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UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES

To Protest or Not To Protest?
Zimbabweans' willingness to Protest

A minor dissertation presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the

Degree of

**MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE**

by

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October 2007

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to 13,009,530¹ suffering people of Zimbabwe currently confronted with a political crisis of enormous magnitude, and yet face a dearth of strategies to unlock the crisis. May we take inspiration from former South African President Mandela's comments in 1960 after the Sharpville Massacre "*there are many people who feel that it is useless and futile for us to continue talking peace and no violence against a government whose only reply is savage attacks on unarmed and defenceless people...the time has come for us to consider in the light of our experiences whether the methods which we have applied so far are adequate*"

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¹ World Bank Development Indicators (2005) <http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/old-default.htm> 18 August 2007

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Profound gratitude goes to my lovely wife Patience for her support during this never ending process. I owe my success to her. This thesis would not have been completed without the assistance of my friends who edited my work and encouraged me: Senzeni, Shuvai and Moses, your efforts shall be remembered in higher places.

Last but not least thanks to Almighty God, from whom I draw encouragement. As his word says in *Proverbs 29 verse 2* “*When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice; but when the wicked are in power, the people mourn.*”

ABSTRACT

Zimbabwe is a country imploding as a result of an unprecedented political and economic crisis which has existed over the last seven years. As the crisis deepens there are very low levels of protest in Zimbabwe. Debates about why Zimbabweans have not taken part in protests, despite what would seem like a conducive environment, have elicited diverse explanations ranging from popular fear of the regime, to the weakness of opposition leadership and the country's political culture. This study investigates the willingness of Zimbabweans to use protest participation as an alternative route to the democratisation of Zimbabwe. A set of theoretical determinants from the literature are tested against individual reports of protest participation using the Afrobarometer survey: Round 3. Explanations include economic, political, cultural, cognitive and collective action factors. The evidence from this study reveals that, while conventional wisdom would associate protest with the economically insecure, the unemployed and individuals who belong to the working class, in Zimbabwe protest potential is high among the urbanised, the young, professionals, educated and the economically secure. The study raises questions about the efficacy of the strategies of civil society and opposition in Zimbabwe to mobilise protest Zimbabweans, despite being marginalised and confronted with the most severe crisis, are not inclined to push for economic and political transformation. Could they have chosen to engage the state on a tactical basis, in order to ensure daily survival ?

ABBREVIATIONS

AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CC	Crisis Coalition
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CNN	Cable News Network
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MPOI	Mass Public Opinion Institute
MIC	Media Institute Commission
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
PSU	Primary sampling unit
PVO	Private Voluntary Organisations
SZC	Save Zimbabwe Campaign
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations Organisation
US	United States of America
WOZA	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
ZANUPF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of trade Unions
ZHRF	Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We cannot have a situation where people decide to sit in places not allowed and when police remove them they say no. We can't have that. That is a revolt to the system. Some are crying that they were beaten. Yes you will be thoroughly beaten. When the police say move you move. If you don't move you invite the police to use force.

President Mugabe addressing delegates at the Zimbabwe Embassy in Cairo Egypt on the arrest, torture and mistreatment of 15 Trade Union activists, September 23 2006

1. Problem

Zimbabwe is going through one of the worst political crises of its history. Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the country has had only two political leaders, Ian Smith from 1964 to 1979 and Robert Mugabe from 1980 until today. Both leaders have ruled the country in a more or less a one party system and both have been embroiled in civil wars to destroy legitimate alternative political voices (Eppel, 2004). The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government has progressively monopolised socio-political and economic space, resulting in the economic crisis that has affected Zimbabwe.

The economic crisis has culminated in shortages of food, fuel, electricity, water and money (Kubatana .net, 2007). Official inflation was 7 634% at the end of July 2007 (Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, 2007). Inflation in Zimbabwe is the highest in the world and this has severely affected Zimbabweans who can barely afford health, education and social services (Kubatana.net, 2007) The purchasing power of the Zimbabwean dollar has fallen to 1953 levels, when an average person living in Southern Rhodesia had an income of US\$760 per year, wiping away the gains of the past 54 years (Clemens and Moss 2005). The scale and speed of this decline has been unusual for a country not in a war situation and has been greater than those experienced during recent conflicts in Cote d' Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone (Clemens and Moss, 2005).

On the political side there has been an increase in human rights abuses in the form of intimidation and arrests of the ruling party's political opponents, closure of independent newspapers and restrictions on political gatherings. This has been regarded as political intolerance on the part of the ruling ZANU-PF government. The failure of the government to respect court decisions, particularly during the land reform process, has provided another example of the government's failure to uphold the rule of law and property rights. It has also made the country unattractive to international investors.

The crisis has resulted in a major decline in all forms of political participation. One of the major reasons for apathy during elections is the belief that elections are rigged and unfair. In these cases citizens have no confidence in their potential to influence the outcome of the elections. Wakatama (2002) captures this lack of confidence of Zimbabweans in the electoral system metaphorically:

There is a team in government that says it wants to play ball but only according to its own rules, not the rules recognised and accepted internationally. It has also made it clear that anyone who might contemplate scoring a goal against it will be physically dealt with. Woe betide all, if it loses the game the referee, opponents and even the fans will be in danger of losing their lives (Wakatama, 2002, p.34).

This perception most probably contributed to the progressive decline in voter turnout. Voter turnout has moved from a very high 94% of eligible voters in 1980 parliamentary elections to 57% in subsequent legislative elections and from 53% in the 1990 presidential elections to 33% in 1996 (Chiroro, 2005). Despite a resurgence of electoral participation in 1999 and 2000, voter turnout plunged culminating in a turnout of 19% in last year's Senate elections, the lowest in Zimbabwe's history (Chiroro, 2005). In 2000, Zimbabweans were described as "unable to influence the political system and least likely of all Southern Africans to feel they can improve things through voting in elections" (Mattes, 2000, p.6).

While the constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees individual freedoms, the existence of multiple parties and regular elections. Democratic space has shrunk dramatically over the last five years as peaceful protests and demonstrations have been effectively outlawed through repressive legislation that restricts basic freedoms, such as the


Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA)² The limitations placed on the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political parties have been exacerbated by the widespread use of state violence. Lebani (2004) argues that the use of state violence and repression is an example that protest of any kind will not be tolerated.

Krieger (2005) argues that the level of repression prevailing in Zimbabwe diminishes the prospects of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) coming to power through elections or of effective civil society pressure on ZANU-PF to reform itself. Thus different sectors of civil society and opposition political parties such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) now advocate protest as an alternative tool through which to trigger democratisation in Zimbabwe. While they have called for numerous protests, very few Zimbabweans have responded to these calls, resulting in the state owned media referring to them as “damp squibs” (The Herald Harare, 2006).

Chikwanha-Dzenga, Masunungure and Madzingira (2001) conclude that the pervasive unhappiness in Zimbabwe has failed to trigger a wave of citizen participation in political life, whether peaceful or violent. There is an increasing reluctance among the population to engage in demonstrations or protest marches. As a result, mobilising a group of more than one hundred people is now a major task. Yet, as recently as 9 December 1997, one million Zimbabweans took part in nationwide demonstrations Chuma, Raftopolous and Alexander, (2006). Why has this willingness to protest diminished even as the ZANU PF government becomes more repressive? Evidence from public opinion data collected by the Afrobarometer Project (Fig 1) presents individual Zimbabweans’ attitudes towards participation in protest marches and demonstration.

² AIPPA (2002) demands the registration of journalists and media houses and grants the state power to investigate journalist’s sources of information. POSA (2002) disallows gatherings of more than 5 people without police clearance

Figure 1: Participation in Zimbabwe 1999 – 2006




Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you have personally done any of these during the past year: a) Giet together with others b) Attended a demonstration or a protest March c) Taken part in a stay away

The data points on the graph (Fig 1) indicate a picture of a rapidly diminishing willingness to protest. Since 1999, levels of stated unwillingness to participate in protest have increased from 50% to 65% in 2006. There has also been a sharp reduction in the number of those who say they had taken part in protests in the last twelve months, from 24% having participated in 1999 to just 8% professing participation in protest action in 2006. Yet the declining trend in protests stands in sharp contrast to increasing levels of popular dissatisfaction with the economy and political system.

Economists argue that no incidence of hyperinflation in global history has ever dissipated without a fundamental change in leadership of a country or in its political regime “examples are Germany in the 1920s which saw the collapse of the Weimar Republic, Brazil in the 1970s, which ushered in a dictatorship, Bolivia in the 1980s and Argentina in the early 1990s, which saw a change in leadership in that country” (Kubatana. net, 2007, p.1).

A trend analysis of public attitudes towards the economic situation (Fig 2) shows that in 1999, 94% of Zimbabweans were dissatisfied with the performance of the economy. While this declined to 49% in 2004, it increased again to 94% in 2006. The sudden drop in dissatisfaction in 2004 might have resulted from momentary improvement of the economic situation. However, it might have also been a result of state propaganda that shifted the public attention from the substantive issues where it was underperforming to symbolic areas where it could be portrayed as performing well (Chikwanha-Dzenga, Sithole and Bratton, 2004).

Figure 2: Performance of the economy and President in Zimbabwe



Questions: In general, how would you describe the present economic conditions of this country? A) Very bad b) Bad c) Neither (Good nor Bad) d) Good e) Very Good f) Don't know
Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following official has performed his job over the past twelve months or haven't you had enough about him to say; The President? A) Strongly disapprove b) disapprove c) approve d) Strongly approve e) Don't know haven't heard enough

The evidence here (Fig 2) also illustrates the same trends in disapproval of President Robert Mugabe. In 1999, 69% disapproved of his performance, this declined to 32% in 2004 and increased again to 76% in 2006. While Zimbabweans are highly dissatisfied with the economy and the way they are governed this has not manifested itself in protest.

Makanza (2006) lamented the missed opportunities to protest as she questioned:

Why pro-democracy movements have not been able to capitalise on the so many reported failures of the ZANU PF government: Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order), the failed land reform programme, the economy characterised by high inflation, high prices of basic food commodities, unemployment ... the necessary conditions needed for combustion to happen exist in Zimbabwe, what is needed is a spark...why has there been no spark, despite numerous opportunities, that if presented elsewhere in the world would have brought a change of the ruling government? (Makanza, 2006, p.1)

Debates about why Zimbabweans have not taken part in protest, despite what would seem like a conducive environment, have elicited diverse explanations ranging from popular fear of the regime, to the weakness of opposition leadership to the country's political culture (Ayittey, 2006). Chikwanha-Dzenga et al (2001) conclude that Zimbabweans have an underdeveloped culture of protest and active civic participation. Despite the fact that they are unhappy with the world in which they live, they are simply not oriented to breaking the law. They argue that Zimbabweans "respect and honour their obligations including onerous ones like heavy taxation, they are law abiding but joyless people" (Chikwanha-Dzenga, et al 2001, p.37).

Kagoro (2005, p.1) however takes a different view of Zimbabwean culture. He argues that the absence of revolt in Zimbabwe despite unparalleled repression "is a result of ingrained capacity of Zimbabweans to constantly hope for a new day ultimately making them prisoners of hope".

Yet a different explanation focuses on the high personal risks associated with confronting the regime. Protest is an unattractive option for most Zimbabweans, as the likely wrath of the ZANU PF government and its security forces makes it an extremely dangerous proposition (Chiroro, 2005). Masunungure (2006) explains that the "paradox of the overall situation of the multifaceted crisis is that as it worsens, the people directly affected become more and more impotent and demobilised". Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean government explains the lack of protest as an indication of people's happiness and satisfaction with its 'pro poor' policies such as the controversial land reform programme.

It argues that the calls for protest emanate from a few 'misguided people from the opposition' who have no support. However, these claims are disputed by the evidence from Afrobarometer (Fig 2) that shows sharp increases in proportions of Zimbabweans who are dissatisfied with the economy and high levels of disapproval of the performance of President Mugabe.

This study explores these and other possible explanations for this apparent paradox. It will empirically assess the extent to which individual Zimbabweans have participated in and are prepared to participate in mass protest and demonstrations. Are Zimbabweans actually satisfied with what the government has done, both politically and economically or are they just opposed to protest in principle? Have they simply concluded that protest is either too risky or do they lack the institutional and cognitive resources to take part in political protests?

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

While there has been longstanding scholarly interest in the factors that shape protest, there is still no clarity on the factors that cause it (Dalton and Sickle, 2005). Protest has been discussed from de Tocqueville's description of the French Revolution to Gurr's *Why Men Rebel?* (Gurr, 1970).

2.1 What is Protest?

On the one hand protest has been described as a tool that is used by the "disenfranchised and the politically frustrated to pressure government" (Dalton and Sickle 2005, p.1). On the other hand it has been portrayed as a tool that is used by those who are already active in politics (Inglehart, 1990, Norris, 2002). For example, in a cross-sectional study of protest in 70 nations using World Values Survey data for 1999-2002 and 1995-1998, it was concluded that "people protest not because they are frustrated and excluded from politics but because they can protest and expect governments to respond (Dalton and Sickle, 2005, p.15)". People resort to protest if they are unable to correct a condition directly and resort to activities that draw attention to their grievances. Turner states that the method used is either to provoke ameliorative steps by some target group or to persuade a group to change (1969, p.816). Protest action expresses grievances and a conviction of wrong or injustice.

Gamson (1990) asserts that protest can simply be viewed as an alternative way of participating in politics. The most common definition of protest is that it is an unconventional form of political action (Dalton and Sickle, 2005). It earns the label "unconventional" because protesters seek to influence social and political outcomes not through traditional channels of political participation such as voting, campaign contributions or petitions but by exerting pressure and demands outside of the traditional institutions, (Barnes and Kaase, 1979).

Dalton and Sickle (2005, p.2) concur with the classification of protest as unconventional and state that protest “seeks to influence the course of social and political change from outside traditional institutions - for protest to be effective on public policy it has to disrupt normal politics”. There are violent and non-violent means of protesting. These range from verbal protests to parades, marches, pilgrimages, picketing and vigils. In some instances, protesting can incite acts of violence, even deaths and military coups, which exceeds the “boundaries of tolerable politics in almost any political system and may reflect different causal processes” (Dalton and Sickle, 2005, p.2). In this paper, protest include methods such as stay-aways, boycotts, closing businesses, attending demonstrations or protest marches.

This study acknowledges that there have been other forms of protests by Zimbabweans through civil society bodies petitioning regional and international organisations such as The African Union (AU) and the United Nations Security Council (UN). Detailed reports of human rights violations have been produced to inform the world about the situation in Zimbabwe. The absence of independent newspapers and radio stations in the country has led to alternative sources of news being established outside the country . For example, newspapers such as New Zimbabwe.com, Zim Daily and Zimbabwe Times are all based abroad in the UK or Canada. Electronic media have been utilised, such as radio stations such as SW Radio and the Voice of America, broadcasting from Britain and the US respectively. Apart from these forms of protest, Zimbabweans have not yielded to calls for marches or boycotts to express their dissatisfaction. Critics of the government argue that the only form of pressure that can push the regime to reform is when people confront it directly. The political science literature offers five sets of factors that can be used to explain protest behaviour in Zimbabwe: the economic, political, cultural, collective action factors and cognitive awareness factors. (Gurr, 1970, Minkoff and Meyer, 2004, Inglehart and Wetzels, 2005, Dalton and Sickle, 2005)

2.2 Theoretical Explanations

2.2.1 Economic factors

Economic explanations of protest action focus on problems caused by changes in the national economy, such as inflation, recession and social deprivation, which in turn shape an individual's ability to be self sustaining (Gurr, 1970). There are three different types of economic explanations that can motivate protest. These factors focus on economic problems caused by sustained poor economic performance and absolute levels of unmet grievances which cause "deprivation and dissatisfaction, in turn stimulating protest (Gurr, 1970, p.13).

