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KINSHIP, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: ALCOHOL *PACHTERS* AND THE MAKING OF A FREE-BURGHER SOCIETY IN CAPE TOWN, 1652-1795

by

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ABSTRACT

"Kinship, Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Alcohol *Pachters* and the Making of a Free-Burgher Society in Cape Town, 1652-1795"

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In 1657 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) released fourteen employees from its service who settled as free burghers at the Cape of Good Hope. By 1795 their number had grown to almost fifteen thousand. The original free burghers shared the same socio-cultural background and were uniformly poor. Yet in the course of the eighteenth century they developed into a stratified society with a clearly identifiable elite. Hitherto this development had been ascribed to capital accumulation in the form of land and slaves, with a focus on the settled arable farmers. This thesis challenges these arguments by applying the theoretical concept of entrepreneurship to the history of the 198 individuals who served as alcohol *pachters* (lease holders) in Cape Town between 1680 and 1795. The thesis argues that a study of their economic and social activities leads to greater conceptual clarity and a better understanding of the way in which social mobility operated. This study reveals how intertwined economic success was with social factors; and traces the changing uses and functions of kinship and social capital in VOC Cape Town. It demonstrates the importance of the urban free burghers to the Cape economy and the ways in which this group was linked to the rural free burghers.

The first chapter treats the origins and operation of the alcohol *pacht* (lease) system and its contribution to the Cape economy. This is followed by a prosopographical analysis of all 198 of the alcohol *pachters*. Chapter three presents the biography of Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen as a vehicle with which to present the theoretical concepts attended on entrepreneurship, which are employed in the rest of the thesis. Chapter four illustrates the

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importance of social capital and kinship to what was still a largely immigrant society in the 1730s, while chapter five traces the changes which had occurred by the 1770s. These two chapters also demonstrate the ways in which the urban and rural elites coalesced over time. The final chapter shows to what extent the economic success of *pachters* was translated into other forms of power.

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Historians depend, more than anyone else, on the goodwill of archivists and librarians. It is thus with due humility and gratitude that I express my indebtedness to the following institutions and their staff where the bulk of the research was performed: the Cape Archives Repository, the National Library of South Africa in Cape Town and the Jagger Library of the University of Cape Town, in particular the Inter-Library Loans section and the African Studies Library whose staff have performed stellar service over the years. A particular word of thanks to Jaco van der Merwe at the Cape Archives Repository for knowing what historical research is all about. I am most grateful to the University of Oxford for allowing me to work in (or, more appositely, raid) the Bodleian Library in November 2004. Without this opportunity to amass large amounts of comparative literature not readily available in South Africa, the work on this thesis would not have progressed very far. My thanks go to Nigel Worden and David Wardle for making this visit possible.

I have been immensely fortunate in that my research formed part of the aforementioned NRF-project on Cape Town during the VOC period. This meant that I could readily tap into the expertise of a group of established and younger researchers whose help and encouragement made my burden much lighter. I am therefore most grateful to Lalou Meltzer and Susan Newton-King for providing the impetus for this project and who, along with Nigel Worden, encouraged me to become part of the project. As it had not been my intention at that point to pursue further graduate studies, least of all

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in History, I can quite honestly state that they have (unwittingly) changed the course of my life. I am very grateful for the practical support and enthusiastic encouragement I continue to receive from Lalou and Susan.

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This thesis was finished under difficult circumstances far removed from where it was started. I am most grateful to my colleagues and friends in Johannesburg for their help and support: Louis Grundlingh (for lessening my burden at a crucial time), Julia Kotze, Helen Ludlow, Jared McDonald (for providing much-needed solidarity), Nicholas Southey (whose practical help, personal support and sympathy made it easier to cope), Nicole Ulrich and Grietjie Verhoef. I think it no exaggeration to say that without the practical and emotional support of Jessica Murray over the past eighteen months this thesis would probably have dragged on for several more years, if ever it did get finished. She is a true friend and an extraordinary person, and my life is the richer for knowing her.

I owe a long-standing debt of gratitude to my friends Susan and Bennie Maré, whom I have known for almost as long as I can remember, and without whose love and support I cannot imagine my life. I am likewise immensely grateful to my parents, Annette and Lukas Groenewald, and my siblings, Wilna, Venneiza and Dylan, both for their support and for never trying to make me what I am not. The older I get, the more I realise how remarkable they are in this, as in so many other respects.

Karel Schoeman had greater belief in me and in the importance of the *pachters* than I'll ever have. I am certain he will not approve of this final product, but I likewise know that it would have been a much poorer work without his encouragement and practical support. My sincere thanks go to this extraordinary and inspiring historian whose many books make the past alive in various amazing ways. I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to Professor Nigel Worden whose exceptional abilities as an inspiring teacher, supportive supervisor and remarkable historian have been praised in many a preface. I cannot add much to those superlatives, other than to say that I doubt that his renowned patience and good humour could ever have been tested as much as by this stubborn, difficult and slow student. The fact that this thesis was started, let alone completed, is a testimony to his inspiration and perseverance. I am more grateful to him than I could adequately express. Finally, I should thank David Wardle who had to live with my *pachters* for longer than he could ever have cared for, and who never complained (at least openly). Without his personal and practical support it is unlikely that this thesis would have progressed very far. His own extraordinary dedication and commitment to scholarship have variously inspired and depressed me.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CA	Cape Archives Repository, Cape Town
DO	Deeds Office, Cape Town
f	guilder(s)
NGKA	Nederduits-Gereformeerde Kerk Archives, Stellenbosch
VOC	*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Geoctroijeerde Compagne* (Dutch East Indies Company)

GLOSSARY

Throughout this thesis the following terms relating to the organisation of the alcohol retail trade in Cape Town, as well as some other terms, are used in the original Dutch (for a full explanation, see chapter one):

bijtapper	assistant tavern or bar keeper
heemraad	member of a local governing board (in the rural districts)
knecht(en)	European servant (usually a farm foreman)
pacht(en)	lease or monopoly
pachter(s)	lease or monopoly holder
tapper(s)	tavern or bar keeper
verpachten	to lease or monopolise
verpachting	leasing or monopolising

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A NOTE ON DATES

Up to 1698 *pacht* contracts coincided with the calendar year, i.e. 1 January to 31 December. The system was changed in 1699 when *pacht* contracts ran from 1 September to 31 August. To avoid a cumbersome way of referencing, this thesis (including the appendices) uses of the notion of a '*pacht* year' which refers to the larger part of the year in which a contract fell for the whole period of the contract, for example: the *pacht* year 1703 equals the period 1 September 1702 to 31 August 1703. The *pacht* year 1699 ran only from 1 January to 31 August.

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INTRODUCTION

Social Stratification at the Cape

When Otto Mentzel, who lived in Cape Town for seven years in the 1730s, later reflected upon the society that developed at the southernmost end of Africa during the administration of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), he divided the free-burgher society into four groups or classes.[1] The second, third and fourth classes ranged from those farmers who could produce a surplus and lived fairly well, to cattle farmers in the interior who could barely eke out a living. The first class, however, Mentzel defined as 'those free burghers who live in the City [Cape Town] and have a considerable fortune and are comfortably off; and who, besides, also possess one or more farms in the country.'[2] Yet the picture painted by Mentzel was not something static or eternal: seventy years before this, the second commander of the VOC's outpost at the Cape, Zacharias Wagenaer, was shocked to discover the extent of the 'painful poverty' (*smertelijcke armoede*) which existed among the recently established (in 1657) group of free burghers. Year after year he reported with palpable distaste to the *Heren XVII*, his superiors in The Netherlands, the situation of the people he referred to variously as 'spoilt, lazy and roguish creatures' or as a 'lazy, useless and harmful bunch.'[3] His solution was that they

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[1] The term 'class', used by Mentzel, should not be considered in the modern sociological sense. Peter Burke has shown how, during the early modern period, some writers started to deviate from the usual language of 'orders' and 'estates.' This was the case in especially the Dutch Republic where society was classified in different tax classes according to wealth, while some contemporary commentators used the term to denote a 'social group.' It is in this sense that Mentzel's usage should be seen, i.e. as a crude attempt to stratify society on the basis of wealth; P. Burke, 'The Language of Orders in Early Modern Europe', in M.L. Bush (ed.), *Social Orders and Social Classes in Europe since 1500: Studies in Social Stratification* (London and New York, 1992), 7.

[2] O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope* (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 3, 98-116, quote from 98.

[3] 'vroegh bedorven luije en verlopene gasten' and 'luijen, onnutten en schadelijken hoop'; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Dagregister en Briewe van Zacharias Wagenaer, 1662-1666* (Pretoria, 1973), 288, 316-17, 346-48 and 385-86. Quotes from 288 and 348.

either be banished to Mauritius, a VOC colony at this time, or be sent back to the Netherlands and that they be replaced with 'abler and more hardworking people' from the fatherland.[4]

How do we explain the differences between these two accounts? What made it possible for the heap of impoverished, indebted and lazy farmers of the 1660s to develop into a stratified community divided on the basis of wealth and status, with a clearly identifiable elite, one which by the early 1780s would elicit comments from high-ranking visitors to the Cape for its wealth, pomp and circumstances?[5] This development is the more remarkable when taking into account that most (though not all) of the immigrants who settled at the Cape originated from the same socio-economic stratum, namely the working classes of North-western Europe.[6] Yet some of them could and did develop into Mentzel's first class, while others remained miserably poor and had to struggle merely to subsist. What, then, were the factors which made possible the growth of a stratified society at the Cape of Good Hope?

One was the shift, in the two to three decades after Wagenaer's term of office, from a European-style intensive farming to an extensive farming model much better suited to the soil and climate of the South-western Cape.[7] Another was the replacement of

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4 'bequamer en arbeijtsamer lieden.' The alternative solution was that the Company should provide more slaves to assist these poor farmers. *Ibid*., 316-17 and 348. Quote from 316. It is likely that Wagenaer, a leading VOC official used to the splendour of the East Indies, was contemptuous of the free burghers and probably couched his language in more negative terms than the situation warranted.

5 Hendrik Breton testified that '… als ik de eer heb te zeggen dat ik … niet dan teekenen van welvaard en voorspoet heb ondervonden, tot zoo verre, dat behalven de pragt en praal in kleederen en rytuijgen de huizen deftig met modieuse meubels voorzien zijn, de tafels met Zilverwerk gestoffeerd, en door propre bekleeden slaven vierden [sic] bedient'; quoted in S.D. Naude, 'Willem Cornelis Boers', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 13/2 (1950), 414.

6 G.J. Schutte, 'Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 298 and G.C. de Wet, *Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707* (Cape Town, 1981), 24-26.

7 Extensive farming was more profitable and less labour-intensive, which has the potential for making the dedicated and forward-thinking farmer wealthy; L. Guelke, 'Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1657-1780', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 69-84.

free labour with bonded labour: Wagenaer continually hammered upon the cost of paying European *knechten* ('servants') as a major factor in the financial struggle of Cape farmers. By the time of Mentzel's stay in the 1730s, the Cape was a fully developed slave society where more than half the colonial population (slaves and Europeans, excluding the indigenes) consisted of slaves in the possession of settlers, the VOC itself and its employees.[8]

Another major factor, and one hitherto largely ignored in the historiography of the Cape, was allowing limited (and highly regulated) free trade in certain areas of economic life. The original purpose of allowing some VOC employees to become free burghers in 1657 was that they would relieve the Company of having to farm and make the Cape self-sufficient in wheat production.[9] By the mid-1660s this experiment was clearly failing and most farmers were attempting to get out of their contracts. Wagenaer, in an act of desperation, allowed some of the poorest of these farmers to abandon their farms and to live in the small village that had sprung up close to the Fort of Good Hope (the predecessor of the Castle). These 'villagers' gained their livelihoods by plying their trades or selling alcohol.[10] In his report to his successor, Wagenaer noted that since 'the common agriculturalists come to notice daily that these [burghers around the Fort] find it much easier to subsist than they do with their heavy labour, many of them now want to leave their farmer's work and establish themselves somewhat closer to the Fort in order to likewise ply such a trade….'[11]

In this lies the germ of the later prosperity of some Cape burghers. As will be discussed in chapter one below, it was clear by the 1670s that the alcohol retail trade was

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8 See N. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge, 1985), 19-40 on the importance of slavery to the Cape economy.

9 See pages 15-16 below for a discussion.

10 De Wet, *Vryliede en Vryswartes*, 27-28 and 46-105 provides a detailed overview of the possibilities.

11 '… de gemeene lantbouwers dagelijcx comen gewaer te worden dat dese [borgers omtrent 't Fort] veel gemackelijcker als zijlieden met haeren swaren arbeijt weten aen de cost te comen, souden der nu wel veele haer boerewerck willen verlaten, en met der woon oock nader aen 't Fort comen, om insgelijcx alsulcke nering te doen…'; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Memoriën en Instructiën, 1657-1699* (Cape Town, 1966), 76-77.

highly successful and that it could be very lucrative. It was also a decidedly competitive business with several free burghers trying to partake in it. These two factors, the in-fighting amongst alcohol entrepreneurs and the profitability of the trade, led the authorities to offer annually at a public auction the right to sell a certain type of alcohol within a certain geographic area to the highest bidder. Starting in 1680, the VOC held an auction to sell off the alcohol monopolies (or *pachten*) every year of its control over the Cape until 1795.[12] During this period, 198 individuals bought at least one *pacht* at these auctions.[13]

The subject of this thesis is not the operation or the economics of the alcohol *pacht* system at the Cape, although this will be covered briefly in chapter one. Instead it attempts, through an extended case study of the alcohol *pachters*, to answer two related sets of questions. The first deals with issues of social mobility: what factors in their background or their VOC careers could have played a role in the success of some *pachters*; to what an extent and in what ways did kin and social networks aid their advancement, and how did this interact with economic factors? The second set deals with issues of status and identity: was there a link between the economic importance of this group and their social status? Did they enjoy some form of prestige and how did this interact with their business activities and, finally, how did they view themselves and their role in Cape society? Can one argue that the alcohol *pachters* of Cape Town were different from the rural gentry – did they form a separate *urban* elite or were they part of a general Cape gentry? Was there a clear relationship between the urban environment, entrepreneurship and social mobility?[14] And how did these factors change over more than

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[12] The British found the notion of monopolies abhorrent, and almost instantly demolished the system of *pachten* when they took over the Cape in 1795; only to re-instate the alcohol monopolies two years later in a bid to increase the revenue of government; H. Giliomee, *Die Kaap tydens die Eerste Britse Bewind, 1795-1803* (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1975), 168-73.

[13] See chapter two below for a discussion.

[14] Studies of social mobility in early modern Europe, the colonial USA as well as Southeast Asia have all indicated that expanding cities were the *loci* of social change with regards to mobility, the availability of commercial opportunities and the provision of social networks; R. Grassby, 'Social Mobility and Business Enterprise in Seventeenth-Century England', in D. Pennington and K. Thomas (eds), *Puritans*

a century of VOC rule? Although the focus of the thesis throughout remains the alcohol *pachters*, the question hovering in the background – one with a much wider application than just the *pachters* – is: what mechanisms and processes were available to free burghers for social and economic advancement?

Cape Historiography and the Role of Economics

Answers to these questions have been sought for other colonial societies, but not yet for the Cape of Good Hope. This is partly due to the relative youth of the historiography in this field, but also to the peculiar trajectory of its development. The great expansion of pre-industrial Cape historiography started in the early 1980s as part of a revisionist project by English-language historians to write a more comprehensive and inclusive history of South Africa which also took class and capital seriously. Thus this decade saw a number of important and large-scale research projects dealing with hitherto neglected groups such as slaves and the Khoisan. In much of this work economic concerns were central. The first major studies in Cape slavery during this period were strongly slanted towards economics.[15] Robert Ross's original interest in issues like capital accumulation and class development[16] led to the major study he published in 1987 with Pieter van Duin

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and Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth-Century History Presented to Christopher Hill (Oxford, 1978), 355-81; G.B. Nash, 'Social Development', in J.P. Greene and J.R. Pole (eds), *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore and London, 1984), 247-51 and P. Boomgaard and H. Schulte Nordholt, 'Connecting People, Places and Commodities', in P. Boomgaard, D. Kooiman and H. Schulte Nordholt (eds), *Linking Destinies: Trade, Towns and Kin in Asian History* (Leiden, 2008), 1-12.

15 Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* and M. Rayner, 'Wine and Slaves: The Failure of an Export Economy and the Ending of Slavery in the Cape Colony, 1806-1834' (unpublished PhD thesis, Duke University, 1986). Earlier work on the frontier was also very economically orientated: D. Neumark, *The South African Frontier: Economic Influences, 1652-1836* (Stanford, 1957) and L.T. Guelke, 'The Early European Settlement of South Africa' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1974). The latter's work and arguments had a great influence on scholars such as Robert Ross and Susan Newton-King.

16 R. Ross, 'The Rise of the Cape Gentry', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 9 (1983), 193-217.

on *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century*.[17] This work inspired a series of important contributions by Ross on the role of economics in the development of Cape colonial society at the turn of the 1990s.[18] Even the much more recent study by Susan Newton-King on the history of labour relations on the Cape Eastern Frontier has its roots in this tradition from the 1980s (when her study was begun) in its strong focus on how the Cape market operated and influenced developments in the interior.[19] All of this work tended to be very firmly focused on the rural parts of the Cape of Good Hope, such as Ross's essays and Worden's study of slavery, with a strong and fruitful tradition of frontier studies which continues to this day.[20] Only more recently has some research been done on the history of VOC Cape Town itself, most notably by historical archaeologists,[21] to supplement the more general overviews which existed.[22]

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[17] P. van Duin and R. Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Intercontinenta 7; Leiden, 1987). Although this work has been much utilised by early modern Cape historians, its obscure publication has meant that it is not as widely known among South African historians as it deserves to be.

[18] R. Ross, 'The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cape Colony: A Survey' in W. Beinart, P. Delius and S. Trapido (eds), *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930* (Johannesburg, 1986), 56-100; 'The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835' in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 243-80 and 'The Cape Economy and the Cape Gentry' in R. Ross, *Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of Colonial South Africa* (Hanover and London, 1993), 13-49.

[19] S. Newton-King, *Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803* (Cambridge, 1999). The late publication of this book belies its roots in the 1980s. For a succinct summary of the contribution of the literature discussed here to our understanding of the economic development of South Africa, see J. Iliffe, 'The South African Economy, 1652-1997', *Economic History Review* 52/1 (1999), 88-90.

[20] In addition to Newton-King's study, the most important works on the frontier during this period are N. Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century* (Athens, OH and Cape Town, 2005) and L.J. Mitchell, *Belongings: Property, Family and Identity in Colonial South Africa (An Exploration of Frontiers, 1725-c. 1830)* (New York, 2009).

[21] Earlier (and more popular) work in this vein are G.E. Pearse, *The Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1833: An Account of its Buildings and the Life of its People* (Pretoria, 1956) and H.W.J. Picard, *Gentleman's Walk: The Romantic Story of Cape Town's Oldest Streets, Lanes and Squares* (Cape Town, 1968). For recent historical archaeological work dealing specifically with Cape Town's burgher population, see most

This economic and rural focus changed rather suddenly in the late 1990s when the cultural and narrative turns in historiography worldwide engulfed Cape historiography virtually at once. Instead of writing on institutions and groups, historians now focused on issues important to the individual, such as status, honour, sexuality and identity.[23] Some of this work also treated marginal groups within Cape Town who were previously ignored, such as artisans, soldiers and sailors.[24] A hallmark of this writing was the use of micro-history, based on court records, to reveal marginalities and contingencies in the lived reality of individuals in the pre-industrial past of the Western Cape.[25] This focus on

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notably the following studies of A. Malan: 'Households of the Cape, 1750 to 1850: Inventories and the Archaeological Record' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 1993); 'Beneath the Surface – Behind the Doors: Historical Archaeology of Households in Mid-Eighteenth Century Cape Town', *Social Dynamics* 24/1 (1998), 88-118; and 'The Material World of Family and Household: The Van Sitterts in Eighteenth-Century Cape Town, 1748-1796', in L. Wadley (ed.), *Our Gendered Past: Archaeological Studies of Gender in Southern Africa* (Johannesburg, 1997), 273-301. P. Mitchell, *The Archaeology of Southern Africa* (Cambridge, 2002), 385-99 provides a synthesis.

[22] The best synthesis of the academic research done on Cape Town during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. Bickford-Smith, *Cape Town: The Making of a City* (Cape Town, 1998), 11-83. There is also an earlier tradition of popular works on the history of Cape Town (though these books were often superficial and badly researched): P.W. Laidler, *The Growth and Government of Cape Town* (Cape Town, 1939) and L.G. Green, *Tavern of the Seas* (Cape Town, 1947).

[23] R. Ross, *Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750-1870: A Tragedy of Manners* (Cambridge, 1999); N. Worden, 'Forging a Reputation: Artisan Honour and the Cape Town Blacksmith Strike of 1752', *Kronos* 28 (2002), 43-65 and 'Strangers Ashore: Sailor Identity and Social Conflict in mid-18th Century Cape Town', *Kronos* 33 (2007), 72-83; S. Newton-King, 'For the Love of Adam: Two Sodomy Trials at the Cape of Good Hope', *Kronos* 28 (2002), 21-42 and 'Sodomy, Race and Respectability in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, 1689-1762: The Story of a Family, Loosely Defined', *Kronos* 33 (2007), 6-44. See N. Worden, 'New Approaches to VOC History in South Africa', *South African Historical Journal* 59 (2007), 3-18 for a discussion of recent trends.

[24] For example, Worden, 'Forging a Reputation' and 'Strangers Ashore'; Newton-King, 'For the Love of Adam' and N. Penn, 'Great Escapes: Deserting Soldiers during Noodt's Cape Governorship, 1727-1729', *South African Historical Journal* 59 (2007), 171-203.

[25] The classic work in this genre is N. Penn, *Rogues, Rebels and Runaways: Eighteenth-Century Cape Characters* (Cape Town, 1999). This work inspired other micro-histories, albeit with different aims and focuses, by historians such as Worden and Newton-King (see note 23 above for some examples), as well as by certain of their students, e.g. A. Alexander, 'Crime and the Chinese Community in VOC Cape

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the individual and the cultural has almost completely displaced work on the economy of the colonial period.

There is, however, an irony here. In the battle of ideas which characterised twentieth-century economic history, the Keynesian macro-economic approach was dominant in the post-World War II era. This started to change in the late 1970s and 1980s when some world leaders took seriously the so-called Austrian School's insistence on the supremacy of the free-market, and with it the importance of individual freedom and choice.[26] It was perhaps this renewed focus on the economic role of the individual which had led to an interest from economic historians in business history and entrepreneurship during the 1980s and 1990s.[27] Thus, since the 1990s, there has been an immense growth in the scholarship of the history of entrepreneurship in, for instance, the early modern Netherlands.[28] While Dutch historians have, understandably, focused on the role of

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Town', *Historical Approaches* 2 (2003), 1-15; K. Thomson, '"The Mistress Will Be Consumed": A Study of Slave Resistance in 18th-Century Cape Town', *Historical Approaches* 2 (2003), 16-29; P. Truter, 'The Robben Island Rebellion of 1751', *Historical Approaches* 3 (2004), 37-49, and N. Taylor, 'A Scapegoat of Status on the Streets of 18th-Century Cape Town', *Historical Approaches* 4 (2005/6), 12-18.

[26] The watershed moment was probably the (controversial) award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Friedrich von Hayek in 1974. Together with his teacher, Ludwig von Mises, and Joseph Schumpeter, he is the best known of the Austrian School economists. It was the adoptation of Hayek's ideas by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s which resulted in a rapid abandonment of the Keynesian approach in the Western world during the 1980s; D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy* (New York, 2002), esp. 123-33.

[27] It is no coincidence that, with the exception of the venerable *Business History* (1959), most of the foremost academic journals in business history were founded during the 1980s and 1990s: *Essays in Economic and Business History* (1979); *Accounting, Business and Financial History* (1990) and *Enterprise & Society* (2000).

[28] L. Noordegraaf, 'Economic Historiography in the Netherlands, 1960-2000', *South African Journal of Economic History* 22 (2007), 129-31. See also the following overview articles discussing the recent trends: F.M.M. de Goey, 'Ondernemergeschiedenis in Amerika, Nederland en België (1940-1995). Trends in Vraagstellingen, Onderzoeksmethoden en Thema's: Een Overzicht', *NEHA-Jaarboek voor Economische, Bedrijfs- en Techniekgeschiedenis* 59 (1996), 21-65; O. Gelderblom and J.L. van Zanden, 'Vroegmoderne Ondernemerschap in Nederland', *NEHA Bulletin voor de Economische Geschiedenis* 11/2 (1997), 3-15; O. Gelderblom, 'Uitdagingen voor de Vroegmoderne Ondernemersgeschiedenis', *NEHA Bulletin voor de Economische Geschiedenis* 16/2 (2002), 69-81 and Anonymous, 'Nederlandse

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entrepreneurs in the remarkable growth of their country's economy in the seventeenth century, they have paid very little attention, as of yet, to the Dutch colonial world.[29] This development was by no means restricted to Dutch scholarship as this period also saw a growth of similar studies for the colonial New World.[30] Thus, during the 1990s, when the

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Ondernemersgeschiedenis (1995-2005): Een Aanvulling', http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/verderlezen.php (last accessed 25 March 2007). Major contributions during this period include the following collections of studies: C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds), *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market* (The Hague, 1995); C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), *Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden* (Amsterdam, 1996) and C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds), *Ondernemers en Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd* (Amsterdam, 1999). There is currently a large, government-funded project in the Netherlands to compile a database of biographies of some 4 000 Dutch entrepreneurs: http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/ (last accessed 15 September 2009).

[29] An exception being F. de Goey and J.W. Veluwenkamp (eds), *Entrepreneurs and Institutions in Europe and Asia, 1500-2000* (Amsterdam, 2002), although most of these essays do not deal with the early modern period. There is a large historiography on the history of trade in the VOC empire, but the focus is macro-economic and institutional (the VOC being the main character); E.M. Jacobs, *Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden, 2006) is the most recent synthesis. There has been important new work on entrepreneurship on regions of the Indian Ocean outside of the Dutch world; see, for example, R. Ptak and D. Rothermund (eds), *Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade* (Stuttgart, 1991); R. Ptak and K.A. Sprengard (eds), *Maritime Asia: Profit Maximisation, Ethics and Trade Structure, 1300-1800* (Wiesbaden, 1994); A. das Gupta, *The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 1500-1800: Collected Essays* (New York, 2001) and O. Prakash, *Bullion for Goods: European and Indian Merchants in the Indian Ocean Trade, 1500-1800* (New Delhi, 2004).

[30] There existed a longer (pre-1990s) tradition of studies on merchants and urban elites for colonial North and South America, but in this historiography too there was a noticeable increase in the focus on entrepreneurship during the 1990s; see, for example, T.M. Doerflinger, *A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia* (Chapel Hill and London, 1986); R.J. Ferry, *The Colonial Elite of Early Caracas: Formation and Crisis, 1567-1767* (Berkeley, 1989); L.S. Hoberman, *Mexico's Merchant Elite, 1590-1660* (Durham and London, 1991); J.F. Martin, *Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill, 1991); R.F. Jones, *"The King of the Alley": William Duer, Entrepreneur and Speculator, 1769-1799* (Philadelphia, 1992) and R.F. Brown, *Juan Fermín de Aycinena: Central American Colonial Entrepreneur, 1729-1796* (Norman, 1997).

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time was ripe to build on the macro-economic history of the Cape Colony established during the 1980s by focusing on the *actors* of the economy, as opposed to its structures, Cape historians completely moved away from economic history. While they did focus on individual lived experiences against the background of the social and cultural history of the pre-industrial Cape, they almost forgot about the importance of economics.

Thus, although a fair amount of work has been done on the Cape economy during the VOC period – of which Van Duin and Ross's monograph is the most significant – it has largely been concerned with depersonalised economic institutions and market forces. There has been little work on the actual actors in the economy.[31] This thesis starts to fill that gap. It aims to show that economic history needs to be taken seriously to understand properly the history of the colonial Cape. The approach is both wider in scope and conceptually more refined than the earlier economic approach of the 1980s by using theoretical work on the operation of entrepreneurship. But the focus is not narrowly on economic matters; through taking economic activities as a starting point, the thesis attempts to flesh out the lived reality of inhabitants at the Cape by showing the links between economic *and* social and cultural decisions made at an *individual* level. The concept of an entrepreneur allows the historian to do this, since business decisions are not made in a theoretical vacuum, but within a social and cultural context. Applying this theoretical concept has not been done before for the pre-industrial Cape or, indeed, the Dutch colonial world.

In addition, since most of the economic opportunities at the Cape of Good Hope during the Dutch period centred on the largest urban centre in the colony, Cape Town, this thesis also represents a major intervention in demonstrating the centrality of the urban locality to the development of the burgher population in the colony. Although there has been a renewed interest in the history of Cape Town itself,[32] instead of the former focus on the rural districts and the frontier, there still remains a dearth of work on the

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31 Two notable exceptions exist: G. Wagenaar, 'Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen: Sy Aandeel in die Kaapse Geskiedenis tot 1806' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1976) and G.A. Cockrell, 'Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984), although both are rather myopic and narrow in their focus on the lives of their subjects.

32 See the more recent works mentioned in footnotes 21 to 23 above.

history of *urban* free burghers.[33] This thesis is an attempt at starting to fill that gap by demonstrating how central Cape Town and its burghers were to the development of both the Cape economy and the Cape gentry.

The Making of the Cape Gentry

A major achievement of the scholarship on the pre-industrial Cape from the 1980s was to reveal the development and workings of a landed gentry at the Cape during the eighteenth century. Thanks to the pioneering works of scholars like Robert Ross, Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, this notion had become well-entrenched.[34] The Cape gentry has been defined by Ross as consisting of 'a relatively undifferentiated broad mass of farmers', who were mostly engaged in wine and grain farming in the South-western districts of the Cape colony.[35] Although there are differences in the approaches and conclusions of Ross on the one hand and Guelke and Shell on the other, it remains clear from their work that there existed at the Cape, from the early eighteenth century, a group of well-off families whose fortunes were based on the accumulation of capital in the form of property (notably land) and labour (slaves).

This interpretation of the development of Cape burgher society as the rise of capitalism has been criticised for its 'theoretical insouciance' (which resulted in too easy and smooth a developmental trajectory) which led to 'frustrating silences' regarding the pre-industrial development of South African society.[36] In addition, Susan Newton-King has pointed out the empirical shortcomings of this work: according to her, 'this term properly belongs to a group of families who have consolidated their position over several

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[33] Older work tended to focus on the relationship between the free burghers and the VOC: A.J. Böeseken, 'Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de-eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 7 (1944) and C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die Laaste Kwart van die Agtiende Eeu en die Voortlewing van hul Denkbeelde* (Second edition, Pretoria, 1967).

[34] Ross, 'Rise of the Cape Gentry'; L. Guelke and R. Shell, 'An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-1731', *Journal of Historical Geography* 9 (1983), 265-86.

[35] Ross, 'Rise of the Cape Gentry', 207-8.

[36] H. Bradford, 'Highways, Byways and Culs-de-Sacs: The Transition to Agrarian Capitalism in Revisionist South African History', *Radical History Review* 46/7 (1990), 81-83; quotes from 82.

generations – whose wealth has a dynastic quality in other words – and whose lifestyle and value mark them off from those below them.'[37] This was not proved by either Ross's or Guelke and Shell's seminal articles. Newton-King's own investigation of this hypothesis for the northern frontier suggested that 'inherited wealth was not the decisive factor in an individual's rise to social and economic prominence in frontier society.'[38] Likewise, Laura Mitchell has shown that, through a combination of inheritance patterns and contingent factors, wealth and property were dispersed and circulated throughout the northern frontier and did not pass on in a dynastic fashion.[39] This then begs the question: were the agrarian districts of the South-western Cape somehow exceptional, or does the problem lie with our current conception of the rise and growth of the Cape gentry?

Martin Hall and, more recently, Wayne Dooling have contributed to the debate by demonstrating how important it was to families in the South-western Cape to consolidate their wealth over generations (particularly because of the difficulties caused by a system of partible inheritance). They also emphasised the central role that women, particularly widows, played in the continuance and expansion of this group of wealthy agrarian farmers.[40] Families could and did retain their hold on land and wealth, although not always through the male line. Central to the interpretation of the development of Cape society in terms of 'the rise of a Cape gentry' is a focus on the agrarian districts and the

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37 S. Newton-King, 'In Search of Notability: The Antecedents of Dawid van der Merwe of the Koue Bokkeveld', in S. Marks (ed.), *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, vol. 20* (London, 1994), 26.

38 *Ibid*., 33.

39 Mitchell, *Belongings*, esp. 126-48. Mitchell does, however, stress the important unifying roles kinship and material culture played in creating a sense of community and connection on the frontier.

40 M. Hall, 'The Secret Lives of Houses: Women and Gables in the Eighteenth-Century Cape', *Social Dynamics* 20 (1994), 1–48; W. Dooling, 'The Making of a Colonial Elite: Property, Family and Landed Stability in the Cape Colony, c. 1750–1834', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31 (2005), 147–62 and *idem*, *Slavery, Emancipation and Colonial Rule in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg, 2007), 16-57. Mitchell, *Belongings*, 78-86 also illustrates the importance of marriage strategies and the role of women in patrilineal descent for the northern frontier.

belief that, over time, this group of people (and the power they held)[41] were perpetuated through endogamous marriages between members of these leading burgher families.

There remain, however, questions to be answered about the origins and growth of the Cape gentry. How is the picture of a group of people who perpetuated and consolidated their wealth over time through capital accumulation to be reconciled with that sketched in the opening paragraphs of this Introduction? In other words, how did people with no or little capital become wealthy in the first place? What were the mechanisms of wealth creation at the Cape of Good Hope – other than accumulating land and slaves, which was only possible from a capital base? In addition, the previous focus of VOC Cape historiography on the rural areas of the colony meant that none of these scholars considered the role of free burghers in *Cape Town* in this process. Although Guelke and Shell pointed out in their seminal article that '[t]he complexity of early free society at the Cape has not generally been adequately appreciated, because scholars have made too much of the fact that most whites were farmers or, more accurately, made a living from the land',[42] this line of investigation has not yet been pursued.

This thesis attempts to cast some light on these issues through its study of the alcohol *pachters* and their relation to the wider society. It is argued (in chapters three and four) that the basis for the capital accumulation which enabled the development of a rural gentry should be sought, rather, in Cape Town which afforded business opportunities – most lucratively in the alcohol retail trade – that could be used as a springboard for agricultural investment. In addition, this study of the alcohol *pachters* also reveals the ways in which newcomers could enter this supposedly closed and endogamous group of families (chapters three and five). It also suggests that in the course of the eighteenth century there developed close business and family ties between the rural gentry and the merchant elite of Cape Town; in fact, it questions whether the notion of a 'rural' gentry is at all applicable and whether there ever was such a clear-cut differentiation between the burghers of the agrarian districts and the urban centre (chapter five). The various case studies which make up the bulk of the thesis suggest that there existed rather a process of

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41 Ross already indicated the preponderance of members of the rural gentry in the local governance structures; Ross, 'Rise of the Cape Gentry', 208.

42 Guelke and Shell, 'An Early Colonial Landed Gentry', 280.

assimilation between these two groups, and that the development of a free burgher society at the Cape was a much more dynamic process than had hitherto been realised. Finally, an investigation of how economic success translated into power and prestige among successful alcohol *pachters* also exposes much about the ways in which the elite at the Cape could and did differentiate them from those belonging to the 'lower strata' of society (chapter six). This thesis thus reveals much about the making of a free-burgher society at the Cape through a case study of the alcohol *pachters* of VOC Cape Town.

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CHAPTER 1

THE DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE ALCOHOL *PACHT* SYSTEM AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1652-1795

It was not the intention of the *Heren Bewindhebbers* (Lords Governors) of the VOC in the early 1650s to establish a permanent settlement at the Cape of Good Hope but only a 'Fort and Garden' for the 'preservation of the Company's ships and people'.[1] Nature would provide the water, the Khoikhoi the meat, while the Dutch only needed to establish a garden for fruit and vegetables and build a fort for protection from their competitors and enemies. At first, though, the station was largely a failure and ran at a loss to the VOC. During its first years the settlement had to be saved from going under by having most of its supplies shipped from Batavia. The founding commander, Jan van Riebeeck, realised that because of the way the station was organised it could never succeed nor be profitable in the long run. There was simply too much to do with too few people, and all within the context of a merchant company which owned and controlled *everything*. His solution was to suggest the establishment of free burghers. These people would no longer be employees of the VOC (which had to pay, feed, clothe and defend them) but were to be farmers on their own land. They would, however, remain subjects of the VOC. Apart from the legal implications of this, it meant that there was to be no free-market – free burghers may own land and produce crops, but they could only sell their produce to the Company at pre-determined prices.[2] In the eyes of the VOC, the *raison d'être* for the free

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[1] 'Fort ende Thuijn' … 'preservatie van des Comps. schepen ende volcq', quoted from the 1649 'Remonstrantie', which led to the establishment of a station at the Cape; E.C. Godée Molsbergen, *De Stichter van Hollands Zuid-Afrika: Jan van Riebeeck, 1618-1677* (Amsterdam, 1912), 206.

[2] On the establishment of the free burghers and its consequences, see : A.J. Böeseken, *Jan van Riebeeck en sy Gesin* (Cape Town, 1974), 110-21 and L. Guelke, 'Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1657-1780', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition: Cape Town, 1989), 69-71.

burghers was to help fulfil more economically the function of the Cape as a refreshment station.[3]

Much lip service has been paid to the fact that Cape Town served first and foremost as a halfway station in the VOC empire,[4] yet little has been done to understand how one of the most important functions of this station, namely to provide alcohol to passing ships and their visiting crews, as well as to local inhabitants, was organised and regulated. This is of particular importance since alcohol production and provision played such a major role in the Cape economy, and hence in the lives of its permanent inhabitants. From 1680 onwards, during *every* year of VOC government at the Cape, the rights to retail various types of alcohol were sold at a public auction to the highest bidders. Yet this system, while remarkably stable after 1680, did not arrive part and parcel with the Dutch in 1652, but had a troubled development during the first decades of European settlement. This chapter describes how during the early decades the alcohol *pacht* system evolved at the Cape, against the background of developments in the Dutch world; how the system operated after its establishment in 1680, and what the overall meaning of and contribution by the alcohol *pacht* system was to the economy of the Cape of Good Hope during the VOC era.

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[3] As late as the 1780s the Independent Fiscal, W.C. Boers pointed out that the free burghers did *not* have the same rights as citizens in the Netherlands 'want het is eene waarheid, gelijk zulks door niemand sal kunnen worden ontkend … dat dit geheel establissement [sc. Kaap de Goede Hoop] *alleenlijk is van Compagnies Weegen en om 's Compagnies wille* …' (my emphasis); quoted from G.J. Schutte, *De Nederlandse Patriotten en de Koloniën: Een Onderzoek naar hun Denkbeelden en Optreden, 1770-1800* (Groningen, 1974), 66.

[4] A notable exception is K. Ward, '"Tavern of the Seas?": The Cape of Good Hope as an Oceanic Crossroads during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in J.H. Bentley, R. Bridenthal and K. Wigen (eds), *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges* (Honolulu, 2007), 137-52 and *eadem*, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge, 2009), 127-46 and 169-77.

The rise of the nation state in Europe during the early modern period, and the many wars this process engendered, was concurrent with the increasing need and abilities of governments to raise money through taxation – both directly and indirectly (through customs and excises). These two processes are in fact inseparable: 'Taxes not only helped to create the state, they helped to form it.'[5] Taxing its populace and their economic activities became a convenient way of raising money for governments. The early modern era therefore witnessed various experiments which aimed to find the best and most convenient or expedient ways of collecting such income and getting it into the state's coffers.

In the Dutch Republic the most important source of income for the various provinces was the excises levied on virtually all consumer goods. Especially in the province of Holland there was hardly any commodity that remained untaxed.[6] These excises on the *gemene middelen* ('common commodities') became the cornerstone of the Dutch tax system and expanded to such an extent that there were more than forty different types of excise taxes in Holland alone by the turn of the eighteenth century. By the 1630s about two-thirds of all taxes came from the excise alone, which increased to eighty-three percent by 1650. Consequently Holland was heavily taxed, especially as cities added their own excises on top of the provincial ones.[7] The government itself did

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5 Joseph Schumpeter, quoted in W.J. Ashworth, *Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and Consumption in England, 1640-1845* (Oxford, 2003), 5.

6 A. Th. van Deursen, *Mensen van Klein Vermogen: Het Kopergeld van de Gouden Eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1991), 198-200. The States of Holland introduced excise taxes as early as 1583 but while all the other provinces eventually also adopted this system of taxation, 'the rates of taxation and the goods burdened with excise varied considerably', J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and Preservance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge, 1997), 102.

7 De Vries and Van der Woude, *First Modern Economy*, 103-106. England, which used to be relatively lightly taxed, primarily on land ownership, introduced excise taxes, 'a system of indirect taxation modelled on Dutch precedents' in 1643, which eventually became the prime source of tax income for the state, K. Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain* (New Haven and London, 2000), 256-58 and Ashworth, *Customs and Excise*, 94-116.

not gather these taxes but leased them out (*verpachten*). In Holland the different excises were divided into seventeen districts, resulting in 680 individual *pachten*. Usually the right to gather these taxes was auctioned off to the highest bidder who could provide two sureties for a period of six months. All the *pachten* in the province were sold on the same day in order to prevent a person from obtaining more than one. In this way the Dutch government deliberately tried to prevent the establishment of large tax farms such as those in France.[8]

Why did the Dutch authorities opt for excises and for *pachters*? Excise tax affects only a small number of people *directly*, namely the retailers and producers of goods, not the consumers who paid indirectly through higher retail prices. It was thus more manageable than a general tax, especially if one considers that early modern governments could not easily enforce their will: there was no police force and government bureaucracy was negligible.[9] This system was also much more flexible – whenever the authorities needed a greater income, they could increase the excise or introduce new ones.[10] But why *pachters*? Not only did the state lack the necessary administrative ability, but the leasing out of the collection of taxes resulted in a more stable system: the government knew what its guaranteed income would be.[11]

The notion of a *pacht* therefore already existed in the Dutch Republic by the seventeenth century. However, this term was mostly understood to mean the right to collect taxes within a certain industry or on certain goods. Much less common were monopoly type *pachten* which only existed where they concerned valuable or scarce commodities. An example is the case of fresh water fishing in seventeenth-century Graft, where the *right* to fish in fresh water and to sell the produce was *verpachten* annually to only one person, who may or may not have had partners or assistants, but who was the

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8 Van Deursen, *Mensen van Klein Vermogen*, 200-203 and De Vries and Van der Woude, *First Modern Economy*, 103. England too had its tax farms, which by the 1670s tended to be controlled by a few groups, or sometimes a single group, of financiers, which made this model closer to the French one; cf. Ashworth, *Customs and Excise*, 100-111.

9 Van Deursen, *Mensen van Klein Vermogen*, 208.

10 De Vries and Van der Woude, *First Modern Economy*, 102.

11 *Ibid*., 103.

only one allowed to exploit the valuable resource of fresh water fish.[12] The forms that a *pacht* could take in the Dutch colonial world were to diversify from this metropolitan form.

In 1602 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was established through a charter of the States General of the Dutch Republic which gave the Company a monopoly to trade in the Indian Ocean area. Within a few decades the VOC had conquered significant parts of Southeast Asia and became the leading colonial power in the Indian Ocean world.[13] The VOC remained throughout a business company whose primary aim was to return a profit to its shareholders. It is, however, important to remember that the aim of a mercantilist company such as the VOC was not so much to obtain the highest possible profit, but rather direct and, above all, secure or safe profits.[14]

Very soon after the VOC's conquest of Jayakarta in 1619 and the establishment of its new 'rendezvous', Batavia, the new authorities instituted a 'toll', i.e. a customs duty, on all goods entering or leaving the city. The justification for this was the compensation of the Company for the 'heavy burdens and unspeakably excessive expenses' caused by the recent war.[15] In addition a further means was devised 'for the relief and repair of the heavy burdens experienced daily', namely to compel all publicans and alcohol retailers to obtain a monthly licence (*licentie briefken*) at a set cost for the right to sell alcohol.[16]

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12 A. Th. van Deursen, 'Bronnen en Hun Gebruik: Het Verpachtingsregister van de Visgronden bij de Sluis van Westgrafdijk', in R. Sanders et al. (eds), *De Verleiding van de Overvloed: Reflecties op de Eigenheid van de Cultuurgeschiedenis* (Amsterdam, 1991), 55-64.

13 F.S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Second edition; Zutphen, 1991), 20-23 and 37-65.

14 Cf. De Vries and Van der Woude, *First Modern Economy*, 431: 'In general, the Company's policy was to use its dominant position … to achieve a stable, medium-term optimum rather than short-term profit maximization'.

15 'groote lasten ende onuytspspreeckelycke excessive costen'; J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811: Deel I, 1602-1642* (Batavia and The Hague, 1885), 74-75. A complete list of the various imposts survives from 1671: except for gold, silver, slaves and wood, everything was taxed at different rates for imports and exports; J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811: Deel II, 1642-1677* (Batavia and The Hague, 1886), 535-44.

16 'tot soulagement ende vindinge van de swaere lasten dagelycx te dragen'; Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek I*, 76.

With this the tone for the future was set. Taxing almost everything became an easy and useful way of supplementing the Company's income.

The Company quickly realised that it was easier to farm out the administration of this, thereby saving on the administration and providing an additional income by selling the right to collect these taxes. In 1622 the first *verpachting* in the history of the Dutch East Indies took place when the Chinese Jancongh was allowed to collect the toll levied on certain articles.[17] This *pacht* was later expanded to include ever greater parts of the imports and exports of Batavia.[18] Soon more and more *pachten* were sold to collect various taxes.[19] Concomitant with these tax-farming *pachten*, a different sort of *pacht* developed, namely one which entailed control over a monopoly.[20] Yet a third type of *pacht* was instituted in 1631 when the *management* of the meat and fish markets were *verpachten*, meaning that in exchange for a percentage of the goods sold these individuals took over the running of the markets.[21] A combination of the tax-farming and management type *pachten* developed with the arack *pacht* of 1633, where the *pachter* ensured that there was no illegal distilling of arack through the selling of monthly licences to distillers – in a way he both managed the industry and collected the income from it.[22]

At first the *pachten* were sold on an *ad hoc* basis to individuals who applied for them, and there was no uniformity in the administration of the various *pachten* and the different contracts. This changed in the 1650s when the *pacht* system was reviewed and standardised. One of the new innovations was that the various *pachten* were all publicly

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17 *Ibid.*, 94. For a general discussion of *pachten* in Batavia, and especially the important role of the Chinese population in it (who formed the majority of *pachters*), see: H.E. Niemeijer, 'Calvinisme en Koloniale Stadscultuur: Batavia, 1619-1725' (unpublished PhD thesis, Free University of Amsterdam, 1996), 77-79 and *idem*, *Batavia: Een Koloniale Samenleving in de 17de Eeuw* (Amsterdam, 2005), 70-77.

18 Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek I*, 282 and *Plakaatboek II*, 187.

19 For example, van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek I*, 291.

20 The first was that of 'sirih-pinang' (the nuts and leaves of the betel palm which were chewed) which could only be sold by the *pachters*, followed shortly by a monopoly on the sale of tobacco; *ibid*., 112 and 202-3.

21 *Ibid*., 259-62.

22 *Ibid*., 295-96.

verpachten in the Castle at the end of every year on terms and conditions which were made public some time before the event.[23] From 1658 onwards it is always mentioned that the *pachten* would go to the 'those who offered the most' (*meest biedende*),[24] i.e. a measure of free competition was introduced with the institution of a public auction, open to everybody who could produce the sureties and pay the *pacht penningen* (the price for the *pacht*).[25]

By the 1650s the *pacht* system not only dominated economic life in Batavia but was also very varied.[26] Of the fifteen *pachten*, only one can be considered a strict monopoly, namely the right to control the making and selling of candles. Most of *pachten* were of the management type.[27] There were also *pachten* which were out-and-out tax farms. Straightforward cases included the *pachten* of the right to use certain rivers and the very lucrative *pacht* of the 'head money of the Chinese' (*'t Hooftgelt der Chinesen*), which entailed the collection of the monthly tax every Chinese man had to pay for the privilege of living and working in Batavia.[28] The *pachten* were not just purely an income-generating device, but perhaps primarily a way of controlling and regulating a specific trade or aspect of the economy.[29] By having *pachters* whose livelihood and fortune would depend on making sure everybody is taxed who ought to be taxed, the Company could put a check on smuggling and illegal trading, thereby securing its own due income.[30]

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23 Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek II*, 213.

24 *Ibid*., 312.

25 *Pachters* always had to produce two sureties when they took on the *pacht*. Before 1654 the *pachters* had to pay their *pachtpenningen* at the end of every month. After 1654 onwards they had to pay two months in advance on acceptance of the *pacht*; *ibid*., 200-201. See the discussion below for the case at the Cape.

26 *Ibid*., 314-21. A similar complete set survives from 1669; *ibid*., 491-506.

27 For example, managing the coconut trees (for the making of arack), the weighing house, the fish, meat and rice markets, the Company's garden, mill, wood yards etc, as well as something akin to gambling houses (Chinese 'topbanen'), cf. *ibid*., 240, 325-27, 356, 499-500 and 504.

28 *Ibid*., 207-8, 251-52 and 314-15.

29 When the import and export duties were *verpachten*, it was done to curb private trade and to prevent the traffic of goods on which the proper taxes have not been paid; *ibid*., 187.

30 According to Niemeijer, the system of having 'licentie briefkens' was primarily a measure to curb 'de illegale concurrentie'; 'Calvinisme en Koloniale Stadscultuur', 77.

This dual function of *pachten* also informed the system of running alcohol retail in Batavia. Seemingly anybody who wanted to and was willing to pay the costs could run a tap. From the outset, though, excise taxes had to be paid on the various types of alcohol, in addition to a monthly licence fee.[31] There were no *pachten* for different types of alcohol, but simply one over-arching 'pacht der herbergiers ofte tapbriefkens'. The *pachter*'s only function was to sell a licence every month to everybody who comes to ask for it.[32] His was purely an administrative function, but it implies that he would also ensure that there were no people tapping without having such a licence. To this end he had to keep a register of all licensed *tappers* (bar or tavern keepers),[33] while all *tappers* had to clearly identify their taverns as such.[34] To an extent, then, it was a management type of *pacht* in that it sought to control the trade, but mostly the *pachter* served as a tax farmer.

Fifty years after the foundation of Batavia, the system of *pachten* came to dominate almost every local economic activity.[35] All the *pachten* together formed what Company officials called the 'general income' (*generaele incomsten*) of Batavia. While it was not a major source of income for the VOC as a whole, its importance to the urban economy, and especially to balance the expenditures of the city, was enormous. The *pachten* were predicated on the notion of protecting one's market and ensuring a monopoly, crucial to the success of the mercantilist VOC, which might explain why they were viewed as a way of combating smuggling. *Pachten* were the Company's instruments of control over the economic activities of their subjects, while they at the same time also made it possible for the VOC to benefit directly from these activities. Eventually, in one form or another, a system of *pachten* became part and parcel of the

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31 On excise see for example Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek II*, 103, 125-26, 237 and *Realia: Register op de Generale Resolutiën van het Kasteel Batavia, 1632-1805: Eerste Deel* (Leiden, 1882), 466 (18.6.1641). For the need to have a licence, see for example Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek II*, 85, 243-44, 300, 316, 492 and *Realia I*, 466 (12.3.1658).

32 Excise collection was not part of his job. That had to be paid when the *tappers* bought the alcohol from the Company, cf. *Realia I*, 154 (19.8.1645).

33 Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek II*, 476.

34 *Ibid*., 244, 316 and 492-93.

35 Niemeijer, 'Calvinisme en Koloniale Stadscultuur', 79.

VOC Empire – from Makassar[36] to Melaka[37] – even though it was not always to the same extent as in the capital city.

The Development of the Alcohol Pacht *System at the Cape, 1656-1680*

When the Dutch arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, they were thus familiar with a system of excise taxes, and equally, with the notion of selling the right to collect certain taxes to a person. In addition, they also knew that certain privileges, due to their value, might be 'rented out' (*verpachten*), i.e. the original right or ownership remains that of the authorities, but the use and management of it may be sold for set periods of time. This particularly developed in Batavia, largely as a way of controlling smuggling and protecting the VOC's commercial interests, but with the useful side-benefit of generating an extra income. Tradition and precedent played an important role with regards to the development of the alcohol *pacht* system at the Cape, which partook of all these various systems, as will become clear; yet it was also the product of the unique circumstances of the Cape.

Within a few years the VOC authorities at the Cape realised that it might be more advantageous (i.e. cost effective) if everything at the Cape was not controlled and handled by the Company. Thus, in 1655, the VOC decided to lease or hire out (i.e. *verpachten*) the Company's milk cows. The cows remained the property of the Company, but the right to sell their milk and make butter from it was being sold. In this way the VOC's possessions were managed by the *pachter* while the Company continued to get an easy and cheap supply of milk and butter. The *pachter*, the gardener Hendrick Boom, for his part, did not only have the duties of taking care of the cows and providing the

[36] During the seventeenth century Makassar had only one *pacht*, namely an alcohol monopoly, but this system was expanded during the eighteenth century to include management and tax farm type *pachten*; H. Sutherland, 'Eastern Emporium and Company Town: Trade and Society in Eighteenth-Century Makassar', in F. Broeze (ed.), *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th-20th Centuries* (Kensington, 1989), 113 and 123-24.

[37] Melaka's port, like that of Batavia, was controlled through a system of excises and customs; F.S. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC: De Financiële en Commerciële Politiek van de Bewindhebbers, 1672-1702* (Zutphen, 1989), 136-37.

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Company with dairy products at a fixed price, but crucially obtained the right to sell the excess milk and butter to any individual at his own price, thereby supplementing his measly monthly wages from the Company.[38]

Hendrick Boom received the cow *pacht* because he was living outside the Fort on a small piece of land adjoining the garden and his wife, Annetje Joris, had previous experience of farm work in the Netherlands.[39] In 1656 she convinced the authorities to allow her keeping an inn 'to host and house those coming and going on the passing ships.'[40] The decision to permit an inn at the Cape was not a sudden whim, but something which Van Riebeeck had been proposing to the *Heren XVII* for several years. Up to this stage all visiting VOC servants had to be entertained in the Fort, and the more important ones had to eat at his table, at great expense to the Company.[41] His superiors saw the sense of this suggestion and agreed to it, and when this became known at the Cape, Annetje Joris jumped at the opportunity. This right was awarded her on the condition that she buys all her provisions from the Company's warehouse at pre-determined prices as well as sell it at prices determined by the authorities. In a sense, Annetje Joris was simply 'managing' the redistribution of alcohol which was in any case meant for the Company employees.[42]

The new inn was a great success. Four months later another woman, Jannetjen Boddijs, was also granted an inn on the same conditions as Joris.[43] After some employees

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38 A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel I, 1651-1669* (Cape Town, 1957), 59-63.

39 *Ibid.*, 61.

40 'tot tractement ende huijsvestinge van de gaende en de comende man der passerende schepen'; she herself advanced two reasons for awarding her this right: she considered herself to be 'sufficiently a free woman' (*genouchsaem een vrije vrouwe*) and because she was 'lumbered with eight children' (*met acht kinderen beladen*); *ibid*., 73.

41 On Van Riebeeck's efforts to establish an inn, see: Böeseken, *Jan van Riebeeck*, 94-95. In April 1657, anticipating the creation of the free burghers, commissioner Van Goens suggested that the economic activities which *de burgerije* (the citizenry) could be favoured with by the Company should include: beer brewing, wine farming, brandy distilling and the keeping of taps; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Memoriën en Instructiën, 1657-1699* (Cape Town, 1966), 8.

42 Böeseken, *Resolusies I*, 73-74.

43 *Ibid.*, 82.

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became free burghers in 1657, certain of them were also allowed to have *tapjens* or bars to complement their income (see table 1.1), all on the same conditions as the first two: namely that they buy all their alcohol at set prices from the Company. None of these *tappers* (bar or tavern keepers) had to pay anything for the privilege of running a public house. The most important condition remained that they all had to obtain their alcohol from the VOC – in this way the Company managed both a strict control over the retail trade of alcohol and received an income by selling it at pre-determined prices. This started to change from 1665 onwards. The following fifteen to twenty years were ones of intense struggles over access to and control over the retail trade of alcohol at the Cape. This issue is important since the outcome of these struggles resulted in an economic system which remained stable for more than a century, and which became one of the corner-stones of the Cape economy.

Table 1.1: Individuals with the Right to Sell Alcohol, 1656-1679

Name	Years Active[44]
Boddijs, Jannetjen	1656-1661
Botma, Cornelis Stevensz	1675-1680
Botma, Steven Jansz	1670-1675
Brinkman, Barend	1676
Cooijman, Matthijs	1670
Cornelisz (van Langesont), Pieter	1657
De Wacht, Jan Martensz	1664-1665
Ferdinandus, Jannetje	1676-1677
Geens, Barbara	1677

[44] The years in this column denote the first and the last known years in which the individual had a concession to retail alcohol; it should not be assumed that they necessarily held this right *continuously* during the years indicated. These names and dates should be seen as the minimum – there were unoubtedly others, and possibly many of these also had taps in years when their names do not appear in the sources.

