

THE ROLE OF CITIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF EMERGING POWERS:

**THE CASES OF BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA AND
JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA**

JERÓNIMO DELGADO CAICEDO

**THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF HUMANITIES,
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN**

DECEMBER, 2017

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

DECLARATION

I, Jerónimo Delgado Caicedo, declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of Cape Town. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other University.

Signed by candidate

.....
11 December, 2017

ABSTRACT

Cities are increasingly important actors in the current International System. Cities fall under the jurisdiction of States where they play a fundamental role in the making and consolidation of emerging powers. In today's State-centred International System, cities are underexamined in the field of foreign policy, a domain that is exclusively that of national governments. Using the cases of Colombia (Bogotá) and South Africa (Johannesburg), this thesis draws from multilingual sources to examine the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers of the Global South. An interdisciplinary approach indicates that, by drawing together debates across International Relations and Urban Studies literature, there is little to no place for the conceptual and operational cross pollination necessary to engage the increasing importance of cities in the emerging powers of the Global South. The weak interface between cities and States in foreign policy is thus failing to inform local-national government interactions over global positioning and masks critical national actors in the evolution of cities.

Through a geopolitical analysis, this thesis engages the conceptual and operational ambiguity around 'emerging powers' by demonstrating how at both the national and city scale notions of 'power resources', 'leadership' and 'international recognition' are actualised in the emerging powers of Colombia and South Africa. By tracking the ways that Bogotá and Johannesburg operate internationally, cities are, despite the lack of formal acknowledgement or endorsement of the nations' foreign affairs machinery, shown to be crucial contributors to their countries' emergence in the world.

An analysis of primary sources in both Colombia and South Africa shows a mismatch between the city and the State in foreign policy caused by dynamics occurring both at national and local levels. The constitutional and legal ambiguities on decentralisation and foreign policy found in Colombia and South Africa make it extremely difficult to determine the how far sub-national entities can go in their burgeoning international engagements. The State-centred approach to foreign policy that is found in both countries contributes greatly to a general disregard for the city in international relations. Finally, the thesis reveals how the increased importance of cities in the global agenda and the proliferation of international associations of cities provides emerging cities such as

Bogotá or Johannesburg with an alternative space in which to defend their own city interests without the help of the national governments.

The thesis concludes by demonstrating that, while it is important that national governments make sure cities have a voice in the International System, changes also need to be made at the domestic level, both in national and local governments, in order to achieve functioning levels of understanding and co-operation between the city and the State in the making and implementation of the foreign policy of emerging powers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When deciding where to do a PhD, many Southern students choose to go North to Europe or North America. I, instead, knew my place was in the South. Then, when I decided to do my studies in South Africa, a few eyebrows were raised and some jaws were dropped. It was not a 'normal' place for someone from Colombia to do his PhD... But it was my place. All these years in South Africa have proved me right. Cape Town and South Africa have taught me more than I could ever imagined. They became not only my temporary home, but also a permanent source of learning and inspiration.

South Africa also provided me with some amazing people who supported and guided me through this journey. My outmost gratitude and respect go to my supervisor, Prof. Susan Parnell, for her generous support, encouragement and guidance. Her teachings and wisdom will *always* be present in both my personal and academic lives. A gigantic ¡gracias! to Nancy Odendaal not only for encouraging me to embark on this intellectual adventure, but also for her unconditional friendship and emotional support. My gratitude to Sharon Adams who took me under her wing and became a shining light in my days. To Fahdelah, Mike, Pippin, Andrea, Rifquah, Sharon, Saskia, Megan and Joré, thank you for making my days at UCT an absolute delight. To Fabio, Hannah, Mokgadi, JP, Stef, Johan, Amale, Gary, Patricia, Jonathan, Theunis, Alan and Jacques, thank you for all the amazing moments and, especially, for being my family away from home.

Even in the distance, the permanent support of my family and friends in Colombia was crucial during this journey. My love and appreciation go to my mother Eliana, my father Humberto, my brother Sebastián and my aunt Ximena. Their calls and words of encouragement proved once more that family is where life begins and love never ends. They will always be my happiness and my strength. Ana María, Jairo, Martha, Claudia, Jhósep, Milton, Érick, Catalina and Olga kept me going through permanent laughs, visits and unconditional support. My heartfelt gratitude to all of them.

Finally, crossing the Atlantic would not have been possible without the generous financial support from the Universidad Externado de Colombia in Bogotá whom I thank profoundly for investing in my future. My special gratitude to Dr. Juan Carlos Henao,

Roberto Hiestrosa, Roberto Núñez and Clara Inés Rey for believing in me and allowing me to embark in this academic adventure.

A todos ellos, ¡gracias!

CONTENTS

Declaration	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	v
Contents	vii
List of Tables and Figures	xii
Acronyms	xv
PART 1	1
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1. Method	6
1.2. Chapter outline	11
Chapter 2: International Relations and Urban Studies: Two disciplines, an embryonic relationship	14
2.1. International Relations, a State-centred discipline	16
2.1.1. Westphalia and the sovereignty of the State: No place for the city	16
2.1.2. Cities and the increasingly irrelevant State-centric model	19
2.1.3. City leaders as foreign policy actors	21
2.1.4. Emerging powers as city-less places?	22
2.1.5. Even in silence, cities are present – a few exceptions in the International Relations literature	24
2.2. Urban Studies: A shift towards the Global South bypasses the State	28
2.2.1. The emergence of Southern global cities and the eroding role of the State	29
2.2.2. Cities as the epicentres of a State's economic power	32
2.3. Paradiplomacy, a different path	35
2.4. Conclusion	38

PART 2: OVERCOMING ABYSSAL THINKING: AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING POWERS OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 40

Chapter 3: Reclaiming a place for the Global South: A conceptual framework of emerging powers 43

- 3.1. The State and its International Relations 44
 - 3.1.1. The State 44
 - 3.1.2. Foreign policy 48
 - 3.1.3. International insertion 49
 - 3.1.4. Global South 50
- 3.2. A new International System: The emergence of the South 53
- 3.3. Conclusion 61

Chapter 4: Power hierarchies in the International System and the improving role of emerging powers 63

- 4.1. The power hierarchies in the International System 64
- 4.2. Selected categories of power in the International System 71
 - 4.2.1. Superpowers 71
 - 4.2.2. Middle powers (traditional and emerging) and secondary middle powers 74
 - 4.2.3. Small powers and microstates 81
- 4.2. Conclusion 82

PART 3: THE POWER RESOURCES OF EMERGING POWERS: DO CITIES MATTER? THE CASES OF BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA AND JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA 84

Chapter 5: Colombia, an emerging power in spite of its past. Bogotá, its powerhouse 90

- 5.1. Understanding the territory: A geospatial analysis of Colombia and Bogotá 90
- 5.2. Demographic dimension: The importance of the people 97
- 5.3. Economic dimension: A key variable for emergence 102
- 5.4. Socio-economic dimension, improving human development 108

5.5. The military dimension of power	112
5.6. Colombian power resources: A conclusion	117
Chapter 6: South Africa and Johannesburg: The contradictions of an African emerging power	119
6.1. Location is not everything: Understanding the South African territory	123
6.2. Demographic dimension: Overcoming apartheid	133
6.3. Economic dimension: Africa's powerhouse?	143
6.4. Socio-economic dimension: Overcoming inequality in South Africa	154
6.5. South Africa's military: From threat to peacekeeper	160
6.6. South African power resources: A conclusion	165
Chapter 7: Leadership and international recognition: Two parallel processes for national and local governments in Colombia and South Africa	167
7.1. Colombia's take off as an emerging power	169
7.1.1. Going global, a shift in Colombia's foreign policy	169
7.1.2. The new shining stars: The changing international perception of Colombia and Bogotá	178
7.1.3. Colombia and Bogotá emerging in parallel: A conclusion	183
7.2. South Africa: From pariah State to an emerging power	184
7.2.1. From isolation to the rainbow nation, the shift in South Africa's foreign relations	184
7.2.2. The birth of a good international citizen and the contradictions in the international perception of South Africa	190
7.2.3. South Africa's emerging power status, a conclusion	194
7.3. The emergence of Colombia and South Africa: two city-blind processes	195
PART 4: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CITIES IN THE OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY OF EMERGING POWERS: THE CASES OF BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA AND JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA	198
Chapter 8: Cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers: A constitutional and legal mismatch	201

8.1. Constitutional and legal ambiguities on decentralisation and International Relations	201
8.2. A State-centred approach to foreign policy	213
8.3. Conclusion	218
Chapter 9: Beyond the law: The operational and practical disconnection between national and local governments in foreign policy	220
9.1. Perception vs. reality: an evident mismatch	220
9.2. Shifting away from the city in the foreign policy guidelines of the National Development Plans	226
9.3. Cities as crucial international actors, just not through foreign policy	229
9.4. The ambiguous role of national government in the international projection of cities	233
9.5. Lack of institutional continuity of international policies at the city level	235
9.6. The politics of political parties and the politics of people	237
9.7. Conclusion	240
Chapter 10: Conclusions	242
10.1. The conceptual framing of the city on the national and global nexus	243
10.2. Substantial findings: Understanding the relationship between the city and the State in the foreign policy of emerging powers	246
Reference list	254
Peer reviewed academic material	254
Books and book chapters	254
Journals	261
Other academic material	275
Working papers	275
Theses	278
Conference proceedings	279
Government and international organisation documents	280

Interviews	286
Media	287
Reports	292
Websites	295

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 2.1. Moravcsik’s core assumptions of liberal International Relations theory	18
Table 2.2. Multilingual sources from the Global North and Global South	23
Table 2.3. Four dimensions of successful national government and world city relationships	34
Table 3.1. Selected Articles of the Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of States	46
Figure 3.1. Countries of the Global South according to UNDP	52
Table 3.2. Summary of emerging countries groupings	57
Table 3.3. Countries with the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (PPP) for 2000 and 2016	59
Table 3.4. Top 30 countries with the largest projected GDP (PPP) for 2050 (data in 2014 USD billions)	60
Table 4.1. Categories of power according to Keohane (1969)	65
Table 4.2. Categories of power according to Sören Scholvin (2010)	66
Figure 4.1. Selected categories of power in the International System	70
Table 4.3. Summary of selected middle powers by category	80
Figure 5.1. Map of Colombia	93
Figure 5.2. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Colombia	94
Figure 5.3. Routes from El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá, Colombia	95
Figure 5.4. National routes of Colombia	96
Figure 5.5. Population growth in Colombia (1960-2016)	98
Figure 5.6. Population growth in the OECD countries and Colombia (2014)	98
Figure 5.7. Population of the 10 largest cities in Colombia (2015)	99
Figure 5.8. The importance of the Spanish language in the world	101
Figure 5.9. GDP growth (annual %) for Colombia (1961-2016)	103
Figure 5.10. GDP growth (annual %) for Bogotá (2001-2015)	104
Figure 5.11. Net inflows of foreign direct investment in Colombia (1970-2016)	107
Figure 5.12. GDP per capita and Poverty Headcount Ratio for Colombia	109
Figure 5.13. Corruption Perceptions Index for selected countries (2015)	111
Figure 5.14. Military expenditure in Colombia (percentage of GDP)	113

Figure 5.15. Countries with the highest military expenditure as percentage of GDP (2015)	114
Figure 5.16. Homicide in Colombia (2006-2015)	115
Figure 6.1. Map of the Gauteng City Region (GCR)	122
Figure 6.2. Map of the municipalities within the Gauteng province	122
Figure 6.3. Map of the Republic of South Africa	124
Figure 6.4. Prince Edward Islands and the South African Sub-Antarctic Region	126
Figure 6.5. The importance of the Cape of Good Hope for the world's maritime shipping routes	126
Figure 6.6. Routes from OR Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, South Africa (as of October 2016)	130
Figure 6.7. South African population by age groups (2015)	134
Figure 6.8. Population growth in South Africa (1960-2016)	134
Figure 6.9. Population growth in the OECD Countries and South Africa (2014)	135
Figure 6.10. Distribution of urban population in South Africa	136
Figure 6.11. Comparison of the population of Johannesburg and selected Southern African countries (in millions) (2016)	137
Figure 6.12. Education enrollment and attainment in South Africa	138
Figure 6.13. Highest education level (all ages) for the City of Johannesburg (2016)	140
Figure 6.14. Languages with the most first language speakers in South Africa (2011)	142
Figure 6.15. GDP growth (annual %) for South Africa (1961-2016)	144
Figure 6.16. City contributions to South Africa's total economic output (1995 and 2013)	145
Figure 6.17. City of Johannesburg GDP growth (1997-2016)	146
Figure 6.18. Unemployment rates for South Africa and Johannesburg	147
Figure 6.19. South African balance of trade (2000-2015)	149
Figure 6.20. Net inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa (1970-2016)	152
Figure 6.21. Metros with the largest share in South Africa's foreign trade totals (1996-2011)	153
Figure 6.22. Human Development Index (HDI) for the City of Johannesburg, Gauteng province and South Africa (1996-2011)	156
Figure 6.23. GDP per capita in South Africa (in USD thousands) (1990-2016)	156
Figure 6.24. Military expenditure in South Africa	163

Figure 7.1. Colombian embassies in the world in 2000 and 2016	175
Figure 7.2. Countries visited by Colombian presidents between 2000 and 2016	176
Figure 7.3. High level contacts between Colombia and foreign countries (2002-2016)	176
Figure 7.4. Colombia in the Fragile States Index (2005-2016)	179
Figure 7.5. International visitors to Bogotá (2007-2015)	182
Figure 7.6. Number of South African diplomatic missions in selected years	186
Figure 7.7. South African embassies overseas in selected years	187
Figure 7.8. South Africa in the Fragile States Index (2006-2016)	191

ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANDI	Asociación Nacional de Industriales [<i>National Association of Manufacturers</i>]
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
APC	Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación [<i>Presidential Agency for Co-operation</i>]
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BBVA	Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CAR	Central African Republic
CBW	Chemical and Biological Warfare
CELAC	Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños [<i>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</i>]
CFIR	Consultative Forum on International Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIVETS	Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa
CoJ	City of Johannesburg
COP	Colombian Peso
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DA	Democratic Alliance
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [<i>National Administrative Department of Statistics</i>]
DBI	Doing Business Index
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Co-operation (South Africa)
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación [<i>National Planning Department</i>]
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAGLEs	Emerging and Growth-Leading Economies
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Economic Exclusive Zone

EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional [<i>National Liberation Army</i>]
ENCI	Estrategia Nacional de Cooperación Internacional [<i>National International Co-operation Strategy</i>]
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [<i>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</i>]
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association [<i>International Federation of Association Football</i>]
FLACMA	Federación Latinoamericana de Ciudades, Municipios y Asociaciones Municipalistas [<i>Latin American Federation of Cities, Municipalities and Municipal Associations</i>]
FMDV	Fonds Mondial de Développement des Villes [<i>World Forum for the Development of Cities</i>]
FSI	Fragile States Index
FTA	Free Trade Agreements
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GCR	Gauteng City-Region
GCRO	Gauteng City-Region Observatory
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GVA	Gross Value Added
G77	Group of 77
HDI	Human Development Index
HSBC	Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
LHDA	Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LPE	Lineamientos de Política Exterior [<i>Foreign Policy Guidelines</i>]
LPL	Lower-Bound Poverty Line
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Colombia)

MINT	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMPA	National Environmental Management: Protected Areas
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRC	People's Republic of China
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [<i>Mozambican National Resistance</i>]
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SANRAL	South African National Roads Agency Limited
SOWETO	South Western Townships
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas [<i>Union of South American Nations</i>]
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	União Nacional de Independência Total de Angola [<i>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</i>]
UPL	Upper-Bound Poverty Line
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VISTA	Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina
WUF	World Urban Forum

ZANU
ZAPU
ZAR

Zimbabwe African National Union
Zimbabwe African People's Union
South African Rand

PART 1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The International System is currently undergoing a major power shift, perhaps the largest in history. Former superpowers United Kingdom and France are more rapidly than not seeing their influence in the world overshadowed by emerging countries from the Global South such as China, India or Brazil. The process is so apparent that even the status of the United States as the sole superpower in the world is currently under debate with the rise of China and Russia.

Beyond the recent positioning of large and powerful countries like Russia, China, India or Brazil, there is a group of smaller, yet increasingly important nations that are thriving. And while they have no aspirations of becoming superpowers or radically changing the rules of the International System, they are keen on shifting power relations and increasing their influence in the world. South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Egypt, Vietnam and Colombia, amongst others, are generally recognised as part of this category of new emerging powers from the Global South (Ardila, 2014; P. Harrison, 2015; Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Huijgh, 2016; Huijgh & Warlick, 2016; Jost, 2012; Kaur & Kaur, 2015; G. Mohan, 2016; Nolte, 2010; É. Vieira, 2011).

A parallel process is also taking place at the urban level. Population growth and higher urbanisation rates are turning cities into fundamental actors in the International System. More and more, cities are responsible for larger shares of their nations' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and, thus, concentrating most of the country's economic and demographic power. In the Global South, this phenomenon is particularly visible. Shanghai, Bangkok, Cairo, Mexico City, Jakarta, São Paulo, Mumbai, Johannesburg, Istanbul and Bogotá are increasingly becoming important economic and financial centres, not only in their countries and the Global South but also in the world as a whole (Gugler, 2004).

At the multilateral level, the United Nations (UN) has also recognised the importance of cities at the global scale. In fact, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) – set to become the successor framework to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) – has already undertaken a global dialogue to “explore the increasingly important role of cities in advancing progress on national and global agendas” (UNDG, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore,

the 'New Urban Agenda' adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 23 December 2016 acknowledges the crucial importance of local governments in achieving sustainable development, and even calls for the strengthening of the World Assembly of Local and Regional Governments (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). The fact that cities are starting to be recognised as fundamental actors by the UN undoubtedly marks a crucial point for urban governments to advance their interests at the multilateral level.

The debate on the emergence of cities in the international arena has taken many forms. From discussions around city diplomacy (Beall & Adam, 2017; K. Fischer et al., 2015; Marcovitch & Dallari, 2014; Nganje, 2016b; van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007) and the pivotal positioning of city leaders in global governance (Acuto, 2013, 2015; K. Fischer et al., 2015; Peirce, 2015; Yuda, 2015) to the argument that Mayors are currently ruling the world (Barber, 2013); from the question on whether States are failing (Curtis, 2016) and cities are the new countries (OECD, 2016c), to international rankings and the positioning of cities in the global system (Alderson & Beckfield, 2004; Beaverstock, Smith, & Taylor, 2000; Borja, 2007; Cadena, Dobbs, & Remes, 2012; Foreign Policy, 2010; Sassen, 2001, 2010, 2011; Taşan-Kok & Van Weesep, 2007), the stances on the emergence of cities in the international arena are extremely varied. However, most approaches on this topic agree with granting the city a pivotal place in the International System while largely bypassing the role of nations. The tendency is thus to push for greater decentralisation and to assume that sub-national governments can readily absorb additional responsibilities. While there may be merit in this argument, especially with respect to conventional developmental functions of the State, this thesis interrogates the more complex interactions of cities and nations in their shifting global positioning through an examination of the machinery of the official foreign policy of the State.

In a world where countries and cities from the Global South are emerging simultaneously to improve their international status and create a global realignment of power, there is a need to reassess how the International System currently operates and which actors are driving it. Furthermore, given the increasing importance of emerging nations, more attention must be given to the particular dynamics of the Global South and the question of the place of their large and powerful cities within this national realignment of global power.

Although both International Relations and urban studies have been consumed by issues of advancement, including the rise of Southern cities and nations, the academic literature reveals a surprising disconnect between the emergence of countries and cities. It seems as if they were two parallel, separate processes with no relation to each other. Though, in a globalised and interconnected world, it is extremely improbable that there is no connection between countries and their cities as they improve their international standing. The International Relations scholarship focuses almost entirely on the State and leaves little, if any, place for the city. Urban Studies engages in a similar dynamic in which the city as the object of study is important enough and, therefore, can be disconnected from the country where it is located.

Consequently, there is a need to bridge these two disciplines in order to understand the links between the emergence of both the country and the city. The fact that cities are becoming more important in a world dominated by nations is the reason why it is crucial to understand this interface better, especially since the conceptual gap is mirrored in an operational gap in which both levels of government act on their own internationally. In turn, there is the official foreign policy of the State on one side and the international engagements of local governments – also known as the foreign relations of sub-national entities – on the other. And when these two modes of international engagement are analysed together, it becomes clear that they are, at best, unlinked and uncoordinated.

But linking the State and the city is no easy task. The disconnection between them is not only present in foreign policy, but also in other topics. For instance, the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics acknowledges the difficulties in linking the national and the urban when analysing fragile states and conflict. As with foreign policy, Putzel and Di John argue that the “analysis and policy discussion around fragile states has concentrated almost entirely on the ‘central state’, failing to see the particular place of cities in state formation historically and the contemporary importance of growing cities as key sites of state building and state erosion” (Putzel & Di John, 2012, p. V).

In an endeavour to build on the national-local disconnect, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South using the cases of Bogotá in Colombia and Johannesburg in South Africa.

By taking a close look at both literature and practice, this study aims to examine the relationship – or lack thereof – between the national governments of emerging powers from the Global South and their largest cities when designing and implementing their strategies to emerge in the world.

The reality of the Westphalian International System, in which the State is the only legal actor capable of being sovereign, forms the premise of the thesis. The primary entry point is thus how emerging nations might better ‘see the city’ rather than how local governments might take on higher profile international roles. In other words, this is not an assessment of city development strategies or the positioning of cities in the global system. While the Urban Studies literature has been largely distracted by city rankings and the implicit hierarchy that has been given to Northern cities rather than to cities elsewhere, this thesis deals with a much more nuanced question about the role of two successful cities from the Global South that appear on that ranking – Bogotá and Johannesburg – but in their own countries and as part of their nation’s emerging strategy in the world. In other words, this study looks at how emerging countries rise in the hierarchy of nations and how their largest cities contribute to or detract from that process.

When discussing the emergence of countries of the Global South, most of the analyses have been focused on the upper tier of this category, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China (Besada & Tok, 2014; A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008; A. F. Cooper & Fledes, 2013; Fledes, 2007b, 2010b; Glosny, 2010; Goldman Sachs, 2007; Gratius, 2008b; Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Käkönen, 2013, 2014; MacFarlane, 2006; Moreira Júnior & Sérgio Figueira, 2014; Nolte, 2006; Roberts, 2010; Sinha & Dorschner, 2010; J. A. Smith, 2011; Subacchi, 2008). However, even if these four countries are the most influential Southern powers in today’s world, there are a large number of other nations also striving to achieve the emerging power status. This thesis focuses on the next tier of countries, those whose size, power resources and overall capabilities are smaller, but still big enough to have an impact in the International System.

The two case studies selected for this thesis are Colombia and South Africa. Both are countries with troubled pasts that have managed to radically shift their domestic and international performances during the last two decades. Also, they both were classified by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and HSBC in 2009 as part of CIVETS (Colombia,

Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) (Allen, 2011; América Económica, 2011; Guerra-Barón, 2014; É. Vieira, 2011), a set of new emerging powers whose economic and political performance in the world are expected to improve considerably in the upcoming years.

Their largest cities, Bogotá and Johannesburg respectively, have also undergone similar transformations. These are cities that have been able to effectively overcome some of the socio-economic problems associated with the Southern urban while, at the same time, becoming their nations' unquestionable powerhouses. As their countries emerge, the cities have also turned into regional, and even global financial and economic centres. And although there is still a long way to go, Bogotá and Johannesburg are slowly abandoning their stereotype of being the materialisation of crime and violence.

By using the cases of Colombia and Bogotá, and South Africa and Johannesburg, this thesis aims to abandon the usual Euro-North American approach to both International Relations and Urban Studies, and focus on emerging middle powers from the Global South. This geopolitical shift is important for three reasons. First, as the literature shows, there is little dialogue between the two disciplines and therefore the relationship between countries and cities in the design and implementation of official foreign policy has not been conceptualised. Second, there is not enough understanding of the interaction between cities and countries in the emerging strategies of countries from the Global South. Finally, there is a tendency to contrast the experiences of cities and nations within their regions (Africa or Latin America) and to eschew the difficulties presented by selecting cases with varied linguistic, administrative and cultural traditions.

In order to answer the main research question on what is the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South, this thesis engages with some secondary questions designed to contribute to the debate around the topic at hand. It tries to find a common ground in the existing scholarship by examining whether the International Relations literature includes cities when assessing the power of States in the International System and if the States are considered by the Urban Studies Literature when analysing the global positioning of cities. It questions if Colombia and South Africa can be considered emerging powers and if Bogotá and Johannesburg can be regarded as emerging cities from the Global South. The thesis also inquires how Bogotá and

Johannesburg operationalise their importance through the official foreign policy tools and instruments of Colombia and South Africa. And finally, it gives an assessment of State-urban interactions in foreign policy in both policy and operational contexts for both case studies.

This study highlights ambiguities in the legal and constitutional frameworks of Colombia and South Africa that affect their ability to include Bogotá and Johannesburg effectively in their foreign policy mechanisms. Also, there are conceptual and operational mismatches that translate into cities not being recognised or even understood when designing and implementing foreign policy in Bogotá and Pretoria. Even when they share similar interests and are part of the same country, cities tend to be disregarded or bypassed by States in their emerging global strategies.

1.1. METHOD

Even when States are the fundamental subject of study for this thesis, cities are also a crucial part of the analysis. Consequently, this thesis draws from the International Relations scholarship as well as from Urban Studies. It does not try to fuse the two disciplines; instead, it lies between them in order to assess their interfaces through an interdisciplinary approach.

Ramadier argues that the linear notion of progress “has been responsible for the compartmentalization of knowledge into a myriad of separate disciplines” (Ramadier, 2004, p. 423) which, in turn, “have led to the creation of more and more new disciplines, to the extent that they have begun to overlap” (Ramadier, 2004, p. 424). This phenomenon can be clearly seen in the topic of this thesis as it engages with two different disciplines – International Relations and Urban Studies – that start to overlap when analysing the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers.

Located at the core of the social sciences, there has been a proliferation of information around the ‘multi-disciplinary’ debate, a term used by Choi and Pak “when the nature of involvement of multiple disciplines is unknown or unspecified” (B. Choi & Pak, 2006, p. 351). The three most common terms found in this debate are ‘multidisciplinarity’,

'transdisciplinarity' and 'interdisciplinarity', each one of them with its own specific meaning and, therefore, are not interchangeable (Alvargonzález, 2011; B. Choi & Pak, 2006). Nonetheless, the way in which each one of these concepts deals with the relationship between disciplines has created not only serious critiques but also tensions amongst academics (Baron, 1999; Brewer, 1999; Klein, 2008; Ramadier, 2004).

For the purposes of this thesis, interdisciplinarity, rather than trans- or multidisciplinary, has been selected as the substantive methodological issue as it allows to abandon the isolation in which both International Relations and Urban studies work in relation to each other. This isolation would inevitably lead to diminished and regressive reductions (Merino Fernández, 1982) on the understanding of the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers. Instead, interdisciplinarity becomes a question of structurally coordinating the plurality of dimensions involved in the unity of the phenomenon (Merino Fernández, 1982). In other words, it "analyzes, synthesizes and harmonizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole" (Alvargonzález, 2011, p. 388). It is, in turn, a useful tool when addressing a common topic across disciplines such as cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South.

Also, considering not only that there is a clear overlap between the two bodies of literature in the topic of this thesis but also that the interface between them still needs to be conceptualised, the simple juxtaposition found in multidisciplinary, that is, being together without a manifest relationship between them or without any of them being modified or enriched (B. Choi & Pak, 2006; Merino Fernández, 1982) falls short for the needs of this thesis. Transdisciplinarity is also inadequate for this study as it is inspired by the idea that everything is intertwined, but avoids the risk of condensing all phenomena into a single science or body of literature (Alvargonzález, 2011; Merino Fernández, 1982) or, as stated by Lawrence, a "fusion of disciplines" (Lawrence & Després, 2004, p. 400). Now, while there is a tendency to favour transdisciplinarity because it is more complex (Ramadier, 2004) and innovative, in this context, it is less useful as the two disciplines of Urban Studies and International Relations have rarely sat in conversation prior to this point.

Consequently, the interdisciplinarity in this thesis is conceptualised to generate a dialogue as a precursor to further discussions between the two fields that might follow. The existing scholarship shows not much has been done on this topic; and because International Relations and Urban Studies mostly ignore the existence of the other, there is an evident gap in the literature between the two disciplines. By exploring this gap, this study aims to contribute to an interdisciplinary dialogue between the two fields that allows for a better understanding of each other's areas of research and creates the necessary bridges to come to terms on the real role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers of the Global South. It also rests on a systematic interrogation and critique of the existing literature, both in its components and then in relation to each other.

In addition to being interdisciplinary, this thesis is also multilingual. This is a generic problem, but one that is particularly important in forging new intellectual pathways from the widening of empirical reference points. Mabin (2014) argues that a debate about the Global South limited to the Anglophone scholarship is bound to be inevitably partial. On this topic, Choplin states that

the aim should not be to idealise anglophone scientific output to the point of creating a new hegemonic model of thought. It would be more stimulating to encourage dialogue between researchers from continental Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as – and, indeed, above all – from Southern countries (Choplin, 2012, p. 3).

There are two different issues at this point. One, the partiality of an all-Anglophone debate, and two, the need to promote a dialogue across the North-South – and perhaps also the East-West – divide. They complement each other. A North-South dialogue could in fact be done only in English and it would ignore – although maybe not voluntarily – any knowledge produced in other languages. Salvatore argues that Latin American scholars had been criticising Eurocentrism long before the topic was studied in North-Atlantic universities (Salvatore, 2010). He talks about Eurocentrism, but the argument can be expanded to other topics. In turn, for the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South, it is possible to find useful information in other languages that enriches the debate and fills gaps found in the English language literature.

On the same topic, this thesis deals with two case studies from the South: Colombia and South Africa. And while the latter is essentially English-speaking, most of the information and literature available for the former is in Spanish. The fact that sources are written in different languages is one of the reasons for the disconnect between the International Relations and Urban Studies fields. Consequently, a multilingual approach to the case studies decreases the possibility of a partialised analysis as an even more extensive body of material can be included. It also allows the author to engage in interviews and access sources such as government documents and reports in their original language. This thesis has used materials mainly in Spanish, English and Portuguese, and to a lesser extent, French and German.

The multilingual element, and the imperative of translation, is present throughout the thesis. In order to make it legible, when the information is available in a different language, an English translation is always provided, while the original text has been included in a footnote. All translations in this study have been done by the author. In most cases, the author tried to keep the translations as close to the original as possible, however there are instances where concepts have different meanings in different languages and they have been pointed out in the text. Also, the thesis is written following the South African English spelling norms. Other forms of English spelling might be found by the reader only in direct quotations.

This thesis follows the Spanish convention in a number of issues. First, it is written in the third person in its entirety. Second, it considers the Spanish geographical division of the world in five and not six continents. Therefore, the 'American continent' refers to the whole of the Americas, namely North America, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America. Also, related to the previous issue and unless it is used in a direct quote, 'United States of America' is used instead of 'America'. Lastly, the thesis uses the word State – with a capital S – in the same way "Estado" – with a capital E – is used in Spanish. Using the word 'State' solves the ambiguity of the notion of the 'nation-state' which in International Relations is a much bigger concept. It also acknowledges that the State has an expression at the local level but, for the purposes of this thesis, the concept refers to the national level, the country.

Apart from interdisciplinarity and multilingualism, this thesis uses the case study method. According to Duminy et al, “what is distinctive about the case study method is the process of drawing conceptual, spatial and temporal boundaries around a case unit, and granting special prominence and interest to what occurs within these boundaries” (Duminy, Andreasen, Lerise, Odendaal, & Watson, 2014, p. 22). Furthermore, this notion of ‘boundedness’ is essential in the case study method (Flyvbjerg, 2011). These boundaries are clearly found in the two case studies of this thesis: Colombia (and Bogotá) and South Africa (and Johannesburg). Also, as the process of ‘emerging’ – both for States and cities – is made up of “operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2009, p. 9), the case study method provides the necessary tools to address ‘dynamic processes’ such as the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South (Flyvbjerg, 2011).

Following the works of Robinson (2002, 2006, 2011a, 2011b, 2016) and McFarlane (2010), the two case studies in this thesis abandon the traditional focus on the North in International Relations and Urban Studies. Instead, it assesses two Southern countries – Colombia and South Africa – and their largest cities – Bogotá and Johannesburg – in an effort to achieve four objectives: 1) to fill the previously identified gap both in the literature and in practice; 2) to come to terms about the distinctiveness of both cases; 3) to place them in the broader Southern context; and 4) to reveal the particularities of the emerging processes for Colombia (and Bogotá) and South Africa (and Johannesburg) (McFarlane, 2010).

