

**CHRONICLE OF A DYS-APPEARANCE: AN AUTOETHNOGRAPHY OF A  
TEACHER IN CONFLICT**

Maria del Carmen Blyth

Thesis Presented for the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
in the School of Education  
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

May 2015

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

My supervisor, Associate Professor Karin Murriss, was instrumental in bringing this thesis to life and light. Without her encouragement and guidance I would never have attempted to write this study. She enabled me to be heard and for “epistemic injustice” to be subverted.

The Posthumanist Reading Group provided me with lively and diffractively enlightening discussions on diffraction, Quantum Mechanics, and the fate of Schrödinger’s cat.

## **DEDICATION**

This study is dedicated to four people:

- Harry Blyth and Maria Antonia Menendez Mayer who taught me what it is right to do and what it is good to be;
- Gary Lovelock: we “have fought the good fight”;
- and Marisa Virtich: we “have kept the faith”.

## ABSTRACT

With the growth in number of international schools from the 50 identified in 1964 to the current 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated teaching staff of 250,000 predicted to grow to 10,000 and 500,000 respectively by 2020, the international school is an increasingly prominent sector of education. Yet despite this standing what is known about how international schools discipline and silence their dissenting teachers is negligible. Metaphorically speaking, the problem is that the “black box” of teacher control and correction remains firmly closed in the international school domain. The aim of this study is to open up the “black box” as it were, to use my experiences as an educator to shed some light on how organisational structures and the people working within them can disempower, silence and discipline a dissenting teacher.

Although I have used autoethnography as methodology the study is not purely autoethnographic but rather a bricolage of methods that through conceptual enquiries of a philosophical nature (on the emotions, ethics etc.) deepen not only my narrative research but also my understanding of the issues. Engaging with these diverse philosophical analyses has taken me from questions of essence that focused on a Cartesian understanding of difference and conflict (us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) to a posthumanist stance on both and questions of how conflict can be understood as emergent from intra-actions between apparatuses of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material. For conflicts are collisions head on, to the accompaniment of squealing brakes and breaking glass. And it is important to understand not why but how such collisions occur if we are to avoid, prevent, or resolve them ethically.

As such I hope that this study contributes to studies on conflict by showing how discourses, material conditions, affect, and power can converge to produce situations with serious consequences for those involved.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....	ii
<b>DEDICATION</b> .....	iii
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	iv
<b>FOREWORD: DISAPPEARANCE AND DYS-APPEARANCE</b> .....	xii
<b>CHAPTER</b>	
<b>1. INTRODUCTION: RESPONDING TO AUTHORITY’S DEMANDS</b> .....	1
<b>1.1 Background to the Story</b> .....	1
<b>1.2 The Research Problem</b> .....	3
<b>1.3 The Research Aim</b> .....	5
<b>1.4 The Research Questions</b> .....	6
<b>1.5 Leadership and Management in the International School Context</b> .....	7
<i>1.5.1 Introduction</i> .....	7
<i>1.5.2. Diversity</i> .....	8
<i>1.5.3 Transience</i> .....	9
<i>1.5.4 Governance</i> .....	10
<b>1.6 Conceptual Framework</b> .....	13
<i>1.6.1 The Emotional</i> .....	13
<i>1.6.2 The Moral</i> .....	16
<i>1.6.3 The Legal</i> .....	17
<b>1.7 The Research Method: Why Autoethnography?</b> .....	18
<b>1.8 Ethics</b> .....	23

<b>1.9 Overview of the Chapters</b>	24
<b>2. METHODOLOGY OR MOVEMENT IN THOUGHT</b>	26
<b>2.1 Introduction: Autoethnography as Methodology</b>	26
<b>2.2 Glass Palaces or Glass Cages?</b>	29
<i>2.2.1 Why Not Autoethnography?</i>	31
<b>2.3 Teachers' Stories</b>	36
<i>2.3.1 The Stories</i>	37
<i>2.3.1.1 Edward Said: Between Worlds: Edward Said Makes Sense of His Life (1998)</i>	39
<i>2.3.1.2 Laurel Richardson: Skirting a Pleated Text: De-Disciplining an Academic Life (1997)</i>	43
<i>2.3.1.3 Ken Winograd: The Functions of Teacher Emotions: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly (2003)</i>	47
<b>2.4 The Verbal Snapshot - What It Reveals, What It Conceals, and Why I Use It</b>	51
<b>2.5 Summary</b>	55
<b>3. THE EMOTIONS</b>	59
<b>3.1 Introduction</b>	59
<i>3.1.2 The Prologue</i>	59
<b>3.2 Emotion – An Intellectual and Moral Activity</b>	61
<i>3.2.1 Introduction – Philosophy's Attempts to Understand the Emotions</i>	61
<i>3.2.2 The Emotions and Philosophy in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century</i>	66
<b>3.3 Women and the Emotions</b>	70

3.3.1	<i>Introduction</i>	70
3.3.2	<i>Women and Anger</i>	72
3.4	<b>Conclusion</b>	75
4.	<b>THE EMOTIONS: WOMEN, SHAME, FEAR, AND ANXIETY</b>	76
4.1	<b>Introduction</b>	76
4.1.1	<i>Women and Shame</i>	76
4.1.2	<i>Women, Fear, and Anxiety</i>	80
4.2	<b>The Emotions, Phronesis and Epistemic Virtue</b>	83
4.3	<b>Schools, Conflict, Emotional Intelligence and the Intelligence of the Emotions</b>	86
4.4	<b>The Emotions as Expressions of the Moral Dimension of a School's Culture</b>	90
5.	<b>THE ETHICAL TEACHER AND THE ETHICAL SCHOOL</b>	93
5.1	<b>Introduction</b>	93
5.2	<b>The Ethical Teacher</b>	97
5.3	<b>The Ethical Administrator</b>	102
5.3.1	<i>Leadership and Gender</i>	103
5.4	<b>The Ethical School: A Symbiotic Relationship</b>	105
5.5	<b>A Moral Education</b>	107
6.	<b>THE APPARATUSES OF CONFLICT</b>	110
6.1	<b>Introduction</b>	110
6.1.1	<i>England &amp; Hong Kong: 1990s through to the early 2000s</i>	111

<b>6.2 Hong Kong, an International School, the 1990s</b> .....	112
<b>6.3 The Role of School Administrators in Public Education: England &amp; Wales</b>	
<b>1980s/1990s/early2000s</b> .....	121
<i>6.3.1 Introduction</i> .....	121
<i>6.3.2 The Principal</i> .....	124
<i>6.3.2.1 Introduction</i> .....	124
<i>6.3.2.2 Role and Responsibilities of the Principal in England &amp; Wales</i> .....	127
<i>6.3.2.3 Principal Attributes</i> .....	131
<b>6.4 The Importance of the Emotions in Leadership and Administration</b> .....	133
<i>6.4.1 The Meaning of Leadership within Schools</i> .....	136
<b>6.5 Summary</b> .....	137
<b>7. MY STORY OF A CONFLICT (PART 1)</b> .....	140
<b>7.1 Introduction</b> .....	140
<b>7.2 Epistemic Injustice</b> .....	143
<i>7.2.1 Fricker on Epistemic Injustice</i> .....	143
<b>7.3 The Verbal Snapshots</b> .....	146
<i>7.3.1 Snapshot 1: Request or Demand?</i> .....	147
<i>7.3.2 Snapshot 2: When is a Disciplinary not a Disciplinary?</i> .....	150
<b>7.4 Cracks, Crevasses, Fissures and Interstices: Silences and Omissions</b> .....	159

<b>8. MY STORY OF A CONFLICT (PART 2)</b> .....	164
<b>8.1 Introduction</b> .....	164
<b>8.2 The Remaining Three Snapshots</b> .....	165
<i>8.2.1 Snapshot 3: The Collective Commitment to the Unjust Action</i> .....	165
<i>8.2.2 Snapshot 4: Letter of Non-Renewal</i> .....	175
<i>8.2.3 Snapshot 5: A Message from the CEO</i> .....	185
<b>8.3 Viewing the Verbal Snapshots as One</b> .....	187
<b>9. CONCLUSIONS: MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, &amp; TRUTH IN A POSTHUMANIST WORLD</b> .....	189
<b>9.1 Introduction</b> .....	189
<b>9.2 Posthumanism and the Phenomenon of Conflict</b> .....	191
<b>9.3 The Outsider-Within</b> .....	195
<b>9.4 A Posthumanist Interpretation of “My” Story</b> .....	199
<i>9.4.1 Diffraction and Reflection</i> .....	203
<b>9.5 Posthumanism and the Notion of Truth</b> .....	205
<b>9.6 A Re-turn to the Research Questions</b> .....	211
<b>9.7 Has the Study made a Substantial Contribution to the Study of Conflict?</b> .....	214
<b>9.8 Implications for Policy, Practices, and Further Research</b> .....	218
<i>9.8.1 Policy and Practices</i> .....	218
<i>9.8.2 Further Research</i> .....	220
<b>9.9 Two “Final” Stories</b> .....	221
<b>9.10 “Final” Words</b> .....	222

<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	224
-------------------------	-----

## FOREWORD: DISAPPEARANCE AND DYS-APPEARANCE

The philosopher and medical sociologist Drew Leder (1990, p. 96) explains that “*social dys-appearance*” is the point at which the self becomes conscious of itself as an “alien thing” through the ethical distance and/or condemnation of the “Other” and is in turn shunned, rendered invisible, seen as a type rather than an individual. The dys-appeared, in turn, seek to disappear from the “highly distanced, antagonistic or objectifying” stare of the Other (Leder, 1990, p. 96) and so become complicit in their own dys-appearance to make it complete.

In my own case so rattled was I by the experience of being rendered invisible by administrators and colleagues that over the course of my final year at one particular international school I dys-appeared. I have since withdrawn from the world of international education, stunned into silence to inhabit the twilight zone of the teaching profession: tutoring and substitute teaching at various schools. At times seemingly erased by present experiences layered over faded pasts, the experience has become the scriptio inferior of my life, resurfacing at critical junctures and destabilising the text of my life. The story will not be told if not in the retelling. Telling and retelling; death and resurrection; my story and I, like Prometheus on his rock, hope to eventually be released from the cycle. My story and this study provide a chronicle of my own dys-appearance.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – RESPONDING TO AUTHORITY’S DEMAND

### 1. 1 Background to the Story

I present the background to the story about my experience of conflict at one particular international school as: (a) the first act of “a surrealist drama about a surreal, yet real” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296) international school and (b) an equally surreal response to authority’s demands. Richardson (1997) explains that the surreal can seem equally “isomorphic to the real” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298), appropriately equal if not identical in form and relations. In other words, the words and setting might differ from what actually occurred but the contexts and meanings are inherently the same. The two examples I provide use school “politics as [a] context for [the] writing and as a site [for] discipline” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296).

### ACT 1

[Scene 1: It is a hot and humid August afternoon at the start of the academic year at the Tepapawai International Secondary School (TISS)<sup>1</sup> yet the principal’s office is chilly bordering on cold. The sound of the air conditioner whirrs in the background. The room is clinical: there are no plants, no personal photos or pictures and the sea view from the sole window has been blocked out with a heavy blind. At a coffee table sits the principal who motions to the head of department as she enters to close the door and take a seat opposite him]

Principal: Listen, I’ve made a decision that I’m not going to offer you another contract after this year I’m afraid to say. I think that is the best way of solving the problem between you and the team.

Head of Department: Okay.

Principal: I think we need to move the situation on.

Head of Department: [Silence]

---

<sup>1</sup>All names used are fictitious.

<sup>2</sup> “English to Speakers of Other Languages” (ESOL) is commonly used in lieu of “English as a Second Language” (ESL).

<sup>3</sup>Personal communication from the chairs of teachers’ associations at three different international schools.

<sup>4</sup> Although Kleinman’s work addresses nosology (the classification of diseases), the medical profession and illness

Principal: I've written you a letter for you to take away that has been counter signed by the HR Director [Principal hands letter to Head of Department].

Head of Department: Wow!

Principal: I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news but I think that's how we need to move forward. That's how it is. So you obviously need to go away and think about that.

Head of Department: Well there is not much to think about, is there?

Principal: No, not a lot.

[Scene 2: In the drab and dingy staff room the Vice Chair of the Teachers Association and the Head of Department are seated having a cup of tea. Their cups remain untouched.]

Vice Chair: Well, there's no point in your filing grievances against your principal and deputy principal, not now that you've been given a non renewal. No, no point at all. I hope you can see that.

Head of Department: [Silence]

[Scene 3: It is a cold and miserable day at the Labour Tribunal court. The last case of the morning session is being heard. The court room is empty save for the lady judge, the plaintiff (a head of department at the Tepapawai International Secondary School (TISS) and the HR Director of the TISS].

Judge: Has the school paid all monies owing to the plaintiff?

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge: Then case dismissed.

Plaintiff: But your Honour they can't just get around the difficulty of a disciplinary and grievance procedure by giving me a non renewal.

Judge: Yes they can.

A CONTRAPUNTAL RESPONSE:

*Dear Deputy Principal*

*Further to our discussions yesterday and today I wish to clarify the problem.*

- 1. A member of staff in my department has approached you to say that she feels uncomfortable with my leadership and therefore has asked for you to line manage her. She refused to meet earlier today as arranged by you to discuss the „issues“ with me present.*

2. *You have been line managing Yvonne at my request as of this year due to the fact that on more than one occasion she has physically threatened and intimidated members of the department. This was well documented by three members of the department as well as myself however no action was taken by you to resolve this issue.*
3. *I cannot allow that you resume your previous backdoor policy with members of my department as this makes my position as Head of Department [HoD] untenable.*
4. *The areas of dissatisfaction and tension were well aired at the meeting of the whole department in March following which a number of actions were agreed and apparently the situation improved until last week since when it appears your policy of allowing members of the department to approach you directly rather than directing them to air their concerns with me first (as you had agreed to do) caused a serious deterioration in communication.*
5. *I can only conclude that this situation continues to be an issue because of your current line management strategies.*

*When I return from medical tests in Australia we need to take some action to rectify this current situation of insubordination and your backdoor management policy before the situation becomes irrecoverable. If we cannot find a way to do so I cannot see how you can continue to line manage the ESOL<sup>2</sup> team.*

## **1.2 The Research Problem**

In this study, the issue that needs exploring and understanding is how power and the emotions are used in international schools to silence, control and correct teachers and the effect that this has on teachers' lives. Reflecting on and interrogating emotions can help sustain and perpetuate historical and local school practices; it can also disrupt them. With the growth in the number of international schools from the 50 identified in 1964 (Bereday & Lauwerys, 1964) to the current estimate of 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated teaching staff of 250,000 predicted to grow to 10,000 and 500,000 respectively by 2020 (Brummitt, 2007, 2009a, 2009b), the international school is an increasingly prominent sector of education. Yet despite this standing what is known about how international schools discipline and silence their dissenting teachers is negligible. Metaphorically speaking, the problem is that the "black box" of teacher

---

<sup>2</sup> "English to Speakers of Other Languages" (ESOL) is commonly used in lieu of "English as a Second Language" (ESL).

control and correction remains firmly closed in the international school domain. By reflecting on and interrogating the emotions that caused and sustained conflict in one particular international school with one particular teacher, myself, I hope to reveal and explore the silenced voices of those concerned. My intent is to give a “voice to the voiceless”, make visible the invisible for “invisibility, in the end, is intolerable” (Short, Turner & Grant, 2013, p. xi).

Consequently if as Bateson (1972/1987) contends justice requires the acceptance of the “other” in all her/his guises then injustice requires that we “listen to the silences” (Fricker, 2012, p. 289) of those silenced. If we are to understand “a human practice” (Fricker, 2007, p. 3) we need to bear witness to those whose credibility (as perceived by the “hearer” through his/her worldview) is such that “others do not, cannot, or will not” listen (Fricker, 2012, p. 290) We need to understand the practice from the standpoint of “those on the losing end” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288)

Feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker argues that it is the social identity and social power of the “loser” as it relates to others that can constitute epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 91); Fricker (2007, p. 1) contends that it is these two elements that inform “two of our most basic epistemic everyday practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling them, and making sense of our own social experiences”. And so as speakers and givers of knowledge we can be perceived as not trustworthy due to “*identity prejudice*” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4) – prejudice based on for example race, gender and class (Fricker, 2007), “accent” (Fricker, 2007, p. 17), age (Murriss, 2013) - and thus remain unheard. In hierarchical institutions, such as schools, unequal power structures (Fricker, 2007, p. 7), based on a shared social construction (Fricker, 2007, p. 14) of teacher identity, can act “passively” (Fricker, 2007, p. 9) to control and silence teachers, our power as

“social agents to influence how things go in the social world” (Fricker, 2007, p. 9) of schools marginalised.

Such “epistemic injustice” which Fricker (2007, p. 145) describes as the act of “wrongfully” denying someone access to “the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-operative practice of pooling information” and hence from participating in the very practice that “defines the core of the very concept of knowledge” can and does lead to systemic and systematic silencing of teachers and administrators alike.

### **1.3 The Research Aim**

The aim of this study, emerging from the research problem, is to open up the “black box” as it were, to use my experiences as an educator to shed some light on how organisational structures and the people working within them can disempower, silence and discipline a dissenting teacher. By scrutinising a phenomenon that has been paid little attention, this study hopes to provide insights into international school teacher control comprising as it does: “a clear vision of the [teacher’s] social world and the way we think, feel and conduct ourselves in it” (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 209) – a paradigm, no less. I hope it can do much more; I hope it can “take you as the reader into the intimacies of my world. . . . in such a way that you are stimulated to reflect upon your own life in relation to mine” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 467). As my own grasp of the events influences my actions so too should you find that your own understanding of the events leads to your own responses to the world around you (Young, 1988).

## 1.4 The Research Questions

Four questions form the framework for this study grounded as they are in the critical incidents that I experienced and which were touched upon in the opening sections of this study: the Foreword and the Background to the Story. These are questions that go to the heart of what it means to be a democratic society, be that within a school or within the wider community. For democracy, to quote Kelly (1995, p. 33) is “a moral concept”; it has in all its forms “firm moral roots, and [is] based on, and justified by, clear moral principles. . . . [with] a concern for the protection of human rights, for the equality of all citizens, for the maximization of individual liberty and the maintenance of proper sovereignty” (Kelly, 1995, p. 48) – that of the people. As such a school that purports to be a democratic institution cannot “ride roughshod” (Kelly, 1995, p. 33) over any of its “citizens” and must be predicated on a belief in and practice of “political freedom” (Kelly, 1995, p. 26; see also Fricker, 2012), a freedom that allows any of its “citizens” to contest any behaviour that appears to be unjust. As such the overarching question looks to render visible the cluster of ethico-political and epistemic practices that were enacted at one particular international school, in one particular case of conflict and on one particular teacher, me. As such it asks:

1. How can conflict in an international school be understood as a case of epistemic injustice?

This leads to three subordinate questions that focus on the ethical aspects of a school, its culture, and staff with respect to conflict and read as follows:

2. How do emotions express the moral dimensions of a school’s culture?
3. What does it mean to be an ethical educator and what is an ethical school?

4. What are the changes necessary for international schools to become more ethical?

## **1.5 Leadership and Management in the International School Context**

### *1.5.1 Introduction*

International schools differ from national schools in three major respects: diversity both at the micro and macro level; transience of students, staff, administrators and boards; and lack of accountability to a higher authority such as a local and/or other government office (Hayden, 2006). There are no government inspections undertaken of international schools except at the specific request of a school and teachers have no higher authority to turn to that is not part of the administration or governing body when conflict occurs. Some international schools allow teachers to form a teachers' association which can mistakenly be seen by some teachers as having the power of a teachers' union<sup>3</sup>. This is far from the case as teachers' association officers are volunteers drawn from the teaching body and consequently employed by the very administration and governing body they are expected by staff to challenge and negotiate with. The conflict of interest these officers face is very real with the struggle between "what it is right to do rather than . . . what it is good to be" (Taylor, 1989, p. 3), a focus on "obligation" as opposed to "the nature of the [morally] good life" (Taylor, 1989, p. 3), an ongoing obstacle to their being ethical in practice. For with the focus on what is in their own best self-interest to be, the teachers' association becomes an apparatus that in its rules and practices precludes ethical behaviour.

Despite the fact that the number of international schools has grown significantly over the past half a decade, from the 50 identified in 1964 (Bereday & Lauwerys, 1964) to the current estimate

---

<sup>3</sup>Personal communication from the chairs of teachers' associations at three different international schools.

of 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated teaching staff of 250,000 predicted to grow to 10,000 and 500,000 by 2020 as mentioned earlier there is still unfortunately a “paucity of documentary evidence concerning leadership of international schools” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001b, p. 9) and the consequences of such leadership for teachers at these schools.

### *1.5.2 Diversity*

Diversity in international schools has been well researched (Cambridge, 1998, 2000; Hayden, Levy & Thompson, 2007; Hayden & Thompson, 1995a, 2000a, 2000b; Hill, 2000; Matthews, 1989a). Diversity occurs at both the micro level and macro level (Hayden & Thompson, 2000b) in international schools. At the macro level it can be said that no two schools are ever the same, ever share exactly the precise same characteristics (Hayden & Thompson, 2000b). However it is diversity at the micro level, that which “characterises so many individual international schools in terms of the large numbers of different nationalities, different cultural backgrounds, different languages spoken and different religious beliefs to be found amongst the student, and perhaps teaching, body” (Hayden & Thompson, 2000b, pp. 2-3), that defines an international school per se.

This diversity of backgrounds - of students, parents, teachers and administrators - gives rise to a multitude of different experiences, knowledge, academic and professional skills as well as educational backgrounds and traditions, values, attitudes and expectations which in their entanglement with one another can and do give rise to complex situations and challenges within these schools: these can and do result in conflict when difference is understood as Other, the “not-I” side of an us/them binary, with “a clear dividing line . . . between us here and them over

there” (Trinh, 1988, para. 1): a dualist hierarchical “vision” of difference rather than an affirmation of it. It is however how conflict is managed that determines the outcome of potentially difficult situations. Stout (2005, pp. 16-17) rightly comments:

Conflict can have positive as well as negative effects, but which state predominates largely depends upon the way in which it is managed. . . . In many cases the initial cause of governance/management conflict begins with a tiny issue. This escalates into a personal agenda, and then all too often becomes a cause célèbre.

Unless managed well small incidents can escalate into crises with grave consequences.

Compounding the issue of diversity is that of transience. The transient nature of the international school acts as a powerful force in the phenomenon of conflict making an already complex issue even more complex. For as staff, students, parents, governing body members, and administrators leave on a regular basis they are replaced by others who bring different experiences to bear on the conflict as was the case in my own international school and my own experience with conflict within that school. I discuss transience more fully in the section that follows.

### *1.5.3 Transience*

Transience is a distinct feature of the international school (Hayden, 2006) and international school life. Mathews (1989b) points to an annual student turnover of 30% or higher in any given international school, with students averaging less than three years in any one school. Similarly both locally hired expatriate teachers and those recruited from overseas also have a high turnover rate with few remaining more than the two or three year initial contracts they take up (Hayden, 2006). A 1994 study by Hawley into the longevity of international school principals points to the fact that 50% of those sampled remained on the job for just less than three years with 15% leaving after only one year and only 26% remaining for more than six years, figures which seem

to have changed little over the last 15 years (Benson, 2011). Littleford and his 1999 study found that 80% of international school heads were “fired” (Littleford, 1999, p. 23). It is therefore not surprising that the governing bodies of international schools also demonstrate high volatility in terms of length of service with some board members and chairs leaving before the end of their term (Hayden, 2006). As Hayden (2006, p. 104) puts it: “the composition of [international school] boards can change both like and with the seasons” which can contribute to the focus being on the effective management of conflict rather than on an ethical consideration of the particular situation. In other words, the transient nature of an international school community fosters the notion that investing time into finding ethical solutions to issues that arise is not a worthwhile endeavour or use of limited time.

The third feature of an international school that adds to those of diversity and transience in further complicating the issue of conflict within such a school is that of governance. For the governing body of an international school is a complex web of interactions in and of itself given the ongoing diversity and transience of its members. As such in the section that follows I explore the issue of governance as it pertains to conflict within an international school.

#### *1.5.4 Governance*

Blandford and Shaw (2001a, p. 2) write that: “The governance and management of [international] schools might be determined by the school, the owner, the Board, the senior management team or Head of school or a managing agency” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001a, p. 2), positions that might be encompassed by just one person, for in international schools one person may wear many “hats”, or by many. The board of an international school may have as its

members “the founder/owner, parents, interested members of the community, specialists from local business, headteacher, teacher representative and others” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001b, p. 23). At one particular international school the owner stated: “I am the Chair and the rest of the Board consists of my daughter and my son-in-law” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001b, p. 23). What is evident, however, is that whatever its constitution, the “Board” (be it one person or many, be they called governors, trustees, directors or members of a school management committee) is, according to Mattern (1994, p. 4): “the employer, the maker of policies to be administered, the arbiter of performance. It must be satisfied that the leadership the Head is providing is suitable for the school.” It is the board that appoints the principal and approves new contracts and renewals of contracts. “Sadly” as pointed out by Hodgson (2005, p. 7): “international schools frequently lurch from Boards that micro-manage, to those that purely rubber stamp senior administrators” recommendations,” with Carver (2006, p. xiii) suggesting that “boards [tend] to be incompetent groups of competent people” selected either for their affluence, allegiance to a particular group within the school community, or the prestigious position they might hold within the local and/or expatriate community rather than their ability to be accountable that the organisation functions ethically (Carver & Carver, 2015; see also Carver, 2006).

In her book *Introduction to International Education*, the leading expert on international schools Mary Hayden (2006, p. 107) aptly notes that:

If it is true that relatively little has been written about teachers in international schools, then it is certainly the case that there is a dearth of material to be found about administrators, including the heads of such schools. So far as support is concerned, while the need is arguably at least as great for heads as it is for their more junior colleagues, it may be less in evidence.

Critically assessing and addressing the complexities of leadership and management in international education is a daunting task, especially in the areas of politics, cultural friction and power, given that international schools are by their very nature heterogeneous entities not only in “type” but also “origin” (Welton, 2001, p. 96) and constituting as they do “a spectrum, with the ideological at one end and the market-driven at the other” (Hayden, 2006, p.17). That heads have to lead and manage such complex institutions with minimal support and guidance is alarming.

She continues:

Schools such as the United World Colleges may be placed as close to the ideologically-driven end of the spectrum as it is possible to be, while at the other end of the same spectrum could be those schools that are entirely market-driven in their approach (and possibly exist principally as businesses). The majority of international schools, meanwhile, would be likely to fall somewhere in between the two extremes, demonstrating in different proportions according to their mission statement and context the influence of both ends of the spectrum. (Hayden, 2006, p. 17)

Yet, irrespective of where any given international school positions itself on this spectrum, the importance of understanding the role of leadership and management when conflict arises is crucial in international schools where diversity of staff perceptions based on what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call “culturally constructed metaphors” and previous reinforcing experiences can be the cause of conflict and struggle for control (Pearce, 2003; Robertson, 2003). International schools are complex organisations; as Caffyn (2011, p. 66) so poignantly puts it, they are:

artificial structures placed in complex environments with a diverse populace. They cannot create consensus because they are too diverse. The idea of creating a school culture and meaning is at odds with a profession that thrives on diversity. Therefore it must be a structure that is imposed, no matter how beneficently, and this gives rise to the strong possibility of power struggles, conflict and political manoeuvring. (Caffyn, 2011, p. 66)

The complexity of demographic, perceptions, aspirations and power in international schools is under-rated by administrators and boards (Littleford, 1999) and can result in a leadership and management style which values expediency over ethics, where short-term goals and managerial

band-aiding become the default operating procedure of a transient and upwardly mobile leadership and management (Caffyn, 2011; Littleford, 1999, 2011), a leadership/management that already has its sights on the next overseas assignment or position (Benson, 2011; Hawley, 1994, 1995; Littleford, 2011). Under such conditions “negotiation and discussion may take second place to [the] pragmatic managerial control and goal-oriented outcomes” of a school leader’s “vision” and his strategic plans with teaching staff identified as “components to be governed rather than to be engaged with” (Caffyn & Cambridge, 2006, p. 48), seen as sources of information rather than individuals.

## **1.6 Conceptual Framework**

What is conflict? Conflict can best be understood as an unresolved serious disagreement or “dispute” (Stout, 2005, p. 19), which, whatever the cause of the particular conflict, is more often than not protracted. It can have dire consequences for the loser and should the conflict escalate into “war” whoever loses loses more. As such conflict can be viewed through an emotional, moral and legal lens among many. However the lens chosen can constrain or liberate the conflict story being told. This is what makes writing about conflict challenging.

### *1.6.1 The Emotional*

Despite the importance of being in touch, so to speak, with our emotions, using them as “forms of cognition” (Murriss, 2009, p. 18), there is often very little in either international (or national (Campbell, 2003)) school management or leadership manuals or programmes that gives concrete advice on how “to deal” with emotions (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69) or indeed how to educate them.

Emotions are a “species of *judgment*” (Solomon, 1986, p. 44). As the philosopher Solomon (1986, p. 44) puts it, they are “a way of constructing the world.” Solomon continues:

To enter into an emotion is not to „enter into somebody else’s brain.“ It is to participate in a way of being in the world, a way in which things matter, a way charged with shared understandings and obsessions. (Solomon, 1986, pp. 44-45)

By educating the emotions we learn how to use them, express them as well as discover what to expect from them (Solomon, 1986).

The emotions that permeate and encompass the international school are without doubt a product of how “history, location, power, control and fear” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69) intersect and interact; as a social construct the international school’s history, location, purpose, and “actors” are “inter-related to it and each other”, entwined as they are with feelings of “[v]ulnerability and insecurity” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69), emotions common to both the transient and permanent groups of the school community that struggle for control over the “focal point” that is the school (Caffyn, 2011, p. 73; see also Caffyn, 2007, p. 343). The “emotional geographies” of school staff (Hargreaves, 1999, 2001), such as the personal and professional, the moral and cultural, the physical and political (Caffyn, 2007), directly impact relationships with colleagues which can also promote powerful emotional ties within groups in international schools (Pearce, 2003). Caffyn also points out that emotions are often veiled behind a façade of professionalism in international schools, presenting a unified front as public image, and gives outsiders a false sense of security and reality: “suggesting that [international] schools are places of order, control and without emotional activity” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69).

My own experiences exemplify the opposite; emotions can be used within the school context to also create political reactions through the practice of “splitting and projection” with unconscious feelings and fears becoming evident as views, reactions and beliefs: a “flow of mental forces within and between individuals and groups . . . [that] can have substantial and significant effects” (Dunning, James & Jones, 2005, p. 245). Individual or group opinions can be a consequence of powerful emotions, feelings and fears about “identity, worth and vulnerability” (Dunning et al., 2005, p. 245) and lead to “organisational politics” (Dunning et al., 2005, p. 245). Organisational members who refuse to accept their emotions, behaviours and feelings (especially contradictory ones that can result in painful or threatening internal conflicts) can project these problematic emotions onto others often in an accusing manner and accompanied by behaviours meant to reinforce the projection (James, Connolly, Dunning & Elliot, 2006). In other words we can project onto others that which we hate most in ourselves: the bully accuses the victim of being the bully, the perfectionist accuses the line manager of demanding perfection, repeatedly, deliberately and in a disrespectful manner. As such: “The emotional experience, mental forces and the defences against emotional experience are fundamental to organising in schools and are highly influential in organisational micro-politics in educational institutions” (James et al., 2006, p. 48), constituting as they do the critical “concepts of human agency and emotion” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69). Unfortunately individuals and groups can unknowingly act as “lightning rods” (Dunning et al., 2005, p. 244) for these projected feelings and become the scapegoats: demonised, bullied, marginalised and silenced (Dunning et al., 2005). Dunning et al., (2005) argue that:

The ability of those involved to transform projected feelings, that is, to accept them, contain them, change them into benign and acceptable forms, and then return them in that different form, is crucial to minimising the impact of splitting and projection and to ensuring that it does not grow into more dangerous organisational phenomena. This

transformation-and-return process is a key educational leadership task. (Dunning et al., 2005, p. 244)

As Rose (1999, p. 97) suggests, drawing on Foucault, freedom may be more about the “capacity to judge, accept or transform the practices that subjectify” you. Without this capacity the leadership will find it difficult to prevent splitting and projection from occurring and can create situations where it actually thrives (Dunning et al., 2005).

Weak and/or transient management and systems, imposed and/or weak corporate cultures, and disparate staff situations (Ball, 2000; Caffyn, 2007; Hargreaves, 1995) can fuel this process and cause schools to “fragment into subcultures, departments and interest groups” (Caffyn, 2007, p. 339). This is especially true if those involved have diverse and divergent reasons for being there. An international school can fragment further into “individual interests” with “small-scale alliances built up on the basis of interest, goals, subcultures and power structures” (Caffyn, 2007, p. 339; see also Hargreaves, 1994) which can result in administrative “short-term solutions to complex organisational problems” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 72; see also Caffyn & Cambridge, 2006) such as conflict.

### *1.6.2 The Moral*

Emotions are expressions of the moral; indeed, emotion, according to Fineman (2004, p. 721):

penetrates and defines many of the processes and consequences of organizing. These include the subjective meanings of work, leadership, decision making, negotiation, motivation, ethical conduct, communication, gender and ethnic relationships. More sharply, *emotion draws attention to the psychological injuries of working, such as harassment, bullying, violence, stress* and emotional labour. (Fineman, 2004, p. 721; my emphases)

Emotions can thus signal the “truth” of a situation more accurately than can logical reasoning (Solomon, 1986). They can signal the fair and unfair, the just and unjust action or words. However, to act “justly requires, evidently, an understanding of the intrinsic value of . . . justice” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 59). To do the right thing for the wrong reason is not good enough: “to sacrifice in the wrong words with the wrong tone of voice at the wrong time would be worse, perhaps, than not sacrificing at all. . . . Obtuseness is a moral failing: its opposite can be cultivated” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 156). To ensure that emotions are displayed and acted upon appropriately whenever the situation calls for it requires an education of the emotions. Righteous indignation for example is in fact nothing other than the result of a moral education (Solomon, 1986). Yet knowing by reason of the emotions contains no inherent promise of action: knowing is not yet acting. By viewing conflict through the emotions, the emotional and moral truth of the story is revealed with “what the bad, mad or childish person prefers count[ing] little or nothing” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 62).

### *1.6.3 The Legal*

Policies and procedures are meant to be unequivocal. They are the professional “checks and balances” used to ensure that teachers are treated fairly and justly. They are there to ensure that when morality and ethics fail then justice can still prevail. However this assumes that there is an impartial authority in place to oversee the process and ensure that policies and procedures are followed. Fear of disclosure is often at the heart of non-compliance, and a non-renewal of contract allows for an efficient and effective way of solving a “problem” and making it “go away”. Unlike national schools, in the international teaching context policies and procedures that deal with non-renewal of contracts as well as the grievance procedures available to staff are often

not made known to teaching staff when they do exist. Alternatively they are made difficult to access by teachers even if they are aware that said policies and procedures exist. The teachers are thus uninformed and hence unaware that a “strategic bricolage”, a “mixed economy of power and knowledge” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xvi), is being used to disempower them.

As such the use of a legal narrative as a lens with which to view a story of conflict and ethics within the international school context would be to reconfigure the story as a set of narrow technical concerns to be solved and to interpret them “within a particular nomenclature”, a particular “taxonomy”, to create something new – a new “entity, an „it“<sup>4</sup> (Kleinman, 1988, p. 5): the storyteller would be rendered invisible. It would be to view the particular as though generalisable. Reliance on legality assumes that general rules and laws can indeed cover all concrete actions and events and that individual judgment is not required. The legal narrative ignores the fact that conflict is polysemic, intimately entwined with emotions and feelings; by its very nature conflict requires that multiple voices be acknowledged if the conflict is to be understood. It is these emotional issues, the feelings involved, that the legal narrative fails to expose. The legal narrative results in voices being side-lined, silenced and marginalised; they thus remain unheard.

### **1.7 The Research Method: Why Autoethnography?**

Teachers’ narratives are a way of writing about teaching that liberates the insider’s voice without the need for mediation by others. Kennedy (2001, p. 124) upholds the notion that “testimony” narratives circumvent the need for an “expert” to mediate the experiences of the “other” as the

---

<sup>4</sup> Although Kleinman’s work addresses nosology (the classification of diseases), the medical profession and illness narratives, I have used his insights to inform my understanding of conflict and conflict narratives within a legal framework.

narrator not only tells her story, but also interprets the meaning of her experiences, and reflects on their “broader significance”. It is this mediation by the narrator that empowers her with the agency to interpret her own experiences. It allows for an in depth look at how the participants in the events narrated understand their own predicament and how this understanding leads to their particular responses. Young (1988) explains that as the participant’s grasp of the events influences her actions so too should the readers find that their own understanding of the events leads to their own responses to the world around them. It is a narrative of self that “critiques the situatedness of self with others in social contexts” (Spry, 2001, p. 710). Ellis, Bochner and Tillmann-Healy aptly call this form of narrative an “evocative narrative” (Ellis, Bochner, & Tillmann-Healy, 2000, p. 13) with the “reader as a co-participant in dialogue” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 744; see also Richardson, 1994, p. 521).

These teachers’ narratives, though few and far between (Day & Leitch, 2001; Pelias, 2003; Richardson, 1997; Winograd, 2003), can take different forms but they all share one common feature: they are told by people who are themselves teachers and experienced the very stories they write about. These are stories that act as journeys of discovery as well as journeys about discovery: explorations of self as subject, subject as self and the act of doing both simultaneously. In this way they act as both text and metatext at one and the same time. They can act as a form of embodied testimony and as a form of advocacy too. They can also do much more.

Teachers’ narratives can help the storytellers make sense of their own situation, their conflicted and fragmented identity; they can be a way of forging a new identity (Spector-Mersel, 2011, p.

173), a "practice of freedom" (Foucault, 1984/1997), a means of moving from an old identity to a new one. We all have multiple identities, plural affiliations and memberships that span cultural as well as other boundaries. As the economist and writer Amartya Sen (2006, p. 19) puts it: "I can be at the same time, an Asian, an Indian citizen, a Bengali with Bangladeshi ancestry, an American or British resident, an economist, a dabbler in philosophy, an author in Sanskrit". In a way we are all "cosmopolitan" (Bhabha, 2000, p. 139); we all cross multiple boundaries at any point in our lives; however, at critical "disjunctions" (Muncey, 2005, p. 2) certain affiliations and memberships can be compromised by the crisis of self. Thus it is that through the process of storytelling the storyteller can come to understand that although there may be no return to the land of the former narrative self, of former affiliations and memberships, the new narrative self, created through the storytelling process, can be equally valid (Frank, 2002).

These stories are not in the business of proving or disproving anything; they do not offer advice for professionals (Brody, 1997, pp. 26-27; see also Day & Leitch, 2001). They are told to "remind those who share their form of life what it is they share" (Frank, 2000, p. 361). They are told to allow for a different way of "knowing", a way of knowing differently that can "trouble the received meaning of *data*" (St Pierre, 1997, p. 177) as we commonly know it. They are told to allow the reader to know what it is like - psychologically, spiritually as well as physically - to be involved in the storyteller's world (Frank, 2000; Goodall, 2008; Polkinghorne, 1988; Said, 1983; St Pierre, 1997) and the conflicts that can occur there. Storytellers tell stories because "the texture of any form of life is so dense that no one can describe this form of life; the storyteller can only invite someone to come inside for the duration of the story" (Frank, 2000, p. 361).

My story is used to explore the experience and understanding of the participant/observer as well as the tactics and strategies (Foucault, 1980a; Rabinow & Rose, 2003) employed by all involved in the conflict, administration and teachers alike. The story itself comprises contextualised artifacts, “*verbal snapshots*”<sup>5</sup> (Richards, 2012) interwoven with commentary and metareflections on the use of the method itself, and raises the questions: how does the past inform the present and how does the present inform the past story; how does this interplay change the past’s current meaning and how does the story’s meaning change as my current understanding of events and people changes? A “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977, p. 31) is embedded in and embodied by the past. Bochner (2007, p. 203) would have it that I have gathered “knowledge *from* the past” to tell a story of “knowledge *about* the past” but I have come to support Polkinghorne’s view that one comes to understand and give meaning to experiences and events only retrospectively, by taking a metaphorical step back (Polkinghorne, 1995) in time and space. This is not to “reconstruct some narrative of the way it was, but to respond, to be responsible, to take responsibility for that which we inherit . . . [and for what] „we“ *are*” (Barad, 2010, p. 264). Clough (2002) reminds us that concerns both ethical and embodied are woven into the story and that “how *I* write [the] story will not be a matter of *method* as such, but a personal, moral and ethical response to research experiences. . . . an [experience] to be reflected upon” (Clough, 2002, p. 6).

Sparkes (1996) describes his personal journey through inflammatory back disease, a disease that not only curtailed a promising sporting career but also permanently disrupted his narrative self leading to what he describes as an “interrupted body project” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 463). With this

---

<sup>5</sup>Richards (2012, p. 96) introduces and uses the notion of a “verbal snapshot”, a “metaphorical snapshot” that is “all in writing”, with which to convey her story of kidney transplant.

narrative Sparkes (1996) blurs the genres of academic and personal writing: “to take you as the reader into the intimacies of my world. . . . in such a way that you are stimulated to reflect upon your own life in relation to mine” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 467). Sparkes (2000) later speaks about what it means to produce “proper” academic work and how this notion initially influenced his writing. He admits he “felt the need to add something to the story to signal it as scholarship” (Sparkes, 2000, p. 28) so that in his first attempts to write the paper there were sections of theory to frame his personal experience. But this changed as his focus shifted from the theoretical to the narrative writing required to “tell” his story so that theory in the final publication weaved itself into the telling as and when needed. This allowed for an interplay between the academic and personal voices, an interplay between the various theoretical texts and narrative to allow for a very specific type of meaning to emerge. His epilogue which initially went into “a review of the lit and suggestions for further research” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 486) was replaced by an ending that “trafficked in human possibilities rather than settled certainties” (Sparkes, 1996, p.484). Sparkes (1996) produced a story that reads as personal and emotional borne of - using Hudak’s phrase – “systemic sociological introspection” (Hudak, 2007, p. 59); it is a story that resonates deeply with its readers. His atypical use of other data sources (apart from his own personal story), the reconstructed conversations and medical reports, all add to the richness of the telling and reveal the possibilities this must have afforded him with for “reliving, reshaping, and realigning past events and experiences in order to give them new meaning in relation to the present” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 484). I hope to do something similar.

## 1.8 Ethics

To maintain confidentiality of the school and participants, all names have been disguised by pseudonyms including the school name which has been replaced by Tepapawai International Secondary School (TISS). Any details or features, such as physical descriptors, qualifications, nationality, and/or exact locations, that might identify the people or institutions involved in this case study will not be included. In the case of administrators involved in the case study they are referred to by their position only. This is not research “on” or “with” others but rather I write about my own life in one particular teaching context. This is not to dismiss empirical research within the educational field but rather to offer the field my autobiographical and personal/professional narrative as a means to explore the ethics of international schools as organisations. It is to explore what we might learn from “our „data“ if we stage them in different writing formats” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298).

Strict anonymity cannot be guaranteed (as is the case in most cases of educational research). With knowledge of the identity of the author, it might be possible to trace the identity of the school in question. However, the large majority of the people in the case-study are no longer working at that school. Moreover, as this is an autoethnographic study there are no conventional claims to truth, but instead the episodes referred to are theorised and are used to interrogate the literature. All effort has been made to make sure that no one can be identified in the descriptions of critical incidents referred to with details such as specific dates and places omitted in the reconstructed conversations I use as “*verbal snapshots*” - conversations that disrupted and destabilised me and that were written down immediately after the fact as I recalled them. That said, given that the methodological and ethical dimensions are interwoven in a study of this type,

ethics clearance from the School of Education at the University of Cape Town has been obtained. And I remained vigilant throughout the writing of this study to ensure that the ethical rights of others are not infringed or violated.

## **1.9 Overview of the Chapters**

The study is divided into nine chapters:

Chapter 1 includes the background to the study, the aim and the research questions that form the focus of this research study together with an outline of the research approach. It also discusses the distinguishing features of the international school context revealing that little is known about how dissenting teachers are dealt with in this fast-growing sector of education.

Chapter 2 discusses the methodology used and contrasts different ways of using narratives for teachers' stories and illuminates how such narratives of self include the emotions as sources of knowledge and moral injustice as well as expressions of epistemic injustice.

In Chapters 3 and 4 I discuss the emotions in general and anger, shame, fear, and anxiety in particular as they relate to women in general and women teachers in particular and how they can influence how conflict arises, is managed and the outcome arrived at within a particular international school.

Chapter 5 explores what it means to be an ethical educator, an ethical administrator and an ethical school and locates this stance within different ethical theories.

Chapter 6 examines the apparatuses involved in a particular conflict at a particular international school on one particular teacher, me. It discusses how the context from whence administrators come as well as the context of the particular international school – of “views from somewhere”

(Haraway, 1988, p. 590) - can influence how conflict arises, is managed and the outcome arrived at.

In Chapters 7 and 8 I tell “my” story of teacher conflict within the international school context and one particular international school, interweaving a commentary on the reflection, a meta-reflection so to speak. The fact that no one had listened to me, “heard” “my” story, means that the desire for epistemic justice, which is all about being listened to, acknowledged as worthy of being listened to, ran deep within me. This study, this piece of work, fulfills this function, hence the length and detail of several of the “*verbal snapshots*” I provide; they act as testimonies of a sort as well as events and experiences to be problematised and theorised, used to explore the literature as it pertains to conflict. However, that said, I let go of any pretence that there is only one truth, “my” truth, and that I am in the right. As such the study became philosophical therapy/transformation, so to speak, a way of enacting epistemic justice for myself.

Chapter 9, the final chapter, is a meta-analytical discussion of the four research questions and forms the basis of my conclusions on “conflict” within an international school. Each question sheds light on the “black box” of teacher control and correction within the international school context that are illuminated by the narrative.

A narrative thread runs through the thesis providing the autoethnographic link required between the distinct chapters as well as to and between Chapters 7 and 8.

## CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY OR MOVEMENT IN THOUGHT

### 2.1 Introduction: Autoethnography as Methodology

I suffer from migraine attacks. During an attack I lose central vision; it becomes a pixilated view of the world and it is only by using my peripheral vision that I can see. The detail revealed in a peripheral view of my surroundings is amazingly detailed and vivid. I am much more aware of my context, the events unfolding around me, the minutest of movements and sounds. The peripheral view, a place “where edges meet” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x), can sometimes give a much clearer image than that which is formed at the centre. It is usually where “the action most worth watching is”: a place of “interesting frictions and incongruities” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). A sideways “glance” can often be illuminating.

An autoethnography allows for and welcomes the peripheral view, setting the scene for the “telling [of the] story, weaving intricate connections among life and art, experience and theory, evocation and explanation” (Holman Jones, 2005, p. 765). It allows for what Gilbert Ryle calls “thick description” (Ryle, 1968, para. 5), an intrepid way to investigate relationships over time without it resulting in a shallow, “superficial” study (Holman Jones, 2004, para. 30). It allows for a re-enactment, a re-“imagin[ing] and re-liv[ing]” (Lenz Taguchi, 2010, p. 171) of an experience which allows people to find new meaning and through this find a closure of sorts, a renewal (Frank, 2002). It also allows for an investigation not only into how we structure stories, and how they function, but also into “who produces them and by what means” (Andrews, Squire & Tamboukou, 2008, p. 2). More importantly it allows us to investigate “how narratives are silenced, contested or accepted” (Andrews, Squire & Tamboukou, 2008, p. 2).

Richardson makes a powerful link between writing, knowing and understanding, observing that:

writing [is] a *method of inquiry*, a way of finding out about yourself and your topic. Although we usually think about writing as a mode of „telling“ about the social world . . . Writing is also a way of „knowing“ - a method of discovery and analysis. By writing in different ways, we discover new aspects of our topic and our relationship to it. Form and content are inseparable. (Richardson, 1994, p. 516)

It is this aspect, what Spector-Mersel (2010, p. 208) and Brown (2012, p. 50) call the “interpretive-qualitative paradigm” of narratives, that allows for a “subjective and multifaceted social reality” (Brown, 2012, p. 50; see also Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 209; Muncey, 2005) to emerge as opposed to the single objective reality posited by the positivist paradigm. Tamboukou (2008a, p. 107) interestingly identifies narratives as “technologies of power” and “*technologies of the self*”, positing that we should focus not on what stories are but on what they do: their impact or lack thereof rather than their structure as fixed, unchanging artifact. That we should, in fact, focus on how their meaning can be ceaselessly deferred, marginalised to become silenced “nomadic narratives” (Tamboukou, 2008b, p. 1) in search of a home. Stories allow “the said” to be challenged, the silenced to speak, “the unsaid” to be spoken, the “technologies of the self” to become “*technologies of resistance*” as the marginalised create “new forms of subjectivity” (Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 107), These are forms of subjectivity that contest the way power can mediate to create “conditions of possibility for particular narratives to emerge as dominant and for others to be marginalized” (Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 104).

Muncey (2005) describes four approaches to autoethnographic “data”: “snapshots, artifacts, metaphor, and journey” which, when used in combination, illuminate the “disjunctions” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2) that mark people’s lives and “demonstrate that although memories are

fragmentary, elusive, and, sometimes „altered“ by experience, the timing and sequencing of them is more powerfully presented in this juxtaposition of themes than if they were presented sequentially or alone” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11). Disjunctions serve to engage “personal history” in such a way as to demonstrate how it is “implicated in larger social formations and historical processes” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2). They allow us to see the trees for the woods as well as the woods for the trees.

Autoethnographic writing attempts to write “across the line of fault that separates lived experiences . . . from academic and professional analyses of these experiences” (Frank, 2000, p. 357). As such it requires what Lévi-Strauss calls an “intellectual bricolage” (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17): a “gathering [of] concepts and ideas” as and when needed to tell the story or make a particular point (Frank, 2000, p. 358), a narrative “métissage” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 8) so to speak. Moving in and out of the artifacts and “snapshots”, rereading, reviewing as well as re viewing<sup>6</sup>, a going back to look at again, all the documents gathered to provide the physical details, events, thoughts, emotions and dialogue acts as a kind of aide memoir in the process of “emotional recall” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 739; Frank, 2000; Sparkes, 2002, p. 210) that the autoethnographic study requires. Categories, themes and patterns emerge as “emotional textures” (Fineman, 2000, pp. 15, 25) as the researcher/researchee rereads, recalls and re calls<sup>7</sup>, writes and rewrites rather than being “imposed prior to data collection” (Janesick, 1994, p. 215) or at the start of the writing process (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). For as Muncey (2005, p. 3) rightly points out autoethnographic writing is a “messy iteration looking backward and forward, examining images and memories through a lens that has been influenced by experience and

---

<sup>6</sup> “Review” is generally understood to mean to assess or evaluate. However, in the autoethnographic context I use it as “re view” meaning “to go back to look at again”.