A second explanation focuses on relative unmet grievances. It argues that when people evaluate their present living conditions, it is important to consider the fact that their "point of reference may be their own past condition or an abstract ideal or standard articulated by a leader as well as reference group" (Gurr, 1970, p.13). When people perceive a discrepancy between what they feel they are entitled to and what they actually receive, they become more likely to take action (Gurr, 1970). A third type of economic factor focuses on people's future expectations. In this case, protest becomes more likely when people lose hope of being able to improve their personal circumstances.

2.2.2 Political Factors

The underlying premises related to political factors are not material conditions but whether or not people feel the configuration of political institutions allows them to influence the political system (Minkoff and Meyer, 2004). Protest is more likely in societies where there are few channels for citizens to access the political system (Kitsschelt, 1986; Cuzan, 1991). A closed political system is likely to "push actors outside conventional channels into the streets increasing levels and degrees of unconventional political action" (Dalton and Sickle, 2005, p.8).

2.2.3 Cultural factors

Culturally based explanations focus on the impact of human values on behaviour. Dalton and Sickle (2005, p.9), argue that "the political culture shapes the repertoire of citizen action". Protest for example, is embraced by French political culture, while in

Britain protest is gentrified and less common. Other scholars have argued that protest is far more common in Western democracies (Norris 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003; Inglehart and Wetzel ,2005).

One branch of cultural theory argues that specific sets of cultural beliefs inhibit protest, for example Confucianism³. A different cultural explanation is based on modernisation theory which argues that modernisation produces a political culture that is more willing to question authority, to emphasise self expression and participation and to challenge established political elites Inglehart (Inglehart, 1990, Inglehart and Wetzel, 2005) argues that the pressure of post material culture characterised by questions of authority and emphasis on quality of life and self actualisation produces higher levels of protest. Advanced industrial societies also experienced the emergence of new social movements and a more active civil society, which advocates protest and, other forms of direct action. Meyer and Tarrow (1998), assert that processes of modernisation produce a social movement society where protests represent a conventional form of action. In contrast, traditional societies are often seen to be characterised by a subject political culture that emphasises respect for tradition.

Cultural theory would argue that African culture is described as encouraging passiveness and unquestioning loyalty to authority. Manguelle (2000,p.70) concurs that “it is difficult to explain the African passivity other than the fear inspired by a God hidden in the folds of the clothes of every African Chief”. Unfortunately, education has not liberated Africans from being subjects to being citizens as it produces individuals who are submissive, wary of risk and respectful of authority (Mamdani, 1996: Bratton, Mattes and Boadi, 2005).

2.2.4 Collective Action Dilemma

The collective action dilemma explanation states that when one feels economically or politically aggrieved, such grievances will turn into collective action only if people think that the action will be effective, and that participation will make a difference

³ This is a teaching that emphasizes self control and adherence to a social hierarchy and social political order

without entailing high personal costs. Oliver (1984) best captures this debate on protest participation in Zimbabwe when she questions

Why some people are willing to make some real commitment of their time to a cause, while others give only token support or lip service? Are those who make the larger commitments simply those who are more interested in the collective goal and have more at stake in its provision? Do they have an unusually great faith in the willingness of their fellow citizens to back them up in their efforts? Are they people with a lot of spare time on their hands looking for a way to avoid boredom? Are they power hungry moguls exploiting community needs as an avenue to their own advancement? (Oliver 1984, p.601).

Olson (1965,p.2) argues that “unless the number of individuals is quite small or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest.” Such costs are typically seen to include personal effort, loss of wages and expenses to get to the protest site. In repressive political environments such as Zimbabwe costs include the possibility of arrest, severe beatings or death. Herbst (1990) concurs that in most African states the reason for classic collective action problems in organising protest is that individuals are deterred by the risks posed by confrontation with the government.

If people feel that they will see the possibility of realising the potential benefits of protest without having to incur these potential costs they are not likely to take part in protest, giving rise to the “free rider problem” (Ostrom, 1990). Olson (1965, p.2) adds that “whenever a person cannot be excluded from the benefits others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort but to free ride on the efforts of others, if all participants choose to free ride the collective benefit will not be produced”.

The other cause for people to free ride is the repressive nature of the political system. In the prevailing environment in Zimbabwe, the risks are evidenced by high incidences of politically motivated human rights violations such as abductions, detention without charge and beatings. Opp and Roehl (1990) state that “there has been little effort however to develop propositions that explain the conditions in which repression advances or inhibits the growth of social movements and participation in

protest action.” Olson (1965, p.2) explains that “participation under repressive conditions has a deterrent effect if no other costs and benefits of the punished behaviour changes.”

However a contrasting view is proffered by DeNardo (1985) who argues that repression can possibly increase the chances of people protesting when demonstrators become the victims of brutal repression as their movement gains sympathy and material support from people who have not been exposed to the excesses. The possible public good to be derived from participating in protest in Zimbabwe has been articulated by civic leaders and opposition leaders as ushering in a new constitution, a change in political culture, economic growth and the emergence of a new leadership which could culminate in the country’s readmission to the global economy.

The other risks associated with protesting are influenced by one’s economic status. O’Brien (1974, p.229) explains that “poor people are too concerned about survival to have time for leisure activities and their failure to participate in community organisations is not due to apathy but to an acute case of the free rider problem in which costs of participation outweigh some of the collective good.” If poverty and repression illicit different responses to protest participation, what then explains the levels of collective action that we do see in the world? A possible answer relies on the resources provided by group membership. Belonging to a group decreases the costs of participating and decreases the chances that one might be the only “sucker” who pays the costs of participating through greater confidence in the fact that other group members will be there to provide solidarity.

2.2.5 Cognitive Awareness

Lastly, the cognitive explanation argues that regardless of whether one belongs to a group, collective action requires some minimal level of cognitive awareness of politics (Bratton, et al, 2005). People have to be aware of the causes of their discontent to be able to blame government and have some sense that their participation will be meaningful and effective. Education, media use and cognitive engagement increases the chances for participation.

Cognitive factors relate to peoples' knowledge of the world around them and the factors that enable them to have an informed opinion on the political and economic issues of the day (Bratton, et al, 2005). This knowledge can be acquired because of an individual's education, media exposure, information interest and personal efficacy. The knowledge enables them to understand the power dynamics and how decisions that affect their lives are made (Bratton, et al, 2005).

At face value, one would expect low levels of information to decrease people's ability to connect their interests with political and economic reforms or to engage in effective demand on their own. From a completely opposite perspective Namate (2006) posits that Zimbabweans are too educated to throw stones or 'toyi toyi' in the streets and that "there is a belief in Zimbabwe that demonstrations are for township simpletons not those with an Ordinary level or above".

2.2.6 Data

To test these explanations, survey data from Afrobarometer Round 3 is used. Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. The instrument asks a standard set of questions to allow systematic comparisons of countries. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over time. Results are shared with decision makers, policy advocates and civic educators, as well as average Africans who wish to become more informed and active citizens. The next chapter discusses the research design, hypothesis and significance of the study.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Research Methodology

This is a cross sectional micro level analysis derived from individual responses to questions in the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey in Zimbabwe. The empirical basis of this study measures protest activity by using Afrobarometer questions that ask respondents to describe their participation in previous forms of protest and whether they would participate in protests in the future. Between 9 and 25 October 2005, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1048 adult Zimbabweans by the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in the country's three official languages: Shona, Ndebele and English. The target sample size was 1200 respondents, divided into two parts: a random (main sample) of 1096 respondents, and a purposeful sub-sample of 104 respondents of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order victims.

The random sample was selected in four stages: selection of the primary sampling units (PSUs), starting points, households, and individual respondents. Because selection at each stage was conducted randomly, the main sample comprises a representative cross-section of the adult population of Zimbabwe aged 18 years and older. The sampling frame used was Zimbabwe's official 2002 national census data. For primary sampling units, a total of 137 census enumeration areas were randomly selected with probability proportionate to population size. These were stratified by province and by residential location (urban or rural). To ensure an equal representation of respondents by gender, interviews were alternated between male and female respondents. An additional 13 PSUs were selected for the sub-sample in three cities: Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. Due to fieldwork-related disruptions, the full sample of 1200 was not achieved, but a total of 1112 interviews were successfully completed. These included 1048 for the main sample, and 64 for the sub-sample. The latter did not include any Harare interviews, which could not be conducted due to the interruption of fieldwork. For the main sample, the sample size is sufficient to yield an overall margin of error of ± 3 percent at a confidence level of 95 percent.

3.2 Dependent Variable

To measure protest potential a two item construct was created based on individual responses from Zimbabweans who indicated that they had participated in a protest or demonstration or in a stay-away.⁴

3.3 Research Question

What factors account for different levels of participation and willingness to participate in protests in Zimbabwe?


3.3.1 Participation in Protest Demographics

Afrobarometer survey results for 2005 revealed that 65% of the respondents indicated that they would never attend a demonstration or protest march, whereas 26% confirmed that they would protest if they had a chance. 8% of the respondents confirmed attending a protest march. A general assessment of protest participation in Zimbabwe reveals demographic variations in protest participation. While anecdotal evidence has indicated that citizens in urban areas are more likely to protest compared to rural areas, Fig 3 indicates minimal variation. There is a 1% difference in the number of respondents from rural and urban areas who say they would never attend a protest or participate in a protest march. There is just a 7% difference for the respondents from both rural and urban areas who confirmed they would participate in future demonstrations if they have the opportunity. This evidence may challenge conventional assertions that urbanites are more predisposed to protest.

⁴ The items measuring participation in protest and stayway are sufficiently correlated - Pearson's $r=(.732^{**})$ and reliable Cronbach Alpha $=(.23)$ to warrant creation of a two item average construct of protest potential (n=1112)

Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you personally have done any of these during the past year: Attended a demonstration or a protest march and taken part in a stay away a)No would never do this b)No would if had the chance c)Yes once or twice d) Yes Several Times e) Often

Figure 3: Participation in protest by region Zimbabwe 2005



Question: Respondent residence Urban/Rural?

Protest participation in Zimbabwe also reveals little variation based on age. Protest participation does decrease with age, but the differences are far less than common wisdom would suggest. There is a 3% variation in confirmation of reported protest between respondents in the age range of 18-25 years compared to respondents 40 years old or older. This again is contrary to common wisdom, which argues that the young are more likely to protest as they are faced with the heaviest burden concerning the economic situation, possibly because of high levels of youth unemployment.

Figure 4: Participation in protest by age in Zimbabwe 2005



Question: Respondent Age

3.4 Hypotheses

For each explanatory factor a hypothesis is presented

3.4.1 Political factors

Individual Zimbabweans who feel that the political and institutional channels for expressing concerns are closed are more willing to protest than those who think that the institutions are open.

3.4.2 Cultural

Zimbabweans who are respectful of leadership and authority and who do not demand accountability from leadership are less likely to participate in protest

3.4.3 Cognitive factors

Individual Zimbabweans who have limited access to public information and the media and have lower levels of formal education are less likely to protest. This is compared with individuals interested in public affairs and those who have access to the media and have high levels of interest.

3.4.4 Economic

Individual Zimbabweans who feel relatively deprived or who perceive their economic situation to be worse than others and unlikely to improve will be more willing to protest compared with those who are more satisfied with their economic situation.

3.4.5 Collective Action

Zimbabweans who do not belong to a civil society group and who fear the state are less willing to protest than those who belong to a group and do not fear the state.

3.5 Limitations of Study

Using public opinion data has limitations because this data reflects individual's subjective views that can be influenced by wide range of factors, from the characteristics of the interviewer to the political and social environment. The Afrobarometer survey was conducted in an environment which was politically volatile and respondents might not have freely expressed their views regarding political matters for fear of future reprisals. However an assessment of the impact of fear on respondents indicates that there is no evidence to suggest this. Respondents were asked in the very last question who they thought the sponsor of the survey was. Responses revealed that, regardless of whether they thought the survey was government or privately funded, 8% of respondents indicated that they had participated in protest action. This indicates that responses to the survey were not compromised by fear. Despite the margin of error inherent in this methodology, the data can provide to a large extent an indication of Zimbabweans' predispositions to protest as a form of political participation.

3.6 Data Analysis

Wherever possible, valid and reliable multiple item measures of relevant concepts were constructed in order to test these hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis is used to test empirical connections between these indicators and measures of protest participation⁵.

3.7 Significance of Research

Most of the literature on Zimbabwe has assessed political participation by reference to levels of voter turnout or through the statements and actions of organised groups such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), the Save Zimbabwe Campaign and political parties. But this literature tells us very little about what individual Zimbabweans think about protest. Yet the strategies of organised groups need to be based on an accurate picture of public predispositions. Are citizens ready to shift en-masse toward protest as a way to effect democratic change? Or will groups that pursue such strategies meet discontent, apathy or fear, and thus poorly attended protest marches or strikes?

⁵ Multiple regression analysis allows us to find linear combinations of independent variables that maximally predict a dependent variable. From this we can gauge the relative contribution of variables in the combination and can use the combinations to predict a value on the dependent variable for particular configurations of data on the independent variables (Tredoux, 2006 p.339)

CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The acceleration of economic collapse signifies an end game for President Mugabe and the country...the first phase of the countries' liberation is coming to an end as the economy is collapsing...we are closer to seeing change in Zimbabwe today from within than at any time since Independence (Christopher Dell US Ambassador Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Online News Agency, 18 June, 2007)

4.1 The Decline of Zimbabwe's Economy

In Chapter two it was pointed out that economic factors are often seen by political scientist as a determinant of individual participation in protest. These factors include absolute deprivation, relative deprivation or anticipated future declines in personal living standards. If the economic school of protest is correct one would expect to find that Zimbabweans who view themselves as absolutely deprived due to the impact of the economy on their personal livelihoods are more likely to protest. More so, one would expect that people who perceive their economic situation to be worse than other Zimbabweans are more likely to protest. The rest of this chapter briefly gives an overview of the decline of the Zimbabwean economy and proceeds to assess the impact of the economic changes on the attitudes of individual Zimbabweans.

The current economic decline in Zimbabwe stands in sharp contrast to the economic situation of the early 1980s when the government was credited with extending social services previously designed to cater for minority whites to the majority of Zimbabweans. Davies (2002, p.22) explains that “at independence there was rapid expansion in the education system and improved access to both preventative and curative health with some notable successes”. The government introduced free and compulsory education, and introduced massive expansion in secondary schools and teacher training. It further undertook to improve community primary health care through large investments in hospitals and clinics” (Gatsheni, 2002). The working class also benefitted from minimum wage legislation which raised wages. There was also deliberate accelerated advancement of Africans in different professions (Gatsheni, 2002; Davies, 2002).