This thesis follows Robinson’s call to move beyond comparative studies and propose an account of ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2002). Consequently, this is not a comparison between Colombia and South Africa or Bogotá and Johannesburg. The case study method allows for an illustration of the importance of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers of the Global South with reference to more than one example, but not in comparison to each other, partly because the data is not good enough and the metrics are not clear. Given the differences between Colombia and South Africa, the importance of having two case studies is that it demonstrates that the processes of emergence and the role cities play in them varies from one country to another.

Finally, in order to be able to understand the operational context of the interaction between national and local spheres of government in foreign policy in both Colombia and South Africa, interviews to people at both levels were conducted. The interviewees were selected mainly from government agencies involved in foreign policy such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Colombia, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in South Africa, the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg and the Colombian Agency for International Co-operation. Scholars working on the international relations of both countries and cities were also interviewed. All interviews were semi-structured, conducted personally by the author in Bogotá, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Paris and Medellín, and interviewees were informed that their responses would be used as primary sources for this thesis.

1.2. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on the interface between the International Relations and the Urban Studies scholarships. It provides an interdisciplinary approach to the role of the city in International Relations and the role of the State in Urban Studies in order to understand the points of contact between them, or the lack thereof. By interrogating and critiquing the paucity of material linking the city and the State in foreign policy, this chapter discovers an embryonic relationship between the two bodies of literature that creates a gap in knowledge.

Chapter 3 engages with a conceptual analysis of four key International Relations concepts that are crucial to understand the State as the main object of study for this thesis and its role in the International System. It then analyses the power shift in the world today with an emphasis on emerging powers from the Global South. Using data from international banks and organisations, the chapter demonstrates how emerging countries will overtake some of the traditional middle powers and increase their influence in the International System.

Chapter 4 assesses the conceptual debate on power hierarchies in the International System. Given the lack of agreement in the literature, especially around emerging powers and other similar concepts, this chapter takes previous contributions on the topic and

adapts them to propose a hierarchy in the International System that responds to the particular needs of this thesis. The analysis includes Nolte's three variables for understanding the power of countries in the world – power resources, leadership and international recognition – and uses them to build up on the concept of 'emerging power'.

The first part of the case study analysis starts in Chapters 5 and 6. By including the five dimensions of power resources – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic and military – proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al., these two chapters engage in a geopolitical analysis of the power resources of the two countries and cities. Colombia and Bogotá are assessed in Chapter 5, and South Africa and Johannesburg in Chapter 6. The aim of these chapters is to demonstrate that both countries and cities can be classified as 'emerging' and understand the importance of the city for national power resources.

Chapter 7 is divided in two parts, each one of them assessing the leadership and international recognition of Colombia and South Africa respectively. After examining the power resources of each country in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter analyses what Colombia and South Africa have done with what they have in terms of foreign policy and what consequences their power resources and leadership have had in their international recognition as emerging powers. Simultaneously, the chapter evaluates the role Bogotá and Johannesburg have played in their countries' emerging strategies.

Throughout the thesis, it becomes evident that neither countries nor cities are talking to each other in their emerging processes. This gap is not only present in the literature but it is also operational. By using predominantly primary sources to zoom in on the disconnection between national and local governments in foreign policy, Chapter 8 addresses the constitutional and legal reasons that prevent cities and countries from cooperating in foreign policy, while Chapter 9 analyses the operational and practical reasons for this disconnection. After acknowledging the crucial importance of Bogotá and Johannesburg in their countries' power resources, leadership and international recognition, this chapter explores the practice of foreign policy in both countries to explain the mismatch and provides six reasons why it exists.

Finally, Chapter 10 provides the key conclusions of this thesis. Evidence shows that the disconnection found between International Relations and Urban Studies literature is also

present in the practice. As the relationship between the city and the State in foreign policy has not been conceptualised, this translates into an operational gap. The cases of Colombia and South Africa show that cities and States are emerging in two parallel, disconnected processes; this final chapter explains the reasons behind that disconnection and the consequences they have when they appear as a composite.

CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND URBAN STUDIES: TWO DISCIPLINES, AN EMBRYONIC RELATIONSHIP

Every city is the algebraic sum of its parts. Its ugly and its sad; its splendid and its squalid. This may be obvious, but that is precisely why we forget. Then, the city is subjected to the eye that expurgates it. And it lies there, solvent or prostrated, dazzling or shabby¹ (Translated by the author from Garcés González, 2010, p. 22).

When analysing cities, Garcés González argues, it is usually difficult to look at the full picture; not every part of the city is included and, therefore, its dynamics cannot be fully understood. Now, his insight can also be used for subjects other than the city, and in this case, the way States have been analysed in the International Relations scholarship: Every country is the algebraic sum of its parts. And then the questions arise. Are the eyes that expurgate the role of the country in the International System neglecting the city as a fundamental part of the whole? The opposite question is also relevant: Are the eyes that expurgate the city in the International System neglecting its role as a fundamental part of a country's power?

These questions are crucial when trying to come to terms with the role played by cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers as they link two of the key concepts in this thesis: cities and States. This is important because these two concepts tend to be presented as isolated, unlinked and not related to each other in the existing literature. In order to interrogate the problem, there are two bodies of literature or communities of academic practice that must be brought into a dialogue – International Relations and Urban Studies. To date, despite the widespread uptake of interdisciplinarity research, these are two realms that seem to act independently without having much regard for each other. Typically, the Urban Studies scholarship understands cities as actors that are powerful enough to act on their own in the International System. At the same time, the International Relations discipline is almost entirely State-centred leaving no place for the

¹ Original text in Spanish: “Toda ciudad es la suma algebraica de sus partes. Sus feas y sus tristes; sus esplendorosas y sus paupérrimas. Esto puede ser obvio, pero por ello, precisamente, se nos olvida. Entonces la ciudad se somete al ojo que la expurga. Y queda solvente o postrada, deslumbrante o lamentable” (Garcés González, 2010, p. 22).

city in its analysis. A central concern for this thesis is to interrogate points of contact between them.

Consequently, as this thesis falls on the interface between International Relations and Urban Studies, the present chapter rubs these two disciplines against each other. Moreover, it aims to build on this interaction using the concept of sovereignty that places cities within the framework of a State. The main objective of this chapter is thus to identify the points of contact between cities and States in international relations, or, if it is the case, to identify and analyse the lack of contact.

Given the paucity of material linking the city and the State in foreign policy, this thesis engages in an interdisciplinary analysis (Connell, 2004; Jacobs & Frickel, 2009; Lawrence & Després, 2004; Merino Fernández, 1982; Reybold & Halx, 2012). Drawing on divergent bodies of work to address the role of cities in emerging powers allows for a better understanding of two key issues: First, the role played by cities in the International Relations literature, and second, the role played by States in the Urban Studies scholarship. At the end, it will be possible to understand whether they are two self-absorbed, isolated disciplines that do not communicate, or if there are contacts but they are provisional and embryonic, or finally, if there is a fluent, but until now unlinked, dialogue between the fields of International Relations and Urban Studies.

The global system is multilingual and, as such, the specific empirical cases that inform this thesis are grounded in different linguistic traditions. In other words, they include not only different linguistic sources but also various linguistic cultures and practices. This chapter draws in the available literature published mainly in English, Spanish and Portuguese with a few additional documents in French and German. Including documents in different languages allows for a more thorough understanding of the scholarship as it takes authors from Latin America, Europe, North America, Africa and Asia into consideration and, therefore, brings together a comprehensive international view on the subject (Fitzgerald, 2003; Leonard, 2013; Mabin, 2014).

To highlight the traditionally unconnected accounts of cities and States in the global system, the remainder of this chapter is structured in three parts. The first one looks at International Relations as a State-centred discipline. It starts by analysing the

Westphalian concept of sovereignty in the almost entirely city-blind dominant International Relations theories. Then, it considers the changes brought into the world system by globalisation in the 20th and 21st centuries and how they have created a new place not only for cities but also for city leaders as actors in the international arena. This section ends with an analysis on emerging powers from the Global South and the existing silences on the role of cities in the literature. Noting the very broad terrain of Urban Studies and the extensive debate about which issues should be prioritised (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016; Robinson, 2016; Robinson & Roy, 2016), the second part highlights three specific trends in the Urban Studies scholarship that relate directly to the thesis' central issue of the role of cities in emerging powers: the shift towards cities in the Global South; the way cities tend to bypass the State in today's International System; and the cities as epicentres of a country's power resources. Finally, the chapter ends with a third section on 'paradiplomacy', a useful interdisciplinary bridge that links cities and International Relations in the literature. The practice of paradiplomacy will be further explored and positioned in relation to official foreign policy of the States of Colombia and South Africa in Chapters 8 and 9.

2.1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, A STATE-CENTRED DISCIPLINE

2.1.1. WESTPHALIA AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE: NO PLACE FOR THE CITY

Since the creation of the State and the subsequent concept of sovereignty² at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Goss, 1948), scholars dealing with the dominant International Relations theories have been fascinated by the notion of the State as one of the key actors – if not the most important actor – in the International System. Realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau argue that “the nation-state appears as the main and almost exclusive referent in International Relations” and the “final point of reference of contemporary foreign policy” (Morgenthau, 1986, p. 20). Furthermore, Morgenthau understands the

² Westphalia is commonly accepted as the birthplace for the concept of sovereignty. According to Daniel Philpott: “It made the sovereign state the legitimate political unit. It implied that basic attributes of statehood such as the existence of a government with control of its territory were now [...] the criteria for becoming a state. Finally, as it came to be practiced, the Treaty removed all legitimate restrictions on a state's activities within its territory” (Philpott, 1995, p. 364).

State as the predominant and monolithic actor of International Relations, as a 'black box' whose actions are nothing but rational. He even goes as far as writing the word 'State' with a capital S to emphasise its importance as the sole actor in the International System, whereas 'national interest' – as opposed to 'national interests' – is written in singular, assuming there is only one interest and it is defined by and for the wellbeing of the State (Carvajal, 2007). Consequently, realists disregard the role of any actors other than the State in international politics.

While realism is the quintessential State-centred International Relations theory, other important theories abandon the notion of the State as the *only* actor in International Relations but keep it at the *core* of the discussion. For example, institutionalists such as Robert Keohane share the realists' vision that the International System is anarchic and States as its *crucial actors* (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005) are self-interested, but introduce new actors such as international institutions³ that can overcome the uncertainty that undermines co-operation between States (Keohane, 1984; Slaughter, 2011). Although institutionalists include other actors in the equation, these are limited to institutions and organisations that bring together a group of States. Therefore, their focus still lies on the Westphalian importance of sovereignty where States are the most important actor in International Relations. Cities and other non-State actors are not referred to in any of the institutionalist literature.

Liberals have also included other players in the debate. Individuals and private groups are considered as fundamental actors of world politics and determinants of the behaviour of the State in the International System (Moravcsik, 1998). Amongst the liberals, Andrew Moravcsik in particular argues that "the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behaviour by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences" (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 516). This liberal fundamental premise can be restated in terms of three core assumptions as seen in Table 2.1.:

³ Slaughter defines these new actors as "a set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures that shape expectations" (Slaughter, 2011).

TABLE 2.1. MORAVCSIK'S CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

<p>ASSUMPTION 1: THE PRIMACY OF SOCIETAL ACTORS</p>	<p>The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organise exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.</p>
<p>ASSUMPTION 2: REPRESENTATION AND STATE PREFERENCES</p>	<p>States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics.</p>
<p>ASSUMPTION 3: INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM</p>	<p>The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour.</p>

Source: Adapted from Moravcsik, A. (1998). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 52(1), p. 516-520.

The preceding paragraphs show that, even if its role in the world is understood from different points of view and different levels of importance, the State and its relations with other States have been at the heart of almost every discussion in International Relations during the last few centuries. But why is this important? Because, being as State-centred as it is, the field of International Relations has continuously neglected cities – amongst other non-State actors – in its efforts to understand and explain the International System. Even in today’s world where cities are key actors of globalisation (Blank, 2006; Curtis, 2011, 2014; Robinson, 2011a; Taylor, Hoyler, Walker, & Szegner, 2001), the main International Relations debates are still almost completely city-blind.

It could be argued that cities have indeed been indirectly included – however, not mentioned – in the analysis by a small number of scholars with different interests in the International Relations field, such as Maxi Schoeman (2003), Joseph S. Nye (2008) and Detlef Nolte (2010), amongst others. They agree that the role of a State in the world depends on how powerful it is, and that power can be determined by analysing three key factors: its power resources; its leadership – either globally or regionally; and its perception in the world⁴ – both by the country itself and by other countries (Hurrell,

⁴ Even though Nolte talks about “self-conception”, that concept has been replaced in this thesis by “its perception in the world” because there is a need for a broader understanding of the concept. In fact, Nolte

Cooper, González González, Ubiraci Sennes, & Sitaraman, 2000; Nolte, 2010). And cities, especially those that concentrate a large portion of a nation's GDP or are at the centre of international fluxes, are extremely important in determining not only a country's power resources, but also the way it projects itself to the outside world and how it is perceived by other States. As proof of the importance of cities in today's International System, Michele Acuto argues that "the progressive move to the city by most of humanity, two-thirds of which is set to be residing in urban settlements by 2050, has made cities of central concern to analysts of world affairs" (Acuto, 2013, p. 483).

However, despite cities being central not only to the analysis of world affairs but also in determining a country's power resources, explicit references to the urban issue are of extremely rare occurrence in the traditional International Relations literature. As stated by Michele Acuto,

for most of the 1990s and early 2000s there has basically been no consideration for the urban in the dominant debate of International Relations (IR) – whether in terms of security, climate change, or as to the rise of China. Yet for instance, it is now quite evident how, short of reducing international affairs to military strategy, the growth of the People's Republic of China is intrinsically tied to impressive urbanisation to degrees so vertiginous that some commentators have tagged it as the rise of the 'concrete dragon' (Acuto, 2013, p. 482).

2.1.2. CITIES AND THE INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT STATE-CENTRIC MODEL

Setting aside the dominant debate of International Relations, there has been a limited number of scholars who have, to a certain extent, introduced the urban issue into their research during the last decades of the 20th century and the first of the 21st. In 1976, Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert presented the innovative 'complex conglomerate

quotes Andrew Hurrell when he introduces the concept of "self-conception". Both Nolte and Hurrell argue that the status of a country as a power in the International System – be it middle power, regional power, super power or any other – not only depends on "a self-created identity", but also "on recognition by others – by your peers in the club [of great or middle powers], but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy" (Hurrell et al., 2000, p. 2; Nolte, 2010, p. 892).

model' that acknowledged the existence of 'governmental noncentral' actors in the International System (Mansbach, Ferguson, & Lampert, 1976). Mansbach et al. did not deny the 'paramount position' of the State in the world, but at the same time, argued that "the state-centric model is increasingly irrelevant" (Tucker, 1978, p. 692). However, even though the authors recognised the importance of these 'governmental noncentral' actors – where cities should have been included – in the International System, the cases used in their study focused on the Palestinian movement, multinational corporations and the European Economic Community (Tucker, 1978), leaving cities once again out of the International Relations debate.

In 1985, Michael Timberlake, a sociologist focused on globalisation and the world system of cities, questioned the way cities had been studied in social sciences and noted that urbanisation processes had, so far, been limited to the boundaries of nations or regions within nations (Timberlake, 1985). He argued that, although urbanisation has been one of the most frequently studied features of the modern world, it could "be more fully understood by beginning to examine the many ways in which [it] articulates with the broader currents of the world-economy that penetrate spatial barriers, transcend limited time boundaries, and influence social relations at many different levels" (Timberlake, 1985, p. 3). Furthermore, he stated that "there have not been attempts to interpret patterns of urbanisation in light of a world-system perspective" (Timberlake, 1985, p. 4) – a gap that his book *Urbanization in the world-economy* (1985) sought to fill. Nonetheless, his work focused on mapping the world-system's city system, neglecting, to a large extent, the role of the State in his analysis.

In 1990, Chadwick Alger's paper "The World Relations of Cities: Closing the gap between social science paradigms and everyday human experience" exposed once again the gap between the urban and the international studies scholarship. He argued that viewing the world as a 'system of States' has prevented not only the study but also the "perception of the linkages between human settlements and worldwide phenomena" (Alger, 1990, p. 493). Alger stated that:

This obstruction has encouraged a division of labour between those who study connections between states and those who study behaviour within states. International relations scholars are inclined to aggregate activity that crosses state borders into state totals. The state paradigm inhibits them from linking this activity to specific human settlements. At

the same time, urban scholars have been prevented from following the threads of urban behaviour across state borders (Alger, 1990, pp. 493–494).

2.1.3. CITY LEADERS AS FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS

20 years after “The World Relations of Cities” (Alger, 1990), in 2010, Alger published another article in the journal *Global Governance* in which he focuses on the expanding governmental diversity in participants in global governance through a close look at the role of the International Parliamentary Union, the International Union of Local Authorities and their roles within the United Nations system (Alger, 2010). The focus for Alger was not on role the city itself has in the International System, but on the role city leaders play in the world. Michele Acuto’s work, probably one of the most important scholars linking the city with the International System, also analyses city leaders in the international arena. Acuto first argued that it is important to “understand the city not solely as a place but also as an agent in world affairs” (Acuto, 2010, p. 427), and that:

For [International Relations], the importance of paying attention to global cities goes far beyond there being inspiration for a more urban-conscious theory of international politics. Contemporary global cities challenge our traditional and IR-dominated theoretical frames of reference, bypassing scalar (globe, state, region) as well as political (supranational, governmental, regional and local) hierarchies and disrupting the Westphalian system of sovereignty. In their activities, these cities stand as a reminder that the governmentality of the milieu in which humanity’s political relations unfold is far more complex, multiscalar, and variable than [International Relations] theory presently makes evident (Acuto, 2010, p. 429).

Furthermore, Acuto argues that there is a “need to pay some careful attention to the leaders at the helm of these cities as key drivers in this internationalization, both theoretical as well as diplomatic, of the city in the twenty-first century” (Acuto, 2013, p. 482).

Other important studies that focus on the role of city leaders in the world are Brian Hocking’s book *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy* (Hocking, 1993), Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating with *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments* (Aldecoa & Keating, 1999) and

Heidi Hobb's *City Hall Goes Abroad: The Foreign Policy of Local Politics* (Hobb, 1994). Hocking debates the 'localisation' as many sub-national actors – and their authorities – respond to pressures generated outside the national borders while, at the same time, they aim to enhance their possibility to manoeuvre in the International System. Aldecoa and Keating focus their work on the role local government leaders play in the constitution of international organisations such as APEC or the European Union, while Hobb takes a close look at the activism of city leaders within the framework of an 'active city' in the international arena.

But even with some authors dealing with the increasing importance of cities and their leaders in global affairs, the International Relations literature on the role of cities in the world is still extremely limited. Acuto stated that "[a]lbeit still partly relegated to spare theorisations, the political scholarship on the growing importance of urban players in world affairs has seen a moderate resurgence in the past years, after more than two decades of conspicuous marginality" (Acuto, 2013, p. 482). This resurgence has taken mostly two forms: "magazines such as *The Economist* and popular fora such as Chatham House have focused on the relevance of urbanisation in world affairs" (Acuto, 2013, p. 483). While these theorisations offer insights into the role of cities in globalisation, they do not speak to the role of cities within emerging powers in the International System.

2.1.4. EMERGING POWERS AS CITY-LESS PLACES?

If cities are almost absent in the main International Relations debates, they are even more so in the literature that aims to explain the rise of new emerging powers in the International System. When looking at the existing International Relations scholarship, it seems as if emerging economies such as Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico or Colombia were *city-less* places. By exploring this literature, it is almost impossible to determine whether India's growth is linked to its impressive urbanisation, or how many cities are fuelling China's emergence as a world power, or even if Brazil's economic capacity is only located in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, or if it is spread throughout its territory.

Therefore, in order to determine whether or not cities have been studied – or at least mentioned – as a foreign policy tool or as an international actor in the emerging powers literature, the academic sources in Table 2.2. were reviewed.

TABLE 2.2. MULTILINGUAL SOURCES FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH AND GLOBAL SOUTH

LANGUAGE	FROM THE GLOBAL NORTH	FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH
SPANISH	Nolte (Flemes, Nolte, & Wehner, 2011; Nolte, 1992, 2006); Flemes (Flemes et al., 2011; Pastrana Buelvas, Jost, & Flemes, 2012; Velosa Porras, 2012); Gratius (2008a, 2008b); Nye (1990a); Steinberg (2008); Sanahuja (2014); Freres (2013); Lamo de Espinosa (2010); Suárez Sipmann (2011)	Pastrana Buelvas (Pastrana Buelvas, 2011b; Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012); Lechini (Lechini, 2006; Lechini & Giaccaglia, 2016); de Sousa (2007a, 2007b, 2008); Ardila (Ardila, 2014, 2015; Ardila, Cardona, & Ramírez, 2005); Guerra-Barón (2014); Carvajal (2009, 2012); Tokatlián (2007); Vieira (2011); Gutiérrez Sanín (2011); Bonilla Montenegro (2014); Salama & Fernández (2014); Alcalde Cardoza (2010)
ENGLISH	Gray (1988); Tammen (Tammen et al., 2000); Thies (2014); de Bruyn (2013); Patrick (2010); Huijgh (Huijgh, 2016; Huijgh & Warlick, 2016); Schirm (2006); Nolte (Nel & Nolte, 2010; Nolte, 2008, 2010; Nolte & Hoffmann, 2007; Nolte & Wehner, 2013); Harris (2005); Chin (2010); Besada (Besada & Tok, 2014); Cooper (A. F. Cooper, 1997, 1998; A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008; A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; A. F. Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, 1991; Hurrell et al., 2000; T. M. Shaw, Cooper, & Antkiewicz, 2007); Nye (1988, 1990, 1992, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013); Schwengel (2008); Subacchi (2008); Prys (2010); Stewart-Ingersoll (Stewart-Ingersoll & Frazier, 2012); Flemes (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; Ebert, Flemes, & Strüver, 2012; Flemes, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Flemes & Castro, 2016; Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2011; Flemes & Wojczewski, 2010); Hurrell (Hurrell, 2006, 2008; Hurrell et al., 2000); S. MacFarlane (2006); Kappel (2010); Hawksworth (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015); Ryerson (Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006); Scholvin (2010); Goldstein (2001); Väyrynen (1979); Käkönen (2013, 2014); Stairs (1998); Hancock (2007); Morgenthau (1946, 1949, 1964, 1967, 1973); Layne (1993); Destradi (2008, 2010); James (1990); Schraeder (2001); Turner (2009, 2011); Pape (2005); Ikenberry (2008); Glosny (2010); Huntington (1999); Roberts (2010); Jacques (2009); Dieckhoff (2014); Keohane (1969, 1984); Weitz (2012); Müller & Steyaert (2013); Allison (2008); Goble (2011)	Bijian (2005); Mahbubani (2005, 2009); Tok (Besada & Tok, 2014); Van der Westhuizen (D. Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Van der Westhuizen, 1998); Vital (1967); Ružić (2013); Choi (2009); Cornelissen (Cornelissen, 2010; Cornelissen, Cheru, & Shaw, 2012); Gupta (1975); Chenoy & Chenoy (2007); de Almeida (2007); Sinha (Sinha & Dorschner, 2010); Korkut & Civelekoğlu (2012); Ogunnubi & Isike (2015); Zysk (2009); Kenkel & Martins (2016); Louw-Vaudran (2016); Rasheed (1995); Mohan & Kapur (2015); Malamud (2011); Harrison (2014); Alden (Alden & Le Pere, 2009; Alden & Soko, 2005; M. A. Vieira & Alden, 2011); Schoeman (2003); Pastrana Buelvas (2011a); Khilnani (Khilnani et al., 2012); Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007); Ismayilov (2012); Özkan (2010); Southall (1994); Cunha Leite (2011); Kaur & Kaur (2015); Landsberg (Landsberg, 2011; Landsberg & Georghiou, 2016); Novăcescu (2013)
OTHER LANGUAGES	Flemes (Dördrechter, Flemes, Strüver, & Wojczewski, 2010; Flemes, 2010a, 2010b; Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014; Flemes & Gomes Saraiva, 2014; Flemes & Seith, 2014); Humphrey & Messner (2006)	Njoya (2010); Cunha Leite (2007); Pereira Pinto (2008); Moreira Júnior & Sérgio Figueira (2014); Brigagão & Seabra (2011)

A close look at the existing scholarship across languages that focuses on emerging powers and the issue of power in the International System, led to four key findings. First, irrespective of the geographical origin or theoretical background of the scholars, their focus is almost entirely on the State. Second, references to the countries' economies, their national governments or their foreign policies can be found, while the urban has no relevance in their analysis. Third, only nine documents mentioned the word 'city' or made some kind of marginal reference to any city in the countries being analysed. And fourth, apart from world city rankings that usually include cities in the Global South such as Shanghai, Mexico City, Istanbul, Johannesburg or Bogotá, researchers and scholars working on emerging powers have failed to recognise the crucial role that the urban has played in the rise of countries of the global south. There is, therefore, a generalised silence that translates into cities being either overlooked or undervalued, especially in the International Relations literature dealing with emerging powers.

2.1.5. EVEN IN SILENCE, CITIES ARE PRESENT – A FEW EXCEPTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE

Nonetheless, even in silence, cities are present. Very few references to the city have been made in the literature addressing the issue of emerging powers, but these are not only particularly specific and limited but also extremely scarce. Four different ways in which cities have been marginally included in this scholarship can be identified. It must be noted, however, that only the first one – mega-events and cities in the Global South – recognises the city as part of the power resources of emerging powers in the International System.

The first, and probably the most important one, focuses on what Martin Müller and Chris Steyaert describe as “the geopolitics of organising mega-events” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013). Mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic Games, the Rugby World Cup or even the Eurovision song contest “are considered the ultimate trophy in the intensified competition for public attention and investment” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013, p. 139) because of their ability “to affect whole economies and [...] receive sustained global media attention” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013, p. 139). As stated by Nolte (2010), two of the key requirements for a country to become an emerging power are its will to go global and

its international recognition, and as a consequence, the organisation of mega-events turns out to be an extremely useful tool for national governments as it has a direct impact on both indicators.

The important issue on the topic of organising mega-events is the fact that many of them take place in one city and, although some of them are country-oriented, such as the FIFA or Rugby world cups, even then, the role of cities as hosts is crucial. Cities are, therefore, used by countries and are “indicative of this process of image construction often called ‘imagineering’” (Müller & Steyaert, 2013, p. 141). Through the use of cities, States engage in nation-branding, “a process by which a nation’s images can be created or altered, monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to enhance the country’s reputation among a target international audience” (Fan, 2010, p. 101).

What is also remarkable is the fact that, for decades, the organisation of mega-events was limited to powerful countries of the Global North and its close allies⁵. Then, since the 2000s, the dynamics of power in the International System changed significantly in such a way that allowed emerging countries of the Global South not only to bid for the most important mega-events, but also to organise them successfully. As a consequence, starting in 2008, the majority of the three largest mega-events – FIFA World Cup, the Olympic Games and the Rugby World Cup (Cornelissen, 2008; Ren & Keil, 2018; Slater, 2014) –, amongst other smaller ones, are taking place in cities and countries of the Global South and are being used by these emerging countries as a way to increase their exposure and power in the world.

Scarlett Cornelissen talks about three of them in particular: the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008; Cape Town, Johannesburg and other South African cities during the 2010 FIFA World Cup; and the 2010 New Delhi Commonwealth Games (Cornelissen, 2010), but these are not the only ones. There is extensive literature on other various examples throughout the Global South such as the 2012 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia

⁵ Since the commercialisation of mega-events in the decade of 1990, the FIFA World Cup was organised by Italy in 1990, the United States in 1994, France in 1998, Japan and South Korea in 2002 and Germany in 2006. As for the Olympics, the organisation by cities of the Global North dates back to 1984 in Los Angeles and continues in 1988 in Seoul, 1992 in Barcelona, 1996 in Atlanta, 2000 in Sydney and 2004 in Athens. Finally, apart from the 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa, every other edition has taken place in countries of the Global North since its beginning in 1987.

(Ostapenko, 2010); the 2022 FIFA World Cup mostly in and around Doha in Qatar (De San Eugenio Vela & Ginesta Portet, 2013); or even the 2012 Eurovision song contest (Erickson, 2012) that, according to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put Baku and Azerbaijan “in a new league” (Goble, 2011, p. 1) as it created “an incredible influx of attention for a country that [was] known, if at all, as Europe’s backwater” (Ismayilov, 2012, p. 833). With this, the existing scholarship on the organisation of mega-events becomes the largest body within the International Relations literature linking the city and emerging powers.

The second reference to the urban in the emerging powers literature does not deal with cities themselves, but uses them as a replacement for the State. A large variety of authors mention the capital city of an emerging country as a synonym for the government of the country they are referring to. For example, Pastrana Buelvas et al. write that “Due to the fact that it is a shared problem, dealing with transnational crime along the Colombia-Brazil border calls for joint efforts in both countries. It seems like this has been very well understood in Bogotá and Brasilia during the past few years”⁶ (Translated by the author from Pastrana Buelvas, Jost, & Flandes, 2012, p. 435). Here, the two capital cities refer to the governments of Colombia and Brazil respectively.

Another example can be found in the work of Flandes and Wojczewski when they replace the governments of many African countries with their capital cities: “Pretoria’s NEPAD leadership (together with Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, and Abuja) is the lever with which it can claim economic jurisdiction over the African geographic entity” (Flandes & Wojczewski, 2010, p. 24). It is important to note that this practise can be better understood as a writing tool than as an engagement between the author and any real issues regarding the city.

A third reference can only be found in two of the 166 sources consulted and mentions the process of urbanisation in emerging powers. However, it does so in a very light way as these paragraphs do not really connect with the rest of the arguments. Käkönen argues that “Connected to this industrialization will also be fast growth in the urbanization of India. By 2020 it is estimated that 140 million people will have moved to urban areas”

⁶ Original text in Spanish: “Debido a que se trata de una problemática compartida, el tratamiento del crimen transnacional en la frontera Colombia-Brasil demanda una labor conjunta de ambas naciones. Esto parece que lo han entendido muy bien Bogotá y Brasilia en los últimos años” (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 435).

(Käkönen, 2014, p. 91). On the other hand, when Ellen Huijgh and Jordan Warlick discuss the emergence of Turkey in the International System, they state that

Around 75% of the population lives in urban areas, as compared to 50% in 1990, and Istanbul has doubled in size from 7.2 million people in 1990 to 15 million people or more in 2010. This rural to urban migration, and the trend of people moving east to west, has drawn a greater number of members of the religious, conservative middle class to the cities (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 9).

Two more further references by International Relations scholars to the urban are made by Huijgh and Warlick (2016) who mention that “as many as 2 million Kurds now live in Istanbul” (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 10) or when they discuss the Gezi Park protests stating that they “began as a peaceful sit-in at Istanbul’s Taksim Square on May 23, 2013, against the government’s decision to turn one of Istanbul’s last urban public parks into a mall or a museum” (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 30). Once more, it seems as if the urban issue was a secondary topic that does not contribute greatly to the emergence of countries of the Global South in the eyes of International Relations scholars.

Finally, cities are only used as the place where a conference, workshop, meeting or embassy is hosted. “The Flemish government, whether using its own offices or those of the Belgian foreign service, has delegates [...] in 64 countries, the most important ones in Berlin, The Hague, London, Vienna, Washington and Pretoria”⁷ (Translated by the author from Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 328); “At the IMF’s meeting in Singapore in September 2006, they agreed on reforms that will give China, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey a greater voice” (Ikenberry, 2008, p. 33) and “The three heads of government coordinated their standpoints and voting behaviour for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Havana and the 61st UN-General Assembly, where South Africa was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2007-2008) for the first time” (Flemes, 2007b, p. 6). Again, cities might be mentioned, but there is no in-depth information or analysis about them or the role they play in their countries’ emergence in the International System.

⁷ Original text in Spanish: “El Gobierno flamenco, bien con sus oficinas o usando el servicio exterior belga, tiene delegados —«representantes diplomáticos» según la página web oficial— en un total de 64 países, siendo las representaciones principales las sitas en Berlín, La Haya, París, Londres, Viena, Washington y Pretoria” (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 328).

To conclude, after taking a close look at the existing International Relations scholarship on emerging powers, it can be argued that the vast majority of it is almost completely city-blind. The field of International Relations proved to be, once more, a city-less space; one that deals with the State as a central actor but, as stated by Garcés González (2010), fails to understand it as a sum of its parts. The city is, for the most part, neglected, rejected, overlooked or ignored both in the Southern and Northern literatures. It is not perceived as necessary when addressing the key issues of the field. Using the words of de Sousa Santos (2010), the State exists on this side of the line while the city has been sent to the other side of the line, a place of the unknown where its dynamics are disregarded and its knowledge is marginalised. Apart from very few exceptions, the city does not matter for scholars working in the field of International Relations.