<sup>7</sup> „I use the term “re call” as in “going back to take back possession”.

reflection on the interaction” of teaching and researching, my stories and the stories of others. For the peripheral view can inform the centre (Pratt, 2002): working through others stories can be a postmodern act (Richards, 2012): a way of empowering the disempowered, giving a voice to the voiceless, providing no new answers but hopefully offering some new questions. Where “[t]he way of saying is the what of saying” (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 68).

## **2.2 Glass Palaces or Glass Cages?**

Darwin in his *Origins of Species* (1859/1968, p. 170) talks about diversity and plurality in an ecosystem: variety and heterogeneity are vital if the species and that particular environment are to survive. Likewise Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2002, p. 6; see also Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000) points out the intrinsic value of “plurilingualism”, paralleling linguistic diversity with bio-diversity and “the importance of preserving the latter [as] comparable to preserving the diversity of languages around us.” For with the start of the “information age”: “two of the world's great stores of information, the diversity of biological organisms and of human languages, are imperiled” (Brush, 2001, p. 517). As the repositories “of historically developed knowledges” linguistic and cultural diversity are intrinsically connected to and entwined with biodiversity (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002, p. 13). Lose one and we lose the other. Lionnet (1991, p.18) further extends the metaphor aptly suggesting that discourse can operate according to “Darwinian divergence: that a given space (text) will support more life (generate more meanings) if occupied by diverse forms of life (languages).” For as Lionnet (1991, p. 18) points out, it is by “privileging . . . the intermediary spaces [that] boundaries become effaced”, binary systems are subverted and more forms of “life” supported. However, this fundamental truth about “difference”, what Lionnet calls a “principle of divergence”, is all too often “excluded by a politics of knowledge” (Lionnet,

1991, p. 18). Lionnet (1991) calls this intermediary space “métissage” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 8; Glissant, 2002), Garber (1997, p. 223) a “third space”, Richards (2012, p. 4) the “littoral”, a place that “thrives on ambiguity and multiplicity, on affirmation of differences, not on polarized or polarizing notions of identity, culture, race, or gender” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 16).

The primary meaning of “métis” was cloth made of two different types of thread: “cotton for the warp and flax for the woof” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 16). In Polkinghorne’s view individuals construct “private and personal stories linking diverse events of their lives into unified and understandable wholes. These are stories about the self” (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 136) and as such narrative constructs of our identities and worlds (MacIntyre, 1984): our warp and woof. To experience life as “a meaningful whole”, one must maintain coherence of the narrative text (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 145). “Epiphanies”, “watersheds” (Clandinin, 1986), “critical incidents” (Measor, 1985; Tripp, 1993) or what Muncey (2005) calls “disjunctions” can interrupt these “projects of the self” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 464) and precipitate a “dissolution into . . . parts” (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 145): a loss of tension between the warp and woof in the “cloth” that is our identity. By placing my narrative of self as the warp of the text and the conflict as the woof, I hope to create a new tension, a “third space”, a “littoral”, a “métissage” by which “those truths, which cannot otherwise be told, are uncovered” (Sparkes, 2003, p. 416).

Métis as a proper noun is also the name of the Titan goddess of good counsel (Lionnet, 1991), advise, cunning, craftiness, transformation and wisdom who as the wife of Zeus was devoured by him when about to give birth to Athena (goddess of weaving), thus appropriating her and her powers both physically and metaphorically, “thereby guaranteeing his paternal authority for

eternity” (Klein, 1986, p. 5). The term is synonymous with transformation, transmutation and translation (both mathematical and linguistic), its permeable and polysemic nature making it an appropriate metaphor for the approach I hope to take in this study.

### *2.2.1 Why Not Autoethnography?*

In discussing why I choose autoethnography as my research method it is as important to understand and respond to the arguments made against the method as it is for its use, arguments that view narrative accounts of teachers’ experiences as purely subjective with nothing to offer to the pool of *knowledge* in a particular field. As such autoethnography stands accused primarily of being “self-indulgent” (Brooker & Macpherson, 1999, p. 208; Sparkes, 2002, p. 214), of being a “blind alley” (Atkinson, 1997, p. 325) rather than a “narrative turn” unable to satisfy the criteria of truth as corresponding theory. I believe that nothing could be further from the truth yet in order to respond to such criticisms we must move beyond the stories themselves (Frank, 2000) to questions of “deliberation and critique” (Brooker & Macpherson, 1999, p. 219), questions such as those of “standpoint” (Frank, 2000, p. 356), of whether the story being told is a “principled” and ethical investigation, providing an “advocacy” of sorts (Frank, 2000, p. 357), an alignment by the storyteller with the stories she tells, by speaking as though “imbued with the [voices] of others” (Frank, 2000, p. 358; Bakhtin, 1981; see also Taylor, 1992, pp. 32-33).

In making the distinction between rigor and imagination, Bateson (1972/1987) (as cited in Holman Jones, 2004, para. 31) states that “quantitative social science was high on rigor but low on imagination”. However those who criticise the rigour of personal narrative might be missing the point: “Maybe the point is not to engage it systematically but to engage it personally” (Frank,

2000, p. 355); maybe the point is to judge it on whether it “meet[s] literary criteria of coherence, verisimilitude, and interest” (Richardson, 2000, p. 11), believability and the ability to evoke a response “on the basis of our own experiences” (Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998, p. 526) rather than satisfying the criteria of truth as corresponding theory (Caduri, 2013). Lionnet (1991) appropriately dismisses the criticisms saying:

criticisms leveled against poststructuralist epistemologies have very disturbing parallels in the nineteenth-century polygenists’ discourse of racial purity. In both cases, indeterminacy, hybridization, and fragmentation are feared because of the risks of „degeneration“ of the human species, of the race, and of „traditional“ literary culture. If *métissage* and *indeterminacy* are indeed synonymous metaphors for our postmodern condition, then the fundamental conservatism of those who fight against both should be obvious. (Lionnet, 1991, p. 17)

For a view of knowledge based on diversity, that sees it as an asset rather than a threat, sees it as an effacing of boundaries and subversion of “binary modes” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 18) rather than a “slowly unfolding pattern of eternal and unchallengeable „truths“, or as derived from some kind of objective, scientific inquiry” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74) is one that will survive and thrive capable as it is of supporting a continuum of divergent views (Code, 2008a; Kelly, 1995; Lionnet, 1991; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002) and evolving “truths”.

It would thus seem to me that Aristotle’s distinction between *sophia* (theory) and *phronesis* (practical wisdom) is what lies at the heart of the debate as to whether narrative inquiry is a valid method: whether it should satisfy the criteria of truth as corresponding theory, demonstrating a causal connection between a “teacher’s life story and [their] teaching practice” (Caduri, 2013, p. 38), or should be judged as to the ultimate purpose or end (*telos*) of a teacher’s actions based on their life story (Caduri, 2013). If the goal of narrative inquiry were to justify teacher practice as the “predictable consequences” of “defined events” then “empirical evidence” (Caduri, 2013, p.

45) would be necessary. However, as we strive to understand teacher knowledge, their behaviour as it relates to a teacher's past experiences within the context of a current story (Clandinin & Connelly, 1995; Xu & Connelly, 2009), then the link must as such be teleological rather than causal and the need for empirical evidence nullified. Teachers possess "practical knowledge" which according to Aristotle (as cited in Caduri, 2013, p. 40) "entails the virtues one has to possess in order to achieve *eudemonia*, that is, wellbeing": the ultimate purpose or *telos* of teaching.

However, this brings us to the question of whether we are "*justified*" or "*entitled*" (Caduri, 2013, p. 38) to accept the knowledge claims of narrative inquiry research. The use of the term "justified" implies a causal link, with "causal explanations" (Caduri, 2013, p. 38) needed to verify conclusions reached: a notion of truth based on correspondence theory. Entitlement requires no such conception of truth as correspondence, based as it is on the interpretive as well as practical and ethical nature of "*teleological explanations*" (Caduri, 2013, p. 38). Rather entitlement relies on our accepting the knowledge claims of the research unless given compelling reason to believe otherwise (Fricker, 1994). For, reproducible empirical evidence as to a causal relationship between norms, values, culture – a teacher's past life and experiences – and a teacher's current working practice within a given context is difficult if not impossible to acquire. As such we are entitled to accept such knowledge claims as revealed by narrative inquiry but not justified, reserving this term for the results of mechanical events where change in an independent variable would produce a predictable change in the dependent variable (Caduri, 2013, pp. 46-47).

For if as Bateson (1972/1987) argues human communication and behaviours are “not the stuff of quantities” (Bateson as cited in Holman Jones, 2004, para. 31) and cannot be understood by quantitative means, then I believe that the criteria of truth as corresponding theory has no place in the evaluation of narrative evidence. Rather narrative inquiry should satisfy criteria such as plausibility, adequacy and verisimilitude whilst at the same time providing viable and visible ethical ends that link a teacher’s life story, her norms, values and cultures, with her current teaching practice. We “need meaning as well as facts; [for] what is the use of any amount of facts if they have no meaning for us?” (Eyres, 2014, p. 24). It is the narrative turn that I believe restores meaning, what Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 9) calls “a poetry of human relations”, to the world of academic research for “any wholly objective account of the world will fail to accommodate the essentially subjective quality of mental states” (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 355) of teachers and others. As Nagel (1974, p. 436) states: “there is something that it is like to *be* [an] organism” that resists capture by any “reductive, physicalist view of the mind” (Eyres, 2014, p. 24), whether that organism be a bat (as in the case of Nagel’s thought experiment) or a teacher (as in the case of this study). That is not to negate other types of enquiry, other methods of enquiry but it is to understand that this different way of “knowing” allows for ways of knowing differently that can “trouble the received meaning of [objective] *data*” (St Pierre, 1997, p. 177).

In this age of “glass” (Gabriel, 2003), a substance that “generates changing images . . . whose mere presence leaves us in no doubt that what it encases is worthy of attention” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 167), as opposed to metal, man is no longer imprisoned in what Weber (1958, p. 181) called his “iron cage”, one of “subjugation and containment” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 169) imposed by rational modernity. Rather s/he is exposed to the stare of the “Other” in every aspect of life, so

too with methodology. The iron cage of quantitative studies is in the process of being displaced (in the social sciences at least) by the “glittering [glass] palace” (Gabriel, 2003, p.168) of qualitative work. However, with the glass palace comes exposure to all of all with the incumbent risk of it becoming nothing more than another cage albeit of glass, a self-indulgent fantasy. I believe not. I believe, as Gabriel aptly argues, that in this postmodern age where people “may be managed, prodded, seduced and controlled” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 174) the likelihood of their succumbing is no longer guaranteed as it was in the age of modernity. Today’s wo/man is “unpredictable, inconsistent and contrary” (Gabriel & Lang, 2008, p. 334). Gabriel continues:

in spite of the forces intent on silencing them, individuals and groups in today’s organizations strive and eventually discover *voices* of their own. . . . Voice, then, is . . . a means for expressing and working through ambivalence, and for instigating some social and organizational change. (Gabriel, 2003, p. 175)

A voice that despite its fears and insecurities allows for the construction of different identities that can be “experimented with, developed, modified, rejected and reconstructed” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 175). The glass cage allows for greater ambiguity as its very visibility and transparency severely limits the “overt control” (Gabriel, 2003, p.176) of management and managers. It allows for the outsider to look in as the insider looks out and as such is symbolic of the autoethnographic turn in postmodern qualitative studies.

As such autoethnography should be viewed not solely as methodology but also as a way of knowing, a way of being, both epistemology and ontology, with ethics the ties that bind them (Fricker, 2007). For autoethnography constitutes “a clear vision of the social world and the way we think, feel and conduct ourselves in it” (Spector-Mersel. 2010, p. 209) – a paradigm, no less.

### **2.3 Teachers' Stories**

Of the many terms assigned to narrative research - a methodology (Clandinin, 2007), a method of data collection and analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), or just another qualitative approach (Creswell, 2007) - I believe that the notion of narrative as paradigm, as defined by Spector-Mersel (2010), captures more fully the essence of narrative inquiry and especially of autoethnography offering as it does unique insights into human practices and socially constituted and constructed phenomenon unmediated by the other. As such the focus of this section will be autoethnographical stories. That is not to dismiss the work of researchers such as Clandinin (1986), Clandinin and Connelly (1988, 1989, 1991), Connelly and Clandinin (1990, 1995a, 1995b), Day (1998), Day and Leitch (2001), Dunning, James and Jones (2005), Hargreaves (1994, 1995, 1998, 2000), Hargreaves and Hopkins (1991), Landau (2004), Galton and MacBeath (2008), MacLure (1993, 2003), Measor (1985), Nias (1989), Woods and Carlyle (2002), Woods and Jeffrey (2002). It is however to say that although, as with any narrative inquiry, "the reality being studied is often created only during the inquiry" (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 216), when it is "created" for a researcher, it is a reality that did not exist before: these are stories that "were not previously there" (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 216). As such these are stories that no longer retain the integrity of the sole narrator's voice, no longer "clean" (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 216), contaminated by the researcher's presence, her own worldview, her epistemology, to become a "co-construction" (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 216) of researcher and researchee, though given the unequal power structures at play in the researcher/researchee relationship an equal say by both in what is said and how would be unlikely (Pillow, 2003; Stenhouse, 1979). For teachers' stories have for the most part been told to researchers for research purposes rather than told by teachers to and for other teachers; this is narrative used as

data selected for its ability to “fit in” with other stories in the “canon” of research literature that portrays a “particular conception of teaching” (Carter, 1993, p. 10). As a result in the sections that follow I will be exploring autoethnographic stories/studies by Laurel Richardson, Ken Winograd and Edward Said that present a different conception of teaching and knowing. These “stories” are what Foucault (1980d, p. 82) would call “disqualified knowledges”: those knowledges “disqualified from the hierarchy of knowledges and sciences” yet which provide “a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge” through which “criticism performs its work.” It is a knowledge that owes “its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it” (Foucault, 1980d, p. 82). For I would not want others to colonise my stories, nor would I want to colonise those of others.

### *2.3.1 The Stories*

There seems, for me at least, a strange affinity between Laurel Richardson and Edward Said, beyond the fact that both use writing to contest the established ways of knowing and those who have vested interests in perpetuating these ways. Their stories speak to me in ways others’ stories do not and can not. Their stories speak to me of injustice, ethical and epistemic as well as ontological for to claim to know the other, speak for the other, to propose one reality while erasing others is to harm the very fibre of one’s being: “the nature of [one’s] „world,“ the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 107).

However, Winograd, his story, speaks to my shame, my anger, my frustration: “outlaw emotions” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166), “conventionally unacceptable” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166) which

can become powerful change agents when they are the expressions of the collective, “politically because epistemologically subversive” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166). Yet when experienced alone and in private, as shameful secrets, these same emotions can become “a site of social control” (Zorn & Boler, 2007, p. 143; see also Boler, 1999) and domination, used to maintain the status quo.

As such these are stories that tug at the threads of my own woven identity, linking my story with theirs, weaving a greater collective story or text, for the English word “text” derives from *texere*, the Latin word for weaving and as such has much to do with feeling, appearance, and/or consistency: subjective realities, and little to do with single objective truths. They are stories that have provided me with “a platform for seeing what might be called our 'actual worlds' more clearly” (Eisner, 1997, p. 264) and to reflect upon them “from different vantage points” (Sparkes, 1998, para. 5). For the ability to see from different vantage points, to see different worlds, belongs, according to Said (1978, p. 1), to the outsider, “the Other” who from a position of marginality of being (Said, 1996), a “critical positioning” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586) with a “critical vision” (Haraway, 1988, p. 589), is able to both conflate and separate, both work with and work against for “identity . . . is difficult to maintain in exile” (Said, 1986, p. 16). As such “the exile” sees things not only in terms of the “here and now” but also in terms of what has been lost, “left behind”: “there is a double perspective that never sees things in isolation” (Said, 1996, p. 60) and it is this “plurality of [self and] vision” that allows for “originality of vision” (Said, 1984, p. 55) and the ability to become critically aware of the multidimensional aspects of subjectivity, its interpretive-qualitative qualities. “Exile” appears to be a prerequisite for true critical “worldliness” (Said, 1975, p. 2; Said, 1998, p. 7), the ability to juxtapose “an idea or experience . . . with another”, thereby creating a paradigmatic shift in how both are viewed (Said,

1996, p. 60; see also Lionnet, 1991, pp. 15-16<sup>8</sup>). As such the stories that follow are outsiders' stories told by an outsider who "refuses to sit on the sidelines nursing a wound, [for] there are things to be learned: he or she must cultivate a scrupulous (not indulgent or sulky) subjectivity" (Said, 2000, p. 184).

### *2.3.1.1 Edward Said: Between Worlds: Edward Said Makes Sense of His Life (1998)*

As Edward Said (1998) found in Conrad's work so too do I find in his that "aura of dislocation, instability and strangeness" (Said, 1998, p. 3): the unmistakable sense of loss which has acted as a "steady ground bass" (Said, 1998, p. 3) to much of his life and work. In this brief "memoir" Said draws on Conrad to reflect back, to mirror, his own experiences, as well as reflect upon them, using writing as a metaphorical pause, an ontological meditation, with which "to put the whole jumble together" (Said, 1998, p. 3).

He starts his own chronicle with a depiction of his earlier days. Edward Said was, by his own admission, the anomalous schoolboy par excellence: born in Jerusalem, Palestinian by birth and a US national by (his father's) design, on being exiled with his family to Egypt, he continued an elite colonial education at Victoria College, Cairo until he was expelled and "exiled" a second time to a boarding school in Massachusetts, USA where he was the only student "not a native-born American, who did not speak with the required accent, and had not grown up with baseball, basketball and football" (Said, 1998, p. 5). Despite the fact that he was "born, baptised and confirmed in the Anglican Church" he remained "an alien, a Non-European Other, educated by

---

<sup>8</sup>Lionnet's discussion of Nancy Morejón's concept of "[t]ransculturation" is relevant here: "the constant interaction, the transmutation between two or more cultural components with the unconscious goal of creating a third cultural identity . . . that is new and independent . . . one changes into the other so that both can be transformed into a third. Nothing seems immutable" (Morejón as cited in Lionnet, 1991, pp. 15-16).

my betters to know my station and not to aspire to being British” (Said, 1998, p. 5). Said himself would describe this state of being at once “aggressor and aggressed against. . . . a Wog and an Anglican” an ontological “state of standing civil war” (Said, 1998, p. 5).

However as Said explains it was that state of standing civil war that finally led him to link the diverse facts of his own background and life to a detailed and cogent explication of identity as “Other”, as social discursive “manipulation” (Said, 1998, p. 6) with the associated epistemic, ontological and ethical injustices that this could and would perpetrate and perpetuate at the individual and group, local and regional level. His own experiences of injustices figure frequently in his writing, as part of the “worldliness” (Said, 1998, p. 7) of his text, text as identity and identity as text with all its “vast web of affiliations” (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 7; see also Said, 1983). Yet one event he speaks of suffered at his States-side boarding school embodies many of the rest; for it was there that he was deemed “morally wanting” (Said, 1998, p. 5) and denied the title of valedictorian or salutatorian on graduation. The memory of this epistemic, ontological, and ethical injustice was to remain with him for the rest of his life: “– a moral judgment which I have ever since found difficult either to understand or to forgive” (Said, 1998, p. 5) - the depth of the hurt caused palpable even decades later.

On graduating from a US college, he promptly went off to teach the canon of English literature at an American university, finally settling at Colombia, New York where he was known as an Alexandrian Jew, “a term that offended no one” (Said, 1998, p. 5). However, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 finally acted as the catalyst needed to urge Said not only to seek out the voice of his own culture, its language and literature (Said, 1998, p. 5), but also to speak out on what was the

“annulment” of a people through “occlusions, misrepresentations and denial” and their history of “loss and dispossession” (Said, 1998, p. 6). It was though for him not only a “political” need but also an “existential” (Said, 1998, p. 5) one: to bring harmony between an identity that had been acquired and the one he had been born into but from which he had been exiled. As such it revealed:

how a subject was constituted, how a language could be formed – writing as a construction of realities that served one or another purpose instrumentally. This was the world of power and representations, a world that came into being as a series of decisions made by writers, politicians, philosophers to suggest or adumbrate one reality and at the same time efface others. (Said, 1998, p. 6)

As such he saw his work as that of the “intellectual without mandate”(Said, 1998, p. 7), a cultural go-between, standing exquisitely balanced between the two camps of Americans and Palestinians; “think[ing] and writ[ing]contrapuntally”(Said, 1998, p. 6), using the distinct yet asymmetrical facets of his life experience to work for and against each other: to make visible “the non-existence, the non-history” (Said, 1998, p. 6) of a people that had not only been denied but also erased. Said’s simple assertions throughout the story remain:

that power determines which representations may be accepted as „true“, that Orientalist texts owe their alleged „truthfulness“ to their location in the discourse, and that this situation is one that emerges out of, and confirms, a global structure of imperial domination. (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 75)

Thus it is that by “know[ing] something” is “to have power over it” and by “hav[ing] power is to be able to know the world” on and “in your own terms” (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 83).

The power and genius of Said’s writing lies in the simplicity with which he tells his itinerant and recursive tale, a tale that conveys “a definite, almost palpable discomfort” with his position affiliated as he was with “an extremely unpopular cause” and an American university at one and the same time, and most poignantly given the “irreconcilability of the two constituencies, and the two lives they have required” (Said, 1998, p. 7). He remains unapologetic about his stance, as a

critic of either camp, with a foot in each camp metaphorically as well as literally, “speaking truth to power” (Said, 1996, p. 85) as and when needed. For he unequivocally believes that: “We have to defend peoples and identities threatened with extinction or subordinated because they are considered inferior, but that is very different from aggrandising a past invented for present reasons” (Said, 1998, p. 7). And it is this belief that resonates with the reader, interacts dialogically with her due in large part to the modesty of the language he uses and the lack of “aggrandising” as to the not-insignificant role he played in revealing the “true” nature of the “Orient” and the “Oriental” to the West.

Accordingly Said ends his chronicle by bringing us back to the beginning, describing new experiences of life as the “Other” (the Boston psychologist who “only came to see how [he] lived,” and is amazed that he actually owns and plays a piano and the publisher who “refused to sign my contract until I had lunch with him. . . . [as] the great man wanted to see how I handled myself at the table” (Said, 1998, p. 7)) and his enduring fascination with Conrad:

Conrad says in *Nostramo* that a desire lurks in every heart to write down once and for all a true account of what happened, and this certainly is what moved me to write my memoir, just as I had found myself writing a letter to my dead mother out of a desire once again to communicate something terribly important to a primordial presence in my life. (Said, 1998, p. 7)

However, as Said himself so rightly observes: “One achieves at most a provisional satisfaction, which is quickly ambushed by doubt, and a need to rewrite and redo that renders the text uninhabitable” (Said, 1998, p. 7). Any story, including my own within this study, is dynamic: a moving target, so to speak, that defies being pinned down metaphorically and literally to one version of events as does the identity of the man known as Edward Said.

### 2.3.1.2 Laurel Richardson: *Skirting a Pleated Text: De-Disciplining an Academic Life* (1997)

In this narrative Laurel Richardson focuses on the vicissitudes of life in academia as a feminist enacting “*feminist-poststructuralist writing practices*” (Richardson, 1997, p. 295) in the context of “entrenched authority” and “the ethics and politics of social scientific enquiry and presentation” (Richardson, 1997, p. 295) as well as the epistemic injustices embodied by and enacted on students and faculty alike. As such, this is my story too (Richardson, 1997, p. 295).

Richardson tasks herself and her reader to explore the issues and practices of academic writing and how these can promote “a care for the self, despite conflict and marginalization” (Richardson, 1997, p. 295) as well as integrate interests both academic and social, needs both emotional and spiritual thus illuminating the intertwining connections between them (Richardson, 1997). Most importantly she questions the subordinate position of the ethical subject to research’s practices. Thus it is that in exploring these issues, Richardson discusses how she came to construct *Fields of Play* and the marked impact writing the book had on her.

As in the book so too in the paper, Richardson “skirts a pleated text” of both traditional and experimental text, interwoven with “writing-stories” that detail the contexts of the writing and explain how the “specific” context “in which we write” determines “what” and how “we write” (Richardson, 1997, pp. 295-296). As such the “writing-stories” frame the academic work, effacing the boundaries between writing genres, subverting the politics of knowledge and “privileging . . . the intermediary spaces” (Lionnet, 1991, p.18) creating a “métissage” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 8) that allows more meanings to emerge.

The particular “pleat” that Richardson enters in this narrative is “departmental politics . . . as a site of discipline” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296), elegantly delineating three different examples of departmental politics at work. Richardson contends that the story line touted by the disciplines of the social sciences comprises “telling writers” not only “to suppress their own voices” but also “to adopt the all-knowing, all-powerful voice of the academy; and keep their mouths shut about academic in-house politics” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296). However, as Richardson (1997, p. 296) so rightly points out: “We are always present in our texts” – we cannot write ourselves out – “Power relations are always present”.

The first story (in both the paper and the book *Fields of Play*) is written at a time of severe marginalisation for Richardson within her department, when the newly appointed department chair: “Like a medieval warlord who executes or banishes all who might pose a threat to his absolute authority . . . deposed the three other contenders for the position, all men, from their „fiefdoms,“ their committee chairships” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). On relieving Richardson of one her own “fiefdoms” and limiting the scope of another to render it almost powerless, she publicly makes known her dissent and at an awards evening in honour of her work: “my face making a face, repulsed, I shrugged his arm off from around my shoulder” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). This very public display of emotion and very public slight does not go unpunished.

The new chair hires a consultant who in his appraisal of Richardson, already a full professor of some standing, judges her to be “promising” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) and makes the insult deep and complete by advising her to return to the study and teaching of medical sociology (an area she worked in for a year as part of her postdoctorate); he declares she should abandon the

past ten years of research, and pronounces her area of research and expertise, gender research, “a fad” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). She dissents, publicly, vehemently.

The consequences of not “yield[ing] to authority” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) are swift and ruthless: the assignment of an extra undergraduate course to teach with less than a week to prepare. Richardson’s “stomach cramped in severe pain” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) on getting the news; so did mine on reading same, for I had been down that same road myself and knew what was coming: I know the feeling well. However with Richardson’s refusal to acquiesce, the new dean, a woman, advises her to: “roll over” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). When Richardson refuses to, the new dean rolls over for her, teaching the course herself rather than “pull rank” on a man (Richardson, 1997, p. 297): gender is still a powerful site of domination, of unethical and unjust practices in the academic worlds. And with this one act the dean “legitimated the chair’s right to do anything he wanted” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). The irony that the course is on the sociology of women is not lost on Richardson or the reader. More punitive action follows with regards salary, which courses she could teach and when. With Richardson “in virtual exile to Coventry” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297), colleagues realising that she was now dangerous to be seen with or even know, abandon her (Richardson, 1997, p.298). And Richardson’s disappearance is complete.

It is with questions of ethics and principled behaviour at the forefront of her mind that Richardson turns to herself, rather than others, and writes about her own life, no longer comfortable with the act of doing research “on” others. Her experiments with “textual form”, “content”, “frame” and “voice” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298) in turn cause her to seek out

communities other than the academic for support. Her intent, then as now, to “examine [the field]. . . . enlarge [it] through other representational forms” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298).

Yet despite her dys-appearance the “assault [is] warming up in [her] home department” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298) and Richardson decides to embody the issues in the form of a drama. This is presented as the next “story” in the paper. This is a drama that captures the essence of what it means to dys-appear, acting as a mirror for others to see themselves, know themselves “through another’s life story, revisioning their own, arriving where they started and knowing ,the place for the first time“” (Richardson, 1997, p. 299). It is a drama that acts as “collective story” (Richardson, 1997, p. 300) for the many who think themselves alone; it affords us with a much-needed view from the loser’s standpoint (Fricker, 2007, 2012).

Richardson completes the paper with the penultimate story in *Fields of Play*, a “collective” story that joins her voice with those of graduate students in different sociology departments. For academia, Richardson states, has become “inhospitable” not only to those that “would change it [but also] to those who are most vulnerable – graduate students” (Richardson, 1997, p. 300). In so doing she acknowledges the voices of graduate students, frees them “to be heard”, to do most of the “talking” so to speak, with sections taken from students’ emails, letters, papers as well as an open letter to the department that states clearly the epistemic injustices based on race endured by students of colour, excused in the name of efficiency (80 per cent of the undergraduate students are white (Richardson, 1997, p.301)), and condoned by administrators which leave the student with no other option but to seek an academic life elsewhere.

In her concluding paragraphs we learn that Richardson has taken “early retirement from [her] ,home“ sociology department” (Richardson, 1997, p. 302), no doubt having learnt not to water the rocks (MacBeath, 2000). She has left the department both physically and emotionally:

As a shaman might say, I have called my spirit back; the place no longer has power over me. I go into the building and do not feel alienated. Sometimes I sing while I am there. (Richardson, 1997, p. 302)

She has learnt to water the green shoots instead (MacBeath, 2000), teaching at another university and working on numerous projects that speak to her soul as well as her heart.

### *2.3.1.3 Ken Winograd: The Functions of Teacher Emotions: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly (2003)*

Ken Winograd’s self-study explores “the emotional dimensions of teaching from feminist and sociological perspectives” (Winograd, 2003, p.1642) and as such sheds light on the potential to use the emotions as sites of contestation (Boler, 1999): alerting teachers to unjust practices and the need to collectively challenge the unequal power structures (Fricker, 2007, 2012) at play in schools.

Winograd chooses to situate the theoretical underpinnings to the study in three separate sections that precede the study rather than within the study itself. Rather than detract from the story, these sections serve to sharpen the focus of the reading, tracing as they do essential ways of viewing the emotions from somatic and cognitive responses to our environment to emotion as social construct “with one’s experience and display of emotions reflect[ing] the totality of a person’s experience, which includes organizational culture, gender, race, class, education, and personality” (Winograd, 2003, pp. 1643-1644). Together with the final discussion, these sections

serve to frame the story and provide a socio-historical educational context to the study itself, elucidating how certain emotions are “outlawed” in schools historically in order to control a predominantly female teaching staff and thus maintain the dominant hierarchical and patriarchal status quo (Winograd, 2003, p. 1644). However these same emotions, Winograd (2003, pp. 1644-1645) argues, citing Jaggar (1989) and Barrows (1996), can be liberated, and liberating, when shared with others to bring “to consciousness our ,gut level“ awareness that we are in a situation of coercion, cruelty, injustice or danger” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 167). Fully realised as a collective response, the emotions, Winograd (2003), citing Barrows (1996), contends, can guide us to and promote social change.

The methods section that follows the theory, although presented in the style of a quantitative study, belies by its content this very fact and acts more as an introduction to the story, detailing the context and background as well as situating it and the author within a specific local domain and providing, in the results section, the actual story. Winograd admits to as much in stating that “the purpose of this enquiry is not the creation of any new claims to knowledge but, rather, a representation of my experience so others may imagine their own uses and application” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1649).

In what was supposed to be a sabbatical year from 13 years as an education professor taken with a mandate to study “students“ learning of mathematics as they wrote mathematics stories” (Winograd. 2003, p. 1650), Winograd’s year quickly turned into what he would call his “antisabbatical” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1641) year, a year where “the struggle for survival and the concomitant search for [his] identity as a teacher became the research focus” (Winograd, 2003,

p. 1650). It was the journal he would keep during this year and its record of the “dark” emotions he experienced that would form the heart of the study that speaks to me of Winograd’s vulnerabilities as a reconstituted “novice teacher” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1651) with the status of an expert – a burden he finds hard at times to bear. His journal entries, which he uses to support his analysis, read at times as raw emotion, and capture the uncertainties and contradictions of teaching, especially for the novice teacher who might question whether they have:

the dispositional „knowledge“ to be a teacher. When people see me in the school or around town, they often ask me something like, „Are you just loving it?“ or „Don’t you just love being with the kids?“ Right now, I am not „loving it,“ nor do I want to go to work. It’s just too hard right now. (Winograd. 2003, p, 1656)

Using these entries he elaborates “feeling rules” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642) for himself as a teacher, rules such as “[t]eachers love their work” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1652) and “[t]eachers avoid overt displays of extreme emotions, especially anger or other dark emotions. They stay calm and tend to avoid displays of joy or sadness” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1652). These are rules he tries to teach by, with the extent to which he manages to do so becoming the context and content of subsequent journal entries: a dialogical conversation with himself and the reader on the strategies he applies. It is in this respect that Winograd uses writing as “a way of knowing” (Richardson, 1994, p. 523), as a way of coming to understand himself as a teacher and the complexities of classroom life, and it is this writing that affects who he becomes (Richardson, 1997, p. 295) allowing him to fashion a professional identity that is not only flexible but subjective and multifaceted. By the end of the study he comes to personally understand the emotional and professional cost to teachers of their tendency:

to avoid explicit discussion and examination, collectively, of the emotional experience of teaching. . . . [and] teachers’ tendency to avoid explicit and organized expression of anger and subsequent action directed towards structures or individuals who are in positions of influence. (Winograd, 2003, p. 1662)

That said, I question whether it is Winograd's need to signal this study as "proper research" (Holt, 2003, p. 24) that triggers his use of words such as "validity problems . . . clear description of data collection and analysis" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1650), words that I feel detract from the author's invitation "to „relive“ the events emotionally with the writer" (Richardson, 1994, p. 521), or a need to distance himself, remove himself at least by one level from the very transparent and honest accounts of emotion he is living? Whatever his intent, with the introduction of such words however he succeeds not only in distancing himself from the researchee in these textual spaces but also in distancing me as reader, as a certain dissonance is created by his use of quantitative terminology within an qualitative study.

Winograd ends his paper with a discussion that rightly concludes that: "teaching is profoundly emotional work" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1667), an aspect widely underestimated by schools and teacher education (Winograd, 2003, p. 1667), with schools reflecting "modern masculinist organizational culture, [that] tends to privilege dispassionate, emotionally flat and rational discourse" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1668; see also Boler, 1999) to the detriment of the teaching profession as a whole and the student bodies concerned. Teacher anger, he states, directed towards controlling powers is "restrained and guarded" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669) even when in response to perceived injustice, fearful that they be perceived and "dismissed" as "incompetent or as incapable of self-control" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669; see also Campbell, 1994). Thus the emotion rules as they pertain to teachers reflecting as they do the socio-historical "patterns of patriarchy and bureaucracy" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669) have succeeded in deterring teachers from using emotions, their own and others', "as a vehicle for action and social justice" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669), as a site of contestation, for the emotions can disrupt local and

historical practices as well as sustain and perpetuate them. People in positions of little or no “social power” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287), such as teachers, “do know their problems. After all they are their problems. If they do not express their views openly, it is only because they do not have the power of an organisation behind them” (James S., personal communication, 1996). It will, Barrows (1996) suggests, require collective outrage, “political/emotional consciousness” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669), to address the many injustices in teachers’ working lives and to free teachers from the margins of institutional life (Boler, 1999).

#### **2.4 The Verbal Snapshot - What It Reveals, What It Conceals, and Why I Use It**

Muncey (2005) suggests that what a photograph conceals can be as illuminating as what it reveals. Taking the notion of snapshot as “data” one step further, as it applies to narratives and autoethnography, what the “photo” cannot reveal, what lies beyond the edges, the omissions (what the writer considers to be irrelevant information (Spector-Mersel, 2011)) and the silences (what the writer does not wish to reveal), can be as telling as what lies at the focal point of the “photo”, and is central to the story - the subject (Barthes, 1981; Foucault, 1977; Muncey, 2005). Appearances can be deceptive: “where edges meet” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x), the “periphery” (Pratt, 2002) can often illuminate the story in nuanced and remarkable ways. As such the writers discussed in the prior sections try to signal where those silences and omissions occur and offer explanations as to why they lie beyond their current “field of vision” and inclusion in the text: a way of deconstructing the text (Derrida, 1978). I will try and do the same in my own study, offering a series of “*verbal snapshots*” to try and contain the silences.

Muncey's (2005) story of teenage pregnancy provides us with a fitting example of how method can be as important if not more important than the story itself: that if one is to tell a "complex story in which the disjunctions dictate that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, the method requires some portrayal of this disjunction" (Muncey, 2005, p. 2). Such a story requires using "[w]riting tactics" (Muncey, 2005, p. 2), techniques with which to make a "deviant [s] case" (Muncey, 2005, p. 3) to the academic world. The four writing techniques favoured by Muncey are the "snapshot" - actual photographs; "artifacts" - Muncey's school reports, a letter published in a newspaper and her nurse's belts; "metaphor" - her garden; and the "journey" - actual journeys she has taken. However it is the notion of a "snapshot", a photograph that captures one brief moment in time at once representative and symbolic of the moment (Muncey, 2005) and the story being told, that to me seems to encapsulate the short verbal encounters that acted as critical incidents in my own story. However I do not possess any actual snapshots or artifacts with which to tell my story. And the notion of metaphor and journey appear as one subsumed in the story I have to tell as it acts as both a journey of and to meaning and understanding, which is itself the metaphor. As such I turn to the *verbal snapshots* of certain critical incidents, "*Momente der Wahrheit . . . tauchen unerwartet auf, wie Oasen in die Wüste [moments of truth . . . [that] arise unexpectedly, like oases in the desert]*" (Arendt, 1989, p. 135; see also Steyerl, 2003), that when considered as a whole, viewed from afar so to speak, delineate a consistent and reinforcing pattern of epistemic injustice, both testimonial and hermeneutical, in the making. Such epistemic injustice based on gender "identity prejudice" and the entrenched structural practices that view teachers (and women teachers in particular) as compliant and subordinate, prevent us from understanding our own experience; for the power relations they engender "constrain women's ability to understand their own experience" (Fricker, 2007, p.

147). As such each *verbal snapshot* provides a piece in the jigsaw puzzle of what is one particular apparatus: that is an educational institution lacking the “virtue of testimonial justice” (Fricker, 2007, p. 97) and which in its interaction with other apparatuses of bodily production, “at the level of processes, practices, and peculiarities” (Code, 2008a, p. 33), produces a constrained distribution of epistemic agency for its female teachers within the phenomenon that is conflict. With the institution’s widespread use of “preemptive” testimonial injustice, neither inquiring nor requesting of a teacher’s knowledge when pertinent, a teacher is “silenced by the identity prejudice that undermines her credibility in advance” (Fricker, 2007, p. 130).

With this study and story I hope to reposition myself and my story and hopefully introduce, as does Muncey, a new and different narrative to add to “the received wisdom” (Muncey, 2005, p.11) on international schools and the “deployment” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 49) of apparatuses such as power and emotions within them that intersect to produce power relationships that position female teachers as Other. For if as Richardson (1990, p. 26) contests you can only make sense of your life through the cultural and collective narratives available to you then new narratives, those deviant collective stories such as Muncey’s and my own, allow the “textually disenfranchised” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26) to legitimately replot their own lives, offering as they do “patterns for new lives” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26), patterns that view difference as constituted by sameness, “a critical difference within” (Haraway, 1992, p. 299; see also Trinh, 1987-87, 1988, 1989), rather than its binary opposite. As such they can become a part of the cultural and collective legacy “affecting future stories, future lives” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26). For in schools hierarchical structures of power that lead to unequal power relations:

can skew shared hermeneutical resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their experiences ready to draw on . . . whereas the powerless are more

likely to find themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render [their experiences] intelligible. (Fricker, 2007, p. 148)

It would be to offer the powerless different resources within the “collective social understandings” (Fricker, 2007, p. 147) with which to understand their own situation, their own experiences within the international school terrain.

Muncey (2005) describes her own positioning as a “deviant” (Muncey, 2005, p.3) and how this positioning outside the mainstream stereotypical image of teenage pregnancy and motherhood led to what Fricker (2007) would call “testimonial injustice”: her story not heard and her voice silenced. Because Muncey’s story does not fit the norm, of “educational failure and poverty” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11), it cannot be used as a cautionary tale, a “cultural narrative” about morality, with which to “instruct the young, control the adult” (Richardson, 1990, p. 25) and as such it must not be told embodying as it does a metaphor for “success and enlightenment” rather than “a society out of control” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11). Cultural tales, what Spector-Mersel (2010, p. 208) calls “[o]ur culture’s grand stories”, act as apparatuses that are told not only to caution and control but also to maintain the status quo and if that happens to be a patriarchal one, as in Muncey’s situation and my own, then her story fails on a second count as being “acceptable” for it is the incest she endures as a teenager at the hands of a familial male that leads to her pregnancy. The fault, if there be one, is placed firmly on the adult male who should have been there to protect rather than abuse her; as such the character roles of the “cultural narrative” are subverted both in their positioning as central or minor, and morality or lack thereof. Muncey’s story by subverting the status quo cannot be acknowledged and must be challenged as representing a truth. With accusations ranging from “self-indulgence to outright lying” (Muncey,

2005, p. 2) Muncey's "credibility" (Murriss, 2013, p. 248), as a giver of knowledge on teenage pregnancies is Murriss (2013, p. 248) would say "deflated", making it hard if not virtually impossible for the hearer to believe or accept what is being said (Fricker, 2007, p. 17). In her 2005 retelling however Muncey provides us with an analysis that uses actual snapshots of herself (from infant child through to being doctored) and other material-semiotic (Haraway, 1988) artifacts to deconstruct the cultural narrative of teenage pregnancy as one of poverty and perpetuating the "cycle of teenage parenting" (Muncey, 2005, p. 2) to move from a position of victimhood to one of survivor (Muncey, 2005). Muncey's story inspired me to use my own *verbal snapshots* to do something similar. For as Muncey (2005), so too do I feel that visceral need to have our stories "heard", to keep on telling them until we *are* heard. As such the detailed *verbal snapshots* that follow in Chapters 7 and 8 endeavour to fulfill that need: to be heard with "an openness to who [we] are and what [we] have to say" (Fricker, 2012, p. 287). For as Fricker so aptly comments: "contesting wrongful treatment crucially requires that one be properly heard without prejudice" (Fricker, 2012, p. 301).

## 2.5 Summary

It was Rabinow and Rose (2003, p. xv) who coined the phrase a "practice of criticism" to describe the methodology of Foucault and as such define it as an "antimethodology" (Frank, 2010, p. 73). In their introduction to *The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984* (2003) their unique description of this "antimethodology" captures the essence of autoethnography as:

a movement of thought that invents, makes use of, and modifies conceptual tools as they are set into a relation with specific practices and problems that they themselves help to form in new ways. When they have done this work, without regret, they can be recycled or even discarded. (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xv)

In applying this definition to stories, Frank (2010, p. 73) extends the notion of what stories can be and do: to act as “bridges” between the social sciences and literary criticism. What defines “critical” thought, Frank (2010, p. 73) suggests, is “a refusal to accept immediate, commonsense understanding[s]” while paradoxically having the utmost respect and interest in them. Critical thought can acknowledge the fact that people “know” their own problems, after all they are *their* problems, yet at the same time study the ways in which their “self-awareness is limited” (Frank, 2010, p. 73). Interpretation, according to Frank (2010), thus lies finally balanced between appreciation and examination. As such: “We must learn to know what we see rather than seeing what we already know” (Heschel, 1969, p. 3).

The notion that method could and should be viewed as a movement of thought would seem to imply that methods prevent thought from actually moving (Frank, 2010). In other words, critical, “interpretive thought” (Frank, 2010, p. 73) that is moving is more liable to allow for a movement in thought to be interpreted. Dialogue moves thought; and thought moves dialogue (Frank, 2010). As a chronicle of a dys-appearance, this study implies movement, a constant state of flux and hopefully a dialogical commitment between researcher and researchee, writer and text, text and metatext, writer and reader as well as reader and text. For by embodying both the “conceptual tools” of the researcher with the “practices and problems” of the researchee, the autoethnographer engages in living her life while at the same time analysing the considerable and wide-ranging “effects of living that way” (Frank, 2010, p. 73): one interacts with the other, affects and shapes the other, with the researcher becoming the effects of her performed research while at the same time positing a self (the researchee) as the cause of the research but which the research has served to reconfigure (Hofstadter, 1979). Conceptual tools help us to form “new

ways” (Rabinow & Rose, 20003, p. xv) of making sense of our own problems, and can inform the ways we deal with those problems. As Frank (2010, p. 74) aptly notes: “Any analysis is always already interactive with what is being analyzed; that interaction is part of what is *dialogical*”.

With their last sentence: “When they have done this work, without regret, they can be recycled or even discarded” (2003, p. xv, cited earlier), Rabinow and Rose encapsulate the work of stories: to be told within a certain time and space of telling/writing, hopefully to be “recycled . . . as part of a larger movement of thought” (Frank, 2010, p. 74). Consequently autoethnography refuses to say, as Frank (2010 p. 74), following King (2003), so succinctly puts it: “*these are the rules; here are the steps to implement these rules; follow my direction or suffer rejection.*” Rather it demands that those we use are the right tools for the right job, modifying as and when necessary so as the “*better to understand the people you listen to, to make sense to people you hope will listen to you, and to be responsible*” (Frank, 2010, p. 74) and thus ethical in your undertaking. As such, although I have used autoethnography as methodology the study is not purely autoethnographic but rather a bricolage of methods (the right tools) that through conceptual enquiries of a philosophical nature (on the emotions, ethics etc.) deepen not only my narrative research but also my understanding of the issues. Engaging with these diverse philosophical analyses has taken me from questions of essence that focused on a Cartesian understanding of difference and conflict (us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) to a posthumanist stance on both, and questions of how conflict can be understood as emergent from “intra-actions” between apparatuses of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material: discourses of gender and professional status, political and economic forces, the details

of the personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, and the emotions. For conflicts are collisions: “head on, to the accompaniment of squealing brakes and breaking glass” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). They are messy affairs. For we inhabit a tangled yet dynamic web of material-discursive power relationships upon which the production and outcome of any conflict depends. As such it is important to understand not why but how such collisions occur if we are to avoid, prevent, or resolve them ethically.

The methodology used in this study is validated by Pratt (1995, p. 22) when she states: “We cannot move theory into action unless we can find it in the eccentric and wandering ways of our daily life.” For “[s]tories give theory flesh and breath” (Pratt, 1995, p. 22); they restore meaning to the world of academic research. As with culture which we construct “but not as a craftsman constructs an object, but more in the way that a traffic jam is constructed – it is simply emergent out of surrounding conditions” (Taborsky, 2010, p. 2) so too with the narratives we tell. For teachers’ stories capture the richness and ambiguity of teachers’ lives, the complexity of knowledge that although based on past experience is both flexible, pragmatic and subject to change. This is knowledge that evades generalisation, cannot be captured by numbers or mathematical formulae alike and is the “stuff” out of which practical wisdom is made.

## CHAPTER 3: THE EMOTIONS

### 3.1 Introduction

What is an emotion? The question appears at first glance “a quest for a definition, a conceptual analysis” (Solomon, 2008, p. 10). However, in Western philosophical and epistemological traditions the question has assumed the larger proportions of a different quest that of “orientation” (Solomon, 2008, p. 10) compelling us to ask questions such as: Is emotion subservient to reason? Is emotion dominated by reason rather than controlled by it or vice versa? Or can emotions be seen as an essential part of our rationality, in reasoning and making sense of as well as judging an event, a person, a state of affairs? What is it about emotion, its aspects, that should be seen as fundamental to our understanding of emotions and how can our assumptions (and that of others) about our emotions, what Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*<sup>9</sup> (II, 2 [1104a6]; IV, 5 [1126a4 ff]) calls their appropriateness and inappropriateness, be seen as intimately entwined with and complicit in our social, moral and political lives (Spelman, 1989). I address these questions as they pertain to schools and conflict in the sections that follow. I will be focusing on four emotions: fear, anxiety, anger, and shame as these are emotions that played a significant role in my own conflict which is the subject of this study. In the process I will touch upon theories of emotion more generally speaking.

#### 3.1.2 Prologue

It was January, 1996. I had flown from Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (where I was working at the time) to Hong Kong to be interviewed for the position of Head of ESOL with the TISS, a position that had been advertised on overseas terms – terms which in addition to a salary

---

<sup>9</sup> I will use *NE* to cite this work in the text for subsequent references.

included housing, airfares to and from country of origin as well as comprehensive medical and dental coverage, benefits which were commensurate to the salary per se. We were approaching the end of the panel (2 male and 1 female) interview when the chairman suddenly asked: “If we were to offer you the position on local terms [a salary only] would you accept?” Without a moment’s hesitation, I responded in what I can only describe as a short burst of righteous indignation: “Do I look local?” The man to my left, a principal at one of the TIS schools, struggled to control the huge grin that was threatening to upset his composure. The interview came to an abrupt end shortly thereafter. I was thanked for my time and seen out the door. I did not regret answering as I had believed the question to have been unethical, unfair. As such you can imagine my surprise when several months later I received a call offering me the job - on overseas terms no less. On arriving in Hong Kong to take up the position, I discovered, quite by chance, that women who had applied for TIS positions advertised on overseas terms had invariably been asked the same question and those that had replied in the affirmative had been offered the jobs on local terms. However, the same had not been true of the men applying for similar positions also advertised on overseas terms: not a single one of them had been posed that same question.

What I had believed to be an unethical action on the part of one individual (the chairman of my interview panel) was clearly structural, part of their everyday practice with overseas female candidates. What my short outburst of anger had signaled as the unjust and unethical disposition of an individual acting on his own initiative (unethical due to the fact that the offer of a local as opposed to an overseas contract depended on an arbitrary fact – my being a woman rather than a man) now appeared to be a normal occurrence in the everyday running of a sexist institution

despite the CEO being a woman, she no doubt having internalised those practices used to subjectify her, under the gaze, the “inspecting gaze” (Foucault, 1980c, p. 155), of the Chair of the TIS Board of Governors, a wealthy and exceptionally powerfully positioned man in Hong Kong. Yet if we are to understand how the emotions were used in the preceding story (and in the conflict itself) then I will need to delve a little more deeply into what the emotions are.

### **3.2 Emotion- An Intellectual and Moral Activity**

#### *3.2.1 Introduction – Philosophy’s Attempts to Understand the Emotions*

The ambivalence of Western philosophers, from Plato onwards, towards the emotions and their role in our lives stems it would seem from the belief that emotions muddy the intellectual waters of rational thinking: they are and continue to be seen “as interfering with the smooth and successful functioning of reason” (Spelman, 1989, pp. 263-264). Yet Plato sees emotion not as separate to but rather as permeating all three parts of the soul, a soul he views as being made up of spirit, appetite and reason as defined in Plato’s the *Republic* (360 BCE/1994b, Book 4). Reason judges what is true from what is false making wise decisions in accordance with its *love* of goodness. In the just soul the spirit aligns with reason, resisting the desires of appetite, and has the *courage* to be good. Even appetite can display emotion, according to Plato, with a *love* of money, though Plato sees this type of emotion as solely a means of gratifying other appetites/bodily desires. Yet notwithstanding his deliberations on the emotions, Plato eschews the issue of what an emotion actually is, other than urges, leaving it to Aristotle to define the “[e]motions as all those feelings that so affect men as to change their judgments, and that are also attended by pleasure and pain” (*Rhetoric*, II, Part 1). Emotion, according to Aristotle, has cognition – a belief and a judgement – at its core; in the case of anger, for example, this is a

perceived unjustified “slight” (the cause of the anger) to oneself or friends and as such context-specific; it is intentional in that there is an object to one’s anger, psychological as it is a state of mind and motivational/behavioural with its associated desire for revenge, a desire accompanied by a feeling of pleasure that turns the initial pain (of being unjustly treated) to “sweetness” (*Rhetoric*, II, Part 2). And it is Aristotle’s notion of an unjustified “slight” that lends moral weight and meaning to his definition of anger as a natural response, a response that can be educated as well as incited by appropriate rhetoric and reasoning (*Rhetoric*, II, Part 1).