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Hendrikz, Hendrik Thielman	1662-1675
Israels, Jan	1670
Jansz (van Hoesum), Christiaen	1657
Jansz, Joris	1660-1673
Joris, Annetje	1656
Leendertsen, Wijnand (and his widow)	1677
Marquaerdt, Jochem	1670-1679
Mostaert, Wouter	1666-1677
Smient, Dirck Jansz	1672
Smit, Hendrik Evertsz	1670-1679
Valckenrijk, Jan	1671-1678
Valckenrijk, widow	1679
van Dieden, Willem	1673-1679
van Rosendael, Jacob	1665-1676
van Suerwaerden, Hendrik	1661-1671
Vetteman, Jan	1658
Victor, Gerrit	1678

Source: CA, C 1344; *Resolusies*; De Wet, *Vryliede*, 50-52

By 1665 the Council of Policy realised that 'amongst all these free burghers nobody can achieve more comfort, greater prosperity and more advantages than those who have long been permitted to retail strong liquor.' The reason for this was that these people have not had 'the least trouble of any impost', nor did they have to pay any 'reasonable acknowledgement' (*billicke erkentenisse*) for this right.[45] Even worse was that the success of these *tappers* meant that those who failed at agriculture continually requested the Council to let them set up bars. Considering this, the Council decided that the four people, who at that time had been permitted taps, would have to pay in future a

[45] 'er onder alle dese vrije ingesetenen alhier niemant is, die meer gemack, beter welvaart, en grooter voordelen behalen kan, als alleen die geene, die dus lange is toegestaen geweest, eenige tapneringe in stercken drank te mogen doen; de alderminste last van eenige impositien'; Böeseken, *Resolusies I*, 331-32.

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'moderate excise' (*matigen accijns*) for the liquor they bought from the Company.[46] Thus, the Cape authorities finally realised both that alcohol retail was lucrative to the free burgher population and that this fact afforded them an opportunity for creating another source of income for the Company.

A further innovation came in 1668 when one of these *tappers*, Wouter Mostaert, was allowed to buy alcohol, not from the VOC as before, but from passing ships. For this right he had to pay *f* 100 per annum as *recompens*, in addition to the excise.[47] In 1670 the system was thoroughly reviewed and the rights and obligations of the *tappers* were determined: a *tapper* could retail a specific type of alcohol only by permission of the Council of Policy and by paying a monthly impost, i.e. the excise of 1665.[48] An important development in the evolution towards the *pacht* system occurred in 1673, namely the renting out (or *verpachting*) of the Company's farm Rustenburg. This was done on much the same principles as with the milk cows some years earlier, i.e. the farm remained the property of the VOC, but that the *pachter* paid for the right to use it. The two *pachters* who took it on had to pay *f* 4000 a year for the exploitation of the land, while their contract remained valid for four years.[49]

During the same year, the Council of Policy became increasingly alarmed at the extent of alcohol smuggling which 'robbed' the Company of its excises.[50] This concern

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46 *Ibid*. The four *tappers* were Hendrick van Suerwaerden, Joris Jansz, Thielman Hendricxz and Jacob van Rosendael.

47 M.K. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Deel I (1652-1707)* (Cape Town, 1944), 93-94; Böeseken, *Memoriën en Instructiën*, 77 and Böeseken, *Resolusies I*, 372-73.

48 A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel II, 1670-1680* (Cape Town, 1959), 24-27 and Böeseken, *Memoriën en Instructiën*, 91-92. This resolution should be considered a sort of micro-economic reform of the Cape by Van den Brouck, as in the same document the fate of several other industries was decided, i.a. fishing, tannery, milling, brick making and the provision of wood.

49 CA, VC 6, 742-44. For details of the contract, see CA, C 1344, 114-16.

50 CA, C 1344, 116: 'Ende gemerct de luijden hier aan 't Fort woonende geensints comen afgeleijt werden van d' tapneeringe wat middelen ooc daar toe aangeneemt hebben, en buijten de gepreviligeerde haar sulcx seer strict verboden is, mitsgaders door overtreedinge van 't verbot verscheijde reijsen tot [*illegible*] vervallen sijn, desgelijcx 't volc van de overcomende schepen stercken drank soo uijt Hollandt als Batavia herwaards te brengen, ende onaengesien de wachten en nacht gaand' patrollien den meesten tijt bedecktelijck weten aan lant te krijgen.…'

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might have been prompted by a specific case of smuggling of January 1673, which involved some prominent free burghers and a high-ranking Company official.[51] The Council's solution was to lease out (*verpachten*) alcohol retail 'to those who offer the most [money], and to such four individuals as we deem to be the most suitable for it.' Not only would this relieve the authorities of 'many troubles', but the VOC would get its due income from the excise, in addition to the new *pachtpenningen*.[52] Everybody else but these 'privileged *pachters*' (as they were now called) was prohibited from retailing alcohol. Two important innovations seem to be inaugurated with this. Firstly – perhaps resulting from the example of Mostaert paying for the right to obtain alcohol from passing ships – *tappers* had to pay for the *right* to sell alcohol. The second major innovation which started in 1673 was that these tap concessions, now called *pachten*, were expressly limited to one year, after which they had to be renewed. Heretofore, concessions normally stated that they were granted simply 'until changed again' (*tot wederseggings*).

The system, which was in place by the mid 1670s, meant that *pachters* had to pay an annual fee for the right to retail alcohol. This was not a system open to all free burghers and there was no free competition involved: the Council of Policy nominated those burghers they deemed 'most suitable' for the job, while the Council also determined the sum they paid for the privilege. It was for this reason that the same individuals' contracts were renewed year after year during the 1670s. This closed system which favoured some burghers and not others caused unhappiness in the small burgher community. Already in 1676 the visiting commissioner, Nicolaas Verburch, commented on the harsh treatment of the free burghers by the Cape authorities, saying that the laws and ordinances at the Cape were 'very strict and in certain cases rather too severe,' which served as proof for his remark that 'the Dutch Colonists are called here free people, but they are so restricted and bounded in everything that their unfreedom becomes more than

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51 Jacob Rosendael, with the assistance of his *knecht*, brought liquor from a ship without the necessary permission, nor having paid the Company's *geregtigheijt* ('entitlement') on it. Upon investigation, the Company *dispensier*, Willem van Dieden, was also implicated; CA, VC 6, 612-15 and CA, C 2398, 83-86. Their sentences are in CA, CJ 1, vol. ii, 836-38.

52 CA, C 1344, 116-17.

just apparent…'. This moved him to recommend that the free burghers should be 'cherished with greater freedom, gentleness and kindliness.'[53] He was the first commissioner to have realised that the reason why so many free burghers were inclined to tap keeping was not due to laziness but because of real economic hardships. Verbruch noted that these people were not allowed taps because the Council only ever privileged the wealthiest tavern-keepers, while in fact 'the common man' ought to be permitted to participate in this trade as well. Because of the complaints he received over this, Verbruch instructed the Cape authorities to take this into consideration, and to give these burghers 'some relief and comfort'.[54]

This resulted in several requests from free burghers who wanted to enter the alcohol retail business. The Council of Policy noted the unhappiness (*doleantien*) which existed among the burghers at large over this issue and the fact that only some individuals were allowed to profit from the most lucrative industry at the Cape. Consequently it was decided to wait for the return fleet of 1679 and a new commissioner to rule over this matter.[55] This led to the last major reform of the system of tap concessions. The Council submitted the request of the burghers 'that these privileges may be *verpachten* at a public auction to the highest bidder' to commissioner Dirk Blom. He agreed that it was a fair request and allowed a public auction, but insisted that only six to eight people were admitted to it who were able to produce sureties for the price the *pachten* would likely get.[56] On 25 April 1679 the first public auction of the rights to sell certain types of

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53 'seer precijs en in sommige gelegentheden al wat rigoreus'; 'de Nederlandtse Coloniers dragen hier de naam van vrije luijden, daar se noghtans in alles soo gerestringeert en bepaelt zijn, dat haere onvrijheijt niet dan al te veel is blijckende…' and 'met meerder liberteijt, saghtigheijt en minsaamheijt … gecoestert werden.'

54 'wat verlichtinge en troost'; all quoted from Böeseken, *Memoriën en Instructiën*, 124.

55 Böeseken, *Resolusies II*, 270-71.

56 'dat dese privilegien bij openbare opveijlinge aan d' meest biedende verpacht mochte werden'; *ibid*., 281. The commissioner also decided that proper contracts must be drawn up for the *pachters*, which became the so-called *pacht conditiën* which every *pachter* had to sign after having accepted a *pacht* at an auction. The first such contract was drawn up by Blom; see *ibid*., 282-83 for the text.

alcohol was held, 'in order to prevent unhappiness among the common [people].'[57] This auction was deemed a huge success because more money than ever before had been realised for the Company. The Council of Policy therefore decided that all other industries which heretofore had been entrusted to free burghers on an *ad hoc* basis be *verpachten* at a public auction to the highest bidders.[58]

Despite this victory to the Cape burghers, the Council of Policy still had too great a say in who could have access to the alcohol retail business. Their continuing complaints forced the Batavian government to order the Cape authorities to open the alcohol retail trade, to all free burghers 'without exception.'[59] Henceforth any burgher could bid for an alcohol *pacht* at a public auction. And thus, by 1680, there was in place a system that would remain stable for the remaining 115 years of VOC rule at the Cape. From this year onwards, there was a public auction of the alcohol *pachten* every year at which any free burgher could bid for a *pacht* which would allow him or her to sell a specific type of alcohol at a set place for a set period. It took twenty-five years to develop the alcohol *pacht* system but, once it was established, it stayed remarkably stable and became the most successful and profitable form of retail for both the free burghers and, indirectly, the Cape authorities.[60]

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57 'tot voorcominge van doleantien onder 't gemeen'. The *pachten* ran for only eight months until the end of the year, after which they would be auctioned off every New Year; CA, VC 8, 864-65.

58 This included the brewing of Cape beer, bread baking, milling, 'd' bouwerij van Hottentoos Hollandt en coornschuir'; Böeseken, *Resolusies II*, 290. Earlier it was decided to henceforth also auction off the right to sell 'vivres' (oil, vinegar, butter and bacon) and Spanish wine in large quantities; *ibid.*, 283-84. None of these, with the exception of the Cape beer *pacht*, were as successful as the alcohol *pachten*, and came to an end within a few years.

59 'sonder onderscheijt van persoon'; *ibid*., 317.

60 Between 1680 and 1795 more than one thousand individual alcohol *pachten* were leased out to almost two hundred different individuals. Of these one thousand *pachten* only twelve were not auctioned off, ten of which were special *ad hoc* arrangements with the Menssink family concerning beer brewing. In addition, only four alcohol *pachten* over this period were not awarded, usually because the amount bid was too low; cf. Appendix 1 for details.

The Operation of the Alcohol Pacht *System at the Cape, 1680-1795*

From 1680 the right to retail various types of alcohol in small quantities was auctioned off annually to the highest bidder. This remained the basic underlying principle of the alcohol *pacht* system at the Cape until the end of VOC rule. Here a brief description is offered of the way in which the system was operated and the changes which were introduced.

From the inception the *pachten* were divided by type of alcohol. They were, in the order they were auctioned off every year: Cape malt beer (from 1681); brandy and 'distilled waters' (including arack and certain types of Spanish wines); Cape wines (from 1684) and *vaderlandsche en uijtheemse bieren en wijnen*, i.e. various imported European alcohol types not covered by the other *pachten*. All of these *pachten* gave the holder the right to sell that type of alcohol for one year in 'this Table Valley' (the farm Roodebloem, i.e. modern Woodstock, was considered the boundary for this purpose). A change occurred in 1699 when the Council of Policy decided to divide the Cape wines *pacht*, given its profitably, into four 'parts' (*perceelen*).[61] This meant that there were in effect seven *pachten* available at the annual auction. The success of this measure led to the adoption of a similar division of the brandy *pacht* in 1703, resulting in a total of ten *pachten*.[62] There was however no limit on how many parts any individual may hold, and several individuals held a number or even all of a given *pacht*. In August 1705 W. A. van der Stel and the Council of Policy decided to change the rules for selling the wine *pacht*. When the *pachten* for the new year were sold, the four parts of the wine *pacht* were auctioned off as per usual: three were bought by Van der Stel's business partner, Johannes Phijffer and one by another individual. The whole wine *pacht* (i.e. all four parts together) was then auctioned off again and awarded to Phijffer at a slightly higher price

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61 J.I. Janse van Rensburg, 'Die Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur in Suid-Afrika tydens die Eerste Eeu, 1652-1752', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 17/2 (1954), 70-71 and G.J. Krause, 'Drankpagte gedurende die Eerste Honderd Jaar van die N.O.I.K. aan die Kaap' (unpublished MA thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1955), 73-74.

62 Krause, 'Drankpagte', 107-8.

than the four individual parts.[63] This, however, went against the guidelines for *verpachting* drawn up by commissioner Daniel Heijns in 1699 and caused great dissatisfaction among the free burghers who considered this another example of Van der Stel's favouritism and corruption. Their complaints led the *Heren XVII* to order a reversion to the usual format of dividing the wine *pacht* into four parts.[64] This idea was, however, revived in 1734 when the Council of Policy decided to institute a *generaele pachter* for Cape wines: this is a person who offered more for the combined four parts of the Cape wine *pacht* than the individual parts had realised.[65] This happened on all but one occasion, in 1759, when the offer for the *generaele pacht* was lower than the four parts combined, meaning that on that occasion there were four Cape wine *pachters*.[66] The *generaele pacht* could, however, be held by two or even three individuals who shared the wine *pacht* between them.[67] In 1793, commissioners-general Nederburgh and Frijkenius decided to revert to the original system, so that there were four Cape wine *pachters* annually for the period 1794-1795.[68]

The number of alcohol *pachten* were increased in the 1710s, not through a subdivision of existing *pachten*, but through the institution of new geographic *pachten*. In 1714 a *pacht* was created for selling Cape wines and brandy in the Stellenbosch district, and in 1716 one for the Drakenstein district. At first these two *pachten* were auctioned off in Stellenbosch every year, but from 1722 they were auctioned off with the other alcohol *pachten* at the Castle. This year also saw the amalgamation of these two *pachten* into one,

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63 CA, C 2701, 18-25.

64 See on this incident, Krause, 'Drankpagte', 78-83; G.C. de Wet, *Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707* (Cape Town, 1981), 49 and G.J. Schutte, 'Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 304.

65 Janse van Rensburg, 'Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur', 79-80 and Krause, 'Drankpagte', 87-89.

66 CA, C 2714, 2-17.

67 In 1737, 1738, 1740, 1746 and 1747 (*pacht* years); see Appendix 1 below for details.

68 A.J. Böeseken, 'Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de-eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 7 (1944), 198.

allowing the holder to sell alcohol in both districts.[69] Another addition came in 1716 when a *pacht* was instituted for selling alcohol at the Company's farm Rustenburg. This followed on the precedent of the 1670-80s when Rustenburg was rented out to private individuals who not only produced wine for the Cape market but also held the right to sell some in the area.[70] The farm reverted to the VOC in 1683, however, but the idea of creating a geographic alcohol *pacht* on the basis of the Stellenbosch one revived the Rustenburg *pacht* which allowed the holder to sell alcohol in the Cape district outside of the Table Valley. In 1720 the name was changed to the 'Rondebosje' (Rondebosch) *pacht*, to which was added in 1743 'Baaij Fals' (i.e. Simon's Town).[71] This meant that by the 1720s there were four alcohol type *pachten* (divided into ten[72]) and two geographic ones available for auction. Only in 1757 was a seventh alcohol *pacht* added, namely the *impost op vreemde natiën* ('the excise on foreign nations') which entailed the management and collection of the excise tax which the VOC levied on all alcohol sold to foreign ships anchored in Table Bay.[73] The latter was the only alcohol *pacht* at the Cape which was of the management type so common in Batavia.

Alcohol *pacht* contracts ran for one year.[74] Between 1679 and 1698, the *pacht* year coincided with the calendar year. However, in 1698 it was decided to make the *pacht* year coincide with the financial year of the VOC, which ran from 1 September to

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69 Janse van Rensburg, 'Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur', 76-77 and Krause, 'Drankpagte', 145-51.

70 Böeseken, *Resolusies II*, 122; Jeffreys, *Kaapse Plakkaatboek I*, 126-27; CA, VC 6, 742-44 and C 1344, 114-16.

71 Krause, 'Drankpagte', 159-61.

72 But only seven when there was a *generaele pachter* for Cape wines, i.e. one each for Cape beer, Cape wines, European alcohol and four brandy *pachters*.

73 G.J. Erasmus, 'Die Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe aan die Kaap, 1652 tot 1795' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1986), 220-21 and G.J. Jooste, 'Die Geskiedenis van Wynbou en Wynhandel in die Kaapkolonie, 1753-1795' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1973), 42.

74 For a summary of the contents of the contracts, which remained more or less fixed throughout the eighteenth century, see Janse van Rensburg, 'Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur', 68-69; Krause, 'Drankpagte', 74-76 and Erasmus, 'Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe', 216-17.

31 August.[75] The *pachten* were auctioned off in the Castle on the 31st of August (except if that was a Sunday) every year.[76] According to eye-witness accounts, this was one of the highlights of the social calendar in Cape Town when the VOC provided free drinks and tobacco to those who assembled to bid on the *pachten* – a clear indication of the importance of this event to the VOC.[77] A *pacht* was first auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the prices going up. After the highest bidder had signed the contract, the same *pacht* was again auctioned off, this time from a much higher starting price which was decreased in small increments until someone called it. If the latter auction realised a higher price than the first one, a new contract was signed with the bidder. If not, the contract of the highest bidder from the first auction was retained. In this way the VOC ensured the highest possible price for the right to retail alcohol.[78]

The contracts, which were drawn up beforehand, had to be signed by the *pachter* who bought the *pacht*, along with two 'sufficient' sureties. Although the *pacht* price was only paid in two instalments, due after six and twelve months respectively, the huge amounts paid for most *pachten* meant that the capital layout was beyond the means of most individuals. Thus, as Mentzel testified, most sureties were in effect business

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75 Krause, 'Drankpagte', 74. In this thesis the year given for any given *pacht* from 1699 onwards should be interpreted as a '*pacht* year', i.e. running from 1 September the previous year to 31 August of the year stated, i.e. the *pacht* year 1702 equates to the calendar year 1 September 1701 to 31 August 1702.

76 There are a few exceptions when some *pachten* were not auctioned off. The most common exception was that of the malt beer *pacht* which, as the *pachter* was mostly also the producer, was simply re-awarded to the holder without bringing it to the public auction. This happened in: 1680-81, 1693-96, 1700-1706 and 1708-11 (cf. CA, VC 8, 1061; C 2698, 21; C 2699, 96 and 101-2; C 2700, 68 and 94-95; C 2701, 26, 88, 111 and 125 and C 2702, 7). The following *pachten* were not awarded during the following years (the first two because the VOC was unhappy with the price offered for it): malt beer (1720), European alcohol (1714) and the 'excise on foreign nations' (1783-84).

77 It appears as if anyone who attended the auction (which was widely advertised beforehand) was treated to these free refreshments.

78 For eye-witness accounts, see P. Kolb, *Naaukeurige en Uitvoerige Beschrijving van de Kaap de Goede Hoop* (2 vols, Amsterdam, 1727), vol. 2, 275-77 and O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope* (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 2, 50-53. Cf. Krause, 'Drankpagte', 162-73.

partners who shared in the costs and the profits of a *pacht*.[79] An indication of the seriousness with which the system of underwriting by sureties was viewed, is revealed by the fact that the governor sometimes interviewed prospective *pachters* who were new to the business ahead of the auction, during which he interrogated them about their sureties and financial backing.[80] The Company was in general ruthless about getting its due income from a *pachter* and several cases survive in which *pachters* had to struggle paying off their debt; even being sued by the authorities.[81] Therefore, being a surety was a serious responsibility: if a *pachter* should die or for some reason or the other be unable to fulfil his contractual obligations, the sureties either had to take over the *pacht* or ensure that the Company get its due, either from the estate of the *pachter* or (if it was not big enough) pay it themselves.[82] Although it was tacitly agreed that sureties could be partners in a *pachter*'s business, the VOC was vigilant about collusion between *pachters* (especially the Cape wines and brandy *pachters*) who by forming a cartel could force down the price they pay for their *pachten*. When this was discovered in 1710, the wine *pachters*' contracts were annulled and the *pacht* re-auctioned. In addition to being fined, the guilty *pachters* also had to make up the loss that the Company experienced for having sold the *pacht* for only eleven months in the second auction.[83]

A complex but important issue related to tavern holding was that of the so-called *bijtappers* (assistant tavern-keepers). Essentially this refers to individuals who, in addition to the *pachter*'s own tavern, would run another tavern (or taverns) on his or her behalf. The issue was complex and controversial because the right to a *bijtapper* or *bijtappers* was never part of the *pacht* contracts. During the period of W.A. van der Stel's governorship, the issue came to the fore and it was decided that each *pachter* would be allowed one *bijtapper*. However, in order not to change the contracts this would only be

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79 Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 2, 52.

80 See G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739* (Pretoria, 1981), 289-90.

81 For example CA, C 1073, 12-14 and 41-46; C 1074, 65-68; C 1092, 154-55 and Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 43.

82 See for example CA, C 1073, 12-14 and Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 42-43.

83 CA, C 2702, 14-17 and 22-26; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IV, 1707-1715* (Cape Town, 1962), 172-83 and Krause, 'Drankpagte', 84.

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an oral agreement for which the *pachters* would apply each year. In the 1720s the issue again caused unhappiness when the Council of Policy decided no longer to allow *bijtappers*.[84] The outcome of this was an agreement that *pachters* could apply for *bijtappers* and be granted this right on an *ad hoc* basis.[85] One therefore finds in the *Requesten en Nominatiën* series in the Cape Archives numerous applications from *pachters* for *bijtappers*, sometimes stating the name and place of the *bijtapper* and tavern in question. Although in the 1720s it seems as if *pachters* were allowed one *bijtapper* each, Mentzel mentions that wine *pachters* could have up to four taverns, meaning that there were up to sixteen wine shops for the four *pachters* of the Cape wine *pacht*.[86] There were also contraventions of the *ad hoc* agreement, as revealed by the complaints of the *generaele wijnpachter*, Carel Boetendagh, in 1738 that the four brandy *pachters* had more than twenty taverns in total, as opposed to the eight they were allowed to by the Council of Policy.[87] This was more than an emotive issue: with the ability to run more taverns, a *pachter* could increase his or her turnover, while a competitor with a large number of taverns could likewise harm one's business. But for some reason, the Cape authorities never gave a final verdict regarding the issue of *bijtappers*, and the system continued to be run on an *ad hoc* basis of applying to the Council of Policy for permission.

This was the way in which the alcohol *pachten* at the Cape operated. There were, however, also other *pachten* sold at the Cape. As mentioned above, after the first successful auction of alcohol *pachten* in 1679, the VOC authorities decided to *verpachten* a whole range of other goods. In 1681, commissioner Van Goens also instituted a tobacco *pacht*.[88] However, these *pachten* were clearly considered not profitable enough to the

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84 In answer, the *pachters* stated that it would mean they would be unable to pay their *pachtpenningen*; CA, C 1088, 232-35.

85 See the discussion in Krause, 'Drankpagte', 85-87.

86 Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 2, 86. During the deliberations about instituting the *generaele wijnpacht* in 1734, one factor which was hoped would make this a more desirable proposition was to allow the *generaele pachter* as many *bijtappers* as he wished, though this seemingly was not incorporated into the *pacht* contracts; Krause, 'Drankpagte', 88.

87 CA, C 1100, 68-70.

88 Böeseken, *Memoriën en Instructiën*, 151.

Cape population to generate much competition and they dwindled away until they were all abolished in the early years of the eighteenth century.[89] The only other *pacht* which remained in place throughout the eighteenth century was the meat *pacht*. It differed in important respects from the alcohol *pachten*: it was never sold publicly by auction and only rarely on an annual basis (nor did the *pachters* have to pay an overt sum for the privilege), but rather took the form of three to five individuals who were contracted to deliver meat to the Company and its passing ships at a pre-determined price on certain conditions, normally for a period of four to five years.[90] Like the alcohol *pachten* it was a monopoly, but there the similarities end.

Alcohol Pachten *and the Cape Economy*

As shown above, the alcohol *pacht* system ultimately derived its origins from the realisation that alcohol retail at the Cape was highly profitable. This was particularly thanks to Cape Town's position as a port of call for the outward and homeward VOC fleets. There is naturally a very close connection between Cape Town's origins as a port and the success and profitability of the alcohol business.

This link became apparent very early on in the history of the town. When, in 1669, the visiting commissioner, Joan Thijsen asked the commander, Jacob Borghorst, 'what profits occur here annually, and whence do they take their origin?', the latter replied: 'No remarkable profits occur here except through the selling of alcohol, for the rest there are only expenditures and for this reason no profits can be made in this place.'[91] As the colonial population of Cape Town was very small at this period, these profits were derived essentially from transient sailors. The arrival of the annual homeward fleet from

[89] The 'vivres' (oil, vinegar, butter and bacon) *pacht* was stopped in 1695 and that of tobacco in 1707. The import and sale of tobacco then reverted to be a VOC monopoly; cf. Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 2, 54 and De Wet, *Die Vryliede en Vryswartes*, 90-91.

[90] H.B. Thom, *Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery in Suid-Afrika* (Amsterdam, 1936), 133-43 and Erasmus, 'Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe', 205-8.

[91] 'Item wat overwinsten hier jaerlijx come voor te vallen, waeruijt deselve haer oorspronck nemen…Hier en vallen geen sonderlinge winsten als door 't vercopen van den dranck, andersints sijn 't in generael oncosten en dierwegen in loco geen winsten te vinden...'; CA, VC 36, 191-92.

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Batavia during the Cape summer and autumn months was therefore considered the underpinning of the Cape retail economy, so much so that Cape burghers created a special term for it: *Oorlammentijd*.

This name was derived from the term (*Oorlammen*) for 'men who have been in the East for many years, or who have gone there for a second time after having once returned to Europe.'[92] Although the VOC restricted the amount of time their ships should remain in Table Bay to ten, and 'at most' fourteen, days,[93] the reality was that the VOC fleets remained generally about three to four weeks at the Cape.[94] This meant that at least twice a year, for one to two months, Cape Town's population was dramatically increased by thousands of passing sailors and soldiers, with equally dramatic results for the social and economic life of the town.[95] Peter Kolb testified that the town's inhabitants considered this *Oorlammentijd* their annual market or fête 'since their houses are then filled with many strangers who richly burn money and who help to use up the abundance of farm and garden produce as well as meat.' In addition, these visitors brought a variety of retail products from the East to be sold or bartered, while the ship's personnel and other officials also sold some of their provisions.[96] Officials too recognised the importance of the arrival of the annual return fleet to the local retail economy, as witnessed by Hendrik Crudorp in 1678: '[the free burghers] earn almost all their money

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92 O.F. Mentzel, *Life at the Cape in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: Being The Biography of Rudolph Siegfried Allemann* (translated by M. Greenlees) (Cape Town, 1919), 79.

93 The authorities became so exasperated by, what they deemed the tarrying of the ships (which increased the running costs of getting their imports from Asia), that in the 1760s they considered prohibiting their ships stopping at the Cape except in emergency cases; Böeseken, 'Nederlandse Kommissarisse', 15-16.

94 See the table in J.R. Bruijn, F.S. Gaastra and I. Schöfer (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (3 vols, The Hague, 1979-87), vol. 1, 68-69.

95 See N. Worden, 'Strangers Ashore: Sailor Identity and Social Conflict in Mid-18th Century Cape Town', *Kronos* 33 (2007), 72-83 for the social impact of this phenomenon.

96 'houden zy dezen Orlammen-tyd jaarlyks voor een halve Misse of jaarmerkt, aangezien hare huizen daar door met vele vreemdelingen opgepropt worden, die rykelyk geld verteren'; Kolb, *Naaukeurige Beschrijving*, vol. 2, 417. For a similar description, cf. that of J.W. de Grevenbroek in I. Schapera (ed.) and B. Farrington (tr.), *The Early Cape Hottentots: Described in the Writings of Olfert Dapper (1668), Willem ten Rhyne (1686) and Johannes Gulielmus de Grevenbroek (1695)* (Cape Town, 1933), 281.

upon the annual arrival of the homeward bound fleet, arranging all the contracts among themselves to become payable on the arrival or departure of the return fleet of such a year; and should a single fleet fail to put in here, many persons would be reduced to the utmost distress.'[97] The importance of this event in the economic *and* mental worlds of the Cape inhabitants that Crudorp alludes to is also borne out by examples in the archive.[98]

When it comes to alcohol retail, the crews of the moored ships acted as the customers of the *pachters*' taverns. Although we do know, thanks to *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, how many people were on any given ship, we cannot determine exactly the number of people who actually visited the town. Travel descriptions reveal, however, that although some passing sailors and soldiers may have chosen to remain aboard ship during their lay-over in Table Bay, the majority of them obtained permission to spend at least part of their time ashore in the town where drinking at taverns seems to have been their chief pastime.[99] Certainly Cape Town developed a reputation among weary seafarers as a place where abundant alcohol could be had at a price; celebrated in songs with lines such as 'A big glass of Cape wine / will be tasty to him with money.'[100] Kolb testified to the

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97 D. Moodie, *The Record: Or a Series of Official Papers Relative to the Conditions and Treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa* (Amsterdam and Cape Town, 1960), 363.

98 Cf. L. Hattingh, *Die Eerste Vryswartes van Stellenbosch, 1679-1720* (Belville, 1981), 23 and CA, CJ 780, 871-75.

99 A particularly apposite example is that of Georg Naporra who chose not to leave his ship while anchored in Table Bay with the express intention of saving his money; his account does however reveal that many of his fellow shipmates did go ashore and how they spent their time in town; R. van Gelder, *Naporra's Omweg: Het Leven van een VOC-Matroos (1731-1793)* (Amsterdam and Antwerp, 2003), 285-88. This is also confirmed by the many court cases in which visiting sailors and soldiers got into trouble with the law (for example CA, CJ 335, 326-38; CJ 338, 9-27; CJ 340, 64-94 and CJ 785, 299-305); cf. Worden, 'Strangers Ashore' for a general discussion.

100 This comes from a song at the turn of the nineteenth century, but there is little reason to doubt that similar songs existed earlier in the eighteenth century; cf. M. Barend-van Haeften and B. Paasman, *De Kaap: Goede Hoope Halverwege Indië: Bloemlezing van Kaapteksten uit de Compagniestijd* (Hilversum, 2003), 189-92, quote from 189.

reputation of all European nations visiting the Cape as heavy drinkers,[101] while cases of sailors drinking themselves to death are recorded.[102]

This in effect meant that twice a year, for three to four weeks, tavern keepers could expect very brisk business from a large transient population desperate for what they could offer.[103] It therefore follows that the profitability of alcohol retail in Cape Town during the VOC period must have been closely related to the number of visiting ships and the duration of their layovers.[104] This is even more the case if we believe Kolb who claims that Cape burghers considered it the *affschuwelykste laster* ('most horrendous slander') to be seen drunk in the street (preferring, instead, private festivals and celebrations to do so).[105] Although tavern keepers could always rely on the local garrison and other VOC personnel stationed in town for regular business, the fact still remains that the profitability of alcohol retail in early modern Cape Town depended on visiting ships. Can this link be proved?

Figures are available for both the number of Dutch and foreign ships which called at the Cape of Good Hope during most of the eighteenth century. Between 1700 and 1793 some 8444 ships called at the Cape, of which just over sixty percent belonged to the VOC (see table 2.1 and graph 2.1 in Appendix 2). On average, during this period, about fifty-five Dutch ships stopped annually at the Cape. But the numbers, though fairly stable overall, did fluctuate: after climbing in the first part of the century, there were normally more than

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101 Kolb, *Naaukeurige Beschrijving*, vol. 2, 123.

102 For example, on 11 February 1702 the *Dagregister* notes: 'The cook of the Noordgouw found dead before the door of a certain canteen. The surgeon's report stated he had died of drink'; H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Journal, 1699-1732* (Cape Town, 1896), 47-48.

103 On the role of taverns in fulfilling the material and psychological needs of sailors; see M. Seltzer, 'Haven in a Heartless Sea: The Sailors' Tavern in History and Anthropology', *The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 19 (2004), 63-93.

104 Mentzel provides an eye-witness account: 'I knew a man who held the lease of a beer-hall in the town and during the stay of the homeward fleet in Table Bay ["Orlamme-tyd"] he made enough silver to fill a fireman's bucket'; Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 2, 54.

105 Kolb, *Naaukeurige Beschrijving*, vol. 1, 404.

sixty or even seventy ships which came here from 1715 to 1740. Thereafter the numbers dipped below sixty for most of the rest of the period.[106] The figures for foreign ships varied much more greatly per year. For most of the eighteenth century, their number remained firmly under thirty per year, occasionally going below ten. However, this trend changed during the early 1770s when the number of foreign ships annually calling at the Cape started to increase drastically, overtaking the number of Dutch ships for the first time in 1772. For the following twenty years, the number of foreign ships calling at the Cape would outstrip that of the VOC ones by a very large margin, especially during the 1780s when well in excess of one hundred foreign ships annually stopped at the Cape. While the overall average number of foreign ships at the Cape during the period under discussion is thirty-four, the average rose to almost ninety-three between 1781 and 1790. This sudden rise (as also the decrease of VOC ships calling at the Cape during the same period) is undoubtedly related to both the increase in international trade during the second half of the eighteenth century and, more especially, the revolutionary wars of the 1770-80s, especially the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war of 1780-1784 during which France was an ally of the Netherlands. These upheavals had major consequences for the social and economic history of Cape Town during this period.[107]

The total income derived from the alcohol *pachten* by the VOC between 1685 and 1795 fluctuated rather much, although here too there is a clear increase from the 1760s onwards. The seven *pachten* can be divided into two groups: the smaller *pachten*, comprising the two geographical ones as well as the malt beer and European alcohol *pachten*, were rather negligible to the total income from the alcohol *pachten*. It was especially the malt beer and the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein *pachten* which remained small throughout this period, the latter never realising more than *f* 2 000 per annum,[108] and the

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106 This concurs with Maurice Boucher's statement that there was a decline in the number of ships calling at the Cape during the period 1735-1755 in comparison with the preceding twenty years; M. Boucher, *The Cape of Good Hope and Foreign Contacts, 1735-1755* (Pretoria, 1985), 9.

107 Cf. N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. Bickford-Smith, *Cape Town: The Making of a City* (Cape Town, 1998), 81-83 and Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 56.

108 This is because of the tiny population of these settlements. Apparently the main source of income for the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein *pachter* was the week or so that the garrison from Cape Town encamped in Stellenbosch every October for the burgher militia exercises; Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 2, 53.

former hardly ever *f* 4 000 (see graph 2.2 in Appendix 2). The European alcohol *pacht* shows a curious pattern of wildly fluctuating in price throughout the century for reasons which still need to be uncovered. Of the minor *pachten*, the Rondebosch-False Bay one is exceptional in that it shows a clear growth from the 1750s onwards and a rapid increase from the mid 1770s. This is no doubt related to the decision reached in 1742 to make VOC ships anchor in Simon's Town between May and August (during which period Table Bay was deemed too dangerous due to the bad winter weather),[109] which resulted in a greater number of potential customers for this *pachter*. The major alcohol *pachten* also show relatively minor fluctuations in price for most of the eighteenth century, with prices starting to increase in the mid 1760s and very drastically (almost fourfold in the case of the Cape wine *pacht*) during the 1780s. This coincides with the introduction of the 'excise on foreign nations' *pacht* in 1757 which likewise increased in value during the 1770s and 1780s (see graph 2.3 in Appendix 2).[110]

As graph 2.4 (in Appendix 2) clearly illustrates, overall there is a clear pattern between the increase in ships calling at the Cape and the total income the VOC generated from the alcohol *pachten* at auctions. Where there are sudden increases in shipping volume, the *pachten* income follows within a year or two (as is to be expected, since *pachters* would be *reacting* to an observable trend). It is noticeable how the overall *pacht* income started to increase during the 1760s, and drastically so during the 1770s and 1780s, with a decrease in the early 1790s. This is quite in line with the increase in shipping volume during these decades.[111] The quantitative data is also supported by qualitative evidence: Johannes Heufke made his fortune from farming and only bought his first alcohol *pacht* in 1727, when he was an elderly man. He later declared that he had never had any intention of becoming a *pachter* but was tempted to enter the business

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109 D. Sleigh, *Die Buiteposte: VOC-Buiteposte onder Kaapse Bestuur, 1652-1795* (Pretoria, 2004), 302-3.

110 See also the discussion in P. van Duin and R. Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Intercontinenta 7; Leiden, 1987), 52.

111 Boucher identified 1755 as a watershed year since it marked 'the inauguration of a period of a considerably increased volume of shipping in South African waters'; Boucher, *Cape of Good Hope and Foreign Contacts*, 144.

since the prices of the *pachten* had become so low by the mid 1720s.[112] This was indeed the case, and must be related to the sudden and severe decrease in the number of foreign ships which called at the Cape during this period.[113] Although the general trend was for the *pacht* prices to be related to shipping volume, as can be most clearly seen in the drastic increase in both during the 1770s and 1780s, the *pacht* income fluctuated much more wildly than the shipping volume, and there were periods (notably in the 1710-20s and the 1740-50s) when the overall *pacht* income *decreases* while the overall shipping volume was slightly increasing. Clearly there were other, contingent factors which also influenced the prices prospective *pachters* were prepared to pay for the right to retail alcohol. One such factor, although not a major one,[114] which often caused *pachters* to complain about their lot, was a lack of supply because of insufficient alcohol provisions.[115] Another was smuggling – the selling of alcohol (presumably at lower prices) by people who did not pay the Company for the privilege – which could also undercut the profits of a *pachter* and hence the price someone would be willing to pay for that *pacht*.[116] A further factor was the fluctuating size of the garrison stationed at the

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112 G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734* (Pretoria, 1975), 110. When the authorities investigated in the 1730s why the income from the *pachten* was decreasing, they also blamed it on the decrease in shipping volume; cf. Janse van Rensburg, 'Geskiedenis van die Wingerdkultuur', 74-76.

113 A total of 49 during 1725-29 as opposed to 116 during 1720-24. The number of Dutch ships remained fairly stable during this decade.

114 Van Duin and Ross, *Economy of the Cape Colony*, 54-55 argue that the variation in the trend of the *pacht* income was related more (about two-thirds) to issues of demand (most notably the number of ships calling at the Cape) than to supply (which was responsible for one-third of the fluctuation in *pacht* prices).

115 See for example CA, C 1076, 22-23 and 34; C 1096, 80-81 and H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806* (5 vols, Cape Town, 1905-6 and 1989), vol. 2, 703.

116 For examples of *pachters* complaining about how smuggling affected their profits (or livelihoods, as they claimed), see CA, C 1080, 44-45; C 1086, 41-42; C 1091, 46-48; C 1100, 68-78; C 1101, 150-53 and Kolb, *Naaukeurige Beschrijving*, vol. 2, 278-81; and cf. Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 61-97 and A.G. Hesselink, 'In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg: Onderhuidse Spanning en Samenwerking in een Koloniale Samenleving in Zuid-Afrika, 1751-1771' (unpublished doctoraalscriptie, University of Amsterdam, 1997), 67-83 for a discussion.

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Cape. Clearly the massive increase in the prices the lucrative *pachten* realised in the 1780s is related as much to the foreign legions *stationed* in Cape Town as to the ships calling in its bays.[117] But these are issues which a future economic historian of the Cape should investigate in greater detail.

According to Otto Mentzel, writing in the 1780s (but reflecting on his experiences of the Cape in the 1730s), the income of the VOC government at the Cape was derived from three broad categories: (1) 'The revenue proper, derivable from taxation'; (2) 'Receipts derived from merchandise imported from Holland and Batavia'; and (3) 'Credit balances due to profits made on the rate of exchange, and to payment of portion of the salaries in Holland.'[118] The last of these categories was negligible in comparison to the other two; while in Mentzel's calculation (on which year his figures are based is not stated) the VOC derived more income from the profits (ranging from fifty to one hundred percent) on the goods it imported to the Cape and sold to the populace at large. The latter source of income is, however, one that would fluctuate and be dependent on a number of contingent factors. The traditional, more stable source of income for a government is taxation (under which Mentzel considered the *pacht* income). At the Cape there was a variety of taxes imposed on the colonists, the most significant (in terms of income) of which was the ten percent grain tax.[119] But in general, the income derived from the alcohol *pachten* was such a major contribution to the *direct* income of the VOC at the Cape that it was enumerated in a separate category from the income from various forms of taxation.

After the first auction of the alcohol *pachten* in 1679, the Council of Policy decided to continue with the system and to expand it to other products, because of the large amount of money the VOC could receive from this institution 'which would so improve the Company's dominions here at this place that it could only, in our opinion,

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117 For examples of the wrangling caused by access to (and protection of) this very lucrative market, see Leibbrandt, *Precis: Requesten*, vol. 1, 145-50 and 208-10; vol. 2, 787; vol. 3, 1003, and CA, C 190, 327-409 (my thanks to Erika van As for alerting me to the latter reference).

118 Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 2, 34-44.

119 See Böeseken, 'Nederlandse Kommissarisse', 198-208 for the best overview.

improve the bad state of the impoverished society of the Cape.'[120] This decision was of course related to the efforts of the local authorities to prove the profitability of the Cape station to their overlords in the Netherlands,[121] something to which the *verpachting* of the alcohol retail trade could only contribute. Within two years of this event, the visiting commissioner Rijckloff van Goens jr., could report that the 'most important' (*voornaamste*) income of the Company at the Cape came from the *verpachtingen*, followed by the sale of tobacco.[122] More than a century later, when commissioners-general Nederburgh and Frijkenius were undertaking a thorough-going investigation of the Cape economy, they came to the conclusion that the income from the alcohol *pachten* 'must without a doubt be considered the most notable branch of income for this Government.'[123]

These statements are borne out by the figures which show the increasing importance of the alcohol *pachten* to the direct income of the VOC at the Cape in the course of the period under discussion. Thus, we know that for the decade 1730 to 1739, the total net income of the Cape station: *f* 1 368 911. Of this amount, almost thirty-one percent (*f* 423 960) was derived from the alcohol *pachten*. The contribution of the *pachten* to the net profit during individual years during this decade fluctuated wildly, from twenty-four to forty-seven percent, but still indicates that the income the VOC derived, virtually effortlessly, from the *verpachting* of alcohol retail formed the single largest contribution to its direct income.[124] By the last decade of VOC rule at the Cape (1784-1794), the average annual income of the Company here was *f* 351 298 of which

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120 '… en gevolgelijck Compagnies domainen alhier ter plaetse daer door sooveel sijn verbetert, dat, na d' slechte constitutie van d' Caapse verarmde gemeente ons bedunckens heel wel gaen can, staende sodanigh voortaan alle jaren...'; CA, VC 8, 866.

121 In the 1670s the VOC management in the Netherlands seriously considered closing the Cape station due to the high costs of maintaining it. This has to be seen against the background of the reforms within the VOC during this period and the subsequent attempts at *bezuiniging*, cf. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, chapters four and five.

122 Böeseken, *Memoriën en Instructiën*, 151.

123 'De pachtpenningen … moeten gewisselyk voor de notabelste tak van inkomsten in dit Gouvernement gehouden worden'; Böeseken, 'Nederlandse Kommissarisse', 197.

124 Derived from an analysis of the figures provided in CA, LM 30, 66-85.

more than thirty-eight percent (*f* 134 891) derived from auctioning off the alcohol *pachten*. If one considers that a further ten percent of the VOC's income came from alcohol tax, the enormous contribution of the alcohol industry to the Company becomes clear.[125] In total, for the period 1685 to 1795, *pachters* offered the VOC almost *f* 6, 7 million for the right to retail alcohol (see chapter two),[126] which makes the alcohol *pachten* the single most significant sector of retail trade in early modern Cape Town, at least from the perspective of the authorities.

The importance of the *pacht* system to the Cape government is revealed by the various attempts of the latter to increase and expand the system, in the hope of increasing its income from it. Thus, as discussed above, the decision to *verpachten* a wide variety of other retail goods after the success of the first alcohol *pachten*. The decisions to divide the brandy and wine *pachten* into four parts, and later on to unite the wine *pachten* into a *generaele pacht*, should all be seen as part of the VOC's desire to increase its revenue from this easily exploitable system. Likewise, the introduction of a new alcohol *pacht* in the 1750s was probably the result of the desire to do something about the stagnating *pacht* prices as well as to exploit the increase in the volume of foreign ships calling at the Cape. As has been suggested by others, it was probably also due to the fear that this *pacht* had caused a decline in the income from the very profitable Cape wine *pacht* that caused it to be discontinued for two years in the 1780s.[127] The realisation that the *pachten* formed the best and easiest way to gain direct income for the local government came too late to be fully exploited: when commissioners-general Nederburgh and Frijkenius drew up recommendations to increase the Cape colony's income, they suggested expanding the system of *verpachting*. Not only were other management type *pachten* (after the example of the existing meat *pacht*) introduced (on bread, vinegar, dairy, vegetables etc) during 1792-1793, but they also suggested the establishment of a true tax-farm *pacht*, viz. to

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125 Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 58.

126 The actual income was likely somewhat lower since there are some cases of *pachters* being unable to pay their full *pachtpenningen*.

127 Van Duin and Ross, *Economy of the Cape Colony*, 52.

collect the ten percent tax on wheat.[128] Although the latter was not realised, the recommendation does illustrate how central *verpachting* had become to the Cape economy.

Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross have demonstrated that as regards alcohol production and retail, there was no 'stagnant, glutted market, or indeed … an economy little concerned with market opportunities.'[129] The system of alcohol *pachten* played a major role in the possibilities which this sector of the economy presented to the inhabitants of the Cape (which in turn was exploited by the VOC authorities).[130] There was clearly a market for alcohol at the Cape of Good Hope and both the producers and the retailers were geared to its possibilities. How entrepreneurs in Cape Town exploited these possibilities is the subject of the rest of this thesis.

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[128] Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 45-47 and Böeseken, 'Kommissarisse', 197-99. Already in 1711 commissioner Peter de Vos suggested that the Cape government should create a tax farm for the collection of the ten percent wheat tax, but the Council of Policy decided against this.

[129] Van Duin and Ross, *Economy of the Cape Colony*, 57.

[130] It also illustrates how burgher activities on the economic front were not only intertwined with, but were also, to a large extend, influenced by the larger aims and structures of the VOC empire and its mercantilist aims.

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CHAPTER 2

THE ALCOHOL *PACHTERS* AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1680-1795: A PROSOPOGRAPHY

Methodology and Sources

This thesis is based on a combination of the prosopographical method and the analysis of certain qualitative material. Prosopography entails 'the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives.'[1] A collective biography is built up by asking a uniform set of questions about each individual in a given group. Thus, by collecting seemingly isolated facts and information about a certain group of individuals, it is possible to discern long-term trends which reveal something about the structural and more general aspects of a society. Prosopography is often used in this way to uncover two sets of historical problems, viz. the working of political power, and the development of social stratification and the workings of social mobility in a given group or society. It is with this latter object in mind that this thesis focuses on the alcohol *pachters*: what can a study of their social patterns reveal about the larger forces at work in VOC Cape Town? In this aim and methodology, the thesis is influenced by the extensive work done on the development of social stratification and elite formation in the cities of the Dutch Republic – work which relied heavily on the prosopographical method.[2]

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1 L. Stone, 'Prosopography', in *idem*, *The Past and the Present Revisited* (London and New York, 1987), 45.

2 See L. Stone, 'Prosopography', 45-73 and F. Lequin, 'De Prosopografie', *Spiegel Historiael* 20 (1985), 543-46 for a general discussion of the uses and problems of the prosopographical method. For a discussion of how this methodology has been applied to studies of the urban elite during the Dutch Republic, see D.J. Roorda, 'Prosopografie, Een Onmogelijke Mogelijkheid?', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 94 (1979), 212-25 and J. de Jong, 'Prosopografie, Een Mogelijkheid: Eliteonderzoek tussen Politieke en Sociaal-Culturele Geschiedenis', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 111 (1996), 201–15. F. Lequin, 'Het Personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Azië in de Achttiende Eeuw, Meer in het Bijzonder in de Vestiging Bengalen' (unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 1982) is a pioneering study applying the prosopographical method to a VOC settlement. More recently, Roelof van Gelder has used prosopography to establish a profile of German writers in the VOC; see R. van

In order to perform prosopographical research, a fairly uniform serial source is needed. One such source is provided by the lease contracts every *pachter* had to sign, along with two sureties, when he or she bought a *pacht* – a large series of fairly uniform documents which has hitherto hardly been utilised by Cape historians. These contracts survived fairly completely for the period during which the alcohol *pacht* system operated at the Cape, 1680-1795.[3] There are, however, two *lacunae*: the years before 1688 and those from 1715 to 1727. Most of the period between 1715 and 1727 is covered by the existence of a volume which lists the details of the annual auction of the alcohol *pachten*.[4] Since for most years the details of the *pacht* auctions were also recorded in the *Dagregisters* (Daily Journals) of the Castle of Good Hope, as well as the Resolutions of the Council of Policy, the details for the period 1715 to 1718 could also be uncovered. The early years of the *pacht* system, before 1688, proved to be most difficult to research. However, by utilising a variety of sources, I could determine the names and details of all the *pachters* for this early period except for the year 1681.[5] In this way it was possible to build-up a database of all the individuals who invested in alcohol *pachten* at the Cape of Good Hope from 1680 to 1795. This data is presented in Appendix 1 and, in summary form, in table 2.5 below. In addition to the details of the *pacht*-holdings of the individual *pachters*, I also use genealogical data to determine the origins (and in later chapters, the marriage patterns) of the alcohol *pachters*.[6]

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Gelder, *Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in Dienst van de VOC (1600-1800)* (Nijmegen, 1997), esp. 53-70 and 289-97.

3 CA, C 2697-2729.

4 In fact, there are three such volumes covering 1718 to 1794 which usefully summarise the detail of the contracts; CA, C 2730-31 and RLR 163 (the latter volume is a continuation of the previous two but, for some reason, was not archived in the Council of Policy series in the Cape Archives).

5 Some *pacht* contracts were found in CA, ZK 8/1/12; while the details of most of the years could be found in the various *Dagregisters*; CA, C 1887, 1889 and 1893 as well as VC 8-9.

6 Genealogical data were derived from the following sources: C.C. de Villiers and C. Pama, *Geslagsregisters van die Ou Kaapse Families* (3 vols, Cape Town and Amsterdam, 1966); J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, *Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies* (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007); J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946), and E. Moritz, *Die Deutschen am Kap unter der Holländischen Herrschaft, 1652-1806* (Weimar, 1938).

The current chapter presents a brief overview of some significant patterns derived from an analysis of the data of all the alcohol *pachters* of the period 1680 to 1795. In the chapters to follow, more detailed prosopographies for smaller groups of alcohol *pachters*, relating to their career and marriage patterns, will be presented to help answer the questions raised by each case study.

Minor and Major Alcohol Pachters

From the inception of the alcohol *pacht* system in 1680 until the end of VOC rule in 1795, some 198 individuals were successful in bidding for the right to retail alcohol at the Cape of Good Hope (see table 2.5).[7] One would be mistaken, though, to view all of these people as a group apart with several characteristics in common. Clearly, the economic and social behaviour of those individuals who only ever bought one or two *pacht(en)* each, must have differed greatly from those who invested a considerable amount of money in alcohol retail over an extended period of time. But why did some individuals only ever invest in one or two alcohol *pachten* while others made a success of the opportunities this business afforded? The explanation for the existence of the former group lies in a number of factors.

Several *pachters* simply did not continue to invest in more alcohol *pachten* because death or some other disaster befell them. Thus, in September 1734 Jan Sprangel was murdered in his Rondebosch tavern by one of his customers, only three weeks after taking on only his second *pacht*.[8] Earlier that year Willem Raams also abandoned alcohol retail at the Cape shortly after buying his first *pacht* due to an impulsive decision to repatriate, caused more than likely by the early death of his wife

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[7] In a few cases investors sold their *pachten* to a third party (mostly a fellow *pachter*) some time after having bought them (or they died, necessitating a sale). This analysis is based on the data generated by the actual auctions of the *pachten* – in reality circumstances sometimes later caused people to give up *pachten* before the expiry of their terms, or paying less than the bid with which they won the *pacht*. As a result the picture presented here is a somewhat idealised one; although only very slightly since such cases were generally rare. All of these exceptions are noted in the 'Database of Alcohol *Pachters*, 1680-1795' presented in Appendix 1.

[8] J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946), 405 and G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734* (Pretoria, 1975), 167 note 151.

and tension with his family-in-law.[9] A different sort of 'misfortune' was brought upon himself by Godfried Meijhuizen who, after four years as a *pachter* was prevented from further investment because he was banished to Robben Island for cruelly murdering one of his slaves.[10] In all of these cases failure to continue investing in further *pachten* was related to personal misfortunes which befell these individuals (or were the result of their actions), rather than a lack of financial acumen or access to resources.

Yet others seemed to have been mere opportunists who tried their luck but failed due to a lack of the requisite skills and access to networks of financial support. Thus Jacobus Marshoorn was at the Cape for almost two decades before attempting to invest in an alcohol *pacht* in 1734. But he was ill-suited to this as his chequered career before this event indicates a lack of focus and drive: he variously worked as a cobbler and *tappersknecht* ('tavern servant') who was described by the governor a few years earlier as 'a loafer who lodges sailors and who is poor.'[11] He was no more successful in the alcohol retail business and, within a year of his experiment, he repatriated.[12] A similar case of failed opportunism relates to Noach Backer: after being in the VOC service as beadle (*koster*) of the local church, he became a free burger in 1725 and also tried to exist by lodging passing sailors. A few years later he too tried his luck at the alcohol *pachten* – within two months he realised this was a mistake as he sold his *pacht* to somebody else.[13] Clearly, in his case, taking on alcohol retail was just another desperate measure as a few months before this he had applied to be allowed to serve as a private undertaker.[14] In the event, Backer was not able to survive on his

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9 De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 311. See page 126 with note 81 below for Raams and his family.

10 Hoge, 'Personalia', 273 and CA, CJ 780, 1265-79. Meijhuizen was sentenced for life and died in 1701 while still on Robben Island.

11 'is een leegloper die matrose logeert en is arm'; L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte (eds), *The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732* (New Haven, 1990).

12 De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 366 note 148. The fact that he was a Dutchman who married an ex-slave woman may have made it difficult for him to gain entry into the alcohol retail business which at this time was dominated by a fairly tight-knit group of German immigrants; see pages 117-24 below.

13 *Ibid*., 375.

14 *Ibid*., 322.

own and returned to VOC service, yet again as beadle, shortly after selling his alcohol *pacht* – at least he was assured of a monthly income and a free house.[15]

Perhaps the largest group of these minor *pachters* consists of those who only invested in the *pachten* because of family ties. In some cases, it is clear that blood relations or in-laws bought alcohol *pachten* because of the success of their family. Their motivation is not always clear, but they were either inspired by the success of their relatives, or (perhaps more likely) were asked by their successful kin to buy *pachten* on their behalf, thus spreading their risks over several individuals. This will be seen in several of the case studies to follow, but a particularly good example is the family of Aletta de Nijs whose *pacht* investments included two sons-in-laws who each bought one *pacht* but who thereafter reverted to their other careers, leaving the alcohol retail business to their more successful relatives.[16] This great diversity in the motivations and careers of the minor *pachters* would make them a difficult – and perhaps not very rewarding – group to study for significant trends and patterns.

An altogether different group of people is formed by those who were sufficiently adept or successful to continue investing in the alcohol retail trade over a period of time. It seems likely that these individuals must have had some characteristics or abilities in common that set them apart from not only the less successful *pachters*, but also from Cape society at large. With the help of prosopography, it may be possible to discover some of these characteristics.

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Table 2.1: Number of *Pachten* Bought by Individual *Pachters*

No of *Pachten* Held	*Pachters* 1680-1795
1	73 (37%)
2	33 (17%)
3-5	41 (21%)

[15] He was paid *f* 12 per month as beadle, in addition to the free accommodation. He remained beadle until his death a few years later; G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739* (Pretoria, 1981), 28 and H. Storm de Grave, ''t Capitael der Caebsen Armen: Werking en Beleid van de Diaconie van Kaap de Goede Hoop, 1715-1725' (unpublished doctoraalscriptie, Free University of Amsterdam, 1996), 39.

[16] They were Michiel Daniel Lourich (1737) and Jan Biesel (1754). See pages 138-49 below on the De Nijs family's lengthy involvement in the malt beer *pacht*.

6-9	18 (9%)
10+	33 (17%)
Total	198

Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

However, the latter group is relatively small. The vast majority (seventy-five percent) of alcohol *pachters* invested in five or fewer *pachten*; with the majority of these only ever buying one or two *pachten* each (respectively thirty-seven and seventeen percent of the total number; see table 2.1). This means that the majority of alcohol *pachters* were likely to have been the sort of opportunists described in the preceding paragraphs – people who experimented with investing in alcohol retail but who, for a variety of reasons, chose not to repeat the experiment. Holding or investing in a *pacht* could not have had a major impact on the lives and behaviour of this group of minor *pachters*. One cannot therefore claim that *pacht*-holding contributed significantly to their social standing or social advancement.

This was, though, certainly not the case with the small minority of *pachters* (seventeen percent of the total) who invested in ten or more *pachten* over a number of years.[17] Between them, these thirty-three individuals paid sixty-three percent of the total amount of almost seven million guilders that the VOC received from the individuals who bought alcohol *pachten* between 1680 and 1795 (see table 2.2).

Table 2.2: *Pachters* who Invested in Ten or More *Pachten*, 1680-1795

Pachter's Name	Years Active[18]	No of *Pachten*	Total Invested
Bam, Jan Christiaan	1780-1792	13	131850

[17] If one takes the number of years between their first and last investment in an alcohol *pacht* (although they did not necessarily – although this was more often the case than not – hold *pachten* for *every* year between the terminal ones), these people held alcohol *pachten* for an average of fifteen years.

[18] For the period after 1699, the years in this column refer to *pacht* years, i.e. from 1 September the previous calendar year to 31 August of the year given (e.g. '1702' equates to 1 September 1701 to 31 August 1702). Before that, the *pacht* year coincided with the calendar year, except for 1699 when *pacht* contracts only ran from 1 January to 31 August.

