections?

The EFF did not exist a few years ago and have gotten a lot of headspace, recognition and brand knowledge in a very short space of time. We need to think of them as a consumer brand they are a massive success, they have gotten more pound for pound in their short existence in terms of reconcilability and getting support for their cause across numerous platforms than even the DA. They have successfully created their own history and narrative and effectively used branding tools such as positioning while managing to steal market share from an entrenched competitor. They have effectively stolen the ANC's position as an underdog and the sympathy that goes with that while branding themselves as fighters against state power.

Another element of their success is the fact that the electorate has brand knowledge of the EFF and whether or not their platform makes sense or if they have a groundswell is not important when you consider they started from nothing

3. Do you think the EFF has developed a successful brand?

Yes, they have. They have a flamboyant leader, dress like the people which resonates, have successfully used the colour red, are recognisable and have used spectacle and event branding to get votes.

They have used their political instinct to successfully steal the sympathy the electorate has for the ANC and have crafted a brand that is easily recognisable within South African politics.

Their brand is based around a simple platform, almost too simple - Anti-Zuma and fighting for workers – to that existent let's use the most recognisable iconography possible – berets and suits are a branding mechanism – probably true that they are representing workers in parliament but ultimately it's a branding mechanism

4. Do you think the other parties have achieved branding success

The ANC brand is fully behind Zuma, he can do anything he likes and he won't be fired while a key component of the ANC's brand is its history and narrative which it uses to campaign.

5. What do you think of the EFF's promotional items?

The Berets are a branding mechanism and have become a recognisable symbol/logo for the party while their red overalls have been used a branding mechanism which has created reconcilability and made it very hard to forget the party

6. What branding concepts have been carried across to politics?

Upstart Branding, commercial branding and event/experiential branding has been carried across. In terms of upstart branding people are attracted to upstarts and if you want to be successful as political upstart it is all about the story you tell which should be simple. You should be constantly evolving in order to survive.

In terms of commercial branding it is all about top of head Brand recognition, brand knowledge, sales and sales in categories. Consumers need to know you, know about you and buy your product. This can be carried across to politics.

In terms of event/experiential branding consumers need to touch/interact with brand on a physical level. It is all about what happens on the ground and brands need to focus on how they can create an experience.

7. What makes Julius Malema a brand?

He is not afraid of anyone and can speak the language of common person and has ability to sit down with anyone and appeal to their emotions. He has re-positioned himself as a fighter and is extremely political savvy. What makes his brand unique is his level of political insights which with hindsight has proved to be very smart. He understands instinctively that you need to set yourself apart, appeal to the widest amount of people and have a simple platform.

Interview with Alistair Mackay

1. How did the EFF Communicate their brand and Perception of brand

They have changed the way parliament works, put the DA on the back foot in a lot of ways. A lot of what they have done is to show how obstructive to real change the rules of parliament are. A lot of what they do in parliament blatantly ignores the rules and ways things have always been done. Like refusing to wear appropriate clothing and chanting at Zuma and demanding to be centre of attention. Interesting tactic which works for a lot of people. It has gotten them a lot of fame and resonates with a lot of people who are angry. If they hammer on this and don't move to policy, they will begin to seem one dimensional and start to lose support. They need to get that balance right.

2. Have they built a loyal following?

I think it might be a bit early to see if their voters are loyal. SA voters are very emotional. Very emotionally charged environment. There is a lot of anger at how slow transformation has been. Voters very focused on sense of belonging. This has held DA back and maintained ANC dominance even they have failed at delivery. There is a lot of anger amongst voters in SA. A lot of Black middle class people feel frustrated at the slow rate of change.

3. What does the future hold for the EFF?

A lot of changes that could happen in the next few years. There might be a Left front of the unions. Quite hard to build a party in SA, they have to build brand infrastructure and ensure that there is no-infighting. But if they can stay single minded they should succeed. I think they should try and focus their efforts. They could do well in the North West. Gauteng is quite interesting because a lot of black middle class are quite sympathetic to the EFF. They should focus their energies on that, then it could get interesting.