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle returns to the notion of emotions; here he discusses how they can be appropriately expressed, morally justified, considered virtues (virtuous character traits no less) necessary if one is to live a morally good life and so achieve well-being and happiness, *eudemonia*: a state impossible to attain without being “morally good” (Orchard, 2011, p. 6). Even though “moral goodness” does not naturally guarantee attaining *eudemonia* for as Aristotle suggests we may be beset by “great misfortunes” (*NE*, I, 9 [1100a11]) that blemish our moral goodness and prevent us from achieving it. As individual character traits, Aristotle considers each emotion as a combination of a belief and a desire: in the case of anger there is a belief in having been unjustly slighted and a desire for revenge. In addition the emotion must, according to Aristotle, be expressed “in the right way”, “to the right” degree, “at the right time”, “towards the right” person and with “the right” intent (*NE*, IV, 5 [1126a4 ff]). In other words it requires that our actions be predicated on the paradoxically tentative moral principles of practical wisdom (*phronesis*) resulting in firm moral practice (*praxis*). That the emotion is justified and its expression falls between the extremes of moral excess or deficiency in and of itself determines whether an emotional virtue has been achieved. As such according to Aristotle there are no

negative emotions per se other than those seen as in excess or in deficiency of an emotion.

Indeed, when it comes to anger for example: “Increased moral understanding may even make you angrier than before, because it renders you more sensitive to how you or someone close to your heart has been insulted” (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 48). Likewise Aristotle (*NE*, IV, 5 [1126a5 ff]) makes it abundantly clear that those “who are not angry at things they should be angry at are thought to be fools” further adding that “since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself, and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to one’s friends is slavish.”

The ancient Stoics’ approach to the emotions although different to that of Aristotle also conjoins ethics with the emotions and posits a cognitive theory of the emotions as judgements. Their view of the emotions however is not just of judgements but of evaluative judgments “about the world and one’s place in it” (Solomon, 2008, p. 5), propositional affirmations which due to their inability to think the Stoics denied to nonhuman animals and human babies (Deigh, 2006). Yet such was the Roman Stoics view of their world (as one of chaos and confusion) that they came to believe that emotions arose from false judgements predicated on false beliefs, as unattainable expectations imposed on the world and not to be entertained by any wise man (Solomon, 2008). It would however be the Stoics’ notion of evaluative judgements, inclusive though of nonhuman animals and human babies alike, that the neo-Aristotelian Martha Nussbaum would use as the core principle on which to base her cognitive theory of emotions (Deigh, 2006) in her seminal work *Upheavals of Thought* (2003).

The Middle Ages with the Christian concern (if not obsession) with sin saw the emotions again linked to ethical concerns with certain emotions, such as greed, envy, and anger, deemed to be

vices and as such sins (Hyman & Walsh, 1973). Yet the emotion anger was not considered as just one sin among the many but proscribed by the Church as a deadly sin; it was typically singled out and used as an example in Christian medieval sources of the need to “uproot vicious dispositions in ourselves” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 73) by exercising our own freewill and self control. The fact that psychologists today claim to be consulted over anger and anger management strategies far more than over any other emotion (Brooks, 2009) is testament to the enduring medieval stigma attached to anger and its excesses (Kristjánsson, 2007). For emotions in the Middle Ages were seen as linked inextricably to desires, most notably those desires that were thought to be self-absorbing and most destructive to the self and others. This enduring Christian preoccupation with sin and its link to the emotions would lead to numerous studies of the emotions that resulted in a curious reclassifying of what the medieval Church considered certain of the highest virtues to be (Solomon, 2008). As such emotions/virtues such as love, faith and hope, no longer considered as part of the pantheon of emotions/sins, were elevated to a higher standing and as such one with reason (Aquinas, 1274/1892). This has resulted in an enduring bond between ethics and the emotions, the emotions and sin, and the notion that emotions can be considered good or bad rather than neither per se, dependent for their valence on the way in which the emotion is felt and expressed. And it is this notion of emotions as either good or bad that continues to exert a considerable hold over the social imagination of the Western world particularly in the domains of teaching and education with the emotion anger as demonstrated by subordinate women teachers seen as not only inappropriate but morally wrong and unacceptable.

As such, although reason would continue to dominate the ethical, theological and epistemological arena, with emotion a poor second cousin, the ancient Greeks and medieval philosophers saw the emotions, though in need of guidance, as providing invaluable motivational power when the situation called for it: for only a fool would ignore emotion's plea to flee in a genuinely dangerous situation. Indeed, it would take the Age of Reason in the 17<sup>th</sup> century to sound emotion's death knell. For it was at this juncture that Descartes pronounced the emotions passions as distinct from "clear cognition" that rendered judgement "confused and obscure" (Descartes as cited in Solomon, 2008, p. 6), while seemingly at the same time aligning himself with Aristotle in declaring passions as "all good" (Descartes, 1649/1650, art. 211) yet requiring mastery (Descartes, 1649/1650, art. 50) by the "charioteer of reason", as described in Plato's the *Phaedrus* (360 BCE/1994a), who not only controls the horse of irrational urges (emotions) but also that of bodily desires (appetites).

With the subsequent rise of science and empiricism, nature came to be seen as being intrinsically of no import with values considered as inherently part and parcel of a human being's emotional responses and proclivities (Jaggar, 1989) and as such irrelevant to and in the epistemological domain. Reason was conceptually repackaged as the sole means of objectivity, uncontaminated as it was seen to be by personal proclivities (Jaggar, 1989; Solomon, 2008), with the emotions dismissed as "inessential to morals at best and intrusive and disruptive at worst" (Kant as cited in Solomon, 2008, p. 8), and repackaged as external, uncontrolled, irrational or arational "passions" that befell one, much as an accident might. With this clear division between reason and the emotions, the emotions, together with the sensory perceptions, became scientifically and hence epistemically untrustworthy, relegated to relative obscurity until the mid

20<sup>th</sup> century when a philosophical reawakening of interest in the emotions and what they were occurred. This was a reawakening brought about by feminists whose concern with and work on the links between the female and the emotions, the body and the irrational shed light on woman's position within society as a subordinate and subordinated group. As such in the sections that follow both in this chapter and the next I address the issues as they pertain to women and the emotions and the integral part the emotions play in the way conflict as it concerns women teachers is handled within a patriarchal school system.

### *3.2.2 The Emotions and Philosophy in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*

At the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the emotions consigned by Darwin and Freud to our biology or psychology, they were viewed as independent of our social situations, with social and/or environmental factors triggering biological responses that caused emotional reactions. As such the emotions were largely ignored in Britain and North America as the hold of logic and science continued to dominate with only European philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger and Ricoeur developing philosophies where the emotions took centre stage (Solomon, 2008). It was not until the 1960s that interest in the emotions was fully reawakened with the poststructuralist argument that emotions are historically, culturally and socially dependent and as such a social construct. According to this view different cultures, different societies construct emotion according to the “conceptual and linguistic resources” available to them as noted by Jaggar (1989, p. 157). Accordingly Western notions as to which emotion is experienced, why and how it is experienced (consciously or not), expressed, communicated (to oneself and to others) and perceived (Shweder, 2004) would differ across cultures and societies. Rosaldo (1984) for example posits that the Western notion of emotion as a personal and private experience is perceived in other

cultures as socially constructed with no separation between the public and private domain. The notion that emotion is socially constructed and therefore concept dependent implies that emotions identified as apparently universal such as anger, grief, shame and fear may indeed vary significantly across cultures and societies from the way *we* describe any particular emotion. For poststructuralists such as Shweder (2004, p. 91) the mental states and mental lives of Others “who by virtue of lifelong membership in that group ascribe meaning to their lives in the light of wants, feelings, values, and beliefs . . . are not necessarily the same as one’s own.”

However the neo-Aristotelian perspective on emotions challenges this poststructuralist view as it considers them a type of intelligence rather than solely a social construct, “forms of cognition” (Murrin, 2009, p. 18) that allow us to understand the truth of a situation in ways otherwise not available (Nussbaum, 1992); as such they can capture a truth in one’s experience inaccessible by other means. It is in this way that the “particular” as it pertains to your context, your specific experience takes priority when it comes to ethical reasoning (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 68). And it is by viewing human practice (such as conflict) through the emotions that the emotional and moral truth of a practice is revealed.

It is these cognitivist theories of emotions (of the 1960s with their revival in the 1980s onwards) that provide us with a different lens through which to understand how it is that social, political and even theological issues become so easily associated with what is seemingly a simple metaphysical question (Spelman, 1989): what is an emotion? These are theories of emotion that maintain that it is beliefs or judgements that constitute emotions as such: for to be angry requires a belief or judgement that some wrong has been done. As Nussbaum (2004a, p. 188) states:

In order to have anger, I must have . . . [a] complex set of beliefs: that there has been some damage to me or to something or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; that it was done willingly; that it would be right for the perpetrator of the damage to be punished. It is plausible to assume that each element of this set of beliefs is necessary in order for anger to be present.

Building on the cognitivist theories of emotions put forward by Aristotle and the Stoics, neo-Aristotelian feminist philosopher Nussbaum (2003, 2004a) posits that every emotion has cognitive content, the content being the judgement attributed to that particular emotion and which as such identifies the emotion. And it is this cognitive content that constitutes the thought processes by which people conduct their daily lives (Deigh, 2006). Yet Nussbaum's (2003) cognitive theory diverges from that of the ancient Stoics in two important aspects: firstly she broadens the conception of judgement to include the emotions of nonhuman animals and human babies. And secondly she then renders salient the developmental nature of our emotions from infancy through to adulthood, their "narrative structure" by reason of these "developmental histories" (Deigh, 2006, p. 386). This was an aspect largely ignored by the Stoics which resulted in emotion's cognitive content being treated as ahistoric, independent of its core foundations (Deigh, 2006). Nussbaum however grounds her theory on the notion of humans whose initial needs at birth explains their primary interests in the objects that surround them. As such these initial desires lead to the first emotions we experience in life such as happiness, sadness, fear and anger which grow and transform as we come to understand that the objects of our love can also be the objects of our anger (Deigh, 2006). These are objects, forces of desire, we subsequently learn to compromise over while at the same time learning a basic sense of fairness and a capacity for emotions that are noticeably moral (Nussbaum, 2003). It is Nussbaum's inclusion and development of this aspect that adds "explanatory depth" (Deigh, 2006, p. 386) lacking in the Stoics' theory. As such Nussbaum's theory allows one not only to understand how emotions help

shape institutional as well as social customs but also allows for a critical understanding of how the entrenched practices of social institutions are shaped by them (Deigh, 2006; Nussbaum, 2003).

This theory is in stark contrast not only to the poststructuralist view but also to the positivist's "Dumb View" (Spelman, 1989, p. 265) of emotions which holds that emotion is nothing more than feelings devoid of any cognitive component or content. As such it is the cognitivist theories of emotion, those theories that have as their focus the conceptual aspects of emotion: the web of "concepts, beliefs, attitudes, and desires, virtually all of which are context-bound, historically developed, and culture-specific" (Solomon, 2003, p. 87), which have again come to the fore with philosophy's current preoccupation with epistemological concerns (Solomon, 2008). For these are theories that hold that whether one is sad or angry, happy or afraid, one is sad, angry, happy or afraid "*about or at* someone or something" (Spelman, 1989, p. 265). And in recalling Aristotle, this sadness, anger, happiness or fear can be deemed appropriate or inappropriate, justified or not, rational or irrational, not only by others but by oneself. As such, emotions are publicly constituted and construed as well as privately held and have much to do with "power, persuasion, manipulation, and intimidation" (Solomon, 2003, p. 153). Most importantly, what the cognitivist theories of emotion render salient is that in requiring an object to our emotions by default requires that we make a value judgement about that object. In the case of the emotion anger, it means that the judgement is a moral one for to say that I am angry with someone is to say that s/he has done something I consider bad, immoral, unfair or unjust (Nussbaum, 2003, 2004a; Spelman, 1989). And if the object of my anger is my boss (or potential boss as in the anecdote told in the prologue), then such a judgement becomes an act of insubordination

(Spelman, 1989) and as such deemed wholly “inappropriate” by those in power, a threat to the status quo (Zorn & Boler, 2007). Yet this act of anger is at one and the same time an act of self-respect for Aristotle (*NE*, IV, 5 [1126a5]) is clear that to never be angry is to lack respect not only for Others but also yourself. As such the “emotional types”, the disenfranchised, are denied the one emotion that those in positions of power can use with impunity: anger.

### **3.3 Women and the Emotions**

#### *3.3.1 Introduction*

There has been a long tradition in the West (and the teaching world) of associating the rational form of reasoning and thinking with those who dominate the political and hence social worlds we inhabit, and the emotions with subordinate groups, thereby establishing the accepted norm that “rational types ought to [and do] dominate emotional types” (Spelman, 1989, p. 264) and the notion that reason is somehow superior to emotion: the metaphorical rational master of the emotional slave. From Plato onwards up until the present, with the notable exception of poststructuralist, neo-Aristotelian and feminist philosophies, emotion has been seen as having nothing to offer in the construction of knowledge or even of knowing. Reason however has been seen as inextricably linked to “the mental, the cultural, the universal, the public and the male” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 151), with the male mode of moral reasoning – “rules, rights, universality, and impartiality” (Tong & Williams, 2014, para. 1) – favoured. As such the relationship between the “irrational, the physical, the natural, the particular” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 151) and emotion remains firmly entrenched in the female camp (Bartky, 1996; Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994; Weiler, 1988; Zorn & Boler, 2007), a notion that feminist ethicists justly believe does a profound disservice to women subjecting us as it does to “a powerful disciplinary pedagogy which teaches

us that we are Other. . . . [and] our destiny . . . is to serve and please” (Bartky, 1996, p. 225)<sup>10</sup>.

That women teachers are expected to maintain control of children “without expressing anger or aggression” (Grumet, 1988, p. 52) and at the same time be submissive to principals and supervisors alike is indicative of this notion in the teaching world (Weiler, 1988).

Yet are women’s and men’s diverging character traits, their virtues and vices, social manipulation or biological imperative, a case of male versus female or masculine versus feminine? Aristotle would have it that character can be educated; as such females can be “educated” to internalise masculine practices, their virtues and vices, a view endorsed by Wollstonecraft (1792/1988, p. 105). The opposite would also pertain. Yet feminist thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as Wollstonecraft, Stanton and Gilman although divided in their answers to the question, challenged by their very discussions the epistemological supposition that “the more universal, abstract, impartial, and rational knowledge” is the “more closely” it resembles “reality” (Tong & Williams, 2014, para. 17). In so doing they also challenged the accompanying ontological notion that the more divorced we are from one another the more developed the self is. In lieu feminist ethicists offered the notion that the “more particular, concrete, partial, and emotional knowledge is, the more likely it represents the way in which people actually experience the world” and that the more connected we are with each other the more developed the self will be (Tong & Williams, 2014, para. 17). Yet these ethical as well as epistemological and ontological presumptions have as yet to cause a significant paradigm shift in the ways traditional philosophy views the female and feminine world of the emotions. As such

---

<sup>10</sup>That this same notion also does a disservice to men is aptly captured by the aphorism that “big boys don’t cry”. Yet it is this same notion that serves to embed the corresponding “truth” that rationality shuns emotion and is thus male.

in the sections that follow I discuss the emotions of anger, shame, fear and anxiety as they relate to women, schools and conflict within schools.

### *3.3.2 Women and Anger*

The feminist ethicist Elizabeth Spelman (1989, p. 263) interprets Aristotle as saying that “[anyone] who does not get angry when he has reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people is a dolt”. Yet Aristotle in fact uses the word “man” rather than “anyone” making it abundantly clear that “subordinates” such as woman, child, slave have no right to experience or express the emotion anger. As such anger in a woman makes a man anxious, angry himself that a “subordinate” would dare judge him and find him morally wanting, and is thus apt to dismiss the woman as “bitter” (Campbell, 1994, p. 51), “cute” (Spelman, 1989, p. 267) or “a crazy bitch” (Zorn & Boler, 2007, p. 148), at times ascribing to her person the behavioural aspects of anger as rage: an excess of emotion in Aristotelian terms and as such a judgement of inappropriacy. To the extent that the dominant refuses to acknowledge the Other’s anger, to take it up (Frye, 1983) so to speak, to accept that the subordinate has a right to their anger, the dominant manipulates and controls and so retains power (Campbell, 1994; Spelman, 1989; Zorn & Boler, 2003). As such to return to the anecdote I recounted in the prologue at the start of this chapter, my anger, justified at the slight of being offered a local as opposed to the overseas contract initially advertised, was “dismissed” (LaRoque, 1990, xvii) as was the comment I made and as was I. For, rather than being fearful and accepting the possible offer of a local contract (rather than the implied no job at all), my remark rendered visible to those present the unethical nature of the chairman’s proposal, identified it a site of contestation and of social control (Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994; Jaggar, 1989; Spelman, 1989) and as such

was considered by him inappropriate, the look on his face and his tone of voice said it all, and an act of insubordination. That the interview finished shortly after ensured that what had been rendered visible was once more rendered invisible. But what are the moral consequences of such a dismissal for the people concerned? For the emoter it means that there is no need for her to be taken seriously (Campbell, 1994; LaRoque, 1990), both knowledge and speaker can be safely ignored. For those in positions of power it means that the status quo is maintained: with teachers learning to suppress their free expressions of anger, to replace them with habituated feelings of shame, embarrassment, inadequacy, and fear which constrains not only teachers' potential to critically evaluate their working conditions but also their potential to work together to "affect social change" (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642).

The fact that we can experience emotions that are outlawed, "conventionally unacceptable" (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166) due to their incompatibility with dominant views and values such as anger, is of significant import if we wish to understand how we are "faring" (Bartky, 1996, p. 235) and "fairing" within the confines of our particular world and to render visible the covert patterns (Jaggar, 1989, p. 167; Campbell, 1994, p. 48) in our lives that display the effects of subjectivity-in-the-making on us, though these are revelations that can be at one and the same time "ambiguous and oblique" (Bartky, 1996, p. 235). For outlaw emotions such as anger and revulsion can direct our attention to what are coercive, cruel, unjust and/or dangerous situations (Jaggar, 1989); to experience them is to have "antennae that track, not infallibly and not without proper tutoring, salience" (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 36) and can lead us to "subversive observations" (Jaggar, 1989, p. 167): observations that might lead us to challenge currently constructed notions about the status quo. They can help us understand that what we have

assumed to be fact has, in fact, been constructed in such a way as to conceal the reality of the subordinated, particularly that of women (Jaggar, 1989). And for women who are also teachers this constitutes a double bind: what Bartky (1996, p. 234) would call a case of “double jeopardy”.

But this begs the question: why should we take these outlaw emotions as reliable evaluations of a situation? What is about the subordinate position that privileges their view of the world over that of the dominant group’s? In response I turn to the postfeminist Donna Haraway (1988) who in arguing for a “politics of positioning” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586) posits that there is “good reason to believe [that] vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful” (Haraway, 1988, p. 583). For to see from the “peripheries and the depths”(Haraway, 1988, p. 583) is not to imply that these are “innocent” positions but rather that the subjugated have a better chance of affirming that at the heart of all knowledge lies a “critical and interpretive core” (Haraway, 1988, p. 584; see also Foucault, 1980d, p. 82). The stuttering of silenced voices offers the possibility of an unfixed and indeterminate world, a world where all are agential subjects rather than objects of subjugation (Haraway, 1988). And so outlaw emotions can be a way of paying critical attention to one’s situation yet also a way of stuttering silently: “expressing ourselves” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 36) and our outlaw emotions. As such: “How we comport ourselves emotionally matters morally” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 37). Yet often women will dismiss their own “outlawed” anger, feel shame and guilt for having experienced it or fear that it will have been perceived as an act of insubordination by those against whom it was directed, those in power, and be punished for it.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

If we accept the notion that anger can be seen as justified then it would seem possible to describe certain school scenarios where anger would be justifiable (Kristjánsson, 2007). Consider the teacher who has reason to believe that she is being systematically discriminated against by an administration that views women teachers as subordinate and as such proscribed from challenging judgements made by her superiors. At the more personal level, consider the teacher who is accused of causing and exacerbating conflict yet because she is a woman is denied the right to contest. In such cases “collective and individual anger seems to be the morally fitting reaction” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 77) and answer.

In the next chapter I discuss shame as it pertains to women and how it can be used to disempower and silence within the context of schools and conflict as well as engender anger in those shamed. I also discuss the emotions fear and anxiety and how they relate to the notion of morally fitting emotional responses.

## CHAPTER 4: THE EMOTIONS: WOMEN, SHAME, FEAR, AND ANXIETY

### 4.1 Introduction

If the emotions are to be understood as constituted by beliefs or judgements, does it follow that emotions are solely accessible through a rational belief or judgement (Campbell (1994)?

Feminist ethicists, such as Bartky (1996), argue that it is not always so in particular with respect to the emotion shame.

#### *4.1.1 Women and Shame*

To feel shame is to see oneself as a lesser creature and to feel anguish over this. It is an emotion called forth by our own perceived “shortcomings” (Deigh, 1983, p. 225) and is sharply aligned and hence difficult to distinguish from guilt which is felt “over wrongdoings” (Deigh, 1983, p. 225), both being based on a “failure to measure up” (Bartky, 1996, p. 229). Yet as Deigh explains: “shame goes to failure, guilt to transgression” (Deigh, 1983, p. 225); shame is about the self rather than our acts (Nussbaum, 2003, pp. 196-200; see also Brooks, 2008). That both emotions can be accompanied by a physical and/or psychological cringing, a need to hide from the internalised antagonist stare of the Other suggests that shame (and guilt) is a condemnation of the self by the self; and can lead to what Leder (1990) calls social dys-appearance. Yet it is shame rather than guilt that can quickly turn into rage (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992). For in being shamed we are treated as being of less worth (Brooks, 2008, p. 323) resulting in a loss of dignity (Deigh, 1983, p. 226; see also Brooks, 2008) and an accompanying need to reclaim both. Yet although Nussbaum believes that “a decent society needs to . . . protect the dignity of its members against shame and stigma” (Nussbaum, 2004b, p. 282), she also believes

that some types of shame can have a “positive ethical value” (Nussbaum, 2004b, p. 176); for it can tell a truth about certain goals, certain standards we hold dear and believe in but have failed to live up to through our own failings; it can thus urge us to do better (Nussbaum, 2004b). It can also tell us a certain truth about our social standing and how we see ourselves and are seen with respect to others for shame “always relates to others”, always “turns on an inter- and intra-subjective hinge” (Shotwell, 2011, p. 79).

However, the shame that women in particular experience, that “pervasive sense of personal inadequacy” (Bartky, 1996, p. 226) that is manifest when indeed one holds no such belief or judgement that one is inferior (that one does not quite measure up), is a conditioned response (Bartky, 1996), that pertains to women in a sexist and patriarchal society. This is not so much any one feeling or emotion, despite involving particular feelings and emotions, but rather “a pervasive affective attunement to the social environment” (Bartky, 1996, p. 226). It is a shame that is less easily rendered conspicuous, less easily rendered conscious; and is more often than not denied and most deeply disempowering (Bartky, 1996; see also Shotwell, 2006). For it is to have been taught, socialised to experience an emotion when we have no grounds for holding it and to internally sanction ourselves over a shortcoming we do not have, feel guilt for a transgression we have not committed (Bartky, 1996). For this shame is the shame of dys-appearance (Leder, 1990), albeit a special case affecting as it does only women. Yet the mechanism remains the same and is dependent on one becoming conscious of and internalising the ethical distance of the Other, the condemnation of the Other; to accept oneself as alien; it is to view oneself as a type rather than an individual, and so render oneself invisible. There is no further need of the antagonistic gaze of the Other for we now carry that Other within ourselves

(Leder, 1990), ready to sanction ourselves for falling short, for failing to measure up for the arbitrary reason: that we are woman, disabled, aged – a member of any of the many subordinated group. Yet for women, Bartky (1996, p. 226) suggests, “shame may well be a mark and token of powerlessness” more so than for any other disempowered group. As such, as Campbell (1994, p. 48) posits, the emotions can reveal a “pattern to our experience that is not captured by our judgments,” and that may even be at odds with them. Emotions may thus be more than the mere consequences of subordination; rather within a patriarchal and hierarchical society, they may well be a way of knowing the reality of one’s circumstances: a “corporeal disclosure of self in situation” (Bartky, 1996, p. 226; see also Shotwell, 2011). For shame “can make unspeakable things viscerally present” (Shotwell, 2011, p. 77).

As such, the pedagogy of the school, family, workplace, media continues to uphold, “both overtly and covertly, a powerful patriarchal grasp” on what is presented as “truth” (Bartky, 1996, p. 239) to the young: that female students are different, that they do not psychologically belong in domains where the rational is valued over the emotional such as Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM<sup>11</sup>), that they can never live up to the expectations of such rigorous and rational disciplines, and as such they are subordinate to men. Such “truths” are often implicitly understood, an unconscious association made between being for example an able scientist, technologist, engineer, or mathematician and being a white male, and fall outside our conscious awareness, acted upon without our even knowing (Shotwell, 2011; see also Bartky, 1996). Such biases form the epistemological context for our propositional thoughts, an “implicit

---

<sup>11</sup>A study published in 2014 by Coursera, an online provider of MOOCs, found that online enrolment by women in the company’s courses was lowest – around 20% - for subjects such as computer science, mathematics, and engineering. Another study (Breslow, Pritchard, DeBoer, Stump, Ho, & Seaton, 2013) on edX, an online consortium also offering MOOCs, showed that its course on *Circuits and Electronics* had a female study body of 12%.

*framework* of practices, understandings, and situated knowledges” (Shotwell, 2006, p. 4) for our actions both prejudicial and not (Shotwell, 2011), embedded as they are in our embodied social interactions. As such salient aspects of a woman’s experiences, “potentially liberatory spaces” (Shotwell, 2006, p. 61) at that, and key aspects of gender formation are “passed over in silence” (Shotwell, 2006, p. 61), dismissed as irrelevant at best and worthless at worst. For what more often than not we understand implicitly is not or can not be put into words (Shotwell, 2006, 2011): the meeting or conversation (a propositional interaction) that effects a persistently worrisome feeling you just cannot put into words but through which you can unpack the underlying nuances of what occurred making the implicit explicit.

As Nussbaum (2004b) has stated shame that goes beyond the personal to the group level, that targets the socially disadvantaged, what Brooks (2008, p. 323) calls the “disfavoured groups”, results in further social disadvantage. These are groups that are targeted on the basis of not only gender, but also race, and sexual-orientation with even the poor, as a socio-economic group, and slaves, both past and present (Kristof & WuDunn, 2009), seen as easy prey (Brooks, 2008; see also Nussbaum, 2004b). Such shame denies the individual members of such groups the “full and equal dignity they possess as human beings” (Brooks, 2008, p. 323). Shotwell’s (2011, p. 91) advice for those so shamed: “refuse the shaming gaze or stare back”. Yet within the school context to take up the shaming gaze, to stare right back is tantamount to insubordination and a punishable offence. To the extent that gender like race is a “system of social relations” upheld as obdurate and unquestionable universal “truths” through “commonsense assumptions”, we will need to transform common sense in order to significantly transform the social world (Shotwell, 2011, p. 35) and the discursive practices associated with it. In the case of race Smith (1997, p.

181) argues: “The challenge is to understand what race is, how it functions, and ultimately to theorize how we might endeavor within a culture bound by race to subvert the subordinating strictures that race was designed to perpetuate.” So too with gender: not only within the wider community but also most especially within schools with respect to women teachers and the conflicts that they endure therein.

#### *4.1.2 Women, Fear, and Anxiety*

Aristotle states that the “man that flies from fear and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash” (*NE*, II, 2 [1104a2 ff]). Yet the object of fear, what inspires the “thought of the impending damage that threatens my cherished relationships and projects” (Nussbaum, 2004a, p. 189), can be such within the international school system that women teachers learn to stand their ground on nothing, habituated to experience fear and anxiety over any act that could possibly threaten their current or future employ. For we lack the self training necessary to “despise and endure terrors” (*NE*, II, 2 [1104b]) and so are unable to despise and endure them when they arise in our day-to-day lives.

Fear and anxiety are closely related emotions, both a part of an “evolved mammalian defense system” in response to life-threatening (Öhman, 2008, p. 709) situations. Yet despite the considerable “overlap” between the two emotions involving as they both do “intense negative feelings” and “strong bodily manifestations”, there is a significant difference in their subjective forms (Öhman, 2008, p. 710). For fear is a response to an obvious danger “located in space and time” that requires immediate action usually avoidance with flight (Öhman, 2008, p. 710).

Anxiety on the other hand is a response to an ambiguous threat obscure both in terms of time and location, relating as it does to long-lasting and aversive contexts that cannot easily be dealt with even by fleeing (Öhman, 2008). As such although fear and anxiety can be appropriate emotional responses to conflict within schools as it can potentially escalate out of control with dangerous if not dire consequences for a woman teacher's aspirations and career, not to mention the potential for shame and humiliation that conflict can incur, it is anxiety that debilitates for the ambiguity of the threat proscribes one from coping effectively (Öhman, 2008) if at all. This can in turn cause one to question oneself, to question one's sanity: to wonder indeed whether a threat does in fact exist. Anxiety can indeed "paralyse" (Öhman, 2008, p. 710) and prevent one from taking action. And it is endemic in schools that are led by people who "enhanced their own authority [and status] by diminishing that of others", who live with a "paranoid fear of [their] own colleagues" (MacBeath, 1998b, p.5) and promote an often covert policy "of ,constructive destabilisation" – an emotional shuttling of . . . staff between censure and fulsome praise, between job satisfaction and job threat" (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 6) so that they are never emotionally stable enough to be a threat to the "leader's" power, never fully cognisant of their experience, their situation, and as such unable to contest.

As such the use and abuse of emotion is of particular concern in schools where fear, anger, shame and anxiety can be powerful sites for the political manipulation and control (Campbell, 1994) of women teachers and can therefore also be powerful sites of contestation (Boler, 1999). To feel shame when one judges oneself to have no real cause for shame may point to an important aspect of a school's culture: one that by holding the individual responsible for structural, systemic issues diverts attention away from the school and the patterns of complicity

entrenched in the school. To be denied the right to anger or deemed “a crazy bitch” for displaying anger is to be denied the right to challenge unjust behaviours. Feminists such as Lorde (1984) and Spelman (1989) advocate the necessity of women claiming their right to anger, for Spelman (1989, p. 263; my emphasis) in reinterpreting Aristotle states that: “[*anyone*] who does not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people, is a dolt.” However, the socially constituted and construed role of fear and anxiety within schools is central to the control of teachers and any public display of “inappropriate/outlaw” emotions they might entertain. This makes the claiming of such a right difficult if not impossible to achieve for fear and anxiety are inculcated in women teachers from the moment they step into a school: fear of and anxiety about the very real and very serious consequences that can be incurred in standing up to a senior teacher or administrator, even when we have moral authority on our side (Colnerud, 1997; Reitz, 1998). For expressions of anger by members of subordinate groups such as women teachers endanger the status quo (Jaggar, 1989) and so are negatively construed by the powerful as an “inappropriate irrationality in need of containment” (Simola, 2010, p. 255). This is to deny the disenfranchised a “feminine” voice, one that can be vital to moral agency (Simola, 2010). It is to label them as irrational, unwilling “to „calmly“ resolve conflict” (Simola, 2010, p. 260) and is to trivialise and dismiss or overtly label their claims as “crazy” or “uncompromising” without duly deliberating on or being held accountable for the “abuse”, “injustice, or carelessness” (Simola, 2010, pp. 256, 261) that occasioned and still occasions their anger (Frye, 1983). And “anger denied subverts community” (Harrison, 1989, p. 220). Yet within an ethic of care (Noddings, 1992<sup>12</sup>) framework anger can be viewed as caring for ourselves politically as well as others. As Foucault (1984/1997, p. 285)

---

<sup>12</sup>I discuss Noddings’ notion of an ethic of care more fully in Chapter 5.

admonishes: ““Take care of yourself” [*soucie-toi de toi-même*]” for “ethics as the conscious practice of freedom” revolves and resolves itself around this practice.

#### **4.2 The Emotions, Phronesis and Epistemic Virtue**

*Phronesis* is a different way of knowing. It is a way of knowing through one’s actions and experience and cannot be “learnt” as can episteme with its knowledge of rules for “matters of conduct admit of variation” (*NE*, VI, 6 [1140b6]). As such it is a way of knowing differently. To possess practical knowledge (*phronesis*) is according to Aristotle (*NE*, 350 BCE/1994a) to possess the moral virtues necessary in order to achieve *eudemonia*, happiness or wellbeing: the ultimate purpose or *telos* of life; for practical knowledge or wisdom is the knowledge necessary to do the right thing, at the right time and with the right intent. As such *phronesis* is concerned with particulars and how to act in particular situations, in unforeseeable and unforeseen circumstances; for one might learn the rules of how to act but applying them in the real world requires experience of the world. Indeed good moral judgements require *phronesis*, practical wisdom, rather than knowledge of rules alone (Nussbaum, 1992). For “practical wisdom is internal to moral virtue” (Garcia, 2007, p. 90) and it is moral virtue that Aristotle (*NE*, II, 6 [1106b11 ff], my emphasis) states is concerned with “passions” and requires that we “*feel* them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way . . . [as] both what is intermediate and best, and . . . characteristic of virtue”.

The emotions, what Aristotle calls passions, inextricably entwined as they are with thoughts and beliefs (Nussbaum, 1996), can thus guide us in the epistemic, ontological and hence ethical

activity of “grasping the truth” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 41), accepting or rejecting what is proffered as knowledge. They have what Simola (2010, p. 259) calls “epistemic value in moral recognition” that can enable us to choose to act in the right way, a way that proceeds from a firm moral character based on practical experience with the end goal of doing the right thing which is none other than the action itself (*NE*, 350 BCE/1994a). For believing someone as a credible giver of knowledge is not a case so much of believing what is being offered as knowledge but rather of belief “both *of*” the wo/man, and therefore “*of* the truth of what [s/]he says”: it requires “[f]aith in the [wo/]man” (Hobbes, 2003, p. 48) *per se*. It is a question of trust, that of the hearer in the speaker and the speaker in the hearer: trust in that the speaker is an honourable person (Hobbes, 2003, p. 48) and that the hearer a virtuous listener (Fricker, 2007). This feeling of trust (or distrust) that either experiences is an emotional response, a moral judgement, trained and honed as it is by experience. Aristotle (*NE*, II, 1 [1103b1 ff]) puts it well when he states that: “It is by our conduct in our intercourse with other men that we become just or unjust” and I would add trustworthy or untrustworthy. And it is by our conduct with other men that we learn who and how to trust. For with regards our passions, Aristotle (*NE*, II, 1 [1103b1]) believes that “acts of any kind produce habits or characters of the same kind.” It is thus through moral practice (*praxis*) that we habituate practical moral wisdom (*phronesis*), learning by experience and practice how, when and who to trust, for example, and through practical moral wisdom that moral practice is cultivated and revised. As such moral virtue encompasses not only action but more importantly emotion (Kristjánsson, 2006), with emotions not only directing our attention and expressing our concerns, but also motivating us to act (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 37) and *react*. And properly habituated emotional responses, as Aristotle states, will cause us to act in a deliberative and reflective manner. It is through such deliberation and reflection that we learn to

review and revise “the thoughts and beliefs that constitute our emotions” and in turn to modify and adjust the emotions themselves (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 43) and as such our practical moral wisdom. Thus it is that by cultivating and schooling the emotions from an early age that emotional virtue is achieved (*NE*, II, 1-2 [1103b1 ff]).

Given this, would it not be the case, argue Sherman and White (2007), that “intellectual excellence” requires that we comport ourselves well, “in a way conducive to the function of grasping the truth” not only “with respect to beliefs” but also “emotions?” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 41). Would intellectual excellence also not require that “emotions be expressed in the right way, at the right time, towards the right person” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 41)? I believe it would. For intellectual excellence is dependent upon the intellectual and moral virtue of practical wisdom concerned as it is with practice and the knowledge of both general truths and more especially particular facts. Aristotle is clear: having *phronesis* is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous (*NE*, VI, 7-13 [1145a7 ff]) and being *phronetic* or prudent is to “show a faculty of foresight in what concerns [your] own life.” (*NE*, VI, 6 [1141a7]) and that of others: “human and non-human nature” (Guattari, 1989, p. 133; see also Guattari, 2008), not only animal and vegetable but also “cosmic, and machinic” (Guattari, 1989, p. 133; see also Guattari, 2008; Haraway, 1988).

As such a prudent person cannot act against their better judgement for a phronetic disposition requires the right and proper way of being. As Wisnewski (2012) suggests Heidegger sees practical wisdom as the “gravest of all knowledge, since it is concerned with human existence itself” (Heidegger cited in Wisnewski, 2013, p. 60), gained as it is from the practical and

embodied nature of our experience in and of the world, and is a way of comporting oneself in and toward the world. For *phronesis* is a way of orienting oneself and thus of caring, seeing, knowing and enabling a particular way of being, one that sees at its end, its *telos*, a well-lived life, a life based on reflection and deliberation consistent with such an end. As such the intellectual and moral virtue of epistemic trust must be touched, however lightly, by emotion consciously or unconsciously, revised as it is through deliberation on past experience of the world. For without this, knowledge of the particulars of a specific situation is insufficient. As such the emotions as practical judgements are an important constituent of *phronesis* and *phronesis*, in turn, of the emotions.

#### **4.3 Schools, Conflict, Emotional Intelligence and the Intelligence of the Emotions**

Goleman's book on *Emotional Intelligence* first published in 1995 was not only a bestseller worldwide but also so popular in international schools that it and his ideas about emotions deserve a closer look to reveal why this might be the case. Especially in light of the fact that Goleman (2006, xxiv) himself emphasises the importance of Emotional Intelligence in the Aristotelian "challenge . . . to manage our emotional life with intelligence."

According to Aristotle there are no negative emotions per se other than those seen as in excess or in deficiency of an emotion. Indeed as pointed out earlier, when it comes to anger for example "[i]ncreased moral understanding may even make you angrier than before, because it renders you more sensitive to how you or someone close to your heart has been insulted" (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 48). This is in stark and direct contrast to a current and commonly held notion within teaching of the value of Emotional Intelligence (EI) as defined by Goleman (2002, p. 13) where

“negative” emotions “powerfully disrupt work” making us “less emotionally intelligent”; where the “rational” head should be the master of the “emotional” heart, and anger is seen as an “afflictive” (Goleman, 1997, p. 34) emotion that needs to be “defuse[d]”, “de-escalate[d]”, and “deflate[d]” (Goleman, 2006, pp. 60-63) rather than the “emotionally intelligent reaction to certain states of affairs” (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 48). As such Goleman takes us back, as I see it, to the dark ages of emotion and reason: to the master/slave dichotomy of reason over emotion with reason as the head controlling the emotional heart rather than educating it as Aristotle, and recent cognitive theories of emotion, would have us do, where to quote Kristjánsson (2006, p. 49) “emotion itself is seen as permeated by reason” and I would add reason is permeated by emotion.

As such the good life as defined by Goleman in his version of Emotional Intelligence is in stark contrast to Nussbaum’s “intelligence of emotions” (2003) where emotions are highly complex and discriminating forms of thought as responses to one’s circumstances and experiences.

Goleman’s EI is one measured by the extent to which you understand and manage your negative emotions, such as anger, to bring monetary “success”, “prosperity” and “prestige” which in turn leads to “happiness” (Goleman, 2006, p. 36). Thus the Aristotelian “good life” (Goleman, 2006, p. xxiv), where “wealth is not the good we are seeking” (*NE*, I, 5 [1096a6]), has by 2002 been developed by Goleman into one that helps maximise company profits and works for the financial good of the company or organisation rather than the individual (Goleman, 2002, p. 251). For Aristotle (and myself as a teacher) the end aim of any virtue is to achieve well-being or happiness with the virtues “at once conducive to and constitutive of *eudaimonia*” (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 45) and happiness as a morally good end. As such for Aristotle “the happy life [is that

which] is thought to be virtuous” (*NE*, X, 6 [1177a]) and is not one based on wealth (*NE*, I, 5 [1096a6]) or monetary success. It would appear that for Goleman life’s aim is not a moral one based on moral goodness but rather one founded on financial success.

To this end Goleman believes that any conflicts that arise within an organisation can be resolved by being “emotionally intelligent”, which requires compromise (Goleman, 2006). This end, Goleman believes, is possible only through empathising with others, placing ourselves, he says, in the other’s metaphorical shoes (Goleman, 2006, xi, xiv, xvii, 43, 96-100, 103-107, 118, 146, 149, 284-286). Goleman would do well to realise, as Kristjánsson (2006, p. 52) points out, that empathy is neither an emotion, constituted as it is neither by a set of beliefs or desires, nor inevitably a “moral concern” and can result in our delighting in rather than lamenting someone else’s pain and suffering. Empathy rather comprises a “capacity for differing emotions” generated by the “perception of someone else’s situation” as they experience it (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 52). Rather than seeking to empathise and compromise we would do well to listen to John Stuart Mill’s argument (cited in Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 51) for “the need to have one’s deepest convictions constantly challenged in order for them to retain their heartfelt vitality, urgency, and immediacy.” For Goleman’s views would seem to take us back to the notion of schooling as “factory farming” (Kelly, 2004, p. 205) and of education as ensuring the “economic and commercial success of the nation [/company/industry/organisation]” rather than the “spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical developments of pupils at school and of society” (Kelly, 2004, p. 205) as well as that of teachers. This presupposes a need for teachers to curb certain emotional responses in the interests of administrative efficiencies rather than confront unethical practices. Yet I have never read an obituary or heard a eulogy, teacher’s or other,

where the monetary success of the deceased was praised or indeed even mentioned as opposed to their virtues and moral integrity. For indeed, financial success counts for little with regards providing a meaningful sense of purpose, a meaningful life, and rather should be seen as *a means* to achieving *eudaimonia*, a morally good end where one holds oneself not only accountable but also responsible for what we do and fail to do.

Indeed, given such notions, I am not surprised at the enthusiastic welcome Goleman and his ideas have garnered from administrations in certain international schools, dove-tailing as they do with their own proclivities for power, control and subordination and hence the need to keep certain teacher emotions under control while simultaneously promoting others with even teachers seduced no doubt by Goleman's "eloquence" (Russell, 1938/2004; see also Gregg, 2011) and his appeal to the Platonic notion of the need to keep (teachers') emotions in check and under strict control. Indeed Salovey, Detweiler-Bedell, Detweiler-Bedell and Mayer (2008), who undertook the initial extensive research on emotional intelligence and coined the term, advise caution in taking at face value the claims made by Goleman about Emotional Intelligence such as that having "a highly developed emotional intelligence will make you a candidate for CEO or a brilliant lawyer" (Goleman, 1995, p. 76) and urge educational and business managers alike to remain "sceptical of „quick-fix“ programs" (Salovey et al., 2008, p. 543) based on Goleman's work for "it will not, at the end of the day, be the key to reducing international conflict" (Salovey et al., 2008, p. 543) or even conflict at the local level of the school.

#### **4.4 The Emotions as Expressions of the Moral Dimensions of a School's Culture**

The word anger derives from the old Norse words “anгр” and “anгрa” meaning distress, sorrow and grief. As seen in Chapter 3, to feel anger is to feel aggrieved, to feel a sense of distress and sorrow at a loss. In the case of the anger of the disenfranchised it is a response to their sense of powerlessness; it is a judgement on and about the way one has been dealt with and asserts that “one has been harmed in unacceptable ways” (Simola, 2011, p. 261; Campbell, 1994; Shotwell, 2011; Spelman, 1989). It is also about the desire to enact revenge and the pleasure one experiences in seeking it.

Fear and anxiety are also dependent upon beliefs for their intensity: the greater the damage we believe and judge we will suffer the greater the fear (Nussbaum, 1996, 2004a), the greater the anxiety. As such to inspire fear in others is to control them for the fearful person will act in such a way as to avoid damage and suffering. In schools this can be put to “*powerful political use*” (Campbell, 1994, p. 46), to cause teachers to think twice before expressing certain emotions in certain ways for fear of being “dismissed” (LaRoque, 1990, p. xvii), of no longer being “taken seriously” (LaRoque, 1990, p. xvii) or of being permanently dismissed from the teaching profession. And to cause a teacher severe anxiety is to emotionally shuttle her between praise and threat so that she is never emotionally stable enough to understand her experience or situation, or even credit it as true.

Shame is a powerful ally when it comes to disempowering teachers, fostering fear and “dismissing” anger. It is used by administration to distract attention away from the culpability of the school and its administrators. Teachers are loath to question rules and regulations, even the

standards against which they will be measured for fear of being accused of inadequacy themselves. Yet when they fail to measure up to the standards set, due to systemic failures rather than personal inadequacy, teachers will all too often blame themselves, see themselves as wanting, as failures and shamed (Winograd, 2003). They withdraw to their classrooms, close the door and hide ashamed of their failure to reach the given mark. As Winograd (2003, p. 1642) suggests: “the self-accusatory stance of teachers diverts teachers’ attention from structural problems in their working conditions and, instead, focuses attention on the inadequacies of teachers as individuals.” It is however what Winograd (2003, p. 1641) calls the “*dysfunctional dimensions*” to teachers’ emotions that can in fact alert them to oppressive working conditions, based on oppressive premises, to their own “potential to critique” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642), and move them in every sense to affect social change rather than let it inhibit them (Boler, 1999; Winograd, 2003).

As such the emotions of anger, fear, anxiety, and shame within the educational context, their expression or lack thereof, can be seen as expressing the moral dimension of a school, one that is unethical, autocratic and immensely unfair to teachers in general (Scenes from the Battleground: Teaching in British Schools, 2008, 2014) and female teachers in particular (Tabula Rasa, 2013a). As the Scenes from the Battleground: Teaching in British Schools blog (2008) and the Tabula Rasa blog (2013b) point out: these are schools where open and frank discussion of a pedagogical and/or systemic nature does not occur. These are schools where teachers fear to speak out against unjust, unethical practices and refrain from confiding even in each other. And these are schools where minutes of meetings held are massaged so as to reflect the prevailing administrative view and displays of teacher anger aimed at “hierarchical/patriarchal structural arrangements or at

larger economic and political structures” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642) are not only frowned upon but dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly. In schools such as these fear rules the day and is embodied in the teachers who talk with their feet with high teacher turn-over and high rates of sickness and sick leave the norm. The embodiment of these emotions should provide clear indications that all is not well at a school.

Rorty rightly stated that the “rehabilitation of the emotions” (Rorty, 1980, p. 4) is long overdue. In over the three decades since she made the comment little I believe has changed for the historical and unequal association of the emotions with the feminine and of the rational with the masculine continues to lead to the subordination of women and their opinions in institutions, educational and other, across disciplines and fields (S. Campbell, 1997).

## CHAPTER 5: THE ETHICAL TEACHER AND THE ETHICAL SCHOOL

### 5.1 Introduction

I attended convent schools throughout my primary and secondary school career. The fact that my father was Church of England and therefore a “non-believer” in the eyes of the nuns did not make life at school easy. I can well remember my first week at school when we were told by our form teacher that only Catholics went to heaven. I had asked where the rest went and was told: “Limbo for non-believers and unbaptised babies who die young, Purgatory for believers who die in venial sin and have to do penance before being admitted to Heaven and Hell where those who die in mortal sin go for eternity.” The teacher had smiled sweetly. “And after Limbo do they get to go to Heaven?” I had asked. “No, that’s for eternity too but it’s a very nice place.” I was unconvinced and cried myself to sleep that night. My father was old in the eyes of a 4 year old and at age 50 already had one foot in the grave in my book. This meant I would never have the chance to see him again once he died and I was sure this was imminent! Yet the teacher had seemed unaware of the possible moral import of her words. It would take a visit by my father to talk about the incident with the Mother Superior and the teacher concerned for the teacher to retract her pronouncement; though similar pronouncements made in the other primary classes remained intact, unretracted despite the fact that there were children with non-Catholic parents in those classes too.

Many years later I would be reminded of this incident when the principal at the TISS sat down for “just a quick chat as I have a Chinese lesson to get to!” post observation of a lesson I had just co-taught. He handed me his completed observation form and commented that the co-observer

had mentioned to him that he had thought ESOL<sup>13</sup> should be taught one-on-one and that my role as the ESOL support teacher was to work with and challenge individuals rather than co-teach the class. This was noted on the form as the key area for development. He suggested that I take a look through the comments and, if I wanted, write a comment in the (one inch by one inch) box that had been provided for this purpose at the bottom right hand corner of the last page. Totally oblivious of the grief he was causing, he checked his watch, said that he was already late for his class and left. The moral indignation felt by myself and my co-teacher at his treatment meant that we had no choice but to act (Boss, 1998) and act we did, writing a 10 page document with a response to each point raised in the principal's observation notes. For the emotions can signal a truth about one's situation, one's circumstance (as I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4); they have what Simola (2010, p. 259) calls "epistemic value in moral recognition" that can guide us to choose to act in a morally right way and which we ignore at our peril.

Both the teacher in the first instance and the principal in the second lacked the moral compass, a sense of responsibility, required of teaching professionals to navigate the complex environment that is the school (MacBeath, 2010), because they failed to understand their actions and words in ethical terms. They were oblivious to the "complexity of the ethical landscape" (Strike & Ternasky, 1993, p. 225) that teaching encompasses and did not, could not or would not reflect critically on their professional conduct "in ethical terms" (Campbell, 2003). Their lack of self-awareness about levels of integrity, honesty and compassion and how these pertain to the educational context was indicative of a marked deficiency in moral sensitivity (Coombs, 1998; MacBeath, 2010) and the practical wisdom required of "good deliberation" (Nussbaum, 1992, p.

---

<sup>13</sup> "English to Speakers of Other Languages" (ESOL) is becoming a more widely used acronym than ESL ("English as a Second Language") at international schools.

74), “where what counts is flexibility, responsiveness, and openness to the external” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 74). Where to “rely on an algorithm . . . is not only insufficient, it is a sign of immaturity and weakness” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 74). The fact that my co-teacher and I were the only teachers to challenge the principal’s observation ethics is a sad testimony to the fact that teachers have a tendency not “to rock the boat” (Reitz, 1998, p. 48). They have as MacBeath (2010, p. 2) puts it “learn[t] to do what they are told” no matter how badly they and others less powerful than them are treated, remaining silent and silenced, in the margins of institutional life (Boler, 1999; see also Foucault, 1977).