2.2. URBAN STUDIES: A SHIFT TOWARDS THE GLOBAL SOUTH BYPASSES THE STATE

From the Urban Studies perspective, the initial tendency to focus on traditional megacities in the Global North has started to subside by giving way to an increasing number of scholars dealing with cities of the Global South, especially during the past two decades. The consequence has been that, increasingly, cities like Beijing, Mumbai, São Paulo, Mexico City or Johannesburg have started to appear next to New York, London, Tokyo or Paris as global centres of economic and political power. It seems as if Jennifer Robinson's call to "bring more cities into view in urban studies [...] through a postcolonial critique of generalized, abstract Euro-North American analytic categories" (McFarlane, 2010, p. 736) is actually being carried out. But the key issue for this thesis is not whether or not cities of the Global South are being studied by urban scholars; the key issue revolves around two central questions: first, are these authors granting any relevance to the role of the State as its cities emerge as important actors in the International System? And second, is the urban scholarship considering these cities as part of a country's strategy to become an emerging power in the world? Part 2.2. addresses these two questions by analysing urban literature exclusively on cities in the Global South.

2.2.1. THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTHERN GLOBAL CITIES AND THE ERODING ROLE OF THE STATE

One of the most important scholars dealing with the international projection of the city is undoubtedly Saskia Sassen. After her earlier works on the mobility of capital and labour (Sassen, 1990, 1999, 2000), she focused her research on the rise of private transnational legal codes and supranational institutions to show how sovereignty remains an important concept in today's world, while at the same time, took an important step in urban literature by questioning the State as the only sovereign actor in the International System (Sassen, 1996).

Sassen moved to take a close look at the city's role in the world, publishing *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* in 2001, where she popularised the term 'global city' – as opposed to the previously coined terms 'world-city' or 'megacity' – by arguing that “the organisational side of the global economy materialises in a worldwide grid of strategic places” (Sassen, 2002, p. 218) and that “we can think of this global grid as constituting a new economic geography of centrality, one that cuts across the old North–South divide” (Sassen, 2002, p. 218). This is the first relevant finding for this thesis in Sassen's work. Not only does she mention traditionally important cities like New York, Tokyo or Sydney as the major international business and financial centres, but she also introduced a new set of crucial strategic places that participate in this world-city group by including cities in emerging countries such as São Paulo, Shanghai, Bangkok, Taipei and Mexico City (Sassen, 2002). With that, Sassen brings parts of the Global South into her analysis of cities with global profile.

The second relevant finding in Sassen's work could be described as an increasing autonomy of these global cities with respect to the States they are part of. She introduces this issue by stating that “globalisation and the international human rights regime have contributed to the creation of operational and legal openings for non-state actors to enter international arenas that were once the exclusive domain of national states” (Sassen, 2002, p. 217). She then argues emphatically that the new linkages between global cities in today's globalised world are “creating a strategic cross-border geography that [has bypassed] national States” (Sassen, 2002, p. 217). The key verb in her argument is *bypass*, meaning that cities are now acquiring the ability to function in the International

System as individual actors without the need to rely on their countries' official foreign policies. These arguments are also present in her later works, most importantly her 2011 book *Cities in a World Economy* (Sassen, 2011).

A similar argument can be found in the work of Yishai Blank at Tel-Aviv University in Israel. He argues that "in an era of globalization, cities are, again, the most prominent sites of the reconfiguration of the global order in which supra-national and sub-national entities gain control and influence over area once dominated by nation-states" (Blank, 2006, p. 879). He continues his analysis by stating: "one could roughly divide the impact of globalization on cities into two main categories: first, an evolution of the complicated relationship between cities and global forces; second, a transformation in the traditional relations between localities and states" (Blank, 2006, p. 880). As a consequence, by questioning the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty while granting the city an exceptional importance in today's globalised economy, Sassen and Blank are only two of the many scholars have eroded even more the almost non-existent role of the State in the field of Urban Studies, especially when it comes to the international projection of cities.

On a different approach, Neil Brenner abandons the perception that the rise of cities in the international system is eroding the power of the State and, instead, talks about a 're-scaled' configuration of State territorial organisation. His analysis is based on how globalisation and the emergence of global cities affects the relationship between the national and local levels within a State while largely bypassing the role of its cities in international relations or foreign policy. On this topic, he states that

state territorial power is not being eroded, but rearticulated and reterritorialized in relation to both sub- and supra-state scales. [...] Currently unfolding re-scalings of global social space cannot be grasped through unilinear notions of 'state decline' or through one-sided conceptions of globalization as a place-less dynamic of 'deterritorialization'. Contemporary reconfigurations of both urbanization patterns and forms of state territorial organization are best conceived as contradictory, contested strategies of reterritorialization through which the place-based and territorial preconditions for accelerated global capital circulation are being constructed on multiple spatial scales. I interpret global city formation and state re-scaling as dialectically intertwined processes of reterritorialization that have radically reconfigured the scalar organization of capitalism since the global economic crises of the early 1970s. Global city formation is linked both to the globalization of capital and

to the regionalization/localization of state territorial organization (Brenner, 1998, p. 3).

Another important and more recent piece, the *Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South* by Parnell and Oldfield (2014) is focused on the “geographical alignment in urban studies” and “brings into conversation a wide array of cities across the Global South – the ‘ordinary’, ‘mega’, ‘global’ and ‘peripheral’” (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014, p. i). While the book provides an analysis about how cities in the Global South are rapidly changing global and regional economic dynamics, references to how the *southern urban* affects the power of emerging powers in the International System are extremely scarce. In fact, the Handbook follows the same pattern as most Urban Studies publications on cities in the Global South: it considers the State when analysing domestic issues such as multi-layer governance or decentralisation but, like Sassen and Blank, bypasses it when it comes to international relations. At this point, the lack of points of contact between Urban Studies and International Relations is evident.

Taking a different approach, Ed Glaeser, in making the case that cities drive development success (Glaeser, 2012), engages with some success stories from cities in the Global South, such as Singapore, Bangalore, Gaborone or Mumbai. Most of his book discusses the steps followed by these and other cities to achieve what he considers *a success*, not only in urban planning, but also in other aspects such as human interactions within the cities. However, it is important to mention that his approach to urbanisation and the path cities everywhere should follow nowadays to achieve that success is completely centred on the Western European and North American models. In his own words: “Urban governments in the developing countries must do what the cities of the West did in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (Glaeser, 2012, p. 94). The issue is not whether that statement is right or wrong but whether an analysis of cities in the Global South should be carried out through the eyes of the Global North. The result is Glaeser’s inability to understand Southern cities within their own contexts and realities and, instead, through a very colonial approach, suggests they look to the North for solutions.

There are, however, two references in his book on the relationship between the success stories of these cities and the repercussions they have for their countries internationally. In the first one, Glaeser argues that “an open city cannot exist in a closed nation” (Glaeser,

2012, p. 251). He explains this point by referring to the effects a change in Argentina's openness to the world had on the city of Buenos Aires:

At the start of the twentieth century, when Argentina was one of the world's most open countries, Buenos Aires was a vibrant, international city full of English and Spanish and Italian and even Swedish entrepreneurs. Over the course of the century, Argentina closed its borders, and Buenos Aires became an insular place, whose beautiful older buildings reminded visitors of a more dynamic, cosmopolitan past (Glaeser, 2012, p. 251).

The second reference deals with migration policies of States and the impact they have on the country's economy as well as their main cities. Using the example of the United States, he states that:

While the biggest beneficiaries of immigration into prosperous countries are the immigrants themselves, the United States has benefited enormously from all the talented people who have settled here. Cities especially benefit from an influx of talent, because foreigners help urban areas play their crucial role of connecting countries (Glaeser, 2012, p. 252).

Although not extensively and in a very limited manner, Ed Glaeser becomes one of the few urban scholars to address the consequences national policies have on the international projection of the cities. However, it is interesting to notice that, for him, it is an inwards phenomenon. One that starts in the decisions made by the State and ends up affecting the city positively or negatively, depending on the case. By stating that "foreigners help urban areas play their crucial role of connecting countries" (Glaeser, 2012, p. 252), Glaeser acknowledges that there clearly is a link between the city and the international behaviour of countries. But that is a link that he – voluntarily or involuntarily – ignores and, thus, evades the State once more.

2.2.2. CITIES AS THE EPICENTRES OF A STATE'S ECONOMIC POWER

The connection between cities and a country's power resources will be discussed extensively in Chapters 5 and 6; however, this is a topic that infuses the Urban Studies literature and so is noted here for its narrow economic understanding of why cities are important for nations. The economic importance of cities in the Global South was

discussed in “The growing economic power of cities” by Cadena, Dobbs and Remes in 2012 when they argued that, by 2025, “many of the six hundred cities expected to generate 60 percent of global GDP growth will be in the South” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 1). They did not only focus on the well-known megacities of the South but also in what they call the ‘middleweights’, that is, “midsized cities that are among the most powerful forces for global growth today” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 1). However, their main aim was to “demonstrate how local governments can impact the scale and speed of economic development in their regions and how private investment in buildings and infrastructure today will shape the global economy in future decades” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 1).

Nonetheless, Cadena et al. (2012) did establish a link between the urbanisation rate in emerging countries of the Global South and their performance in the international arena, but did so only from an economic perspective. For example, they argued that “Latin America experienced a rapid phase of urbanization and today, four out of five people live in cities. The region’s top ten cities alone generate 30 percent of GDP” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 9) and that “given the importance of the top ten Latin American cities to the region’s economy, overall growth depends on the capacity of these cities to continue generating growth and improving performance” (Cadena et al., 2012, p. 9).

The previous approach is present in many other books and articles in the field. In his article “Back to the city”, Elliot Sclar argued that “the economic strength of a nation is nothing more than the sum of the economic strengths of its metropolitan regions” (Sclar, 1992, p. 30), whereas Ash Amin and Stephen Graham (1997) go further in their city-centred analysis and state that

US cities are the core of the metropolitan areas which play a pivotal role in the national economy. They provide work for millions and are the home to major private employers, the port of entry of foreign goods, capital and workers, and the port of exit of American goods, services and tourists. They house many of the world’s premier institutions of commerce, culture and learning (Amin & Graham, 1997, p. 414).

Considering the manner in which the analysis is presented by the authors discussed in this section, a country’s growth could be understood as a direct consequence of their cities’ growth, and not as part of a national strategy to improve the country’s economic performance, which is usually also the case. The city is, again, at the centre of the debate.

These authors ignore other extremely important economic activities within a State such as mining, agriculture or tourism which, in most cases, take place outside the city limits. Thus, by looking at the city as an ‘independent’ actor, the scholarship fails to see it as part of a bigger entity, the State, whose behaviour and public policy decisions have an enormous impact on the city itself.

However, the recent book *World Cities and Nation States* by Clark and Moonen (2017) tries to fill this gap in the literature. According to the authors, there are four dimensions of what they call “successful national government and world city relationships” (Clark & Moonen, 2017, p. 8) which can be seen in Table 2.3.:

TABLE 2.3. FOUR DIMENSIONS OF SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND WORLD CITY RELATIONSHIPS

World city success in its own right	World city contribution to the national economy
Role of national government in helping the world city succeed and compete	Role of national government in managing the consequences of its world city for the rest of the nation

Source: Clark, G., & Moonen, T. (2017). *World Cities and Nation States*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Wiley Blackwell, p. 8.

Clark and Moonen base their analysis on four different national systems of government – centralised unitary systems, federal systems, specially empowered cities and independent city-states – to assess the intergovernmental relations between cities and States. What is innovative in this work is the fact that the authors cover the traditional approach of cities’ contribution to the national economy but go further to determine the role of national governments in helping its cities succeed in the world and in integrating its world cities to the rest of the nation. However, as it is usually the case, the analysis mostly considers domestic dynamics between city and State, but largely ignores the role of these world cities in the foreign policy of their countries.

2.3. PARADIPLMACY, A DIFFERENT PATH

In the 1980s, Ivo Ducháček went a different path and introduced the concept of ‘multivocal actors’ through which he argued that there exists a polyphony in the International System (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005). He established through various case studies that there was no longer the single voice of the State in the international arena but, instead, there were other actors that were gaining a louder voice in the system: political opposition, ethnoterritorial communities, interests groups and subnational entities such as states or provinces (Ducháček, 1986). It was a first step towards a different, non-State-centric understanding of the International System, although cities were not mentioned yet.

A year later, Ducháček proposed an interesting political science analysis “on federalism [that concerned] 3 major forms of ‘trans-sovereign relations’ conducted by noncentral governments: (1) influencing external relations from within, (2) trans-border regionalism, and (3) direct contacts with foreign centres of power” (Ducháček, as cited in Alger, 1990, p. 494). Then, in 1988, Ducháček went back to dealing with the urban and included cities as the fourth *perforator* of the sovereignty of the State⁸ and thus, recognised them as actors that are able to “use different mechanisms of international activity”⁹ (Translated by the author from Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 287) outside of national borders. With this new approach to cities in International Relations, Ducháček became the first scholar in the field to systematically use the term ‘paradiplomacy’ throughout his work (Calvento, 2014). A critical reading of the paradiplomacy concept provides the architecture for Chapters 8 and 9.

Unlike the narrow international relations value given to cities by Glaeser and others, Ducháček’s “Global paradiplomacy consists of political contacts with distant nations that bring noncentral governments into contact not only with trade, industrial, or cultural centers on other continents... but also with the various branches or agencies of foreign national governments” (Ducháček, 1986, pp. 246–247). He also argues that

⁸ Alongside internal political opposition, private interest groups and migrants (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 287).

⁹ Original text in Spanish: “Estos perforadores emplean diferentes mecanismos de actividad internacional” (Ugalde Zubiri, 2005, p. 287).

“‘paradiplomacy’ [...] creates an image of a central route of diplomacy on which national governments ‘ride’, and a separate, peripheral route of diplomacy on which city actors ‘ride’” (van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2007, p. 9). With this, the paradiplomatic role of cities in the international arena was now clear.

What must be noted is that much of the literature dealing with cities in the international arena now falls under the category of ‘paradiplomacy’. The concept appears in important works by Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (1999), Michele Acuto (2015), Édgar Zamora (2013), Alexánder Ugalde (2005), Panayotis Soldatos (1991), Rogier van der Pluijm and Jan Melissen (2007), Kaj Fischer et al. (2015), Eduardo Iglesias and Graciela Zubelzú (Iglesias, Zubelzú, & Iglesias, 2008), María Lis Rolandi and Marcos Merello (2017), Vanessa Marx (2009) and Leobardo Ruíz (2009), amongst others. The scholarship on this topic seems endless, both from the Global North and the Global South. The problem is that scholars working on paradiplomacy tend to look at the city as an isolated place, as one that does not have a relationship with the State it is in. It seems as if a focus on the foreign activities of subnational entities also means ignoring the role of the State and its official foreign policy. Consequently, regarding the topic of this thesis, so far, the paradiplomacy literature does not provide for any useful contact points between the International Relations and the Urban Studies fields. However, a few exceptions that link subnational entities and the State when engaging in international activities can be identified. Two of them are presented in the following paragraphs.

In 1996, Caterina García Segura from the Universidad Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona drew on the work of Ducháček and contributed to the debate by identifying four different scenarios of what she described as the ‘behaviour of foreign activities of subnational entities’ (García Segura, 1996). In her words, cities and provinces can engage in International Relations:

According to the level of implication on the international system (direct or indirect presence); according to the level of institutionalisation (formal or informal contacts); according to the nature of the relationship with the official foreign policy of the nation-state (cooperation, conflict or parallel action); according to the geopolitical criteria (trans-borders, transregional or global)¹⁰ (Translated by the author from Calvento, 2014, p. 306).

¹⁰ Original text in Spanish: “Asimismo, Segura (1996) revela cuatro clasificaciones que se han utilizado para describir el comportamiento de las actividades exteriores de las entidades subnacionales: según el nivel de

Not only did she mention the possibility of co-operation, conflict or parallel action between national and local governments in foreign policy; García Segura went further and introduced the word 'geopolitics'¹¹ – a term used almost exclusively in the International Relations literature – in her analyses of foreign activity of subnational political entities (García Segura, 1996). By including the word 'geopolitics', García Segura built a clear bridge between the two bodies of literature. She also implied that the foreign relations of cities can be understood under a geopolitical perspective, a domain that had been exclusive to analyses of the State.

The second exception can be found in a chapter by John Kincaid called "Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Polities and the Nation-State as Foreign-policy Actor" in the book *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units* by Michelmann and Soldatos (1990). This chapter focuses on the conflict that could arise between local and national governments when they engage in foreign activities. Kincaid states that

the patterns of co-operation and conflict that emerge from subnational diplomacy are not special or independent; on the contrary, they tend to be parallel to the patterns of conflict and co-operation that are present in other fields of the relationship between the central and subnational governments. [Kincaid] insists that it is only the novelty of these topics what can cause some unusual conflict in those areas in which the central government was used to have a power monopoly in foreign policy¹² (Translated by the author from Kincaid, as cited in García Segura, 1996, p. 258).

implicación en el sistema internacional (Presencia directa o indirecta); según el nivel de institucionalización (Contactos formales o informales); según la relación con la actividad exterior del Estado Nacional (Cooperación, conflicto o actuación paralela); según criterio geopolítico (transfronteriza, transregional y global) (Calvento, 2014, p. 306).

¹¹ Geopolitics can be understood as the "effects of geographical location and other geographical features on the foreign policy of a state and its relations with other states. It is also concerned with the strategic value of geographical factors (resources, access to the sea, etc.)" (Mamadouh, 1998, p. 238).

¹² Original text in Spanish: "afirma que el conflicto derivado de la actividad exterior de las entidades subestatales mantiene una relación directa con los patrones de cooperación/conflicto existentes en el seno del Estado. Según este autor, los patrones de conflicto y de cooperación que emergen de la diplomacia de las subunidades no son especiales ni independientes, al contrario, suelen ser paralelos a los patrones de conflicto y cooperación presentes en otros campos de las relaciones central-subestatales. Insiste en que es solamente la novedad de estos temas la que puede ocasionar algún conflicto inusual en aquellas áreas en las que el gobierno central estaba acostumbrado a ejercer el monopolio de los poderes de la política exterior" (Kincaid, 1990, p. 73).

The conflict mentioned in the previous paragraph becomes, then, the only reference in the paradiplomacy literature that engages with the relationship between local and national governments in the international arena. It does not deal, however, with cities and their paradiplomacy as part of the official foreign policy of the State. It presents them as two different phenomena, two different actors that go out in the world independently and then, there are consequences for the two levels of government within the State. It is a tentative link that will be further explored in Chapters 8 and 9.

2.4. CONCLUSION

As one of the contributions of this thesis, this chapter engages in a joint analysis of two bodies of literature that have rarely been studied together: International Relations and Urban Studies, and works across languages to present a more global and multilingual reading of the issues. This recasting is an important interdisciplinary exercise because of the currently fragmented nature of the scholarship in dealing with a common topic, the international activities of city actors.

The careful review of the secondary literature suggests that concerns with common issues exist. This is not a fictitious link. International Relations and Urban Studies scholars should be connecting at a deeper level or, at least, should be talking to each other. However, evidence has showed that a siloed debate prevails. Even in the few places where there is an overlapping debate, it is extremely tentative and as a result, the analysis is provisional and fragile. This leads to the first finding of this chapter: that there is an embryonic interface between the city and International Relations, but it is one that has not been conceptualised in the literature.

The disjuncture in theoretical ideas (across multiple languages) about the role of cities in International Relations practices of emerging nations is mirrored in policy, though not in practice. Chapters 8 and 9 will try to fill that gap and bridge the two bodies of literature by taking a close look at Bogotá and Johannesburg, two cities in emerging powers of the Global South, and their role in the official foreign policy of Colombia and South Africa respectively.

The reality is that cities of emerging powers do make a difference in today's international arena and they are extremely important in the power resources of countries – as it will be further explained in Chapters 5, 6 and 7; but because academics are not thinking about it consciously, the relationship between cities and States in foreign policy has not been fully conceptualised, with scholars and policy makers trailing practitioners.

PART 2

OVERCOMING ABYSSAL THINKING: AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING POWERS OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, director of the Centre for Social Studies at the Universidade de Coimbra in Portugal, has become an important point of reference – especially for the scholarship in Spanish and Portuguese – in understanding how modern Western thinking has hierarchised the production of knowledge in today's world. According to him,

Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones. The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two realms, the realm of "this side of the line" and the realm of "the other side the line". The division is such that "the other side of the line" vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent and is indeed produced as nonexistent. Nonexistent means not existing in any relevant or comprehensible way of being. Whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded because it lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers to be its other. What most fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility of the copresence of the two sides of the line. To the extent that it prevails, this side of the line only prevails by exhausting the field of relevant reality. Beyond it, there is only nonexistence, invisibility, nondialectical absence (De Sousa Santos, 2007, pp. 45–46).

Though, de Sousa Santos' theory is not exclusive for Western thinking. The International System has also been organised in an abyssal way. The North – or the West – is not only on top, but also at the centre of the world, leaving the rest – the Global South, the periphery (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2013; Flandes, 2007b; Robinson, 2011b) – as a place of the unknown; a place that cannot produce valuable knowledge and, therefore, has to rely on the North to find solutions to its many problems. Moreover, besides being the only side of the line that claims to exist, the North also allows itself to be the one that establishes which practices are acceptable and which are not, what is adequate and what is not, what is right and what is not – this can be clearly seen in the work of Ed Glaeser (2012). In that sense, countries and cities of the Global South are often perceived as failed for not being able – or not wanting – to follow the same path the North has and, therefore, their dynamics are disregarded and their knowledge marginalised (De Sousa Santos, 2010).

Consequently, if cities in the Global South are underdeveloped and problem-ridden, that would mean they are intended to stay in *the other side of the line* as it is argued in modern

Western thinking. However, if that is the case, a few questions need to be raised at this point. Why are some of these cities experiencing an outstanding growth in today's world, not only in terms of population but also in terms of importance in the International System? Why are some of them increasingly becoming centres for global politics, trade and communications? Why are some of them even pushing their countries into a new and improved position within the international community?

Thus, it is time to abandon the perception of cities in developing countries as second-class and start considering them as key actors not only in their own countries and regions, but also in the world as a whole. In the words of Jennifer Robinson, it means "to construct (or promote) an alternative [...] theory which reflects the experiences of a much wider range of cities" (Robinson, 2002, p. 532) and countries; to widen our understanding of the world by including cities and countries of the Global South that, according to the distribution of power in the current International System, can no longer be disregarded.

Part 2 follows Robinson's call as it focuses on these emerging powers from the Global South. Chapter 3 provides four key concepts from the International Relations fields that are crucial to understand the State as the main subject for this thesis and its role in the International System. It also engages with the current radical shift of power in the world, takes a close look at the emergence of the Global South and analyses some of the new groupings of emerging countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Chapter 4 engages in the conceptual debate on power hierarchies in the International System and zooms in on the concepts of emerging powers and emerging middle powers.

Consequently, Part 2 aims at providing the reader with a theoretical and conceptual framework that will serve as the basis for the analysis undertaken in Part 3 as to whether Colombia and South Africa can be considered emerging powers of the Global South and the role Bogotá and Johannesburg play in that emergence as part of the countries' power resources.

CHAPTER 3: RECLAIMING A PLACE FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EMERGING POWERS

This research explores the role of cities in the *official foreign policy of emerging powers*. As such, it is crucial at this point to focus the debate on the International Relations realm in order to contextualise and enrich the discussion that will take place in the following chapters. Consequently, Chapter 3 builds on the conceptual foundations for the case investigations by drawing from the International Relations, Political Science and Sociology literatures in order to explain four key concepts that are directly or indirectly present in the title of this thesis:

- ◆ It starts by looking at the *State* as the only actor capable of conducting official foreign policy according to International Law.
- ◆ It continues to explain what will be understood as *foreign policy* and why it can only be implemented by the national government of a State.
- ◆ As this thesis is focused on emerging powers, it introduces the concept of *international insertion*, that is, the positioning of a State within the international community.
- ◆ It explains and analyses the concept of *Global South* as the geopolitical framework for this thesis.

Finally, Chapter 3 ends with a close look at the International System and the way the emergence of the Global South is affecting the current world order and its power dynamics. It looks at literature from both the Global South and the Global North to discuss some of the countries that are rapidly becoming the world's most important non-Western powers. Then, it continues to explore some of the main groupings of emerging powers from the Global South according to different international banks and organisations and it ends with some economic projections on the role these countries are expected to play in the world in the near future.

3.1. THE STATE AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

3.1.1. THE STATE

Attempting to define the State is no easy task. Niccolò Machiavelli mentioned the word for the first time in the 16th century in his book *The Prince* (Maquiavelo, 2004) and, from there, a large number of works have followed suit, addressing the concept not only from a Political Science point of view, but also from the fields of Sociology and International Relations, amongst others. The following section will briefly discuss some of the most important scholars from different disciplines dealing with the issue of the State and will conclude by examining the definition of the State according to Public International Law.

Jean Jacques Rousseau understands the State from a sociological point of view. In his book *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right* (2003), he does not present the State as a political actor or as an international actor, but instead, he understands it as the natural evolution of social and community life. Furthermore, in *The Spirit of the Laws* (2003), Charles de Secondat Montesquieu approached the concept from a legal point of view. For him, the State is an organic legal organisation incorporated under legal principles in which power no longer depends on the ruler but it is regulated by law and is governed by objective criteria. In Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (2007), the State is considered a necessary evil for society that, by the monopolisation of the use of force, constitutes itself as an authoritarian and repressive figure. In a similar way, Karl Marx positions himself against the State as he believes it to be a tool of oppression between classes (K. Marx, 1975).

The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries brought about further analyses of the State. Hermann Heller's *Staatslehre* [Theory of the State] (1942) argues that the State is a centralised bureaucratic organisation whose social function is the assurance of coexistence and co-operation amongst men. At the same time, he includes other additional elements in the analysis such as sovereignty and territorial supremacy that are crucial for the role of the State in the International System.

While the previous authors discuss different issues about the State, Max Weber provides a more comprehensive definition of the concept in his book *Politics as a Vocation*:

we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence. Hence, 'politics' for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state (Weber, 1959, p. 83).

For the purposes of this thesis, however, the most appropriate definition of the State does not come from the previous debates, but from the field of Public International Law. Taking into account that this thesis deals with the role of cities in the official foreign policy of countries in the Global South, Public International Law is the umbrella under which States function in the International System.

In 1933, the member countries of the Organisation of American States (OAS) met in Montevideo, Uruguay to discuss the rights and duties of the States in the American continent¹³. The result of that meeting was the Montevideo Convention which provides not only a definition of the State but also establishes the different components that are needed for a State to be recognised as such in the International System. The Convention has 16 articles but only the six in Table 3.1. are relevant at this point, Article 1 being the most important one (Organization of American States, 1933).

¹³ This thesis uses the widespread understanding of the "American continent" in the Spanish Language. The American continent (or América as it is known in Spanish) comprises all three sub-continent: North America, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America. As such, all 35 independent States of the American continent are members of the Organisation of American States and signatories of the Montevideo Convention (Organization of American States, 2017).

TABLE 3.1. SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES

ARTICLE 1	The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
ARTICLE 3	The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.
ARTICLE 4	States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.
ARTICLE 5	The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.
ARTICLE 6	The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.
ARTICLE 7	The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.

Source: Adapted from Organization of American States. (1933). *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention)*. Montevideo, Uruguay: Organization of American States - OAS.

It must be noted that, even though the Montevideo Convention should, at least in theory, only legally bind the States in the American continent as it was signed within the OAS, it has been recognised as Customary International Law, that is, “an international obligation

arising from established state practice” (M. N. Shaw, 2003) or “a general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation” (M. N. Shaw, 2003). On this issue, Thomas Grant argues:

The Montevideo Convention is just a definition. On its face, it is simple: four succinct elements. Moreover, it arose from a convention. The principle underlying international agreements – pacta sunt servanda – is probably the oldest rule of international law. Writers have counted treaties and conventions as a source of international law from the beginning of modern treatment of the subject. The statute of the International Court of Justice identifies treaties and conventions as a favored source of international law (Grant, 1998, p. 454).

Based on the Montevideo Convention, and for the purposes of this thesis, a State will be understood as a person of international law with permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other States. In addition, a fifth element must be included: sovereignty – both internal and external –, a key pillar of the current International System. According to Daniel Philpott:

Another relevant pair of adjectives is “internal” and “external,” which are not distinct types of sovereignty, but complementary, always coexistent, aspects of sovereignty. Supreme authority within a territory implies both undisputed supremacy over the land’s inhabitants and independence from unwanted intervention by an outside authority – a church, an empire, another state or a United Nations. It is to the external aspect of sovereignty that modern international legal scholars and political scientists refer. In a broader historical perspective, however, in which the state becomes the legitimate polity at Westphalia or colonies attain independence in the 20th century, both internal and external sovereignty are at issue (Philpott, 1995, p. 357).

For the purposes of this thesis, understanding the State as the sovereign legitimate polity in the International System is key at this point. This framing, rather than Sassen’s, makes it possible to look at Southern cities in a global context without having to address Jennifer Robinson’s concerns that every city is different and, thus, Southern cities must be studied through a post-colonial critique that distances itself from Western analytic categories (McFarlane, 2010). Therefore, by focusing the analysis on States, the thesis is able to address its main objective: the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers. In other words, it is about the States’ role in the world and how its cities contribute to it, not about the international ranking of its cities.

3.1.2. FOREIGN POLICY

Emerging not only from the State's sovereignty, but also from its capacity to enter into relations with other countries – as stated by the Montevideo Convention –, is the State's ability to conduct foreign policy. According to Christopher Hill, foreign policy can be understood as “the sum of external official relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations”¹⁴ (Translated by the author from Hill, as cited in Velosa Porras, 2012, p. 61). On the previous statement, Eduardo Velosa Porras stresses the importance of the word official, meaning that not all members of the State can implement it. Therefore, “international actions carried out by individuals or groups of individuals who have not been endowed with some degree of authority or legitimacy, could not be considered as foreign policy”¹⁵ (Translated by the author from Velosa Porras, 2012, p. 61).

Given the fact that States are not autistic or autarchic, Gyngell and Wesley include an additional characteristic of foreign policy by stating that it is a special public policy as it does not have a defined thematic. As a consequence, it may deal with issues of international co-operation, the environment, trade, or human trafficking, depending on the particular needs of a country at a given time (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007).

A more comprehensive definition of foreign policy can be found in the works of Rubén Vergara and Martha Ardila. The former understands foreign policy as “the implementation of domestic policy across national borders, visualising it as a means to achieve the interests that different social groups pursue independently, through the government”¹⁶ (Translated by the author from Vergara Crespo, 2012, p. 154). The latter adds that foreign policy is an extension of national or internal policy, or of hegemonic sectors within the country, whether jointly or fragmented. She argues that there is no one

¹⁴ Original text in Spanish: “la suma de las relaciones oficiales externas conducidas por un actor independiente (usualmente un Estado) en relaciones internacionales” (Hill, as cited in Velosa Porras, 2012, p. 61).

¹⁵ Original text in Spanish: “acciones internacionales de individuos o grupos de individuos que no hayan sido investidos con algún grado de autoridad o legitimidad, no podrían ser consideradas como política exterior” (Velosa Porras, 2012, p. 61).

¹⁶ Original text in Spanish: “la implementación de la política doméstica fuera de las fronteras nacionales, visualizándola como un medio para alcanzar los intereses que los diferentes grupos sociales persiguen de manera independiente, a través del gobierno” (Vergara Crespo, 2012, p. 154).

single national interest but, instead, there are many interests in permanent interaction (Ardila et al., 2005).

Ardila includes in her definition a key concept within foreign policy: national interest, understood as “the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world” (Nye, 1999, p. 23). In that regard, Narnia Bohler-Muller explains the importance of national interest for the international relations of countries: “Despite all the peripheral rhetoric, it is no secret that in the world of realpolitik, international relations are driven primarily by national interests. [...] [N]ational interests, values and identity should be paramount in informing foreign affairs” (Bohler-Muller, 2012, p. 5). Finally, and also related to national interest, foreign policy is the result of a rational analysis of the country’s role in the International System (Velosa Porras, 2012) and the way in which States identify themselves in order to interact with the rest of the world (Steele, 2008).