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Bateman, Maarten	1763-1787	36	261000
Beck, Johann Zacharias	1723-1737	15	76625
Boetendagh, Carel Diederik	1731-1739	14 ½	77400
De Jong, Dirk	1756-1763	10	32600
De Kruger, Willem	1770-1786	19	142025
De Nijs, Aletta	1744-1762	17	14675
Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald	1708-1721	25	113270
Esselaar, Johannes Nicholaas	1762-1774	13	70375
Esser, Isaac	1719-1725	10	37450
Greijling, Jan	1753-1769	10	4400
Heufke, Johannes	1727-1731	10	47800
Hoesemans, Anthonij	1709-1723	31	152995
Holst, Jan	1740-1754	24 ½	166700
Hubner, Jochem Daniel	1740-1761	37	207225
Hugo, Daniel	1781-1793	13	677400
Leever, Abraham	1727-1758	28 ⅔	273076
Melck, Martin	1760-1781	32	604700
Mulder, Hendrik	1699-1711	11	41280
Pentz, Michiel	1736-1752	17 ⅔	46411
Phijffer, Johannes	1697-1711	21 ½	155775
Roep, Johannes	1767-1781	21	86875
Schreuder, Johan Jacob	1762-1790	39	160525
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen	1738-1752	13	25325
Steenbok, Rudolf Frederik	1714-1725	11	26900
Stokvliet, Jan Jacob	1725-1729	11	56150
Van der Spuij, Melt	1722-1733	20	76125
Van der Swijn, Jan	1732-1747	19 ⅔	123591
Van Dijk, Hendrik	1725-1734	11	45400
Van Leijpsig, Marthinus	1719-1728	10	25525
Van Schalkwijk, Theunis Dirksz	1683-1697	13	35600
Vermeij, Steven	1693-1705	12	132205
Wispelaar, Jacob	1788-1795	10	113700

Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

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The average personal investment in the alcohol monopolies by this group of major *pachters* amounted to almost *f* 129 000 – this in comparison with an average of just under *f* 12 000 for those who invested in five or fewer *pachten*; while the average amount invested for the one-timers came to just over *f* 6 000. The pattern here is a clear one: those who repeatedly invested in the alcohol *pachten* were also the ones who were successful in the alcohol retail business. It is important to keep the differences between these two groups in mind throughout the discussion in this thesis, and to this end I shall differentiate between them by referring to those who invested in ten or more *pachten* as the major *pachters*. It is this group of wealthy entrepreneurs who in some ways set the trends in Cape Town, as discussed in chapter six below, and who best exemplify the possibilities that the alcohol *pacht* provided the alert entrepreneur.

The Origins of the Alcohol Pachters

The world of the alcohol *pachters* at the Cape of Good Hope was one of immigrants, and a very German one at that. Only fifty-six of the total number of alcohol *pachters* whose place of origin could be determined (N = 187) were Cape-born,[19] which means that the vast majority (seventy percent) of them came to the Cape as immigrants. Among this latter group, those from the German-speaking lands[20] predominate: they form almost forty-three percent of all *pachters*, while the Dutch contingent only

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[19] This number includes those who were born elsewhere but came to the Cape as children with their parents. They were to all extent and purposes Cape burghers – not least of which was the fact that they did not work for the VOC before becoming free burghers, the crucial difference between Cape-born free burghers and the majority of those who came to the Cape as immigrants (the majority of immigrants came to the Cape as VOC-servants, although there was a small minority who immigrated to the Cape without ever having been VOC-employees).

[20] Naturally this is a broad 'cultural' indicator which does not correspond to a political or 'national' unit. The German-speaking areas of Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries correspond to parts of modern Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as Poland and the Baltic states; cf. J.E. Louwrens, 'Immigrasie aan die Kaap gedurende die Bewind van die Hollandse Oos-Indiese Kompanjie' (unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1954), 228.

makes up twenty-four percent; with a small number of French and Scandinavians being responsible for the remainder (see table 2.5).[21]

A chronological analysis of the origins of alcohol *pachters* reveals interesting patterns. Based on when a person first bought a *pacht*, the following picture emerges. Most of the Dutch *pachters*, thirty-two out of forty-four, entered the business before 1730 while the majority of Cape-born *pachters*, forty-three out of fifty-six, only started investing in the alcohol *pachten* after 1740. The latter trend is not unusual as one would expect greater involvement of Cape-born burghers in the second half of the eighteenth century as by then the number of second and third generation South African settlers had increased significantly.[22] However, the pattern becomes highly unusual when the German *pachters*' chronological spread is analysed: the majority of them (sixty-three percent) were active in the alcohol *pacht* business in the decades from 1710 to the end of the 1760s.

Table 2.3: Origins of Alcohol *Pachters* over Time

Period	Dutch	German	Cape	Other
1680-1709	16 (44%)	16 (44%)	2 (6%)	2 (6%)
1710-1769	25 (24%)	50 (49%)	24 (23%)	4 (4%)
1770-1795	3 (6%)	14 (29%)	30 (63%)	1 (2%)

Source: Genealogical Data

A breakdown of the figures for the three periods, 1680-1709, 1710-69 and 1770-95 shows that during the first period the number of Dutch and German immigrants who began investment in the *pacht* business were equal. During the second period, however, the Germans dominated (the combined number of Dutch and Cape-born *pachters* during this period was still lower than that of the Germans). During the last decades of VOC-rule, the *pachten* were dominated by Cape-born burghers; although there were still a substantial number of Germans entering the trade, yet very few

[21] The Dutch figure includes two persons from Flanders, while the German one includes someone of Swiss origin. There were four known French *pachters*, two Danes and a Swede.

[22] Cf. P. van Duin and R. Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Intercontinenta 7; Leiden, 1987), 114-15.

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Dutch (see table 2.3). When one considers that these figures only refer to those who *first* entered the *pacht* business and ignore those who continued their investments over a number of years, it is clear that throughout most of the eighteenth century Germans dominated the alcohol *pacht* business. This is proved by the fact that German *pachters* bought fifty-six percent of the total number of *pachten*, while the German *pachters* represent only forty-three percent of the total number of alcohol *pachters*.[23] This trend is also confirmed when one concentrates only on the top or major *pachters*, i.e. those who invested in ten or more *pachten*. Twenty of the thirty-two whose origins are known were Germans. Of the eight Dutch *pachters* in this category, only one entered the trade after 1740.

Are these figures surprising? Up to a certain extent they conform to what we know about immigration to the Cape during the VOC era. During the early decades of the settlement at the Cape, the majority of free burghers were indeed of Dutch origin.[24] One would, therefore, expect a greater predominance of Dutch *pachters* for the first few decades of the alcohol *pachten*. Indirect immigration to the Cape continued at a consistent level throughout most of the eighteenth century – primarily through VOC personnel who were stationed at the Cape and became free burghers.[25] Thus we know that 2 667 Company employees became free burghers at the Cape during 1657 and 1795. Of these, sixty percent (1 598) originated from the German-speaking lands. The vast majority (seventy-five percent) of these German immigrants came in the decades after 1706 and before 1779, and mostly around the middle decades of the century.[26] Thus, the majority of the (male) immigrants to the Cape

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23 This is based on the total number of *pachten* bought (N = 1041) minus those bought by people whose origins have not been established (1041 minus 48 = 993). Interestingly enough, the Dutch share in the total number of *pachten* bought corresponds with the percentage of Dutch *pachters* (both at about twenty-four percent). The Cape-born *pachters*, though, were less successful: although they made up thirty percent of all *pachters*, they only bought seventeen percent of the total number of *pachten* (see Table 2.5). This clearly indicates that German *pachters* were on the whole more successful than others, generally invested in more *pachten*, and usually over a longer period.

24 G.C. de Wet, *Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707* (Cape Town, 1981), 112.

25 R.C.-H. Shell, 'Immigration: The Forgotten Factor in Cape Colonial Frontier Expansion, 1658 to 1817', *Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Comparative Studies* 18 (2005), 3-13.

26 Louwrens, 'Immigrasie aan die Kaap', 239-40 and 248.

during the VOC period were German-speakers who arrived through indirect immigration.

These facts about immigration do not, however, sufficiently account for the dominance of Germans in the alcohol retail trade in the early and middle decades of the eighteenth century – if the origins of first-time *pacht* holders had reflected exactly the demographic realities of the VOC Cape, one would have expected greater numbers of Dutch and Cape-born burghers among the *pachters* of the first half of the eighteenth century. German immigrants undoubtedly dominated the alcohol retail business in Cape Town for most of the century; the reasons for which are to be found in other factors, as will be demonstrated in the chapters to follow.

Women Alcohol Pachters

The world of the alcohol *pachten* at the Cape was a largely male one. Yet the world of alcohol retail was exceptional in not being completely dominated by men, as was the case with most other economic activities at the Cape. Thus ten of the 198 *pachters* who were active during the VOC period were women (table 2.4). The hospitality business, and hence also alcohol retail, had been closely associated with women during the mediaeval and early modern periods, in both Europe and the colonial world. In fact, recent research has shown that tavern-holding during the early modern era was generally a family affair. The stereotypical picture is that of men attending to the (public) business and management of taverns while their wives were responsible for serving and dispensing drink and food, with their children often acting as barmaids and waiters.[27] But while there is undoubtedly truth in this, the reality was often considerably less clear-cut: in many cases husbands and wives took decisions together, and it is likely that in some cases it was really the wife who ran the business, yet used the husband to deal with the legal and official side of it, like obtaining the licence or, as was the case in the Cape, publicly bidding for the *pacht* at the annual

[27] On women and alcohol retail during this era, see J.M. Bennett, *Ale, Beer and Brewsters in England: Women's Work in a Changing World, 1300-1600* (New York and Oxford, 1996); S.V. Singler, *Taverns and Drinking in Early America* (Baltimore, 2002), 161-73; D.W. Conroy, *In Public Houses: Drink and the Revolution of Authority in Colonial Massachusetts* (Chapel Hill and London, 1995), 99-141 and K.S. Rice, *Early American Taverns: For the Entertainment of Friends and Strangers* (Chicago, 1983), 49-56.

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auction. That this was indeed the case, and was a generally known and accepted fact, is proved by a comment of the Council of Policy. In 1678 the Council summoned the current alcohol *pachters* to appear before it about changes to the *pacht* system, yet two of them did not come since they were away on business. Instead they sent their wives, who 'declared to be authorised by the same [their husbands] and to have full power of attorney.' Significantly, the Council added in parentheses to this statement: 'as we are also aware that they [these women] concern themselves the most with it.'[28]

Table 2.4: Women who Invested in the Alcohol *Pachten*, 1680-1795

Pachter's Name	Nationality	Years Active[29]	No of *Pachten*	Total Invested
Berdenis, Gerbregt (widow Mensink)	Dutch	1701-1711	7	19475
Bernard, widow (Sara Strand?)	Dutch?	1745	1	200
Coster, Maria (widow Feijt)	Cape	1728-1732	3	4000
Datis, Cecilia (widow Dumont)	French	1719-1720	2	760
De Bruijn, Christina (widow Botma)	Cape?	1720-1722	3	4030
De Nijs, Aletta (widow Honk)	Cape	1744-1762	17	14675
Odendaal, Judith (widow Reijndersz)	Cape	1790-1794	3	3950
Redox, Hilletje (widow Valckenrijck)	Dutch?	1680	1	1900
Truter, Anna Clofia (widow Keijser)	Cape	1788	1	11000
Van Dam, Josina (widow Stokvliet)	Cape	1730-1731	5	20525

Source: Genealogical Data; CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

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It is significant that all ten of the independent *pachter* women were widows at the time of first buying a *pacht* (see table 2.4). In at least eight cases, these women

[28] 'verclaerende van de selve [haar mannen] g'authoriseert en volmachtight te wesen' and 'gelijck ons oock bewust is dat haar daarmede wel meest bemoeijen'; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel II, 1670-1680* (Cape Town, 1959), 271-72. It seems likely that this was also the case later in the history of the alcohol *pachten*; the more so when the wife was a *pachter* herself, or had been married to one.

[29] See note 18 above.

invested in the same alcohol *pacht* as their late husbands had done.[30] Essentially they were continuing the trade of their husbands or, more simply, continuing the family trade. Early-modern Dutch society was characterised by the fact that 'single women and widows had the same freedom to trade or engage in commerce as did men.' This was the case because 'marriage under Dutch law was essentially a partnership' with equal ownership of properties.[31] The eight *pachter* widows who continued with their husbands' business were therefore not exceptional by early modern standards: in the Dutch Republic widows often took over their husbands' trade, especially where he had been an artisan who had built up a specialised skill, equipment and connections over time.[32] In some ways working in the alcohol business required specialised skills and knowledge, which would make it similar in some sense to an artisanal trade. This was certainly the case with the beer *pachters* at the Cape who were also involved in the production of their wares. Three of these women were the widows of malt beer *pachters*. This group includes Gerbregt Berdenis and Aletta de Nijs who were the two most active women *pachters* in the history of alcohol retail at the Cape.[33]

This suggests that, certainly in some cases, it was the wives who were really running the business even though the *pachten* were officially in their husbands' name

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30 The exceptions being Hilletje Redox, the widow of Jan Valckenrijck, whose late husband had had no known affiliation to alcohol retail. The other is a person who is identified in the sources only as 'the widow Bernard'. She can plausibly be identified as Sara Pietersz Strand from Amsterdam who had married Johannes Bernard of Cologne in 1710. He died in 1728 which meant that Sara Strand must have remained a widow for an exceptionally long time as she only remarried in 1753 to one Johann Georg Hansen, the cobbler of Stellenbosch (which is where she had had her tavern); Hoge, 'Personalia', 27 and 132.

31 M. Dickinson Shattuck, 'Women and Trade in New Netherland', *Itinerario* 18/2 (1994), 44.

32 A. Schmidt, *Overleven na de Dood: Weduwen in Leiden in de Gouden Eeuw* (Amsterdam, 2001), 143-54. This was also the case in Germany and other parts of Europe where the wives of master artisans were closely involved in the running of their husbands' businesses. Because of her familiarity with the business (and her close involvement over many years), and because remaining active in trade would prevent her family from becoming a burden to others, local governments were eager to allow a widow in charge of an established business to continue her trade; cf. M.E. Wiesner, 'Gender and the World of Work', in B. Scribner (ed.), *Germany: A New Social and Economic History, Volume 1: 1450-1630* (London, 1996), 222-23.

33 See N. Penn, *Rogues, Rebels and Runaways: Eighteenth-Century Cape Characters* (Cape Town, 1999), 15-16 and 21-34 on Gerbregt Berdenis's role in the malt beer *pacht*; and pages 138-44 below on that of Aletta de Nijs.

or, at the very least, that there was close co-operation between the two sexes. Clearly, these *pachter* women had to be well familiar with the alcohol *pacht* system before they could take on the risk of investing large sums in the alcohol *pachten* on their own. However, although the alcohol retail sector did see active participation from women, the figures suggest that it was difficult for a single woman to survive in the high-risk world of direct investment in alcohol retail.[34] The majority of these women bought *pachten* in their own name for only a short period; in fact, only three of them invested in more than five *pachten* over a number of years. And although Aletta de Nijs stands out as having invested in some seventeen *pachten* over almost twenty years, the combined investment from all ten of these women *pachters* was very small – just over one percent of the total amount of money invested in the alcohol *pachten* came from them.

This, though, does not mean that women did not fulfil a crucial role in the alcohol retail world of the Cape. Women served an important linking function between different holders of the same *pacht* and often they were the ones who assured continuity in *pacht*-holding. Thus at least four of these widows remarried,[35] whereupon their new husbands became the holders of the *pacht*. In this way, they essentially ensured keeping a *pacht* in the same family, even though three different names would appear in the records.[36] The centrality of women in the alcohol retail business at the Cape – by introducing and linking different people to the alcohol *pachten*, irrespective of whether or not they held any in their own name – is an important issue which will be discussed at greater length in the chapters to follow.

In summary: the large bulk of the *pachters* who controlled alcohol retail at the Cape between 1680 and 1795 were men who only ever invested in a small number of

[34] The impression one gets from court cases was that women (especially widows) often acted as tavern keepers or *bijtappers* for *pachters*. This would tie in with the situation elsewhere in the early modern world where alcohol retail was seen as a welfare measure to help women who had fallen on difficult times; cf. Schmidt, *Overleven na de Dood*, 134-36 and the references in note 27 above.

[35] They were Maria Coster, Aletta de Nijs, Judith Maria Odendaal and Josina van Dam.

[36] The best example of this is the history of Aletta de Nijs, see pages 138-49 below. But the same principle operated in the other cases as well: Maria Coster provided continuity in the holding of the malt beer *pacht* by linking Coenraad Feijt (1722-1727) and Godlieb Opperman (1730-1734). Likewise Judith Odendaal provided the continuity in the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein *pacht* between her first husband, Johannes Daniel Reijndersz (1783-1786), and her second one, Willem Geeringh (1795).

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pachten. At first men and women of Dutch descent played a prominent role in this business, but for most of the eighteenth century alcohol retail in Cape Town was dominated by German immigrants (see table 2.5). How some of these men and women managed to make a success of the alcohol *pacht* business, and what mechanisms they used to ensure financial success and social mobility, are the topics of the case studies in the chapters to follow.

Table 2.5: Alcohol *Pachters* at the Cape of Good Hope, 1680-1795

Pachter's Name	Nationality	No of *Pachten*	Years Active[37]	Total Invested
Adriaansz, Lambert		3	1700-1701	17000
Auret, Jeremias	Dutch	1	1783	8000
Backer, Noach	Dutch	1	1735	1375
Bam, Jan Christiaan	Cape	13	1780-1792	131850
Bam, Jan Andries	Cape	4	1782-1785	29600
Bateman, Maarten	German	36	1763-1787	261000
Beck, Johann Zacharias	German	15	1723-1737	76625
Berdenis, Gerbregt	Dutch	7	1701-1711	19475
Bernard, widow (Sara Strand)		1	1745	200
Beukes, Dirk	Cape	2	1787-1788	2950
Bierman, Frederik	German	1	1726	2250
Biesel, Jan	Cape	1	1754	1125
Boetendagh, Carel Diederik	German	14 ½	1731-1739	77400
Botma, Cornelis Stevensz	Cape	2	1688-1691	4150
Botma, Jan	Cape	4	1715-1719	9370
Bouwman, Hendrik	German	1	1700	5825
Broeders, Pieter	German	8	1758-1773	109100
Bruijns, Johannes	German	1	1753	1000
Coert, Claas	German	1	1762	2350
Combrink, Hermanus	Cape	2	1770-1774	1075

[37] See note 18 above.

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Conterman, Hans Jacob	German	9	1718-1734	7195
Coster, Maria	Cape	3	1728-1732	4000
Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz	Dutch	8	1701-1719	47050
Datis, Cecilia	French	2	1719-1720	760
De Beer, Jan Dirksz	Dutch	4	1686-1692	16500
De Bruijn, Christina		3	1720-1722	4030
De Goede, Jan	Cape	9	1784-1794	25130
De Jong, Dirk	Dutch	10	1756-1763	32600
De Kruger, Willem	German	19	1770-1786	142025
De Nijs, Aletta	Cape	17	1744-1762	14675
De Swart, Ernst Frederik	Dutch	1	1719	2450
De Vos, Gerrit Reijndersz		1	1751	900
De Vries, Hendrik	Dutch	1	1720	2000
De Waal, Jan	Dutch	1	1744	900
Deele, Johan Bernard	German	4	1749-1752	8125
Dempers, Willem	Cape	1	1775	600
Doman, Gabriel	German	1	1705	1100
Dreijer, Andries	Cape	1	1763	2750
Eberg, Bartholomeus	Swedish	5	1790-1795	50200
Eksteen Pietersz, Johannes Paulus	Cape	4	1790-1794	46800
Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald	German	25	1708-1721	113270
Esselaar, Johannes Nicholaas	German	13	1762-1774	70375
Esser, Isaac	Dutch	10	1719-1725	37450
Eversdijk, Hendrik	Dutch	2	1730-1736	2350
Feijt, Coenraad	German	3	1722-1727	3750
Frank, Dirk Gijsbert	Cape	5	1752-1755	15450
Frisnet, Guilliam	Dutch	2	1711-1712	14300
Gardieu, Jean	French	2	1704-1705	3220
Geeringh, Willem	Cape	1	1795	750
Gockelius, Nicolaas	Dutch	2	1715-1723	3150
Greijling, Jan	German	10	1753-1769	4400
Hartog, Philip sr	Cape	1	1763	500

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Heems, Guilliam	Flemish	6	1684-1687	28375
Heijns, Paul	German	5	1708-1713	44125
Herhold, Albrecht	German	4	1755-1758	2825
Hertzog, Johannes	Cape	1	1792	1700
Herwich, Johan Frederik	German	2	1792-1793	13200
Heufke, David	German	4	1706-1708	21150
Heufke, Johannes	German	10	1727-1731	47800
Heugh, Evert	German	3	1785-1795	50100
Hoesemans, Anthonij		31	1709-1723	152995
Holst, Jan Daniel	Dutch	3	1764-1773	7025
Holst, Jan	Dutch	24 ½	1740-1754	166700
Holtman, Johannes Casparus	German	2	1756-1766	5000
Holtsmit, Jan	Dutch	1	1685	1000
Honk, Hans Jurgen	German	8	1738-1743	5845
Hubner, Joachim Daniel jr	Cape	1	1795	9600
Hubner, Jochem Daniel sr	German	37	1740-1761	207225
Hugo, Daniel	Cape	13	1781-1793	677400
Hurling, Jan Frederik	German	9	1756-1759	26325
Hurter, Jan Willem	German	7	1763-1783	12550
Jansz, Cent	Dutch	2	1717	9700
Joubert, Josua	Cape	1	1787	18000
Joubert, Pieter sr	French	1	1728	6900
Kalteijer, Anthonij	German	2	1776-1777	2225
Kamp, Jacob	Dutch	1	1769	6100
Kannemeijer, Frederik	Cape	4	1789-1795	9250
Keijser, Jan Simon	German	7	1781-1786	64850
Kemp, Gerrit	Cape	1	1750	250
Kotze, Johan	German	2	1696-1702	10370
Laurik, Daniel	German	1	1737	2900
Le Roux, Gerrit	Cape	1	1789	7300
Le Roux, Jan jr	Cape	4	1736-1739	2825
Le Roux, Jan sr	Cape	2	17471748	400

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Le Roux, Johannes jr	Cape	1	1758	2300
Le Roux, Matthiam	Cape	5	1740-1744	1000
Lever, Abraham	Dutch	28 ⅔	1727-1758	273076
Loubser, Claas	Swiss	1 ½	1700-1718	7700
Luijt, Frederik	German	1	1752	125
Luijten, Jan	German	2	1793-1794	4950
Maartensz, Isaac	Dutch	7	1735-1741	42285
Maasdorp, Christiaan	German	6	1717-1726	8150
Marshoorn, Jacobus	Dutch	1	1735	2600
Matfeldt, Hendrik	German	9	1792-1795	109200
Meijboom, Claas	Dutch	4	1706-1717	8400
Meijburgh, Jan Lambertz	Cape	4	1716-1720	22800
Meijer, Gerrit	German	5	1704-1713	14285
Meijer, Hendrik	German	3	1771-1773	1675
Meijer, Pieter	French	9	1705-1713	20470
Meijhuijsen, Godfried	German	5	1691-1695	41110
Melck, Martin	German	32	1760-1781	604700
Mensink, Rutgert	Dutch	1	1700	2950
Mensink, Willem	Dutch	5	1701-1713	12075
Morkel, Philip	German	2	1713-1714	20800
Mulder, Hendrik	German	11	1699-1711	41280
Mulder, Jan Theunis	German	1	1791	19100
Munnik, Gerhardus	Cape	1	1779	48000
Munnik, Johannes Albertus sr	Cape	3	1741-1746	2500
Odendaal, Judith Maria	Cape	3	1790-1794	3950
Oortmans, Pieter Bertram	German	1	1716	1050
Opperman, Godlieb Christiaan	German	4	1730-1734	5225
Palmer, Hannes		1	1721	120
Pentz, Michiel	German	17 ⅔	1736-1752	46411
Phijffer, Johannes	German	21 ½	1697-1711	155775
Pijthius, Johannes	Dutch	8	1705-1714	51000
Pretorius, Johannes	Dutch	1	1682	900

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Raams, Willem	Dutch	1	1734	1375
Rabe, Christiaan	Danish	1	1739	1500
Rasp, Christiaan	German	1	1716	2600
Redox, Hilletje		1	1680	1900
Reijndersz, Johannes Daniel		2	1783-1786	1750
Roep, Johannes	German	21	1767-1781	86875
Rogiers, Jan	Dutch	2	1714-1726	9525
Rogiers, Tobias	Cape	4	1775-1778	9200
Roos, Francois Tielmansz	Cape	1	1794	8100
Rothman, Sebastiaan	German	1	1792	90000
Roux, Jeremias	Cape	1	1729	6100
Russouw De Wit, Frederik	German	8	1688-1696	77120
Scheffer, Hendrik	German	1	1722	30
Schenk, Joost	German	1	1717	2010
Schreuder, Johan Jacob	German	39	1762-1790	160525
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen	German	13	1738-1752	25325
Sebrits, Frans	German	4	1778-1782	2300
Smal, Jan Jurgen	German	1	1746	200
Smit, Carel	Cape	4	1791-1795	59500
Smit, Hendrik Evertsz	German	2	1680-1682	625
Smook, Jan	German	5	1763-1779	22450
Snijder, Jan Hendrik	German	4	1757-1759	14450
Spengler, Jurgen	German	2	1762-1769	4325
Spengler, Lodewijk	Cape	1	1780	18500
Spoor, Jan	Dutch	2	1718-1722	2775
Sprangel, Jan	German	2	1732-1735	1475
Steenbok, Rudolf Frederik	German	11	1714-1725	26900
Steijn, Jacobus	Cape	3	1714-1716	10525
Stokvliet, Jan Jacob	German	11	1725-1729	56150
Taute, Matthias Petrus	Cape	1	1792	18300
Thomasz, Hendrik	German	1	1731	750
Truter, Anna Clofia	Cape	1	1788	11000

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Truter, Hendrik	Cape	1	1786	19000
Valk, Cornelis	Dutch	2	1718-1720	4550
Van Aarden, Johannes	Cape	2	1759-1760	3700
Van As, Willem	Cape	1	1729	2625
Van Bochem, Jacob	Dutch	4	1721-1724	8900
Van Dam, Josina	Cape	5	1730-1731	20525
Van den Bergh, Jacobus Johannes	Dutch	4	1785-1791	291400
Van der Lint, Frederik		2	1707-1708	3995
Van der Poel, Pieter	Dutch	4	1703-1716	25070
Van der Spuij, Melt	Dutch	20	1722-1733	76125
Van der Swijn,Jan	Dutch	19 ⅔	1732-1747	123591
Van der Westhuijsen, Pieter	Flemish	1	1707	9400
Van Dieden, Willem	Dutch	2	1680-1682	7200
Van Dijk, Burgert	Cape	1	1734	360
Van Dijk, Hendrik	Cape	11	1725-1734	45400
Van Donselaar, Claas	Dutch	2	1724	11000
Van Hartmansdorf, Carel Hendrik	German	1	1736	1850
Van Helsdingen, Jan Hendrik	Cape	3	1728-1733	2170
Van Helsdingen, Johannes Guilliam	Cape	4	1781-1787	32000
Van Leijpsig, Marthinus	German	10	1719-1728	25525
Van Reenen, Jacob	German	1	1726	1950
Van Reenen, Jacobus Arnoldus	Cape	1	1789	9300
Van Reenen, Sebastiaan Valentijn	Cape	2	1788-1791	131500
Van Reenen, Willem	Cape	1	1782	32700
Van Schalkwijk, Theunis Dirksz	Dutch	13	1683-1697	35600
Van Straalen, Joris		2	1690-1691	6500
Van Wielligh, Hermanus	Cape	1	1754	3400
Vermeij, Steven	Dutch	12	1693-1705	132205
Victor, Gerrit	Dutch	8	1683-1690	30125
Victor, Jacobus	Cape	1	1700	5875
Vogel, Jacob	German	9	1697-1709	66090
Volraad, Jan	German	1	1767	2500

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Vooght, Johannes	German	1	1702	5650
Vos, Gabriel Jacobus	Cape	2	1794-1795	19950
Vrij, Jacob	German	1	1717	350
Weber, Hendrik	German	2	1784-1785	2975
Welcher, Hendrik	Dutch	1	1795	1500
Wendel, Hendrik	German	1	1710	3000
Wepener, Joachim Ernst	German	2	1747-1749	2025
Wiese, Benjamin	Dutch	1	1717	7300
Wilders, Casper	German	1	1685	950
Wilkens, Jan Willem jr	Cape	1	1776	2500
Wilkens, Jan Willem sr	German	1	1777	3000
Wimmer, Jacob	German	1	1764	2150
Wispelaar, Jacob	German	10	1788-1795	113700
Wolf van der Steur, Claas		1	1727	2000
Wolmarans, Joseph	German	1	1761	2175
Zaaijman, Bartholomeus	Cape	1	1749	150
Zeeman, Pieter	Cape	1	1786	9400
Zieteman, Godfried Christiaan	Danish	3	1762-1763	14075
TOTAL		1041		6737588

Source: Genealogical Data; CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

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CHAPTER 3

EARLY MODERN ENTREPRENEURS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CASE OF HENDRIK OOSTWALD EKSTEEN, 1702-1741

In June 1702 one Heinrich Oswald Eckstein, a twenty-four-year soldier in the service of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), arrived with the ship *Oostersteyn* at the Cape of Good Hope.[1] Here he became known as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen. Born in Lobenstein, in what was then Saxony, he grew up in a poor family who had been engaged for generations in the cottage industry or craft of cloth shearing (called *tuchscherers* in German).[2] In a rare insight into his pre-Cape life, Eksteen is recorded in 1735 as someone whose 'profession' had been wool farming 'in the fatherland.'[3] In 1695, when he was seventeen, both his parents and an uncle died, leaving him with two younger siblings. Around his twentieth year he decided – for some unknown reason, though possibly connected to the death of his parents – to join the mighty VOC.[4] In this he was no exceptional young man: thousands of his compatriots during this period left, for a variety of reasons, their familiar surroundings, their family and network of friends and kin, the communities which shared their language, religion and culture in order to travel to the coastal cities of the Netherlands.[5] Although the motivations for leaving their native German soil differed from individual to

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1 The *Oostersteyn* sailed into Table Bay on 12 June 1702 and left again on 7 July; J. Bruijn, F. Gaastra and I. Schöffer (eds), *Dutch Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (The Hague, 1979), vol. 2, 274-75 (no. 1883.4).

2 J.P.G. Eksteen, 'Enkele Aantekeninge oor die Familie Eksteen', *Familia* 6/2 (1969), 31-33.

3 G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739* (Pretoria, 1981), 10-11.

4 Eksteen, 'Enkele Aantekeninge', 33. At what point he left his two younger siblings to pursue his fortunes elsewhere is unknown. Given the chronology, it seems plausible that Eksteen may have undergone at least one return journey to the East Indies before the 1702 journey which deposited him at the Cape.

5 For a recent synthesis of the literature on this topic, see E. Kuijpers, *Migrantenstad: Immigratie en Sociale Verhoudingen in 17e-eeuwse Amsterdam* (Hilversum, 2005), 37-81.

individual, the biggest single cause was economic.[6] The almost continual wars which the German lands experienced during the seventeenth century resulted in economic and demographic upheavals with often deleterious effects on individuals. In personal and economic terms, particularly for young people, '[r]ecurring warfare meant the loss of calculable perspectives for the future', and many chose to search for better prospects elsewhere.[7] Nothing is known about the personal circumstances of Eksteen's departure from his native land.[8] But even so, a decision such as his was one with major consequences: on the one hand, he was sacrificing the security provided by his kinship and social networks, though on the other hand, by leaving his familiar surroundings and entering into new relationships – be they social, economic, personal – elsewhere, he increased the number of opportunities available for exploitation. This step represents a major risk for the individual concerned, and for many German immigrants who entered VOC service it was a mistake leading, more often than not, to a premature death in impoverished circumstances on foreign soil.

Not so with Eksteen. His success at the Cape can only be described as spectacular. His disembarkation may have been accidental, as he is listed with the *impotenten* ('powerless ones') in the Company Hospital on 1 July 1702.[9] But he decided to stay and became a free burgher in 1704. Within six years he was able to buy a prime farm. Eight years later, in 1718, he owned four farms, three houses and a cellar in Cape Town, sizeable livestock holdings and 46 slaves – his estate was valued

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6 See R. van Gelder, *Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in Dienst van de VOC (1600-1800)* (Nijmegen, 1997), 113-122 for a discussion of the motivations of German emigrants for joining the VOC.

7 B. Stier and W. von Hippel, 'War, Economy and Society' in S. Ogilvie (ed.), *Germany: A New Social and Economic History, vol. 2: 1630-1800* (London, 1996), 256.

8 Eksteen's leaving his ancestral town can plausibly be connected to his parents' death (although it is not certain when exactly he left Lobenstein, and how long he might have roamed about before joining the VOC), but was probably also motivated, directly or indirectly, by the upheavals caused by either (depending on when he left) the Wars of the Palatine (1688-97) or Spanish Succession (1701-13). More speculatively: Eksteen's decision to join the VOC could have been influenced either by stories from, or the book published in 1679 by, his fellow Lobensteiner, Johann Schreyer, who was stationed at the Cape during the 1670s. Cf. J. Schreyer, *Reise nach dem Kaplande und Beschreibung der Hottentotten, 1669-1677* in S.P. L'Honoré Naber (ed.), *Reisebeschreibungen von Deutschen Beamten und Kriegsleuten in Dienst der Niederländischen West- und Ost-Indischen Kompagnien, 1602-1797, vol. VII* (The Hague, 1931).

9 CA, VC 40, 39.

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at more than *f* 91 000.[10] He was without a doubt one of the wealthiest men at the Cape, a remarkable achievement for someone who, fourteen years earlier, was listed in the *opgaaf* (tax census) with no possessions.[11] By 1731 Eksteen was the richest free burgher at the Cape of Good Hope: seven farms, six town properties, one hundred slaves, extensive livestock, including a large stable of fifty horses, and very big investments in wheat and vines.[12] He was described at this time by Governor De la Fontaine simply as someone *die rijkelijk kan bestaan* ('who can exist wealthily'). This laconic expression obscures just how extraordinary this was by Cape standards: of the 938 people on De la Fontaine's list, only ten are described unqualifiedly as well-off or rich, i.e. without qualifying that they had debts. Only six of these were actually at the Cape (the others had repatriated) and of them it was Eksteen who was most active in economic terms.[13] By the time of his death in 1741 his estate had increased even further,[14] so much so that his widow had no need to remarry, and could raise and

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10 This was before debt amounting to *f* 24 500 was subtracted, but even then it was a big estate; CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93.

11 In 1705 the Eksteen household was listed as consisting of one adult male, one adult female and one boy who together owned *no* possessions worth listing in the *opgaaf* whatsoever. My thanks to Dr Hans Heese who shared with me his transcription of the 1705 *opgaaf* in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague.

12 L. Guelke and R. Shell, 'An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-1731', *Journal of Historical Geography* 9 (1983), 278.

13 There were 938 (including fifty-seven who had recently repatriated) individual householders commented upon in De la Fontaine's report. Three of the six at the Cape who were described as well-off or rich were widows (Beatrix Verweij, Geertruij de With and Helena Gulix). The two men who were thus described along with Eksteen, were Jan de With and Johannes Cruijwagen. The latter was Eksteen's one time brother-in-law who had shortly before the compilation of the report inherited one third of his father's large estate; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 19. See L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte (eds), *The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732* (New Haven, 1990).

14 According to the 1741 *opgaaf*, 'he had doubled the size of his stable and increased his slave holdings by 25%', Guelke and Shell, 'Early Colonial Landed Gentry', 278. Unfortunately there exists no inventory of his estate after his death. Eksteen requested in his will that his estate not be broken up and that it be handled *en famille* with no interference from the Orphan Chamber or other officials. His wife was to be the sole executor and had to ensure that their children would get their rightful portion of their inheritance. To this end an inventory and evaluation had to be drawn up, but it seems likely that it was not deemed necessary to lodge it with any official body like the Orphan Chamber or Council of Justice. The fact that Eksteen left his wife in sole control of his large estate and that they had ten minor

establish their ten minor children on her own. An indication of how enormous Eksteen's estate must have been is provided by the fact that when his widow died more than forty years later – and after providing their thirteen children with their rightful inheritance as they reached the age of majority – she did so as a very rich woman in her own right.[15]

With the exception of the better-known Martin Melk, Eksteen's career as a free burgher probably has no equivalent at the eighteenth century Cape, and it is remarkable that it has hitherto received relatively little attention from historians.[16] The most extended discussion of his economic activities and achievements occurs in Guelke and Shell's article about the rise of an early colonial landed gentry at the Cape. Here Eksteen serves as an example of one of the 'many aggressive and upwardly mobile individuals.' [17] In their argument Eksteen illustrates how the Cape gentry – some of whom, like Eksteen, were parvenus – built up capital (in the form of

children at the time, probably explains why his widow never remarried; cf. CA, CJ 2650, 253-59 for his will of 1739.

15 CA, CJ 2677, 396-438 (1784). She owned a residential house and three rented houses in town; four farms in Rondebosch and Tijgerberg (where she seems to have bred goats and horses) and 49 slaves. Her estate had in cash the equivalent of more than *f* 20 000 while it was owed a phenomenal amount of *f* 121 990 by creditors, including the VOC itself who had an *obligatie* (debenture) of *f* 46 500. This indicates that she must have acted as a rentier.

16 Although both are 'rags to riches' stories, there is a significant difference in their rise to wealth: Melck's early career at the Cape did reveal entrepreneurial activities, but he was suddenly catapulted to wealth and instant acceptance in the Cape gentry by marrying a wealthy widow; see G.A. Cockrell, 'Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984) and pages 156-59 below. Eksteen, on the other hand, had a much slower and more staggered rise to wealth and social prestige. Unlike Melck, he had no lucky breaks.

17 Guelke and Shell, 'Early Colonial Landed Gentry', 277. Their portrayal of Eksteen has been followed by others, for example, Karel Schoeman, *Armosyn van die Kaap: Die Wêreld van 'n Slavin, 1652-1733* (Cape Town, 2001), 688 and *idem*, *'n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en Loopbaan van Hendrik Schoeman* (Pretoria, 2004), 215-16. There are short entries for Eksteen in J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946), 86 and E. Moritz, *Die Deutschen am Kap unter der Holländischen Herrschaft, 1652-1806* (Weimar, 1938), 228-29 though likewise not without their errors. Even the useful entry for Eksteen in J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, *Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies* (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007), vol. 2, 174-77 contains a number of mistakes.

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land) and labour (in the form of slaves) which formed the basis of their wealth. These individuals are seen as essentially landed capitalists who consolidate and expand their wealth through agricultural activities. In their account of Eksteen's activities, Guelke and Shell make no attempt to explain how it was possible for this man who came to the Cape with no capital to be economically so successful; nor do they account for the mechanisms which enabled his capital base of, say 1718, to grow to what he had by 1731. Although this is partly due to the fact that their overview of Eksteen's economic activities is incomplete and in some cases misleading,[18] it is mainly the result of the fact that their approach to the establishment of wealth at the Cape is not applicable in the case of parvenus like Eksteen. Or, at the very least, analysing Eksteen's activities in terms of capital accumulation cannot account for his spectacular rise, especially in the early part of his career.

Eksteen's achievement can only be understood when his whole life course is considered in detail. This enables the historian to perceive the mechanisms which made it possible for Eksteen to achieve his successes. In addition, it allows the historian to discover how Eksteen's individual actions can be related to larger structural and systemic forces in place at the Cape. It is crucial, therefore, to view Eksteen's activities within the immediate context of the Cape of Good Hope, but also within the contexts of the VOC world and the workings of the early modern economy. Moreover, it would be wrong to concentrate only on Eksteen's economic activities. As will become clear, his success in this field was wound up with both his personal and public lives.

When considered in this fashion, it is evident that every action of Eksteen's must have contributed in some way or the other to his success. The first momentous decision was to leave his home in Lobenstein, which indicates an ability and willingness to take on risks. This opened up a number of opportunities, one of which was to join the ranks of the VOC. Accepting a position in the Company once again came with risks (not least of which was the loss of life and limb) but also brought with it a whole gamut of possibilities and opportunities. One of these was to disembark at the Cape and to decide to remain here. In all of this early experience of

[18] They are for instance unaware of Eksteen's involvement in the alcohol *pachten*, thereby missing an important clue to his success.

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and within the Company, Eksteen gained knowledge, experience[19] and became acquainted with a large number of people – even if only very briefly and superficially. But enough is known from similar cases about how important these early experiences in Holland and aboard VOC ships were for German immigrants to be sure that, for Eksteen too, despite the absence of positive information, this must have been a formative and important experience.[20] The most momentous decisions of the young Eksteen's life, occurred in 1704 when he became a free burgher at the Cape and married a local woman.

Capital, as Ludwig von Mises famously remarked *pace* Karl Marx, does not 'beget profit.'[21] Entrepreneurial activities and decisions do, however. Although Guelke and Shell once refer to Eksteen as an 'entrepreneur',[22] they do not analyse his enterprises within a framework of entrepreneurship. Seeing Eksteen rather as a foremost exemplar of an early modern entrepreneur provides the historian with both the theoretical framework to explain the mechanisms of Eksteen's success, *and* the ability to see the connections between Eksteen's economic activities, his personal and public life, and to relate all of these subjective factors to the larger context. The aim of this chapter, then, is to present a theoretical framework which would enable the historian of eighteenth-century Cape society to analyse and understand the activities of men like Eksteen in a more complete and nuanced fashion. In doing so, Eksteen's life is used as a superstructure, not only because he is such an outstanding example of a Cape entrepreneur, but especially because his life is so well documented.

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19 One thinks here of him, *inter alia*, improving his Dutch; learning about the monetary system of the Dutch empire, and expanding his knowledge of humanity.

20 Cf. R. van Gelder's remarkable study of *Naporra's Omweg: Het Leven van een VOC-Matroos, 1731-1793* (Amsterdam and Antwerp, 2003) and, for some Cape examples, Schoeman, *'n Duitser aan die Kaap*.

21 L. von Mises, 'The Entrepreneur and Profit', in: R. Swedburg (ed.), *Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View* (Oxford, 2000), 97. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx conflated capitalists with entrepreneurs; for a critique, see M. Blaug, 'Entrepreneurship Before and After Schumpeter', in *idem*, *Economic History and the History of Economics* (Brighton, 1986), 219-22.

22 Guelke and Shell, 'Early Colonial Landed Gentry', 278.

Eksteen the Entrepreneur: What and How?

In describing the isolated retail market that operated in the Cape during the 1730s – a market which depended on the irregular supply of retail goods from visiting ships – Mentzel provides us with the following example of Eksteen's economic activities:

> Another article of common use [in addition to tobacco] that is liable to equally rapid fluctuation in price is soap. I can instance the case of a burgher called Eckstein who laid in a stock of 20,000 lbs. at 6 stuivers[23] per lb. at a time when the market was glutted, owing to an unusually large number of shipments that came in within a short space of time. Some six weeks later it became known that no fresh soap was likely to arrive within the next three months, and then this astute speculator sold out at 20 stuivers per lb., netting within a short while a profit of *f* 14,000.[24]

This seemingly straightforward account of the economic reality at the Cape contains within it almost all the elements with which to define the notion of 'entrepreneur'.

All economic activity is subject to uncertainty.[25] At the time of Mentzel's incident, the consumers of soap could not foretell how long the good supply would last. It is this uncertainty that Eksteen exploited for his own profit. According to Mises it is precisely this exploitation of uncertainty which results in profit or loss, *not* capital investment. What Eksteen had done, was to judge 'the future prices of products more correctly than other people do [and to buy] some or all of the factors of production at prices which, seen from the point of view of the future state of the market, [were] too low.'[26] This is what an entrepreneur does: to make decisions or,

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23 There were twenty *stuivers* to a guilder.

24 O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope* (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 2, 76.

25 F.M. Scherer, *Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance* (Second ed., Boston, 1980), 29.

26 Mises, 'Entrepreneur and Profit', 89. The converse, however, also holds: if the entrepreneur misjudges the future prices, the result would be a loss. This means that 'one entrepreneur's error basically creates another entrepreneur's opportunity' and implies that entrepreneurs can learn from

phrased differently, to exploit opportunities.[27] As theoreticians of entrepreneurship have shown, profit (or loss) arises from entrepreneurs who notice and exploit opportunities created by uncertainties inherent in the market.[28] What distinguishes entrepreneurs from other people is not their possession of specific skills or forces of production, but their *behaviour*. What had set Eksteen apart from others was his ability to correctly anticipate 'uncertain events'[29] (i.e. his spotting of the opportunity), his willingness to act on this[30] (i.e. his grasping of the opportunity) and, finally, his decision to act on this knowledge (i.e. to exploit the opportunity). In general, it is this decision process which distinguishes an entrepreneur from other people.

Eksteen was an entrepreneur because he grasped and exploited opportunities like the one described by Mentzel. How did he manage to do that? Through his access to different types of information and knowledge: Eksteen's long experience of Cape circumstances had taught him that fresh soap was a commodity in constant demand, but that supply of it could be erratic at times. So when there was a glut (instead of assuming like the other inhabitants of the Cape that it would last), he used his knowledge of the opportunity as well as the suspicion (undoubtedly based on previous experience) that the supply would drop to buy up the existing stock. He needed, of

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their own errors; R. Swedburg, 'The Social Science View of Entrepreneurship: Introduction and Practical Applications', in: *idem* (ed.), *Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View* (Oxford, 2000), 23.

27 Cf. Mises, 'Entrepreneur and Profit', 97: 'It is the entrepreneurial decision that creates either profit or loss. It is mental acts, the mind of the entrepreneur, from which profits ultimately originate. Profit is a product of the mind, of success in anticipating the future state of the market. It is a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon.'

28 'Opportunity' is necessarily a relativistic concept since opportunities vary over time and from person to person. H.J. Stevenson and J.C. Jarillo, 'A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial Management', *Strategic Management Journal* 11 (1990), 23 define 'opportunity' in this context as 'a future situation which is deemed desirable and feasible.'

29 Swedburg, 'Social Science View', 20 summarises Mises' definition of entrepreneurship as 'anticipations of uncertain events.' For a discussion of Mises' work on entrepreneurship, see R.L. Hébert and A.N. Link, *The Entrepreneur: Mainstream Views and Radical Critiques* (2nd ed., New York, 1988), 127-30.

30 Mises did not dwell on the importance of the willingness of the entrepreneur to grasp an opportunity. Several people can notice an opportunity, but it is only the entrepreneur who is willing to take on the risk and goes on step further, namely to act on the opportunity arising. Thus Stevenson and Jarillo, 'Paradigm of Entrepreneurship', 17-27, consider the willingness to pursue opportunities as the defining characteristic of entrepreneurs.

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course, a capital layout of *f* 6 000 but the possession of that money is not the central issue in this entrepreneurial activity: a person with a confident expectation of success could probably have loaned the money.[31] Crucial for the success of this venture, was first of all knowledge of the opportunity and, secondly, making the decision to grasp it.

Thus it is knowledge which enables an entrepreneur to grasp opportunities. Friedrich Hayek has argued cogently about the importance of knowledge to economic activities. Since in any given situation a person's knowledge of that situation does not correspond with the facts – i.e. knowledge is of necessity imperfect – it means that there is a need 'for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired.'[32] Moreover, knowledge is dispersed and nobody has it in its totality.[33] The consequence of the fact that different kinds of knowledge exist is that a person's possession of or control over knowledge can be used to his or her advantage. In order to bring home this point, Hayek stresses that 'scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge', and makes a powerful case for the existence of

> a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active co-operation.[34]

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31 Cf. Mises, 'Entrepreneur and Profit', 95: 'Those who know how to take advantage of any business opportunity cropping up will always find the capital required' and Stevenson and Jarillo, 'Paradigm of Entrepreneurship', 23: Entrepreneurs 'pursue opportunities without regard to the resources they currently control.' Likewise, I.M. Kirzner, *Competition and Entrepreneurship* (Chicago and London, 1973), 38-39 argues that entrepreneurs do not require 'means' in order to make decisions, i.e. to grasp opportunities. This was already recognised by Richard Cantillon, an early theoretician of entrepreneurship, in the first half of the eighteenth century; Hébert and Link, *The Entrepreneur*, 25-26.

32 F.A. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', in: *idem*, *Individualism and Economic Order* (London and Henley, 1976), 91.

33 *Ibid*., 77-78.

34 *Ibid*., 80.

He defines this knowledge as the 'knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of special circumstances'; which relates closely to how anthropologists define 'local knowledge.'[35] It was Eksteen's possession of local knowledge about the circumstances at the Cape, the characteristics of its market and, possibly, 'insider' knowledge about current sources of soap supply[36] which had enabled him to exploit the opportunity.

The ideas of Mises and Hayek were later combined and expanded by Israel Kirzner in his work on modern entrepreneurship. For Kirzner, entrepreneurship revolves around three notions: imperfect knowledge, opportunities and alertness. The fact that in the real economic world every actor suffers from imperfect or incomplete knowledge means that, since 'the participants in this market are less than omniscient, there are likely to exist at any given time a multitude of opportunities that have not yet been taken advantage of.' Thus, in addition to local knowledge, Eksteen possessed 'alertness' – the ability to spot relevant new information or resources – which enabled him to make decisions about new profit opportunities. Hence Kerzner's definition of an entrepreneur as 'a decision-maker whose entire role arises out of his alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities.'[37]

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35 *Ibid*. Clifford Geertz, in arguing that 'law is local knowledge not placeless principle', echoes what Hayek argued for economic activity: that it is not driven by knowledge of abstract theory, but by actors on the ground operating on the basis of local knowledge. Geertz's notion of local knowledge is contained in this statement about law: 'Law … is local knowledge, local not just to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to accent – vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings of what can'; C. Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective', in: *idem*, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, 1983), 215 and 218.

36 At this stage Eksteen was a meat *pachter* who routinely had to supply meat to visiting ships, so could have learned of it via that; or, alternatively, in the course of his duties as burgher councillor who sat in on the meeting of the Council of Policy.

37 Kirzner, *Competition and Entrepreneurship*, chapter two; quotes from 39 and 41. It is a much discussed issue in studies of entrepreneurship whether or not there is something like an entrepreneurial type of personality; i.e. is this special 'alertness' entrepreneurs have some personal characteristic unique to some individuals and not to others? Cf. R.H. Brockhaus sr. and P.S. Horwitz, 'The Psychology of the Entrepreneur', in D.L. Sexton and R.W. Smilor (eds), *The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 25-48; and Swedburg, 'Social Science View', 32-34 for the challenges and problems associated with this type of research.

How far can these theoretical perspectives be applied to the world of VOC Cape Town? The preceding paragraphs have suggested a way in which to view the activities of a person like Eksteen. It is my contention that the economic success of Eksteen at the Cape can be more plausibly described *and* understood with reference to entrepreneurship, rather than to capital accumulation. In order to explicate this point, I present here the conceptual tools with which to do so, followed by an analysis of Eksteen's economic activities.

Early Modern Entrepreneurship: Risks, Profits and the Uses of Capital

At about the same time as Eksteen was successfully exploiting economic opportunities at the Cape, Richard Cantillon was reflecting in his *Essai sur la Nature de Commerce en Général* (published posthumously in 1755) on the role of entrepreneurs in the economy. For Cantillon the entrepreneur was the link in the chain of distribution between producers and consumers. Since individuals do not have perfect foresight about the future, entrepreneurs have to exercise their business judgment. This means that the willingness to take on risk and uncertainty becomes the distinguishing feature of an entrepreneur. Because the entrepreneur is willing to take on risks in order to make goods available at a given time and place, he functions as the central actor in the economy who continually deals with uncertainty in his economic decisions. Hence, entrepreneurs are people 'who engage in market exchanges at their own risk in order to make a profit.'[38]

Although modern economists differentiate between 'true' uncertainty and risk (the latter is something which can be insured against), the fact remains that entrepreneurial success depends on successfully taking a chance or gambling on a true uncertainty, such as predicting demand.[39] Profit, Frank Knight stated, is the result of 'a unique uncertainty resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility which in its

[38] Hébert and Link, *The Entrepreneur*, 19-28, quote from 21.

[39] This argument is associated with Frank Knight's 'uncertainty theory of profits.' Subsequently economists have differentiated further between 'uncertainty' and 'radical uncertainty'; on Knight's theory, see Blaug, 'Entrepreneurship', 224-25 and Hébert and Link, *The Entrepreneur*, 95-99.

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very nature cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried.'[40] The converse, however, also holds: entrepreneurial misjudgement can lead to loss.

P.W. Klein, the foremost scholar of early modern Dutch entrepreneurship, has identified 'the elementary features of entrepreneurial behaviour' as, first, 'the management and administration of relatively scarce economic resources' through 'planning on the basis of a mixture of rational calculation and inspired intuition in the face of competition under constantly changing market conditions.' This implies the second feature, namely taking the responsibility for risks, which in the case of early modern entrepreneurs meant 'the risks peculiar to creative optional choices between change and continuity, adaptation and originality, tradition and innovation.' Thus, the entrepreneur has to decide on 'the optimal position of the enterprise on a continuum between the two poles of security and uncertainty.' For this reason Klein argues that the early modern entrepreneur's central task was 'to balance risks and profits.'[41]

Uncertainty was all pervasive in the world of early modern business. This was particularly the case with one of the most important aspects of entrepreneurship, namely access to information. Due to the slow and unpredictable nature of the movement of news and knowledge, entrepreneurs were often unable to make proper risk analysis and could not always adapt in time to changing circumstances. Hence, Clé Lesger's characterisation of early modern entrepreneurship as 'calculated gambling'. Early modern transport was slow and dangerous, which resulted in a number of consequences for entrepreneurs, not least of which could be slow payment leading to problems with cash flow. In addition, early modern markets were small and unstable, with the result that determining demand was an even greater uncertainty then than in the modern economy.[42] This was clearly the case at the Cape where the

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40 Quoted from Hébert and Link, *The Entrepreneur*, 98. This was written apropos the question of whether or not the entrepreneur is also a capitalist. Like Cantillon, Knight argued that although the entrepreneur could be a capitalist, the essence of entrepreneurship does not lie in the possession of capital, but in the entrepreneur's behaviour.

41 P.W. Klein and J.W. Veluwenkamp, 'The Role of the Entrepreneur in the Economic Expansion of the Dutch Republic', in K. Davids and L. Noordegraaf (eds), *The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age: Nine Studies* (Amsterdam, 1993), 28.

42 On uncertainty and risk, see C. Lesger, 'Over het Nut van Huwelijk, Opportunisme en Bedrog: Ondernemers en Ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne Tijd in Theoretisch Perspectief', in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), *Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden* (Amsterdam,

success of investment in the alcohol retail trade depended crucially on the size of visiting fleets and the length of their stay-overs.[43]

However, the fact that the early modern business world was one in which risks and uncertainties were plentiful must be seen in conjunction with the social and cultural nature of that world. Although entrepreneurship revolves around personal gain, another dimension has to be added to it where it concerns the early modern world, at least in the case of the Dutch world. Thus Veluwenkamp and others have shown that Dutch entrepreneurial enterprises were mostly family businesses founded on family capital. Entrepreneurs were motivated as much by their social environment as by a desire for profit. This includes a concern over the standing and future of the family. As a result of this, continuity became a very important factor influencing economic decisions. Since the social and economic position of the family had to be maintained and improved, it follows that an entrepreneur should not unnecessarily risk the economic, and hence social, downfall of the family. The aim of an entrepreneur in such circumstances was, then, to realise 'the largest trading results possible' while 'safeguarding the continuity of the enterprise.' One of the consequences of this was that entrepreneurs tended to invest in enterprises which promised both profit and continuity.[44] In general, early modern entrepreneurship was characterised by the subordination of profit maximisation to long-term stability.[45]

How, then, did early modern entrepreneurs manage to diminish risks and minimise uncertainties? One way was to build up human capital, i.e. one's skills and knowledge.[46] An entrepreneur needed to have knowledge of the market and of the commodity he traded in, of the nature of that commodity, of prices, demand, supply and possible markets. Hence, personal experience could play a major role, but also the ability to learn from others, and to identify and exploit human capital in others. For

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1996), 66-69; L. Kooijmans, 'Risk and Reputation: On the Mentality of Merchants in the Early Modern Period', in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds), *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market* (The Hague, 1995), 28-29 and R. Grassby, 'Social Mobility and Business Enterprise in Seventeenth-Century England', in D. Pennington and K. Thomas (eds), *Puritans and Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth-Century History Presented to Christopher Hill* (Oxford, 1978), 368-69.

43 Cf. the discussion on pages 37-41 above.

44 Klein and Veluwenkamp, 'Role of the Entrepreneur', 36-38.

45 Cf. Kooijmans, 'Risk and Reputation', 30 and Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 71.

46 J. Field, *Social Capital* (London, 2004), 50-51.

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this reason early modern entrepreneurs often specialised in a specific commodity or range of commodities.[47] Another, more tangible, form of protecting one's position was to spread one's investments. Although entrepreneurs tended to specialise in one area or industry, they were not averse to speculate in some other field if the profit margins seemed good, but this was mostly *ad hoc* and was never a major investment. In general, Dutch entrepreneurs diversified their estates by investing part of it in business, part in stocks and bonds and part in land and property. An entrepreneur had to weigh up the different advantages of his investments since higher profits were to be made from high risk ventures while safe investments such as in land yielded very low but stable interest.[48]

Business, however, is not purely a matter of markets and investments; it is first and foremost a social phenomenon where individual people interact with one another.[49] Entrepreneurs are perhaps more than any other actors in the economy people-centred since they are mediators between producers and consumers. In the early modern high-risk context of doing business, trust was a crucial commodity. Trust can lead to loyalty from customers; open up new opportunities through recommendations; and provide credit. Hence, Veluwenkamp's statement that '[t]rust was perhaps even more important than capital, the main function of which indeed was … to generate trust, and thereby credit. Money is trust; the equation is reversible.'[50] In practical terms this translated into a preference for doing business with family members, people from the same town or area, or of the same background. Foreigners, in this context, were people whose behaviour was unpredictable, thereby increasing one's risks. Another result was that reputation became a crucial resource. Reputation was something that had to be earned – and it was something that only existed in a

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47 Klein and Veluwenkamp, 'Role of the Entrepreneur', 41-42.