As instances of the practical expression of ethics (or lack thereof) by both teachers and school administrators, which is the emphasis in this study rather than a study of meta-ethics and questions about ethics itself, the above “stories” and others from my own experience raise a range of philosophical questions that I will be addressing in this chapter and that need answering “in ways that illuminate both the beneficial and the harmful influence teachers can have on students” (Hansen, 2001, p. 826) and I would add on each other. These are questions that go to the heart of ethical teaching and the ethical teacher: Are teachers required to be more ethical than other professionals? Are teachers required to speak out when they see injustice done despite the ramifications that doing so might have on their own lives and careers? Are teachers required to care about their feelings and actions as they pertain to their school lives? What reasons are there for teachers and school administrators to act unethically? And why do teachers “learn to do what they are told?” (MacBeath, 2010, p. 2). I address these questions and issues as they pertain to conflict between women teachers and administrators in international schools in the sections that follow.

My concerns, issues and dilemmas discussed in this study are philosophical in nature; this is due to the fact that the “activity of teaching is itself saturated with moral significance” (Hansen, 2001, p. 826). Given that teaching is by its very nature both a moral and ethical act<sup>14</sup> (Campbell, 2003, p.10) ethics, or the lack thereof, as Campbell rightly observes, “emanates from the realities of teaching, rather than being applied to these realities” (Campbell, 2003, p. 10). Simply put, “practical ethics” (Baron, Pettit & Slote, 1997, p. 229) is about being fair, honest, responsible and accountable, treating others with care and respect (Campbell, 2003). Choosing not to do so is also a moral act. It requires that we “live *mindfully*: to take some care about how we act and even about how we feel” (Weston, 1997, p. 2). It requires that we “reflect wisely” throughout the course of our teaching day on the ethical implications of what we “say or do not say, do or do not do” (Campbell, 2003, p. 10). For as Hansen sensibly observes: “not everything that teachers do *necessarily* has moral significance, but any action a teacher takes *can* have moral import” (Hansen, 1993, p. 669). It requires above all else that we have the courage to act, to speak out when injustice is done or seen to be done by colleagues, administrators and/or others (Campbell, 2003) despite peer pressure to do otherwise (Colnerud, 1997; Reitz, 1998).

However Barrow (1992, p. 108) in her review and criticism of Goodlad, Soder and Sirotnik (1990) argues that it is the teacher’s ability to “communicate worthwhile understanding” that is important not “his or her moral integrity”. Barrow makes a valid point, arguing that teaching is “no more about morality than many other human activities; [rather] it is about developing minds”

---

<sup>14</sup> As does Campbell (2003) so too do I use the terms moral and ethical interchangeably as “both address virtue and basic principles of right and wrong as they influence belief, intention, and behavior” (Campbell, 2003, p. 17). However, I do use the term moral rather than ethical when it reflects a teacher’s individual stance on principles and the term ethics when considering a more collectively conceived set of principles such as professional ethics.

(Barrow, 1992, p, 107) and asserts that: “neither good teachers nor educated people are necessarily particularly moral” (Barrow, 1992, p. 105). However as Hansen (2001, p. 831) points out: “Teaching is a moral endeavor because it influences directly the quality of the present educational moment, a moment in which, Dewey reminds us, the persons we are becoming hang in the balance”, both as teachers and as students. Given that students look to us as models of ethical behaviour (whether we wish it so or not) we as teachers need to display a higher degree of moral integrity than those engaged in many other human activities; for if schooling is to mean more than mere training then ethics needs to lie at the heart of our teaching. As such I firmly stand with Hansen (1993, 2001) on this issue (see also e.g., Campbell, 1996, 1997, 2003; Colnerud, 1997; Delattre, 1998; Hall, 1996; MacBeath, 2010; Noddings, 1992, 2002; Nucci, 2001; Nussbaum, 1992; Reitz, 1998; Weston, 1997) and believe that teachers have a moral obligation to, at the very least, cause no harm and at the very best cultivate an ethics of care. For turning a blind eye when administrators do not allow a teacher to contest a serious accusation of misconduct causes irreparable damage to the teacher and sends a clear message to staff and students: do what is in your own best interests rather than what it is morally right to do (Taylor, 1989).

## **5.2 The Ethical Teacher**

It would appear, however, that the predominant tendency of teachers is to remain silent when confronted with the unethical conduct of either colleagues or their superiors: to display what Campbell (2003, p. 6) calls “suspended morality”. Despite any discomfort we may feel at witnessing unethical acts, teachers fail to act (by not confronting those whose behaviour is ethically inappropriate) citing the need to be “careful”, “tactful” or “protective” of themselves

(Campbell, 2003, p. 88). Such “gutless behaviour” and “cowardice”, to use teachers’ own words (Campbell, 2003, p. 88), arises from the very real fear of being labeled a “tattletale”, punished by administration or, worse, standing accused of professional misconduct themselves (Colnerud, 1997). With the added anxiety that confronting a colleague or superior can lead to not only a very personal conflict but also possibly a very nasty one, compliance is ensured (Campbell, 2003). Teachers thus can feel silenced by school cultures that emphasise the need not “to rock the boat. [Where] peace at any price seems to be the order of the day” (Reitz, 1998, p. 48). It is alarming but not surprising given my own experience that Reitz concludes, from his study of 300 teachers, that in virtually every case reported of unethical conduct it was “encouraged or enforced” by school administrators, or organisational “policies and procedures” (Reitz, 1998, p. 42). It is no wonder that new and trainee teachers are quickly “apprenticed” into the code of collegial loyalty that the group demands (Colnerud, 1997; Reitz, 1998). As such unequal power structures (Fricker, 2007) based on a shared social construction of teacher identity (Fricker, 2007, p. 14) act “*passively*” (Fricker, 2007, p. 9) undetected in their ability to control and manipulate under the guise of “collegiality”. This should cause us to critically reflect as teachers on “the internally coercive power that this sort of „we-attitude“ can have” (Fricker, 2012, p. 300) and “what mere relations of power are doing to our thinking” (Fricker, 2007, p.3) and actions.

Consequently being an ethical person does not necessarily guarantee becoming an ethical teacher. The extent to which a person is critically self-aware, reflective about their levels of integrity, honesty, compassion as well as the courage “to be responsible” (Campbell, 2003, p. 5; see also MacBeath, 2010), to oppose unethical workplace practices despite a collective commitment to do otherwise (Fricker, 2012, p. 299), will determine the extent to which they will

become an ethical professional and teacher. That is not to say that we cannot have different interpretations of what it means to be honest, just, compassionate or brave. It does however mean that when we beg to differ, we are able to support and defend our “actions and our attitudes on ethical grounds alone” (Campbell, 2003, p. 37). As Coombs (1998, p. 569) wisely comments:

Actions they [teachers] may see as insulting, belittling, arrogant, patronizing, or unfair in other contexts may not be perceived as such in the educational context. Consequently an important aspect of the task of enhancing the moral sensitivity and perception of educators is that of engaging them in a consideration of how the educational context, with its particular constellation of power, authority, and responsibility relations, affects the applicability of their moral concepts. (Coombs, 1998, p. 569)

Practical ethics thus requires that teachers as professionals in positions of power and authority not only over students in their care but in certain cases teachers as well, should hold themselves accountable to a higher standard than that which they hold themselves to in private life. It requires that they view students and others in the school environment less powerful than themselves as equally deserving of moral sensitivity and fair and just treatment. It requires that the fact that those in their care have limited power and even less authority not corrupt their view of the moral implications of their actions and behaviours. For the “*idea of power corrupts*” (Bateson, 1972/1987, p. 492) and the oppressed can make the “colonisers’ laws” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) their own, taking out their own disappointments and dissatisfactions on those less powerful than themselves: those who cannot or will not fight back (Farrell, 1997; Griffin, 2004; Marquard, 1957). In institutions such as these “very bad things” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) can and do happen. Hence, the power and authority given to us as teachers carries with it a responsibility, “an accountability for how we use it, not to our own personal benefit but for the benefit of others” (MacBeath, 2010, p. 5). As such professional ethics can in no way stand alone, apart from ordinary ethical norms of everyday life: “Ethics is ethics” (Delattre, 1998, p. 2) and so the “ethical teacher” is consequently also an “ethical person”, their “professional ethics . . . the

extension of everyday ethics into the nuances of a professional's practices" (Campbell, 2003, p. 12).

Despite this, there are those teachers who throughout the course of their teaching careers appear oblivious to the "complexity of the ethical landscape" (Strike & Ternasky, 1993, p. 225) that teaching encompasses. They do not, can not, or will not reflect on their professional conduct in ethical terms and often cite context as the rationale for their unethical behavior. However, as Campbell so succinctly puts it: "Context can not make a disrespectful action suddenly respectful" (Campbell, 2003, p. 43). For morals and ethics are neither "all provisional, all exchangeable" (Hunter, 2000, p. xiii); they should not be confused with individual preferences of a non-moral nature. Some things are just "inherently wrong" (Somerville, 2000, p. xii, 21) and it is those things that fail to respect life or intentionally cause harm (Somerville, 2000) that are equally ethically wrong.

There are also a number of teachers who lie and cheat for personal gain, who are knowingly cruel and unfair (Campbell, 2003). There are also those teachers who, though not intentionally cruel or unkind, are insensitive to the needs of others, who fail to realise that "treating others fairly may mean treating people unequally in the sense that equity requires adjustments that bring people into more comparable statuses" (Nucci, 2001, p. 88), and who by respecting the "letter of the law" fail in every sense to respect its spirit. Good moral judgements require *phronesis*, practical wisdom, rather than knowledge of rules alone (Nussbaum, 1992). For if "practical wisdom is internal to moral virtue" then "so too many moral virtues are internal to practical wisdom, and thus to intellectual virtue and practical rationality themselves" (Garcia, 2007, p.

90). Respect is a two-way street: it is ethically problematic to demand the respect of students and colleagues alike without respecting them in return (Campbell, 2003).

As such the emotions can play a significant cognitive role, not only signaling but also expressing the moral, the immoral, the just and the unjust word or action not only of others but of ourselves as well. For as Jaggar (1989, p. 167) contends “outlaw emotions”, those emotions that are considered unacceptable within a specific domain can:

provide the first indications that something is wrong with the way alleged facts have been constructed, with accepted understandings of how things are. . . . Only when we reflect on our initial puzzling irritability, revulsion, anger or fear may we bring to consciousness our „gut level“ awareness that we are in a situation of coercion, cruelty, injustice or danger.

As such listening that is attentive to “what it is that one doesn’t want to know” (Boler, 1999, p. 200) requires we be not only attentive but open to emotions as “part of critical and ethical inquiry” (Boler, 1999, p. 23). For as Barad (in interview with Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 69) makes abundantly clear: ethics entails: “[l]istening for the response of the other and [having] an obligation to be responsive to the other”. As such, Aristotle (as cited in Nussbaum, 1992, p. 78) holds that:

the truly good person will not only act well but also feels the appropriate emotions about what he or she chooses. Not only correct motivation and motivational feelings but also correct reactive and responsive feelings are constitutive of this person’s virtue or goodness. If I do the just thing from the wrong motives or desires (not for its own sake but, say, for the sake of gain), that will not count as virtuous action.

Choice thus lies carefully balanced between the rational and the emotional, and can be described, says Aristotle (*NE*, VI, 2 [1139b1]) “as desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire” (as cited in Nussbaum, 1992, p. 78).

### 5.3 The Ethical Administrator

Noddings (1992) writes about the ethic of care as it pertains to education. In her forward to Beck's (1994) work on educational administration as a caring profession, she reminds readers about "the tendency in highly bureaucratized systems . . . to attend most diligently to those above us in the hierarchy" leading one to conclude that much, if not all, of an administrator's time "goes into compliance" (Beck, 1994, p. ix). She also reminds us that by evaluating our work through the lens of caring: "we experience a motivational shift toward those who need us and to whom we must now respond" (Beck, 1994, p. ix). As "caring" administrators it is our duty "to promote our friends' moral growth" (Noddings, 2002, p. 98) and this requires alerting colleagues and others to their unethical practices and providing an environment where teachers too will feel unafraid to speak to colleagues and superiors alike about unethical behaviour, their own and others. An ethic of care thus provides a different lens through which an educational administrator's decision-making process can be understood and provides a condition necessary for transforming schools into thriving living and learning ecosystems (Marshall, Patterson, Rogers & Steele, 1996) where teachers unafraid to apprise colleagues and superiors as to unethical aspects of their behaviour would be seen as caring professionals who open up possibilities for growth and change for colleagues rather than "tattletales" looking to mete out punishment. This is a notion we would do well to extend beyond the individual to *all* that is *of* the world, *in* the world.

Although Kanter (1975, p. 43) points to the fact that institutions, schools included, seek to appoint administrators with "a tough-minded approach to problems; analytical abilities to abstract and plan; [as well as] a capacity to set aside personal, emotional considerations in the

interests of task accomplishment” – characteristics “assumed to belong to men” - Marshall (1992, p. 370) asserts that there is compelling evidence that the ways female school administrators view schooling, their approach to, their manner of prioritising and managing, as well as “structuring interactions” have “elements that hold great promise for improving school leadership”; that in fact we should not be training women “to fit within a male-defined decision-making mode” (Marshall, 1992, p. 370). Rather should we not as Almond (1988, p. 42) proposes be using these feminine and feminist perspectives to “rewrite the map of morality to promote a separate moral perspective?” My answer would be a resounding yes as I explain and explore in the section that follows.

### *5.3.1 Leadership and Gender*

Leadership theories conceptualised in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century were “presented as if gender-neutral” (Klenke, 1996, p. 9). Yet as Klenke (1996, p. 9) rightly observes:

traditionally, women were believed to lack the traits and behaviours considered prerequisites for effective leadership, traits such as aggression, competitiveness, dominance, Machiavellianism, ambition, and decisiveness. . . . qualities which typically have been missing from descriptions of women. (Klenke, 1996, p. 9)

This is a conceptualisation sadly lacking in the notion of ethics as caring as introduced by Noddings in her seminal work of 1992. And it might have been acceptable in certain “cultural-historical contexts” (Fricker, 2008, p. 70) when there was a “gap in collective understanding – a hermeneutical lacuna . . . owing to the relative powerlessness of [women]” (Fricker, 2008, p. 69) with respect to gender (Fricker, 2007, 2008) and the view that women’s qualities were somehow inferior when it came to leadership in the workplace in general and schools in particular. Yet despite the fact a hermeneutical lacuna no longer exists with regards gender, gender prejudice remains alive and well in educational institutions (and others) with the epistemic injustice this

can and does perpetrate. This certainly begs the question as to whether my co-teacher and I (and the observation protocol used to assess us) discussed in the prologue to this chapter would have been treated in such an off-hand and derisive manner had we been male.

In a study by Hall (1996) where she documents, describes and analyses “headship . . . as done by women” (Hall, 1996, p. 26), women leading schools in Britain, she appropriately argues that to challenge the current association of management with “masculinity and the autocratic control over others” (Hall, 1996, p. 5), educational leaders need to practice what she calls “critical leadership” (Hall, 1996, p. 5), a more feminine conceptualisation of leadership. This is leadership that not only seeks to but in fact “liberates rather than controls”, sees as its strength “its concern with ethics and morals” rather than exclusively “efficiency and means” (Hall, 1996, p. 5). She continues:

It represents „power to“ rather than „power over“. Leadership and followership are interchangeable. The power of the individual leader is limited. The awareness of non-dominant groups is raised. Finally, critical leadership stimulates organizational change through mutual education. (Hall, 1996, p. 5)

It is a leadership that does the right thing for the right reason and with the right intent, with no thought of gain or emotional doubt or reluctance (Nussbaum, 1992), irrespective of pressures exerted on it to act differently. It is a leadership that is honest, fair, compassionate and courageous: traits that the majority of the world’s population holds in high esteem, irrespective of race, class, culture or creed (Fenstermacher, 1990). And it regards as inherently wrong that which: “harms, deceives, manipulates, deprives, neglects, cheats, intimidates, and uses others for one’s own ends” (Campbell, 2003, p. 16; see also Somerville, 2000).

Marshall et al.'s (1996) findings strongly suggest that in order for administrators to make decisions that sustain an ethic of care, they need to nurture the emotional health of individuals and the institution alike. As both social and moral agent (Murphy, 1992) as well as instructional leader, they need to establish connections and respond to needs in ways that synthesise the realities of their particular contexts yet also contribute to establishing a peaceful and congruent school culture: "living places that fit children" (Murphy, 1992, p. 130). Care is at the "forefront" of a caring and ethical administrator's mind when making decisions (Marshall, 1992; Marshall et al., 1996).

#### **5.4 The Ethical School: A Symbiotic Relationship**

An educational leader has an impact, for better or worse, on a school's culture (Klenke, 1996).

Yet, as Klenke (1996, p. 18) argues, context defines the leadership process, moulds it:

"Contextual factors set the boundaries with which leaders and followers interact and determine the constraints and demands that are put on leaders" and are both many and varied. They can include: the political, economic, socio-cultural as well as the historical as it pertains to the school and its geopolitical location as I discuss in Chapters 1 and 6. Yet often, as Campbell states in her study of administrators' decisions: "Fairness and equity are not used as [their] guiding principles, and . . . as a practicing teacher you have very little power" (E. Campbell, 1997, p. 253).

Treatment such as this continues to be "not uncommon" (Campbell, 2003, p. 71) and is described by one teacher as "part of the unethics of administration" (Paul cited in Campbell, 2003, p. 71).

In such school cultures, to stay out of trouble, teachers will often succumb, as do administrators, to the trap of "suspended morality" (Campbell, 2003, pp. 6, 92). They will compromise on or

abandon their own beliefs about what is right and wrong and justify their actions as a result of having no choice in the matter (Holmes, 1992; see also Piddocke, Magsino & Manley-Casimir, 1997). However, to do so is to abdicate one's personal as well as professional responsibilities and thus abandon the professional discretion that comes with acting ethically (Holmes, 1992).

Administrators and teachers alike also have a tendency to succumb to the notion of "the false memory trap" (Campbell, 1996, p. 72): to validate and excuse unethical or immoral behavior on the basis that it is "vital", "crucial" or "essential" and to act in any other way would be catastrophic. However, as Piddocke, Magsino and Manley-Casimir (1997) sensibly observe both teachers and administrators, as members of a profession, have a moral obligation to "uphold the dignity of the profession by his/her actions" *and* a responsibility to "duly criticize the profession and its members when they fail to abide by the profession's own proper standards" (Piddocke, Magsino & Manley-Casimir, 1997, p. 224). Although the "tyranny of the group" (Malcolm, 1973; Fricker, 2007) can weaken our commitment, our resolve and determination to do what we know is right (Boss, 1998; Fricker, 2007), anything less falls short of what it means to be an ethical educator and ethical person.

As Campbell rightly concludes, there are:

two clear roles for principals: to facilitate efforts by teachers to enhance and share ethical knowledge; and to ensure that their own behaviour, attitudes, decisions, and leadership practices contribute positively to an overall ethical environment rather than to a dysfunctional community that places little premium on professionalism and moral agency. (Campbell, 2003, p. 126)

It is the duty of the ethical principal to connect people morally not only to each other but also to their work as teachers (Sergiovanni, 1994). It is the duty of the ethical principal to develop

“shared purposes, beliefs, values, and conceptions themed to teaching and learning, community building, collegiality, character development, and other school issues and concerns” (Sergiovanni, 1994, p. 7). And it is the duty of an ethical principal to consider his/her decisions, actions, attitudes, policies and procedures as well as his/her own personal proclivities from the standpoint of moral agency before foisting them on teachers and students alike. If, however, as Marshall (1992, p. 383) suggests, due to a serious lack of training in the moral and ethical approaches to decision-making (McKerrow, 1997), principals are making decisions based on “[s]eat-of-the-pants ethics” (Marshall, 1992, p. 383), an approach that uses intuition and experience rather than a real understanding and appreciation of the moral implications of decisions reached and actions taken, then this is an approach to ethics that simply “does not work; [but] gives us stressed administrators unable to make decisions with any sense of professional guidance or support” (Marshall, 1992, p. 383). This is untenable as “we cannot realistically hope to reinvigorate the moral climate of the schools . . . if schools are not managed ethically” (Reitz, 1998, p.49): where ethics is not at the forefront of the administering and governing.

The ways of the playground where to “report a peer is regarded as a betrayal of the in-group member to the alien out-group authority” (Power, 1993, p. 153) belong in the playground where emotions are in the process of being educated and such beliefs need to be challenged. They are neither appropriate nor professional in the adult teaching world or the ethical school.

## **5.5 A Moral Education**

Which brings us to the issue of whether a moral education could and would benefit teachers:

“Might it not be advantageous for all educators, no matter what their job or where they work, to

become increasingly aware of the moral potency of their actions?” Jackson, Boostrom and Hansen (1993, p. 2) ask. My answer would be a resounding yes. That is not to say that all teachers and administrators act unethically, rather, as Rose (1999, p. 97) suggests, drawing on Foucault, the freedom to act ethically may be more about an educator’s “capacity to judge, accept or transform the practices that subjectify” her. Yet, as Jackson, Boostrom and Hansen (1993) imply, many teachers remain critically unaware of the ethical implications of their own, and others’, actions and words, and are hence unable to transform those practices and systems that would subjectify them into ones that will free them.

In applying Murriss’ notions of what teachers expect of children (Murriss, 2013) to educators, it becomes apparent that teachers, as do children with teachers, present to administrators that which the latter want to hear and not necessarily what the teachers feel they want and need to communicate. Similarly, administrators present to school boards that which the board wants to hear rather than what needs to be said. As Murriss (2013, p. 249) so cogently argues, there is “a deeper engrained epistemic orientation [in schools] that profoundly influences how we speak” as well as how and if we listen, for as Fiumara (1990, p. 8) points out, “in the absence of a radical reciprocal openness to listening ,no genuine human relationship“ exists.” In applying Murriss’ (2013, p. 248) concepts on children to teachers and administrators, it would appear that the sole capacity an administrator or board has to “hand out punishments influences and regulates” behaviours. Such passive epistemic injustice which Fricker (2007, p. 145) describes as the act of “wrongfully excluding” someone “from the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-operative practice of pooling information” and hence “from participation in the practice that defines the core of the very concept of knowledge” leads to systemic and systematic silencing of

teachers and administrators alike. We teachers are habituated to conform: moulded, transformed (Rabinow & Rose, 2003; MacBeath, 2010) to the “norm”. Thus teachers maintain a close scrutiny over their own lives, the source of power never visible: colonised and colonisers become one. From the “periphery” (Pratt, 2002), from a space of “not-belonging” (Said, 1978) the obscure becomes obvious. It is thus a teacher’s critical awareness as to their moral agency and the behaviours that this implies that not only defines them as a moral teacher (Sockett, 1993) but also gives them the moral courage to act.

As stated previously, knowing is not yet acting. The need for teachers in international schools to define themselves as an ethical profession and act accordingly is long overdue. It will take courage and determination to achieve. However, as Stenhouse (cited in Rudduck, 1988, p. 35) so pointedly remarked: “It is teachers who, in the end, will change the world of the school by understanding it” and I would add by acting on that understanding in a moral, ethical and timely manner. With this study and this story I hope to provoke teachers in the international school community to think: “That could be my story.” I do not want to provoke empathy but to ask “for us to become critically conscious of our subject-positions in the ongoing practices of denial” (Kennedy, 2001, p. 130). I hope it serves to bring these teachers together, “emotionally binding” them together, as Richardson (1990, p. 26) would say, and offering the potential for both “social action” and “societal transformation” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26) in the international school domain. For as Barad (in interview with Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 69) states: “Matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care are shot through with one another.”

## CHAPTER 6: THE APPARATUSES OF CONFLICT

### 6.1 Introduction

What constitutes an apparatus (Foucault, 1977) of conflict, an “apparatus of bodily production” (Haraway, 1994, p. 62), cannot be known prior to “engaging in the always messy projects of description, narration, intervention, inhabiting, conversing, exchanging, and building” (Haraway, 1994, p. 62) of a phenomenon such as conflict. Nor can the relative importance of any one apparatus to a particular social practice such as conflict within a particular international school be known prior to the enactment of the practice itself. For according to Foucault (1980b, p. 39) power is not imposed from outside an event but becomes apparent in the power relationships that develop within the event itself: “*within* the social body, rather than *from above* it.” These are relationships that Foucault (1984/1997, p. 292) defines as: ones “in which one person tries to control the conduct of another. . . . [but where] there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides” for without such freedom there can be no power relationship at all, only domination. As such it requires placing the event, the enacted practice, in a unique position at a unique time within the four dimensions of space and time in order to render visible the apparatuses deployed, and how they were deployed to constitute a certain phenomenon, a certain subject; as such it is to render visible the discursive practices and social relations of a particular community involved in so doing. As such in this chapter I will be returning to specific moments in time and space as they relate to the conflict, to specify particular apparatuses that became entangled in the phenomenon of conflict at this one particular international school, how they were deployed and to what effect.

### 6.1.1 England & Hong Kong: 1990s through to the early 2000s

Although the conflict took place August 2006 through to September 2008 the historicity of the administrators involved in the conflict as well as that of the school itself had a marked impact on how the conflict arose, evolved, was handled and ultimately “resolved”. As such it requires that we examine the literature pertaining to the 1990s and 2000s during which time the principal<sup>15</sup> and deputy principal<sup>16</sup> were administrators in England in the public sector to understand what neo-liberalist policies and practices and other apparatuses had produced in terms of administrators with respect to the “leadership” and the management of teachers in general and of conflict in particular; and to see how this understanding interacts with what it means to be an ethical educational leader as discussed in the previous chapter. For the fact that the principal emerged from his time within the public education sector as a recognised “Beacon School<sup>17</sup>” leader in England can be misleading implying that he was exemplary not only in terms of the technical knowledge required to lead a school but also in the practical wisdom (*phronesis*) required in the moral work of leading teachers and students.

It also important that within this particular space and time we situate the school itself within its own historicity, the hand-over of Hong Kong by the United Kingdom to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, an event that brought into being serious political and economical ramifications for the school and those employed by it, creating a pervading culture of insecurity and fear among staff about the future of the school, Hong Kong and themselves. As such I turn to a

---

<sup>15</sup>I use the term “principal” to mean the head of the school which in British literature is used interchangeably with the terms headteacher and head.

<sup>16</sup>The term “deputy headteacher/principal” in the English literature is synonymous with the term “assistant principal” used in US literature. For clarity and ease of reading I will refer to the position throughout this study as deputy principal.

<sup>17</sup>A Beacon School was a government designated award given to “outstanding” primary and secondary schools in England and Wales from the late 1990s until the mid 2000s. The programme purported to identify schools that were “beacons” of “good practice” and funded them to share “effective” practice with other schools.

review and re view of the literature, a reflection *on* the literature, as it pertains to Hong Kong and the UK 1996 through 2004, in order to situate this autoethnographical study of conflict in an international school within its own socio-historical educational context. I do this advisedly believing that as Haraway (as cited in Richardson, 1990, p. 27), so cogently argues: “There is no view from „nowhere,“ the authorless text. There is no view from „everywhere,“ except for God. There is only a view from „somewhere,“ an embodied, historically and culturally situated speaker” that speaks within the framework of a particular community, a particular conflict.

I begin my discussion of the literature as it relates to leadership and education with a section on Hong Kong circa 1990s, where the conflict took place and then move on to sections that cover the role of school administrators in England and Wales as both the principal and deputy principal in this study hailed from the UK. They had both been administrators (1996-2001 and 2002-2004 respectively) in the public sector in England at a time when the public education system had been dominated for several decades by state prescription (Fullan, 2003) and where “efficiency” and “effectiveness” were seen as hallmarks of an “outstanding” (Office for Standards in Education [Ofsted], 2007, p.25) school and leadership, terms that smack of the “factory floor” (Kelly, 2004, p. 42) that view schools as “teaching shops” (Kelly, 2004, p. 42) and administrators as managers hired to ensure that “value for money” (Kelly, 2004, pp. 55, 170) is assured.

## **6.2 Hong Kong, an International School, the 1990s**

China and Hong Kong have been at the forefront of the proliferation in the number of “international” (Caffyn, 2011<sup>18</sup>) schools (Brummitt, 2007, 2009b<sup>19</sup>) offering local families an

---

<sup>18</sup>Caffyn (2011) suggests such schools are “artificial structures placed in complex environments with a diverse populace. They cannot create consensus because they are too diverse” (p. 66).

English-medium education. The enforcement of mother-tongue education in Hong Kong (Cheung, 2008; Lin, 1998a, 1998b; Morris, 1996; Slater, 1998; Wong, 2000) in 1997 by the Hong Kong government meant that local schools, which had previously been free to choose their language of instruction, were designated either Chinese-medium or English-medium. The Chinese-medium schools tended to be labeled as “inferior” by local parents and found it hard to attract students (Cheung, 2008; Morris, 1996, 2004; Wong, 2000). According to Slater (1998), Wong (1993) and Wong (2000), the English-medium schools had strict admission requirements and many students, given their levels of academic English and Chinese, found it hard to gain access to one of these schools, considered elite because of the native-like fluency of the students’ English language skills (both social and academic) as well as their fluency (written and spoken) in Chinese. Local parents then turned to the international school sector in search of schools that offered English-medium instruction for many of these schools not only provided an English-medium education but very often support for those students who had a language other than English as a mother tongue. One of the cheapest and often easiest ways for a local family to gain access to an English-medium education was to apply to one of the Tepapawei International Schools (TIS) Group of schools which in the years prior to the 1997 hand-over of Hong Kong was struggling to fill its schools. By the time I arrived at TISS in August 1996, approximately 25% of the student population was both ESOL and local Chinese yet the school was still contracting with teachers’ jobs on the line.

---

<sup>19</sup>There are currently around 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated expatriate teaching staff of around 250,000 predicted to grow to 10, 000 schools and 500,000 teachers by 2020 (Brummitt, 2007, 2009b). According to the web site <http://www.iscresearch.com/> (April, 2008), of the 1,375 English medium international schools that opened in 2008, 50.4% of these were in Asia.

With the run-up to the hand-over of Hong Kong from the British to the People's Republic of China in 1997, many expatriates had left Hong Kong taking their children with them, children who had filled many of the places at the TIS schools both at primary and secondary level. Their school fees had been subsidised by the Hong Kong government under a special ordinance to cover Native English Speaking (NES) students who were unable to access the curriculum at many of the local schools that taught in Chinese or a mixed code of Cantonese and English. Now the children of local middle class and well-to-do families who could not gain access to a local English-medium school or international school with stricter entrance requirements for non-native English speakers had the option of attending one of the most "prestigious" (Hayden & Thompson, 1998) educational establishments in Hong Kong at a minimal price as the substantial subsidy provided to TIS by the Hong Kong government (approximately 30% of fees charged per student) would remain in place after the hand-over.

The English as an Additional Language (EAL<sup>20</sup>) admissions test for the secondary schools was basic<sup>21</sup> and allowed for an influx of local students into the TIS schools who had neither the academic abilities in English necessary for "success" within the TIS system nor the desire to assimilate into the English National Curriculum school culture that was on offer. That the TIS did not see it as part of their remit, neither a moral obligation nor even an instrumental one, to provide these students with the language support (both English and mother tongue) necessary for them to realise their full potential within the system was not only negligent but unethical, an

---

<sup>20</sup> EAL ("English as an Additional Language") is used in the UK in lieu of ESOL ("English to Speakers of Other Languages") and ESL ("English as a Second Language") the more generally used terms at international schools.

<sup>21</sup>The test comprised a set of short non-academic-like sentences which required a verb (provided) to be inserted using the correct tense. A short interview where the student was asked general questions about their lives, eg., where do you come from., was also administered. The test was the same irrespective of whether the student was aged 11 or older, applying for admission to a year 7 or year 10 level of entry. Admission to A level courses was based on the outcome of a short "chat" with the Head of the Senior Section of the school with no formal assessment of academic language skills.

unwillingness to respond to the needs of both staff and students alike. That TIS teachers were neither trained nor experienced in teaching ESOL students compounded the issues and was a recipe for disaster for students and teachers alike, evaluated as both would be on their external examination results that would mark both teachers and students as successes or failures, included or excluded by the practice of normative evaluation.

The TIS primary schools fared no better than the TIS secondary schools as they continued to accept students with the most rudimentary of English language skills in order to “put bums on seats<sup>22</sup>”. As with the TIS secondary schools, these schools also failed to provide the most rudimentary of language support, both English and mother tongue, for these students, failed to train their teaching staff the basics of ESOL support, yet readily accepted the financial gain these students provided. However, given that TIS could not meet the ever-increasing demand for an English-medium education by the local population and had in addition already put in place more rigorous admission tests<sup>23</sup> with a view to cutting language support costs for those whose mother tongue was not English by excluding students who did not possess a certain level of English language skills, the number of international schools offering an English-medium education to a local and “returnee<sup>24</sup>” clientele grew dramatically and with it the demand for native English speaking teachers and administrators, the majority of which came from the UK. Bates (2011) states that international schools will need to recruit approximately 250,000 extra teachers from English speaking education systems, mainly UK and American, over the next decade if they are

---

<sup>22</sup>Personal communication from TIS teachers.

<sup>23</sup> This was based on a cost effectiveness evaluation leading to the admission of ESOL students that would not require substantial language support.

<sup>24</sup> These were local Chinese families that had immigrated to English speaking countries prior to the hand-over in 1997 but who had returned post 1997 when they saw that stability had been maintained. The children spoke neither their “mother” tongue” Cantonese nor English fluently and had poor literacy skills in both Chinese and English.

to meet the demand of the estimated 4.9 million students Brummitt (2007, 2009a, 2009b) expects will be enrolled by them over the next 5-10 years.

This influx of non-native English speakers with poor academic literacy skills, both in English and their “mother” tongue, did not sit well with a TISS teaching staff that was used to a student body that not only had excellent academic skills in English but also understood and was a party to the British colonial culture of the school<sup>25</sup>. That these ESOL students were subsequently blamed by staff for the school’s sudden decline in examination results (in all subject areas except mathematics, physics and chemistry) was not surprising given the antagonism with which they were viewed by many teachers and administrators alike. Yet teachers had only to look to themselves to understand that much of what they were “teaching” was not being “learnt” for the sole reason that there was very little effort being made to make the information “comprehensible” (Krashen, 1982/2009; see also Carder, 2002) and hence accessible to non-native English speakers. They had only to look to the administration not solely for having caused the “problem” but more importantly for not having provided them with the appropriate support (at the appropriate time and for appropriate reason): the training necessary if they were to provide these students with the best education possible. The fact that it can take up to 7 years for an ESOL student to become proficient in academic English (Carder, 2002) was lost on many of the teaching staff. The fact that the school was still contracting, despite it having taken on close to 200 ESOL students (almost 30% of the total student population) during the previous two years, meant that teachers’ jobs were still on the line. The upshot of this was that if your teaching contract came up for renewal at a time when there was a need to cut a member of staff then you would be terminated, irrespective of circumstance, length of tenure. As such the fear, anxiety

---

<sup>25</sup>Personal communication from the Head of the English Curriculum Group for the TIS Group, June 1997.

and the anger generated by this situation which to teachers appeared beyond their control was a palpable presence in the classrooms and staffroom. The ESOL student became the object of their anger and fear: the scapegoat no less. For poor examination results meant that local parents, fixated as they were with these results, would look to other schools to which to send their children thereby causing a drop in student enrolment and further contraction and job loss for the school and more importantly the staff: the effect of “social power” which according to Fricker (2007, p. 13) following Foucault is “a practically socially situated capacity to control others” actions” actively or passively, solely structurally or through social agents. Divide and conquer has for millennia been the provenance of power, a tried and tested formula for its success (Trinh, 1988).

It was in such circumstances that the Head of English (HoE) at TISS took it upon himself on the eve of the British handover of Hong Kong to the Chinese to address the TISS teaching staff on the issue of language use at TISS. In a “paper” titled *The State of English at TISS*, the Head of English started his polemic, a clearly racialised reading on the use of languages other than English, with a scathing attack on the quality of students’ English at the school, stating that during his tenure proficiency had deteriorated drastically due to the fact that the school was not enforcing its “English-only” policy – a policy which was in fact non-existent. His proposal: that we enforce the policy irrespective of the fact that students had in fact voted (the previous year) to be allowed to use their mother tongue, responsibly and with consideration for others who might not understand. Elaborating further on this positivist and neo-colonial stance, he extolled the virtues of an English-only policy: how it would improve examination results; would be lauded by parents and teachers alike, and more importantly would stop the “pervasive alienation” he stated

was currently occurring among the school body, positing that the “neutrality” of English would diffuse any “petty divisions” that could arise among different ethnic groups with national passions “inflamed” by the use of different languages. If an English-only policy were not enforced, it would, he warned, be just one “short step” from this Tower of Babel to all kinds of bullying that the staff would find very difficult to deal with.

His polemic served to expose the extent to which neo-colonialist and positivist views were (and continue to be) entrenched within the TISS system couched in the paternalistic and autocratic language of the neo-colonial, not only within this particular school but also within the wider organisation. It painted a picture of an organisation arrogant and secure in its own knowledge with little use for what others, who disagree, have to offer to the pool of knowledge or even information, an organisation that views diversity as a “problem to be managed rather than engaged with” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 191) and celebrated. As such it is an organisation that hires “leaders” whose ideology resonates with that of the status quo and expects teachers to tow the line and not rock the boat.

In light of his “paper”, my response sought to demystify the notion that the use of a mother tongue was detrimental, interfered with the learning of another language and was disruptive and divisive. I stated that there was compelling evidence that speaking one’s mother tongue neither interfered with nor caused regression of a second language already acquired; rather it had a direct, positive and significant impact on Second Language Acquisition (SLA). I suggested that from purely pragmatic considerations we should seek to encourage rather than proscribe a student’s use of their mother tongue, to even go so far as to provide them with support in this

endeavour, as it could only benefit the English language outcome for them and the school. I argued that any English-only language policy, whether written or unwritten, formal or informal, spoken or unspoken, that sought to deny students the right to use their mother tongue was not only seriously misguided with regards SLA but also highly questionable ethically for to deny a student their mother tongue was to deny them access to their own ethnocultural identity.

I ended my response as follows:

*To believe that English is a „neutral“ language is naïve. It is as ideologically encumbered as any other language and „has ideological as well as behavioral and econo-technical consequences“ (Phillipson, 1992). And if our aim is to empower rather than assimilate ESOL students, value what they bring rather than denigrate it, then introducing a reductionist educational policy of English only is not the way forward. For many, if not most, of these students call Hong Kong home and as such the need for them to be bilingual (if not trilingual given the eminent handover of Hong Kong to the Mainland), bi-literate and bicultural should be obvious, rather than a semi-lingual with no language to call a metaphorical home. As such honouring and observing the rights of these students to maintain and develop their mother tongues implies at the collective level their right to be different, their right to exist (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994) within the current framework of Hong Kong law. At the individual level it implies a right to identify positively with their mother tongue and have it accepted and respected by us and others (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994) – a basic human right.*

There had been a scribbled note at the top of my copy of the paper from the Head of English stating: “Carmen, I know we see eye to eye on this and so I will go ahead and put a copy in everyone’s pigeon-hole<sup>26</sup>”. This was despite the fact that he was well aware of my views on the issue as I had made them perfectly clear to both him and the teaching staff on numerous occasions. The use of the term “we” was no doubt an attempt to make me complicit, the note a written verbal equivalent of a hand on the shoulder to ensure compliance, a reminder of a female teacher’s commitment to the collective, her subordinate position to male teachers (Bartky, 1996;

---

<sup>26</sup>A pigeon hole is a small post box, generally in the staff room, with one assigned to each and every teacher for internal and external mail and communications.

Shotwell, 2011) and the “internally coercive power that this sort of „we-attitude“ can have” (Fricker, 2012, p. 300). At almost the same time that the TISS HoE was penning these words, Edward Said was “revisiting” (Richardson, 1997, p. 299) his time spent at Victoria College, Cairo in the 1940s where:

the school’s first rule, emblazoned on the opening page of the handbook, read: „English is the language of the school; students caught speaking any other language will be punished.“ Yet there were no native English-speakers among the students. Whereas the masters were all British, we were a motley crew of Arabs of various kinds, Armenians, Greeks, Italians, Jews and Turks, each of whom had a native language that the school had explicitly outlawed. Yet all, or nearly all, of us spoke Arabic – many spoke Arabic and French – and so we were able to take refuge in a common language in defiance of what we perceived as an unjust colonial stricture. (Said, 1998, p. 3)

It would appear that little had changed in the intervening 50 years in educational attitudes at British schools overseas, the apparatus involved in both situations very much alive; for the HoE’s ability to present racialised views in the guise of an ethic of care was the voice of ghosts past, present, and future of racialised, colonial and neo-colonial patriarchs in their interactions with the „Other“, students and teachers as other: the „[n]ot you/[l]ike you“ of Trinh T. Minh-ha’s post-colonial world which presumes that a “clear dividing line . . . between I and not-I” (Trinh, 1988, para. 1) can be drawn, for the students are not white, not from a Western background and not native speakers of English; the teacher’s background is equally suspect having been brought up bi-culturally and bi-lingually with a Cuban mother and an English father. Drawing on Foucault (1980a) and his theory that it is the discursive that produces specific and local relations of power allows for the patriarchal voice of the HoE to define what is in the students’ best interests. Yet at this border, this liminal place where “everything happens” (Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 9), the HoE’s paper and my response becomes an engagement of the human (HoE, me, others that think like us, the students, the staff) and the non human (schools both international and national, neo-liberalist and neo-colonial policies, as well as notions of and policies on second

language learning, gender, race, class, age) that is triggered by a perceived potential loss of power and which places students and certain staff in the shadows and in the margins of school life. With this one act the HoE and his “paper” also positions the administration as culpable for any future possible shortfall in examination results, any and all teaching deficiencies having been split and projected (Dunning et al., 2005) onto the administrators as their failure to enforce the language policy of the school. It also positions the HoE and the staff firmly in the winners’ seat.

### **6.3 The Role of School Administrators in Public Education: England & Wales**

#### **1980s/1990s/early 2000s**

##### *6.3.1 Introduction*

Literature pertaining to the era when both the TISS principal and deputy principal were public school administrators in England (1996-2004) such as Fullan (2003), Hoy, Bayne-Jardine & Wood (2000) and the PricewaterhouseCoopers<sup>27</sup> (2007) study, makes clear that there were a growing number of issues associated with school administrators and administration in England and Wales, not least the lack of capacity and critical self awareness of school leaders about their leadership practices, the entrenched prescriptive nature of both administrative and teaching practices and the systems that supported them. This interplay between policies, practices, bodies (government ministries and organisations, public schools, government administrators, policy makers as well as school leaders and teachers) resulted in leaders that lead very much by the book – the government “book” of neo-liberalism. As such issues arise when administrators from contexts such as these move overseas to take up senior positions at international schools where

---

<sup>27</sup>The project management group for the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study (2007) on school leadership commissioned by the UK Government Department for Education and Skills (DfES) consisted of officials from: the DfES, the National College for School Leadership (NCSL) and an observer from the School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB). The study involved extensive surveys of school leaders, their leadership teams, and teachers using a criterion-referenced set of survey items.

apparatuses such as transience, diversity and a lack of accountability to a higher “disinterested” authority such as a local and/or other government office (Hayden, 2006) which is no part of the administrative or governing bodies, are part of the terrain.

In the case of the particular administrators associated with this study, they both came from a system that viewed leaders as “*the* initiator and innovator” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190) of organisational change within the school, change designed to align with predetermined managerial outcomes: a system where teachers were expected to be loyal irrespective of any personal conflict they might have over professional issues of “equity and care” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190; see also Schmuck, Hollingsworth, & Lock, 2002). They came from an educational terrain where mainstream educational research had enabled the depoliticisation of education and schools at a time when both were becoming highly political in nature (Blackmore, 2006b). This panopticonic aspect of teachers’ lives had ensured within the UK not only compliance by teachers to the norm but also habituation of teachers and administrators to that norm. In addition the increased flows of population during the 1990s across and within countries combined with the “rapid internationalization” of education had “produced a cultural diversity that required schools [to] be more responsive through individualised pedagogy and [an] inclusive curriculum” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 191). Within this new framework for the management of schools, “diversity was seen to be a problem to be managed rather than engaged with as productive” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 191) and leadership an instrument through which the notion of education as a free market enterprise subject to market conditions established (Blackmore, 2006b).

As such a move overseas by administrators emergent from terrains such as these can serve to exacerbate and magnify the issues such systems have by “exporting” them intact, transplanting “knowledge” and practices so to speak rather than grafting/amending them, with principals and deputy principals “leading” very much as they did in their home country. This ignores the fact that knowledge, educational as well as other, although presented as reflecting reality is rather a practice of intervention (Barad, 2011), a situated reconfiguring of the world rather than a metaphysical presence (Barad, 2011). It also ignores the fact that an overseas environment can be far more complex than the home environment and the school viewed as a “deliberative” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) democratic institution where agreement is negotiated and “informed by a professional ethics of democratic accountability” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 194) rather than autocratically imposed by administrators. For leadership, to quote Blackmore (2006b, p. 194) is “a situated, social and collective practice undertaken by different people, informally and formally, differently in different contexts”: a complex interplay of apparatuses such as institutional policies and practices, the discourses of gender and professional status within the school, political and economic forces, the details of the personal as well as professional lives, as well as many other factors.

As such international schools as institutions of great diversity require productive engagement rather than mere management (Blackmore, 2006b) if power struggles over the focal point that is the school are to be resolved collectively and in ways that are socially just. For these are institutions where emotions can be “valued performatively” different across “different national cultures and across ethnicity and gender” (Fineman, 2004, p. 730) yet where difference needs to be viewed as an exploration of “a different terrain of consciousness . . . a terrain in which clear

cut divisions and dualistic oppositions such as . . . masculine vs feminine, may serve as departure points for analytical purpose but are no longer satisfactory if not entirely untenable to the critical mind” (Trinh, 1988, para. 4). These are terrains where how we feel becomes as important as what we think and do (Hochschild, 1990) to the outcome of interactions within the school. The leader who approaches such complex terrains unaware of and/or unprepared to engage with the diversity that exists across the many domains within an international school (as discussed in previous chapters), who comes with ready-made managerial solutions for “foreign” situations – a product of previous ethico-political educational experiences - then the possibility of resultant power struggles and conflict remains high. For such an approach is to view the international school as a territory to be colonised, the teachers as natives to be subjectified, and the administrators as paternalistic neo-imperial colonisers.

### *6.3.2 The Principal*

#### *6.3.2.1 Introduction*

The 1980s and 1990s saw the rapid implementation of neo-liberal policies in response to the escalation in “flows of people, money, goods, images and ideas” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190). This was particularly the case in the UK, New Zealand and Australia (Blackmore, 2006b) with schools viewed as part of the market place and education a product-based enterprise, strictly controlled however by the state through the “strong accountability requirements of outcomes-based education and performance management” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190). Discourses of “choice, competition and accountability” replaced those of “equity, comprehensiveness and co-operation” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190), with the “discourse of choice” reduced to “rights” rather than “needs”, supplanting the social liberalist notion of “collective interests” with the

“competitive individualism” of neo-liberalism (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190; see also Kelly, 2004). This resulted in a dramatic change in the way in which students were viewed. Whereas previously the assumption had been that *all* students were capable of learning and entitled to access all of “life’s goodies” (Blackmore, 2006a, p. 182) irrespective of “differences”, and that this would require extra resources as well as time to achieve, students were now viewed as needing to “fit into economical imperatives, be „polished up“ in a particular way” (Blackmore, 2006a, p. 182). And if teachers failed to demonstrate this with appropriate student outcomes on standardised testing, testing which did not take into account the diversity of a school’s student population, within the required timeframe, then they would be held responsible and the school deemed to be a “failing school” and its students failures. This perpetual positioning of schools, teachers and students as failures irrespective of the fact that their achievements may have been substantial relative to where they started can lead to “self-perpetuating cycles of despair” (Blackmore, 2011, p. 222), fear and anxiety: “stress and distress” (Blackmore, 2011, p. 222). It is also a stark example of what social power can enable in the production of identity prejudice, with particular social groups at once stereotyped, stigmatised and unable to understand their own social positioning (Fricker, 2007, p. 13-14) as academic failures. And for those concerned with social justice, it leads to the ethical struggle between “what it is right to do rather than . . . what it is good to be” (Taylor, 1989, p. 3), for it is undoubtedly better in terms of self interest to comply but what of the demands of social justice for colleagues and students alike (Blackmore, 2011)?

Governmental neo-liberal policies focused on effectiveness and quality have continued to influence educational policy in the UK for over two decades primarily due to the fact that they easily align themselves with the notion of the self-managing school, isolated and seen as a

“discrete unit”, with “leadership as the solution to „underperforming schools“” in the 1990s (Blackmore, 2014, p. 504), teachers as the solution to underperforming students in the 2000s (Hattie, 2008) and “effective” schools as having identical attributes irrespective of terrain: the context and/or demographic (Thomson, 2002), with the end goal being to “out-source” public educational systems (Blackmore, 2014).

Yet in 2003 at a time when leadership had become synonymous with the notion of reform in self-managed schools, with “innovation and change” (Blackmore, 2011, p. 210), the UK government was still seeking to improve the “quality” of school leadership as a system focused on relentless structural change had not brought about the predicted changes in student outcomes (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). It took an “outsider” to the British system to point out that to move from an age of “prescription” to one of “professionalism” in the area of educational leadership would be no easy task as: “it takes capacity to build capacity,” and if there is little capacity initially then it is foolhardy to believe that a “move” to “professionalism” provides the foundations of a new way forwards (Fullan, 2003, p. 7).

That the recruitment process for principals in the UK was and continues to be:

characterised by variable rigour, the application of instinct and „gut feel“, a lack of foresight to future needs, a lack of knowledge about statutory requirements and standards, and a rush to advertise spurred by fear of delays in appointment. (National College for School Leadership [NCSL], 2006, p. 4)

ensures that the recruitment of the leader of the school, one of the defining positions, was and continues to be haphazard and more a question of chance.

### *6.3.2.2 Role and Responsibilities of the Principal in England & Wales*

The primary role and responsibility of a principal is leadership and management (Kruchoy, MacBeath & Riley, 1998, p. xi); however it is quality and effectiveness that are the key measures in England and Wales by which they were and continue to be judged. The origins of the National Standards for Headteachers in England (Department for Education and Employment [DfEE], 2000; Department for Education and Skills [DfES], 2004; Teacher Training Agency [TTA], 1997) with its emphasis on quality and effectiveness can be traced back to the 1990s and the transfer of Deming's ideas on "quality management", "quality control" and "quality assurance" from the business/factory floor to the educational setting. Deming's ideas did not survive the transfer intact, losing as they did his notion of "philosophy of moral action that regards organizations as systems subject to variation" (Holt, 2000, p. 2), a concept of quality "of what it is good to do" (Holt, 2000, p. 2) and reminiscent of Aristotle's own view of practical wisdom. It instead gave rise to the notion that all you have to do is "collect data at each [key] stage, optimize it and wait for the desired" (Holt, 2000, p. 3) result to emerge at the end of the line. This assumes that if the performance benchmarks are defined and observed (Holt, 2000, p. 3) at specific stages then quality will naturally result (Deming, 1994). Nothing could be further from the truth (Holt, 2000; MacBeath, 2000; Winch, 1996). As Holt (2000, p. 3) points out: "Painting by numbers cannot reproduce a Monet." The quality resides in the product and is unique to that product: "Quality stems from the way in which the product takes shape as it moves through the system; it resists hierarchy and eludes determinism" (Holt, 2000, p. 3). As such, the "capacity of any system to generate quality" (Holt, 2000, p. 5) defies numerical measurement. Quality is a property that numerical measurement renders indeterminate.

