

**Working with the Enemy:
The Military Integration Process in Transitional South Africa
and Factors that Shaped a New Defence Force**

Gillian Turner

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ABSTRACT

Against the backdrop of South Africa's political transition from Apartheid to a democratic system of governance during the early 1990s, the South African military underwent a distinct transformation of its own. During the military's transition seven disparate forces that had previously been vying for power were integrated under one umbrella organization and re-branded as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Scholars and analysts generally consider this process to have been successful; it was a seminal achievement by both the negotiating parties and the Government of National Unity. Looking at the transformation process during two distinct periods, 1990 through the national elections of 1994, referred to as 'the planning phase,' and post-elections through 1996, referred to as 'the implementation phase,' this study seeks a more robust and nuanced accounting of the factors that contributed to this outcome.

Building upon an evaluation of the existing literature, this study also analyzes the impact that the strategies employed by the negotiating parties had upon outcomes. It offers the novel approach of analyzing the military's integration through the lens of negotiation theory rather than more conventional theoretical lenses. In doing so, this study aims not only to contribute to a common understanding of the means by which the SANDF was created and shaped, but also to broaden the scope and depth of military integration theory itself.

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Working with the Enemy: The Military Integration Process in Transitional South Africa and Factors that Shaped a New Defence Force

“If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.”

-Nelson Mandela

Chapter One: Introductory Chapter

Introduction

Amidst the tumultuous reformation of the post-Apartheid South African government in the late 1990s, South Africa's military landscape evolved from a collection of disparate armed forces vying for power into a single unified national military. Scholars and analysts generally consider the establishment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1994, and the military integration that ensued, to be relatively successful¹; it was a seminal achievement by the major parties involved during the pre-1994 period, and by the Government of National Unity (GNU) after 1994. The reality is that the transition process itself was fraught with obstacles from the very start and its eventual resolution was neither optimal nor equal for all parties involved. South Africa's transitional government faced a myriad of challenges with respect to its military, though two stand out as uniquely consequential.

First, the military had to unite seven separate forces: the South African Defence Force (SADF); two liberation armies called Umkhonto we Sizwe [MK] and the Azanian

¹ Le Roux (2005); Williams (2002); Ferreira and Henk (2009); Burgess (2008); Frankel (2000)

Peoples Liberation Army [APLA]; and four independent homeland armies called the Transkei Defence Force [TDF], the Bophuthatswana Defence Force [BFD], the Venda Defence Force [VDM], and the Ciskei Defence Force [CDF]. Unique cultures, command structures, and missions characterized each of these entities. Second, the transitional government had to redefine its entire defence and security strategy, which had prioritized national security and significant defence spending under the Apartheid regime, in order to align itself with the interests and priorities of the new majority rule system.

Less than a decade after the African National Congress (ANC) was unbanned by President F.W. De Klerk, the South African military had made significant progress. It had transformed from a white-dominated independent entity into a regulated, professionalized force on a path towards becoming racially representative and with a mission that supported the interests of South Africa's national majority.²

This study seeks to identify the factors that enabled the achievement of military integration against great odds, led by the ANC and MK on one side and the National Party (NP) and the SADF on the other, both under a newly established Government of National Unity (GNU). It divides the integration process into two distinct periods: 1990 through the national elections of 1994, referred to as 'the planning phase,' and post-elections through 1996, referred to as 'the implementation phase' of integration.

The results of this study determine that during both periods the transitional government identified and accepted significant tradeoffs in order to ensure the stability of the military and the nation's long-term security objectives. More broadly, this study offers the novel approach of analyzing the military's integration through the lens of negotiation theory rather than the more conventional theoretical lenses that pervade existing literature on the subject. In doing so, this study aims not only to contribute to a common understanding of the means by which the SANDF was created and shaped, but also to broaden the scope and depth of military integration theory itself.

² Le Roux (2005)

This chapter first presents the research questions that guide this study. It follows with a review of the literature on South Africa's military integration and suggests why conventional scholarly accounts and the explanations they offer are often incomplete (during both the planning and implementation phases). The chapter then presents the author's hypotheses to explain outcomes and provides the theoretical underpinnings of the hypotheses. The chapter concludes by providing an outline of the subsequent chapters.

Research Questions

This study seeks answers to the following questions:

- (a) What role did the ANC/MK and NP/SADF negotiating strategies play in the creation and subsequent integration of South Africa's post-Apartheid military?
- (b) How did both parties devise and maintain a relatively stable and sustainable South African military transition?

Literature Review

A sizable literature attempts to explain the outcome of South Africa's military integration as dependent upon one among a myriad of influential factors, including but not limited to: the impact that Apartheid governance and the SADF had on the SANDF's structure and mission;³ the SANDF's strategic and economic resources at the time of its inception;⁴ and the influence exerted by the international community and other external actors.⁵ Some of these factors do indeed constitute necessary and fruitful areas for study, while others receive inadequate analysis and exploration. Within this dense literature, two common analytical oversights persist.

³ Frankel (2000); Vrey (2004)

⁴ Winkates (2000)

⁵ Heinecken (2005); van der Waag (2010)

First, scholars often conveniently treat the military integration and democratization processes as one and the same. As a result, analyses of the integration process become conveniently but inappropriately subsumed within the democratization process. The creation and integration of the SANDF occurred concurrently with the state's transformation from the Apartheid system into a full-fledged constitutional democracy, and for good reason; the two transitions exerted strong influence upon one another. However, this influence does not and should not necessitate consideration of them as a singular phenomenon. In general, military transitions and their impact upon the historical trajectory of nations are narrower in scope than national democratization processes, and are also rife with subtleties that distinguish them as such. Krebs (2004) asserts, "Whether the military can remake individual (nations') fundamental identity commitments is a questionable proposition on its own terms, but such mechanisms are inadequate as explanations for the construction and reconstruction of political communities."⁶ The study of the history of military transitions proves that they do not always lead to, or result in, political transformations at the national level.

In the South African case political transformation engendered or *necessitated* a military transition; the new SANDF was fashioned as an instrument of a democratically elected legislature. However, the major objective of the negotiating parties wasn't just to ensure the military reflected the will and makeup of the majority, but was also to ensure it was controlled by and responsive to the civilian government. Whereas the SANDF was meant, from its inception, to serve as an extension of the newly formed civilian government, the SADF had for a long time existed as a separate entity, distinct from the NP and often acting on its own accord. Thus, as will be shown, while the creation of the SANDF was very much a direct manifestation of democratization occurring in South Africa, the country's military integration was in many ways an independently imperfect process.

In this regard, Kenkel (2006) observes that, "defence issues (during South Africa's democratization process) received particular attention because it was in this area that the

⁶ p.120

normative turnaround from white minority to democratic majority was evident."⁷ While it is true that the racial aspect of military integration increased both domestic and international awareness about the process, this hardly suggests that the stakes, processes, and objectives of democratization and integration were identical. Democratization required an immediate transformation of government. The outcome of the election held on April 27, 1994, necessitated a swift and complete overhaul of the executive and legislative branches and immediate implementation of the interim Constitution. The integration of the nation's military was, by comparison, deliberately gradual. Cawthra (2000) points out that "The onset of the negotiations, and the realization by the ANC that it would inherit the existing South African Defence Force into which the MK would at best be integrated, and possibly assimilated, led to a requirement for new policy options to be explored."⁸ Kenkel (2006) similarly points out that the ANC's "lack of a viable defence policy" and "insufficient capacity to produce adequate policy options" led to a "power vacuum" that allowed insights from the academic community and civil society to creep into the defence policy process over time.⁹ Other scholars have agreed with this assessment.¹⁰

As a result, though the ANC swiftly adopted a "New Approach to Security"¹¹ its approach to restructuring the military was by comparison slower and implemented incrementally. The Military Research Group (MRG) was established in 1991 and had a "long-term goal" to "prioritise *future* areas of co-operation."¹² The MRG, in particular Laurie Nathan and his framework for a new defence strategy in *The Changing of the Guard* (1994), played a significant role in shaping the 1996 White Paper on Defence, released two years after the SANDF was formally established. Subsequently Vrey (2004) points out that "the Defence Review (1998), the Military Strategy (2001)... the 1996 Defence White Paper, and the 2004 Defence Budget Vote represent prominent indicators of an *ongoing maturation process*"¹³ of the new military force.

⁷ p. 11

⁸ p.51

⁹ p.13

¹⁰ Shaw, 232-3 (Kenkel 2006)

¹¹ ANC (1992), Q.2.

¹² Kenkel (2006)

¹³ P.89

Thus, the error of subsuming integration under the broader democratization process results in scholarship 'losing sight of the trees because of the forest.' The military's relatively peaceful and incremental integration throughout the 1990s was, in many ways, distinct from the government transition and remarkable in its own right.

A second scholarly oversight is the general paucity of attention paid to how the ANC's strategies and tactics impacted the outcome of the integration process. In between De Klerk's reinstatement of the ANC in 1990 and ratification of the Constitution in 1997, power dynamics and the political landscape shifted. At the period's outset the landscape was dominated by two diametrically opposed parties, one statutory and the other insurgent, and by its conclusion that same insurgent party held firm (and legitimate) control over the government and its future. Some scholars purport that the SANDF emerged as an organic and perhaps inevitable result of the political negotiations, but a more nuanced analysis reveals that the ANC's approach to military integration was deftly calculating. Early on in the process the ANC made concessions to its rivals out of weakness, but over time it gained legitimacy and strength and managed to maneuver itself into a position of dominance vis a vis the SADF. The ANC maintained a perpetually strategic approach to military integration that ultimately paid off; it was able to ensure, against considerable odds, that the former statutory forces never mutinied. This in and of itself constituted a remarkable achievement.

In terms of broader military objectives and strategies, the ANC also faced greater pushback and adopted a more strategically balanced approach than many scholars acknowledge. Ferreira and Henk (2009), and others¹⁴ suggest that South Africa's post-1994 focus on human security as the dominant paradigm for its defence strategy was inevitable because of the history of Apartheid and the SADF.¹⁵ According to this narrative, human security emerged as the result of lessons learned during a period of

¹⁴ Williams "Human security and the transformation of the South African national security environment from 1990-2004: Challenges and limitations"

¹⁵ Ferreira and Henk (2009) write, "Human security values already were part of the framework of local South African civil society, derived from the powerful relationships of family, local community, and local churches and the socialization these produced. Arguably, without this base, it is doubtful that human security would have resonated as strongly with South African society or have been so readily endorsed by the new government," 521.

"corrosive internal strife"¹⁶ and severe economic and social difficulty. The concept was embraced by the post-1994 ANC government, which was particularly weary of the 1993 UN Human Development Report's assessment of South Africa, and was then manifested as an "agenda to inform [the government's] domestic and foreign policy."¹⁷ This report reflected the post-Cold War world's prioritization of individuals' safety over that of nation states, as well as the socioeconomic advancement of local communities. Ferreira and Henk (2009) point out that the belief that sovereign nations should maintain defence postures focused on external threats became increasingly obsolete at this time, across the globe (South Africa included). However they fail to recognize that the human security paradigm wasn't the sole determinant of the GNU's posture, and that other security priorities (mostly determined by politicians) eventually subsumed it.

Le Roux (2005) maintains that the 1996 White Paper defines the primary function of the SANDF as being "to defend South Africa against external military aggression," and argues that the SANDF "should be designed mainly around the demands of this primary function."¹⁸ Le Roux (2005) argues that this stemmed from "a marriage of convenience between unlikely parties."¹⁹ In this scenario the ANC's interest in maintaining an 'apolitical' force that stayed out of domestic affairs, combined with the SADF's interest in re-equipping the newly formed SANDF, led both sides to conclude that privileging 'defence against external threat' above all else (including the human security paradigm) was the prescient thing to do. As a result, Le Roux asserts that the "current demand for the SANDF in African peace missions (one extension of the human security paradigm) was simply not formally envisaged"²⁰ at the time. Nearly a decade after the Defence White Paper's publication, "the SANDF continues to budget and plan for its primary function, but is deployed extensively in operations other than war."²¹ So though the ANC always prized the human security paradigm, it had the strategic foresight to realize that phasing in elements gradually, over time, might be a better approach than implementing it comprehensively all at once.

¹⁶ p.507

¹⁷ p.509

¹⁸ p.256

¹⁹ p.257

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ p.76

Other analysts such as Heineken (2005) have touched on aspects of the fluid power dynamics at play during this time, with references to things like the "changing strategic environment."²² She points to the fact that, while certain structural elements of the SANDF remained intact under the new leadership, the defence budget was reduced from 4.3% of GDP in 1990 to 1.6% of GDP in 1998. Resource allocation was extended to include support for the South African Police Service (SAPS) and other government offices for the purposes of various internal 'support the people' missions as well.

Africa (2011) proposes that, "the opening of political space in the 1990s ... made it possible to place the reform of the security sector on the political agenda."²³ She acknowledges that putting reform on the agenda is distinct from actually achieving reform. She also points out that "leaders had to move decisively to align their armed followers with the policy decisions made in pursuit of peace."²⁴ Towards this end, the parties involved in the defence review process employed a number of tactics, including "extensive consultation and formation of coalitions and alliances, transparent decision making; strategies to deal with those in opposition; use of state machinery and powers to facilitate changes that would enhance the peace process..."²⁵ Though Africa's analysis (2011) sheds light on these tactics, she offers little by way of application to the actual negotiations themselves. These negotiating strategies and their impact on the integration process serve as the intended foci for this study's investigation and analysis.

Integrative Negotiation: An Alternative Theoretical Explanation and Justification of Study

Leading up to the 1994 elections and during four subsequent years of military integration, ANC and MK leaders repeatedly demonstrated willingness to allow the SADF a seat at the negotiating table and a hand in restructuring the armed forces.²⁶ At first glance this approach appears conciliatory, and perhaps indicates inherent ANC weaknesses; the

²² p.75

²³ Africa (2011): 3

²⁴ p.27

²⁵ p.10

²⁶ Burgess (2008): 77-79

ANC and its military wing MK did indeed suffer considerable deficiencies. As Williams (2006) notes, MK suffered from limited numbers of personnel due to the fact that many of its leaders (including Chris Hani and Tokyo Sexwale) defected; some by death and others by choice.²⁷ The SADF was significantly larger, better equipped and resourced, more organized, and more experienced in terms of managing domestic and foreign security threats.

