UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

Understanding the livelihoods of small-scale fishers in Lamberts Bay: Implications for the new Small-scale Fisheries Policy

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Supervisor: Dr. Serge Raemaekers
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By Tsele Tommy Nthane

Abstract
Small-scale fishers (SSFs) are among the most vulnerable socio-economic groups because of their high dependence on marine resource harvesting. While small-scale fisheries employ the overwhelming majority of the world's fishers and contribute substantially to the global catch, they are, on the whole, marginalised and ignored. Despite their importance in providing food security and livelihoods in coastal communities, state management authorities routinely neglect small-scale fisheries in favour of industrial fisheries. In South Africa, the exclusion of small-scale fishers is intricately linked with the oppressive policies of the apartheid government, which limited access to the fisheries for the largely Black and Coloured small-scale fishers. Changes within fisheries management practices led to the development of management tools that moved away from conventional resource-centred strategies, to management approaches that recognised the complexity of natural and ecological processes inherent within small-scale fisheries.

Many of these new approaches have been embraced in South Africa's new small-scale fisheries policy. The policy represents a long line of arguably failed attempts at reforming South African fisheries undertaken by the South African government. While the policy is unique in the scale of participation by the small-scale fishers themselves it is still faced with the hurdle of implementation. The adoption of the individual rights approach embodied by the individual quota (IQ) system in the post-apartheid reforms has led to divisions within the community. Fishing rights benefited a small elite and disenfranchised many more fishers for whom fishing was a livelihood, but were excluded from the rights allocations. The new small-scale fisheries policy is widely acknowledged as progressive and carries the hope of inclusion for small-scale fishers along South Africa's coasts. After decades of disenfranchisement and individual rights allocations, the major challenge in the new policy's implementation will be dealing with the range of complex and unique communities in which the policy will be carried out.

The purpose of this study was to establish a profile of the Lamberts Bay small-scale fisher groups and their perceptions regarding the new small-scale fisher policy, in order to inform the policy's implementation in Lamberts Bay. The study employed a multi-method research strategy predominantly consisting of household surveys, key informant interviews, and focus groups. These were used to understand the socio-economic context of the small-scale fishers, to determine whether socio-economic differences existed between the fisher groups, to gather the perceptions of the fisher groups with respect to the new policy, and to aid in identifying the factors that will enable the expectations and needs of different groups to be accommodated in the SSF policy implementation.

The study focused on two fisher groups: West Coast Rock Lobster Right Holders (WCRLRHs) and Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers. It was found the WCRLRHs earned far greater income than the IRP fishers, as a result of the WCRLRHs superior Lobster quota allocation. Both fisher groups showed almost identical historical livelihood dependence on fisheries prior to the introduction of the IQs. This allocation of the IQs did not represent a repetition of historical instances of elite capture in Lamberts Bay, but, however, the introduction of the medium-term IQs in 2001 and the long-term IQs in 2005 resulted in

externally imposed income differences within the fishing community. This led to household food security and income differences among the fishers, which created divisions within the Lamberts Bay fishing community. All the IRP fishers had missed meals as a result of their household food security context, while very few WCRLRHs experienced comparable food insecurity. The far-reaching reforms of the new small-scale fisher policy (SSFP) were therefore overwhelmingly welcomed by the IRP fishers while the WCRLRHs perceived the policy as a threat to their existing privilege.

The key finding of this research was that the Lamberts Bay fishing community is not homogenous and struggles with a low sense of community cohesion. This was a direct result of the external income differences imposed by DAFF's fishing rights and permit allocations. Implementation strategies for the SSF policy must take this community fracturing into account. Particular attention must be paid to addressing the general educational, institutional and infrastructural deficits that plague both fisher groups, in addition to an in-depth understanding of the challenges of incorporating two fisher groups with important household differences in relative prosperity, into one small-scale fisher policy. Future fisheries research in the Lamberts Bay community must focus on specific implementation challenges centred on fisher co-operatives, giving agency to the fishers by liberating the fishers from the exploitative established fisher companies, and incorporating the small-scale fishers into the lucrative local value chains as well as macro-economic export environment.

Declaration

I know the meaning of plagiarism and declare that all the work in the dissertation, save for that which is properly acknowledged, is my own. This thesis uses the Harvard-Anglia (2008) referencing method throughout.

Tsele Nthane, November 2014

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMERB	Áreas de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos
ANC	African National Congress
CBLE	Community Based Legal Entity
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EEU	Environmental Evaluation Unit
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FCT	Fishermen's Community Trust
FPDC	Fisheries Policy Development Council
HDI	Historically Disadvantaged Individual
IQ	Individual Quota
IRP	Interim Relief Permit
ITQ	Individual Transferable Quota
IUU	Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
LTRA	Long-Term Rights Allocation
MCS	Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MLRA	Marine Living Resources Act
MPA	Marine Protected Area
MSY	Maximum Sustainable Yield
MTRA	Medium-Term Rights Allocation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
SFTG	Subsistence Fishery Task Group
SLA	Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
SSF	Small-Scale Fishery
SSFP	Small-Scale Fisher Policy
TAC	Total Allowable Catch
TAE	Total Allowable Effort
TURF	Territorial Use Rights Fisheries
UCT	University of Cape Town
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WCRLRH	West Coast Rock Lobster Right Holder
WCRLR	West Coast Rock Lobster Right

Figure 1: Fishers offloading their day's harvest (Author, 2014)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Fishing is one of the world's oldest occupations, and developed in the period when human societies depended heavily on hunting and gathering (Bavinck, et al., 2014). It is estimated that over 120 million people are involved in activities that relate directly to the capture, processing, sale, and marketing of fish with the overwhelming majority (over 95 per cent) located in developing countries (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Poverty in fishing communities is due to a variety of socio-institutional factors beyond income, such as land tenure security, access to health and education, and exclusion from political decision-making; factors which are also recognised in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Bene & Friend, 2011; Charles, 2011). This makes small-scale fishers (SSFs) among the most vulnerable socio-economic groups because they, in particular, are exposed to natural and economic related crises (Bene, 2009).

Despite their importance in providing food security and livelihoods in coastal communities, small-scale fisheries are on the whole ignored and marginalised throughout the world (Hauck, 2009; Zeller, et al., 2007). State management authorities systematically neglect the small-scale fishing sector in favour of industrial fisheries. This has resulted in a demographic information deficit of coastal communities (Sowman, et al., 2014). Further, small-scale fisheries suffer from a negative public image because of the myths and misconceptions fuelled by deficient data, insight, and knowledge (Kolding, et al., 2014). This is true even while small-scale fisheries are considerably more efficient, less wasteful, and provide more livelihood support per tonne produced than industrial fisheries (Sadovy, 2005; Chuenpagdee, et al., 2006). In South Africa, not only do small scale fisheries suffer from persistent neglect, as described above, but this neglect takes on particular social equity and justice issues centred on race and South Africa's apartheid history, the legacy of which continues to plague the fisheries.

Subsequent to the democratic elections in 1994 and the enactment of the 1996 Constitution, South Africa undertook reforms aimed at addressing racial injustice and equity in the fisheries sector. This included publication of a new fisheries policy under the auspices of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998, which replaced the existing fisheries legislation (Van Sittert, et al., 2006; Witbooi, 2006; Isaacs, et al., 2007). Along with other policy developments, the MLRA explicitly encouraged 'transformation'; however, no consensus existed on how to measure it. At least for fishers, 'transformation' implied achieving formal direct access to marine resources (Isaacs, 2006). To achieve this reform, the post-apartheid South African government relied on individual transferable quota-based (ITQ-based) fisheries.

The ITQ approach was intended to broaden access to fisheries, in particular, for the marginalised sectors consisting of the artisanal and small-scale fishers (Isaacs, 2013). While progress had been made in granting access to poor fishers, the complexity of the fisheries

sector meant progress was haphazard. A fundamental component of the complexity was the individual rights-based approach to fisheries allocations. This required the identification of *bona-fide* fishers and the appropriate marine resources that matched their livelihood profiles (Sowman, 2006). The consequence was that the small-scale fishing sector was not formally recognised and catered for by the subsequent MLRA-sanctioned medium- and long-term rights allocations (Sowman, et al., 2014).

Western Cape fishers (supported by NGOs) took the Minister to court to contest their exclusion from the rights allocations in the fisheries sector and the resultant social and economic impacts of the ITQ approach (George K and others vs. the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2004) (Isaacs, 2013). The fishers contested that the government's failure to allocate harvest rights to the small-scale fisher group violated their Constitutional rights and inflicted substantial economic hardship upon the fishers (Sowman, et al., 2014). Beyond the matters of the court case, the ITQ approach also led to high levels of poaching of species such as West Coast Rock Lobster, hereafter referred to as Lobster *(Jasus lalandii*) and Abalone (*Haliotis midae*) (due to high demand and prices), poverty in fishing communities worsened, and the communities were radically divided into factions representative of rights-holders and fishers without rights, as well as poacher versus non-poacher (Stewart, et al., 2010). By court order, a new policy that specifically catered for the small-scale fishers was therefore finally gazetted in June 2012 (Sunde, et al., 2013).

Among other sweeping reforms, this new policy espoused a paradigmatic shift from the individual rights-based approach to a co-management and community rights-based approach (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). This meant fishing rights would no longer be issued to individual fishers but to community entities. For the implementation of the policy to occur efficiently, fishing communities are ideally conceptualised as homogenous entities. However, the distribution of the Commercial Rights and the Interim Relief permits over the last decade has been seen to have a fracturing effect in South African fishing communities (Stewart, et al., 2010). Van Sittert (2003) goes further stating that a homogenous community along the West Coast has never existed in the first place. Implementation of the small-scale policy therefore requires a context-sensitive approach and flexibility in addressing the nuances of every fishing community. Lamberts Bay as a traditional fishing community along the West Coast of South Africa presents unique challenges to the implementation of the new policy, and is the focus of this thesis.

Fishing is deeply ingrained in the history of Lamberts Bay (Figure 2) and apart from primary agriculture, fishing is considered the first industrial development of the Sandveld region (Enderstein, 2009). Marine resource harvesting was historically conducted by Coloured[1] and European fishermen for the local market; the resources harvested included: Cape Bream

[1]Contrary to international usage, in South Africa the term ''Coloured'' does not refer to black people in general. It instead alludes to a diverse group of people descended largely from slaves, indigenous Khoisan peoples and other black people who had been assimilated to colonial society by the late 19th century. Being also partly descended from European settlers, Coloureds are popularly regarded as being of ''mixed race'' and occupy an indeterminate status in the South African racial hierarchy, distinct from the historically dominant white minority and the numerically predominant African population. ''Black'' is a generic term in South Africa for those ethnic groups identified by apartheid policy as ''Indian'', ''African'' or ''Coloured'' (Isaacs, 2006).

(Pachymetopon blochii) (known colloquially as Hottentot), Snoek (Thyrsites atun), and Maasbanker or Horse Mackerel (Trachurus capensis) (Enderstein, 2009). Like all other South African fishing communities, Lamberts Bay was subject to management by ITQs, and the resultant community fragmentation carries implications for the implementation of the new policy. The particular nature of this fragmentation will be explored by this thesis with the view to inform the implementation of the new Small-Scale Fisheries policy in Lamberts Bay.

1.2 Aim

To understand the livelihoods of various fisher groups of Lamberts Bay and the implications for the implementation of the SSF policy.

1.3 Objectives

1. Understand the socio-economic context of the small-scale fisher groups in Lamberts Bay
2. Assess socio-economic differences between these groups
3. Gather the perceptions of these different groups with respect to the new policy
4. Identify factors that will enable the expectations and needs of these different groups to be accommodated in SSF policy roll-out and model.



Figure 2: Lamberts Bay (FAO, 2001)

Figure 3: Onlookers and buyers observing the day's catch (Author, 2014)

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 International Small-scale fisheries

Worldwide, small-scale fisheries are estimated to employ 37 million people, 90% of whom are located in Asia. In addition, secondary endeavours associated with fishing are the occupation of another estimated 100 million people (FAO, 2008-2014). Small-scale fisheries are also responsible for roughly half of the globe's entire catch and underpin the local economies of many coastal areas by providing employment, fish for household consumption, and financial benefits from selling fish (ICSF, 2014; Walmsley, et al., 2006). However, fisheries governance policies are too often designed with the view that small-scale fisheries are homogenous entities, neglecting their complex, globalised, and constantly changing nature (Johnson, 2006).

The characteristics of small-scale fisheries worldwide are incredibly diverse, spanning the spectrum of social, ecological, and economic aspects of fishing communities (Ratner & Allison, 2012). For these reasons, small-scale fisheries are terribly difficult to define, amidst suggestions they are indeed impossible to define. Two features of SSFs give rise to this conception: first what is considered small in one area can be considered large-scale in another; and second, SSFs show tremendous diversity depending on their context (Chuenpagdee, et al., 2006). Despite the multiplicity of small-scale fisheries, characterizations of SSFs display a significant amount of homogeneity and consist of any one or a combination of these features: fishing as a defining feature of a community, tribe or caste; the use of specific types of gear and their place along the fishing hierarchy in a national context; and, finally, whether fishing is part of a long-standing tradition (Mathew, 2003). Therefore, the term small-scale fishers has broadly come to mean:

> "…fishers who use beach-landing craft and passive fishing gear and have a limited range of operation. Generally their occupation is less capital-intensive, and catches are less voluminous per unit of effort (Bavinck, 2005, p. 806)."

Fishermen and women remain some of the poorest and most marginalised groups within the globe's societies, and disproportionately so, the women of rural fishing communities (Williams, 2002). Fisheries is riddled with a strong gender bias against women (McCay & Jentoft, 1996). This is because, historically, fishing has been framed as an exclusively male domain (Siason, 1998). Women do not even self-identify as fishers in contexts where fishing is culturally considered as the men's job (Kleiber, et al., 2014).

Women are frequently limited to post-harvest activities such as smoking, drying, salting, and marketing, which generally earns less than harvesting (Bene, 2008; Vunisea, 1996; Williams, 2001; Suwanrangsi, 1998). Some fisherwomen occupy very low status in the social hierarchy; a position reinforced by cultural beliefs, norms, laws, and discriminate regulatory practices that among other things, consider women out at sea as bad luck (Bene, 2003; Weeratunge, et al., 2010; Choo, et al., 2008).

Women's marginalisation is compounded when access to the fishery is increasingly restricted through, for instance, Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) allocations. Men who are

excluded from the allocation process subsequently engage in fish trading and processing, leaving the women vulnerable in an increasingly competitive arena (Gehab, et al., 2008; Gordon, 2005). This highlights the fact that men are able to work in every field of the fishery sector, while very few women will choose to work on board boats (Goncuoglu & Unal, 2011).

Social ills such as alcoholism is prevalent in many fishing communities, primarily due to the poverty and marginalisation experienced by fisherfolk (Allison & Seeley, 2004). Alcoholism disproportionately affects the men in the community, while the increased household burden remains with the women. Women's participation is crucial to the survival of fishing communities and the preservation of their way of life (Medard, et al., 2002). The role of gender in the development process therefore needs to be a key part of any policy interventions aimed at creating sustainable livelihoods (Burnett, 2005).

The resource environment in which small-scale fishers operate presents unique challenges in itself. SSFs disproportionately depend on natural resources as opposed to other economic activities where the option of alternative revenue streams are easily accessible. In addition, the often apparent open-access arrangement of the natural resources that small-scale fisher folk harvest arguably leads to resource degradation, increasing poverty, and associated social marginalisation (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Small-scale fishers therefore live precariously because of their vulnerability and susceptibility to misfortune (Kolding, et al., 2014). Furthermore, the asymmetrical focus on industrial fisheries research has neglected the roles and functioning of small-scale fisheries, which also suffer from an information deficit (Kolding & Van Zwieten, 2011). Small-scale fisheries' problems were therefore erroneously conceptualised and addressed indiscriminately from industrial fisheries; the basis for this was Hardin's (1968) treatise on the 'Tragic Commons'.

2.2 Concepts in Small-Scale Fisheries Management

Garrit Hardin's 'Tragic Commons' is generally cited as the leading paradigm in the management of common-pool resources, such as fisheries. He described the degradation that occurred when many users exploited a common resource, where the individual benefited from exploiting the resource, and the burdens or costs were shared among the group (Hardin, 1968; Olstrom, 1990; Raemaekers, 2009). Describing the exploitation of a common pasturage, Olstrom (1990: 2), quoting Hardin (1968: 1244), writes:

> *"Each herder is motivated to add more and more animals because he receives the direct benefit of his own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing."*

The consequence when fisheries are the common resource is that every fisher engages in a 'race to fish' because of the absence of incentives to conserve the resource (Hilborn, et al., 2003). Inspired by Hardin's arguments, several countries extended their political sovereignty from three to two hundred nautical miles from shore in response to the intensifying exploitation of coastal fisheries (Juda, 1991; Nadelson, 1992). It was only in 1982 that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sanctioned customary marine

law and thereby recognised the 200-mile exclusive economic zone in which states could exercise complete economic and political sovereignty. Coastal waters therefore became the property of states, replacing their previous conceptualisation as open-access entities (Mansfield, 2004). The consequence of this evolution saw biological scientists coming to the fore of fisheries management in a highly centralised governance environment. Mathematical modelling of single-species fish population dynamics determined the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of specific resources, which was the sole approach to species targets endorsed by UNCLOS (Caddy, 1999; Hilborn, 2007). This biological-science dominated approach culminated in the annual calculation of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), determined from regular stock assessments, catch and effort statistics and resource modelling.