The notion that a school that does well on exams, meeting targets and standards set, possesses quality is also flawed as with the push for accountability, the relentless pursuit of targets and results, teachers “begin to treat understanding as a luxury they cannot afford” (MacBeath, 2000; see also Mullen, Holt, Shaw & Parratt, 2000). The pursuit of quality therefore becomes reduced to items such as: teaching to the test, the transference and imposition of out-of-context “best practice” and the relentless ticking of tick boxes in the assessment of teachers and students alike by senior and other “leaders”, intent on their school emerging or remaining at the top of the market place, the league tables<sup>28</sup>, thus ensuring that they retain their own positions (Blackmore, 2006a, 2011; Holt, 2000; MacBeath, 2000). It would appear that “[t]he curriculum may be impoverished, yet still satisfy the demands of accountability” (Holt, 2000, p. 4). In other words: the accountable school may in fact lack quality (Winch, 1996). Schools however require, “inspire a different sense of a-count-ability, a different arithmetic, a different calculus of response-ability” (Barad, 2014, p. 178). It requires/inspires the return of those excluded: a return to needs rather than rights.

With a focus on quality in the educational sector came an equal focus, if not fixation, by the UK government on the notion of school effectiveness – Orchard (2007) correctly states that the third edition of the National Standards for Headteachers in England (DfES, 2004) refers to “effectiveness” twenty-three times in the space of three pages – a fixation that can be traced back to the Blair government of 1997 when:

It took upon itself responsibility for delivery, in effect treating the education system as a large company producing goods. For this it needed a measurable product and it chose to regard test and examination results as the equivalent of the barrels of oil extracted by a petroleum company. . . . Targets were set for test and exam scores against which the

---

<sup>28</sup> Schools in England and Wales are awarded points as to their formal exam results and then ranked in a league table of academic results for schools that is published annually.

performance of schools would be judged, with the obvious corollary that unproductive units in these terms became candidates for closure. (Smithers & Robinson, 2007, p. 2)

As such the notion of school effectiveness would appear to be as equally impoverished as that of school accountability (Holt, 2000; Hoy et al., 2000; MacBeath, 2000) as “we can make the trains run on time,” – “which is what effective school research is all about” (Holt, 2000 p. 5) – “but if they do not go where we want them to go, why bother?” (Postman, 1996, p. 61; see also Gregg, 2011). Education as such can inhabit either end of the “quality” spectrum from the low end of attainment and tactical learning to the high end of understanding, metacognition, learning skills and strategies where paradoxically a focus on understanding produces deeper meaning/learning, integration into memory and ultimately higher standards (Hoy, Bayne-Jardine, & Wood, 2000, p. 13; see also Ball, 1999; MacBeath, 2000). However the notion that “effectiveness” can lead to “quality” in education ignores the fact that this notion is dependent on a particular view of what “quality” in education entails (Orchard, 2007, pp. 2-4; see also Winch, 1996) and what a “quality” education looks like. It also ignores the fact, as Reid (as cited in Holt, 2000, p. 5 ) has commented, that “the term „effective“ is devoid of moral content”, and as such an inappropriate term to apply to education if by that we mean schooling as opposed to mere training: “Cheap liquor is effective. We do not say that a good bottle of vintage claret is effective” (Reid, 1997, p. 216). The term also cannot speak to “the real internal character of a school” (Mullen, Holt, Shaw & Parratt, 2000, p. 448) focused as it is solely on the differences between inputs and outputs. It cannot speak to the needs of a child as opposed to the rights of a child and as such confuses “the „thin“ democracy of markets and managerialism” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) with the “deliberative democracy” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) of social justice. As such good leadership and management, Orchard (2011, p. 2) suggests, might have more to do with “professional judgement” and “practical wisdom” than notions of quality management, quality control and

quality assurance, and the associated effectiveness implied, transplanted as “best practice” from the commercial and industrial sectors intact. Yet the notion of effectiveness “continues to exert considerable influence on educational policy in Britain however as a form of captured discourse” (Ball cited in Orchard, 2007, p. 3).

And it is this view of “quality” and “effectiveness” in education that the TISS principal and deputy principal transplanted and imposed as “best practice” from England to the school with their arrival at TISS, attempting to control and shape through these apparatuses not only how we teachers should teach but also what we should feel and how we should express those emotions (Bartky, 1986; Jaggar & Boddo, 1989; Winograd, 2003). Rather than acknowledge that the emotions form an integral part of the warp and woof of our social and thus by implication our teaching practices (Hochschild, 1990), they instead stripped these practices bare of all but those emotions valued by their administration: fear, anxiety, and shame. And for those teachers “who fail[ed] to measure up” (Fineman, 2004, p. 725) on emotions both prescribed and proscribed by the powers-that-be the consequences were dire.

Together the academic “straitjacket[s]” of the National Standards for Headteachers and the National Curriculum for England and Wales have conspired over the past two decades to “fostering mediocrity” and eradicating quality (Holt, 2000, p. 9). Unfortunately on being transplanted to TISS intact they enacted the same consequences. A focus on “excellence” to the exclusion of all else and the use of instrumental practices for organisational ends are as Blackmore (2006b, p. 197) states “inadequate normative bases to inform ethical judgements.”

And ethics are not an “optional extra” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) when it concerns educational leaders, leadership, teachers, and schools.

### *6.3.2.3 Principal Attributes*

In a study of effective school leadership (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998), of the skills, knowledge, qualities and traits the principals (from Denmark, England and Scotland) interviewed found most important to being a good principal was: the ability “to resolve conflict” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 33). In the top 29 categories, coming in at numbers 6, 7 and 9 were: “Courage and the ability to confront difficult situations”; “Being concerned and able to help people to develop professionally and personally” and “[b]eing able to handle/manage people well” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 33-34). When looked at more closely across national boundaries the data yielded that the Danish principals valued the ability to resolve conflicts and manage people effectively (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 35) as well as being able to mediate and negotiate more highly than their English or Scottish counterparts with the English principals adopting a “rather more managerial . . . Total Quality Management” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 36) approach to leadership. The Scottish valued relationships more and placed a high value on “mentoring, coaching and the creation of a positive ethos” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 36). Differences were also seen in the analysis when experience was taken into account. Those principals new to the role (with 3 years or less in the position) chose categories favouring “the „hard“ end of leadership style” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 38) such as “[b]eing prepared to wield [their] authority” and “[b]eing able and prepared to evaluate and make judgements” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 38).

In this same study principals were asked to discuss a series of ethical dilemmas they might encounter in schools. The English principals responded “in a way which seemed to belie the personal angst which had been expressed” in private interviews and “[a]ny sense of dilemma disappeared to be replaced . . . [with] clear courses of action underpinned by strongly expressed moral principles” (Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p.135). When asked why the activity had not afforded them the opportunity to talk about the issues these dilemmas had raised for them, featured at either end of the range of responses given were: from “I’m not going to reveal in public how vile I can be” (Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p. 136) to “What I am going to do isn’t necessarily a request for a solution. It’s a cry for understanding – look how awful this is for me” (Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p. 136). In other words the English principals were unwilling to “present themselves [in public] in any way other than morally virtuous” (Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p. 136).

Yet another key finding of the study, and one of the most significant, was with regards to gender with women principals identifying: “• caring • collaboration • courage • intuition • vision” (Reeves et al., 1998, p. 38) as the five key elements for school leadership. This showed a clear overlap with the features identified by USA Women principals in a study by Regan and Brooks (1995) (see also Marshall, 1992), demonstrating a clear conceptualisation of an “ethic of care” (Noddings, 1992) in their understanding of what the notion of leadership entails, sadly lacking in the male principals’ responses.

Unfortunately, however, Reeves et al., (1998, p. 40) found more often than not that the senior staff admired by deputy principals had also “actively supported them in preparing for leadership

and in furthering their career” (Reeves et al., 1998, p. 40). This was very much the case at TISS for the deputy principal had been handpicked by the principal with the intention of grooming her for principalship. This would indeed suggest that:

the road to induction was quite haphazard and would tend to perpetuate and reinforce tradition because upcoming leaders were looking to the previous generation to help define their own role. (Reeves et al., 1998, p.40)

thus ensuring that the quality of leadership is likely to remain unchanged in the years to come (Marshall, 1992).

#### **6.4 The Importance of the Emotions in Leadership and Administration**

Fineman (2000, p. 11) reminds us that , as we have seen in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, emotions neither interfere with nor serve rationality, rather emotions and rationality “*entwine*”, flow together.

From Fineman’s perspective there is no such thing as “pure cognition; thinking and deciding is always brushed with emotion, however slight” (Fineman, 2000, p. 11). Indeed, emotion, according to Fineman (2004, p. 721):

penetrates and defines many of the processes and consequences of organizing. These include the subjective meanings of work, leadership, decision making, negotiation, motivation, ethical conduct, communication, gender and ethnic relationships. More sharply, *emotion draws attention to the psychological injuries of working, such as harassment, bullying, violence, stress and emotional labour.* (Fineman, 2004, p. 721; my emphases)

Educational ethicists such as Campbell (2003) and Marshall (1992) appropriately lament the dearth of decision making models based on moral and ethical principles to be found in most school leadership programmes. Rather most of these programmes focus on “instrumental, technical, managerial, political and strategic models of decision making” (Campbell, 2003, p. 127; see also Marshall, 1992) to the exclusion of ethics and the emotions that could signal unethical and immoral attitudes, practices and actions. Educational ethicists have also rightly

disparaged the exclusion, “by default”, of a “serious consideration of ethics in a profession whose mission is fundamentally moral but whose practice is not” (McKerrow, 1997, p. 210). As one principal in Campbell’s (1997) study remarked:

Ethically, you don’t have a really good basis for making decisions and you have to hunt around and build a value set . . . Until you have the experience, you tend to back off so sometimes you find yourself allowing things you think are wrong, but you don’t think you have a basis to act on. (E. Campbell, 1997, p. 254)

Hence, it would appear that school leaders tend to make decisions that have an impact for better or worse on the school community without a clear understanding of the moral and ethical dimensions and implications of those decisions and are left to rely as previously mentioned on what Marshall (1992, p. 383) calls “[s]eat-of-the-pants ethics”. However, if administrators, as Campbell (2003) fittingly concludes:

do not consider their actions, decisions, policies, procedures, habits, inclinations, personal styles, and attitudes from a perspective of moral agency before subjecting them on teachers and students, they injure the chance to foster truly moral communities. (Campbell, 2003, p. 127)

Yet many senior administrators at international schools seldom receive any formal training in practical wisdom, where dialogue and deliberation go hand in hand with the use of the emotions (Blackmore, 2006b; Caffyn, 2011) to address unequal power structures identified within schools and provide greater distribution of agency to all: teachers, parents and students (Blackmore, 2006b). For the principled administrator’s practice is distinguished by being morally fitting for the particular socio-political and material terrain in which it is situated (Orchard, 2011) and encompasses the ability to recognise, manage and resolve conflict (Caffyn, 2011) in an ethically appropriate way. Stout (2005, p. 16) comments that conflict:

is a natural concomitant of social interaction and has been so since the day of Eve and her apple . . . Social groups require a certain degree of dissonance in order to achieve progress . . . Conflict can have positive as well as negative effects, but which state predominates largely depends upon the way in which it is managed.

However, it is unfortunate that in many cases, the initial cause of a “governance/management conflict begins with a tiny issue. This escalates into a personal agenda, and then all too often becomes a cause célèbre” (Stout, 2005, p. 16) leading to short-term ethically questionable solutions to a highly complex organisational issue.

As such there is a need for administrators that can comply with official criteria for demonstrating “quality”, “effectiveness” and “efficiency” for example while also demonstrating a marked commitment to “values, learning communities and shared leadership” (Orchard, 2011, p. 2).

There is a need for administrators who resist change for the sake of change, resist prescriptive injunction from above and directly involve all members of the school community in any decision-making process ensuring that when change does occur it has a high probability of being accepted and implemented by those concerned (Gold, Evans, Earley, Halpin & Collarbone, 2003; Orchard, 2011). We need administrators that believe in “open governance”, in making the decision-making procedures not only transparent but also inclusive with information communicated regularly and publically to all members of the school community in a way that is respectful of them as individual people rather than “elements of an organisational structure” (Orchard, 2011, p. 3). We need administrators who are able to apply to great effect the notion that the sum of the parts is greater than that of the whole to ensure that executive functions are not only shared among the leadership team but also result in exceptional outcomes for all; this is collaborative team work that should also extend to the pedagogical ensuring that leaders are seen by the teaching staff as trustworthy in matters educational as well as operational (Bush & Glover, 2003). For “Principled Principals” (Gold et al., 2003) are not only willing to listen and learn from colleagues they are also willing to trust and entrust them with the responsibilities and rights

of leadership roles ensuring that leadership is distributed throughout the school. They are school leaders whose attitudes and dispositions are such that they model what it means to open-minded, trusting and curious to know what others have to offer the pool of knowledge that exists within a school (Gold et al., 2003). They understand and value what it means to be a democratic society within the school context and wider community and act on that understanding.

“Outstanding” yet principled school leaders are thus able to work “creatively within a tension; between „standards“ of educational „effectiveness“ prescribed by the national level government” or other and an environment within which those directly involved in the school have the opportunity to shape its future (Orchard, 2011, p. 4). They have by virtue of reflecting on their experiences acquired the disposition necessary to do the right thing, at the right time, for the right reason and with the right feeling (*NE*, 350 BCE/1994a) and thus know when and where to best draw the line between a CEO’s or governing body’s involvement and school-directed change: they know where the “mean” lies with respect to any such situation.

#### *6.4.1 The Meaning of Leadership within Schools*

The ability of a school to handle change, with transience and diversity two of the key features effecting change in an international school, is dependent on its leadership and is an expression of its “belief system, attitudes and values” (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998, p. 28). And it is a leadership’s ability to acknowledge and welcome internal tensions as well as problems that creates the internal conditions necessary for managing the complexity and speed with which change occurs (Fullan, 1993, 2001, 2003) in international schools. Leithwood, Leonard and Sharratt (1997) state that it is only in a supportive environment where collaboration and trust

exist that conflict and ambiguity can be dealt with positively. For it is only within such a school culture that teachers and students learn to thrive and survive any challenges the future might hold (Dalin, 1995).

As such the primary duty of school leaders is to ensure that conditions for engagement and open dialogue exist, that teachers are not only challenged with respect to their basic assumptions and values but feel free to express their thoughts and opinions without fear of punishment (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998). As MacBeath, Moos and Riley (1998, p. 28) suggest, it is “[t]ransformational leadership” that helps teachers to “cross the thresholds of their classrooms” to rich and challenging interactions with others both inside and outside their particular schools and communities. As such transformational leadership requires an ability to be flexible and pragmatic, to “accommodate different demands and expectations” (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998, p. 29) rather than depend solely on a belief in “the right way”, a way based on “hard” data rather than the practical wisdom acquired through deliberation on past experiences. And it is this ability that Rosener (1990) suggests is more aligned with a woman administrator’s repertoire of management practices than that of men; for a woman’s repertoire of leadership practices are grounded in the emotional rather than solely the rational, enabling the transformation of subordinates “own self-interest into the interest of the group through concern for a broader goal” (Rosener, 1990, para. 6; see also Orchard, 2011, pp. 2-3).

## **6.5 Summary**

In the 1990s the saying: “It is better to ask for forgiveness than ask for permission” became a leitmotif for “proactive leadership” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 2) in England and Wales. In a four

country study conducted by MacBeath (1998a) he noted that “it was the English headteachers who were the quickest to admit to being manipulative and deceptive in order to achieve the goals of the school” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 2). However if the principal task of leadership is “to build the conditions for reflection, open dialogue, mutual respect for ideas and for both professional and institutional growth” (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998, p. 28) then transformational leadership, a democratic concern with political equality and thus the ability “to include members of the community actively in decision making” (Orchard, 2011, p. 3) by being flexible and pragmatic, “transparent as well as inclusive” (Orchard, 2011, p. 3), is essential. This requires a shift away from Total Quality Management and its emphasis on the technical to: “total quality leadership, which takes the technical side and marries it with the human side” (Levine & Crom, 1994, p.29). It requires that leaders be not only “good at” what they do but also “morally good” (Orchard, 2011, p. 6), both practically wise as well as pragmatically sound and well-versed in the technical aspects of education.

Good leaders, according to MacBeath et al., (1998, p. 30) are those “who know where they want to go but also know how to tack with the wind”; good schools, says Hopkins (cited in Macbeath, 1998b, p. 7), “are sailed rather than driven . . . tacking and changing with a reading of wind and current.” For if we are to move away from “institutions [with] deeply entrenched vices” (Fricker, 2012, p. 296), where the morally and ethically suspect actions of administrators and teachers alike, actions that belie their morally and ethically considered words, are condoned then we need to consider these institutions from the standpoint of those “on the losing end” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288), from the “point of view afforded . . . by a given social identity positioning and the range of social experience that typically attends it” as the “underdog” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288),

considerations I will be exploring in Chapters 7 and 8 where I tell “my” story of teacher conflict within the international school context and one particular international school, using “*verbal snapshots*” of events I experienced during “the” conflict.

The fact that up to this point in time no one had listened to me, “heard” me and “my” story, means that my desire for epistemic justice, which is all about being listened to, acknowledged as worthy of being listened to, runs deep within me. This study, this piece of work, fulfills this function, hence the length and detail of several of the verbal snapshots I provide in the chapters that follow; they act as testimonies of a sort as well as events and experiences to be problematised and theorised, used to explore the literature as it pertains to conflict. However, that said, I let go of any pretence that there is only one truth, “my” truth, and that I am in the right. As such the study has become philosophical therapy/transformation, so to speak, a way of enacting epistemic justice for myself.

## CHAPTER 7: MY STORY OF A CONFLICT (PART 1)

### 7.1 Introduction

In late 2006, the year the conflict started, I started to suffer from loss of central vision. The episodes at the onset would last a few seconds and would occur irregularly and infrequently; by the end of the year they had become a regular occurrence, often daily, and would last from 15 to 20 minutes. What had been a mild inconvenience had become a frightening daily occurrence. So off I went to consult a doctor who sent me to an ophthalmologist who on ruling out any disease of the eye promptly sent me to a neurologist. He in turn ordered a Magnetic Resonance Image (better known as an MRI) and told me to come and back and see him when it was done. I duly did. He pointed me to an office chair to the left side of his desk which when I sat in it left me a good eight inches below his line of vision. He peered down at me from on high and glanced at the MRI scans. “You have a lot of lesions on the brain and that to my expert eye suggests Multiple Sclerosis (MS),” he stated matter-of-factly. I jacked up my chair to eye level with him and responded: “Actually it could mean a number of things: lupus, Lyme Disease, a Vitamin B13 or B12 deficiency, allergies or MS. So can we test to eliminate some of these?” (I had been busy doing my own research.) He looked annoyed. “Well, for starters we don’t get Lyme Disease here” he replied. “Yes but by the same token MS is virtually unheard of here. I however have lived in the States and South America and Lyme Disease does occur there.” He looked very annoyed: “I suggest you see your local doctor to arrange for those sorts of tests.” He handed me the scans and looked down at his notes: I was seemingly dismissed. Campbell (1994, p. 49) uses the term “being dismissed” to “capture” the “nuance of being treated . . . like a piece of furniture” when a conversation is taking place, when the knowledge one has to offer is seen as of

no import, one's epistemic agency not taken into account (Code, 2008a, p. 37; see also Fricker, 2007); "once thus dismissed we [do] not have to be taken seriously" (LaRoque, 1990, xvii) and both knowledge and speaker can be ignored.

In contrast, the MS specialist I went to see a few months later in Sydney, Australia made no such assumptions on looking at the scans. Rather he asked me to tell him about the episodes, the attacks, to describe them in detail not only in terms of their quality, frequency and duration but also in terms of the circumstances and contexts of their occurrence. He listened attentively, actively, respectfully interrupting my story only to ask questions of clarification. He studied the journal I had kept of the attack episodes and then asked me to perform several physical exercises: for example standing with my eyes closed; balancing on one foot and then the other. At the end of the two hour session his prognosis was that he very much doubted that I had MS rather he suspected stress-induced late onset migraines without the accompanying headaches. However just to make sure he suggested I undertake a simple test that would check to see if electrical impulses were travelling along my nerves at a reasonable speed or had been "delayed" due to myelin degradation as occurs in MS. He did not "play" the expert (Jones, 1997; see also Foucault, 1961/1988) and I the unknowing layperson rather he constructed the interaction as one of a team – with both of us playing on the same side and with important knowledge to share. The prognosis had mattered but his respect for the knowledge I had to share with him had mattered more. As Code (2008b) suggests: to be recognised and acknowledged as a reliable epistemic resource is to have one's social standing with regards knowledge and knowing accepted. It is to be seen as different yet equal in the epistemic domain rather than a source of information, an object from which "true belief, can be extracted" (Craig, 1990, p. 36), to be viewed and judged

from afar with little or no interaction necessary. For to be seen as a source of information is to be “perceived and treated as a lesser human being” (Fricker, 2012, p. 294), it is to be seen as an object rather than part of the apparatuses in the phenomenon that is the materialisation of knowledge. Code (2008b, para. 9) continues:

Not being asked blocks possibilities of epistemic collaboration, contestation, negotiation; it silences the voices of the powerless, objectifies them epistemically, thereby again enacting patterns of dehumanizing testimonial injustice that the [sic] preempt the exchanges -- the team-work (in Craig's words) -- on which viable epistemic community depends. It is at once personally and socially damaging. (Code, 2008b, para. 9)

What lies at the heart of such epistemic injustice is “structures of unequal power” (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) which when combined with our very inability to be sensitive to those “stray residual prejudices that threaten to influence our credibility judgments” (Fricker, 2007, p. 5) leads us to silence those we should in fact be listening to. Perhaps if the neurologist had affected the “active, attentive silence of those who are *listening*, perhaps trying to make out a voice that is seldom heard” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287) but which still has a major contribution to make, he would have been more open to other possibilities and perhaps would have revised his misdiagnosis. The view that those in positions of less power, in the loser’s seat so to speak (Fricker, 2012), have nothing to offer the “experts” when it comes to knowledge about their own condition is unremarkable given Weil’s comment (Weil cited in Fricker, 2012, p. 287):

Human beings are so made that the ones that do the crushing feel nothing; it is the person who is crushed who feels what is happening. Unless one has placed oneself on the side of the oppressed, to feel with them, one cannot understand. (Weil, 1978, p. 139)

For being in “a position of social power” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287) eclipses certain truths, which leaves the powerful with only a “partial perspective” of the particular social world considered, a not very useful one at that as its their own (Fricker, 2012, p. 288), a reflection from a look in the

mirror of reflexivity (Haraway, 1997). Despite this, the “expert” continues to hold a privileged position in the medical world (Jones, 1997), one which they would seem unwilling to relinquish.

## 7.2 Epistemic Injustice

In the sections that follow I turn to the work of ethicist and philosopher Miranda Fricker to develop my argument that as a teacher in an international school I remained unheard and silenced as a direct result of how my identity was constructed and constituted as one that is gendered and subordinate to those in positions of “social power” (Fricker, 2007) – those who by virtue of their position have the capacity to control what others do and say, a control that Fricker (2007) asserts acts both actively and passively<sup>29</sup>. Though as Winograd (2003, p. 1646) observes male teachers, although in a profession that embodies the cultural expectations of women, are privileged by virtue of their gender positioning allowing them “to express [their views and] outlaw emotions more freely than women.”

### 7.2.1 Fricker on Epistemic Injustice

In her book *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing* (2007), Fricker departs from mainstream principles of epistemology by positing that ethics and epistemology are inextricable intertwined in the practice of constructing knowledge. Her work is grounded in and builds on the feminist philosophy of the 1980s onwards, a philosophy that in exploring the notion of “standpoint”, an epistemology based on, though not assured by, one’s “social identity positioning” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288) (e.g., female, gay, disabled) within a given social context, links power (or the lack thereof) to voice and one’s social identity. This is a positioning that

---

<sup>29</sup>The fact that an administrator has the power to punish a teacher acts passively to prevent a teacher from acting “inappropriately”.

makes the “underdog [‘s]” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288) voice hard (if not impossible) to hear. It is a notion that asserts that “[s]ubjectivity is multidimensional; so, therefore, is vision” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586) and requires “a politics of positioning” (Haraway, 1988, p.586), of being critically located and critically aware, in order to understand the “standpoints of the subjugated” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586): those “partial” (Haraway,1988, p. 586) perspectives that when joined together “see together without claiming to be another” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586). This is a notion that ironically provides us with the basis for objectivity – “inter-subjectivity” - for in experiencing the world in our own particular way and communicating it with others (Eyres, 2014, p. 24) we respond to “the call of each individual freedom to all the others” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 9). It is a notion that uncovers the fact that those who decide what counts as knowledge have power over those that do not (Haraway, 1988; see also Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). It is a notion that uncovers the fact that male-dominated “material-semiotic fields of meaning” (Haraway, 1988, p. 588), the discursive practices and the “apparatus[es] of bodily production” (Haraway, 1988, p. 595) such as geography, gender norms, stereotypes, emotions such as fear and anxiety, guilt, shame and anger, work together to form a matrix within which institutions have translated and continue to translate gender differences into “female disadvantage” (Bem, 1994, pp. 5, 42). And that economic power controls not only what is socially constructed as knowledge but also who and what counts as epistemically trustworthy (Shapin, 1995). The implication of these notions is to assert that in order to fully understand any social phenomenon you must look at it from the standpoint of the underdog: those whose voices are difficult to hear. As such if, as Fricker (2007, 2012) contends, the “epistemology of testimony” can be seen as the epistemology of a human social practice – the human social “*practices of telling, and accepting (or not) what we are told*” (Fricker, 2012, p. 290) - then to

understand such practices will require looking at them from the standpoint of those who are in the loser's seat, whose social positioning and lack of social power results in their acquiring little or no epistemic agency (Fricker, 2007) in their interactions with others.

Fricker (2007, p. 145) explains that:

When someone is excluded from the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in the co-operative practice of pooling information, they are wrongfully excluded from participation in the practice that defines the core of the very concept of knowledge. (Fricker, 2007, p. 145)

They are thus denied on three counts: ethically for being wrongfully excluded, epistemically for being wrongfully mistrusted, and ontologically for being wrongfully positioned as a lesser being. Social position and social power are what determine the extent to which a person is considered epistemically trustworthy Fricker (2007) contends. They are involved in “two of our most basic everyday epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling them, and making sense of our own social experiences” (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). As such Fricker goes on to explain that when you are seen as a type rather than an individual your credibility as a giver of knowledge can be diminished to such an extent that you are silenced, dismissed: you dys-appear. Fricker calls this kind of epistemic injustice based on “*identity prejudice*”<sup>30</sup> (Fricker, 2007, p. 4), any arbitrary fact such as that you are woman, gay, disabled, or otherwise “other”, testimonial injustice. If however we fail to understand our own social situation, “our own social experiences” (Fricker, 2006, p. 96), due to unequal power structures, “*structural identity prejudice*” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155), then this can lead to what Fricker (2007, p. 6; see also Fricker, 2006) calls “*hermeneutical injustice*”, with certain social groups unable to make sense of their own situations and experiences and thus unable to contest the distorted interpretations of

---

<sup>30</sup>Fricker (2007, p. 4) defines “identity prejudice” as “a label for prejudices against people *qua* social type” which leads to “testimonial injustice”.

these by others (Fricker, 2006, 2007). As a woman and teacher in a hierarchical and patriarchal organisation that is the international school, the potential to be subjected to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice is very real. As such the epistemic, ontological and thus ethical challenge, following Murriss (2013, p. 249), in international education is that of “hearing [teacher’s] voice<sup>31</sup>”, of making it determinate. And so in the sections that follow I turn to ways of making one particular teacher’s voice determinate and thus heard.

### **7.3. The Verbal Snapshots**

Although as stated previously in Chapter 2 I have no actual snapshots with which to retell my own tale, the five *verbal snapshots* I have chosen are representative and symbolic of the encounters I have omitted telling in this story. As such they embody the notion of unequal power relations and how this can lead to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in the international teaching world; they are chosen advisedly pointing as they do to the cracks, fissures and silences in what is said and not said, yet when viewed together “they seek to fracture the lens through which” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11) dissenting teachers are viewed. These *verbal snapshots* are of critical incidents, what Muncey calls “key milestones” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11), in the journey of a teacher, from disempowered and voiceless to empowered and with voice, from invisible to visible: “together ... they juxtapose power and truth with the spiritual and emotional journey from victim to survivor” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11).

The *verbal snapshots* I present in this and the subsequent chapter are presented in chronological order and occurred during my final two years at the school, a school that had been a part of my

---

<sup>31</sup> Murriss (2013) in her paper “The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice” talks about how children are often not heard by adult teachers due to the fact they are children. Murriss states that (black) child is “wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Murriss, 2013, p. 245) due to their age.

life for 12 years. All save a handful of teachers continue to this day to be employed on the same finite two year contract I was hired on, irrespective of a teacher's length of service. These are contracts that can be arbitrarily not renewed. A small minority of TIS teachers hired in the early 1970s and 1980s (when it was difficult to attract English national teachers to work in Hong Kong) were however given general contracts at the time of hire which meant that they enjoy tenure until retirement at age 60; they are known as the "untouchables" and can only be terminated for proven gross misconduct. The fact that I had served the school and community for such a length of time made the termination I suffered all the more painful: the most personally devastating incident in my 30 years of international teaching.

### *7.3.1 Snapshot 1: Request or Demand?*

*Carmen, Could you come and see me today period 2b please.*

The note on my desk from the deputy principal was brief, cryptic yet to the point. I had found it waiting for me on my return from teaching period 1. Period 2b was just about to start so I went down to the office she shared with the other deputy principal and an assistant deputy. The other two were there, the deputy nowhere in sight. After waiting for 15 minutes I asked the assistant deputy if she knew where the deputy was. "She's in the middle of a *scheduled* interview and won't be free for a while" was the response. She suggested I leave a note which I did to say I would return at lunch time. I returned at lunch time: no deputy and no note left for me; my note had vanished. I left her another note to say that I was meeting with the Head of English and the Head of Science to discuss scheduling for the coming year if she cared to join us. She neither responded to the note nor joined us for the meeting. Her silences were not the "active, attentive"

(Fricker, 2012, p. 287) silences of the listener. For as Foucault (1976/1990a, p. 101) reminds us: “silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions”.

I returned to the ESOL office 2 hours later to find the deputy waiting for me seated at my desk. “I’ve been looking for you all day,” were her first words then that there had been “an incident last week” and a member of the team, Rachel, had been to see her to say she did not want to be line managed by me. The deputy demanded an explanation. I had none to give. I had no idea what the issue could be, said as much and asked the deputy what *she* thought the problem might be. She said she did not know but demanded to know what *I* intended doing. “Meet with her and as soon as possible to discuss the situation” I replied. I checked Rachel’s and my timetables for the next day. We were both free first period. A terse “Fine” and then a “we will meet here tomorrow morning at 8am sharp” was her response. As she walked out the door, she gave the following parting shot: “This is the most dysfunctional department in the whole school and you’re responsible for this. In the meantime, I advise you reflect overnight on what you have done to cause this crisis.” I had no clue as to what had happened and so it would appear neither did the deputy, or so she implied. And reflecting on the matter would have made me none the wiser for as Haraway (1997, p. 16) makes clear: “reflection only displaces the same elsewhere, setting up . . . worries about . . . the search for the authentic and really real.”

I was at a loss as to what exactly I was supposed to reflect upon: confused and angry with her “arbitrary interference” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301) I went home. The deputy had already made up her mind as to whom she believed: for whatever reason I appeared to have no credibility in her eyes and it seems to me now that it was to be one very small step from that label of dysfunctional

to one of dys-appeared, that moment when the self becomes conscious of itself as an “alien thing” through the ethical distance and/or condemnation of the “Other” and is in turn shunned, rendered invisible (Leder, 1990, p. 96) seen as a type rather than an individual. Said reminds us that: words and texts “are in and of the world” (Said, 1975, p. 7; see also Said, 1983) with their effectiveness, their use more a matter of “ownership” (Said, 1975, pp. 11, 17), “of power . . . authority” (Said, 1975, p. 14) than the imposition of force. The conversation/relation between text and reader is thus not one between equals but rather more usually typified as that “between colonizer and colonized, the oppressor and the oppressed” (Said, 1975, p. 17). As Nietzsche (cited in Said, 1975, p. 14) asserts: “texts are fundamentally facts of power, not of democratic exchange”.

The entire incident, from receiving the deputy’s note to meeting with her, had felt like a bad dream: one from which there was no awakening. Had the deputy expected me to accept responsibility for the situation irrespective of being totally in the “dark” as to what had happened? Had she expected me to just “roll over” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) and take the blame without any discussion ever taking place? Or was she “exploit[ing] a ready-made set of gender prejudices” (Code, 2008b, para. 8) within the teaching world that constitute the emotions as sites of social control (Boler, 1999), their expression inappropriate (Campbell, 1994), their suppression (in particular that of anger directed towards the administration) and replacement with a “self-accusatory stance” (Winograd, 2003, p.1642) the norm? Apparently so, for the meeting with Rachel scheduled for the next day never took place, as according to the deputy she had refused to attend any meeting at which I was present and I received in lieu an email from the deputy threatening me with termination. It is clear to me now that “[w]hen a speaker *should* be

heard, but is not heard, [s/]he is silenced” (Fricker. 2012, p. 290 ) and you are left wondering what *you* have done wrong rather than questioning the unequal power relations that are in play, thereby causing you to question yourself instead.

This much I know now: that a contrapuntal response (Said, 1983), a “voyage in” (Said, 1993, p. 261) of “mimicry ...and menace” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86) would have spoken “truth to power” (Said, 1996, p. 102; see also Said, 1978), would have recreated a self with the ability to resist, shown a “technology of resistance” (Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 107) in action yet I question whether it would have changed the final outcome. I believe not. For institutions that lack the “*virtue of testimonial justice*” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301) make it impossible for certain groups to contest injustices. And if you cannot do that then as Fricker so cogently argues you are “politically unfree” (Fricker, 2012, p. 302). Although individual members of the administration and school per se might not have agreed with the deputy’s behaviour or handling of the situation, the fact that they viewed themselves as members of the school, part of the collective, resulted in their condoning the behaviour or at the least going along with the practice as just part and parcel of “workplace culture” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299). As such “[t]he collective commitment to the practice thereby [had become] part of the very practical identity” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299) of teachers and administrators in that institution and difficult if not impossible to oppose within the interactions that followed.

### 7.3.2 Snapshot 2: *When is a Disciplinary not a Disciplinary?*

*We waited: 10, 12, 15 minutes and still no sign of the deputy. The principal called her office once, twice: no response. „She must be teaching.” he said. We all knew she wasn’t. After another 5 minutes: he went to look for her. She finally arrived 35 minutes late with*

*no apology given. We sat in silence for what felt like an age but could not have been more than a minute. I finally broke the silence.*

*“Why did you send me an email threatening me with termination on the eve of my departure for serious medical tests in Australia?”*

*“I was only stating the facts,” the deputy replied.*

*“Which are?”*

*“That a member of your department emailed me [holding up a piece of paper] to say that she was uncomfortable with your style of management and no longer wished to be line-managed by you.”*

*“I’d like to read that email please.” I put out my hand for the piece of paper she was holding.*

*“It is private and confidential.” She very quickly put the sheet of paper away.*

*I looked at the principal. He looked down at his shoes.*

*“But you told me that Rachel had been to see you about the issues. You made no mention of an email” I said.*

*There was no reply and so I continued:*

*“And your comment to me this morning in the departmental office: that I was seriously escalating the situation by involving the Teachers’ Association Representative (TAR)?”*

*“She was quite right to state the obvious” the principal responded in lieu.*

*“Carmen has every right to involve the union given the deputy’s email and the implied threat to her position” the TAR intervened.*

*“Yes, yes, of course however . . .” The principal left his sentence hanging.*

*“Where was the deputy’s duty of care towards me?” I asked.*

*Nobody spoke. It was so quiet the metaphorical pin dropping would have sounded like the noonday gun<sup>32</sup> going off.*

---

<sup>32</sup>The noonday gun is a gun that has been fired off in Hong Kong over Victoria Harbour since colonial days to indicate it is twelve noon.

*“Procedures agreed to are being circumvented and department members are going directly to the deputy with apparently accusations about how I manage the department” I continued.*

*“It’s up to you to open up lines of communication within the department and better manage relationships. You need to move the department forward and work hard to improve the team” the principal stated, avoiding the question.*

*“I cannot do this with the deputy as my line manager and I respectfully request a change of line manager” I replied.*

*“Request denied. She is ideally situated to help you get communication with the team back on track” the principal continued.*

*“She has done everything possible to derail any progress made. The problem is that she spends her time listening to the team but at no point am I included in those discussions”.*

*“I have spent hours talking with you and helping you” the deputy commented.*

*“You did not schedule a single line management meeting with me at your request prior to April of this year and the handbook categorically states that line management meetings should be held every 3 weeks. If there was such a crisis in the department why didn’t you initiate 3-weekly, even weekly meetings with me to resolve the situation?”*

*“I spent hours with you” the deputy repeated, though she was looking at the principal not me.*

*“When?” I asked.*

*Silence. There was no response.*

*“To ensure that proper procedures are being followed where disciplinary action might occur, what process is now being put in motion and what are the steps?” the TAR asked.*

*“It is not yet at the stage where disciplinary action might be taken. Carmen has to work with the deputy to draw up an action plan to resolve the issues over the next few months. I want to see an Action Plan within 2 weeks. That plan will be reviewed 2 months into the next term to assess progress. I am happy to have someone to act as a mentor to Carmen in the planning process but I will not change her line manager” the principal stated.*

*The principal stood up, quickly followed by the deputy, indicating that the meeting was over. The TAR and I left, the deputy stayed behind.*

*[When we were out of ear-range of the principal and deputy, the TAR told me that he did not want anything more to do with matter and that I should contact the Chair of the TIS Teacher’s Association for future help/guidance.]*

The principal had addressed his final words to the TAR. It was as if I was not there anymore: I had apparently become such a “monstrous” sight, a female teacher who contested a principal’s and deputy’s demands, that I had literally dys-appeared; for the English word for monster derives from *monere* the Latin word for to warn and instruct and as such has much to do with scapegoating and demonising. The word also has the same roots as to demonstrate, as such “monsters signify” (Haraway, 1992, p. 333). I had been brought in to confess and if confess I would not - to behaviour both deviant and fundamental - then I would be found guilty none-the-less (Foucault, 1976/1990a, pp. 66-67; see also Said, 1978). For the principal was what Foucault would call “the master of truth. His was a hermeneutic function” (Foucault; 1976/1990a, p. 67).

The above *snapshot* illustrates the import of an apparatus that Senge calls organisational “learning disabilities” (Senge, 1990, p. 18): that is an institution fails to learn what everybody knows because “people speak from and through positions – I speak as „only the secretary“, the caretaker, a junior member of staff, the union spokesperson, the managing director, the headteacher” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 10): for “I am my position” (Senge, 1990, p.19), my “responsibilities limited as to the boundaries of [our] positions” (Senge, 1990, p. 18). This failure to allow free and open dialogue, dialogue “not blinkered by positional status” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 10), allows those in positions of social power<sup>33</sup> to evade, ignore and redirect answers to key questions posed, to remain silent, thereby blocking any open exchange of information and silencing people as both seekers and givers of knowledge within a phenomenon such as conflict

---

<sup>33</sup>Fricker (2007, p. 13) defines “social power” as: “*a practically socially situated capacity to control others’ actions, where this capacity may be exercised (actively or passively) by particular social agents, or alternatively, it may operate purely structurally.*”

within the international school domain. It is in this way Code (2008b, para. 2) suggests that “hearers deny or withhold credibility to/from speakers *qua* members of a certain social type”. Code (2008b, para. 2) continues: “Structurally, members of some social groups are ill-understood, marginalized, reduced to unintelligibility through patterns of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice that often seem to be everyone's and no one's responsibility”. Thus the policies and practices that support such patterns remain uncontested and unchanged.

As MacBeath (2000) notes: “Learning disabilities may be tragic in children but they are fatal in organizations”: they lead to disabled organisations. These are organisations that are led by people “who enhanced their own authority [and status] by diminishing that of others” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 5), who live with a “paranoid fear of [their] own colleagues” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 5) and promote an often covert policy “of „constructive destabilisation“ – an emotional shuttling of . . . staff between censure and fulsome praise, between job satisfaction and job threat” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 6) so that they are never emotionally stable enough to be a threat to the leader’s power, never fully cognisant of their experience, their situation, and as such unable to contest the distorted interpretations of their leaders: practices that promote both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice at one and the same time. Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993, p. 28) echo these sentiments when they say “participation is not a technique designed to get workers to do what their managers wanted in the first place”, but rather an eagerness and capacity to positively engage with “an unforeseen initiative or suggestion”.

Code (2008a, p. 47) echoes their sentiments when she states that those in positions of power, those doing the listening, need to demonstrate a “readiness to engage with surprises” if we are to move to undo the “power/knowledge imbalance and injustice structures” that currently exist. It

requires being open “to imagining beyond instituted possibilities” (Code, 2008a, pp. 46-47), first seeking to understand before seeking to be understood. It also requires a “critical reflexivity” so that the apparatus of identity prejudices does not intervene to diminish another’s capacity as a knower and giver of knowledge (Fricker, 2007, 2012) within any interaction and allows all to share and participate in the creation that is knowledge, institutional and other. The “games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience” (Foucault, 1984/1990b, pp. 6-7) structure and mark the narratives of teachers’ lives, professionally and personally, and serve to give cohesion to the catechism of the organisation’s teaching community. They are what Frank (2012, p. 49) describes as “practices of self-knowledge by which people are made into proper subjects of institutional necessity.” They arise out of and in relation to specific practices: “the places and spaces, the apparatuses, relations, and routines that bind human beings into complex assemblies of vision, action, and judgment” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xxi) wherever those places and spaces might be. Yet as Frank (2012, p. 49) suggests following Foucault, in order to live a life that is not only ethical but free requires not a rejection of these truth games, “but learning to play them well – another instance of *phronesis*<sup>34</sup>” - by contesting what Code (2008b, para. 12) calls the “instituted social imaginary<sup>35</sup>” that holds such institutional practices and policies in place in the “gaps, the interstices [where] there is room for dissent to enter.” For as Foucault (1976/1990a, pp. 100-101) reminds us:

Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing

---

<sup>34</sup> I discuss the notion of *phronesis* in detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>35</sup> Code (2008a, p. 34) describes an “*instituted* imaginary” as carrying “the normative social meanings, customs, expectations, assumptions, values, prohibitions, and permissions . . . into which people are nurtured from childhood” and a “social imaginary” as the “implicit but effective systems of images, meanings, metaphors, and interlocking explanations-expectations woven through a social-political order, within which people, in specific time periods and cultural-geographic climates enact their knowledge and subjectivities and craft their self-understandings.”

strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.

In other words, power can be not only negative and confining but also positively affirming producing alternative subject positions, alternative power relations, and as such disrupting the status quo within a practice such as conflict within the teaching world and reconfiguring the power relations that emerge to being more socially just. It is this postmodern perspective on what Kelly (1995, p. 55) calls “the problem of knowledge” and its associated discursive practices that allows for a plurality of values and perceptions while recognising the inherent “dangers of manipulation through the control of discourse” (Kelly, 1995, p. 72). Applying Lionnet’s (1991, p. 18) notion of “Darwinian divergence” to the discourse of knowledge allows for a greater diversity in the “aesthetic, moral and cultural” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74) ecosystems associated with a “truly democratic form of social organization” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74), which in turn allows for more meanings to emerge. As Lionnet (1991, p. 18) makes abundantly clear: “a given space (text) will support more life (generate more meanings) if occupied by diverse forms of life (languages).” By privileging these “intermediary spaces where boundaries become effaced” binary modes are subverted and allow for more meanings to emerge (Lionnet, 1991, p. 18). However as Lionnet (1991, p. 18) also points out, this “principle of divergence” is all too often “excluded by a politics of knowledge”. As such a view of knowledge as one of a “slowly unfolding pattern of eternal and unchallengeable „truths“, or as derived from some kind of objective, scientific inquiry” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74) is incapable of supporting a continuum of divergent views on any one matter and can only support autocratic forms of “political organization” (Kelly, 1995, p. 75) be that in education or society in general.

If as Murriss (2013, p. 249) so cogently argues there is “a deeper engrained epistemic orientation [in schools] that profoundly influences how we speak” then it would appear that the sole capacity an administrator has to “hand out punishments” (Murriss, 2013, p. 248) manipulates and controls teacher behaviours. Fear flows through and between bodies so that the power relations that emerge within schools support the status quo and view the teachers as objects. Fricker (2007, p. 145) describes such “epistemic injustice” as the act of “wrongfully excluding” someone “from the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-operative practice of pooling information” and hence “from participation in the practice that defines the core of the very concept of knowledge” leading to the systemic and systematic silencing of teachers. It is an act that diminishes, that destructively positions teachers as Other. We teachers are fashioned, transformed (Rabinow & Rose, 2003; MacBeath, 2010) to conform to the “norm” and as such we maintain a close scrutiny over our own lives, the source of power never visible: colonised and colonisers become one. From a space of “not-belonging” (Said, 1978), from the “edges” (Fadiman, 1997), the “periphery” (Pratt, 2002), the obscure becomes obvious. And it becomes clear that a teacher’s critical awareness as to their moral agency and the behaviours that this implies not only defines them as a moral teacher (Sockett, 1993) but also gives them the moral courage to act, contesting those institutional and instituted policies and practices that would subjectify them. This might not be enough in the short term to enable change to occur, to eradicate epistemic injustice within the international school terrain, however it might be sufficient, according to Code (2008b, para. 12), to set “a wave of justice-motivated collective refusal and creative renewal . . . in motion” for the benefit of future generations of international teachers.

As such the principal's and deputy's lack of "uptake" (Frye, 1983, p.89; see also Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994) of any expression of anger or indignation I, as a female teacher, make – using what Campbell (1994, pp. 54, 56) calls "techniques" or "strategies of interpretive dismissal" that "block" (Campbell, 1994, p. 48) the successful expressions of emotion such as silence, redirection, ignoring the emoter and what she has to say – serves to silence, apportioning the blame for not being "heard" on what is considered unfeminine, "unhealthy" (Campbell, 1994, p. 47, 49) and hence "unacceptable" and insubordinate teacher behaviour, (the expression of anger directed towards the administration (Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994; Jaggar, 1989; Winograd, 2003)) rather than any deficiency on the part of the hearers. Campbell (1994, p. 63) notes:

[W]hen our feelings are trivialized, ignored, systematically criticized, or when they are extremely constrained by the poverty of our expressive resources, this situation can lead to a very serious kind of dismissal - the dismissal of the significance to a person of her own life, in a way that reaches down deeply into what the significance of a life can be to the person whose life it is.

As such women's long-standing association with the emotions continues to provide a "long-standing historical ground" (Campbell, 1994, p. 49) on which to dismiss them and the emotion being expressed. Any injustice, any deficiencies on the part of the hearers – what Campbell (1994, p. 51) calls "the failure of others to listen and act" – as such remain hidden. This social control of "outlaw emotions" (Jaggar, 1989) in schools structures our experience of gender, race and class (Boler, 1999) as well as social position and also serves to embed and reproduce it (Bartky, 1996; Boler, 1999). For the emotions have a collaborative and public (Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994) dimension, requiring "uptake" (Frye, 1983, p. 89) as a social act, without which they fail to be successfully expressed (Campbell, 1994).

Democracy, Kelly (2004, p. 215) argues is more than just “a political system”; it is above all else “a moral system”, one that is based on “equality and freedom” with respect for the individual as the guiding principle that holds all others in place. As such any institution, Kelly (2004) argues, any school that purports to be democratic must respect these core principles and must be seen to adhere to them, reflect them not only in their policies but more importantly in their day-to-day practices. Democracy in education is fundamentally about equality, eschewing as it should the belief that only those in positions of power have a voice, privileged by their social positioning. For a school or institution that does not allow for vigorous debate is an unhealthy educational and intellectual environment embodying as it does what Freire (1972) would call a “pedagogy of the oppressed” and generating a climate of assent based on fear and oppression rather than one of inquiry and understanding based on fact and principle. For when “argument ceases - blood happens” (Postman, 1996, p. 73); in schools this means that sometimes people are fired, sometimes they just leave; more often than not “they retreat to their rooms, close their doors, and go about their own business living a lonely existence” (Anderson, 2010). To deny teachers the freedom to speak freely is to “deny democracy itself” (Kelly, 2004, p. 216; see also Fricker, 2012); it is to actively and passively (Fricker, 2007), overtly and covertly seek to constrain “knowledge, thought, opinion, expression and speech” (Kelly, 2004, p. 216) and in so doing maintain and replicate the status quo – a dictatorship no less.

#### **7. 4 Cracks, Crevasses, Fissures and Interstices: Silences and Omissions**

When I finally sat down to write my story it just simply gushed out – 283 pages of anger, pain, regret, a sense of betrayal and grief at a passing. The story would lurch from chaos to quest to restitution then back to chaos again. It was a rollercoaster ride of emotion. Although Frank

(2012, p. 47) uses the terms “chaos”, “restitution” and “quest” narratives to describe “illness stories”, I find them equally appropriate and applicable to conflict stories.

The restitution narrative of “thin medical resources . . . technical accounts, not stories” (Frank, 2012, p. 48) has a parallel life in the legal and human resources “stories” told by conflicted people involved in conflict; these are stories that have uncertain endings, with the outcome for the protagonist hanging in the balance. Equally the chaos narrative of illness where “life is collapsing around” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) the protagonist as “[o]ne bad thing has lead to another” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) with no resolution seen as possible – “which is its chaos” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) - and the expected outcome bleak, is mirrored in conflict. The quest narrative, appearing as it does in both illness and conflict stories, however presents a series of “obstacles” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) which the protagonist encounters and overcomes, in the process gaining “power and wisdom” (Frye, 1957/1973, p. 193); the question though still remains as to whether the protagonist’s “original attitude towards the illness[/conflict] will transform into understanding the transformative potential in the illness[/conflict] experience” (Frank, 2012, p. 47).

I would describe my own story of conflict as encompassing all three “typologies” (Frank, 2012, p. 49). However as Frank (2012, p. 49) states “a typology is never an end in itself.” Rather narrative typologies tell the narrator exactly what resources they have available to them in telling their story and for those “who can represent their lives only in chaos stories . . . limited [as they are] in imagining anything that could make those lives better; their story becomes their fate” (Frank, 2012, p. 49; see also S. Campbell, 1997; Spector-Mersel, 2010). As such stories can, according to Frank (2012, p. 49), by “imposing themselves on people” limit them “to

representing their lives according to whatever imagination the stories make available.” This is not to say that the outcome per se will necessarily be different by adopting a different typology, however, it is to say that “any ending is necessarily provisional” (Frank, 2012, p. 49) with the quest story “traffick[ing] in human possibilities” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 484) other typologies and their endings do not. As Spector-Mersel (2010, p. 208) so eloquently puts it: narratives have “enormous power to shape reality. If we narrate ourselves as active agents, we will conduct ourselves in the ,real world“ very differently than if we base our life stories on victimhood.”