Deficiencies in MK and ANC ranks, however, do not exclusively account for the privilege the SADF's so-called 'old guard' enjoyed, or the subsequent success of integration. Shubin notes that though MK was in fact weaker than the SADF, "'weaker' could hardly be used as an equivalent of 'smaller' and in any case the strength and weakness of one or another military formation cannot properly be measured if it is taken out of context of its political ties and popular base."²⁸ The reality was that the ANC was coming into power whether the NP and SADF agreed to it or not. De Klerk had unbanned the ANC, along with other political parties, and had released Nelson Mandela in 1990 with the intent to establish a new South African government that quelled violence at home and satisfied criticism levied by the international community. Though the NP initially envisaged a potential power-sharing arrangement, the international consensus so strongly favored a majority-rule system of governance that it was ruled out; if negotiations failed to produce a majority-rule outcome and conflict resumed, the likelihood was that external forces would intervene. During the five years that preceded establishment of the GNU alone, approximately 10,000 people had died and more than 30,000 had been internally displaced.²⁹ None of the parties to the transition, nor the external monitors, would accept a return to such a level of instability.

Knowing that negotiations would inevitably produce a majority-rule system that enjoyed the support of the international community, the ANC could easily have adopted a more aggressive stance on the negotiations, especially concerning the structure and mission of the new national force. The ANC chose instead to adopt a considerably more nuanced

²⁷ Ellis (2013): 68

²⁸ Shubin (2001)

²⁹ Haysom (1992)

strategy, one that entailed concessions early on, but paved the way for a reversal of fortune in the future. Frankel asserts that "all knew deep down that after a diplomatic period of time when the ANC had consolidated its power base – be it three years or five – MK would inevitably begin to make the necessary changes to the military pact as circumstances required, no matter how fine-tuned within a wealth of sealed and signed documents."³⁰ The appearance of the ANC's early concessions to the SADF belied a well of strategic foresight whose effects were latent by design. As a result, relatively few differences were noticeable between the old SADF and newly integrated SANDF in 1998.³¹

History has demonstrated that the long-term effects of this approach ultimately paid off, for the SANDF slowly and incrementally evolved into the civilian controlled, 'people-first' type of security force that its creators envisioned. How can scholarship account for the SANDF's success incorporating SADF elements into its structure and mission, while managing to continually, incrementally, evolve and progress? How did it become new without cleaving all that was old?

Few scholars consider the innate explanatory power that negotiation theory has to offer here. Following a rich literature on the subject, Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008) classify negotiations by strategy type so that two fundamental, opposing categories emerge: distributive and integrative negotiations. Distributive negotiation assumes there is a fixed amount of negotiable assets that must be divided between negotiating parties: whatever one party gains the other loses (it is zero-sum). By contrast, integrative negotiation assumes that the proverbial 'pie' to be divvied up is more complex, and that achieving a mutually agreeable solution will leave both parties better off than if either attempted to achieve a solution on their own. Due to the complex nature of international relations, Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008), along with many other scholars, suggest that integrative negotiation is more commonly applicable to international politics.³² They explain it as a

³⁰ p. 42

³¹ Heinecken (2005): 80-81

³² p.8

negotiation model in which the parties "have the objective to walk away with at least a perception of having gained more than they could through an alternative approach."³³

Spangler (2003) similarly defines integrative negotiation as a "strategy in which parties (attempt) to find a 'win-win' solution to their dispute" by focusing on "developing mutually beneficial agreements based on the interests of the disputants."³⁴ Spangler outlines the classic theoretical example of this negotiating strategy, which involves two children fighting over an orange. If both children take the position that they want the entire orange, their mother will cut the orange into two halves and give one to each child. Such is distributive negotiation, in which both children are forced to compromise and each receives only part of what she wanted. However, what if in fact one child wanted the orange in order to eat its meat, while the other child wanted the orange in order to use its peel as a spice for cooking? In this case, both children could have theoretically been fully satisfied by splitting the single orange in a constructive (and more strategically nuanced) way. In this second scenario, an integrative negotiation would have allowed each child to secure all of what she wanted. Drawing on the seminal work on integrative negotiation by Fisher and Ury (1987), Spangler (2003) identifies a number of characteristics of integrative negotiating that contribute to its success. Broadly, these include 'working together to determine who gets what,' 'focusing on the interests rather than positions of the participants,' and 'looking for win-win opportunities.'³⁵ Odell and Tingley (2013) add that, "negotiations are more successful to the extent that they are efficient by reducing process costs."³⁶

Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008) refer to negotiations between South Africa and the Angola-Cuba alliance that brought an end to the Angolan Civil War as a seminal example of the success that can be achieved through integrative negotiating. They describe how "both sides, after each meeting, walked away with at least 'something' that they could take back to their constituents ... to gain 'face' and make a little bit of progress" under the pretense that "disagreement might cause the war to be extended and even escalate, and that would

³³ p.8

³⁴ Spangler (2003)

³⁵ Spangler (2003)

³⁶ Spangler (2003)

be much more costly than compromising."³⁷ As the direct result of this negotiating strategy, gains and losses for both sides were (for the most part) equalized. This was due in large part to the detailed agreements concerning trade-offs in terms of troop withdrawal and financial assistance that would follow Namibian independence. In broad terms South Africa was assured of future international support, while Cubans and Angolans were assured of greater economic progress.³⁸ Additional applications of integrative negotiation in international relations abound.³⁹

When applying integrative negotiation concepts to the establishment of the SANDF and its integration process, many synchronicities between theory and reality emerge. Fundamentally, the parties involved sought coexistence with one another moving forward (with the end of Apartheid and the push for democracy, the likelihood of the new nation maintaining separate armies appeared improbable), a common starting point for pursuing integrative negotiation.⁴⁰ For this reason, it's likely that "expanding the pie" or reaching a "mutual-gain deal"⁴¹ on the military's composition was preferable to both sides maintaining separate defence organizations. Additionally, both sides had multiple interests at stake rather than a single, fixed asset requiring division. Although on the surface the asset in dispute appeared to be the military at large, in reality the issues were more complex. The ANC's chief concern was that the new military be subject to civilian control by government agencies. So long as this interest was secured, ancillary concerns including the military's mission, structure, composition, and funding were negotiable during the early stages. The SADF maintained a number of interests in these ancillary areas. Thus, an integrative negotiation process fit the bill and, as ensuing sections of this study demonstrate, proved to be crucial in effecting a smooth transition.

Some analysts might rush to point out that once majority rule was established and the new Constitution was in place, the ANC no longer needed to negotiate with the SADF's old guard. This analysis is misguided, however, in both its assessment of the

³⁷ Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008)

³⁸ Crocker (1993)

³⁹ Watkins and Rosegrant (2001)

⁴⁰ Marzec (2015)

⁴¹ Odell and Tingley (2013):145

circumstances and its tactical proscription. Though the ANC assumed control over the GNU via majority rule, members of the SADF still held an overwhelming majority and maintained a preponderance of power within the newly established SANDF. Desertion and mutiny were still very much possible under this fragile arrangement; President Mandela needed to preserve military loyalty to the interim government. In short, a two-sided power struggle still existed *even after* the establishment of majority rule and the GNU. Thus, the need for the two parties to pursue mutually beneficial agreements continued. Subsequent sections of this study highlight that as a result of this ongoing struggle the ANC continued to make strategic concessions to the old guard even after it had assumed full control of the national government.

In considering the post-Apartheid military integration process within the context of an integrative negotiation framework, this paper also seeks to more broadly contribute to the fields of conflict resolution and negotiation theory at-large, by identifying two strategies that the negotiating parties (primarily the ANC) consistently made use of prior to and during the military's transition. First, they prioritized achieving broad objectives over narrow ones in their initial agreements, allowing for difficult, specific points of contention to be hashed out over time; second, they maintained small negotiating teams and kept them shielded from public scrutiny. These two strategies employed by the major parties during the planning phase and subsequently by the GNU during integration, were responsible for much of the success that the process ultimately enjoyed. By maintaining broad objectives rather than specific ones, negotiators ensured that symbolic progress continued to define the process and that difficult and contested issues did not grind the negotiations to a halt. By keeping the number of participants at the proverbial decision-making table small and isolated from the public, negotiators limited the potential for specific issues to become subjects of public criticism and debate before agreements had been reached. In this way, national-level public opinion was largely prevented from influencing specific outcomes and the public perception of the negotiation process remained more positive throughout.

Hypotheses

In an attempt to address both of the aforementioned deficiencies in the literature and to consider the establishment and integration of the SANDF within the proposed integrative negotiation framework, this study offers the following two hypotheses:

- (a) Integrative negotiating by the major parties involved, particularly the ANC, played an integral role in the creation of the SANDF and the subsequent military transition. The ANC's willingness to maintain certain structural, financial, and mission-related elements of the SADF allowed it to ensure that South Africa's new national defence force would remain intact in the short term and progressively transform into a racially representative, civilian controlled army in the long term.
- (b) Two specific strategies, employed by the major parties in the planning phase and the GNU in the integration phase, contributed to the swift transformation of the military. First, the governing entities maintained broad objectives, rather than specific ones, in order to ensure that symbolic progress continued to define the process and allow for difficult and contested issues to be sorted out over time. Second, the governing entities kept the number of participants at the proverbial decision-making table small and isolated from the public in order to limit the potential for specific debates and public discontent to derail progress.

Here, it is important to address notions of 'success' and 'progress' that are used to characterize the military transformation in this study. This characterization is undoubtedly subjective and incomplete, providing a broad brushstroke interpretation of the struggles and breakthroughs that occurred throughout the process. The characterization also perhaps over sells the current state of the SANDF, and the extent to which it remains riddled with deficiencies, particularly regarding racial representativeness and its ability to execute its mission. Though this characterization of

the SANDF is certainly overly simplistic, it is not unfounded within the literature. Le Roux (2005) writes that, "despite the difficulties and setbacks experienced, the integration process was largely successful and has contributed significantly to the present stability and success of the SANDF in its internal and external operations."⁴² Other scholars have expressed similar sentiments, describing South African military integration as a model that has been emulated in subsequent post-conflict military transitions and even peace building missions.⁴³

When comparing South Africa's military transition to other transition processes, the speed with which it occurred and the results that it obtained can safely be characterized as out of the ordinary. Licklider (2015) cites South Africa's military integration as a model for other African nations since the end of the Second World War. He remarks upon the fact that it was able to maintain internal integrity while incorporating personnel and soldiers virtually one at a time, rather than in tranches or units, without the whole operation erupting into conflict. Though studies concerning whether the outcome of the integration was a success or failure deserve a separate forum for research and debate, this study chooses (for the sake of brevity) to accept assertions made by many in the literature and consider the South African military's integration to have been, in broad terms, successful.⁴⁴

Chapter Outline

Chapter two focuses on the planning period of the military transition, spanning 1990 through the end of 1993. During this time, preparations for integration were in full swing. Closed-door meetings between small teams of negotiating parties led to agreements that were broad in scope, but nevertheless kept all sides satisfied enough to continue moving towards a unified military and defence apparatus. Specifically, this chapter examines the relevant planning documents that formed the basis of the formation of the new SANDF

⁴² p. 254

⁴³ Burgess (2008): 71

⁴⁴ Heinecken (2005) and Winkates (2000)

and demonstrates how integrative negotiating can lead to agreements that encourage progress and leave room for enough maneuvering that mutual benefit can be achieved.

This study distinguishes between these two periods based on its theoretical interest in evaluating the efficacy of integrative negotiations during the South African military's transition and subsequent integration. By demarcating a split between 1990-1993 and 1994-1996, this author is able to analyze the behavior of the negotiating parties during the run up to, and the establishment of, the interim government. It enables the author to consider whether the ANC, after its ascendance to power via the interim government, continued to rely upon integrative negotiating tactics, or instead moved away from them in favor of a hard-line approach (or distributive integration strategy). Ultimately, this study proves that even after the ANC assumed control over the means of governance, it maintained the same long-term goals; namely, ensuring stability and sustaining momentum.

Chapter three considers the politics of integration, and focuses on the integration itself, spanning the years 1994 through 1996. During this time, bargaining, compromising, and budgeting carry the day. It is shown that the success of both the political and military leadership hinged in large part on their ability to reach agreement, however coarse its provisional terms. In terms of the new South African democracy that emerges from this period, every facet of the new government reflects compromises wrought between majority and minority: the interim Constitution itself serving as the ultimate example of political bargaining. The first section provides a historical overview of the period focusing on the immediate run up to the general election. During these weeks the SADF conceded to underwriting the transition in exchange for a significant ANC concession; the indefinite delay of restructuring. This constituted significant compromise by both parties and demonstrates the impact that an integrative negotiating strategy had in the South African case. The second section provides analysis of the implementation of the three-phase military integration plan and highlights some of the key concessions the ANC made in exchange for longer-term military stability.

The final chapter is devoted to considering the implications of this case study for the study of military integration more generally, in other parts of the world.

South Africa's status as a regional economic and political powerhouse, advanced development relative to other Sub-Saharan African nations, leadership role in international organizations and peacekeeping operations throughout the continent,⁴⁵ and ability to successfully harness domestic infrastructure to increase GDP, have all contributed to its contemporary branding as a 'model nation' for the African continent. Not only has South Africa superseded expectations for Africa, but it has also made itself an appealing partner and ally for countries throughout the world. Foreign government officials often view the country as a sort of bridge between Africa and the rest of the developed world. From this perspective, its military is worthy of examination because perhaps its organization and culture can provide clues about the comparative success of modern South African governance.