However, within 10 years of independence the government of Zimbabwe was financially broke. “Contrary to the 3.4% annual growth in this period, the crisis deepened as growth contracted by 6.1% in 2000, 4% in 2001 and further dropped by 5% in 2002 (Lloyd, 2002, p.222)”. Zimbabwe’s economy has contracted in real terms in the past seven years. Inflation is in quadruple digits and the local currency has lost 99% of its value. Almost half of the country faces shortages of fuel, cash, and electricity, cooking oil, sugar and drugs. Up to one quarter of the population has fled the country, comprising mostly skilled labour such as teacher’s doctors and nurses. It is estimated that close to three million Zimbabweans are outside the country with most of them living in the United Kingdom and South Africa (Bloch, 2006).

The multifaceted crisis can be attributed to factors such as the mismanagement of state owned companies by ruling party officials, poor economic policies and bad governance (Sachikonye, 2003). The crisis can also be credited to the IMF inspired Economic Structural adjustment programmes (ESAP) introduced by the government in the 1990s. With the worsening of the economic situation, the government sought assistance from multilateral donor agencies whose support was attached to demands for economic reforms designed to reduce the role of the government in the economy and promote private enterprise. It was asked to liberalise the economy, reduce subsidies to state owned companies, abolish import and export licenses and devalue the currency. These reforms led to the closure of companies, high unemployment, accelerated inflation and increased labour strikes and riots, (Maclean 2002; Sachikonye, 2002). This was further worsened by “huge unbudgeted payoffs of above 5 billion Zimbabwe dollars to war veterans who sought compensation for their role in the liberation struggle (Sachikonye, 2003, p.14)”. To add to the crisis 11 000 troops were dispatched to fight in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which further strained the government’s budget (Maclean, 2002).

Finally, the government land reform programme contributed to economic decline as it led to disruptions in the tobacco market, an important source of foreign currency. (Clemens and Moss, 2005) The current political turmoil within Zimbabwe has increased the risk of investing in Zimbabwe such that most organisations and donor agencies have either relocated or withdrawn their support from Zimbabwe (Clemens and Moss, 2005).

However, the Zimbabwean government has laid the blame for the crisis on foreign 'sanctions'. It has frequently claimed that there are external forces with an agenda to destabilise the government, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the British government (Clemens and Moss, 2005). The government of Zimbabwe has claimed that it is facing sanctions while the West refutes these claims and argues that the sanctions are imposed only on individuals working with the ruling party.

A further explanation given by Mugabe's government for the crisis is drought. The government has claimed that the United States (US) is able to control the weather in order to cause drought. On the face of it, the argument of drought as the source of the crisis appears credible, since most of Zimbabwe's economy is based on agriculture. Yet a study by Richardson (2005) using data from Zimbabwe's Meteorology Department has shown that this argument does not hold up under evidence. The evidence indicates that the drought suffered during 2000/01 was about 22% below average and less severe than at least other recent low rainfall periods. Since 1948, there has never been a situation where an important drop in rainfall in Zimbabwe's maize producing regions was not associated with corresponding drop in production in neighbouring Zambia and Malawi (Richardson, 2005). Countering this historical pattern, Zimbabwe's decline in maize production has been dramatically greater than its neighbours over the past five years. National maize production fell 74 percent from 1999 to 2004, while in Zambia it actually increased (Richardson, 2005). Thus Zimbabwe's bad weather does not sufficiently account for its economic collapse.

The most plausible explanation of the current crisis in Zimbabwe is misrule by the current government. The policy of land seizures and chaotic disruption on the farms is the main reason that staple maize production fell by three quarters. Zimbabwe now requires massive food aid as a result of the undermining of property rights and absurd macroeconomic management. Mills (2007) argues that Zimbabwe has moved from being a breadbasket into being a basket case as political troubles, combined with the abandonment of sound economic policies, have closed off access to foreign aid, scared away most foreign investment, and driven much of the skilled workforce out of the country. Clemens and Moss (2005) further explain that it can hardly be a coincidence that the economy began its precipitous fall just as the ruling party unleashed a wave of political violence and repression directed against rising political

opposition. With the escalation of the crisis in Zimbabwe, donors have cut off international aid and withdrawn hundreds of millions of dollars (Goldsmith, 2001).

4.2 The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Individual Zimbabweans

Sachikonye (2003) explains that the economic crisis in Zimbabwe has resulted in an increase in the proportion of Zimbabweans living below the poverty datum line from 40% of the population in 1990 to above 80%. According to the IMF report of October 2005, the human cost of the government's policies in Zimbabwe has been very high as the country's human development indicators, once among the best in Sub Saharan Africa, have deteriorated sharply to rank 147th out of 177 countries in the World.

More than four out of five Zimbabweans are currently unemployed. There has also been a massive increase in the price of basic commodities such as sugar, bread, transport and cooking oil of between 90% and 260% (Consumer Council of Zimbabwe, 2007). The Afrobarometer survey confirms the impact of the crisis over the last seven years on individual Zimbabweans. The evidence illustrates that people are frustrated with the performance of the economy and are equally dissatisfied with the performance of President Mugabe. With such severe economic hardships one wonders at what point such frustration would spur people to demonstrations and protest.

The views of Zimbabweans were sought to assess a set of economic explanations derived from political science literature that might possibly shift people's predispositions to protest participation. These explanations include absolute poverty, relative deprivation and expectations of possible improvement of their livelihood in future.

4.2.1 Absolute Deprivation


To measure the impact of absolute deprivation on Zimbabweans' protest potential the Lived Poverty Index developed by Mattes, David's and Bratton (2003) was used. The model was constructed based on the 1995 World Summit definition of absolute deprivation. It states that poverty is a condition characterised by severe lack of basic

human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It relates not only to income but also to access to services (World Summit, 1995). While there is no consensus within the literature on the most effective measures of lived poverty, Sen (1999) argues that there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty which translates manifestations of death by starvation, malnutrition and visible misery into a diagnosis of poverty. The Lived Poverty Index measures individual responses to questions of well being. This index consists of seven items considered basic necessities: a cash income, food, medical treatment, home fuel, water, electricity and home safety⁶ (Mattes, et al, 2002). The scale was interpreted as a composite measure of lived poverty based on the ability to extract a single valid and reliable measure of lived poverty. In the table below (Fig 5) fuel and shelter are the items most weakly correlated with a factor loading of B of (.41) and (.46) respectively.

The items most strongly correlated are food (.63), medical treatment (.73) and school expenses (.69). The results (in Fig 5) show that the highest number of respondents indicated that they had “Always” or “Several Times” gone without basic items such as cash income (97%) transport (91%) school expenses for children (90%). There are possible explanations to the high confirmations of the shortage of cash and transport. These responses reflect cash shortages in the country and the unavailability of fuel as a result of the shortage of foreign currency. The two items on which respondents went without least are shelter (29%) and fuel to cook food (54%).

⁶ The scale was confirmed verified through statistical procedures known as Factor analysis (using Maximum Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin Rotation and Reliability Analysis. From these items it is possible to extract a single variance unrotated factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.71 that explains 35percent of the common variance. The items load on or correlate with the underlying factor as follows transport (.44) cash income (.63) food (.73) medical treatment (.53) home fuel water (.44) and school expenses (.69) .The scale is reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .74) Factor analysis is a statistical technique that allows the condensation of complex sets of inter-relationships between several or many variables in terms of a simpler underlying structure. The general aim of factor analysis is to reduce the complexity of multiple observed variables in terms of a simpler, underlying dimensional structure (Durrheim, 2006, p. 290)

Figure 5: Absolute deprivation in Zimbabwe 2005



Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: enough food to eat, gone without transport, gone without school expenses, gone without fuel to cook food, gone without clean water, gone without cash income, gone without medicine and gone without shelter a) Never b) Just (Once or Twice) c) Several Times d) Many Times e) Always f) Don't know

A bivariate correlation of absolute poverty and protest reveals that it is moderately and negatively related to protest potential (Pearson $r = -0.133^{**}$)⁷. This indicates absolute deprivation reduces protest potential.

4.2.2 Relative Deprivation


The second economic explanation of protest focuses on relative rather than absolute deprivation. This is when a person feels that their living conditions are worse compared to others. Relative deprivation is defined as the "position of a person or family in relation to others in the community or to a standard considered necessary for

⁷ The values of the co-efficient range from -1 to +1 with 0 indicating no relationship, +1 indicating a positive relationship and -1 indicating a negative relationship. Values close to -1 or +1 indicate a strong relationship between the two variables and values close to 0 indicate a weak relationship between the two variables. It is important to note that correlation does not equal causation, but if they are not correlated one cannot cause the other (Kranzler, 2003, p. 94-101)

living in their society. Thus the position of different individuals and groups are considered in relation to others in a specific universe (Ruinciman, 1966, p.24)".

In order to operationalise relative deprivation the question from the Afrobarometer survey that asks respondents how they rate their living conditions compared to those of other Zimbabweans was used. Previously Zimbabwe boasted a high quality education system that produced exceptionally qualified personnel and supported a vibrant economy. However there are now glaring disparities in terms of lifestyles in the country regardless of whether or not people possess these skills. This can be attributed to the erosion of personal income levels by the harsh economic environment. It can also be interpreted as a result of some people benefitting from the system of patronage that has been put in place by the government through the numerous government agricultural schemes meant to assist new farmers. Others are able to participate in the informal economy legally or otherwise. The Afrobarometer survey confirms that 60% of the respondents indicated that they felt that their living conditions were worse or much worse than other Zimbabweans compared to only 16% who felt that their situation was better (Fig 6). The bivariate correlations reveal that individuals attitudes of relative deprivation have a strong and positive correlation with protest participation (Pearson $R = .325$). Absolute deprivation reduces protest potential while relative deprivation increases it.

Figure 6: Relative Deprivation in Zimbabwe 2005




Question: In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Zimbabweans? a) Much worse b) Worse c) Same d) Better e) Much better f) don't know

4.2.3 Future Expectations

An alternative explanation would hold that regardless of people's actual or relative perceived deprivation, what really matters for protest is their projected well being in the future. The Afrobarometer survey results indicate that while individual Zimbabweans indicate having gone without basic necessities, they also confirm that they do not anticipate any positive changes in the future and this disillusionment can be seen to increase their frustrations.

To measure the views of Zimbabweans on what the future has in store for them Afrobarometer asked: "Looking ahead do you expect your living conditions to be better or worse in 12 months time?" 85% of the respondents forecast that their situation could be worse, 6% respondents felt it would remain the same and only 7% are confident that their situation would improve (Fig 7).

Figure 7: Future expectations in Zimbabwe in 2005




Question: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time? a) Much worse b) Worse c) Same d) Better) Much better f) don't know

The explanation for such high pessimism might be based on Zimbabweans' dissatisfaction with government programmes. The lack of optimism might be exacerbated by the lack of confidence in the leaderships' capacity to turn around the economic downturn based on the government's track record. There is a strong bivariate correlation between future expectations and protest (Pearson $r=217^{**}$). This indicates that anticipation of change in the future increases protest potential.

4.2.4 Employment Status

The other possible factor that determines protest participation is one's employment status. Conventional wisdom states that if a person is unemployed the chances of them demonstrating are high because of frustrations caused by enforced idleness. The evidence from the Afrobarometer survey (Fig 8) revealed that 78% of the respondents were not employed compared to 22% who confirmed being employed. The bivariate correlation between employment and protest shows that there is a significant positive relationship (Pearson $r=.132^{**}$). This means employed people are more likely to protest compared to the unemployed.

Figure 8: Employment status Zimbabwe 2005




Question: Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it full time or part time? Are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?

4.2.5 Receiving Money from the Diaspora

The crisis in Zimbabwe has resulted in a massive brain drain with, the most skilled citizens emigrating in search of employment in other countries. With the decline of the economy more and more people are sending money home to support families. More enterprising Zimbabweans have established facilities to buy unavailable groceries and fuel for relatives at home through networks based in the Diaspora. While 14% of Zimbabweans acknowledged receiving money 86% did not receive money from the Diaspora. A correlation between receiving money from abroad and protest potential indicates a significant and positively related link to protest potential (Pearson $R = .122^{**}$). Thus individuals who received money from the Diaspora are more likely to protest compared to those who did not.

Figure 9: Respondents receiving money from Diaspora Zimbabwe 20005



Question: Considering all the activities you engage to secure a livelihood, which of the following do you do now? What about six months ago? Receiving money from family members working in other countries?

4.3 Multivariate Regression Model Economic Explanations and protest participation

Having reviewed the bivariate associations of economic factors and protest behaviour, it is necessary to consider the joint relative effect of all economic factors. A combined multivariate model of economic explanations is statistically significant, but explains only 7% of the variations in protest participation. The most important economic factor is employment (Beta=239) and absolute deprivation (Beta =-.157). Whereas one's employment status increases protest potential, absolute deprivation reduces that potential. Receiving money from relatives in the Diaspora is also significant and positively related to protest (Beta =.092).

Table 1: Regression Model

	R	B	Beta	Stat Significance
Constant		.300		.000
Absolute deprivation	-.133**	-.120	-.157	.000
Relative Deprivation	.325**	.016	.014	.692
Future Expectations	.217**	.026	.019	.541
Employment	.132**	.442	.239	.000
Diaspora support	.122**	.208	.092	.007

Adjusted R square (.071) (n=1112)

The beginning of this chapter presented the hypothesis that attitudes of economic decline such as absolute deprivation, relative deprivation and pessimism about the future can motivate respondents to protest. However the evidence illustrates that absolute deprivation deters protest in Zimbabwe. Being employed, and receiving support from the Diaspora increases protest potential among Zimbabweans. The evidence counteracts the conventional view that protest is a weapon of the dispossessed and the downtrodden. Protest in Zimbabwe tends to be a vehicle of dissent for the relatively economically secure.

Chapter 5 examines political determinants of protest participation and assesses whether the nature of the country's institutions – whether they are closed or open - motivates protest.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL FACTORS

We hear others say we want to go into the streets to demonstrate, to unseat a legitimately elected government. It will never happen and we will never allow it. If a person now wants to invite his own death, let him go ahead (Robert Mugabe, 30 May, 2006 from ZHRF Report 2007)

Dalton (2006), states that democracy requires an active citizenry. Without public involvement in the process democracy lacks both legitimacy and its guiding force. The inability of citizens to participate through conventional methods such as voting has raised questions about the legitimacy of the current political leadership in Zimbabwe. The previous chapter explored the economic determinants of protest and demonstrations. This chapter tests a set of political explanations specifically individual's attitudes about the accessibility of Zimbabwe's political institutions. The political science literature argues that individual's decisions to protest are determined by perceptions of the accessibility of a country's political institutions. The study expects to find that individuals who feel that their elected representatives, members of parliament and councillors are responsive will protest and demonstrate. Those who feel that Zimbabwean elections are not free and fair are more likely to participate in protest or demonstrations.