Out of these developments arose what has been termed the 'conventional' or 'traditional' approach to fisheries management. This recognised that territorial waters remained open to all nationals; however, fisher behaviour was regulated through stringent input regulations consisting of seasonal closures, effort restrictions, and output controls among which included Total Allowable Effort (TAE), quotas, and TACs (Morison, 2004; Hilborn, 2007). Fisheries management has subsequently been deemed technocratic because this suite of regulations was heavily dependent on scientific information (Raemaekers, 2009). In parallel developments on the economic front during the 1950s and '60s, economists concerned with dwindling fish stocks proposed private property regimes in order to curb the decline in ocean fish stocks in lieu of the failed technical controls. The 200 mile EEZ demarcation was therefore supported by economists as an important step in limiting access (Caddy & Cochrane, 2001; Mansfield, 2004).

Currently, across varying spatial scales, many combinations of use rights exist, which underpin the quota-based fisheries management regime in developing and developed countries' commercial fisheries (Raemaekers, 2009). Fisheries managers therefore have a wide variety of tools available, the most important of which, follow:

i. The development of Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) was borne from the desire by fisheries managers to limit access to fisheries within the EEZ, and turn the resources into private property. ITQs are prevalent in places such as New Zealand, Iceland, and Australia (Clark, 1993; Arbuckle, 2000; Mathiasson, 2003; Grafton, et al., 2006; Bess & Rallapudi, 2007). An ITQ system distributes the quota shares of the TAC, which are then subject to purchase, selling, or lease arrangements among the fishers. Fishers who cannot operate successfully eventually sell their quota and exit the fishery, which reduces excess capacity and increases the efficiency of the fishery (Degnbol, et al., 2006).
ii. In the context of worldwide collapse of fish stocks, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been identified as a leading contributor (Pitcher, et al., 2002; Ainsworth & Pitcher, 2005; Berkes, et al., 2006; Gallic & Cox, 2006; Sumaila, et al., 2006; Vince, 2007). Besides rights allocations and punitive sanctions against offenders, other typical measures to combat IUU include Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) networks consisting of patrol boats, vessel monitoring systems, and fisheries control officers. Due to the inherent mobility of ocean travel, regional

cooperation has become an important aspect of reducing IUUs (Erceg, 2006). As an example, in 2001, many countries became signatories of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (FAO, 2001).

iii. Biologists and conservationists have solidified Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as effective management tools (Clark, 1996). MPAs encourage the restoration of natural processes, as well as biological and fishery resource sustainability (Attwood, et al., 1997). MPAs are well entrenched in the fisheries management arena; many varieties have evolved focusing on highly protected demarcations to more flexible multi-use areas (Raemaekers, 2009).

The majority of the world's fisheries are, however, still prone to the effects of over-investment while resources are still in decline (FAO, 2004; FAO, 2007). As a result, substantial criticism has been levelled at the suite of conventional and rights-based management tools. To begin with, resource modelling and estimating the MSY necessitated making too many assumptions amidst the elusive accuracy of much of the required data (Caddy, 1999). Traditional input and output controls such as TAEs, gear restrictions, and TACs have become increasingly rigid in response to declining fisheries, increasing the race for fish and other perverse incentives for the fishers (Turner, et al., 1999; Fujita & Bonzon, 2005). These tools largely failed in achieving resource sustainability within country EEZs (Gordon, 1954; Gordon, 1954). Furthermore, while ideally the resource users cover the costs of administration, governments tended to rely on taxpayer revenue to manage fisheries; the revenues from potential resource rent were therefore never realized (Virdin & Schorr, 2001).

ITQs have also been the subject of much criticism, primarily from social scientists and fishing communities (Raemaekers, 2009). This is because the ITQ system results in the concentration of fishing rights to the exclusion of other legitimate fishers, and hence denies some fishers their livelihood and the resultant economic contribution to a community's development (McCay, 1995). In addition, by privatising a common property good, the social justice of the ITQ system has come under scrutiny (Anderson, 1995; Hannesson, 2005). Proponents of the ITQ have countered these arguments by charging users for access to fish resources. The rents collected subsequently cover the costs of administration and control (Hilborn, et al., 2005), effectively rendering ITQs use rights and not property rights (Grafton, 1995; Bromley, 2005). MPAs have not lived up to their management objectives (Alder, 1996), and hence have come under scrutiny from the stakeholders in their implementation. The closure of certain areas served to concentrate resource exploitation in other areas (Degnbol, et al., 2006), migratory species could not be adequately accommodated by the rigid spatial demarcations (Boersma & Parrish, 1999), and most importantly, the exclusion of fishing communities with a history of fishing in MPA areas raised the ire of social scientists (Jameson, et al., 2002; Jentoft, 2007; Sunde & Isaacs, 2008). It therefore became apparent that more inclusive approaches to fisheries were necessary.

The oceans were conceptualised as existing under an open access regime; the perspective of Hardin (1968) and Gordon (1954) therefore suggested resources were effectively managed only when privatised or controlled by a central government. However, this conceptualisation also led to the increasing focus on common property-based natural resource management

(Agrawal, 2001). This literature was a significant departure from the conventional interventionist ideas of fisheries management recognising common property resources under ownership of a people group (under a communal property regime) and successfully managed for sustainability without the necessity of private property rights (Jentoft & McCay, 1995; Hara, 2003). There is no shortage of examples of locally situated small user groups and communities managing local natural resources, and this has also inspired funding for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects (Ruddle, 1998; Van Mulekom, 1999; Martin, 2001). Drawing from Balland & Platteau (1996), Raemaekers (2009) suggests there is no association between successful fisheries regulation and property rights regimes because communal, private, and state property have all experienced failures and successes.

The focus on fishing communities has also served to highlight the small-scale fisheries sector. The range of fisheries management tools described above was primarily focused on managing the more lucrative large-scale industrial fisheries sector, with the small-scale fisheries sector left unattended to by the state (Raemaekers, 2009). Despite their neglect, small-scale fisheries are increasingly recognised as critical contributors to incomes and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people globally; the total output from small-scale fisheries nearly matching that of the industrial fisheries (Bene, et al., 2007). This disjuncture created a particular management problem for fisheries authorities worldwide and so too in South Africa's small-scale fishing communities. It became clear to fisheries management practitioners that new tools and approaches needed to be developed (Raemaekers, 2009).

2.3 The Era of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)

CBNRM garnered widespread favour as a fisheries management paradigm (Hara, 2003) and was incorporated into the rights-based management approach to fisheries as a fisheries management tool (Degnbol, et al., 2006). Concurrently, the discussions around CBNRM led to the endorsing of community-based exclusive fishing rights, also called Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). Chilean 'Areas for the Management and Exploitation of Benthic Resources' (Áreas de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos-AMERB) are a prominent example of TURFs in which local small-scale fishers exercise exclusive rights over access (Gonzalez, et al., 2006). The rise of CBNRM and TURFs appeased social scientists by reclaiming social concerns and adjusting for issues of inequality amidst the desire for economic efficiency. As a result, CBNRM and TURFs constituted a new set of management tools that accommodated the various social, economic, and institutional context of fishing communities (Raemaekers, 2009).

However, CBNRM has its limits, and in an attempt to merge the important aspects of state control, private and communal property approaches, new management options were investigated. The relationship between the state, local fishers, and communities required overhaul, and this ushered in the 'co-management concept' defined as the distribution of management responsibility across the state, organisations, and communities (Jentoft, 1989). Co-management effectively grants users a formal role in resource management and serves to improve the legitimacy of the management plan (Jentoft, 1989). In conjunction with an existing individual or community property rights regime, users are incentivised to protect and

monitor the state of their resources (Berkes, et al., 2006). Despite the potential of decreasing administration costs, the initial phases of implementation usually require significant capacity development both within the government and amongst the community (Nielsen, et al., 2004). Even so, co-management has been accommodated as a critical component of the fisheries management toolbox and applied to various contexts where ITQs, TURFs, and Community Quotas are the prevailing rights regimes (Jentoft & McCay, 1995; Nielsen & Vedsmand, 1999; Nielsen, et al., 2004; Jentoft, 2005).

In summary, resource economists have endorsed rights-based management approaches by the state as a solution to fisheries problems through privatising common resources using ITQs and other rights-based measures. These use rights offer secure and consistent access to marine resources and prevent overexploitation of fisheries (Huppert, 2005; Hilborn, 2007; World Bank, 2008; Costello, et al., 2008). ITQs also provide incentives for users to conserve their resources because of their value as assets, which are linked to the sustainability of the resource (Hilborn, et al., 2005). However, privatising fishing rights has faced severe criticism from fishing communities, social justice groups and social scientists (Raemaekers, 2009). Much of this criticism is due to the negative social effects of ITQs on fishing communities, such as in South Africa. Consequently, use rights such as Community Quotas and TURFs, as well as unconventional approaches that include CBNRM and co-management, returned to the mainstream and have since become integral to contemporary fisheries management regimes (Raemaekers, 2009). In order to understand the consequences of South Africa's rights-based fisheries management approach in fishing communities, this thesis adopted the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA).

2.4 The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA)

Conceptual underpinning

The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) has been adapted in many different forms, the most popular, however, being that developed by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (Isaacs, 2006). The notion of a sustainable livelihood has its roots in the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio, where one of the outcomes of the conference was the idea that everyone should be granted the opportunity to enjoy a sustainable livelihood (Morse & McNamara, 2013). The livelihoods approach is particularly strong because it enriches the understanding of poverty, allotting to it multiple dimensions. The livelihoods approach also encourages specific outcomes for households, with resilience to external shocks being a key component (Isaacs, 2006). A precise definition of a sustainable livelihood is difficult to establish; however, Schoones (1998) offers us a comprehensive conception:

> *"A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base* (Schoones, 1998, p. 5).

An important aspect of this approach is the conception of vulnerability that alludes to the degree of exposure to risks, shocks, and susceptibility to food insecurity (Brocklesby & Fisher, 2003). The primary focus of the SLA is the different patterns of capabilities and asset holding that affects the ability of families to withstand shocks (Allison & Horemans, 2006). It is important to note ecological principles are not all abandoned; a key component as evidenced by the SLA is the sustainability of ecosystems. Extended further, this sustainability specifically refers to the ability of the marine resource to maintain productivity in the event of major shocks and disturbances (Allison & Ellis, 2001).

The framework of analysis

The framework itself is a combination of assets and activities that expresses interrelatedness, as shown in Figure 4. Typically, this framework is applied to the household, where a household is defined as a social group occupying the same space, which enjoy meals in common and coordinate decision-making and the distribution of pooled income (Allison & Horemans, 2006). The framework is geared to extract a comprehensive and practically focused understanding of fishers' realities, which can then subsequently inform development initiatives and policy documentation (Baumann, 2002). A description of the framework follows.

Vulnerability context and asset types

The vulnerability context is composed of the trends, shocks, and seasonality that affect people's livelihoods and the availability of assets over which people characteristically have limited control (Baumann, 2002). The framework identifies five integrated and interrelated asset types. The five assets encompass the financial, physical, social, human, and natural. An individual actor, in our case a fisher, may own or acquire access to a particular set of assets. The combination of assets is determined by the context in which the fisher lives (Parkinson & Ramirez, 2006). Households use the assets in their productive activities in order to draw an income and meet their consumption needs, while also seeking to invest in future productive activities (Nizamedinkhodjayeva, 2007). A livelihood asset profile is thus drawn from understanding how a household has access to different assets.



Figure 4: Livelihoods Framework (Nizamedinkhodjayeva, 2007)

The SLA has, however, been identified as having significant weaknesses. These include the inability to analyse power and power relations, the inability to deconstruct processes influenced by human agency, and, crucially, it is restricted in understanding the highly variable ways in which interactions occur between institutional practices and livelihoods (Allison & Horemans, 2006). As far as the SLA provides a more complete picture of complexities in poor communities, it remains effective, extending beyond other insular indices that largely rely on income, employment, or consumption (Brocklesby & Fisher, 2003; Isaacs, 2006).

Figure 5: Post-harvest 'flekking' of Snoek (Author, 2014)

Chapter 3: Methods

This research used case studies as a lens to provide a description of the socio-economic characteristics, resource utilisation and harvesting techniques used by the Lamberts Bay small-scale fishers. The four principle data gathering methods included:

a. Household questionnaires
b. Focus group discussions
c. Interviews with key informants
d. Informal Interviews

Collecting different kinds of data concerning the same phenomenon allowed the researcher to obtain greater accuracy in his judgements (Jick, 1979). The benefits of using multiple methods of analysing data, a process termed 'triangulation', increased confidence in the research data, granting the researcher different ways to understand the problem, and allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Thurmond, 2004).

3.1 Scoping Visit

A critical step in social science research is the process of informing as far as possible all stakeholders about the aims, outcomes and commencement of the project. During an initial scoping visit, which was also aimed at piloting a draft householder survey (see below), time was spent raising awareness about the research. Lamberts Bay was unfamiliar to the researcher and he was therefore required to learn the geographical proximities, establish a connection with the family he was to stay with, and determine his project needs after the scoping was completed. Further, during this stage the researcher established connections with fisherfolk who subsequently participated as key informants.

During the scoping visit the researcher was made aware of two important factors that subsequently impacted the data collection process. The first was the impending National Elections on the 7th May. The proximity of the elections and the presence of the researcher in Lamberts Bay led community members to believe the researcher was a government official involved with distributing fishing permits, and consequently they were eager to engage. Others associated the presence of a 'government official' as a threat to the rights they currently held and hence were reluctant to engage. The community further associated the researcher's demographic, as a Black male, with a particular political party, the African National Congress (ANC). In addition, the researcher's assistant was a vocal supporter of the ANC and had been involved in the liberation struggle during his younger years.

Therefore, while piloting the household survey the researcher was constantly required to reinforce his position as a Masters student from the University of Cape Town (UCT) and dismiss any notions of political affiliation. Utmost transparency was therefore critical and all survey documentation was clearly labelled as affiliated with UCT. The researcher initially used his car to get around the community while piloting the surveys. However, he subsequently resorted to conducting the surveys on foot because the car acted as a potential barrier between his work as a researcher and the way in which the community perceived him.

The second important factor beyond the control of the researcher was the Snoek run. The researcher began the pilot study soon after the fishers recorded consistently large volumes of Snoek. In addition, the pilot was conducted while the town was preparing for an influx of tourists during the Easter Holidays in mid-April; a time when the fishers earn higher prices per Snoek because of the increased demand both locally and throughout the Western Cape. This meant that most of the fishers maximised their time at sea during the day, and those involved in post-harvesting were equally as busy.

The Snoek run however provided the researcher with valuable insight into the fisheries process in Lamberts Bay, including the economic relationship between the fishers and those who bought their fish, the various actors involved in the fishing process and the workings of the value chain covering pre-harvest, harvest, and post-harvest activities. The Snoek run ultimately made it impossible for the research assistant to arrange a community-wide meeting to introduce the project to the community, which meant the researcher and the research assistant spent more time introducing the project individually and in smaller informal groups in the community.

3.2 Household Survey

The household as a unit of analysis is appropriate because it is considered the most basic socio-economic unit for people with a subsistence livelihood (Branch, et al., 2010). Despite some fishermen operating independently of family connections, for purposes of this survey the household was defined as 'those who pool resources and share consumption' (Branch, et al., 2010). The household unit is employed by other economic datasets and hence is compatible with national census data. A fluent Afrikaans-speaking translator was required as a research assistant because the researcher had a limited comprehension of Afrikaans.

The household survey was the most important source of information that provided a profile of 'small-scale' fishers and their households. Its purpose was to provide statistical estimates of the characteristics of the target population group, from the same set of people (Floyd J. Fowler, 2009). To achieve that, the research aims designated small-scale fishers as a subset of the population from which information was collected. It is estimated there are 300 self-identified small-scale fisher households in Lamberts Bay, ten percent of which we wanted to include in our survey. The fundamental premise governing this method was that by describing the population sample who responded we could infer identical characteristics of the target population (Floyd J. Fowler, 2009), in this case the small-scale fishers of Lamberts Bay.

In identifying the households, this thesis relied on snowball sampling. The research assistant had extensive knowledge of both the West Coast Rock Lobster Right Holder (WCRLRH) and Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers and aided in identifying households in which surveys were conducted. The researcher also relied on the individual WCRLHs and IRP fishers to identify other fishers with their respective permits, and their availability. However, due to the existing tensions surrounding rights holders and non-rights holders, it was suggested to the researcher that caution be exercised in talking to certain rights holders who might be unwilling to engage with the researcher. In addition, intra-community dynamics meant that

the researchers association with the research assistant was not apolitical, in that community alliances existed beyond the knowledge of the researcher, which was expressed in the reluctance of the research assistant to visit certain homes of rights holders in particular.