⁴⁵ Ball & Campbell (1998)

Chapter Two: Planning for Military Transformation, 1990-1994

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the planning period of the military transition with a particular focus on the 1990 through 1994 time period. The first section provides a historical overview of the key military entities that existed at the time, both statutory and non-statutory, and that were eventually consolidated to form the new SANDF that emerged after the 1994 elections. Each of these entities faced prospects for gains and losses contingent upon military restructuring. SADF stood to lose its autonomy and the backing of the ruling government party, and thus wanted to maintain the strength and resources it enjoyed during the 1980s to the greatest degree possible. MK and the APLA stood to gain power and influence via the provision of majority rule, but at the same time wouldn't be able to maintain stability without the loyalty of the (much stronger and culturally entrenched) SADF. The next section examines the most salient agreements, planning papers, and legislation related to the SANDF's formation and integration.

The subsequent section applies this study's hypotheses in order to demonstrate that integrative negotiation theory does indeed contribute to a more fulsome understanding of the planning phase and its historical trajectory. It will also highlight that agreements reached during this period mandated very little military restructuring and focused instead on broader, longer-term strategic objectives. These agreements delayed implementation of some of the most painful restructuring until later points in time, but they fulfilled the more important objective of moving the integration process along. The final section of the chapter concludes that integrative negotiation theory provides a helpful analytical lens through which scholars can better understand the planning phase of South Africa's military integration.

Historical Account: Pre-1990

In terms of international politics during the late 1980s, the single issue that shaped the global order was the waning of the Cold War and its accompanying ideological mandate, and South Africa was not spared involvement. The United States' Reagan Doctrine breathed life into the South African government, and parties on both sides of the negotiating table felt the impact of shifting tectonic plates. As the Cold War entered its final years and months, the imminent collapse of Eastern European communism provided even more urgent incentives for South Africa to orchestrate change.⁴⁶ This sense of urgency included reevaluating the government's fragmented national security strategy during a period in which, as Kenkel (2007) asserts, "it was a rarity for any state's defence posture not to be in a state of flux."⁴⁷ A brief summary of each of the major internal forces at this time follows.

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)

Since its inception MK fell short of the SADF in terms of force structure, capabilities, and resources; MK was outnumbered, possessed insufficient arms, and was under-prepared in comparison with its primary adversary. At its zenith in the 1980s, MK boasted only 7,000 soldiers as compared to the SADF's 100,000 plus⁴⁸ (the SADF continued to grow annually through the 1970s and much of the 1980s, whereas MK leveled off). After an influx of recruits following the 1976 Soweto rebellion, MK troop numbers remained consistent for much of the ensuing fifteen years, even though its activities proliferated.⁴⁹ MK also endured the extreme disadvantage of operating in exile and, with its high command based in Lusaka, Zambia, faced logistical hurdles in terms of moving people and equipment across borders with stealth and efficiency.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Geldenhuys & Kotze (1983): 33-45

⁴⁷ p. 4

⁴⁸ Liebenberg (1997)

⁴⁹ Williams (2000)

⁵⁰ Motumi (1994)

During the early 1980s MK participated in a multitude of large-scale attacks intended to symbolize their opposition to the NP's increasingly harsh policies and practices.⁵¹ This campaign included, most notably: an attack on a SASOL fuel plant that incurred R66 million worth of damage; an attack on army headquarters at Pretoria (Voortrekkerhoogte); the bombing of the Koeberg power plant; and a series of smaller car bombings in urban areas targeting groups of military personnel (the so-called Church Street bomb in Pretoria figures as part of this series, though it garnered severe criticism for the loss of civilian life it unintentionally incurred).⁵²

In the mid 1980s MK reconfigured strategy to focus on rural (rather than urban) areas inside South Africa.⁵³ In 1985 MK leadership declared a 'people's war' that served as a guise through which it sought direct engagement with the SADF and SAP for the first time (prior to this their efforts were self described as armed propaganda, a much more limited form of engagement).⁵⁴ MK's special operations unit featured prominently during this period as it undertook attacks upon the SADF's nerve centers, the Witwatersrand Command and one of their radar satellite stations at Klippen.⁵⁵

During this time MK was given a series of opportunities to cut its teeth in conventional warfare with military engagements that tested its competence and resilience. First, MK's infiltration of the SADF put its intelligence capabilities to the test, and its leadership learned the importance of developing intelligence strategy and implementing assets in a strategic rather than tactical manner.⁵⁶ Second was MK's involvement in its neighbors' affairs; it provided auxiliary assistance to ZIPRA forces in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and to the MPLA government forces in Angola (in this instance they even gained firsthand experience combating the SADF, who were sent in by South Africa to back Jonas Savimbi's regime).⁵⁷ The collective effect of these experiences was, according to Liebenberg, to "provide MK with important combat experience ...and

⁵¹ Williams (2000)

⁵² Liebenberg (1997): 5

⁵³ Ellis (2013): 186

⁵⁴ Liebenberg (1997): 5

⁵⁵ Liebenberg (1997): 6

⁵⁶ Williams (2000)

⁵⁷ Motumi (1994)

helped to build the capacity of its personnel. "⁵⁸ Despite MK's increasing presence in combat zones, it rarely renounced the humanitarian principles operating at the core of its ethics creed and during this time became a signatory to the Geneva Convention of the United Nations.⁵⁹

The South African Defence Force

The story of the SADF is largely one of struggle. As the nation's primary statutory defence force, it expended much of its energy in attempts to delay what was clearly deteriorating prowess and legitimacy.⁶⁰ It is important to point out that there was much competition among the SADF's branches during the lead up to the 1994 national elections. Comprised of army, navy, air force, and medical services branches, the SADF consisted of a foundation of professional soldiers (a high tech force) and a bulk force of conscripts. Many of its operations were marked by tension, inherent in a system in which the services were sharply divided by age and experience.⁶¹

By the 1970s, the SADF was determined to employ harsher methods to achieve its security objectives. In response to the escalating violence that characterized the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SADF decided to engage any means necessary (whether legal or not) to protect against black incursion into territories outside of the homelands. The SADF employed heavy-handed measures to monitor and manage the day-to-day activities of civilians, and the opaque nature of its operations was aided by the inclusion of intelligence branches in its operating structure.⁶²

Towards the end of the 1970s the military's intelligence arm, the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI), was dragged from the periphery of the state's governing apparatus and granted a position at its very core.⁶³ Operating in concert with South Africa's larger

⁵⁸ Liebenberg (1997): 7

⁵⁹ MK's shift to armed propaganda occurred after the Kabwe Conference allowed attacks on civilians: see African National Congress 1985.

⁶⁰ Spoelstra & Pienaar (1999): 22

⁶¹ Seegers (1992): 160

⁶² Shaw (1995): 14

⁶³ Ellis (2013): 199

intelligence community comprised of the SAP's Security Branch and the Cabinet-created Bureau for State Security (known as BOSS), DMI was granted special powers (this in the wake of concerns about the regime's security that proliferated as a result of the uprising in Soweto). DMI's special status as a quasi-military force allowed it certain prerogatives that, as many anti-Apartheid activists argued, were unconstitutional and infringed upon civil liberties in an unprecedented manner. "The most striking feature of the South African Defence Force's Military Intelligence structures was the extent to which they engaged in domestic and cross-territorial attacks on anti-apartheid activists, many of whom were in exile in banned political organizations ... The apartheid government's 1977 White Paper on Defence presented the role of the defence establishment as being to uphold the right of self-determination of the 'White Nation.'" ⁶⁴

In order to fulfill this mission, the military employed a range of extreme and illegal measures against civilians, including at various times: intimidation; both random and targeted arrests and prolonged detentions; beating and torture; the propagation and outright instigation of so-called black-on-black violence; political assassinations; and even murder of non-suspect civilians. ⁶⁵

The APLA

The genesis of the 1984 people's war was a declaration made by MK and the APLA (Azanian People's Liberation Army) in response to "the authoritarian implementation of apartheid at all levels of society." ⁶⁶ Eventually the ANC's armed wing would prove itself considerably more successful than its PAC-bred counterparts, as it became evident that the APLA would garner little if any support outside of the Western Cape province, and the efforts of the APLA were relegated to the sidelines of the conflict.

The APLA was initially conceived of as a foil for MK. It came into being around 1962 (under the name Poqo), and thereafter established clusters of loyalists and followers

⁶⁴ Africa (2009): 3

⁶⁵ For more on this see Moss and Obery (1992)

⁶⁶ Liebenberg (1997): 3

throughout several provinces, to include Natal, the Transvaal, and the Eastern and Western Cape provinces. Headquarters were established inside Lesotho. It was not until 1968 that it switched its name to the Azanian People's Liberation Army, by which time the organization was already beset with internal difficulties.

From the outset the PAC struggled to match the ANC's success in maintaining international operability. Initial attempts were made to set up remote bases in London, Accra, Cairo, Francistown, Leopoldville, and Dar es Salaam, with an Algerian location added in 1964.⁶⁷ Despite the establishment of such offices, the APLA soon confronted the stark reality that forging meaningful connections between branches was not a simple task. For starters, the leadership found it difficult to instill loyalty towards the Maoist doctrine in soldiers scattered across the globe.⁶⁸ Furthermore, as host countries became involved in various conflicts of their own during the 1970s and 1980s, APLA forces found themselves drawn into the disputes of countries as varied as Angola, Libya, and Yugoslavia, which further eroded their own party loyalties.

While some scholars trace the problems of the APLA directly to leadership problems within the PAC,⁶⁹ others point to the disparate training APLA soldiers received and the variety of external influences they were subjected to as the result of time spent overseas in exile. Terence Jackson and Elize Kotze assert that much of the training the APLA forces received came in the form of crash courses in guerrilla warfare, and that qualifications for entry were overly lenient when compared with those for MK.⁷⁰

Regardless of why MK ultimately fared better than the APLA, discrepancies between these two political parties' armed offshoots was obvious. The APLA fared considerably better once the ban on opposition parties was lifted by the South Africa government, and it began to flourish during the mid to late 1980s. Many APLA operatives based overseas returned to South Africa during this time, and the PAC was better able to consolidate control over them by managing and coordinating their daily activities and operations.

⁶⁷ Liebenberg (1997): 5

⁶⁸ Ball (1997): 85-105

⁶⁹ Such as Liebenberg (2001)

⁷⁰ Jackson and Kotze (2005): 175

The Homeland Militaries (Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei, Venda)

Security forces were established for each of South Africa's four independent homeland territories in order to fortify and extend the state's reach into opposition-led territory. Strong links were established early on between each of the homelands' individual militaries and the SADF's Department of Military Intelligence (DMI).⁷¹ Of the four militias, only the Transkei Defence Force was directly involved in the negotiations of the 1990s, due largely to the successful efforts of its leader, General Bantu Holomisa, to ally himself with the ANC.⁷²

Military Consolidation

It has been argued that the Apartheid government historically relied heavily upon the SADF to support its campaigns and implement its policies, but it wasn't until the 1980s that the SADF's power actually rivaled that of the state governing apparatus. The western democratic model, which stipulates military organizations must be subordinate to civilian command and control via government departments and agencies, had long prevailed in South Africa as the model of choice.⁷³ Herbert Howe, writing for the journal *Modern African Studies* in 1994, points to Botha's creation of the 'military-dominated' State Security Council (SSC) as a watershed moment that indicated the military's usurpation of civilian rule.⁷⁴ The SSC effectively replaced the Cabinet as the locus of political power and decision-making for the duration of the 1980s, and enabled the SADF to extend its operations into the domains of domestic counterinsurgency and policing. In this way Botha's Total Onslaught campaign placed the control levers in the military's hands at the expense of the civilian led cabinet.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Cilliers (1998)

⁷² Seegers (1996): 278

⁷³ Howe (1994): 33

⁷⁴ Howe (1994): 34

⁷⁵ Geldenhuys & Kotze (1983) 33-45

Over time, Botha tightened his personal control over the SADF.⁷⁶ By strengthening his relationships with senior military commanders, he managed to both consolidate military power within the executive branch and (paradoxically) encourage military encroachment into civilian life. Because neither of these developments were – despite legitimate claims to historical precedent – entirely constitutional, establishing plausible deniability became an immediate priority for those in Botha’s administration. “The S.A.D.F. placed itself, under the rubric of national security, beyond the reach of parliament, the courts, commissions of inquiry, and even the state's auditors. General Malan defended such secrecy on the principle of need-to-know.”⁷⁷

This rubric proved to be increasingly useful to the administration as it sought more opaque means of governance and pursued an end state in which the security services were virtually unrestrained when it came to running their operations. Botha began to incrementally afford himself, his political appointees, and certain designees within the military chain-of-command, powers usually reserved only for wartime presidents.

Covert Operations

During the early 1980s the SADF started insinuating itself into covert operations, often planned and executed in concert with the South African Police (SAP).⁷⁸ Beginning with Operation Hammer in 1983, which resulted in the death of anti-Apartheid activists, the SADF adopted covert methods of confrontation with increasing frequency. Over the course of the next decade, hundreds of South Africans would perish, often indiscriminately, at the hands of this new shadowy defence force.⁷⁹ Much was made of this development at the time, as Seegers (1996) has pointed out, but these initial tactical operations proved to be mere precursors to larger, more destructive campaigns.

The issue of South Africa’s security forces conducting covert, possibly illegal operations, later came to the forefront of national consciousness in 1992 when, in the midst of

⁷⁶ Howe (1994): 34

⁷⁷ Howe (1994): 35

⁷⁸ Ellis (2013): 200

⁷⁹ *The Sunday Tribune* (1992)

speculation about the existence of a malignant ‘third-force’ comprised of members of the SADF and the SAP, Botha fired 23 of his top commanding officers.⁸⁰ Despite the fact that Botha did not refer explicitly to the use of such a force when publicly addressing these dismissals, his actions indicated that perhaps some of his allegiances had been compromised. These actors, whether authorized internally or independently of the official chain of command, had been responsible for shootings, massacres, and murders propagated on a wide scale against black South Africans, the ANC, and the UDF for some time. This topic is deserving of greater analysis than it receives here. Though an in-depth examination of the alleged third-force is beyond the scope of this paper, it is mentioned here in order to illustrate the extent to which the military began – under PW Botha’s command – to expand the scope and distort the shape of traditional military power in South Africa during the 1980s.⁸¹ This initial expansion of military powers laid the groundwork for later operations.