The chapter will give a brief description of the nature and climate of political participation in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe. It will further assess the opinions of individual Zimbabweans towards the accessibility of their political institutions. The focus is on the channels of communication and their ability to allow people to express their grievances and participate in defining societal goals. The chapter concludes with a regression model to establish the relationship between Zimbabweans' stated satisfaction with democracy, the state's respect for personal freedoms, leadership responsiveness and the effectiveness of the electoral system and their participation in protest or demonstrations.

5.1 Political participation

5.1.1 Political Participation in Pre-Independence Zimbabwe

Under white minority rule Zimbabwe's black people were not allowed to participate in political affairs. Gatsheni (2002, p.124) argues that "pre-colonial societies were characterised by non-competitive politics for power. Black people were relegated to forms of behaviour and associations that did not threaten the state, such as burial societies, co-operatives and religious groups. Organisations such as trade unions, teachers unions and student bodies were banned together with political parties." Moyo (1993) concurs with this view and asserts that:

Public institutions were notoriously not accountable to the general public, there was no due process of law and the law was against the majority of the people (Moyo, 1993, p.10).

These undemocratic tendencies in the colonial government inevitably permeated the liberation movements. According to Bhebhe and Ranger (2003, p.2), "nationalist movements were not only positive schools of democracy and human rights but were also negative schools of despotism, authoritarianism and violence". Thus, when they took power the new Zimbabwean leaders did not provide an environment conducive to open participation. The government made efforts to improve provisions of social services such as health and education, but conspicuously failed to open political institutions or repeal repressive state security laws.

5.1.2 Political participation in Post- Independence Zimbabwe

The first significant incident of intolerance became evident in 1981 through the state sanctioned massacre of about 20 000 civilians in the Midlands and Matabeleland to counter opposition to ZAPU PF⁸. Over the years, the levels of repression have intensified and manifested themselves in different forms. One such example is the state's use of the army and police to pacify restive labour and student protests.

⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace & Legal Resource Foundation reports titled "*Breaking the Silence*" the massacre was done under the guise of maintaining state security. The process was motivated by a need to eliminate the opposition political party of Joshua Nkomo that threatened the ruling party's hegemony.

On the 20th of April 1989, addressing the second judicial colloquium on the domestic application of International Human Rights Norms held in Harare, Robert Mugabe stated that:

Human rights and fundamental freedoms allow us to fully develop and use our human qualities, intelligence, talents and conscience to satisfy our spiritual and other needs. It follows, therefore that the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms is not only an individual and personal tragedy but also creates conditions of social and political unrest, sowing seeds of violence and conflict within and between societies and nations (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum [ZHRF], 2007, p.35)

Unfortunately, despite extolling such virtues in public, the Zimbabwean president has not changed the institutional and legislative framework for citizens' participation. The government has maintained laws that restrict the development of opposition political parties, the media and civic society. Moyo (1993, p.1) argues that "black nationalists...used their political power to maintain, and in some cases to expand the oppressive legislation used by the colonial regimes to suppress the political activities of Black Africans". The ruling party exploited the repressive legislation and the underdeveloped culture of participation and pushed the society towards a one party state with the ultimate intent to absorb all groupings under ZANU PF.

5.2 Political and Civil Liberties in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's civil society has evolved in an environment with a deeply entrenched culture of intolerance, partly inherited from the "guerrilla armies" and "nationalist parties" that were undemocratic, highly commandist and authoritarian (Gatsheni, 2002, p.:103). However, the emergence of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes in the late 1990s and its impact on the economy saw the surfacing of a vibrant labour movement. This was exacerbated by the failure of the government to manage the economy and its abuse of human rights. Thus the political environment in Zimbabwe since 2000 has been highly polarised as both political parties, the ZANU PF and MDC, contest for state power. Sylvester (1995) refers to the political setting in Zimbabwe as a "terrain for intense contest with those already in the state doing everything to stay in and seeking to ensure that contenders stay out (1995, p.409).

He further states that “some sections of civil society in Zimbabwe view the present government as quite evil, using dirty tricks to maintain the status quo and also perceive the government as above the law and the master opposer of opposition (Sylvester,1995, p.409)”.

The government has promulgated legislation over the years targeted at curtailing the activities of the labour movement, students and nongovernmental organisations. These include:

1. the Labour Relations Amendment Act (2000) controls the activities of labour organisations and places them under the total control of the state;⁹
2. the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (1990) provides for the arbitrary expulsion of students and members of staff for political reasons;¹⁰
3. the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO Act,1995) monitors and controls the activities of civil society formations;¹¹
4. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002) violates journalists’ rights.. It requires the registration of journalists and media houses and grants the state power to investigate journalists’ sources of information ¹²
5. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA,2002), outlaws gatherings of more than 5 people without police clearance. This ensures that the state has control of meetings held and can manage or even deny activities such as protests that are perceived to be anti-government. ¹³

Public sentiment against the state has continued to rise with the escalation of violations of freedoms of association, expression, assembly and movement in an attempt by the state to regain lost control. A Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (ZHRF, 2006) report confirms that 2006 freedom violations were markedly worse than the 2005 violations of freedoms (ZHRF, 2006). Trend analyses of violations of individual freedoms over the years show that most of the violations are politically motivated.

⁹ Labour Relations Amendment Act (Chapter 28:01) . 2000.

¹⁰University of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 26:01) . 1990.


¹¹Private Voluntary Organisations Act. 1995.

¹²Access to Information and Protect of Privacy Act. 2002.

¹³Public Order and Security Act (POSSA) . 2002.


They involve abductions, arrests and detentions, assaults, attempted murders, death threats, disappearances and displacements. The table below (Fig 10) indicates reported incidents of human rights violations over the years and shows a massive increase in arrests without detention. “2006 accounts for 27% of all violations that have been reported to date and 2005 and 2006 together are nearly half of all reported violations since 2001(ZHRF, 2006, p.8)”.

Figure 10: Human rights violations in Zimbabwe 2001 – 2006



The reported violations shown (Fig 10) are supported by Freedom House country assessments of civil and political liberties from 2003 to 2006 to date in Zimbabwe (Fig 11 and 12).

Figure 11: Freedom House ratings of civil Liberties in Zimbabwe 2003-2006



Since 2003 there has been a gradual decline in civil liberties in Zimbabwe (Fig 11). The evidence is consistent with the reported incidents of violations during the same period which led to the closure of the only independent daily newspaper, The Daily News. It was bombed in 2002 and subsequently shut down by the Media Information council (MIC). Currently, all the foreign media agencies such as the BBC and CNN are banned from Zimbabwe as they are accused of peddling propaganda to effect regime change in Zimbabwe.


The media has been threatened with all forms of punishment, ranging from arrest, deportation and banishment to death. These violations have been openly justified by the Zimbabwean government. For example, the then Minister of Home Affairs, who currently is the Speaker of Parliament, John Nkomo comments that:

Even the press are now regulated because you know; you have a tendency of the press, the print media and so on of inciting people to violence. Those who want to condemn Zimbabwe for coming up with these pieces of legislation are themselves interested in creating violence or a violent environment in Zimbabwe (as cited in ZHRF, 2007, p.30)

There have also been reported incidences of the government using the state apparatus such as the police and the courts to detain civil society leaders and opposition leaders without charge and at times for trumped-up charges. In contrast, members of the

ruling party have been given favourable treatment and amnesty for political crimes. Equally, with the decline in civil liberties there has been a drop in political rights (Fig 12).

Figure 12: Freedom House ratings on political rights Zimbabwe 2003-2006




Given this history, how have ordinary Zimbabweans evaluated the state of their post-independence democratic institutions? Attitudes of Zimbabweans are examined in this regard relating to their personal freedoms, the fairness of elections, the responsiveness of elected representatives and the supply of democracy.

5.2.1 Personal Freedoms

The incidents related to violations of freedom reported above are consistent with the attitudes of individual Zimbabweans on their personal freedoms (Fig 13). To evaluate trends in political freedoms over the past few years respondents were asked whether they felt that there were any improvements in their freedoms compared to previous years. 80% of respondents revealed that personal freedoms to join any organisation were more curtailed than in previous years. The other expressed dissatisfaction related to restrictions on 'freedom to say what they think,' where 76% of respondents confirmed that they had fewer freedoms in this regard. While 60% felt there was lack of improvement in the freedom to vote.

An index to measure all items related to personal freedoms was created and found to be valid and reliable¹⁴. A bivariate correlation reveals that perceptions of changes in personal freedoms is statistically insignificant in relation to protest potential but negatively related (Pearson's $R=-.058$). This indicates that individuals who feel that their personal freedoms have been eroded are less likely to protest.

Figure 13: Personal freedoms in Zimbabwe 2005



Question: Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, or are they the same: a) Freedom to say what you think b) Freedom to join any organisation c) Freedom from unjust arrest d) Freedom to vote

5.2.2 Elections Free and Fair

The country has had a multi-party system with regular elections since independence. Different political parties such as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU PF), Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) have contested elections, posing varying challenges to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF). The ruling party's perpetual victory in successive elections has been credited to the uneven playing field coupled with the use of

¹⁴ Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigen value=2.50) which explains 62.5 percent of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach Alpha=.85) is high (n=1112). Factor analysis is a statistical technique that allows the condensation of complex sets of inter-relationships between several or many variables in terms of a simpler underlying structure. The general aim of factor analysis is to reduce the complexity of multiple observed variables in terms of a simpler, underlying dimensional structure. (Durrheim, 2006, p. 290)


violence that has characterised political contests in Zimbabwe. The fairness of the electoral contests has been a subject of dispute among political parties and within civil society, who argue that the political processes favour the incumbent party. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has held highly contested elections. The government of Zimbabwe has shown disregard for open and fair democratic practices. In some instances, ruling party activists have openly asserted that:

Zimbabwe was won through the loss of blood and not elections. Therefore if anyone wants to take it he should go to war with the ruling party. Even if other people accept results we will not. We are married to this country and Mugabe until we bury him. (As cited in ZHRF, 2007, p.20)

An example of the bias in the electoral process is the management of registration and supervision of elections by the ruling party. Human Rights Watch (2006) reveals that the processes of registering voters, delimiting electoral districts and providing for inspection of voters rolls is conducted in a non-transparent and discriminatory way.

Public opinion data on Zimbabwe (Fig 14) reveals lack of confidence in elections. Only 19% of respondents indicated that the 2006 elections were free and fair, 20% saw that the elections were free and fair with major problems and 40% indicated that they were not free and fair. The low levels of confidence in the elections could be a result of public statements, as discussed above, that erode citizens' confidence in the state institutions. The attitudes of individual Zimbabweans to elections are significantly but negatively correlated with protest (with a Pearson R of -0.274^{**}). This means those who think that elections are not free are less likely to protest.

Figure 14: Attitudes of freeness of elections Zimbabwe 2005



Questions: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election? a) completely free and fair b) Free and fair, but with minor problems c) Free and fair, with major problems d) Not free and fair e) Do not understand question f) Don't know


5.2.3 Responsiveness

In the absence of basic freedoms, and in the presence of an electoral system which is open to abuse by the state, the process of holding elected representatives accountable to the people is rendered ineffective.

The evidence from individual Zimbabweans who were asked whether elected representatives listen to them (Fig 15) show that only 22% felt that Members of Parliament consider their views compared to 28% indicating that local government councillors always listen to them. This is low compared to 78% of the people who felt that they had been consulted sometimes and or had never been consulted by a Member of Parliament. 68% of the respondents indicated that they had sometimes and/or never been consulted by a councillor. It is possible that with the limitations on freedoms power possibly currently resides not in the ability of the people to vote out elected individuals but in state apparatus to convince people to vote or support elected representatives. Therefore, the incentives for parliamentary members to be in

touch with the people has been removed. It is also possible that because of the harsh economic environment, representatives have limited financial resources to visit their respective constituencies. Evaluations of responsiveness of Zimbabweans MPs and local councillors are significantly correlated with protest (Pearson $R = -110^{**}$)¹⁵. This indicates that those who feel that they are consulted less are less likely to protest.

Figure 15: Attitudes towards elected official's levels of responsiveness Zimbabwe 2005



Question: How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Members of Parliament, Elected local government councillors? a) Never b) Only sometimes c) Often d) Always e) Don't know


Having considered all the other factors that create a democratic society, respondents were asked their attitudes regarding the levels of democracy in Zimbabwe. Only 19% of respondents indicated their satisfaction with democracy in Zimbabwe (Fig 16).

81% of respondents felt that Zimbabwe's democracy was not satisfactory while others indicated that they did not regard it as a democracy at all

¹⁵ The items measuring whether Members of parliament and Councillors listen to what people say are sufficiently correlated Pearson's $r = (.755^{**})$ and reliable Cronbach Alpha = (.85) to warrant creation of a two item average construct of responsiveness ($n = 1112$) I report the Cronbach's Alpha which is an estimate of responses to different scale items (Finchilescu, 2006:213)

To measure supply for democracy a two item construct was created which is sufficiently correlated and reliable.¹⁶

Figure 16: Satisfaction with democracy Zimbabwe 2005




Question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Zimbabwe? a) Zimbabwe is Don't not a democracy b) Not at all satisfied c) Not very satisfied d) Fairly satisfied e) Very satisfied f) Know

5.2.4 Supply of Democracy

Public opinion data from Afrobarometer (2005) (Fig17) indicated that, when asked their views on the extent of democracy in Zimbabwe, 51% of respondents asserted that the country was not democratic. 44% felt that it was a democracy with problems and only 5% indicated that it was a full democracy with problems. To measure supply for democracy a two item index was created combining satisfaction with democracy and views of the extent of democracy. A bivariate correlation of supply for democracy and protest is negatively significant (Pearson R -0.203^{**}). This means respondents who are dissatisfied with democracy are less likely to protest.

¹⁶ The items measuring extent of democracy and satisfaction are sufficiently correlated Pearson's $r=(.577^{**})$ and reliable Cronbach Alpha $=(.73)$ to warrant creation of a two item average construct of supply of democracy (n=1112)

Figure 17: Perceptions of levels of democracy Zimbabwe 2005



Question In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Zimbabwe today? A)Not a democracy b) A democracy, with major problems c)A democracy but with minor problems d) A full democracy e)Do not understand question/do not understand what "democracy" is f) Don't know

5.3 Multivariate Regression Model of Political Explanations and Protest

Zimbabwean's evaluations of the political system and their association with protest behaviour have been discussed. The overall and relative impact of these factors on protest in Zimbabwe will now be considered. While many of these factors have a strong impact taken together, all factors explain only 6% of the variance in responses to protest potential.

Examining the standardised regression coefficient, we can see that the most important political evaluation related to protest potential is the consideration that Zimbabwe's elections are not free and fair. The second strongest factor relates to the view that political freedoms have been eroded over the past few years. This is interesting, since this factor displayed a weak bivariate association.

However controlling for the simultaneous impact of other attitudes, the impact of perceived decline in rights becomes evident.