3.1.3. INTERNATIONAL INSERTION

‘International Insertion’ is a term that has been widely used in International Relations literature. There is, though, a major problem with it as most academics and researchers use it assuming the reader knows what it means and very few take the time to explain or define it. It is noteworthy to see many articles – especially in Spanish – in which the concept is even used in the title but no explanation of it is given throughout the text. This phenomenon can be seen in the works of Jorge Mario Martínez Piva and Esteban Pérez (2003), Ángeles Sánchez-Diez and David Matesanz (2011), Mariana Calvento (2014), Jean Njoya (2010), Marta Ardila (2014), Sandra Borda (2012) and Didier Ramousse (2007). When analysing the literature in English, two different phenomena stand out. First, authors from Anglophone countries do not tend to use the concept and, therefore, ‘international insertion’ is absent from their works. And second, scholars from non-Anglophone countries writing in English do include the concept of ‘international insertion’ in their articles. A few examples of this situation are found in the works of Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007), Andrés Malamud (2011), Detlef Nolte and Bert Hoffmann (2007) or Juliana Aldana Díaz (2012). Consequently, it seems as if the concept was limited to the scholarship produced by authors whose native language is not English.

Definitions, however, are provided by Alexandre César Cunha Leite and Juan Scartascini del Río, two Latin American scholars who have dealt with the issue of international insertion of countries, the former for the People's Republic of China and the latter for the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania –. According to Leite,

[I]t can be said that international insertion is the interaction and integration that a country has with the international environment. Thus, to analyze the international insertion of a country, it should be taken into consideration its positioning in front of the many current international agendas and its (political, economic, social, environmental, juridical etc.) relations with other countries (Leite & Máximo, 2011, p. 4).

Furthermore, Scartascini provides a more comprehensive definition of international insertion. In his words, international insertion

is the positioning of a certain state, as a result of state action in a given context in the contemporary international community. It is determined by multiple variables, such as: its political and diplomatic negotiations; its strategic and defensive alliances; its political and economic partners; the degree of cooperation (political, economic, military or scientific-technical), its concertation and integration with other States; the quantitative and qualitative level of trade with other/s state/s; the fluidity and depth of its relationships with its peers, and especially their selection (following political and economic criteria, regional or historical proximity, its neighbourhood, socio-cultural identification, etc.)¹⁷ (Translated by the author from Scartascini del Río, 2010, p. 3).

3.1.4. GLOBAL SOUTH

After the end of the Cold War, the so-called Third World or Non-Aligned countries struggled to find a new identity. The main reason for their existence as a concept – an

¹⁷ Original text in Spanish: “El posicionamiento que obtendrá un Estado determinado, como resultado de su accionar estatal en el contexto dado en la Comunidad Internacional que le es contemporánea. La misma estará determinada por múltiples variables, como pueden ser: sus negociaciones político-diplomáticas; sus alianzas estratégicas y defensivas; sus socios políticos y económicos; el grado de cooperación (política, económica, militar o científicotécnica), concertación e integración con otros Estados; el nivel cuantitativo y cualitativo del intercambio comercial con otro/s Estado/s; la fluidez y profundidad de las relaciones con sus pares, y en especial la selección de los mismos (siguiendo un criterio político, económico, de cercanía regional o histórica, de vecindad, de identificación socio-cultural, etc.) (Scartascini del Río, 2010, p. 3)

alternative to the East–West confrontation – had disappeared and the ‘end of the Third World’ as we knew it became a possibility (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003). However, even though the concept itself could disappear, it was evident that the problems faced by this grouping of countries still existed and, in some cases, were even deepening (Delgado Caicedo & Sáenz Peñas, 2013).

With the changes in the post-Cold War International System,

it became necessary to reconfigure the construction of the concept and shift the identity issue from the vertical and confrontational to the horizontal and cooperative, making a renewed South-South dialogue possible that allows for a different frame of action for the foreign policy of the African, Asian and Latin American countries. This new way of categorising the international reality of those States would fall within the concept of Global South¹⁸ (Translated by the author from Delgado Caicedo & Sáenz Peñas, 2013, p. 112).

When trying to come to terms about the true nature of the Global South, some of the most important scholars such as Comaroff & Comaroff agree with Boaventura de Sousa Santos and his abyssal thinking theory (De Sousa Santos, 2007, 2009, 2010). In their article “Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa”, they state that

‘The Global South’ has become a shorthand for the world of non-European, postcolonial peoples. Synonymous with uncertain development, unorthodox economies, failed states, and nations fraught with corruption, poverty, and strife, it is that half of the world about which the ‘Global North’ spins theories. Rarely is it seen as a source of theory and explanation for world historical events. Yet, as many nation-states of the Northern Hemisphere experience increasing fiscal meltdown, state privatization, corruption, and ethnic conflict, it seems as though they are evolving southward, so to speak, in both positive and problematic ways (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, p. 113).

However, given the role countries from the Global South are playing in today’s world, it would probably be inadequate to refer to it as a negative concept associated with


¹⁸ Original text in Spanish: “Fue necesario reconfigurar la construcción del concepto y de trasladar la identidad de lo vertical y confrontacionista a lo horizontal y cooperativista, haciendo posible un renovado diálogo Sur-Sur que ofreciera un marco de acción diferente para la política exterior de los países africanos, asiáticos y latinoamericanos. Esta nueva forma de categorizar la realidad internacional de dichos Estados se enmarcaría dentro del concepto de Sur Global” (Delgado Caicedo & Sáenz Peñas, 2013, p. 112).

underdevelopment or failed States or simply as “the geopolitical concept replacing ‘Third World’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union” (Levander & Mignolo, 2011, p. 3). Instead, a more positive approach is required. For Levander and Mignolo, “the ‘Global South’ is the location where new visions of the future are emerging and where the global political and de-colonial society is at work” (Levander & Mignolo, 2011, p. 3).

Finally, in 2004, the United Nations Development Programme – UNDP – produced its report ‘Forging a Global South’ in which it explains not only the concept but also states which countries are located in this new grouping (See Figure 3.1.). According to the UNDP,

The use of the term “South” to refer to developing countries collectively has been part of the shorthand of international relations since the 1970s. It rests on the fact that all of the world’s industrially developed countries (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand) lie to the north of its developing countries. The term does not imply that all developing countries are similar and can be lumped together in one category. What it does highlight is that although developing countries range across the spectrum in every economic, social and political attribute, they all share a set of vulnerabilities and challenges (UNDP, 2004, p. Cover).

FIGURE 3.1. COUNTRIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH ACCORDING TO UNDP



Note: Data adapted from “Forging a Global South”, by United Nations Development Programme, 2004, (<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH-PR-Publications-UNDay-for-South-South-Cooperation.pdf>), Copyright 2004 by the United Nations Development Programme - UNDP. In the public domain.

3.2. A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTH

There has been an overwhelmingly large debate on the distribution of power in the International System amongst scholars ever since the study of International Relations became a scientific discipline. In fact, as it has been explained in Chapter 2, every International Relations theory has considered the issue of power as key for its debates and analyses. From works focused on super powers and their influence in the International System by well-known authors in the field such as Hans Morgenthau (1945, 1946, 1949, 1964, 1967, 1986), Robert Keohane (1969, 1984) or Joseph Nye (1984, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013) to research on the role of emerging countries in world politics by scholars from or focused on the Global South such as Daniel Flandes (2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 2010b), Esteban Actis and Julieta Zelicovich (2016), Martha Ardila (2014), Kamal and Anuradha Chenoy (2007), Young Choi (2009) and Umut Korkut and İlke Civelekoğlu (2012), the literature on the topic is endless.

However, even though the literature is as varied as it is immense, the majority of the most recent scholarship agrees on one particular issue: a profound change in the power dynamics of the International System during the past two to three decades. As stated by Daniel Flandes, “the global order is in the midst of a fundamental transformation. Not many experts would have imagined something like this just twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall”¹⁹ (Translated by the author from Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 26). As a consequence, governments and scholars from both sides of the line have increasingly started to engage with the so-called “emergence of the South”. The world is now being understood as a different place, one that differs greatly from the traditional Western-centric approach by bringing a wide range of Southern actors into the equation. For example, researchers funded by the Indian Centre for Policy Research described the current International System as follows:

The United States remains the single biggest power, and projections of American GDP do not show any diminution in its relative pre-eminence. At the upper tier, China and India

¹⁹ Original text in Spanish: “El orden global está en medio de una transformación fundamental. No muchos expertos hubieran imaginado algo así tan sólo veinte años después de la caída del Muro de Berlín” (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 26).

will continue to rise as will Brazil. Russia and Japan may experience marked declines, while Europe will decline more slowly. Middle rung powers like South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran and South Africa will become increasingly important. Over the horizon, Africa and Latin America will experience rapid growth (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 31).

Another example can be found in ‘Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory review’ by Cooper and Flemes. In their article, the authors argue that

The rise of emerging countries beyond the West is pivotal to understanding how the global system is being reshaped in the first quarter of the 21st century. The ascent of these states is addressing imbalances in the global system—and in the globalisation process—that up until now have mainly reflected the greater influence of traditionally powerful states and commercial actors. The rise of new groupings of states from the global South (groupings that cross regions and exercise considerable influence, especially in international economic and social policy negotiations) is starting to overcome the disorganisation that in the past has tended to mute emerging countries’ contributions in global policy debates. The emerging states that grab most of the attention—China, India, Brazil and to some extent South Africa—are beginning to reverse the historically weak mechanisms of collective action associated with forums such as the G77, and the splintering effects of the policy competition that has often arisen among developing states as a consequence of economic globalisation (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013, p. 944)


Indeed, the transformation is evident. “Since 2000, the world has experienced the largest shift of power in history, and this is not limited to the BRICS” (S. M. Patrick, personal communication, February 2, 2016). This argument needs to be highlighted at this point. While the BRICS countries have been under the spotlight for years, they are not the only ones in the process of achieving a new and improved position in the International System. Patrick includes Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Iran as part of “the world’s main non-Western powers” (Patrick, 2010, p. 45); Nolte (2010) talks about new dynamics of power in the world for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey, whereas Hawksworth and Chan (2015) include Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Nigeria, Argentina and Thailand on the list of new emerging countries.

Many international banks and economists have also started to use acronyms to identify other sets of countries that are beginning to challenge the structure of power in the International System. Some of these are: MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) (Huijgh, 2016; Wright, 2014); the Next Eleven (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam) (Bloomberg Business, 2012; A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008); and CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa) (Huijgh, 2016; Ramírez, 2012; Russell, 2010), amongst others. On the same topic, since 2010, the Spanish Bank BBVA has produced an annual report called “EAGLEs Economic Outlook”. It started with the coinage of the term EAGLEs (Emerging and Growth Leading Emerging Economies) and then the analysis grew to include a different category of “smaller emerging powers” called the NEST countries. According to BBVA,

[Their] goal was to identify which emerging economies would be contributing more to world growth in the next ten years than the largest developed economies, i.e. the G7 countries. For the EAGLEs threshold [they] excluded the US due to its extraordinary size, while [they] set the G6 member with the smallest contribution as the Nest threshold (BBVA, 2014, p. 7).

As a result, the BBVA Research Unit 2015 report included the following countries in their EAGLEs category: China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Turkey, Philippines, Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh and Thailand. Also, the NEST category included: Malaysia, Egypt, Colombia, Vietnam, Poland, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Algeria, Peru, Argentina, South Africa, Chile and Sri Lanka (BBVA, 2015). For all of the above, both EAGLEs and NEST, their contribution to world growth during the next ten years will be greater than that of Italy, the G7 country making the smallest contribution (See Figure 3.2.) (BBVA, 2014).

FIGURE 3.2. EAGLES AND NEST COUNTRIES IN 2015 ACCORDING TO BBVA RESEARCH



Note: Data from “BBVA EAGLEs Emerging and Growth Leading Economies Economic Outlook Annual Report 2015”, by BBVA Cross-Country Emerging Markets Analysis Unit, 2015, (https://www.bbvarsearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BBVA-EAGLEs-2015_eng_final6.pdf), Copyright 2015 by BBVA Research. Reprinted with permission.

The conclusions in BBVA’s 2015 report are extremely relevant for this thesis. They found that “emerging markets will account for 78% of global growth between 2014 and 2024, with EAGLEs contributing up to 62%, the NEST group 9% and other emerging countries another 7%” (BBVA, 2015, p. 9). Furthermore, “China and India will lead global growth contributing 28% and 14% respectively between 2014 and 2024” (BBVA, 2015, p. 12); “Russia, Mexico and Nigeria will contribute more than any developed country. Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Turkey will add more to the increase of world GDP than Germany and the United Kingdom” (BBVA, 2015, p. 13) and, “while Malaysia ranks at the top of the NEST group, Egypt, Colombia, Vietnam and Poland show contributions to global growth comparable to those from large developed economies” (BBVA, 2015, p. 14).

TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF EMERGING COUNTRIES GROUPINGS

COUNTRY	BRICS	MINT	NEXT 11	CIVETS	EAGLES	NEST
 Algeria						✓
 Argentina						✓
 Bangladesh			✓		✓	
 Brazil	✓				✓	
 Chile						✓
 China	✓				✓	
 Colombia				✓		✓
 Egypt			✓	✓		✓
 India	✓				✓	
 Indonesia		✓	✓	✓	✓	
 Iran			✓			✓
 Iraq					✓	
 Kazakhstan						✓
 Korea (Rep.)			✓			
 Malaysia						✓
 Mexico		✓	✓		✓	
 Myanmar						✓
 Nigeria		✓			✓	
 Pakistan			✓		✓	
 Peru						✓
 Philippines			✓		✓	
 Poland						✓
 Qatar						✓
 Russia	✓				✓	
 Saudi Arabia					✓	
 South Africa	✓			✓		✓
 Thailand					✓	
 Turkey		✓	✓	✓	✓	
 U. A. Emirates						✓
 Vietnam			✓	✓		✓

The emergence of categories of nations and the role of new emerging powers in today's International System can be further understood by looking at the evolution of the 30 largest economies in the world in 2000 and 2016 in the following tables drawn from the World Bank data. The first noticeable change is at the very top of Table 3.3. In 2000 the largest economy in the world was the United States, whereas in 2016 it was replaced by

China, one of the emerging economies from BRICS. The traditional middle powers in Europe also saw a decrease in their economic power from 2000 to 2016. Germany dropped from the fourth position to the fifth, France from the eighth to the tenth and the United Kingdom suffered the biggest decline by going from the sixth position to the ninth. The third largest economy in 2000, Japan, was also relegated to the fourth position by India, another emerging economy from BRICS. Furthermore, other traditional middle powers such as Italy, Canada and Spain all lost between two and four positions, while Belgium simply disappeared from the top 30. At the same time, the number of positions gained by other emerging countries of the Global South is impressive: Russia went from 11th to 6th, Indonesia from 12th to 8th, the Republic of Korea from 15th to 14th, Saudi Arabia from 17th to 15th, Turkey from 18th to 13th, Thailand from 21st to 18th and Colombia from 30th to 29th.

But the growth experienced by countries of the Global South cannot only be seen in terms of their place in the top 30 ranking. When looking at the change in GDP, China's economy was approximately seven times bigger in 2016 than it was in 2000 going from USD 3,6 to 21,4 billion in just 16 years. The Indian economy grew approximately four times in the same period; Russia grew 3,3 times; Nigeria grew four times; Turkey, Colombia and Saudi Arabia grew three times; the Egypt and Pakistan grew 2,5 times while the Republic of Korea and Thailand were twice as big in 2016 as they were in 2000.

If the global GDP ranking projected for 2050 by PwC in Table 3.4. is included, there is a significant decline in the number of traditional Western countries in the top 30 going from 12 in 2000 to ten in 2016 and then to nine in 2050. Furthermore, the projection for 2050 shows some additional relevant data: India surpasses the United States as the second largest economy in the world while Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Nigeria climb to the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th positions respectively displacing some traditional powers such as Germany and the United Kingdom down to the 10th and 11th positions. At the bottom of the table, the economies of two traditional middle powers like Spain and Australia end up having approximately the same size as South Africa and Colombia, two of the new emerging powers from the Global South. All the previous data goes back to the common ground in the current International Relations literature: the increasing importance of countries of the Global South in today's world order.

TABLE 3.3. COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) (PPP) FOR 2000 AND 2016

2000			2016		
RANK	COUNTRY	GDP (USD)	RANK	COUNTRY	GDP (USD)
1.	United States	10,284,779,000,000	1.	China, P.R.	21,417,149,856,080
2.	China, P.R.	3,681,133,749,299	2.	United States	18,569,100,000,000
3.	Japan	3,290,078,495,532	3.	India	8,702,900,012,352
4.	Germany	2,189,918,931,363	4.	Japan	5,266,443,919,742
5.	India	2,105,369,974,081	5.	Germany	4,028,362,431,411
6.	United Kingdom	1,616,501,540,098	6.	Russia	3,397,368,441,152
7.	Brazil	1,585,205,951,881	7.	Brazil	3,141,333,107,725
8.	France	1,582,452,951,605	8.	Indonesia	3,032,090,005,363
9.	Italy	1,517,958,032,295	9.	United Kingdom	2,796,731,825,411
10.	Mexico	1,060,833,552,415	10.	France	2,773,931,830,825
11.	Russia	1,000,581,673,013	11.	Italy	2,312,559,334,097
12.	Indonesia	973,477,182,951	12.	Mexico	2,278,072,027,969
13.	Canada	894,658,117,917	13.	Turkey	1,927,693,211,930
14.	Spain	880,773,581,563	14.	Korea, Rep	1,832,073,483,290
15.	Korea, Rep	850,446,556,726	15.	Saudi Arabia	1,756,793,436,986
16.	Iran	621,359,989,136	16.	Spain	1,686,372,919,950
17.	Saudi Arabia	599,266,227,159	17.	Canada	1,597,516,516,505
18.	Turkey	589,614,306,790	18.	Thailand	1,164,928,290,123
19.	Australia	504,330,170,749	19.	Australia	1,128,908,014,064
20.	Netherlands	502,235,090,244	20.	Nigeria	1,091,227,625,574
21.	Thailand	458,572,949,080	21.	Egypt	1,065,179,267,161
22.	Egypt	409,278,963,385	22.	Poland	1,055,353,929,932
23.	Poland	405,951,968,212	23.	Pakistan	1,014,180,695,173
24.	Pakistan	383,732,563,387	24.	Argentina	874,071,002,223
25.	South Africa	346,205,491,128	25.	Netherlands	866,204,439,716
26.	Malaysia	299,737,631,489	26.	Malaysia	863,287,467,785
27.	Belgium	289,965,380,050	27.	Philippines	806,539,481,635
28.	Venezuela	279,759,803,714	28.	South Africa	739,419,184,416
29.	Nigeria	276,212,746,140	29.	Colombia	688,817,300,979
30.	Colombia	266,073,563,933	30.	U. A. Emirates	671,292,424,231

Note: Data not available for the Islamic Republic of Iran for 2016.

Note 2: Data for 2000 table adapted from "GDP, PPP (current international \$)", by The World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2000+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc&page=3) and data for 2016 table adapted from "GDP, PPP (current international \$)", by The World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc&year_high_desc=true). Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

It must be noted that all the previous tables and projections are based entirely on the economic performance of the State. They do not disaggregate the domestic components of a country's GDP and, therefore, are completely city-blind. Attention is brought to this issue because all these rankings are oblivious to three important dynamics involving the influence of cities in their countries' economic performance in the current International System. First, they ignore the fact that the world is shifting, although somewhat ambiguously, from national to city economies (McGranahan & Martine, 2014). Second, while they acknowledge the shifting in the location of economic power from the Global North to the Global South, they ignore the fact that urbanisation plays a key role; in other words, it is not just shifting from the Global North to the Global South but from "the urbanised North to the urbanising South" (McGranahan & Martine, 2014, p. 1). And third, they fail to recognise the importance of the relationship between urbanisation and economic growth, especially for countries of the Global South (Chen, Zhang, Liu, & Zhang, 2014; Turok & McGranahan, 2013).

TABLE 3.4. TOP 30 COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST PROJECTED GDP (PPP) FOR 2050 (DATA IN 2014 USD BILLIONS)

RANK	COUNTRY	GDP	RANK	COUNTRY	GDP
1.	 P.R. of China	61,079	16.	 Egypt	4,239
2.	 India	42,205	17.	 Republic of Korea	4,142
3.	 United States	41,384	18.	 Italy	3,617
4.	 Indonesia	12,210	19.	 Canada	3,583
5.	 Brazil	9,164	20.	 Philippines	3,516
6.	 Mexico	8,014	21.	 Thailand	3,510
7.	 Japan	7,914	22.	 Vietnam	3,430
8.	 Russia	7,575	23.	 Bangladesh	3,367
9.	 Nigeria	7,345	24.	 Malaysia	3,327
10.	 Germany	6,338	25.	 Iran	3,224
11.	 United Kingdom	5,744	26.	 Spain	3,099
12.	 Saudi Arabia	5,488	27.	 South Africa	3,026
13.	 France	5,207	28.	 Australia	2,903
14.	 Turkey	5,102	29.	 Colombia	2,785
15.	 Pakistan	4,253	30.	 Argentina	2,455

Note: Data from "The World in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue?", by PwC, 2015, (<http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf>), Copyright 2015-2016 by PwC. Reprinted with permission.

3.3. CONCLUSION

Conventional concepts from International Relations provide a framework that is crucial for the advancement of this thesis, although the city is not a traditionally considered object of study by the discipline. Nevertheless, as the main aim of this research is to analyse the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers from the Global South, four concepts that provide analytical precision to the case investigations were addressed in this chapter:

The State, not only as the most important actor for this thesis, but also as the only one capable of pursuing an official foreign policy in the International System. Also, although it might seem obvious, defining the State is crucial as all emerging powers are indeed States. In other words, actors other than the State cannot be considered as emerging powers in the International System under the International Relations umbrella.

Foreign policy as the official tool available to the State to pursue and defend its national interests abroad. As it was explained previously, even though sub-national entities may indeed go overseas and establish relationships with foreign entities, those dynamics cannot be understood as foreign policy as they are not implemented by the national government of a State.

The concept of international insertion becomes relevant as this thesis explores the emergence of countries from the Global South. In other words, when a country emerges, it gains international importance and power as it inserts itself in new dynamics and engages with a wider variety of international actors. Consequently, it would be impossible for a country to emerge without inserting itself internationally.

Finally, as it was explained throughout this chapter, the Global South serves as a geopolitical framework for the thesis. The case studies do not come from the Global North, from the already industrialised world; they come from the developing world, from the Global South. And again, although it might seem obvious, the only countries that can emerge in the current International System are those that have not yet emerged, that is, countries of the Global South.

After engaging with the conceptual framework, the discussion continued to address power relations in today's International System. By analysing various groupings of emerging powers and the economic projections proposed by international banks and organisations, it was possible to prove that the world is experiencing the single largest shift of power in history. As a consequence, it is expected that, during the following decades, the influence of traditional powers of the Global North decreases considerably while that of new emerging powers from the Global South increases steadily. This shift is so evident that PwC projects a world in which only 9 out of the 30 largest economies in 2050 will be in the Global North.

A clear issue that stands out in this chapter is the fact that most – if not all – economic rankings are done by international banks, organisations or consulting firms while the academic literature in the International Relations field largely ignores the need to produce such rankings. In fact, academics seem to be concerned about defining the different categories in the hierarchy of power in the International System and how individual countries are located in each one of them, but they do not appear to be interested in the mobility between these categories provided by the rankings. This can be clearly seen in the literature. For example, Cooper and Antkiewicz (2008) refer to the study produced by Goldman Sachs, Subacci (2008) uses data from the World Bank, Flesmes (2007b) cites the UNDP, Käkönen (2013) refers to PwC and Scholvin (2010) to the OECD. Therefore, since the tracking of these rankings is not made by academics, practice simply runs ahead.

After addressing the key concepts and the emergence of the Global South in the world today, Chapter 4 will engage with a debate around the power hierarchies in the International System and the increasing role of emerging powers. It will provide a theoretical approach to the different categories of power and the characteristics of each one of them. The final aim is to allow the reader to come to terms with the concept of emerging powers and their relations with countries in the other categories.

CHAPTER 4: POWER HIERARCHIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE IMPROVING ROLE OF EMERGING POWERS

“Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it” (Nye, 1990b, p. 177)

The available literature on power hierarchies in the International System is extremely vast, reflecting the International Relations concern with the ranking of nations and how they rise or fall. For the purposes of this chapter, the main focus will be on emerging powers and its related concepts. The problem, however, is that there is no consensus amongst scholars on when and how to use the term ‘emerging powers’ (Flemes & Gomes Saraiva, 2014; Gratius, 2008b; Nolte, 2006).

In fact, during the last few decades, the field of International Relations has been flooded with the appearance of alternative concepts that could lead to confusion when referring to emerging powers. Some of these are: ‘global powers from the south’ (Lennon & Kozlowski, 2008), ‘middle powers’ (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006; Van der Westhuizen, 1998), ‘emerging middle power’ (A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008; A. Malamud, 2011; Schoeman, 2003), ‘southern middle power’ (Flemes, 2007b), ‘regional power’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Destradi, 2008; Korkut & Civelekoğlu, 2012; Nolte, 2010), ‘secondary power’ (Ardila, 2014; Huntington, 1999), ‘intermediate powers’ (A. F. Cooper, 1997; R. W. Cox & Sinclair, 1996; Hurrell, 2006; Keohane, 1969; Schoeman, 2003), ‘new intermediate power’ (Flemes, 2009; Juan G Tokatlián, 2007), ‘would-be great powers’ (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013; Hurrell, 2006) or ‘ascending power’ (Y. J. Choi, 2009; Hurrell et al., 2000) amongst others. The result, according to Daniel Flemes (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012), is that this multiplicity of terms darkens the debate more than it illuminates it. Therefore, the following section will aim to explain the power hierarchies in the world today, define the terminology around emerging powers and its related concepts, and provide the definitions that will be used in this thesis.

4.1. THE POWER HIERARCHIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

As it was mentioned previously, the issue of power has been at the core of every International Relations debate. Since the establishment of the Westphalian world order, “there has always been a wide variety of hierarchical relationships within the International System, including empires, protectorates, spheres of influence, dependencies, and other relationships” (Lake, 2007, p. 48). What is remarkable is that, even though the structure of power affects every single State as an equally sovereign entity, the emphasis in the different studies on the topic is almost entirely based on countries considered ‘super powers’ or ‘great powers’ and their relationship with ‘the rest’²⁰.

Unsurprisingly, the radical line that divides the world into two realms – as stated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) – is also present in these studies as most of them have been carried out in the current or past ‘super powers’, namely the United States, the United Kingdom or France. In this regard, Daniel Flemes claims that the debates have focused on either the rise and fall of ‘hyper-powers’ or the power transition theory based on the specific forms of conflict between ‘ascending’ and ‘hegemonic’ powers (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012). He further draws on authors such as Chua (2009), Organski and Kugler (1981), Gilpin (1981), Tammen et al. (2000), Overholt (2008), Lake (2007), Kagan (2008), Haass (2008), Humphrey and Messner (2006), Friedberg (1993) and Nolte (2008) amongst others to argue that, in their works, the role of emerging powers and the link between regional and global orders has been largely ignored, and when it has not, it has been analysed in a comparative way and in a very superficial manner (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012).

In 2013, Cooper and Flemes deal again with the structure of power in the International System and state:

Significantly, however, this image of marginalisation in the scholarship is contradicted by a revival of interest in the middle power model predicated on alternative sources of capacity and agency in international politics. With a focus on such attributes as GDP and other

²⁰ For one of the most notable exceptions, refer to Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. *International Organization*, 23(2), 291–310.

dimensions of economic and demographic weight, a number of reports has pointed to the appearance of an 'emerging middle' in the global economy (A. F. Cooper & Flesmes, 2013, p. 956).

In the previous paragraph, Cooper and Flesmes subscribe to Nolte’s idea that “neither global or regional power hierarchies are stable” (Nolte, 2010, p. 887) and that the world is in a constant power shift. They also agree with recent literature by recognising the fact that the emergence of the South can no longer be marginalised in the debates. There is, then, an explicit need to further understand how power is organised in the world today.

Keohane proposed a power hierarchy in 1969 that included the most important concepts – great, secondary, middle and small powers – and has been widely used and analysed in the International Relations scholarship for decades. Table 4.1. provides a ranked overview of Keohane’s concepts and categories.

TABLE 4.1. CATEGORIES OF POWER ACCORDING TO KEOHANE (1969)

TYPE OF POWER	CHARACTERISTICS	EXAMPLES
GREAT POWER	System-determining states: a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the International System.	United States and the Soviet Union
SECONDARY POWER	System-influencing states: a state whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in itself decisive, on that system.	United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan, Communist China and perhaps India.
MIDDLE POWER	System-affecting countries: a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through international institutions.	Canada, Sweden, Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina.
SMALL POWER	System-ineffectual countries: a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system.	Lesotho and an array of other states ²¹ – most of which would fall into Vital’s population / development categories.

Source: Adapted from Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. *International Organization*, 23(2), p. 293, 296.

²¹ David Vital draws the ‘rough upper limits’ for ‘small states’ as “a) a population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries” (Vital, 1967, p. 8). What is noteworthy at this point is the fact that; even though Vital admits that this categorisation is “frankly subjective, if not arbitrary” (Vital, 1967, p. 8), he is still quoted in Keohane’s *Lilliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics* as a valid parameter to classify countries in the International System. For more information, see Vital, D. (1967). *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*. New York City (NY), United States: Oxford University Press.

However, the world has changed radically since 1969 and, therefore, a few questions emerge at this point. After the fall of the Soviet Union, can the United States of America be considered as the sole superpower (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Huntington, 1999; Pape, 2005) or have other emerging countries from the Global South like China or Russia joined the United States as superpowers located at the top of the pyramid (Bijian, 2005; Hancock, 2007; Jacques, 2009)? Where are former superpowers – secondary powers according to Keohane (1969) – like France or Great Britain located in the current structure of power? What place do middle powers have in today's world? Is there a difference between new middle powers like Brazil or South Africa and traditional middle powers like Australia or Canada? Are they on the same level? Is it accurate to place two microstates like Singapore and the Comoros in the same group even though their influence in the International System is radically different? Is it still possible to refer to other less powerful countries as the 'mediocre rest' (Flemes, 2007b)?

TABLE 4.2. CATEGORIES OF POWER ACCORDING TO SÖREN SCHOLVIN (2010)

TYPE OF POWER	CHARACTERISTICS	EXAMPLES
SUPERPOWERS / PRIMARY POWERS	Decisive influence all over the world	United States / (Soviet Union) ²²
GREAT POWERS / SECONDARY POWERS	Relevant influence all over the world, decisive in some regions only	France / Russia
MIDDLE POWERS	Too weak for independent global politics, relevant partners of great powers, focus on specific policies and peaceful means	Australia / Canada
REGIONAL POWERS / REGIONAL GREAT POWERS	Strong focus on their regions, leading role in their region, relevant partners of great powers	Brazil / South Africa
SECONDARY REGIONAL POWERS	Limited to their regions, face stronger states nearby and thus seek external partners for balancing, relevant partners of superpowers	Argentina / Ukraine
MINOR POWERS	Limited to their regions, face stronger states nearby and thus seek external partners for balancing, relevant partners of superpowers	(Cuba) / Egypt / Israel
REGIONAL STATES	Limited influence on direct neighbours, otherwise irrelevant	Ethiopia / Tanzania
MICROSTATES	No relevant influence beyond their borders	Malta / Haiti

Source: Scholvin, S. (2010). *Emerging Non-OECD Countries: Global Shifts in Power and Geopolitical Regionalization* (GIGA Research Programme: Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations No. 128). Hamburg, p. 9.

²² Scholvin argues that "The USSR and Cuba are both included in this table as examples taken from Cantori's and Spiegel's work. This reflects the situation of 1970. Both countries have experienced a decline in power since the end of the Cold War" (Scholvin, 2010, p. 9).

To try to give an answer to all these questions, Sören Scholvin (2010) reviewed the works of important authors in the field such as Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, Detlef Nolte, Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington, and developed a table that aimed to provide an accurate power hierarchy for the International System in 2010. According to Scholvin, the current categories are found in Table 4.2.

In his table, Scholvin proposed what can be understood as *the* power hierarchy in the International System in 2010, *the* being the key word as he argues there is only one. However, Douglas Lemke (as cited in Nolte, 2010) suggests the existence of a multiple hierarchy model in which

Instead of one international hierarchy of power, the international power hierarchy consists of a series of parallel and superposed power hierarchies. The subsystems function according to the same logic as the overall power hierarchy – each of the regional or sub-regional systems has a dominant state at the top of the regional or sub-regional power pyramid. The regional or sub-regional subsystems are subordinated to the global power hierarchy. The dominant power in the global hierarchy, and also other great powers, can interfere in the sub-systems, especially if the local status quo is at odds with the global dominant power's preferences or the global patterns of political and economic resource allocation. Other issues – such as the delimitation of boundaries and territorial control in the region/sub-region – can be resolved within the framework of the regional/sub-regional power hierarchy. They are part of the regional/sub-regional status quo (Lemke, as cited in Nolte, 2010, p. 886).