4. Who is their target market?

It has shown that a lot of black middle class you may be you may be feeling like you are hitting a glass ceiling because of your colour. There might be the thinking that people give enough votes to disrupt the ANC but not defeat them. Protest vote. They are clear on who they targeting – people who are excluded from system. Single minded in their messaging, shifting economy.

5. Is there brand fluid enough?

If their entire message is about economic freedom which the black middle class have it will hard not to dilute their message. Focus on issues rather than people that could broaden their appeal. Moderate message that appeals more to centre. A lot of South Africans are more centrist than EFF policies

6. How have the EFF used the online space?

Twitter use quite well. Twitter is quite small but influential, the EFF has been quite good at that. They have been good at it. It is hugely important but you also need branches on the ground meeting people face to face as well as online stuff. Have been clever targeting social media instead of traditional, EFF see's right through traditional media agenda and thinking and priorities – Everyone trying to get into Sunday Times for prestige and press hits

7. Was their brand planned or did the media just jump on?

Some of stuff is quite smart, Guerilla marketing was quite smart. Went viral and got SA talking. But then you look at political posters and they are so amateurish. Very hard to tell. Viral marketing stuff is great but it is difficult to tell if it is instinct or planned.

8. How much of a role does the media play?

If you read headlines before election you would think the EFF would win. I think it is partially because the media is more and more responding to social media rather than dictating to social media and because the EFF went viral they responded to this. Also because of fear. Media loves a scary story that will freak out readers so this could be why they gave so much coverage.

9. How sustainable is their brand of politics?

I think they even did live analysis of the state of the nation address and it showed in the beginning of the address people were quite favorable of the EFF's antics but it dipped quite sharply quite quickly. I think it will start to seem a bit childish. They need to have more to offer than just the anger and a plan to turn around SA rather than just shouting. Puts them in a similar space to Tony Leon's DA.

10. How have the EFF incorporated Social media marketing

A lot of stuff in parliament might seem quite childish on TV but makes sense in terms of social media, if they have a hashtag that trends all over the place than people see their message and can follow it

11. How professional is the EFF?

I have not seen anything like that. I don't think it is as necessary for them. A lot of people they are targeting do not care about press releases and it is more about reacting on the fly. They are seen as this brand that is trying to break down these political barriers and traditions.

Interview with Steven Grootes

1. How would you assess the level of success of the EFF in the 2014 Election?

There is a core group of people – they are the protest vote, vote for anything not the ruling party. Then you have a mixture of poor/unemployed/no hope kind of people who are Julius core audience. Then you have middle class professional 99% black who are pissed off and angry with the ANC and who won't vote for DA.

In terms of how they did well, mainly because they were the alternative. Sometime you actually need to work. We have never really seen a party after come together 2 or 3 years before an election and actually work. They did pretty well considering JM had the biggest recognition there is.

1. How would you view the role played by political branding and marketing in South African politics?

There are Different ways of branding. In America and Britain, it is very rar rar, rallies, designed for TV. We have branding by colour. DA = blue. ANC = black, green and gold. EFF – Red. That definitely works. Beret very recognisable. Yes, they did use branding. In SA branding is caps and t-shirts. That is what they did and it was effective. They did what you do when you start a party in SA. It is how you associate yourself with a party in SA politics. You don't see it in the USA or Britain. They did what you do in terms of branding in SA politics.

2. How would you compare the EFF's election campaign against other parties' campaigns during the election?

They did what they could within their resources. The DA has the best functioning structure. The ANC has the biggest structure and the most resources. The ANC could lose its top 20 leaders and get the same number of voters in next election, the DA can lose top 3 or 4. The EFF cannot afford to lose Julius. Helen Zille always used to say do you know how hard it is to build a structure. That is the hardest part of politics, to build a structure. That structure comes into overdrive during Elections. Election is a great way to foster unity. They did not do anything new. They did what they could and did it effectively. The red worked and that was pretty clever. Helped that it was colour of the SACP and they could not turn it against them. Lots of politically aware people had red already and could use it against the SACP

3. How do you think the EFF was positioned in the political landscape by themselves, other parties and the media?

Was not a complete surprise. Consistent with what Malema fought for before. Was going for a group of people who had no one to vote for. The LGE elections 2011 Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West only half the people voted because ANC has such a majority no point voting and JM should have targeted these people which he did not. However, there Positioning was right. Group of people

who stood up and clapped when EFF was thrown out of parliament. They related to it. They felt it was Zuma establishment rounding on them, felt it in a way white people can never feel
How successful was it? You have to get people who feel like there is no one to vote for to vote for you and that is quite a tough ask

Cannot afford to move to the centre because that is where ANC is and they will kill them. What Julius needs to do is to force the ANC and the DA into an alliance, policy platforms are not far apart. If the EFF got 40% we might see DA and ANC working together to remove EFF, this would play right into JM hands because then it would show that he was right on them working together. Would not be in Julius interest to move to the centre and would be a hypocrite if he did.