Subsequent to piloting the surveys, the researcher adjusted the questions to suit the needs of this particular research by omitting certain questions and including new ones directed at the aims and objectives of the research (see Appendix A). The final surveys were conducted from the 27th March to the 3rd of April. The fishers of Lamberts Bay became increasingly busy leading up to the Easter weekend and many were not present in their households during the day. As a result, many surveys were conducted in and around the community streets, at the harbour where the fishers landed their catch, and in common meeting places which included certain households. The households and the harbour where the majority of interviews took place were mapped with the help of the research assistant using print-outs obtained from Google Earth, as shown in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Location of households and other areas where interviews occurred (Nthane, 2014)

There are two significant issues with the household survey approach: the first is determining the degree to which the answers accurately capture and measure the characteristics described; the second concerns how well the sample of respondents is reflective of the target population (Floyd J. Fowler, 2009). Finally, the manner in which the information was handled was paramount to the ethical standards of the research. To this end, the researcher maintained confidentiality and anonymity during the data collection process. By severing the link

between a household and its responses, it therefore became impossible to associate respondents with their surveys (Floyd J. Fowler, 2009).

3.3 Focus Groups

A focus group gathers qualitative information from individuals who had shared similar experiences and similar situations (Stewart, et al., 2007). Focus groups are especially useful for investigating issues that are considered sensitive and difficult to discuss in a public space, for example people's views on local politics and the respective exercising of that authority (Stewart, et al., 2007). The focus groups provided information on the pertinent themes the household surveys brought up. The questions focused on particular issues that affected the different fisher groups in the community. The intention of the focus group was to elaborate on themes drawn from the experiences of 'typical' local fishers during the household surveys. From the surveys, two groups of fishers were identified for separate focus groups: Interim Relief permit holders and near-shore commercial rights holders.

After a preliminary analysis of the household survey, the researcher returned to Lamberts Bay to conduct focus groups with the two groups of fishers: Interim Relief Permit holders and near-shore commercial West Coast Rock Lobster Right (WCRLR) holders. The fishers experienced an unusually long Snoek run lasting four months. The researcher's focus groups coincided with the last few days that the fishers returned with significant Snoek harvests. This provided an opportunity for the researcher to observe the dramatic exodus of fishers and their crewmen who left Lamberts Bay to pursue Snoek in other waters along the coast. With the end of the Snoek run in Lamberts Bay, the fishers turned their focus to catching Cape Bream. As a result the community and the harbour were far less busy than the researcher experienced during his earlier data collection processes. With the assistance of the father of the family he was staying with and a research assistant, the researcher successfully arranged focus group meetings with IRP fishers on the 9th July and with WCRLRHs on the 10th of July.

3.4 Key Informant Interviews

A research interview is an interview in which knowledge is constructed through the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (Kvale, 2007). Moral and ethical issues permeate interview research. The researcher obtained informed consent for participation in the study and ensured confidentiality and anonymity primarily by maintaining anonymity through all stages of the interview process (Kvale, 2007). Key informants are people whom others consider extraordinary and usually occupy positions of responsibility and influence. The greatest advantage to a researcher using the key informant technique is the ability to collect high quality data in a comparatively short period, in contrast to questionnaire surveys (Marshall, 1996; Tremblay, 1957). In addition, interviews allow the researcher to co-create meaning with the interviewees by reconstructing perceptions and phenomenon observed by the researcher (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). The key informants for this research were selected based upon the positions of authority they held relative to the fishing community, and also for particular characteristics; for instance, so few women were near-shore commercial rights holders, that it became imperative to include at least one woman from this sector as a key informant.

The researcher conducted five key interviews in total. They included the sole near-shore commercial rights holder who was part of the organisation that represents interim relief permit holders, a woman with a near-shore commercial right, a member of the four-member local co-management committee, a member of an NGO that represents small-scale fishers nationally (Masifundise/Coastal Links), and finally an IRP fisher husband and wife. In addition, while the researcher conducted household surveys, he took the opportunity to engage in informal discussions with the respondents, which allowed the researcher early insight into issues not directly addressed by the household survey.

The fieldwork was conducted at various stages between March 2014 and August 2014 through surveys, interviews, focus groups, informal interviews, and a community feedback meeting. The fishers in the community were receptive to the research and the respondents were willing to share their time and information with the researcher. In total, 44 household surveys were conducted, in addition to five key informant interviews, two focus groups, and one feedback meeting. The sampling strategy utilized in this research is representative of the broader fishing community of Lamberts Bay. Data on precise figures of the WCRLRHs and IRP fishers was hard to come by. The researcher therefore relied on the data issued by the local representative of the national fisher organisation, Masifundise, which stated there were 119 IRP fishers and 90 WCRLRHs. The researcher was therefore able to establish that he surveyed 26% of the IRP fishers (n=31), and 11% of the WCRLRHs (n=10), figures well representative of the broader fishing community of Lamberts Bay.

Table 1: Dates of the data collection process

Data Collection		
Tools	**Number**	**Date**
Scoping Visit	1	4th-5th March
Household Surveys	44	27th March 2014- 4th April 2014
Key Informant Interviews	5	2nd-4th July
Focus Groups	2	9th-10th July

3.5 Data Analysis

Quantitative and Qualitative

The data collected from the household surveys was organised and analysed using Microsoft Access, Microsoft Excel, and NVivo. The researcher developed a database in Microsoft Access in which all the household surveys were captured. By subsequently using a function called "PivotTables" in Microsoft Excel, the researcher linked the survey database in Microsoft Access with Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets. This allowed the researcher to explore the relationships in the survey and discover whether certain variables correlated with one another. Following on from this, the researcher produced graphs and tables that highlighted the relationships he felt were particularly pertinent for his study. Those relationships

represented on the graphs formed the basis of the focus groups. Further themes for discussion were drawn from queries run in NVivo and the Microsoft Access database.

The qualitative data gathered from focus groups and key informative interviews was input into Microsoft Word. The interviews and focus groups that were voice recorded were transcribed into Microsoft Word. Where Afrikaans was spoken it was translated into English with the help of the research assistant. A number of informal interviews and personal conversations were recorded in the researcher's note book but did not warrant transcription into Microsoft Word.

3.6 Research Considerations

This Master's dissertation forms part of a wider project that attempts to build profiles of South Africa's many fishing communities. The project is primarily aimed at, first, establishing a livelihood profile of fishing communities along South Africa's coast, and secondly, investigating their response to particular stresses or the development of new community dynamics as a result of government policy adjustments and management interventions. For instance, similar studies within the Environmental Evaluation Unit (EEU) housed in UCT have been conducted in fishing communities investigating the impact of MPAs on the livelihoods of fisherfolk, another has tracked the impact of the banning of traditional fishing gear, and currently a study is underway to determine the importance of 'by-catch' to food security. The project aims to update the study by Branch et al. (2002) that presented insight into the socio-economics and livelihoods of subsistence and informal fishers in South Africa.

The project therefore demanded a degree of standardisation, particularly for the household surveys which were used to assess the socio-economic profile of the Lamberts Bay fisher community. Several specific questions and themes are common across project case study areas; however, the researcher originated specific questions that were unique for the research that was conducted in Lamberts Bay. The researcher was responsible for adjusting the standard general household survey and for its piloting, which was duly conducted in Lamberts Bay. With the help of staff from Masifundise Development Trust, an NGO active in organising the fishers in the community, the researcher was provided with a research assistant.

The research assistant grew up in Lamberts Bay and hence was instrumental to the data collection process, in particular, the household surveys, focus groups, and the mapping exercise. Of key importance was the research assistant's ability to speak both Afrikaans and English fluently, his extensive knowledge of the community, insight into the nuanced attitudes towards current fisheries governance among the fishers, and his ability to assist in the data collection process. In addition, the research assistant was part of the co-management structure in the community which acts as the liaison between the fishers and the government. As a result, the researcher benefited from the in-depth insight into the community offered by the research assistant.

For the majority of the fieldwork, the researcher was fortunate to be welcomed by a family in Lamberts Bay, of which the father worked with an NGO active in the fisher community, and was a previous fisher himself. Living with the family provided the researcher with access to the father's insights and profound knowledge of the nuances within the fisher community, which were essential to understanding the complex relationships amongst the fishers.

Self-reflexivity was a particularly important process to the researcher because the study dealt with issues sensitive to individuals; in addition, the researcher was seen as an outsider to the Lamberts Bay community. It was important therefore, at every step, for the researcher to critically evaluate his relationship with the community and the implications for the data collection process. The experiences and perceptions of the people that were studied therefore formed a fundamental basis for understanding the livelihoods of the Lamberts Bay fishers. Through this, every concept discovered in the research process was highlighted because it was repeatedly present in the interviews and surveys, or similarly, it was repeatedly absent when it was expected to be present (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).

3.7 Research Ethics

The researcher obtained permission to conduct the research from the Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee of the University of Cape Town. The researcher was cautioned about the sensitive nature of the study and directed to uphold the associated ethical standards. The researcher paid particular attention to the requirement of appropriately informing the research respondents before seeking consent, and ensuring the integrity of the anonymity of the household survey respondents.

The fishers in Lamberts Bay would be characterised as poor and vulnerable. Vulnerability is defined as: "the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of the capacity to adapt" (Adger, 2006, p. 268). Ethical principles that apply to larger groups such as communities are intended to protect the dignity, integrity, confidentiality and the rights of the people who compromise them (Gostin, 1991). Informed consent is a pre-condition for any ethical research because of the intrinsic value of individual autonomy (Schuklenk, 2000).

Communities are also aware of the fact that researchers collect data on impoverished people without contributing to the alleviation of that problem, while themselves profiting incredibly both professionally and certainly economically (Nama & Swartz, 2002). Researchers are generally privileged, while their research subjects exist in conditions of severe deprivation and are among the most vulnerable (Benatar & Fleisher, 2007). Indeed, researchers benefit much more than any single research participant. The researcher therefore sought to look beyond the focus on informed consent and concentrate on the implications of the research for the community (Benatar, 2002). In addition, the researcher attempted to affirm the right of members of the community to participate as partners in the research that generated knowledge concerning their culture, identity, and welfare (Castellano, 2004).

Figure 7: Post-harvest cleaning and salting facility (Author, 2014)

Chapter 4: Background and Context of the Study

4.1 South African Small-Scale Fisheries

In South Africa, the desire for poor fishers to have increased access to fisheries, and the creation of an enabling environment to achieve transformation, were important drivers of democratic reforms within the fisheries sector after 1994 (Isaacs, 2011). At the exclusion of the black majority, the capture fisheries of the mid-20th century were supported in their efforts to tap into the world markets, and reaped substantial economic benefits for the white English and Afrikaner capitalists (Van Sittert, 2002). Yet this opportunity was restricted to white fishermen. Hence the current distribution of economic benefits from fishing is grossly skewed, with poverty occurring adjacent to riches, and this occurring clearly along apartheid-era racial classifications (Bavinck, et al., 2014).

With the proverbial 'winds of change' blowing through apartheid South Africa in the late 80s, the apartheid state commissioned an investigation (The Diemont Commission, 1985) to assess quota allocations of marine living resources, their transferability, permissibility of new entrants, degree of transformation based on race, and finally stability measures for the industry (Isaacs, 2006). The Commission made two recommendations: the establishment of a Quota Board to manage existing rights and allocations, and a statutory body to oversee future allocations. This resulted in the promulgation of the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988, and the institution of the Quota Board in 1990 as the earliest measures seeking to broaden the participation of the marginalised into South African fisheries (Isaacs, 2011).

4.2 Post-apartheid fisheries reform

Between 1990 and 1998, under the Quota Board's mandate, national government began to address the inclusion of historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) in the fishing industry. In an effort to equitably distribute the benefits from fishing, government began reforming the legislation of the 1940's that had facilitated white fishing monopolies (Van Sittert, 2002). These reforms consisted of Fishermen's Community Trusts (FCTs), and various Section 21 companies (non-profit). Both of these initiatives were short-lived. They lacked transparency, accountability, and representation (Isaacs, 2006).

The FCCs poor regulation allowed local elites, commonly teachers and lawyers who possessed superior formal education, to benefit from rights allocations primarily meant for the poor fishers. The failure of the FCCs had profound impacts on the psyche of the fishers, and in particular their trust of government-led interventions. Mistrust among fishers is high and many are rightfully concerned about the authenticity of those with fishing rights. Poor fishermen remained marginalised as the process was exposed to elite capture (Sowman, et al., 2014).

According to Isaacs (2011) the creation of the Fisheries Policy Development Council (FPDC) in 1996 heralded a new approach to fisheries management. The FPDC focused on equity, sustainability and stability; however, it did not sufficiently address concerns over access and long-term rights of marginalised fishers. The FCTs indicated a move towards community-led

fisheries resource management. However, these nascent structures fell prey to mismanagement and were abandoned in favour of the ITQ.

4.3 The Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA)

As of 2014, post-apartheid fisheries rights allocations had endured distinct phases. These included the Quota Board from 1994 to 1998, the MLRA from 1998 to 2000, the MLRA with the new allowance for subsistence allocations from 2000 to 2001, the medium-term rights allocations (MTRAs) from 2002-2006, and the Long-Term Rights Allocations (LTRAs) from 2005 until 2015 (Isaacs, 2006). The Marine Fisheries White Paper of 1997 was the precursor to the MLRA; it emphasised job creation and economic growth. Once promulgated a year later, the MLRA institutionalised the ITQ allocation process, which by definition meant that many fishers would again be excluded (Isaacs, 2011).

The MLRA categorized fishers either as commercial, recreational, or subsistence. Artisanal, informal, and small-scale fishers were bundled together with subsistence fishers, which Isaacs (2006) disparagingly refers to as a 'one size fits all approach'. Perhaps the most critical passage of the MLRA was section 18(5) which expressly stated that access rights should necessarily benefit 'historically disadvantaged sectors of society'. This passage was contested because, according to Isaacs (2006), it officially included any HDI regardless of fishing history (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The fishing communities were therefore negatively affected because the Act neglected their long-held ideas of what it meant to be a *bona fide* fisher and, by extension, deserving of fishing rights. Under the MLRA, the small-scale fishers found themselves in a perennial struggle to be recognised as legal fishers, in which *bona fide* fishers were constantly defending their rights to harvest marine resources.

The MLRA did, however, introduce a new subsistence fisher category to specifically recognise fishers marginalised by apartheid legislation and the post-1994 management ambiguities. Government recognised its incapacity to manage the category and therefore established the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) in 1999 (Sowman, 2006; Branch, et al., 2002). The SFTG set about redefining the meaning of subsistence so that only genuinely poor, vulnerable, and food-insecure fishers qualified; this prevented them from being crowded out by the commercial fisher categories (Witbooi, 2006). The SFTG defined subsistence fishers as:

"*…poor people who personally harvest marine resources as a source of food or to sell them to meet the basic needs of food security; they operate on or near to the shore or in estuaries, live in close proximity to the resource, consume or sell the resources locally, use low-technology gear (often as part of a long-standing community-based or cultural practice, and the kinds of resources they harvest generate only sufficient returns to meet the basic needs of food security."* (Branch, et al., 2002, p. 475).

However, this narrow definition excluded previously subsistence or artisanal fishers who sold their harvest commercially. To remedy this oversight, the 'small-scale commercial' fisher category was included (Sowman, 2006). However, admitting to its parochial focus, Sowman (2006) added that the methods employed by the SFTG failed to acknowledge the socio-

cultural practices of subsistence fishers, neglecting to take into account their complex array of livelihood strategies. Meanwhile, the MLRA sought to include marginalised fishers in the formal fishing sector by issuing annually allocated fishing rights from 1999 (Branch & Clark, 2006). However, the spectacular failure of the annual rights centred around the financial insecurity of allocating rights on such a precariously short-term basis. Consequently, after numerous legal challenges to the previous dispensation, applications for 'medium-term rights' were instituted, with a view to allocating longer term rights for up to 15 years from 2006 (Branch & Clark, 2006).

4.4 Medium-Term Rights Allocation

The South African Government introduced the first multiple-year rights allocation in 2001, in which the MTRA Fishing Policy was implemented. The MTRA allocated ITQs for a period of four years (Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2006). This policy dealt primarily with commercial enterprises and the allocation of 22 commercial species to them, while excluding the majority of traditional, small-scale, and artisanal fishers (Sunde & Isaacs, 2008).

In repetition of previous institutional oversights, the redistribution process was subject to elite-capture once again. In addition, the process spawned the paper quota holder phenomenon in which quota holders effectively rented out their quota allocations and their right to fish (Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2006). Attempts to transform the fisheries were also met with strong resistance by apartheid-era incumbent right holders, because they were now forced to compete against new black entrants (Van Sittert, et al., 2006).