In order to examine the hierarchy in the International System today, this thesis will focus on the three criteria that determines a country's power according to Detlef Nolte: power resources, leadership and self-conception (Nolte, 2010). It is important to mention at this point that, even though Nolte only uses these criteria when discussing what he calls a 'leading power', the three elements are present in the works of a large number of authors in the field when defining any country's role in the world, namely Joseph Nye (Nye, 2008), Andre Hurrell (2006), Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier (2012), William Wohlforth (1999), Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Daniel Flandes (2012), Marijke Breuning (2007) and Sören Scholvin (2010), amongst others.

But defining these three concepts is not an easy task. Most authors use the terms extensively throughout their works, assuming the reader knows what each one of them means, especially when it comes to power resources. Allusions to this concept are

everywhere but the definition is nowhere to be found. For example, in his article 'How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics', Nolte uses the concept of power resources as a fundamental part of his argument, but only defines it in a parenthesis when he states that it should be understood as "hard and soft power or smart power – the right combination of hard and soft power" (Nolte, 2010, p. 892). He includes "legitimacy and prestige" (Nolte, 2010, p. 896) in the definition a few pages later. There is no further explanation as to what hard and soft power actually are or what should be understood by legitimacy or prestige. Andrew Hurrell follows the same path when he argues that power resources mean the "possession of material, organisational and ideological resources for regional and international projection of power (power over outcomes)"²³ (Translated by the author from Hurrell, as cited in Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 144). Again, no further reference is made as to what constitutes material, organisational or ideological resources and how they can contribute to the international projection of power.

In contrast, Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego Vera Piñeros are two of the few scholars that have gone beyond the common approach to the concept of power resources in most of the literature. In their book *Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica?* (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012), the authors engage in a thorough analysis of Colombia's power resources that provides an explanation of the concept. According to them, the power resources of a country can be understood in the following terms:

1. Territorial Dimension: including size and location – absolute and relative to other centres of power.
2. Demographic Dimension: size of the population and levels of education.
3. Economic Dimension: including GDP size, GDP growth, unemployment, national production of goods and services, resources available within the national borders, exports and imports, industrialisation and levels of commercial diversification.
4. Socio-economic Dimension: national income, poverty rates, Gini index, corruption, tax collection and human development index.

²³ Original text in Spanish: "la posesión de recursos materiales, organizacionales e ideológicos para la proyección regional e internacional de poder (Power over Outcomes)" (Hurrell, as cited in Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 144).

5. Military Dimension: military capacity, military expenditure, ability to guarantee internal public order and to defend the national borders against foreign threats.

In contrast, the second term, leadership, is clearly defined in the literature. Nolte's initial definition is short and simple when he states that "leadership refers to political influence in diplomatic forums" (Nolte, 2010, p. 890). He later elaborates on the concept by drawing on the works of Dirk Nabers on regional leadership:

Nabers emphasises that leadership must be conceptualised as an activity (including leaders and followers) in an institutionalised context. Leadership also has a normative dimension because it depends on the ability of a regional power (or its leaders) to present its own particular worldview as being compatible with the aims of the regional followers. Leadership is conceptualised by Nabers as discursive hegemony (Nabers, as cited in Nolte, 2010, p. 899).

As for the concept of 'self-conception', Nolte not only gives a definition but also uses Andrew Hurrell to link it with the previous two determinants of power: power resources and leadership. In his words:

Most authors do not refer to specific objective criteria or resources (GDP, military power, etc.) to differentiate middle powers from great powers or less powerful states. Rather, they define a middle power from a constructivist point of view as a self-created identity or an ideology for the conduct of foreign policy. Therefore, what applies for great powers is also true for middle powers and regional powers: 'You can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others – by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. So a constructivist approach would view power hierarchies in terms of shared understandings that develop amongst groups of states.' The status of middle power or regional power is a social category that depends on the recognition of this status and the corresponding power hierarchy by other states. Nevertheless, inclusion in this social category also presupposes the corresponding material resources (Nolte, 2010, p. 892).


After a close look at these three concepts, it is possible to argue that a country's position in the international power hierarchy depends on the amount of power resources it has, the will and ability to exercise its leadership in the world and whether or not it is recognised by other countries as a member of one of the different existing power

categories in the world. However, further analysis is required at this point to determine what the various categories of power are in the current International System. And at this point is where the existing literature becomes problematic as there is no consensus on what these categories should be. Nolte explains this problem very clearly when he argues that apart from

the US as the only remaining superpower [...], there is much less consensus as to the further characteristics of the international power hierarchy. Not even with regard to the terminology – secondary powers, second-tier states, great powers, intermediate states, middle powers, middle-tier states, regional (great) powers, to enumerate some examples – do the different authors or scientific approaches agree. The same applies to the semantic discrimination with regard to the concepts of great power, regional power and middle power (Nolte, 2010, p. 885).

As a consequence of the abundance of terms and the lack of agreement in the scholarship, for the purposes of this thesis, a few alterations will be made to the categories of power established by Sören Scholvin in Table 4.2. in order to adapt the theoretical framework to the particular needs of this analysis. By doing so, the objective is not to ignore the contributions of many scholars in the field, but to select the terms needed to create a classification that allows for a better understanding of the world and the interface between cities and nations within this particular thesis. The selected hierarchy is presented in the following figure:

FIGURE 4.1. SELECTED CATEGORIES OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM



4.2. SELECTED CATEGORIES OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Figure 4.1. includes the four categories of power selected by the author in an effort to understand the power hierarchy in the current International System. In the following paragraphs, each one of the four categories will be defined and explained. Also, reasons as to why these four categories have been chosen will be discussed.

4.2.1. SUPERPOWERS

Being at the top of the pyramid, the superpower category is probably the least problematic of all the concepts as it usually refers to the role played by the United States of America in the world today. Samuel Huntington defined a superpower as a “state with pre-eminence in every domain of power – economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural – with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world” (Huntington, 1999, p. 36). Robert Pape includes a few additional characteristics to the concept of superpower, using the United States as an example. He argues that

The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. As a unipolar leader, the United States is also more secure than any other state in the world, able to determine the outcome of most international disputes, and has significant opportunities to control the internal and external behaviour of virtually any small state in the system (Pape, 2005, p. 11).

In other words, using Nolte’s three criteria, a superpower is a country: a) whose power resources are, in every possible aspect, notably higher than those of any other State in the International System; b) its leadership and influence can be exercised in a decisive manner all over the world; and c) it is recognised as being part of the club of the most powerful countries on earth by all other countries.

Today, it is clear that the United States of America is a superpower (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Nye, 2013). Its pre-eminence in the International System as the most powerful country in the world has been discussed and proved by almost every author in the field

since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Hurrell et al., 2000; R. Mohan & Kapur, 2015; Pape, 2005). However, more and more, references to the decline of the United States as the only superpower can be found in the literature (M. Cox, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Hirsch, 1995; Nye, 2010; Schweller, 2011) giving way to the rise of possible new superpowers in the International System. Nolte mentions “a growing literature on [the United States of] America in decline and the post-American world” (Nolte, 2010, p. 885), while Michael Cox goes further in the analysis to explain why the United States’ power is declining:

We are still left with a [United States of] America that looks a little less like the great omnipotent portrayed in the 1990s. We are also confronted by something that only a few years ago some would have thought inconceivable: namely a serious debate – once again – about the future of American foreign policy in a world in which it is no longer able to shape events on the basis of its pre-existing international assets. [...] Of course there are [...] many things the United States can still do, and indeed ought to do, in the world. The one thing it is unable to do, though, is avoid the single most important law of international history: the one which insists that, however singular and exceptional a powerful nation’s qualities might be, it cannot, for ever, expect to determine the way in which the international system operates. The question then is not whether decline is going to happen – it already is – but how successfully the United States will adjust to the process. There is no formulaic answer (M. Cox, 2007, pp. 652–653).

However, the concept of decline needs to be put in perspective. Nye argues that “the word ‘decline’ mixes up two different dimensions: absolute decline, in the sense of decay, and relative decline, in which the power resources of other states grow or are used more effectively” (2010, p. 3). And it is the latter that seems to be happening in the world today. As it is commonly agreed in the literature, the most serious candidate to join the United States in the club of superpowers is China (Goldstein, 2001; Hu, 2011; Mahbubani, 2005, 2009; Nye, 2010; Yueh, 2013). There are even authors that predict a world where China is more of a superpower than the United States. Zheng Bijian talks about ‘China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to great-power status’ (2005) while Martin Jacques goes beyond that statement with his book *When China Rules the World: The rise of the middle kingdom and the end of the Western world* (2009). The arguments to place China as a potential superpower evolve around its rising economy expected to surpass the United States by 2026 (Holodny, 2015), its growing military muscle (Goldstein, 2001) and its expanding diplomatic capability in the world (Bijian, 2005; Dördrechter et al., 2010; Glosny, 2010; J. Harris, 2005).

The other candidate to join the United States in the superpowers club is Russia. According to Cynthia Roberts,

Since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has tried to deny the realities of unipolarity while grudgingly adjusting to its constraints. Now that American primacy is waning, Russia, the perennial outsider, aims to become an insider and a rule maker in the international system. Despite questioning the existing order's durability and legitimacy, Russia and the other BRICs seek to be among its managing directors, not to overthrow it (Roberts, 2010, p. 38).

What is remarkable about Russia's projection in the world today is that, even with power resources notably smaller than those of the United States or China, Vladimir Putin has managed to implement a foreign policy that may well be understood as one of a superpower (Allison, 2008; Hancock, 2007; Lo, 2003; Ružić, 2013). Moscow's recent military incursions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria (MacFarlane, 2006; Nye, 2013), its alliance with China (Goldstein, 2001; Ong, 2009; Turner, 2009, 2011; Weitz, 2012), its dominant position in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Allison, 2008; Jonson, 2004; Turner, 2011) and its military power (Monaghan, 2016; Tsvetov, 2016; Zysk, 2009) have taken Russia to a new and improved position in the International System. However, as Hancock (2007) argues, the economy will be Russia's biggest downfall, making it difficult for Moscow to maintain its leading role in the world in the following years.

It must be noted at this point that none of the debates around which countries are superpowers and which countries are not consider cities as a determining variable. Cities are implicitly included in the countries' power resources but they are not recognised as a separate contributing force to superpowership. Perhaps one of the reasons that could explain this phenomenon is the fact that neither Washington nor Beijing are the largest cities in the United States and China respectively. This, in turn, would mean there is a disconnection in the literature between the capital city where political power resides on one side and the largest cities where economic power is concentrated on the other. However, the situation is quite different for Moscow as it is the only city in a would-be superpower that holds both political and economic power. The city then comes close to having an urban image or proxy of the State in the analysis of Russia as a superpower. This can be clearly seen in the works of Allison (2008), Hancock (2007) and Lake (2007).

4.2.2. MIDDLE POWERS (TRADITIONAL AND EMERGING) AND SECONDARY MIDDLE POWERS

The middle powers category is both the most important for this analysis and the most difficult to define. And it is difficult because, as it was mentioned previously, there is no agreement in the literature as to what terms should be used and what each one of them means. The term middle power – as well as other related terms such as secondary powers, second-tier States, great powers, intermediate States, middle-tier States and regional powers – has been extensively studied and, what is more problematic, interchanged in the scholarship. As stated by Andrew Hurrell,

Many people have tried to construct a theory of middle powers but without conspicuous success. On the one hand, it has proved very hard to decide what the shared attributes of middle powers should be and which states are to be included in the category. On the other, it has proved harder still to associate a set of plausible shared attributes (GNP, military resources etc.) with common patterns of foreign policy behaviour. Putative middle powers end up as a very diverse group subject to a wide range of external circumstances. It has been very difficult to identify common patterns as to what they will do; and indeed as to what they can do (consider in our sample the degree to which India has sought to develop sizeable military capabilities whilst Brazil has largely downplayed hard military power). There are, then, few, if any, common patterns of behaviour as to how a particular group of middle or intermediate powers will [behave] internationally, because the variation in the types of states involved, the categories of power that they possess, and the arenas within which they operate are all so various (Hurrell et al., 2000, p. 1).

The starting point for the concept of middle power was at the founding of the United Nations in 1945. Denis Stairs explains that, in preparation for the Conference of San Francisco, the concept was propagated by Canada and Australia to “provide a foundation for the claim of certain states – not great powers, but not pip-squeak powers, either – to an enhancement of their influence within the new United Nations Organisation under the terms of its constitutional ‘Charter’” (Stairs, 1998, p. 272). He then argues that the concept emerged just as “‘positional politics’, and nothing more” (Stairs, 1998, p. 272) from a group of countries that refused to have the same power as small countries, considered by them as ‘the rest’.

Though, since 1945, the concept of middle power has evolved, and more often than not, it has been used as a synonym for regional power. Adam Chapnick (as cited in Ardila, 2014) argues that both terms are ambiguous and confusing. They are not static or permanent, and instead, their place in the structure of power can increase or decrease in time. In the same article, Marta Ardila also states that there are no reliable methods to examine the behaviour of middle powers. That is why most of the literature focuses on the characteristics of a regional power while ignoring those of a middle power.

As a consequence, when trying to determine the nature of a middle power, most of its characteristics have been drawn and adapted from the definition of regional powers by the large majority of scholars (Ardila, 2014; Bonilla Montenegro, 2014; A. F. Cooper & Flandes, 2013; Nolte, 2006, 2010; Van der Westhuizen, 1998). However, there seems to be at least one exception. Maxi Schoeman distances herself from the rest by engaging in an analysis of the concept of middle power. In her article 'South Africa and the world' (2003), she starts by disregarding the importance of the region for the concept by arguing that

Middle powers, as defined in the literature, would seem to exclude the regional position of a state aspiring to or enjoying the status of being a middle power. Another interpretation would be that a middle power is defined vis-à-vis the existence of a major power(s) and is therefore not seen as a major power writ small in its own region – the examples of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden support this interpretation. Cox notes that middle powers had no 'special place in regional blocs' (1996: 245) during the Cold War era and Wight (1979) distinguishes between regional powers and middle powers, the former having a geographically more restricted range (Schoeman, 2003, p. 350).

Then Schoeman discusses the international capabilities of middle powers by claiming that the concept

refers to their size and rank which places them in an international division of labour in which they have the opportunity of exerting a type of moral influence on the international system, a role they accept and actively seek to play. Although their position or rank is determined by the structure of the international system, their role and functions are not. Structure gives them the room or opportunity to take up a certain role (Schoeman, 2003, p. 350).

Finally, she addresses the participation of middle powers within the existing world order. As a middle power, she argues, a country “cannot impose its own vision of [...] an ideal world in the presence of big or superpowers, it chooses, almost logically, to exert influence at the multilateral level where it can build consensus around certain issues” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351). In other words, “a middle power is one active in international organisations, supporting the objectives of international peace and security, also as one of its defined ‘national interests’” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351).

To sum up, and once more taking Nolte’s three criteria into consideration, a middle power is a country whose power resources are big enough to allow for an influence at a global scale, but at the same time, that influence is not strong enough to alter the existing power structure. Also, it has the will to become an important actor in the world and acts accordingly; and its leadership and legitimacy are recognised by most actors in the system, even superpowers. A preference to act within the existing international organisations can be added to the definition.

But another problem arises at this point: not all middle powers are the same and not all of them have the same influence in the International System. The previous statement is not only true because there are no two States in the world with exactly the same power resources, leadership and self-conception; it is also true because there are radical differences between the different groupings of middle powers. The following paragraphs will explain the two types of middle powers in the second level of the pyramid – traditional and emerging – as well as secondary middle powers located in the third level of the pyramid.

The middle powers group is made up of two subcategories: Traditional and Emerging (D. R. Black & Hornsby, 2016; Nel, Taylor, & Van der Westhuizen, 2000), and the difference between the two is what makes the current International System different from the one that arose after the Cold War. As it was explained previously, the concept of middle power emerged in the midst of the creation of the United Nations in 1945 (Stairs, 1998) and, as a consequence, the existence of middle powers has not been a strange phenomenon in the post Second World War period. The countries that can be classified as middle powers during the second half of the twentieth century – traditional middle

powers – differ greatly from those that can be classified as middle powers in the twenty first century – emerging middle powers –.

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries are located in the first group – the traditional middle powers (Nolte, 2010). These countries have achieved an extremely high standard of living for their populations and, through a focus on particular topics, have succeeded in obtaining important levels of influence in the International System. For example, Canada started with the ‘human security’ discourse in the decade of 1990 (Delgado Caicedo, 2007) and then modified the concept to introduce a new and improved one called ‘the responsibility to protect’ (McRae & Hubert, 2002). New Zealand, on the other hand, used the ‘denuclearisation of the world’ as the key tool in its foreign policy (Robson, 2000; R. Smith, 2002). So important was the anti-nuclear discourse for New Zealand that, in the mid-1980s, the government in Wellington forbid the United States to deploy nuclear submarines in its waters. The event was known as the ‘New Zealand – United States nuclear dispute’ and ended with New Zealand exiting the ANZUS military treaty with Australia and the United States (Tow & Albinski, 2002).

In today’s world, the traditional middle powers are perceived as important because they emphasise “the promotion of international peace and security and therefore highly value participation in international organisations, particularly those concerned with arms control and disarmament and with socio-economic issues” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 363). However, this perception has started to change. Ryerson and Dewitt explain the current situation in the following paragraph:

The middle power governments continue to use the language of being internationally engaged, and of promoting the traditional set of middle power issues. Yet the actions and capabilities of these states became increasingly disconnected with the discourse of middlepowermanship. The international stature of these states was then affected by this perceived gap between public diplomacy and the capabilities and policy choices of such states. At the same time as there was a decline in the middle power role of the first generation of states [that is, traditional middle powers], the post-cold war period saw the emergence of several states in the South (Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006, pp. 17–18).

And with that, Ryerson and Dewitt introduce the next category: emerging middle powers. In a world where the traditional middle powers are experiencing a clear decline

(Käkönen, 2013; Nolte, 2010), a new set of countries from the Global South are experiencing an outstanding increase in power in the International System. In regards to these new emerging powers, Jyrki Käkönen considers that “the issue is no longer about small or medium-sized capitalist success stories, but about states that also have the potential for political influence and are not satisfied with their current roles in the international order” (Käkönen, 2014, p. 94). Furthermore, Daniel Flemes proposes an approach that contradicts Nolte’s three criteria when he argues that in most of the scholarship, the accepted definition of emerging middle power is based mostly “on their international behavior rather than on their material power” (Flemes, 2007b, p. 8). That means that the focus of power for these new emerging powers is both on the leadership and the self-conception and not in the power resources, as it is usually the case in the International System.

Some additional characteristics of emerging middle powers can be found in Schoeman’s ‘South Africa and the world’ (2003):

- a) Emerging middle powers are part of the developing world and, furthermore, they are regional powers: “in their own regions, they are considered powerful, irrespective of whether they represent regional relationships of enmity or amity” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351).
- b) While traditional middle powers played their role on a world scale, “emerging middle powers seem to play or are expected to play the role of regional peacemakers and police; they have the responsibility for keeping their backyard neat and orderly with a measure of support from the big powers” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351).
- c) It seems “that emerging powers face and exhibit a dual role. On the one hand, due either to their economic size, military power or geopolitical importance, the role of regional leader seems to be specific, if not special, and they are supported by the major powers. On the other hand, because moral standing may be a defining characteristic of their power status [...] emerging powers would also seem, in turn, to strive for broader roles in the global system” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 353).

For the purposes of this thesis, where Colombia and South Africa are the geographical focus, the category of emerging middle powers has also been divided in two: (primary)

emerging middle powers and secondary emerging middle powers. The former includes the three members of IBSA – namely India, Brazil and South Africa – as the countries that have been internationally recognised as the regional powers and leaders of the Global South for a longer period of time (Flemes, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, Käkönen, 2013, 2014; Ryerson & Dewitt, 2006). On the contrary, the latter includes countries of the Global South that are actually ‘emerging’ – which means they have not yet achieved that status, but have started to be recognised as future middle powers. The countries that are located in this category are: Turkey (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016; Korkut & Civelekoğlu, 2012), Saudi Arabia (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Väyrynen, 1979), Mexico (Ardila, 2015; A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013), Indonesia (Kaur & Kaur, 2015), Colombia (Guerra-Barón, 2014; Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012), Vietnam (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015; Kaur & Kaur, 2015), Egypt (Guerra-Barón, 2014; É. Vieira, 2011), Iran (Dördrechter et al., 2010) and Nigeria (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015), amongst others.

However, it is essential to mention that, considering the international behaviour, particularities and recent history of this new set of emerging middle powers – or secondary emerging middle powers –, not all the characteristics mentioned in the previous paragraphs are applicable to them. In that sense, for example, it is extremely difficult to perceive Colombia as a regional peacemaker or police, as stated by Schoeman (2003), as its internal armed conflict has created tensions with its neighbours, particularly Venezuela and Ecuador, during the past few decades (Ardila, 2014; Borda & Tickner, 2011; Carvajal, 2012; Ramírez, 2012). The same is true for countries like Iran or Saudi Arabia. Far from being peacemakers in the Middle East, the governments of these two countries have created a “sharp geopolitical divide between [them] and their respective allies and clients” (Khilnani et al., 2012, p. 22) since the United States military intervention in Iraq.

Another characteristic that can be questioned is their role as regional powers. Schoeman states that “in their own regions, they are considered powerful, irrespective of whether they represent regional relationships of enmity or amity” (Schoeman, 2003, p. 351). This is certainly true for countries such as Nigeria or Turkey, but it is not so clear for others like Colombia or Vietnam. Since the regional power concept is not absolute, but depends on a given region and the countries located there, the fact that the former borders Brazil and the latter borders China brings a new parameter into the analysis. Can Vietnam truly

be considered as a regional power when the region includes more powerful countries like China, Indonesia, the Philippines or even Japan? Similarly, is Colombia a regional power when compared to Brazil or Mexico which are also in the same region? Probably the best way to address this problem is by introducing the concept of ‘secondary regional powers’ (Ardila, 2014; Ebert et al., 2012; Flandes & Castro, 2016; Nolte & Wehner, 2013). With this, taking into account that the difference in power between the main regional power and the secondary regional powers may be extremely significant, as it is between Colombia and Brazil or Vietnam and China, some of the emerging middle powers may not even be considered as regional powers at all as they might be overshadowed by the most powerful countries in their regions.

As a consequence, the definition of middle power using Nolte’s three criteria (2010) needs to be put in perspective. The three elements are clearly visible in traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers, but as soon as the secondary emerging middle powers appear in the picture, Nolte’s criteria might become blurry. The reason for this is the fact that these countries are not middle powers just yet. As a result, their power resources may still not be big enough to have influence at a global scale; their international projection may still have some flaws; and its leadership and legitimacy may still not be recognised by most actors in the system. They are still in the journey to middlepowermanship and some of them may even fail in the process, while some others might become the next middle powers from the Global South in the near future.

A summary of the traditional, emerging and secondary emerging powers discussed in this section can be found in Table 4.3.:

TABLE 4.3. SUMMARY OF SELECTED MIDDLE POWERS BY CATEGORY

TRADITIONAL	EMERGING	SECONDARY EMERGING
 Australia	 Brazil	 Colombia
 Canada	 India	 Egypt
 Finland	 South Africa	 Indonesia
 Netherlands		 Iran
 New Zealand		 Mexico
 Norway		 Nigeria
 Sweden		 Saudi Arabia
		 Turkey
		 Vietnam

4.2.3. SMALL POWERS AND MICROSTATES

The last two categories, small powers and microstates, could easily be defined by exclusion, that is, every country that is not included in the previous categories. Nevertheless, a further explanation is needed. What is interesting, however, is that the literature often refers to these States in rather derogatory terms. For example, Doug Lieb wrote an article in which even the title would undoubtedly upset a few presidents: 'The Limits of Neorealism: Marginal States and International Relations Theory' (2004). The words used by Lieb in his article to describe these countries range from "less powerful nations" to "small states" to "impotent states at the margins of broad military coalitions" (Lieb, 2004, p. 26).

It is difficult to provide an accurate definition for small powers as the category includes countries and territories with extremely high standards of living such as Latvia, Slovenia or Taiwan, as well as very poor countries like Mauritania, Afghanistan, Honduras or Haiti. What is common to both cases, however, is their inability to make a significant impact on the International System, either alone or in a small group (Keohane, 1969). This characteristic is, of course, shared with microstates which are also small powers but, at the same time, are further limited by an extremely small territory, scarce resources and very few inhabitants (Armstrong & Read, 2000). However, the difficulty mentioned earlier in this paragraph arises again as microstates with very high standards of living and a considerably large international involvement like Singapore, Andorra or Liechtenstein are placed in the same category as some other microstates where poverty rates are high and international involvement extremely low like the Comoros, Kiribati or the Solomon Islands (The World Bank, 2016k).

The previous paragraph demonstrates that, at least for small powers and microstates, a high Human Development Index or GDP per capita may have a significant impact in the way the country engages with the world, but they do not prevent it from being placed in the same category with the poorest and smallest countries in the International System. A small country, even if it is extremely rich, will always have limited power resources and, therefore, its place in the international hierarchy of power will most likely be affected by its inability to significantly impact world politics.

4.2. CONCLUSION

After drawing from scholars rooted in International Relations, Sociology, Political Science and Economics to define and enrich the concepts needed for this thesis, and after analysing the emergence of the Global South in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 provides the reader with an analysis of power hierarchies in the International System. It was evident that the wider literature tends to use concepts such as 'emerging powers', 'middle powers' or 'regional powers' indistinctively, but there is no consensus as to what the characteristics of each one of them are. The limits between them are blurry and academics agree that it is not clear what exactly constitutes an emerging power.

This ambiguity of concepts and the difficulty to provide accurate definitions pose an important problem for the field of International Relations because authors tend to ignore the need for definitions or simply avoid the debate. As it was shown in Chapter 4, most academics talk about 'regional powers' because the geographic component makes the term easier to define, while, at the same time, they make mention of 'middle powers' or 'emerging powers' but few actually engage with the concept and try to provide a definition.

Since a definition of emerging powers – also known as emerging middle powers – is crucial for this research, a combination of the works of Pastrana Buelvas and Vera Piñeros, Nolte, Hurrell, Schoeman and Scholvin amongst others was used to solve the conceptual ambiguity around 'emerging powers'. Chapter 4 also draws on the works previously mentioned to provide a power hierarchy that meets the needs of this thesis while keeping the most significant contributions from the field.

However, the most important point raised by this chapter is the fact that the hierarchy of States in the International System is fluid. The rise of potential superpowers like China (Goldstein, 2001; Hu, 2011; Mahbubani, 2005, 2009; Nye, 2010; Yueh, 2013) or Russia (Allison, 2008; Hancock, 2007; Lo, 2003; Roberts, 2010; Ružić, 2013) and an "emerging middle" in the global economy (A. F. Cooper & Flemes, 2013), as well as the decline of the United States (M. Cox, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Nye, 2010; Schweller, 2011) are clear proof of this fluidity. To suggest that the place of a State in the system can and will change over time implies a fundamental realignment of global power. It provides a departure from

the idea of a permanent hegemonic Global North and becomes the way in which the current North–South divide can be modified. This is an essential notion for this thesis as it acknowledges the possibility of countries from the Global South to become emerging powers and alter their place in the international hierarchy of States.

Overall, the chapters that comprise Part 2 of this thesis provide the background for the analysis of the power resources of Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers in Part 3. By taking into consideration the definitions already provided in this Part, the next two chapters will apply both the emerging powers theory and a geopolitical analysis to the two case studies of this thesis to determine whether Colombia and South Africa can indeed be considered emerging powers and what role the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg have played in that emergence.

PART 3

THE POWER RESOURCES OF EMERGING POWERS: DO CITIES MATTER? THE CASES OF BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA AND JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA

Thus far, several important findings have emerged from the thesis. By analysing the International Relations and Urban Studies scholarship, Chapter 2 was able to demonstrate that the two bodies of literature do not recognise the importance of each other and, therefore, make the practice of interdisciplinarity extremely difficult. This, in turn, means that the theoretical ideas are not translating to inform the practice. Since the interface between the city and International Relations has not been conceptualised in the literature, there is a need for further exploration that allows for a better understanding of the role of cities in their country's emerging status and its official foreign policy.

Then, the thesis moved to analyse the current International System. Chapter 3 showed conclusively that the State, as the single actor legally capable of having sovereignty, is the only one allowed to have a foreign policy and thus, becomes the main subject both for International Relations and in the International System. This, in turn, means that cities are bypassed, overlooked or ignored as fundamental parts of the States and, as such, also of their foreign policy. This chapter also reinforced the idea that the world is experiencing the single largest power shift in history created by the rise of emerging powers from the Global South that, now, are starting to shape the way in which the International System functions.

There was also a need to analyse the concept of 'emerging power'. Chapter 4 compared it with other similar concepts such as 'regional powers', 'middle powers' or 'secondary middle powers' to conclude that there are no clear limits between all of them. Since very few academics engage in the definition of these concepts, there is no consensus on what each one of them really means. This conceptual ambiguity was solved by using the work of Detlef Nolte (2010) and expanding it to satisfy the particular needs of this thesis.

At this point, the discussion shifts to ground Nolte's contributions for two case studies: Bogotá, Colombia and Johannesburg, South Africa. The investigation is structured around the question of whether Colombia and South Africa can currently be regarded as emerging powers from the Global South. From this primary assessment, the secondary discussion deals with the questions of if and how the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg matter in the international projection of both countries. Having demonstrated that Colombia and South Africa are, indeed, emerging powers from the Global South and that Bogotá and Johannesburg have clearly played a key role in their countries' emergence in

the international arena, the last Part (Part 4) seeks to explain that there is nevertheless a constitutional, institutional and operational mismatch in the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers.

To understand the emerging and fluid status of Colombia and South Africa in the global system, the chapters in this Part engage, first, in a comprehensive geopolitical analysis of the countries and second, with their major cities (Bogotá and Johannesburg) in the world today. Drawing on the works of Detlef Nolte (2010) and his theory on leading powers, the role of the State in the world is assessed against three key factors: its power resources, its leadership – either globally or regionally – and its perception in the world – both by the country itself and by other countries.

Nolte's framing, and the body of International Relations literature from which it draws, is flawed in suggesting specific metrics of relevance to determine a country's place in the international hierarchy of power and is even less useful in applying the conventional understandings of power in the global system to measuring the impact of cities as global actors themselves or as contributors to their countries' upward global trajectory. As mentioned in previous chapters, many scholars in the International Relations field use and explain the concepts of 'power resources', 'leadership' and 'international perception' or 'self-conception', but very few make the effort to explain how to measure them.

In trying to identify the dynamics of emerging nations and in scaling these concepts to take on board the role of cities in the growing international profile of these nations, there is both less discursive coherence and the metrics that might help to bring the conceptual objects into view are weak. That said, there is value in making legible and comparable the global dimensions of city and national performance, especially for Southern contexts where countries' status and influence are shifting rapidly. To this end, still drawing on Nolte's broad framing, Chapters 5 to 7 lay bare the information on Colombia (Bogotá) and South Africa (Johannesburg) in the International System.

While Nolte is unspecific about the application of his ideas and the empirical substantiation that might be necessary to verify or refine the conceptual framework he posits, there is other work that takes up the issue of a more appropriate empirical evidence base. When analysing the power resources of emerging powers, some metrics

can be found in the works of Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas, Stefan Jost and Daniel Flandes (2012) and Marijke Breuning (2007). The overall development of metrics on power resources in the wider State literature is still embryonic; nonetheless, Pastrana Buelvas et al. and Breuning provide a valuable starting point. The situation is less robust when dealing with metrics of 'leadership' and 'international perception'. As it was explained in the previous chapter using the work of Hurrell et al. (2000), for these two concepts, the metrics are almost non-existent and that creates a clear gap in the scholarship.

But the fact that it is difficult does not mean that it cannot be done. Building on the emerging practices to assess national and city power, and developing this for the city scale, Chapters 5 and 6 engage with the power resources analysis for Colombia and South Africa based on the works already conducted by Pastrana Buelvas et al. Also, expanding the methodological approach to accommodate the cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg creates a geopolitical perspective which allows for a better understanding of the link between the power resources of the city and the country in the international projection of emerging powers. In other words, these two chapters explore the connection between urbanisation, development (Turok & McGranahan, 2013) and economic growth (Chen et al., 2014).