Military Waning

All of this activity served to severely undermine the credibility of the SADF, particularly its overreach into the government’s civilian affairs, and of Botha himself. When FW De Klerk assumed office in 1989, he eliminated the nefarious SSC and replaced it with a civilian lead Cabinet for Security Affairs (akin to the Cabinet that had preceded the SSC under Botha). Within the first couple of years of De Klerk’s tenure, it was generally conceded that he had effectively shrunk the security apparatus of the state – both in size and in power. The decreased stature enjoyed by the military was attributable to a multitude of factors, including De Klerk’s influence. “South Africa’s military-industrial complex has been significantly shrunk by De Klerk. His overall policy of reconciliation over confrontation scuttled the Government’s reliance upon physical force and, thus, much of the need for continued support of, and deference to, the security establishment. By mid-1992 the military’s political influence and its ability to sustain conventional operations had been reduced.”⁸²

⁸⁰ Sacks (1992)

⁸² Howe (1994): 38

Historical Account: 1990-1994 Elections

During the period spanning 1990 through the 1994 elections, the prospect of military integration in South Africa became a tangible reality, as negotiations between the De Klerk Administration and the ANC kicked into high gear.⁸³ Faced with this prospect, military operatives on both sides of the political divide conducted rounds of contingency planning in preparation for the government's transition. Throughout this period, MK and the SADF prepared for transformation, yet also made sure to retain autonomous force-readiness.

Several key elements emerged as early indicators of what could be expected of the defence forces in post-Apartheid South Africa; later on they would re-emerge as major themes. Among these were the interim Constitution, in which a new paradigm for civil-military relations was hammered out and the future of civilian supremacy was codified.⁸⁴ "1990 to 1994 was marked by the lifting of restrictions on political organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This period saw the emergence of transitional forms of control of the security sector as a whole and a shifting of the terrain on which the control of the intelligence services was mediated. As a by-product of the negotiations process, discussions were initiated about the future of all security services – police, defence and intelligence – including security components of the liberation movement."⁸⁵

Another important element was the proposition of a new defence posture with altered budgetary considerations for the entire military apparatus. During this period the national posture with regard to defence changed drastically. While the SADF under President De Klerk prioritized defence and traditional national security expenditure, the new regime, empowered by democratic elections, planned to embrace a human security paradigm in which the concept of national security was expanded to include human welfare. In turn, military spending was to be constrained.

⁸³ O'Malley 325-340

⁸⁴ *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993: Act No. 200 of 1993*

⁸⁵ Africa (2011): 1- 38

However, these objectives were meant to be pursued gradually and incrementally, which was made evident in the proposal for the three-phase transition process introduced by the Technical Committee on Violence (though the committee's report on this plan focused primarily on the integration phase), and was agreed to by the ANC and SADF during a bilateral meeting in 1993. The plan was subsequently proposed and accepted by the multiparty negotiation process (the MPNP) and became a roadmap for the military's transition from that point forward.⁸⁶

The Three-phase Plan

Between 1990 and 1993 there was much speculation about what a new SANDF would and could look like, but it wasn't until the latter part of the period that these ideas assumed more pragmatic form. An assortment of legislation and policy-focused councils created a platform for the consideration of the future of the military at the highest levels of government, and the three-phase military integration roadmap was born.

The government decided upon this plan because it would provide flexibility but at the same time prevent competing defence force contingents from overwhelming or preempting the entire process. Each phase was projected to last between one and several years, and would necessitate pre-determined alterations to force demographics.

Every aspect of this plan, from its projected timeline to the manner in which it would be managed and monitored, exposed heavy-handed operational intent on the part of the government (both executive and legislative branches). It is clear that in spite of the rapidly changing political environment, the transitional authorities had every intention to maintain strict control over the military during every stage of its transformation. While certain elements of South Africa's transition would be executed with little oversight and interference from the governing authorities, the defence force would not be one of them.

⁸⁶ Shaw (1996)

The initial phase of the plan was termed ‘integration’, and comprised the intake of non-statutory forces.⁸⁷ During this phase the existing armies came together formally on paper, in a national registry, so that the scope of the new force could be approximated.⁸⁸

The second phase was referred to as ‘demobilization’, and consisted of a process whereby former SADF and MK fighters were given the option to voluntarily depart or retire from military service.⁸⁹ The government intended for this process to whittle down the force considerably, though in practice it did not achieve this effect.⁹⁰

‘Rationalization’ (which is explored in-depth in the subsequent chapter of this study) the third and final phase of the transition process,⁹¹ was designed to help align the remaining force structure with revised force design, and was also the period during which retrenchment would begin.⁹² Chief of the Army Johan Pretorius captured the prevailing sentiment of the time when he pessimistically characterized this phase as a “no-win” situation for the emergent SANDF.⁹³ (Chapter three provides evidence in support of this point and shows that as long-standing members were let go, the new military hemorrhaged expertise. Conversely, as former non-statutory fighters were released, the new military suffered a tremendous loss of legitimacy in the eyes of both the ruling party and the international community).

There is perhaps no stronger example of the presumptive prowess of South Africa’s governing elites than the three-phase integration process they designed for the armed forces; it laid out a roadmap for the transition of the forces from a motley collection of competing interests and individuals into a cohesive, nationalist brand of military force. At its core, the military’s transformation was something required of the organization in order to accommodate a new political reality. This organizational challenge was of such

⁸⁷ Reports 1-5 of the Technical Committee on Violence (1993)

⁸⁸ Shaw (1996)

⁸⁹ *Final Integration Report* (2003)

⁹⁰ Modise

⁹¹ Reports 1-5 of the Technical Committee on Violence (1993)

⁹² Reports 1-5 of the Technical Committee on Violence (1993)

⁹³ Kynoch, (1996): 441-457.

great magnitude that it not only tested the military's adaptability but constituted an existential threat to its survival.

“First and foremost, defence transformation supports the primary objective of the government, which is the transformation of the state towards a new democratic society.”⁹⁴ The three-phase plan laid out in planning documents and in various pieces of legislation reflects the negotiating and back-and-forth political wrangling between the two primary stakeholder groups vying for dominance.

Transition Agreements and Plans Relevant to the Defence Forces

Negotiations and planning for the military's transition proceeded during this period in anything but a predictable or smooth manner. This section presents an overview of important decisions taken that moved the planning process along and ensured that progress, however haphazard and intermittent, was made.

At first, a framework for the future of a new South Africa existed only on paper, as a series of roadmaps and planning papers, which collectively represented a vague alternative future for the country. It was several years before this framework advanced beyond conceptual platitudes and became a viable aspiration with discernible features. Additional pieces of legislation were added incrementally until the effect of their consolidated contributions produced a constitutional framework within which the post-Apartheid military could survive.

With the Organization of African Unity (OAU's) adoption of the Harare Declaration in 1989, political negotiations gained legal legitimacy, something they had not previously enjoyed. This was the first major piece of international legislation to be passed that laid out a certain future for a negotiated political settlement; it presented options for the government to advance, assigned action items to relevant stakeholders, and imbued the transition effort with a sense of momentum.

⁹⁴ Liebenberg (1997): 105-132

After 1989, ensuing agreements related to the military can be categorized according to their signatories. On the one hand were agreements reached in South Africa between the government in power and the ANC, and on the other hand were those reached ‘during multilateral decision-making processes’⁹⁵ by the South African government in concert with multiple external stakeholders.

Bilateral Negotiations with Implications for the Defence Force

The next major agreement reached was the Groote Schuur Minute in May of 1990 (named for the President’s residence in Cape Town). Between Harare and Groote Schuur, however, one major event occurred that merits special mention because it helped to turn the tide in favor of pursuing military integration. This was President De Klerk’s lifting of the ban on the ANC and PAC in summer of that year, resulting from months of secret negotiations with Nelson Mandela.⁹⁶ The implications of this decision reverberated with incalculable force throughout the country.

The Groote Schuur Minute highlights how uncertainty affected defence interests during the political negotiations process.⁹⁷ Though this agreement’s authorization constituted a watershed moment, and publicly heralded the launch of negotiations, conflicting defence interests beleaguered it from the start (mostly over South African security legislation and the fact that it undermined or conflicted with norms established by international bodies of law).⁹⁸

During the weeks leading up to the signature of the agreement, the ANC revealed cracks not only along party lines but within its own ranks. The party was rife with disagreement over how and when negotiations should commence with the government, and even whether they should commence at all.⁹⁹ At the end of the day, the agreement set forth some general parameters for the commencement of military negotiations, though these

⁹⁵ Africa (2011): 3-4

⁹⁶ Thomsson, (2001): 250

⁹⁷ O’Malley: 352

⁹⁸ *The Groote Schuur Minute* (1990)

⁹⁹ Africa (2011): 5

parameters were more notable for their symbolic value rather than the particulars they put forward.¹⁰⁰ The main component was contained in paragraph three of the Minute, which established a working group intended "to resolve all outstanding questions arising out of the decision to suspend armed action and related activities".¹⁰¹ Once signed, the agreement stood as the first official joint venture between the government and ANC.

The Pretoria Minute of 1990 followed on the heels of Groote Schuur and was plagued by a similar sense of uncertainty, but it also went a considerable way further in terms of producing meaningful output.¹⁰² This Minute contained two primary clauses with special relevance for the defence forces: one which stipulated an end to the state of emergency that President De Klerk had kept in place for years,¹⁰³ and another that paved the way for the release of political prisoners and brought the issue of the ANC's use of violence front and center.

The ruling party had maintained a state of emergency in an effort to propagate a legal foundation for the detention and imprisonment of activists (an overwhelming majority of whom were black South Africans) from previously banned political organizations.¹⁰⁴ Though the burden of enforcing the state of emergency fell primarily to national and local law enforcement operatives, violence often erupted that overwhelmed SAP capacity and it became routine practice for the SADF to intervene. Thus, maintenance of De Klerk's state of emergency had occupied much of the military's attention and resources for some time, and so when its end came about much of their resources and manpower were freed up.

It is notable that Pretoria laid out a timetable for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners throughout the country,¹⁰⁵ many whom had been jailed for upwards of a decade. This development lent considerable momentum to the overall negotiating process, but it had particular significance for the defence forces. Once Mandela and other

¹⁰⁰ *The Groote Schuur Minute* (1990)

¹⁰¹ *The Groote Schuur Minute* (1990)

¹⁰² *The Pretoria Minute* (1990)

¹⁰³ For more information on the effects of the state of emergency upon the defence forces and the country at large, see Kathrada (2011)

¹⁰⁴ Mandela

¹⁰⁵ Kynoch (1996)

ANC leaders were released they confronted a backlash by members of the ANC's guerilla army who didn't want to relinquish violent means of resistance. This opposition – mandated by Pretoria in exchange for their unbanning – was vehement and often fierce. “Guerilla warfare ... had great emotional appeal, as it pitted the strength of an underground movement that held high moral ground in the eyes of the country's black majority against what was considered to be an illegitimate and racist regime with superior firepower.”¹⁰⁶

It was this issue that was most difficult for the ANC to manage at the beginning of military integration. This single clause strengthened the resolve of a minority faction that felt the party's leadership was already compromising too much by acquiescing to negotiations in the first place, and felt further betrayed by the prospect of relinquishing its most effective means of resistance.¹⁰⁷ Eventually, proponents of the new terms prevailed, and further details pertaining to the ANC's ceasefire were hammered out in the DF Malan Accord during the following year, 1991.

Multilateral Negotiations with Implications for the Defence Force

In September 1991 the majority of South Africa's political, security, and private sector organizations formally adopted the National Peace Accord (NPA); exceptions were the PAC, the Conservative Party, and several other high-profile conservative organizations.¹⁰⁸ Regardless, the NPA was widely considered a success, as it set an increased tempo for the transition of the military and established an emphasis on consensus building that prevailed during subsequent proceedings. It also contributed to the establishment of generally peaceful conditions in cities and during protests. It was “the first significant transitional arrangement to lay the basis for the negotiations that were to begin in later months ... [and] it gave parties greater confidence that multiparty conferences could yield agreements.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Africa (2001): 5

¹⁰⁷ Mandela (1994): 106

¹⁰⁸ *National Peace Accord*

¹⁰⁹ Kynoch (1996): 7

The value of the confidence building element inherent in this agreement cannot be overstated; it paved the way for what was perhaps the most publicized round of agreements to occur during the entire transition period, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).¹¹⁰

Thus far in the formal negotiations process, the ANC's willingness to postpone agreements on more complicated issues in exchange for symbolic progress, had been crucial to the process's momentum. Both the government and the ANC appeared disposed towards fostering a receptive political climate before actually implementing meaningful change (though each had very different reasons for pursuing this approach; the government because it hoped to delay meaningful change for as long as possible¹¹¹ and the ANC because Nelson Mandela believed that change would only be sustainable in the long term with buy-in from the white population).¹¹²

Prior to the first round of CODESA, which occurred in December of 1991, the ANC rallied all opposition forces – under the aegis of the Patriotic Front Conference – in October. Headlined by the ANC, the PAC, and AZAPO (the Azanian People's Organization), this conference was conceived of in order to ensure as much cohesion between competing opposition groups as possible, in preparation for their first round of direct negotiations with the government. During this conference the consortium agreed to move forward with official negotiations (still flying high on the recent success of the NPA), which was a significant step.