Table 2: Regression Model

	R	B	Beta	Sig Statically
Constant		.600		.035
Supply of democracy	-.203**	-.189	-.102	.053
Personal Freedoms	-.058	.205	-.094	.039
Responsiveness	-.110**	-.013	-.010	.816
Elections Free and Fair	-.274**	-.177	-.180	.001
Elections Ensure Parliament reflects Voters choice	-.171**	-.065	-.058	.217

Adjusted R Square = (.060) (n=1112)

The factors that have strong explanatory power in the model are pessimistic views of the freeness and fairness of elections and beliefs in the erosion of personal freedoms which are negatively related (Beta = -.180) and .094). It was hypothesised earlier that individuals who feel that their elected representatives are responsive are more likely to protest. Conversely, those who feel that Zimbabwean elections are not free and fair are more likely to participate in protests or demonstrations. The results are not consistent with my hypothesis as they reveal that views on representatives' responsiveness are insignificant in motivating protest. Beliefs in the unfairness of elections are less likely to increase protest potential.

However, it is important to reiterate the finding that political factors account for only 6% of explanations of protest participation. Therefore chapter 6 explores another influence - the impact of collective action dilemma - on protest participation. To what extent does fear deter Zimbabweans from participating in protests?

CHAPTER 6

COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA

While the state elites are risk taking the masses in Zimbabwe are predominantly risk averse demos...they were made risk averse through a process of conditioning over time making them politically passive and inert... For that reason Zimbabweans are the easiest people to govern in politics and indeed in any social arena than any other group of citizens in the region and beyond ... as such the road to mass action is blocked because of few takers (Masunungure, 2006, p.2-3).

The previous chapters discussed the economic and political determinants of protest participation. None have yet provided wholly satisfactory explanations. Perhaps we need to consider how the collective action dilemma affects both the politically repressed and economically dissatisfied, providing disincentives to protest. The Afrobarometer survey provides no measure of citizens' perception of the collective action dilemma. But it does provide valuable measures of factors often seen as useful to overcome this dilemma, such as membership of civic organisations and degrees of trust in opposition parties. The Afrobarometer survey also provides a measure of political fear, which exacerbates the collective action dilemma. These concepts will be correlated with participation in protests and demonstrations to establish whether they have an effect in determining predispositions to protest. I anticipate that Zimbabweans who do not belong to a group that advances their interest and who fear the state will not be willing to protest compared to those who belong to associations and groups and do not fear the state.

6.1 Measuring the collective action Dilemma

6.1.1 Fear

Fear is often identified as a factor that limits participation in protests. Fear increases the perceived risk involved in participation. If perceived risk outweighs the benefits people are bound to make rational decisions not to protest (Olson 1965). Thus Zimbabweans may have been demotivated by the massive repression in Zimbabwe that raises the risk of being arrested or being killed.


The Afrobarometer country report (2001) probed the mood in Zimbabwe and concluded that;

There is no doubt that political fear is rampant in Zimbabwe. More than four out of five of the country's citizens (83 %) say that, often or always, "people must be careful of what they say about politics". There is no difference between urban and rural areas, which tends to confirm that political intimidation, whether by war veterans, green bombers, or the police, is widespread (Chikwanha-Dzenga, et al, 2001, p.23).

Makumbe (1994, p.1) confirms the overwhelming climate of fear in the country and argues that "people dare not discuss the views of an opposition party in public for who knows, the women's league or the ZANU youth may hear you, the public is all the time looking over its shoulders when it comes to discussing political views that are contrary to those of the ruling party." In 2006, citizens were asked whether they are careful of what they say at times. The evidence as shown in the table below (Fig 18) reveals that there has been a gradual increase in fear between 1999 to and 2005. 38% of the respondents confirmed that they are always fearful in 1999, while 65% felt this in 2005. Despite fear being so widespread, there is a weak bivariate association between political fear and protest potential (Pearson= -.065*). Fear reduces the potential to protest, as it is negatively related to protest participation.


In an alternative measure of fear, respondents were asked whether they had been forced to vote in the previous elections. Fully one fifth confirmed that they had been forced to do so (Fig 19). Indeed, those who experienced this form of political repression in the elections are less likely to have protested and indicated they would not do so in the future. Fear, measured by the views of individuals who have had a family member or personally been forced to vote is negatively related to protest participation and significant (Pearson's $r = -.216^{**}$). Similarly, individuals who were careful of what they said because of fear instilled by intimidation during elections had reduced protest potential.

Figure 18: Perceptions of fear in Zimbabwe 2005



Question: In this country, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about politics? a) Always b) Often c) Rarely d) Never e) Don't know

Figure 19: Attitudes of intimidations during voting Zimbabwe 2005




Question: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each one of the following statements: During the campaign for the 2005 March Parliamentary election were you or any immediate member of your family forced to vote for a candidate not of your choice? a) Yes b) No c) Don't know

6.1.2 Associational Life

Almond and Verba (1963) argue that voluntary organisations increase the propensity of individuals participate in political action because they provide opportunities for training in participation. Bratton (1989) argues that while associational life in Africa has taken various forms, it has everywhere provided ordinary citizens with an outlet for the political urge to join others in the pursuit of shared goals. In a 2005 Afrobarometer study respondents were asked whether they belong to any of the following groups: religious groups, trade unions, farmers' unions, professional or business associations or community development associations. Their responses are illustrated below (Fig 20). The evidence shows active membership of religious groups - from 60% in 1999 increasing to 63% in 2005. There is a drastic decline in active membership of trade unions and farmers association - from 21% in 1999 to 2% in 2005. Similarly, there is a huge decline in active membership of and official leadership positions in professional and business organisation - from 31% in 1999 to 3% in 2005.

Figure 20: Associational life in Zimbabwe 2005




Question: Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could you tell me whether you are an official leader or an active member, or not a member: A religious, trade union or farmers association, professional or business association, community development self help association a) Not a member b) inactive member c) Active member d) Official Leader e) Don't know

The reason for the decline in active membership in organisations such as trade unions is possibly because of the political crisis that has affected the economy. Whereas the rise in membership of religious organisations might be in response to the crisis, where more and more people disillusioned by initiatives to solve the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe are turning to religion for consolation. Bratton (1989) explains that associational life does not thrive amid political disorder, lawlessness and inadequate physical infrastructure and intermittent essential services. This might possibly explain the decline in associational life in Zimbabwe. The bivariate correlations indicate that belonging to a professional or business association is strongly associated with protest behaviour (Pearson's $r = .207^{**}$). That is, belonging to a professional organisation increases protest potential. However, membership of a religious group (with a Pearson R of $-.049$), trade union or farmers association ($.036$) or belonging to a community development self help association ($.045$) is not statistically significantly related to protest participation. In Chapter 4, dealing with economic explanations and protest, the evidence reveals that protest is a weapon for the economically secure. When combined with this finding it suggests that political opposition to Mugabe is undertaken by the middle classes and not the working class population.

6.1.3 Identification with the opposition

The other factor that may help to overcome the collective action dilemma is raised levels of trust in opposition political parties. The Afrobarometer survey offers two separate measures of citizen trust and identification with the opposition. The evidence below (Fig 21) reveals that in 1999, 5% of respondents identified with the opposition and 29% with the ruling party. But by 2005 identification with the ruling party has decreased to 20% and with the opposition has increased to 33%. A bivariate correlation of identification with the opposition and protest potential confirms that there is a significant and strong relationship (Pearson R $=.258^{**}$). This means that individuals who identify with the opposition are more likely to protest.

Figure 21: Respondents who identify with the opposition 2005




Question: Which party do you feel close to?

6.1.4 Trust in the opposition

Participation in risky collective action like political protests may depend on the belief that those who have initiated and organised the protest will come to one's rescue if one is arrested or injured. Yet many have complained that Zimbabwe's opposition and civic leaders are often not present at such rallies especially if there is a risk of violence. To assess the confidence levels of people with regard to the opposition, respondents were asked how much they trust the opposition. In 2004 34% responded that they didn't trust the opposition at all, and 32% trusted the opposition a little. In 2005 only 20% did not trust the opposition at all compared with 31% who trusted the opposition a little - a slight decline from 2004. Only 5% of respondents indicated they trusted the opposition a lot in 2004 compared to 15% in 2005. While still very low, trust in the opposition has increased. A bivariate correlation of trust in the opposition and protest potential revealed that the two are positively correlated (Pearson $R = .078^*$). This indicates that trust in an opposition party increases protest potential.

Figure 22: Respondents who trust the opposition parties Zimbabwe 2005



Question. How much do you trust the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: the opposition political parties a) Not at all b) Just a little c) Somewhat d) A lot e) Don't know

6.2 Multivariate Regression Model of Collective Action and Protest

Having reviewed survey responses related to fear, trust in the opposition, and group membership, the study now examines their collective influence on protest participation. The model explains 13% of the variance in protest potential. A factor that has high explanatory power in the model on overcoming the collective action dilemma is that of belonging to a professional or business association (Beta .190). Belonging to a religious group is also significant but negatively related to protest participation, that is it increases the collective action dilemma. Fear and belonging to a professional and business association are statistically significant in relation to protest participation (Beta-.190 and -.175 respectively).

Table 3: Regression Model

		R	B	Beta	Sta Sign
Constant			.947		.000
Associational Life	Member of a religious group	-.019	-.078	-.097	.007
	Member of a trade union or farmers association	.036	.059	.047	.208
	Member of a professional or business association	.207**	.495	.190	.000
	Member of a community development or self help association	.045	-.035	-.018	.628
Fear	Careful about what you say	-.065*	-.052	-.031	.107
	You or your family member forced to vote	-.216**	-.312	-.175	.000
	Identification with opposition party	.258**	.333	.204	.000
	Trust in opposition parties	.078*	-.079	-.041	.313

Adjusted R Square (.134) N (1075)

In conclusion, the evidence in the model is consistent with my hypothesis that fear deters one from participating in protest. However, the interesting result is that belonging to an opposition party and business association encourages participation in protest while being part of a religious group lowers protest potential. Surprisingly belonging to a trade union is insignificant to the model. Fear, explained by being forced to vote in the 2005 elections, exacerbates the collective action problem. Membership of an opposition party helps overcome the collective action dilemma.

In the next Chapter the study examines the role of culture as a possible determinant of low protest potential in Zimbabwe. Under cultural explanations values of agency, respect for the rule of law and attitudes to holding leaders accountable shall be assessed with regard to their impact on protest potential.

CHAPTER 7

CULTURAL FACTORS

If African people were not underdeveloped, passive, resigned and cowardly why would they accept underdeveloped leaders? We forget that every people deserves the leaders it gets (Etounga –Manguelle, 2000, p.70)

Is protesting and demonstrating un-African? Is it alien to Zimbabwean culture? Scholars have argued that Africans have different ways of engaging with the state, ways that are informed by deeply held, socialised values and norms of communalism and patriarchal respect for authority (Ake, 1994). Contrary to conventional opinion, the ethos of the liberation struggle in places like Zimbabwe did not raise protest potential as it was commandist in nature. Is it justified to propose that there are practises within the African way of life that have a bearing on methods of engaging with the state in Africa? Is it correct to argue that in the African culture there is no demand for agency and accountability as the systems are based on trust that the leaders have the people's interest at heart? The African culture has been referred to as patriarchal. Under patriarchal values, leaders are seen as "fathers" and it is a sign of disrespect to march in the streets to express grievances as there are methods within African culture of channelling grievances' without parading them in public. Protesting is viewed as an embarrassment and disrespectful. These values have generated conclusions among scholars that Africa has an underdeveloped civic culture that breeds passivity, docility and loyalty.

In the previous chapters, the impact of economic and political explanations in motivating participation through demonstration or protest is discussed. This chapter considers the impact of cultural values and their impact on determining the decision of individual Zimbabweans to participate in protests or demonstrations. The discussion will assess concepts such as agency, respect for the rule of law, and demands for accountability. Through these explanations I would expect that individuals who are respectful of their leadership and do not demand accountability from their leadership are less likely to participate in protests or demonstrations. Furthermore, it is hypothesised that respondents who obey their leaders and support the rule of law are less likely to protest.

7.1 What is political Culture?

African societies are often said to be characterised by a subject political culture that emphasises respect for tradition. Kamrava (1995) supports this view. He states that:

Political nuances such as patriarchy or coercion give regime orientations a façade of unanimity, normalcy and stability, and prompt people to resort to a different type of behaviour towards the state to engage in a different form of politics if they are given the opportunity to do so (Kamrava, 1995).

What is not clear is whether protest could possibly form part of the behaviour that people can resort to or not Thompson (2000, p.12) explains that “adversarial political culture was alien to the continent and nationalists considered it foolish to recreate institutions that had been born and evolved out of Europe’s need to manage social inequality and class conflict” By celebrating such virtues, African leaders were able to motivate for a one party state.

What then are the African methods of engaging with the political leadership? Thompson (2000) and Ake (2000) explain that African forms of participation were romanticised by leaders such as Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta, and Julius Nyerere who described how their forbearers had traditionally met as communities rather than as individual contestants. To make decisions, elders would sit under a village tree and discuss an idea until consensus was reached and then insist on conformity. Ake (2000) criticised African methods of participation as having inherent weaknesses that are not democratic, for example the exclusion of women in the decision making process. Moyo (1993) contends that the principle of the African system of participation was misunderstood when he argues that:

African traditional values demand a system of governance which has one chief and one clan bound together by consensus politics... However what is rarely articulated is that the revered Nyerere once argued that despite all the variations and some exceptions where the institutions of domestic slavery existed, African family life was everywhere based on certain practises and attitudes which together mean basic equality, freedom and unity (Moyo, 1993, p.11).

Unfortunately, these values were not embraced by most African leaders. The communal mode of participation was embraced by ZANU PF to restrict political space by giving cultural legitimacy to monopoly politics under the cover of culture.

The ruling party initiated a process to institute a de jure one party state. In May 1990, President Mugabe argued:

When you hear us talk about one party state ... we are thinking purely that our family must be one. A one party state system would give Zimbabwe greater space and greater democracy (cited in Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991, p.47)

Etounga-Manguella (2000) explains that in the African custom it is rather inconceivable that an individual can be viewed as autonomous, an African can only bloom and develop through social and family life.” Ake (1994, p.6) explains further that “participation is linked to communality as Africans do not generally see themselves as self regarding atomised beings in essentially competitive and potentially conflicting interaction with others, rather their consciousness is directed towards belonging to an organic whole.

Hydén (2006), attempts to explain the values that shape participation among Africans through his theory of the “economy of affection¹⁷”. His theory differs from relations of power in other types of political economy, where social relations are disembodied from the origin in local places. It offers pragmatism adaptability to cope with shifting conditions over which people have little control. Hydén (2006, p.83) further argues that “people do not strive for the right to speak out and challenge authority, as is the case of the ideal type of civic communicative space. He gives an example of the widespread disillusionment with governments in African countries, which has produced an interest in professional and other circles creating a civic culture. The fledging culture of the civil society is still under economy of affection, since power remains personal rather than institutional. If the economy of affection has extended to civil society, it does not explain the influence of culture in driving these institutions.