4.5 Long-term Rights Allocation

South Africa's second attempt at multiple-year rights allocations occurred During the 2005/2006 season. However, the LTRA was plagued with procedural issues that made it especially burdensome for small-scale fishers. For instance, fishers were required to form co-operatives and hence compete with established and long-running white-owned companies in the inshore zone, the communication was conducted in English while most fishers only spoke Afrikaans, and the applications did not take into account the formal education deficit among many community members. These procedural barriers were once again enough to exclude the majority of *bona fide* fishers (Isaacs, 2011).

While some authors suggest socio-political imperatives took precedence in the first decade of fisheries reform, in reality it appears environmental and economic considerations were the primary beneficiaries (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Isaacs, 2006; Van Sittert, et al., 2006). With the next allocation phase occurring after 2015 and possibly in 2020, the LTRA process was the last possibility for the South African Government to transform the most lucrative sectors, such as the hake deep-sea trawling and Lobster sectors (Ponte & Van Sittert, 2007). In addition, armed with evidence of an irregular allocation process, litigation in 2013 that served the interests of previously advantaged fishers succeeded, jeopardising the government's attempts to conserve the resource and transform the sector (Underhill, 2014; Sesant, 2014).

4.6 Equality Court Order

In light of the marginalisation of small-scale fishers during the rights allocation under the MLRA, a class-action suit was launched against the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in 2004. The key applicants were the Artisanal Fisher Association and Masifundise (with the support of academics, and lawyers from the Legal Resource Centre) (Isaacs, 2011). Government had failed to recognise the small-scale sector and the failure to allocate adequate fishing rights was a violation of fisher's Constitutional rights, resulting in incredible hardship (Sowman, et al., 2014). The Court Order therefore declared:

"New policy and legislative process needed to be developed by all parties concerned that would include all traditional fishers in South Africa and accommodate the socio-economic rights of these fishers." (High Court of South Africa, 2007)

The Minister signed the Court Order in 2007, which bound the Department to developing a new legislative and policy framework accommodating small-scale fishers in South Africa. This meant that fishers who had previously only received exemptions were to be recognised as full rights holders (Sunde & Isaacs, 2008). This process culminated in the Draft Policy for the Small-Scale Fisheries Sector in South Africa, 2010. Further, as part of the court order, the Minister was required to provide an immediate reprieve for the traditional small-scale fishers who could demonstrate a family history of dependence on fisheries resources in the form of IRPs (Shanyengange, 2010). Restricted to the Western Cape, the IRPs temporarily broadened the rights of small-scale fishers to harvest species such as yellowtail and snoek, as well as permitting limited harvesting of selected inshore resources (Shanyengange, 2010).

4.7 Small-Scale Fisher Policy (SSFP) 2012

The aim of the Small-Scale Fisher Policy is to:

> *"provide redress and recognition to the rights of the small-scale fisher communities in South Africa previously marginalised and discriminated against in terms of racially exclusive laws and policies…in order to fulfil the constitutional promise of substantive equity"* (Sowman, et al., 2014, p. 36; Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 10).

In response to the limiting definition of small-scale fishing put forward by the SFTG as described earlier, the new policy recognises that small-scale fishers harvest along a use spectrum. Consequently, the policy describes small-scale fishers as:

> *"…persons that fish to meet food and basic livelihood needs, or are directly involved in harvesting, processing or marketing of fish, traditionally operate on or near shore fishing grounds, predominantly employ traditional low technology or passive fishing gear, usually undertake single day fishing trips, and are engaged in the sale or barter or are involved in commercial activity"* (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. iv).

The policy states the "ecosystem" approach is central to fisheries management, and adds that the policy has adopted a "community-based co-management approach (Department of

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 4)". However, an autonomous idea of 'community' has never existed along the west coast (Van Sittert, 2003). Nonetheless, this paradigm shift in management approach evolved from the consistent plea of fishing communities and their desire for inclusive marine resource management approaches. In many cases, however, fisheries co-management has been unsuccessful, the only real successes the redistribution of power and responsibility amongst different stakeholders (Bene, 2009).

The SSFP identified four principles that determined the new management approach: first, the principle of preferential access to small-scale communities with historic livelihood dependence on marine living resources; second, the policy adopted a multi-species approach in allocating rights, recognising the basket of marine resources that sustains fisher livelihoods. (More on this principle: management approaches commonly encouraged a single-species approach to harvesting; however, recent developments indicate a basket species approach offered greater social and ecosystem outcomes (Kolding & Van Zwieten, 2011). Third, the policy aims to manage the Small-Scale Fisheries sector through a co-management approach, but as with other governance systems, co-management involves risks, principally, the manipulation of power by local elites (Bundy, et al., 2008). Co-management is suggested to work best when there is strong local leadership, social cohesion, and a community managed protected area (Gutierrez, et al., 2011). Finally, the policy subjects marine living resources management to sustainability precepts, as well as maintaining the integrity of broader ecosystems (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 11).

4.8 Conclusion

The ITQ as a rights-based management tool has weakened the influence of fishers and increased unemployment and the overall insecurity of fishers. The poor fishers carry much of the burden of this management approach, yet they are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries (Hara, 2013). The participation of small-scale fishers and the various stakeholders is therefore essential, but this requires an interventionist approach from government to develop the appropriate management skills among the fishers (Hara, et al., 2013; Proches & Bodhanya, 2014). Repetition of past scenarios that gave rise to paper-quota holders and inadequate processing facilities are important failures DAFF needs to rectify (Bailey, 2013).

The policy holds the potential to make significant progress in addressing the varied causes to poverty. However, this recognition is tempered by the realities of the monumental implementation effort required to successfully roll out the policy over the next decade (Sowman, et al., 2014). The new policy paves the way for future reforms that address issues of justice and race-based oppression, in addition to reallocating aquatic resources equitably (Ratner, et al., 2014).

Most importantly for this research was the irregular allocation of fishing quota by the South African Government; the result of which was externally imposed income inequality (Visser & Burns, 2013). By benefiting a small elite over those with legitimate claims to a livelihood from fishing, the allocations divided fishing communities (Visser & Burns, 2013). The

resultant levels of mistrust by community members towards each other, and towards formal governance structures, was the departure point of this thesis. This context provided the backdrop against which the research sought to understand the livelihoods of fisher groups in Lamberts Bay and the implications for the implementation of the new small-scale fisheries policy.

Figure 8: Fisher boats of different capacity and engine size returning from sea (Author, 2014)

Chapter 5: Results

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the data collected in Lamberts Bay. The resultant data is drawn from the household surveys, focus groups, and key informant interviews as declared in the Methods chapter. The overall aim of the research was to gain an understanding of the livelihoods context of fisher groups in Lamberts Bay in order to determine the implications for the implementation of the new small-scale fisher policy. It was important to understand the socio-economic context of the fishers, of which the household surveys were a key component. The focus groups and key informant interviews were used with the intention of revealing the perceptions of the different fisher groups in Lamberts Bay, especially concerning their needs and expectations of the new policy. The West Coast Rock Lobster Right Holders (WCRLRHs) and the Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers constituted the two different fisher groups that served as the lens through which the data is presented. The chapter will show that the primary difference between the two fisher groups was the type of fishing right or permit they held, which had implications for the marine resources harvested and their resultant incomes. These differences are shown to be critical to the development of household differences of the two fisher groups.

First, the chapter presents the demographic data collected through the household surveys, as shown in Table 1. This is followed by data that identifies key points of difference and similarity that help clarify the household livelihood context of the different fisher groups. The chapter then goes on to address the natural assets and resource base of the fishers and provides a profile of the marine resources harvested by the fishers in Lamberts Bay and their relative importance to food and income needs. The chapter further explores the physical assets held by the Lamberts Bay fishers, and identifies stark differences between the fishers in terms of their fishing assets. Finally, the chapter describes the perverse financial relationship between the Lobster exporting companies and the fishers, which was common to both fisher groups.

5.1.1 Identifying the Lamberts Bay Small-Scale fishers

Forty-four households were surveyed during the course of the data collection period. The overwhelming majority of the fishermen surveyed self-identified as ‘Coloured’. Many respondents took issue with the apartheid race classifications and chose to identify as ‘Other’, ‘Brown’, or ‘Khoi’. The national census records reveal that 76.37% of the total Lamberts Bay population self-identified as ‘Coloured’ (Statistics South Africa, 2014). This complements the findings from the household surveys conducted for this research which showed that 65% of the respondents self-identified as ‘Coloured’. The surveys were conducted within the Apartheid-designated area for Coloured people; consequently, other racial categories are underrepresented in the results. This included the White small-scale fishers in the historically White areas, and the Black fishers who lived in the ‘Kampong’ (‘the camp’ in the Sesotho language): a tiny informal settlement adjacent to the Coloured area.

WCRLRHs were approximately a decade older (average of 53) than the IRP fishers (average of 45); in addition WCRLRHs had the oldest person among both fisher groups of 71 years

old. The youngest among both fisher groups was an IRP fisher of 29. All fishers occupied a very mature age bracket. Both the WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers spoke Afrikaans as their first language. The language data shows congruency with the census data, which indicates that 90% of Lamberts Bay residents self-identify as Afrikaans speakers. This is followed by isiXhosa and English in third (Statistics South Africa, 2014).

Table 2: Demographic Profile of the Lamberts Bay Small-Scale Fishers

Group	IRP	WCRLRH
Population Group (%) ('Coloured')	65%	60%
Home Language (%)	100% Afrikaans	90% Afrikaans
Marital Status (%) (Married)	68%	100%
Birthplace (%) (Lamberts Bay)	77%	80%
Years in Lamberts (Average)	40,6	50
Age (Average)	45,8	53,4
People in Household (Average)	4	5
Number of People in School	1	1
Housing Structure (%) (Permanent House)	81%	100%
Cooking Energy using Mains Electricity (%)	97%	100%
Drinking Water (House Connection)	94%	100%
Household Breadwinners	2	2

5.1.2 Marine Resource Use

The WCRLRH right and the IRP were differentiated by the marine resources harvested and the regulations surrounding the harvests. The IRP allowed the fishers to legally harvest four different species: Lobster, Snoek, Cape Bream, and White Mussel, as shown in Table 3 below. Attached to these species were regulations that determined the quantity the fishers were allowed to harvest and their liberties regarding what they could do with their harvest. For instance, for every other species, the fishers could sell their harvest privately or consume it in the home. Whereas with the Lobster, the fishers could only sell to the Lobster exporting companies with whom they were required to sign contracts. The WCRLRH right on the other hand, was limited to the harvesting of one species: Lobster. For every other resource, the WCRLRHs required recreational fishing rights.

Table 3: IRP Marine Resource Use

Interim Relief Permit				
Resource	***Quota restriction***	***Price (2013/14)***	***Recreational permit***	***Use***
Lobster	138Kg/season	R200/kg	No	SELL ALL
Snoek	60/day	R20-R95/Snoek[2]	No	MAINLY SELL
Cape Bream	30/day	R120/bossie[3]	No	MAINLY SELL
White Mussel	50/day	R0.50	No	BAIT

5.1.3 Type of employment in fisheries

The two fisher groups could more or less be defined in terms of two interrelated factors: the jobs they performed within the small-scale fisheries and boat ownership. In this respect, the individual quota (IQ) right allocation process created a class of boat owners and a class of boat assistants. All the WCRLRHs indicated they were boat owners, in contrast to only 42% of IRP fishers. Almost half of the IRP respondents, at 45%, stated they were assistants on other's boats. This data showed a distinction between the IRP fishers and the WCRLRHs according to their fishing asset base and ownership of the means of production, with an intermediary class of IRP fishers who had their permits for a longer period of time and could therefore afford boats. Two key informants attested to the development of a pseudo-class structure among the fishers:

> *"KI3: …and suddenly a situation have unfolded…, if you could say, the one is becoming the boss, other one is becoming the worker, and the worker was now, in terms of the livelihood, depending on what we call, the site [job as boat assistant/crewman], on a boat of a rights holder [WCRLRH]. So that was very magnificent, it actually have disturbed the peace and the harmony in the community."*

> *"KI2: …see it divides the people, the quota system of that time, and even it divide the communities.* ***Now they are like a bourgeoisie now, and the other fishers are like the local fishers, and they doesn't have money and so on, so it discriminates against the bona fide fisher now****. But he forget that he was on the same level as that guy, but now he got a right [WCRLRH], he like a Boer now, like a boss."* [Own emphasis added]

Furthermore, the IRP holders who worked as boat assistants worked on boats owned by other IRP fishers, but more importantly, also on boats owned by the WCRLRHs, which reinforced the class distinction between the fisher groups. According to the survey data, the intermediary class of IRP fishers who did own boats had acquired their permits with the first introduction

[2] Price fluctuates according to the present demand. The spike in Snoek demand immediately preceding the Easter holidays is a boom time because the prices reach their season's maximum.

[3] Seven or 8 fish tied together by the fishers and sold as a bundle. Price ranges according to demand, size, and quantity.

of the IRP allocation system in 2006 and 2007. The IRP fishers who were boat assistants had acquired their permits anywhere between 2006 and 2010. The context is different for the WCRLRHs, who were granted their fishing right allocations in 2005 according to the Long Term Rights Allocation (LTRA) for a secure ten-year period. This translates to a period of ten years in which their income was, for the most part, consistent, and relatively high compared with the IRP fishers'. Further, it granted the WCRLRHs the opportunity to plan ahead for the next nine seasons to maximise the benefits from harvesting, which included investing in boats, gear, and equipment. The WCRLRH's 606kg allocation of Lobster in contrast to the IRP fishers' 138kg was the chief determinant of the material differences between the fishers. The different fisher groups can therefore also be classified along their physical assets data, considering that all the WCRLRHs are boat owners, and about half of the IRP holders are boat assistants, with an intermediary boat-owning IRP fisher class, as shown in Figure 9 below:



Figure 9: Lamberts Bay Small-Scale Fisher Class Structure

5.1.4 Fishing as a Cultural Identity

In contrast to what the researcher expected, a significant proportion of fishers from both fisher groups are first-generation fishers. That is, their parents were not involved in the fisheries sector. Sixty-eight percent of IRP fishers and half of the WCRLRHs indicated their parents were not involved in fisheries. Of the fisher parents who were involved, the majority were employed in paid, shore-based fisheries jobs such as Lobster processing facilities, trap-making factories, and other fisheries support services. This has profound implications for the identity of the fishers in Lamberts Bay who jealously guard their fisher authenticity.

Parents' involvement in fisheries was considered an important determinant of the fisher identity for both fisher groups. The fishers who stated their parents were involved in fisheries regarded it as a marker of their identity as *bona fide* fishers. First generation fishers stated

their employment history in the fisheries sector was enough to self-identify as a *bona fide* fisher. The reasoning behind fishers' consideration of themselves as *bona fide* small-scale fishers is significant. Members from both fisher groups expressed their animosity towards fisherfolk who were granted Lobster rights or the IRP, but of whom the respective respondents believed were not *bona fide* small-scale fishers:

> *"Only fishermen can get the permit - not fishermen from a white man's garden, a 'kasual'[4]. At the potato factory they ask for your blue overalls to check - but fishermen don't get asked - you only see at sea that someone can't fish. A gardener is not a fisherman."(LBN24)*

> *"CFG3 : there was one guy on the television I heard in St. Helena Bay, who said that he's catching the Lobster for a person in Johannesburg, for a businessman."*

For both fisher groups, early entry into the fishing industry was an important marker of their identification as *bona fide* fishers. One fisher remarked: "fishing runs through my blood" (HS13), while another stated he was "born with a line in his hands" (HS6). The majority of fishers from both fisher groups began harvesting marine resources before the age of 16. The fishers who began fishing at the ages of 15 and 16 stated they had left school to enter the formal employment sector. There were significant overlaps in try to differentiate between fishing as occupation, and fishing casually during their youth.

5.2 Social and Human Assets

5.2.1 Household profile of Lamberts Bay Small-Scale Fishers

The WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers registered very similar numbers of people residing in their households. IRP fishers had on average 4.4 people per household, whilst WCRLRH had on average 4.9 household occupants. In contrast to the average household size for the Cederberg Municipality at 3.3 persons per household (Municipality, 2012), Lamberts Bay fishers have relatively high numbers of household residents. For both fisher groups, the average number of breadwinners was two. This commonly consisted of a husband and wife partnership, but in some instances, adult children who remained in the household were included as breadwinners. The breadwinners in the households of both fisher groups in Lamberts Bay carry a greater household burden and have to allocate their income among more people than other households within the Municipality.

The data showed very little difference between the housing structure of the IRP holders and the WCRLRHs. All the WCRLRHs indicated they lived in permanent brick structures, with 81% of those with IRPs indicating the same. IRP holders were the only respondents to indicate they lived in any structure other than a permanent house, with a small minority that stated they lived in permanent shacks and traditional dwellings. The Lamberts Bay housing problem was peculiar in that large numbers of its residents were backyard dwellers, some of whom were small-scale fishers. None of the houses had been constructed within the tenure of the Long Term Rights Allocation (LTRA) or the allocation of the IRP, as the majority

[4] Afrikaans word translated as 'casual' in the English used in reference to casual laborers.

appeared to have been constructed during the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)[5].