The first round of CODESA addressed the needs and objectives of the military as part of a larger agenda that included everything from the design of the interim government to the future status of homeland territories. Here, the idea of including the previously maligned non-statutory forces was put forward for official consideration for the first time.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Thompson (2001): 250-255

¹¹¹ Kathrada (2011): 336-58

¹¹² Mandela (1994): 445 – 486

¹¹³ For more information on first and second rounds of CODESA see O'Malley 391-403

Other crucial decisions taken included those related to defence legislation, such as the retention of both the Public Safety Act and Internal Security Act for the duration of the transition.¹¹⁴ These and other laws allowed for the military's (future) success in maintaining order during the chaotic and uncertain transformation of the country.

The Multiparty Negotiating Forum (or the 'third round' of CODESA) convened in April 1993¹¹⁵ and produced a watershed piece of legislation called the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) Act.¹¹⁶ This act set up the mechanisms that would usher the defence forces (and the entire state apparatus) through the remainder of the transition, as well as the widgets that would hold it together. The precise wording of the Act was such that a transitional governing body was established (the TEC) that could later transform itself into a new government.

The particular brilliance of the legislation lay in the fact that it enabled the Council to serve this dual function; it served the immediate purpose of propping up the government during the negotiations,¹¹⁷ and at a certain point in the future would give way to the emergence of a new permanent government. In other words, the TEC put forth in the act was adaptive, flexible, and would also alleviate some of the risk inherent in an uncertain political climate (and mitigate the perception of a political vacuum surrounding the transition). The TEC would later provide more detail to the plans accepted by the MPNP.

The design of the TEC supports the argument put forth earlier in this section, that the initial agreements reached during negotiations were somewhat loose and flexible by comparison with what came later, and they allowed for more difficult agreements to develop incrementally and at a more organic pace.¹¹⁸

Various sub-councils of the main TEC were created to deal with an assortment of core focus areas of particular concern to all involved; not surprisingly the military constituted

¹¹⁴ Sass (1993)

¹¹⁵ US Library of Congress report: <http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/36.htm>

¹¹⁶ *Transitional Executive Council Act, Act 151 of 1993* (1993)

¹¹⁷ http://articles.dailypress.com/1993-09-25/news/9309250100_1_south-africa-transitional-executive-council-economic-sanctions

¹¹⁸ For more on the effects of negotiated settlements upon the trajectory of military conflict, see Mamdani, (2008)

one such focus area, and its equities were divided between the sub-council on Defence, the sub-council on Intelligence, and the sub-council on Law and Order, Security, and Stability.¹¹⁹ These councils were each responsible for producing reports covering the status quo of their respective constituent organizations, as well as prospects for resolving future difficulties. The sub-council on Defence was where issues related to the amalgamation of statutory and non-statutory forces were housed.

TABLE 1: THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL¹²⁰

The Sub-Council on Defence had a number of responsibilities, which included:

- To formulate a code of conduct that would bind all military forces, and to monitor observance of the code; and
- To commission or undertake research into the parliamentary control, composition, manpower policy, organization and executive command of the future defence force, and the future of the arms industry.

The Sub-Council on Defence was also charged with the establishment of the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF). The NPKF would draw on the security resources of the parties involved in the negotiation process. It was disbanded after the 1994 elections, however, and its short existence foreshadowed a number of challenges (i.e. resources, command and control, training doctrines and mandate) faced by the architects of South Africa's new security services. Nevertheless, the main lesson that emerged from the NPKF was that integration, however difficult, was possible.

The Sub-Council on Intelligence had powers of oversight and political supervision similar to those of the Sub-Council on Defence. It also had the following responsibilities:

- To adopt basic principles of intelligence to serve as a basis for the creation of a national intelligence capacity in the new democratic system;
- To formulate a binding code of conduct for all intelligence components during the transition, which could serve as the basis for an official code of conduct in a new democratic dispensation; and
- To obtain evaluations of the security situation in the country from the intelligence services.

The Sub-Council on Law and Order, Security and Stability was tasked with the supervision of police performance. Responsibilities included:

- To establish a national inspectorate composed of the police structures and outside police structures to investigate and monitor police agencies' alignment with the broad objectives of TEC and the transition;
- To establish, in consultation with the ministers responsible for the policing agencies, a national independent civilian complaints mechanism to be responsible for the investigation of complaints by members of the public about possible abuses or misconduct by police agents; and
- To ensure that the provisions of the National Peace Accord related to police responsibilities were complied with.

Small Working Groups with Implications for the Defence Force

Particularly in the wake of the original Groote Schuur Minute and the first CODESA, government officials relied upon small, carefully selected 'working groups' to fulfill new

¹¹⁹ Williams (2005): 28

¹²⁰ Africa (2011): 14

mandates and hammer out outstanding defence issues.¹²¹ For the most part it was members of Parliament, already weary of the incursion of public opinion into government business, who appointed and empowered the individual members of these policy implementation groups.¹²² Defence matters were considered especially sensitive because of national security imperatives, and as a result defence policy working groups were kept especially opaque. With little oversight or transparency, these elite groups maintained an advantage over the other larger forces at work in the negotiated transition. Some ANC members who were excluded from this part of the process believed the very existence of the working groups undermined the spirit of the transition process. This reinforced suspicion of elite and sheltered conclaves even among transitional authorities themselves.

What was termed the ‘sunshine clause’ served as perhaps the best, or most notorious, example of the secret nature of these working groups’ operations. When it was revealed in 1992 that the NP and ANC had negotiated, in secret, a resolution that determined the future of the military, an outcry ensued.¹²³ This clause introduced the terms that allowed all members of the Apartheid SADF, civilians included, to retain their current positions once the new democratically elected government assumed power.

The ANC responded to criticism by asserting that this compromise – hatched entirely in secret – was necessary in order to ensure stability during the national election.¹²⁴ The fact that governing elites managed to keep the incursion of public sentiment at bay for so long, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, is a factor that partially helps to explain why negotiations were ultimately successful.

Defence Force Policy in the Interim Constitution

The interim Constitution of 1993 represented the culmination of the myriad defence interests laid out in this chapter, and was one of the greatest advances towards democracy

¹²¹ Africa (2011):17

¹²² Williams (2005): 29

¹²³ Joe Slovo referred to the problems of ‘white national exclusiveness’ and how elites’ need to keep public the public in the dark on important national issues ultimately proved problematic. For more on this see Slovo (1988)

¹²⁴ Africa (2011): 17

made by the De Klerk administration. It also became a hallmark of the pre-integration planning period. The draft text itself materialized in the form of the Republic of SA Constitution Act of 1993 (and the document itself was slated to take effect in April of the following year, 1994).¹²⁵ It provided a blueprint for the subsequent permanent standing constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and as such heralded an era of not only democracy and equality of all citizens before the law, but what came to be called the birth of a new nation.¹²⁶ The interim Constitution contained many provisions relevant to the military and their future position vis-à-vis the new government's non-military authorities, and this section will single out some of the most important ones for consideration.

The document included several critical elements that underpinned the new military's structure and ethos. These included South Africa's first ever Bill of Rights,¹²⁷ the codification of civilian supremacy over the defence forces (accomplished via 15 line-items contained in section 82)¹²⁸ and a stipulation that it remain non-partisan. During the height of Apartheid little existed by way of legal infrastructure to check or constrain executive and legislative power; concentrations of power and political muscle tended to remain relatively fluid within and between these two branches of government. These three elements of the interim Constitution were intended to redress some of the fundamental inequalities (related to the defence forces) that had prevailed under the Apartheid regime.

Another element of the interim Constitution that bore consequences for the military is a section on administrative law whose relevance to the military is not always considered by scholars, but nonetheless deserves attention. The proposal this author offers is that in the process of 'codifying civilian supremacy,'¹²⁹ the drafters of the interim Constitution also assured that executive and legislative-level negotiations would retain the ability to significantly impact the defence forces.

¹²⁵ *Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 (1983)*

¹²⁶ Thompson (2001): 252-257

¹²⁷ *Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 (1983)*

¹²⁸ *Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 (1983)*

¹²⁹ *Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 (1983)*

Administrative law, according to the interim document, would be equally potent in the new democratic government. In fact, in light of the broad spectrum of goals and aspirations laid out in the interim Constitution, emerging administrative bodies would be called upon to plan and implement rules and procedures perhaps more than ever before, and this fact would impact the military. “Administrative law will certainly play a key role in South Africa’s immediate future ... In the new South Africa there will be rule making and adjudication in abundance. New agencies will spring to life, [and] old ones will be pruned.”¹³⁰

Likewise the military of the new South Africa would be granted a specific mandate, but its operational capacities would depend upon a national government to empower and sustain it (in terms of both budget authorization and public perceptions of legitimacy). In light of the political wrangling that marked the military’s early transition period, the emergent structure would need to prove itself subservient to the cooler heads of policy makers and civil servants. In this way the interim Constitution of 1993 ended decades of political control of the defence forces and heralded a new era in which legitimate and lawful policy would rule the day.¹³¹

The exertion of influence by universities and NGOs, traditionally the arbiters of more progressive notions of democratic practices than their political and military contemporaries, served as a counterweight to the elite who managed this military integration process. Publications in academic journals, newspapers, and in the international press laid out alternative visions for South Africa’s military, and appeared frequently during the early 1990s. Sandy Africa’s assessment of the ‘primacy of political actors’¹³² in the transition remains accurate, in the sense that this information did not necessarily manifest itself in a quantifiable manner during military negotiations. However, it did contribute to the overall tone and tenor of the discussions. It was one

¹³⁰ Asimow (1996): 394

¹³¹ Shaw (1996)

¹³² Africa (2001): 11

element that managed to intrude upon and actually affect the political agendas of governing elites.¹³³

The role of South Africa's civil society in the military's transition, while not as influential as in the broader political transformation, was nonetheless fairly significant. Thanks in large part to the strength and vibrancy of the country's proliferation of academic and non-governmental organizations, the interests of South Africa's vast civil society manifested itself in military doctrine produced during the transition.

The Impact of Integrative Negotiation

As has been shown, both sides demonstrated a strong willingness to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements that they could in turn tout as successes to their respective constituencies. The ANC conceded to the SADF on certain issues in order to increase their prospects of achieving their long-term goals. In particular, the ANC's willingness to maintain certain structural, financial, and mission-related components of the SADF ensured that South Africa's new national defence force would remain intact in the short term and progressively transform into a racially representative, civilian controlled army in the long term. The three-phase integration plan and the interim Constitution serve as practical examples of how the ANC sacrificed short term advances in the interest of guaranteeing continued progress and the achievement of their future objectives.

The interim Constitution was designed with a long-term focus. Though it would eventually be repealed and replaced by a permanent standing Constitution, it was designed by its authors to provide a foundation for this later iteration. It bore many passages that were later duplicated in the permanent version. There is no room for doubt about the fact that the constitution's authors intended its proscriptions to be enduring; when they laid out the contours of an emergent civilian led military, free from political interference and the shackles of special legislative interests, they expected these elements to stand the test of time.

¹³³ Kenkel (2006)

Integrative Negotiation Strategies

Two specific strategies - employed by the major parties in the planning phase and by the GNU in the first phase – largely account for the efficacy of the transition process. First, the governing entities maintained broad objectives, rather than specific ones, in order to ensure that symbolic progress continued to define the process and allow for difficult and contested issues to be sorted out over time. Second, the governing entities kept the number of participants at the proverbial decision-making table small and isolated from the public at-large to limit the potential for specific debates and public discontent to derail programs.

The discussions between Nelson Mandela and NP leadership that resulted in the unbanning of the ANC and PAC are best classified as integrative negotiations and are characterized by opaque proceedings and exclusivity. Both the ANC and NP ruling party relied on keeping these meetings hidden from the public as a means to limit outside influence upon proceedings. They also both had interest in keeping participation limited. These discussions were exploratory in nature, for neither party knew with absolute certainty what the entire range of possible outcomes was.¹³⁴ Integrative bargaining ultimately produced an outcome in which both parties perceived the results to be worse than their best-case scenario, but better than the worst. For the NP this meant formal recognition of their political rival (worse than the best case, in which they would continue to deny the ANC's legitimacy) but continuation of their tenuous and illegitimate hold on government power (better than the worst case in which they would be driven out completely). Conversely, the ANC gained legitimacy (better than the worst case) but had to accept a situation in which the NP still controlled the government.

The terms of the Groote Schuur Minute highlight the advantages incurred by both parties to the negotiations by way of securing broad, interest-based agreement. It set forth some general parameters for the commencement of negotiations over defence matters, though it

¹³⁴ Odell and Tingley call this a preparatory or diagnostic period and describe it as one in which "parties explore cautiously whether a zone of agreement seems possible and a mutual-gain deal could be negotiated."

was consequential in that it set forth goals rather than immediate requirements.¹³⁵ In the Minute, the parties decided to postpone agreement on specific defence matters further down the road and stipulated very little for the near term; in short, it was symbolic more than substantive. The Pretoria Minute negotiators also relied upon integrative negotiating tactics that produced a win-win outcome for each party. For MK, the most immediate gain was the promised release of Nelson Mandela from prison along with much of the ANC's leadership. And for the SADF it was the end of the ANC's guerilla warfare strategy.

The NPA's negotiators employed integrative negotiating tactics in order to achieve a win-win outcome further on in the future. The ANC maintained broad rather than specific objectives throughout the multiparty conference, and emphasized consensus building among participants. It gave all parties greater confidence that these conferences could in fact yield agreements, and this confidence building measure in turn infused the transition with momentum and paved the way for CODESA.¹³⁶

The CODESA meetings and the TEC Act were characterized by broad agreements among disparate parties intended to sustain the military transition's momentum and prepare it for productive negotiations. CODESA's main purpose was to unite the ANC, PAC and AZAPO as much as possible prior to the first official round of direct negotiations with the government, which underscores its commitment to broad and longer-term objectives. The TEC Act established a new transitional governing body that, if successful, could later transform itself into a new government.