48 W. Frijhoff and M. Spies, *1650: Bevochten Eendracht* (The Hague, 1999), 19-20; P. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Elites* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1994), 62-70.

49 Cf. M. Vaughan, 'The Character of the Market: Social Identities in Colonial Economies', *Oxford Development Studies* 24 (1996), 61-77.

50 Klein and Veluwenkamp, 'Role of the Entrepreneur', 41. For an application of this to the Cape, see chapters four and six below.

social context. Consequently, someone with a good reputation could be trusted, and was deemed credit worthy. The converse, however, also held.[51]

Trust and reputation are both related to the final, and perhaps most important, resource for early modern entrepreneurs, namely their social capital. This notion is related to that of human capital in that both were at first used metaphorically: as with physical capital, the idea was that a person could invest in it and expect a profitable return on this investment. Like capital, it can be accumulated and exploited. However, this metaphor does not work quite as well for social capital as there is no direct relationship between inputs and outputs and its value cannot be measured in terms of currency.[52] Yet subsequent research has led to the development of a useful concept, defined by H.D. Flap as 'an entity, consisting of all expected future benefits derived not from one's own labor, but from connections with other persons.'[53] Central to this definition is connections with other people, the results of which can be beneficial to an individual.[54] Robert Putnam's definition shows both what social capital consists of, and how it can be used: social capital consists of 'features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and network, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.'[55]

Being part of networks is central to building up social capital. Knowing a large number of people means greater access to credit and information, both of which are crucial for identifying and exploiting business opportunities. But in order for people to cooperate, they need not only to know one another, but also to trust one another. This in turn implies certain norms and expectations, which relate to the crucial role of

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51 Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 72; Kooijmans, 'Risk and Reputation', 30-32. Cape *pachters*' concern with reputation is discussed on pages 181-86 below.

52 Field, *Social Capital*, 3, 9 and 12.

53 H.D. Flap, 'Patronage: An Institution in its Own Right', in M. Hechter, K.-D. Opp and R. Wippler (eds), *Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects* (New York, 1990), 232.

54 Pierre Bourdieu's definition is similar: 'Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word'; P. Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', in J.G. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (New York, 1986), 248-49.

55 Quoted in Field, *Social Capital*, 4.

reputation – mediated through third parties. Having a good social network is crucial for starting an economic enterprise, but it is also important for management and growth since networks give easy access to economic resources which would otherwise only be obtainable at great(er) cost (for example, obtaining capital through formal bodies; needing to draw up formal contracts, etc).[56]

How does one acquire social capital? By helping and giving to others, who are thereby indebted. Such direct ties do not need to be the result of intentional acts but can get built up unconsciously over time. There are also indirect or weak ties with acquaintances and other people which are the 'by-products of actions directed towards other goals.'[57] Thus social capital can be built up through the course of ordinary work experience. The extent of one's social capital gets determined by three factors: (1) the size and scope of one's social network; (2) the resources these friends and family have at their disposal, and, equally crucial, (3) their willingness to make these resources available.[58] All of these factors played a role in achieving Eksteen's economic and social success at the Cape of Good Hope.

Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Alcohol and the Free-Black Community

Viewed against this background, *everything* in Eksteen's life – every experience, every acquaintance, every bit of knowledge he picked up – contributed in one way or another to his success. It is plausible that he kept up links with his home country or, more likely, that he used his ethnicity as a point of connection with other Germans in Cape Town.[59] Certainly his early years at the Cape indicate that this was the case. During his first two years at the Cape Eksteen seems to have had close contact with the free-black community: he procreated at least two illegitimate children, both born around 1704, the year in which he became a free burgher, with free black women.[60]

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56 *Ibid*., 50-57 and 62-65. It should be noted that there is some debate as to whether trust ought to be considered integral to social capital or rather as one of its outcomes.

57 Flap, 'Patronage', 232-33.

58 *Ibid*., 231-32; Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 66.

59 See pages 117-24 below on the role of 'ethnic identity' in building up social capital in Cape Town.

60 The exact chronology is uncertain: Hendrik Eksteen was baptised in February 1705, so was plausibly born either early that year or more likely in 1704. The date of birth of Michiel is equally

The first, also called Hendrik, was with Anna Maria Colijn, who thereafter disappeared from his life.[61] This son later achieved some notoriety on the Cape frontier when he was murdered by his Khoi mistress.[62] The second son, called Michiel, was with Sara, the illegitimate daughter of a fellow German Paul Heijns and the freed slave Maria Schalk. Heijns was at this stage married to another free-black woman, Maria Lozee.[63] By then Heijns had been at the Cape for a few decades and made his living from various farming enterprises, although he was not very successful and was in debt to the Orphan Chamber and the Poor Fund.[64] Shortly after the birth of Michiel, Eksteen married Sara Heijns on 13 July 1704.

It is plausible that Eksteen at first worked with his father-in-law, thereby gaining experience and knowledge of the Cape circumstances, but also building up social capital with the links Heijns had.[65] A revealing indication of Eksteen's social network at this early stage comes from the fact that he was one of the signatories in early 1706 of a testimonial to the 'honour and virtue' of W.A. van der Stel. Eksteen's support of this was likely influenced by the fact that his father-in-law was a supporter of the Van der Stel faction, and along with most of the free blacks of Cape Town signed this testimonial, including the relations of Eksteen's late mother-in-law, Maria Schalk.[66] That Eksteen's early support and contacts were with the free-black community he entered via his wife and father-in-law is also revealed by his friendship

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uncertain: he was later referred to as a *voorkind* which means he must have been born before the marriage of Eksteen with Sara Heijns in July 1704 (in the event he was baptised in April 1705). Having illegitimate children was no impediment to social or other success in the eighteenth-century Cape; cf. G. Groenewald, '"A Mother Makes no Bastard": Family Law, Sexual Relations and Illegitimacy in Dutch Colonial Cape Town, c. 1652-1795', *African Historical Review* 39/2 (2007), 58-90.

61 H.F. Heese, *Groep sonder Grense: Die Rol en Status van die Gemengde Bevolking aan die Kaap, 1652-1795* (Bellville, 1984), 48.

62 Cf. R. Viljoen, '"Till Murder Do Us Part": The Story of Griet and Hendrik Eksteen', *South African Historical Journal* 33 (1995), 13-32.

63 Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 2, 174 and Hoge, 'Personalia', 161.

64 G. C. de Wet, *Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707* (Cape Town, 1981), 108 and H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: The Defence of Willem Adriaan van der Stel* (Cape Town, 1897), 184-85.

65 For a more extensive discussion of the role that marriage, kinship and 'ethnic identity' played in the entrepreneurial success of German immigrants at the Cape during this period, see the discussion on pages 114-24 below.

66 Leibbrandt, *Precis: Defence*, 69-72. My thanks to Karel Schoeman who alerted me to this.

with Claas Cornelisz (another signatory of the Van der Stel testimonial) and Beatrice van Couchin.[67] When the latter couple drew up their will in 1709, they made provision for Michiel, Eksteen's son with Sara Heijns. This friendship seemingly survived Eksteen's later success, for in 1720 he acted as an executor of Beatrice's estate.[68]

How was a newly released free burgher to maintain himself and his young family? As discussed in chapter one, economic options at the Cape of Good Hope were limited since it was controlled by the VOC which did not permit a free-market and jealously guarded its monopoly. Free burghers remained subjects of the VOC and their activities had to aid the Company in its aims. This primarily meant being engaged in the productive sector, particularly agriculture, and only secondarily in the service sector. Although the Cape did not have a completely free market system since the Company bought most agricultural produce at pre-determined prices, there still existed a small retail market. It was cheaper for the VOC to lease certain productive activities to free burghers. The best example of this system is the meat *pacht* (monopoly or lease) whereby three to five individuals were contracted to provide passing ships and the VOC establishment at the Cape with meat at a fixed price, usually for periods of multiple years.[69] There were also certain needs of both free burghers and callers at the Cape which had to be met. One of these was the demand for alcohol and sociability in taverns. As illustrated in chapter one, this trade was immensely lucrative with the result that the VOC was unwilling to allow complete free trade in alcohol and instead controlled it through selling *pachten* to the free burghers. Despite the restrictions, the alcohol trade remained the closest the VOC Cape came to a free market system since any person could invest in one of the *pachten* as the sole criterion for ownership was a financial one. Thus, seen from the viewpoint of entrepreneurial activities, there were fewer opportunities for exploitation at the Cape, although the very restrictions of the system created some other, albeit illegal ones. It is in forgetting about the opportunities that the alcohol *pacht* system

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67 M. Upham, 'Armosyn Revisited', *Capensis* 2 (2000), 26.

68 A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VI, 1720-1723* (Cape Town, 1965), 78-79.

69 See pages 36-37 above for details of the retail market in Cape Town and the operation of the meat *pacht*.

provided, that led Guelke and Shell to miss the key to Eksteen's spectacular rise to success.

In August 1707 Eksteen bought one of the brandy *pachten* for *f* 2 725.[70] The fact that he bought the fourth quarter of the brandy *pacht* and paid a higher price than the others fetched may indicate that he was keen to get a *pacht*.[71] It is unknown how much capital Eksteen had by this stage, but it needed not have been much: the price he offered for the *pacht* had to be paid in two instalments, the first only after six months. A year later he borrowed *f* 3 000 from a fellow brandy *pachter*, Claas Meijboom, and it is plausible that they may have been business partners and that Meijboom could have helped him earlier as well.[72] Eksteen's main capital outlay would have been his stock of liquor and perhaps some furniture and other equipment to turn a room of his house into a tavern.[73] Thus, during 1708-9, he bought at various auctions equipment such as lamps, drinking and eating vessels, as well as game boards which were popular entertainment in taverns. [74] What is most significant about this venture is that Eksteen entered the alcohol retail trade at the same time as his father-in-law, Paul Heijns, who bought one of the Cape wines *pachten* for *f* 8 325. They may well have decided to share the costs and run one tavern together selling both brandy and wine (a common procedure). This cannot be proved, but given Eksteen's later history and the fact that Heijns had not invested in the alcohol *pachten*

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70 It is significant that he first invested in brandy. It was along with Cape wines the most popular of the alcohol *pachten* and had a huge set off (reflected by the fact that both *pachten* were divided into four parts). Unlike Cape wine, though, the brandy *pachten* could be bought much cheaper. Cf. table 2.2 and graph 2.3 in appendix 2 below for details.

71 The brandy *pachten* were sold in four parts, each auctioned off separately. The VOC bookkeepers noted in which order the parts were sold. Since, as explained on page 34 above, auctions first went up to a high price, and then down from a much higher price, it is likely that a nervous, inexperienced or very keen buyer would stop the bidding at a higher price than what it could have gone for.

72 DO, T 17, 04.09.1708. Eksteen was able to repay fully his debt within a year along with the six percent interest charged. My thanks to Susan Newton-King for sharing the Deeds Office references with me.

73 Though he could have bought the liquor on credit; as he did in 1710 when he entered into a contract with Henning Hüsing for almost *f* 3 000 for liquor provided on credit; this debt Eksteen was able to repay within less than a year; DO, T 19, 292.

74 Cf. for example CA, MOOC 10/1 nos 47 and 56.

in the decade or more that he had been a free burgher, it seems plausible that it was Eksteen's idea to invest in the alcohol *pachten*.

Investing in the alcohol retail trade at the Cape was at best a risky business. Since, in addition to one's layout costs, one had to pay a sizeable premium to the VOC for the privilege, plus the fact that retail prices were fixed, the variable of demand carried even greater importance. Since the *pachten* were auctioned off at the beginning of the *pacht* year (September), before demand was known, it meant that at best prospective *pachters* made a calculated guess as to how much they could offer for the privilege of retailing alcohol (usually based on the experience of the preceding few years). Since the stable, local Cape market was relatively small, the profitability (assuming that there were no problems with supply) of alcohol retail in Cape Town depended crucially on the number of ships calling and the amount of time their crews had to spend in town visiting taverns. At the time that Eksteen entered the alcohol retail business, the number of ships that called at the Cape – both Dutch and foreign – remained stable and grew slightly in absolute terms.[75]

Eksteen was clearly successful enough to pay the VOC their due for his first *pacht*, and his experience was sufficiently positive to make him continue investing in the brandy *pachten*, with Heijns continuing with the wine *pachten*, for the following three years. Curiously enough, Eksteen did not use his early success to expand his alcohol *pacht* interest, as most other successful *pachters* tended to do, i.e. by buying more and more *pachten*, but preferred to diversify his investments slowly. He must have bought livestock during his first years as a *pachter*, for at the beginning of 1709 he was granted a grazing licence at Dieprivier.[76] During that same year he utilised his free-black links by buying two houses in Cape Town.[77] The following year he bought his first farm, in the Tijgerberg, naming it after his home town ('dutchified' to

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75 This is based on an analysis of the relevant figures in Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer, *Dutch Asiatic Shipping*, vols. 2-3.

76 CA, RLR 1, 80.

77 DO, T 18, 31.05.1709 and 14.11.1709. In May 1709 he paid *f* 940 cash to the ex-Company slave, Sara Jansz (aka Sara van de Caab) for her house in block K, and in November bought a larger house from Jan Oberholster for *f* 3 400, *f* 1 500 of which he paid cash. The latter was no free black, but his relationship with Agnieta Colijn, the sister of the mother of Eksteen's first-born son, caused some notoriety during this period; cf. Schoeman, *Armosyn*, 653. The latter transaction is a good example of the workings of social capital, as Eksteen in exchange stood as one of Oberholster's sureties when the latter bought a farm a year later; cf. DO, T 19, 283 and 285.

Loewenstein), for the large sum of *f* 12 000.[78] By the early 1710s Eksteen both exploited the one lucrative retail market at the Cape, to wit the alcohol trade, and started to invest in agriculture, the main economic activity of Cape free burghers. The alcohol *pachten* allowed one to make quick profit with relatively low input costs, but had high risks built into the system. Agriculture required a larger capital base, yielding slower and less spectacular profits, but had the advantage of greater stability while offering the possibility to expand greatly.

By 1710 Eksteen had clearly built up sufficient experience and confidence in his entrepreneurial activities to attempt expansion in the hope of greater profits. He formed an illegal cartel with his father-in-law and two other *pachters* in an attempt to control the most lucrative of *pachten*, namely that of Cape wine. By doing this they presumably had hoped to control the first great uncertainty of investing in alcohol *pachten*: the price paid for the monopoly. In the event, the conspiracy was discovered and the *pacht* was re-auctioned after a month.[79] This was no set-back for Eksteen: in 1711 he successfully bid for one of the Cape wines *pachten*, along with his usual brandy *pacht*. This expansion into wine retail shows how confident Eksteen was that he could pull it off: a wine *pacht* by this stage usually sold for about three times as much as a brandy *pacht*.[80] Yet despite the higher risks Eksteen managed to make a success of the wine retail trade as well. Throughout the 1710s he bought one brandy and one wine *pacht* every year until 1720 when he bought two wine *pachten*. After that year he ceased to invest in the alcohol *pachten*. During the fourteen consecutive years that Eksteen invested in the alcohol *pachten*, he bought the rights to fourteen brandy and eleven Cape wine *pachten*, for which he paid the Company in total *f* 113 270. [81] Unfortunately, due to the lack of the necessary data, it is not possible to calculate the profit Eksteen made from his investments. In general *pachter*s could sell brandy at twice the price they paid for it which should translate into a sizeable

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78 DO, T 19, 352. He paid *f* 4 000 in cash and undertook to repay the remaining sum in two instalments over two years.

79 CA, C 2702, 14-17 and 22-6; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IV, 1707-1715* (Cape Town, 1962), 172-83. See also the discussion of this on page 35 above.

80 The fact that he owned several properties by this stage could also have aided him in securing loans.

81 Data on Eksteen's investment in the alcohol *pachten* are derived from the original contracts, CA, C 2697-2702 and, for the years where they are missing (1715-1727), CA, C 2730.

profit.[82] Of course, this is without taking into account the manifold running and capital expenses a *pachter* incurred, but since many of these could be offset against capital investments (in labour, property and movable goods), it meant that the longer one was engaged in the alcohol retail business, the higher one's yields tended to be. What is remarkable about Eksteen's involvement in the alcohol *pachten* is his stable and controlled conduct. Unlike other *pachters* he did not overplay his hand by using his profits to invest in ever larger shares of the alcohol retail market.[83] Instead, he kept his investment more or less stable during the 1710s and used the profits to build up a capital base with which to undertake new entrepreneurial endeavours. His behaviour reveals someone who was remarkably well aware of the possibilities available for exploitation at the Cape.

Eksteen's early years at the Cape are the most obscure to the historian, but it seems clear that his connections with and marriage into the free-black community, as well as his links with fellow German Paul Heijns, must have been a factor in his early ventures into the alcohol retail trade. It is no co-incidence that he and his father-in-law both started to invest in alcohol *pachten* at the same time, and that Eksteen – as soon as he could afford it – entered agricultural life at the Cape. By joining the support of the free black and urban community for the powers-that-be in 1706, Eksteen ensured their goodwill (and that of his father-in-law) – an example of investing in social capital – which was necessary for someone who soon thereafter entered the retail world of Cape Town. During the 1720s, Eksteen's shaky beginnings as a businessman at the Cape would expand spectacularly, leading to greater social prestige.

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82 In the 1718 inventory of Eksteen's estate, a *legger* brandy (560 litres) was valued at *f* 175 (CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93). According to the 1725 price regulations of the VOC, brandy *pachters* could sell their product at four *schellingen* per bottle (2.4 litres) which means that a *legger* brandy would retail at *f* 350. Cf. G.J. Krause, 'Drankpagte gedurende die Eerste Honderd Jaar van die Bewind van die N.O.I.K. aan die Kaap' (unpublished MA thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1955), 110 for the prices of brandy.

83 This meant that as time went by (assuming all variables remained stable) his profits should have increased as most of his capital layout (for example, investing in a room or building for his tavern; a store; vats; furniture and drinking vessels and, probably, a slave or slaves to work in his tavern) would have been incurred early on in his career as tavern-keeper.

After buying his first farm in 1710 for *f* 12 000, Eksteen spent most of his profit (except for what he needed to continue in the alcohol retail business) on his agricultural concerns. He continually obtained grazing licences and loan farms in prime areas around Cape Town, implying increasing herds of stock.[84] During these years he often bought livestock at auctions.[85] In addition to his six loan farms, he bought three more freehold farms between 1710 and 1718 and by the latter date also owned three houses in Cape Town as well as a store or cellar in which to keep his taverns' supplies.[86] By 1718 his stock holdings had grown to 1600 sheep, three hundred and fifty heads of cattle and a surprising thirty horses which suggests that he must have bred horses, a very profitable undertaking due to the scarcity of horses at the Cape.[87] It seems from his holdings and the variety of land that he owned and loaned, that he was equally engaged in stock and crop-farming.[88] He also seems to have produced on his farms at least some of the wine and brandy he sold in his taverns in town since he owned two distilling kettles and a wine press.[89]

Eksteen, though, was never satisfied with going the safe route of investing in land and expanding his agricultural activities. He kept his eyes open for new opportunities. Already in 1713 he and Willem ten Damme offered to buy the meat *pacht*. Their application was unsuccessful as the Council of Policy preferred to continue with the incumbent meat *pachters*.[90] This step of Eksteen is somewhat surprising as he did not own sufficient land and cattle to take on the major risk of supplying the Company with meat for several years.[91] It seems more likely that it was

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84 CA, RLR 1, 261, 318, 336 and 2, 62, 90, 128.

85 For example, CA, MOOC 10/1 nos. 68, 75 and 76.

86 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93.

87 S. Swart, 'Riding High: Horses, Power and Settler Society, c. 1654-1840', *Kronos* 29 (2003), 49-59.

88 For example, already by 1712 he both kept cattle and planted wheat on the post Burgerspost in the Groenekloof; Böeseken, *Resolusies IV*, 274, 277 and 314.

89 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93.

90 Böeseken, *Resolusies IV*, 323.

91 A meat *pachter* did not primarily provide the cattle from his own farms and holdings, but usually bought them from other farmers. However, it helped having a good base in one's own holdings

Ten Damme who was the main investor and senior partner in this case and that he chose Eksteen for his financial acumen to be the managing partner. This incident indicates that Eksteen's links with the pro-W.A. van der Stel factions survived into the 1710s: Ten Damme was a supporter of and former high-ranking official under Van der Stel who greatly benefited from the latter's favour.[92] This incident also illustrates the power of networks; in this case a negative one. The Council of Policy stated that its awareness of the applicants' 'partisanship' against the current meat *pachters* played a role in its rejection of the bid. One the incumbent *pachters* was the wealthy Jacobus van der Heijden – who played a prominent role in the anti-Van der Stel faction and was the long-standing business partner of Henning Hüsing. The latter was responsible for the financial troubles of Paul Heijns – or at any rate, so the latter believed.[93] At any rate, Ten Damme died the following year and Eksteen waited more than a decade before finally investing in the meat *pacht*.

Eksteen's opportunism did however pay off handsomely in another case. In 1717 he bought a boat for *f* 2000 – a sizeable capital layout. This was the first step in a careful strategy: Eksteen petitioned the Council of Policy that he did not want the boat to go to waste and thus requested permission to fish in the well-stocked waters of Saldanha Bay, an area which at this stage the Company had decided to keep for its own use (namely to provide fish for the Slave Lodge, the garrison and passing ships). In exchange for this prerogative Eksteen was prepared to supply the Company gratis with a mutually agreed upon quantity of salted fish. This reflects how well aware Eksteen was of the market conditions and economic opportunities at the Cape. There was at this stage an increasing demand for fish from free burghers for their growing number of slaves,[94] a demand which could not be fully met by the so-called 'free fishers' who were restricted to Table Bay – by having a monopoly of Saldanha Bay

(most meat *pachters* also owned extensive land and cattle) and a meat *pachter* needed grazing land for the cattle while waiting for the VOC fleets – the major consumers of meat.

92 It was rumoured at the time that Ten Damme's wife was Van der Stel's mistress. In 1708, after Van der Stel's downfall, Ten Damme became a free burgher and built up large land and stock holdings (as did his sons and wife, Helena Gulix, who by 1731 was one of the six richest inhabitants of the Cape); cf. his entry by A.J. Böeseken in C.J. Beyers (ed.), *Dictionary of South African Biography*, vol. 4 (Pretoria, 1981), 644-45 and Schoeman, *Armosyn*, 226.

93 Cf. Leibbrandt, *Precis: Defence*, 184-85. Eksteen too had had business dealings with Hüsing.

94 Between 1711 and 1733 the number of burgher slaves increased from 1 771 to 4 709; cf. N. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge, 1985), 11.

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his profits could soar. But Eksteen must also have been aware of the enormous success his one-time fellow *pachter*, Johannes Phijffer and Simon van der Stel had had between 1711 and 1716 when they were contracted to be the sole providers of the Company's fish demands.[95] Perhaps he was hoping that this might be the outcome of his request. In the event Eksteen's plans were thwarted since the Council of Policy decided that granting him a monopoly in Saldanha Bay would look like favouritism.[96] But ultimately Eksteen was successful since the Council resolved to open fishing in Saldanha Bay to all free burghers on condition that they cede twenty percent of their catch to the VOC for use in the Slave Lodge.[97]

Eksteen soon made a success of this venture. The competition could not have been great since few burghers would have had the capital layout to invest in the large vessel required for journeys to Saldanha Bay, and the prospects were sufficiently good for Eksteen to decide on further capital investment for exploiting this opportunity fully, such as erecting a small house there for his fishermen.[98] The fishing industry was visibly successful and a major source of Eksteen's growing wealth by the late 1710s, so much so that it is plausible that this may have played a role in his decision to stop investing in the alcohol *pachten*. A marker of Eksteen's increasing concentration in this industry was that he bought another small ship sometime between 1718 and 1720.[99] By 1721 Eksteen's original wish got fulfilled: by then he was the main supplier of fish to the VOC authorities at the Cape – a very large and stable market.[100] By 1729 the VOC was sufficiently dependent upon Eksteen's supply

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95 C.F.J. Muller, 'Die Geskiedenis van Vissery aan die Kaap tot aan die Middel van die Agtiende Eeu', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 5/1 (1942), 22-28 and A.J. Böeseken, *Simon van der Stel en sy Kinders* (Cape Town, 1964), 217-18.

96 G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel V, 1716-1719* (Cape Town, 1964), 175.

97 Muller, 'Geskiedenis van die Vissery', 28.

98 Böeseken, *Resolusies IV*, 395.

99 It must have been bought after the 1718 inventory and before January 1721 when the VOC considered approaching Eksteen to buy this vessel; A.J. Böeseken (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VI, 1720-1723* (Cape Town, 1965), 93.

100 This seems to have been the practice but there is no formal contract due to the loss of such records for the period 1715-1727; Muller, 'Geskiedenis van die Vissery', 28.

of fish to have offered him very favourable terms on which to continue his service.[101] By this stage the VOC was his sole market. In 1733 their relationship was formalised when Eksteen was contracted to provide the Company at the Cape with all its fishing needs for five years. This Eksteen achieved by threatening the VOC with ceasing his supply since, so he claimed, it was not profitable enough to him. To ensure a continuous supply from him, the authorities not only gave him this (in terms of risk) relatively safe contract, but even sold him one of their vessels.[102] This contract was renewed after its expiry and continued by his widow after Eksteen's death.[103] In this fashion, then, Eksteen managed to exploit another one of the few viable economic opportunities at the Cape, and indeed seems to have dominated the fishing industry for more than two decades.

The 1710s was not only a decade during which Eksteen greatly expanded his economic interests; it was also a period in which his social network expanded beyond the urban free-black community. After buying his first farm in 1710, Eksteen soon started building up good networks with the farming community of the Cape district. Through both his business activities, family, social and political life, Eksteen built up connections. At the Cape, marriage strategy was an important factor in social mobility.[104] It is plausible that Eksteen developed ties with the Cruijwagen family early on in his career since Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen was another of the signatories in favour of W.A. van der Stel. Cruijwagen had invested in the alcohol *pachten* during the younger Van der Stel's governorship, and did so again in the year that Eksteen and his father entered the alcohol retail business.[105] Eksteen must have cultivated these links for in 1714, after the death of his first wife, he married the young Everdina Cruijwagen, the daughter of Jan Mijndertsz. This was a much more advantageous match than with the late Sara Heijns, but Eksteen's circumstances had changed

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101 G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734* (Pretoria, 1975), 60.

102 CA, C 2705, 17-18; De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 310-11 and 313.

103 CA, C 2705, 18-19 and C 122, 440-42 (per TANAP); G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel X, 1740-1743* (Pretoria, 1984), 65.

104 See pages 112-18 below for a fuller discussion of the workings of this strategy.

105 On Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen's career at the Cape, see W.A. Cruywagen, *Die Cruywagens van Suid-Afrika, 1690-1806* (Vanderbijlpark, 2007), 135-96.

radically during his first ten years at the Cape. Paul Heijns, who acted as a partner of Eksteen in their alcohol retail business, plausibly died in the 1713 small-pox epidemic. Cruijwagen – whose investments in the alcohol *pachten* were very haphazard (i.e. in different *pachten* over a long period) – started investing in them again in 1716, which makes it likely that this was done in partnership with, or at least with the close cooperation of, Eksteen. Cruijwagen was a well-off man who owned four houses in Cape Town and could loan sizeable amounts to a range of individuals.[106] It is not implausible that he helped Eksteen with capitalising some of his ventures in the late 1710s and 1720s. By the time of Cruijwagen's death in 1728, his granddaughter, Catharina Rosina Eksteen, inherited one third of his large estate since her mother had died in 1718. Seen purely in economic terms, Eksteen's connections with the Cruijwagen family paid off handsomely.

By the second half of the 1710s, when Eksteen was newly married to Everdina Cruijwagen and busily expanding his business interests, his social position and prestige also rose. It has long been recognised that entrepreneurial activity is about more than pure economics as the motivation of an entrepreneur consists of both economic and extra-economic gain.[107] Given, then, that entrepreneurship is about both economic *and* extra-economic gain; an entrepreneur can be defined as someone who is 'ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power and prestige.'[108] In line with this, the economic historian Clé Lesger has argued that entrepreneurship is ultimately only a means to an end, namely the realisation of one's wishes and desires. These wishes and desires can be grouped into three categories: wealth, power and prestige.[109] Whether or not Eksteen felt the need to prove himself

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106 CA, MOOC 8/5 no 19. Guelke and Shell, 'Early Colonial Landed Gentry', 277 exaggerate when they claim that Cruijwagen was the 'main creditor' at the Cape – although many creditors owed him money at his death in 1728, the largest chunk of this credit came from his son and son-in-law. What this does show, however, is that Cruijwagen possessed large amounts of cash which he could loan out.

107 Joseph Schumpeter, the pioneering theoretician of entrepreneurship, identified three motivations for entrepreneurs: personal enrichment; a need to prove oneself and 'the joy of creating, of getting things done'; J.A. Schumpeter, 'Entrepreneurship as Innovation', in Richard Swedburg (ed.), *Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View* (Oxford, 2000), 70-71.

108 W.J. Baumol, 'Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive', *Journal of Political Economy* 98 (1990), 897.

109 Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 58.

is something the historian cannot know for certain.[110] By the late 1710s Eksteen had clearly amassed sufficient riches to be one of the foremost free burghers in economic terms. From this period onwards, his economic successes also translated into power and prestige in the Cape context.

The first indication of Eksteen's standing in the community[111] comes from 1716 when he and eleven other free burghers submitted a request to the VOC for some reduction in taxes. Among the names are prominent and well-off farmers of the Cape district such as the Van der Westhuijzens, Nicolaas Loubser and the wealthy Verweij sisters, Aletta and Beatrix.[112] It is a sign of Eksteen's success that within six years of his entering agriculture he could – at least in symbolic terms – act as a spokesperson for the farming community.[113] Another indication of Eksteen's growing standing in the free burgher community was his elevation to ensign in the burgher militia in June 1718, a rank he held for the following seven years. Clearly, by the late 1710s – after ten years as an alcohol *pachter*, and making a success of agriculture and fishing – Eksteen was a leading free burgher, and this the VOC authorities at the Cape had to notice. So, we find him nominated for his first public office – that of Commissioner of Marriage and Civil Affairs – in 1718, although he was not chosen that year. He was however elected in 1719 and re-elected in 1720. Clearly Eksteen must have made a good impression, for he was chosen very soon after this, in 1722, as

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110 It seems plausible, though, from a psychological point of view that his poor background and presumably difficult years as a teenager when his parents and other family members died in quick succession, in addition to the terrible years of war he experienced, may have made him more determined to succeed and build up wealth as a form of protection.

111 The notion of a 'community' is a complex one which certainly needs investigation for the colonial Cape. It is now widely accepted that 'all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact … are imagined'; B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), 15. In addition, historians of colonial societies elsewhere have shown that the notion of a unified community hardly ever existed; as J.F. Martin has demonstrated for New England, 'not one single community, but, rather, several different communities existed within each town'; *Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill, 1991), 235. Which communities existed within Cape Town, how they were imagined and in what ways they interacted and connected with one another, are questions which require an in-depth study of their own.

112 All three these families had farms in the Tijgerberg, although some also owned others. On Aletta and Beatrix Verweij, see Schoeman, *'n Duitser aan die Kaap*, 231-35.

113 De Wet, *Resolusies V*, 32-33.

both an Orphan master and as one of the Burgher Councillors – the highest public office a free burgher could hold at the Cape. He served several more terms as an Orphan master in the 1720s and was continuously re-elected as Burgher Councillor until the end of 1738 when he retired from public office.[114]

In just over twenty years Eksteen managed to reach the highest political office a free burgher could attain at the Cape while his social prestige was such that already in 1723, when he and Johannes Blankenberg were involved in a fracas with the Governor, they were referred to *als van de considerabelste deeser ingesetenen sijnde* ('as being [part] of the most considerable of these inhabitants').[115] His standing amongst his fellow burghers is reflected in his election to lieutenant and, shortly thereafter, to captain of the burgher militia in 1725 – once again the highest rank possible in this public body. During the 1720s Eksteen also acted as a fire warden, which made him one of very few free burghers in the history of Dutch Cape Town to have held every public office open to him. There can be no doubt that Eksteen's entrepreneurial activities enabled him not only to prove himself but also to increase his wealth, power and prestige.

But the social prestige and increasing respect that Eksteen commanded in the 1720s did not weaken his entrepreneurial skills or desire to expand his business enterprises. During the 1720s Eksteen continued to invest in property and land, buying at least three more freehold farms and two town properties over and above those he owned in 1718. By this stage his capital base was so large that he could, with the exception of his fishing activities, concentrate on agricultural ventures. He continued to buy livestock at auctions throughout this period and by 1731 had doubled his number of oxen. Presumably he must have regularly sold off his sheep to the meat *pachters* since the number of his sheep did not increase much during this period.[116] During the 1730s he also concentrated on horse breeding since the number of his horses doubled during that decade. In addition, the ever alert Eksteen also exploited the Company's attempts to introduce wool farming to South Africa, though this time with less success: in 1725 the VOC imported Kirman goats from Persia which, the Company hoped, could be

114 This is based on the relevant entries in A.J. Böeseken and G.C. de Wet (eds), *Resolusies*, vols. 5-9.

115 Böeseken, *Resolusies VI*, 244-45.

116 CA, A 2250, box 1, *opgaaf* for 1731 (transcribed by Hans Heese).

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interbred at the Cape with other goats or sheep to produce wool sheep. The procedure was complicated and Eksteen, given his background in Germany and his entrepreneurial skill, was asked to take on the project. By 1735, however, he had to report that his attempts were not successful.[117] All of these activities required a large labour force and thus Eksteen's slave holding increased from forty-six in 1718 to one hundred by 1731 and a hundred and twenty-five ten years later, in addition to some Khoi workers.[118] The large increase in the 1720s was likely the result of his growing agricultural concerns. Between 1731 and 1741 the median number of slaves arable farmers had in the Cape district fluctuated between fifteen and twenty-two; while in 1731 only nineteen percent of farmers in the Cape district had slave holdings of more than twenty slaves.[119] Eksteen's large number of slaves (no doubt spread out over a number of farms) must have made him one of the biggest, if not the biggest, slave owners outside of the VOC itself at the Cape of Good Hope.[120] These slaves serve both as an indication of Eksteen's wealth but also as a reminder of what made his economic expansion possible in Cape society.

Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Meat Provision and Social Ascendancy

In 1719 Eksteen married his third wife, Alida van der Heijde, who was to bear him twelve children and outlive him by more than forty years. Eksteen's relations with the Cruijwagen family did not suffer from this at all – in fact, it seems that he tended to keep the contacts he built up through his marriages and various undertakings throughout his life. Both the Cruijwagens and the Van der Heijdens played a major role in the success of Eksteen during the 1720-30s. Thus their own networks brought in a larger circle of potential creditors and helpers, for example his sister-in-law Catharina Cruijwagen married Cornelis Heufke, the son of one of the major *pachters*

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117 For a variety of climatic and other reasons; cf. De Wet, *Resolusies IX*, 10-11 and Thom, *Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery*, 264-65.

118 N. Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century* (Athens, OH and Cape Town, 2005), 298 n. 124.

119 Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa*, 29 and 32.

120 We unfortunately do not know much about his slaves, but it seems likely that there must have been specialisation in such a large labour force, as was the case with Martin Melck's similarly large slave holding in the second half of the century.

of the 1720-30s, Johannes Heufke; while in 1730 his brother-in-law Willem van der Heijden married Helena Josina Esser, the daughter of the alcohol *pachter* Isaac Esser.[121] Most importantly, however, was that Johannes Cruijwagen, Eksteen's former brother-in-law, entered the meat *pacht* in 1728 with Eksteen as one of his sureties.[122] The timing of this is not coincidental. Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen had died shortly before this, leaving his large estate to his two children and his surviving Eksteen grandchild.[123] It may well have been this injection of cash which convinced Eksteen to join Cruijwagen *and* his new father-in-law Pieter Jurgen van der Heijden in the meat *pacht*. The financial security, large land and stockholdings, and the large circle of contacts and connections that these families had built up over the years, made it possible for them to control the most lucrative trade at the Cape for almost two decades.

By the late 1720s, with the combined resources of all these family connections, Eksteen felt financially secure enough to embark on his biggest venture yet, the meat *pacht*. The meat *pacht* differed substantially from the alcohol *pacht*. The fact that there were no *pachtpenningen* to be paid made it seem easier to enter, but the sheer size of the operation, and the investments and contacts that it required, made it something that only financially very stable people with good contacts among the cattle farmers could take on. The risks were phenomenal: the successful bidders secured the contract by offering to provide the Company with meat for an extended period at a rate offered by them at the start of that period, i.e. without knowing exactly what either the demand (dependant on the number of ships) or the supply (dependant on the state of the stock holdings in the Colony and farmers' willingness to sell at a certain price) would be.[124] To minimise this risk, which was compounded by the fact that the Company was most unlikely to change the terms of the contract once it had

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121 Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 2, 233 and vol. 3, 355.

122 On Johannes Cruijwagen as meat *pachter*, see Cruywagen, *Die Cruywagens*, 202-10; and on his activities as commando leader ('protecting' his herds of livestock and interests on the pastoral frontier), see Penn, *Forgotten Frontier*, 66-70.

123 Eksteen had three children with Everdina Cruijwagen, but only the eldest, Catharina Rosina, survived infancy.

124 The *pachters* had to provide a very good rate (cost price or even less) to the VOC in exchange for the monopoly right to provide meat to foreign ships. As the number of the latter fluctuated wildly during this period, the business of providing meat to the port could be very risky. Cf. page 37 above for a discussion.

been accepted, a meat *pachter* needed good stock holdings of his own, in addition to sizeable amounts of land and labour. These Eksteen possessed by this stage, unlike his position in 1713 when he unsuccessfully applied for the meat *pacht*.

Eksteen plausibly entered the meat *pacht* because of the involvement of his former brother-in-law, Johannes Cruijwagen who took on one quarter of the *pacht* in 1728.[125] In the following year, the *pacht* was awarded to Cruijwagen, Eksteen and the latter's father-in-law, Pieter Jurgen van der Heijden, along with Jacob van Bochem, a former alcohol *pachter*. As an experiment, the VOC authorities awarded them the contract for a three-year period, a sure indication that the quartet was deemed capable of providing the goods.[126] This they did to the satisfactions of all parties concerned, for in 1732 all four successfully ensured the meat *pacht* for the following five years. Van Bochem died but was replaced as meat *pachter* by Aletta van Es, who was related to the other three by marriage, in 1737 when they received a contract for another five years.[127] Although Eksteen died in 1741 his obligations continued until the expiry of the contract. His estate was clearly well geared towards this business, for in 1742 his widow was part of the quartet who was awarded the meat *pacht* for a further five years.[128]

A Cape Entrepreneur

Thus ended the entrepreneurial activities of Eksteen after almost forty years at the Cape. His career illustrates clearly how it was possible for someone without capital to increase his wealth by exploiting opportunities, even at a place like the VOC Cape colony with its very limited opportunities for free trade. Entrepreneurship can flourish under the most adverse of conditions, and Eksteen clearly made use of almost every opportunity that the Cape did offer: starting with the alcohol retail trade – which was the easiest to enter and one which offered continuity and the possibility of expansion. This he successfully exploited for fifteen years during which he used his profits to diversify his assets and to invest in agriculture. By the 1720s he could concentrate on his wide-ranging agricultural concerns, while also having a very profitable sideline

125 CA, C 2703, 40.

126 CA, C 2703, 74-86 and De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 11.

127 CA, C 2704, 62-73 and 2706, 18-29.

128 CA, C 2707, 71-81.

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providing fish to a stable market. In the last decade of his life his expertise and experience of life at the Cape helped him to make a success of the most profitable, but also the greatest risk-bearing, enterprise at the Cape – providing the VOC and passing ships with a regular supply of meat. However, even though this would have ensured a very sizeable profit, Eksteen could not resist opportunities to speculate, even in the 1730s when he was very wealthy – some of this paid off handsomely, such as his soap hoarding, while others, like his experiment with wool farming, was doomed to failure. It was Eksteen's ability to grasp opportunities and his willingness to take on risks which made him the wealthiest man at the Cape in the 1730s, *not* the capital which he did not possess when he started off in 1705.[129]

Not only did Eksteen's entrepreneurial activities enable him to be successful during his own lifetime, it also laid the foundation for an influential eighteenth-century Cape dynasty.[130] As already mentioned, his wife was able to live wealthily and expand her business interests for another four decades, while most of his (legitimate) children entered advantageous alliances with other families. Only two of Eksteen's children were married by the time he died in 1741, but the marriage pattern of his children, most of who wed during the 1740s, reveals the extent of the large social network Eksteen had built up. Most of his daughters married medium-ranking VOC officials: the minister Henricus Cock (in the mid-1730s), the administrators Joachim Prehn (1739) and Jan Raeck (1746), and the surgeon Rijno Berthault de St. Jean. The latter was the son of the chief surgeon, and his sister shortly thereafter married Eksteen's namesake and oldest surviving son in 1744. The other son Petrus Michiel married Sophia Cloete, from a foremost burgher family, who was also related to the wealthy Loubser farming family, one of whose sons also married an Eksteen

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129 Cf. note 11 above.

130 In psychological terms, one could note that it may have been pride in this achievement which made him request in his will of 1739 that his estate not be broken up after his death: 'en dewijl ik niet en begeer dat den boedel daarom sal moeten vercogt werden, maar integendeel dat mijn gemelte huijsvrouw … in het volle bezit gelaten werden…' and 'zoo wil en begeer ik niet dat zig ijmand anders met mijne kinderen of goederen bemoeijen sal, ten dien eijnde uijtsluijtende alle magistraaten, de weescamer, soo hier als elders, of wie ook eenig gezag of bewind daar over zouden kunnen of vermeijnen te hebben…', CA, CJ 2650, 255-57.

daughter.[131] These children and their descendants were destined to play influential roles in colonial Cape society.

Although Eksteen's was an exceptional life in terms of his many successes, the *mechanisms* he used in his upward mobility are not. Much has been written about the growth of the Cape gentry, but little work has been done on how it came about: what were the actual mechanisms which made it possible for a fairly homogenous group of free burghers (in terms of cultural background and economic possibilities) in the mid-seventeenth century to develop into a stratified society with a clearly identifiable elite within less than century? This chapter has started to fill that gap by illustrating the usefulness of applying the concept of entrepreneurialism to understanding the rise of the Cape gentry, while also showing that some aspects of it (such as its supposed rural roots and the role of endogamy) need to be revisited. Eksteen's remarkable career is exemplary of how the Cape, despite the strictures of the VOC monopoly, did offer sufficient opportunities for an entrepreneurial individual to create wealth, not least of which was the relatively easy accessibility of the alcohol *pachten*. The outcome of Eksteen's life: from poor beginnings in Lobenstein to leaving a dynasty of wealthy children marrying into successful families at the Cape of Good Hope is a felicitous example of the principle underlying social capital – one which is so crucial to all entrepreneurial success: Connections count. The next two chapters investigate in detail how these kinship networks and social capital operated at the Cape, and how these strategies changed over time.

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[131] Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 2, 174-77.

CHAPTER 4

IMMIGRANTS, KINSHIP AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CAPE TOWN: THE ALCOHOL *PACHTERS* OF THE 1730S

By the 1730s Cape Town, some eight decades after its founding, was beginning to change from a small face-to-face community where most people knew one another to a more settled and complex society. We know that by 1731 the town had a population of at least 3 157, of whom well nigh forty-five percent were unfree (slaves and convicts). The free population consisted of three categories. The biggest group comprised the VOC employees (959), most of whom were soldiers stationed in the garrison or Company administrators. The smallest group was the two hundred free blacks about whom relatively little is known. The free burghers living in Cape Town came to 585, which included 151 men and 127 women, with about three hundred children between them.[1] Of these roughly one hundred or so burgher households in Cape Town, we know very little. Yet, as Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell have pointed out, in 1731 a remarkable thirty-eight percent of the Cape Colony's free population lived in Cape Town.[2] Cape historians are still a long way off from fully understanding the development of a free burgher community in VOC Cape Town, but the case study of the *pachters* of the 1730s presented in this chapter provides some important pointers and suggestions.

The period 1730-39 is a generation after the early years of the century during which Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen started to build up his wealth through investment in the alcohol *pachten*. A close study of the alcohol *pachters* of this decade affords an opportunity to determine the role of alcohol retail in the socio-economic life of Cape Town during the early-mid eighteenth century. What was the composition of the body of *pachters* during this period and in what ways did they invest in the alcohol *pacht*? How did they raise capital, and what were the function and nature of business networks? How did the fact that Cape Town during this period was a growing settlement with many newcomers affect the type of alliances entered into and the

[1] N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. Bickford-Smith, *Cape Town: The Making of a City* (Cape Town, 1998), 50.

[2] L. Guelke and R. Shell, 'An Early Colonial Landed Gentry: Land and Wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-1731', *Journal of Historical Geography* 9 (1983), 280.

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ways in which alcohol entrepreneurs operated? In an attempt to answer these questions for the 1730s, this chapter aims to help Cape historians understand the social dynamics operating in VOC Cape Town.

This chapter is not concerned with the operation or the economics of the alcohol *pacht* system at the Cape. Instead it presents a synchronic analysis of a group of people who had one thing in common: they invested in the alcohol retail business during the 1730s. By making use of a combination of prosopography or collective biography[3] and the analysis of certain qualitative material, it addresses the following topics: what factors in their background or their VOC careers played a role in the success of some *pachters* but not others; and to what an extent did kin and social networks aid their advancement? In short, what factors influenced social mobility at the Cape during this period?

The Pachters *of the 1730s: A Prosopography*

There were twenty-seven individuals who invested in the alcohol *pacht* during the decade 1730-39.[4] Their activities in this business were not restricted to this decade, since some began their involvement years before 1730 and others continued into the 1740s and 1750s. Overall the twenty-seven *pachters* who form the database for this chapter (see table 4.2) held *pachten* from 1718 to 1758 so that their *pacht* activities covered most of the first half of the eighteenth century. Not every *pachter* was of course successful, and a measure of this is the number of *pachten* a person bought in his or her career as a *pachter*. As demonstrated in chapter two, during the whole period of alcohol *pachten* at the Cape, the vast majority (seventy-five percent) of

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[3] See pages 49-50 above for a discussion of this methodology.

[4] The sources for compiling this prosopography are varied. They include, in addition to the *pacht* contracts (CA, C 2697-2729), A.J. Böeseken and G.C. de Wet (eds), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, 1652-1743* (10 vols; Cape Town and Pretoria, 1957-84); H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806* (5 vols, Cape Town, 1905-6 and 1989) and various genealogical sources: C.C. de Villiers and C. Pama, *Geslagsregisters van die Ou Kaapse Families* (3 vols, Cape Town and Amsterdam, 1966); J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, *Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies* (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007); J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946), and E. Moritz, *Die Deutschen am Kap unter der Holländischen Herrschaft, 1652-1806* (Weimar, 1938).

pachters invested in five or fewer *pachten*, while the single largest group (thirty-seven percent) was formed by those who only ever bought one *pacht*. Only thirty-three individuals (seventeen percent) held ten or more *pachten*. This pattern largely held the same for the 1730s as well, when two-thirds of all *pachters* active during this period bought fewer than ten *pachten* in total, with the majority only ever buying one or two. But the number of people who invested in ten or more is larger than the overall figure: fully one third of all 1730s *pachters* (nine in total) were in this category (see table 4.1). The reasons for this are not quite clear, but probably relate to the greater economic stability of the Cape during this period and the fact that the *pacht* system had overcome the uncertainty of its early years. In addition, the introduction of the *generaele pacht* system during this decade may also have influenced this pattern.[5] Whatever the case may be, it is important to realise that throughout the history of alcohol *pachten* at the Cape, only a small number of those who became *pachters* were seriously involved in this business. Many invested in the alcohol retail business, but for one reason or another were not successful enough to continue. It is crucial in any analysis of the alcohol *pachters* to distinguish between these two groups. I therefore differentiate between the minor *pachters* (those who invested in nine or fewer *pachten* during their whole career) and the dominant or major *pachters* (those who held ten or more *pachten*).

Table 4.1: Number of *Pachten* Bought by Individual *Pachters*

No of *Pachten* Held	***Pachters* 1680-1795**	**1730s Only**
1	73 (37%)	8 (30%)
2	33 (17%)	2 (7%)
3-5	41 (21%)	5 (19%)
6-9	18 (9%)	3 (11%)
10+	33 (17%)	9 (33%)
Total	198	27

Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

[5] See pages 31-32 above on the introduction of the *generaele pacht* system.

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The *pachter* world of the 1730s was, officially at least, a male one: only two of the twenty-seven *pachters* were women, although this is high considering that overall less than five percent of *pachters* at the Cape were women. While the numbers may be low, investment in the alcohol trade was, as we have seen in chapter two, one of the few areas of economic life where women could compete with men in public. The more so since the official figures are no true reflection of reality: although the contracts may have been in the husbands' names, it is clear that in many, if not most, cases both husband and wife were involved in the running of the business.[6]

The *pachter* world of this decade was also one of immigrants. Of the twenty-seven *pachters*, only six were born at the Cape, including the two women *pachters*.[7] This means that the vast majority of the 1730s *pachters* arrived in Cape Town as Company employees and subsequently became free burghers. Of these immigrants, eight hailed from the Netherlands, twelve from German-speaking areas and one from Denmark. The large number of immigrants and the prevalence of Germans were very typical of the *pachter* scene in the first half of the eighteenth century.[8] It reflects both the realities of immigration to South Africa at this time, with high numbers of German immigrants settling at the Cape,[9] and, very clearly, the importance of networking among alcohol traders (on which, see the discussion below).

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6 See pages 59-62 above for a discussion of the role of women in alcohol retail in Cape Town. The close involvement of both husband and wife in the risky (and demanding) business of investment in the alcohol *pachten* may also explain the rather high rate of marital discord among *pachters* of this period: the wives of at least four of the 1730s *pachters* (Jacobus Marshoorn, Carel van Hartmansdorf, Godlieb Christiaan Opperman and Daniel Lourich) started divorce proceedings against them during this decade; cf. CA, CJ 826, 65-66; CJ 829, 108-11, 122-24 and 132-33; CJ 839, 1-4, 85-86, 91-92, 106-7, 147, 168-69 and 176-77; and CJ 831, 44, 49, 58, 67-70 and 100-101. Isaac Maartensz also became divorced later, in 1752.

7 Jan Hendrik van Helsdingen came to the Cape with his parents as a child in 1696. He was never a Company employee.

8 See pages 57-59 above on the large number of German immigrants among alcohol *pachters* at the Cape, and, for an overview of the involvement of Germans in the alcohol trade; Moritz, *Deutschen am Kap*, 155-65. K. Schoeman, *'n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en Loopbaan van Hendrik Schoeman* (Pretoria, 2004), 147-82 provides a discussion of the German immigrant community at the Cape during the period under discussion.

9 See pages 58-59 above.

Table 4.2: Alcohol *Pachters* at the Cape, 1730-39

***Pachter*'s Name**	**Nationality**	**Years Active**[10]	**No of *Pachten***
Backer, Noach	Dutch	1735	1
Beck, Johann Zacharias	German	1723-1737	15
Boetendagh, Carel	German	1731-1739	14 ½
Conterman, Hans Jacob	German	1718-1734	9
Coster, Maria	Cape	1728-1732	3
Eversdijk, Hendrik	Dutch	1730-1736	2
Heufke, Johannes sr	German	1727-1731	10
Honk, Hans Jurgen	German	1738-1743	9
Lourich, Daniel	German	1737	1
Le Roux, Jan jr	Cape	1736-1739	4
Leever, Abraham	Dutch	1727-1758	28 ⅔
Maartensz, Isaac	Dutch	1735-1741	7
Marshoorn, Jacobus	Dutch	1735	1
Opperman, Godlieb	German	1730-1734	4
Pentz, Michiel	German	1736-1752	17 ⅔
Raams, Willem	Dutch	1734	1
Rabe, Christiaan	Danish	1739	1
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen	German	1738-1752	13
Sprangel, Jan	German	1732-1735	2
Thomasz, Hendrik	German	1731	1
Van Dam, Josina	Cape	1730-1731	5
Van der Spuij, Melt	Dutch	1722-1733	20
Van der Swijn, Jan	Dutch	1732-1747	19 ⅔

[10] The years in this column refer to *pacht* years, i.e. from 1 September the previous calendar year to 31 August of the year given.

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Van Dijk, Burgert	Cape	1734	1
Van Dijk, Hendrik	Cape	1725-1734	11
Van Hartmansdorf, Carel	German	1736	1
Van Helsdingen, Jan	Cape	1728-1733	3

Source: C 2697-2731 and RLR 163 and Genealogical Data

Did a person's earlier career in the VOC play a role in his subsequent career as a *pachter*, i.e. was there a link between one's rank in the Company and later success as an entrepreneur? Of the twenty-one individuals in the 1730s group who were VOC employees, the rank of eighteen could be traced. Only two of them came out as *matrozen* ('sailors'), the majority (ten) were *soldaten* ('soldiers'), while six of them held higher ranks: three were *adelborsten* ('sea cadets'), while there were one each of a corporal, a *landspassaat* (a rank junior to corporal) and a sergeant. Two of the *adelborsten* and the corporal, Abraham Leever, Jan van der Swijn and Melt van der Spuij, became the most active alcohol *pachters* of this period with twenty or more *pachten* each. The first two also had several years as *assistenten* ('assistants') – the lowest rank in the civil service of the VOC[11] – at the Cape before becoming free burghers. Similarly, another major *pachter*, Michiel Pentz, who had a lengthy career in VOC service, rose through the ranks from soldier to become a *boekhouder* ('book-keeper').[12] Clearly, their superior literacy and extensive knowledge of the VOC administration, in addition to the links they must have built up during their service, must have helped these men in achieving their later success as entrepreneurs.[13]

Could there also be a link regarding the length of the period between arriving at the Cape, becoming a free burgher and investing in a *pacht* for the first time? On

[11] The administrative or civil (as opposed to the military) sector of the VOC was divided into six categories of rank, with the governor-general at the head of the first one. The lowest of the ranks was that of 'assistant'. The names of the ranks were derived from the merchant origins of the Company, but a rank did not necessarily equate with somebody's actual function; cf. F. Lequin, 'Het Personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Azië in de Achttiende Eeuw, Meer in het Bijzonder in de Vestiging Bengalen' (unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University, 1982), 48-50 and 343.

[12] A *boekhouder* was the rank above an 'assistant' and below that of an *onderkoopman* ('junior merchant'); *ibid*.

[13] Cf. page 80 above on the importance of experience and 'local knowledge' to the success of an entrepreneur.

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average, the 1730s *pachters* were in VOC service at the Cape for six years after arrival, ranging from a minimum of one to a maximum of thirteen years. The range for the period between receiving their free-burgher papers and becoming a *pachter* was considerably bigger, from one to twenty-nine years, with an average of eight years. But two cases are highly exceptional and should be discarded,[14] which brings the figure down to six years. In and of itself the information regarding the period between *burgerschap* ('citizenship') and *pacht*-holding is not meaningful. Significant trends may, however, be discerned when this information is used in combination with the answers to the following question: what factors led people to first buy a *pacht*?

Table 4.3: Careers of the 1730s *Pachters*

***Pachter*'s Name**	**Rank**	**Arrival > Burgher**[15]	**Burgher > *Pachter***	***Bijtapper***[16]	**Marriage**[17]
Backer, Noach	matroos	13	10		
Beck, Johann Zacharias	soldaat	7	1	x	d
Boetendagh, Carel	soldaat	2	9	x	d
Conterman, Hans Jacob	soldaat	5	20		
Eversdijk, Hendrik	adelborst	3	11	x	d
Heufke, Johannes	unknown	1	29		d
Honk, Hans Jurgen	soldaat	11	4	xx	
Lourich, Daniel	soldaat	6	4	x	
Leever, Abraham	korporaal	5	3		d
Maartensz, Isaac	unknown	?	?	?	
Marshoorn, Jacobus	matroos	5	12	x	
Opperman, Godlieb	soldaat	4	1	xx	w
Pentz, Michiel	soldaat	12	1		

[14] Hans Jacob Conterman and Johannes Heufke, both of whom only invested in the alcohol *pachten* in their old age, after having made their fortunes in other ways.

[15] The numbers in the columns '(arrival > burgher)' and '(burgher > *pachter*)' refer to years.

[16] In this column an 'x' indicates service as *bijtapper* before becoming a free burgher, and an 'xx' after being a free burgher.

[17] In this column 'd' denotes marriage to the (step-)daughter of an (ex-)*pachter*, 'w' to a widow.

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Raams, Willem	unknown	?	?	?	d
Rabe, Christiaan	landspas.	7	9	x	
Schreuder, Jan Jurgen	soldaat	6	8	x?	
Sprangel, Jan	soldaat	9	1	x	
Thomasz, Hendrik	soldaat	7	15	x	
Van der Spuij, Melt	adelborst	7	7	xx	d
Van der Swijn, Jan	adelborst	8	1	x	w
Van Hartmansdorf, Carel	sersant	3	6		w

Source: Genealogical Data; *Resolusies*; *Requesten*

One noticeable result of the tabulation of the period between receiving *burgerschap* and first *pacht*-holding is that five individuals became *pachters* within a year after being released from Company employment. Obviously these two events must be related. It comes as no surprise, then, to learn that three of these men married into *pacht* families shortly after becoming burghers, and that they bought their first *pacht* a few months thereafter. Godlieb Opperman and Jan van der Swijn married the widows Maria Coster and Josina van Dam, who were at that stage *pachters* in their own rights after the decease of their *pachter* husbands. Johann Zacharias Beck married Elsje van As, the step-daughter of the *pachter* Christiaan Maasdorp (who was active as *pachter* between 1717 and 1726).[18] Marriage was a major avenue which led to becoming a *pachter*: at least ten of the 1730s *pachters* married either a widow or a (step-) daughter of a *pachter* (see table 4.3).[19] That this entrance into *pacht*-holding was of significant advantage is shown by the fact that six of these men were part of the group of dominant *pachters* who invested in more than ten *pachten*.[20] This means that two

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[18] The other two men who became *pachters* within a year after becoming burghers also married women with some link to *pacht*-holding: Michiel Pentz's wife was the daughter of Jan Oberholtzer who acted as *bijtapper* in the 1720s; while Jan Sprangel's wife was a cousin of the wife of the alcohol *pachter* Johann Zacharias Beck.