When my legal narrative failed I was left in chaos, confused and silenced – once and for all I thought until reframing my story as an inquiry, repositioning it as: “a quest to know, to understand, to make meaning” (Richardson & Lockridge, 2002, p. 237) for Richardson (Richardson & Lockridge, 2002, p. 237) makes clear: “inquiry and quest come from the same root”. Rather than the traditional quest narrative where the protagonist is cast as the archetypal romantic hero, usually in the form of a third son (Frye, 1957/1973, p. 187) (I was and am neither), this inquiry/quest seeks to understand my conflict from the standpoint of the loser (Fricker, 2012) and the epistemic injustices enacted on and embodied by the loser. It seeks to explore the ethics of international schools as organisations, to understand and find meaning through this particular conflict from a position of marginality of being (Said, 1978), a position that “frees you from having always to proceed with caution, afraid to overturn the applecart” (Said, 1996, p. 63) and as such find a home, if albeit a provisional one, for this “nomadic narrative” (Tamboukou, 2008b, p. 1). It seeks above all else to be heard, As such “revisioning” (Richardson 1997, p. 299) “my” story for this inquiry involved the omission, rather than silences, of much of what appeared in that first writing. The silences that do occur have much to do with

anguish and little to do with occultation, in my not wanting to relive yet again extremely painful experiences.

For some teachers termination is an end point, the destination so to speak, as in the international school arena non-renewal leads more often than not to being blacklisted making it virtually impossible to get a job as a teacher ever again. You might leave the locale, even move to another country where you hope to pass in Goffman's (1963/1990) sense of the word as that which you once were: a teacher without a "past", yet the stigma, although not a visible sign on one's body, lurks in the shadows waiting to make its presence known, to signify you as a "blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided" (Goffman, 1963/1990, p. 11) disgraced and seen as morally wanting. The past can never be left behind (Barad, 2007). The ripple effects of blacklisting, sooner rather than later, catches up with you: there is no escape. For others, such as Winograd (2003) who was on sabbatical leave and so not terminated from the elementary school position he was finding difficult to be "successful" in, having a teaching position to go back to, means that the experience becomes a part of their professional journey, one which can be written about, published so that others may learn from the experience but one that is in no way stigmatising. As such the narrative one might write very much depends on whether the experience was part of a journey or final destination. For some the stigma of non-renewal can be so shaming as to render one silent, precluding the very notion of making the story public (or even private) knowledge, leaving one to embrace anonymity instead, and a "false" social identity, the real you, a teacher who embodies the epistemic injustice perpetrated at a particular international school, not seen at all. As such learning to pass as something you no longer are, a teacher without a "history", can result in an all-consuming "game of truth" one that can cause you to pass, to die metaphorically,

no longer the person you were nor who you truly are either, validating the notion that there is no place for people such as us in society: we live in the shadows:

A borderland . . . a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. . . . The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. *Los atravesados* live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead; in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the „normal.“ (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 3)

Passing can have many meanings; it can also lead to many unexpected consequences. I explore the notion of passing, its various meanings and the consequences of those meanings, in the chapter that follows.

## CHAPTER 8: MY STORY OF A CONFLICT (PART 2)

### 8.1 Introduction

The hallmark of an international school is its “diverse communities and social-ecological situations” (Code, 2008a, p. 32) as discussed in Chapter 1. As such it would appear that Code’s (2008a) comments on the place of testimonial resources (in her case of local rural Tanzanians) not usually accorded a position of epistemic authority, could equally apply to the epistemic resource that is the international school teacher. It is ironic that Code’s analysis is of passing: how “verbal autopsies<sup>36</sup>” on rural Tanzanians conducted with sensitivity and understanding not only evidenced the “burden of disease . . . in a particular ecosystem” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) but served to trouble the “entrenched power” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) of commonsense understanding of a centrally planned and administered system and its practitioners. Passing can thus provide not only meaningful and valuable understanding to those who are passing (such as in my own case) but it can also serve to make visible the epistemic injustices (the “burden” of entrenched power rather than disease, in a particular ecosystem, as discussed in this study) that exist in entrenched ways of knowing and the “intricate epistemic negotiations and advocacy” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) necessary to reverse them. For without either, Code (2008a, p. 32) insists, “knowledge may not be possible, in a strong sense, across diverse communities and socio-ecological<sup>37</sup> situations.”

---

<sup>36</sup>Code (2008a, p. 40) explains: “When a death occurred in a household, trained local researchers traveled by bicycle to conduct “verbal autopsies” with the survivors. . . . Such thorough interviews - rich in context and detail – minimize the likelihood of misdiagnosis. . . . provid[ing] a markedly reliable picture of disease within the general population” and a much improved targeting of disease across the demographic terrain.

<sup>37</sup> Code (2008b, p. 36) defines a “social-ecological responsiveness” as one that is attuned to the “detail of place and demography and naturalized in a quintessentially down-on-the-ground fashion. . . . [with] intricate epistemic negotiations and advocacy”.

Code's notion of "ecological thinking" marked as it is by a reallocation of the epistemic resources of agency and authority allowing for more "[i]maginatively initiated counterpossibilities" (Code, 2008a, p. 35) with which to deconstruct the commonsense notion of foreign aid, finds deep resonance with my own sentiments about agency and authority within the international teaching community. So too does her (Code, 2008a, p. 34) sentiment for "case-by-case" analyses as being "a central ingredient of social and naturalized epistemology and of morally-politically responsible epistemic conduct" resonate with my own. For it is by presenting a case-by-case analysis of my own experiences in a "down-on-the-ground fashion" (Code, 2008a, p. 36) that I hope to render visible, and hence fragile, the organisational practices and processes by which epistemic injustices, both testimonial and hermeneutical, are enacted and embodied in one particular ecosystem, the TISS, on one particular organism – me.

It is my hope that the remaining *verbal snapshots* (snapshots that take the form of words) that follow, those critical incidents that I tell of from this one particular international school and which I experienced during my final year at the school, serve to paint a comprehensive picture of an institution lacking the virtue of epistemic justice (Fricker, 2012), a powerful apparatus in the phenomenon of conflict in this international school.

## **8.2 The Remaining Three Snapshots**

### *8.2.1 Snapshot 3: The Collective Commitment to the Unjust Action*

I had completed and given copies to both the principal and deputy principal of the "action plan" the principal had required I write and submit on how to improve communication with the ESOL team. Despite the fact that I had not been given any information as to what the issues the team

was complaining about were, I had gone ahead and put together a document before we broke for the summer as required. I left immediately when school broke for the summer and headed to South Africa to meet up with my husband. While there my husband suggested I meet with a human resources expert to discuss my situation and see what he thought of it. “They’re going to terminate you” was his candid opinion, one my husband shared. His advice: to file a grievance complaint against the principal and deputy as soon as I returned to school. But that was easier said than done as first I needed to find out what the grievance procedure was and this was information that was not readily available on the school web site nor in other school documentation I had been given throughout my 12 year career at TISS. As such it was as Rabinow and Rose (2003) drawing on Foucault suggest maybe a time to “suspend acting and think about how life is led and the extensive effects of living that way” (Frank, 2010, p. 73).

Broyard (1993, p. 19) describes chronic acute illness as a “series of disconnected shocks”. So too is conflict. This pronouncement of my imminent demise, for I equated termination with the death of what defined me as a person - teaching, was the latest “disconnected shock”; it was the closest I had come to emotionally understanding the “truth” about my situation: that despite all the reassurances to the contrary - from the principal, the teachers’ association vice chair, the “team” embodied in and by Rachel – they were going to terminate me. The signs had all been there all along, just as with the “perfect storm” where a complex set of apparatuses come together and are there for all to see yet remain “invisible” to some. I too had been unwilling to see them constrained as I was by my own “reality tunnel” (Wilson, 2000, p. 40) – what “Performance Philosopher” Jason Silva calls that “idiosyncratic, linguistic, conceptual and symbolic framework” (Shots of Awe, 2014a) that not only constructs but also constrains reality. I had

believed that such an ending would be averted: that if I could somehow make “my” story heard I could change the outcome. But “my” story no longer had a “happy ending”, in the minds of others as well as my own. On the surface I appeared calm, confident yet I was so crippled by anxiety, by panic that I could not think straight. I was in chaos no longer able to make sense of what had become my “chaos story” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) or my narrative self (Polkinghorne, 1991). The disjuncture was frightening. It appeared that only by filing grievance complaints against both principal and deputy could the “chaos” ending be averted but this assumed that I would be able to contest the injustice I felt had been done to me. Only “I” had any chance of saving “me”, I naively believed: subject and object as one. Yet my positioning as Other, as object, would be difficult to contest; as such “I” was in disarray.

Like other schools, this school was a political site involving as it did “asymmetrical relations of power” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. ix), relations which should be subject to contestation. The fact that the ability to contest is dependent upon an institution possessing the “virtue of testimonial justice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301) means that in instances where this is lacking, some groups (e.g., female teachers) are “politically unfree” (Fricker, 2012, p. 302) and unable to contest injustices enacted on them and others. This is especially true in the international school context as discussed previously where there is no higher power that is not part of the administration or governing body, and no independently run teachers’ union a teacher can appeal to when conflict occurs. As Caffyn aptly comments: “There is no system [in international schools] to protect those who do not have power from the vagaries, micropolitical manoeuvring and power plays” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71) of those who do. The school, in all its guises, is according to Rabinow and Rose (2003, p. ix) drawing on Foucault a site “where power [is]

articulated on bodies, where knowledge of human individuals [becomes] possible, and where souls [are] produced, reformed, and even, sometimes liberated”. It is an apparatus that in its interactions with power can determine which “truth” is produced, and as such makes truth “a thing of this world, intrinsically bound” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. ix) to the apparatus, school, for its production, reproduction and distribution (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). However to render such “games of truth” (Foucault, 1984/1997, pp. 282, 296-297) visible requires adopting the disposition and position of the “exile”, in the margins of institutional life. The *verbal snapshot* that follows is one such example of inhabiting the margins of institutional life and occurred on the first day back at school after the summer vacation. It also provides a vivid example of how power acts as a force felt not only by those it acts upon but also those it is passed on to in varying degrees (Foucault, 1980b, p. 39) in the form of professional violence: what Farrell (1997, p. 504) describes as “professional terrorism”.

#### AFTER THE SUMMER BREAK

The deputy principal had allocated the department a very small damp and musty room to have our departmental meetings in. Indeed so small was it that when the four of us were all seated our knees actually touched rather than just brushed one another. This was the first departmental meeting of the academic year and was being held just after a rushed lunch lasting 40 minutes. The mood was sour, the outcome looked bleak.

,

*Carmen: So to the Departmental Development Plan (DDP).*

*Rachel: The focus of today’s meeting was supposed to be the IB, Carmen, looking at the department’s needs.*

*Carmen: Unless the department wasn't involved in teaching the IB.*

*Rachel: Well I do!*

*Carmen: Yes, but the rest of us don't. Maybe you would like to feedback on that?*

*Rachel: Well no, I don't think I do because it's not relevant to the department.*

*Carmen: Mmm, okay. So how would you like to resolve this?*

*Rachel: I'm not going to resolve this. This is a nonsense Carmen!*

*Carmen: We can stop the meeting now or...*

*Rachel: Or what you'll get your envoy from the teachers' union to speak with us again.*

*Yvonne: [Smirks]*

*Carmen: Sorry?*

*Rachel: You know the vice chair!*

*Carmen: Actually it was the principal who requested she meet with you.*

*Rachel: Oh really! Fancy that! How convenient!*

*Carmen: It's just the way it was. So are we going to move on to the DDP?*

*Rachel: I'd like to point out Carmen, if I may, that one of the difficulties that we are facing here is that there is a total lack of trust in the department. And I would like to point out to you that last year you published a booklet, a whole document, folder of every*

*conversation, misquoting almost every conversation . . . I think we've got to deal with a situation where we are working with a complete lack of trust. Last year we were in a situation where really we had a dysfunctional department. The Deputy worked on that . . .*

*Carmen: I'm sorry but there's no document published.*

*Rachel: No, I'm sorry the union representative, the vice chair, showed me a document which misquoted nearly every conversation I had with you over the last few months, so you now need to cope with a situation.*

*Carmen: And what situation would that be?*

*Rachel: It discredits my qualifications, my experience, my . . . You know I'm not having a document out there and then have a conversation with you, I'm sorry. I'm not prepared to have this conversation!*

*Carmen: Then what do you want?*

*Rachel: You needn't sound so sage, Carmen!*

*Yvonne: If we're going to talk about the Department Development Plan that is the Department Head's job to do like the Head of Geography and now we have to do it as a department because . . .*

*Carmen: I'm sorry but it's not the Department Head's job to do it alone. It's a . . .*

*Yvonne: It's like the Team Review, there was no team review.*

*Carmen: No and there was no Team Review last year.*

*Yvonne: So now you're blaming me for that?*

*Carmen: I'm just stating the facts. We didn't have a Team Review last year because the day of the review you attacked Rachel and had to be physically restrained.*

*Yvonne: But it's you that hasn't done the development plan.*

*Carmen: No, it is the department that hasn't done its development plan.*

*Yvonne: That email that was sent about not doing the DDP was sent to YOU!*

*Carmen: Yes and I forwarded it to you.*

*Yvonne: You're the Head of Department aren't you?*

*Carmen: Yes and I forwarded it to you all so that you would know that we had a time frame.*

*Yvonne: Then you need to get it finished ,cause you haven't done your job for two years.*

*Carmen: At this point I'm going to close this meeting.*

*Rachel: Elizabeth was right about you!*

*Carmen: And how would you know what Elizabeth thinks about me?*

*Rachel: We've been emailing since she left TISS!*

*Carmen: Well, I'm really not interested in what she has to say about me or anything else for that matter. The meeting is closed.*

*Rachel: You're living in a fantasy world, Carmen, You really are! I'm going to see the deputy!*

*Catherine had remained silent throughout. Rachel and Yvonne filed out of the room, slamming the door behind them as they went. I looked at Catherine who was hurriedly*

*packing her bag and making a bid for the exit. That I felt sick to my stomach, violated, would be putting it mildly.*

The above *snapshot* is an archetypal example of the violence that Farrell (1997, p. 504) describes as “professional terrorism” and Griffin (2004) as “lateral violence” which they contend frequents the medical and nursing world and I would add the educational and teaching world. In explaining the phenomenon it is important to turn to notions of power and oppression. Bateson (1972/1987, p. 492) argues that the “*idea of power corrupts*”, as such the oppressed make the “colonisers” laws” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) their own, taking out their own disappointments and dissatisfactions on those perceived as less powerful than themselves: those unable or unwilling to fight back (Griffin, 2004; Farrell, 1997; Marquard, 1957). It is in institutions such as these that “very bad things” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) can and do occur. Richards (2012, p. 125) describes her three years in an adult renal unit as a time when:

We were treated as numbers and, worse, we were treated as hopeless cases. The doctors could not cure our disease, so we ceased to matter to them (or so I experienced it). . . . so the adult renal unit was merely a holding pen for untreatables. (Richards, 2012, p. 125)

Richards continues:

It was an unspeakable place of uncaring doctors, hostile nurses and spiteful clerks. . . . No one (for instance, the doctors) ever stopped the clerks from tormenting us and the patients were too frail and too dependent on their „care“ providers to fight back. . . . As a patient you were not human there, but a number to the clerks, a file to the nurses, and a urinary tract to the doctors, and you gradually had all your hope and dignity stripped away from you. (Richards, 2012, p. 118)

Farrell (1997, p. 504) in describing this type of violence as “professional terrorism” cites “raised eyebrows, snide remarks and turning away” as some of the covert behaviours associated with the nursing profession. Griffin (2004, p. 259) adds to the list: “face-making”, “[s]abotage (deliberately setting up a negative situation)”, “[s]capegoating (attributing all that goes wrong to

one individual)”, “[b]ackstabbing (complaining to others about an individual and not speaking directly to that individual)”, and a “[f]ailure to respect privacy” - all are common manifestations of what Marquard (1957 as cited by Wolpe, 1990, p. 29; see also van den Berghe, 1978, p. 296) would call “internal colonialism” or “internal colonization”. Griffin (2004) notes that this is a common occurrence in the nursing world; I would add it is also very much in evidence in the world of international education.

Farrell (1997, p. 502) contends that because “nurses are dominated (and by implication oppressed) by a patriarchal system headed by doctors, male administrators, and marginalized nurse leaders, nurses lower down the hierarchy [of power] resort to aggression among themselves” and on others who depend on them such as the patients and their families. I would argue that it is equally true of the teaching world, a profession also devoted to the notion of “caring” and equally satisfying the criteria of Hochschild’s (1983) notion of “emotional labour”: face-to-face contact with the public, eliciting an emotional response from the client as well as exhibiting some degree of external control over the worker. This is a world where teachers dominated by a historically constituted patriarchal system can take their frustrations out on others, teachers and students alike. Fricker (2007, 2012) would view such behaviour as indicative of the collective dimension of epistemic injustice – systemic, structural and institutionalised – that results from the “collective commitment to the [unjust] practice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299) and which marks the identity of each and every person in the institution (Fricker, 2012). Contesting such practices marks one as no longer part of the group, no longer part of the collective which can be a difficult position to uphold under group scrutiny and pressure to conform.

Viewing the above *verbal snapshot* in terms of affect and the emotions displayed, as “emotional manifestations of disempowerment” (Zembylas, 2014, p. 407), makes for discomfoting reading. Yet it these moments of discomfort that MacLure (2010, p. 14) affirms as moments of “productive *disconcertion*”, moments that point to the material and embodied nature of our connections with others that are “far more complex” than we imagine them to be. It is the palpable anger that “flowed in-between” bodies “affecting us all” (Davies, 2014, p. 45), the very physical feelings of violation, the embarrassment, the sarcasm that point to what Zembylas (2014, p. 405) calls the “transformative potential in our shared vulnerability, grief, and loss which appeals to the development of empathetic connections with others”. For he states that “empathy foregrounds the importance of feeling as knowledge” (Zembylas, 2014, p. 405), providing as it does a lens with which to view others’ experience: to understand their emotions. Zembylas (2003, p. 230) contends that “it is in the presence of [the] emotions that we bring [to] mind as we try to understand ...[the] emotions” of the other that allows for an empathetic connection. It is also the emotional responses associated with any particular empathetic connection, whether they be feelings of anger, suspicion, respect, or mistrust, that make a “positive cognitive contribution to [the hearer’s] epistemically loaded perception” (Fricker, 2007, p. 80). For with epistemic trust, as with moral trust, listening to one’s emotions can be a good idea, trained and sharpened as they are by experience with diverse and differing speakers and situations (Fricker, 2007). For as Fricker (2007, p. 80) notes: “The feeling of trust in the virtuous hearer is a sophisticated emotional radar for detecting trustworthiness in speakers.” For it is these emotions, what Jaggar (1989, pp. 166-167) calls our “outlaw emotions” as seen in Chapters 3 and 4, that may allow us to see our teaching world more clearly than when perceived through a veil of conventionally school-appropriate ones, may allow us to discern which apparatuses are

acting on and through us and others within the framework of a particular phenomenon such as conflict.

In reading Griffin, Farrell, Fricker and Zembylas the one through the other, privileging no one text, no one author but seeking to better understand one through the other, reveals that far from being applied from outside a phenomenon such as conflict, power in its repeated applications as a force acting on bodies within the conflict, causes bodies to react. In other words, according to Foucault (1980a, 1977), power flows through bodies through its repeated interactions with and within bodies: power operates through yet is limited by a body's "responsiveness" (Barad, 2007, p. 189; see also Foucault, 1980d, p. 98, 1980b. p. 39) to the forces applied to it and as such bodies are the material through which power operates to a greater or lesser extent. For as Foucault (1980a) states: a body is at once discursive enactment and transmission of the material and material enactment and transmission of the discursive. As such the nature and notion of power as relations that emerge from within conflict and of the categories "gender" and "teacher" are not fixed in time but rather emerge as the particular outcome of particular discursive practices and their interactions with bodies within particular phenomena (Foucault, 1980a) such as conflict in an international school. These power relations are reconfigured through time and locally defined with each new interaction (Foucault, 1980a), with each new phenomenon.

#### *8.2.2 Snapshot 4: Letter of Non-Renewal*

*Dear Ms Blyth*

*As per your employment Contract Clause 3.3 and on behalf of the CEO of the TIS Group of Schools, I wish to advise that TIS will not offer you a contract for the 2008-2009 year.*

*Yours sincerely*

*Signed: TIS Group HR Director*

*Principal TISS*

*(Letter of Non-Renewal)*

I remember this period of time as a hiatus from the personal and professional chaos and upheavals of the previous years; professionally, the worst had come to pass: I had lost my job in the worst possible way but there was nothing more that they could do to me . . . or so I believed at this point. I had survived this and a misdiagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) in the same year. I fell into the quiet and calming rhythm of going to work, teaching my classes and coming home to work on my Labour Tribunal submission (I was feeling heroic, thinking that I was not going to take the non-renewal lying down: this was not going to become my “chaos<sup>38</sup>” story or so I believed), sometimes working until 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning.

Before the school had broken for the summer vacation, the deputy had sent me a note stating that for the coming academic year I was to be allocated a small, dark room as my office in a part of the building where teachers and students rarely ventured; it could accommodate two small desks and a filing cabinet. There was no discussion. According to the deputy’s note the other three members of the ESOL team had requested and been allocated permanent desks in either the large English Faculty Office or the even larger and light-infused Humanities Office with the now-defunct ESOL Office being given over to the Modern Foreign Languages Faculty to be transformed into a classroom. As such I was the only teacher from a teaching staff of over a

---

<sup>38</sup> Frank (2012, p. 47) describes the chaos narrative as one where “the actors are buffeted by forces they cannot control, and the plot leads to no resolution, which is its chaos”.

hundred that was so accommodated: alone and with no formal or informal interactions possible with other teaching staff over the course of the school day. With that one move the deputy effectively marginalised, silenced and segregated me from the rest of the teaching staff and department; she might as well have given me a bell and hung a sign saying “Unclean” on the office door: teachers would stay away afraid of contagion.

The primary meaning of contagion is the spreading of a disease from one person to another by close contact; however it can also mean the spreading of “harmful” ideas or practices. The appropriation of the medical metaphor with ideas and/or practices seen as disease, whether they be considered “pathologies” (causes and effects of “disease”), “plagues” (widespread “afflictions” with connotations of “divine retribution”), “epidemics” (widespread occurrences of “infection” within specific communities at particular historical points in time) or contagion with its need for “isolation”, is prevalent in educational discourse. Further extending the metaphor and applying it to the notion of educational conflict in general, and to those on the loser’s side in particular, is to see the challenge of alternative ideas, alternative ways of seeing and knowing, as dangerous to the epistemic “health” of those in positions of power. For the “threat of difference” (MacLure, 2010, p. 6), what Stenhouse (1981, p. 103) calls the “threat of heresy” in an orthodox/heresy binary, lies in its ability to render visible and fragile the epistemic practices that subjectify and objectify; as such they challenge the status quo. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) aptly argue that metaphors, such as these, help to “partially structure” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5) our own discourse, the way we understand, perform and talk for example about difference. In using the metaphor, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 5) state: “The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is

metaphorically structured.” As such “we act according to the way we conceive of things” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p, 5) and if we conceive of difference as a threat, as “contagion”, something potentially harmful if not fatal, then we will act accordingly to isolate and destroy it. It can thus become “embodied knowledge” (MacLure, 2010, p. 5) tracing as it does “intensities of affect that move” (MacLure, 2010, p. 5) through and between bodies connecting them “sub-atomically, biologically, physically and culturally” (MacLure, 2010, p. 5). However, in this age of technology, technology can provide us with alternative ways of challenging the status quo; it can provide us with the capacity, the ability and capability of making radical ideas spread, “go viral”, before they can be quarantined. It is these new technologies of resistance that might afford us with an apparatus for making subjectifying practices both visible and fragile.

Only two staff members (who had already resigned their positions and had successfully gained employment elsewhere for the coming year) ventured into the uncharted and seemingly deadly waters my office space had become, to visit and interact with me beyond the superficial for I was specifically required by the administration not to attend any meetings. I was in “limbo” but a limbo I could control or rather felt that I could control. This was not the limbo I had learnt of at the convent school where the souls of unbaptised babies and heathens who had led a “good” life resided. No this limbo, although on the edges of Hell, was a liminal place, a place to pass from one life to another: that of teacher to that of outcast. I was a stranger in a strange land and as Tzvetan Todorov (1984, p. 76), the French critic, reminds us: “The first, spontaneous reaction with regard to the stranger is to imagine him as inferior, since he is different from us” which notion slips all too easily and is “corrupted into inequality” (Todorov, 1984, p. 146).

Dwight Conquergood, the ethnographer best known for his work with marginalised groups such as the Hmong of SE Asia, believes that: “People and actions that disturb order, violate categories, mess up the system are branded as unclean” (Conquergood, 1988, p. 197). For: “The unclear is the unclean” (Turner, 1967, p. 97): the ambiguous, the liminal, the “neither here nor there” (Turner, 1997, p. 97) of the “recognized cultural topography” (Turner, 1997, p. 97). Conquergood (1988, p. 197) goes on to explain that “[l]abeling” someone or something as “dirty” is “a way of controlling perceived anomalies, incongruities, contradictions, ambiguities – all that does not fit into our categories, and therefore threatens cherished principles.” As such unclean – “dirty” – is an expression of our “uneasiness when confronted with Difference, the Other” (Conquergood, 1988, p. 196), the stranger out there rather than the stranger within (Kristeva, 1991). This was despite the fact that this stranger was already within, and the danger I posed was perhaps one of political “auto-immunity” (Derrida, 1998, 2003) with the institutional body politic under attack by its very self: a deconstruction of the self by the self. As such the term “dirty” corrupts “Difference” into “danger”; it “loads the perception of „Difference“ with a moral imperative, and enables the move from description to action, from „is“ to „ought“” (Conquergood, 1988, p. 197). The politics of blaming and shaming the victim, of seeing them as dangerous, opens the way for control and domination, legitimising both (Conquergood, 1988; Said, 1978; Todorov, 1984) within the phenomenon that is conflict in international schools.

For someone who has never lived in the littoral this can be a devastating event; something which may account for the dearth of studies on or by teachers who have been dealt this kind of blow, a blow which casts you adrift as you are unable to secure another job as a teacher without your previous principal’s recommendation. It is an act that is destructive, diminishes, irrespective of

whether the act was ethical or not, and shames - you might not look any different on the outside but deep down inside you always wonder just a little if you did not bring this on yourself; this despite the fact that as Fricker (2012, p. 301) so cogently argues:

[I]f you are employed by someone who could sack you without due reason, leaving you with no redress, then you are dominated, and to that extent not free. What is doing the work here is the question of your safety or non-safety from certain forms of arbitrary interference . . . bad things happen . . . But what is crucial to such interference not counting as arbitrary is the victim's ability to contest the wrongful treatment. . . . So long as one can contest it, the treatment no longer counts as arbitrary. . . . we are free insofar as we are . . . able to contest it if it were to happen.

As such it is an act that has the power to silence, alienate and isolate; in most cases it does all three. It is not something most would want to shout from the rooftops or even tell their best friends and family about, knowing that most will instinctively apportion most if not all of the blame on the teacher. There are no support groups and rarely any support. However, I had spent my entire life on the edge, on the fringes and although this act would diminish me, I would not "go quietly into that good night" as might be hoped for. For as Shotwell (2011, p. 77) argues: "shame can reveal the implicit" as evidenced in "unconscious" sexism. Even though "implicit understanding" always moves in tandem to power, shame confuses and causes one to pause offering a space within which systems of power are rendered visible in their pursuit and exercise of hegemonic privilege (Shotwell, 2011, p. 77). It is a space that offers us the possibility of contesting. What emerged from this period of time was the second retelling of "my" story.

The first had been a *human resources* narrative of "the" conflict with issues identified, strategies put forward and a timeframe proposed. This time I would produce a *legal* narrative where "the" story was again relegated to the appendices while the legal narrative proper, of policies and procedures, ordinances and regulations, laws both local and international took centre stage. The

TIS Teachers' Association Chair, Tom, had recommended the legal recourse as the only option available to me if I wanted to contest what I believed had been an unjust act by the principal and the TIS as an institution; this was about justice rather than revenge, being heard rather than ignored. However, I had failed to understand that the ability to contest "requires that one be properly heard, without prejudice" (Fricker, 2012, p. 301). It requires that the institution as a body, as a collective, "*possess the virtue of testimonial justice*" (Fricker, 2012, p. 301). It also requires that the Labour Tribunal possess the same. This "susceptibility to testimonial injustice means that [teachers'] ability to contest [is] radically impaired" (Fricker, 2012, p. 302). As such the "boss" is well aware that he "is more likely to get away with sacking you without due reason" (Fricker, 2012, p. 302) and to "infringements of political freedom" (Fricker, 2012, p. 302).

However, there are certain advantages to living in denial, denial of the fact that even from the very outset all is lost: you can pretend things are just as they used to be, only they are not; you can try to inure yourself to the pain that is to come, only you can not: this is a pain there is no getting used to. Even though you know that such attempts are futile, there seems to be no other option but to keep on trying. You must try to "regroup and salvage what is left" of your life (Conquergood, 1988, p. 180), to retain some "semblance of stability" (Conquergood, 1988, p. 180), of sanity.

By late November the principal had also relieved me of my position as Head of Department and was denying me the right to attend inset I had worked hard to arrange for the entire organisation. The tactic was simple: punish to control. Any agency I thought I might have possessed was gone.

This was life in the “subjunctive” (Good & Good, 1994). I was gradually being erased, rubbed out of all aspects of my teaching community. I could still just about make out the palimpsest of my teaching life: in the classroom teaching. If I just focused on the teaching, I could forget what had happened, what was happening. Concealment became a way of life.

Zsebik (2000) argues that international education has a virtual inability, an almost unwillingness to recognise the existence of educational politics and conflicts of interest. This “culture of silence” (Zsebik, 2000, p. 64) surrounding issues of power and politics in international schools, however, Zsebik suggests, might have more to do with hermeneutics, “an inability to decipher the conflicting messages found within the school and its adjoining community”, rather than “an inability to read [them]” (Zsebik, 2000, p. 64). For international schools to a large extent work “very much in isolation” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71), neither a part of the “local” or “home” country educational establishments which may explain why power, who has it and who does not, is rarely if ever discussed in such schools (Caffyn, 2011). As such Caffyn argues: “There is no system to protect those who do not have power from the vagaries, micropolitical manoeuvring and power plays” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71) of those who have.

The supervision, control and correction (Foucault, 1977) of teachers has lead historically to the self-imposed limitations that allow those in power to dictate the reciprocal roles teachers are expected to assume: “the rhetoric of professionalism simply seduces teachers into consorting with their own exploitation” (Hargreaves, 1994, p. 15). Acting outside those borders is dangerous territory for as Ndebele (1995, p. 4) reminds us: “The namer isolates the named, explains them, contains them and controls them”. In this way an administrative “numerical

minority”, through a linguistic turn, assumes a “majoritarian character” (Ndebele, 1995, p. 4): only certain voices, certain narratives are empowered. The collective failure of an institution to recognise and address such discriminatory behaviours and practices results in the collective acceptance of institutional testimonial injustice with it becoming the norm, part and parcel of the practical identity of those who work in the institution (Fricker, 2012). As such “once that commitment is made, the group identification it helps define can make it costly to withdraw” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299). To challenge the group identity is tantamount to saying you are not a part of the group anymore which can have serious consequences; this can “passively” pressurise group members to remain silent (Fricker, 2012): to not rock the boat. Campbell (2003) would concur advocating as she does the need to overcome our tendency as teachers to remain silent when confronted with the unethical (and I would add unjust epistemological) conduct of either colleagues or superiors, displaying what Campbell (2003, p. 6) calls “suspended morality” rather than ethical action: “Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology” (Code, 2008b, para. 1) are indeed what is required with virtue working in tandem with power “in matters of knowing and doing” (Code, 2008b, para. 1) and being.

In submitting to narratives that are “forced” on us (Richards, 2012, p. 16) rather than defying convention and promoting alternative narratives, teachers allow “[l]ocal cultural orientations (the patterned ways we have learned to think about and act in our life worlds and that replicate the social structure of those worlds) [to] organize our conventional common sense” (Kleinman, 1988, p. 5) about what the teaching world considers normal, appropriate ways of behaviour. This precludes our own inquiry into alternative meanings, alternative narratives and alternative realities. Schools exist to maintain the status quo, replicate it (Kelly, 1995) and any move to

challenge it is dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly, often favouring efficacy over ethics (Caffyn, 2011; Freire & Macedo, 1987; Pennycooke, 1989; Zsebik, 2000).

What Kleinman (1988, p. 5) calls “our conventional common sense” and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) the “metaphors we live by” have evolved over time. However other newer metaphors are created and imposed upon us by people in positions of power. In an age where the “myth of objectivism is very much alive” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 160) and kicking, “and truth is always absolute truth, the people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true - absolutely and objectively true” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 160). Case in point: in 1991 McMurtry (1991, p. 211) stated that: “The language of educational purpose [in England and Wales] has undergone a sea-shift transformation into business terminology and the going discourse of corporate culture” making it “difficult to avoid the conclusion that the educational process has been so persuasively subordinated to the aims and practices of business that its agents can no longer comprehend their vocation in any other terms.” As Kelly (2004, p. 42) so aptly puts it: “The metaphors of child-centredness have been replaced by the harsher imagery of the factory floor” and become the common everyday parlance of teachers not only in England and Wales but also at TISS courtesy of the principal and deputy. A teacher’s work is now commonly viewed as one of product delivery with “product control”, quality control”, setting “targets” and “delivery” (Kelly, 2004, p. 42; see also Blenkin, Edwards & Kelly, 1992; McMurtry, 1991). This discourse brought with it its own rules as to who had the right to speak and who was consigned to listening only (Kelly, 2004). It was a teacher “speak” that privileged that “mode of the *,already-said*” through which the status quo attempts to control the threat of difference – of that which resists or exceeds meaning” (MacLure, 2010, p. 6). (I

have discussed these ideas more fully in Chapter 6.) It is in this way that “power intervenes” to grant certain narratives voice and to allow for others to be silenced, “marginalized” (Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 104).

### 8.2.3 Snapshot 5: A Message from the CEO

*We'll give you the e-mail address, but I suspect that she [the Chair of the TISS School Council] will not be willing to allow the teacher to speak to the School Council. I'm afraid that it is not part of our process and there is no question of a 'right'. I'm sorry, Tom [Chair of the TIS Teachers' Association], not welcome to you but it is so.*

However, it is the board/school council that not only appoints the principal but also approves new contracts and renewals of contracts for teachers. It is “legally responsible for the school . . . accountable for what the head of school does” (Hodgson, 2005, p. 9); as such it “should ensure that the school operates ethically in all its dealings and practices” (Stout, 2007, p. 318). So if not them, then who does a teacher turn to? No-one it would seem. Tragically as pointed out by Hodgson (2005, p. 7): “international schools frequently lurch from Boards that micro-manage, to those that purely rubber stamp senior administrators’ recommendations” as in this case and as such are explicitly implicated in the “hermeneutical epistemic injustice” of the institution.

Fricker (2007) defines “hermeneutical epistemic injustice” as: “*the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource*” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155). In my experience not only did my encounter with conflict cause me to doubt and in turn to question

my own ability to interpret my situation with regards the conflict but this loss of confidence, the perpetual self-doubting, spilled over into virtually every aspect of my life with my doubting even my ability to understand my own standing/relationships/relations with other people, to even execute simple everyday tasks such as making airline bookings or hotel reservations. For as Foucault (1980/2000, p. 275) explains for power to produce a subject requires “the destruction of what we are as well as the creation of a completely different thing, a total innovation.” What I once had been was no longer. As such this is a doubting that no passage of time can erase or even ease, having serious “ramifications” (Fricker, 2007, pp. 58, 162) for my current and future life as well as for the international teachers as a group and their “social trajectory” (Fricker, 2007, p. 58). As Foucault (1980d, p. 98) states: “The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation.” As such the individual “which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (Foucault, 1980d, p. 98): my doubting ways impact others to become same.

Within the TIS group of schools, teachers would appear to be sadly lacking in epistemic credibility as a group and as individuals with unequal power relations constraining a woman’s and teacher’s ability to understand their own experience (Fricker, 2007, pp. 147-150). As an educational institution whose knowledge of and beliefs on the value of teachers, their rights to add to the “collective understanding”, to express their concerns and emotions, are a “historically situated” (Fricker, 2007, p. 104) and constituted episteme, it was and is “in a position to know better” (Fricker, 2007, p. 100). The CEO was cognitively aware of the wrongness of her words and the harmful effects they would have (Fricker, 2007): the “*epistemic insult*” Fricker, 2007, pp. 45, 49, 58; see also Fricker, 2008) they managed to deliver. This is an epistemic insult that is not

only epistemic and ethical but also ontological; it can harm the very foundations of one's social identity (Fricker, 2007, p. 49; see also Fricker, 2008) as a teacher and human being: it "can mean that someone is socially constituted as, and perhaps even caused to be, something they are not, and which it is against their best interests to be seen to be. . . . [as such] they are prevented from becoming who they really are" (Fricker, 2006, p. 107). As Foucault (cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187) clearly states: "People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does."

### **8.3 Viewing the Verbal Snapshots as One**

Seen individually each verbal snapshot paints a picture of unethical behaviour perpetrated by individuals on individuals. However with each ensuing snapshot, the edges of the picture portrayed are pushed further back to reveal by the final snapshot a sexist institution that condones discriminatory practices not only at the individual level of testimonial injustice but also at the institutional and structural level of hermeneutical injustice. It presents what Code (2008a, p. 40) would call an "entrenched reliance on stereotypes embedded in the instituted social imaginary"<sup>39</sup> . . . through which administrators . . . purport to know local populations" – whether that local population be rural Tanzanians (as in the case of Code) or teachers, both local and non-local, transient and permanent (as in the case of this study).

The sexist/colonialist tenor of the CEO's message to the Teachers Association Chair in the last snapshot testifies to the highly resistant and resilient "conventional wisdom" currently held in the

---

<sup>39</sup>Code (2008a, p. 34) defines "a social imaginary" as the "implicit but effective systems of images, meanings, metaphors, and interlocking explanations-expectations woven through a social-political order, within which people, in specific time periods and cultural-geographic climates enact their knowledge and subjectivities and craft their self-understandings."

international teaching world of TIS and that which the institution holds of the epistemic worthlessness of teachers, their knowledge. It epitomises the quasi imperialistic and insensitive efforts of an administration that seeks to establish a “policy” that conforms to pre-established notions of what female teacher behaviour, their words and actions, should be and treats them as sources of information to be viewed from afar rather than epistemic agents with valuable knowledge to share (Craig, 1990; Code, 2008a). It is a “systemic failure of uptake” (Code, 2008a, p. 39), a structural failure to acknowledge the epistemic authority teachers possess, that exemplifies what Code (2008a, p. 39) would describe as the “firmly instituted social-epistemic imaginary through which hermeneutical injustice was subtly perpetuated.” And as such it is I believe a web of beliefs (Code, 2008a, p. 40) that will be difficult to untangle.

## CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS: MEANING, UNDERSTANDING & TRUTH IN A POSTHUMANIST WORLD

### 9.1 Introduction

My mother died suddenly, unexpectedly yet despite the fact that I was half a world away, sitting in a theatre watching a Noh<sup>40</sup> drama on life, death and the spirit world, I knew, not in any mental sense of the word but with every part of my being, of my very body, the very instant she died; so intimately had we been entangled in life that “time” and “distance” had been constrained and we remained intra-twined in some inexplicable way until death, and as such open to each other’s mattering. *We are* connected in unexpected ways, material and non material; our “intra-actions” (Barad, 2007), actions where we have come into such close proximity that our very properties have become forever linked, connect us *through* time and space for it is not time that passes but rather it is we who pass, with each intra-action marking or making determinate a particular point in time for us, on us. Existence to quote Barad (2007, p. ix) is “not an individual affair” and the “past is never finished” (Barad, 2007, p. 394).

The above phenomenon<sup>41</sup> I experienced can best be explained by the quantum mechanical state of entanglement. Two particles, for example electrons, become entangled if they come into close

---

<sup>40</sup>Noh theatre is “structured around song and dance. Movement is slow, language is poetic, tone is monotonous, and costumes are rich and heavy” (Traditional Theater, 2012, para. 4). However this modern version I was attending consisted of stylised masks with stark black and white costumes. Plots “are usually drawn from legend, history, literature and contemporary events” and themes “relate to dreams, supernatural worlds, ghosts and spirits” (Traditional Theater, 2012, para. 5). Noh is performed “on a square stage with a roof that is supported at its four corners by pillars. All sides of the stage are open except for the back side which consists of a wall with a painted image of a pine tree. A bridge runs at an angle oblique off the stage for performers to enter” (Traditional Theater, 2012, para. 6).

<sup>41</sup>I use the term phenomenon in the Bohrian sense of the word to “signify the wholeness of an interaction between „objects of investigation“ and „agencies of observations“ [so] as” (Barad, 2007, p. 427) to form a “nondualistic whole” where there are no independently existing “things” (Barad, 2007, p. 205).

proximity in such a way that their properties become linked. Incredibly, quantum mechanics tells us that even if you separate the pair, sending them in opposite directions, they remain entangled, inextricably connected. To understand what this phenomenon means let us consider the concept of spin which for an electron remains indeterminate until the moment of measurement at which point it will be found to have either a clockwise or anticlockwise spin. However in the case of entangled electrons, measuring the spin of one of the pair ensures that the other will automatically and instantaneously have the opposite spin. This holds true even when the pair is distant (with one of the pair even as far away as Mars) with no means of communicating with each other. In other words the act of measuring makes determinate not only the spin of the electron involved in the measuring but also of its pair no matter where it might be. The pair remains entangled, inextricably connected throughout time, space and matter thereby displacing the Western epistemological and ontological notions of “space as container” (Barad, 2007, p. 223), “time [as] divided into evenly spaced increments” (Barad, 2007, p. 223) signaling a progression, and matter, the material, as fixed rather than emergent from a field of possibilities (Barad, 2014).

It would appear that we do not just *occupy* the world; we *are* the world both in its resonance and dissonance with itself, in its never-ending and ever-changing patterning of differing, difference-in-the-making, patterns of darkness and light, with any and every shade in between; patterns where darkness is not an absence of light but rather an excess of light (Barad, 2014), where the crest of one wave meets the trough of another to create a darkness within, with no absolute boundaries. We are not a superior “other” that lives apart from the world in all its “mattering” and never-ending “becoming” (Barad, 2007). We are not together apart but rather “together-

apart” (Barad, 2014) as we emerge from entanglements past and future very much as electrons do remaining intimately connected though far apart.

As such in the chapter that follows I discuss our diffracted intra-connections both human and non human, as well as material-discursive, as they relate to “the” world in general and “my” conflict in particular. I use the quotation marks with the terms “the” and “my” to indicate a non-objectivist stance, to denote the fact that any phenomenon does not comprise individual elements or things interacting prior to producing an “outcome”. Rather a phenomenon is an entanglement of various apparatuses, apparatuses such as bodies, discourses and discursive practices such as those of gender, professional status, and power, as well as nature and many other material factors. It is in their entanglement that these apparatuses enact a particular phenomenon, a particular agential distribution within the limits of the phenomenon, that determines the “agential cut” (Barad, 2007), to produce object and subject.

## **9.2 Posthumanism and the Phenomenon of Conflict**

The notion of the unbounded organism that is the posthumanist body, a posthumanist body that exists in “a complex network of human and nonhuman forces” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 734; see also Barad, 2007, p. 23) - an entanglement - is well captured by the Buddhist notion of reincarnation. In Buddhism it is this notion of reincarnation which intra-weaves the natural and non human with the human where: “a neglected elephant queen . . . is reborn as the Queen of Varanasi, yet remains the same soul” (Dalrymple, 2014, p. 8). As such nature and the animals at Ajanta, the ancient Buddhist cave paintings in central-southern India, are rendered with the same amount of detail, love, respect and individuality as are the humans (Dalrymple, 2014). These are images

where boundaries between palaces and the jungles beyond are vague, indistinct, where the “biological boundary between the human and the natural world is blurred as friezes unroll like ribbons . . . to tell the tales of Naga princes who are at once both royal personages and snakes, crowned with diadems of curved cobra hoods” (Dalrymple, 2014, p. 8) forever entangled in their never-ending becomings.

The notion of “entanglement” posited by Barad (2007) explicates that reality and language, the world of nature and the world of discourse, cannot have meaning the one without the other, that “matter” and “meaning” (Barad, 2007, p. 3) are inextricably entwined. For entanglements, our “connections and responsibilities [our ability to respond] to one another” (Barad, 2007, p. xi), human and non human, material as well as discursive, are nature’s “invitation” to act ethically, to “live justly” (Barad, 2007, p. xi) for within entanglements matter has the power to enact agential cuts in the ongoing distribution of agency within phenomena. Beings can propose certain outcomes, certain agential cuts but the world in its material-discursive becoming disposes. As Barad (2007, p.171) puts it: “human subjects are neither outside observers . . . nor independent subjects that intervene in the workings of an apparatus” stepping in centre-stage to both orchestrate the entanglement and configure its outcome. For as in the fairy-tale of *The Princess and the Pea*, it is the pea that in becoming entangled with the discursive, that a princess would display greater sensitivity than a woman who was not, enacts an agential cut which in so doing distributes agency within the phenomenon that is the story. As such, “matter matters” (Barad, 2007, p. 210). It is from such entanglements that ontology, epistemology and ethics emanate as one rather than being imposed discretely prior to any “intra-action” – actions that subvert the commonsense notion of boundaries (Barad, 2007, 2011) with objects and apparatuses

*ontologically inseparable* within phenomena (Barad, 2007, p. 128). For as Deleuze (1981/1988b, p. 124) states: “if you define bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected”, as possibilities of becoming, then “many things change.” For bodies only *seem* ontologically separable and separate because of how we perceive them: through sight, our sense of touch. However the boundaries between us, human and non human, are in fact blurred: indeterminate “borderlands” (Anzaldúa, 1987).

As such the ripples caused by the dipping of toes in the waves of the phenomenon called conflict intra-act in unpredictable ways with those of others, both human and non human, to form new patterns, patterns that expose nuances of difference (Barad, 2007), difference in being, knowing and doing with the reality of what we are and what we are becoming a product of the apparatuses of “history, discourse, bodies, nature and many other factors” (Hekman, 2010, p. 58). It thus exposes patterns of inclusion as well as patterns of exclusion – who and/or what is positioned as “Other”, excluded to the littoral, as was I in my own story of conflict. These waves of patterns, ripples in the sea of existence, rhizomatic causalities, formed by “our” intra-actions are by their very nature nomadic fated to continue their journey unchanged or to unfold as they intra-act with yet other waves with “different intra-actions produc[ing] different phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 58). These are waves of patterns that in their intra-actions with other waves can reinforce our positioning as “Other” or liberate us from the “borderland” (Barad, 2014, p. 179), a “vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 3). Anzaldúa (1987, p. 3) continues: “It [the borderland] is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants.” For borderlands are always in a state of flux, indeterminate possibilities, like the borders of countries which although human, non

human, material-discursive marks made on the body physical of land remain in a constant state of material-discursive flux, human and other: an unnatural boundary.

In my own case the agential distribution and cut of this particular phenomenon of conflict positioned me as “Other”, persona non grata within the teaching profession, blacklisted within the international teaching domain. Further intra-actions within this domain produced patterns that reinforced this positioning for the same apparatuses enact the same phenomenon, the same patterns, “reproducible and unambiguously communicable” (Barad, 2007, p. 119) in that “permanent marks . . . [are] left on bodies which define the experimental conditions” (Bohr cited in Barad, 2007, p. 119). It reinforced my positioning as the outsider rather than the outsider-within, with “difference premised on the binary thinking [that] has been instrumental to the workings of power” (Barad, 2014, p. 170). For with a geometric optics<sup>42</sup> of reflection, an optics which unlike physical optics does not take into account the wave nature of light but relies on the notion of light as particles that bounce “off surfaces” (Barad, 2007, p. 81), it is impossible to see behind the mirror beyond one’s own reflection to “Others” that are relegated to the shadows. As Haraway (1992) posits: *diffraction*, also a physical phenomenon, might be an apt “counterpoint” to the use of *reflection* as thinking for reflection is about “mirroring and sameness” (Barad, 2007, p, 29) and “invites the illusion of essential, fixed position” (Haraway, 1992, p, 300). For diffraction involves “the processing of small but consequential differences” (Haraway, 1992, p. 318), differences that make a difference, yet which are enacted by the superposition of sameness. For when waves overlap their crests and troughs combine to produce a pattern that shows the effects of difference within sameness: whether the waves are in phase, out of phase or all phases

---

<sup>42</sup> The “geometric optics” of reflection is “an approximation” of “physical optics” for it fails to take into account the “wave nature of light” and sees light “as a particle . . . bounc[ing] off surfaces” (Barad, 2007, p. 81)..

in between as well as of differing relative amplitudes or not. As such Trinh's (1988, para. 14) notion of "the inappropriate other within every I", a diffracted quantum mechanical way of seeing difference as within sameness, allows for the agential cut to be marked in such a way as to understand the "Other" as included within the diffraction/difference pattern, a superpositioning rather than an extraction.

### **9.3 The Outsider-Within**

My own intra-actions within the academic domain in working on this study positioned me as the outsider-within, re(con)figured the agential cut inclusive of me as part of the observational tools within the new phenomenon formed. As such this autoethnographic study is an agential cut and makes apparent that "[a]gential cuts never sit still . . . Inside/outside is undone. . . . Differences percolate through every ,thing", reworking and being reworked through reiterative reconfigurings of spacetime-matterings . . . each being (re)threaded through the other" (Barad, 2010, p. 268). For intra-actions do not occur between "things" rather they are "ghostly" possibilities that make certain properties, certain beings determinate (Barad, 2010, p. 268) within a specific phenomenon. As such the phenomenon produced is thus dependent on the apparatuses used: a fixed part apparatus can make determinate that which was not there a priori: position for example. While an apparatus of moving parts renders momentum determinate and position indeterminate. The apparatuses involved as such determine in their entanglement the agential cut produced and an entanglement of the same apparatuses produces the same agential cut and marks on bodies. Likewise changes in the apparatuses of "bodily production matter for ontological as well as epistemological and ethical reasons" for "different material-discursive practices produce different material configurings of the world, different difference/diffraction patterns; they do not

merely produce different descriptions” (Barad, 2007, p. 184). Different apparatus produce materially different ontologies. As such in the system of entanglement apparatus and phenomenon are one, knower and known are one, observer and observed are one for one cannot observe the entanglement as though from afar without being involved: one is always an intimate part of the phenomenon, ontologically inseparable from it (Bohr as explicated in Barad, 2007, pp. 127-128) until the “agential cut” (Barad, 2007): that which determines what pertains to the observational tools and what pertains to the object.