Conclusion

Integrative negotiating by the major parties involved, particularly the ANC, played an integral role in the creation of the SANDF and the subsequent military transition. The apparent irreconcilability of the seven disparate armies – four homeland militaries, two insurgent groups, and one dominant, racially distinct military – diminished over time and

¹³⁵ *The Pretoria Minute* (1990)

¹³⁶ Thompson (2001): 250-255

gave way to a defence landscape in 1994 that was more disposed towards integration than had previously been thought possible. This chapter has analyzed the key events that transpired during the planning phase of the military transition, and identified the strategies that participants employed in pursuit of their goals. It has also considered the impact that these strategies had upon the final agreements reached.

This chapter has emphasized two of the primary factors that contributed to and sustained the momentum that negotiations enjoyed during their early months. The first is that both sides opted for symbolic progress over substantive progress, at least on matters in the public domain, in order to allow for the harder decisions to be reached later on (when the time was prescient). The second factor was that governing elites established both formal and informal committees and tasked them with managing the more challenging issues of the day, such as problems the primary negotiators couldn't resolve quickly and sticking points that were contentious and unpalatable.

The functional capacity of the state was at stake amidst a political climate that can be described as tenuous at best. Eventually, both sides would be compelled to move beyond symbolic agreements and demonstrate real progress with defence transformation.

Chapter Three: Bargaining for the Future, 1994-1996

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the integration itself. It examines the period spanning the beginning of 1994, through the establishment of the SANDF alongside the nation's first democratic elections, to 1996, when the first phase of integration was expected to reach its conclusion.

The first section provides a historical overview of the period, with particular emphasis on the weeks preceding national elections. During this time the formerly opposed parties (the ANC and SADF), pursued an integration approach in which the SADF military structure remained largely intact, in exchange for their loyalty to the new government. This constituted a significant concession by the ANC and highlights the impact that an integrative negotiating strategy had on South Africa's military transition at large.

The second section provides analysis of the implementation of the three-phase military transition plan and highlights some of the key concessions the ANC made in exchange for military stability and other long-term objectives. The third section examines the primary challenges that surfaced during this early phase of the transition and posits that they resulted – either directly or indirectly – from concessions and compromises wrought by both sides in the interest of sustaining the process and acquiring either short or long term gains.

The chapter concludes that both sides willingly relinquished some of their priorities in the interest of achieving broader objectives. In the interest of maintaining a peaceful transition, the ANC relinquished short-term control over the military in exchange for old guard allegiances, while the SADF asked for structural continuity knowing that in the long run they would lose their majority status. Though the SANDF's early development was fraught with challenges, the process ultimately served both parties' interests and,

most importantly, never completely broke down, a remarkable achievement given the fragile state of the nation at the time.

Historical Account: 1994 through 1996

Since the beginning of direct talks between the armed forces of the ANC and the South African Government at Simonstown in 1993,¹³⁷ debate about the composition of the new defence force resounded throughout the halls of Parliament and the Executive Branch.¹³⁸ By early 1994 the ‘primary protagonists’ had been identified,¹³⁹ the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and its three sub-councils tasked with overseeing the defence transition process had been established, and the stage was set for integration to commence. During this period of the transformation process, the SADF, MK, APLA and four homeland defence forces (TDF, CDF, VDF and BDF) were combined into a unified command structure and rebranded as the SANDF.

By 1994 planning for the military transformation was complete,¹⁴⁰ the Interim Constitution (discussed in the previous chapter) came into effect,¹⁴¹ and both sides – the SADF and the ANC - recognized the need to maintain momentum and stability. Both parties had a stake in ensuring that political progress translated into progress for the defence forces as well.

As the planning phase ended abruptly and gave way to the reality of a new military in 1994, the SANDF took shape and its contours became apparent.¹⁴² This presented a new spectrum of challenges for the ANC and the interim government. As with many other South African organizations born during the country’s transition in both the public and private sectors, the new SANDF that emerged from the planning phase proved to be in some ways what its architects had envisioned. However, once operational, the SANDF also bore numerous unforeseen challenges.

¹³⁷ *Background to the Multiparty Negotiations*

¹³⁸ Frankel (1998)

¹³⁹ Williams (2002): 17

¹⁴⁰ Williams (2002): 17

¹⁴¹ *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1993)*

¹⁴² Frankel (2000)

The Final Weeks of Planning

Even though there were only a few months separating the dawn of 1994 and South Africa's first-ever democratic national elections, they were eventful months with serious implications for the military's future. During the immediate run-up to April, negotiations between the SADF and MK intensified. They remained largely a closed-door affair, managed by leaders from the parties' highest ranks, and in this sense they mirrored the larger macro-level political negotiations taking place between the NP and ANC.¹⁴³

One of the most consequential decisions undertaken by the SADF and MK at this time was that the SADF, for a myriad of reasons, would underwrite the military's transition. In exchange for this, the opposition agreed to delay the bulk of the major restructuring that the SANDF would need in order to achieve racial representativeness.¹⁴⁴ The result of this agreement was that the SADF's architecture and command structure remained intact, and the bodies of the other armies were essentially grafted onto it.¹⁴⁵ "Given the cultural hegemony, administrative monopoly and exclusive ownership of material resources of the former SADF, government initially feared that its culture and methodology would remain dominant in the contemporary national defence force. Four years after the start of transformation, some of the smaller integrating forces were consequently still of the opinion that they were being absorbed by the SADF, rather than being equitably integrated into a new defence organisation."¹⁴⁶

Once MK and the independent armies had submitted registers containing the names and ranks of proposed personnel to the GNU, they required verification by the SADF.¹⁴⁷ After this part of the process was complete and the junior and senior ranks were distinguished from one another, those individuals with unsatisfactory levels of experience were required to undertake mandatory bridge training.¹⁴⁸ The intended purpose of this training was straightforward; to bring those less qualified soldiers up to speed and

¹⁴³ Wood (1996): 387-99

¹⁴⁴ Wood (1996): 92

¹⁴⁵ Wood (1996): 93

¹⁴⁶ Louw and Esterhuysen (2014)

¹⁴⁷ *Department of Defence Annual Report* (1996).

¹⁴⁸ *South Africa Survey 1996-7*. (1996-97)

establish a semblance of standardization across the entire organization. The more senior members of the opposition armies were merged with their rank equivalents in the SADF without being subjected to additional training.¹⁴⁹

In response to the SANDF's imposition of mandatory bridge training, the Transkei and Bophuthatswana armies executed a series of rank promotions just prior to the elections, leaving both bodies bereft of junior ranking soldiers. Once the SADF became aware of these promotions, they seized on them as an opportunity to decry the former opposition's lack of ethics and tout its own history of professionalism. As a result, the legitimacy that the homeland armies had worked so diligently to establish was poisoned.¹⁵⁰ The promotion fiasco ultimately undermined the opposition. By trying to avoid what they believed were unfair penalties in the form of training and demotions for non-SADF members only, the former opposition reacted rashly and unintentionally damaged their credibility. This in turn further bolstered the SADF's moral high ground.

The Three Phases of Military Transformation

Integration: the First Phase

The name given to the first phase of the transformation process was integration. So called because it represented the induction of guerrilla and non-statutory forces into the new defence force, this was a watershed period that set the proverbial train of transformation into motion. Integration's commencement coincided with the first general election, and thus President Mandela assumed office in tandem with the new SANDF and simultaneously became its commander in chief.¹⁵¹

The most immediate consequence of integration was the SANDF's outsized military roster. Forecasted projections about troop levels had varied throughout the run-up to

¹⁴⁹ *South Africa Survey 1996-7*. (1996-97)

¹⁵⁰ Wood (1996): 92

¹⁵¹ Cock (1993): 17

integration. In the end, the military gained approximately 15,000 new members (or put another way, 15,000 people were added to the existing SADF).¹⁵²

Two oversight committees managed this phase, one a military and the other parliamentary. The former was called the Integration Committee and served primarily implementation purposes. The latter was the Integration Oversight Committee and represented all legislative interests and equities in this process.¹⁵³

Another important development during this phase was the siphoning off of excess personnel via voluntary discharge. Government planners correctly suspected that at least a small percentage of personnel would choose early retirement benefits, if offered, over continued service in the new SANDF. Thus, retirement packages were offered freely during this first phase.¹⁵⁴

Once the desired consortium of former statutory and non-statutory members was reached, and the racial diversity of the country was more proportionately represented, the integration phase could be brought to a close.¹⁵⁵

Demobilization: the Second Phase

Following integration was the demobilization phase in which the government sought the voluntary elimination of those service members deemed ‘unfit’ by the new SANDF. The government’s explanations as to decisions about unfit designations varied, though generally revolved around perceived deficiencies in individuals’ talents, skills, or capacities.¹⁵⁶ Physical and mental disabilities and advanced age were also offered as justification for demobilization. The primary goal of this phase was the elimination of

¹⁵² Winkates (2000): 11

¹⁵³ Winkates (2000)

¹⁵⁴ Siko (1993)

¹⁵⁵ *Termination of Integration Intake Act*

¹⁵⁶ Winkates (2002)

SANDF members who were, in multitudinous ways, less desirable for the service than their healthy and age appropriate peers.¹⁵⁷

Though this period's practices may have seemed harsh or contrary to the prevailing democratic spirit, they were necessary in order to achieve a viable new defence force.¹⁵⁸ The intention motivating demobilization was not the removal of individuals who wished to remain in service, but was rather provision of services and benefits to those who would otherwise be unable to afford retirement.

The remuneration aspect of this phase was viewed as favoring the former guerrilla fighters, who the SANDF authorities anticipated would ultimately receive the lion's share of available benefits.¹⁵⁹ Compensation packages for these individuals would be based upon calculations involving age, length of service, and feasibility of entrance into the civilian workforce. These remuneration policies that favored the ANC were actually an extension of their strategic objectives for the future of the new military. Keeping the former non-statutory guerrilla fighters content with the terms of their departure and simultaneously maintaining a force that the SADF's old guard was comfortable with reduced the chances of defection on both sides.¹⁶⁰

“Because of its voluntary nature, the demobilization phase is the relatively painless aspect of force streamlining. An estimated 10,000 former guerillas are expected to opt for demobilization.”¹⁶¹ The government projected completion of this phase by the end of 1996.

Rationalization: the Third Phase

Phase three of the military transformation was rationalization, and was motivated by the necessity of aligning the SANDF with the new military posture of democratic South

¹⁵⁷ Liebenberg and Roefs (2001)

¹⁵⁸ Liebenberg and Roefs (2001)

¹⁵⁹ Kingma and Pauwel (2000)

¹⁶⁰ Peled (1998)

¹⁶¹ Winkates (2000)

Africa. Primarily, this would consist of another round of streamlining, or cutbacks, intended to right size the force to approximately 70,000. This precise number was determined internally by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and was subsequently circulated for agreement among other government offices.¹⁶²

It was understood from the outset that this phase would take a heavier toll on former members of the SADF because of racial designations, and that because of the complexity inherent in this process the time allotted for rationalization was considerably longer than the other phases.¹⁶³ Initial estimates projected the completion of this phase by years end in 2000.¹⁶⁴

During this period the government would not only have to complete right sizing and finalize a racially representative military, it would also have to identify precisely what the nation's new defence posture would be with respect to the international community. At the dawn of South Africa's democratic age, the prevailing military posture suddenly seemed outdated. It would need to give way to a more modern conception of state sovereignty and priorities.¹⁶⁵ The specific policies that would drive this forward were not yet known, however, in the mid 1990s.

A surprising aspect of the third phase of this plan was that the government, in a complete state of flux and uncertainty, believed with some degree of certainty that it could put forward a comprehensive new posture with accompanying guidelines within only a few years. The difficulty the new SANDF faced, in its quest to make old structures accommodate the new political reality, served as a microcosm of the new government's difficulties as a whole.

¹⁶² Van Staden (1997)

¹⁶³ Kingma and Pauwels (2000)

¹⁶⁴ South African National Defence Force Integration Progress Report to the Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee

¹⁶⁵ Cilliers (1998)

Challenges During the Post-Election Period

The first problem that the SANDF confronted as a new organization was one of numbers. Specifically, a disparity between estimates of troops to be put forward by the SADF and the opposition militias for incorporation into the new force. As of May 1994, the SADF put forward 90,000 people, MK 22,000 people, the APLA 6,000 people, and the TVBC a combined total of 11,000 people.¹⁶⁶ Given this imbalance, it was immediately obvious that the prospects for achieving and maintaining true integration would remain dire without heavy-handed government intervention in the form of legislation, policy implementation, and oversight to rebalance the military's proportions. To complicate this matter further, it turned out that the estimated figures for the TVBC militaries were inaccurate, and the number of soldiers who actually came forward for integration was unexpectedly high.¹⁶⁷ This was due in large part to the fact that many individuals came forward to enroll in the new SANDF who had previously served in unofficial township self-defence units and thus were not included in the original estimates.

Without the exertion of equalizing forces upon the military, it appeared that the new SANDF would remain hostage to the SADF majority. Given that a racially, ethnically, and economically diverse SANDF was, as of the recent national elections, a political mandate, this status quo was not a viable option. Thus from the outset, from the very moment the SADF was statutorily dissolved and the new government assumed power in April of 1994, the SANDF was beleaguered by fundamental, intrinsic challenges that the government had not been able to avoid in spite of its best efforts.

Training Disparities

The ranking process implemented by SANDF authorities was complicated from the outset by the divergent backgrounds of the troops, those between MK soldiers in particular. While some of the MK members put forward had received extensive training

¹⁶⁶ Williams (2002)

¹⁶⁷ *Department of Defence Annual Report*

overseas (approximately 10,000 of them) and were highly qualified to serve in various capacities in the SANDF, others enjoyed no formal training whatsoever. The range of talent, capabilities, and qualifications among service members from the SANDF was so vast and so staggered that deciphering any level of standardization proved to be a tremendous task.¹⁶⁸

Those who entered the SANDF from MK's senior ranks, having served both inside South Africa and overseas, tended to have significant amounts of training for formal military operations and in asymmetric warfare techniques. As they returned to South Africa from camps scattered across the world, however, these soldiers were not nearly as homogenized as their former SADF peers. A small percentage had travelled to host countries in the Soviet Union to participate in programs there. An even smaller number had undertaken specialized courses in India. Much of the remaining soldiers from the senior ranks had received training in other African nations such as Tanzania and Angola.¹⁶⁹

Between the various TVBC armies, the qualifications of members put forward were fairly homogeneous by comparison, in that most soldiers had received very little, if any, formal training at all (with the exception of a handful who had undertaken courses in Libya).¹⁷⁰ As a result, some ninety percent of the soldiers put forward by the TVBC militaries were assigned to the SANDF Army,¹⁷¹ the branch with the lowest barrier to entry.