With the exception of two IRP fishers, all the fishers from both fisher groups stated their households had household electricity connections. Mains electricity was also the most common cooking energy among both fisher groups, with the exception of one IRP fisher who stated they used LPG Gas for cooking, and another who prepared his food in a family member's household. Similarly, all the fishers from both fisher groups stated they had access to piped water in the household, with the exception of two IRP fishers, one of whom also had no electricity connection.

5.2.2 Level of Education

The level of education is shown in Table 4 below. The following description highlights the education problem among the small-scale fishers of Lamberts Bay. The table shows that significant numbers of fishers from both fisher groups did not proceed further than primary school, and among those, very few completed primary school. The data also shows that of those who enrolled for primary school education, more IRP fishers failed to complete, in contrast to WCRLRHs. The survey did not, however, explore the reasons for this early departure from the formal school system. This data shows that among those whose education ended at the primary level, more dropped out than finished, which has enormous consequences for the literacy and numeracy of the fishers.

The data shows that the two fisher groups had difficulty progressing in high school. Half of the WCRLRHs surveyed had not completed high school, compared to 42% of IRP holders who also did not complete high school. These results show that the IRP fishers and the WCRLRHs are both burdened with the problem of education. One of the priority areas identified by the IDP is the need for a secondary school in Lamberts Bay (Municipality, 2013). Currently parents are forced to send their children to boarding schools in the nearby towns of Graaffwater and Citrusdal for schooling beyond Grade 9: just one amongst the myriad and overlooked Apartheid legacies affecting the community.

Table 4: Schooling Statistics among Lamberts Bay Fishers

Level of Education		
Education	***IRP***	***WCRLRH***
Incomplete primary	29%	20%
Completed Primary	10%	10%
Incomplete high school	42%	50%
Completed High School	16%	10%
Completed Tertiary	3%	10%

[5] A paradigmatic social welfare programme adopted by the post-1994 government that had a significant housing focus.

5.2.3 The Primacy of Fishing as Livelihood Strategy

Both fisher groups stated marine resource harvesting was their primary means of income and food source. WCRLRHs also indicated the importance of self-employment and employment in the fishing industry, which some indicated as their most important income-generating activities. Figure 10 shows that some WCRLRHs were employed in the trap-making factories of Lobster harvest and export companies. This was important because IRP fishers were not legally allowed to perform another occupation outside of marine resource harvesting, while some WCRLRHs considered their permit as part of a range of business opportunities they could exploit as any other. For both fisher groups, where the wife worked outside of the fisheries sector, she was commonly employed in the town's potato factory (previously a fish processing plant) or fulfilled a variety of services for the White patrons in the town including domestic services and staffing the old-age home.



Figure 10: WCRLRHs working a second occupation as trap-makers (Author, 2014)

Fishing was also the most important contributor to the household income among the IRP fishers. The WCRLRH households showed a similar dependence on marine resource harvesting, with 77% who considered marine resource harvesting as their largest and sole income source. Within these same categories, however, the data shows that more WCRLRHs were able to consider marine resource harvesting as their sole income source, while IRP fishers had to rely on a wider range of income activities.

Due to the income differentials, WCRLRHs feel they are wrongly perceived as wealthy, as evidenced from this WCRLRH focus group:

> *"CFG1: They see 606 [kilograms]*
>
> *CFG4: Times 200 [R/kg of Lobster]-*
>
> *CFG1: …they don't see the real part*

CFG3: …50 000 rand you got in your hands but it isn't like that, you got deductions on it.

CFG4: See us, I fish November, now I fish December, and I fished January for Lobster, I didn't catch all of my allocation, but I can tell you now with an honest face, I don't have any money left. I have done a few things, I don't have any money left."

WCRLRHs expressed dissatisfaction with the community perceptions surrounding the value of their permit and their relative wealth, in particular against that of those fishers without rights as well as those with the IRP. Table 5 below shows the potential earnings from marine resource harvesting in a perfect season (November to June). Linefish clearly proves a far more lucrative resource to the IRP fishers than their Lobster quota, even more so than that of the WCRLRH quota. However, the IRP fishers' disproportionate focus on harvesting their Lobster allocation, in addition to structural factors that render Lobster a source of easily-accessible disposable income, results in the IRP fishers forfeiting this potentially lucrative marine resource.

Table 5: IRP vs WCRLRH Projected Earnings before costs ('13/'14 Season)

PERMIT TYPE	**IRP**			**WCRLRH**
SPECIES	**LOBSTER**	**SNOEK**	**CAPE BREAM**	**LOBSTER**
QUOTA	138,00kg	420/week	210/week	606,00kg
AVG PRICE	194,68kg	47,95/fish	112,83/bossie	194,68kg
TOTAL (SEASON)	**R 26 865,84**	**R 483 336,00**	**R 81 237,60**	**R 117 976,08**

5.2.4 Food Security

The most important marine resources of both fisher groups were Lobster and Snoek. These marine resources were however attached to conditions and obligations which the fishers were required to fulfil. For instance, both fisher groups had to sell their Lobster to Lobster exporting companies, and this was policed by the fisheries department. Due to the high prices received per kilogram of Lobster and the ease with which Lobster provided disposable income, both fisher groups declared Lobster the most important resource to their income. The attractive short term gains from Lobster harvesting deflected attention away from the far more lucrative Linefish the fishers could harvest. The Lobster harvest promises the fishers a consistent income because they sell what they catch directly to the Lobster exporting companies as per agreement. However, Linefish harvesting is both inconsistent with respect to the migratory nature of Snoek, and also requires a thriving local market in order for the fishers to benefit from their harvests. Snoek prices are also incredibly sensitive to demand. The few bumper holiday periods provide welcome relief over prolonged periods of muted demand. The importance of these two variables to maximising Linefish harvests renders Lobster the most attractive marine resource to harvest. Snoek, for which the WCRLRHs could only receive a recreational permit, was considered the most important resource for household food provision.

The data also showed that 81% of the IRP fishermen stated they engaged in fishing to meet the direct food needs of their households. In contrast, the majority of WCRLRHs stated their

marine resource harvest does not serve the direct food needs of the household. In addition, the WCRLRHs considered the Linefish as surplus to their income from Lobster, which more often than not exceeded the income from catching Snoek and Cape Bream. The different fishing patterns and incomes therefore developed explicit food security differences, as evidenced by the IRP fisher below:

> *"…one needs to accept their circumstances - you don't have meat every day, on the day, only have coffee and bread - some days you are frustrated that your neighbour [referring to WCRLRHs] can have all they want and you can't." (LBN23)*

The differences in income between the IRP and WCRLRHs had further consequences for the food security of the respective households. An overwhelming majority of WCRLRHs indicated they never skipped a meal during the month before the surveys were conducted, in contrast to half of the IRP fishers who stated they had skipped a meal in the previous month.

Eating fish on Mondays was considered a Lamberts Bay tradition among the Coloured folk, and according to the respondents, this was a Sunday tradition for White folk. For both the WCRLRHs and IRP households, fish was an important part of the household diet. The WCRLRHs stated they consumed fish at least once a week, while all the IRP fisher households consumed fish at least twice a week, with some consuming fish more frequently. Apart from directly harvesting Linefish, some households received fish through an informal network based on friendship, kinship, or mutual reciprocation beyond friendship. The fishers who returned from sea set aside a few Snoek to give away for these purposes, which they called the 'fry', either to take home for the household or for friends and family waiting on shore. Both sets of households therefore depended on the Linefish as an important part of their household diet.

5.2.5 External Support Structures

All the survey respondents from the two fisher groups had social support systems outside their immediate families, in the form of local fishing committees. Different committees existed to serve the interests of the IRP fishers and the WCRLRHs; these were Coastal Links, and the Sea Management Committee, respectively. Membership of a committee was important as an indicator of social capital and alternative support external to kinship. Both fisher groups stated they were satisfied with the performance of their respective fisher committees. However, some of the WCRLRHs lamented the lack of communication with their committee and the poor state of transformation with the majority of the decision makers being White. It appeared the WCRLRHs are default members of the Sea Management Committee by virtue of their Lobster permit. Consequently, they are largely removed from the operations of the committee but continue to pay rates to it.

5.2.6 Profile of the Household Occupants

The data shows that 100% of the WCRLRHs and 68% of those with the IRP indicated they were married. The survey did not include co-habiting couples, despite there being cases in which IRP holder fishers lived with their partners. Due to the younger profile of the IRP holders, it was expected that fewer would be married in comparison to the older group of

WCRLRH. It is, however, important to note that although the WCRLRHs are on average older, both the fisher groups have high average ages, as the data indicates.

The fisher groups have relatively large households and, as a result, the expectation was that they would have household members of school-going age. While the average number of people attending school in both IRP and WCRLRHs households was equal at one, households of IRP holders had a higher maximum number of school goers, at four, in contrast to the WCRLRH households, at three. Problematically, 32% percent of IRP fisher households recorded no school-goers at all, whilst all but 1 WCRLRH household had someone in school. Overall, then, proportionally more WCRLRH households have a member of their household enrolled in school in contrast to the IRP fisher households with less.

5.3 Natural Assets and Resources

5.3.1 Lobster and Snoek central to the SSF livelihood

According to the fishers, Lobster was the most popular target for poachers, followed by Snoek. This was because Lobster was highly valued on the local and international markets, and for which a large black market trade existed. Both fisher groups stated that Lobster was too expensive to be consumed in their household. In addition, the fisheries department had made it illegal for fishers to sell any of their Lobster privately. Lobster was therefore not seen as a food source but rather as the most important source of household revenue. While few IRP holders regarded Snoek as their most important income source, the importance of Snoek to the IRP holder's household income is significant. Despite the potential for Snoek to generate far greater income than Lobster harvesting, as Table 5 above shows, the disproportionate focus on the short-term gains of the Lobster harvest means this is very rarely the case. The extended 2014 Snoek run for instance, which ran for four months, provided the opportunity for the IRP fishers to earn more from their Snoek than their season's Lobster allocation, which was more the exception than the rule. The same could not be said for the WCRLRHs for whom income from Snoek harvesting (which they could only harvest with a recreational permit) remained far below their income from Lobster harvesting, and, hence, was far from being the most important income resource. The pattern that has emerged revealed that WCRLRHs and IRP fishers depended on Lobster more than any other marine resource as a significant part of their income.

Both fisher groups ranked Snoek as the most important marine resource for food. Ninety-six percent of IRP fishers identified Snoek and Cape Bream as their primary food sources. WCRLRHs could only harvest Linefish with a recreational permit which they had to purchase from the Post Office. While some WCRLRHs bought the recreational permit, it appeared as a mere formality because they harvested beyond the recreational quota's allocation, while some WCRLRHs didn't bother with a permit at all. The fishers stated the compliance officers at the harbour were traded Snoek and other species in return for leniency. WCRLRHs therefore had less access to Linefish because of their permit restrictions and this meant their dependence on Linefish was less than that for IRP fishers. For six months of the year WCRLRHs were preoccupied with harvesting their Lobster quota, while IRP holders were not required to divide their attention to such a great degree because of their much smaller Lobster quota.

5.3.2 Threats to the Marine Resources

The results have so far shown marine resource harvesting contributed to the household income and food needs of both fisher groups. It was important therefore to determine the perceived threats to the sustainability of this livelihood. The results showed that both groups unanimously regarded climate change and poachers as the greatest threat to the marine resource. Other factors were less prominent but were important to some fishers, such as the impact of commercial company trawlers and, in particular, their commercial traps that damaged the live Lobster in the WCRLRH near-shore harvest zone. Other outliers some fishers considered threatening included over-fishing, type of gear, and market demand. With respect to climate change, both fisher groups elaborated on the importance of sea temperature to the availability of marine resources, in particular Lobster. The pattern points to the similarity of fishing experiences, despite the different rights and permit specifications.

The majority of references to poaching made by the fisherfolk were directed towards Lobster harvesting. To the fishers, Lobster poaching included harvesting more than the right or permit allowed, as well as launching during the night to poach from the traps of the commercial Lobster companies further out at sea. The fisherfolk further revealed Linefish poaching was prevalent, with Snoek the main target species. Both fisher groups implicated themselves in poaching of these species. The survey did not investigate the reasons fishers poached, but in conversation, both groups of fishers revealed their dissatisfaction with their Lobster quota allocation, and, for the WCRLRHs in particular, the limited opportunities with a permit that only allowed Lobster harvesting. Even so, the WCRLRHs described Snoek harvesting as an important supplement to their diet and income, especially during the winter months:

> *"CFG4: 'Cos most of us don't have…commercial Linefish rights, so what we are actually doing, we are going out and you stealing, because that is what you do and we use that money to get by. When the Snoek runs like it did now [apropos of the 4-month extended run], but it's not that sustainable because you don't show that much of a profit. It's an every day, it's from day to day. And if you weren't successful every day, then you can put a little of that money aside, when the winter really hits us, then it's gonna be very bad."*

Despite unanimously revealing poaching as a problem, the respondents felt they were compelled to poach because their current rights and permits were not sufficient to maintain them. Neither fisher group pointed fingers, but rather spoke of poaching as a problem within their respective allocation system.

5.3.3 Perceptions of the new community right

When asked about their perceptions regarding the community right that was to be introduced, the WCRLRHs stated the policy was good for the fishing community in general, but saw themselves as apart or outside the policy. The WCRLRHs were however very aware that the new policy had profound implications for their fishing livelihood, particularly due to the impending 2015 rights allocation process. However, most were unambiguous in their desire to remain with their current individual permit, and saw the introduction of a community right as the potential loss of their autonomy and privilege. WCRLRHs suggested that while they

welcomed the new policy into the fishing community, they would much rather remain with their individual permits:

> *"T: so when it comes to it, it says that, you have a choice between the near-shore and joining the community right. What would happen there? What would you feel you would do?*
>
> *CFG1: I think that's an individual [decision], if you think that you will perform for the past ten years, what is the hold on applying again? So, what's the problem?"*

The majority of responses from the WCRLRHs indicated their disdain for joining the new policy. Among the dilution of their autonomy and independence, another important factor was the relative income differences between the IRP holder and the WCRLRHs based on their lobster harvests. The income from the Lobster quota allocation is significantly higher than that of the IRP holders and remained the key motivation to retain such a lucrative permit.

One respondent doubted the sustainability of the new policy and suggested that as his key reason for preferring his individual permit. Another WCRLRH felt mistrust between the fishers was his biggest concern with the new policy, in addition to the potential mismanagement of the implementation of the policy. For the WCRLRHs, the critical issue raised by the majority of the respondents and reiterated repeatedly in interviews, surveys and focus groups, was the anxiety brought about by their uncertain position once their rights expire after their final harvesting season, and the allocation process scheduled for 2015. One WCRLRH believed he was sure to lose his fishing right, the implications of which made him anxious:

> *"CFG4: Ya, we gonna be left in the desert without water. That's how it's gonna be. I don't think, I would say 98 percent of people in the near-shore fisheries [WCRLRHs] don't have a backup plan. Because what you do, you've been fishing all your life and it's the only thing that you knew, and some of the guys is coming much older by now, they are set in their ways, what is for them to do?"*

The potential that the WCRLRHs might not retain their current permits during the 2015 allocation process, and the quantity of their quota allocations if they did retain their permit (considering the steady decline in Lobster allocations to allow more entrants), drive this uncertainty. In addition, WCRLRHs felt they were not engaged in the formulation of the new policy. The somewhat sarcastic and rhetorical question below asked by a WCRLRH highlighted the insulation the WCRLRHs felt regarding the new policy:

> *"CFG3: Are we involved in this new policy? As the near-shore small-scale fishers?"*

Unfortunately, the fisheries department failed to adequately conduct the 2013 Linefish allocations, which made the fishers lose confidence in the 2015 process. Data collected from news feeds suggested the fisheries department will be ill-prepared to conduct the 2015 allocations because of a backlog in the necessary preparatory steps. In addition, the WCRLRHs felt the department had not engaged with them enough to give them an indication

of their post-2015 future. The WCRLRHs felt they had not been part of the formulation of the new policy:

"KI3: no, at that time it was only the fishers without the rights [IRP fishers] who were mostly attending the meeting. Because the rights holders [WCRLRHs] have argued that this is not for them, they are sitting with rights."

"CFG4: you see the new policy was, I believe that the new policy was set up in consultation not so much with us, the near-shore guys [WCRLRHs]; this new policy was mainly driven by the Interim [IRP fishers], the subsistence fishers and they forwarded their agendas. Because they felt that they want to have what we [WCRLRHs] have and all that stuff."