To measure culture an assessment of one’s regional location and gender can assist in looking at its impact on protest. As in most African societies rural people are considered to be the custodians of African culture. Most traditional practises are preserved and observed in the rural areas. Similarly in Zimbabwe even traditional


¹⁷ It is constituted by personal investment in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain, that is, sought after goals, whether material or symbolic, such as prestige or status have a scarcity value. That is, they may be physically available but not accessible to all, so people invest in relations with others to obtain them” (Hydén, 2006, p.73)

structures of leadership are still part of the society. Whereas urban areas are cosmopolitan in nature and usually constitutes of people from different tribes leading to the erosion of culture. Rural people in Zimbabwe can be argued to be hostage to African culture. More so that culture advances patriarchal practises that define the role of women and men in society. Afrobarometer measures one's residential location and gender. And these items will also be used as proxies for culture.

7.1.1 Residential location and Gender

Political participation can be influenced by one's regional location. The assumption is that individuals who stay in the rural areas are homogenous and most likely to support the ruling party whereas the opposition is urban based. Previous local government, legislative and presidential elections have revealed that the ruling party has a strong hold in the rural areas compared to the urban areas. The Afrobarometer survey reveals that 64% of the respondents are rural based, compared to 36% who stay in urban areas (Fig 24). A bivariate correlation between one's residential location with protest reveals a negative but significant relationship with protest potential (Pearson $R = .189^{**}$). This means that urban people are more likely to protest compared to people living in rural areas. As for gender, the evidence from Zimbabwe revealed that in 2005 50% of the respondents were male and 50% female. A bivariate correlation of protest and gender is negatively related (Pearson $r = -.150^{**}$). That is, females have less protest potential compared to males. This might be because of the risk involved where participating in protest in the current repressive environment in Zimbabwe could result in injury or death.

Figure 23: Respondents residential location Zimbabwe 2005




Question: Residential location Urban or Rural?

7.1.2 Accountability

To what extent do Zimbabweans feel it is their duty to hold elected representatives accountable? In other words, do Zimbabweans see themselves as active agents? Africans have been classified as too loyal to their leadership and entrusting them with all responsibilities.

Figure 24: Perceptions of leaders' levels of accountability Zimbabwe 2005



Question: Who should be responsible for: making sure that, once elected, Members of Parliament do their jobs? a) The President/Executive b) The Parliament c) Their political party d) The Voters e) Don't

In the survey respondents were asked their opinion regarding who should be responsible to ensure that Members of Parliament and local government councillors do their job. In contrast to popular wisdom, their responses (Fig 24) show evidence that indicates a considerable number of respondents have a higher demand for accountability, with 54% expressing the view that voters are responsible for ensuring Members of Parliament do their job. Similarly 56% of the respondents acknowledged that it is the voters' role to hold councillors accountable for their work.


Despite the high levels of acknowledgment of responsibility for holding members of parliament accountable, a significant number of individuals identified the executive as responsible - 32% felt Members of Parliament were responsible and 24% felt Councillors should have this responsibility. 6% of the respondents indicated that it is the ruling party's responsibility. The evidence above suggests that Zimbabweans take a fairly large responsibility for their fate. But to what extent do these beliefs affect protest participation? Bivariate correlation reveals that those Zimbabweans who believe it is their duty to hold officials accountable are more likely to protest, and

perceptions of holding elected bureaucrats accountable are statistically insignificant (Pearson R = -.031).

7.1.3 Rule of Law

To establish the predisposition of Zimbabweans towards the rule of law responses to questions were combined. These related to whether people should obey government, find lawful solutions to problems, and forego use of violence in Zimbabwean politics. From these a multiple item index was created which is a reliable measure of respect for the rule of law.¹⁸ Below is a review of the items that constitute the index, discussed separately. Different cultures have different methods and systems to deal with lawlessness. Some resort to community justice led by vigilantes and other forms of punishment, such as banishment from the community or corporal punishment, as in Botswana. In order to assess the predispositions of Zimbabweans with regard to the rule of law individuals were asked whether they agreed with the use of unlawful means to solve problems.

Figure 24: Attitudes of respecting rule of law Zimbabwe in 2005



Question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B: A It is better to find lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer


¹⁸ The factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor with an Eigen value=(1.34) which explains 61 percent of the common variance. Index reliability Cronbach Alpha (= .68) is high (1102)

The evidence (Fig 25) shows that 66% of respondents supported using lawful solutions to solve problems, compared to only 33% who would justify ignoring the law. This possibly means that despite the abuse of human rights within Zimbabwe people still have confidence in the law, regardless of the reported violations committed over the last 7 years. More importantly, one would expect that with the level of lawlessness in the country led by a few people aligned to the ruling party this could likely permeate society. Yet this is not the case. Do attitudes on the rule of law affect participation in protest action? Bivariate correlation reveals that an index of perceptions of individuals' respect for the rule of law is negatively correlated and statistically significant (Pearson's $r = -.247^{**}$). This means less support for the rule of law reduces protest potential.

7.1.4 Obedience to government

A second element related to attitudes to the rule of law involves obedience to the legitimacy of authority. The study attempted to establish whether respondents would feel obliged to obey a government even if they did not vote for it. The evidence from the Afrobarometer surveys (Fig 26) reveals that 83% of respondents concurred that they ought to obey authority, compared to 15% who indicated that they would not necessarily be obedient to governmental authority.

Figure 25: Attitudes of levels of obedience to the government Zimbabwe 2005




Questions: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B.

7.1.5 Justification for violence

The other measurement of the rule of law is justification for use of violence. The last seven years in Zimbabwe have seen an upsurge in cases of politically motivated violence. A culture of state violence to achieve political outcomes is the current norm in Zimbabwe. Violence has not only been monopolised by the ruling party but even the opposition has been accused of using violence for political ends. Has this culture of violence permeated the Zimbabwean polity? The evidence below (Fig 27) reveals that 74% of citizens believe that violence is not justified in Zimbabwean politics compared to 25% who feel that it is necessary.

Figure 26: Perceptions on political violence in Zimbabwe 2005




Questions: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or Statement B

7.1.6 Agency

Hydén (2006) argues that African societies have developed an 'economy of affection', where informal channels take precedence over legal channels. The Afrobarometer survey asked people what they would do when confronted with different problems. The respondents were asked whether they would resolve problems by just leaving them, offering a bribe, using their connections or influence or joining a public protest (Fig 28)

Figure 27: Attitudes of agency Zimbabwe 2005



Question: What if anything, would you do to try and resolve each of the following situations? A) Don't worry things will be resolved given enough time b) Lodge complaint through proper channels or procedures c) Use connections with influential people d) Offer tip or bribe e) Join in public protest f) Nothing, because nothing can be done g) Other h) Don't know

Most respondents indicated that they would lodge a complaint if they had problems with the following: obtaining a permit, getting their name on the voters' roll, if they suspect a school/clinic official of stealing, if they were unjustly arrested or if someone wrongly seized family land¹⁹. For example, with reference to land seizures, which affect many people, 85% of the respondents affirmed their preference for using legal channels. In contrast to what Hydén sees as the preferred means of transaction in the economy of affection, only 4% of the respondents indicated that they offer bribes and 7% would use their connections to influence issues (Hydén 2006).

¹⁹ Respondents who would lodge a complaint: waiting for permit 55%, missing on voters role 58%, suspect official of stealing 85%, wrongfully arrested 76%, wrongly seized land 85%

The lack of inclination to use protest action could possibly imply that individual Zimbabweans are still confident of the efficacy of using lawful channels to solve their problems. Bivariate correlation reveals agency is insignificant and negatively related to protest (Pearson R = -.072). This means that individuals who would resort to informal channels for resolving problems are less likely to protest.

7.2 Multivariate Regression Model of Culture and Protest

Participation

Taken together these cultural factors explain 6% of the variance in protest participation. The two factors that have high explanatory power on the model, although negatively related are residential location and respect for the rule of law (with a Beta of -.122 and -.193 respectively).

Table 4: Regression Model

	R	B	Beta	Sta Significance
Constant		.183		.000
Demand accountability	-.053	-.073	-.049	.217
Agency	-.072	-.034	-.009	.834
Respect Rule of Law	-.247**	-.218	-.193	.000
Urban/Rural	-.189**	-.176	-.122	.002
Gender	-.150**	-.167	-.108	.007

Adjusted R square (.066) (n=1112)

Chapter 8 examines the impact of cognitive awareness on protest participation. Do education, media exposure and interest in and discussing of public affairs increase protest potential?

CHAPTER 8

COGNITIVE AWARENESS

As people become ever more aware of the world around them they gain the ability to form opinions around them on the political and economic issues of the day...and comprehend the manifold ways in which their lives are affected by decisions made by distant power holders. (Bratton, et al, 2005, p.203)

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 dealt with political repression culture, economic dissatisfaction and associational life as possible determinants of protest participation. This section assesses the degree to which cognitive awareness, measured through one's level of formal education, media exposure and cognitive engagement, may determine participation in protest or demonstration. Expectations are that individual Zimbabweans who have limited access to news media, low levels of formal education and are uninterested in public affairs will be less likely to protest.

8.1 Measuring Cognitive Awareness


8.1.1 Education

Formal education builds the individual cognitive skills that are necessary to enable citizens to participate effectively by “developing competencies, self concepts, knowledge, values and world views which enable them to understand the workings of the political system and learn to manipulate it to their advantage either individually or collectively” (Arnove, 1973, p.198). Other than creating some understanding of the political situation, education increases knowledge and induces a continuing quest for knowledge through reading and accessing the mass media. Education may often create awareness of civil liberties and human rights, yet it may simultaneously lower the propensity to engage in violent protest. It also increases the level of opposition to any forms of repression from the government. (Hall, Rodegheir and Useem, 1986, p.565) argues that “educated people are more likely to tolerate or grant legitimacy to collective action on behalf of a cause they may not support.”

Whereas on the other hand Zimbabweans are said to be too educated to protest and look down upon such methods of engaging the state as only meant for the unemployed and uneducated (Namate, 2006). To establish the level of education of

individual Zimbabweans respondents were asked how much education they had attained.

Figure 28: Respondents levels of education, Zimbabwe 2005



Question: What the highest level of education you have completed ? a) No formal schooling b) Informal schooling only including Koranic schooling c) Some primary schooling d) Primary school completed e) Some secondary school /high school completed f) Post secondary qualifications other than university g) Some university h) University completed i) Post graduate

The evidence above (Fig 29) reveals that only 7% of the informants had either informal schooling or no formal schooling compared to 28% of the respondents who have either completed primary school or have some primary school education. If the level of education is key to determining the efficacy of one's participation in protest, the evidence above shows that a high number of respondents have the basic level of education to enable them to gain the necessary skills to efficiently participate in protest

Evans and Rose (2006, p.1) explain that even 'primary schooling promotes citizen endorsement of democracy and rejection of non-democratic alternatives even when it has taken place under authoritarian rule without explicit civic education'. If this is

correct it therefore follows that even the 28% with primary school education can grasp at least some of the world around them and can participate in protest action.

The evidence above also indicates that 54% of the respondents had secondary school education and 10% have University education. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence where Zimbabwe is said to have high levels of education with highly skilled people. Zimbabweans are able to read and write and to conceptualise issues because of their relatively high levels of education. Bivariate correlations confirm that higher levels of formal education are indeed strongly related to higher levels of protest (Pearson's $R = .227^{**}$). In the previous chapter the evidence revealed that protest is mostly associated with the economically secure, and with professionals, and in this section the evidence attributes protest to the educated. The evidence seems to suggest a pattern of protest in Zimbabwe undertaken by the middle classes.

8.1.2 Media Access in Zimbabwe

A second determinant of cognitive awareness is an individual's exposure to the news media. The mass media exposes ordinary people to various experiences beyond their immediate environment (Bratton, et al, 2005). News programmes and other public affairs programmes play several roles in this regard, including making people aware of the issues confronting government at home and internationally. The news media expands the range of considerations that people bring to bear and informs their political and economic attitudes. Yet not all news media may be equally useful.

A key distinction may lie with whether the media is state or privately owned. Currently the Zimbabwean government owns a significant share of the news outlets in the mass media sector with the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) enjoying sole access to television and radio broadcasting. The only existing independent daily newspaper was banned. Thus whatever news Zimbabweans are exposed to within the country has bias towards the ruling party (Chuma, 2004). The three independent weekly newspapers are confined to urban areas with a small circulation and are not affordable to most Zimbabweans.


The state of affairs in the media has limited people's exposure to what is happening in the country. Before February 2000 the government started a campaign to rebuild

national identity by encouraging the youth to abide by the principles of the liberation struggle.

ZBC was restructured via a purge of journalists who refused to toe the new official line and foreign programme content was reduced to 25%” After 2002 control of the media was moved into the office of the President and this led to the introduction of the toughest laws. AIPPA was promulgated which requires the compulsory registration of journalists. Its enforcements have led to the prosecution of local journalist on flimsy grounds like ‘causing an article to be published’ (Chikwanha-Dzenga, et al, 2004, p. 4)

Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys 1 and 2 suggests that popular use of the media has narrowed between 1999 and 2004. Daily consumption of radio news has dropped by a third from 60% in 1999 to 41% in 2004. Daily newspaper readership is down by one half from 24% in 2000 to 12% in 2004. Yet access to the single official channel of television news, the content of which is closely controlled by government, has remained steady. As a result urban dwellers are now more than twice as likely to get their news from television than from newspapers and face a diet of restructured information.

Figure 29: Attitudes of media exposure Zimbabwe 2005




Question: How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio news, television news, newspaper news ? a) Never b) Less than once a month c) A few times a month d) A few times a week e) Every day f) Don't Know

2006 survey results (Fig 30) reveal that media exposure for individual Zimbabweans is decreasing from 2004. The evidence shows that 42% of the respondents confirm listening to radio news every day and 26% are without access to news at all. On television 48% of the respondents indicated that they do not have access to television news compared to 29% who are able to watch it on a day to day basis. On access to newspapers the evidence shows that 51% of the respondents do not have access to newspapers compared to 8% who can read them on a daily basis. To explain the causes of this limited access, Moore (2005, p.110) argues that Zimbabweans cannot afford batteries and radios anymore so listening to the state news has declined by a third since 1999, even the number of people who read the newspapers has dropped by half because of the levels of poverty". For those in urban areas having a television is no different to those who do not as there are numerous daily blackouts because of the load shedding of electricity. The few who can afford generators have switched on to satellite news to avoid the state propaganda. Media exposure is also significantly correlated with protest participation (Pearson's R .222**). This indicates that those with media exposure are more likely to protest.

8.1.3 Trust in government media and Independent newspapers


Even though the news media in Zimbabwe is state controlled, Zimbabweans who have exposure to news are more likely to protest. It is only those who actually trust the government media who are less likely to do so. Public opinion results confirm limited trust in Zimbabwe of both state owned and independent media. The evidence (Fig 31) indicates that in 1999, 19% of the respondents indicated little or no trust in the state media and this increased to 26% in 2005. Trust in the government is also statistically significantly correlated with protest action (Pearson $R = -.200^{**}$). That is, those who trust the government newspapers are less likely to protest.

Figure 30: Respondents attitudes of trust in government newspapers 2005



At the same time people expressed limited trust for the independent newspapers with 9% of the respondents expressing limited levels of trust in the media in 1999 increasing to 20% in 2004.