4. Do you think political branding and marketing was used by political parties in the 2014 Elections in an effort to change voter's behaviors?

In SA people are loyal to individuals. People voted for Zuma, Malema, and Helen and to a smaller extent Mmusi. Politics is very personal. That is really what people voted for. I don't know if branding played a huge role. If they did not go for red as a colour I don't think they would have lost a lot of votes.

5. How important was the use of online branding?

Does not change much. No one changes their mind based on Twitter. Look at debates on Twitter, does not make much difference. Useful place to test your support. Another thing and this gets overplayed all the time Young people don't vote anywhere in the world. Politics is an old person's game, what you do when you have a stake in society – children and money. Old people/parents are not going to vote for Julius almost as a whole, he has nowhere else to go, has to target youth.

EFF Brand

The issues will be there for quite some time. There are a lot of people with a lot of anger and until this anger is resolved the EFF will resonate. It is what Malema does best and it is his default position and I don't know what else he would be able to do.

6. Where is the EFF going?

They have a major problem in that a LGE requires people on the ground as well as local recognisable figures and this is going to be a problem for the EFF

7. In your opinion what was good and bad about the EFF's election campaign? Please can you give me some specific examples? E.g. their social media was brilliant but their posters were terrible.

Their symbols were extremely effective, the use of the colour red, the uniforms and symbolism was extremely effective. Their lack of organization was extremely ineffective; they can shout until they

are blue in the face but their lack of organization was totally ineffective. If one of their top leaders quit the party would fall apart.

8. Do you think the social and power relations have changed in South Africa since the EFF was formed? Why or why not? How so?

The political power relations have changed in that suddenly for the first time parliament is the centre of political life in SA. This has not been the case since 1994. The EFF have shone the spotlight on that and brought attention to it.

9. Do you think the local and political context of South Africa contributed to the birth of the EFF?

Yes, South Africa has a growing number of unemployed people who have no hope and have not benefitted from the ANC, they are looking for someone to fight for their rights and Julius Malema has shown himself as someone who will give the middle finger to authority and stand up for these people.

10. What made these elections different from the previous elections and what was the political climate like before, during and after the election?

These elections and the political climate are different in that South Africa is moving away from race and into class. You now have Black politics divided up into classes where the upper classes are continuing to vote for the ANC but the lower classes are voting for the EFF. The upper class is happy with life and would like it to continue while there is a lot of anger amongst the lower black classes who feel betrayed by the ANC.

11. How would you describe the EFF's voice in SA politics? I.E. What kind of power have they acquired and what is the source of this power?

They have acquired their power through shouting and protesting and getting themselves thrown out of parliament. This is important and has some standing but unfortunately cannot be transferred to policy or solutions.

12. What have the EFF brought or not brought to the SA political scene?

They have brought an element of protest politics but have not brought viable policies and solutions.

13. What difference does it make to SA politics that the ANC now has an opposition party that is not affected by the same issues as the DA? (White only party, apartheid baggage etc.)

The ANC is in new and uncharted territory. For the 1st time they face opposition from both the DA on the right and the EFF on the left. They cannot afford to go to the right because then they become like the DA and they cannot afford to go to the left because then they will become like the EFF. They need new options, a new strategy and this is going to be their decline.

14. How important is brand ANC, their history and story and how have the EFF built their own history and story

I think we are closer to the end of brand ANC than the beginning. Brand ANC which is centered on the struggle and liberation is suddenly no longer relevant and is no longer an effective force in convincing voters. There will be people that always vote ANC but as we have seen in the student protests the ANC no longer understands the struggles of the youth.