Only one WCRLRH from Lamberts Bay participated in the discussions and meetings around the new policy. Some respondents felt the WCRLRHs perceived themselves as a separate group among the fishers because of their privilege, and that the policy discussions were beyond their concern as WCRLRHs. The data showed the WCRLRHs had very little knowledge regarding the contents of the new policy and were simply awaiting their fate. One key informant laid bare the tension between the fisher groups and their sentiments:

"KI2: That is the kind of difference between those two rights holders, the commercial [WCRLRHs] one not certain about his livelihood after 2015, while Interim man [IRP fisher] said that ***now this is his time to eat****."* [Emphasis added]

The WCRLRHs also expressed their dissatisfaction with the current size of quota allotted to them. One WCRLRH described his sentiment as such:

> *"CFG1: My point of view, it's not sustainable…*
>
> *T: Not sustainable.*
>
> *CFG1: If you are just depend on the 606 [kilograms], because why? As he said, your levies, they deduct your levies, your maintenance, you pay your crew. You know what? The change is yours. "*

The anxiety over the 2015 rights allocations was also due to the uncertainty over the quota allocations that will be allotted to the rights holders should they retain their permits. In addition to the dissatisfaction with the current quota allocation, the fishers felt the department could reduce their Lobster quota without consultation, as had occurred in previous years.

5.4 Access to finance

5.4.1 Advances

Both the WCRLRHs and IRP holders had taken out advances from friends, family, or from the Lobster exporting companies to cover their household expenses such as food, clothes and school fees. These figures were high, at 70% for the WCRLRHs and 68% for the IRP holders. In addition, the fishers mentioned they often required initial capital to launch their boats each season, to purchase sea-going equipment, and other start-up items. The advances were a quasi-legal arrangement between the fishers and the exporting companies. They were quasi-legal because they thrived under the full knowledge of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (DAFF), yet at the same time the fishing companies do not have the required authority to extend their services to financial credit provision.

By Departmental decree, the fisher groups were required, to enter into contracts with the Lobster exporting companies to whom they were bound. However, in order to secure the quota allocation of the fishers, Lobster export companies offered competing incentives to the fishers in order to entice them to sign with the respective exporter. These incentives commonly came in the form of competing loans to the fishers, and the offer of a better price for the fisher's Lobster. However, fishers were adamant that the key to the success of the fisheries lies in assuming control of the exporting, which remains in the hands of the established and historically White companies, as a WCRLRH describes below:

> *"CFG2: and due to the fact that the resource is limited that everybody can't be accommodated in the resource, we must really look at the marketing, because the marketers [Lobster exporters], are actually the guys who walks away with the money, if that money can be can be channelled to the real fishermen, that will make a whole lot of difference..."*

While this arrangement appeared to grant both fisher groups some degree of autonomy and leverage over which company they selected as their exporter, and by extension the potential to negotiate better prices for themselves, this was seldom the case. Instead, the exporting companies recruited influential members of the fishing community to peddle loans to the fishers prior to the opening of the Lobster season. This coincided with a particularly vulnerable period for the fishers who experienced rough seas during the winter and could not earn money by going to sea, as well as the impending festive season and the associated expectations placed on breadwinners to provide for the family. Repaying the loans to the exporting company was fulfilled by delivering all their Lobster quota for that particular season to the exporter, effectively reducing the fisher to little more than an indentured servant and replicating the apartheid-era bondage that the small-scale permit allocation sought to rectify.

5.4.2 Co-operatives and their challenges

Co-operative membership differed across the fisher groups. Of the surveyed IRP holders, 81% were members of co-operatives. The IRP holders were required to form co-operatives in order to receive infrastructure support from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Key items for each co-operative included 2 boats, safety equipment, amongst other forms of support. WCRLRHs operated with a greater degree of individual autonomy because they were not required to form co-operatives. However, some WCRLRHs stated they had formed co-operatives as a strategic manoeuvre against the threat of losing their individual right in the 2015 allocations.

5.4.2.1 Challenges

The greatest challenge with the co-operatives was the low level of co-operation between members of the same co-operative. Commonly cited grievances were that members absolved themselves of the responsibility of going to sea, leaving the burden of harvesting their catch on the shoulders of the remaining members. Other members limited themselves to the less strenuous activities in the post-harvest sector, such as 'flekking' and cleaning the fish, while some co-operatives had experienced members who left to join other co-operatives. IRP respondents also elaborated on the economic burden of absentee co-operative members. It

was often stated that underperforming members continued to seek economic benefits from the co-operative, despite not contributing to the running of the co-operative.

The fisherfolk continued to support inactive members because they regarded themselves as fishers before they were businessmen, implying kinship and community assumed precedence over economic decision-making. Fishers regarded the perceptions of the community as an important factor in how they responded to the conduct of underperforming members. One example given was of a fisherman who passed away. The deceased's family approached the cooperative for financial support to pay for the funeral. However, unbeknownst to the family, the fisherman had not been an active contributing member. Despite this, the cooperative was compelled to contribute to the family because acting otherwise would be seen as an immoral and unfeeling act by the community. The consequence was that most of the co-operatives were defunct and mistrust among the co-operative members remained high.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter describes the results that were obtained from the household surveys, the focus groups, key informant interviews, and personal notes. The data shows the WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers shared a common upbringing, and engaged in similar fishing activities before the introduction of the ITQ. They harvested similar marine resources and were limited by similar constraints that affected their educational and occupational opportunities. Despite this, the data shows the rights allocation process created a group of fishers with higher income, depending on whether they held the WCRLRH permit or the IRP. As a result, key structural differences developed in Lamberts Bay. These structural differences fostered divisions within the fishing community clearly visible at the household level. These divisions manifested themselves in household food security differences between the WCRLRHs and the IRP holders, and the ability of the IRP fishers to own a share of the means of production such as boat infrastructure.

The boat ownership patterns revealed the emergence of two distinct classes and a third intermediary: a boat owner class, a boat assistant class, and those who fell into both categories. The boat owner class was populated by all the WCRLRHs and some of the IRP fishers, while the boat assistant class consisted entirely of IRP fishers and those without any form of permit. The intermediary class consisted of IRP fishers who had the IRP permit long enough to allow investment in boat infrastructure, but who also worked as boat assistants. Boats were in overwhelmingly short supply. The people who got into the 2005 commercial rights allocation were able to invest in a vessel. Those excluded from that earlier allocation are only just recently obtaining DTI support or loans from marketers. Overall, there is a distinct lack of licensed vessels amongst those who missed out on the 2005 allocations. This control over the means of production, such as fishing boats and associated harvesting necessities lay overwhelmingly with the WCRLRHs, while meagrely distributed amongst the IRP fishers.

Boats were the most important physical assets that made up the SLA asset matrix. Owning boats meant fishers had access to greater credit lines, became employers with the opportunity to pursue other business, and gave them a significant advantage when re-applying for fishing

rights. Through this, boat owners entrenched their wealth, enabled by an allocation process that rewards incumbents. Finally, the chapter described the financial assets at the disposal of the fisher groups, describing the prevalence of advances, and the largely defunct co-operatives, particularly among the IRP fishers. Both fisher groups stated the prevalence of advances contributing to community decay and mistrust between the fishers. Even worse was the fact that advances stripped the fishers of any autonomy over their Lobster, which was also their most important resource. The consequence was that the fishers were effectively reduced to servants of their old apartheid era masters: White-owned fishing companies.

Figure 11: 'Langanas' waiting to purchase fish from returning fishers (Author, 2014)

Chapter 6: Discussion

6.1 Convergent Histories: Social, Human, and Natural Assets

Small-scale fishing in Lamberts Bay is integrally associated with the culture and the identity of the fishers, in keeping with the findings of Bavinck, Pellegrini, & Mostert (2014) who concluded the same about small-scale fisheries in the 'Global South'. This thesis found that if either parent of a fisher was a fisher (commonly the father), the fisher was engaged in harvesting at a very early age. The nature of this resource harvesting was informal and quantitatively insignificant. However, it bore immense cultural importance and affirmed the identity of the fisher. All the fishers grew up during apartheid and, as a result, their educational aspirations were structurally arrested at the age of 16 with the Bantu Education Act (Union of South Africa, 1953). While unable to pursue further education unless under exceptional circumstances, the fishers were also restricted from becoming legal rights holders under apartheid law. Consequently their involvement in fishing was limited to being crewmen for White rights holders, fulfilling their apartheid-designated occupations as 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for White-owned fishing companies (Union of South Africa, 1953).

There was therefore nothing exceptional between the early life histories of the WCRLRHs and the Interim Relief Permit (IRP) fishers. This was also true for the physical structures in which both groups of fishers lived. All had access to basic services such as piped water connections to the house as well as mains electricity connections. None of the households visited had been constructed within the previous nine years, although some had extended their structures. The data did not determine whether the houses were constructed by the fishers themselves or formed part of the roll-out of the RDP programme. It does appear, however, due to the standard structure of the dwellings the researcher visited, that all the permanent houses were government granted RDP houses. Consequently, there was little difference between the household structures of WCRLRHs and IRP fishers. In the relatively short period of nine years since the allocation of the long-term rights, the influence of the allocations has been limited with respect to household structure.

Both fisher groups had remarkably similar numbers of people in the household, in school, and as breadwinners. This consistency confirms that neither fisher group displayed exceptional characteristics but rather had very similar life histories. This suggests the household structure of the two fisher groups has developed largely independent of the rights allocation process. That is to say, the household profiles of WCRLRHs and IRP fishers recorded in the survey responses developed independently of the distribution of the respective permits. No exceptional differences were evident between the WCRLRH and the IRP fisher groups that pointed to the influence of the type of permit they held. Considering the long-term rights allocations (LTRA) were issued in 2005 and the IRP soon after from 2007, it might have been expected that life histories would be largely similar. While this was true, life histories also served the purpose of determining whether they had any impact on the allocation of the rights, considering that elites had often been the recipients of fishing rights intended for the

poor. This thesis now turns to the differences between both fisher groups that have arisen since the long-term rights allocation process.

The rights allocation processes were a significant factor in the 10-year average age difference between the two fisher groups. The IRP is reviewed annually, and in accordance with the determined TAC, the department issues permits to new entrants but also exercises the liberty to revoke the permits of incumbents. This meant that every year, new entrants, whether young or old, became part of the IRP system. In contrast, the WCRLRH system was executed through the LTRA process during 2005. This meant that entrants were only allowed to apply once, with the next application process due after ten years. As a result, many who might have applied for inclusion into the WCRLRH system were not eligible because they were too young, while older and perhaps more established fishers applied for the long-term fishing rights as eligible persons. There was therefore no room for younger entrants during the tenure of the long-term fishing rights unless under exceptional circumstances. The result is that WCRLRHs were on average older than IRP fishers.

Structural factors including the Bantu Education Act, socio-economic hardships and the woeful lack of school infrastructure in the area were the reasons the fishers' education levels were low. Lamberts Bay had no secondary school. In recognition of this, a new secondary school has been given priority by the IDP (Municipality, 2013). The lack of education facilities in Lamberts Bay is an example of the tragic characteristic of small-scale fisheries world-over, whom Kolding, Bene, & Bavinck (2014) claim lack access to basic service needs including schools. The new policy proposes far-reaching reforms in the small-scale fishing sector aimed at granting the fishers greater autonomy in the management of their resources and post-harvest selling and marketing. This highlights the importance of education, over and above anything else, as a critical component. While these new functions for the community were welcomed, it was also clear the fishers felt inadequate regarding the extent of their preparedness for these responsibilities. In particular, the financial skills deficit was highlighted as a key concern amongst the fishers. The policy's support of the post-harvest sector was intended to broaden access of the benefits of the policy to those not involved with primary resource harvesting. This included women, youth, and those involved in the post-harvest sector.

As Figure 7 indicates, the post-harvest sector was the full extent of women's involvement in the Lambert's Bay fishing sector, with the exception of a few women WCRLRHs. The workshop focusing on co-operatives highlighted the prominent place of men even in the post-harvest sector. Women are already faced with a strong gender bias against them in fisheries, as McCay & Jentoft (1996) confirmed. Male encroachment in the post-harvest sector was therefore a double blow to the Lamberts Bay women. The workshop indicated male encroachment was a consequence of their exclusion from the contentious rights allocation process, supporting the finding of Gehab et. al. (2008) and Gordon (2005). Fortunately for the men, they have the option of working in every field of the fishery sector very easily, a fact corroborated by Goncuoglu & Unal (2011), while very few women, as the interviews showed, will choose to work at sea. As incumbents of the lowest position in the social hierarchy, women in fisheries face an increasingly oppressive and marginalised existence.

The new Policy's focus on the post-harvest sector remains unequivocally important to the future livelihoods of the fishers; however, the policy needs to arrest male encroachment into the post-harvest sector to protect the livelihoods of women fishers.

6.2 The Great Divergence: Income and Food Security

6.2.1 Income Differences

Marine resource harvesting limitations created differences between the WCRLRHs and the IRP households. This externally imposed income inequality was consistent with Visser & Burns (2013) who attributed it to the irregular allocation of fishing quota by the South African Government. Further, the implementation of the ITQ system in Canadian fisheries convinced Christiansen-Ruffman (2002) of the inequitable differences they produced within fishing communities, arguing these differences were artificial and superficial, which also holds true in Lamberts Bay.

Table 5 in Chapter 5 shows the projected incomes from the marine resource harvest by fishing right and permit. Harvesting Linefish had the potential to provide far greater income, but because Lobster harvesting provided the fishers with access to easily disposable income, they dedicated fewer resources to catching Linefish. Lobster therefore gained the most attention from the fishers, who considered it their most important marine resource harvest. Lobster became the most important resource to both the fisher groups because it generated the most income relative to other marine resources. The Lobster quota allocation of both groups was of enormous economic consequence as Figure 9 (Chapter 5) indicates. This radical division between the IRP fishers and the WCRLRH fishers is in agreement with Stewart, Joubert, & Janssen (2010) who found that in South Africa, ITQs created clearly distinguishable factions: those who held fishing rights and those who did not.

The IRP income was less than that of the WCRLRH because of the imbalanced 'Lobster-centric' marine resource harvesting. The IRP fishers depended on their permit to a greater degree because they did not (and legally could not) have alternative employment. For the WCRLRHs, they could afford to rely on their harvest as their sole income because it was so economically valuable. As a result, a contradictory relationship emerged between the level of income of the fisher groups and their dependence on their respective right or permit. For the IRP holders this meant they had a high dependence on marine resource harvesting, while the actual economic value of their permit was relatively low. WCRLRHs had a lower dependence on marine resource harvest, yet its value was relatively high. The WCRLRHs relative wealth also meant they invested in boat infrastructure when IRPs did not have the means.

The capacity to invest in boat infrastructure appeared to be the realm of the WCRLRHs as a fisher group. This was evident through the boat ownership data. All the WCRLRHs were able to purchase boats for themselves, while only half of the IRP fishers could afford them. For the IRP fishers who managed to invest in boats, they generally had had their permits for a longer period of time and hence could save for such expenses. The IRP was re-issued annually and hence those for whom it was their first year with the permit had no means to invest in infrastructure. The major implication of this was that the IRP fishers could be at a significant disadvantage if they were to apply for commercial rights in the future.

The typical commercial rights application process looks at the extent of investment in the fishing industry; while the WCRLRH fishers had the means and evidence of their infrastructure investment, the IRP fishers had neither. This unfairly disadvantages the IRP fishers, while granting the WCRLRHs a better chance of retaining their right. Dispensing IQs such as the WCRLR created a small elite (consisting largely of bona fide fishers) who benefited from fishing rights allocations; but this also meant that some fishers with a legitimate claim to a fishing livelihood were denied access to the fisheries because of the limited availability of fishing rights. Visser & Burns (2013) found that benefiting a small elite only divided the communities in which rights were disbursed, as evident in Lamberts Bay. This finding is corroborated by McCay (1995) and Charles (2013) who found that the distribution of ITQs concentrated fishing rights amongst a few, while excluding other legitimate fishers and reducing the community's economic base.

Boat ownership data also served as the de-facto class distinguisher in the Lamberts Bay fisher community. Three identifiable classes existed: a boat-owning class in which all the WCRLRHs were present, a boat assistant class which consisted entirely of those with IRP permits and those without permits, as well as an intermediary class of IRP fishers who managed to buy boats, but who also worked as boat assistants looking for 'site'[6]. The annual allocation of IRP permits, and the 10-year tenure of the WCRLRHs, meant the class distinctions based on boat ownership were rigid. Drawing on communist concepts from Engels & Marx (1888), the WCRLRHs monopolised the means of production, in this instance fishing gear such as boats. The IRP fishers and those without fishing rights at all, as a proletariat unable to own the means of production, resorted to selling their labour in order to live. Fishing boats constitute a fisher's most essential physical asset, and remain central to the fisher's asset matrix. As Nizamedinkhodjayeva (2007) iterated, a compromised asset set (here deficient boat ownership) has far reaching implications for fisher's livelihood sustainability, of which income and the ability to invest in productive activities are the chief casualties.

So far the type of marine resources harvested have been shown to develop class distinctions generated from the income differences associated with the rights and permits held by the WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers. This created differences in boat ownership amongst the fisher groups, contributing to the existence of three different small-scale fisher classes within Lamberts Bay. This class distinction paralleled the rights and permits of the two fisher groups. While Bavinck, Pellegrini, & Mostert (2014) believe South Africa's 'skewed' fisheries economic beneficiation continues to benefit Whites over Blacks, it is also clear that on a local scale, the current distribution of fishing benefits has established WCRLRHs as local elites within the Lamberts Bay fisher community. As a symptom of the relative income differences, household food security contrasts between the WCRLRHs and the IRPs were also stark.