Figure 31: Respondents attitudes of trust in independent newspapers Zimbabwe 2005




While trust in the state media reduces protest potential, trust in private media increases it (Pearson $r = .143$)

8.1.4 Cognitive Engagement

Cognitive engagement is the final factor used in this chapter to measure cognitive awareness. It involves the level of interest in local or national public affairs and active discussion of political events and policy issues with family, friends and neighbours. The current climate in Zimbabwe is highly polarised conducive to people engaging in political discussions, despite the risks involved. Zimbabweans are conscious of the political challenges confronting the country but cannot influence the process through democratic channels.

To establish the levels of participation of individuals in discussing politics, individuals were asked how often they discuss politics with friends. To measure cognitive engagement I created a two item construct²⁰.

Figure 32: Respondents who discuss politics Zimbabwe 2005




Question: When you get together with your friends and family, would you say you discuss political matters a) Never b) Occasionally c) Frequently d) Don't Know

27% of respondent indicated that they never discussed politics with friends while 53% occasionally discuss politics with friends and 21% frequently discuss politics (Fig 33). The evidence shows that there is a high level of discussion of politics with friends. The other measure of cognitive engagement consists of the level of interest in public affairs. As a result of the polarised climate and the harsh economic environment, one would expect a huge interest in “comprehending the manifold ways in which their lives are affected by decisions made by distant power holders” (Bratton, et al, 2005, p.203). On the other hand one might expect to find high levels of apathy as a result of people’s inability to exercise agency.

The evidence shows that the political downturn within Zimbabwe has not significantly increased or decreased the interest in politics (as illustrated in Fig 34).

²⁰ There is a sufficient correlation (Pearson’s $r = .521^{**}$) and reliability (Cronbach Alpha $.68$) between the items to warrant the creation of a two item average construct of cognitive engagement between discussing public affairs and interest in public affairs ($n = 1106$)

Figure 33: Respondents interested in public affairs in Zimbabwe 2005



Question: How interested would you say you are in public affairs? (You know, in politics and government) a) Not at all interested b) Not very interested c) Somewhat interested d)Very interested e) Don't know

22% of the respondents indicated that they were very interested in public affairs, 35% of the respondents were somewhat interested in public affairs and 43% of the respondents were not interested in public affairs. The highest number of respondents indicated they were not interested in politics. The possible reason for this is state repression has rendered them too scared to discuss these issues, or this repression has dissipated interest in public affairs. A bivariate correlation cognitive engagement is positively related to protest participation (Pearson R of .181**). This indicates that individuals interested in public affairs are more likely to protest.

8.2 Multivariate Regression Model Cognitive Awareness and Protest

Cognitive factors as a whole account for 10% of the variance on the regression model. The variable with strong explanatory power in the model relates to lack of trust in the government media (with a Beta of -.154) followed by the education level of respondents (with a Beta of .135) and respondents' levels of cognitive engagement (with a Beta of .135).

Table 5: Regression Model

	R	B	Beta	Sta Significance
Constant		.138		.159
Cognitive Engagement	.181**	.135	.134	.000
Media exposure	.222**	.042	.051	.189
Trust in government newspapers	-.200**	-.125	-.154	.000
Trust in Independent newspapers	.143**	.077	.090	.009
Education	.227**	.058	.135	.000

Adjusted R Square (.098) (n=1112)

In conclusion, these results are consistent with the original hypothesis of this chapter. The evidence shows that individuals who are more cognitively engaged and have more exposure to the media are more likely to protest. It also corroborates the hypothesis that people who are educated are more likely to protest.

CHAPTER 9

ANALYSIS

The previous chapters established theoretical explanations for protest potential through bivariate correlation and multivariate analysis of influencing factors. . This chapter examines the simultaneous impact of these factors. The table below (Fig 35) represents a linear regression model that tests the impact of five sets of factors on protest potential. The first and second columns contains the standardised regression coefficients (Beta) for each independent variable. The negative and positive sign with each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non significant effects mean the two variables are not at all connected. In the last row the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted R Square) of the model on the dependent variable is presented. Models one and two show the effect of adding all five explanations. . Model one illustrates the effects of economic, political, cognitive, cultural and collective action dilemma factors on protest potential. Model 2 drops all statistically insignificant indicators to obtain a more accurate estimate of Adjusted R square and a more parsimonious model

The model explains 28% of the variance in protest potential. The explanation that is most significant on the model is the collective action dilemma factor. The least significant model uses political explanations. The individual items that are most important in the model are employment (.238), education (.149); belonging to a professional organization (.201), identifying with the opposition party (.186) and Diaspora support (.092). These factors motivate protest participation and they are positively related to protest. The individual items that reduce protest potential and are negatively related to protest are absolute deprivation (-.157), belief in the freeness of elections (-.166), trust in government newspapers (-.158), respect for the rule of law (-.227), residential residential location (-.159), belonging to a religious group or being forced to vote also reduces protest potential

9.1 Economic Explanations

The evidence reveals that absolute deprivation (-157) has a negative effect on protest potential. Having employment (.238) and receiving money from the Diaspora (.092) are positively related, that is these factors increase protest potential. Chapter 4 discussed the causes of absolute deprivation - the high cost of living, hyperinflation and unemployment. The evidence of the expressed inability by respondents facing absolute deprivation to protest could be a result of the economic meltdown which has immobilised political participation. The severe hardships might have resulted in people devising survival strategies for enduring the harsh economic environment (Hirschman 1970). The result contradicts Gurr's thesis that relative deprivation spurs protest participation. (Gurr, 1970) The model indicates that relative deprivation is insignificant and has less explanatory power. Similarly, absolute deprivation is strong but dissuades protest action.

The other significant factor related to economic explanations is employment. Being employed is positively related to protest and has more explanatory power in the model (with a Beta of .238). Conventional wisdom dictates that unemployed people are more likely to protest as a result of frustration by their economic and political powerlessness. A possible explanation for the opposite finding is that a working environment enables sharing of information related to public affairs which the unemployed might not have access to. The absence of mobilising structures among the unemployed also exacerbates their inability to protest. In contrast, workplaces are easy platforms for mobilising people to participate in civil disobedience on bread and butter related issues. The other interpretation is that unionised labour is a common feature in urban areas where the culture of protest is strong among the worker. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) heightened the propensity to protest in individuals because of previous organised protest and stayaways against price increases and wage issues in the 1990s.

Figure 34: Multivariate Effects

Economic Explanations	Model 1		Model 2		Adj.R Block	Adj R Cumulative
	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig effects		
Constant	.078	.943				
Absolute Deprivation	-.157	.000	-.157	.000		
Relative Deprivation	.014	.692				
Future Expectations	.019	.588				
Employment	.239	.000	.238	.000		
Diaspora Support	.092	.007	.092	.005		
					.075	.075
Political Explanation						
Supply of Democracy	-.102	.053				
Personal Freedoms	-.094	.039				
Responsiveness	-.010	.816				
Elections Free and Fair	-.180	.001	-.166	.003		
Elections Ensure Parliament reflects voters choice	-.058	.217				
					.003	.127
Cognitive Explanation						
Cognitive Engagement	.134	.000	.140	.000		
Media Exposure	.051	.189				
Trust in Independent newspapers	.090	.009	.094	.006		
Trust in government newspapers	-.154	.000	-.158	.000		
Education	.135	.000	.149	.000		
					.098	.181
Cultural Explanation						
Demand accountability	-.033	.085				
Agency	-.035	.251				
Gender	-.167	.007	-.108	.000		
Respect rule of Law	-.202	.026	-.227	.000		
Urban/Rural	-.102	.002	-.159	.000		
					.084	.211
Collective Action Dilemma						
Member of a religious group	-.097	.007	-.098	.006		
Member of a trade union or farmers association	.017	.208				
Member of a professional or business association	.190	.000	.201	.000		
Member of a community development or self help association	.018	.628				
Opposition party identification	.204	.000	.186	.000		
Careful about what you say	-.031	.407				
You or your family member forced to vote	-.175	.000	-.147	.000		
Trust in opposition parties	-.041	.313				
Adjusted R square	.218		.270		.124	.284

Adjusted R square (.284) n= (1112)

9.2 Political Explanations

As discussed in Chapter 6, protest action can be triggered by perceptions that public institutions and structures will accommodate people voicing their concerns (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). People can protest if political channels are closed and people want to push for them to be opened (Dalton and Sickle, 2005). The evidence from Zimbabwe reveals that individuals who are dissatisfied with the lack of freeness of the elections are less likely to protest. This variable is negatively related (with a Beta of -0.166). The evidence is inconsistent with the literature that states that individuals who perceive the supply of democracy to be inadequate are more likely to protest. The lack of interest in protesting expressed by respondents who perceive the traditional channels to be closed is possibly because of their feelings of inadequacy to change the situation either by voting or protesting.

The evidence shows the weaknesses of opposition parties and civil society in mobilising resistance around human rights violations. This strategy has only served to strengthen the people's resolve not to protest as a result of the risks involved. The model illustrates that variables such as supply of democracy, personal freedoms, responsiveness of leaders and perceptions of the freeness of elections are statistically insignificant and have very limited explanatory power related to protest potential in Zimbabwe.

9.3 Cognitive Explanations

The political science literature argues that cognitive awareness increases protest potential. The findings reveal that cognitive engagement and high education levels are positively related to protest, that is increase protest potential. Trust in government newspapers is negatively related, that is reduces protest potential, while trust in independent newspapers increases protest potential (with a Beta of 0.149). People who show low levels of trust in government newspapers are also less likely to protest (with Beta of -0.158).

In assessing the relationship between education and protest, the evidence from Zimbabwe shows that there is a strong significant relationship between an individual's level of education and protest participation (with a Beta of .149). Educated people have a higher propensity to protest, regardless of whether they are subjected to state propaganda and massive repression. This is because they have avenues of accessing information other than state channels. The less educated might not be able to discern between exercising their rights and committing a crime possibly because they are not exposed to other sources of news such as the independent media.

9.4 Collective Action Dilemma

Zimbabweans' general inability to protest has been attributed to fear and the risks associated with participating in protest. The literature argues that for one to overcome the collective action dilemma one has to belong to a group which helps in overcoming the fear (Bratton et al 2005). The evidence shows that individuals who belong to a professional or business association are more likely to protest (with a Beta of .201). A possible explanation for this is that most people who are involved in business and professional organisations have still been hard hit by the country's economic problems. Surprising is the statistical insignificance of belonging to a trade union or farmer's union and community development organisation as possible determinants of protest. These are grassroots organisations which previously provided support for opposition politics in Zimbabwe and members of these organisations should have had a high propensity to protest. The opposition politics in Zimbabwe has a strong labour background which provided most of the membership of the MDC. It would be expected that belonging to a trade union enables one to be exposed to current bread and butter issues. However, the closure of most companies in Zimbabwe due to the economic meltdown led to the growth of the informal sector therefore most of the people no longer belong to trade unions. These people now form part of the informal sector, such as cross boarder traders and vendors. This could explain why the labour organisation influence is insignificant

However, belonging to a religious group reduces the chances of one protesting (with a Beta of -.098). This might be as a result of teachings of piety and loyalty to leadership in religious organisations.

The results in the model confirm notions that the reason why Zimbabweans are not protesting is related to fear of government reprisals, as this is statistically significant (with a Beta of .147). The repression in Zimbabwe has benefited the current government as it has deterred people from embarking on any form of resistance

9.5 Cultural Factors

The literature argues that culture can deter protest. (Almond and Verba, 1963). The African culture has been associated with limiting individual Zimbabwean's participation in protest as people respect their leader as their father. The model reveals that variables that have a negative and significant explanatory power are if respondents have respect for the rule of law and if they live in a rural area (with a Beta of -.227) and -.159 respectively). The evidence is consistent with what is in the literature, where rural areas in Zimbabwe are viewed as homogenous and the people in these areas are more likely to vote for the ruling party. These results are consistent with electoral trends in Zimbabwe that have resulted in the opposition winning both parliamentary and local government elections in the urban areas

Previous Afrobarometer surveys show that urbanites express greater support for democracy. In the case of Zimbabwe less interest in protesting in urban areas might possibly be as a result of the repressive nature of the state which has clamped down on the people to an extent that it has reduced interest in participating in protests. Lack of interest in participating in protest in the rural areas on the other hand might be explained in the context of the events of the last five years that has seen engineered pro ZANUPF and anti MDC demonstrations mushrooming. This involved the bussing of people from rural areas to urban areas at times in the name of defending sovereignty or fighting the British. There is a need to explore individual understanding of protesting in contrast to the demonstrations that are at times stage managed by politicians and powerful people in society. It might also be necessary for future research to explore the nature of these engineered protests and their origins

CONCLUSION

Zimbabweans are not risk takers, people want to wait for the outcome of a process and join in the celebration...you expect the leadership of the MDC to be battered on your behalf while you sit in the comfort of your own homes. This is a struggle that we need to join in because with only the MDC, ZCTU, NCA and without you the masses we will not realise that dream of seeing the regime out of power.

MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti addressing the Public on the New Zimbabwe on 27 September 2007 in Harare

This study sought to examine the factors that determine protest participation in Zimbabwe. Drawing from the literature it explored the impact of economic, political cultural, collective action dilemma and cognitive awareness explanations using micro level analysis of cross sectional survey results from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey collected through personal interviews in August and October 2002 in Zimbabwe.

Protest in Zimbabwe, based on the evidence from this study, is class based. The individuals who are most likely to protest are the educated, professionals, the urbanized and the economically secure. This could possibly explain why there are few people participating in protest. Professional groups, while predisposed to protest, have been dramatically reduced due to massive migration to the Diaspora and are now thus in the minority. The poor and down-trodden are not willing to protest. The reason for these class differences might be that civic society and opposition parties have possibly alienated the poor through their strategies. The results from this study raise questions with regard to the levels of trust shown in the leadership of civil society organisations and opposition groups. A previous study by Leysens (2004), carried out using Afrobarometer Round 1 data, arrived at similar conclusions. He concluded that the inability of the marginalised to confront the regime is an indication that:

Mugabe's government will in all probability not be threatened by a popular revolt of Zimbabwe's impoverished and marginalised population... even the most arduous circumstances will not necessarily translate into inclinations towards pushing for economic and political transformation. It might mean that Zimbabweans are more inclined to engage the state on a tactical basis, in order to ensure daily survival (Leysens, 2004:19).

As stated earlier, the role and efficacy of civil society and opposition groups needs to be revisited. Current civil society leaders in Zimbabwe have been labelled more as ‘desktop’ or dot com activists. They are perceived as more concerned with getting media attention outside Zimbabwe instead of mobilising on the ground. Furthermore, most civic organisations are confined to urban areas and do not penetrate rural areas. The leadership is not visible at protest marches, only appearing at press conferences.

The marginalised in Zimbabwe could have possibly lost confidence as they see very little benefit from opposition politics other than being pawns in the political game of power. The other possible demoralising factor is the apparent disunity within civil society where the struggle in Zimbabwe has been co -modified and privatised at the expense of the people. The disunity in Zimbabwean civil society has led to uncoordinated protest marches whose agenda is self serving, only serving to raise the profiles of the leaders and organisations abroad rather achieving anything for the collective good. For example, in the same month the NCA, WOZA and the ZCTU would call for protest action on related issues and expect to get support from the same constituency instead of pooling their human and financial resources to be more effective.