The bridge training outlined in the previous section of this paper proved to be another point of contention between the SADF and non-statutory armies. As MK and TVBC soldiers found themselves mired in training requirements that took up significant amounts of time and further delayed their official entry into SANDF, their resentment grew.¹⁷² Despite the fact that the bridge training was intended to act as an equalizing force among the troops, its effects proved to be perversely segregating. Many soldiers forced to

¹⁶⁸ Mashike (1999)

¹⁶⁹ Wood (1996): 93

¹⁷⁰ Van Staden (1988): 42

¹⁷¹ Wood (1996)

¹⁷² Mashike (1999)

undergo additional training perceived it as burdensome, and believed it was a penalty imposed in exchange for their nefarious political affiliations. Conversely, a small group of former SADF soldiers felt that these military courses unfairly advantaged former MK soldiers by preparing them for promotion and advancement, and that they represented a significant investment of resources by the SANDF in these particular individuals.¹⁷³

This tension and antipathy eventually reached a boiling point when MK troops at a military camp in Pretoria revolted and thousands of soldiers simultaneously deserted their base on 1 November 1994.¹⁷⁴

Though the ANC found this episode problematic and extremely undesirable, it was also a far cry from their perceived worst-case scenario, which was one in which former SADF officers ousted from military service took up arms against the new military or mutinied.¹⁷⁵ Had the new military not retained large numbers of former SADF personnel and soldiers, the prospect for a large-scale revolt, or even civil war, would have been much greater. Thus, one plausible explanation for the fact that the ANC did not work harder to immediately extinguish the mounting tension over this issue is strategic. Since their primary goal was to prevent mutiny by the former SADF faction, the ANC was focused on keeping them content and hence less concerned with the dissatisfaction of the military's other contingents.

Uneven Racial Representation Among Ranks

Adding further to the severe training and skills imbalance between former SADF and non-statutory forces was the hemorrhaging of black South African soldiers from the upper echelons of the SANDF.¹⁷⁶ The loss of a significant proportion of the most senior and most skilled black soldiers occurred, and was primarily due to two factors: the first being that the new government in power recruited heavily from the pool of former MK fighters for non-military positions, and the second the government's introduction of the

¹⁷³ Zwane (1995)

¹⁷⁴ *Argus* (1995)

¹⁷⁵ Pretorius (1995)

¹⁷⁶ Gear (2002)

Voluntary Severance Initiative. Once both of these initiatives entered into effect later in the year, the deficit of senior black service members was exaggerated even further, with the result that white males were overly represented in the mid to upper ranks (Major through Colonel, to be precise).¹⁷⁷

PROPOSED RECOMPOSITION OF THE SANDF¹⁷⁸

Source	Actual	Proposed
SADF	64,516	37,756
MK	11,919	10,604
APLA	4,239	4,122
Homeland Armies	9,108	8,461
KwaZulu SPFs	1,459	1,958
Civilians	8,422	7,795
Totals	99,663	70,699

In 1995 the Chief of the SANDF Army, Johan Pretorius, remarked that: “Integration means taking separate entities and joining them together to form a totally new one ... It must also be visible at all levels of the command structure if it is to be successful. The importance of the appointment of senior officers within the SANDF therefore outrivals senior appointments within any other state department.”¹⁷⁹ Unfortunately, and in spite of Pretorius’ sentiment, the appointment of senior officers within the SANDF did not ultimately trump the staffing needs of the various Executive Branch departments and agencies. Throughout this period the SANDF suffered the continual loss of senior officers from the former non-statutory militaries, as they departed the armed services in order to assume civilian posts and accept political appointments with the new government in power.

¹⁷⁷ Wood (1996)

¹⁷⁸ South Africa Survey 1996-97: 77

¹⁷⁹ Pretorius (1995): 9

The Mandela Administration's cabinet leaders often prioritized the staffing of their own offices over that of others, including the SANDF. Career and appointment employment opportunities for blacks at all levels of the government abounded after the 1994 elections, when the ANC found itself responsible for satisfying the personnel requirements of three entire branches of government, including the Judiciary. Members of the former opposition in particular were highly sought after by virtually all civilian agencies because of their proven loyalty to the new regime, as well as their qualifications and competency.¹⁸⁰ Many of MK's senior members –such as President Mandela himself – were lawyers, academics, and skilled industrialists by trade, and had enjoyed successful careers prior to joining the anti-Apartheid struggle as combatants. The combination of these attributes made them desirable candidates to the new government, which sought more than anything to live up to the expectations that accompanied its ascendancy to power.

This bolsters the point made earlier in this chapter that President Mandela and the ANC leadership believed a worst case scenario for the nation was one in which members of the former SADF mutinied and instigated large scale civil unrest. The ANC would have an easier time of retaining SADF loyalty if they conceded to at least some of their demands in the short term, and so this became a priority for the new government. The former non-statutory officers who departed the armed services for civilian appointments were, by contrast, virtually guaranteed to remain loyal to the new government and so a scenario in which they departed voluntarily – even though more left than the ANC would have liked – was preferable to the alternative. Le Roux (2005) says of these problems, "Many of these difficulties were inevitable given the political and logistical complexities of merging forces."¹⁸¹

The Voluntary Severance Initiative was a program offered to members of the former non-statutory forces who, for various reasons, preferred to discontinue their military service with the SANDF. On the one hand the program was advantageous, as it provided a viable

¹⁸⁰ Mandela (1994): 481-486

¹⁸¹ p. 253

departure route in the form of once-off payments (these generally varied between 12,000 and R42,000 per individual), and ultimately helped the SANDF get much closer to achieving its goals for demobilization than it otherwise would have.¹⁸² In practice, however, the program had the unintended and disadvantageous consequence of further diminishing the SANDF's goals for racial distribution and representation.

Most of the soldiers who opted for severance did so in order to join the new civilian government workforce or because they didn't meet the SANDF requirements for active duty. They were elderly, suffered disabilities, lacked education necessary for officer status, or because they hadn't intended to remain in the military after Apartheid ended. A striking number of MK soldiers, both officers and non-commissioned, opted out.¹⁸³

All of this resulted in the unfortunate reality that, at least during the first few post-Apartheid years, the SANDF would remain plagued by uneven racial distribution among its ranks as well as between its branches of service.

Educational Imbalance and Literacy

The body of the SANDF that remained after the implementation of the Voluntary Severance Initiative was comprised of soldiers whose educational backgrounds, just like their combat and training experience, varied greatly among ranks as well as along political lines. The fact that the former SADF members tended to be white meant that they generally had enjoyed a greater degree of access to formal academic education in South Africa during Apartheid than their colleagues from MK and the other non-statutory militias. This disparity was not just in terms of the quality of education and degree of qualification achieved by individuals; many of the former non-statutory forces had never received any academic education whatsoever prior to enlisting. This fault line was clearly visible from the very outset of the SANDF's creation, and its consequences reverberated throughout the organization.

¹⁸² Van Staden (1997): 42

¹⁸³ Malan (1999): 29

The first detrimental consequence to the new force was flagging literacy rates. As the result of the prevailing education imbalance, literacy rates among the former non-statutory forces were abysmal. Only the most senior of the opposition soldiers had received an academic education beyond grade school, and an even smaller select few had completed tertiary studies. Thus, the gap between MK's senior and junior soldiers was so profound that it rivaled that between former statutory and non-statutory forces.¹⁸⁴ This presented a whole host of problems from an operational perspective, including communications, command and control mechanisms, and prospects for organizational unity.

From a macro organizational standpoint, the educational imbalance meant that the majority of non-statutory force members were not eligible for officer status, a reality that confined them to the lower ranks of the new SANDF and restricted their potential for future professional growth. "On account of educational limitations, a large proportion of members of the non-statutory forces were not eligible to gain any rank above that of private within the reconstituted force whatsoever."¹⁸⁵ This policy had the effect of formalizing the divide between the former statutory and non-statutory forces, with the most senior ranks populated by former SADF officers and the lower ranks by the opposition. Only a handful of MK soldiers emerged from the transition with positions in the new military's senior ranks.

A net shortage of skilled staff officers on the whole also persisted. The new SANDF, born on the heels of the Apartheid era military, had to adapt to confront the new socio-political climate in South Africa.¹⁸⁶ Far from concerning itself with conventional warfare exclusively, the new defence force had to learn how to function during peacetime¹⁸⁷ and also serve as an arbiter of that peace (as a regional powerbroker across southern Africa). Thus, not only did the SANDF find itself with an inherent education imbalance, whereby the former non-statutory forces suffered a severe deficit by comparison with their former

¹⁸⁴ Mills (1999)

¹⁸⁵ *South Africa Survey 1995-6* (1995-96): 88

¹⁸⁶ *South African Defence Review* (2006)

¹⁸⁷ Heinecken (2005): 78

SADF peers; it also faced the immediate prospect of being unprepared to fulfill its (new) peacetime mandate.¹⁸⁸

Language Barrier

Another obstacle to immediate and authentic integration was the issue of language. With the various militias that comprised the SANDF speaking approximately 14 different languages, the written and spoken word quickly became an issue of contention.¹⁸⁹ As with education and literacy, the divide on this issue came down primarily between members of the former SADF and those of the former non-statutory defence forces.

The former non-statutory soldiers integrated into the SANDF spoke an assortment of languages, primarily Xhosa, Zulu, and English. The former SADF, on the other hand, had for decades relied upon Afrikaans as the primary lingua franca for day-to-day operations. Everything from service contracts, training manuals, and command and control guides were printed accordingly in that language, and it was the language of choice for drills on bases and command centers throughout the country. Additionally, and perhaps more significantly, it was the language soldiers had used to communicate with one another on a daily basis since the establishment of the SADF in 1957.¹⁹⁰

When integration occurred, former SADF members – who constituted a majority - continued this long-standing practice despite the fact that English was the obvious common denominator for the new body. The former opposition forces who came from around the country had varying degrees of prior exposure to English, and most of the Afrikaners who remained had been required to study it at one point or another during the course of their academics. Much to the chagrin and detriment of the former opposition who was now part of the new military, the exclusive use of Afrikaans persisted. This practice created a tangible barrier between those conversant in the language and those who were not.

¹⁸⁸ Neethling (2003): 95-1 10.

¹⁸⁹ Heinecken (1997): 187-210

¹⁹⁰ Smaldone

Pervasiveness of the ‘Old-Guard’ Mentality

The old-guard mentality that pervaded the new SANDF and was particularly pronounced during its initial years proved to be a severe impediment to progress during this period. Throughout the planning and initial implementation phases of integration a particular conservative faction rose to prominence within the SANDF that propagated an elite, white, boys club culture and remained psychologically opposed to the advent of racial equality and the incorporation of former opposition armies into South Africa’s military.¹⁹¹ This group was not any sort of official entity but rather found its strength in the subliminal collectivity of dissident thought and belief, and was more covertly cultural in nature. This group was not officially sanctioned (its *raison d’être* was unconstitutional and it represented only a small minority of the SANDF’s overall population) but its influence upon the SANDF as a whole was nonetheless profound.¹⁹²

The champion of this culture was none other than General George Meiring, the SANDF’s inaugural Chief, whose personal beliefs and political agenda fueled and sustained the group’s resistance to the legitimization and inclusion of the former non-statutory soldiers in the SANDF.¹⁹³ Its members were primarily former SADF officers, Botha/National Party loyalists who had collectively risen to prominence during Apartheid; some had even been members of the Afrikaner Broederbond that had sought to destabilize the country during the run up to national elections in the early 1990s.¹⁹⁴

This element within the new defence force sought to undermine transformation at every turn, and for several years actually successfully prevented meaningful reform. By perpetuating rather than seeking to alleviate the challenges the new military faced, to include training, skills, educational and racial imbalances within ranks, this group inflicted detrimental damage upon the cultural foundation of the SANDF.

¹⁹¹ Williams (2002): 22-24

¹⁹² Harris (2010): 208-242

¹⁹³ Cilliers (1998): 39

¹⁹⁴ Williams (2006): 22-24

It wasn't until 1998 that the true nature of the group became known outside of military circles and its form and function came under official government fire. In the early part of 1998, General Meiring submitted a report to President Mandela outlining a strange conspiracy theory by his political opponents so poorly crafted and without legitimacy that it ultimately undermined his credibility with the administration and lead him to resign his post before he completed his term.¹⁹⁵

The cultural and psychological influence of the old guard mentality within the new SANDF was also in a certain sense inevitable. Though perhaps difficult for the ANC and other former non-statutory members to endure, the old guard persisted in large part because the ANC's military leadership allowed it to. As laid out earlier in the study, the SADF's number were dominant and the ANC hoped to avoid mutiny at all costs. Thus, all of the problems laid out in this section – racial inequality, education imbalances and uneven literacy rates – would have to be fixed gradually, over time, as part of the transformation process.

The Mission and Budgetary Debates

During this period major consideration was given to the new military's budgetary requirements and priorities for the near to medium-term future. As is the case in many post-conflict societies, South Africa faced dual imperatives: it had to reconstitute its national identity while simultaneously maintaining defence of its territorial integrity.¹⁹⁶ In light of the military's integration and its attendant structural changes, the annual budget for defence spending had to be reconsidered. The advent of democracy in South Africa, too, carried its own requirements for reconfiguration of defence priorities.