[19] Johannes Heufke sits oddly with the rest of these since he only became a *pachter* late in his life (at the age of 57) after the death of his first wife, Aletta Botma, although he was very familiar with this business due to extensive family involvement in it through most of its early existence. See the discussion below.

[20] Of the other three who make up this elite group of nine, the wives of at least two also had some links with the alcohol retail business. As already mentioned, Pentz's father-in-law acted as a

out of every three of the major alcohol *pachters* of the 1730s married into the business.

Another avenue to *pacht*-holding was through previous employment by a *pachter*. As discussed in chapter one above, most *pachters* were allowed to employ so-called *bijtappers* to assist them in the running of their retail business or to run additional taverns on their behalf.[21] These *bijtappers* could be free burghers, even other *pachters*,[22] but were mostly so-called *leenknechten* ('loan servants').[23] Considering that would-be *pachters* during the 1730s were at the Cape on average six years before becoming free burghers, they had ample opportunity to serve as *knechten*. Thus we find that thirteen *pachters* of the 1730s cohort served as *bijtappers* before they first became *pachters*, ten of whom did so as *knechten*, who were variously referred to in the contracts as *tappersknecht* ('tavern or bar servant'), *brouwersknecht* ('brewing servant') or *wijnverlater* ('wine seller'). In this way many would-be *pachters* served something of an apprenticeship with established *pachters*; thereby gaining valuable experience, or what economists would call 'human capital' – the skills and knowledge which give one an advantage in business activity. And with regards to this aspect as well, the major or dominant *pachters* of the 1730s had an advantage: at least five of them had experience as a *bijtapper* in their early career before first becoming *pachters*.[24]

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bijtapper. In addition, Jan Jurgen Schreuder was the second husband of Grisella Sweetmans who followed in the footsteps of her first husband, Jan Stavorinus, by working herself as a *bijtapper* in the late 1720s; cf. CA, CJ 333, 295.

21 See pages 35-36 above on the *bijtap* issue.

22 Since being a *pachter* meant that one owned the right to sell a specific type of alcohol, and could contract others to do so on one's behalf, it was possible for a person to act as *bijtapper* for more than one *pachter* at the same time. Thus a brandy *pachter* may also act as a *bijtapper* for the Cape wines *pachter* thereby selling both brandy and wine in one locale.

23 This was a system whereby a VOC employee such as a soldier could be released to work for a free burgher on an annual contract, without officially leaving the service of the Company. Often these contracts were renewed for years; see O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope* (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 1, 164-66 for a discussion of the system.

24 They are: Johann Zacharias Beck, Carel Boetendagh, Jan Jurgen Schreuder, Melt van der Spuij and Jan van der Swijn.

What, though, of the other third who became *pachters* in the 1730s but who neither married into a *pacht* family nor acted as *bijtappers*? There seems to be no factor unifying this group. Two of them were once-off investors.[25] Two more invested in the very minor Stellenbosch *pacht* – they were essentially farmers who did some speculation on the side.[26] But the rest form a heterogeneous group, albeit a fairly successful one – two of them ended up investing in more than ten *pachten* each, viz. Michiel Pentz and Hendrik van Dijk. What these people do have in common with all the other individuals who invested in alcohol *pachten* is that they were entrepreneurs who saw the system of alcohol *pachten* as a means to realise their desire for wealth, power and prestige.[27] Yet not all of them were successful; nor were the playing fields level. This exercise in collective biography has shown that the 'average' *pachter* in the 1730s was male, an ex-Company soldier of German descent with some experience as a *bijtapper*. Some of the most successful *pachters*, though, did not fit this profile. What then was needed to make a success of the alcohol retail trade during this period?

Compatriots, Kinship and Social Capital

Investing in an alcohol *pacht* required at least some capital: by the second half of the 1730s the Cape wine *pacht* was auctioned off for *f* 25-30 000 – this at a time when a soldier earned little more than *f* 100 a year or one could buy a healthy slave for about *f* 300. Clearly it would have been impossible for an ex-Company employee, even at the rank of *assistent* or *boekhouder* with an annual income of around *f* 300,[28] to save such vast amounts of money. Generally very few *pachters* started their careers by buying one of the expensive Cape wine *pachten*, but even the smaller *pachten* would require a capital layout in excess of *f* 1 000. Of course, rich farmers like Johannes Heufke,

25 Noach Backer and Burgert van Dijk, neither of whom ever acted as a *bijtapper* nor married into a *pacht*-holding family (although Burgert's once-off investment may be related to the death of his cousin, Hendrik van Dijk, in 1734 after the latter had invested in eleven *pachten* between 1725 and 1734).

26 They were Hans Jacob Conterman and Jan le Roux who between them held the Stellenbosch *pacht* during the 1730s. This *pacht* produced in total *f* 7790 for the VOC during the whole decade, less than what one of the four parts of the Cape wine *pacht* produced in 1730 alone.

27 These three elements constitute Clé Lesger's definition of an early modern entrepreneur; cf. page 97 above.

28 Lequin, 'Personeel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie', 343.

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who only entered the alcohol trade late in his life, could amass capital over many years – it therefore comes as no surprise that he entered the *pacht* business by buying Cape wine and brandy *pachten* in his first year, costing him more than *f* 10 000. Most *pachters*, though, particularly those who recently left Company employment, needed access to credit.[29] But the first hurdle a prospective *pachter* needed to overcome was to find sureties. As discussed in chapter one, the VOC, in order to ensure its income from the *pachten*, insisted that every *pacht* sold be underwritten by two solvent sureties who signed the contract alongside the *pachter*.[30] Without sufficient credit and sureties, nobody could become a *pachter*.

Credit was indispensable to the early modern period entrepreneur, especially as most areas suffered from insufficient amounts of specie.[31] At the Cape of Good Hope there existed during this period no loan banks such as in the big European cities. There were instead three alternative sources for personal credit: the Poor Fund of the Cape church (known as the *Diaconij*), the Orphan Chamber (*Weeskamer*) and loans from private individuals. Both the Orphan Chamber and the *Diaconij* possessed sizeable funds which were managed by loaning parts of them on interest – even the Council of Policy was known to loan from these bodies at times (which is a sure indicator of the shortage of specie at the Cape which only received fresh money when visiting ships called).[32] Prospective *pachters* during the 1730s certainly made use of loans from both the Poor Fund[33] and the Orphan Chamber.[34] But such loans could be

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29 Although *pachters* did not have to pay the money they offered for a *pacht* upfront, the first payment was due within six months, and the Company did not wait for its payment. It regularly sued *pachters* who were late with their payments; cf. page 35 above.

30 Every different *pacht* needed two sureties, so a major *pachter* needed a pool. This duty was taken very seriously by all involved; see pages 34-35 above on the role of sureties in the alcohol *pacht* business.

31 See J. Hoppit, 'Attitudes to Credit in Britain, 1680-1790', *The Historical Journal* 33 (1990), 305-22.

32 See on these bodies and their role in providing credit, G.J. Erasmus, 'Die Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe aan die Kaap, 1652 tot 1795' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1986), 306-10 and R. Ross, 'The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835' in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 258-60.

33 The loss of most of the Church council's minutes for the first half of the eighteenth century makes it difficult to gauge the extent to which the 1730s *pachters* loaned from this body. Yet from the

difficult to obtain because of the need to provide mortgage, and the fact that both institutions were very keen on regular payment of interest.

Like most traders in early modern Europe,[35] *pachters* tended to rely on private sources of credit, which were readily available at the Cape and usually at one percent less interest than that charged by more formal bodies such as the *Diaconij* and the Orphan Chamber. In providing credit, private rentiers played an important role.[36] There lived during this period in Cape Town a group of well-off people with ready cash to invest, ranging from wealthy widows[37] to retired Company servants[38] and even high Company officials. Thus it is noticeable how often the governor, Jan de la Fontaine, loaned large sums to private individuals during the 1730s, also to *pachters*.[39] It is regular and continuous access to the crucial commodity of sufficient credit which may well explain the differences in the careers of successful alcohol *pachters* and those of the once-off or small-scale investors.

As discussed with reference to Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen in the previous chapter, entrepreneurs required 'social capital' in addition to their financial and human capital. In short, this means the help a person could rely on from his or her social network consisting of family, friends and other relations. As Clé Lesger has

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one surviving volume of this era, covering 1719-24, it is clear that several *pachters* used the *Diaconij* to help fund their investments; NGKA, G 1 1/2. Hans Jurgen Honk, for instance, owed the *Diaconij* two hundred rixdollars at his death in 1743; CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 59.

34 For example, of the 1730s *pachters*, Hendrik Thomasz had an obligation of *f* 3 000 with the Orphan Chamber in 1735 while Jan le Roux junior owed this institution some 2 000 rixdollars plus back interest in 1752; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 133 and 8/7 no. 50.

35 Hoppit, 'Attitudes to Credit', 315 and 318.

36 See Ross, 'Cape of Good Hope', 259 on private rentiers at the Cape.

37 In 1731, three of the six people described unqualifiedly by Governor de la Fontaine as 'well-off' or 'rich' were widows: Beatrix Verweij, Geertruij de With and Helena Gulix; L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte (eds), *The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732* (New Haven, 1990). See below for a discussion of Geertruij de With's activities in this regard.

38 An example of this was the former minister of religion, Henricus Beck, who lived in retirement in Cape Town after 1731 (until his death in 1755) – according to the cash book he kept, he loaned money to a variety of people throughout the half century he lived at the Cape, but particularly so during his retirement; CA, MOOC 14/19 no. 124. (Henricus Beck, who was of Dutch descent was no relation to the German Becks who also feature in this chapter).

39 Thus, in 1732, Jan van der Swijn had a mortgage from the governor amounting to the very large sum of *f* 8 880; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

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suggested, the value of a person's social capital gets determined by three factors: (1) the size and scope of one's social network; (2) the resources one's friends and family have at their disposal, and, equally crucial, (3) their willingness to make these resources available.[40] When one analyses the activities of the 1730s *pachters* in terms of this framework, it becomes clear that it was access to and the use of social capital, more than any factor in their backgrounds, which determined the success of some *pachters* over others.

When an ex-Company employee married into a *pachter* family, it meant he instantly gained access not only to capital and expertise, but also to a network of credit. This is borne out by the success of those 1730s *pachters* who married the daughters or widows of *pachters*. However, marriage would in and of itself not have been sufficient: for social capital to become a determining asset, all three of Lesger's factors had to be met favourably. Clearly this would differ from one case to another, and would depend on the specific context. Let us look more closely at how a kinship network based on a shared ethnic background assisted one *pachter* in his rise to success.

The making of Johann Zacharias Beck as *pachter* illustrates both the value of marriage as an entrée to an established social network, and the importance of trust in business relations. As discussed in the previous chapter, due to the very high risk factor inherent in early modern business, trust was a vital resource in trying to minimise risk. At the Cape, as elsewhere, this translated into a high degree of endogamy in business relations: it was preferable to do business with people one knew, or who one felt certain one could trust. Hence the high preponderance of family members, people from the same town or region, or with the same social and cultural background among the business associates of early modern entrepreneurs. As Lesger succinctly explained this phenomenon: 'the problem with foreigners [or strangers] was not that they were different, but that this "being different" made their behaviour

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[40] C. Lesger, 'Over het Nut van Huwelijk, Opportunisme en Bedrog: Ondernemers en Ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne Tijd in Theoretisch Perspectief', in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), *Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden* (Amsterdam, 1996), 66. See pages 85-86 above for a discussion of social capital.

unpredictable.'[41] Entrepreneurs could not afford to add even more uncertainty to their business ventures, hence the reliance on what was familiar and trusted.

Thus it comes as no surprise that German *pachters* often employed German soldiers as *knechten* – people who would not only understand their language but who more than likely also shared a similar outlook and approach.[42] This was the case with Johann Zacharias Beck. Hailing from Langensalza in Saxony, he arrived at the Cape in 1715 as a soldier.[43] In 1719 he became loan *knecht* to a fellow German, Christiaan Maasdorp, who had been at the Cape since 1697. From 1716 Maasdorp had held the Rondebosch *pacht* and for this reason Beck was appointed specifically to act as his *bijtapper*. During this time Beck must have become acquainted with Maasdorp's step-daughter Elsje van As.[44] Early in 1722, shortly after her mother's death, Beck married her and in April that year applied to become a free burgher on the basis that he had recently entered into matrimony.[45] By this stage Beck had had some three years experience as *bijtapper* and through his new father-in-law must have had good contacts in the alcohol retail world of Cape Town since, on 31 August 1722, he successfully bid for one of the Cape wine *pachten* at *f* 7 400. It is significant that he at once opted for a major and expensive *pacht* and not one of the minor ones. The following year he bought three *pachten*, paying a sizeable *f* 10 750 for them. Clearly he would not have been able to do so without the capital – both physical and social – that he had gained upon marriage into the established *pachter* community.[46]

Social capital, though, is not something one only acquires; one also needs to actively invest in it.[47] This Beck did by promoting his fellow Germans. Thus he

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41 'het probleem met vreemden is niet dat ze anders zijn, maar dat dit "anders zijn" hun gedrag onvoorspelbaar maakt'; Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 72-73.

42 Cf. the *knecht* contracts for this period; CA, CJ 2880-2882.

43 Hoge, 'Personalia', 19.

44 Her mother Helena van der Merwe, the widow Van As, was Maasdorp's second wife, whom he married in 1713.

45 CA, C 1087, 57.

46 On the links between Christiaan Maasdorp and Johann Zacharias Beck who during the early 1720s acted as each other's business partners; see D. de Villiers, 'Milling, Drinking and Carnage on the Banks of the Liesbeek', *Familia* 33/1 (1996), 19-21.

47 Cf. Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 66 and H.D. Flap, 'Patronage: An Institution in its Own Right', in M. Hechter, K.-D. Opp and R. Wippler (eds), *Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects* (New York, 1990), 232-33.

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employed as a *knecht*, Jan Ludwig Leopold from his own home town, Langensalza, for fifteen years in succession.[48] The operation of the German-Cape immigration network which must have existed during this period is illustrated even more clearly by the case of Johann Zacharias Beck's brother, Johann Christoffel. He arrived at the Cape as a VOC soldier in 1724 but was loaned as a *knecht* to Johann Zacharias Beck within a year.[49] It seems plausible that Beck's becoming a free burgher in 1722, and his early success as an alcohol *pachter*, must have influenced him to encourage his brother to join him.

Johann Christoffel worked as his brother's *wijnverlater* ('wine seller') for less than a year before asking and receiving his free-burgher papers in 1725. In 1726 he married Anna de Groot, whom he must have met through his brother's alcohol *pacht* links. She was twice widowed: she had three children with her first husband, Gabriel Doman, but none from her second marriage to Rudolf Steenbock. Both of these had been *pachters*: Doman only once, but Steenbock acted as the malt beer *pachter* between 1713 and his death in 1725. The beer *pachter* operated from the farm Papenboom, on the banks of the Liesbeek, and it was during the early 1720s that Johann Zacharias Beck was active in this region as the Rondebosch *pachter*. It is highly plausible that it was here that Johann Christoffel worked as his *knecht* during the period that Anna de Groot became a widow. The marriage between Johann Christoffel Beck and Anna de Groot illustrates very well the social and economic links between German immigrants at the Cape during this era: Anna was the daughter of a German immigrant and all three her husbands were likewise German immigrants. Within a short while Johann Christoffel Beck became a large property-holder and a hugely successful and wealthy wine farmer along the Liesbeek.[50]

All of this investment in social capital by promoting and helping fellow German immigrants at the Cape paid off handsomely for Johann Zacharias Beck. Thus, most of the sureties of his alcohol *pachten* were family members such as his

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48 CA, CJ 2881, 204-7. Leopold was employed between 1726 and 1741, and acted specifically as Beck's *kelderknecht* ('cellar servant').

49 CA, CJ 2881, 112.

50 On Johann Christoffel Beck and his success at the Cape; see G. Groenewald, 'Friends Old and New: The Lammens Sisters at the Cape, 1736', *Quarterly Bulletin of the National Library of South Africa* 59/4 (2005), 164-67.

brother, Johann Christian, and brother-in-law, Willem van As.[51] Or else they were fellow German immigrants such as Nicolaas Gockelius and Jurgen Schoester. This favour Beck returned by standing surety for fellow German *pachters* like Maria Coster and Godlieb Opperman.[52] An illustration of just how advantageous these family connections with immigrant Germans could be to a *pachter* such as Johann Zacharias Beck, is afforded by the inventory and estate account of Geertruij de With, the mother-in-law of Johann Christoffel Beck.[53]

Geertruij de With was born Gertrud Witt in Hamburg and, in 1685, married at the Cape Simon [de] Groot from Wittenburg and, after his death, Hendrik Bouman from Dithmarschen.[54] By 1731 Governor de la Fontaine could remark laconically of this wealthy widow: 'Is a woman who is well-off' – one of only six people described as such on his list.[55] By the time of her death in 1733 her estate was valued at *f* 144 952. This very rich woman seemed to have spent her last years as a rentier: thirty-four individuals owed her numerous loans totalling an impressive *f* 77 190.[56] Through her daughter, Anna de Groot – who twice married German *pachters* before marrying Johann Christoffel Beck – De With had clear links with the *pachter* community. The *pachters* Godlieb Opperman, Christiaan Maasdorp and Hendrik Eversdijk all had loans with her of more than *f* 1 000 each. These men all formed part of the group of German *pachters* with whom Johann Zacharias Beck associated and who supported

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51 Between 1728 and 1730 Willem van As and Johann Christoffel Beck acted on six occasions as Beck's surety for alcohol *pachten*. Van As, too, invested in a *pacht*, in 1729, presumably encouraged by the success of his brother-in-law.

52 It is no co-incidence that these two individuals (who later got married) were the malt beer *pachters* during the late 1720s and early 1730s, as the Beck brothers seemed to have had close relations (due to both propinquity and family connections) with the holders of this *pacht*.

53 CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 109a and MOOC 13/1/2 no. 91.

54 J. Hoge 'Die Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk aan die Kaap', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 1/2 (1938), 23 note 8.

55 Guelke, Shell and Whyte, *De la Fontaine Report*.

56 Judith Spicksley has traced the increase of single women in credit provision in seventeenth-century England. She found that an exceptionally high proportion of their personal assets were tied up in lending and suggested credit provision was a mechanism through which single women could remain independent and even become wealthy – providing various forms of credit could and did become an occupation in itself; J.M. Spicksley, '"Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth": Single Women as Sources of Credit in Seventeenth-Century England', *Social History* 32/2 (2007), 187-207.

one another.[57] But just how advantageous this connection via his brother was to Beck is shown by the fact that the second biggest amount owed to De With was by Johann Zacharias Beck: she loaned him, on five occasions, a total of *f* 6 695 *without* any interest.[58]

The career of Johann Zacharias Beck[59] and the network of Geertruij de With's creditors clearly illustrate the financial, familial and other links which existed within the German immigrant community at the Cape during this period. It seems a near universal phenomenon that in immigrant communities where immigrants share the same national, cultural, linguistic and other backgrounds they tend to support, and often marry, one another.[60] Thus Erika Kuijpers has recently demonstrated how immigrants – especially German and Scandinavian – in seventeenth-century Amsterdam worked in, and sometimes even dominated, the same types of employment. Many of these immigrants, especially amongst the working classes which had fewer incentives and opportunities to integrate, entered into endogamous marriages.[61] The situation at the Cape during this period was similar, although here integration was made easier through the fact that immigration was almost exclusively male so that most immigrants married local women, albeit (during this period) the daughters of immigrant men. The case of the Beck brothers also suggests that by the early decades of the eighteenth century, on a small scale, something like chain

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57 Hendrik Eversdijk, although Dutch born, was the brother-in-law of Carel Boetendagh, and like the latter invested in the Rondebosch *pacht*. He also started his career as the *bijtapper* of another German, Johannes Heufke.

58 While her son-in-law had three loans with her totalling more than *f* 10 000, these were all given out on interest.

59 Johann Zacharias Beck encountered financial troubles in the early 1730s when he was embroiled in a number of court cases over unpaid debt (CA, CJ 824, 145-55, 171-77, 192-93, 212 and CJ 825, 5-22, 25-26, 36-37, 42, 54 and 101), so much so that Governor Jan de la Fontaine could remark of him in 1731: 'was een pagter geweest, dog nu armer als arm' (had been a *pachter*, yet is now poorer than poor); Guelke, Shell and Whyte, *De la Fontaine Report*. But Beck rebounded and was investing again in the alcohol *pachten* by the late 1730s, no doubt helped by the massive *obligatie* (debenture) of *f* 9 000 awarded him by Johannes Blanckenberg, the father of his second wife; MOOC 8/5 no. 142a.

60 For a study of such support networks among modern immigrant entrpreneurs, see R. Waldinger and M.I. Lichter, *How the Other Half Works: Immigration and Social Organization of Labor* (Berkeley, 2003).

61 E. Kuijpers, *Migrantenstad: Immigratie en Sociale Verhoudingen in 17e-Eeuws Amsterdam* (Hilversum, 2005), esp. 178-287.

migration was happening between the German lands and the Cape:[62] in the place of origin migration became a well-known option and many people there would know of (and have contact with) somebody who had emigrated. When somebody then considers migrating, these contacts and knowledge are used to help establish the new immigrant. This process explains why one tends to find a concentration of immigrants in certain economic spheres or activities in the place of migration.[63] This may well explain the dominance of Germans in the alcohol retail world of Cape Town during the first half of the eighteenth century, in addition to the fact that the urban environment was more conducive to the establishment and maintenance of ethnic or cultural links.

One cultural factor, in addition to a linguistic one, which most German immigrants shared – in both Amsterdam and in Cape Town – was their Lutheran faith. Although there were Lutherans at the Cape since the inception of the station, a number of factors indicate that they only became more cohesive, or at least displayed a more active awareness of their Lutheran identity, by the 1730s.[64] This was partly due to the fact that several high-ranking VOC personnel such as Johan Tobias Rhenius (captain of the garrison) and Johannes Needer (a junior merchant who acted as deputy to the fiscal) were actively promoting the Lutheran cause.[65] In addition,

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62 The case of the Beck brothers is not unique: during the same period Jurgen Schoester (or Georg Schuster in German), who acted as one of Johann Zacharias Beck's sureties, had his brother Marthinus come out in VOC service. The latter worked for Schoester as a *knecht* for some years before becoming a free burgher himself; H.C. Bredekamp and J.L. Hattingh (eds), *Das Tagebuch und die Briefe von Georg Schmidt, dem Ersten Missionar in Südafrika (1737-1744) / Dagboek en Briewe van George Schmidt, Eerste Sendeling in Suid-Afrika (1737-1744)* (transcribed by B. Krüger and H. Plüddemann; translated by J. du P. Boeke; Bellville, 1981), 79 with note 7. Doubtless there must have been other similar cases.

63 See Kuijpers, *Migrantenstad*, 217 on this process. The history of the Beck brothers suggests a similar process, but this can only be properly demonstrated once a full-scale investigation of German immigration to the Cape has been performed.

64 Cf. Hoge, 'Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk', 26-30 for a discussion of this evidence.

65 Although the bulk of the Lutherans at the Cape were German, not all Lutherans were Germans: people of Scandinavian descent such as the Bergh family as well as some Dutch people were also Lutheran. The best example of the latter is Johannes Needer who was born in Amsterdam yet remained a professed Lutheran (even though it may have stymied his promotion through the VOC ranks); see on him and his Lutheranism, M. Boucher, 'A Cape Girl Writes Home from Holland in 1748', *Cabo* 2/4 (1981), 9-11.

adherents were able to maintain links with others of similar convictions through the growing number of German immigrants in Cape Town during this era, as well as the regular visits by Lutheran chaplains serving aboard Danish ships which regularly visited Cape Town at this time – Needer, for instance, was able to have all his children confirmed by such chaplains.[66]

That there was a network amongst German immigrants at the Cape based on language and faith is well illustrated by the diary of the German missionary Georg Schmidt who maintained links with them during his stay in South Africa in the late 1730s and early 1740s. During his visits to Cape Town he regularly visited and discussed religious and other issues with a wide spectrum of German and Lutheran immigrants in Cape Town: ranging from high-ranking VOC officials such as the Rhenius family,[67] Johannes Needer and Captain Rudolph Siegfried Alleman, to ordinary soldiers and other minor officials; from pre-eminent burgher families such as the Berghs and Jurgen Schoester (the wealthy surety of Johann Zacharias Beck) to free-burgher Germans working as servants and artisans in Cape Town.[68] What they all had in common was a shared identity centred on their German background and Lutheran faith, which they could live out due to their propinquity and the fact that the nature of Cape Town allowed them links with kindred spirits – both those visiting and through correspondence.[69]

It thus comes as no surprise to discover that amongst the signatories of the first two petitions, in 1742 and 1743, for the founding of a Lutheran church in Cape Town are all the most active and best-connected alcohol *pachters* of the period: Johann Zacharias Beck, Jan Fredrik Bierman, Joachim Daniel Hubner, Michiel Pentz, Jacob

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66 *Ibid*., 10.

67 The Rhenius family is another illustration of chain migration: three of Johan Thobias Rhenius' brothers followed him to the Cape, and at least two of them worked under him in the garrison – the one as an ensign and the other as the garrison's bookkeeper. One of these brothers married into the Lutheran Bergh family; cf. Bredekamp and Hattingh, *Tagebuch und Briefe von Georg Schmidt*, 41 with note 6.

68 *Ibid*., 41-43, 77-79, 193-201 and 331-41.

69 Schmidt's diary also reveals how aware the higher-ranking Germans were of what was going on in Europe and elsewhere in the VOC world, and how the Cape formed part of a textual world encompassing both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean regions.

van Reenen and Jan Jurgen Schreuder.[70] And that entrance and acceptance into this German immigrant community allowed access to social capital is clearly illustrated by the case of the Beck brothers: they were both Lutheran and their benefactress, Geertruij de With, was a German immigrant woman from Hamburg who was a convinced and active Lutheran.[71] It was thanks to such networks of kinship and shared identities that several of the most prominent *pachters* of the 1730s were able to make a success of their entrepreneurial endeavours since these links allowed them access to social capital and, with that, financial and other forms of capital.

Friends, Business Networks and Social Capital

The importance of social capital for success in the alcohol *pacht* business is also well illustrated by the career of Abraham Leever. In his case, though, while family connections did help his career initially, it was the cultivation of close business ties which helped to make him perhaps the most successful *pachter* of the 1730s and 1740s. Abraham Leever arrived at the Cape in 1719 with the rank of corporal. In 1720 he became an *assistent* in the civil service of the VOC, which makes him the highest-ranking VOC official to have become a *pachter*. In 1723 he married Margaretha Paassen and in the following year he became a free burgher.[72]

Margaretha was the daughter of Jacob Paassen and Barbara de Jongh. In 1724, the widow Paassen married Johannes Heufke. She was an independently wealthy woman whose estate was valued after her death in 1736 at *f* 117 442.[73] Johannes

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70 The list includes only three *pachters* from the 1730s (Beck, Pentz and Schreuder), but this is because most of the other German *pachters* from this decade were dead by 1742. But having seven *pachters* on this list constitutes a high number considering that only thirty-one of the sixty-four petitioners were in fact free burghers. The majority of signatories were VOC employees of higher ranks such as Needer and members of the Swellengrebel and Rhenius families. In addition, this list only included those Lutherans prepared to sign this public petition, which was by no means everybody who professed the faith; cf. Hoge, 'Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk', 32-33 for a list of the signatories.

71 *Ibid*., 23 with note 8. She actively promoted the Lutheran cause, but died before the petitions (which were unsuccessful in the event) of the early 1740s.

72 G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VIII, 1729-1734* (Pretoria, 1975), 43 note 146 and *idem* (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739* (Pretoria, 1981), 26 note 146.

73 CA, MOOC 13/1/3 no. 9.

Heufke, the man she married, originally came from Hamburg but by the time of their marriage had been living at the Cape for more than a quarter of a century. He himself was a well-off man who by the time of his death in 1739 owned two valuable farms, a number of town properties and eleven slaves. His success as a farmer and businessman also translated into social success and prestige: he held the offices of Orphan Master and Commissioner of Matrimonial Affairs and rose through the ranks to become Captain of the Burgher Militia during the 1710s.[74] Clearly marrying into such an established and wealthy family greatly aided Abraham Leever in establishing himself as an entrepreneur.

However, it was only in 1727 that Leever invested in the alcohol *pachten* for the first time. Curiously enough, both he and his father-in-law bought their first *pachten* at the same time: Heufke obtained one each of the expensive brandy and Cape wines *pachten* while Leever invested in the minor Rondebosch *pacht*. By this stage Johannes Heufke was fifty-seven years old and had already made his fortune from farming. He later declared that it had never been his intention to invest in the alcohol retail business, but that he had only done so because the *pachten* decreased markedly in price by the late 1720s.[75] Johannes Heufke was, however, well familiar with the alcohol *pacht* business: his brother, David, was a *pachter* during the early 1700s,[76] as also his brother-in-law, Johannes Pijthius, who was a major *pachter* between 1705 and 1714; they were followed by the father of his first wife, Jan Botma, who was the Stellenbosch *pachter* during the late 1710s.[77] In addition, Heufke's only son, Cornelis, married Catharina Cruijwagen, who was both the daughter of a *pachter*, Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagen and the sister-in-law of the hugely successful Hendrik

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74 Cf. Moritz, *Deutschen am Kap*, 227-28; Hoge, 'Personalia', 157; De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 53 note 173 and *Resolusies IX*, 48 note 11; CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 44 and 44½, and MOOC 13/1/3 no. 34. Here is another case of chain migration as it seems likely that Johannes Heufke had followed his brother David to the Cape during the late 1690s.

75 De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 110. The slump in prices was due to a lower than usual number of ships calling at the Cape during the late 1720s; see pages 42-43 above.

76 His expertise came in handy: he acted as one of his brother's *bijtappers* in the late 1720s; CA, CJ 333, 295v.

77 His father, Cornelis Stevensz Botma, in turn was one of the pioneer *pachters* of the 1680s.

Oostwald Eksteen.[78] Clearly Johannes Heufke must have known about the possibilities and dangers of investing in alcohol retail at the Cape.

After his first gamble in 1727, Heufke continued to invest in the alcohol *pachten* over the following five years.[79] Leever, on the other hand, did not repeat his early experiment until 1731, and it is plausible that during this period he was assisting his father-in-law as a *bijtapper* as he was described by Governor de la Fontaine in 1731 as being 'the *bijtapper* of a *pachter*, yet he has debts'.[80] From that year onwards, though, Leever continued to invest in the alcohol trade for almost every year until the 1750s. His brother-in-law, Willem Raams, who married Heufke's daughter, Alida, in 1733 also invested in the alcohol *pachten*. He, however, had a short career as *pachter* since he left the Cape in 1734 shortly after the death of his wife.[81]

An analysis of Leever's sureties presents a rather different pattern from that of Beck in that it was considerably less endogamous:[82] for instance, Leever only once made use of a surety who was related to him, viz. Nicolaas Brommert, the brother-in-law of Abraham's own brother, Jacob Leever.[83] Curiously enough Johannes Heufke never stood as surety for any *pachter* during the 1720s and 1730s, least of all his two son-in-laws.[84] But Leever acted as a surety for Heufke through most of the period of

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78 See appendix 1 below for details of their *pacht* holdings; and pages 96-97 above for the links between the Cruijwagen and Eksteen families.

79 This makes him an example of what Lesger argues was one of the entry points for an entrepreneur, along with marriage, viz. opportunism; cf. Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 73-74.

80 'is bijtapper van een pagter, dog heeft schulden'; Guelke, Shell and Whyte, *De la Fontaine Report*. I have been unable to confirm this as it was not necessary to draw up contracts for free-burgher *bijtappers* as was the case with loan *knechten*. In 1728, Leever acted as *bijtapper* for Melt van der Spuij; CA, CJ 333, 295v.

81 This seems to have been a sudden, even impulsive decision, as he did not even serve out his term as *pachter* but sold his *pacht* to Jan van der Swijn; De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 302-303. This plausibly relates to tension in the Heufke family caused by the affair (and illegitimate child) Raams had with his sister-in-law, Catharina Cruijwagen; cf. CA, CJ 828, 8-10. Raams left his children at the Cape and died in Zutphen in 1736; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 138 and MOOC 13/1/3 no. 4.

82 This analysis is based on the signatories of those standing surety for Leever as revealed in the *pacht* contracts between 1727 and 1740: CA, C 2703-2707.

83 See page 187 with note 94 below on Jacob Leever and his wife, Jacomina Brommert.

84 His inventory and estate account record only small debts relating to the provision of wine and other foodstuffs. Heufke did however loan large sums from relations such as Johannes Cruijwagen

the latter's tenure as a *pachter* – which makes it even more plausible that they were in fact business partners, and that it was in this way that Leever built up some of his physical capital.

Three of Leever's sureties were *pachters* of the late 1720s with whom he likely had had dealings while serving his apprenticeship with his father-in-law.[85] But through most of the 1730s, Leever was supported as a surety by a small group of men, consisting of Hendrik van Dijk, Carel Boetendagh, Jan van der Swijn and Melt van der Spuij. During this period, these five men (including Leever) were the prime investors in the most lucrative of the alcohol *pachten*, viz. Cape wines and brandy.[86] Significantly enough, Leever regularly stood surety for these men too. Although *pachters* were not supposed to enter into mutual agreements in order to prevent collusion, the evidence suggests that these major brandy and Cape wines *pachters* formed something of a cartel during the early 1730s.[87] In addition to these four major *pachters* who acted as his sureties, Leever had two others, viz. Abraham Paling and Dirk van den Berg. These connections he seemed to have gained through his close business partner, Carel Boetendagh, as they often acted as his financial backers.[88] Boetendagh had a long-standing relation with the Heufke/Leever family as his sister-in-law was married to Hendrik Eversdijk, the *bijtapper* of Johannes Heufke during the late 1720s – the same period that Abraham Leever acted as his father-in-law's *bijtapper*. In addition to backing Leever from 1731 onwards, Boetendagh and Leever's brother-in-law, Willem Raams, also stood surety for each other.

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(whose sister was married to Heufke's son, Cornelis) and rentiers such as Johannes Swellengrebel and the late Simon van der Stel; CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 44 and MOOC 13/1/3 no. 34.

85 They were Johannes Rogiers; Jacob van Bochem and Jacob van Reenen. Significantly they were all three immigrants of Johannes Heufke's generation (and the latter two were German like him) so that it is likely that Leever gained these men's support thanks to his father-in-law.

86 Between them they owned twenty-four of the forty brandy *pachten* during this decade; fifteen of the twenty Cape wines *pachten* before the institution of the *generaele pacht* in 1734, while for the rest of the decade the *generaele pacht* was held by one or the other member of this group.

87 Throughout the early 1730s the authorities suspected the major *pachters* of collusion, although the latter vigorously denied it; cf. for example De Wet, *Resolusies VIII*, 110, 302 and *Resolusies IX*, 31. It was these suspicions, coupled with the decline in the overall *pacht* income, which led to the adoption of the *generaele pachter* system in 1734; see pages 31-32 above.

88 Abraham Paling was also related by marriage to Boetendagh.

In this way, then, Leever had managed to build up substantial social capital through supporting and helping certain of his fellow *pachters*. It is plausible that this support was built-up over a long period during which these men got to know one another and started developing links: it is no co-incidence that, with the possible exception of Hendrik van Dijk (who could have worked as a *vrijknecht* for whom contracts were not necessary), all of the five major brandy and Cape wine *pachters* of the 1730s had acted as *bijtappers* during the late 1720s. They were of similar age; had just got married (mostly to the daughters of established *pachters*) and become free burghers; and must have had many dealings with one another through the deep involvement of their employers and in-laws in the alcohol retail business of Cape Town.[89] Clearly, what must have started as bonds of friendship in the early parts of their lives at the Cape were translated into more formal bonds of patronage and support by the early 1730s when they became *pachters* themselves.[90]

The desire of Abraham Leever and his close business associates to exert control over the most lucrative *pachten*, as well as their willingness to support one another, reflects another important aspect of early modern entrepreneurship, viz. that maximum profits were subordinate to long-term stability.[91] It is for this reason that stable and enduring business relationships were an important means for the attainment of wealth, power and prestige. These relationships were the key to Leever's success as an alcohol entrepreneur during the 1730s. It also explains why some *pachters* were *not* successful: it is clear from those who only ever bought one *pacht* that a crucial factor for their lack of success must have been their difficulty in finding willing and financially secure sureties. Most of these minor *pachters* used family members or friends as their backers, but unless they could find one of the big money-lenders or

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89 Melt van der Spuij and Hendrik van Dijk started their careers earlier than the others (they were *pachters* by the mid 1720s); but we know that Abraham Leever worked as *bijtapper* for Van der Spuij while Boetendagh acted in a similar capacity for Van Dijk during the late 1720s.

90 These friendships did not always survive being translated into business partnerships: in the early 1730s Melt van der Spuij and Hendrik van Dijk engaged in a long drawn-out court battle over mutual insults relating to their honesty; see pages 182-83 below.

91 Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 71. The VOC itself was an exemplar of this mercantilist principle: 'In general, the Company's policy was to use its dominant position … to achieve a stable, medium-term optimum rather than short-term profit maximization'; J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and Preservance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge, 1997), 431.

(ex-)*pachters* to support them, they were doomed to failure. This underlines the fact that the value of one's social capital gets determined by *all* three of the factors discussed above.

How the lack of social capital could stymie a person's desire to enter the world of Cape alcohol *pachten*, is shown by the case of the unfortunate Jan Horn. During the 1730s, he had acted as *bijtapper* for the malt beer *pachter*, Hans Jurgen Honk. In 1739 he saw an opportunity for advancement when Carel Boetendagh, who had had close business dealings with Honk, died. Horn quickly became a free burgher and at the end of July he married Catharina Valk, the widow of Boetendagh. A month later, on 31 August, he was in the Castle where he won the bidding on the *generaele pacht* at *f* 31 950. But when he had to sign the contract, he was unable to produce the requisite two sureties. He was denied the *pacht*, which was re-auctioned but realised less than what Horn had bid. Instead, it went to the well-connected and established Isaac Maartensz and Jan Holst. The VOC held Horn responsible for the difference between the two sums and instituted criminal proceedings against him. He ended up in the debtor's ward (*gijzelkamer*), having financially ruined himself and Catharina Valk.[92] Without family, friends and social capital, social mobility through the use of the alcohol *pachten* was not possible at the Cape.

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Conclusion

By the 1730s Cape Town was a small, albeit expanding, town whose most marked feature was the transience of a large part of its population. The roughly one hundred or so burgher families who lived in it were mostly also of recent date, and the town's free population continued to expand through the arrival and settlement of new immigrants, mostly single men. This synchronic study of the alcohol *pachters* has revealed the way in which a significant portion of these newcomers managed to establish themselves, make a livelihood and in some cases become wealthy in Cape Town.

In a VOC-town with limited opportunities for an entrepreneur, alcohol retail provided a relatively accessible entry into business. Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, this was not possible without access to credit. The key with which to

92 De Wet, *Resolusies IX*, 289-90.

unlock this access to credit was social capital. By the period under discussion there seemed to have been two ways of accumulating social capital. The most significant was through the cultivation of links with people of a shared background: immigrants (or their children) from the German lands who came out in VOC service, and who often shared their Lutheran faith. During the 1730s, German immigration to the Cape was at its height (see chapter two above) and it appears that there existed something akin to chain migration whereby successful immigrants at the Cape encouraged their kin to join them. This meant that for many German immigrants a network of support was already awaiting them upon arrival. It is clear from this study of the business networks of these German *pachters* that kinship and friendship, based on a shared background, played a crucial role in access to credit and entry into alcohol retail.

Not all alcohol *pachters* during the 1730s were German, although it is clear that this business was dominated by German immigrant men. *Pachters* such as the Dutchman Abraham Leever relied less on shared cultural links, but instead carefully cultivated over many years a business network based on mutual support. In both these ways of accumulating social capital, marriage was an important point of entry which brought with it access to already-established support networks. In several cases, business networks were cemented by family alliances. These processes clearly illustrate the crucial role that trust played in early modern business. How the nature and operation of kinship and social networks among alcohol entrepreneurs changed over time is the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 5

DYNASTY BUILDING, FAMILY NETWORKS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CAPE TOWN: THE ALCOHOL *PACHTERS* OF THE 1770S

This chapter continues the close study of a group of alcohol *pachters*, this time for the period 1770-79. This period falls firmly within the last quarter of the existence of alcohol *pachten* at the Cape of Good Hope, and given that it is a full generation after the 1730s, it affords the opportunity to determine to what an extent the role of the *pacht* in the socio-economic life of Cape Town had changed by the second half of the eighteenth century. What differences occurred in the composition of the body of *pachters* in the 1770s as opposed to the 1730s? What changes happened in the ways in which Cape Town burghers invested in the alcohol *pacht*? Was capital raised in different ways by this later stage, and to what extent did the nature and function of business networks change? What were the continuities and what were the changes regarding the way alcohol entrepreneurs operated in Cape Town? Given that by this stage the Cape was a more settled society, with a mostly second and third generation population, was dynasty building occurring? How did the different social set-up, in terms of a growing local population, affect the type of alliances alcohol entrepreneurs entered into? In suggesting answers to these questions, a study of the 1770s enables the historian to determine how the *pacht* system was used by a new generation of Cape Town inhabitants. This in turn helps the historian to understand how the composition and social dynamics of the burgher population differed in the late eighteenth century from the earlier period.

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The Pachters *of the 1770s: A Prosopography*

During the decade 1770-79 there were nineteen individuals who invested in the alcohol *pachten*.[1] Given that this division into decades is an artificial procedure, it is

[1] The sources for compiling this prosopography are varied. They include: the *pacht* contracts (CA, C 2697-2729); H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806* (5 vols, Cape Town, 1905-6 and 1989) and various genealogical sources: C.C. de Villiers and C. Pama, *Geslagsregisters van die Ou Kaapse Families* (3 vols, Cape Town and Amsterdam, 1966); J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, *Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South*

natural that their activities span much longer than this decade: only a minority of them started investing in the 1770s: most of them were active by the 1760s, with the earliest investment by one of these individuals being 1758. Some also continued investing in the *pacht* long after the end of the decade under focus, with the latest year of activity by this group being 1790. The *pacht* activities of this group therefore cover most of the second half of the century and continued until close to the demise of the *pacht* system in 1795 (see table 5.2). As with the earlier decade discussed (1730s), the number of *pachten* held by individual *pachters* varied greatly. As shown earlier (in chapter two), the vast majority of *pachters* held only five *pachten* or less during his or her career, with about thirty-seven percent who only ever bought one *pacht*. In the 1770s, too, the majority of *pachters* invested in five or fewer *pachten* (eleven out of the nineteen). But an unusual feature of this group of *pachters* is that so many of them (six out of the nineteen, which is more than thirty percent) held ten or more *pachten* in total. This is almost double the average for the whole period of the *pacht* at the Cape (when only seventeen percent of *pachters* held that many *pachten*). In fact, this era saw the biggest investors in the history of the alcohol *pacht*: Jan Jacob Schreuder, who was active between 1762 and 1790, is the person who had invested in the largest number of *pachten* in the whole period of the *pacht* system's existence. Two other *pachters* active during the 1770s, Martin Melck and Maarten Bateman, respectively bought the third and fourth largest number of *pachten*, with Melck being the person who invested the second largest fortune in the *pachten* during its existence at the Cape (cf. chapter two and see table 5.1 for a breakdown of *pacht*-holding during this decade). In general this fits a pattern of *pacht*-holding in the second half of the eighteenth century where fewer individuals held more *pachten*. Whether or not this is related to greater capital accumulation (or a different avenue or pattern of accumulation) will be discussed later in this chapter. It is fair to say that during the 1770s, the alcohol retail trade in Cape Town was dominated by six men: Jan Jacob Schreuder, Martin Melck, Maarten Bateman, Willem de Kruger, Johannes Nicholaas Esselaar (or Esler) and Johannes Roep.

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African Genealogies (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007); J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946), and E. Moritz, *Die Deutschen am Kap unter der Holländischen Herrschaft, 1652-1806* (Weimar, 1938).

Table 5.1: Number of *Pachten* Bought by Individual *Pachters*

No of *Pachten* Held	***Pachters* 1680-1795**	**1770s Only**
1	73 (37%)	4 (21%)
2	33 (17%)	2 (11%)
3-5	41 (21%)	5 (26%)
6-9	18 (9%)	2 (11%)
10+	33 (17%)	6 (32%)
Total	198	19

Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

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Based on a study of patterns from the 1730s, one would have expected *pachters* of the late eighteenth century either to have remained immigrants (showing that urban entrepreneurship was ultimately related to a relative lack of deep connections) or that, one to two generations down the line, *pachters* would be locally-born individuals who continued in the family tradition of alcohol retail. Yet, the tabulation of the origins of the 1770s *pachters* is surprising in that it shows a result which does not conform completely to either one of these scenarios. Of the 1770s *pachters*, the majority were still immigrants: only six were Cape born. Of the remaining thirteen, all bar one (viz. Jan Daniel Holst) came from the German-speaking lands.

At first sight this seems contradictory to what was established in chapter two, viz. that Germans were dominant in the alcohol retail trade in Cape Town from the 1710s to the 1760s, but that in the last decades Cape-born investors took prominence. But the latter periodisation was determined on the basis of when *pachters* bought their *first pacht*. A closer examination of the German-speaking *pachters* of the 1770s reveals that of the twelve active during that decade, eight started their activities a decade or more earlier. All six the Cape *pachters* of this decade, however, started their activities in the 1770s. Even so, the Cape *pachters* remained a small contingent as few of them invested in more than a few *pachten*: the Germans – who had a good head-start – continued to dominate the alcohol retail trade of the 1770s: All six of those who owned more than ten *pachten* were of German origin.

Table 5.2: Alcohol *Pachters* at the Cape, 1770-79

***Pachter*'s Name**	**Nationality**	**Years Active**[2]	**No of *Pachten***
Bateman, Maarten	German	1763-1787	36
Broeders, Pieter	German	1758-1773	8
Combrink, Hermanus	Cape	1770-1774	2
De Kruger, Willem	German	1770-1786	19
Dempers, Willem	Cape	1775	1
Esselaar, Johannes	German	1762-1774	13
Holst, Jan Daniel	Dutch	1764-1773	3
Hurter, Jan Willem	German	1763-1783	7
Kalteijer, Anthonij	German	1776-1777	2
Meijer, Hendrik	Cape	1771-1773	3
Melck, Martin	German	1760-1781	32
Munnik, Gerhardus	Cape	1779	1
Roep, Johannes	German	1767-1780	21
Rogiers, Tobias	Cape	1775-1778	4
Schreuder, Johan Jacob	German	1762-1790	39
Sebrits, Frans	German	1778-1782	4
Smook, Jan	German	1763-1779	5
Wilkens, Jan Willem jr	Cape	1776	1
Wilkens, Jan Willem sr	German	1777	1

Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163, and Genealogical Data

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Thus, as with the *pachters* of the 1730s, most of those from the 1770s had a career in the VOC before becoming free burghers and, subsequently, *pachters*. Of the thirteen immigrant *pachters* of this decade, the rank of twelve could be determined. Of these, all but two came to the Cape as *soldaten* (soldiers). Only one (Maarten Bateman) arrived as a *matroos* (sailor), while another (Jan Daniel Holst) was an artisan on a

[2] The years in this column refer to *pacht* years, i.e. from 1 September the previous calendar year to 31 August of the year given.

ship, a so-called *zijlmaker* ('sail-maker'). The *pachters* of the 1770s do not, however, show the same range of positions in the VOC as those of the 1730s – only one of them is known to have had a position in the VOC hierarchy, viz. Pieter Broeders who worked as an *assistent* – the lowest rank in the civil service of the VOC. Clearly, for the *pachters* of this decade, experience in the VOC seems not to have been a major factor in their later success. There is, for instance, no clear link between the VOC careers of Maarten Bateman, Johan Jacob Schreuder and Martin Melck and their huge success in the alcohol retail business later in their lives. Other factors must evidently have played a greater role by this stage. Clearly in the course of the eighteenth century, new entrepreneurs had less need to rely on the favour of the VOC and expended more of their energy in establishing and maintaining links with the growing burgher population, as will become clear later in this chapter.

As we saw with the *pachters* of the 1730s, there were clear links regarding the length of the period between arriving at the Cape, becoming a free burgher and investing in a *pacht* for the first time. Was this still the case by the 1770s? On average the 1770s *pachters* were in VOC service at the Cape for just over five years after arrival, ranging from a minimum of one to thirteen years. This is only slightly less than the average for the *pachters* of the 1730s. The range for the period between receiving their free-burgher papers and becoming a *pachter* was also rather similar to that of the 1730s. In the 1770s, the immigrant *pachters* took between one year and sixteen years from becoming free-burghers to investing in a *pacht* for the first time, with an average of about seven years.

Thus far the prosopography of the 1770s *pachters* shows a surprising amount of continuity with that of the earlier period. But there were also changes which started to occur during this period. In the 1730s there was a clear link between being released from Company service and obtaining a *pacht* shortly thereafter, viz. marriage to the widow or a daughter of a *pachter*. This way into the *pacht* business was much less common by the 1770s. Only three of these men became *pachters* within a year of becoming free burghers (see table 5.3). But in only one of these cases, viz. that of Jan Willem Hurter, did he marry into a *pacht* family. Hurter married Barbara Honk, the daughter of Hans Jurgen Honk and Aletta de Nijs, in 1755 (while still a VOC servant) and bought his first *pacht* in September 1762 shortly after becoming a free burgher. Hurter, however, never became a major *pachter*, and although he invested in the alcohol *pachten* over a period of almost twenty years, he did so haphazardly and

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relatively rarely (only seven times) although his involvement in the world of alcohol retail was extensive, as will become clear later. In total, of the nineteen *pachters* active during the 1770s, only four married the (step-)daughters of *pachters*,[3] and none who married widows of *pachters*. There were also three individuals who married the granddaughters of *pachters* (see table 5.3).[4] The remarkable thing, however, is that none of those *pachters* who married into *pacht* families became particularly successful in this business: Hurter is the one who invested in the largest number of *pachten* although his influence was much larger than his direct investment would indicate. In fact, of the six main *pachters* of this period, only Johannes Roep could show some connection to a *pachter* family in that he married Johanna Elisabeth Staf, the granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs.

Table 5.3: Careers of the 1770s *Pachters*

***Pachter*'s Name**	**Rank**	**Arrival > Burgher**[5]	**Burgher > *Pachter***	**Marriage**[6]
Bateman, Maarten	matroos	4	6	
Broeders, Pieter	soldaat	2	1	
Combrink, Hermanus	n/a	n/a	n/a	
De Kruger, Willem	soldaat	5	15	
Dempers, Willem	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Esselaar, Johannes	unknown	?	?	
Holst, Jan Daniel	zijlmaker	1	7	gd
Hurter, Jan Willem	soldaat	13	0	d
Kalteijer, Anthonij	soldaat	5	12	
Meijer, Hendrik	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Melck, Martin	soldaat	4	10	
Munnik, Gerhardus	n/a	n/a	n/a	

[3] Jan Willem Hurter; Frans Sebrits and Jan Willem Wilkens sr.

[4] Jan Daniel Holst; Johannes Roep and Tobias Rogiers.

[5] The numbers in the columns '(arrival > burgher)' and '(burgher > *pachter*)' refer to years.

[6] In this column 'd' denotes marriage to the (step-)daughter of an (ex-)*pachter*, 'gd' to a granddaughter.

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Roep, Johannes	soldaat	5	7	gd
Rogiers, Tobias	n/a	n/a	n/a	gd
Schreuder, Johan Jacob	soldaat	4	8	
Sebrits, Frans	soldaat	6	4	d
Smook, Jan	soldaat	9	1	
Wilkens, Jan Willem jr	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Wilkens, Jan Willem sr	soldaat	6	16	d

Source: Genealogical Data; *Resolusies*; *Requesten*

This finding – the fact that *pachters* by the 1770s were still largely immigrants and did not (generally) marry into *pacht* families – is most surprising in terms of seeing the *pachters* as entrepreneurs. Clearly something was beginning to change in relation to how the *pachters* were connected and operated. What variety was there in the ways in which different entrepreneurs operated in the alcohol *pacht* world – particularly with regards to social capital – during the 1770s; and how did their approaches differ from an earlier generation, such as the *pachters* of the 1730s? In what follows, I demonstrate the existence in the 1770s of two different approaches to building up social capital and networks by alcohol *pachters*, both of which show varying degrees of continuity and change from the earlier period.

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A Matriarchal Cape Dynasty

The economist Joseph Schumpeter suggested that one of the desires or motivations for entrepreneurial activity is 'the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty.'[7] Given the fact that by the 1770s large parts of the burgher population of the Cape of Good Hope were second and third generation inhabitants, one would expect a much greater proportion of second generation entrepreneurs who were building on the successes of their parents. Yet this seems not to have been the case during the period under discussion: although no less than four of the *pachters* of the 1770s were the sons or grandsons of *pachters*, not one of them was successful as a *pachter* in his own right: Hendrik Meijer, Gerhardus Munnik, Tobias

[7] J. Schumpeter, 'Entrepreneurship as Innovation', in R. Swedburg (ed.), *Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View* (Oxford, 2000), 70-71.

Rogiers and Jan Willem Wilkens jr. could, between them, only buy eight *pachten*, and not one of these was a major one such as the brandy or Cape wine *pachten*.[8] On a superficial level, then, it seems as if no 'dynasty building' was taking place during this period. Yet on a deeper level there certainly appears to have been something of this process among a section of the *pachter* community. It was, however, hidden due to its matrilineal nature.

The one outstanding case of dynasty building involved the (relatively minor) *moutbier* (malt beer) *pacht*. This case illustrates well both the continuities of *pacht* holding through most of the eighteenth century, and the changes which were occurring towards the end of the century. Superficially there seems to be no pattern in the holding of the *moutbier pacht* during the 1770s as it was held by five different individuals, none of whom had it for more than four years in succession. But once one looks into the marriage patterns and the role of female descent, it becomes clear that during this decade the malt beer *pacht* continued to be controlled by a family complex that centred on Aletta de Nijs. It was thanks to her business acumen that the malt beer *pacht* remained in the same family's hands for more than four decades.

Aletta de Nijs was born at the Cape in 1699, the daughter of Jan de Nijs from Germany who worked as soldier and wood-cutter first on Mauritius and then at the Cape.[9] In 1716 she married the Danish soldier Christiaan Biesel who became a free burgher in 1719.[10] He seemed to have been of some prominence in the burgher community (he was a corporal in the burgher militia but was demoted in 1728)[11] but died in 1730. The young widow was now left with their six surviving (out of nine) children and seemingly little money, as she was described by Governor De la Fontaine in 1731 as having 'a cooper shop and labouring under debts.'[12] In 1734, however, De Nijs married the German soldier, Hans Jurgen Honk (also spelled:

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8 In spite of his name, Johan Jacob Schreuder was no relation to the *pachter*, Jan Jurgen Schreuder who was active during the 1740s.

9 J.A. Heese and R.T.J. Lombard, *Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies* (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch, 1986-2007), vol. 6, 476.

10 G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel VII, 1724-1728* (Johannesburg, 1971), 269 note 186.

11 *Ibid*., 391.

12 L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte (eds), *The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732* (New Haven, 1990).

Hauk), with whom she had three more children (only one of whom survived him and reached adulthood). After buying the farm De Papenboom, the site of the Cape's brewery, the couple became involved in the malt beer *pacht*. Right from the start a pattern of *family* involvement was established, as the first time the family obtained a malt beer *pacht* was when Aletta de Nijs' son-in-law, Michiel Daniel Lourich (or Laurik) obtained the *pacht* for 1737.[13] Between 1738 and 1743 Honk himself held the malt beer *pacht*, in addition to holding the right to sell wine and liquor in Rondebosch during the early 1740s. After Honk's death in 1743, De Nijs came into her right (helped by the sizeable capital she inherited from her husband)[14] and, with two exceptions, held the malt beer *pacht* in her own name from 1744 until 1762. During this time she married Gerrit Reijndersz de Vos who held the *pacht* in 1751. This was a once-off affair, as De Nijs continued to buy the *pacht* from 1752 onwards in her own name (De Vos seems to have died some time between 1752 and 1755). Although De Nijs herself only ever invested in the malt beer *pacht*, for which she produced her own beer, she also acted on several occasions as the *bijtapper* for *pachters* who held the Rondebosch and False Bay *pachten*. Her son from her first marriage, Jan Biesel, held the Rondebosch and False Bay *pacht* for one year during this period (1754).

But the De Nijs family involvement in the malt beer *pacht* did not end with her retirement from *pacht* holding (or death) in 1762.[15] During 1763-64 this *pacht* was held by the German immigrant, Jan Willem Hurter. He arrived at the Cape in 1750 and worked as master gardener until he became a free burgher in 1762, in time to take over the *pacht* from Aletta de Nijs. He had married Barbara Honk in 1755, the daughter of Aletta de Nijs with her second husband, Hans Jurgen Honk. As the only surviving child of Honk, (the then minor) Barbara shared her father's reasonably wealthy estate with her mother.[16] Although Hurter married into a successful and wealthy *pachter* family, he was only involved in the malt beer *pacht* on and off, investing in it seven times over twenty years, and in no other *pachten* at all. Like his

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13 Lourich was married to Anna Catharina Biesel, a daughter from De Nijs' first marriage. He started his career in 1730 as the *bijtapper* of his fellow-German, Johannes Heufke; CA, CJ 2882, 323-35.