Chapter 7 on 'leadership' and 'international perception' for both Colombia and Bogotá, and South Africa and Johannesburg is somewhat more problematic. Considering there are no quantitative metrics, there is a need for a better understanding on whether cities have an impact on the leadership and international perception of emerging powers, and thus, this chapter will be almost entirely based on a qualitative analysis. The city profiles and analysis will aim at filling the gap in the literature on formal metrics by drawing on interviews, newspapers and journal articles, information on international meetings and summits, and official documents.

This Part will show that there is a clear imbalance between the availability of metrics for 'power resources' on one side and that of 'leadership' and 'international perception' on the other. The reason behind this imbalance is the difficulty to assign specific metrics to abstract, and oftentimes unquantifiable, issues related to the behaviour of a State in the world (leadership) or how it is perceived by itself and other international actors. Therefore, considering that the literature on the measuring of power resources is far

better formed than that of the other two concepts, the reader will find, on one side, two chapters dedicated to the analysis of power resources for Colombia and Bogotá (Chapter 5) and South Africa and Johannesburg (Chapter 6), and, on the other, only one chapter (Chapter 7) dealing with the leadership and international recognition for both case studies.

The structure for this Part allows for a better engagement with the three variables and their application to the two case studies. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the power resources of Colombia and South Africa respectively in order to come to terms on what these countries *have* to back up their emergence in the world and how Bogotá and Johannesburg contribute in this process. Then Chapter 7 deals with two issues. First, it analyses the countries' leadership in the International System to understand *what they do* with their power resources – including their largest cities – to emerge in the world. And second, the chapter focuses on the *effects* or *consequences* of what they have and how they have used it, that is, how they have influenced their international recognition to demonstrate that Colombia and South Africa can indeed be considered emerging powers and that Bogotá and Johannesburg play a key role in their countries' emergence in the world. Finally, since this thesis does not engage in a comparative analysis, Chapter 7 deals with both case studies separately: first with Colombia on Section 7.1. and then with South Africa on Section 7.2.

One additional issue must be highlighted at this point. Given the fluid nature of the hierarchy of power in the International System, States can change their place in the world by modifying their power resources, leadership and international recognition. The key verb is *to modify*. However, not all three variables can be modified in the same way. In turn, Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the power resources of Colombia and South Africa which are in some senses fixed. Components such as size and geography are almost immutable while others like demography or the economy are somewhat more flexible. Power resources can be modified and these two chapters demonstrate it. Nonetheless, the process of modifying them is slow and oftentimes quite difficult.

On the contrary, when dealing with the questions of leadership and international recognition in Chapter 7, there is a lot more flexibility. Governments – both national and local – are able to foster and promote them more actively. In fact, an effective use of the

country's foreign policy tools as well as both State and city promotion can have an outstanding impact in their leadership and international recognition as it is demonstrated in the Colombian and South African cases. These are two variables that can be turned around, influenced and even manipulated in much quicker and easier ways by governments. Consequently, the reader will find that the pace of the change for power resources on one side and leadership and international recognition on the other differs greatly.

CHAPTER 5: COLOMBIA, AN EMERGING POWER IN SPITE OF ITS PAST. BOGOTÁ, ITS POWERHOUSE

Even with the widespread disagreement amongst scholars on what constitutes an emerging power, a common meeting point for most of them is the fact that the size of its power resources is indeed a crucial determinant (Actis & Zelicovich, 2016; A. F. Cooper et al., 1991; Hurrell, 2006; Nolte, 2010; Nolte & Hoffmann, 2007; Nye, 1990b; Pape, 2005; Stewart-Ingersoll & Frazier, 2012). In other words, the way a State interacts with the rest of the world depends greatly on its power, which, in turn, is determined by all the resources it possesses within its borders.

When analysing the power resources of a State, a comprehensive approach that covers all possible variables is needed. Spykman made it clear when he stated that the power of States depends not only on their military capacities, but also on the “size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability, and national spirit” (Furniss, 1952, p. 385).

This chapter engages with the nascent metrics on power resources proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) and, to a lesser extent, Breuning (2007). It first draws from the authors’ five dimensions – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic and military – to undertake a geopolitical analysis of the power resources of Colombia. Also, taking into consideration that the field of geopolitics focuses on the State, it innovates by expanding this analysis to the city and examines the five dimensions for Bogotá. The final aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the power resources of Colombia are indeed those of an emerging power and that Bogotá is a crucial component of them.

5.1. UNDERSTANDING THE TERRITORY: A GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ

The first dimension proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) is related to the territory as a fundamental part of the State. In fact, according to Article 1 of the Montevideo

Convention (Organization of American States, 1933), a State cannot exist without a territory. Furthermore, in the words of Agnew and Corbridge, “The merging of the state with a clearly bounded territory is the geographical essence of the field of international relations” (As cited in Death, 2016, p. 72). In turn, a State’s territory defines its boundaries and contains all its population, resources and economic activities. It also contains its cities as drivers of an important share of the country’s economy. This part focuses on an analysis of the Colombian territory, what it means in terms of its power resources and how the city of Bogotá contributes to this territorial dimension of the State.

Colombia is the 25th largest country in the world (CIA, 2016a) with a land area of 1,141,748 square kilometres and a maritime area of 928,660 square kilometres (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016b). It is the fourth largest country in South America, the seventh largest in the Americas and is slightly smaller than South Africa, the other case study in this thesis (CIA, 2016a). When considering the total internal area – land area plus inland water bodies – plus the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ)²⁴, Colombia is the 29th largest country on earth (CIA, 2016a; Marine Regions, 2016).

Located in the North-West corner of the South American landmass, with coasts in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea and right next to the Panama Canal, Colombia is undoubtedly one of the best strategically located countries in the Americas. Its territory is one of the most varied on earth, ranging from the snow-capped peaks of the Andes to the rainforests on the Pacific coast and the Amazon in the South, Colombia’s five clearly identified geographical regions (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016b) make the country a megadiversity hotspot in the world. According to the *Convention on Biological Diversity*,

Colombia is listed as one of the world’s “megadiverse” countries, hosting close to 10% of the planet’s biodiversity. Worldwide, it ranks first in bird and orchid species diversity and second in plants, butterflies, freshwater fishes and amphibians. With 314 types of


²⁴ Because it includes the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), this ranking is quite problematic as it states that, overall, insular micro-states such as Micronesia, the Marshall Islands or Kiribati are much bigger than countries like Colombia or South Africa. For example, the Federated States of Micronesia has an EEZ that covers roughly 2,939,300 km² while only having a land area of 701 km². Thus, for Micronesia, only 0.023% of its territory is land (Bell et al., 2011, p. 35) whereas, for Colombia, 55.14% of its territory is land (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016b). Therefore, this ranking must be analysed carefully as the land area for Colombia is 1,628.74 times bigger than that of Micronesia.

ecosystems, Colombia possesses a rich complexity of ecological, climatic, biological and ecosystem components. Colombia was ranked as one of the world's richest countries in aquatic resources, which is explained in part by the fact that the country's large watersheds feed into the four massive sub-continental basins of the Amazon, Orinoco, Caribbean, Magdalena-Cauca and the Pacific. The country has several areas of high biological diversity in the Andean ecosystems, characterized by a significant variety of endemic species, followed by the Amazon rainforests and the humid ecosystems in the Chocó biogeographical area (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2016a).

Most of Colombia's cities are located on the Andean region that starts on the border with Ecuador in the South-West and crosses the country diagonally all the way to the Venezuelan border in the North-East. Unlike other countries in South America, the Colombian Andes spread into three different mountain ranges as soon as they enter the country. This fact constitutes a biodiversity advantage but it has also halted the development of an adequate roads and train infrastructure. The building of highways and train tracks is extremely difficult given the nature of the Colombian territory (Pérez, 2005). Even with the current efforts being made by the government to build an appropriate road network in the country, land travel between the major urban centres is still slow and inefficient (Franco García, 2012) and almost half of the national territory, especially the South-East Departments in the Amazonía and Orinoquía regions, is yet to be connected to the network (Instituto Nacional de Vías, 2016).


The islands of San Andrés and Providencia, 16 keys and 5 banks in the Caribbean (Gobernación del Archipiélago de San Andrés Providencia y Santa Catalina, 2016) and the Island of Malpelo in the Pacific Ocean expand the Colombian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) considerably. Consequently, the country has control over large portions of the Southern Caribbean, starting at the maritime border with Nicaragua on the West to just South of the Dominican Republic on the East. That also means that most of the ships that go through the Panama Canal must use Colombian waters at some point (See Figures 5.1. and 5.2.)

FIGURE 5.1. MAP OF COLOMBIA



Note: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi [cartographer]. (2001). Mapa Oficial de la República de Colombia [map]. 1:2'500.000. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Contenidos-mapa-general-Colombia-Anexo%201_0.jpg. In the public domain.

FIGURE 5.2. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES (EEZ) OF COLOMBIA



Note: Flanders Marine Institute [cartographer]. (2016a). Sovereign: Colombia · MRGID 8426 [map]. Retrieved from http://marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=8426&all_territories=1&zone=eez. Reprinted with permission.

Bogotá, the capital city, is located 2,625 metres above the sea level on a plateau on top of the Eastern Andes (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2015). With an area of 1,578 square kilometres (Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas, 2017), Bogotá accounts only for 0.1382% of the national territory. Out of the 1,578 km², 780 km² belong to the Sumapaz Páramo²⁵, the only rural area within the limits of the Capital District of the city of Bogotá (Secretaría de Cultura Recreación y Deporte, 2016). Also, within the Sumapaz Páramo, an area of 2,231.79 km² constitutes the Sumapaz Páramo National Park which represents approximately 43% of the world's largest páramo complex in the world (Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, 2016) making the city itself a biodiversity hotspot.

Considering the geographical location of Colombia, Bogotá is strategically located right at the heart of the Americas. Consequently, most of the major economic centres on the

²⁵ A páramo is “a high treeless plateau in tropical South America” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Furthermore, Zdravko Baruch describes them as follows: “The páramo is a neotropical high mountain biome with a vegetation composed mainly of giant rosette plants, shrubs and grasses. Latitudinally, it extends from Colombia to northern Peru; altitudinally, it forms a belt between the upper treeline and the perpetual snowfields” (Baruch, 1984, p. 115) .

continent can be reached by plane in 6 hours or less. A flight to New York City takes 5.30 hours, 5.15 hours to Washington, 5.45 hours to Mexico City, 5.40 to Santiago and 5.00 to São Paulo (See Figure 5.3.a.) (Invest in Bogotá, 2012). Also, all the other economic centres in the country such as Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena or Bucaramanga can be reached by plane in 1.30 hours or less (See Figure 5.3.b.). Most national routes start in Bogotá (Instituto Nacional de Vías, 2016) and the government is currently increasing the connectivity of the city with a USD 12,5 billion investment in 30 highways known as “Autopistas 4G” (See Figure 5.4.) (El Tiempo, 2016a). Also, the national railway network is currently being rehabilitated and expanded in order to connect the centre of the country – where Bogotá is located – with the port city of Santa Marta on the Caribbean coast (Blanco Ríos, 2016). It is expected that the city will be able to take a greater advantage of its geographical location once all these projects are finished within the next five years.

FIGURE 5.3. ROUTES FROM EL DORADO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA




FIGURE 5.3.A. INTERNATIONAL ROUTES FROM EL DORADO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA

FIGURE 5.3.B. DOMESTIC ROUTES FROM EL DORADO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA

Note 1: Data as of May 19, 2017

Note 2: Data from “Un Aeropuerto. 70+ destinos directos”, by Aeropuerto Internacional El Dorado, 2016, (<https://eldorado.aero/sobre-el-aeropuerto/destinos/>) Copyright 2016 by Aeropuerto Internacional El Dorado. Produced by author.

FIGURE 5.4. NATIONAL ROUTES OF COLOMBIA



Note: Logistics Cluster / World Food Programme [cartographer]. Colombia Road Network [map]. (2015). Retrieved from <http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.3+Colombia+Red+Carretera;jsessionid=CCCE6E8B9F7D3C69611663FF63A23A82>. Reprinted with permission.

Apart from the infrastructural difficulties that the varied and diverse Colombian territory poses for the government, in a world where globalisation and climate change are key issues of the global agenda, its outstanding geostrategic location and megadiversity are not only advantageous for the country but also a fundamental part of its power resources. Furthermore, due to the current environmental degradation in the world, it could be argued that these two elements will increase the importance of Colombia in the International System in the following decades.

5.2. DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PEOPLE

The second dimension deals with demography and involves not only the size but also the characteristics of a country's population. The relationship between population and economic power seems to be clear. Perkins and Syrquin (1989) demonstrated that the size of a country's population has a dominant influence on its economic structure and performance, and thus, on its ability to become an emerging nation in the International System. Furthermore, given the rapid growth of large cities in many Southern nations (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014), Bogotá being a case in point, a demographic analysis of Colombia and Bogotá provides for a better understanding of the national and local emergence in the world.

With an estimated population of 47,220,856 inhabitants, Colombia is the 30th most populated country on earth, the second most populated in South America after Brazil and the third in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico (CIA, 2016d). It is also slightly less populated than South Africa, the other case study in this thesis, which comes in number 26 on the list (CIA, 2016d). More than a quarter of the country's population is younger than 15 years old (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016) and the largest age group is located between 25 and 51 years old with approximately 41.82% (CIA, 2016e). Even though the population growth rate has slowed down during the past decades going from 3.0% in 1961 to 0.9% in 2015 (See Figures 5.5.a. and 5.5.b.) (The World Bank, 2016q), Colombia's rate is still more than twice as high as the average of the OECD countries (See Figure 5.6.) (OECD, 2016a).

FIGURE 5.5. POPULATION GROWTH IN COLOMBIA (1960-2016)





FIGURE 5.5.A. POPULATION GROWTH IN COLOMBIA (IN MILLIONS) (1960-2016)

Note: Data from “Population, total”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CO>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

FIGURE 5.5.B. POPULATION GROWTH RATES IN COLOMBIA (IN %) (1960-2016)

Note: Data from “Population growth (annual %)", by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=CO>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

FIGURE 5.6. POPULATION GROWTH IN THE OECD COUNTRIES AND COLOMBIA (2014)




Note: Data from “ALFS Summary tables: Population growth rate”, by OECD.Stat, 2016, (<http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=27482>) Copyright 2016 by OECD.Stat. In the public domain.

Colombia is mainly an urban country. Approximately 76% of its inhabitants live in cities whereas urbanisation rates largely vary from one region to another. Out of the 1,122 municipalities in the country, 746 have less than 20,000 inhabitants (OECD & Ministerio

de Educación Nacional, 2016). Four cities – Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla - currently have more than one million inhabitants. Bogotá has a population of 7,963,379 in the city alone, but it goes up to 8,502,443 inhabitants if the city of Soacha – located within same conurbation – is included (DANE, 2016e). It must be noted that there is a 5.5 million people difference between Bogotá, the most populated city in the country, and Medellín, the city in second place (See Figure 5.7.) (DANE, 2016e). Consequently, Bogotá is extremely important for Colombia in demographic terms as it accounts for approximately 17% of the country’s population. If the city of Bogotá was a country, it would have a similar number of residents as Jordan, Switzerland or Israel (CIA, 2016d).

FIGURE 5.7. POPULATION OF THE 10 LARGEST CITIES IN COLOMBIA (2015)



Note: Data for 2015 adapted from “Proyecciones Población Municipales por Área - DANE”, by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE, 2016, (http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/proyepobla06_20/ProyeccionMunicipios2005_2020.xls) Copyright 2016 by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE. Reprinted with permission.

In terms of education, Colombia has shown outstanding improvements during the last decade. According to the OECD and the Ministry of Education, between 2000 and 2013, the proportion of children attending pre-school increased from 36% to 45%; from 59% to 70% for grades 6 to 9; from 30% to 41% for grades 10 to 11; and from 24% to 48% for graduate studies (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016). Colombia has also been able to increase the retention rate in school by 2 years, going from 11.4 years in 2001 to 13.5 in 2010 (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016). But there are still problems to be faced. The constant desertion rates and a weak transition rate between the different education levels result in a considerably high rate of 36% of young people

between the ages of 15 and 19 that are not attending school. That rate is similar to that of Mexico (35%) but more than double the rate of OECD countries (13%) (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016).

As for Bogotá, the city has 1.5 million people attending pre-school and grades 1 to 9, approximately 14% of the students in the same grades in the country. Furthermore, between 2002 and 2011, Bogotá increased the number of students in its schools by 21% (Delgado Barrera, 2014), however, 30% of students dropped out of school after grade 9 (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2015). The city is also the powerhouse for higher education in the country. In 2012, Bogotá had 115 higher education institutions that offered 2,300 different graduate programmes to 861,000 students. Also, approximately 94,000 students finish their higher education degrees in the city every year, more than the entire countries of Peru or Chile (Invest in Bogotá, 2012). The education infrastructure and capacity in Bogotá is so developed that only the graduate student population in the city is larger than the whole population of Cúcuta, the sixth largest city in Colombia (DANE, 2016e; Invest in Bogotá, 2012).

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), calculations for Colombia indicate that twelve or more years of schooling increase the chances of not falling into poverty by 80%. This objective is about to be achieved in Bogotá for people between the ages of 15 and 24 as the average years of schooling for the city is 1.7 years higher than the national average (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2015). To sum up, both Colombia and Bogotá still have a long way to go in terms of education, however, the improvements in the sector during the past decade are outstanding. There are currently joint efforts being carried out by both the private and the public sectors to increase the funding for education in the country. In fact, between 2000 and 2013, the public spending in education went from 3.5% to 4.9% of the national GDP, which is slightly lower than the average of 5.0% for OECD countries in 2011 (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016).

Finally, as part of the demographic dimension, there is a need to analyse the implications of language for Colombia. According to Cristine Severo, there is a direct relationship between language and power, especially when it is a widely spoken language in the world, as it allows its speakers to have a better understanding of the available information

and empowers them to engage with other actors at the international level (Severo, 2013). With Spanish as the second language with the most native speakers in the world (See Figure 5.8.a.) and the third with the most overall speakers (See Figure 5.8.b.) (Ethnologue, 2016b), Colombia gains a linguistic and geopolitical importance as the second largest Spanish speaking country by number of speakers after Mexico and before Argentina and Spain (Ethnologue, 2016a).

FIGURE 5.8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SPANISH LANGUAGE IN THE WORLD




FIGURE 5.8.A. LANGUAGES WITH THE MOST FIRST LANGUAGE SPEAKERS IN THE WORLD (2016)

Note: Data for 2016 adapted from “Languages with the most 50 million first-language speakers”, by Ethnologue – Languages of the World, 2016, (<https://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size>) Copyright 2016 by Ethnologue – Languages of the World. Printed with permission.




FIGURE 5.8.B. COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST SPANISH SPEAKERS IN THE WORLD (2016)

Note: Data for 2016 adapted from “Spanish”, by Ethnologue – Languages of the World, 2016, (<https://www.ethnologue.com/language/spa>) Copyright 2016 by Ethnologue – Languages of the World. Printed with permission.

An analysis of the demographic dimension for Colombia shows a growing population which, according to Perkins and Syrquin (1989), facilitates a country's emergence in the world. Also, a clear improvement in the quality and coverage of education generates a human capital that is both more abundant and better prepared to contribute to the emerging role of Colombia in the International System. This section showed that Bogotá is at the heart of these improvements. The city has almost four times more people than Medellín, the second largest city, and concentrates a great share of the country's education infrastructure. In fact, most data for Bogotá show better results than those of Colombia and, therefore, it is clear that the city is largely contributing to improve the country's overall demographic dimension results.

5.3. ECONOMIC DIMENSION: A KEY VARIABLE FOR EMERGENCE

Economy is perhaps the most important determinant of the power resources of a country. States have been ranked according to the size of their economy for decades, and for that, the GDP is the variable of choice. The higher a country's total GDP, the more powerful it is in the International System. But the economy is not only a national matter. Ed Glaeser acknowledges the importance of cities in a country's economic emergence by stating that "there is a near-perfect correlation between urbanisation and prosperity across nations" (Glaeser, 2012, p. 7). Furthermore, Glaeser recognises cities have a significant impact on a country's economy as they tend to improve the city-dwellers income considerably. On this topic, Turok agrees by stating that "many governments now support investment in their major cities because they offer the best prospects for raising productivity, innovation and tackling their greatest social and environmental problems" (Turok in McGranahan & Martine, 2014, p. 163). In turn, this section focuses on the increasing economic resources of Colombia and the role the city of Bogotá plays within the country and also for its international emergence.


Colombia had the world's 30th largest economy in 2015 with a GDP (PPP)²⁶ of USD 666,958,000,000. The country's GDP is slightly smaller than South Africa's (number 29th)

²⁶ Unless otherwise specified, every reference to GDP in this thesis should be understood as GDP (Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)). GDP measures the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year. When corrected to PPP exchange rates, the adjusted GDP controls for the price

and bigger than that of the United Arab Emirates and Algeria (numbers 31st and 32nd respectively) (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Also, taking into account the fluctuations of the Argentine Peso in the past few years, between 2012 and 2016, Colombia has become the third largest economy in Latin America – after Brazil and Mexico – for limited periods of time (El País, 2014; Portafolio, 2012; Revista Semana, 2012).

Colombia's economic growth has been very positive since its recovery from a crisis in 1999 when it sank to -4,20%. After that, growth has always been positive, reaching its highest values in 2006 with 6,69%, 2007 with 6,90% and 2011 with 6,59%. Considering a general decline in the world's economic growth since 2010, Colombia has followed the same path with a growth rate of 3,08% for 2015 (See Figure 5.9.), which ranks the country at number 89 in the world (The World Bank, 2016f). Nonetheless, and even with the recent decline in global growth, the IMF projected an economic growth for Colombia of 4.89% for 2017, 6.26% for 2018, 6.66% for 2019 and 6.45% for 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 2016). With that, Colombia is expected to surpass the South African economy by 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

FIGURE 5.9. GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) FOR COLOMBIA (1961-2016)




Note: Data from "GDP growth (annual %)", by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CO>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

level, valuing all goods and services at the same price level, usually that of the United States. This makes the values of GDPs comparable across different countries with different price levels (CIA, 2016c).

In 2015, Bogotá had a GPD of USD 138,443,000,000 which accounted for 20.75% of the national GDP (DANE, 2016d; Revista Dinero, 2016a); however, that percentage varies from trimester to trimester. For instance, the fourth trimester of 2015, the city's economy accounted for 26.2% of the national GDP for that period (Revista Dinero, 2016a). Furthermore, Bogotá's contribution to Colombia's GDP is larger than that of the next four largest contributing cities combined: Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga (Solano, 2015). If Bogotá were a country, it would have the 75th largest economy in the world and it would be larger than Bulgaria, Tunisia, Guatemala, Uruguay, Costa Rica or Panama (International Monetary Fund, 2016; Invest in Bogotá & EY, 2016).

Also in 2015, Bogotá grew 1.75 percentage points more than the Colombian economy, reaching an overall yearly growth of 3.90%. The city's GDP growth has had a positive performance during the past years. Between 2010 and 2015, the lowest growth rate was 3.60% in 2010 and the highest was 5.70% in 2011 (See Figure 5.10.) (DANE, 2016d; Revista Dinero, 2016a). Consequently, and considering the demographic dimension mentioned in part 5.1.2., the 17% of Colombian population that lives in Bogotá produces approximately a quarter of the country's GDP, making the capital city the unquestionable powerhouse of Colombia.

FIGURE 5.10. GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) FOR BOGOTÁ (2001-2015)



Note: Data from “Cuentas Trimestrales de Bogotá, D.C. – Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) – Primer Trimestre de 2014”, by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE, 2014, (http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/Bol_PIB_Bta_I_trim_14.pdf) Copyright 2014 by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE; “Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) Trimestral de Bogotá, D.C. – Primer Semestre de 2016”, by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE, 2016, (https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/Bol_PIB_Bta_I_trim_16.pdf) Copyright 2016 by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE; “Cuentas Trimestrales de Bogotá, D.C. – Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) – Primer, Segundo y Tercer Trimestre de 2013”, by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE, 2014, (https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/Bol_PIB_Bta_III_trim_13.pdf) Copyright 2014 by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE. Printed with authorisation.

Colombia reported a rate of 8.93% unemployment for 2015 which locates it in 69th place in the world and is comparable with the unemployment rates of Belgium, Brazil, Nigeria or Slovenia. This shows a notable reduction from 2002 when the unemployment rate was 15.58%. Nonetheless, there is still place for more improvement as Colombia currently doubles the unemployment rates of other Latin American countries like Bolivia (4%), Honduras (4%) or Mexico (4.35%) (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

On the same line, Bogotá has historically had rates a few points below the national average. For 2015, 8.7% of its inhabitants were unemployed, making it the city with the fifth largest unemployment rate in Colombia after Montería, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla and Cartagena (Guerrero Albarracín, 2016). While jobs are being permanently created, with a current annual average population growth rate of 1.28% (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2012a), the population in Bogotá usually grows faster. Consequently, the city receives approximately 104,000 new residents every year, making it harder for the economy to absorb the incoming labour force (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2012a).

In terms of foreign trade, Colombia exported a total of USD 35,690,775,971.27 in 2015, approximately 59.36% of what the country exported in 2012 and 65.13% of the total for 2014 (DANE, 2016b). For 2015, the most important sector in the economy was oil and mining with 48.4% followed by the manufacturing sector with 44.6%, leaving only 6.8% for the primary sector (DANE, 2016b). Considering the national economy is highly dependent on oil²⁷, the recent fall in international oil prices has had a considerable impact on the country's imports income which went from USD 31,518,166,522 in 2014 to 17,266,444,748 in 2015 (DANE, 2016b). It also affected the government's budget negatively as it had to be cut in more than 3.5 billion pesos for 2016 (Revista Dinero, 2016b).

Regarding imports, the total amount for 2015 was USD 54,057,599,471 (DANE, 2016c) leaving the country with a commercial deficit of USD 18,366,823,500, which means a 198.91% increase from the previous year (USD 9,233,559,977) (DANE, 2016b, 2016c). With 95.4%, most of Colombia's imports for 2015 fell under the industrial category, being chemical products the most important one with 18% (DANE, 2016c).

²⁷ Colombia is currently the 20th largest oil producer in the world. Its production has ranged between 950,000 and 1.5 million barrels a day since 2014 (Trading Economics, 2016)

As shown in the previous paragraphs, Colombia is still highly dependent on the export of commodities making the country vulnerable to sharp fluctuations in international prices. The recent decrease in exports of manufactured goods is happening at the same time as industrial products dominate the country's imports, thus translating in a reprimarisation of the economy (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012). A combination of the exports and imports dynamics for Colombia explains the government's urge to diversify its trading partners by signing various Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Consequently, the list of existing agreements with the United States, Canada and the members of the Pacific Alliance – Mexico, Peru and Chile – and Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela –, is currently being expanded into new markets by negotiating and signing new FTAs with Panama, Costa Rica, Israel, South Korea and Turkey, amongst others (Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo, 2016a, 2016b, 2016d). Also, as part of the government's strategy to increase international trade and investments, Colombia is currently South America's second most economic liberalised country after Chile (Baena Rojas & Fernández Pons, 2016)

Nonetheless, even with the current contracting trade perspective, there is a positive outlook for Colombia in the following years, as it was explained at the beginning of section 5.1.3. The first reason is the increasing participation of the service sector in the GDP, growing from 55.57% in 2011 to 59.18% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016v). Consequently, regardless of lower international commodity prices which affect trade income, the Colombian economy has been able to compensate as the sector grew from USD 161.33 billion in 2011 to USD 193.02 billion in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016w). The items that registered the highest growth in the sector since 2014 were banking services, auxiliary transport services, information technologies, real estate, rental of machinery and administrative and business support activities (ANDI, 2016; El Tiempo, 2016b).

The second reason is the growing confidence in the economy by foreign investors. It must be noted that, for decades, the armed conflict in Colombia scared investments away and only in 2003 (The World Bank, 2016d) did the country start to receive considerable amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (See Figures 5.11.a. and 5.11.b.). Currently, that confidence is supported by the World Bank's Doing Business (DB) Index which locates Colombia as 53rd in its ranking, only second in Latin America after Mexico (47th) and ahead of Peru (54th) and Chile (57th). With that, the four member countries of the

Pacific Alliance are at the top of investor confidence in the region (The World Bank, 2016a). Also, according to the DB Index, Colombia is tied with the United States and Rwanda as the second easiest country in the world to get credit after New Zealand (The World Bank, 2016a). As a direct consequence of these improvements, Colombia was the 26th largest recipient of FDI in the world and the 5th in Latin America in 2015 with USD 11,942,001,264 (The World Bank, 2016d).

FIGURE 5.11. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN COLOMBIA (1970-2016)




FIGURE 5.11.A. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN COLOMBIA (IN USD BILLIONS) (1970-2016)

Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CO>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.




FIGURE 5.11.B. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN COLOMBIA, (% OF GDP) (1970-2016)

Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.V.WD.GD.ZS?locations=CO>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

Bogotá is also one of the reasons behind Colombia’s positive performance. The city has a diversified economy with an emphasis in services accounting for 82.2% of its GDP, followed by manufacturing with 11.8%, construction with 5.8% and agriculture and mining with 0.2% (Invest in Bogotá, 2012). In 2015, Bogotá was responsible for 33% of the country’s foreign trade, it hosted 30% of the companies and 53% of all banking transactions (Invest in Bogotá & EY, 2016). Also, the city’s place in international rankings has improved dramatically over the past decade. Bogotá is currently the 5th best city to do business in Latin America and the first in the Andean region (Revista América Economía, 2016), and the 57th Global City in the world and the 5th in Latin America

(ATKearney, 2016). Consequently, Bogotá is undoubtedly a hub, not only for the Colombian economy but also for Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, the diversification of the city's economy has contributed greatly to Colombia's ability to overcome the price fluctuations of its export commodities, mainly oil.

5.4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION, IMPROVING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The fourth dimension is the socio-economic. It goes beyond the merely demographic approach and considers the characteristics of the population in terms of human development, corruption and inequality. It measures Colombia's achievements in overcoming the common development problems of countries in the Global South. Also, as cities become the epicentre for the State's provision of services, Bogotá's performance in these indicators will be analysed as they become crucial for Colombia's overall performance.

The UNDP classified Colombia as a country with 'high human development' in its Human Development Index (HDI)²⁸ for 2015 (UNDP, 2016). Even though the country is currently number 95 in the world with an HDI of 0.727, it has escalated 5 places since the first report in 1990 when it had an HDI of 0.596 – considered a medium HDI similar to Vanuatu's today (UNDP, 2015b). Furthermore, the current HDI for Colombia is comparable to that of South Korea or Malta in 1990 but the average annual HDI growth for Colombia is 0.79, slightly smaller than South Korea's 0.86 and higher than Malta's 0.59 (UNDP, 2015b).

²⁸ The Human Development Index (HDI) is defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as "a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean" (UNDP, 2015a).

Bogotá, however, is far more advanced than Colombia with a ‘very high human development’ score of 0,904 for 2010 in the last available data (PNUD, 2011). If Bogotá was a country and its 2010 HDI was to be compared with the world rankings of that same year, the city would be the fourth entity with the highest HDI in the world below New Zealand (Number 3 with 0,907) and above the United States (Number 4 with 0,902) (UNDP, 2010). This, in turn, means that the quality of health and education services as well as the quality of life in Bogotá are radically better than in the rest of the country.

FIGURE 5.12. GDP PER CAPITA AND POVERTY HEADCOUNT RATIO FOR COLOMBIA




FIGURE 5.12.A. GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH IN COLOMBIA (IN USD THOUSANDS) (1990-2016)

Note: Data from “GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCA.P.PP.CD?locations=CO&locations=CO&year_high_desc=true) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

FIGURE 5.12.B. POVERTY HEADCOUNT RATIO FOR COLOMBIA, (% OF POPULATION) (2002-2015)

Note: Data from “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

Colombia’s GDP (PPP) per capita reached USD 13,800 for 2015 (number 82nd in the world), more than double than the USD 6,585 the country registered in 2000 (See Figure 5.12.a.) (The World Bank, 2016i). Its poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines has been descending steadily for more than two decades, going from 49.7% of the population in 2002 to 27.8% in 2015 (See Figure 5.12.b.) (The World Bank, 2016s). If the poverty headcount ratio were disaggregated, the rural population considered as poor went from 61.7% in 2002 to 40.3% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016t) while the percentage of urban poor went from 45.5% in 2002 to 24.1% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2016z). The progress in


Colombia's socio-economic indicators has been outstanding for the past two decades; however, there is still much to be done, especially in three main indicators: poverty reduction, corruption and distribution of wealth.