The reasons for the divisions among opposition groups range from the quest for personal glory by leaders to the politics of accessing donor funds. Civic society leaders are accused of mostly being concerned with outcomes that enhance their visibility, such as the number of street protests organised, and how many times they are arrested, instead of dedicating more time to organising the protests. This lack of co-ordination in civil society has manifested in the failure to mobilise the impoverished. Most organisations organise their meetings in hotels, advertising in independent newspapers or on the internet. Unfortunately these channels have limited coverage and are out of reach for the marginalised.

Zimbabweans might be docile and passive and appear to be waiting for a messiah to solve the crisis. This could be attributed to the absence of a culture of protesting however this is worsened by lack of capacity and the repressive nature of the regime. To unlock the crisis there is need for massive training on methods of rebelling against the regime that minimise individual risk. Other strategies of protest that could be

explored are rent and rates boycotts and demand for better services from local communities. Massive street protests will only emerge through a consolidate process of community gains were people see the benefits of confronting the regime at a local level. People need to be mobilised on bread and butter issues such as price increases, water shortage,s power cuts and increases in school fees.

The current trend within civil society to call on protests for abstract issues such as human rights and democracy will not achieve their intended aims. There is need for opposition and civil society leaders to form structures from village level, within the low and high density areas across the country that train people on how to deal with local problems and ways to petition and mobilise for change and results. This might be difficult and it demands effort and resources but it is an opportunity that has to be explored. Leysens (2004) argues that it is difficult to mobilise and organise for political transformation when every day is a struggle to meet one's basic needs . Alternatively, if protest is class oriented and the majority are not willing to protest it possibly gives the civics and opposition no alternative but to focus on the SADC initiative to resolve the 7 year old crisis as a possible option, despite its serious flaws, instead of hoping for change through elections or protests within the country.

Implications for Democracy

The evidence in this study illustrates that the Zimbabwe's road to democratizations is far from being complete. While the electoral system is uneven, participation is confined to the middle class. If democracy is to take root in Zimbabwe more resources have to be invested in enabling the masses to demand accountable leadership. There is also a need to revisit the effectiveness of the current leadership within opposition groups and civil society and assess whether they have the capacity to mobilize people. Resources have been poured into Zimbabwe with very little or no success.

It is time for opposition groups, civil society and other democratic forces outside and within Zimbabwe to revisit their strategies. The crisis in Zimbabwe raises questions regarding those who are driving the drive for democratization. Are they now only self serving and manipulating the crisis for personal gain through donor funding? Is the inability of the masses to heed calls for protest a vote of no confidence in the

opposition and civil society leadership? Or have Zimbabweans devised alternative strategies to cope with the crisis?

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APPENDICES

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Appendix A: Operationalisation of Variables

Dependant Variable

Protest participation

Question 29

Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not would you do this if you had the chance?

- A Attended a community meeting
- B Got together with others to raise an issue
- C Attended a demonstration or protest march
- D Taken part in a stay away
 - 1. Often
 - 2. Several times
 - 3. Once or twice
 - 4. Would if had the chance
 - 5. Would never do this
 - 6. Don't Know

Economic Explanations

Deprivation

Question 12

Over the past year how often, if ever has you or anyone in your family gone without food, water, medical care, cooking fuel, without cash income, how often have you gone without school expenses for children?

- 1) Never
- 2) Just once or twice
- 3) Several Times
- 4) Many times
- 5) Always

Relative Deprivation

Question 7

In general how do you rate your living conditions to those of other Zimbabweans?

- 1) Much worse
- 2) Worse
- 3) Same
- 4) Better
- 5) Much better

Future Expectations

Question 9

Looking ahead do you expect the Living conditions in twelve months to be?

- 1) Much worse
- 2) Worse
- 3) Same
- 4) Better
- 5) Much better
- 6)

Employment

Question 82

Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it fulltime? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)

1. No (not looking)
2. No (looking)
3. Yes part time (not looking)
4. Yes ,part time (looking)
5. Yes ,full time (not looking)
6. Yes, full time (looking)
7. Don't know

Demographics

1. Urban
2. Rural

Political Explanations

Extent of Democracy

Question 41

In your opinion how much of a democracy is Zimbabwe today?

- 1) Full Democracy
- 2) A democracy with minor problems
- 3) A democracy with major problems
- 4) Not a democracy
- 5) Do not understand question/do not understand what democracy is?
- 6) Don't Know

Satisfaction with democracy

Question 42

Overall how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Zimbabwe? Are you

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Fairly satisfied
- 3) Not very satisfied
- 4) Not at all satisfied
- 5) Zimbabwe is not a democracy

Personal Freedoms

Question 49

Please tell me if the following things are worse or better than they were few years ago or are they about the same

A Freedom to say what you think

B Freedom to join any political organisation you want

C Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured

D The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does

- 1) Much worse
- 2) Worse
- 3) Same
- 4) Better
- 5) Much better

Responsiveness

Question 56

How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?

A Members of Parliament

B Elected Local government Councillors

- 1) Never
- 2) Only Sometimes
- 3) Often
- 4) Always

Free and fairness of elections

Question 40

On the whole how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election held in 2005?

- 1) Completely free
- 2) Free and fair but with minor problems
- 3) Not free and fair
- 4) Do not understand question?
- 5) Don't know

Elections Result reflection of the voters views

Question 70

Think about how elections work in practise in this country. How well do elections

A Ensure that the members of Parliament reflect the views of the voters?

B Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

- 1) Very well
- 2) Well
- 3) Not very well
- 4) Not at all well

Cultural Explanations

Accountability

Question 69

Who should be responsible for

A Making sure that once elected members of Parliament do their jobs?

B Making sure that once elected local government councilors do their jobs

- 1) President and Executive
- 2) The Parliament and local council
- 3) Their political party
- 4) The Voters
- 5) Don't Know

Rule of Law

Question 44

A) It is better to find a lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer B) It is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately using other means

- 1) Agree very strongly with A
- 2) Agree with A
- 3) Agree with B
- 4) Agree very strongly with B
- 5) Agree with Neither
- 6) Don't Know

Age

Question 1

How old are you?

Gender

Respondent

1. Male
2. Female

Agency

Question 68

What if anything would you do to try and resolve each of the following situations?

- A You were waiting for a government permit for license but keep encountering delays
- B Election officials left your name off the voters roll
- C You suspected a school or clinic official of stealing
- D The police wrongly arrested someone in your family
- E Someone wrongly seized your family's land

- 1) Don't worry things will be resolved given enough time
- 2) Lodge complaint through proper channels or procedures
- 3) Use connections with influential people
- 4) Offer tip or bribe
- 5) Join in public protest
- 6) Other
- 7) Nothing because nothing can be done

Collective Action Dilemma

Associational Life

Question 26

Now I am going to read a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could you tell me whether you are an official leader an active member an inactive member or not a member

- A A religious Group
 - B A trade Union or Farmers Association
 - C A professional or Business Association
 - D A community development or self help association
1. Official leader
 2. Active member
 3. Inactive member
 4. Not a member

Opposition identification

Question 73

Which party is that?????

1. ZANU PF
2. MDC
3. ZANU NDONGA
4. ZUD
5. ZIYA
6. NAGG
7. Yes other

Fear

Question 47

In this country how often are you careful about what you say

1. Always
2. Often
3. Rarely
4. Never

Question 48

During the campaign for the 2005 March Parliamentary Elections were you or any immediate member of your family forced to vote for a candidate ???of your choice?

1. Yes
2. No

Cognitive Awareness

Media Exposure

Question 18

How often do you get news from the following sources?

A Radio

B. Television

C. Newspapers

1. Everyday
2. A few times a week
3. A few times a month
4. Less than once a month
5. Never

Interest in Public affairs

Question 19

How interested would you say you are in public affairs?

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested
5. Don't Know

Question 20

When you get together with your friends or family would you say you discuss political matters

1. Frequently
2. Occasionally
3. Never
4. Don't Know

Education Levels

Question 78

Respondent's highest level of education

1. Primary school completed
2. Some secondary / school high school
3. Secondary school / high school completed Post secondary qualifications other than university e.g. diploma or degree from tecknikon or college
4. Some University
5. University completed
6. Post Graduate

Trust in the media

Question 50

How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

L Government Newspapers

M Independent Newspapers

1. All of them
2. Most of them
3. Some of them
4. None
5. Don't Know

University of Cape Town

Appendix B: Variable Recodes

All the transformation of the recodes done in this dissertation refer to valid responses. Missing data, refusals to answer, and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded from the calculation of any result employing basic or advanced statistical techniques in this study

Economic Explanations	
<i>Question 12 Absolute Deprivation (Original Format)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
4 = Always	1 =Always
3 = Many Times	1=Always
2 = Several Times	2=Several Times
1 = Just Once or Twice	2=Several Times
0 = Never	3=Never
9 = Don't Know	3=Never
<i>Question 7 (Relative Deprivation)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
5= Much Worse	1=Worse
4 = Better	3=Better
3 = Same	2=Same
2 = Worse	1=Worse
1 = Much Worse	1=Worse
9 = Don't know	9=Worse
<i>Question 9 (Future Expectations)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
5 = Much better	3=Better
4 = Better	3=Better
3 = Same	2=Same
2 = Worse	1=Worse
1 = Much worse	1=Worse
9 = Don't Know	9=Worse
<i>Question 82 Employment</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
0=No not looking	0=Unemployed
1=No looking	0=Unemployed
2=Yes part time (not looking)	1=Employed
3=Yes part time (looking)	1=Employed
4=Yes full time (not looking)	1=Employed
5= Yes full time (looking)	1=Employed
9=Don't know	0=Unemployed

<i>Question Urban /Rural</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
1=Urban	1=Urban
2=Rural	2=Rural
Political Explanations	
<i>Question 42 (Satisfaction with Democracy)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
4 = Very satisfied	2=Satisfied
3 = Fairly satisfied	2=Satisfied
2 = Not very satisfied	1=Not satisfied
1 = Not at all satisfied	1=Not satisfied
0 = Zimbabwe is not a democracy	0=Zimbabwe not a democracy
9 = Do not know	9=Zimbabwe not a democracy
<i>Question 49 (Personal Freedom)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
5 = Much worse	1=Worse
4 = Better	3=Better
3=Same	2=Same
2=Worse	1=Worse
1 = Much worse	1=Worse
9 = Don't Know	9=Worse
<i>Question 56 (Responsiveness)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
3 = Always	3=Always
2 = Often	2=Sometimes
1 = Only sometimes	2=Sometimes
0 = Never	1=Never
<i>Question 40 Elections Free and Fairness</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
4 = Not free and fair	0=Not free and fair
3 = Free and fair with major problems	1=Free and fair with problems
2 = Free and fair but with minor problems	1=Free and fair with problems
1 = Completely free and fair	2=Free and fair
8 = Do not understand question	8=Not free and fair
9 = Don't know	9=Not free and fair
<i>Question 70 (Effectiveness of Elections)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
3 = Very well	3=Well
2 = Well	3=Well
1 = Not very well	2=Not very well
0 = Not at all well	1=Not at all

Cultural Explanations	
<i>Question 69 (Accountability) Dummy</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
3 = The voters	1=Voters
2 = Political Party	0=Other
1 = Parliament and Local Council	0=Other
0 = President and the Executive	0=Other
9 = Don't know	0=Other
<i>Question 44 (Rule of Law)</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
5 = Agree with neither	2=Agree with neither
4 = Agree very strongly with B	1=Agree with B to ignore law and use other means to solve problems
3 = Agree with B	1=Agree with B to ignore law and use other means to solve problems
2 = Agree with A	3=Agree with A to use lawful solutions to solve problems
1 = Agree very strongly with A	3=Agree with A to use lawful solutions to solve problems
9 = Don't Know	2=Agree with neither
<i>Question 1 Age</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
1=18-24	1=18-24
2=25-34	2=25-34
3=35-44	3=35-44
4=45-54	4=45-54
5=55-64	5=55-64
6=65-74	6=65-74
7=75-84	7=75-84
8=85-94	8=85-94
9=95-100	9=95-100
9=Don't Know	9=Other
<i>Question 89 Gender</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
1=Male	1=Male
2=Female	2=Female

Collective Action Dilemma	
<i>Question 26 Associational Life</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
3 = Official Leader	3=Official leader
2 = Active member	2=Active member
1 = Inactive member	1=Inactive member
0 = Not a member	0=Not a member
9 = Don't know	0=Not a member
<i>Question 47 Careful of what you say</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
3 = Always	0=Always
2 = Often	1=Rarely
1 =Rarely	1=Rarely
0 =Never	2=Never
9 =Don't know	2=Never
<i>Question 48 Forced to Vote</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
2 =No	2=No
1 =Yes	1=Yes
9 =Don't know	1=Yes
<i>Question 73 Identify with opposition</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
440=ZANU PF	0=Other
442=ZANU NDONGA	1=Opposition
443=ZUD	1=Opposition
444=ZIYA	1=Opposition
445=NAGG	1=Opposition
995=OTHER	1=Opposition
999=Don't know	1=Opposition
Cognitive awareness	
<i>Q18 Media exposure</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
4 =Everyday	3=Everyday
3 =A few times a week	2= A few times a week
2 = A few times a month	1= A few times a month
1 =Less than a month	1= A few times a month
0=Never	0=Never
9 =Don't know	0=Never
<i>Question 19 Interest in public affairs</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
3 =Very interested	2=Very interested
2 =Somewhat interested	1=Somewhat interested
1 =Not very interested	0=Not at all interested
9=Don't know	0=Not at all interested

<i>Question 20 Discuss Political matters</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
2 =Frequently	2= Frequently
1 =Occasionally	1=Occasionally
0 =Never	0=Never
9 =Don`'t know	0=Never
<i>Question 78 Respondent Education</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
9 =Post graduate	9 =Post graduate
8 =University completed	8 =University completed
7 =Some university	7 =Some university
6 =Post secondary qualifications/diploma	6 =Post secondary qualifications/diploma
5 =Secondary/high school completed	5 =Secondary/high school completed
4=Some secondary school and high school	4=Some secondary school and high school
3 = Primary school	3 = Primary school
2 = Some primary schooling	2 = Some primary schooling
1 = Informal schooling only	1 = Informal schooling only
0 = No formal schooling	0 = No formal schooling
99 = Don`'t know	0=No formal schooling
<i>Question 50J Trust in government newspapers</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
0=Not at all	0=Not at all
1=Just a little	1=Just a little
2=Somewhat	2=Somewhat
3=A lot	3= A lot
9=Don`'t Know	0=Not at all
<i>Question 50k Trust in Independent newspapers</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
0=Not at all	0=Not at all
1=Just a little	1=Just a little
2=Somewhat	2=Somewhat
3=A lot	3= A lot
9=Don`'t Know	0=Not at all
Dependant Variable	
<i>Question 29 C Attend demonstration or protest march</i>	<i>Recoded Format</i>
4=Often	4=Often
3=Several Times	3=Several Times
2=Once or Twice	2=Once or Twice
1=Would if had a chance	1=Would if had a chance
0=Would never do this	0=Would never do this
9=Don`'t know	0=Would never do this