14 This includes the farm Papenboom, valued at *f* 15 000, a house in Table Valley (valued at *f* 5000) and fourteen slaves; cf. CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 59.

15 I have been unable to ascertain her date of death.

16 Cf. CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 59.

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mother-in-law, though, he also often served as *bijtapper* for the Rondebosch and False Bay *pacht* (which during this period had increased much in turnover due to ships calling at False Bay); and since he possessed the brewery at Papenboom, he continued to be the sole provider of beer to *pachters* at the Cape. The malt beer *pacht* during the 1760-70s developed a curious pattern of ownership, alternating between descendants of De Nijs and their associates. After Hurter's stint, it was held by Jan Jacob Schreuder for three years in a row. It is plausible that Schreuder and Hurter were long-standing friends: they were born in 1722 and 1723 respectively in the German-speaking lands and both arrived at the Cape in 1750. What is more certain is that they were part of a group of business associates – or at least financial backers – centred on Hurter's relative, Johannes Roep.

Johannes Roep, another German immigrant (five years younger than Schreuder and Hurter) who arrived at the Cape as a soldier in 1755 and became a free burgher in 1760, seemed to have been at the epicentre of a group of *pachters* who shared connections with Aletta de Nijs; in addition to their shared German origins and VOC experience. In 1761 he married Johanna Elisabeth Staf, who was the daughter of Lourens Staf and Elisabeth Biesel. The latter was one of Aletta de Nijs' children from her first marriage. But Johanna Staf seems to have been more than just a granddaughter of De Nijs: her father had been incarcerated on Robben Island due to insanity and it seems as if she and her mother lived with De Nijs (and no doubt assisted her in her business activities). When Johanna's mother died during the small-pox epidemic of 1755, De Nijs formally adopted her grandchild.[17] To all extent and purposes, then, she was more like a daughter of Aletta de Nijs and this, coupled with the closeness in age between her husband, Johannes Roep, and what was technically her step-uncle, Jan Hurter, must explain the close business links between these two men. For Johannes Roep acted as one of the two requisite sureties for Hurter on each of the four occasions the latter bought the malt beer *pacht* during the 1760s and 1770s. Johannes Roep was likewise a very regular surety for Jan Jacob Schreuder's many investments in the *pacht* business.[18] Roep himself entered the family business in

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[17] H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. and tr.), *Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: Requesten (Memorials), 1715-1806* (5 vols, Cape Town, 1905-6 and 1989), vol. 1, 383 and CA, C 133, 409-15.

[18] Schreuder held thirty-nine *pachten* during a twenty-eight-year period (1762-90). He started investing in the malt beer and *vaderlandschen* alcohol *pachten* during the 1760s, but expanded his

1767 by investing in the malt beer *pacht* after Schreuder's three year stint. In total Roep invested four times in this particular *pacht* during the late 1760s and 1770s, thus ensuring the continuing dominance of the De Nijs family in the malt beer business.

During this period a non-German married into the family. Jan Daniel Holst from Amsterdam arrived at the Cape in 1754, a year before Roep, and became a burgher shortly thereafter. In 1757 his wife joined him from Amsterdam,[19] and in the mid-1760s he twice invested in alcohol *pachten*. On one of these occasions Schreuder acted as one of his sureties. In 1767, shortly after the death of his first wife, he married Aletta Johanna Biesel, the granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs, thereby becoming related to both Hurter and Roep.[20] He was, however, a minor cog in the wheel of the Hurter/De Nijs family as he only invested in one more *pacht* after his marriage, viz. in the Rondebosch-False Bay *pacht* in 1773, a *pacht* in which several of his relatives had invested over the years and which was closely tied to the malt beer *pacht*.

During the early 1770s ownership of the malt beer *pacht* circulated between Jan Willem Hurter, the son-in-law of Aletta de Nijs, Johannes Roep, her 'grandson-in-law' and Johannes Esselaar (or Essler). The latter was another German immigrant who arrived at the Cape during the late 1740s or very early 1750s (he was married by 1751) and had been actively investing in the brandy *pacht* during the 1760s. He had no family ties to De Nijs herself, but seems to have formed part of the group of German immigrant *pachters* centred on Johannes Roep. It was Esselaar who, along with Roep, acted as Hurter's surety during the times he bought the malt beer *pacht* in the 1760-70s. In addition Esselaar also acted as Schreuder's surety on at least eight occasions during the 1770s, and also three times for Johannes Roep when the latter started investing in the alcohol *pachten* in the late 1760s (in which Schreuder became so prominent). Esselaar himself seems to have made use of these fellow Germans as sureties less often: on only three occasions did Roep and Schreuder stand as sureties for him during his twelve-year long involvement in the *pachten*.

Another expatriate German who invested briefly in the malt beer *pacht* (in 1779) during this period, and seems to have formed part of this group of mutual supporters, was Jan Smook (or Schmuck). He was born in 1724 and arrived at the

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business to include the lucrative brandy *pacht* in the 1770s, often buying more than one of the four brandy *pachten* a year.

19 CA, C 135, 174.

20 CA, MOOC 8/12 no. 32; Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vols. 1, 278 and 3, 449.

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Cape in 1753 where he became a burgher in 1762. He therefore follows the pattern of Hurter, Roep, Schreuder and Esselaar who were all born in the early 1720s, arrived at the Cape as soldiers in the early 1750s and became involved in the alcohol *pachten* during the 1760s. On four of the five occasions that Smook invested in an alcohol *pacht*, Roep acted as one of his sureties, while Smook in his turn stood as surety for Schreuder (four times) and on many occasions for Roep (nine times), especially at the start of their respective careers as *pachters*. Acting as a surety for someone in the eighteenth-century Cape, as illustrated earlier (in chapter four), was no mere formality since it carried formidable risks and was normally only done for people one trusted. In addition, as Otto Mentzel had testified of the situation in the 1730s, more often than not the person who stood as someone's surety acted more as business partners and not mere sureties.[21] It is clear from the aforegoing that during the 1760-70s there developed a group of German men of roughly the same age and experience who all invested in *pachten*, also the malt beer one, and supported one another financially. This group seems to have been centred on Johannes Roep (in terms of the network of sureties) who was helped by his connections via his wife and Hurter to the De Nijs family business complex.

In the mid-1770s the malt beer *pacht* was held for three years in succession by a newcomer to the business, viz. the Cape-born Tobias Rogiers. But his involvement too was no accident: he was the son of Johannes Rogiers (and a free-black woman, Maria Vermeuelen) who had worked as *tappersknecht* for most of his life but also twice held a *pacht* (in 1714 and 1726).[22] In 1765 Rogiers junior married Maria Elisabeth van Ellewee, another granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs via her daughter Anna Catherina Biesel. During 1775-77 he held the malt beer *pacht*, and on all three occasions Johannes Esselaar stood as one of his sureties, along with his 'step-uncle', Jan Willem Hurter on two occasions and Jan Smook once. In the tradition of his family-in-law, he also acted as *bijtapper* for the Rondebosch and False Bay *pachters*. After Rogiers' stint as malt beer *pachter*, he was succeeded by his 'cousin-in-law' for 1778, who in turn was succeeded by the family friend, Jan Smook for 1779, after

[21] O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope* (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 2, 52.

[22] M. Cairns, 'The Land and Its Owners, 1660-1822', in J. Walton (ed.), *The Josephine Mill and Its Owners: The Story of Milling and Brewing at the Cape of Good Hope* (Cape Town, 1978), 38.

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which the *pacht* returned to the head of the family again, Jan Willem Hurter, the son-in-law of Aletta de Nijs and Hans Jurgen Honk, in 1780 and again in 1782-83. Hurter died in 1783 which meant the end of the involvement – which started in 1738 – of the family of Aletta de Nijs (and some of their associates) in the malt beer *pacht* and beer brewing at the Cape. Although Hurter's son-in-law, Dirk Gijsbert van Reenen, inherited Papenboom, which he greatly expanded and improved,[23] he never became directly involved in the alcohol *pachten* (although three of his many brothers briefly invested in some of the other *pachten* during the 1780-90s).

For more than forty years, De Nijs, her husbands, sons-in-laws and grandsons-in-law controlled the malt beer *pacht* and beer brewing at the Cape. While this particular *pacht* was not the most lucrative of the alcohol *pachten*, it did produce a continuous income – the more so since it did not have any competition from other *pachters*, unlike the more lucrative brandy and Cape wine *pachten*. It seems to have become particularly lucrative during the 1770-80s, during which era the wine *pachters* complained about the unfair competition they received, to their detriment, from the beer *pachter*.[24] In addition, the De Nijs family complex all seem to have been working closely with the Rondebosch and False Bay *pachters*, acting as their *bijtappers* on their farms and premises in the area behind Table Mountain. In fact, the De Nijs family appears to have been quite prominent in this part of the Cape: Aletta de Nijs's niece, Elisabeth de Nijs,[25] married in 1750 the colony's master woodcutter, Salomon Bosch, with whom she lived at Paradise, Newlands – not far from her aunt's

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23 Moritz, *Die Deutschen am Kap*, 163.

24 G.J. Jooste, 'Die Geskiedenis van Wynbou en Wynhandel in die Kaapkolonie, 1753-1795' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1973), 71-79. Certainly, by the 1770s the beer *pachters* were better established and deeper connected than ever before. It is not impossible that the Cape wine *pachters* feared their growing influence precisely because of the dynasty building that was taking place. It could also be, by the late 1770s and early 1780s, that the beer *pachters* (who were so closely connected to the Van Reenens and other leading burgher families) were associated with the dissenting Cape Patriot movement while the wine *pachters*, especially Martin Melck, were keen to dissociate from this movement.

25 Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 6, 476 list Elisabeth de Nijs as the second daughter of Jan de Nijs who was born at the Cape and married in 1725. Although they do not make this connection, it seems highly plausible (certainly in chronological terms) that this Jan de Nijs is the same as the third child of Aletta's father, Jan de Nijs of Germany who was also called Jan and was baptised in 1701.

farm Papenboom.[26] During this same period another De Nijs worked for the VOC in this area, viz. Adriaan de Neijs (*sic*). He seems not to have been directly related to the Cape De Nijs family as he came from The Netherlands (not Germany) in 1741 but some distant relation is not impossible and would certainly have been cultivated in the small social world of the Cape.[27] Adriaan de Neijs was a wealthy and respectable man who as postholder of Simon's Bay between 1751 and 1761 fulfilled an important function in the Cape settlement as is indicated by his rank of junior merchant (*onderkoopman*).[28] It was precisely during his tenure that Simon's Bay became the preferred anchorage for the VOC fleet which caused a major increase in the value of the Rondebosch and False Bay *pachten* with which the De Nijs family was so intimately concerned. No doubt their close relation to senior officials in the VOC establishment at the Cape added to the status of the De Nijs family.[29]

In and of itself the story of the De Nijs family's involvement in the malt beer *pacht* illustrates the family nature of the alcohol retail business during this period. In this sense, as well as the fact that new links continued to be made based on a shared German background, this case study proves similar to that of the 1730s where German immigrants were building up business networks. Yet the history of the De Nijs involvement in the *pachten* also illustrates how, as connections became deeper with each new generation, the nature of alliances changed – this became particularly evident during the 1770s and 1780s. For one thing, the fact that the De Nijs family was able to hold onto the malt beer *pacht* for three generations also indicates that dynasty building was possible through investment in the *pachten*, especially if it was

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26 M. Cairns, 'Paradise, Newlands', *Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Library* 35/2 (1980), 60-65.

27 His eldest daughter had the family name Aletta; while (at the time of his wife's death in 1773) Johannes Roep, married to the granddaughter of Aletta de Nijs, owed the estate some *f* 3000; CA, MOOC 8/15 no. 15.

28 Leibbrandt, *Precis: Requesten*, vol. 1, 381 and D. Sleigh, *Die Buiteposte: VOC-Buiteposte onder Kaapse Bestuur, 1652-1795* (Pretoria, 2004), 321-22. The source of his wealth is not known, yet he managed to transfer thousands of guilders every year to his family in The Netherlands. Although Sleigh does not speculate, it seems likely that his wealth must have been connected to his post which afforded any number of opportunities for enrichment.

29 Adriaan de Neijs' daughter was married to Ensign Johan Arnold Bleumer, adding another high-ranking VOC official to the family's connections; CA, MOOC 8/15 no. 15.

coupled with owning the correct type of property, viz. the farm which produced their retail.

Establishing a dynasty, though, is about more than just business and economic success. The capital – both economic and social – which the De Nijs family built up over several generations paid off handsomely by the period under discussion. The children of Jan Willem Hurter and Barbara Honk all made spectacularly advantageous marriages. Their first daughter married in 1775, but five of their other children all married in 1782-83, which is no co-incidence. This was at the height of the Patriot agitation and almost all of the families into which the Hurter children married were closely involved in this movement. The exact origin of Hurter's involvement with the Patriots cannot be determined, but certainly his family's close contact with the van Reenens since 1775 and his long-standing friendship with Schreuder (who was a supporter of the Patriots; see below) contributed to this. [30]

The first Hurter daughter, Aletta (named after the matriarch) married Dirk Gijsbert van Reenen in 1775, while her sister, Catharina, married his younger brother Sebastiaan Valentijn in 1783. In 1782, Elisabeth Maria Hurter married Arend Munnik, while her brother followed suit by marrying Martha Maria Munnik, Arend's niece, the following year. Another daughter of Hurter married Servaas van Breda, also in 1782. Hurter's eldest son, Jacobus Adam, married Anna Elisabeth Bergh in 1783.[31]

These were about the most advantageous (in social and economic terms) marriages a person could make in the late eighteenth-century Cape. The Munniks were one of the foremost burgher families with large landholdings. Arend was the younger brother of Gerhardus Munnik, the father of Martha Maria.[32] It is likely that there existed a long-standing business relationship between the De Nijs/Hurter family and the Munniks: Gerhardus Munnik was the *pachter* of Rondebosch and False Bay in 1779 while his father, Johannes Munnik, also held this *pacht* for three years during the 1740s. Gerhardus Munnik was, however, better known and well-respected as a *heemraad* of Stellenbosch, captain of the burgher militia and a man of property.[33] By

30 They were also all connected via their interest in promoting the Lutheran church at the Cape; see below.

31 Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 3, 531-32.

32 Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 5, 738-39.

33 G.J. Schutte (ed.), *Briefwisseling van Hendrik Swellengrebel Jr oor Kaapse Sake, 1778-1792* (Cape Town, 1982), 186 and 252.

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marrying Martha Maria Munnik, Jan Willem Hurter jr. obtained not only another Van Reenen brother as a brother-in-law (to add to the two his sisters had married), but also a Morkel brother-in-law as well as both a Dreyer sister and brother-in-law. This was in addition to having a De Waal as his mother-in-law. By this stage the Munnik family was at the epicentre of a network of very wealthy families who intermarried to consolidate their wealth.[34]

The van Bredas were like the Van Reenens by this stage a third-generation Cape family with connections to most of the other wealthy burgher families. Servaas was the brother of the better-known Patriot leader, Pieter van Breda who both lived off their properties and inheritances.[35] Through them the Hurter family became related to the Smuts, Myburgh, Loubser, Eksteen and (yet again) the Van Reenen families. By the 1780s the Hurter family was immensely intertwined with the Van Reenens – not only through direct marriage alliances but also via indirect ties through in-laws. These links were most advantageous. By this stage the Van Reenen family was probably the wealthiest at the Cape thanks to their father, Jacobus van Reenen's vast landholdings and major involvement in the meat *pacht* over several decades.[36] Dirk Gijsbert continued in this vein and with several of his brothers also invested in the meat *pacht*. Apart from his other farms, he bought his father-in-law's estate, De Papenboom, in 1785 for the massive sum of *f* 110 000. In addition to continuing to grow malt for the brewery, he also turned it into a foremost wine farm.[37] It was partly thanks to his business acumen that the beer *pacht* (which he provided with its produce) became a threat to the wine *pachters* during the 1780s.[38]

Finally, the oldest Hurter son, Jacobus Adam, married Anna Elisabeth Bergh. She was the great-granddaughter of the high-ranking VOC official Olof Bergh and Anna de Koning who at the turn of the eighteenth century became some of the

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34 Cf. Martin Hall, 'The Secret Lives of Houses: Women and Gables in the Eighteenth-Century Cape', *Social Dynamics* 20/1 (1994), 10-20.

35 J.H. Verduyn den Boer, *Schetsen uit het Kaapse Leven van de 18e en 19e Eeuw* (Cape Town, 1929), 1.

36 G. Wagenaar, 'Johannes Gysbertus van Reenen: Sy Aandeel in die Kaapse Geskiedenis tot 1806' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1976), 3-10.

37 W.J. de Kock and D.W. Krüger (eds), *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: Deel II* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1972), 818-19.

38 Cf. Jooste, 'Geskiedenis van Wynbou', 71-79.

wealthiest landowners at the Cape. Like their ancestor, the descendants of Olof Bergh moved in both the worlds of the free burghers and VOC administrators at the Cape. Anna Elisabeth was the daughter of the burgher lieutenant Olof Bergh. The latter's cousin, however, was a high-ranking Company official: secretary of the Council of Policy, Auction Master and (for a while) acting Independent Fiscal, Olof Martini Bergh reached the apogee of his career by becoming a chief merchant (*opperkoopman*) in 1785.[39] Two of his sons became VOC officials like their father, but the rest entered the burgher community. The ambidextrous nature of this family is well-illustrated Olof Martini Bergh's son, Marthinus Adrianus Bergh, who during the late 1770s and early 1780s caused something of a scandal when he resigned from his senior posts in the VOC (*inter alia* as landdrost of Stellenbosch, like his grandfather) to join the cause of the Patriots.[40] The Hurter family was also related to him through his wife, Catharina de Waal. In addition, they must have had cultural links with Olof Martini Bergh because of his close association with the Lutheran movement of this period (see below).

Via the Hurter family's marriages to the Van Bredas, Munniks and Van Reenens during the late 1770s and early 1780s they became related to the most influential and wealthy of the Cape gentry families, viz. the Smuts, Myburgh, Eksteen, Morkel, De Waal, Dreyer and Loubser families. Many of these were also involved in the Patriot agitation of this period (see below). How then does one explain the Hurters' link with a prominent VOC family such as the Berghs, the more so (as G.J. Schutte has written) since 'even when certain official families had settled at the Cape, sometimes for generations, they retained the stamp of belonging to the Company rather than to the citizenry'?[41] Yet, Aletta de Nijs had close links with family members such as Salomon Bosch and Adriaan de Neijs who were middle-ranking VOC officials in the Rondebosch-False Bay area, while her third husband,

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39 De Kock and Krüger, *Biografiese Woordeboek II*, 54-55. Olof Martini's father, Marthinus Bergh, was the landdrost of Stellenbosch during the 1720-30s, cf. D.W. Krüger and C.J. Beyers (eds), *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: Deel III* (Cape Town, 1977), 63.

40 C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die Laaste Kwart van die Agtiende Eeu en die Voortlewing van hul Denkbeelde* (Second edition, Pretoria, 1967), 128-32.

41 G.J. Schutte, 'Company and Colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 297.

Gerrit Reindersz de Vos, was a retired VOC captain. The answer lies in the changing nature of family alliances by this period.

Robert Ross has described the last decades of the eighteenth century and the start of the nineteenth as a period during which officials in Cape Town 'were not a distinct economic class' but who, through marriage alliances, became increasingly closely allied with the established farming families of the Western Cape. These locally-born officials with deep and wide-spreading roots acted as political links between the government and the farming community.[42] Ross is primarily concerned with the turn of the nineteenth century, but the process he is describing seems already to be at work in the 1770-80s, and has even deeper roots with certain families such as the Berghs. In the course of the eighteenth century, as some administrator families settled at the Cape and their children remained there, marriages between the Company and burgher elites increased. By the period under discussion, when third and fourth generation Cape inhabitants were getting married, the desired links between wealth, power and status overrode any differences that may have existed between Company and burgher families.[43]

The history of Aletta de Nijs and her family's involvement in the malt beer *pacht* for four decades and her son-in-law, Jan Willem Hurter's spectacular success – both financially[44] and socially – illustrate the role of *pachters* in the making of the Cape gentry during this period. Ross has argued that there was a remarkable continuity in families who were involved in wine farming in the Western Cape. As a result of this the division of wealth within the rural gentry 'did not become extreme', but at the same time the number of what Ross terms 'middle-level' farmers increased in the course of the eighteenth century.[45] This means that despite the continuity of

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42 R. Ross, 'The Rise of the Cape Gentry', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 9/2 (1983), 196, quoting William Freund.

43 Although it must be added here that it is unlikely that any 'Company family' who had been at the Cape for more than two generations would not also include several members who were part of the burgher community. In this sense Schutte's statement quoted above seems wrong – although that may have been the appearance, it was the reality with only a very few Company families such as the Swellengrebels.

44 This is illustrated in the increase of the value of their main estate, De Papenboom: in 1743, at the death of Honk, it was valued at *f* 15 000, half a century later, Hurter's son-in-law bought it from his estate for *f* 110 000.

45 Ross, 'Cape Gentry', 207.

some families in the farming sector, the gentry also expanded with new blood. Ross continues to argue that 'the Cape gentry consisted of a relatively undifferentiated broad mass of farmers, rather than a very small elite …' with the exception of the 'small group' of meat and wine *pachters* who, however, 'became submerged in the growing group of substantial, but not exceptionally rich, farmers'.[46] But by the late eighteenth century there were exceptionally rich farmers, and none more so than the Van Reenens. The success of Dirk Gijsbert van Reenen would not have been possible without the history of the *pachters* of De Papenboom. Van Reenen was able to build on Hurter's achievements and successes as brewer and farmer, and with his own capital – both financial and social – to expand it immensely. But in his turn Hurter would not have been as successful had it not been for the many small achievements of Aletta de Nijs over the decades as she slowly consolidated and expanded her family's wealth from a relatively meagre base.

This case of 'dynasty building' by Aletta de Nijs and her descendants is unusual in the history of *pacht* holding as no other family controlled a single *pacht* for such a long period and with so many different family members being involved in it. This is partly due to the fact that the malt beer *pachters* were also the producers of beer which generally translated in greater continuity of ownership than with the other *pachten*.[47] But in many other ways the De Nijs/Hurter involvement in this *pacht* also illustrates well the continuities of the ways in which *pachters* operated: the centrality of German immigrants to the business; the role of endogamous marriages and the importance of kinship in building up social capital. It does however also indicate that by the 1770s and 1780s some aspects of this process started to change, especially in the changing nature and object of family alliances, which moved from urban entrepreneurs to the Cape gentry. But how does the experience of the De Nijs/Hurter family complex differ in this regard from their fellow *pachters* of the 1770s?

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46 *Ibid*., 207-8.

47 See page 34 note 76 on the nature of the malt beer *pacht*. In general, female *pachters* were central to continuity in *pacht* holding, as discussed on pages 61-62 above.

Friends, Family Networks and Social Capital

As indicated earlier in this chapter the *pachters* of the 1770s reveal different prosopographic patterns as a group from those of the 1730s. There were both continuities and changes: a surprising continued dominance of immigrant Germans, no clear patterns between VOC ranks and *pacht* holding, and generally a lack of using marriage as a direct entry into the world of alcohol retail at the Cape. The history of the De Nijs/Hurter family complex well demonstrates how, among some *pachters*, the way into the world of alcohol retail remained similar for a long period. However, there are also indications from the history of that family that important changes were beginning to occur during the 1770s. These changes can be discerned more clearly with the history of the other *pachters* of this decade.

As late as the 1770s there was still a sizeable and prominent German community in Cape Town and its surrounds, consisting of both immigrant and second-generation members. It was during this period that they reasserted themselves in an attempt to practise a prominent part of their heritage, viz. their Lutheran faith. After their attempts of the 1730-40s failed, the Lutherans at the Cape kept a low profile until the 1770s. This was due to two factors, one was the death of Rijk Tulbagh in 1771 (who was very unsympathetic to the Lutheran cause)[48] but probably more significant is the rise to prominence during this period of German Lutherans in the public life of the Cape of Good Hope – both civilian and official. A study of those involved in the campaign for religious freedom reveals many of the links suggested above.

In the early 1770s Martin Melck, the wealthiest *pachter* of this period, erected a 'warehouse' in Strand Street for use by the Lutherans of Cape Town, although this met with some official resistance. In 1776 a number of prominent Lutherans sent a memorandum to the Dutch Reformed Church authorities in Amsterdam to plead their cause. For fear of reprisal, this memorandum was signed by only twenty Lutherans. The names include three of the foremost *pachters* of this era: Martin Melck, Maarten Bateman and Johannes Esselaar. This in addition to a number of individuals who were related to them (such as Johannes van Reenen) and several who acted as their sureties:

[48] J. Hoge, 'Die Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk aan die Kaap', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 1/2 (1938), 70-71.

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Jens Jansen (to Esselaar), Dirk Lehman (to Melck), Baltus Willem Beets (to De Kruger) and Johannes Gijsbert Frank (to Melck).[49] A fascinating aspect of the Lutheran struggle is how involved high-ranking VOC officials at the Cape were in the process: the request of 1778 to establish a congregation was signed by eight individuals, four of whom were Company administrators: the bookkeeper, Jan Anthon Hitzman, the junior merchants, Tobias Christian Rönnenkamp and Jan Fredrik Kirsten as well as the secretary of the Council of Justice, Christian Ludolph Neethling.[50] The very influential and high-ranking official, Olof Martini Bergh, also supported their cause and became a member once the congregation was established in 1780.[51] This partly explains the links between the Bergh and Hurter families discussed in the previous section. When the Lutheran congregation came into existence, the most successful German *pachters* of the 1770s who were still alive became members: Maarten Baateman, Johannes Esselaar and Martin Melck, in addition to several of the families to whom they were related by marriage, such as the Dreyer, Hoffman, Hop, Meijer and Wispelaar families.[52]

If, as the previous paragraphs suggest, there were still some important links due to a shared cultural background between Capetonians of German descent, did this also translate into business networks as during the 1730s? Let us first consider marriage alliances and then the issue of financial backers.

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49 *Ibid*., 72.

50 *Ibid*., 75. It is possible that the support of Lutherans in high office was a redeeming factor in finally allowing a Lutheran congregation. Likewise, it could be that because the German community was much better integrated with both the local burgher and VOC populations by this late period, there was less fear of them forming a 'separatist' group which could divide the populace.

51 De Kock and Krüger, *Biografiese Woordeboek II*, 55. The way in which officials were interlinked with burghers is illustrated by the fact that Bergh owed Jan Christoffel Fleck a sizeable loan of *f* 12 000 in 1783, the same period when Jan Jacob Schreuder owed Fleck *f* 6 000 (see below). Although Schreuder did not join the Lutheran congregation in 1780, he was linked to Bergh via the Hurter complex.

52 Hoge, 'Geskiedenis van die Lutherse Kerk', 222-31.

Twelve of the nineteen *pachters* active during the 1770s were German immigrant men and one was Dutch.[53] They all married at the Cape and, with one exception,[54] they all married Cape-born women. But only four of them married into 'German' families, with only two of them having links to parents who were *pachters*. One of the latter is Jan Willem Hurter who, as discussed, married the daughter of Hans Jurgen Honk and Aletta de Nijs. The other one is Johannes Roep who married the granddaughter of De Nijs, Johanna Elisabeth Staf, who had grown up in the De Nijs household. As shown above, these family links played an important role in the success of Hurter and Roep as *pachters* and alcohol traders. Only two other *pachters* from this period married the daughters of German immigrants: Jan Jacob Schreuder,[55] after a brief first marriage to Johanna Meyn, married Maria van Laar whose father was a German immigrant to the Cape in the 1720s.[56] Martin Melck first worked as a *knecht* to the German immigrant, Johan Gubeler (or Gubelaar), and later married his widow, Anna Margaretha Hop, the daughter of the successful German farmer (and burgher councillor) of the 1720-40s, Jan Heinrich Hop.[57] All of them, most spectacularly Martin Melck, used these marriages to gain the financial and social capital with which to pursue their entrepreneurial interests.[58] In this sense they did not differ much from the German immigrant *pachters* of the 1730s.

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53 I will not deal with Jan Daniel Holst here as he is highly exceptionable. As a Dutch immigrant he brought out his wife but married into the De Nijs family upon her death in 1767. His involvement in the *pachten* was minor.

54 Pieter Broeders first married Maria Strand from Amsterdam who had been at the Cape for some time as she was twice widowed by the time she married Broeders in 1757; Heese and Lombard, *Genealogies*, vol. 1, 455 and J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946), 48.

55 Jan Jacob Schreuder was not the son of the earlier *pachter*, Jan Jurgen Schreuder, who was active during the 1740s.

56 Hoge, 'Personalia', 230.

57 *Ibid*., 173.

58 It is no co-incidence that Schreuder only started to invest in the alcohol *pachten* after his second marriage. Although Melck already started his entrepreneurial activities before his marriage, the capital he gained through that marriage enabled him to expand his business interests massively, ultimately starting to invest in the expensive Cape wine *pacht* in 1760; cf. G.A. Cockrell, 'Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984), 21-35 on Melck's business activities before his marriage.

They are, however, a minority of the *pachters* of the 1770s. Five of the *pachters* of this period married women of Dutch descent. Two of these concern the *pachters* of Stellenbosch-Drakenstein who are somewhat exceptional. Anthonij Kalteijer married Anna van Biljon, the widow of the farmer Bartholomeus Zaaijman. After his two-year stint as *pachter*, Kalteijer was succeeded by Frans Sebrits (or Zebrits) who was married to Rachel Francina Zaayman, the daughter of Kalteijer's wife from her first marriage. In a minor way this was a bit of a family tradition: Bartholomeus Zaaijman acted as the Stellenbosch-Drakenstein *pachter* once, in 1749. Pieter Broeders, as mentioned, married a Dutch woman who had long been at the Cape, although his second marriage (much later in life) was to Maria Elisabeth Taute, the daughter of the German immigrant, Matthias Taute.[59] More significant are the histories of Johannes Nicholaas Esselaar and Maarten Bateman, as they were two of the most successful *pachters* of this period. Esselaar married Pieternella Bury and Bateman married Catherina Elisabeth Jansen. Both of these women came from well-established Cape families with no connections to the *pacht* business. Clearly, in none of these five cases could the marriages of these German men have played a direct role in gaining them access to the world of alcohol *pacht*-holding.

Three of the *pachters* during this period married free-black women. Neither Jan Smook's wife Johanna Magdalena Needer nor that of Willem de Kruger (or de Grieger), Susanna Margaretha Fynton, had any direct links with the alcohol *pachten*. After the death of his first wife, De Kruger married Elizabeth Meijer who was the widow of the German immigrant, Paulus Beck.[60] Jan Willem Wilkens sr. also married a free black woman at first, Maria Juliana Constant, but his brief involvement in *pacht*-holding only came after his marriage to Anna Susanna Wepener who was the daughter of the Rondebosch *pachter*, Joachim Ernst Wepener (active in the 1740s).

There seems then to have been relatively little direct connection between marriage and entering the alcohol *pachten* during this period, at least for the German *pachters*. The six Cape-born *pachters* active during the 1770s were only involved in *pacht*-holding in a minor way – not one of them held more than three *pachten*, nor did any one of them ever own the lucrative Cape wines or brandy *pachten*. Three of these concern the minor and exceptionable Stellenbosch-Drakenstein *pacht*: Hermanus

59 Hoge, 'Personalia', 420.

60 *Ibid*., 20.

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Combrink, Hendrik Meijer and Willem Dempers. Except for Meijer – the grandson of Gerrit Hendrik Meijer who was involved with the alcohol *pachten* at the start of the eighteenth century – there is no identifiable link with other *pachters* in their families. This is not the case with the other three Cape-born *pachters*. The fathers of Jan Willem Wilkens jr., Gerhardus Munnik and Tobias Rogiers were all once *pachters* – but not one of them (either father or son) was particularly successful. Rogiers, in addition, was married to a granddaughter of De Nijs and was therefore closely related to a number of more prominent *pachters* of this period. Ultimately it seems, then, as if marriage and descent did not play a particularly important role in the careers of successful *pachters* during the 1770s, with the exception of the complex surrounding the De Nijs family. Clearly, by this stage, German immigrants did not need to contract endogamous marriages as during the 1730s. But had the nature of their business networks changed significantly by this later period?

It has been shown in the previous section how the group of German *pachters* associated with the De Nijs/Hurter complex during the 1770-80s were connected through standing surety for one another. This had also been the case for the 1730s *pachters* studied in the previous chapter. If German immigrant *pachters* during the 1770s did not primarily gain entry into the alcohol *pacht* business through marriages, did they do so via business links centred on standing surety for partners? In what follows an analysis is made of the sureties of the six most prominent *pachters* (each owning more than ten *pachten*) during this period: Maarten Bateman, Willem de Kruger, Johannes Esselaar, Martin Melck, Johannes Roep and Johan Jacob Schreuder.[61] All of these men were German immigrants to the Cape.

Since all of these men held *pachten* over many years, it is not surprising that they each had many different individuals who stood as their sureties; and that these individuals changed over time (as some died, or for some reason or the other could not or chose not to remain involved in the alcohol trade). Yet some suggestive patterns do occur. Bateman, who was involved in the *pachten* for fifteen years, had eighteen different men who stood surety for him. His partner throughout this period

[61] This analysis is based on the signatories of those standing surety as revealed in the *pacht* contracts between 1760 and 1789 (the years during which these men were actively investing in *pachten*): CA, C 2714-2727.

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was his fellow-brandy *pachter* and compatriot, Johannes Esselaar, who was his surety on eighteen occasions. He was also, on one or two occasions each, supported by other of the German *pachters* active in the 1770-80s: Jan Jacob Schreuder, Willem de Kruger, Johannes Roep, Johannes Holtman and Jan Andries Bam. But after Esselaar, Bateman's most regular sureties were two Dutchmen with no obvious family links: Jacob Kamp (nine times) who was a once-off *pachter* in the 1760s, and Jacobus van den Berg (eight times) who was to become a *pachter* in the 1780s. In addition, Bateman was supported by the German Michiel Benning (seven times) who had no direct involvement in the *pachten*.

Bateman returned the favour by being Esselaar's most regular surety: a total of nine times, and one of only two of Esselaar's sureties who regularly supported him. Although Esselaar also on one or two occasions had the support of Schreuder, Roep and Kamp, his second-most regular surety, Jan Verlee, has no other links to the *pachten* and also had no obvious relation to Esselaar. Both Esselaar and Bateman also supported Jan Jacob Schreuder during his lengthy career as *pachter* (thirty-nine *pachten* in almost thirty years) as sureties, although between them only eleven times. Schreuder's most regular surety was the one-time *pachter* Johannes Holtman, who acted in this capacity nineteen times. Holtman, although he only invested in *pachten* twice, seems to have been quote supportive of this group of *pachters* – he stood surety for Schreuder, Melck, Roep and Bateman. Other regular supporters of Schreuder were Johannes Roep – at the start of his career (ten times) – and Jan Andries Bam (seven times) during the 1780s. Other fellow *pachters* who supported him on more than one occasion include Jan Smook and Jan Daniel Holst. But Schreuder's lengthy career necessitated many sureties and the twenty-two men who acted in this capacity represent many – Dutch, German and Cape-born – who did so only once or twice. Johannes Roep's shorter career as *pachter* resulted in only twelve individuals who acted as his sureties. The most regular of these were his fellow German *pachters*, Jan Smook (ten times) and Schreuder (five times). Holtman also acted as his surety on six occasions, in addition to other *pachters* such as Esselaar, Holst, Bam, van den Berg as well as Jurgen Spengler.

It is clear from the above that these four men were very closely linked through a web of mutual support – both for one another and through friends and relations who supported them to various degrees. The two exceptions among this group of successful *pachters* from this period are Willem de Kruger and Martin Melck. De

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Kruger remarkably only has one fellow *pachter* among his sureties, viz. Bateman who acted twice in this capacity. The remaining twelve of his sureties are a mixture of German, Dutch and Cape-born men, none of whom had clear links with *pacht*-holding. This may well be related to the fact that De Kruger was twice married to free-black women: his brother-in-law, Johan Rediger (or Rettiger)[62] supported him six times, while his two other most regular sureties, Adam Siedel (nine times) and Johan Peter Voges (six times), were both Cape Town artisans married to free-black women.[63] The remainder of his sureties, with one exception, only supported him once or twice.

Martin Melck, the most successful of all *pachters*, had eighteen sureties in his eighteen-year career as a *pachter*. An analysis of them reveals an interesting development over time. During the first part of his career he was regularly supported by second-generation established Cape farmers, Nicolaas Brommert (nine times) and Jan Gijsbert Franke (seven times). Only by the late 1760s did he start making use of other *pachters* as sureties, viz. Spengler, Smook, Roep, Holtman and (later) van den Berg – but not one of them stood as surety more than twice. The only exception was Maarten Batemen who acted as his surety on five occasions. In the second half of his career Melck was mostly supported by fellow Stellenbosch farmers, notably Dirk de Vos and his fellow *heemraad* Johan Bernard Hofman. His biggest supporter during this period was, however, Hendrik Cloete who acted in this capacity on eight occasions. This Cloete was the son of Jacob Cloete, for whom Melck worked as *knecht* in the late 1740s. Melck maintained a close friendship with the Cloete family throughout his life and the Cloetes often acted as baptismal sponsors to his children.[64] This yet again illustrates how closely business interests were intertwined with social ones.

This analysis of the sureties for the six most important *pachters* of the 1770s reveals an intriguing pattern: it is evident that bonds of friendship – especially with those of a similar cultural background (German and Lutheran) – played a huge role, especially with those *pachters* who formed part of the Hurter complex centred on the malt beer

62 Hoge, 'Personalia', 327.

63 Siedel was a tailor and Voges a smith who both lived in Cape Town; *ibid*., 395-96 and 438.

64 Cockrell, 'Lewe van Martin Melck', 170.

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pacht. At its centre the *pachters* of the 1770s still exhibit a marked degree of German support for one another, albeit with significant shifts. This is also clear from other sources. Thus Jan Jacob Schreuder, who was certainly very much at the core of the 1770s *pachters*, loaned money from his (not very wealthy) mother-in-law, a woman of Dutch descent who married a German immigrant, Dirk Gijsbert Frank, another second-generation German, and Jan Christoffel Fleck, also the son of a German immigrant.[65] Likewise Johannes Esselaar was prepared to loan the large amount of *f* 10 000 to the German, Johannes Beck, and stood surety for several of his fellow *pachters*, but gave out very few other loans, and certainly nothing as large.[66] However, the situation regarding the *pachters* during this period was more complex. There were continuities, such as those just indicated, but there were also changes. Thus the variety of sureties, and the many changes that occurred over time, indicate a significant change from the 1730s: German immigrant *pachters* by this stage did not limit themselves to fellow Germans for financial support and business partnerships – there was less reliance on direct family support (especially in-laws) and a greater willingness to enter into alliances with other groups.

It is clear, further, that the German community of Cape Town during this period were much better integrated with the rest of the citizenry than earlier in the eighteenth century. As an analysis of their marriage and business network patterns has revealed, one of the outstanding features of the German *pachters* of the 1770s is how interconnected they were with the wider burgher community as well as (to an extent) the VOC officialdom. This inter-connectedness is well illustrated through the involvement of some of the *pachters* (especially those who formed part of the Hurter complex) in the Patriot agitation of the late 1770s and early 1780s. Thus, the very first meeting of what became known as the Cape Patriots was held in May 1778 in the tavern of Jan Jacob Schreuder.[67] The 1781 burgher request – in which the citizenry complained about taxation – was signed by the *pachters* Jan Willem Hurter, Johannes Roep, Tobias Rogiers and (a *pachter* of the 1780s) Jan Andries Bam. As significant is the fact that several men from the families related to the Hurter complex, as well as their financial supporters (in terms of sureties) also signed it, to wit the Dreijer, de

65 CA, MOOC 8/14 no. 53; 8/16 no. 52 and 8/18 no 53.

66 CA, MOOC 8/19 no. 11.

67 Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte*, 25.

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Waal, van Reenen, van Breda, Meijer, Taute, Voges, Beck, von Wielligh and Eksteen families.[68] The Patriot manifesto of 1784 was signed by the son of Jan Willem Hurter (who died in 1783) along with men from his many relations, the most significant of Cape farming families, i.e. the van Reenens, Eksteens, von Wiellighs, van Bredas, Munniks, Meijers, Eksteens, Mijburghs, Morkels, Rossouws and Maasdorps.[69] With the exception of the Van Bredas, every one of these families has had members invest in the alcohol *pachten* during the course of the eighteenth century.

The aforegoing discussion has shown that while certainly the main part of the 1770s *pachters* still exhibited much in terms of co-operation based on a shared German identity, significant changes were occurring by this stage. Thus we see these *pachters* marrying exogamously, having business partnerships with established Cape burghers and even having some links with VOC officials. If one analyses this period and this group in terms of factions, as Teun Baartman is doing for the 1780s,[70] it seems likely that the Hurter complex of *pachters* formed part of the van Reenen faction (to whom they were intricately related and connected) who led the Patriot resistance of the late 1770s and early 1780s. It is significant, however, that the most successful *pachter* of this period, Martin Melck, was in no way involved in the Patriot agitation. The discussion above has shown how his rise to prominence – in spite of his German background – was thanks to links with the established rural gentry of the Cape. As Baartman has suggested, it is likely that prominent burghers such as Hendrik Cloete (a friend and ally of Melck) formed part of a different faction which was much more closely allied to high Company officials.[71] Yet Melck was also a friend of the Van Reenen family and had some business links with them as well.[72] Ultimately, as this chapter has demonstrated, the links and alliances between families and individuals at the Cape had become immensely intricate by the last quarter of the eighteenth century and are much more complex than had hitherto been realised.

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68 K.M. Jeffreys (ed.), *Kaapse Archiefstukken Lopende over het Jaar 1781* (Cape Town, 1930), 166-67.

69 Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte*, 315.

70 T. Baartman, 'The Role of the Burghers and Factions in the Politics of Cape Town at the End of the Eighteenth Century' (forthcoming PhD thesis, University of Cape Town).

71 T. Baartman, 'Burghers in Cape Town, 1780-1790', unpublished paper, History of Cape Town Project (Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town), 1992.

72 Cockrell, 'Lewe van Martin Melck', 170.

The different behaviour of Melck and the Hurter complex raises the question of the role of space and location. The *pachters* of the Hurter complex and their relations were either based in Cape Town or on farms along the Liesbeek; Melck – although he owned several town properties – very much identified with the Stellenbosch district where he acted as *heemraad*. To what an extent did this influence their behaviour? A revealing comparison can be made between the *pachters* of the Hurter complex and those of Stellenbosch-Drakenstein. As shown above, both Frans Sebrits and Anthonij Kalteijer married Dutch women and became involved in the *pachten* through their in-laws. Yet both of them had German sureties, most often Coenraad Eb and Johannes Holtman, who also supported members of the Hurter complex. Yet neither Kalteijer nor Sebrits became members of the Lutheran congregation or had any role in the Patriot agitation.[73] And when Sebrits, who worked as cooper and carpenter in the town of Stellenbosch, died in 1784 his estate account and inventory reveal only local debtors and creditors, with the exception of the tiny amount of eighteen rixdollars he owed Maarten Bateman.[74] It was not possible for these Germans in Stellenbosch-Drakenstein to be as involved in the economic, social, political and cultural affairs of the colony, simply because they were too isolated and did not have the immediate support of a larger community of people with similar backgrounds.[75] The same is true of Melck – but only to an extent. He chose to identify largely with the rural gentry of Stellenbosch (as is revealed by his sureties and the marriages of his children), but his wealth (and no doubt personal conviction) allowed him to get involved in some aspects of urban life in Cape Town.

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[73] It seems plausible that those involved in the Patriot agitation were town-based burghers who had diverse economic interests, and were not largely dependent on agricultural production. Although Melck invested widely in the alcohol *pachten*, he came from a basis of wine farming.

[74] CA, MOOC 13/1/14 no. 1 and 8/18 no. 98.

[75] As an indicator: the Lutheran congregation had 442 members in 1780 – most of these would have been based in Cape Town itself.

Conclusion

As Robert Ross has reminded historians of this period, 'the economy of Cape Town was … dominated by its dual function as a port and a government centre'[76] The Cape Town of the 1770s was, however, a very different one from that of the 1730s. For one thing, the Company establishment (garrison and administrators) had increased from 920 in 1730 to more than 1 700 by 1770, while the population of the Cape district (including Cape Town for which separate figures do not exist) almost doubled during the same period from 1 414 to 2 743 (excluding slaves and Khoikhoi).[77] Not only did the population expand, and with it economic and other opportunities, but the social and political set-up was much more complex than earlier: there were more people, mostly with longer histories of being settled and with deeper connections. Ross's statement is very apposite in this regard, for it reminds us that not only were wine and meat needed to feed the large local and visiting populations, but more officials were employed than ever before to cope with the growing and more complex administration of the colony. This translated in a reconfiguration of the links and bonds between the various parts of the burgher population on the one hand, and the Company administrators and their families on the other hand.

It is because of these changes that the *pachters* of the 1770s reveal a different pattern of advancement. Although many of them still were German and still did use their shared background to amass social capital, there are clear signs of a shift taking place with many of them abandoning endogamy and opting instead to establish much wider connections and alliances among the burgher and (to a lesser extent) administrative populations. There were both continuities with and significant changes from the 1730s. This is partly the result of a deeper history: by the 1770s there were families at the Cape with three to four-generation histories which of necessity meant deeper and wider links and connections between families. Highly successful *pachters* like Melck and those centred on Hurter (especially the extended De Nijs family) family knew how to exploit these to their advantage.

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[76] R. Ross, 'Structure and Culture in Pre-Industrial Cape Town: A Survey of Knowledge and Ignorance' in W.G. James and M. Simons (eds), *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1989), 42.

[77] P. van Duin and R. Ross, *The Economy of the Cape Colony in the Eighteenth Century* (Intercontinenta 7; Leiden, 1987), 112 and 114-15.

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Ultimately this study of the 1770s *pachters* reveals a 'mixed' system of advancement. Some *pachters* operated very similarly to those of the 1730s by becoming part of an urban network based on links of marriage and descent (either German or, in some cases, free black) and building up social capital through immigrant links. But increasingly some of them moved towards closer links with the established Cape gentry (at least those based in Cape Town or the Cape district) as well as some links with the world of VOC officialdom (which, also as a result of deepening histories, had become much more intertwined with the burgher population). But in both cases, marriage and kinship remained the keys which allowed entry to these networks and connections (which in turn resulted in support – economic, social and political). This case study also illustrated that the world of the Cape gentry during this period was by no means endogamous yet (i.e. intermarriage between important families) but still allowed for some 'new blood' from outside, in this case successful immigrant urban entrepreneurs. It yet again illustrates that connections and alliances were built on considerations larger than merely economic ones. Ultimately one can claim that the 1770s were on the cusp of a change-over from an urban elite or merchant class to a Cape gentry which not only maintained links with this group but eventually incorporated it.[78] This means that the foundations of the Cape gentry lie in more than accumulation of land and slaves – an important component of its wealth ultimately derived from entrepreneurial activities (over several decades) in Cape Town itself.

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[78] See the Conclusion below for a fuller discussion of this suggestion.

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CHAPTER 6

SYMBOLIC CAPITAL, CONSUMPTION AND IDENTITY AMONG THE ALCOHOL *PACHTERS* OF CAPE TOWN, 1680-1795

The preceding chapters have demonstrated how the relatively homogenous group of free burghers of the mid-seventeenth century could have developed into a stratified society with a clearly identifiable elite by the end of the eighteenth century. This was possible due to entrepreneurial activity within Cape Town which played a crucial role in allowing some families to gain financial and social ascendancy over others. At the Cape, the alcohol *pacht* system was the premier vehicle with which to act entrepreneurially. As argued in chapters three to five, some *pachters* managed to be more successful in the alcohol retail business than others. This success was made possible through using marriage and kinship as an entry point into networks of financial support, and through building up social capital which could be converted into financial assistance.

There is little doubt that between 1680 and 1795 some of the wealthiest free burghers at the Cape had made their fortunes from the alcohol *pachten*, and that the *pacht* system had been responsible for the economic advancement and upward mobility of some of the most notable Cape families. Taking that as a given, this chapter explores how the economic pre-eminence of some alcohol *pachters* was expressed or translated into other forms of power. As discussed in chapter three, the motivation of an entrepreneur consists of both economic *and* extra-economic gain. According to William Baumol, an entrepreneur is someone who is 'ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power and prestige.'[1] The early modern economic historian Clé Lesger built on this statement by arguing that entrepreneurship, which can take many different forms, is ultimately only a means to an end, viz. the realisation of one's wishes and desires. This can be grouped into three

[1] W.J. Baumol, 'Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive', *Journal of Political Economy* 98 (1990), 897.

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categories: wealth, power and prestige.[2] Did the wealth of successful alcohol *pachters* in early modern Cape Town translate into power and prestige?

In trying to understand this issue, the concept of symbolic capital is useful. Symbolic (or cultural) capital refers to the resources which are available to an individual on the basis of his or her honour, prestige or recognition. Unlike social capital which can operate in such a way as to give access to economic capital, symbolic capital cannot be converted directly into other forms of capital but is more often than not the result of having power and influence of some sort, mostly (as in the case of the *pachters*) economic. It is important to keep in mind that symbolic capital is defined by the system in which it operates – what was valued as significant in the eighteenth-century Cape may appear rather strange to the modern reader.[3] As such a study of symbolic capital reveals much about the system of values which were in place in early modern Cape Town. The successful alcohol entrepreneurs of Cape Town would not have experienced their success without access to and use of both economic and social capital; but how did this add to their symbolic capital? What forms did symbolic capital take in VOC Cape Town?

Lifestyle, Material Culture and Consumption

As will become clear later in this chapter, the desire and need for honour and respect was all-encompassing for the alcohol entrepreneurs of Cape Town. Possessing honour, or being seen as honourable, translated into trust and respect which in turn could lead to status and power. An honourable and respectable life was the *sine qua non* for successful entrepreneurship. In the early modern world, an honourable and respected person was one you could trust; and in the uncertain and risky world of early modern business, trust could translate into tangible financial assistance in the absence of financial institutions, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters.

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2 C. Lesger, 'Over het Nut van Huwelijk, Opportunisme en Bedrog: Ondernemers en Ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne Tijd in Theoretisch Perspectief', in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk (eds), *Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden* (Amsterdam, 1996), 58.

3 See on symbolic capital and how it relates to other forms of capital, P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, 1977), 159-97 and *idem*, 'The Forms of Capital', in J.G. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (New York, 1986), 241-58.

In the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, trade was not considered a degrading occupation due to the low profile of the nobility. In fact, in Dutch society, living off the fruit of one's own labour was considered the most *honourable* way of living. But Dutch merchants also desired social mobility and the ultimate aim was to live as a rentier off the interest of one's possessions – just as the regent class did (see below). The first condition for upward social mobility was wealth which would make possible a lifestyle such as those of the higher classes.[4] Hence in this world, external or outward show or presentation formed an essential subpart of someone's social role and contributed in a major way to his or her reputation. And it is on the basis of someone's reputation that a person decided whether or not he or she is honourable and could be trusted.

But to what extent did early modern Cape Town differ from the situation in North-western Europe? As Robert Ross stated more than two decades ago, 'In Cape Town … social relations have never been a direct function of economic activity, but have been heavily influenced by all sorts of other considerations, including physiognomy, clothing, language, religious affiliation, even food, which are at best tangentially or derivatively linked to the productions and exchange processes of the town.'[5] The immense power differentiations which existed in colonial Cape Town must have made these issues even more pertinent. It is thus important to realise that in eighteenth-century Cape Town, material culture and consumption were essential to a society where social boundaries and status were fluid and could be (and were) used to indicate or express something of an individual's or group's identity. In addition, consumption during the early modern period was closely linked to respectability, as Woodruff Smith has argued: '[r]espectability gave meaning – moral and political as well as social and economic – to consumption, thereby permitting the construction of

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4 L. Kooijmans, 'De Koopman', in H.M. Beliën, A.Th. van Deursen and G.J. van Setten (eds), *Gestalten van de Gouden Eeuw: Een Hollands Groepsportret* (Amsterdam, 1995), 87-88.

5 R. Ross, 'Structure and Culture in Pre-Industrial Cape Town: A Survey of Knowledge and Ignorance', in W.G. James and M. Simons (eds), *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1989), 43. Subsequently Ross has done much to address these issues, most notably in his *Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750-1870: A Tragedy of Manners* (Cambridge, 1999).

a host of connections between purchasing commodities and thinking and acting appropriately.'[6]

Unfortunately it is not possible to study the consumption patterns and use of material culture by all successful *pachters* for this period due to a lack of sources. This type of research relies crucially on the existence of household inventories, and at the Cape these were only drawn up when somebody died intestate or where the estate had minor children as heirs. This explains why only eight inventories of *pachters* who invested a total of more than *f* 50 000 in the alcohol *pachten*, or who held more than ten *pachten*, could be traced for use in this analysis.[7] One has to restrict oneself to such a sample as those who invested less would more than likely have derived their wealth from other sources. Although this is a small number, the aim of this exercise is not completeness but to demonstrate how a certain approach and sources can be combined to raise important questions (and to suggest some answers) about the social and cultural history of VOC Cape Town.

To what extent did wealthy and successful alcohol *pachters* use their money to set themselves physically and symbolically apart from their fellow Capetonians? The first aspect of this concerns their choice of address, which might suggest some sentiment of unity. The addresses of eight of these successful *pachters* have been traced, and they reveal an interesting pattern.[8] They all lived on the edges of what can be called the public centre of VOC Cape Town: the area roughly between the Grand Parade, Green Market Square and the Company Gardens. Thus, the rich and respected Johannes Heufke lived in block EE, modern St. George's Street,[9] while just around the corner from him was Melt van der Spuij and the wealthy Hendrik Oostwald

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6 W.D. Smith, *Consumption and the Making of Respectability, 1600-1800* (New York and London, 2002), 3.

7 They are the inventories of (with their dates in brackets): Frederik Russouw (1699); Hendrik Möller (1713); Johannes Pijthius (1714); Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk (1717); Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen (1718); Jan van der Swijn (1732); Johannes Heufke (1736) and Johan Nicolaas Esler (1786).

8 Although most of them owned several properties in Cape Town, it is normally possible to determine which one was their main residential address.

9 CA, MOOC 8/6 no. 44. It is described in contemporary sources as 'situated behind the Company's hospital': for a rare glimpse into the interior of a *pachter*'s house of this period, see the court case in which Jephta van Batavia, a slave of Johannes Heufke, was involved; N. Worden and G. Groenewald (eds), *Trials of Slavery: Selected Documents Concerning Slaves from the Criminal Records of the Council of Justice at the Cape of Good Hope, 1705–1794* (Cape Town, 2005), 115-19.

Eksteen in Oliphant Street, modern Hout Street.[10] Not far from them (in block QQ) the successful Martin Melck had his large house and garden bordering on the Company's Gardens in what is now Long Street.[11]

Figure 6.1: Residences of Major Alcohol *Pachters* in Cape Town[12]



On the other side of the Company Gardens, Abraham Leever and Jan van der Swijn lived in the area between modern Buitekant and Parliament Streets (blocks T, V and W),[13] an area where, according to contemporary descriptions, the houses were large

[10] In addition, Van der Spuij's immediate neighbour was the former *pachter* Jan Rogiers; V.A. van der Spuy, *Die Van der Spuy-Stamregister* (no place, 1973), 30-31; CA, MOOC 8/3 nos. 19 and 93.

[11] G.A. Cockrell, 'Die Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781' (unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984), 49-51.

[12] Note that the street names are those of modern Cape Town. In some cases the locations are only approximations (it is not always known exactly where in a given block the person lived). This figure is based on the 1751 map of Cape Town by Carel David Wentzel.

[13] CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110 and G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel IX, 1735-1739* (Pretoria, 1981), 46.

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and the gardens big.[14] There is no doubt that this is related to the fact that this was close to the area around the Church, Hospital and Slave Lodge which had a high proportion of taverns, but there is also no overlooking the fact that the area around modern Adderley and Darling Streets contained the most impressive houses.[15] Significantly enough, both Eksteen and Van der Swijn chose not to live in their respective taverns in Strand Street, but preferred their houses closer to the centre. Whether or not this spatial distribution of wealthy *pachter* residences may indicate some feeling of group identity cannot be proved, but it does demonstrate that the successful *pachters* were spatially set apart, at least as regards their living space, from the largest part of Cape society, viz. the customers of their taverns (see figure 6.1).

In 1755 the Cape government adopted and adapted the sumptuary laws of Batavia.[16] These laws recognised that status in Dutch colonial society was asserted through visible symbols, and sought to restrict these mechanisms to those who were truly worthy of them. As Robert Ross had commented in his comparative study of sumptuary laws, the Batavian ones provide insight both into 'the ways in which material objects were used to claim status in the colonial world of VOC Batavia and into the prime objects of the VOC's rulers' prejudices and dislikes.'[17] The laws limited the use of certain types of carriages and, crucially, the number of horses they were drawn by, to VOC officials of certain rank. Likewise the use of slaves as status symbols was also restricted: only high-ranking Company officials could have liveried slaves, while only the wives and widows of such officials were allowed to walk the streets followed by more than two slave women. The greatest effort went into detailing and describing who would be allowed to wear what clothing. Only senior

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14 O.F. Mentzel, *A Geographical and Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope* (translated by H.J. Mandelbrote, G.V. Marais and J. Hoge) (3 vols, Cape Town, 1921, 1925 and 1944), vol. 1, 135-36.

15 Cf. K. Schoeman, *Die Suidhoek van Afrika: Geskrifte oor Suid-Afrika uit die Nederlandse Tyd, 1652-1806* (Pretoria, 2002), 67 and N. Worden, 'Space and Identity in VOC Cape Town', *Kronos* 25 (1998/9), 77-81.