Schrödinger (cited in Barad, 2007, p. 281) states that “in the realism point of view observation is a natural process.” That is: “a world external to cognition and discourse is the baseline against which the truth of our sentences about the world must be measured” (Merlingen, 2013, para. 9). However reality in fact according to Schrödinger and Bohr “does not determine the measured value” rather the “measured value must determine reality” (Schrödinger cited in Barad, 2007, p. 281). For as quantum mechanics has shown it is the “diffraction apparatuses” (Barad, 2007, p. 73) those boundary-producing practices that make determinate the properties being measured, the properties that did not exist prior to the measuring. Yet if this is so how can we ensure that “[a]ny old playing around with an indicating instrument in the vicinity of another body, whereby at any old time one takes a reading” is not called “a measurement of this body” (Schrödinger cited in Barad, 2007, p. 281)? Bohr (cited in Barad, 2007, p. 119) makes clear that patterns that are “reproducible and unambiguously communicable” in that “permanent marks . . . [are] left on bodies which define the experimental conditions” is what determines that what is produced is not just any old playing around. As such for Bohr cognition and discourse, our words and thoughts both spoken and unspoken, written and unwritten, as well as the totality of our social practices,

are *of* the material world as are we rather than just *in* it which in their entanglement with one another become something new. For all is a part of the “physical world” (Barad, 2007, p. 32), that which is constituted by matter, for our social practices have very material affects on bodies, leave their marks on bodies as do thoughts and words. Which is not to say that the social can be reduced solely to the material; it is however to say that the discursive has very material materialisations in the physical world.

Foucault (1981, p. 67) makes the point well when he states: “we must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge”. Rather the world in being entangled with us in acts of knowledge-making, acts of being and doing, co-constructs reality, embodying our intra-actions as do we. Yet it is in the realm of human ontology that the discursive “enables” the material, for without the discursive recognition of one’s society “one cannot, quite literally, *be* at all” (Hekman, 2010, p. 57), constituted as an object rather than as part of the observational tools and thus subject (Althusser as explicated in Hekman, 2010, p. 116-118). This is not to say that we do not bring our own ontologies into play when intra-acting with the social practices that play a part in constituting our “subject<sup>43</sup>” identities in their becoming. It does however mean that “subject” identity formation is governed by the material practices of a society (Althusser as explicated in Hekman, 2010, p. 116-118) in the intimate intra-action of apparatuses and that we “emerge through and as a part of their entangled intra-relating” (Barad, 2007, p. ix), reconfigured in our entanglements with social relations of power. For the “social scripts” (Hekman, 2010, p. 100) of a community are a “key aspect” (Hekman, 2010, p. 100), powerful forces of desire in the

---

<sup>43</sup>The notion of subject is “not singular *or* plural, not self *or* other, not fixed *or* mobile, but all of these” (Davies, 2014, p. 44). However it “yet remains locked in a series of binaries, and hierarchies within those binaries, that need to be pulled undone” (Davies, 2014, p. 44).

entanglement that also enfolds a body already marked by previous intra-actions. As such the „I“ produced in the entanglement might be found more or less within the social scripts that exist, part of the tools of observation, or in resisting them become the object of the agential cut as constituted by the intra-action (Barad, 2007; Hekman, 2010). Yet the “material-discursive nature of boundary-drawing practices” (Barad, 2007, p. 93), in our intra-actions with others, “produce[s] „objects“ and „subjects“ and other differences out of, and in terms of, a changing relationality” (Barad, 2007, p. 93) and as such identities that are always becoming. As Latour (2005, pp. 89-90) points out social constructions are as material as any building we might construct for without society’s discursive enablement one simply dys-appears as did I. For in my own case the fact that I as a woman teacher displayed the “inappropriate/d” (Trinh, 1986-87) emotion of anger to a principal and deputy principal, my “superiors”, an anger that “flowed in-between” through bodies present “affecting us all” (Davies, 2014. p. 45) with concerned frowns all around, this anger produced me as “Other”; it produced me as together apart, emergent from what was the intra-play of what was/is “inappropriate” behaviour for a woman teacher within the teaching world and what is considered fitting, what can be/is appropriated and what cannot. As such I dys-appeared with the principal and deputy directing subsequent comments to the other teacher present who, wary of being excluded himself, ignored me as well: fear also flows with “power relations materializ[ing] in the intra-action between/with the material and the discursive” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 265). As such the entanglement produced an “I” as alien, a type rather than an individual, viewed through the ethical distance and condemnation of administrators and teachers alike within this international teaching community. Had we understood my anger as an inappropriate/d behaviour within, a diffracted reading of ourselves

and each other, the agential cut would have included us all in the tools of observation with a different phenomenon produced.

#### **9.4 A Posthumanist Interpretation of “My” Story**

John Muir (cited in Fox, 1981, p. 291) observed in his journal entry of July 27, 1869: “When we try to pick out anything by itself we find that it is bound fast by a thousand invisible cords that cannot be broken to everything in the universe.” As such when I returned to my story and analysis, positioned as they are as partial and incomplete – “always being re-told”, always being “re-membered” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 3) - and viewed them as a diffraction pattern of multiple apparatuses, human and non human, material and discursive, I realised that the voice evoked had “not emanate[d] from a singular subject” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 733), me, as I had believed. Rather it had emanated from the entanglement of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material: discourses of gender and professional status, political and economic forces, the details of the personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, theories that provided more questions than answers, more diffraction than resolution as well as narratives of international school life. All these voices and forces that acted on the machine of teacher control and correction within an international school had “plugged in” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 262) to produce what Jackson and Mazzei (2013, p. 262) would call an “assemblage”: a “process of making and unmaking” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 262; see also Mazzei, 2013, p. 735), a “*Voice without Organs*” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 732), a voice that cannot be traced to one particular subject but emanates from the entanglement itself. The voice without organs makes material Bakhtin’s notion that we speak with the voices of others, that although nothing new can be uttered it becomes something different, something new when entangled in

other intra-actions with apparatuses both material and discursive to produce new phenomena: “matter and meaning meet in a very literal sense” (Barad, 2007, p. 67).

The story as such has become a phenomenon of “*differential patterns of mattering*” (Barad, 2007, p. 140), a phenomenon where the “apparatuses” far from being “*mere observing instruments*” are “*boundary-drawing practices*” (Barad, 2007, p.140), practices that determine what gets included and what gets excluded; practices that mark and constitute the “differential boundaries between humans and nonhumans, culture and nature, science and the social” (Barad, 2007, p. 140). It has become a story of plots that stretch backwards and forwards, of bodies “full of sentences and moments” (Ondaatje, 2004, p. 13), of multiple voices both human and non human, dead, alive or as yet to be born, involved directly and indirectly in the phenomenon, in the process of creating and recreating reality (Barad, 2007). It is a story where voice is not bounded “by speech, but can be found in inhabited silence” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 733).

As such by decentering voice, by adopting the posthumanist stance on agency where “intentionality” is not attributable to humans but “is understood as attributable to a complex network of human and nonhuman agents, including historically specific sets of material conditions that exceed the traditional notion of the individual” (Barad, 2007, p. 23), the story is freed from the “representational trap” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 262) of assigning meaning to others. It allows us to focus on the “forces of desire” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 738), their intensities, which work through and with that which is engaged in the phenomenon; it allows us to focus on what results from such intra-actions. These are the forces of desire that act on us to enact an entanglement that leads to appearance and dys-appearance. They are the forces of desire that

make and unmake us; as such we “make and unmake each other” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 735). Voice thus becomes the enactment of an entanglement of those desires (Mazzei, 2013): a voice without organs that is made and unmade throughout the process of control and correction, of re-telling and re-remembering, of re-searching and re-analysing. As such intra-actions “enact agential separability – the condition of *exteriority-within-phenomena*” (Barad, 2007, p. 140) with our agency to change the world and be changed by it immanent from within the phenomenon. Such a stance begs the question: how are we becoming as well as what are we becoming (Mazzei, 2013). It also begs the question: how are we diffracting ourselves and each other? Indeed, following Haraway (1997, pp. 75, 104), it begs the question: “what counts”, “for whom, and at what cost” to Others?

Barad’s (2007, p. 185) notion of “knowing in being”, the notion that practices of knowing cannot be fully understood as solely a human practice given that “we are *of* the world. . . . *part* of the world in its differential becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 185; my emphases), posits that our ability to understand, to know the physical world “hinges on . . . recognizing that our knowledge-making practices, including the use and testing of scientific concepts, are material enactments that contribute to, and are a part of, the phenomena we describe” (Barad, 2007, p. 32). You cannot know the world by observing it from the outside: “Practices of knowing and being are not isolable; they are mutually implicated” (Barad, 2007, p. 185). This notion decenters the discursive of the linguistic turn without privileging the material. It “brings the material back in without rejecting the legitimate insights of the linguistic turn” (Hekman, 2010, p. 7). As such entanglements require an analysis that “enables us to theorize the social and the natural together” (Barad, 2007, 25). For in our intra-actions with the material of our world we change each other,

transforming both ourselves and the material world: “How our environment moulds and shapes us; how what is without becomes within” (Shots of Awe, 2014b; see also Willis, 2006). As such I describe the material-discursive world of my office in Chapter 8 as:

a small, dark room . . . in a part of the building where teachers and students rarely ventured; it could accommodate two small desks and a filing cabinet. There was no discussion. According to the deputy’s note the other three members of the ESOL team had requested and been allocated permanent desks in either the large English Faculty Office or the even larger and light-infused Humanities Office with the now-defunct ESOL Office being given over to the Modern Foreign Languages Faculty to be transformed into a classroom. As such I was the only teacher from a teaching staff of over a hundred that was so accommodated: alone and with no formal or informal interactions possible with other teaching staff over the course of the school day. With that one move the deputy effectively marginalised, silenced and segregated me from the rest of the teaching staff and department; she might as well have given me a bell and hung a sign saying „Unclean“ on the office door: teachers would stay away afraid of contagion.

My office space acts as a force to prevent the materialisation of bodies as it acts to repulse teachers, to discourage them from visiting. I experience the material force of the office as one producing a social environment of exclusion and segregation: a prison, an apartheid environment which most of the teachers avoid. There is no sign on my office door - no name: mine or the department I represent – despite my having requested a sign several times; this lack of a material presence helps constitute me as dys-appeared. The teachers experience the space as exclusive and exclusionary, experiencing my identity as one that is becoming not only different from theirs but dangerous. However for the two teachers who had already resigned their positions and had successfully gained employment elsewhere for the coming year, my office space has become a sanctuary, a physical space where they are free to talk about the school, the principal and deputy without fear of being overheard and reported on: it has taken on the intimacy of the confessional box and I the identity of the confessor. Despite the fact that it is a school with over 1000 students and 100 teachers, the immanent sound is one of silence, the hallways are ghostly possibilities in the making. As such the material and non material, the human and non human, have intra-acted

to produce “different becomings” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 269) of identity, both human and non human, mine and others. Understanding the phenomenon as an entangled state of “social and natural, material and discursive” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 269) agencies (Barad, 2007) thus allows for different ways of knowing and ways of knowing differently. It allows the material of the office space to be diffracted through the discursive practices of power, fear, discipline, and control that act as apparatuses within the school.

#### *9.4.1 Diffraction and Reflection*

Diffraction, unlike reflection, is not a “self-referential glance back at oneself” (Barad, 2007, p. 88). It instead allows for a critical glance backwards and forwards in time, space and matter, for space, time, and matter are “integral aspect[s]” (Barad, 2007, p. 316) of the phenomena and as such are “intra-actively produced in the making of phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 315); it allows for a critical glance beyond the mirror of reflexivity. For it is impossible to see what lies beyond the mirror by solely staring into it; we must look to the edges where diffraction occurs to see difference-in-the-making. Diffraction “maps where the *effects* of difference appear” (Haraway, 1992, p. 300); diffraction patterns trace the “history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference” (Haraway, 1997, p. 273) and thus allows us to see gender-in-the-making, race-in-the-making, class-in-the-making; in fact it allows us to see any “boundary-making practices that produce „objects“ and „subjects“ and other differences out of, and in terms of, a changing relationality” (Barad, 2007, p. 93), with the concept(s) constituted and embodied by a particular apparatus to the exclusion of all others. As such the physical and conceptual come together in the apparatus to form a “nondualistic whole” with concepts obtaining their meaning “in relation to a

particular apparatus” (Barad, 2007, p. 120) used marking as it does a particular subject-object boundary.

As Foucault<sup>44</sup> claims, it is the Panopticon, its material arrangement, which constitutes the discursive practice of punishment and allows something new and material to come into being, the prison, which in turn constitutes the regulation of self by self. Yet the extent to which the regulation of self by self is constituted by the Panopticon is dependent on marks already on the body self and the apparatuses involved in the entanglement with the Panopticon itself. As Barad (2007, p. 65) points out, Foucault fails in this analysis to offer an account and thus to take into account “the body’s historicity in which its very materiality plays an active role in the workings of power.” In other words, the question remains: how does the very material of the body, both human and non human, physiologically and anatomically, matter in the “processes of materialization” (Barad, 2007, p. 65). Despite these omissions, Foucault’s later work enlivens the notion of bodies (prisons for example) showing how they and the words (such as “delinquency”) within which they are enfolded “act only in entanglement with one another, and that the human being acts within the actualization and realization of these discursive forces” (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 88).

---

<sup>44</sup>Barad (2014, p. 187) also determines that Foucault’s critique analysis is a “mode of disclosure, exposure, and demystification” of a phenomenon rather than an “affirmative engagement” with it as is diffraction analysis; yet she acknowledges (2014, p. 187) that diffraction analysis is “indebted” to Foucault’s critique analysis (as well as those of Marx and Nietzsche) in taking into account at a core level “the (material-discursive) conditions of possibility in their social-historical-political-(natural)cultural contingency”. Barad (2007, pp. 191-192) also points to a lack in Butler’s (1993, 1997a, 1997b) notion of “performativity” limited at it is to the “production “of “certain aspects”(Barad, 2007, p. 145) of “human bodies” (Barad, 2007, p. 145) while also not taking into account the non human and material in linking both to the discursive.

## 9. 5 Posthumanism and the Notion of Truth

Yet if different apparatuses and different entanglements of those apparatuses produce different phenomena and agential cuts, what does this mean in terms of the truth posited by any particular phenomenon? Truth understood in this way can not depend on a correspondence between description and nature, a representational account of truth. Rather truth emanates from the causal intra-actions within the phenomenon that leaves marks on the bodies (Barad, 2007), “permanent marks . . . left on bodies which define the experimental conditions” (Bohr cited in Barad, 2007, p. 119), bodies that “differentially materialize” (Barad, 2007, p. 176) as the particular diffraction pattern of a particular material-discursive practice. Truth understood in this way contests those “unexamined habits of mind” that endow language and other representational systems with far “more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve” (Barad, 2007, p. 133). (Yet these habits of mind are difficult to break ingrained as they are into our psyche: “written into” the very marrow of “our bones” (Barad, 2007, p. 233) with the human constantly nudging nature to one side in its quest for centre stage.)

Truth understood in this way points to the marks left on a body by apparatuses material-discursive, human and non human, marks that make determinate difference as “Other” as well as difference understood as differing, as constituted by and in sameness. They are the material enactments on a body of the discursive: marks such as loss of vision, loss of face, loss of self enacted by voice, thoughts, language and emotions, observations and documents, both virtual (electronic) and paper. These are marks made by letters of accusation and letters of rejection that cause one to question one’s sanity, leaving yet other marks on the “*bodymind*<sup>45</sup>” (Merrell, 2003,

---

<sup>45</sup>Merrell (2003) uses the term “*bodymind*” to describe how “*sensing corporeally*” (Merrell, 2003, p. xiii) occurs with “mind and body act[ing] in concert . . . [with] really no Cartesian distinction between the two” (Merrell, 2003,

p. 16; see also Lenz Taguchi, 2012, p. 267), and it is these marks that tell the truth of a particular phenomenon, mine. As such truth is a material entanglement, a direct material engagement with the world that extends both backwards and forwards across time and space and cannot be located in time or space (Barad, 2007) except within the framework of a particular phenomenon. It cannot be understood as truth as correspondence theory for what precedes the phenomenon is unknown, indeterminate and does not rely upon dualisms such as “subject-object, culture-nature, and word-world” (Barad, 2007, p. 129) within which the notion of truth as correspondence theory is entrenched. As such this account of truth allows us “not merely to welcome females, slaves, children, animals, and other dispossessed Others (exiled from the land of knowers by Aristotle more than two millennia ago) into the fold of knowers but to better account for the ontology of knowing” (Barad, 2007, p. 378) in an ethical way. For knowing, being, and doing cannot be differentiated in any entanglement, entangled as they are within each other, made determinate only with the agential cut.

Bohr’s and Barad’s (2007) philosophy of ontology, epistemology and ethics as inextricably interconnected resists the Cartesian dualisms which would see us separate them out. For there is no “observation-independent reality” according to Bohr (as explicated in Barad, 2007, p. 129) only a much richer “correspondence” between “theories and phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 129) from which truth emerges. As such the truth that emerges from the letter of non-renewal I received, maps not only the geopolitical terrain but also the economic and historical factors. The warning is clear: “gender interpellation must be understood in terms of the relevant relations of production” (Barad, 2007, p. 194) as must other hegemonic ideologies. Truth becomes “painfully

---

p. 6). It is “non-conscious mind and body” (Merrell, 2003, p. 12) acting in tandem. It is a notion that harkens to Spinoza (1677/1992) and his monist belief that body and mind are one.

clear if we move beyond the privileged boundaries of the upper-middle class in the industrialized West” (Ebert cited in Barad, 2007, p. 194).

In returning to my description (a material fact) of the principal’s office (Background to the Story, Chapter 1) on “a hot and humid August afternoon at the start of the academic year at the Tepapawai International Secondary School” as “chilly bordering on cold” I describe the material forces on me that discourage familiarity. I continue my description:

The sound of the air conditioner whirrs in the background. The room is clinical: there are no plants, no personal photos or pictures and the sea view from the sole window has been blocked out with a heavy blind. At a coffee table sits the principal who motions to the head of department as she enters to close the door and take a seat opposite him.  
(Background to the Story, Chapter 1)

The office appears before me a black box of control and correction, a concept made “meaningful, that is, semantically determinate . . . by virtue of [its] embodiment in the physical arrangement of the apparatus” (Barad, 2007, p. 117), in this case the principal’s office. It is a space in which I am becoming less than what I was. There are no personal belongings in the room, with even the external view excluded; I experience its sterility as a block to discussion, meaningful engagement. I experience the principal as banal, intent on saving his own skin at the cost of mine, as constituted by the office space, by his voice, the words he utters and how he utters them. This is a place, a spacetime matter, I do not want to be in for long or even at all for fear that I will dys-appear. I experience my own identity as one of victim, anxious for what the space might make material in me. The material thus intra-acts in extraordinary ways with the discursive to produce different becomings of both my identity and that of the principal.

Truth like “[m]emory does not reside in the folds of individual brains” (Barad, 2007, p. ix). Rather, it is enfolded in the spacetime-matter of mattering (Barad, 2007). It is constituted with the enactment of particular phenomena, the entanglement of material-discursive practices that the world materialises and experiences, and is revealed in the agential cut made which distinguishes the tools of observation from the object within the framework of each particular phenomenon (Barad, 2007). For truth like memory is dynamic, not static in its meaning and our understanding of it. It cannot be possessed but is re(con)figured with each new entanglement, each new phenomenon, each new re-membering and re-telling. It is a “complementary” truth made determinate by particular apparatuses, particular phenomena, particular agential cuts, and is “mutually exclusive” yet mutually necessary (Barad, 2011, p. 9) very much as in making position determinate for an electron renders momentum indeterminate. As such I experience the TISS staff room as “drab and dingy” (Background to the Story, Chapter 1) and the Vice Chair of the Teachers Association and myself as “seated having a cup of tea”, our cups untouched. Teachers at TISS experience the staff room as unwelcoming: a place best avoided. It is empty of teachers for most of the school day. The material - all that is matter and includes voice, thought, language, and emotion as well as letters, documents, memoranda posted on the walls of the staff room - discourages the familial, acts as a force to keep staff away. I experience the Vice Chair as weak and fearful, her desperation to leave clear and palpable in her voice, her manner, her body language. Even the material forces of weather intra-act with the discursive in a way such that I experience the day at the Labour Tribunal court hearing not only as cold but also “miserable” (Background to the Story, Chapter 1) and the last case of the morning session as being heard in a court room that is “empty” despite those present. I experience the court room and its inhabitants as empty on many levels, an apparatus that makes determinant with this particular agential cut

the power of the school and its officers and excludes me. For it bears repeating that the notion of bodies (law courts, schools for example) and how they and the words (such as dismissed, blacklisted) within which they are enfolded “act only in entanglement with one another, and that the human being acts within the actualization and realization of these discursive forces” (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 88).

Truth is intertwined with memory and memory as Barad (2007, p. ix) states is:

the enfolded articulations of the universe in its mattering. Memory is not a record of a fixed past that can ever be fully or simply erased, written over, or recovered (that is, taken away or taken back into one’s possession, as if it were a thing that can be owned). And re-membling is not a replay of a string of moments but an enlivening and reconfiguring of past and future that is larger than any individual. Re-membling and recognizing do not take care of, or satisfy, or in any other way reduce one’s responsibilities; rather, like all intra-actions, they extend the entanglements and responsibilities of which one is a part. The past is never finished. It cannot be wrapped up like a package, or a scrapbook, or an acknowledgment; we never leave it and it never leaves us behind. (Barad, 2007, p. ix)

The truth like the past is always with us, always a part of us, marks on our bodies. As such truth requires that we be mindful of Others as well as ourselves and for who and what we are becoming, that we acknowledge and recognise our ability to respond to Others as well as our responsibility towards Others. For one cannot simply ignore that which is excluded “without taking responsibility and being accountable for the constitutive effects of these exclusions” (Barad, 2007, p. 58) for exclusions matter; indeed Barad (2007, p. 136) makes clear that difference “is what matters.” It requires the “ongoing practice of being open and alive to each meeting, each intra-action” so that we too may be attentive to “ever new possibilities of living justly” (Barad, 2007, p. x). For as Barad (2007, p. 396) makes abundantly clear: “There is no getting away from ethics – mattering is an integral part of the ontology of the world in its dynamic presencing.” As such diffraction is an “ethico-onto-epistemological matter” (Barad,

2007, p. 381) – a doing and being way of knowing which helps “break open” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 263) particular identities with the apparatus imparting “conditions of possibility” (Barad, 2007, p. 230) for determinate meaning, “for contesting and iteratively remaking apparatuses” (Barad, 2007, p. 230). This is in stark contrast to the geometrical optics of reflection where the binary notion of difference asserts a clear cut boundary between the included and the excluded, between the “I and not-I, he and she; between depth and surface, or vertical and horizontal identity; between us here and them over there” (Trinh, 1988, para. 1), between those that stand in front of the mirror and see only themselves and those “Others” that stand in the shadows behind the mirror itself.

As such our ethics determines our experiences, it “grounds” (Barad, 2007, p. 391) them. It holds you accountable (to account for yourself) for those entanglements we help weave as well as our part in them. The entanglements we are a part of reconstitute our identities, material and other; they reconfigure “our beings, our psyches, our imaginations, our institutions, our societies” (Barad, 2007, p. 383) as this study has reconfigured me. As such: the “smallest cut matters” (Barad, 2007, p. 384). And so if as Levinas (as cited in Barad, 2007, p. 391) posits “[p]roximity, difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility” then, in departing from Levinas’ notion as it pertains to the human to a posthumanist inclusivity of *all* that is non human, material and other, it behooves us to be non-indifferent in our intra-actions with that excluded in the cut; for despite how different and hence distant the excluded may seem, the reality is that they are always a part of our becoming, a part of us and hence the world in its becoming. The “tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility” (Levinas, 1982/1985, p. 97) whether we know the Other or not, accept the responsibility or not, whether we know how to fulfill our responsibility or not, able or

not, the responsibility is there (Levinas, 1982/1985, p. 97). Ethics *is* responsibility: responsibility for the Other, where we are responsible for that which we have not done, even if it is of no consequence to us (Levinas, 1982/1985). For each of us is responsible for the Other's "very responsibility" (Levinas, 1982/1985, p. 97) irrespective of whether the Other is responsible for us (Levinas, 1985). Ethics as such does not precede us or our intra-actions rather it is immanent from our intra-actions with Others, human and non human, material-discursive. It is a very part of matter and mattering itself.

### **9.6 A Re-turn<sup>46</sup> to the Research Questions**

The overarching question to the study looked to render visible the cluster of ethico-political and epistemic practices that were enacted at one particular international school, in one particular case of conflict, on one particular teacher, me, and asked:

1. How can conflict in an international school be understood as a case of epistemic injustice?

This led to three subordinate questions that focused on the ethical aspects of the school, its culture and staff with respect to conflict and read as follows:

2. How do emotions express the moral dimensions of a school's culture?
3. What does it mean to be an ethical educator and what is an ethical school?
4. What are the changes necessary for international schools to become more ethical?

---

<sup>46</sup>Barad (2014, p. 168) uses the term "re-turning" as opposed to returning – "a reflecting on or going back to the past that was" – to mean "a turning over and over again – iteratively intra-acting, re-diffracting, diffracting anew, in the making of new temporalities (spacetime-matterings), new diffraction patterns. . . . opening it up and breathing new life into it."

I believe that these four questions are inextricably entangled, for epistemology, ontology and ethics are “threaded” (Barad, 2007) the one through the other, rethreaded with each new reconfiguring. I believe that a commitment to knowing how to be as well as being what we know, being responsible (able to respond) and demonstrating a willingness to doing so, is what constitutes an ethical teacher and ethical institution, apparatuses (Foucault, 1977, p. 224) that in their entanglements and intra-actions produce certain configurations and reconfigurations of the material world of school and teacher. For ultimately response-ability and account-ability require “knowing in being” (Barad, 2007, p. 185): knowing in being open to the other within, willing to listen, to enter into dialogue, and thus communicate between “simultaneous differences” (Clark & Holquist, 1984, p. 9), knowing in being immanently polysemic, multivocal within intra-actions. It is being that other in all her guises, allowing the other to disrupt, to destabilise the “self” so that life becomes the creation of ongoing meaning (Frank, 2000). As such can conflict be understood as a case of epistemic injustice? Undoubtedly yes. However it is so much more than this for as an unresolved profound and protracted disagreement, conflict can cause one to be denied not only epistemically by being wrongfully mistrusted, but also ethically by being wrongfully excluded and ontologically by being wrongfully positioned as a lesser being. Conflict not only challenges what we know but who and how we are becoming.

This in turn leads me to questions that rather than reinforce the binary notions of conflict (for example: us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) explore and expose the darkness within the light of conflict, questions such as:

How can conflict be understood as emergent from intra-actions between apparatuses of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material: discourses of gender

and professional status, political and economic forces, the details of the personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, and the emotions?

How can conflict be understood as a product of all the above apparatuses with the agential cut dependent on the intra-play of these forces rather than the interplay of individual entities, with these intra-plays producing causes and effects by all on all?

In other words, how are we diffracting ourselves and how are we diffracting each other within the phenomenon of conflict? For conflicts are collisions: “head on, to the accompaniment of squealing brakes and breaking glass” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). They are messy affairs with “[b]oth sides wounded” but with neither side seeming “to know what had hit it or how to avoid another crash” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). We inhabit a tangled yet dynamic web of material-discursive power relationships upon which the production and outcome of any conflict depends. And it is important to understand not why but how such collisions occur if we are to avoid, prevent, or resolve them ethically.

Rather than relying on old binaries with their narrow range of possibilities for theorising about conflict, the posthumanist stance affords us the opportunity to accept that the difference produced by an entanglement, in this case conflict, lies within us all with the many possibilities this presents for transforming ourselves and each other to create something new. However it is our “reluctance to cross over” to poke “a hole out of the old boundaries of the self” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 49), that prevents us from exploring such possibilities that are at once all inclusive and ethical in the becoming of a just world.

The littoral, where waves colliding meet the shore, is an interesting place of incongruities and discontinuities. It is where the action most worth watching takes place. For the diffraction patterns produced there are complex yet intimate, embodied as they are by us all forever caught up as we are in the roil and tumble of the waves. It is a place where past/present/future “continually converge, [ merge,] collapse and co-invent each other” (Pastpresents: Playing cat’s cradle with Donna Haraway, n.d., para. 2). It is where what we have done, are doing, and will do matter; for we are always responsible and accountable for what we are, who we are, and what we know through our never-ending becoming. It is where, as Deleuze and Parnet (1977/1987, p. 127) put it: “It might be thought that nothing has changed, and nevertheless everything has changed.”

### **9.7 Has the Study made a Substantial Contribution to the Study of Conflict?**

Whether or not my research has made a substantial contribution to research into understanding the lived experience of conflict is I would suggest up to other researchers and others living with conflict to determine. However it has made a substantial contribution to my own understanding of how conflict emerges from an intra-play of material conditions, discourses, affective and power flows, and the effects (the marks left on bodies) of such immanence.

In research as in life it is difficult to know where the writing and the reading will take you in your journey of discovery. In my own case however it was not until I started to write the final chapter (Chapter 9) of this study and came upon the writings of the philosopher and quantum physicist Karen Barad that a true “movement in thought” occurred, affecting me profoundly,

deeply, and effecting a dramatic conceptual shift in the way I thought that took me from questions of essence that focused on a Cartesian understanding of difference and conflict (us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) to a posthumanist stance on both and questions of how conflict can be understood as emergent from “intra-actions” (Barad, 2007) between apparatuses of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material: discourses of gender and professional status, political and economic forces, the details of the personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, and the emotions. That movement of thought changed how I read what I had previously written and therefore how this end-to-account-for-the-beginning would be written. For to read my study through Barad (2007) was to see it not with new eyes, but with no eyes at all for Barad uses and develops Haraway’s methodology of diffraction<sup>47</sup> to explain the world in all its (re)configurations. This is a methodology (Haraway, 1992) that suggests that diffraction might be a fitting “counterpoint” to the use of reflection as thinking for reflection is about “mirroring and sameness” (Barad, 2007, p, 29) and “invites the illusion of essential, fixed position” (Haraway, 1992, p, 300) while diffraction involves “the processing of small but consequential differences” (Haraway, 1992, p. 318), differences that make a difference, yet which are enacted by the superposition of sameness. Rereading the study in such a way was to recognise that implicit to the study is the notion that the only ethical stance to take is that of recognising that one’s life takes place not only among many different kinds of other but also that this entails responsibilities towards the other. That this notion needed to be made explicit led to a final chapter that opens up the study, provides a border crossing, to a cacophony of voices, organic and inorganic, human and non human, the material in all its many (re)configurations, the alive, the dead, the not yet materialised, that come

---

<sup>47</sup>Diffraction is the physical optics of “seeing” which takes into account the wave-particle nature of light rather than the geometric optics of “seeing” which relies on the notion of light as a ray which in turn gives rise to the notion of reflection, an approximation of what actually occurs.

together as one in problematising and theorising the phenomenon of conflict within the space, time and matter of one particular international school, mine.

As such it is to hold myself accountable and responsible for what I have done, and failed to do; for what I do and do not do now and in the future. And it is to understand that to every truth there are many equal and opposite truths, what Clatk and Holquist (1994, p. 9) call “simultaneous differences”, that act to disrupt and destabilise; yet it is only by superimposing these truths that critical differences are made determinate and real. That realisation, that consciousness has “denatured” (Haraway, 1991) my notion of the Other as out there, allowed me as Other to come in out of the cold, to be anOther within, different but with voice (Deleuze, 1986/1988a, p. 98).

Yet as Haraway (1991) makes abundantly clear, writing from the “borderlands” (Anzaldúa, 1987) is a “power[ful] way to survive” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175). It is to seize “the tools to mark the world that marked [us] as other” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175) and includes tools such as “stories”, blasphemous (Haraway, 1991) stories retold to “reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities” (Haraway, 1991, p.175), subverting both “structure and modes of reproduction of „Western“ identity, of nature and culture, of mirror and eye, slave and master, body and mind” (Haraway, 1991, p. 176), male and female, civilised and primitive. And it is in this way that we Others subvert those “myths of origin of Western culture” which have “colonized” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175; see also Marquard, 1957; Said 1978, 1983) us and continue to do so.

As such the writing *of* this study and the *writing* of this study have marked my body, affirmed it as the body of a woman teacher, inured it to the likelihood of “passing into the unmarked” territory of “Anglo” white male principal (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). For we that live in the educational borderlands are people of the book and as such can strike fear in the heart of patriarchal authority and its power to name and shame us for we have the ability to exploit the language of our colonisers to expose the light within the darkness. As such this study seeks to fulfill Haraway’s function of a “modest witness” which rather than be “oppositional” is “suspicious, implicated, knowing, ignorant, worried, and hopeful” (Haraway, 1997, p. 3). For nature cannot continue to be resource for culture (Haraway, 1991) nor can all those constituted as other continue to “mirror the self . . . the One who is not dominated” (Haraway, 1991, p. 177), for it is the other that “gives the lie to the autonomy of the self” (Haraway, 1991, p. 177). As such “[i]nside and outside are inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 474). That is we are not only both a part of the world but also “coextensive with” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 430) it, constituting but also “constituted” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 527). We might occupy a certain space, a certain time, certain matter, what Barad calls a “spacetime mattering” (Barad, 2007, 2014), but that “spacetime mattering” will occupy “you” back. We might build the tools but the tools build us back (Willis, 2006). As such our choices matter; the choices we make today matter for everything we “design” today – our schools, our educational institutions, our relationships – and the relations of power that emerge as recurring patterns from what we “design”, whether “emergent and self-organizing” or “deliberately crafted” (Johnson, 2010, p. 17), is in turn designing us back to become a part of us all in further becoming.

I therefore present this study, my ideas as “candidates for others to entertain, not necessarily as truth, let alone Truth” (Peshkin, 1985, p. 280), but as ever changing possibilities about the nature of a phenomenon called conflict that may shape “our” thinking about enquiries into like phenomena.

## **9.8 Implications for Policy, Practices, and Further Research**

### *9.8.1 Policy and Practices*

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 8, international schools work very much in isolation neither a part of the “local” or “home” country educational establishments. As such policies, procedures and practices at such schools are developed independently, dependent for their fairness on the individual administrators that produce them within the context of a particular school. In institutions such as these teachers are reliant on the integrity of the administrator in charge, having no higher authority to turn to that is not part of the administration or governing body and no independently run teachers’ union to appeal to when conflict occurs. There are no systems of accountability in place in international schools to protect the powerless from the caprices and manipulations of the powerful: “where power [is] articulated on bodies” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. ix), and the material and the discursive come together as one.

So how to affect and effect change is problematic in a school terrain such as this. It will I believe require “intricate epistemic negotiations and advocacy” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) to reverse entrenched ways of knowing. It will require a willingness by the school to let go of all previous understandings as to pre-existing essentialised individuals and rely on emerging relational ontologies (Barad, 2007) that proceed from intra-actions rather than interactions. It will require a

profound philosophical shift and a willingness to acknowledge that we emerge from the intertwining of the material, the discursive and the affective and that these are mutually constitutive and constituting. It will require epistemic modesty of all involved, a sensitivity by all to those stray residual prejudices that lurk in the shared social imaginary, prejudices that arise in our entanglements with “others”. It will require a willingness to live with the ambiguity that this implies, to accept the disruptions and destabilisations (Frank, 2000) by others-within that allows for a more response-able and account-able distribution of agency within the agential cut. For it is these moments of discomfort that MacLure (2010, p. 14) affirms as moments of “productive *disconcertion*”, moments that point to the material and embodied nature of our connections with others that are “far more complex” than we imagine them to be. Above all it will require listening that remains attentive to what it is that we do not want to know (Boler, 1999, p. 200), open to flows of affect (Davies, 2014, p. 45). For as Barad (in interview with Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 69) makes abundantly clear: ethics entails: “[l]istening for the response of the other and [having] an obligation to be responsive to the other”. This requires being open “to imagining beyond instituted possibilities” (Code, 2008a, pp. 46-47), first seeking to understand before seeking to be understood. It also requires a “critical reflexivity” so that the apparatus of identity prejudice does not intervene to diminish another’s capacity as a knower and giver of knowledge (Fricker, 2007, 2012) within any intra-action and allows all to share and participate in the creation that is knowledge, institutional and other. For although the “tyranny of the group” (Malcolm, 1973; Fricker, 2007) can weaken our commitment, our resolve and determination to do what we know is right (Boss, 1998; Fricker, 2007), anything less falls short of what it means to be an ethical educator and ethical person within an ethical institution where voice is not bounded “by speech, but can be found in inhabited silence” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 733).

### *9.8.2 Further Research*

My research has made only a small inroad into the lived experience of a conflict participant, that of the teacher, and life thereafter. The few verbal snapshots I presented gave only an indication of what remains to be studied: the lived experience of other conflict participants as embodied in and by the school, its physical location in all its material-discursive becoming, the administrators, children, parents, governing body and other international school community members.

Another area worthy of exploration is the role of the taboo story in the lives of those involved in professional conflicts. What kind of taboo stories exist? What can the taboo story do for those whose lives have become entangled in professional conflict personally or by association (here I have in mind the families, both close and distant, of those personally involved)? What does conflict do to such family ties?

Another area worthy of further research would be exploring the lived experiences of men teachers entangled in professional conflict; and the affects and effects that flow from, in and through those entangled in the conflict.

Finally I believe that what constitutes and is constituted by an ethical international school is worthy of further investigation.

## 9.9 Two “Final” Stories

### Story 1

The neurologist pointed me to an office chair to the left side of his desk which when I sat in it left me a good eight inches below his line of vision; the agential cut made allowed him to experience me as distanced Other: difference as indifference. As he peered down at me from on high, the other in this vertical/horizontal binary of difference (Trinh, 1988), he glanced at the MRI scans I had brought with me and diagnosed MS. I jacked up my chair to eye level with him and requested a series of tests to eliminate other possible causes for the brain lesions. “I suggest you see your local doctor to arrange for *those* sorts of tests.” He handed me the scans and looked down at his notes: I was dismissed. He had learnt to see what he knows rather knowing what he sees. What was excluded from mattering - the patient - by the cut made constituted him as much if not more than what had been included. The stick held by the wo/man walking down the street can be “cut” to become a part of the tools of observation or a part of the object, the wo/man. For those that walk in darkness the cut matters: it is a mattering that matters to all. For “[t]here is darkness and there is darkness” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 49); there is the darkness constituted by light where the crest of a wave meets the trough of another wave and there is the darkness constituted by the darkness/light binary. Both produce darkness of an equal depth yet the diffracted darkness occurs when the waves are 180° out of phase with each wave alone displaying a maximum intensity of light; darkness is emergent from an “abundance” of light not from an absence, an expulsion: “it haunts its own interior” (Barad, 2014, p. 171). This darkness “queers the binary darkness/light story” (Barad, 2014, p. 171). As such darkness cannot be the binary opposite of light, where darkness figures as “absence, lack, negativity” (Barad, 2014, p. 171) for light inhabits darkness and darkness light. As such diffraction opposes the diametric positioning of

difference to sameness (Barad, 2014); rather it reveals the “Other”, the other that stands in the shadows behind the mirror.

## Story 2

I was leaving Hong Kong. I had packed everything to do with the conflict in a suitcase, a large suitcase. This was one piece of “baggage” I did not want to take with me but neither was I willing to let it go just yet. So I padlocked the case, wheeled it to a local left luggage office and left it there. Two years later and I was back in Hong Kong. I was writing a legislative narrative this time, for LegCo (the Legislative Council of Hong Kong), and needed some of the notarised documents that were in the case. The attendant took one look at the stub and said: “We throw everything out after 6 months you know,” a wave of panic and then relief swept over me, “but give me a few minutes and I’ll go check for you.” Ten minutes later and he was back, a huge smile on his face and the case in tow. The past never leaves us and we never leave it behind.

## **9. 10 “Final” Words**

This story and study has traced my iterative journey to becoming, to being in the here and now and the then and there, to becoming of the world in all its dynamic possibilities rather than being in a world of static certainties. In the beginning as in the end we are all becoming. We are the sum total of our entanglements, the marks on our bodies, human and non human, material and discursive - some of us less layered than others, some more inscribed, but all scarred. Eventually all scars fade, even the most livid, to become a familiar part of who we are becoming; they are the scars that bind us to the world in its “open-ended articulation” (Barad, 2007, p. 379). They

are there to remind us of our ongoing responsibility and accountability, our ability to respond and account for ourselves, for entanglements past, present and future.

## REFERENCES

- Almond, B. (1988). Women's rights: Reflections on ethics and gender. In M. Griffiths & M. Whitford (Eds.), *Feminist perspectives in philosophy* (pp. 42-57). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Anderson, C. (2010, October 8). Twitter book club: Neil Postman (1996) *The end of education*: Chapter 4 [Blog comment]. Retrieved from [http://carlanderson.blogspot.com/2010/10/twitter-book-club-neil-postman-1996-end\\_08.html?m=1](http://carlanderson.blogspot.com/2010/10/twitter-book-club-neil-postman-1996-end_08.html?m=1)
- Andrews, M., Squire, C., & Tamboukou, M. (2008). Introduction: What is narrative research? In M. Andrews, C. Squire & M. Tamboukou (Eds.), *Doing narrative research* (pp. 1-21). London: Sage.
- Anzaldúa, G. (1987). *Borderlands/La frontera: The new mestiza*. San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Book Company.
- Aquinas, T. (1892). *Aquinas ethicus: The moral teaching of St Thomas* (Vol. 1) (J. Rickaby, Trans.). *Online Library of Liberty*. London: Burns & Oates. (Original work published 1274). Retrieved from <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1965>
- Arendt, H. (1989). Der Auschwitz-Prozeß. In E. Geisel & K. Bittermann (Eds.), *Nach Auschwitz: Essays und Kommentare 1* (pp. 99-136). Berlin: Tiamat.

Aristotle (1994a). *Nicomachean ethics* (W. D. Ross, Trans.). In D. C. Stevenson (Ed.), *The Internet Classics Archives*. (Original work published 350 BCE). Retrieved from <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html>

Aristotle (1994b). *Rhetoric* (W. R. Roberts, Trans.). In D. C. Stevenson (Ed.), *The Internet Classics Archives*. (Original work published 350 BCE). Retrieved from <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.html>

Ashcroft, B., & Ahluwalia, P. (2001). *Edward Said*. London: Routledge.

Atkinson, P. (1997). Narrative turn or blind alley? *Qualitative Health Research*, 7(3), 325-344.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). Discourse in the novel (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). In M. Holquist (Ed.), *The dialogic imagination: Four essays by Mikhail Bakhtin* (pp. 259-422). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. (Original work published 1975)

Ball, S. J. (1999). Labour, learning and the economy: A 'policy sociology' perspective. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 29(2), 195-206. doi:10.1080/0305764990290203

Ball, S. J. (2000). Educational studies, policy entrepreneurship and social theory. In S. J. Ball (Ed.), *Sociology of education: Major themes. Vol. 3: Institutions and processes* (pp. 1524-1553). London: RoutledgeFalmer.

Barad, K. (2007). *Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Barad, K. (2010). Quantum entanglements and hauntological relations of inheritance: Dis/continuities, spacetime enfoldings, and justice-to-come. *Derrida Today*, 3(2), 240-268. doi:10.3366/E1754850010000813

Barad, K. (2011, April 11). Erasers and erasures: Pinch's unfortunate „uncertainty principle“. *Social Studies of Science*, 1-12. doi:10.1177/0306312711406317. Retrieved from <http://humweb.ucsc.edu/feministstudies/faculty/barad/barad-social-studies.pdf>

Barad, K. (2014). Diffracting diffraction: Cutting together-apart. *Parallax*, 20(3), 168-187. doi:10.1080/13534645.2014.927623

Baron, M. W., Pettit, P., & Slote, M. (1997). *Three methods of ethics: A debate*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Barrow, R. (1992). Is teaching an essentially moral enterprise? *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 8(1), 105-108.

Barrows, A. (1996). *The light of outrage: Women, anger, and Buddhist women on the edge*. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books.

- Barthes, R. (1981). *Camera lucida: Reflections on photography* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (R. Howard, Trans.). New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
- Bartky, S. L. (1996) The pedagogy of shame. In C. Luke (Ed.), *Feminisms and pedagogies of everyday life* (pp. 225-241). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Bates, R. (2011, July 3-6). *Learning to teach internationally: What international teachers need to know*. Paper presented at the Australian Teacher Education Association Annual Conference, Melbourne.
- Bateson, G. (1987). *Steps to an ecology of mind*. North Vale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc. (Original work published 1972)
- Beck, L. G. (1994). *Reclaiming educational administration as a caring profession*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Bem, S. L. (1994). *The lenses of gender: Transforming the debate on sexual inequality*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Benson, J. (2011). An investigation of chief administrator turnover in international schools. *Journal of Research in International Education*, 10(1), 87-103.

Bereday, G. Z. F., & Lauwerys, J. A. (Eds.). (1964). *The yearbook of education 1964: Education and international life*. London: Evans Brothers.

Bhabha, H. (2000). The vernacular cosmopolitan. In F. Dennis. & N. Khan (Eds.), *Voices of the crossing: The impact of Britain on the writers from Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa* (pp. 133-142). London: Serpent's Tail.

Bhabha, H. K. (1994). Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse. In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.), *The location of culture* (pp. 85-92). New York: Routledge.

Bhabha, H. K. (1996). Culture's in-between. In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds.), *Questions of cultural identity* (pp. 53-60). London: Sage Publications.

Blackmore, J. (2006a). Deconstructing diversity discourses in the field of educational management and leadership. *Educational Management Administration & Leadership*, 34(2), 181- 199. doi:10.1177/1741143206062492

Blackmore, J. (2006b). Social justice and the study and practice of leadership in education: A feminist history. *Journal of Educational Administration and History* 38(2), 185–200. doi:10.1080/00220620600554876.

- Blackmore, J. (2011). Lost in translation? Emotional intelligence, affective economies, leadership and organizational change. *Journal of Educational Administration and History*, 43(3), 207-225. doi:10.1080/00220620.2011.586-554
- Blackmore, J. (2014). Cultural and gender politics in Australian education, the rise of educational capitalism and the „fragile project“ of critical educational research. *The Australian Educational Researcher*, 41(5), 499-520. doi:1007/s13384-014-0158-8
- Blandford, S., & Shaw, M. (2001a). Introduction. In S. Blandford & M. Shaw (Eds.), *Managing international schools* (pp. 1-8). London: RoutledgeFalmer.
- Blandford, S., & Shaw, M. (2001b). The nature of international school leadership. In S. Blandford & M. Shaw (Eds.), *Managing international schools* (pp. 9-28). London: RoutledgeFalmer.
- Blenkin, G. M., Edwards, G., & Kelly, A. V. (1992). *Change and the curriculum*. London: Paul Chapman.
- Bochner, A. P. (2007). Notes toward an ethics of memory in autoethnographic inquiry. In N. K. Denzin & M. D. Giardina (Eds.), *Ethical futures in qualitative research: Decolonizing the politics of knowledge* (pp. 196-208). Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Boler, M. (1999). *Feeling power: Emotions and education*. New York: Routledge.

Boss, J. A. (1998). *Ethics for life: An interdisciplinary and multicultural introduction*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.

Breslow, L. B., Pritchard, D. E., DeBoer, J., Stump, G. S., Ho, A. D., & Seaton, D. T. (2013, Summer). Studying learning in the worldwide classroom: Research into edX's first MOOC. *Research & Practice in Assessment*, 8, 13-25. Retrieved from <http://www.rpajournal.com/dev/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SF2.pdf>

Brody, H. (1997). Who gets to tell the story? Narrative in postmodern bioethics. In H. Nelson (Ed.), *Stories and their limits: Narrative approaches to bioethics* (pp. 18-30). New York: Routledge.

Brooker, R., & Macpherson, I. (1999). Communicating the processes and outcomes of practitioner research: An opportunity for self-indulgence or a serious professional responsibility? *Educational Action Research*, 7(2), 207-221.  
doi:10.1080/09650799900200091

Brooks, D. (2009, November 9). The rush to therapy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/opinion/10brooks.html>

Brooks, T. (2008). Shame on you, shame on me? Nussbaum on shame punishment. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 25(4), 322-334.

Brown, L. D. (2012). *Consumer-run mental health: Framework for recovery*. New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-0700-3

Broyard, A. (1993). *Intoxicated by my illness and other writings on life and death*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Brummitt, N. (2007). International Schools: Exponential growth and future implications. *International Schools Journal*, 27(1), 35-40.

Brummitt, N. (2009a). Facing up to global recession. *International School Magazine*, 12(1), 13-14.

Brummitt, N. (2009b, October 22). Presentation to the International and Private Schools Educational Forum (IPSEF) Conference, London.

Brush S. B. (2001). Protectors, prospectors, and pirates of biological resources. In L. Maffi (Ed.), *On biocultural diversity: Linking language, knowledge and the environment* (pp. 517-530). Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Butler, J. (1993). *Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex"*. New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1997a). *Excitable speech: A politics of the performative*. New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1997b, Autumn-Winter). Merely cultural. *Social Text*, 52/53, 265-277.

Bush, T., & Glover, D. (2003). *School leadership: Concepts and evidence*. Nottingham: NCSL.

Caduri, G. (2013). On the epistemology of narrative research in education. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 47(1), 37-52.

Caffyn, R. (2007). Fragmentation in international schools: A micropolitical discourse of management, culture and postmodern society. In M. Hayden, J. Levy & J. Thompson (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of research in international education* (pp. 339-350). London: Sage.

Caffyn, R. (2011). International schools and micropolitics: Fear, vulnerability and identity in fragmented space. In R. Bates (Ed.), *Schooling internationally: Globalisation, internationalisation and the future for international schools* (pp. 59-82). Abingdon, OX: Routledge.

Caffyn, R., & Cambridge, J. (2006). Critical approaches to researching cross-cultural management in international schools. *International Schools Journal*, 25(2), 46-50.

- Cambridge, J. (1998). Investigating national and organizational cultures in the context of the international school. In M. C. Hayden & J. J. Thompson (Eds.), *International education: Principles and practice* (pp. 197-211). London: Kogan Page.
- Cambridge, J. (2000). International schools; globalization and the seven cultures of capitalism. In M. C. Hayden & J. J. Thompson (Eds.), *International schools and international education* (pp. 179-190). London: Kogan Page.
- Campbell, E. (1996). Suspended morality and the denial of ethics: How value relativism muddles the distinction between right and wrong in administrative decisions. In S. L. Jacobson, E. S, Hickcox, & R. Stevenson (Eds.), *School administration: Persistent dilemmas in preparation and practice* (pp. 63-74). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Campbell, E. (1997). Administrators' decisions and teachers ethical dilemmas: Implications for moral agency. *Leading & Managing*, 3(4), 245-257.
- Campbell, E. (2003). *The ethical teacher*. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.
- Campbell, S. (1994). Being dismissed: The politics of emotional expression. *Hypatia*, 9, 46-65.
- Campbell, S. (1997). *Interpreting the personal: Expression and the formation of feelings*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Carder, M. (2002, April). Intercultural awareness, bilingualism and ESL in the International Baccalaureate, with particular reference to the MYP. *International Schools Journal*, 21(2), 34-41.