One feature that can hold a country back from becoming an emerging power is corruption, as it affects both political and social institutions and economic stability (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015). The Corruption Perception Index (CPI)²⁹ locates Colombia as the 83rd least corrupt country in the world – tied with Benin, China, Liberia and Sri Lanka (Transparency International, 2016c) with 37 points. The same index shows that the corruption indicators have worsened as the country was number 60 in 2000 (Transparency International, 2016a) and 78 in 2010 (Transparency International, 2016b). Corruption is indeed a serious problem in Colombia. As stated by *The Guardian*, “in Colombia, an estimated 1,380 local Mayors have been charged with corruption over an eight-year period” (Shenker, 2016).

Figure 5.13. compares the CPI of Colombia with that of three groups of countries. First, the least corrupt countries of Denmark (91), Finland (90), Sweden (89) and New Zealand (88) are on the left part of the graph. Then, in the middle are some Latin American countries and some selected emerging powers from other continents. Finally, on the right part of the graph, are the most corrupt countries in the world, namely Somalia (8), Korea DPR (8), Afghanistan (11) and Sudan (12) (Transparency International, 2016c). As it is shown in Figure 5.13., Colombia's CPI is very similar to that of Brazil, Peru or Mexico, its Latin American neighbours; however, it is much lower than Chile's (70) and more than two times higher than Venezuela's (17). It is also almost three times lower than the CPI of the least corrupt countries on earth.

²⁹ The CPI measures corruption from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt).

FIGURE 5.13. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES (2015)



Note: Data adapted from “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015”, by Transparency International, 2016, (<http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>) Copyright 2016 by Transparency International. Printed with permission.

In contrast, inequality, measured using the Gini index, for Colombia in 2015 was 0.502 (DANE, 2016a). According to the CIA’s ranking, Colombia had the eleventh highest Gini coefficient in the world in 2012. In fact, in Latin America, only Haiti (5) and Honduras (8) had higher rates than Colombia. However, inequality seems to be a problem for most of the region as Colombia is closely followed by Paraguay (12), Guatemala (13), Chile (14), Panama (15) and Brazil (16), and the difference between Brazil and Colombia is only 0,016 points (CIA, 2016b).

Data for Bogotá is somewhat contradictory. While the GDP per capita for 2014 was USD 12,091 (Invest in Bogotá, 2016), that is USD 1,285 lower than the national value for that year (The World Bank, 2016i), the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines for the city was only 10,4% for 2015, 17,4% lower than the national data (DANE, 2016a). The inequality index (Gini index) was also lower with 0,498 for Bogotá and 0,502 for Colombia (DANE, 2016a). In terms of corruption, there is no CPI index available for cities, however, the NGO *Bogotá cómo vamos* conducted a survey in 2014 in which 76% of the participants believed the city administration was corrupt (*Bogotá cómo vamos*, 2014). Furthermore, in their 2015 survey, 50% believed corruption had increased in the last year and only 15% thought it had decreased (*Bogotá cómo vamos*, 2015).

Indeed, corruption is currently one of the biggest problems for Bogotá. Former Mayor Samuel Moreno has been sentenced to 18 years in prison for his 'contract carousel' (*Carrusel de la Contratación*), one of the most significant corruption scandals in the country in recent history (El Tiempo, 2016c). His successor, Gustavo Petro, is also being investigated for several corruption cases (Blu Radio, 2015; Revista Semana, 2015c, 2016c) and five of his local Mayors are currently being prosecuted (El Espectador, 2016a). It is interesting, however, to see the remarkable improvement in Bogotá's indicators, even with these high levels of corruption.

An analysis of the socio-economic dimension shows an interesting phenomenon as the strengths and weaknesses of Colombia and Bogotá seem to be closely linked. On one side, the national and local HDIs and their GDP per capita have experienced an outstanding growth during the past few decades, but, on the other, city and national levels share the problems of widespread corruption. This reinforces the fact that Colombia and Bogotá are highly connected, they depend on each other and they benefit from each other. But when something goes wrong, the connection means that they also suffer from each other's failures. It is both a top-down and bottom-up relationship. Nonetheless, the improvement in most indicators shows the socio-economic dimension is increasing its contribution to the overall power resources of Colombia and Bogotá and thus, helping them in emerging in the world.


5.5. THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF POWER

Finally, the military dimension, often recognised as 'hard power', has been at the core of the International Relations debates on power since the beginning of the field. In fact, the concept of power is often first understood as 'military power' and then as other types of power (Nolte, 2010). Due to the Colombian armed conflict, the military dimension has both a domestic and an international application. This section explores the security and defence situation in Colombia and emphasises how the peace agreement with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) (FARC) has allowed for a better international emergence of the country. Given that the military is strictly a responsibility of the national government, very few references to Bogotá are made in this section.

More than five decades of armed conflict in Colombia have transformed the role of the Armed Forces in the country. As stated by Ferreyra and Segura, “the Latin American case [...] has been a challenge to theoretical conceptions that restrict the military's role to the defense of national sovereignty from external enemies” (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000, p. 19). Consequently, in Colombia the military force was used by the State as a way to resolve the conflict and guarantee the public order within the national borders (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000; Pastrana Buelvas & Gehring, 2016), a task usually undertaken by the police, and thus altering the general purposes served by Armed Forces around the world.

In terms of military expenditure as percentage of the GDP, Colombia ranked 19th in the world in 2015 with 3,38%, 0,06% more than the United States, the next country on the list (The World Bank, 2016n). As seen in Figure 5.14., the military expenditure for Colombia has been stable between 3,0% and 4,0% for the period 1998-2015. Nonetheless, it has been the highest in the Western Hemisphere during most of these years. Furthermore, since 2014, Colombia has been the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean where the military expenditure has been higher than 3,0% of the GDP (Otero Prada, 2016) and, as shown in Figure 5.15., the only one in the region to appear in ranking of the Top 20 countries in the world with the highest military expenditure as percentage of GDP (The World Bank, 2016n).


FIGURE 5.14. MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN COLOMBIA (PERCENTAGE OF GDP)



Note: Data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true)

Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

FIGURE 5.15. COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (2015)



Note: Data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?downloadformat=excel>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

The explanation behind the large military expenditure in Colombia during the past few decades is found in the national security and defence strategy. The Ministry of Defence stated in 2009:

[I]n Colombia, there is a situation of domestic insecurity and low levels of public safety (drug trafficking, subversion, corruption, kidnappings, homicides), amongst others, that force the defence and security spending to be relevant over time. In addition, in order to continue with the efforts to preserve the security conditions achieved up to now and to recover those that are still lacking in some areas of the country, it requires at least the sustainability of the level of resources invested so that the results of the [National Security and Defence Policy] are guaranteed and irreversible over time³⁰ (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2009, p. 41).


Consequently, the existence of illegal armed groups such as the FARC, the ELN and the Paramilitaries (Borda & Tickner, 2011; Sánchez & Chacón, 2005; Ugarriza & Nussio, 2015),

³⁰ Original text in Spanish: “[E]n Colombia subsiste una situación de inseguridad interna y un nivel deficiente de seguridad ciudadana (narcotráfico, subversión, corrupción, secuestro, homicidios), entre otros, lo cual obliga a que el gasto en defensa y seguridad siga siendo pertinente en el tiempo. Adicionalmente, para continuar con el esfuerzo para preservar las condiciones de seguridad alcanzadas hasta ahora y recuperar las que aún faltan en algunas zonas del país, exige al menos la sostenibilidad del nivel de recursos invertidos, de manera que los resultados de la PSD sean garantizados e irreversibles en el tiempo” (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2009, p. 41).

the consolidation of Colombia as one of the most important sources of illegal drugs in the world (Ardila et al., 2005; Puyana Valdivieso, 2005) and the high homicide and kidnapping rates (Casas Dupuy & González Cepero, 2005) forced the government to allocate a large portion of the national budget to the security and defence sectors, especially since the 1990s (Otero Prada, 2016) – see Figure 5.14. –. However, the severity of the security situation has declined notoriously since the mid-2000s, especially since the signing of the ceasefire between the government and the FARC (CERAC, 2017) (See Figure 5.16.). Again, the Ministry of Defence explained what they call “the new Colombia in terms of security” in its 2016 document *Security and Defence Policy*:

[T]he general security situation has evolved very favourably for the Colombian State as a result of the sustained work of the Armed Forces, the National Police and other state agencies. Illegal armed groups and Organised Crime with transnational, national, regional and local outreach, have been weakened structurally and disarticulated in a decisive way³¹ (Translated by the author from Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2016b, pp. 7–8).

FIGURE 5.16. HOMICIDE IN COLOMBIA (2006-2015)



Note: Data from “Logros de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad. Todos por un Nuevo país”, by Ministerio de Defensa, 2016, (https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios%20sectoriales/info_estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf) Copyright 2016 by Ministerio de Defensa. Reprinted with permission.

³¹ Original text in Spanish: “la situación general de seguridad ha evolucionado de forma muy favorable para el Estado colombiano como resultado del trabajo sostenido de las Fuerzas Militares, la Policía Nacional y otras instancias estatales. Los Grupos Armados al Margen de la Ley y el Crimen Organizado con alcance trasnacional, nacional, regional y local, vienen siendo debilitados estructuralmente y desarticulados de manera decisiva” (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2016b, pp. 7–8).

It must be noted that, while the motivation for a large military spending in Colombia is mostly domestic, some of its neighbours – particularly Ecuador and Venezuela – have perceived a threat to their national security that originates in the Colombian armed conflict and the possibilities of illegal actors, especially the guerrillas, to cross into their territories (Dallanegra Pedraza, 2012; Jost, 2012; C. Malamud, 2003; Tickner, 2007). Subsequently, in response to the Plan Colombia, a joint initiative signed in 1998 between Bogotá and Washington aimed at fighting the illegal armed groups and the production of illicit drugs, Ecuador and Venezuela started to perceive Colombia as a threat and increased their military expenditure considerably (Ardila, 2014; Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012; Tokatlián, 2001). This, in turn, had serious consequences for Colombia's ability to engage constructively with two of its most important neighbours and, thus, harming its possibilities to become an influential actor in the region as part of its emerging strategy (Pastrana Buelvas, 2011a, 2011b).

Even though the relationship with Ecuador and Venezuela did reach some critical moments, especially in March 2008 when the Colombian Air Force killed Raúl Reyes, number two in the FARC leadership, in Ecuadorian territory close to the Colombian border (Arámbula Reyes, 2008; Carvajal, 2012; Chirinos, 2008; Hernández Moreno, 2013; La Nación, 2008), there was a considerable de-escalation of tensions since president Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010 (Camacho & Martínez, 2014; Puerto Castro, 2011). Currently, relations with Venezuela and Ecuador have evolved positively to the point where both countries have actively participated in the peace negotiations with the FARC and ELN (BBC, 2016a; Molano Jimeno, 2016).

Given the current de-escalation of the armed conflict due to the signing of the peace agreement with FARC, the improvement in the general security situation and the close working relations with its neighbours, the near future may bring a radical shift in the way the Armed Forces are perceived in the National Security and Defence Strategy, and thus, altering the military expenditure of the Colombian government (Cruz Rodríguez, 2016; Pastrana Buelvas & Gehring, 2016). However, this new approach to security and defence will not be clear until the peace agreements have been implemented in the upcoming years. In the meantime, more than five decades of internal war have left Colombia with the second largest Armed Forces in the region – after Brazil – and one of the best prepared in the continent (Carvajal, 2012). This, in turn, contributes greatly to Colombia's hard

power capabilities, even if the country has shown no interest in using its military to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

5.6. COLOMBIAN POWER RESOURCES: A CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Colombia has seen an outstanding increase in its power resources during the past two decades, and the trends indicate that the situation will keep improving in the following years. The steady improvement in socio-economic indicators, the country's positive economic performance and the outstanding reduction of violence, especially during the past decade, have come together to have a significant impact on Colombia's ability to overcome some of its most important problems of the past. The road is still long, but the transformation has started to yield results for the country's power resources. As stated by Pastrana Buelvas,

Colombia is no longer a problematic country for others, it has experienced hard-to-reverse trends of domestic development and democratic consolidation, it has what it takes to become a 'driver' in the region on a variety of issues, playing a proactive role in the economic, political-military and cultural-ideological dimensions of the international system³² (Translated by the author from Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 228).

While Colombia does not have the same power resource of larger countries in the region like Brazil or Mexico, or the political stability of Chile or Peru, it is true that Colombia has undergone a transformation process in its power resources that has started to place it as a new, emerging power, not only in the region, but also in the world. It is undoubtedly an *emerging* emerging power and, as it will be explored in Chapter 7, the international perception and leadership support this statement.

At the same time, as seen previously in this section, there is an extremely close relationship between the national level and Bogotá when it comes to power resources.

³² Original text in Spanish: "Colombia ya no es más un país problemático para otros, que experimenta índices de desarrollo interno y consolidación democrática difíciles de revertir y que tiene lo que se necesita para convertirse en "motor" de la región en diversos temas, desempeñando un papel protagónico en las dimensiones económica, político-militar y cultural-ideológica del sistema internacional" (Pastrana Buelvas et al., 2012, p. 228).

While the first has been responsible for improving security, infrastructure and socio-economic indicators, the latter proved to be its economic powerhouse, the one responsible for generating approximately 25% of the national income and, thus, having an important impact in the overall performance of the country. At this point, it would be extremely difficult to imagine Colombia's current growth in power resources without the contributions from Bogotá. The city is a fundamental part of the country; they are linked and they depend on each other. Therefore, for the Colombian case, a power resources analysis that excludes Bogotá would be incomplete.

CHAPTER 6: SOUTH AFRICA AND JOHANNESBURG: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AN AFRICAN EMERGING POWER

South Africa is widely recognised as an emerging power from the Global South (Van der Westhuizen & Smith, 2013). The invitation to join the BRICS grouping in 2010 (J. A. Smith, 2011; Xinhua, 2010), its membership in the India – Brazil – South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum with Brazil and India (Alden & Vieira, 2005; De Sousa, 2007a) or even the country's selection to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup (D. Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2008), amongst others, are evidence of a major shift from the pariah State that was South Africa before 1994 to becoming a key African player in today's International System (Akokpari, 1999; Mills, 1994; Sidiropoulos, 2007a; Van der Westhuizen, 1998).

South Africa is perceived as the most important interlocutor for Africa in world affairs as a result of the country's "return as a constructive player in the International System and as a good international citizen" (A. F. Cooper, 1998, p. 707) after the end of apartheid. Furthermore, South Africa's democratic transition was considered Africa's greatest success story at the time (Schraeder, 2001). But also, various policies such as the 'Diplomacy of Ubuntu' (Bohler-Muller, 2012; Qobo & Nyathi, 2016), Thabo Mbeki's 'African Renaissance' (Bohler-Muller, 2012; Mills, 2000a; Vale & Maseko, 1998) and the country's participation in peace negotiations and peace building initiatives, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi (Schoeman, 2003), contributed to the recognition of South Africa as a continental leader and Africa's voice in the world.

But nonetheless, it is clear that the role of South Africa in international affairs is ambivalent. Even if the country is currently playing in the major leagues of International Relations as one of the most important emerging powers from the Global South, there are still doubts about the true capacity of its power resources. For example, when compared with Brazil, China, India or Russia, the other BRICS countries, South Africa falls short in most indicators, from size, to GDP to military capacity (Almeida Cravo, Hornsby, Nascimento, & José Santos, 2014; Rosstat - Statistics of Russia, 2015). In the words of Philip Harrison, "South Africa is a real minnow within BRICS" (P. Harrison, 2014, p. 68)

and “from the perspective of size and economic growth, there is little if any rationale for South Africa’s membership of BRICS” (P. Harrison, 2014, p. 69).

It is true that South Africa’s international capabilities are considerably smaller than those of the other generally accepted emerging powers from the Global South. On this topic, Jim O’Neil, creator of the BRIC acronym, considers that South Africa “is punching above its own weight” (Martyn Davies, 2012) while Peter Draper goes one step further and argues that “South Africa’s days as the African representative of choice are numbered” (Draper, 2011, p. 207).

Reality shows that South Africa is quite a contradictory emerging power. The fact that the country is the most powerful player in the weakest continent has undoubtedly elevated its status in the International System. With power resources similar to those of Colombia, it is questionable if South Africa would indeed have such important weight in the world if it was located in a different continent. Therefore, the regional dimension plays an outstanding role in South Africa’s emergence. The country has also been privileged after 1994. Its transition to democracy and the leadership of Nelson Mandela catapulted South Africa out of its international isolation status and placed it in the emerging power category. However, the widespread poverty, unemployment and inequality brought about by apartheid seem to be an enormous burden for the country (Schoeman, 2015). In turn, South Africa is faced with a dichotomy: maintaining its emerging status on one side, while, on the other, solving the economic, social and demographic legacy of apartheid.

The city of Johannesburg has followed a similar path. It transitioned from being the cosmopolitan but isolated stronghold of capitalism in Southern Africa during apartheid, to falling in despair with the arrival of democracy in the 1990s, to becoming a “world-class African city” (Kruger, 2012, p. 195) during the build-up to the FIFA World Cup in 2010. With the end of international sanctions and South Africa’s renaissance as a constructive player in the world, Johannesburg was able to leave the place of darkness where it was during apartheid to position itself as a place of centrality in the Global South along with cities like São Paulo, Shanghai, Istanbul or Mumbai; as the gateway to Africa (Games, 2012).


Again, by drawing on the works of Nolte (2010), Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) and Breuning (2007), this chapter engages in an analysis of the power resources of both South Africa and Johannesburg, and highlights the importance of the city as an emerging actor in the country's positioning in the world. This chapter has two objectives: first, to conclusively determine that South Africa is an emerging power from the Global South; and second, to demonstrate that, even though the power resources of Johannesburg contribute greatly to increase those of South Africa, city and country emerge at the same time but do so in isolation and not as part of a coordinated strategy that involves the power resources of both.

There is, however, the need to clarify what will be understood as the 'city of Johannesburg' in this thesis. Considering the existence of other important municipalities such as Tshwane and Ekurhuleni right on Johannesburg's borders, it is common to perceive them all as a whole, as one big conurbation, a City-Region at the heart of the Gauteng Province (See Figure 6.1.). The Gauteng City-Region Observatory explains it as follows:

The main Gauteng City-Region is an integrated cluster of cities, towns and urban nodes that together make up the economic heartland of South Africa. The core of the city-region is Gauteng, South Africa's smallest but most densely populated province. Gauteng includes the cities of Johannesburg, once the world's most important centre of gold production and today South Africa's financial capital, and Pretoria, the country's administrative capital. It also includes commercial, industrial and mining centres such as Germiston, Springs, Alberton, Boksburg, Benoni, Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Krugersdorp, Randfontein and Westonaria (Gauteng City-Region Observatory, 2016).

Even though often perceived as an amalgam of cities, especially regarding the municipalities of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni with boundaries between them that are extremely hard to see for someone who is not familiar with the territorial organisation of the area, this thesis will only focus on the Municipality of Johannesburg proper. And whereas it is clear that other municipalities such as Ekurhuleni and Tshwane contribute greatly to the importance of Johannesburg and Gauteng both within South Africa and the world, the main objective for this thesis is only to analyse the role of the *main city* in the international projection of emerging powers; in this case, the city of Johannesburg as seen in Figure 6.2.

FIGURE 6.1. MAP OF THE GAUTENG CITY REGION (GCR)



Note: Adapted from: Gauteng City-Region Observatory (2015). Map indicating Gauteng City-Region [map]. Retrieved from <http://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-voices/an-open-data-revolution-for-the-gauteng-city-region/>. Reprinted with permission.

FIGURE 6.2. MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITIES WITHIN THE GAUTENG PROVINCE



Note: Adapted from: The Local Government Handbook 2016. Gauteng Province [map]. Retrieved from <http://www.localgovernment.co.za/provinces/view/3/gauteng>. Reprinted with permission.

This section draws again on the metrics put forward by Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas, Stefan Jost and Daniel Flandes (2012) to complement the work of Detlef Nolte (2010). The analysis picks up on the same five key dimensions of power resources of emerging powers addressed in Chapter 5 for Colombia and Bogotá, and applies them to both South Africa and Johannesburg. The aim of this Section is to establish the true power resources of South Africa as an emerging power and, also, to understand how much of those power resources depend on Johannesburg as the nation's economic and demographic powerhouse. In other words, the overarching point is to show that the power resources of South Africa as an emerging power are closely linked to those of the city of Johannesburg.

6.1. LOCATION IS NOT EVERYTHING: UNDERSTANDING THE SOUTH AFRICAN TERRITORY

South Africa is the 24th largest country in the world (CIA, 2016a) with a land area of 1,219,090 square kilometres (South African Government, 2016) and a maritime area of 1,535,538 square kilometres (Sea Around Us, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). It is the ninth largest country in Africa, the smallest of all the BRICS countries and slightly bigger than Colombia (CIA, 2016a), the other case study in this thesis. In terms of total internal area – land area plus inland water bodies – plus the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), South Africa is the 30th largest country in the world (CIA, 2016a; Marine Regions, 2016).

Located on the Southern tip of the African continent where the Atlantic and Indian Oceans meet, South Africa is simultaneously strategically located for global trade and far away from the world centres of power. Although the country is considered as semi-arid, South Africa has important variations in climate as well as topography (Brand South Africa, 2002). The territory has two main features: the interior plateau and the lower areas around the coasts, both of which are divided by the Great Escarpment (South African Government, 2015).

FIGURE 6.3. MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



Note: Adapted from: Worldofmaps.net (2016). Map of South Africa (Political Map) [map]. Retrieved from <https://www.worldofmaps.net/en/africa/map-south-africa/political-map-south-africa.htm> . In the public domain.

Due to the high presence of plant, animal and invertebrate endemisms, unique land and marine ecosystems and higher-level biodiversity, South Africa has been classified as one of the 17 most biodiverse countries on earth by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2014). On this topic, the Convention on Biological Diversity describes South Africa as follows:

The diversity of topography, climate, geology and people in South Africa presents a wide variety of natural and cultural resources. It is notably considered one of the most biologically diverse countries in the world due to its species diversity, rate of endemism and diverse ecosystems. Terrestrial biodiversity can be divided into nine biomes, rivers into 31 different river ecoregions, and estuaries and coastal marine habitats into three biogeographical zones around the coast (subtropical, warm temperate, cool temperate). In addition, numerous structural types of vegetation, rivers, wetlands, estuaries and marine habitats add considerably to the biodiversity within these environments. While it occupies only 2% of the

world's land surface area, South Africa is home to 10% of the world's plant species and 7% of its reptile, bird and mammal species. Furthermore, it harbours around 15% of the world's marine species. Endemism rates reach 56% for amphibians, 65% for plants and up to 70% for invertebrates (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2016b).

Apart from the mainland, Marion Island and Prince Edward Island form the Prince Edward Islands archipelago in the sub-Antarctic Indian Ocean which was annexed by the Union of South Africa in January 4, 1948 (South African History Online, 2011) (See Figure 6.4.a.). Located 2,170 kilometres southeast of Cape Town (Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2016) and politically part of the Western Cape Province, the islands have a combined area of 316 square kilometres (South African National Antarctic Programme, 2016) and are South Africa's only overseas possession (J. Cooper, 2006). The archipelago's sui generis status is explained by Cooper as follows:

The Prince Edward Islands [...] have been accorded the country's highest state of formal protection, that of Special Nature Reserve in terms of the then Environmental Conservation Act of 1989, now superseded by the national Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, No. 57 of 2003 (NEMPA). In terms of NEMPA, entry into a Special Nature Reserve is restricted for research and conservation management activities only. One consequence of this high level of protection is that commercial tourism may not be permitted (J. Cooper, 2006, p. 6).

Due to its sovereignty over the Prince Edward Islands, South Africa is able to expand its influence on the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans in the sub-Antarctic region as they enlarge the country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 473,371 square kilometres (See Figure 6.4.b.) (Sea Around Us, 2016a). This area has been crucial for South Africa in geopolitical terms for two reasons. First, it grants the country greater control over the Cape of Good Hope, one of the most important maritime routes in the world (See Figures 6.5.a., 6.5.b. and 6.5.c.) (Rodrigue, Comtois, & Slack, 2017); and second, it was remote enough for the apartheid government to allegedly engage in secret nuclear tests and activities with Israel during the 1970s in the region (De Villiers, Jardine, & Reiss, 1993; V. Harris, Hatang, & Liberman, 2004; Marshall, 1980; The Economist, 1993).

FIGURE 6.4. PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUB-ANTARCTIC REGION




FIGURE 6.4.A. PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS IN THE SUB-ANTARCTIC REGION

Note: Data from “Prince Edward Islands declared a Marine Protected Area”, by the Department of Environmental Affairs, 2013, (https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/princeedwardislands_declaredmarineprotectedarea) Copyright 2016 by the Department of Environmental Affairs. Produced by author.




FIGURE 6.4.B. SOUTH AFRICAN EEZ INCLUDING PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS

Note: Flanders Marine Institute [cartographer]. (2016b). Sovereign: South Africa · MRGID 8396 [map]. Retrieved from http://marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=8396&all_territories=1&zone=eez. Reprinted with permission.

FIGURE 6.5. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE FOR THE WORLD'S MARITIME SHIPPING ROUTES




FIGURE 6.5.A. MAIN MARITIME SHIPPING ROUTES IN THE WORLD

Note: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Claude Comtois & Dr. Brian Slack [cartographer]. (2016). Main Maritime Shipping Routes [map]. Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/main_maritime_shipping_routes.html. Original source: Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). The geography of transport systems (Fourth). New York, United States: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html>. Reprinted with permission.




FIGURE 6.5.B. MARITIME SHIPPING ROUTES AND STRATEGIC PASSAGES

Note: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Claude Comtois & Dr. Brian Slack [cartographer]. (2016). Maritime Shipping Routes and Strategic Passages [map]. Retrieved from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch1en/app11en/maritimerroutes.html>. Original source: Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). The geography of transport systems (Fourth). New York, United States: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html>. Reprinted with permission.




FIGURE 6.5.C. OIL TRANSPORTATION AND MAJOR CHOKEPOINTS

Note: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Dr. Claude Comtois & Dr. Brian Slack [cartographer]. (2016c). Oil Transportation and Major Chokepoints [map]. Retrieved from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/app15en/oiltransportation.html>. Original source: Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). The geography of transport systems (Fourth). New York, United States: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/index.html>. Reprinted with permission.

Johannesburg, the nation's largest city, is located 1,694 metres above the sea level on the South African interior plateau (Department of Government Communication and Information System, 2015). With an area of 1,645 square kilometres (The Local Government Handbook, 2016a), the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality accounts only for 0.1347% of South Africa's territory. Within its limits, the city of Johannesburg comprises a wide variety of territorial features ranging from the farmlands in the northwest, to the Klipriviersberg, Rietfontein, Melville Koppies, Kloofendal and Wild's Nature Reserves, to former mining sites just west of the Central Business District, to the densely populated areas, both formal and informal, located all throughout the city (Beavon, 2004; City of Johannesburg, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h).

An important feature for Johannesburg lies in the fact that, while the city's economy includes water-intensive activities such as mining and farming, there are no significant water sources available within or near the city limits (Akoon et al., 2010; City of Johannesburg, 2011). This, in turn, means that Johannesburg depends greatly on the Gauteng Province as most of its water comes from the Vaal River, which is located outside its city borders (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2015). Moreover, since the water consumption in the whole Gauteng City Region is higher than what the nearby South African water sources can provide, foreign supply was required. The Lesotho Highlands Project was thus developed to satisfy the water demand for the Gauteng Province (City of Johannesburg, 2011; Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012; Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, 2008) thereby making the city of Johannesburg dependent not only on the rest of the province, but also on a foreign country.

Unlike Colombia where the mountainous terrain, the armed conflict and the lack of political will have left the country with a very incipient transport network, South Africa adopted its national roads strategy in 1935 and started building its national highway network in the 1970s (Floor, 1985). More than four decades later, the country has an impressive physical infrastructure (A. F. Cooper, 1998; Games, 2012) that comprises 747,000 kilometres of roads, 16,200 of which are national roads linking all nine provinces, and the largest and most developed air and rail networks in the African continent (Brand South Africa, 2013). The city of Johannesburg and its surroundings, as the heart of the South African economy, are served by six out of the 15 national routes – namely the N1,

N3, N4, N12, N14 and N17 (South African National Roads Agency, 2016) –, making it the centre of the national transportation system (See Figure 6.3.).

Furthermore, the South African government used the 2010 FIFA World Cup to complete a ZAR 60 billion infrastructure programme (Games, 2012) that included the upgrade and construction of highways (The South African National Roads Agency Limited, 2010, 2011), the expansion of airports (Airports Company South Africa, 2010, 2015) and the building of new rail lines such as the Gautrain linking Johannesburg with Pretoria and OR Tambo International Airport (Gautrain Management Agency, 2015; McGranahan & Martine, 2014). The transport sector has been recognised by the national government as a “key contributor to South Africa’s competitiveness in global markets. It is regarded as a crucial engine for economic growth and social development, and the government has unveiled plans to spend billions of rand to improve the country’s roads, railways and ports” (Brand South Africa, 2013).

Apart from being South Africa’s transportation hub, Johannesburg has developed an outstanding road and rail infrastructure of its own. With more than 9,000 kilometres of roads within the municipality limits, 10 freeways and 4 more under construction, the city has a larger road network than the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Rwanda, Luxembourg or Hong-Kong (CIA, 2017; City of Johannesburg, 2017a; South African National Roads Agency, 2016). Also, with the recent construction of more than 325 kilometres of Rea Vaya Bus Rapid System (City of Johannesburg, 2017b) and 80 kilometres of the Gautrain rapid train linked to a 430 kilometre network of Gautrain buses (Gautrain Management Agency, 2015), Johannesburg not only is slowly reducing its dependency on private cars as the main form of transportation, but also increasing its national and international competitiveness as a world class African city (City of Johannesburg, 2012a, 2012b; Kruger, 2012; Lipietz, 2008).

Being at the southern tip of the African continent, South Africa and Johannesburg are at least an 8-hour flight away from the Americas, Europe, Asia or Oceania. However, as the most advanced commercial city in Africa with a “world-class infrastructure in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, water and power, and with globally-competitive healthcare and educational facilities” (The Local Government Handbook, 2016a), Johannesburg has managed “to strategically position itself at the intersection of the

economic activity between Africa and the rest of the world” (Nganje, 2016b, p. 9). Consequently, the city has been able to develop an outstanding network of domestic and international connections in and out of OR Tambo International Airport³³.

Currently, the airport handles 19 million passengers a year and has an annual passenger capacity of 28 million. It is served by 47 airlines that connect Johannesburg with all six inhabited continents, making OR Tambo International the busiest airport in Africa and an international gateway to the continent (See Figures 6.6.a. and 6.6.b.) (Airports Company South Africa, 2016). Also, the domestic air network is extremely well developed as most of the urban centres and tourist hotspots in South Africa can be reached by plane in two hours or less from OR Tambo International as seen in Figure 6.6.c.

FIGURE 6.6. ROUTES FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016)




FIGURE 6.6.A. INTERNATIONAL ROUTES FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016)

Note: Data from “International Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts”, by OR Tambo International Airport, 2016, (<http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/inter.php>) Copyright 2016 by OR Tambo International Airport. Produced by author.

³³ Although OR Tambo International Airport is located in the city of Ekurhuleni 24 kilometres from Johannesburg city centre, it serves the whole of the Gauteng Province for international and domestic flights (Brand South Africa, 2016b)



FIGURE 6.6.B. REGIONAL ROUTES FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016)

Note: Data from “Regional Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts”, by OR Tambo International Airport, 2016, (<http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/reg.php>) Copyright 2016 by OR Tambo International Airport. Produced by author.




FIGURE 6.6.C. DOMESTIC ROUTES FROM OR TAMBO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA (AS OF OCTOBER 2016)

Note: Data from “Domestic Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts”, by OR Tambo International Airport, 2016, (<http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/dom.php>) Copyright 2016 by OR Tambo International Airport. Produced by author.

Finally, in today’s world where most of the trade takes place across the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Gramer, 2017), South Africa’s location could be perceived as its biggest disadvantage. However, despite being far from the centres of world power, South Africa, and particularly its two main cities, have been a key component of international trade for centuries. First was Cape Town, a key place for Europe after “the discovery of the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope” (Boshoff & Fourie, 2010, p. 469), identified by Adam Smith as one of the “greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind” (Boshoff & Fourie, 2010, p. 469). Then was Johannesburg, the city of gold, a rarity in 18th and 19th century Africa, described by Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall as follows:

As far as we are concerned, Johannesburg is first and foremost a metropolis in every conceivable sense of the term. In fact, the entire history of its built structures testifies to its inscription into the canons of modern Western urban aesthetics. After all, until very recently, Johannesburg described itself as the largest and most modern European city in Africa. As amply demonstrated by Clive Chipkin, this meant that Johannesburg was the progeny of nineteenth-century European industrial society. This inland city developed as an

industrial metropolis supported by gold mining. A breeding ground for modernism, it grew as a frontier city closely tied to the global market economy and the world of consumption while at the same time mired in bigotry and prejudice, constantly caught between what it could be and what it ended up being (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pp. 361–362).