16 For a discussion, see Ross, *Status and Respectability*, 9-14.

17 R. Ross, 'Sumptuary Laws in Europe, the Netherlands and the Dutch Colonies', in N. Worden (ed.), *Contingent Lives: Social Identity and Material Culture in the VOC World* (Cape Town, 2007), 386-87.

officials could wear velvet and were allowed to sport gold or silver shoe buckles.[18] Although much of this appears alien to the modern reader, these laws reveal a great deal about both the nature of symbolic power in, and its immense importance to, Cape Town society during the VOC period.

Slaves, carriages, horses and clothing were, to judge by the sumptuary laws, the indicators of elitism in eighteenth-century Dutch colonial society. Of the eight *pachters* in the sample, only two possessed less than ten slaves. Between the eight of them, they owned a hundred and sixty-four slaves, more than twenty apiece on average. This is well in excess of the average Cape slave-holding, which tended to be small and rarely exceeded ten slaves.[19] It is, however, difficult to make an argument about conspicuous consumption based on slave numbers as many of these slaves would probably have been used to help run these *pachters*' taverns, while some of the wealthier *pachters* such as Eksteen (who had forty-five slaves by 1718) and Johannes Heufke also owned and operated farms. Yet somebody like Jan van der Swijn had no farms but possessed twenty-one slaves, which makes it highly likely that not all of his slaves were bought for purely economic reasons.[20]

Horses, unlike slaves, were in short supply at the Cape and few people farmed with horses[21] – Eksteen was an exception and owned thirty horses by 1718, a number which he expanded much during the 1720-30s as his stud grew.[22] Two of the *pachters* in the sample owned no horses, but three (in addition to Eksteen) who also had farms possessed thirty-two horses between them.[23] Yet, interestingly enough, Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk, with fourteen horses on his farm, had the same number at his house in Cape Town.[24] Jan van der Swijn, who possessed only town properties, nonetheless owned five horses.[25] In general, horse-drawn carriages (especially for

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18 The text of the Cape sumptuary laws is published in S.D. Naudé and P.J. Venter (eds), *Kaapse Plakkaatboek, Deel III (1754-1786)* (Cape Town, 1949), 12-15.

19 N. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge, 1985), 29 and 32.

20 At least according to his 1732 inventory; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

21 S. Swart, 'Riding High: Horses, Power and Settler Society, c. 1654-1840', *Kronos* 29 (2003), 49-59.

22 See pages 93 and 99 above.

23 They are: Fredrik Russouw (CA, MOOC 8/1 no. 39); Hendrik Möller (CA, MOOC 8/2 no. 93) and Johannes Heufke (CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 137).

24 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 41.

25 CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

personal use) were relatively scarce at the Cape and most farmers used ox wagons. Yet five of these *pachters* had a horse-drawn carriage on their Cape Town properties. That of Hendrik Möller was valued at *f* 100 and Eksteen's at *f* 200.[26] In Jan van der Swijn's inventory there is a 'chaise with four horse-harnesses'.[27] No doubt it was vehicles such as the latter, drawn by four horses, which would later lead to the sumptuary laws which limited such carriages to the use of senior Company personnel.

The inventories in this sample unfortunately do not record details of clothing, but at least two of them reveal the ownership of vast numbers of gold and silver buttons and shoe buckles. Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk owned eighty-seven silver buttons for his shirts and jackets, along with two pairs of golden shirt buttons and a pair of silver buttons for his trousers. That was in addition to two pairs of silver buckles for his shoes.[28] This ostentation was outdone by Johannes Pijthius who owned thirty-eight pairs of gold buttons (mostly with agate stones in them) and sixty silver ones for his shirts and jackets; as well as eleven pairs of silver trouser buttons (likewise with agate stones) and a pair of golden ones too. Not only could Pijthius amble the streets wearing a pair of golden shoe buckles (in addition to the eleven silver pairs he owned), but he could choose to carry with him either one of his swords with silver work, or one of his walking sticks, the one with a golden and the other with a silver top.[29] All of these items were ultimately aimed at, quite literally, 'showing-off' their owners' wealth and importance – to set them apart from others in the streets – not only by being drawn in a carriage but to be seen wearing expensive accessories. All of these examples come from the first half of the eighteenth century, before the sumptuary laws of 1755 were enacted, and they clearly reveal why the VOC became concerned with such ostentation.

There were other forms of conspicuous consumption about which the authorities did not complain. In three of these estates there were large quantities of jewellery. Wearing jewellery is an obvious way to advertise one's wealth to the world in addition to serving as forms of investment. By 1718, Eksteen's estate contained what was loosely described as 'a chain made of gold, along with some gold rings and

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26 CA, MOOC 8/2 no. 93 and MOOC 8/3 no. 93. In addition, Eksteen also owned six 'old wagons' valued at *f* 70 each.

27 CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

28 *Ibid*.

29 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 13.

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other pieces of gold.'[30] Pijthius also owned much jewellery: nine gold rings, three with precious stones; six silver rings; seven pairs of silver earrings and two signet rings, one gold and the other silver.[31] When Jan van der Swijn's wife died, she left behind two strings of pearls, one with diamonds; two diamond bracelets; two gold bracelets; two pairs of gold and diamond earrings as well as two broaches (one diamond and the other gold), and a diamond ring.[32]

Much less valuable but equally significant in terms of showing off, was the possession of Bibles with clasps of precious metals. Both Eksteen and Heufke owned Bibles with copper clasps while the Van der Swijns had one with silver clasps.[33] Eksteen also had two further 'church books' (probably hymn books) with silver clasps. It was common in Dutch colonial cities, from Batavia to Cape Town, for wealthy women going to church services to be followed by a slave woman carrying a Bible and hymn book (sometimes wrapped in expensive cloth).[34] This practice constituted a particularly visible form of ostentation and advertisement to the public at large.

All the estates in the sample contained vast amounts of silverware and porcelain, mostly in excess of what could conceivably have been used for everyday purposes. Paintings appeared in equally large numbers. Five of these inventories specify the number of paintings an estate owned, and in total this comes to 126, an average of more than twenty-five. But the two large owners were the Van der Swijns with forty-three paintings and the Heufkes with fifty-two: in both households these paintings were distributed over all the rooms of the house.[35] This is exceptionable, even by Dutch standards. Ownership of paintings was not universal in the Dutch Republic by the first half of the eighteenth century. Paintings were, however, something of an urban fashion statement (and an expression of identity); and only

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30 'een goude gemaakte ketting, benevens eenige goude ringen, en ander goudwerk'; CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93.

31 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 13.

32 CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

33 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93; MOOC 8/5 no. 137 and MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

34 K. Schoeman, *Dogter van Sion: Machtelt Smit en die 18de-Eeuse Samelewing aan die Kaap, 1749-1799* (Cape Town, 1997), 116-17.

35 CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110 and no. 137.

about twenty percent of people who did own paintings had more than twenty.[36] Heufke and Van der Swijn are therefore definitely exceptionable and one should see their possession of so many paintings as a form of conspicuous consumption. An equally intriguing form of public display was hanging curtains. Even by the end of the eighteenth century, owning curtains in the Dutch Republic was by no means common in the cities, and even less so in the rural areas. It was an outright status symbol to have curtains, and in many cases people owned curtains but only hanged them on special occasions.[37] At the Cape, when curtains do appear, the colours and types of material are described and a distinction is made between different types of curtains – a clear indication of their unusualness and value. Thus it is no surprise to find that in only four of these *pachters*' estates do we find curtains, and in only two do they appear to a significant extent: Essler owned one curtain and Pijthius three.[38] The Heufkes, however, owned eleven curtains, of which five were described as 'window curtains'.[39] The Van der Swijn family's very large estate had quite a variety of curtains: six window curtains (four with frills), a set of red damask curtains and another one made out of the sought-after red sarsenet (a woven silk known as *armozijn*).[40]

In these ways, then, some of the wealthier alcohol *pachters* managed to set themselves apart from their fellow burghers. This was done through such visible ways of advertising their wealth and status as their choice of address, being driven in public by horse and carriage, having expensive and valuable decoration on their clothes, and wearing jewellery. This presentation of their wealth and importance was also done in more private spheres, such as their homes, through the display of commodities like paintings and curtains. In this way a certain praxis developed: these presentations served to showcase their wealth; to indicate that they were set apart from others because of their financial success. Yet at the same time this fed back into their self-identity and self-conception of their own worth: by being seen and acknowledged as wealthy (even in negative ways such as being limited by the authorities as to how

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36 Cf. H. Dibbits, *Vertrouwd Bezit: Materiële Cultuur in Doesburg en Maassluis, 1650-1800* (Nijmegen, 2001), 288-89.

37 *Ibid*., 117-18.

38 CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 13 and MOOC 8/19 no. 11.

39 'venster gardijnen'; CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 137.

40 CA, MOOC 8/5 no. 110.

much wealth could be showcased and in what forms) because of these symbolic representations, the *pachters* added to their own symbolic capital which could be translated into power and prestige.

Status, Society and Symbolic Power

In the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the various cities (the backbone of Dutch society and economy) were governed by councils of burghers. In effect, these formed oligarchies as new members were not elected democratically but entered the councils through co-optation by the existing members. Much debate has centred around how much these so-called *regenten* ('regents') developed as a 'class apart' through, what is termed, the 'aristocratisation of the *regenten*' – although at first these councils were more 'open' for most of the seventeenth century they later became more 'closed' because of endogamy. At the same time the *regenten* increasingly imitated an aristocratic lifestyle by living as rentiers and obtaining all the trappings of a nobleman, including country estates and even titles.[41] Although in practice any burgher in the Dutch Republic could become sufficiently wealthy to obtain all the necessary status symbols of the elite, merchants saw obtaining a seat on the city councils as the *summum bonum*. By becoming a regent, a merchant entered a 'class apart'.[42] Now, was this the case at the Cape – if successful alcohol *pachters* were the closest Cape society came to a merchant class, did they also (over time) attain political, social and symbolic power by joining something like a 'regent class'?

Early modern Cape Town, however, differed significantly from Dutch cities as it was founded and controlled by the VOC. The city and colony were governed by the Council of Policy which consisted of the VOC-appointed Governor and senior Company officials. But Cape Town mirrored Dutch cities insofar as it adopted most of the municipal institutions and civil bodies found in these cities, such as an Orphan Chamber, Commissioners of Marriage Affairs, the Court of Petty Cases, fire wardens

41 For a discussion of the debate, see J.L. Price, 'De Regent', in H.M. Beliën, A.Th. van Deursen and G.J. van Setten (eds), *Gestalten van de Gouden Eeuw: Een Hollands Groepsportret* (Amsterdam, 1995), 33-42 and J. de Jong, *Een Deftig Bestaan: Het Dagelijks Leven van Regenten in de 17de en 18de Eeuw* (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1987), 31-63. See also pages 197-98 below for a brief discussion.

42 Kooijmans, 'De Koopman', 88.

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and the *burgerwacht* or town militia.[43] Cape Town's smaller size is reflected in its lack of institutions such as an Orphanage, Houses of Correction (*tucht- en spinhuizen*) and, for most of the Dutch period, a Latin School. Although all of these bodies were controlled by the VOC, they all had some representation from the free burghers. The Councils of Policy and Justice each had two and, later on, three such members, called burgher councillors, who were considered the representatives of the free-burgher community. The minor bodies tended to have greater representation of this kind, although in all cases VOC functionaries formed the majority of the council members. As in the Netherlands, there was no direct election to an office. Instead, council members drew up a shortlist of names from which the Council of Policy selected the new member(s).[44] Office-holding was therefore a clear indication of the favour of and trust by the authorities in an individual.

In an attempt to gauge the role alcohol *pachters* played in the government of Cape Town,[45] I concentrate on the twenty most active and successful *pachters*, i.e. those who held ten or more *pachten* and directly invested in excess of *f* 70 000 in alcohol retail. Together their years of activity stretch from 1692 to 1795. On the basis of how wealth and political power were connected in Dutch cities, one would expect that, if anybody, this group of alcohol merchants would show a similar pattern in the Cape context. A tabulation of the results, however, proves that this was *not* the case (see table 6.2). Of these twenty *pachters*, only two ever attained high civil office.[46] One of these was Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen, who fits the expected pattern very well in having held one office after the other – in order of their importance – culminating

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43 Thus, as Ad Biewenga has argued, the Cape of Good Hope essentially had a Dutch 'superstructure' in that it adopted most of the institutions that existed in the urban centres of the Dutch Republic. While this is certainly true, Biewenga fails, however, to take into account changes over time and how new generations of Cape-born burghers used, challenged and adapted these institutions. The forms may have been similar but their meanings and uses differed; A. Biewenga, *De Kaap de Goede Hoop: Een Nederlandse Vestigingskolonie, 1680-1730* (Amsterdam, 1999).

44 Cf. G.G. Visagie, *Regspleging en Reg aan die Kaap van 1652 tot 1806* (Cape Town, 1969), 41-46 and, on the origins of these councils, G.C. de Wet, *Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707* (Cape Town, 1981), 180-91. During the 1780s the number of burgher councillors were increased to six.

45 These institutions were restricted to the town; a different system operated in the rural districts.

46 Jan van der Swijn was nominated as a burgher councillor but was not elected.

in acting as a burgher councillor for eighteen years in a row.[47] It does not mean, though, that these men were the only *pachters* who ever held civil offices – other *pachters* also held these offices (some even became burgher councillors), but they were not individuals of whom it could be claimed that involvement in the alcohol *pachten* was the prime or major origins of their wealth.[48]

Why was this so? The most plausible reason for the limited involvement of *pachters* in civil affairs was that such a position would have interfered with their business activities: these bodies met regularly for several hours at a time and did so during the day. Another factor may be that many of these offices tended to be held by the same person over a very long period: thus, as was seen earlier, Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen remained a burgher councillor through most of the 1720-30s until his retirement shortly before his death – given the fact that by this stage there were only two seats available for burgher members, it means that very few opportunities arose for new entrants. A final, more speculative, possibility is that there may well have been some form of prejudice against successful *pachters* in spite of their financial success. As discussed in chapters four and five, the majority of all *pachters* up to the 1770s were German immigrants and, indeed, of the twenty *pachters* under discussion here, sixty percent were German. Several of them were involved in attempts, during the 1730-40s and again in the 1770-80s, to establish a Lutheran Church in Cape Town. The VOC authorities were for a long time very resistant to this idea, fearing it might be divisive and create split loyalties. This could have been a factor in the non-consideration of some of these *pachters* for public office; yet at the same time both members of this group who held high office, to wit Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen and Martin Melck, were Lutherans of German descent.[49]

However, studies of Dutch merchants have shown that it was more likely for the children of merchants to enter the regent class, either through marriage or through

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47 See page 99 above.

48 An example of such a person is Johannes Heufke who sat on most of these boards, culminating in being elected as burgher councillor. However, he only became a *pachter* late in his life and had held all his public offices before becoming involved in alcohol retail. The fact that he was a *pachter* could therefore not have played a role in his election to public offices. On his career as an alcohol *pachter*, see pages 124-25 above.

49 The fact that both these men were during their time the wealthiest free burghers at the Cape may have off-set these fears.

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being co-opted into councils, after the first generation had established the appropriate lifestyle and gained prestige through amassing wealth and its trappings.[50] This may also have been the case with the *pachters* at the Cape, as a brief case-study of the 1780s seems to indicate: of the fifteen individuals who became burgher councillors during this decade,[51] at least five were the direct descendants of *pachters*,[52] while most of the others had other family links to earlier or current *pachters* through marriage and descent. It seems, then, that while wealth through investment in the alcohol *pachten* rarely brought political power and prestige (in the form of holding public offices in the VOC government) to the *pachters*, it could provide the basis for social and political prestige for their descendents in the future. This long-term development of a political Cape elite is, however, a topic that needs further and fuller investigation.

Table 6.2: Public Offices Held by the Major Alcohol *Pachters*

***Pachter*'s Name**	**Years Active[53]**	**Militia**	**Other**
Vermeij, Steven	1693-1705		
Phijffer, Johannes	1697-1711		
Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald	1708-1721	ensign; lieutenant; captain	marriage commiss.; orphan master; councillor
Hoesemans, Anthonij	1709-1723		

[50] Kooijmans, 'De Koopman', 88.

[51] Based on the tabulation of T. Baartman, 'Burghers in Cape Town, 1780-1790', unpublished paper, History of Cape Town Project (Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 1992), 21.

[52] They were Christiaan George Maasdorp; Gerrit Hendrik Meijer; Johan Hendrik Munnik; Adam Gabriel Muller and Cornelis van der Poel.

[53] The years after 1700 in this column refer to *pacht* years, i.e. from 1 September the previous calendar year to 31 August of the year given. Before 1699 a *pacht* year coincided with the calendar year.

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Van der Spuij, Melt	1722-1733	lieutenant	
Beck, Johann Zacharias	1723-1737	fire warden; sergeant	
Lever, Abraham	1727-1758	ensign	
Boetendagh, Carel Diederik	1731-1739	fire warden	
Van der Swijn, Jan	1732-1747	fire warden	councillor (nominated)
Holst, Jan sr	1740-1754		
Hubner, Jochem Daniel sr	1740-1761		
Melck, Martin	1760-1781		heemraad
Esselaar, Johannes Nicholaas	1762-1774	corporal	
Schreuder, Johan Jacob	1762-1790		
Bateman, Maarten	1763-1787	fire warden	
Roep, Johannes	1767-1781		
De Kruger, Willem	1770-1786		
Bam, Jan Christiaan	1780-1792		
Hugo, Daniel	1781-1793		
Wispelaar, Jacob	1788-1795	schutter; fire warden	

Source: *Resolusies*; *Requesten*

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The involvement of the alcohol *pachters* in the Cape Town *schutterij* or *burgerwacht* (town militia) was, however, of a rather different nature. The militia was a major source of social prestige for this group. The militia, based on similar bodies in Dutch cities, was more than just a group of able-bodied men. It performed an important social *and* symbolic function, expressed by Willem Frijhoff in these terms: '[Militias] formed the active centre of the city as a corporation, fed its inner strength and provided the visible form of this strength.'[54] Although one may doubt whether quite the same amount of urban 'patriotism' existed at the Cape, it seems likely that here too the structure of the burgher militia was highly symbolic of the structure of society

[54] '[Schuttersgilden] vormden de actieve kern van de stad als corporatie, voedden haar innerlijke kracht en gaven er een zichtbare gestalte aan'; W. Frijhoff and M. Spies, *1650: Bevochten Eendracht* (The Hague, 1999), 141.

at large: since the militia represented order, virtue and civil co-operation, its members were expected to act in a similar spirit. Moreover, officers were chosen from among the socially foremost burghers – they were the people who would gain most from an orderly society. Thus, in Dutch cities most of the higher ranks of the officer corps were elected from the *regenten* class – which is a clear indication of the prestige which was attached to these offices.[55] At the Cape, belonging to the officer corps both reflected eminence amongst one's fellow burghers, and indicated the trust and approval of the VOC authorities: although militia members nominated their officers, the final choice was made by the Governor and the Council of Policy. But it is most likely that the VOC paid heed to the social standing of potential candidates as the militia was primarily a burgher institution, unlike the other public offices available.

It is therefore a significant indication of the social prestige of the successful alcohol *pachters* that nine of them held an officer rank in the burgher militia: four were fire wardens;[56] two became corporals or sergeants while the other three reached the higher ranks of ensign, lieutenant and captain (table 6.2).[57] These men were obviously considered by their fellow burghers and the authorities to be men of sufficient social importance and prestige to be elected to their offices. But it went both ways: no doubt the *pachters* were keen on such positions since the militia served as an important vehicle for male sociability and provided *pachters* – through its regular meetings and functions – with the opportunities of doing important networking, thereby also investing in their social capital.[58] In this way there was a close link between possessing symbolic capital and gaining social capital. In addition, burgher militias often insisted on having some say in the governance and running of a town, and it is no co-incidence that at the Cape there were close ties between the burgher

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55 Cf. J.A.J. de Jongste, *Onrust aan het Spaarne: Haarlem in de Jaren 1747-1751* (Amsterdam, 1984), 119-20.

56 The fire wardens formed part of the militia and were responsible for maintaining order and discipline during fires; see C.G. Botha, *The Collected Works of C. Graham Botha* (3 vols, Cape Town, 1962), vol. 1, 161 and Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 1, 133-34.

57 Johann Zacharias Beck was both a fire warden and a sergeant.

58 Frijhoff and Spies, *1650: Bevochten Eendracht*, 141-43 and De Jongste, *Onrust aan het Spaarne*, 117-23. For a good discussion of the *schutterij* in the Stellenbosch district, see Biewenga, *De Kaap de Goede Hoop*, 74-87. Similar work still needs to be done for Cape Town.

councillors and the burgher militia.[59] In this way, too, the alcohol entrepreneurs could use their influence in matters which concerned them.[60]

The importance of the militia in the symbolic world of Cape society is reflected by the role it played in occasions such as the arrivals, inaugurations and funerals of high-ranking VOC officials. Robert Ross has already explained the role of such public events to showcase the importance of hierarchy and pomp in the VOC establishment.[61] More particularly in the current context, the role of the militia in these processions not only reflected the authorities' belief in its importance, but also demonstrated in a symbolic way to the inhabitants of the Cape that the men of the militia were favoured. These public processions did not always follow the same format and the latter was contingent on the rank and status of the individual being honoured, as well as his or her relations at the Cape. But in general all office-holders were present and the militia played a significant role.

Thus in 1760, in the funeral procession of Sergius Swellengrebel, *Secunde* (deputy governor) and cousin of the former governor,[62] the incumbent burgher councillors followed directly behind the governor, the Council of Policy, the Church ministers and the VOC's military personnel. The burgher councillors were eleventh in order, while the 'common burghers' (*gemeene burgers*) came last in the thirty-first position. Former burgher councillors came in the seventeenth position followed immediately by the captains of the burgher militia, *ahead* of the incumbent members of the smaller civil institutions such as the Orphan Chamber and Matrimonial Court. Other officers of the militia followed in twenty-eighth place, ahead of some of the

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59 Almost invariably burgher councillors also held high ranks in the militia, and it is significant that the Burgher Council had its meetings in the *Burgerwachthuis*; cf. Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 1, 133.

60 It should be stressed, though, that, unlike the case in Dutch cities where the elite tended to be defined by their involvement in city governance and hence their possession of political power, the case was rather different at the Cape. The lack of real influence by the burgher elite was an issue which came to the fore in the last quarter of the eighteenth century when, under pressure, the VOC increased the number of burgher councillors to six; see C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte gedurende die Laaste Kwart van die Agtiende Eeu en die Voortlewing van hul Denkbeelde* (Second edition, Pretoria, 1967), on the Patriot movement, although his interpretation is in need of revision.

61 Ross, *Status and Respectability*, 21-26.

62 See on him the entry in W.J. de Kock and D.W. Krüger (eds), *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: Deel II* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1972), 747.

low-ranking VOC officials. Thus, clearly officers of the militia were symbolically set apart from the common citizens.[63]

In other funerals the militia played an even more prominent role: in the funeral of Governor Rijk Tulbagh the cortege was preceded by 'the oldest Company cavalry' (*d' oudste Comp[agnies] cavallerie*), followed directly by the burgher infantry. In this procession, too, captains and other officers of the militia preceded many VOC officials in rank. Finally, it is not insignificant in symbolic terms that only right at the end of this very lengthy funeral procession followed 'some free burghers who do not form part of the militia' – their physical separation illustrates what was clearly also an important mental and social distinction.[64]

The burgher militia played an even more prominent role in the funeral of Governor Maurits Pasques de Chavonnes in 1724 when the procession was led by a company of burgher cavalry followed by the burgher infantry, in which their officers played an equally prominent role carrying various flags and standards.[65] Likewise, when Baron Gustaaf von Imhoff was introduced to the Cape as the new governor general of the Dutch East Indies, the VOC organised an impressive public ceremony, 'the likes of which had never before been seen here'. On the day on which the new governor was to be 'solemnly presented in public' at the Castle of Good Hope, both the VOC's garrison and the burgher militia stood directly in front of him under their various flags and banners. Only then were the *burgerij* (citizenry) allowed to enter and had to stand behind them.[66] Thus, in symbolic terms, the town militia and its officers were held up to the rest of the inhabitants of Cape Town as being 'different' and 'separate' from them. There could be no doubt that they were important and favoured.

It is thus clear that in many cases the prominent role that alcohol *pachters* played in the business world of Cape Town was translated into social and symbolic power by their elections to and functions in the burgher militia, virtually the only public body in eighteenth-century Cape Town in which burghers could be

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63 CA, M 41: Funeral Notices no. A (no pagination).

64 'eenige burgers, die onder de resp[ectiev]e burger militie niet sorteeren'; CA, VC 31, 17 August 1771 (no pagination).

65 CA, VC 22, 167.

66 'dewelke … alhier nooijt is gesien geworden' and 'in het openbaare solemneelijk sal werden voorgesteld'; CA, VC 25, 22 and 26 January 1741 (no pagination).

prominently visible. Another way in which these *pachters*' pre-eminence in the citizenry was reflected came to the fore in the leading position that many of these more prominent *pachters* played in forms of popular protests, often over taxes, during the eighteenth century. In the tradition of the 'urban republicanism' typical of Dutch cities, Cape burghers also made use of the unwritten right of citizens to petition their councils. This right was never contested and it was considered a matter of course that city councils should take heed of petitions and react to them.[67] This was also the case with the Council of Policy at the Cape. In general, it seems as if *pachters* were not afraid to use their economic influence and social status to complain about conditions not conducive to their business activities: thus Eksteen took a leading role in complaining about excessive taxes in the late 1710s,[68] while the *pachters* of the 1770-80s added their signatures to petitions regarding business matters and taxation issues raised by the so-called Patriots.[69] The issue of popular participation in Cape politics still needs investigation. It seems, however, at this stage as if in this arena too prominent alcohol *pachters* could and did take the lead, thereby expressing their symbolic importance and significance in Cape society.

Honour, Respectability and Self-Identity

Prestige was predicated upon a good reputation. Although reputation in the early modern world was not purely an individual matter since it was connected with one's family and their status, it was essentially something that had to be earned. The converse of this is that one could also lose a reputation, and that would be disastrous to an entrepreneur: 'If you wished to convince others that they could trust you, you could not afford to lose your reputation. Loss of reputation meant loss of credit, so you had to be careful to protect your good name.'[70] As studies of Dutch

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67 On the role of petitions in the 'urban republicanism' of early modern Dutch society, see H. van Nierop, 'Popular Participation in Politics in the Dutch Republic', in P. Blickle (ed.), *Resistance, Representation, and Community* (Oxford, 1997), 284-90.

68 See page 98 above.

69 See pages 157-58 above.

70 L. Kooijmans, 'Risk and Reputation: On the Mentality of Merchants in the Early Modern Period', in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds), *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern*

entrepreneurship during this period have shown, the ultimate aim of entrepreneurs was to take care of their families and to lead an honourable life. In both these cases continuity was essential.[71] Reputation, then, should be seen as a resource which was 'closely linked to concrete issues of opportunity and loss.'[72] Hence the obsession of Cape *pachters* with their reputation: they saw themselves as honourable people with good names, and were concerned to protect these valuable assets. Being honourable was an important facet in the self-identity of Cape alcohol entrepreneurs.[73]

Three court cases illustrate this issue very well. Hendrik van Dijk had a long-standing dispute with Melt van der Spuij over outstanding debt. It finally came to a head in 1730 when Van der Spuij was ordered by the Council of Justice to pay the debt.[74] Though before this happened, in one of the sessions before the commissioners from the Council, Van Dijk shouted at Van der Spuij: 'Mate! You are a perjurer,' and then told him: 'You'd be prepared to swear an oath for a dime'.[75] This was a terrible and potentially disastrous insult to Van der Spuij: by claiming that he was not a man of his word, Van Dijk could seriously damage his reputation. Since so much business, not least the granting of credit, in this period depended on trust, the faintest whiff of untrustworthiness in a merchant or trader could have disastrous consequences.[76] Tavern-keepers, as comparative studies have shown, were also particularly sensitive

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Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market (The Hague, 1995), 30.

71 Kooijmans, 'De Koopman', 86.

72 K. McKenzie, *Scandal in the Colonies: Sydney and Cape Town, 1820-1850* (Carlton, 2004), 10.

73 This is not to suggest that a pre-occupation with one's reputation was only limited to entrepreneurs and business people. Protecting one's reputation was a common concern for most sectors of society, also in Cape Town; cf. N. Worden, 'Forging a Reputation: Artisan Honour and the Cape Town Blacksmith Strike of 1752', *Kronos* 28 (2002), 43-65. Yet, since trustworthiness was a valuable *asset* to entrepreneurs, as it could be translated into access to (or loss of) credit and profitable opportunities, they were particularly careful to protect it.

74 CA, CJ 824, 14-15, 21-22, 26, 33, 36, 42-43 and 49-51.

75 'Vent! Je bent een meijneediger! … Je zouw wel een eed doen voor een dubbeltje'; CA, CJ 1043, 236.

76 Lesger, 'Over het Nut', 72. For the link between credit and creditable behaviour, see J. Hoppit, 'Attitudes to Credit in Britain, 1680-1790', *The Historical Journal* 33 (1990), 318-20. See also pages 84-85 and 115-16 above for a discussion of this topic with reference to the alcohol *pachters* of Cape Town.

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to issues regarding their image since their business was 'dependent on the good opinion of an extraordinarily broad cross section of the community, whose views on the proper conduct of a tavern were expressed with an intensity entirely absent from their assessments of other trades.'[77] Moreover, in a relatively small settlement like the Cape, gossip and scandal, the vehicles through which to discredit people, spread very quickly.

Van der Spuij was well aware of this: he sued Van Dijk for injury to his honour and demanded that he, Van der Spuij, be acknowledged 'as an honourable and virtuous man.'[78] When the two of them appeared before the commissioners, who tried to effect a conciliation by asking the two parties to live 'as good Christians with each another', Van der Spuij claimed that he would desire nothing better, 'yet since nothing is more dear to him than his honour, he is obliged to protect it', and he therefore insisted that Van Dijk 'must acknowledge him, Van der Spuij, to be an honest man about whom he has nothing to say.'[79] Van Dijk consented to this, thereby avoiding a hefty fine, and the two of them left the court 'in friendship and peace.'[80] Van der Spuij's concern with his honour, and his desire to protect it, reveals how closely personal honour was wound up with social status and public reputation. It is for this reason that injuries to a person's reputation and honour were taken very seriously by Dutch law, as revealed by the jurist Simon van Leeuwen's statement that 'nothing is more precious in life than one's honour, and the good opinion that others have of one.' [81]

In 1769 Martin Melck was similarly concerned with protecting his honour and went to great lengths in order to protect this valuable commodity. Melck sold a large

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77 P. Thompson, *Rum, Punch and Revolution: Taverngoing and Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1999), 55-56. Thompson also states that a 'goodly number of licensees made healthy profits from keeping public houses, but equally many publicans were undone by the high financial and emotional overheads associated with this singular trade.'

78 'dat hij den gehoonden erkend voor een eerlijk en deugdelijk man'; CA, CJ 1043, 240.

79 'als goede Christenen met den anderen te leeven'; 'dog dat hij niets dierbaarder als zijn eer hebbende, hij ook verpligt was die te maintineeren', and 'hem, Van der Spuij, … voor een eerlijk man soude erkennen, op wie hij niet en weet te seggen'; *ibid*., 244.

80 'in vriendschap en vreede'; *ibid*., 245.

81 'Naar 't leven en is niet kostelijker als de eer, ende het goed gevoelen dat een ander van ons heeft'; quoted from H. Roodenburg, 'De Notaris en de Erehandel: Beledigingen voor het Amsterdamse Notariaat, 1700-1710', *Volkskundig Bulletin* 18 (1992), 369.

quantity of wine to a visiting ship but did not obtain the requisite permission (and letter) from the Council of Policy to do so, with the result that the incumbent wine *pachter*, Pieter Broedersz, confiscated the wine and accused Melck of smuggling.[82] Melck then did obtain a letter of permission after Broedersz had confiscated the wine, but the latter refused to return the wares. Consequently Melck sued him for the restitution of the wine and asked for a full excuse from Broedersz, declaring that he, Melck, 'was not only deeply wounded in his feelings, but that he also finds his honour, good name and reputation severely damaged, the more so since he had never involved himself with such infamous things and even less deserves the name of Smuggler.'[83] Not only did Melck request that Broedersz return his wine, but that he should also proffer an apology which would be both 'honourable and profitable' (*honorabel als profitabel*). The latter aspect took the form of a fine to be paid to the Church's poor fund; the former involved Broedersz

> appearing before this Council [of Justice], with open doors so that everyone can listen, and begging the claimant [Melck] for forgiveness, while declaring that he had committed the aforesaid injuries unthinkingly, recklessly and against the truth, and that it consequently pains his heart; and that he has nothing to say about the claimant's actions and behaviour other than that they are only honourable and virtuous.[84]

The importance of these issues is revealed by the fact that Melck did this despite being by this stage the wealthiest burgher at the Cape with little to lose. But part of

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82 It was precisely to limit smuggling that the Council of Policy had instituted the requirement of first obtaining a letter of permission from it to sell wine to passing ships.

83 'hij niet alleen in sijn gemoed geraakt, maar ook in desselfs eer, goede naam en faam, op het hoogste geledeert is vindende, temeer, zig nooijt met infame dingen heeft opgehouden, nog veel minder den naam van Smockelaar verdiend'; CA, CJ 1096, 295.

84 'compareerende voor deese Vierschaar, met opene deuren, ten aanhooren van een ijder, den Eijscher [Melck] om vergiffenis te bidden, met betuijging dat hij de voorszeijde injurien onbedagtelijk, onbesonnen en teegens de waarheijd heeft gesprooken gehad, en dienvolgens 't hem van hertenleed is, en niet op des Eijschers handel en wandel, als alle eer en deugd weet te seggen'; *ibid*., 299-300. See A.G. Hesselink, 'In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg: Onderhuidse Spanning en Samenwerking in een Koloniale Samenleving in Zuid-Afrika, 1751-1771' (unpublished doctoraalscriptie, University of Amsterdam, 1997), 64-65 for a discussion of this case.

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the vehemence of Melck's reaction may well lie in the fact that his actions were not entirely above board and that some suspicion may well have arisen. Since a person was respectable if he or she *acted* respectably, and it was only through one's actions (and not birth or inheritance) that one became respectable, it was crucially important for Melck to be *seen* to have acted respectably.[85] As respectability was a commodity which needed to be earned, it could also be contested; and this is essentially what Broedersz was doing. Although for both persons involved, financial gain was at the root of the disagreement, the vehemence of Melck's reaction also reveals how much respectability was wound up with issues regarding the symbolic importance of an individual's standing in society.

Another case concerning honour and respectability, but one which also reveals much about the nature of the social ties which existed between some *pachters*, was the result of the behaviour of Michiel Lourich in 1736.[86] The latter arrived at the house of Jacob de Vries where he also found the *pachter* Johannes van Helsdingen. Lourich started to berate the absent Carel Boetendagh, calling him a *schelm* (crook). This was no mere insult: in general, the word denoted professional or financial untrustworthiness, but could easily lead to 'a general suggestion of untrustworthiness, in the worst imprecations, even of baseness and dishonourableness.'[87] This was an insult particularly aimed at men and was meant to attack their *public* honour and reputation.[88] Being called a *schelm* was clearly not something a *pachter* would desire.

What is particularly significant in this case is the role of Van Helsdingen. After having insulted Boetendagh, Lourich continued: 'You, Van Helsdingen can go and report this to him [i.e. Boetendagh] or I would consider you to be one (namely a

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85 Cf. Smith, *Consumption and the Making of Respectability*, 205-206, for an analysis of the issues involved in acting respectably.

86 Although Michiel Daniel Lourich was a *pachter* only once, he worked through most of the 1730s as a *bijtapper* (see pages 137-44 above for a discussion of the long involvement of his in-laws, centred on Aletta de Nijs, in the malt beer *pacht*). Lourich abused his wife, was involved in several disputes with other alcohol *pachters*, and in 1740 was banished after having murdered a slave woman in his tavern; cf. Worden and Groenewald, *Trials of Slavery*, 176-87.

87 'een algehele suggestie van onbetrouwbaarheid, in de felste verwensingen zelfs van laaghartigheid en eerloosheid'; Roodenburg, 'De Notaris en de Erehandel', 377.

88 Women were more often the target of insults, such as *hoer* (whore), attacking their personal honour; *ibid*.

crook), since I am well aware that you are a good friend of his.'[89] Van Helsdingen defended Boetendagh and took Lourich to task for insulting 'an honourable man' behind his back. Boetendagh learned of this episode from his friend and sued Lourich, claiming that the latter had tried in this way 'to steal … the crown from his head.'[90]

Van Helsdingen's defence of Boetendagh's honour becomes more understandable when one considers the important role of friends in this period. From a friend one expected solidarity and help, but in return one too accepted responsibility and offered help. In addition, 'friends also exercised social control, because they suffered from the bad reputation of someone closely connected to them.'[91] Where both of them, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters, were also involved in high-risk entrepreneurial undertakings which depended on their public reputation, it becomes crucial that such friends should defend one another. This explains Van Helsdingen's behaviour in this case: since the late 1720s he and Boetendagh had been business partners and stood surety for one another on several occasions.[92] If Boetendagh's reputation became compromised, it would reflect negatively on Van Helsdingen's, who might suffer financially as a result. In this way, the operation of reputation in the social world of Cape *pachters* could lead to a greater feeling of solidarity, perhaps even something of a group identity, among those who supported one another. But contesting a person's reputation and respectability could also be used against one's competitors, as is demonstrated by the case of Broedersz and Melck.

A court case of a rather different kind affords us a rare opportunity to discover something about the self-identity and perception of at least one *pachter*.[93] In 1746

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89 'Gij Van Helsdingen kund het hem [Boetendagh] wel weder te rugge zeggen off ik zal er uw voor houden (te weeten voor een schelm). Want mij wel bewus is, dat gij een goed vriend van hem zijt'; CA, CJ 1049, 443.

90 'een eerlijk man' and 'om de kroon van zijn hooft … te ontvreemden'; *ibid*., 447. By using the latter metaphor, Boetendagh clearly expressed that he considered his good reputation to be the most significant contributor to his public image.

91 Kooijmans, 'Risk and Reputation', 32. A particularly insightful discussion of how friendship was conceived and operated in the eighteenth century is provided by N. Tadmor, *Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship and Patronage* (Cambridge, 2001), 167-215.

92 See pages 127-29 above.

93 For comparative work on the topic of the self-identity and perception of early modern entrepreneurs, merchants and other business people; see M.C. Jacob and C. Secretan (eds), *The Self-Perception of Early Modern Capitalists* (Houndmills, 2009).

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Abraham Leever, who by this stage had become the most important, wealthy and influential alcohol *pachter* at the Cape, was sued by his sister-in-law, Jacomina Brommert, [94] for having insulted and assaulted her in her house. Leever certainly had a strong and forceful character and had previously been in trouble with the law over his quick temper. [95] The reasons for the assault are complex and had to do with tense family relations; but, significantly, the last straw for Leever was when Brommert called him a *schelm* (crook) after which he hit her in the face.[96] To add insult to injury, she then went into the street – a public space – where she shouted at the daughters of Leever: 'he is a crook as God and the whole world know; that is what he is known as, and I shall make his eyes stream, if God would grant me life!'[97] The further details of the case are not relevant here, but some of the statements Leever made in his very vigorous and lengthy defence are most revealing about how he viewed himself in the context of the Cape's burgher population.[98]

As Leever and his wife were leaving Brommert's house after having assaulted her, she threatened to lay a complaint with the fiscal. To this Leever replied: 'you would not dare going there since one word from me would carry greater weight than

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94 Jacomina Brommert was the widow of Jacob Leever, the brother of Abraham. Jacob was the Secretary of the Orphan Chamber for many years. Upon his death in 1737 it was discovered that over the years he had defrauded the Orphan Chamber of *f* 121 742; J.L.M. Franken, ''n Kaapse Huishoue in die 18de Eeu: Uit Von Dessin se Briefboek en Memoriaal', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 3/1 (1940), 37-38. The VOC went to considerable pains to recover as much of this money from his estate (cf. the various cases concerning this issue in CA, C 1101, 58-70 and CJ 832-833), with the result that Jacomina Brommert was left destitute and in later years had to be supported by the Church's poor fund; Mentzel, *Description*, vol. 1, 27-28.

95 In 1736 the baker Jan Bam sued Leever for overstepping the bounds of his office as an ensign of the militia when he gave him a spot fine during the 1736 Cape Town fire for having started up his oven. Bam claimed that Leever charged at him 'als een brieschende leeuw' with his 'brutaliteijten'; CA, CJ 1049, 235. Hesselink, 'In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg', 60 characterises Leever 'als een eigenzinnig en koppig persoon, die niets en niemand uit de weg ging om zijn doel te bereiken.'

96 CA, CJ 353, 257.

97 'hij is een schelm dat Godt en de heele weerelt weet, daar staat hij voor te boek, en ik zal [']t hem in zijn oogen doen druijpen, spaar Godt mij 't leeven'; *ibid*., 291.

98 Leever had served several years as an official in the VOC before becoming a free burgher, which is certainly betrayed by the excellent command of VOC officialese he used in his defence. The documents for this case are in CA, CJ 353, 254-345.

ten of yours, seeing that he is a bosom friend of mine.'[99] The fiscal at this time was Baron Pieter van Reede van Oudtshoorn, a rich nobleman who was to become a future governor of the Cape.[100] It is highly plausible that Leever would have had friendly relations with him – they certainly had a great deal of official business with one another[101] – although the fiscal denied this in his *eijsch* (the plaintiff's plea).[102] But what is revealing about this statement is that Leever thought his position in Cape society, and his influence with the authorities, was of such a nature that he could receive special treatment.

This belief in his own superior importance in the world of mid-eighteenth century Cape Town is revealed by what Leever wrote in his defence. Leever was particularly upset and hurt by the very strict punishment the fiscal demanded in his *conclusie* (the plaintiff's recommendation of punishment): a fine of one thousand rixdollars and that Leever be declared *een onwaardig burger* ('an unworthy citizen') and be banished from the Cape.[103] Leever felt that the fiscal had no right to act 'so rigorously' against him and to exact a punishment 'so outrageous, so terribly exceeding the limits of reasonableness and so little applicable to the deed.'[104] As if the fine was not ridiculously high enough ('indeed a pretty sum'), the fiscal went out of bounds by suggesting banishment: 'the *eijsch* has no poles [i.e. knows no limits] and the right of citizenship is an insufficient dyke to staunch the violent fury of this

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99 'daer durft gij niet koomen, want mijn een word sal merder [sic] geloof hebben als thien van u, want 't is een boesemvriend van mij'; *ibid*., 258v. When Brommert later went to Leever threatening to go to the fiscal, he encouraged her; saying nothing would come of it since the fiscal was his bosom friend; *ibid*., 258v-59.

100 See his entry in W.J. de Kock and D.W. Krüger (eds), *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: Deel II* (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1972), 816-17.

101 Leever was one of the most vigilant protectors of the *pachters*' right to monopoly and he reported the slightest whiff of smuggling to the fiscal who was duty bound to investigate this. There are numerous such court cases instigated by Leever in the 1730-40s. The fiscal benefited from the prosecution of such cases since he received a share of the fines imposed. On the problem of smuggling for *pachters*, see page 43 with note 116 above.

102 CA, CJ 353, 260.

103 *Ibid*., 260v.

104 'soo enorm, soo schrikkelijk van 't spoor der billijkheijt dwalende en soo weijnig applicabel op 't gepleegde fijt'; *ibid*., 295.

flood.'[105] What particularly galled Leever was that anybody could conceive of him as 'a useless subject.' He writes with indignation that he 'differs much in his feelings with the honourable fiscal since he believes that he is by no means a useless but indeed – in terms of contributing to the honourable Company's *gemeene landsmiddelen*[106] – a useful inhabitant.'[107] For Leever, this was the crux of the matter: as a successful *pachter* of many years' standing, he had to be considered as *een dienstig inwoonder* ('a useful inhabitant') – anything else was just inconceivable for a man of his attainments: 'Since having paid, for conducting his civilian trade, to the aforementioned honourable Company, both specifically and in general, already the tiny sum of five times a hundred thousand guilders, and most likely more, rather than less.'[108]

Leever was exaggerating somewhat: by 1746 he had invested over almost a twenty-year period a total of about *f* 160 000 in the alcohol *pachten* at the Cape.[109] But the principle is certainly valid: this is a massive sum and this money, as discussed in chapter one, formed a major source of direct revenue for the Company at the Cape. In Leever's eyes, this made him a particularly useful and valuable inhabitant of the Cape – one who, while making his own gains, also profited the Company immensely. According, then, to Leever's own conception of himself and his role in Cape society, he should have received special treatment, and seemed to have believed that he indeed merited it, and hence could muster influence. And perhaps this was indeed the case since the Council of Justice rejected the fiscal's *eijsch* and sentenced Leever to a

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105 '[den] eijsch heeft geen paalen en het burger regt is geen suffisante dijk genoeg om den onstuijmige drift van deesen vloet te stuijten'; *ibid*., 295v.

106 This was the term used in the VOC's bookkeeping to refer to its income from the alcohol *pachten*.

107 'differeert veel in sijn gevoelen met den Heer Eijs[che]r aangesien hij gelooft dat hij geensints een onnut, maar wel een, tot opbrenging van 's E[dele] Comp[agnie]s gemeene landsmiddelen, dienstig inwoonder is'; *ibid*.

108 'als hebbende voor sijn burgerlijke neering drijving aan wel opgem[elde] Edele Comp[agnie] soo wel in 't particulier als generaal al een sommetjie van vijf maal hondert duijsent guldens veel eer meerder als iminder betaalt'; *ibid*., 296.

109 This amount is what he paid directly for the alcohol *pachten* at the auctions: his reference to his *particuliere* contribution. What he had contributed in various taxes and excises with his business activities – and his cooperative business deals with others – would probably reach a considerably higher amount.

token fine of 100 rixdollars.[110] Leever's exceptional position in Cape society helped him in this case to retain his prestige, reputation and honour – he did *not* have to beg Brommert for forgiveness and was certainly not declared *een onnut burger* ('a useless inhabitant') – which allowed him to continue for many years in the alcohol retail business.[111]

Conclusion

The *pachters* discussed in this chapter were among the most successful inhabitants, in financial terms, of VOC Cape Town. Their financial ascendancy also translated into social success which was represented symbolically. This took different forms: on the one hand some wealthy *pachters* chose to advertise their wealth publicly through consumption and the use of material culture; on the other hand, their involvement in the significant burgher militia meant that they were publicly presented to the bulk of Cape Town's inhabitants as being set apart in symbolic terms. And these *pachters* were well aware of their exceptional position in the free burgher population, as was expressed by their obsession with protecting their reputation and honour. Both in their own eyes, and those of Cape Town society at large, their success as entrepreneurs made them deserving of social prestige and honour – even special treatment by the authorities. In terms of entrepreneurship, these *pachters* had realised their wishes and desires to be wealthy, powerful and respected.

This chapter focused only on a small group of successful alcohol *pachters*. It does not mean, however, that the processes and mechanisms used by them to gain ascendancy were not also used by the other inhabitants of Cape Town. The alcohol *pachters* were by no means unique; but they usefully serve as examples of how an entrepreneurial group of people could, and did, use social and symbolic capital to their own advantage. In essence, this chapter should be viewed as a case study of a process with wider application than to the alcohol *pachters* alone. Although the

110 CA, CJ 28, 70-71.

111 The outcome of Leever's involvement in the alcohol retail trade was less fortunate: by the mid-1750s he had overplayed his hand and his creditors started calling in their debts. He could not repay them all and as a result his estate was sequestrated. By 1758 he was forced to apply, like his sister-in-law two decades earlier, to the Church's poor fund for financial support; NGKA, G 1 1/4, 8 and Hesselink, 'In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg', 61-62.

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analysis in this chapter is based on a small sample only, it does demonstrate how people in a relatively small colonial town could use various forms of capital to promote their social mobility. Thus even though the focus of this chapter, like this thesis, is on the alcohol *pachters*, the investigation reveals a number of issues about the development of the burgher society of early modern Cape Town which suggest new areas of future research.

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CONCLUSION

The history of the Cape of Good Hope is unthinkable without Cape Town. Although this may seem like a truism, until recently an outsider would not have guessed this from the historiography of the VOC period of South African history. This is largely due to the development of the nationalistic invention of the (white) South African past during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which the conquest and settlement of land were the driving factors in the development of 'South Africa.' In this view Cape Town was merely the starting point for these processes and it stopped being of much importance after the 'founding' years of Van Riebeeck and Van der Stel. Cape Town always remained on the periphery of this view, while the focus was the expanding frontier and the role of the 'pioneer' trekboers with their restless spirit which strengthened over the years to find its fulfilment in the Voortrekkers of the nineteenth century.[1]

In general, the revisionist historians of the 1970s and 1980s successfully managed to demolish the old nationalistic myths about the development of South African society. This is also true for the history of the VOC Cape, but here curiously the focus remained very strongly on the frontier, or at least the landed classes of Cape society. The revisionists successfully broadened our perspective on the early Cape by writing previously ignored groups such as the slaves and Khoisan into the history of the Cape of Good Hope. However, insofar as the free burgher population continued to receive attention in their own right (most notably in the work of Robert Ross), the focus remained on the rural population; although less on the white frontiersmen and more on the settled population of the arable districts which had previously been rather ignored. It is only very

[1] The classic work of P.J. van der Merwe was pivotal in the development, and acceptance, of this view (although it has its roots earlier): *Die Trekboer in die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie, 1657-1842* (Cape Town, 1938) and, *Trek: Studies oor die Mobiliteit van die Pioniersbevolking aan die Kaap* (Cape Town, 1945), esp. 61-98 and 284-99.

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recently, thanks largely to the project of which this thesis forms part, that Cape Town has begun to receive the attention which its historic importance merits.[2]

This thesis has demonstrated through a series of case studies centred on the alcohol *pachters* of Cape Town that the city was central to the economic and social development of the burgher population of the Cape of Good Hope. It has argued that the central mechanism for the creation of wealth in the town was the use of entrepreneurialism. In spite of the restrictive nature of the mercantilist economy of the VOC period, Cape Town as a port city with a large transient population, offered more economic opportunities for exploitation by the alert entrepreneur than elsewhere in the colony. The most lucrative, and also the most accessible, of these opportunities was the system of alcohol *pachten* which was successfully exploited by several dozen Cape Town free burghers who used it to create personal wealth. Some of the wealthiest individuals at the Cape during the VOC period, such as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen and Martin Melck, used the alcohol *pachten* as a stepping stone in their rise to become financially ascendant. In this way, the development of wealth in the free burgher community was closely related to larger, international forces since the prosperity of Cape Town was crucially dependent on the visits and needs of calling ships.

A surprising result of the research for this thesis was the revelation of the centrality of male German immigrants to the alcohol retail trade of Cape Town. Throughout most of the eighteenth century they dominated this business. There were important changes in the role and nature of this group in the course of the eighteenth century. From chapter four it appears that by the second quarter of the eighteenth century, when German immigration was at its height, this group formed a rather tight-knit community which supported one another financially, brought family members to the Cape, and contracted endogamous marriages, with many of them actively promoting the

[2] The NRF-funded project, 'Social Identities in VOC Cape Town', is set to change the way in which South African historians think about the role of Cape Town in the history of both South Africa and the Indian Ocean world. See N. Worden, 'New Approaches to VOC History in South Africa', *South African Historical Journal* 59 (2007), 10-18 on the aims and likely impact of the project. This latter project was inspired by the research done on the history of the city during the 1990s as part of the Cape Town History Project at the University of Cape Town, which was synthesised in N. Worden, E. van Heyningen and V. Bickford-Smith, *Cape Town: The Making of a City* (Cape Town, 1998).

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Lutheran faith. Over time, however, the more successful members of this group started to intermarry with the settled free-burgher population, although even by the last quarter of the century there were still indicators that Cape Town businessmen and women of German descent kept close ties (see chapter five).

Although this thesis only concentrated on Germans who were *pachters*, it has revealed how central this group were to the history of Cape Town, as well as more generally to the development of the burgher population of the colony. An intriguing discovery is the close ties German immigrant men had with the Cape Town free black community, especially in the first half of the century.[3] It may well be that the decrease in such relations by the late eighteenth century was related to the growing incorporation of these German businessmen by the Cape gentry. German immigrants and their relations with both the free black community and the Cape gentry warrant further research.

This study has proved that, certainly in relation to German immigrants, there existed a close link between the urban environment (in the opportunities that it created), the entrepreneurship of newcomers to the Cape and social mobility. This can be seen most spectacularly in the career of Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen (chapter three), but there are many other smaller success-stories from both the 1730s and 1770s to prove the point. In all of these successes kinship and marriage played a crucially important role, although the nature of the alliances which entrepreneurs made changed over time as third and fourth-generation families at the Cape developed deeper histories and more complex

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[3] The impression one gets from works such as J. Hoge, 'Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806', *Archives Year Book for South African History* 9 (1946); H.F. Heese, *Groep sonder Grense: Die Rol en Status van die Gemengde Bevolking aan die Kaap, 1652-1795* (Bellville, 1984); K. Schoeman, *'n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en Loopbaan van Hendrik Schoeman* (Pretoria, 2004) and A. Malan, 'Chattels or Colonists?: "Freeblack" Women and their Households', *Kronos* 25 (1998-99), 50-71, is that free-black women were more likely to marry first-generation German immigrants living in Cape Town than the sons of settlers; although the statistical analysis to prove this still remains to be done. Was the preponderance of first-generation German immigrants in Cape Town and their links to free blacks, as opposed to the farming community and their daughters, a function of the immigrant support network that existed in the city (cf. chapter four), or does it rather reveal an exclusionary prejudice of the rural gentry who would only allow German immigrants entry once they were financially successful (such as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen), or to their descendants who had achieved social and economic ascendancy (such as those discussed in chapter five)?

connections (as shown in chapter five). Social capital likewise continued to be crucial to the success of entrepreneurs in Cape Town. Although here too changes over time can be flagged, it seems that a shared background or identity continued to play a very important role in the economic support networks people cultivated. Both in the younger, more face-to-face society of the early eighteenth century and in the larger, more complex society of the last quarter of the century, German ethnicity did remain a valuable entry point for newcomers to enter established business and social networks in Cape Town. Central to accumulating social capital was honour and reputation, the loss of which could lead to both economic and social failure (chapter six). The way in which social capital operated among the entrepreneurs of Cape Town begs important questions which need to be answered by future historians: how was community and identity construed at the Cape of Good Hope during this period, and what role did common cultural markers such as ethnicity, language and religion play in these processes? Our starting point for an understanding of the society-in-the-making in Dutch colonial South Africa is thus the history of early modern Cape Town's inhabitants and the ways in which they interacted with one another and the free burghers of the hinterland.

The Urban Elite and the Cape Gentry

This thesis is about more than the ways in which entrepreneurs exploited alcohol *pachten* in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Cape Town. Its focus on the growth of an entrepreneurial class in the Cape colony's foremost settlement also reveals much about how economic and social mobility operated at the Cape which enabled the development of an elite. Hitherto Cape historians have posited the existence of a landed or rural 'Cape gentry' based on capital accumulation. This case study of entrepreneurs in Cape Town has shown that this picture needs to be amended in several respects. Entrepreneurialism needs to be recognised as an important mechanism in wealth creation for people who started off with no or little economic capital. Furthermore, it was the urban environment which presented the most lucrative of business opportunities. Ultimately, the Cape gentry had their origin in Cape Town.

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In addition, the Cape gentry were not as closed or endogamous as is generally believed. Although much still needs to be done to fully understand the processes of gentrification at the Cape, it is clear enough that the Cape gentry were never closed during the eighteenth century, but that new blood (and capital) continuously entered it from Cape Town. Instead of having a group of families marrying one another in the country, there was a dynamic process of assimilating successful and wealthy new families. Even by the last quarter of the eighteenth century new members entered the gentry from the urban elite through marriage alliances. Both these trajectories are revealed by the descendents of alcohol *pachters*: the Eksteens and the Van Reenens were perhaps the foremost gentry families of the late eighteenth century. The former were the children of arguably the most successful entrepreneur in the VOC Cape (see chapter three). The latter were the children and grandchildren of alcohol and meat *pachters* who, even by the 1780s, were marrying the children of an urban immigrant entrepreneur (see chapter five).

This development in the eighteenth-century Cape is similar in some respects to what was happening in the Dutch Republic from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century. The high level of urbanisation as well as the relative independence and power of individual cities, coupled with the fact that the nobility was not very powerful or visible in Dutch society, led to the development of the so-called regent class from wealthy urban burghers. These were the foremost burghers in social and economic terms who governed the cities. Up to the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the regent class remained fairly 'open', i.e. newcomers could enter its ranks. The absence of an urban aristocracy, as well as the fact that there was no stigma attached to deriving one's livelihood from business, meant that wealth became the determining factor for social advancement. Thus the merchant elite could, and did, aspire to enter the regent class. This resulted in a dynamic social process whereby, in the seventeenth century, the children of successful and wealthy merchants became *regenten*. This started to change towards the end of the seventeenth century when the regent class started to contract socially in what Dutch historians call a process of 'aristocratisation' – increasingly regent families contracted endogamous marriages and adopted the lifestyle and status symbols of the nobility

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(including pursuing rural estates and titles).[4] Although English society differed significantly from the Dutch one, in England too there was what Richard Grassby has called a 'dynamic social equilibrium' whereby the (often younger) sons of gentry entered business in London and wealthy businessmen aspired to be gentry. It was, in both these countries, because of the process of assimilation between those in business (merchants) and those who lived off capital (gentry) that 'no powerful or hostile social order arose to challenge the gentry, and new business wealth did not transform social institutions. Business did not create a self-conscious class, but a functional group.'[5]

It is among these lines that one can argue that, on a much smaller scale, a similar process was occurring in the eighteenth-century Cape: a dynamic process whereby successful entrepreneurs were assimilated into the gentry who, because of the nature of Cape society (i.e. lacking a nobility and access to political power[6]), was not threatened by the urban elite and continue to maintain close links with them. This does not mean that the urban elite were simply an extension of the rural gentry, waiting to be assimilated.