15. What is the role of event/experiential branding in SA?

This will always be an important element in SA politics. The ANC's rallies have proved extremely effective amongst the Black electorate. The white electorate are not drawn to rallies and this is why the DA campaigns in the parks in suburban neighborhoods. The EFF rallies have been pretty effective but they have been hindered by the lack of media coverage especially the massive SABC coverage that the ANC rallies get.

Addendum 3: Consent forms

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN



Faculty of Humanities

Consent Form

Title of research project: Political Communication: Master's Thesis: The Economic Freedom Fighters and the role of Branding in South African politics

Names of principal researcher(s): Dean Horwitz

Department/research group address: Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town (UCT), Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7700.

Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

GLEND A NEVILL

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. **What's involved:** Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

- I agree to participate in this research project.
- I have read this consent form and the information it contains and had the opportunity to ask questions about it.
- I agree to my responses being used for research on condition that my privacy is respected, subject to the following:
 - Will be used in aggregate form only (only as part of collected data), so that I will not be personally identifiable (identity anonymous in research project and archived transcriptions of data).
- I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this project.
- I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this project at any stage.

Signature of participant:



Alistair Mackay <alistair.charles.mackay@gmail.com>

8/14/15



to me

Dear Dean,

This is to confirm that I consent to you using the answers I provided to your questions for your Political Communications Master's Thesis on The Economic Freedom Fighters and the Role of Branding in South African Politics, provided my privacy is respected and the answers will be used in aggregate form.

Kind regards,
Alistair Mackay

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN



Faculty of Humanities

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Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Anthony Butler

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. What's involved: Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Andrew Ihsaan Gasnolar

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. What's involved: Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

AG

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Signature of participant:

07/01/2016

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Signature of participant:

Angus J. MACKENZIE 07 Jan '16

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Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Kameel Premhid

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. What's involved: Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

MARTIN SLABBERT-CAPPER

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. **What's involved:** Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Signature of participant:

13/08/2015

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN



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Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Maynard Kudakwashe Manyowa

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. What's involved: Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Signature of participant: _____ M.K Manyowa _____

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Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Rushil Ranchod

Nature of the Research:

Qualitative, interview-based.

Participant's Involvement:

1. **What's involved:** Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

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Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Stephen M. Grootes

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. **What's involved:** Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

- | |
|---|
| <p>2. <u>Risks</u>: NA</p> <p>3. <u>Benefits</u>: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study</p> |
|---|

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Signature of participant:

W. J. ...

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN



Faculty of Humanities

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Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Quanita Hunter

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. **What's involved:** Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

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- I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this project at any stage.

Signature of participant:



Steven Friedman <sef53@mweb.co.za>
to me ↵

Jan 7



Hi Dean

I am sorry to be difficult but I am overwhelmed by the absurdity of this requirement.

First, if I did not consent to participate in the project, I would not have agreed to two interviews. Insisting that I consent to something I have already done is a symptom of a disconnect with reality which has been the stuff of countless satires. Secondly, I fail to understand why anyone should believe that it is rational to reward people for giving of their time by demanding that they give of more time to fill in meaningless forms. I can only assume that this nonsense was devised by university lawyers with no understanding either of the research process or the rest of the human race. I am battling to understand why I should comply with their fantasies.

If you are going to suffer negative consequences from my failure to sign, please feel free to sign for me (which I advise other students who present me with consent forms to do). If not, please inform the relevant bureaucrat that you have encountered a rational adult who refuses to sign.

Best
Steven

Professor Steven Friedman
Director
Centre for the Study of Democracy
Rhodes University/University of Johannesburg
Phone: [+27 11 559 1937](tel:+27115591937) (office)
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UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN



Faculty of Humanities

Consent Form

Title of research project: Political Communication: Master's Thesis: The Economic Freedom Fighters and the role of Branding in South African politics

Names of principal researcher(s): Dean Horwitz

Department/research group address: Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape Town (UCT), Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7700.