Carter, K. (1993, January-February). The place of story in the study of teaching and teacher education. *Educational Researcher*, 22(1), 5-12, 18.

Carver, J. (2006). *Boards that make a difference: A new design for leadership in nonprofit and public organization* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Carver, J., & Carver, M. (2015, January 2). Carver's policy governance® model in nonprofit organizations. Retrieved 2015, April 1 from <http://www.carvergovernance.com/pg-np.htm>

Cheung, A. (2008, March 27). Mind our language. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from [http://www.scmp.com/article/631346/mind-our-language#qt-most\\_popular-ui-tabs2](http://www.scmp.com/article/631346/mind-our-language#qt-most_popular-ui-tabs2)

Clandinin, D. J. (1986). *Classroom practices: Teacher images in action*. London: Falmer Press.

Clandinin, D. J. (2007). Preface. In D. J. Clandinin (Ed.), *Handbook of narrative inquiry: Mapping a methodology* (pp. ix-xviii). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (1988). Studying teachers' knowledge of classrooms: Collaborative research, ethics and the negotiation of narrative. *The Journal of Educational Thought*, 22(2A), 269-282.
- Clandinin, D. J. & Connelly, F. M. (1989). Developing rhythm in teaching: The narrative study of a beginning teacher's personal practical knowledge of classrooms. *Curriculum Inquiry*, 19(2), 121-141.
- Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (1991). Narrative and story in practice and research. In D. A. Schon (Ed.), *The reflective turn: Case studies in and on educational practice* (pp. 258-281). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (Eds.). (1995). *Teachers' professional knowledge landscapes*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (2000). *Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in qualitative research*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Clark, K., & Holquist, M. (1984). *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Clough, P. (2002). *Narratives and fictions in educational research*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

- Code, L. (2008a). Advocacy, negotiation, and the politics of unknowing. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 46, 32-51.
- Code, L. (2008b, March 12). Review of Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. Retrieved from <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23398-epistemic-injustice-power-and-the-ethics-of-knowing/>
- Colnerud, G. (1997). Ethical conflicts in teaching. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 13(6), 627-635.
- Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1990). Stories of experience and narrative enquiry. *Educational Researcher*, 19(5), 2-14.
- Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1995a). Personal and professional knowledge landscapes: A matrix of relations. In D. J. Clandinin & F. M. Connelly (Eds.), *Teachers' professional knowledge landscapes* (pp. 25-35). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1995b). Teachers' professional knowledge landscapes: Secret, sacred, and cover stories. In D. J. Clandinin & F. M. Connelly (Eds.), *Teachers' professional knowledge landscapes* (pp. 3-15). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Conquergood, D. (1988, Autumn). Health theatre in a Hmong refugee camp: Performance, communication, and culture. *The Drama Review*, 32(3), 174-208.

Coombs, J. R. (1998). Educational ethics: Are we on the right track? *Educational Theory*, 48(4), 555-569.

Coursera. (2014, March 8). What about women? [Blog post]. Retrieved from [https://tech.coursera.org/blog/2014/03/08/what-about-the-women/?utm\\_source=Brilliant%3A+The+New+Science+of+Smart+Newsletter&utm\\_campaign=23c0d324e1-Brilliant\\_Report\\_16\\_1\\_2012&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_9c734401c1-23c0d324e1-311786097](https://tech.coursera.org/blog/2014/03/08/what-about-the-women/?utm_source=Brilliant%3A+The+New+Science+of+Smart+Newsletter&utm_campaign=23c0d324e1-Brilliant_Report_16_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9c734401c1-23c0d324e1-311786097)

Craig, E. (1990). *Knowledge and the state of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Dalin, P. (with Rolff, H. G.). (1995). *Changing the school culture*. London: Cassell.

Dalrymple, W. (2014, December 13-14). Discovery: Ajanta, India. *Financial Times Weekend*.

Darwin, C. (1968). *The origin of species*. New York: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1859)

- Davies, B. (2014). *Listening to children: Being and becoming*. London: Routledge.
- Day, C., & Leitch, R. (2001). Teachers' and teacher educators' lives: The role of emotion. *Teaching and Teacher Education, 17*(4), 403-415.
- Day, C. W. (1998). Working with different selves of teachers: Beyond comfortable collaboration. *Educational Action Research, 6*(2), 255-274.
- Deigh, J. (1983, January). Shame and self-esteem: A critique. *Ethics, 93*(2), 225-245.
- Deigh, J. (2006). The politics of disgust and shame. *The Journal of Ethics, 10*, 383-418.  
doi:10.1007/s10892-006-9001-4
- Delattre, E. J. (1998). *Leadership: A position? An activity? And . . . ? Ethics in policing*. Ottawa: The Police Leadership Forum, Occasional Papers Collection.
- Deleuze, G. (1988a). *Foucault* (Seán Hand, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1986)
- Deleuze, G. (1988b). *Spinoza: Practical philosophy* (R. Hurley, Trans.). San Francisco: City Lights. (Original work published 1981)

Deleuze, G. (1990). *The logic of sense* (M. Lester, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1969)

Deleuze, G., & Parnet, C. (1987). *Dialogues* (H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1977)

Deming, W. E. (1994). *The new economics for industry, government, education*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dempster, N., & Mahony, P. (1998). Ethical Challenges in school leadership. In J. MacBeath (Ed.), *Effective school leadership: Responding to change* (pp. 125-139). London: Paul Chapman.

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). *The Sage handbook of qualitative research* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Department for Education and Employment (DfEE). (2000). *National standards for headteachers*. London: DfEE Publications.

Department for Education and Skills (DfES). (2004). *National standards for headteachers* (revised). Nottingham, England: DfES Publications.

Derrida, J. (1978). *Writing and difference* (A. Bass, Trans.). London: Routledge and Paul.

Derrida, J. (1998). Faith and knowledge: The two sources of „religion“ at the limits of reason alone (S. Weber, Trans). In G. Vattimo & J. Derrida (Eds.), *Religion* (pp. 1-78). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, J. (2003). Autoimmunity: Real and symbolic suicides. In G. Borradori (Ed.), *Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida* (pp. 85-136). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Descartes, R. (1649/1650). *The passions of the soul: In three books* (Unknown, Trans.). London: Printed for A. C., sold by J. Martin & J. Ridley. Retrieved from [http://net.cgu.edu/philosophy/descartes/Passions\\_Letters.html](http://net.cgu.edu/philosophy/descartes/Passions_Letters.html)

Dolphijn, R., & van der Tuin, I. (2012). *New materialism: Interviews and cartographies*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press. Retrieved from <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/new-materialism-interviews-cartographies.pdf?c=ohp;idno=11515701.0001.001>

Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1983). *Michael Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dunning, G., James, C., & Jones, N. (2005). Splitting and projection at work in schools. *Journal of Educational Administration*, 43(3), 244-259.

- Ebert, T. (1996). The matter of materialism. In D. Morton (Ed.), *The material queer: A lesbian and gay cultural studies reader* (pp. 352-362). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Eisner, E. W. (1997). The new frontier in qualitative research methodology. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 3(3), 259-273.
- Ellis, C., & Bochner, A. P. (2000). Autoethnography, personal narrative, reflexivity: Researcher as subject. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 733-768). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ellis, C., Bochner, A., & Tillmann-Healy, L. (2000). Relationships as stories: Accounts, storied lives, evocative narratives. In K. Dindia & S. Duck (Eds.), *Communication and personal relationships* (pp. 13-29). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Eyres, H. (2014, March 15-16). Poetry's true objective. *Financial Times Weekend*.
- Fadiman, A. (1997). *The spirit catches you and you fall down: A Hmong child, her American doctors, and the collision of cultures*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Farrell, G. A. (1997). Aggression in clinical settings: Nurses' views. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 25(3), 501-508.

- Fenstermacher, G. D. (1990). Some moral considerations on teaching as a profession. In J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder & K. A. Sirotnik (Eds.), *The moral dimensions of teaching* (pp. 130-151). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Fineman, S. (2000). Emotional arenas revisited. In S. Fineman (Ed.), *Emotion in organizations* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 1-24). London: Sage.
- Fineman, S. (2004). Getting the measure of emotion – and the cautionary tale of emotional intelligence. *Human Relations*, 57(6), 719-740. doi:10.1177/0018726704044953
- Fiumara, G. C. (1990). *The other side of language: A philosophy of listening* (Charles Lambert, Trans.). London: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punishment: The birth of the prison* (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1980a). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (Colin Gordon, Ed.; Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1980b). Prison talk (J.–J. Brochier, Interviewer; Colin Gordon, Trans.). In Colin Gordon (Ed.), *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (pp. 37-54). New York: Pantheon Books.

- Foucault, M. (1980c). The eye of power (J-P Barou and M. Perrot, Interviewers; Colin Gordon, Trans.). In Colin Gordon (Ed.), *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (pp. 146-165). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1980d). Two lectures (Kate Soper, Trans.). In Colin Gordon (Ed.), *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (pp. 78-108). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1981). The order of discourse. In R. Young (Ed.), *Untying the text: A poststructuralist reader* (pp. 48-79). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Foucault, M. (1988). *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason* (Richard Howard, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1961)
- Foucault, M. (1990a). *The history of sexuality: Vol. 1: An introduction* (Robert Hurley, Trans.). London: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1976)
- Foucault, M. (1990b). *The history of sexuality: Vol. 2: The use of pleasure* (Robert Hurley, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1984)
- Foucault, M. (1997). The ethics of the concern of the self as a practice of freedom (H. Becker, R. Fernet-Betancourt & A. Gomez-Müller, Interviewers; P. Aranov & D. McGrawth,

Trans.). In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *Michel Foucault: Ethics, subjectivity and truth. The essential works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984: Vol. I* (pp. 281-301). New York: The New Press. (Original work published 1984)

Foucault, M. (2000). Interview with Michel Foucault (D. Trombadori, Interviewer; Robert Hurley, Trans.). In P. Rabinow (Series Ed.), J. D. Faubion (Vol. Ed.), *Michel Foucault: Power. The essential works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984: Vol. III* (pp. 239-297). New York: The New Press. (Original work published 1980)

Fox, S. (1981). *The American conservation movement: John Muir and his legacy*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. (Original work published in 1981 as *John Muir and his legacy: The American conservation movement*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc.)

Frank, A. W. (2000, May). The standpoint of storyteller. *Qualitative Health Research*, 10 (3), 354-365. doi:10.1177/104973200129118499

Frank, A. W. (2002). *At the will of the body: Reflections on illness* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.

Frank, A. W. (2010). *Letting stories breathe: A socio-narratology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

- Frank, A. W. (2012). Practicing dialogical narrative analysis. In J. A. Holstein & J. F. Gubrium (Eds.), *Varieties of narrative analysis* (pp. 33-52). Los Angeles: Sage.
- Freire, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Freire, P., & Macedo, D. (1987). *Literacy: Reading the word and the world*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Fricker, E. (1994). Against gullibility. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), *Knowing from words: Western and Indian philosophical analysis of understanding and testimony*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academy.
- Fricker, M. (2006). Powerlessness and social interpretation. *Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology*, 3(1-2), 96-108. doi:10.1353/epi.0.0004
- Fricker, M. (2007). *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fricker, M. (2008). Forum on Miranda FRICKER's *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*/Précis. *Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia*, 23(61), 69-72.

- Fricker, M. (2012). Silence and institutional prejudice. In S. L. Crasnow & A. M. Superson (Eds.), *Out from the shadows: Analytical feminist contributions to traditional philosophy* (pp. 287-306). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frye, M. (1983). *The politics of reality: Essays in feminist theory*. Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press.
- Frye, N. (1973). *The anatomy of criticism: Four essays*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1957)
- Fullan, M. (1993). *Change forces: Probing the depths of educational reform*. London: Falmer Press.
- Fullan, M. (2001). *Leading in a culture of change*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Fullan, M. (2003). *The moral imperative of school leadership*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
- Gabriel, Y. (2003). Glass palaces and glass cages: Organisations in times of flexible work, fragmented consumption and fragile selves. *Ephemera*, 3(3), 166-184.
- Gabriel, Y., & Lang, T. (2008). New faces and new masks of today's consumer. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 8(3), 321-340. doi:10.1177/1469540508095266

Galton, M., & MacBeath, J. (2008). *Teachers under pressure*. London: Sage Publications Limited.

Garber, M. (1997). *Vested interests: Cross-dressing and cultural anxiety*. London: Routledge.

Garcia, J. L. A. (2007). Practical reason and its virtues. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), *Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology* (pp. 81-107). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Garratt, D., & Hodkinson, P. (1998). Can there be criteria for selecting research criteria? A hermeneutical analysis of an inescapable dilemma. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 4(4), 515-539.  
doi:10.1177/107780049800400406

Glissant, E. (2002). Conclusion: The unforeseeable diversity of the world (Haun Saussy, Trans). In E. Mudimbe-Boyi (Ed.), *Beyond dichotomies: Histories, identities, cultures and the challenge of globalization* (pp. 287-296). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Goffman, E. (1990). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. London: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1963)

- Gold, A., Evans, J., Earley, P., Halpin, D., & Collarbone, P. (2003). Principled principals? Values-driven leadership: Evidence from ten case studies of „outstanding“ school leaders. *Educational Management and Administration*, 31(2), 127-138.
- Goleman, D. (1995). EQ: What's your emotional intelligence quotient? *The Utne Reader*, 72, 74-76.
- Goleman, D. (1997). Afflictive and nourishing emotions. In D. Goleman (Ed.), *Healing emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on mindfulness, emotions, and health* (pp. 33-46), Boston: Shambhala.
- Goleman, D. (2002). *The new leaders: Transforming the art of leadership into the science of results*. London: Little Brown.
- Goleman, D. (2006). *Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ* (10<sup>th</sup> anniversary ed.). New York: Bantam Books.
- Good, B. J., & Good, M-J. D. (1994). In the subjunctive mode: Epilepsy narratives in Turkey. *Social Science and Medicine*, 38(6), 835-862.
- Goodall, H. L. (2008). *Writing qualitative inquiry: Self, stories and academic life*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.

Goodlad, J. I., Soder, R., & Sirotnik, K. A. (Eds.). (1990). *The moral dimensions of teaching*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Gregg, A. (2011, December 20). *Neil Postman on what is lacking in schools* [Video file].

Retrieved from <http://tvo.org/video/169800/neil-postman-what-lacking-schools>

Griffin, M. (2004). Teaching cognitive rehearsal as a shield for lateral violence: An intervention for newly qualified nurses. *The Journal of Continuing Education in Nursing*, 35(6), 257-263.

Grumet, M. R. (1988). *Bitter milk: Women and teaching*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press.

Guattari, F. (1989, Summer). The three ecologies (Chris Turner, Trans.). *New Foundations*, 8, 131-147.

Guattari, F. (2008). *The three ecologies* (L. Pinder & P. Sutton, Trans.). London: Continuum.

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 105- 117). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hall, V. (1996). *Dancing on the ceiling: A study of women managers in education*. London: Paul Chapman.

Hampden-Turner, C., & Trompenaars, L. (1993). *The seven cultures of capitalism*. New York: Doubleday.

Hansen, D. T. (1993). From role to person: The moral layeredness of classroom teaching. *American Educational Journal*, 30(4), 651-674.

Hansen, D. T. (2001). Teaching as a moral activity. In V. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of research* (4<sup>th</sup> ed., pp. 826-857). Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association.

Haraway, D. (1988, Autumn). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. *Feminist Studies*, 14(3), 575-599.

Haraway, D. (1991). A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In D. Haraway (Ed.), *Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature* (pp. 149-181). New York, NY: Routledge. Retrieved from <http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Haraway-CyborgManifesto.html>

Haraway, D. (1992). The promises of monsters: A regenerative politics for inappropriate/d Others. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P. A. Treichler (Eds.), *Cultural studies* (pp. 295-337). New York: Routledge.

Haraway, D. J. (1994, Winter). A game of cat's cradle: Science studies, feminist theory, cultural studies, *Configurations* 2(1), 59-71.

Haraway, D. J. (1997).

*Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millennium.FemaleMan<sup>©</sup>Meets\_OncoMouse<sup>™</sup>: Feminism and technoscience*. New York: Routledge.

Hargreaves, A. (1994). *Changing teachers, changing times: Teachers' work and culture in the postmodern age*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Hargreaves, A. (1995, April). Renewal in the age of paradox. *Educational Leadership*, 52(7), 14-19.

Hargreaves, A. (1998). The emotional practice of teaching. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 14(8), 835-854.

Hargreaves, A. (1999, July). *Teaching in a box: Emotional geographies of teaching*. ISATT millenium keynote address, International Study Association on Teachers and Teaching 9th Biennial Conference, Dublin.

Hargreaves, A. (2000). Mixed emotions: Teachers' perceptions of their interactions with students. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 16(8), 811-826.

Hargreaves, A. (2001). The emotional geographies of teachers' relations with their colleagues. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 35, 503-527.

Hargreaves, D., & Hopkins, D. (1991). *The empowered school*. London: Cassell.

Harrison, W. W. (1989). The power of anger in the work of love. In J. Plaskow & C. P. Christ (Eds.), *Weaving the visions: New patterns in feminist spirituality* (pp. 214-225). San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers.

Hattie, J. (2008). *Visible learning*. London: Routledge.

Hawley, D. B. (1994, November). How long do international school heads survive? A research analysis (Part I). *International Schools Journal*, 14(1), 8-21.

Hawley, D. B. (1995, April). How long do international school heads survive? A research analysis (Part II). *International Schools Journal*, 14(2), 23-36.

Hayden, M. (2006). *Introduction to international education: International schools and their communities*. London: Sage.

Hayden, M., Levy, J., & Thompson, J. (Eds.). (2007). *The Sage handbook of research in international education*. London: Sage.

- Hayden, M., & Thompson, J. (1995a). International schools and international education: A relationship reviewed. *Oxford Review of Education*, 21(3), 327-345.
- Hayden, M., & Thompson, J. (2000a). International education: Flying flags or raising standards? *International Schools Journal*, 19(2), 48-56.
- Hayden, M. C., & Thompson, J. J. (Eds.). (1998). *International education: Principles and practice*. London: Kogan Page.
- Hayden, M. C., & Thompson, J. J. (2000b). Quality in Diversity. In M. C. Hayden & J. J. Thompson (Eds.), *International schools & international education - improving teaching, management & quality* (pp. 1-14). London: Kogan Page.
- Hekman, S. (2010). *The material of knowledge: Feminist disclosures*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Heschel, A. J. (1969). *The prophets*. New York: Harper Rowe.
- Hill, I. (2000). Internationally-minded schools. *International Schools Journal*, 20(1), 24-37.
- Hobbes, T. (2003). *Leviathan* (R. Tuck, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hochschild, A.R. (1983). *The managed heart: The commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1990). Ideology and emotion management: A perspective and path for future research. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 117-142). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Hodgson, A. (2005). Introduction to the world of governance. In A. Hodgson & M. Chuck (Eds.), *Governance in international schools* (pp. 7-11). Great Glemham, Suffolk: Peridot Press.
- Hofstadter, D. (1979). *Godel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid*. New York: Basic.
- Holman Jones, S. (2004). Building connections in qualitative research: Carolyn Ellis and Art Bochner in conversation with Stacy Holman Jones [113 paragraphs]. *Forum: Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 5(3), Art. 28. Retrieved from <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0403284>
- Holman Jones, S. (2005). Autoethnography: Making the personal political. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The handbook of qualitative research* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pp. 763-791). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Holmes, M. (1992). Alasdair MacIntyre and school administration: After the collapse of the common school. *Canadian Journal of Education*, 17(4), 422-436.

Holt, M. (2000). Introduction: The concept of quality in education. In C. Hoy, C. Bayne-Jardine & M. Wood, *Improving quality in education* (pp. 1-9). London: Falmer Press.

Holt, N. L. (2003). Representation, legitimation and autoethnography: An autoethnographic writing story. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 2(1), 18-28.

Hoy, C., Bayne-Jardine, C., & Wood, M. (2000). *Improving quality in education*. London: Falmer Press.

Hudak, J. (2007). *Are we not family? The transition from heterosexual marriage to partnering with a woman*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Drexel University, USA.

Hunter, J. D. (2000). *The death of character: Moral education in an age without good or evil*. New York: Basic Books.

Hyman, A., & Walsh, J. (1973). *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Jackson, P. W., Boostrom, R. E., & Hansen, D. T. (1993). *The moral life of schools*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Jackson, A. Y., & Mazzei, L. A. (2012). *Thinking with theory in qualitative research*. Abingdon, OX: Routledge.

Jackson, A. Y. & Mazzei, L. A. (2013). Plugging one text into another: Thinking with theory in qualitative research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 19(4): 261-271.

doi:10.1177/1077800412471510

Jaggar, A. M. (1989). Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 32(2), 151-176.

doi:10.1080/00201748908602185

Jaggar, A. M., & Boddo, S. (Eds.). (1989). *Gender/body/knowledge: Feminist reconstructions of being and knowing*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

James, C., Connolly, M., Dunning, G., & Elliott, T. (2006). *How very effective primary schools work*. London: Paul Chapman.

Janesick, V. J. (1994). The dance of qualitative research design: Metaphor, methodolatry and meaning. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 209-219). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Johnson, S. (2010). *Where good ideas come from: The natural history of innovation*. New York: Riverhead Books

- Jones, A. H. (1997). From principles to reflective practice or narrative ethics? Commentary on Carson. In R. A. Carson & C. R. Burns (Eds.), *Philosophy of medicine and bioethics* (pp. 193-195). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Kanter, R. M. (1975). Women and the structure of organizations: Explorations in theory and behavior. In M. Millman & R. M. Kanter (Eds.), *Another voice: Feminist perspectives on social life and social science* (pp. 34-74). Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
- Kelly, A. V. (1995). *Education and democracy: Principles and practices*. London: Paul Chapman.
- Kelly, A. V. (2004). *The curriculum: Theory and practice* (5<sup>th</sup> ed.). London: Sage Publications.
- Kennedy, R. (2001). Stolen Generations testimony: Trauma, historiography and the question of “truth”. *Aboriginal History Journal*, 25, 116-131.
- King, T. (2003). *The truth about stories: A native narrative*. Toronto: House of Anansi Press.
- Klein, R. (1986, Summer). The métis of centaurs. *Diacritics* 16(2), 2-13.
- Kleinman, A. (1988). *The illness narratives: Suffering, healing and the human condition*. New York: Basic Books.

- Klenke, K. (1996). *Women and leadership: A contextual perspective*. New York: Springer.
- Krashen, S. D. (2009). *Principles and practice in second language acquisition*. (Original work published 1982). Retrieved from [http://www.sdkrashen.com/content/books/principles\\_and\\_practice.pdf](http://www.sdkrashen.com/content/books/principles_and_practice.pdf)
- Kristeva, J. (1991). *Strangers to ourselves* (Leon S. Roudiez, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kristjánsson, K. . (2006). “Emotional intelligence” in the classroom? An Aristotelian critique. *Educational Theory*, 56(1), 39-56.
- Kristjánsson, K. . (2007). *Aristotle, emotions, and education*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing.
- Kristof, N. D., & WuDunn, S. (2009). *Half the sky: Turning oppression into opportunity for women worldwide*. New York: Knopf Books.
- Kruchov, C., MacBeath, J., & Riley, K. (1998). Introduction. In J. MacBeath (Ed.), *Effective school leadership: Responding to change* (pp. xi-xv). London: Paul Chapman.
- Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Landau, N. (2004). Teachers in the school context. In P. Adey (with G. Hewitt, J. Hewitt & N. Landau), *The professional development of teachers: Practice and theory* (pp. 97-118). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- LaRoque, E. (1990). Preface or here are our voices - who will hear? In J. Perreault & S. Vance (Eds.), *Writing the circle: Native women of Western Canada* (pp. xv-xxx). Edmonton, AB: NeWest Press.
- Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leder, D. (1990). *The absent body*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Leithwood, K., Leonard, K., & Sharratt, S. (1997, January). *Conditions fostering organisational learning in schools*. Paper presented at the International Congress on School Effectiveness and Improvement, Memphis, TN, USA.
- Lenz Taguchi, H. (2010). *Going beyond the theory/practice divide in early childhood education: Introducing an intra-active pedagogy*. London: Routledge.
- Lenz Taguchi, H. (2012). A diffractive and Deleuzian approach to analysing interview data. *Feminist Theory*, 13(3), 265-281. doi:10.1177.1464700112456001
- Levine, S. R., & Crom, M. A. (1994). *The leader in you*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966). *The savage mind* (George Weidenfield and Nicholson Ltd., Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1962)
- Levinas, E. (1985). *Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo* (Richard. A. Cohen, Trans.). Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. (Original work published 1982)
- Lin, A. M. Y. (1998a). Re-visioning the right to mother-tongue education in Hong Kong [Online.]. Retrieved from <http://www.tesl-hk.org.hk/PreGen/TESLV0003>
- Lin, A. M. Y. (1998b). Understanding the issue of medium of instruction in Hong Kong schools: What research approaches do we need? *Asia Pacific Journal of Language in Education*, *1*(1), 85-98.
- Lionnet, F. (1991). *Autobiographical voices: Race, gender, self-portraiture*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Littleford, J. (1999). Leadership of schools and the longevity of school heads. *International Schools Journal*, *19*(1), 23-34.
- Littleford, J. (2011, November). Head compensation: The race to the top. Retrieved from <http://jlittleford.com/articles.php>

Lorde, A. (1984). *Sister outsider: Essays and speeches* Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press.

MacBeath, J. (Ed.). (1998a). *Effective school leadership: Responding to change*. London: Paul Chapman.

MacBeath, J. (1998b). Seven selected heresies of leadership. In J. MacBeath (Ed.), *Effective school leadership: Responding to change* (pp. 1-19). London: Paul Chapman.

MacBeath, J. (2000, November). *Who's top in the world class or just another day in the global village?* Paper presented at the meeting of the International Network for Educational Improvement, City University of Hong Kong.

MacBeath, J. (2010). Leadership for learning: Concepts, principles and practice. *Leadership for Learning: The Cambridge Network*. Cambridge: LFL. Retrieved from [http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/centres/cce/initiatives/projects/leadership/LfL-Concepts\\_Principles\\_Practices\\_cc\\_1.pdf](http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/centres/cce/initiatives/projects/leadership/LfL-Concepts_Principles_Practices_cc_1.pdf)

MacBeath, J., Moos, L., & Riley, K. (1998). Time for a change. In J. MacBeath (Ed.), *Effective school leadership: Responding to change* (pp. 20-31). London: Paul Chapman.

MacIntyre, A. (1984). *After virtue* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

MacLure, M. (1993). Arguing for yourself: Identity as an organising principle in teachers' jobs and lives. *British Educational Research Journal*, 19(4), 311-322.

MacLure, M. (2003). *Discourse in educational and social research*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

MacLure, M. (2010, December 6-9). *Qualitative inquiry: Where are the ruins?* Keynote address presented to the New Zealand Association for Research in Education Conference, University of Auckland. Retrieved from <http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/respapers/nzareRuins.pdf>

Malcolm, A. (1973). *The tyranny of the group*. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, and Co.

Marquard, L. (1957). *South Africa's colonial policy*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Institute of Race Relations.

Marshall, C. (1992). School administrators' values: A focus on atypicals. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 28(3), 368-386.

Marshall, C., Patterson, J. A., Rogers, D. L., & Steele, J. R. (1996). Caring as career: An alternative perspective for educational administration. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 32(2), 271-294.

Mattern, W. G. (1994). *The most important decision: Searching for and selecting new heads for international schools*. Petersfield: European Council of International Schools.

Matthews, M. (1989a). The scale of international education: Part 1. *International Schools Journal*, 17, 7-17.

Matthews, M. (1989b). The uniqueness of international education: Part 2. *International Schools Journal*, 18, 24-34.

Mazzei, L. A. (2013). A voice without organs: Interviewing in posthumanist research. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 26(6): 732-740.

doi:10.1080/09518398.2013.788761

McKerrow, K. (1997). Ethical administration: An oxymoron? *Journal of School Leadership*, 7(2), 210-225.

McMurtry, J. (1991). Education and the market model. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 25(2), 209-217.

Measor, L. (1985). Critical incidents in the classroom: Identities, choices and careers. In S. J. Ball, & I. F. Goodson (Eds.), *Teachers' lives and careers* (pp. 61-77). London: Falmer Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). An unpublished text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A prospectus of his work (Arleen. B. Dalley, Trans.). In J. M. Edie (Ed.), *M. Merleau-Ponty, The primacy of perception: And other essays on phenomenological psychology, the philosophy of art, history and politics* (pp. 3-11). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2005). *Phenomenology of perception* (Colin Smith, Trans). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1945)

Merlingen, M. (2013, May 8). Is poststructuralism a useful IR theory? What about its relationship to historical materialism? Retrieved 2014, November 29 from <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/08/is-poststructuralism-a-useful-ir-theory-and-what-about-its-relationship-to-historical-materialism/>

Merrell, F. (2003). *Sensing corporeally: Toward a posthuman understanding*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Morris, P. (1996). *The Hong Kong school curriculum: Development, issues and politics*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Morris, P. (2004). Teaching in Hong Kong: Professionalization, accountability and the state. *Research Papers in Education*, 19(1), 105-121. Retrieved from <http://eprints.ioe.ac.uk/4752/1/Morris2004Teaching105.pdf>

- Mullen, C. A., Holt, M., Shaw, K. E., & Parratt, A. (2000). Books reviews. *Teacher Development: An International Journal of Teachers' Professional Development*, 4(3), 437-454. doi:10.1080/13664530000200116
- Muncey, T. (2005). Doing autoethnography. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 4(1), Art. 5, 1-12. Retrieved from [http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/4\\_1/pdf/Muncey.pdf](http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/4_1/pdf/Muncey.pdf)
- Murris, K. (2009, January-June). A philosophical approach to emotions: Understanding love's knowledge through a frog in love. *Childhood and Philosophy*, 5(9), 5-30.
- Murris, K. (2013, January). The epistemic challenge of hearing child's voice. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 32(3), 245-259. doi:10.1007/s11217-012-9349-9
- Murphy, J. (1992). *The landscape of leadership preparation: Reframing the education of school administrators*. Newbury Park, CA: Corwin Press.
- Nagel, T. (1974, Oct). What is it like to be a bat? *The Philosophical Review*, 83(4), 435-450.
- National College for School Leadership (NCSL). (2006). *Recruiting headteachers and senior leaders: Overview of research findings*. Nottingham: NCSL.

Ndebele, N. S. (1995). Maintaining domination through language. *Academic Development*, 1(1), 1-5.

Nias, J. (1989). *Primary teachers talking: A study of teaching as work*. London: Routledge.

Noddings, N. (1992). *The challenge to care in schools: An alternative approach to education*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Noddings, N. (2002). *Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Nucci, L. P. (2001). *Education in the moral domain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1992). *Love's knowledge: Essays on philosophy and literature*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1996). Aristotle on emotion and rational persuasion. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's rhetoric* (pp. 303-323). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2003). *Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2004a). Emotions as judgments of value and importance. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions* (pp.183-199). New York: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2004b). *Hiding from humanity: Disgust, shame, and the law*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted). (2007, May). *Ofsted departmental report 2006-07*.

London: Ofsted. Retrieved from

<http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/annual-reports/t/The%20Annual%20Report%20of%20Her%20Majestys%20Chief%20Inspector%20of%20Schools%202005-06%20%28PDF%20format%29.pdf>

Öhman, A. (2008). Fear and anxiety: Overlaps and disassociations. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones & L. Feldman Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pp. 709-729). New York & London: The Guilford Press.

Ondaatje, M. (2004). *The English patient*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

Orchard, J. (2007). Are the national standards for headteachers in England helpful? In *Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, New College Oxford*.

Orchard, J. L. (2011). Practical wisdom and the good school leader. In *Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, New College Oxford*.

Pastpresents: Playing cat's cradle with Donna Haraway. (n.d.). Opening up to knowledge work as gaming through stories, histories, and conversations [Blog post]. Retrieved from <http://playingcatscradle.blogspot.com/>

Pearce, R. (2003). Cultural values for international schools. *International Schools Journal*, 22(2), 56-65.

Pelias, R. J. (2003). The academic tourist: An autoethnography. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 9(3), 369-373.

Pennycooke, A. (1989). The Concept of method, interested knowledge, and the politics of language teaching. *TESOL Quarterly*, 23(4), 589-618.

Peshkin, A. (1985). Virtuous subjectivity: In the participant-observer's I's. In D. Berg & K. Smith (Eds.), *Exploring clinical methods for sound research* (pp. 267-282). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Piddocke, S., Magsino, R., & Manley-Casimir, M. (1997). *Teachers in trouble: An exploration of the normative character of teaching*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Pillow, W. (2003). Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as methodological power in qualitative research. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 16(2), 175-196. doi:10.1080/0951839032000060635
- Plato (1994a). *Phaedrus* (B. Jowett, Trans.). In D. C. Stevenson (Ed.), *The Internet Classics Archives* (Original work published 360 BCE). Retrieved from <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedrus.html>
- Plato (1994b). *The republic* (B. Jowett, Trans). In D. C. Stevenson (Ed.), *The Internet Classics Archives*. (Original work published 360 BCE). Retrieved from <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html>
- Polkinghorne, D. (1988). *Narrative knowing and the human sciences*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Polkinghorne, D. E. (1991). Narrative and self-concept. *Journal of Narrative and Life History*, 1(2 & 3), 135-153.
- Polkinghorne, D. E. (1995). Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis. In J. A. Hatch & R. Wisniewski (Eds.), *Life history and narrative* (pp. 5-23). London: Falmer Press.
- Postman, N. (1996). *The end of education: Redefining the value of school*. New York: Vintage Books.

- Power, F. C. (1993). Just schools and moral atmosphere. In K. A. Strike & P. L. Ternasky (Eds.), *Ethics for professionals in education: Perspectives for preparation and practice* (pp. 148-161). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Pratt, M. B. (1995). *S/HE*. Ithaca, NY: Firebrand Books.
- Pratt, M. L. (2002). Modernity and periphery: Toward a global and relational analysis. In E. Mudimbe-Boyi (Ed.), *Beyond dichotomies: Histories, identities, cultures and the challenge of globalization* (pp. 21-47). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2007). *Independent study into school leadership: Main report*. Norwich: Department for Education and Skills (DfES).
- Rabinow, P., & Rose, N. (2003). Introduction: Foucault today. In P. Rabinow & N. Rose (Eds.), *The essential Foucault: Selections from the essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984* (pp. vii–xxxv). New York: The New Press.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2002). Husserl and Nagel on subjectivity and the limits of physical objectivity. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 35, 353-377.
- Reeves, J., Moos, L., & Forrest, J. (1998). The school leader's view. In J. MacBeath (Ed.), *Effective school leadership: Responding to change* (pp. 32-59). London: Paul Chapman.

- Regan, H. B., & Brooks, G. H. (1995). *Out of women's experience: Creating relational leadership*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
- Reid, W. A. (1997, Spring). Conceptions of curriculum and paradigms for research: The case of school effectiveness studies. *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision*, 12(3), 212-227.
- Reitz, D. J. (1998). *Moral crisis in the schools: What parents and teachers need to know*. Baltimore, MD: Cathedral Foundation Press.
- Richards, R. (2008). Writing the othered self: Autoethnography and the problem of objectification in writing about illness and disability. *Qualitative Health Research*, 18(12), 1717-1728.
- Richards, R. J. (2012). "You look very well for a transplant": *Autoethnographic narrative and identity in chronic kidney disease, kidney failure and the life post-transplant*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stellenbosch University, Cape Town, RSA. Retrieved from [scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10019.../richards\\_transplant\\_2012.pdf?](http://scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10019.../richards_transplant_2012.pdf?)
- Richardson, L. (1990). *Writing strategies: Reaching diverse audiences*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Richardson, L. (1994). Writing: A method of inquiry. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 516-529). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Richardson, L. (1997). Skirting a pleated text: De-disciplining an academic life. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 3(3), 295-303. doi:10.1177/107780049700300303
- Richardson, L. (2000). New writing practices in qualitative research. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 17(1), 5-20.
- Richardson, L., & Lockridge, E. (2002). Out of Russia: Two narratives and a conversation. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 8(2), 219-238. doi:10.1177/10778004008002021
- Robertson, J. E. (2003, December). Teachers' perceptions of accountability at an international school. *Journal of Research in International Education*, 2(3), 277-300.
- Rorty, A. O. (1980). Introduction. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), *Explaining emotions* (pp. 1-8). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rosaldo, M. Z. (1984). Towards an anthropology of self and feeling. In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), *Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion* (pp. 137-157). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Rosener, J. B. (1990, November-December). Ways women lead. *Harvard Business Review*, 68(6), 119-125. Retrieved from <http://hbr.org/1990/11/ways-women-lead/ar/>
- Rudduck, J. (1988). Changing the world of the classroom by understanding it: A review of some of the aspects of the work of Lawrence Stenhouse. *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision*, 4, 30-42.
- Russell, B. (2004). *Power: A new social analysis*. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1938)
- Ryle, G. (1968). *The thinking of thoughts: What is „le penseur“ doing?* University Lectures (18), The University of Saskatchewan. Retrieved from [http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/CSACSA/Vol11/Papers/ryle\\_1.html](http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/CSACSA/Vol11/Papers/ryle_1.html)
- Said, E. (1983). *The world, the text, and the critic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Said, E. (1984, September). The mind of winter: Reflections on a life in exile. *Harper's Magazine*, 49-55. Retrieved from <http://www.slashdocs.com/kiiivw/mind-of-winter-reflection-on-life-in-exile-1984-edward-said.html>
- Said, E. (1986). *After the last sky: Palestinian lives*. New York: Pantheon.
- Said, E. (1993). *Culture and imperialism*, London: Chatto and Windus.

Said, E. (1998, May 7). Between worlds: Edward Said makes sense of his life. *London Review of Books*, 20(9), 3-7.

Said, E. (2000). *Reflections on exile, and other essays*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Said, E. W. (1975, Autumn). The word, the text, and the critic. *The Bulletin of Midwest Modern Language Association*, 8(2), 1-23. Retrieved from <http://www.rlwclarke.net/Theory/SourcesPrimary/SaidText,theWorld,theCritic.pdf>

Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Said, E. W. (1996). *Representations of the intellectual*. New York: Vintage.

Salovey, P., Detweiler-Bedell, B. T., Detweiler-Bedell, J. B., & Mayer, J. D. (2008). Emotional intelligence. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones & L. Feldman Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pp. 533-547). New York & London: The Guilford Press.

Scenes from the Battleground: Teaching in British Schools. (2008, May 26). Seven habits of highly defective headteachers [Blog post]. Retrieved 2008, May 26 from <http://teachingbattleground.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/seven-habits-of-highly-defective-headteachers/>

Scenes from the Battleground: Teaching in British Schools. (2014, December 26). A guide to scenes from the battleground. Retrieved 2014, December 26 from <https://teachingbattleground.wordpress.com/2014/12/26/a-guide-to-scenes-from-the-battleground/>

Retrieved 2015, April 20 from <https://teachingbattleground.wordpress.com/2015/04/16/a-guide-to-scenes-from-the-battleground/>

Schmuck, P., Hollingsworth, S., & Lock, L. (2002). Women administrators and the point of exit: Collision between the person and the institution. In C. Reynolds (Ed.), *Women and school leadership: International perspectives*. Albany, NY: SUNY.

Sen, A. (2006). *Identity and violence: The illusion of destiny*. London: Allen Lane.

Senge, P. M. (1990). *The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization*. New York: Doubleday/Currency.

Sergiovanni, T. J. (1994). The roots of school leadership. *Principal*, 74(2), 6-9.

Shapin, S. (1995). *A social history of truth: Civility and science in seventeenth-century England*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Sherman, N., & White, H. (2007). Intellectual virtue: Emotions, luck, and the ancients. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), *Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology* (pp. 34-53). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Short, N. P., Turner, L., & Grant, A. (2013). Acknowledgements. In N. P. Short, L. Turner & A. Grant (Eds.), *Contemporary British autoethnography* (Vol. 9, p. xi). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers.

Shots of Awe. (2014a, May 20). *Nonconformity and the creative life* [Video file]. Retrieved from [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NA\\_tjY8osGE&feature=youtu.be](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NA_tjY8osGE&feature=youtu.be)

Shots of Awe. (2014b, November 25). *How our creations change us* [Video file]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHCo9U4jxzE>

Shotwell, A. (2006). Commonsense racial formation: Wahneema Lubiano, Antonio Gramsci, and the importance of the nonpropositional. In J. Young & J. Evans Braziel (Eds.), *Race and the foundations of knowledge: Cultural amnesia in the academy* (pp. 46-62). Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Shotwell, A. (2011). *Knowing otherwise: Race, gender, and implicit understanding*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Shweder, R. A. (2004). Deconstructing the emotions for the sake of comparative research. In A. S. R. Manstead, N. Frijda & A. Fischer (Eds.), *Feelings and emotions: The Amsterdam symposium* (pp. 81-97). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Simola, S. (2010). Anti-corporate anger as a form of care-based moral agency. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 94, 255-269. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0755-7

Skutnabb-Kangas T. (2000). *Linguistic genocide in education – or worldwide diversity and human rights?* Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (2002). Why should linguistic diversity be maintained and supported in Europe? Some arguments. In *Guide for the development of language education policies in Europe: From linguistic diversity to plurilingual education: Reference study*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Language Policy Division, DGIV. Retrieved 2008, December 20 from [www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural\\_Co-operation/education/Languages/Language\\_Policy/Policy\\_development\\_activities/Studies/Skutnabb-KangasEN.pdf](http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/education/Languages/Language_Policy/Policy_development_activities/Studies/Skutnabb-KangasEN.pdf).

Slater, J. (1998). Tongue-tied. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 161 (15), 48-50.

Smith, D. L. (1997). What is black culture? In W. Lubiano (Ed.), *The house that race built: Black Americans, US terrain* (pp. 178-194). New York: Pantheon Books.

- Smithers, A., & Robinson, P. (2007). *School headship: Present and future*. Buckingham, UK: University of Buckingham, Centre for Education and Employment Research. Retrieved from <http://www.teachers.org.uk/files/active/0/Headsfin.pdf>
- Sockett, H. (1993). *The moral base for teacher professionalism*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Solomon, R. (2003). *Not passion's slave: Emotions and choice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Solomon, R. C. (1986). Literacy and the education of the emotions. In S. De Castell, A. Luke & K. Egan (Eds.), *Literacy, society, and schooling: A reader* (pp. 37-58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Solomon, R. C. (2008). The philosophy of emotions. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones & L. Feldman Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pp. 3-16). New York & London: The Guilford Press.
- Somerville, M. (2000). *The ethical canary: Science, society and the human spirit*. Toronto: Viking.
- Sparkes, A. C. (1996). The fatal flaw: A narrative of the fragile body-self. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 2(4), 463- 494. doi:10.1177/107780049600200405

Sparkes, A. C. (1998). Narratives of self as an occasion of conspiracy. *Sociology of Sport Online*.

Retrieved from <http://physed.otago.ac.nz/sosol/v1i1/v1i1a3.htm>

Sparkes, A. C. (2000). Autoethnography and narratives of self: Reflections on criteria in action. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 17, 21-43.

Sparkes, A. C. (2002). Autoethnography: Self-indulgence or something more? In A. Bochner & C. Ellis (Eds.), *Ethnographically speaking: Autoethnography, literature and aesthetics* (pp. 209-232). New York: Alta Mira Press.

Sparkes, A. C. (2003, December). Review essay: Transforming qualitative data into art forms. *Qualitative Research*, 3(3), 415-420. doi:10.1177/1468794103033011

Spector-Mersel, G. (2010). Narratives: Time for a paradigm. *Narrative Inquiry*, 20, 205-224.

Spector-Mersel, G. (2011). Mechanisms of selection in claiming narrative identities: A model for interpreting narratives. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 17, 172-185. doi:10.1177/1077800410393885

Spelman, E. V. (1989). Anger and insubordination. In A. Garry & M. Pearsall (Eds.), *Women, knowledge, and reality: Explorations in feminist philosophy* (pp. 263-273). Boston: Unwin Hyman.

- Spinoza, B. (1992). *The Ethics: Treatise on the emendation of the intellect; Selected letters* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (Seymour Feldman, Ed.; Samuel Shirley, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. (Original work published 1677)
- Spry, T. (2001). Performing autoethnography: An embodied methodological praxis. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7(6), 706-732.
- Stenhouse, L. (1979). Case study in comparative education: Particularity and generalization. *Comparative Education*, 15(1), 5-10.
- Stenhouse, L. (1981). What counts as research? *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 29(2), 103-114. doi:10.2307/3120018
- Steyerl, H. (2003, May). Documentarism as politics of truth. (Aileen Derieg, Trans.). Retrieved from <http://eipcp.net/transversal/1003/steyerl2/en>
- Stout, W. (2005). Conflict and its resolution in the governance and management of international schools. *International Schools Journal*, 25(1), 15-21.
- Stout, W. (2007). The promotion of international education in formal institutions: Potential for conflict? In M. Hayden, J. Levy & J. Thompson (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of research in international education* (pp. 315-325). London: Sage Publications.

St Pierre, E. A. (1997). Methodology in the fold and the irruption of transgressive data. *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 10(2), 175-189.

Strike, K. A., & Ternasky, P. L. (Eds.). (1993). *Ethics for professionals in education: Perspectives for preparation and practice*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Taborsky, P. (2010). *The logic of cultures: Three structures of philosophical thought*. Bern: P. Lang.

Tabula Rasa, (2013a, October, 19). What makes a good school leader [Blog post]. Retrieved 2013, October 19 from <http://tabularasaeducation.wordpress.com/2013/10/19/what-makes-a-good-school-leader/>

Tabula Rasa. (2013b, December, 23). The twelve sighs of Christmas [Blog post]. Retrieved 2013, December 23 from <http://tabularasaeducation.wordpress.com/2013/12/23/the-twelve-sighs-of-christmas/>

Tamboukou, M. (2008a). A Foucauldian approach to narratives. In M. Andrews, C. Squire & M. Tamboukou (Eds.), *Doing narrative research* (pp. 102-120). London: Sage.

Tamboukou, M. (2008b). Visual silences, nomadic narratives. *Auto/Biography Yearbook*, 2, 1-20. Nottingham: Russels Press.

Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P. E., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Shamed into anger?: The relation of shame and guilt to anger and self-reported aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62(4), 669-675.

Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of self: The making of modern identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1992). *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Teacher Training Agency (TTA). (1997). *National standards for headteachers in England*. London: Teacher Training Agency.

Thomson, P. (2002). *Schooling the Rustbelt kids: Making the difference in changing times*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Todorov, T. (1984). *The conquest of America: The question of the other* (Richard Howard, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.

Tong, R., & Williams, N. (2014, Fall). Feminist ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/feminism-ethics/>

Traditional Theater. (2012, July 22). Noh Theater [Web page]. Retrieved from <http://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2091.html>

Trinh, T. Minh-ha. (Ed.). (1986-87, Fall-Winter). Introduction: She, the inappropriate/d Other. *Discourse*, 8, 3-9.

Trinh, T. Minh-ha. (1988). Not you/like you: Post-colonial women and the interlocking questions of identity and difference. *Inscriptions*, 3-4. Special issue: Feminism and the Critique of Colonial Discourses. Retrieved from [http://culturalstudies.ucsc.edu/PUBS/Inscriptions/vol\\_3-4/minh-ha.html](http://culturalstudies.ucsc.edu/PUBS/Inscriptions/vol_3-4/minh-ha.html)

Trinh, T. Minh-ha. (1989). *Woman, native, Other: Writing postcoloniality and feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Tripp, D. (1993). *Critical incidents in teaching: Developing professional judgment*. London: Routledge.

Turner, V. (1967). *The forest of symbols: Aspects of Ndembu ritual*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

van den Berghe, P. L. (1978). Education, class, and ethnicity in southern Peru: Revolutionary colonialism. In P. G. Altbach & G. P. Kelly (Eds.), *Education and colonialism* (pp. 270-298). New York: Longman.

- Van Maanen, J. (1988). *Tales of the field*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Weber, M. (1958). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (T. Parsons, Trans.). New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons.
- Weil, S. (1978). *Lectures on philosophy* (Hugh Price, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weiler, K. (1988). *Women teaching for change: Gender, class and power*. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey.
- Welton, J. (2001). Planning: The art of the possible. In S. Blandford & M. Shaw (Eds.), *Managing international schools* (pp. 94-104). London: RoutledgeFalmer.
- Weston, A. (1997). *A practical companion to ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Willis, A-M. (2006). Ontological designing – laying the ground. *Design Philosophy Papers Collection* 3(2), 80-98. Retrieved from <http://www.desphilosophy.com/dpp/home.html>
- Wilson, R. A. (2000). *Prometheus rising* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Tempe, Arizona: New Flacon Publications.

- Winch, C. (1996, March). Quality and education. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 30, 1-152.
- Winograd, K. (2003, December). The functions of teacher emotions: The good, the bad, and the ugly. *Teachers College Record*, 105(9), 1641–1673.
- Wisnewski, J. J. (2012). Heidegger's Aristotelian ethics. In M. Sanders & J. J. Wisnewski (Eds.), *Ethics and phenomenology* (pp. 57-77). Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books.
- Wollstonecraft, M. (1988). *A vindication of the rights of women* (M. Brody, Ed.). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1792)
- Wolpe, H. (1990). *Race, class and the apartheid state*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Wong, K. (1993). A report on medium of instruction grouping assessment (MIGA) in Hong Kong. In N. Bird, J. Harris & M. Ingham (Eds.), *Language & content* (pp. 56-63). Hong Kong: Institute of Language in Education.
- Wong, K. M. K. (2000). A critical review of the revised policy on the medium of instruction in Hong Kong secondary schools. Retrieved from <http://repository.ust.hk/dspace/bitstream/1783.1/1357/1/changlang01.pdf>
- Woods, P., & Carlyle, D. (2002). Teacher identities under stress: The emotions of separation and renewal. *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 12(2), 169-189.

- Woods, P., & Jeffrey, B. (2002). The reconstruction of primary teachers' identities. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 23*(1), 90-110.
- Xu, S., & Connelly, F. M. (2009). Narrative enquiry for teacher education and development: Focus on English as a foreign language in China. *Teaching and Teacher Education, 25*, 219-227.
- Young, J. (1988). *Writing and rewriting the holocaust: Narrative and the consequences of interpretation*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Zembylas, M. (2003). Emotions and teacher identity: A poststructural perspective. *Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice, 9*(3), 213-238.
- Zembylas, M. (2014). Theorizing "Difficult Knowledge" in the aftermath of the "Affective Turn": Implications for curriculum and pedagogy in handling traumatic representations. *Curriculum Inquiry, 44*(3), 390-412. doi:10.1111/curi.12051
- Zorn, D., & Boler, M. (2007, April-June). Rethinking emotions and educational leadership. *International Journal of Leadership in Education, 10*(2), 137-151.  
doi:10.1080/13603120601174345

Zsebik, P. (2000). The politics of international education. In M. C. Hayden & J. J. Thompson (Eds.), *International schools and international education: Improving teaching, management and quality* (pp. 62-69). London: Kogan Page.