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[4] This theory was first put forward in H. van Dijk and D.J. Roorda, 'Sociale Mobiliteit onder Regenten van de Republiek', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 84 (1971), 306-28, and received much attention from Dutch historians during the 1970s and 1980s. For recent syntheses of this line of research, see for example: M. Prak, J. de Jong and L. Kooijmans, 'State and Status in the Eighteenth Century. Three Cities in Holland: Hoorn, Gouda and Leiden', in H. Schilling and H. Diederiks (eds), *Bürgerliche Eliten in den Niederlanden und in Nordwestdeutschland: Studien zur Socialgeschichte des europäischen Bürgertums in Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit* (Cologne and Vienna, 1985), 183-94; J. de Jong, *Een Deftig Bestaan: Het Dagelijks Leven van Regenten in de 17de en 18de Eeuw* (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1987), 65-82; J.L. Price, 'De Regent' and L. Kooijmans, 'De Koopman', in H.M. Beliën, A.Th. van Deursen and G.J. van Setten (eds), *Gestalten van de Gouden Eeuw: Een Hollands Groepsportret* (Amsterdam, 1995), 25-62 and 65-92.

[5] R. Grassby, 'Social Mobility and Business Enterprise in Seventeenth-Century England', in D. Pennington and K. Thomas (eds), *Puritans and Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth-Century History Presented to Christopher Hill* (Oxford, 1978), 355-81, quotes from 380 and 381. Grassby suggests that this process was due to 'the absence of an independent, urban aristocracy or a legal and office-holding nobility. The absence of privilege made the gentry no economic threat to the merchants, and the wish to identify with the upper class made the gentry more sympathetic to the social pretensions of business'; *ibid.*, 380.

[6] The entrepreneurs of Cape Town should *not* be seen as a group similar to the Dutch regent class. Although exceptionally successful alcohol *pachters* such as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen did attain a great deal of social prestige which translated into some political influence and power, this was not a hallmark of the *pachters* in general (cf. chapter six).

There seems to have been sufficient differences between these groups, at least until the late eighteenth century, to claim that the urban elite formed a different social group, albeit one with close ties to the rural gentry. The most important of these differences is that the *pachters* were primarily urban phenomena. In addition, they had much closer links with (and dependence on) the VOC than most of the other free burghers at the Cape. Yet, at the same time, they were not a group apart: they maintained close ties with the larger free-burgher community: both economically (the rural gentry who sold their wine to them as well as the larger urban community who acted as their customers) and socially (through marriage and other alliances).[7] In addition, it is striking to what an extent alcohol *pachters*, certainly the more successful ones, remained immigrants until late in the eighteenth century.

What then could one call the group of successful alcohol *pachters* who played such an important role in the economy and society of Dutch colonial Cape Town? I suggest that they fulfilled the same social function – though not exactly the same economic one – as the urban bourgeoisie in eighteenth-century Europe. This term originally denoted somebody who had citizenship rights in a city (hence Dutch *burger*), which came with certain privileges and duties,[8] but by the eighteenth century held a much narrower meaning for contemporaries in continental Europe. By this stage the term came to denote an urban dweller with definite social status derived from a certain measure of affluence.[9] It is not necessary to find a narrow or restricted definition for the eighteenth-

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7 Cf. A.G. Hesselink, 'In de Schaduw van de Tafelberg: Onderhuidse Spanning en Samenwerking in een Koloniale Samenleving in Zuid-Afrika, 1751-1771' (unpublished Doctoraalscriptie, University of Amsterdam, 1997), 54, rightly states that '[d]e drankpachters speelden een sleutelrol in de maatschappij omdat ze zowel voor de overheid als voor de vrijburgers een belangrijke rol vervulden.'

8 J. di Corcia, '*Bourg*, *Bourgeois*, *Bourgeois de Paris* from the Eleventh to the Eighteenth Century', *Journal of Modern History* 50 (1978), 207-33.

9 The exact source of that affluence differed, though: in Vovelle and Roche's study of the French bourgeoisie, they found that the bourgeoisie of Paris were more likely to be rentiers, while those in provincial cities often acquired their wealth through practising a profession; M. Vovelle and D. Roche, 'Bourgeois, Rentiers and Property Owners: Elements for Defining a Social Category at the End of the Eighteenth Century', in J. Kaplow (ed.), *New Perspectives on the French Revolution: Readings in Historical Sociology* (New York, 1965), 25-46.

century bourgeoisie, since the exact form this group took depended on local circumstances.[10] I prefer to follow the suggestion of Reddy, viz. that the 'bourgeoisie can easily be defined by means of a bundle of attributes (that is, of relationships) that characterise a cluster of individuals or families.'[11] In eighteenth-century Cape Town these attributes included urban residence, a certain level of wealth and prestige, access to capital in order to engage in entrepreneurial activities, and generally a good relationship with the VOC authorities and the local alcohol producers.

The urban entrepreneurs of the Cape colony were not a group to be totally separated from the rural gentry – together they formed what can be called the burgher elite of the colony – but there are sufficient differences between these two groups to justify seeing the urban elite in terms of something akin to the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie of Europe or what in terms of Dutch historiography is known as the 'merchant elite', although there are differences between the Cape and the Dutch versions.[12] There were, as shown in chapter five, a symbiotic relationship between the urban and rural burgher elites: over time, second and third-generation members of the urban bourgeoisie established closer links with the rural gentry and the VOC officialdom

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[10] This is the point made by H.R. French in his study of social stratification in small English villages. Such small communities tended to only make one sort of distinction, viz. a differentiation between 'chief' and 'other inhabitants': 'Within this truncated hierarchy [French writes] evaluation of status was based on contingent comparisons and relative criteria rather than by reference to absolute, or national, categories and stereotypes'; H.R. French, 'Social Status, Localism and the "Middle Sort of People" in England, 1620-1750,' *Past and Present* 166 (2000), 96-97. Cape historians still need to determine what these 'contingent comparisons and relative criteria' were for the VOC Cape.

[11] W.M. Reddy, 'The Concept of Class', in M.L. Bush (ed.), *Social Orders and Social Classes in Europe since 1500: Studies in Social Stratification* (London and New York, 1992), 22.

[12] The major differences are in scale (size of capital, profits and risk) and the fact that alcohol *pachters* were essentially active in retail, not bulk trade. For a succinct synthesis of the nature of the merchant elite in early modern Dutch society, see J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1998), 344-48. Merchants in the proper sense of the word only developed at the Cape around the turn of the nineteenth century; cf. R. Ross, 'The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Second edition, Cape Town, 1989), 263-69.

so that the different elites of the Cape of Good Hope formed a dense network of connections by the end of the century.

The aforegoing paragraphs are tentative suggestions of the possible development of a Cape elite. As of yet our knowledge of the social complexities of life in early modern Cape Town is too limited to allow a clearer exposition of such a development. What other opportunities existed within Cape Town for entrepreneurs to exploit? What role did the meat *pachters* play – did they form a link between the urban and rural elites, as the history of the Van Reenen family suggests? What was the role of rentiers in the business and social life of Cape Town? What links existed between the urban and rural burgher elites, on the one hand, and the higher-ranking VOC officials? How did public office (and Church leadership) operate and what role did access to it play in the creation and maintenance of status and respectability? It is clear from this study of alcohol entrepreneurs in Cape Town that they provide a key focus for an understanding of the development of the free-burgher society at the Cape of Good Hope during the VOC period.

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APPENDIX 1

DATABASE OF ALCOHOL *PACHTERS* AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1680-1795

This database lists in alphabetical form all the individuals who held any alcohol *pacht* during the period 1680 to 1795, with a cursory indication of which *pacht(en)* he or she held.[1] 1680 was chosen as a starting point since the major characteristics of the *pacht* system (as described in chapter one above) were established in that year; even though not all the various types of alcohol *pachten* were auctioned off publicly in 1680 (some were only added in later years).

The list is filed alphabetically by surname. Under each name, the *pachten* the person held are given using the abbreviations explained below. After identifying the *pacht*, only the year(s) during which the individual held that specific *pacht* is provided with no further information.[2] Following the name of any person who held *pachten* in more than one year there follows a date (in italics) which indicates the first and the last year in which that person held a *pacht*. This serves to provide a rough indication of the person's years of activity in the alcohol *pacht* business; it does *not* follow that a person held alcohol *pachten* throughout that period.

The list follows the modern Afrikaans (and not the Dutch) usage of filing surnames starting with *van*, *le* or *de* under those words, and not the under the main word, e.g. *van der Spuij* is filed under *van*, not *Spuij*. I have consistently used the grapheme *ij*, not *y*, but treated it as a *y*, i.e. it is filed between *x* and *z*.

As is typical of sources from this period, there is little consistency in the spelling of proper nouns. I have been guided by the form used most often in my sources, and have mostly, but not always, changed it where necessary in accordance with the spelling used in the register to H.C.V. Leibbrandt's *Requesten (Memorials)*. Cross references have, however, been included to facilitate searching. Names in which patronyms appear are filed under the last name, i.e. the surname, though cross references to the patronyms are also included. Thus, *Jan Dirkz de Beer* is filed under *de Beer*, not *Dirkz*. In cases where toponyms were used as surnames, e.g. *Michiel van*

[1] This database is based on the *pacht* contracts and other sources which list details of the individuals who bought alcohol *pachten*; cf. the discussion of these sources on page 50 above. I have been unable to ascertain the names of the *pachters* for the year 1681 as none of the usual sources which mention the names of *pachters* have them for that year.

[2] See table 2.5 above (pages 63-69) for the total amount each alcohol *pachter* paid for his or her *pachten* at the auctions.

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Lijpsigh, they are filed under *van*. Where toponyms appear after a surname, they are placed in brackets, and the person's name is filed under the surname, e.g. *Jan Rogiers (van Amsterdam)* is filed under *Rogiers*. Women's names, where possible, are filed under their maiden names, though cross filings under their married names are also included. Where part of a name appears in brackets it means that it is sometimes given as part of the person's name, but otherwise omitted. For example: *Hurter, (Jan) Willem* means that the person mostly appears under the name *Willem Hurter*, but also occasionally as *Jan Willem Hurter*.

A Note on Dates

At first the *pachten* were auctioned off on the last day of the calendar year and therefore ran from 1 January to 31 December. This changed in 1698 when the *pacht* year only ran from January to the end of August. From that year onwards the *pacht* year coincided with the VOC's financial year: 1 September to 31 August. Thus, any date after 1699 in this database should be interpreted as a *pacht* year, i.e. running from 1 September of the previous calendar year until 31 August of the stated year.

The Various Alcohol Pachten

The database makes use of the following abbreviations for the different alcohol *pachten*.

MB: Malt Beer

This *pacht* was not auctioned off with the other alcohol *pachten* on 30 December 1679, but was included from the next year onwards. Because this *pacht* often remained in the same hands (the *pachter* was also the brewer) for a long time, it was sometimes not auctioned off publicly, but instead a specific arrangement was made between the authorities and the incumbent *pachter* to pay some set price for it annually.[3] Where two people shared the *pacht* during the same year, this is indicated by a ½-sign after that year. This *pacht* was not awarded in 1720.[4]

[3] See page 34 note 76 above for a list.

[4] Because the *pacht* could not raise more than *f* 600 at the public auction, the Company decided not to award it; G.C. de Wet (ed.), *Resolusies van die Politieke Raad: Deel V, 1716-1719* (Cape Town, 1964), 360.

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BW: Brandy and Distilled Spirits

This *pacht* also included the right to sell *aracq* and distilled spirits, and from 1696 Spanish wine and *secq* (a heavy Spanish wine) too. From the 1704 *pacht* year onwards, this *pacht* was divided into four parts (*percelen*), each auctioned off separately. Thus for every year after that, there are four different contracts. However, there was no limit on how many parts any individual could buy, and hence some individuals held several parts, or even all, in a given year. In the database, as in the contracts, I indicate which of the four parts a *pachter* bought by adding the number of the part (1, 2, 3, 4) in brackets after the given year.

VB: European Beer and Wines

This *pacht*'s name changed a few times, but it more or less always concerned the right to sell Dutch (*vaderlandsche*) and other European (*uijtheemsche*) beers and wines, i.e. not the Cape varieties for which separate *pachten* existed. This *pacht* was not awarded in 1714.[5]

CW: Cape Wines

This *pacht* was only auctioned off with the other three alcohol *pachten* at the end of 1683. From 1700 onwards the *pacht* was divided into four parts, and like the brandy *pacht*, each part was auctioned off separately. In the database this is indicated with numbers following the given year. In 1734 (the *pacht* year '1735') the *generaele pacht* was instituted, meaning that one person bought the whole *pacht* at a higher price than the four parts combined.[6] Therefore, after 1735 there are no numbers after the stated year, except on three occasions (1759, 1794 and 1795) when there were no *generaele pachters,* and the four individuals who first bought the separate parts together held the wine *pacht*. In some years two (or even three) people bid together for the *generaele pacht* and they therefore shared the wine *pacht* between them. This is indicated with a

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[5] The *pacht* was not awarded as nobody at the auction bid more than *f* 2000 which the Company deemed too low; CA, C 2702, 95-97.

[6] See page 32 above for an explanation

½-sign after the year in which there were two partners and a ⅓-sign for three partners. Finally, note that the *pachters* for 1711 held the *pacht* for only eleven months.

RB: Rondebosch and False Bay

All the above *pachten* were limited geographically to 'this Table Valley', usually giving the farm Roodebloem (modern Woodstock) as the boundary. The Company's farm Rustenburg was rented out to private individuals during 1673-1683 and not only produced wine for the Cape market, but also sold some in the area. However, the farm reverted to the VOC, but in 1716 (the *pacht* year '1717') it was decided to re-institute the Rustenburg *pacht*, after the example of the Stellenbosch *pacht* (see below). This *pacht* concerned the right to sell various types of alcohol in the area beyond Table Valley (but did not include renting the Company farm). At first it was called the Rustenburg *pacht*, but was renamed the 'Rondebosje' *pacht* in 1721. In 1744 the area covered by the *pacht* was extended to include False Bay (i.e. modern Simonstown).

SD: Stellenbosch and Drakenstein

In 1714 a *pacht* was instituted for Stellenbosch and a year later for Drakenstein. These *pachten* gave their holders the right to sell wine and brandy in small quantities within the boundaries of the district. Up to 1722 they were auctioned off separately and had different *pachters* each. From 1723 onwards, these two *pachten* were amalgamated into one *pacht* which gave the *pachter* the right to sell alcohol in both areas. For the period before this date, the abbreviations **S** and **D** are used in the database to designate Stellenbosch and Drakenstein.

IV: Impost on Foreign Nations

This *pacht* was only instituted in 1757 but soon became extremely valuable. The Company levied excise duties on all alcohol sold to ships of foreign nations docking in Table Bay. The right to manage and collect this excise became the seventh of the alcohol *pachten*. This *pacht* was not awarded in 1783 and 1784.

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Adriaansz , Lambert *1700-1701*

BW: 1702

CW: 1700 (1); 1701 (4)

Auret , Jeremias

RB: 1783

Baartman , Maarten *1763-1787*

BW: 1763 (2); 1764 (1); 1765 (1, 3); 1766 (2, 3); 1767 (2, 4); 1768 (1, 3, 4); 1769 (3); 1770 (1); 1771 (2, 4); 1772 (2); 1773 (1); 1774 (3); 1775 (1); 1776 (2); 1777 (1); 1778 (2); 1779 (3); 1780 (1, 4); 1781 (4); 1782 (2); 1783 (1); 1784 (2); 1785 (2); 1786 (2, 3); 1787 (1, 3)

VB: 1783; 1784

Backer , Noach

BW: 1735 (2)

Bam , Jan Andries *1782-1785*

BW: 1782 (1); 1783 (4)

RB: 1784; 1785

Bam , (Jan) Christiaan *1780-1792*

BW: 1780 (3); 1781 (3); 1784 (4); 1785 (3); 1787 (2); 1788 (2, 4); 1789 (4); 1790 (3)

VB: 1791

RB: 1787; 1788; 1792

Bateman , Martin

see: Baartman, Maarten

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Beck , (Johann) Zacharias *1723-1737*

BW: 1724 (2); 1725 (1); 1726 (1); 1727 (1); 1728 (1); 1730 (1)

VB: 1737

CW: 1723 (4); 1724 (2); 1725 (1); 1726 (1); 1727 (3); 1728 (1); 1730 (1)

RB: 1724

Berdenis , Gerbregt (widow Mensink) *1701-1711*

MB: 1701 (½); 1702 (½); 1703 (½); 1704 (½); 1705 (½); 1706 (½); 1708; 1709; 1710; 1711

Bernard , widow[7]

SD: 1745

Beukes , Dirk *1787-1788*

SD: 1787; 1788

Bierman , Frederik

SD: 1726

Biesel , Jan

RB: 1754

Boetendagh , Carel Diederik *1731-1739*

MB: 1735; 1736

BW: 1734 (1); 1735 (1); 1736 (4)

VB: 1731; 1734; 1735

CW: 1732 (2); 1734 (1); 1738 (½); 1739

RB: 1737; 1738; 1739

Botma , Cornelis Stevensz *1688-1691*

VB: 1688

[7] This is likely to have been Sara Pietersz Strand; see page 61 note 30 above.

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CW: 1691

Botma , Jan *1715-1719*

S: 1715; 1716; 1718; 1719

Botma , widow

see: De Bruijn, Christina

Bouwman , Hendrik

CW: 1700 (3)

Broeders , Pieter *1758-1773*

BW: 1760 (2); 1767 (1)

VB: 1768

CW: 1759 (3); 1769; 1770; 1773

IV: 1758

Bruijns , Johannes

RB: 1753

Buurman , Frederik

see: Bierman, Frederik

Buijtendagh , Carel Diederik

see: Boetendag, Carel Diederik

Calteijer , Anthonij

see: Kalteijer, Anthonij

Cannemeijer , Frederik

see: Kannemeijer, Frederik

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Coert , Claas

RB: 1762

Coetsee , Johan

see: Kotze, Johan

Combrink , Hermanus *1770-1774*

SD: 1770;[8] 1774

Conterman , Hans (Jacob) *1718-1734*

D: 1718[9]

SD: 1724; 1728; 1729; 1730; 1731; 1732; 1733; 1734

Coster , Maria (widow Feijt; wife Opperman) *1728-1732*

MB: 1728; 1729; 1732

Cruijwagen , Jan Meijndertsz *1701-1719*

MB: 1707

BW: 1717 (4); 1718 (4); 1719 (3)

CW: 1701 (1); 1703 (2); 1704 (2); 1710 (3)

Datis , Cecilia *1719-1720*

D: 1719; 1720

De Beer , Jan Dirksz *1686-1692*

MB: 1692

BW: 1686

CW: 1686; 1688

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[8] Jan Smook bought this *pacht* at the auction of 31 August 1769, but sold it, with the permission of the Council of Policy, on 5 September 1769 for the same amount to Hermanus Combrink; CA, C 2731, 106-7.

[9] Conterman also had to take over the surplus of Jan Jurgen Hummel and had to pay *f* 150 for that on top of the *f* 180 for the *pacht*, paying in effect *f* 330 for his *pacht*; CA, C 2730, 2-3.

De Bruijn , Christina (widow Jan Botma) *1720-1722*

S: 1720; 1721; 1722

Deele , (Johan) Bernard *1749-1752*

BW: 1749 (3); 1751 (2, 3); 1752 (2)

De Goede , Jan *1784-1794*

MB: 1784; 1785; 1786; 1787; 1788; 1789; 1791; 1793; 1794

De Gruger , Willem

see: De Kruger, Willem

De Jong , Dirk *1756-1763*

BW: 1756 (2, 3); 1760 (1); 1761 (2, 3); 1762 (2); 1763 (1)

VB: 1756; 1757; 1759

De Kruger , Willem *1770-1786*

BW: 1775 (3, 4); 1776 (1, 3, 4); 1777 (2, 4); 1778 (4); 1779 (1, 4); 1782 (4); 1783 (3); 1784 (3); 1785 (4); 1786 (1)

VB: 1770; 1771; 1775; 1782

Dempers , Willem

SD: 1775

De Nijs , Aletta (widow Honk; widow De Vos) *1744-1762*

MB: 1744; 1745; 1746; 1748; 1749; 1750; 1752; 1753; 1754; 1755; 1756; 1757; 1758; 1759; 1760; 1761; 1762

De Swart , Ernst Frederik

VB: 1719

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De Visser , Theunis[10]

MB: 1683

De Vos , Gerrit Reijndersz

MB: 1751

De Vos , widow

see: De Nijs, Aletta

De Vries , Hendrik

BW: 1720 (4)

De Waal , Jan

RB: 1744

De Wit , Frederik Russouw

see: Russouw (De Wit), Frederik

Dircx de Beer , Jan

see: De Beer, Jan Dirksz

Dirxen (van Schalkwijk) , Theunis

see: Van Schalkwijk, Theunis Dirksz

Doman , Gabriel

VB: 1705

Dreijer , Andries

RB: 1763

[10] This is probably Theunis Dirksz van Schalkwijk, who, apart from holding the Malt Beer *pacht* for several years, also held the right to provide the Cape with fish, hence this nickname ('the Fisher').

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Eberg , Bartholomeus *1790-1795*

BW: 1794 (3); 1795 (4)

CW: 1794 (3); 1795 (4)

IV: 1790

Eems , Guilliam

see: Heems, Guilliam

Eksteen , Hendrik Oostwald *1708-1721*

BW: 1708 (4); 1709 (3); 1710 (3); 1711 (3); 1712 (2); 1713 (3); 1714 (1); 1715 (2); 1716 (1); 1717 (1); 1718 (2); 1719 (1); 1720 (1); 1721 (2)

CW: 1712 (2); 1713 (3); 1714 (4); 1715 (1); 1716 (3); 1717 (2); 1718 (2); 1719 (2); 1720 (1); 1721 (1, 4)

Eksteen (Pietersz) , Johannes Paulus *1790-1794*

RB: 1790; 1791; 1793; 1794

Elberg , Bartholomeus

see: Eberg, Bartholomeus

Esselaar , Johannes Nicholaas *1762-1774*

MB: 1772; 1774

BW: 1762 (3); 1763 (3); 1764 (2); 1765 (2); 1766 (1, 4); 1767 (3); 1768 (2); 1769 (2); 1770 (2); 1771 (3)

Esser , Isaac *1719-1725*

BW: 1721 (4); 1722 (3); 1723 (2)

CW: 1719 (4); 1720 (3); 1721 (3); 1722 (4); 1723 (3); 1724 (4)

SD: 1725

Essler , Johannes Nicholaas

see: Esselaar, Johannes Nicholaas

University of Cape Town

Eversdijk , Hendrik *1730-1736*

RB: 1730; 1736

Evertsz (Smit) , Hendrik

see: Smit , Hendrik Evertsz

Eijbergen , Bartholomeus

see: Eberg, Bartholomeus

Feijt , Coenraad *1722-1727*

MB: 1726; 1727

RB: 1722

Feijt , widow

see: Coster, Maria

Frank , Dirk Gijsbert *1752-1755*

BW: 1754 (1); 1755 (2)

VB: 1752; 1753; 1755

Frisnet , Guilliam *1711-1712*

CW: 1711 (2); 1712 (3)

Gardieu , Jean *1704-1705*

BW: 1704 (2); 1705 (4)

Geeringh , Willem

SD: 1795

Gockelius , Nicolaas *1715-1723*

VB: 1715

RB: 1723

University of Cape Town

Greijling , Jan *1753-1769*

SD: 1753; 1754; 1759; 1760; 1761; 1764; 1765; 1767; 1768; 1769

Hartog , Philip (senior)

SD: 1763

Harwigh , (Johan) Frederik

see: Herwich, (Johan) Frederik

Hauk , Hans Jurgen

see: Honk, Hans Jurgen

Heems , Guilliam *1684-1687*

BW: 1685

VB: 1684; 1687

CW: 1684; 1685; 1687

Herhold , Albrecht *1755-1758*

SD: 1755; 1756; 1757; 1758

Hertzog , Johannes

SD: 1792

Herwich , (Johan) Frederik *1792-1793*

MB: 1792

IV: 1793

Heufke , David *1706-1708*

BW: 1706 (3); 1708 (3)

CW: 1707 (1); 1708 (4)

University of Cape Town

Heufke , Johannes *1727-1731*

BW: 1727 (3); 1728 (3); 1729 (2); 1730 (3); 1731 (1)

CW: 1727 (2); 1728 (4); 1729 (4); 1730 (2); 1731 (3)

Heugh , Evert *1785-1795*

IV: 1785; 1788; 1795

Heijns , Paul *1708-1713*

CW: 1708 (2); 1709 (3); 1710 (2); 1712 (4); 1713 (2)

Hiebner , Joachim Daniel

see: Hubner, Joachim Daniel (junior)

Hiebner , Jochem

see: Hubner, Joachim (Daniel) (senior)

Hoesemans , Anthonij *1709-1723*

BW: 1710 (1); 1711 (2); 1712 (3); 1713 (4); 1714 (2); 1715 (3); 1716 (3); 1717 (2); 1718 (1); 1719 (2); 1720 (2); 1721 (1); 1722 (1); 1723 (1)

VB: 1717

CW: 1709 (1); 1710 (1); 1711 (1); 1712 (1); 1713 (4); 1714 (1); 1715 (2); 1716 (2); 1717 (1); 1718 (1); 1719 (1); 1720 (2); 1721 (2); 1722 (1); 1723 (1)

RB: 1719

Holst , Jan (senior) *1740-1754*

BW: 1740 (3); 1741 (1); 1742 (1, 3); 1743 (1, 4); 1744 (4); 1745 (4); 1747 (4); 1750 (2, 3); 1751 (4); 1752 (3)

VB: 1742; 1743; 1744; 1750; 1754

CW: 1740 (½);[11] 1743; 1749; 1750; 1751; 1753

SD: 1751

[11] This *pacht* was only held for eleven months after first being bought by Jan Horn; see page 129 above.

University of Cape Town

Holst , Jan (Daniel) (junior) *1764-1773*

RB: 1773

SD: 1766

IV: 1764

Holtman , Johannes Casparus *1756-1766*

RB: 1765; 1766

Holtsmit , Jan

VB: 1685

Honk , Hans Jurgen *1738-1743*

MB: 1738; 1739; 1741; 1742; 1743

RB: 1740; 1742; 1743

Honk , widow

see: De Nijs, Aletta

Hörling , Jan Frederik

see: Hurling, Jan Frederik

Hubner , Joachim Daniel (junior)

RB: 1795

Hubner , Jochem (Daniel) (senior) *1740-1761*

BW: 1740 (2); 1743 (2); 1745 (1); 1746 (2); 1747 (1); 1748 (1); 1749 (4); 1750 (1); 1752 (1); 1753 (1, 2, 3, 4); 1754 (2, 4); 1755 (1, 3, 4); 1757 (2, 3, 4); 1758 (4); 1759 (1, 2, 3, 4); 1760 (3, 4); 1761 (1, 4)

VB: 1760; 1761

CW: 1752; 1755; 1756; 1757; 1759 (1)

University of Cape Town

Hugo , Daniel *1781-1793*

BW: 1789 (1, 3); 1790 (2, 4); 1791 (2)

CW: 1781; 1782; 1783; 1784; 1787; 1789; 1790; 1793

Hurling , Jan Frederik *1756-1759*

BW: 1756 (1, 4); 1757 (1); 1758 (1, 2, 3)

RB: 1755; 1756

IV: 1759

Hurter , (Jan) Willem *1763-1783*

MB: 1763; 1764; 1770; 1771; 1780; 1782; 1783

Huijgh , Evert

see: Heugh , Evert

Jansz , Cent

CW: 1717 (4)

S: 1717

Joubert , Josua

IV: 1787

Joubert , Pieter (senior)

CW: 1728 (3)

Kalteijer , Anthonij *1776-1777*

SD: 1776; 1777

Kamp , Jacob

BW: 1769 (4)

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Kannemeijer , Frederik *1789-1795*

MB: 1795

VB: 1792

SD: 1789; 1791

Kemp , Gerrit

SD: 1750

Keijser , Jan Simon *1781-1786*

BW: 1781 (1); 1782 (3); 1783 (2); 1784 (1); 1785 (1); 1786 (4)

VB: 1786

Keijser , widow

see: Truter, Anna Clofia

Kotze , Johan *1696-1702*

VB: 1696

CW: 1702 (4)

Kruijwagen , Jan Meijndertsz

see: Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz

Lambertz Meijburgh , Jan

see: Meijburgh, Jan Lambertz

Laubscher , Nicolaas

see: Loubser, Claas

Laurik , Daniel

see: Lourich , Daniel

University of Cape Town

Le Roux , Gerrit

RB: 1789

Le Roux , Jan (senior)[12] *1747-1748*

SD: 1747; 1748

Le Roux , Jan (junior)[13] *1736-1739*

SD: 1736; 1737; 1738; 1739

Le Roux , Johannes (junior)[14]

VB: 1758

Le Roux , Matthiam *1740-1744*

SD: 1740; 1741; 1742; 1743; 1744

Leever , Abraham *1727-1758*

MB: 1747

BW: 1731 (4); 1732 (1); 1733 (2); 1734 (4); 1736 (2); 1738 (4); 1741 (3, 4); 1742 (2); 1744 (3); 1745 (2)

VB: 1738; 1748; 1751

CW: 1732 (1); 1733 (2); 1734 (3); 1735; 1736; 1741; 1744; 1745; 1746 (⅓); 1747 (⅓); 1748; 1754; 1758

RB: 1727; 1750

Loubser , Claas *1700-1718*

BW: 1700 (½)[15]

[12] This is probably Jean le Roux, who came to the Cape in the 1690s and lived in Stellenbosch where he died in 1752.

[13] The appellations *de oude* and *de jonge* appear after these two names in the sources; and it is likely that this must then be the son of Jean le Roux mentioned in the previous note.

[14] It is not certain whether or not this is the same as the previous person. Probably not, as the name 'Jan' here seems to be a Dutchification of 'Jean', and not 'Johannes', as per usual.

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CW: 1718

Lourich , Daniel

MB: 1737

Luijt , Frederik

SD: 1752

Luijten , Jan *1793-1794*

VB: 1793; 1794

Maartensz , Isaac *1735-1741*

BW: 1736 (1); 1737 (2); 1738 (3)

VB: 1739; 1741

CW: 1737 (½); 1740 (½)[16]

SD: 1735

Maasdorp , Christiaan *1717-1726*

RB: 1717; 1718; 1720; 1721; 1725; 1726

Marshoorn , Jacobus

BW: 1735 (4)

Martens , Isaac

see: Maartensz, Isaac

Masthorn , Jacobus

see: Marshoorn, Jacobus

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[15] At first, Steven Vermeij bought the whole *pacht* as per usual on 31 August 1699 for *f* 10450, but after six months he sold it to Claas Laubscher who held it from 1 March to 31 August 1700 and paid *f* 2550 for it; CA, C 2699, 80-85 and 103-109.

[16] This *pacht* was only held for eleven months after first being bought by Jan Horn; see page 129 above.

Matfeldt , Hendrik *1792-1795*

BW: 1792 (1, 3); 1793 (2, 3, 4); 1794 (4); 1795 (3)

CW: 1794 (4); 1795 (3)

Maijboom , Claas

see: Meijboom, Claas

Maijhuizen , Godfried

see: Meijhuijsen, Godfried

Melck , Martin *1760-1781*

BW: 1764 (3)

VB: 1763; 1764; 1769

CW: 1760; 1761; 1762; 1763; 1764; 1765; 1766; 1767; 1768; 1771; 1772; 1774; 1775; 1776; 1777; 1778; 1779; 1780

IV: 1760; 1761; 1762; 1765; 1766; 1767; 1773; 1776; 1779; 1781

Mensink , Rutgert

MB: 1700

Mensink , widow

see: Berdenis, Gerbregt

Mensink , Willem *1701-1713*

MB: 1701 (½); 1702 (½); 1703 (½); 1704 (½); 1705 (½); 1706 (½); 1712; 1713

Meijboom , Claas *1706-1717*

BW: 1706 (4); 1707 (3); 1709 (4); 1717 (3)

Meijburgh , Jan Lambertz *1716-1720*

CW: 1716 (4); 1718 (3); 1719 (3); 1720 (4)

University of Cape Town

Meijer , Gerrit *1704-1713*

BW: 1704 (3); 1705 (2); 1712 (4); 1713 (2)

CW: 1711

Meijer , Hendrik *1771-1773*

SD: 1771; 1772; 1773

Meijer , Pieter *1705-1713*

BW: 1705 (1); 1706 (2); 1707 (2); 1708 (1); 1709 (2); 1710 (2); 1711 (1); 1712 (1); 1713 (1)

Meijhuijsen , Godfried *1691-1695*

BW: 1691; 1692

VB: 1695

CW: 1692; 1693

Meijndertsz Cruijwagen , Jan

see: Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz

Morkel , Philip *1713-1714*

CW: 1713 (1); 1714 (2)

Mulder , Hendrik *1699-1711*

MB: 1699

BW: 1701

VB: 1697; 1698; 1699; 1701; 1706; 1707; 1709

CW: 1704 (4); 1711 (4)

Mulder , Jan Theunis

BW: 1791 (4)

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Munnik , Gerhardus

RB: 1779

Munnik , Johannes (Albertus) (senior) *1741-1746*

RB: 1741; 1745; 1746

Mijburgh , Jan Lambertz

see: Meijburgh, Jan Lambertz

Mijndertsz Cruijwagen , Jan

see: Cruijwagen, Jan Meijndertsz

Odendaal , Judith Maria (widow Reijndersz) *1790-1794*

SD: 1790; 1793; 1794

Oortmans , Pieter Bertram

VB: 1716

Oostwald Eksteen , Hendrik

see: Eksteen, Hendrik Oostwald

Opperman , Godlieb Christiaan *1730-1734*

MB: 1730; 1731; 1733; 1734

Opperman , wife

see: Coster, Maria

Palmer , Hannes

D: 1721

Peijffer , Johannes

see: Phijffer, Johannes

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Pentz , Michiel *1736-1752*

BW: 1743 (3); 1744 (2); 1745 (3); 1746 (1, 4); 1747 (2); 1748 (2, 4); 1749 (1)

VB: 1736; 1745; 1746; 1747; 1749

CW: 1746 (⅓); 1747 (⅓)

RB: 1748; 1751; 1752

Phijffer , Johannes *1697-1711*

BW: 1697 (½); 1703; 1704 (1); 1705 (3); 1706 (1); 1707 (1); 1708 (2); 1709 (1); 1711 (4)

VB: 1702; 1710

CW: 1701 (2); 1702 (1); 1703 (1, 4); 1704 (3); 1705 (1, 4); 1706;[17] 1707 (2); 1708 (1); 1709 (2)

Pietersz , Johannes Paulus Eksteen

see: Eksteen (Pietersz), Johannes Paulus

Pretorius , Johannes

VB: 1682

Pijthius , Johannes *1711-1714*

VB: 1711; 1712; 1713

CW: 1705 (2); 1707 (4); 1708 (3); 1710 (4); 1714 (3)

Raams , Willem

BW: 1734 (3)

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[17] In August 1705 W.A. van der Stel and the Council of Policy decided to change the rules for selling the wine *pacht*. Thus, when the *pachten* for the new year were sold on 31 August, the four parts of the wine *pacht* were auctioned off as per usual. Phijffer bought the first three parts for *f* 9 000 each, and Michel Leij the fourth for *f* 9 450. The whole wine *pacht* (i.e. all four parts together) was then auctioned off again and awarded to Phijffer for *f* 39 000; CA, C 2701, 18-25. Thus, in effect, Phijffer became the first *generaele pachter*. However, this innovation caused much unhappiness among the free burghers so that the VOC reverted to the former system in the following year; see pages 31-32 above.

Rabe , Christiaan

BW: 1739 (4)

Rasp , Christiaan

BW: 1716 (4)

Redox , Hilletje (widow Valckenrijk)

VB: 1680

Reijndersz , Johannes (Daniel) *1783-1786*

SD: 1783; 1786

Reijndersz , widow

see: Odendaal, Judith Maria

Reijndersz de Vos , Gerrit

see: De Vos, Gerrit Reijndersz

Roep , Johannes *1767-1781*

MB: 1768; 1769; 1773

VB: 1767

RB: 1768; 1769; 1770; 1772; 1774; 1775; 1778; 1780

SD: 1781

IV: 1768; 1770; 1771; 1772; 1774; 1775; 1777; 1778

Rogiers (van Amsterdam) , Jan *1714-1726*

BW: 1714 (4)

VB: 1726

Rogiers , Tobias *1775-1778*

MB: 1775; 1776; 1777; 1778

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Roos , Francois (Tielmansz)

IV: 1794

Rousseau (De Wit) , Frederik

see: Russouw (De Wit), Frederik

Rothman , Sebastiaan

CW: 1792

Roux , Jeremias

CW: 1729 (3)

Russouw (De Wit) , Frederik *1688-1696*

BW: 1688; 1689; 1695

VB: 1692; 1693; 1694

CW: 1694; 1696

Rijndersz , Johannes (Daniel)

see: Reijndersz, Johannes (Daniel)

Rijndersz de Vos , Gerrit

see: De Vos, Gerrit Reijndersz

Saaijman , Bartholomeus

see: Zaaijman, Bartholomeus

Scheffer , Hendrik

D: 1722

Schenk , Joost

MB: 1717

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Schreuder , Jan Jurgen *1738-1752*

BW: 1738 (1); 1739 (2, 3); 1740 (4); 1742 (4); 1744 (1); 1746 (3); 1747 (3); 1748 (3); 1749 (2); 1750 (4); 1751 (1); 1752 (4)

Schreuder , (Johan) Jacob *1762-1790*

MB: 1765; 1766; 1767; 1781; 1790

BW: 1769 (1); 1770 (3, 4); 1771 (1); 1772 (1, 3, 4); 1773 (2, 3, 4); 1774 (1, 2, 4); 1775 (2); 1777 (3); 1778 (1, 3); 1779 (2); 1780 (2)

VB: 1762; 1765; 1766; 1772; 1773; 1774; 1776; 1777; 1778; 1779; 1780; 1781; 1785; 1788; 1789

Sebrits , Frans *1778-1782*

SD: 1778; 1779; 1780; 1782

Smal , (Jan) Jurgen

SD: 1746

Smit , Carel *1791-1795*

BW: 1791 (3); 1792 (4); 1794 (2); 1795 (2)

Smit , Hendrik Evertsz *1680-1682*

MB: 1680; 1682

Smook , Jan *1763-1779*

MB: 1779

BW: 1764 (4); 1765 (4)

RB: 1771

IV: 1763[18]

[18] The Impost *pacht* was not auctioned off with the other *pachten* on 31 August 1762. It was eventually bought by Smook for the period 12 October 1762 to 31 August 1763; CA, C 2716, 33-38.

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Snijder , Jan Hendrik *1757-1759*

CW: 1759 (2, 4)

RB: 1757; 1758

Spengler , Jurgen *1762-1769*

SD: 1762

IV: 1769

Spengler , Lodewijk

IV: 1780

Spoor , Jan *1718-1722*

BW: 1718 (3); 1722 (4)

Sprangel , Jan *1732-1735*

RB: 1732; 1735

Steenbok , Rudolf Frederik *1714-1725*

MB: 1714; 1715; 1716; 1718; 1719; 1721; 1722; 1723; 1724; 1725

CW: 1715 (3)

Stevensz Botma , Cornelis

see: Botma, Cornelis Stevensz

Steijn , Jacobus *1714-1716*

BW: 1714 (3); 1715 (1); 1716 (2)

Stokvliet , Jan Jacob *1725-1729*

BW: 1727 (2); 1728 (2); 1729 (1)

VB: 1725; 1727; 1728; 1729

CW: 1726 (2); 1727 (1); 1728 (2); 1729 (1)

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Stokvliet , widow

see: Van Dam, Josina

Taute , Matthias Petrus

IV: 1792

Thomasz (van Hoesum) , Hendrik

RB: 1731

Tielmansz Roos , Francois

see: Roos, Francois (Tielmansz)

Truter , Anna Clofia (widow Keijser)

BW: 1788 (3)

Truter , Hendrik

IV: 1786

Valckenrijck , widow

see: Redox, Hilletje

Valk , Cornelis *1718-1720*

VB: 1718; 1720

Van Aarden , Johannes *1759-1760*

RB: 1759; 1760

Van Amsterdam , Jan Rogiers

see: Rogiers (van Amsterdam), Jan

Van As , Willem

BW: 1729 (3)

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Van Bochem , Jacob *1721-1724*

VB: 1721; 1722; 1723; 1724

Van Dam , Josina *1730-1731*

BW: 1730 (2); 1731 (2)

VB: 1730

CW: 1730 (3); 1731 (1)

Van den Bergh , Jacobus Johannes *1785-1791*

VB: 1787

CW: 1785; 1786; 1791

Van der Lint , Frederik *1707-1708*

BW: 1707 (4)

VB: 1708

Van der Poel , Pieter *1703-1716*

BW: 1715 (4)

CW: 1703 (3); 1715 (4); 1716 (1)

Van der Spuij , Melt *1722-1733*

BW: 1723 (3); 1724 (3); 1725 (2); 1726 (3); 1729 (4); 1730 (4); 1731 (3); 1732 (4); 1733 (3)

CW: 1722 (3); 1723 (2); 1724 (3); 1725 (3); 1726 (4); 1729 (2); 1730 (4); 1731 (2); 1732 (3); 1733 (3)

SD: 1723

Van der Steur , Claas Wolf

see: Wolf (van der Steur), Claas

Van der Swijn , Jan *1732-1747*

BW: 1732 (3); 1733 (1, 4); 1735 (3); 1737 (1, 3, 4); 1738 (2); 1739 (1); 1740 (1);

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1741 (2)

VB: 1732; 1733; 1740

CW: 1733 (1, 4); 1734 (2); 1737 (½); 1738 (½); 1742; 1746 (⅓); 1747 (⅓)

Van der Westhuijsen , Pieter

CW: 1707 (3)

Van Dieden , Willem *1680-1682*

BW: 1680; 1682

Van Donselaar , Claas

BW: 1724 (1)

CW: 1724 (1)

Van Dijk , Burgert

RB: 1734

Van Dijk , Hendrik *1725-1734*

BW: 1725 (4); 1726 (4); 1727 (4); 1732 (4); 1734 (2)

CW: 1725 (2); 1726 (3); 1727 (4); 1731 (4); 1732 (4); 1734 (4)

Van Hartmansdorf , Carel Hendrik

BW: 1736 (3)

Van Helsdingen , Jan (Hendrik) *1728-1733*

RB: 1728; 1729; 1733

Van Helsdingen , Johannes Guilliam *1781-1787*

BW: 1781; 1787 (4)

RB: 1781; 1782

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Van Hoesum , Hendrik Thomasz

see: Thomasz (van Hoesum), Hendrik

Van Leijpsig , Marthinus *1719-1728*

BW: 1719 (4); 1720 (3); 1721 (3); 1722 (2); 1723 (4); 1724 (4); 1725 (3); 1728 (4)

CW: 1722 (2); 1725 (4)

Van Reenen , Jacob

BW: 1726 (2)

Van Reenen , Jacobus Arnoldus

IV: 1789

Van Reenen , Sebastiaan (Valentijn) *1788-1791*

CW: 1788

IV: 1791

Van Reenen , Willem

IV: 1782

Van Schalkwijk , Theunis Dirksz *1684-1697*

MB: 1684; 1686; 1687; 1688; 1689; 1690; 1691; 1693; 1694; 1695; 1696; 1697

BW: 1687

Van Straalen , Joris *1690-1691*

VB: 1690; 1691

Van Wielligh , Hermanus

BW: 1754 (3)

Vermeij , Steven *1693-1705*

MB: 1698

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BW: 1693; 1694; 1696; 1697 (½); 1699; 1700 (½)[19]

VB: 1703; 1704

CW: 1695; 1698; 1699; 1705 (3)

Victor , Gerrit *1683-1690*

BW: 1683; 1684; 1690

VB: 1683; 1686; 1689

CW: 1689; 1690

Victor , Jacobus

CW: 1700 (4)

Vogel , Jacob *1697-1709*

BW: 1698; 1704 (4)

VB: 1700

CW: 1697; 1700 (2); 1701 (3); 1702 (2); 1704 (1); 1709 (4)

Volraad , Jan

RB: 1767

Vooght , Johannes

CW: 1702 (3)

Vos , Gabriel (Jacobus) *1794-1795*

CW: 1794 (1); 1795 (1)

Vrij , Jacob

D: 1717

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[19] At first, Steven Vermeij bought the whole *pacht* as per usual on 31 August 1699 for *f* 10450, but after six months he sold it to Claas Laubscher who held it from 1 March to 31 August 1700 and paid *f* 2550 for it; CA, C 2699, 80-85 and 103-109.

Weber , Hendrik *1784-1785*

SD: 1784; 1785

Webener , (Joachim) Ernst

see: Wepener, (Joachim) Ernst

Welcher , Hendrik

VB: 1795

Wemmer , Jacob

see: Wimmer , Jacob

Wendel , Hendrik

BW: 1710 (4)

Wepener , (Joachim) Ernst *1747-1749*

RB: 1747; 1749

Wespeler , Jacob

see: Wispelaar, Jacob

Wiese , Benjamin

CW: 1717 (3)

Wilders , Casper

MB: 1685

Wilkens , (Jan) Willem (senior)

RB: 1777

Wilkens , (Jan) Willem (junior)

RB: 1776

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Willers , Casparus

see: Wilders, Casper

Wimmer , Jacob

RB: 1764

Wispelaar , Jacob *1788-1795*

BW: 1788 (1); 1789 (2); 1790 (1); 1792 (2); 1793 (1); 1794 (1); 1795 (1)

VB: 1790

CW: 1794 (2); 1795 (2)

Wolf (van der Steur) , Claas

SD: 1727

Wolmarans , Joseph

RB: 1761

Zaaijman , Bartholomeus

SD: 1749

Zebrits , Frans

see: Sebrits, Frans

Zeeman , Pieter

RB: 1786

Zieteman , Godfried Christiaan *1762-1763*

BW: 1762 (1, 4); 1763 (4)

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APPENDIX 2

SHIPPING VOLUME AND *PACHT* INCOME, 1685-1795

Table 2.1: Annual Shipping Volume Compared to *Pacht* Income, 1700-1793

Year	Dutch Ships	Foreign Ships	Total Ships	As % of Highest	*Pacht* Income[1]	As % of Highest
1700	43	18	61	32.2	42875	20.9
1701	46	20	66	34.9	48820	23.8
1702	55	24	79	41.8	29650	14.4
1703	48	27	75	39.7	41630	20.3
1704	46	22	68	36	43900	21.4
1705	46	18	64	33.9	43560	21.2
1706	43	30	73	38.6	47550	23.2
1707	39	27	66	34.9	49180	24
1708	47	23	70	37	49075	23.9
1709	47	12	59	31.2	51450	25.1
1710	60	17	77	40.7	48525	23.6
1711	43	30	73	38.6	41915	20.4
1712	48	19	67	35.4	43730	21.3
1713	42	24	66	34.9	62250	30.3
1714	47	17	64	33.8	57675	28.1
1715	61	21	82	43.4	49540	24.1
1716	55	11	66	34.9	41445	20.2
1717	66	23	89	47.1	48470	23.6
1718	62	26	88	46.6	41780	20.4
1719	63	27	90	47.6	36800	17.9

[1] The amounts are in guilders. This is the combined total from all the individual *pachten* (see table 2.2 below for a breakdown).

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1720	67	20	87	46	36440	17.7
1721	76	28	104	55	31970	15.6
1722	68	33	101	53.4	28330	13.8
1723	76	20	96	50.8	45350	22.1
1724	73	15	88	46.5	43375	21.1
1725	65	8	73	38.6	43200	21
1726	75	15	90	48.1	45950	22.4
1727	77	6	83	43.9	60550	29.5
1728	69	12	81	42.8	47425	23.1
1729	73	8	81	42.8	42650	20.8
1730	56	11	67	35.4	51950	25.3
1731	73	10	83	43.9	23600	11.5
1732	61	16	77	40.7	34760	16.9
1733	66	10	76	40.2	36660	17.9
1734	69	12	81	42.8	37935	18.5
1735	74	10	84	44.4	48625	23.7
1736	57	11	68	36	53225	25.9
1737	78	9	87	46	51285	25
1738	77	12	89	47.1	36295	17.7
1739	64	11	75	39.7	42725	20.8
1740	50	12	62	32.8	39350	19.2
1741	60	13	73	38.6	41475	20.2
1742	50	20	70	37	40875	19.9
1743	46	16	62	32.8	41195	20.1
1744	54	27	81	42.8	34600	16.9
1745	53	18	71	37.5	32750	16
1746	53	11	64	33.9	35400	17.2
1747	53	21	74	39.1	30325	14.8
1748	49	35	84	44.4	26525	12.9
1749	56	19	75	39.6	30400	14.8

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1750	60	21	81	42.8	33150	16.1
1751	48	17	65	34.4	35750	17.4
1752	60	18	78	41.2	32950	16.1
1753	52	21	73	38.6	46875	22.8
1754	56	13	69	36.5	50575	24.6
1755	52	18	70	37	44725	21.8
1756	46	9	55	29.1	33750	16.4
1757	55	2	57	30.1	50500	24.6
1758	52	14	66	34.9	54550	26.6
1759	55	16	71	37.5	50025	24.4
1760	53	12	65	34.4	28025	13.6
1761	53	18	71	37.5	43925	21.4
1762	45	14	59	31.2	50175	24.4
1763	50	22	72	38.1	55250	26.9
1764	50	28	78	41.2	61850	30.2
1765	57	10	67	35.2	68200	33.3
1766	50	14	64	33.8	57475	28
1767	50	25	75	39.6	53025	25.8
1768	40	26	66	34.9	57725	28.1
1769	57	35	92	48.6	61900	30.2
1770	52	26	78	41.2	71400	34.8
1771	48	46	94	49.7	78525	38.3
1772	58	60	118	62.4	76825	37.5
1773	54	59	113	59.7	72050	35.1
1774	53	73	126	66.6	77775	37.9
1775	56	64	120	63.4	75125	36.6
1776	58	65	123	65.1	72000	35.1
1777	45	67	112	59.2	86175	42
1778	51	66	117	61.9	82325	40.2
1779	48	65	113	59.7	82475	34.2

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1780	44	64	108	57.1	76575	31.8
1781	29	59	88	46.5	105550	43.8
1782	14	93	107	56.6	125625	52.1
1783	20	151	171	90.4	103950	43.1
1784	49	122	171	90.4	117800	48.9
1785	53	117	170	89.9	164325	68.2
1786	72	74	146	77.2	160750	66.7
1787	70	90	160	84.6	167350	69.4
1788	68	106	174	92	194500	80.7
1789	76	113	189	100	214830	89.2
1790	56	101	157	83	222450	92.3
1791	64	119	183	96.8	240800	100
1792	60	94	154	81.4	196150	81.4
1793	53	75	128	67.7	127650	53

Source: Beyers, *Kaapse Patriotte*, 333-35; CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163



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Table 2.2: Annual Income from the Alcohol *Pachten*, 1685-1795[2]

Year	Malt Beer	Brandy	European Alcohol	Cape Wines	Rondebosch-False Bay	Stellenbosch-Drakenstein	Foreign Impost	Total
1685	950	7400	1000	9900				19250
1686	1900	10600	1900	1500				15900
1687	2000	12500	1425	2200				18125
1688	1650	11500	2000	2400				17550
1689	1250	14100	2200	2125				19675
1690	2000	8500	2500	2900				15900
1691	2100	13500	4000	2150				21750
1692	2000	15010	3975	3100				24085
1693	2000	17575	3975	4100				27650
1694	2000	15125	4160	10050				31335
1695	2000	14400	5400	12800				34600
1696	2000	16150	4870	14960				37980
1697	3400	14400	4800	13325				35925
1698	2025	10100	3200	11150				26475
1699	2950	15375	3940	13875				36140
1700	2950	13000	3625	23300				42875
1701	2950	6000	1570	38300				48820
1702	3000	2500	1700	22450				29650
1703	3000	2700	1930	34000				41630
1704	3000		1500	39400				43900
1705	3000	6810	1100	32650				43560
1706	2000	5350	1200	39000				47550
1707	3350	7330	1300	37200				49180
1708	2750	10500	2125	33700				49075

[2] All the amounts are in guilders. Where a block is left blank, it means that no *pacht* was awarded for that year.

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1709	2750	11800	2000	34900				51450
1710	2750	11500	3200	31075				48525
1711	2750	7895	3100	28170				41915
1712	1600	8970	2000	31160				43730
1713	2000	14225	3125	42900				62250
1714	2500	14350		40825				57675
1715	2000	16500	1600	28620		820		49540
1716	2000	12225	1050	24020		2150		41445
1717	2010	11560	1600	28450	1550	3300		48470
1718	2000	8000	2050	25100	1500	3130		41780
1719	2500	6200	2450	20500	1250	3900		36800
1720		6800	2500	23350	1300	2490		36440
1721	2000	7000	2200	18600	1000	1170		31970
1722	2000	5850	2100	16800	600	980		28330
1723	2000	10100	2400	28650	1550	650		45350
1724	2000	12225	2200	24100	1250	1600		43375
1725	1500	10400	3350	25300	1200	1450		43200
1726	1550	8250	6000	26300	1600	2250		45950
1727	1600	14100	4500	37625	725	2000		60550
1728	1400	10475	5000	28850	800	900		47425
1729	1400	10325	4500	24925	850	650		42650
1730	1325	12800	4700	30900	1600	625		51950
1731	1300	4050	4050	12600	750	850		23600
1732	1200	5325	5100	21250	825	1060		34760
1733	1300	7000	5400	21760	520	680		36660
1734	1300	7725	6700	21350	360	500		37935
1735	1350	6825	7000	32000	650	800		48625
1736	1700	7250	5550	36600	750	1375		53225
1737	2900	7235	7550	32000	900	700		51285
1738	1120	5325	4100	25000	400	350		36295

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1739	1125	6800	3500	30500	400	400		42725
1740	1000	6950	6050	24500	550	300		39350
1741	750	10250	5000	24725	600	150		41475
1742	800	7200	3800	28400	450	225		40875
1743	800	7645	3225	29125	250	150		41195
1744	900	10175	2350	20100	900	175		34600
1745	1200	5350	2350	23000	650	200		32750
1746	1000	7075	2525	23350	1250	200		35400
1747	1425	5425	3050	19150	1050	225		30325
1748	825	3825	1450	19150	1100	175		26525
1749	850	6725	1800	19900	975	150		30400
1750	900	8950	2525	19000	1525	250		33150
1751	900	9525	2400	22000	825	100		35750
1752	900	8125	2500	20000	1300	125		32950
1753	1025	16725	3500	24300	1000	325		46875
1754	925	13800	4300	30000	1125	425		50575
1755	925	14750	2800	24400	1150	700		44725
1756	875	7175	3500	20500	1100	600		33750
1757	850	17000	2850	27100	1800	900		50500
1758	725	24500	2300	24100	1800	625	500	54550
1759	575	23250	2575	20375	2100	375	775	50025
1760	750	8375	2050	12300	1600	250	2700	28025
1761	675	14350	2350	18000	2175	375	6000	43925
1762	775	17975	1850	20700	2350	225	6300	50175
1763	800	23000	3100	20000	2750	500	5100	55250
1764	1550	24750	6100	23200	2150	775	3325	61850
1765	1050	24550	5000	31000	3000	600	3000	68200
1766	1250	22300	2000	27400	2000	425	2100	57475
1767	1575	23300	2250	22000	2500	600	800	53025
1768	1775	22600	1500	26100	2475	275	3000	57725

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1769	1650	24300	1700	28000	1750	400	4100	61900
1770	1900	26300	1025	34500	2100	275	5300	71400
1771	1900	26000	1225	40000	2550	650	6200	78525
1772	1975	25400	1000	36300	2825	525	8800	76825
1773	2150	26325	1500	32300	3275	500	6000	72050
1774	2650	26975	2750	32000	3300	800	9300	77775
1775	2600	24950	1125	35550	1800	600	8500	75125
1776	2350	27525	650	29000	2500	1225	8750	72000
1777	2400	33400	675	36200	3000	1000	9500	86175
1778	1850	34200	500	35200	3800	675	6100	82325
1779	1900	34600	725	32000	4800	450	8000	82475
1780	2525	18300	600	32200	3900	550	18500	76575
1781	2250	27300	1300	34600	5400	400	34300	105550
1782	2300	37100	800	45000	7100	625	32700	125625
1783	1575	42700	425	50600	8000	650		103950
1784	1400	49550	600	61400	3700	1150		117800
1785	2500	55950	650	71500	6500	1825	25400	164325
1786	3000	52950	800	74500	9400	1100	19000	160750
1787	3000	49950	1400	86500	7000	1500	18000	167350
1788	2800	45200	1100	123000	6750	1450	14200	194500
1789	1330	57100	1000	137000	7300	1800	9300	214830
1790	3450	52000	2000	140000	13100	1300	10600	222450
1791	3300	68100	2600	144000	12600	1700	8500	240800
1792	4000	66000	2750	90000	13400	1700	18300	196150
1793	4200	48000	2650	51500	10500	1600	9200	127650
1794	3600	60850	2300	45050	10600	1050	8100	131550
1795	3000	33700	1500	31050	9600	750	10500	90100

Source: CA, C 2697-2731 and RLR 163

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Graph 2.2: Income from the Smaller Alcohol *Pachten*, 1685-1795



Graph 2.3: Income from the Major Alcohol *Pachten*, 1685-1795



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Graph 2.4: Shipping Volume Compared to *Pacht* Income



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