Telephone: 072 288 0777

Email: deanhorwitz@gmail.com

Name of Participant:

Stephen M. Grootes

Nature of the Research:

Participant's Involvement:

1. What's involved: Answering questions on their thoughts about the topic

2. Risks: NA

3. Benefits: The chance to provide insight into an emerging field of study

- I agree to participate in this research project.
- I have read this consent form and the information it contains and had the opportunity to ask questions about it.
- I agree to my responses being used for research on condition that my privacy is respected, subject to the following:
 - Will be used in aggregate form only (only as part of collected data), so that I will not be personally identifiable (identity anonymous in research project and archived transcriptions of data).
- I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this project.
- I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this project at any stage.


Signature of participant:



Richard Poplak

to me ▾

Jan 31 (12 days ago) ☆



Will do, Dean. But in the meantime, this email should serve as my giving consent.

> On Jan 30, 2016, at 11:49 AM, Dean Horwitz <deanhorwitz@gmail.com> wrote:

>

> <Consent Form.docx>

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Signature of participant: _____

Addendum 4: Social media analysis

Tweets

 **EFF Official Account**
@EconFreedomZA Following

[@Julius_S_Malema](#) takes stage in [#JanKempdorp](#), EFF Northern Cape Elections Rally [#VoteEFF](#)



RETWEETS: 18 LIKES: 8

1:42 PM - 5 Apr 2014

EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA Following

Some school children in Limpopo haven't had books in 2 years. A bad ANC story.
#VoteEFF

RETWEETS 16 LIKE 1

12:07 AM - 23 Apr 2014

Reply to @EconFreedomZA

Ntobo Gobiwa @Mosa_N_S - 23 Apr 2014
@EconFreedomZA they are sharing books. 1 book=5learners. Is not good

Winston Smith @mensheviak - 23 Apr 2014
@EconFreedomZA why did CIC not make a noise about this when CIC was still the leader of the yooof leeck?

EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 5 Apr 2014
We call on the IEC to act and act with speed and decisively against the ANC.

EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 5 Apr 2014
We will continue doing everything in our power to protect our events, our members and our right to exist.

EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 5 Apr 2014
In Soweto, our billboard was completely destroyed by ANC hooligans as it is with many of our posters across the country.

EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 5 Apr 2014
You can see the ANC truck in the background in Pampierstad defying the police after being requested to leave.



RETWEETS 28 LIKES 4

 Sentletse Retweeted



EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 7 Apr 2014

Join CIC @Julius_S_Malema for an hour long Q&A online on Monday, 7 April 2014, at 12:00.





  28  5 

 Julius Sello Malema Retweeted



EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 11 Mar 2014

PRESS ALERT: EFF Will hand over all the IEC required compliance details at IEC offices tomorrow, 13h00 effighters.org.za/press-alert-ef...

  49  12 



EFF Official Account @EconFreedomZA · 2 Mar 2014

#Malema: Our land is still in hands of whites. When you don't have land, there's nothing you can do. #EFFmanifesto #Seshego

  24  5 

Facebook posts



Economic Freedom Fighters added 3 new photos.

5 April 2014 · 🌐

EFF CONDEMNS THE TORCHING OF ITS MARQUES, STAGE AND SOUND BY ANC HOOLIGANS

5, April, 2014

The Economic Freedom Fighters condemns the torching of its marques, stage and sound system by ANC hooligans in Tokoza during the early hours of this morning. The EFF was preparing to host an elections rally in Sam Ntuli Stadium, Tokoza when ANC hooligans, during the cover of night found their way into the stadium and petrol boomed the facilities in an attempt to disrupt the EFF event. ... See More



👍 Like 💬 Comment ➦ Share

132 people like this.

Top Comments ▾

111 shares





Economic Freedom Fighters

3 March 2014 · 🌐

EFF Provincial Rally in Seshego yesterday, the 2nd of March 2014. EFF is dominant everywhere. After Marikana, they said we are dominant in Marikana only; after Tembisa, they said we are dominant in Marikana and Tembisa only; and now it's Seshego. On the 7th of May it will be the whole country and we will emerge victorious!



👍 Like 💬 Comment ➦ Share

Jakobus Petrus Barbers and 780 others like this.

Top Comments ▾

135 shares



Economic Freedom Fighters

7 April 2014 · 🌐

EFF commander in Chief, Julius Malema is now ready to discuss, let's begin



👍 Like 💬 Comment ➦ Share

1,655 people like this.

Top Comments ▾

181 shares

Social media growth (Data from Apurmac Media)