[6]Colloquial term referring to the process of seeking daily employment on a fishing boat as a crewman

6.2.2 Food Security

The household food situation of the WCRLRHs was better than that of the IRP fishers, and this was also attributed to the differences in income. WCRLRHs, for instance, never had to miss a meal for a lack of food or income in the household. Their quota allocation allowed them to meet the basic food needs of their families. The incomes from the WCRLR quota allocation was also high enough that the fishers did not need to think of it as the most important provision of food. While this is also tied to the fact that the fishers do not eat their Lobster because it is worth far more sold than consumed, it also points to the capacity of the WCRLR to provide over and above the household food needs. In addition, WCRLRHs were known to have invested in boats, pick-up vehicles, and had built extensions to their houses, which some fishers noted were the more inconspicuous expenditures. For WCRLRHs, household food provision was never a problem they needed to concern themselves with; for IRP fishers, however, the food security picture was very different.

All the IRP fishers experienced concerns around household food availability. Many had gone without a meal in the previous month before the survey was conducted, with some missing more than one meal a week. In contrast to the WCRLRHs, all the IRP stated their marine resource harvest was their primary source of food. In other words, they lived 'from hand to mouth'. The IRP fishers' dire food security context supports the findings of Brocklesby & Fisher (2003) who found that small-scale fishers were particularly vulnerable to food insecurity. The IRP fisher's dependence on marine resources as their primary food source was in large part due to the abundance of Snoek and Cape Bream which forms part of the IRP's allowed catch. Most fishers from both groups also stated these species were their most important food source out of all the other marine resources they harvested. However, this also meant the IRP fishers in particular were susceptible to losing a significant food source in the event of natural crises. This relationship between small-scale fishers' food sources and natural disasters is corroborated by the findings of Bene (2009) who highlighted the vulnerability of small-scale fishers as a socio-economic group to natural and economic crises.

6.3 Natural Assets: The Lobster Resource Curse

That Lobster was bundled with the IRP marine resource allocation had profound implications for the fishers. The fishers of Lamberts Bay traditionally considered themselves Line fishers, and only caught Lobster as a bonus or for extra cash during the festive season to pay for children's clothing and other household expenditures (KI4, 2014). The pre-eminence of Lobster is therefore a new phenomenon ushered in by the relative ease with which Lobster provides disposable income, which was tied to the exploitative practices of the large exporting companies. As Table 5 above shows, this preoccupation with Lobster is unfortunate because the IRP fishers forfeit the opportunity to earn far greater income through their Linefish allocations, which under perfect conditions could provide a relatively extraordinary amount of much needed income.

The importance of Linefish as part of the cultural identity of the fishers is underscored by the fact that some of the WCRLRHs continue to harvest Linefish, either illegally or with a recreational permit. This is because Linefish harvesting remains a part of their small-scale fisher identity, having been harvested for generations. As a result of the 'Lobster-centric'

rights and permit allocations, however, this part of the fisher identity slowly eroded, which had detrimental consequences for the concept of community among the fishers and their traditional fishing practices. Some fishers, in particular women with IRP permits, only harvest Lobster and neglect to harvest Linefish species (KI1, 2014). While this is also due to the dangers involved with fishing for Linefish which the women are wary of, Goncuoglu & Unal (2011) stated the ease of the Lobster-harvesting process and in particular its ability to generate substantial short-term revenue make it the most attractive marine resource to harvest. The Lobster allocations have also incentivised inauthentic 'fishers' to infiltrate the small-scale fisheries sector.

Some WCRLRHs were late entrants into the fishing sector. This may well be people who had no fisher history and seized the opportunity to be included in the fishing right allocations. This is important because both fisher groups consider the problem of inauthentic fishers a grave concern. IRP fishers and WCRLRHs felt the fishing rights and permits which were supposed to be allocated to *bona fide* fishers, had also been allocated to people they felt were not eligible *bona fide* fishers. The Lobster quota offered a particularly strong financial incentive for non-fishers to enter into the small-scale fishing sector, or at least apply for fishing rights. Those fishers who considered themselves *bona fide* fishers and demonstrated a history to that effect, also fished for Linefish, which offered crude clues as to the extent of fisher's claims to authenticity; opportunistic people who entered the fishing industry would likely not bother themselves with the rough and dangerous work of catching Linefish, especially when they held the more lucrative WCRLR. The fisheries department was yet to establish mechanisms that ensured only eligible small-scale fishers received rights or permits, and had plans to implement a verification system through the early phases of the implementation process of the new policy (DAFF, personal communication, 2014).

According to key informant KI3 (2014), the department will be compelled to accept the opportunists who were awarded long-term rights in 2005 as part of the legitimate group of small-scale fishers. Inclusion of non-fishers is addressed by Isaacs (2006), who believes DAFF remains hamstrung by section 18 (5) of the MLRA that recognises all historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) as eligible beneficiaries of fisheries reform regardless of fisher history. However, the policy's proposed verification procedures offers the opportunity for DAFF to honour the *bona fide* fishers livelihoods, setting fair and just criteria for inclusion into the policy. Beyond the direct benefits to the fishers, succeeding in granting the rights to those who qualify will have untold benefits for the legitimacy of the entire policy and will surely elevate the reputation of the government in the eyes of the fisher communities.

6.4 Financial Assets: Patterns of Dependency and Dysfunctional Co-Operatives

Lobster fetched high prices because of the vast demand both domestically and internationally. The LTRA of 2005 distributed Lobster quota to small-scale fishers to offer them a potentially lucrative livelihood source, as well as attempting to transform the fishing industry which remained dominated by incumbent apartheid-era fishing companies owned by the White elite (Van Sittert, 2002). However, the Lobster exporting companies exploited the poor socio-economic status of the fishers, by offering the fishers loans honoured through contractual

agreements to sell their Lobster quota to the respective exporting company. Some fishers had been extended loans from two different exporting companies of which they had to pay back with the same amount of Lobster quota (KI3, 2014). Consequently, the IRP and the WCRLRHs who had taken out loans from the exporting companies were effectively reduced to indentured servitude, hidden behind the veil of relative prosperity and presumed financial agency.

These financial arrangements also reinforced already-existing community divisions. Using unscrupulous methods such as enticing members of the locally elected co-management committee to use their influence to convince fishers to take out loans from preferred exporting companies, these companies actively contributed to, and fed off the community's fracturing. Further, some WCRLRHs were employed as 'marketers' and peddled loans to these fishers on behalf of the exporting companies. Even though Van Sittert (2003) dismissed the idea of the existence of homogenous communities along the West Coast in 2003 (before the LTRA), and while the income differences between IRP and WCRLRH already created tensions amongst these two fisher groups, WCRLRHs operating as middlemen were especially problematic for the IRP fishers because of the existing power asymmetry. Replicating age-old colonial divide-and-rule schemes, the exporting companies have successfully driven a wedge between the fisher groups, eroding the already slim prospects of fisher co-operation. Van Sittert, Branch, Hauck, & Sowman (2006) have already shown how fisheries' transformation has been met with resistance from apartheid-era incumbents; it should come as no surprise that externally driven conflicts such as these would proliferate. As argued by Gutierrez, Hilborn, & Defeo (2011), social cohesion remains a pillar of successful co-management.

6.4.1 Dysfunctional Co-operatives

Two structural issues arose with regards to the co-operatives in Lamberts Bay. The first was that most IRP fishers were part of a co-operative, whilst most WCRLRHs were not. This experience granted the IRP fishers some expertise with regards to operating in co-operatives, however, very few of them were actually operating successfully, with the majority either dysfunctional or idle. Common reasons were distrust among the fishers and an inability to get along. Another concern was the free-rider problem in which benefits from the co-operative were distributed evenly among members, whilst few punitive measures existed to act as disincentives to free-riding.

The second structural concern was that these co-operatives were instituted at the behest of the DTI as the only entities they gave infrastructural and financial support to, avoiding the challenges of issuing benefits to individuals. The DTI also aided the fishers in the process of establishing co-operatives and as a result, almost all the IRP fishers found themselves in non-operational co-operatives. Some fishers in co-operatives were not fishers that could meet the criteria of the new policy, and hence *bona fide fishers* were in co-operatives with those who might not qualify as small-scale fishers under the new policy. The new policy's verification process will therefore need to take this into account, either continuing to work with the co-operatives as they stand, or overhaul the entire co-operative process and create new ones reflective of the goals of the new policy. As Isaacs (2006) showed, intra-fisher mistrust has

its roots in the failed FCTs and the early fisher beneficiation attempts by government. The failure of co-operatives therefore has the potential to reinforce the idea that community co-operation is a hopeless goal, however imperative.

Adopting the framework of the SLA approach, it is clear the Lamberts Bay community is riddled with complex issues across the human, physical, natural, social, and financial capitals. Figure 12, overleaf, depicts the progression of the small-scale fisher sector from the divisive effects of IQs to the new SSFP that seeks to bring all the small-scale fishers together. Before this discussion turns to recommendations, a summary of the issues follow:

i. The divisions between the fisher groups are varied. These divisions occur primarily across income and food security. This despite the history shared by the fisher groups that preceded the allocation of the fishing rights. Other less significant issues, yet still important, include the age and language differences between the two fisher groups which are important for consideration of future allocation processes.
ii. Both the IRP and WCRLRH fisher groups are plagued with the problem of education. The roots of this problem are deep and extend beyond multiple decades. The new policy entrusts communities with new roles and responsibilities, where education and skills are critically important assets.
iii. The allocation of the Lobster and the high prices on the international markets, has granted Lobster a place within the community it had never historically occupied. This has detrimental consequences for both fisher groups who have historically relied on Linefish as their livelihood mainstay. In addition, the local markets have subsequently been structured to exploit the export of Lobster, at the expense of the fishers who find themselves the target of unscrupulous, powerful, and monopolistic apartheid-era fishing companies that benefit from the fisher's financial distress and their fishing rights.
iv. Mistrust amongst the fisher community is especially high; this straddles the WCRLRH vs IRP fisher lines, and also prevails amongst members of the same fisher group. The new policy's success demands co-operation amongst the fishers in order for the policy-mandated structures to be effective. However, because of historical failures at co-operation and the current prevalence of the dysfunctional co-operatives, achieving the required level of trust will require exceptional measures.



Figure 12: From divergent to converging interests under the new SSFP

The new small-scale fisher policy represents a progression from diverging interests since the allocation of individual rights in Lamberts Bay to the community right where small-scale fisher interests have converged. 'Lobster-centric' individual rights spawned income and food security differences among the fisher groups in Lamberts Bay, effectively eroding the shared characteristics of the small-scale fisher community. Yet despite the introduction of individual rights, the separate fisher groups have largely maintained a dependence on Linefish and acknowledge their common fisher history. The small-scale fisher policy draws on these important aspects of convergence culminating in the allocation of community rights under the CBLE, as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 13: Landed Snoek on the harbour (Author, 2014)

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Overview of the Study

The overall aim of this study was to understand the livelihoods of the various fisher groups in Lamberts Bay and the implications for the new small-scale fisher policy (SSFP). To achieve this aim, the following four objectives were identified: 1) Understanding the socio-economic context of the small-scale fishers in Lamberts Bay; 2) Assessing the socio-economic differences between the fisher groups; 3) Determining the perceptions of the fisher groups as regards the new small-scale fisher policy; and 4) Identifying factors that will enable the expectations and needs of the different fisher groups to be accommodated in the SSF policy roll-out.

To meet these objectives this thesis adopted the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA), which focused on five 'assets' important for rural livelihoods. These fives assets include the social, human, physical, financial, and natural assets which the fisher groups exploited to varying degrees. This approach emphasised the need to understand the Lamberts Bay small-scale fishers holistically and not observe them in isolation from their broader social, cultural, political, historical, and economic contexts.

This thesis employed qualitative research methods to gain an understanding of the small-scale fishers and draw out some of the more nuanced data that was important for grasping the socio-economic context of the fisher groups. The findings were interpreted through the lens of some key concepts contained in the literature surrounding the history of South African small-scale fisheries up to the contemporary era embodied by the introduction of the SSFP, as well as some of the prominent management tools that had been used to manage the small-scale fisheries in South Africa. Particularly important, were the principles and objectives of South Africa's new fisheries policy in light of the unique features revealed by the Lamberts Bay fishing community.

Historical as well as new approaches to small-scale fisheries governance were comprehensively reviewed in Chapter 2, and provided the theoretical foundations of this study. Conventional management approaches which were intended for the industrial fisheries were shown to be woefully inadequate for the small-scale fisheries sector, which is riddled with substantial social complexities intricately tied to the marine resources the fishers harvest. Thus, small-scale fisheries were recognised as requiring management approaches that expressed a more nuanced appreciation of the fishers' livelihood context. Particular attention was paid to literature that revealed the myriad negative consequences ITQs had on fishing communities, and the development of other management tools that sought to alleviate the hardships imposed on communities and move towards more inclusive forms of small-scale fishery management.

Concepts from this first section were then linked to South Africa's own journey of transformation in the fisheries which sought to address the legacy created by decades of gross racial oppression faced by the small-scale fishers. It was shown that the almost chronic failures of the government's reform attempts entrenched feelings of mistrust in the fishing

communities and, worse, denied many *bona fide* fishers a right to their livelihood. These persistent failures on the part of government culminated in the landmark court case which saw small-scale fishers granted IRPs until the new SSFP was drawn up and implemented. The small-scale fisheries landscape was therefore altered as fishing rights were irregularly allocated in communities. This was the case in Lamberts Bay which has significant numbers of those with fishing rights, those with interim relief permits, and *bona fide* fishers without any source of state-sanctioned right to marine resources.

This set the stage for the following chapters which were an in-depth investigation of the socio-economic context of the different fisher groups and their image of the new SSFP. The study used a mix of surveys, interviews and focus groups to reveal the intra-community dynamics that had developed since the introduction of the long-term fishing rights and the IRP, and the tensions resulting from the irregular allocation processes. Taken together, these informed a comprehensive understanding of the Lamberts Bay small-scale fisher groups as they presently stand.

7.2 Recommendations

The new small-scale fisher policy (SSFP) is comprehensive in both its assessment of the livelihoods context of the small-scale fishers and the implementation challenges the policy will face (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). However, the policy document expressly declares its function is not to …"spell out operational details" (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 27), or explain how the proposed management system will work in practice. The necessity for a nuanced approach to a contextual appreciation of each fishing community is apparent. The wholesale adoption of a generic management approach to the implementation of the new policy in fishing communities, devoid of recognising the unique features of each fishing community, sets the policy up for spectacular failure which DAFF can ill afford. These recommendations serve to fill the information deficit characteristic of small-scale fishing communities as identified by Bene, Macfadyen, & Allison (2007) and Kolding & Van Zwieten (2011).

The new policy has the potential to radically address issues of justice, race-based oppression and resource allocation equity (Ratner, et al., 2014); however, this optimism is tempered by Sowman, Sunde, Raemaekers, & Schultz (2014) who warn of the immense implementation effort required to successfully roll out the policy. In addition, Charles (2013) states that community managed rights are entirely unfeasible in areas where communities are largely heterogeneous, relatively large, display weak geographical clarity and lack cohesive community involvement (Charles, 2013). The discussion has shown the Lamberts Bay fishing community has significant elements of heterogeneity and lacks cohesiveness; however, the small-scale fishers are bound by a common identity which has endured the relatively short dispensation of individual rights and permits. Drawing from the policy's proposals and the findings of this study, this thesis now proposes recommendations to overcome the implementation challenges.

7.2.1 Capacity Building

In Lamberts Bay, the focus of capacity building efforts should rest on three important issues; the educational deficit, financial upskilling, and infrastructural development. The education challenges in Lamberts Bay have their roots in the structural inequalities of the apartheid era. Making progress in this area therefore requires interventions that are at once beyond the ambit of the policy, and others that speak directly to the current small-scale fishers. While infrastructure investments such as the development of a much-needed secondary school and associated support may take some years, more immediate intervention options are available to the government. These include adult literacy and numeracy programmes. The educational challenges in Lamberts Bay are also inter-generational, which has implications for the post-harvest sector in which fishers have envisaged the younger generations with tertiary qualifications leading the charge on the marketing and exporting front. However, this remains ambitious considering the lack of the secondary school and the serious challenge faced by Lamberts Bay youth being eligible for tertiary education on such shaky foundations.