The Interim Constitution was clear that the SANDF should seek to be a “balanced, modern and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its functions in terms of this Constitution.”¹⁹⁷ This directive left little room for interpretation but was nevertheless construed differently by the SANDF's former SADF and ANC members,

¹⁹⁵ Williams (2002): 21

¹⁹⁶ Williams (2001): 60

¹⁹⁷ *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993: Act No. 200*

who retained disparate alternative visions for the military. While the former camp was focused almost exclusively on the acquisition of modern defence technologies as the surest path towards modernization, the latter believed that, conversely, investment in personnel and human resources (of both civilian staff and soldiers) should trump technological acquisition. For the most part, it was former SADF members – current SANDF officers – who favored increased defence acquisitions, while the ANC and members of the former non-statutory militaries supported increased budgeting for personnel requirements.¹⁹⁸

Resolution: the Defence White Paper and Defence Secretariat

In 1995 two seminal events in the early history of the SANDF prodded these debates towards an early, if not lasting, resolution.¹⁹⁹ The first was the drafting of the Defence White Paper, which commenced in June and concluded less than one year later (in May of 1996).²⁰⁰ The second major event was the creation of the Defence Secretariat, which occurred via passage of the Defence Amendment Act of the same year.²⁰¹ The department was to be headed by a civilian officer whose role vis a vis the head of the SANDF was left purposefully undefined.²⁰²

The White Paper laid out the new dimensions of the SANDF on paper, both its size and scope, defined its strategic and tactical goals, and a rationale for its existence in light of the fact that South Africa faced no evident external threats.²⁰³ Here, the introduction of the human security paradigm (introduced in this study's previous chapter) was introduced to the South African public in the form of commitments to the protection and maintenance of civilian order, as well as general civilian wellbeing. The revolutionary principal introduced here was the idea that the military existed primarily to protect the

¹⁹⁸ For further background on why the ANC and former-SADF camps broke down along these lines, refer to Sheldon, Garth & Alden (1998)

¹⁹⁹ Cawthra (1995)

²⁰⁰ Sheldon, Garth & Alden (1998)

²⁰¹ *South Africa Survey 1995-6 (1995)*: 86

²⁰² Uys (1997): 61

²⁰³ *South African Defence Review* (1998)

people (South African citizens of all races) and only secondarily to protect the state (both its government as well as its borders and sovereign territory).²⁰⁴

The fact that the White Paper included the protection of the state as a priority at all further substantiates one of the core arguments presented in this study; that the ANC retained and even in certain instances promoted outdated defence concepts in an effort to mollify the SADF old-guard constituency. Defence against external threats remained a priority in the White Paper, but its simultaneous introduction of the human security paradigm was a direct intimation of what would take priority in the future.

The matter of budgeting priorities was temporarily resolved via a constitutional inclusion inserted by the new ANC majority Parliament in 1996, which effectively determined that the government would pursue a more technologically modern military (this was the year in which the standing Constitution came into effect and displaced the interim Constitution that had been implemented in 1993).

The Defence Review, which also commenced in 1996, was designed as a means to reconsider and reappraise the SANDF's dimensions as laid out in the White Paper, and also to align posture with overarching strategic objectives. The budget debate again resurfaced during the review process, when the Department of Defence put forth four distinct force posture plans for consideration by its oversight committees. This time around the former SADF lobby proved formidable, as SANDF officers used all the power and persuasion at their disposal to launch a major campaign advocating for increased investment in defence technologies.²⁰⁵ Ultimately, the new government decided that the SANDF could not retain its competitive edge without the modern accoutrements of warfare, and the matter of the budget was resolved once and for all in favor of the pro-technology investment camp in May of 1998.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Le Roux (2005): 263

²⁰⁶ Williams (2001): 62

Here again, the ANC made a concession in order to ensure the loyalties of the SADF's old guard, or at the very least ensure that weapons expenditure did not drive a fatal wedge between them and black SANDF officers. The ANC did this knowing that in the future the continuation of majority rule would allow them to make further changes to the budget.

The former-SADF constituency within the new SANDF appeared determined to maintain its Apartheid- and Cold War-era offensive capabilities, which enabled it to engage in war fighting with external aggressors, despite the fact that these threats no longer existed.²⁰⁷

Accommodating the SADF

Existing SADF structures and procedures exerted heavy influence upon the newly formed SANDF. This influence, as discussed earlier in the chapter, was very pronounced, caused much dissension among the lower ranks, and served to undermine organizational coherence and capacity. The SADF's cultural imprint upon the new SANDF underscores that the ANC conceded in allowing large numbers of SADF soldiers and personnel to be put forward for integration and determined they should be siphoned off incrementally rather than all at once. Because the SADF had such a large presence in the new military, the logical inference is that they would also have a disproportionately large cultural influence. This reality created many problems (laid out earlier in the chapter) and the fact that these problems persisted underscores the ANC's concessions. After the April elections the ANC sat squarely in the seat of power – executive, legislative and judicial (they had a monopoly on the country's governing bodies and institutions) and so much of what transpired after that point was within their ability to control at least to a limited extent.²⁰⁸

An additional point is that all of these problems were to a certain extent inevitable, in the sense that viable alternative options for the ANC were practically non-existent. The ANC

²⁰⁷ Williams (2001)

²⁰⁸ Mandela (1994): 445-486

did indeed make many concessions, but all were made in the interest of preventing what they viewed as the worst-case scenario: mutiny by the former SADF members and the ensuing collapse of the entire military transition process. Thus, from the ANC's perspective, dismantling the SADF entirely was not an option at the time. As long as the former SADF members retained employment and believed they were not entirely losing their monopoly on military power all at once, the ANC believed the government could count on their loyalty and dedication. The former SADF members were for their part aware that over time the ANC would gain an increasing hold on the levers of military power and that ultimately the tables would turn in their favor.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered a conceptual framework for the dynamics at play within the SANDF during the South African military's early integration (1994-1996). It provides a historical overview of this period, frames the three-phase transformation process, and provides an in-depth look at the major problems that emerged in the aftermath of the 1994 elections. Examination of the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence, and other legislative and executive documents in particular highlight some of the tactical concessions made by both sides in the interest of longer term strategic objectives.

The ANC relinquished its prospects for short-term control and allowed for certain inequalities to persist among the military ranks, in exchange for the allegiance of former SADF soldiers. The SADF, for its part, asked for continuity of structure, mission and financial resources knowing that in the long term they would be phased out and would lose majority status. This system was both mutually reinforcing and mutually beneficial for the two parties.

Chapter Four: Conclusion & Lessons from South Africa's Military Integration

Macro-Level Review

Against the background of the political reform process that commenced in South Africa in the 1990s, a concurrent process of military integration unfolded. The establishment of the new SANDF in 1994 represented a watershed moment for the post-Apartheid GNU. When the ANC and the F.W. De Klerk administration commenced negotiations, the security landscape was dotted with military bodies vying for power.

The new government eventually managed to combine these bodies into a single force whose statutory powers and responsibilities were codified in a series of official policy and strategy papers, legislation, and in the Constitution itself. These foundation documents provided a blueprint for the new SANDF, and provided original guidance as to its formation, functioning, and force structure. However, the issues that the SANDF faced with regard to integration were not resolvable on paper; compromises wrought between the ANC and the SADF influenced the military's transformation process tremendously and were even reflected in its force structure.

The obstacles to integration were many and varied. By 1990, South Africa had seven separate armies, all of which needed to be incorporated into a new military. These armies were characterized by different cultures, command structures, missions, and sizes, and were competing for power in the new order. During the introduction and subsequent implementation of integration, the security forces' posture changed dramatically. The military shifted its focus from prioritizing national defence and national security (the SADF under the command of P.W. Botha) to a new paradigm that emphasized human security, and in which the traditional concept of national security was expanded and military spending was constrained.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ Winkates (2000): 451

Outcomes

In assessing the military's transformation since the end of Apartheid, Heinecken (2005) determines that, "In terms of South Africa, there is no doubt that the SANDF has made momentous strides in transforming itself into a Defence Force for the people, and not against them."²¹⁰ However, he also points out that a number of shortcomings plagued the process and a number of deficiencies still exist within the current force, acknowledging that, "the changes brought about by the transformation process have been massive and perhaps too ambitious, as morale and the operational capacity of the SANDF have suffered."²¹¹ Burgess (2008) arrives at a similarly 'positive with shades of grey' conclusion, stating that even though "the quality and effectiveness of the forces had deteriorated," the "integration process was complete after nine years," and the old guard had "been replaced by a new and more promising generation of troops."²¹² By and large, the literature seems to agree with these assessments. Despite the SANDF's myriad shortcomings, it is important to keep in mind that it was eventually effected and subsequently remained intact during an incredibly fragile period in South Africa's history.

As the previous chapters have shown, this could not have happened without a) the ANC and SADF finding satisfactory grounds for mutual benefit during the pre-integration phase, and b) the ANC acquiescing to a number of SADF demands during the integration phase. The ANC did so in order to maintain old guard loyalty to the new civil government and to move the integration process along during the early development of South Africa's new military apparatus, knowing that in the long run they would be able to enact incremental changes to the military and ensure progress via majority rule. In turn, the former SADF leadership was also aware that their days of exerting influence were numbered,²¹³ and they opted to trade loyalty to the new regime in exchange for structural, financial, and mission-related gains within the SANDF. Some scholars might point to the resolve and obstinacy of old guard factions of the SANDF as proof of the former SADF's inflexibility and refusal to negotiate. Specifically, they might highlight the resistance and

²¹⁰ Heinecken (2000): 451

²¹¹ p. 94

²¹² p. 70

²¹³ Geldenhuys & Kotze (1983): 33-45

subsequent ousting of General Meiring as a manifestation of the larger group's hard-line approach once the integration began. Certainly, these were significant obstacles that needed to be overcome and they should not be ignored. However, what is even more remarkable is the reality that neither mutiny nor dissolution of the armed services occurred during this highly tumultuous time, in which former SADF soldiers constituted a substantial majority of the new military and could have forced the hand of the new government.

Ultimately, both parties to the negotiated military transition gave up something in the short term in order to get something later on, and this strategy proved to be mutually beneficial. Such is the nature of integrative negotiations, in which a strategy that pursues mutual benefit (in this case, the establishment, integration, and progress of the SANDF) wins out over other alternatives. Integrative negotiating also has the added benefit of preventing parties to a negotiation from becoming entrenched in their original positions and thus inadvertently sacrificing potential mutual gains.

In addition to broad approaches, specific, tactical means also served to benefit the process. Agreements themselves remained broad during this period, such as was the case with the Interim Constitution, the Defence White Paper, and the Pretoria and Groote Schuur Minutes. Additionally, participation at the proverbial negotiating table was severely limited, and all meetings kept out of the public eye until conclusions had been reached and were ready to be announced. The negotiating teams were also kept small in an effort to limit the potential for delays and hang-ups over details, and to avoid the pitfalls that consensus building would have required. The proceedings and meetings of the parliamentary committees tasked with oversight of the SANDF serve as prime examples of these two phenomena.

Broader Implications & Future Areas of Study

The South African case proves that nations which undertake military transitions, particularly those in which disparate competing entities are brought under a single

umbrella organization, can greatly improve their prospects for success through the employment of specific negotiating strategies. More specifically, this case study demonstrates the efficacy of having both negotiating parties identify and focus on areas of mutual interest as opposed to drawing red lines in the sand.²¹⁴ Furthermore, when parties to a negotiation confront obstacles or barriers to progress, it can be very helpful for them to expand the scope of their perspective and focus on longer-term outcomes (as opposed to imminent or shorter term interests). It is possible to forge a path forward (and avoid stalling or the collapse of negotiations entirely) by delaying commitments to fulfill terms at a designated future point in time.²¹⁵ It is in precisely this manner that the SADF and ANC largely avoided major pitfalls and managed to sustain the trajectory and progress of military negotiations throughout the South African military's transformation. The ANC employed this technique, for example, in the instance when the SADF demanded inclusion of traditional state-based national security strategy in the Defence White Paper.

The evaluation and application of the hypotheses proposed in this study have contributed to a more fulsome understanding of how certain conditions can contribute to successful military integration. These hypotheses, however, would benefit greatly from further analysis in the form of their application to other cases in other countries, including Ukraine. The current push for military integration in Ukraine bears some similarities with the South African case study: the Ukrainian Government seeks to right-size its defence force in accordance with some severe financial constraints it currently faces, and also to implement greater civilian control over the military apparatus at large.²¹⁶ The Ukrainian and South African militaries are also both large by comparison with most of their regional neighbors. There are also major differences between the two cases, most notably the fact that Ukraine shares a border with Russia and faces the ongoing threat of military incursion into its territory by that former superpower, while South Africa stands as a regional hegemon and faces no comparable, formidable security adversary.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ Odell and Tingley (2013): 144-174

²¹⁵ Odell and Tingley (2013): 149-150

²¹⁶ Koehn (2014)

²¹⁷ Mills and Pienaar (2000)

Ukraine faces obstacles to reform, much like South Africa did in the 1990s, most notably dissonance and competition between the defense ministry and the parliamentary bodies responsible for military oversight.²¹⁸ The application of integrative negotiation theory and its attendant components here could prove to be especially useful for analysts seeking to identify and describe the various alternatives for integration. It will be important for Ukraine to be mindful of longer-term security objectives it has vis a vis NATO and its European allies as it moves forward with the pursuit of reform.

A comparative study of negotiation theory applications to military integrations will allow scholars to determine under what conditions integrative versus distributive negotiations might be beneficial for various nation states. For one, the South African military's integration consisted of relatively minimal foreign assistance and oversight (save for some minor British involvement).²¹⁹ Greater foreign and third party assistance might influence both the strategies pursued and outcomes achieved in military transformation negotiations in other countries.

A dearth of literature exists that attempts to analyze the intersection between military integration and negotiation theory. If scholars and analysts ultimately seek concrete answers about what makes certain military integrations successful, then the scholarship needs to continually approach the study of military integrations in new and innovative ways, which is precisely what this study has sought to achieve.

²¹⁸ Closson (2002)

²¹⁹ Ball (1997): 85-105

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