Adult numeracy and literacy programmes will go a long way in developing the financial acumen of the small-scale fishers. However, more directed financial-skills focused programmes are essential if the fishers are to exploit the opportunities provided for by the new policy. This task is likely overwhelming for the national government, which makes it imperative that government both support and commission NGOs and civil society organisations to fill this capacity. NGOs such as WWF have already been involved in local level programmes aimed at empowering small-scale fishers. Financial institutions such as banks often engage with communities in financial skills development programmes. The fishers are likely to take on new financial responsibilities as they expand their operations under the new policy, for which more sophisticated financial arrangements will need to be configured with these financial institutions. Government therefore need not burden itself with some of the tasks required with this type of capacity building, but should entrust already existing efforts of NGOs and other civil society organisations to meet the needs of the fishers. This view is firmly supported by Ratner, Asgard, & Allison (2014, p. 127) who believe civil society will occupy a ‘crucial’ role in what they state is South Africa’s ‘policy experiment’. This broad-based approach to small-scale fisheries intervention further entrenches small-scale fishing into mainstream public discourse, allowing them a greater platform for which their challenges can be recognised and addressed.

The DTI has made impressive inroads into the fishing community’s infrastructure development, however, their efforts have been hamstrung by a lack of communication between the DTI and DAFF which has seen the distribution of boats and other equipment stalled. The importance of enhancing the capacity of the fishers in their marine resource harvests is intimately linked to allowing fishers the ‘multi-species’ approach in which all Linefish are legally harvestable with catch restrictions that are deemed legitimate. While all Linefish will be available for legal capture, some of the lucrative and more desirable Linefish such as Tuna, are found further out to sea; the current capacity of the fishers does not allow them to explore these waters. To bring to life the ‘multi-species’ approach it is therefore critical that fishers’ boat infrastructure be boosted to overcome the limitations imposed by

their current equipment. The distribution of this infrastructure is likely to cause serious tensions within the already fractured community. It may be useful for the DTI and DAFF to provide infrastructure support subsequent to the verification process and establishment of functioning co-operatives, thereby reducing any doubt of the authenticity of those entities that receive infrastructural support.

7.2.2 The Income and Food Security Dynamics

The LTRA led to the development of income and food security differences amongst the small-scale fishers of Lamberts Bay. The IRP was intended to alleviate the poverty of the fishers, but, IRP households continued to experience food security difficulties, which has led to both relative and absolute problems of food security amongst the IRP fishers. The new policy therefore needs to recognise that apart from including those fishers who have never held use rights or permits, it must aim, in one policy, to pool together two household fisher groups that have important differences between them. The Policy's rights allocation needs to be especially sensitive to the plight of the IRP fishers whichever way the rights allocations are distributed to the community-based legal entity (CBLE). Pretending the new policy incorporates homogenous groups of fishers would be a grave error that will most likely continue to benefit the WCRLRHs with more power and financial resources at their disposal. DAFF must therefore pay attention, first and foremost, to organising the IRP fishers so that they are the primary recipients of both harvest rights and benefits. It is suggested the policy's extraordinary potential will voluntarily draw in WCRLRHs; DAFF therefore needs to be prepared to be advantageous to both groups in the rights to harvest and beneficiation.

The new policy states that fishers who have been fishing for a minimum of ten years, among other criteria, will also be considered for inclusion in the new policy as *bona fide* fishers (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012, p. 38). Fisher authenticity is an issue close to the hearts of many small-scale fishers; this criterion in the policy effectively recognises opportunistic people who won rights in the LTRA in 2005 (which at their 2015 expiry, will be a ten-year tenure). The fishers who have benefited off the vastly more lucrative WCRLR represent a greater injustice to the legitimate fishers who were denied a livelihood by the allocation process. The verification process therefore needs not only to be sensitive to the already skewed household differences between the WCRLRHs and the IRP fishers, but needs to recognise the double injustice incurred by those *bona fide fishers* without rights or permits. The importance of the legitimacy of the policy in the eyes of the fishers hinges on this all-important verification process.

The inclusion of WCRLRH fishers into the new policy caused considerable concern amongst the WCRLRH fishers themselves, and this was closely tied to the income benefits they received from their Lobster allocation, as well as the autonomy granted by their individual right. It is already clear that including the WCRLRHs along with the IRP fishers is riddled with issues of justice and fairness in light of the historical benefits granted the WCRLRHs; however, their inclusion in the policy also needs to reflect fairness to them as small-scale fishers considering their present feelings of neglect in the policy's development. This is in agreement with Charles (2013) who also suggests that where tenure rights already exist, it is important to consider the human rights of the fishers who are to be included into the new

system, taking into account their cultural and historical situation to ensure they are included appropriately.

While it is not entirely certain whether the WCRLRHs will all be included in the new policy as their individual rights potentially fall away or whether their allocations will be significantly reduced, it is clear DAFF's focus is on the success of the new policy. This could mean diverting Lobster quota away from the WCRLRH right towards the new small-scale policy quota allocations (DAFF, personal communication, 2014). As a result, it is likely the WCRLRHs will find it beneficial to be a part of the new policy. Including the WCRLRHs will have important implications for their financial situation. Being relatively privileged for the past ten years or so with a consistent income, it is important the policy does not pull the rug from underneath them by leaving them suddenly with a reduced income. Many have invested in boat infrastructure, household appliances, extensions on their houses, and taken out loans that could only be serviced with their current incomes. Jeopardising this income by inappropriately reducing their quota allocation or compelling them to join the new policy may have disastrous effects for their livelihoods. The wholesale inclusion of WCRLRHs would be too abrupt; DAFF therefore needs to consider a phased approach allowing WCRLRHs to adjust to their new financial arrangement, however it is configured.

7.2.3 Co-management Committee

The new policy proposes the establishment of a co-management committee that would represent the shared responsibility between the small-scale fishing community and DAFF (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). The co-management committee will be tasked with some important responsibilities including fisher verification and the subsequent arrangement regarding the allocation of the community right, among others. If the current co-management committee is anything to go by, the policy's implementation is surely heading for dire straits. Not only is the committee dysfunctional at present, but it has been infiltrated by external interests to serve the ends of the exporting companies, entirely destroying its mandate by effectively serving interests inherently opposed to the development of the small-scale fishery. The current committee was democratically elected by the fishers, yet the persistence of the intra-committee problems has not yet been addressed.

This points to a lack of recourse in the event the fishers are not happy with the elected representatives. The co-management committee stands in an incredibly powerful position, and the potential to act as a gate-keeper to settle old scores is not beyond possibility, considering the community fracturing. It is therefore imperative that DAFF establishes comprehensive institutional support circumscribing its roles, responsibilities, transparent dispute mechanisms, and the tenure of elected members, among many other important checks, without hindering its functionality. Small-scale fisheries reform processes are prone to elite capture as recent history shows, which the fishers have not forgotten. The legitimacy of the co-management structure and comprehensive institutional support is therefore critical to the success of the policy and needs to occur well before the policy is implemented.

7.2.4 Financial Freedom

The mandatory obligation of the fishers to enter into agreements with the exporting companies severely limits the agency of the small-scale fishers over their quota allocations. This arrangement requires serious overhaul if the fishers are to be released from their debasing position as mere debt-ridden servants of the exporting companies. The new policy holds the promise of the fishers being able to finally export their own Lobster under their own recognisable label that would market their history and their livelihoods as small-scale fishers. However, this will remain a pipe dream until DAFF commits to providing the capacity for the fishers to export their products. Until then, the fishers will continue to require the services of the established apartheid-era export companies and their far superior exporting facilities. The government will need to take a tougher stance to deter the influence of monopolistic capital, against the backdrop of its overall neo-liberal macro-economic policy, which Sowman, Sunde, Raemaekers, & Schultz (2014) recognise as a significant stumbling block.

The co-operatives have given the fishers the opportunity to interact with complex financial arrangements that are important for the policy's implementation. Unfortunately, very few co-operatives could successfully exhibit records that included catch history, associated revenues, and bank statements indicating solvency. However, this thesis identified two successfully operating co-operatives from the harvest and the post-harvest sectors. DAFF needs to build on the experience of these successful co-operatives to inform the policy's prescribed co-operative structures. As with other forms of capacity building, NGOs have been more responsive than government in providing support services to small-scale fishing communities expanding their fishing operations. An example is the WWF's Fisheries Improvement Projects currently exploring ways for fishers to partner with establishments to whom they can directly sell their Cape Bream. It is important that DAFF recognises the involvement of other actors and functions as a facilitator to other projects such as these.

7.3 Conclusion

The discussion tracked the institutional changes that have affected the Lamberts Bay small-scale fishers since the inception of the individual rights in the fishing community. The journey showed the small-scale fishers, while sharing a common history, developed stark differences brought on by the introduction of the individual rights in which some sections of the community were privileged over others. Household differences emerged amongst the WCRLRH and the IRP fisher groups which bore important consequences for their income and food security. WCRLRHs were better off from an income and food security perspective owing to their relatively lucrative Lobster allocation. The implementation of the new policy depends on a significant degree of homogeneity and co-operation amongst the small-scale fishers. The development of these differences between the WCRLRH and the IRP fisher groups therefore threatens the successful implementation of the policy in Lamberts Bay. Consequently, the discussion suggested recommendations that highlighted the particular challenges for the implementers of the new policy and ways to overcome these challenges, summarized in Figure 14 below. While the issues raised are not exhaustive, they are the culmination of months of work in Lamberts Bay and highlight the most important challenges that DAFF needs to address to overcome the implementation challenges posed by the

Lamberts Bay small-scale fishery. Future fisheries research in the Lamberts Bay community must focus on specific implementation challenges centred on fisher co-operatives, giving agency to the fishers by liberating the fishers from the exploitative established fisher companies, and incorporating the small-scale fishers into the lucrative macro-economic export environment and, just as important, into the local scale value chains within South Africa.



Figure 14: Key Recommendations to overcoming the implementation challenges in Lamberts Bay

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Appendix A- Household Survey

Household Survey Number……

This survey is for the purposes of a research project conducted through the University of Cape Town.

Lamberts Bay

Small-Scale Fishers Survey

Environmental Evaluation Unit, University of Cape Town

Interview Details	
Date	/ /**2014**
Interviewer's Name	**Tsele Nthane**

Background Information					
1. Gender				2. Age	3. Birth date
	Male		Female		

4. What population group do you describe yourself as belonging to?									
	Black		White		Coloured		Asian/Indian		Other

5. What language do you mostly speak at home?							
	Xhosa		English		Afrikaans		Other

6. Marital Status							
	Single		Married		Divorced		Widow
	Widower		Separated		Common law		

7. What is your level of schooling?			
	No formal Education		Complete High school Education [finished Gr. 12 or Std 10]
	Incomplete primary education [between Gr.1 and Gr.6 or Sub A to Std 4]		Technical/ College Education
	Complete Primary education [finished Gr.7 or Std 5]		University Education
	Incomplete High School Education [between Gr. 8 and Gr.11 or Std 6 and 9]		

8. Where were you born?		
Town	Province	Country

9. How long have you been living in Lambertsbaai?

Household Characteristics	
10. How many people live in your household/homestead?	
11. Number of people in school?	

12. Housing structure			
OBSERVE and indicate what is the MAIN material used for the MAIN dwelling			
	Traditional dwelling (mud brick, clay, dung, wattle)		Permanent house (brick, block)
	Temporary shack (plastic, cardboard, plywood)		Other (specify)
	Permanent shack (corrugated iron, mixed brick)		

12. Is your household connected to an electricity supply (even if it is currently disconnected)?							
	Yes				No		
13. What is the MAIN source of energy for **COOKING** in your household? [just ask question without going through entire list and then tick one]							
	Electricity from mains or generator		LPG Gas		Biogas		Charcoal
	Solar Power		Firewood		Kerosene		Paraffin

14. What is the MAIN source of **DRINKING** water in your household?

Marine Resource Use
15. How old were you when you first became involved in?
i) harvesting marine?
ii) the fishing industry?

16. Which marine resources have you and do you currently harvest?									
Marine Resources	When (if possible indicate the year[s])	Where	Have you ever had a permit or quota for this species? Y or N	If you have had a ***permit***, which permit was it? (ie: Subsistence, Interim, Exemption??)	***When*** did you have this permit (ie. What year(s)?	Do you currently have this permit? Y or N	If you have had a ***quota***, how much was your quota (ie. Kilograms or tons)?	***When*** was this quota allocated? (ie. What year?)	Do you have a recreational permit for this species? Y or N
Kreef									
Hottentot									
White Mussel									
Rooivis/red roman/red stumpnose									
Snoek									
Harders									
Steenbras									
Other:									

17. Over the past year, what did you do with the resources that you harvested (for yourself or for others)? Tick one for each resource.								
Marine Resources	Sell everything	Mainly sell (eat some)	Eat everything	Mainly eat (sell some)	Share with neighbours	Other (specify)	If you sell, ***who*** do you mainly sell to (ie: local community, fish shop/restaurant, informal or formal buyers (inside or outside comm.), process facility, tourists etc)	What is the average price that you sell for? (ie. R10/bundle; R60 per kilo etc)
Kreef								
Hottentot								
White Mussel								
Rooivis/red roman/red steenbras								
Snoek								
Harders								
Steenbras								
Other:								

18. Have you ever applied for a permit or a quota and were not successful?			
	Yes		No
19. If yes, what type of permit was it?			

20. Rank the THREE most important species that you harvest in terms of INCOME (one is the most important)	
i	
ii	
iii	

21. Rank the THREE most important species that you harvest for food (one is the most important)	
i	
ii	
iii	

22. In your opinion, what are the greatest threats to the marine resources in the area?			
	Increase in human activity in area		Commercial fisheries: trawlers
	Market demand		Commercial fisheries : Ski boats
	Fishers from outside		Climate change
	Type of gear		Poachers
	Over-fishing		Other:

		Mother	Father
23. Were/are your parents involved in fisheries-related activities?		Yes?	No ?
If yes, in which activities? Tick all that apply	Collecting inshore resources (bait, mussels, etc.)		
	Worker for commercial fishing company (name(s))		
	Fish from shore		
	Boat-owner (sole or share)		
	Skipper		
	Shore-based job – (**PAID**): driver, repair nets/engines, processing etc.		
	Shore-based job – (**UNPAID**): repair nets, cleaning fish etc.		
	Crew/boat assistant		
	Diver		
	Own fishing company (specify)		
	Shares in a fisher's company (name)		
	Marketer/agent (paid or unpaid)		
	other		

24. What fishing activities have YOU been involved in over the past year?	Tick all that apply
Collecting inshore resources (bait, mussels, etc.)	
Worker for commercial fishing company (provide name)	
Fish from shore	
Boat-owner (sole or share)	
Skipper	
Shore-based job – (**PAID**): driver, repair nets/engines, processing etc.	
Shore-based job – (**UNPAID**): repair nets, cleaning fish etc.	
Crew/boat assistant	
Diver	
Has own company (specify)	
Shares in a fisher's company (name)	
Marketer/agent (paid or unpaid)	
Other	

25. If you are a boat owner do you have crew that work for you?			
	Yes		No
26. If so, how many?			
27. What type of boat do you own?			
28. If you are a crewman, on what type of boat do you work?			

Local Institutions			
29. Is there a local fishing committee or organization within your community?			
	Yes		No
30. If YES, are you a member of this committee/organization?			
	Yes		No
31. What is the name of the organisation of which you are a member?			
32. Do you feel that this committee or organization represents your interests?			
	Yes		No

Food security			
33. In the last month, has there been a day when your household had to skip a meal because of a shortage of food?			
	Yes		No
34. If YES, how often:			
	i) 1 day per week		ii) 2 or more days per week

35. Are you or anyone in your household forced to fish because of a lack of food?			
	Yes		No
36. How often do members of your household eat fish (including lobster and mussels)?			
	Once a day		Two days per week
	Twice a day		Three days per week
	One day per week		Other

37. What present activities contribute towards income and food in your household? Tick **ALL** that are applicable and go through each. Then rank.			
	All activities that contribute to HH monthly income and food (tick all that are applicable)	Rank the **THREE** most important activities in terms of monthly income (1 being most important)	Rank the **THREE** most important activities in terms of providing food (1 being most important)
(1) Harvesting marine resources			
(2) Harvesting crops (fruit, vegetables etc.)			
(3) Livestock (poultry, cattle etc.)			
(4) Harvesting wood			
(5) Harvesting wild plants			
(6) Employment in fishing industry (specify)			
(7) Other employment (specify)			
(8) Self-employed (i.e. shop owner, taxi driver):			
(9) Pension			
(10) Government grants (specify)			
(11) other			

38. How much of your income comes from fisheries-related activities:	
	All of it

	Most of it
	Some of it
	None of it

39. How many people contribute to the total household income?

40. Have you currently obtained an advance? Why or why not.

Understanding the SSFP	
44?. In your opinion, what will be the difference between fishing with a commercial right and fishing under the new community rights of the SSFP?	
45. For this new 2014 season, did you apply for a commercial fishing right in any sector?	
Yes	No
46. If yes, were you awarded the right? Why or Why not?	
47. For this new 2014 season, are you fishing using the interim community fishing right?	
Yes	No
48. Are you a member of a Co-op? If yes, how many members make up the Co-op?	
Yes	No
49. Do you believe you are a *bona fide* fisher? Why or why not?	
50. How do you, as a fisher, benefit from being a member of a Co-op?	
51. In your opinion, are there small-scale fishers who do not want the new Small-Scale Fisher Policy implemented? If so, please explain why.	

Thank You