Due to its strategic importance as well as its natural resources, especially diamonds and gold, South Africa has been somewhat able to overcome its condition as an ‘geographical outsider’ in global trade, mainly because of the economic power of the city of Johannesburg and its importance in the world’s mining industry. But the world today is different and, therefore, South Africa’s past strategic importance has changed dramatically. The Cape of Good Hope is not as important as it used to be and the country no longer relies on its mineral resources.

Consequently, as was the case with Colombia, in a world where globalisation, the environment and climate change are key issues of the global agenda, South Africa’s megadiversity and its proximity to and engagement with Antarctica (Jabour-Green & Nicol, 2003; Pyper, 2011; Secretaría del Tratado Antártico, 2017; South African National Antarctic Programme, 2017) – the world’s biggest fresh water reserve – greatly enhance the country’s power resources. In turn, South Africa’s territorial dimension will affect its power resources mainly as a biodiversity hotspot and, to a much lesser extent, as a strategic point in world trade.

To conclude, by analysing South Africa’s territory and location, this section provides the reader with a better understanding of the physical and geographical characteristics of the country in order to address its implications in the broader national emergence strategy. There are two confronting approaches on this topic. First, the resources available in the South African territory have guaranteed a place for the country in the global dynamics of capitalism for decades; and second, its location on the Southern tip of Africa and far from the centres of power can potentially create difficulties in interacting with the rest of the world. Nonetheless, South Africa’s geographic and economic positions allows it to exert influence on the continent as one of its most important regional powers.

As an integral part of the country, Johannesburg is both affected by the territory’s limitations and favoured by its resources. It was the gold of the Witwatersrand – where Johannesburg is located – that shaped the economic and political life of South Africa since


the 18th century (Beavon, 2004; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004). The city has been effectively integrated into the country through very ambitious infrastructure projects that deepen the connection between the national and the local. In geographical terms, it is impossible to understand today's South Africa without the city of Johannesburg as its central point where most of the country's dynamics come together. Johannesburg is also South Africa's most important international city; through its international airport, it is the place where the country and the world meet, and thus, becomes a key point of South Africa's emergence strategy.

6.2. DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION: OVERCOMING APARTHEID

As it was explained in the previous chapter on Colombia, the size of a country's population has a dominant influence on its ability to become an emerging nation in the International System. Additionally, in 1994 during the dawn of democracy, one of South Africa's most important challenges was universal education for its people. The educational gap created by apartheid affected the country's ability to create human capital, especially for the vast black majority. As a city trying to emerge in the world after international isolation, Johannesburg was also greatly affected by this problem. In order to understand the implications demography has on South Africa's international status, this section analyses the country's most important population trends and the contribution of the city of Johannesburg to the national demographic power resources.

South Africa has an estimated population of 54,956,920 inhabitants (The World Bank, 2016p), making it the 26th most populated country on earth, the fifth in Africa – after Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo –, and the least populated BRICS nation (CIA, 2016d). South Africa has a slightly bigger population than Colombia, the other case study in this thesis, which comes in number 30th on the list (CIA, 2016d). According to Statistics South Africa (2016b), 55.39% of the population is between 15 and 49 years old, making it the largest age group in the country. 28.78% is 14 years old or younger and only 15.83% is 50 years old or older, the smallest age group in South Africa (See Figure 6.7.).

FIGURE 6.7. SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS (2015)



Note: Data from “General Households Survey 2015”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, (<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182015.pdf>) Copyright 2016 by Statistics South Africa. Reprinted with permission.

Since 1960, the highest population growth rate for South Africa occurred in 1961 when it reached 3,31%. From then, the rate has oscillated between 2,0% and 2,6% until the period 2000 – 2002 when it experienced a dramatic fall going from 2,4% to 1,19%, the lowest rate in more than half a century. After that, population growth rates have grown steadily at approximately 0,3% a year reaching 1,64% in 2015 as it is seen in Figure 6.8.b. (The World Bank, 2016r). As of 2015, South Africa’s population growth rate is higher than the majority of OECD countries and it is only surpassed by Luxembourg, Israel and Switzerland (See Figure 6.9.) (OECD, 2016a).

FIGURE 6.8. POPULATION GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICA (1960-2016)




FIGURE 6.8.A. POPULATION GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICA (IN MILLIONS)

Note: Data from “Population, total”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.





FIGURE 6.8.B. POPULATION GROWTH RATES IN SOUTH AFRICA


Note: Data from “Population growth (annual %)", by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

FIGURE 6.9. POPULATION GROWTH IN THE OECD COUNTRIES AND SOUTH AFRICA (2014)

Note: Data adapted from “ALFS Summary tables: Population growth rate”, by OECD.Stat, 2016, (<http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=27482>) Copyright 2016 by OECD.Stat; “Population growth (annual %) – South Africa”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by The World Bank. In the public domain.

In terms of urbanisation, the tipping point when urban population exceeded rural population in South Africa occurred around 1986-1987 (McGranahan & Martine, 2014; Turok, 2012) and currently, the urbanisation rate for the country is around 64,8% (The World Bank, 2016y). “The rate of urbanisation accelerated in the 1980’s reaching a peak at 3.3% in 1993. Since then, there has been a general drop to about 1.3% in 2012 with a projected rate of 1% by 2025” (Ruhiiga, 2014, p. 610). However, urbanisation rates vary largely from one region to another. In fact, 52% of the urban population in South Africa is concentrated in five municipalities, namely Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Cape Town and eThekweni (Turok, 2012) which together account for only 1,20% of the national territory (See Figure 6.10.) (The Local Government Handbook, 2016a, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).

FIGURE 6.10. DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA




Note: Adapted from Statistics South Africa 2016. Municipal Population - Municipalities [map]. Retrieved from http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=270. Reprinted with permission.

In 2016, the city of Johannesburg had a population of 4,949,347 inhabitants (Statistics South Africa, 2016e; The Local Government Handbook, 2016a). If the city of Ekurhuleni – located in the same conurbation – is added, the total population goes up to 8,328,451 inhabitants (The Local Government Handbook, 2017b) and if the whole Gauteng City Region is considered, the continuous urban region within the borders of the Gauteng Province had an estimated population of 13,200,349 inhabitants for 2015 (Gauteng City-Region Observatory, 2016). Even if only the city of Johannesburg is considered, its population is still almost one million inhabitants larger than that of Cape Town – the second largest city in South Africa – making it the demographic heartland of the country (The Local Government Handbook, 2016a, 2017a). Johannesburg has 8.89% of the national population and, if it was a country, it would have a similar number of residents as Costa Rica, Georgia or Ireland (CIA, 2016d). The demographic importance of Johannesburg exceeds the South African context as the city’s population is larger than that of Botswana and Namibia combined. Furthermore, the conurbation Johannesburg – Ekurhuleni has

more inhabitants than Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland combined (See Figure 6.11.).

FIGURE 6.11. COMPARISON OF THE POPULATION OF JOHANNESBURG AND SELECTED SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES (IN MILLIONS) (2016)



Note: Data adapted from “Population, total”, by The World Bank, 2017, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>) Copyright 2016 by The World Bank; “City of Johannesburg”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, (http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=993&id=city-of-johannesburg-municipality) Copyright 2016 by Statistics South Africa; “The Gauteng City-Region”, by Gauteng City-Region Observatory, 2016, (<http://www.gcro.ac.za/about/the-gauteng-city-region/>) Copyright 2016 by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory. Reprinted with permission.

In terms of education, South Africa gave the sector a major overhaul between 1994 and 2016, not only in terms of the amount of resources available but also in the government’s pro-poor and pro-equity education policies (Statistics South Africa, 2016a). Yet, the Community Survey 2016 shows that the population aged 5 years and older attending at an education institution decreased from 37.59% in 1996 to 34.82% in 2016, that is -2.77% (Statistics South Africa, 2016a). These numbers can, however, be misleading. Data shows that the population aged 5 years and older attending school increased from 12.8 million in 1996 to 17.2 million in 2016 but, during the same period, the total population in that age group increased from 34.1 million to 49.5 million making the government’s efforts insufficient (Statistics South Africa, 2016a). Furthermore, the 2011 census shows that more than 95% of children aged between 7 and 14 in South Africa were attending school (as seen in Figure 6.12.a.) and that percentage decreases greatly between ages 15 and 24 (Statistics South Africa, 2012).

FIGURE 6.12. EDUCATION ENROLLMENT AND ATTAINMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA




FIGURE 6.12.A. PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION AGED 5-24 YEARS ATTENDING AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2011)

Note: Data from “Census 2011 - Census in brief”, by Statistics South Africa, 2012, (http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf) Copyright 2012 by Statistics South Africa. Reprinted with permission.

FIGURE 6.12.B. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION AGED 25 YEARS AND OLDER BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Note: Data from “Community Survey 2016 Statistical Release”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, (<http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/>) Copyright 2016 by Statistics South Africa. Reprinted with permission.

As for educational attainment, according to the Community Survey 2016 (Statistics South Africa, 2016a) and as seen in Figure 6.12.b., the number of people aged 25 years and older that had no schooling decreased from 3.7 million in 1996 to 2.2 million in 2016, while the population in that same age group with some level of schooling increased dramatically. In 1996, 10 million people stated their highest level of education successfully completed was primary education. In 2016, that number increased to 22.4 million. The same is true for secondary education and bachelor’s degrees going from 3.5 million in 1996 to 11.8 million in 2016 for the former and from 0.4 million in 1996 to 1.2 million in 2016 for the latter. Consequently, statistics show an outstanding increase in South Africa’s education coverage during the past two decades.


But there are still serious problems. Seekings and Natrass demonstrated that, after apartheid, white South Africans continued to enjoy “the benefits of the skills and credentials they had acquired in the past and that they could pass onto their children

even when public education was deracialised” (Seekings & Natrass, 2005, p. 300). Also, although an increasing black population managed to abandon poverty and climb to the higher classes (Crankshaw, 2008), the majority of black South Africans continued in deep poverty. In turn, in post-apartheid South Africa, privileges – including access to education – “could be reproduced on the basis of class rather than race” (Seekings & Natrass, 2005, p. 300). The authors also mention a ‘skewed revolution’ in education in South Africa in which

African students tended to complete fewer years of higher education, be enrolled in technikons rather than top universities, and be underrepresented in the more professional courses (such as engineering and accountancy). Institutions of higher education turned out very large numbers of African men and women with qualifications for middle class jobs but relatively fewer for the highest occupations (Seekings & Natrass, 2005, p. 313).

Consequently, the improvements in the number of students enrolled in South African institutions and in educational attainment fall short as the consequences of apartheid are still present in the country. Seekings and Natrass (2005) argue that access to education no longer depends on race, but on class. However, even with an increasing deracialisation of classes, it is true that the majority of the black population that did not have access to education during apartheid is the same group that still belongs to the poorer classes today.

As for Johannesburg, in 2015 the municipality had 610,185 learners registered in the ordinary school sector (Pre-Grade R to 12 Grade), approximately 4.82% of the learners in the same grades in the whole of South Africa, making it the third municipality in the country after eThekweni and Oliver Tambo (Department of Basic Education, 2016). The city has shown an impressive improvement in the levels of education since 1996. The literacy rates reached 98.7% in 2015 (Statistics South Africa, 2016b) and the number of people with no schooling in Johannesburg went down from 7.8% in 1996 to 2.9% in 2011. In the same period, those who completed grade 12 increased from 26.3% to 35%, while those who continued studying after grade 12 also increased from 10.6% to 19.1% (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014). For 2016, further information is available in Figure 6.13.

FIGURE 6.13. HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL (ALL AGES) FOR THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG (2016)

Note: Data from “City of Johannesburg”, by Statistics South Africa, 2016, (http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=city-of-johannesburg-municipality) Copyright 2016 by Statistics South Africa. Reprinted with permission.

Nonetheless, even with the improvements previously mentioned, differences within the city itself are marked and can be still linked to the consequences of apartheid. For example, between 1996 and 2011, the functional illiteracy rates for Region B (Rosebank, Bryanston, Randburg) were stable at around 20,000 people, while those for Region A (Diepsloot, Midrand, Fourways, Sunninghill, Woodmead) almost tripled by going from approximately 22,000 to 59,000 people. Out of Johannesburg’s 7 regions, only two reduced the number of people with functional illiteracy (Regions D and F) during that period. For Soweto in particular (Region D), the most affected by apartheid exclusions, the number of people who could not read or write decreased by 41% from 120,000 in 1996 to 70,000 in 2011, showing the biggest improvement in the municipality, but still having the largest functionally illiterate population amongst all regions (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014).

In terms of higher education, only 8% of people aged between 18 and 29 years in Johannesburg are enrolled at a higher education institution. This enrolment is slightly higher than the national average of 7,8% but considerably lower than eThekweni’s 13,2%, the highest in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2016b). Pretoria is home to as many as five universities followed by Johannesburg and Cape Town, each with three. The combined universities in Johannesburg – namely the University of Johannesburg, the University of the Witwatersrand and the Vaal University of Technology – have a total

enrolment of 98,203, which account for 9.60% of South Africa's university students (BusinessTech, 2015).


The previous paragraphs show that, despite being the largest city in South Africa, Johannesburg is far from being the country's basic or higher education powerhouse. There have been important achievements in education after the fall of apartheid, but the fact that 80.9% of the city's population does not continue studying after grade 12 shows the road to universal education is still long, both for South Africa and Johannesburg. In fact, South Africa is not only tied with El Salvador and Vietnam in place 116 in terms of educational achievements in the world, but also it is positioned after other African countries such as Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana and Algeria (UNDP, 2015b). Nonetheless, aware of the need to invest in education, government expenditure in the sector has been higher than the average of 5.0% of the GDP for OECD countries in 2011 since 2009, reaching an all-time high of 6.36% for 2012 (OECD & Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2016; The World Bank, 2016l).

The last item in the demographic dimension is language. As explained in Chapter 5, according to Cristine Severo (2013), widely spoken languages become a source of power for countries as they allow them to better engage with the international community and the available information. Consequently, as an English-speaking country, South Africa has direct access to almost 985 million English speakers as a first or second language in more than 106 countries around the world (Ethnologue, 2016b, 2017).

However, the use of English in South Africa is somewhat different to that of other English-speaking countries. Unlike the United Kingdom, Australia or the United States where almost all communications are in English, in South Africa only 11% of the population speaks the language at home (See Figure 6.14.) (Ndebele, 2016). Data regarding the total number of English speakers in South Africa is not clear as Statistics South Africa only provides information on English as a first language in the country. According to the Dictionary of South African English on Historical Principles (C. Muller & Wright, 1996) approximately 45% have a speaking knowledge of English, whereas, for Ethnologue (2017), it is only 29.99%. Yet, "English is South Africa's lingua franca, and the primary language of government, business, and commerce. The new education curriculum makes two languages compulsory at school, with English the language of

learning and teaching at most schools and tertiary educations” (Brand South Africa, 2016a).

FIGURE 6.14. LANGUAGES WITH THE MOST FIRST LANGUAGE SPEAKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA (2011)



Note: Data adapted from “Census 2011 - Census in Brief”, by Statistics South Africa, 2012, (http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf) Copyright 2012 by Statistics South Africa. Printed with permission.


The demographic dimension shows a South Africa still struggling with the consequences of apartheid. Even though education rates have increased considerably since 1994, there is still a lot of work to be done on this subject. The city of Johannesburg shows a similar pattern. While the indicators continue improving, universal education is still far out of reach, especially in the city’s poorest areas. Nonetheless, as it was demonstrated by Perkins and Syrquin (1989), the power of size is present in South Africa. With a population of almost 55 million (The World Bank, 2016p), the country has a considerable demographic base that positively affects its ability to become an emerging nation in the International System. The same is true for Johannesburg. The city’s population, in conjunction with the other dimensions of power, have made it one of the most important emerging cities in the Global South.

6.3. ECONOMIC DIMENSION: AFRICA'S POWERHOUSE?

This section explores the economic dimensions of South Africa and Johannesburg and their implications for the emergence of the country and the city in the world. The economy is closely linked to the power of size explained by Perkins and Syrquin (1989). The larger an economy, the more it increases a country's power resources. And the same is certainly true for a city. This section demonstrates that, even though it has been argued that South Africa is 'punching above its weight' (Martyn Davies, 2012; P. Harrison, 2014), especially when compared with other BRICS nations, the country does have sufficient economic power resources to become an emerging power in the world. It also argues that, as South Africa's economic powerhouse, the city of Johannesburg plays a crucial, if uncoordinated, role in the country's emerging status in the world.

In 2015, South Africa was the 29th largest economy in the world with a GDP (PPP) of USD 725,908,000,000, just one place above Colombia (number 30th on the list) and below Malaysia (27th) and the Philippines (28th) (International Monetary Fund, 2016). The IMF's GDP (PPP) list places South Africa as the third largest economy in the continent after Nigeria (21st) and Egypt (22nd), however, when using the nominal GDP indicator, which is affected by the exchange rates between the USD and the national currency, South Africa and Nigeria have been competing to be the largest economy in Africa during the past lustrum (BBC, 2016d; BusinessTech, 2016; Doya, 2016).

Nevertheless, the outlook for the largest economies in Africa is currently not very promising. According to the BBC, if the competition "was a horse race, the two leading contenders [South Africa and Nigeria] would be virtually neck and neck. But they wouldn't be galloping, they'd be trotting at best. And looking increasingly tired and in need of sustenance" (BBC, 2016d). Indeed, after registering a 5.58% growth in 2006, the highest since the end of apartheid, the South African economy sank to -1.53% in 2009. There has been a noticeable recovery since, reaching 3.28% growth in 2011, and dropping to 1.26% in 2015 (See Figure 6.15.) (The World Bank, 2016g).

FIGURE 6.15. GDP GROWTH (ANNUAL %) FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1961-2016)

Note: Data from “GDP growth (annual %)\”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.


The IMF estimated South Africa’s growth to be 2.90% for 2016, 4.01% for 2017 and 4.49% for 2018 (International Monetary Fund, 2016), however, Statistics South Africa (2017) recorded a much lower overall growth for the South African economy of 0.7% for 2016. According to the OECD, the reasons for the country’s current low growth rates include negative or zero growth in private investments for six consecutive quarters, persistent drought, political uncertainties and a 27% unemployment rate that is affecting household consumption and driving up inequalities (OECD, 2016b). Even with the existing difficult macroeconomic situation, “economic growth is projected to rebound in 2017 and strengthen further in 2018, driven by household consumption and investment” (OECD, 2016b, p. 233). South Africa will continue to grow, however by 2020, projections show the country will fall to place 31, losing two positions in the global ranking to Colombia and Bangladesh (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

In 2013, the city of Johannesburg represented 13.9% of South Africa’s total economic output (GVA)³⁴, 3% more than Cape Town, the second city on the list (See Figure 6.16.) (Karuri-Sebina, 2016). Furthermore, with a GDP of approximately USD 123,404,360,000

³⁴ GVA is a measure of the value of goods and services produced in a defined area. It is related to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) though the following formula: $GVA = GDP + \text{subsidies} - (\text{direct, sales}) \text{ taxes}$ (P. Harrison, 2013, p. 11).

for 2015, the city of Johannesburg accounted for 17% of South Africa’s GDP (City of Johannesburg, 2015a). If Johannesburg were a country, it would be the 79th largest economy in the world, similar to that of Guatemala and larger than Ghana, Serbia, Libya or Croatia (International Monetary Fund, 2016).


FIGURE 6.16. CITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA’S TOTAL ECONOMIC OUTPUT (1995 AND 2013)



Note: Data from “State of South African Cities Report 2016”, by the South African Cities Network, 2016, (http://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/SOCR/SoCR16_Main_Report_online.pdf) Copyright 2016 by the South African Cities Network. Reprinted with permission.

The importance of Johannesburg as South Africa’s largest economy is widely recognised (Boraine et al., 2006). The city’s economy is the main driver of national growth and, over the past two decades, it “has grown faster than [...] South Africa as a country. The result of this performance is a city output which in 2013 was some 92 percent larger than in 1996 – compared with the 70 percent of South Africa as a whole” (City of Johannesburg, 2015b, p. 6). In fact, out of the last 19 years, the city’s GDP growth has been higher than that of South Africa in 17 of them (See Figure 6.17.). When taking the three main municipalities in the Gauteng City Region – Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni – into consideration, their economic output accounts for 31,9% of that of South Africa, making not only the city of Johannesburg but also the Gauteng province the indisputable powerhouses of the country (Karuri-Sebina, 2016).

FIGURE 6.17. CITY OF JOHANNESBURG GDP GROWTH (1997-2016)



Note: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy and other Key Indicators”, by the Human Sciences Research Council, 2014, ([http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COI%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20 Report.pdf](http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COI%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20Report.pdf)) Copyright 2014 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Reprinted with authorisation.

The OECD reported that South Africa’s unemployment rate for 2015 was 27% (OECD, 2016b), however, both Statistics South Africa and the IMF placed the country’s unemployment rate for 2015 at 25.3% (International Monetary Fund, 2016; Statistics South Africa, 2016c). With that, South Africa had the third highest unemployment rate in the world after Bosnia-Herzegovina (27.70%) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (26.05%), and 3.76 percentage points higher than that of Sudan, the next African country on the list (International Monetary Fund, 2016). As seen in Figure 6.18.a., apart from three short periods in which the unemployment rate decreased since 1980, this indicator had an increasing tendency during the past 35 years until it finally stabilised in 2010 at around 25%.

FIGURE 6.18. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND JOHANNESBURG




FIGURE 6.18.A. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1980-2015)

Note: Data from “World Economic Outlook database”, by the International Monetary Fund, 2016, (<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/WEOOct2016all.xls>) Copyright 2016 by the International Monetary Fund. Reprinted with authorisation.




FIGURE 6.18.B. CITY OF JOHANNESBURG REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (2011)

Note: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy and other Key Indicators”, by the HSRC, 2014, ([http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20 Report.pdf](http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20Report.pdf)) Copyright 2014 by the HSRC. Reprinted with authorisation.

Although “between 2009 and 2015 employment increased from 14,2 million to 15,7 million[. . .] this rise [. . .] did not keep pace with the increase in the working age population” (Statistics South Africa, 2016c). Unemployment is a structural problem for the economy of South Africa. In the period 2009–2015, “the number of long-term unemployed persons increased by 828,000, accounting for 88% of the increase in the total number of the unemployed. Those who have been unemployed for more than 5 years increased from just over 1 million to 1,5 million” (Statistics South Africa, 2016c).

In terms of unemployment, similar problems are faced by the city of Johannesburg. The unemployment rate had a significant decrease from 37.4% in 2001 to 25.0% in 2011 (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014) before going up again to 26.2% in the second quarter of 2015 (Karuri-Sebina, 2016). But the overall unemployment rate is not the only labour-related problem in the city. A youth unemployment rate of 31.5% for 2011 shows how difficult it is for new entrants into the job market to find employment (The Human

Sciences Research Council, 2014). Informality in the city grew 209.9% between 1996 and 2001 posing an additional challenge as “growth in employment in the informal sector was much higher than growth in the formal sector for the period” (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014, p. 56).

Also, there are evident disparities in unemployment rates not only by regions in the city of Johannesburg (See Figure 6.18.b.) but also by race and gender (City of Johannesburg, 2013a). On this topic, Crankshaw states that “the decline in manufacturing employment has transformed many of [the] Black neighbourhoods into ‘ghettos of exclusion’ with extremely high unemployment levels” (Crankshaw, 2008, p. 1693). Finally, the city’s 2.4% annual growth in population (Karuri-Sebina, 2016) adds to the challenges faced by Johannesburg’s labour market.


Nevertheless, the city of Johannesburg concentrates the largest amount of jobs in South Africa as it accounts for 11.3% of all national employment, 2.5 percentage points more than eThekweni, the second metro in importance. Additionally, the city’s average labour absorption rate between 2003 and 2013 showed a positive behaviour as the average annual change in total employment (formal and informal) at approximately 3.2% was considerably higher than the average change in working age (15-65 years) population at approximately 2.6% (Karuri-Sebina, 2016). Consequently, even with the existence of serious employment challenges, Johannesburg is undoubtedly the epicentre of South Africa’s labour market.

Regarding foreign trade, South Africa exported a total of USD 69,631,082,610 in 2015, 23.15% less than what was exported the previous year and 35.49% less than the total exports for 2011, the best year since the end of apartheid (See Figure 6.19.) (The World Bank, 2017c, 2017e, 2017f). In 2015, the most important sub-sectors for South Africa’s export market were precious metals with 20.8% of the export share, ores with 13%, mineral fuels with 10.7%, vehicles with 8.6%, iron and steel with 7.5% and machinery with 6.9% (Anand, Perrelli, & Zhang, 2016).

Imports accounted for USD 79,590,945,310 in 2015 and were, in turn, 14.30% larger than the total value of exports during the same period. This leaves South Africa with a trade deficit of USD 9,959,862,700 (The World Bank, 2017g), a value similar to the total exports

of Sri Lanka, Bolivia or Zambia (The World Bank, 2017a). Furthermore, as Figure 6.19 shows, the total value of exports was larger than the total value of imports only in 2011. For all other years, South Africa experienced a trade deficit.

FIGURE 6.19. SOUTH AFRICAN BALANCE OF TRADE (2000-2015)



Note: Data from “South Africa Exports by Country and Region 2015”, by the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017, (<http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/all/>); and “South Africa Imports By Country and Region 2015”, by the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017, (<http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/2015/TradeFlow/Import/>); Copyright 2017 by the World Bank. Reprinted with authorisation.

Confidence, both political and economic, has been the key factor undermining South African industrial production and external trade (OECD, 2016b). The economic uncertainty linked to president Zuma’s various corruption scandals (Al Jazeera, 2016; BBC, 2016b, 2016c; Cohen, 2016; Kende, 2014) and his handling of the Minister of Finance post during the past few years (Cohen, 2017; Jammie, 2015) have undoubtedly damaged the country’s economic performance; so much that South Africa’s credit rating has recently been downgraded to junk status (BBC, 2017; Matthew Davies, 2017; eNCA, 2017a, 2017b; EWN, 2017; The Guardian, 2017). Also, the global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009; the flat OECD industrial performance during 2014 and 2015; the negative effects of a weak rand over South African manufacturers who rely heavily on imports for their inputs; and a higher inflation rate contribute to the recent decline in both exports and imports in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2016f).

Additionally, the government's inability to continuously provide basic public services such as electricity and water has also had a considerable impact on the country's productivity and external trade. During 2015 and 2016, Eskom, South Africa's primary electricity supplier, was not able to meet the country's demand and therefore engaged in load curtailment and load shedding to protect the electricity power system from a total blackout (Eskom, 2017). Subsequently, "[f]irms in the electricity intensive sectors have seen lower exports growth as lack of power ("load shedding") has prevented firms to expand exports" (Anand et al., 2016, p. 11). Water supply is also becoming uncertain. On top of South Africa already using 98% of its available water sources (Thelwell, 2014), the recurrent drought (Hlomendlini, 2016a, 2016b; Makube, 2015) is already having serious consequences both in the quality of life of South Africans and the country's economic performance. According to Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank:

The economy continues to suffer spillovers from low global growth as well as idiosyncratic shocks, of which drought is the most recent. Rainfall in 2015 was 20 per cent below its long-run average. Parliament recently adopted a motion that drought should be declared a national disaster. [...] In addition to the issue of access to food, we continue to see enormous human suffering from water shortages affecting people's quality of life. These shortages also endanger businesses; this, in turn, threatens the livelihood of the communities dependent on those businesses for employment (Kganyago, 2016, pp. 2–3).

Thus, the economic forecast is not very promising and, even though the government recognised the export sector as a key driver of faster growth, it seems the aim to increase total exports by 6% a year and non-traditional exports by 10% a year to 2030 is not going to be achieved (National Planning Commission, 2011). According to the World Bank, South Africa's exports are currently facing two major problems. First,

South African exports are concentrated in few mega firms who ship products to countries around the world, with approximately 1000 companies generating 93% of all of the country's exports. The rest of South Africa's 20,000 exporting firms export small amounts. In addition, these mega companies are losing momentum as they are creating fewer new products and not expanding into new markets (The World Bank, 2013).

And second,

South Africa export goods are also mainly highly sophisticated, capital intensive goods that are produced by highly skilled workers. While this offers opportunities for upgrading and moving up the value ladder, trading in these products means that the dominant export companies are underutilizing South Africa's large pool of low-skilled labor, thus failing to create enough jobs to make the export sector a major contributor to employment growth and poverty reduction (The World Bank, 2013).

The answer to South Africa's export problems might lie in its own neighbourhood. Since 2013, the World Bank has stated that, as "South Africa faces challenges from weaker commodity prices, lower Chinese demand and rising U.S. interest rates" (The World Bank, 2016x), greater competitiveness and regional integration are critical for South Africa's growth (The World Bank, 2013, 2014b, 2016x). And the country seems to be going in that direction. In 2010, 27.67% of South Africa's exports went to Sub-Saharan Africa (The World Bank, 2017d) whereas, in 2015, that number went up to 30.26% (The World Bank, 2017c). During both years, Sub-Saharan Africa was South Africa's main export market; however, the difference with Europe and Central Asia, the second most important destination for South Africa's exports, increased from 1.27% in 2010 to 6.04% in 2015 (The World Bank, 2017c, 2017d).

Confidence in the economy by foreign investors has also been affected by South Africa's economic performance during the past few years. While in 2010, South Africa was the 34th easiest country to do business according to the World Bank's DB Index, by 2015, the country had lost nine places and ranked 43rd in the world, and, by 2017, the fall was even more noticeable as South Africa lost 31 additional places and ranked 74th (The World Bank, 2009, 2014a, 2016a).

On this topic, the "getting credit" indicator went from being the second best in the world in 2010 to number 62 in 2017; whereas the "getting electricity" indicator ranked South Africa 111th in the world, similar to that of least developed countries such as Sudan or East Timor (The World Bank, 2009, 2016a) and, as stated previously, proved the country's difficulties to provide basic public services. Finally, even though the ranking for "trading across borders" improved nine places between 2010 and 2017, South Africa is still ranked 139 in the world, placing its objectives of reducing poverty through promoting exports further out of reach (The World Bank, 2009, 2016a). Figures 6.20.a. and 6.20.b. demonstrate the volatility of Foreign Direct Investment in post-apartheid South Africa.

FIGURE 6.20. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA (1970-2016)




FIGURE 6.20.A. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA (USD BILLION) (1970-2016)

Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.





FIGURE 6.20.B. NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA (% OF GDP) (1970-2016)

Note: Data from “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

Even with the difficulties mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the city of Johannesburg is still the cornerstone on which the economy of South Africa is based. 82% of Johannesburg’s economic activity is driven primarily by four sectors: finance and business services, community services, manufacturing and trade (City of Johannesburg, 2013a). Trade is particularly important. In 2011, the city itself was responsible for 37.4% of South Africa’s external trade (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014) and, in accordance with Johannesburg’s mining history, coal and lignite, metal ore and metal products, and machinery and household appliances made up for 69% of the city’s contribution to national trade (The Human Sciences Research Council, 2014). Figure 6.21. indicates the importance of the city of Johannesburg’s share in South Africa’s foreign trade totals, as it doubles that of the city of Tshwane, the second most important contributor to the country’s external trade.

FIGURE 6.21. METROS WITH THE LARGEST SHARE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN TRADE TOTALS (1996-2011)

Note: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy and other Key Indicators”, by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 2014, (<http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20Report.pdf>) Copyright 2014 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Reprinted with authorisation.

Finally, more than 70% of South African companies are headquartered in the city of Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg, 2013c), its stock exchange is the largest in Africa and the 19th largest in the world (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2013) and the city hosts South Africa’s four largest banks – FirstRand, Absa, Standard Bank and Nedcor – which together control over 80% of the country’s banking assets (City of Johannesburg, 2013b). Also, with 4.4 million overnight international visitors and USD 2.6 billion of visitor cross-border spending in 2015, Johannesburg is ranked second (after Dubai) in both of these indicators for the Middle East and Africa region (Hendrick-Wong & Choong, 2015). In terms of Global Cities, Johannesburg ranked 60th in the world and second in Africa after Cairo (ATKearney, 2016). Consequently, the city of Johannesburg is currently not only the heart of South Africa’s economy but also a hub for Africa and a point of entrance to the continent (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2002; Lipietz, 2008; Rogerson, 2002).

The analysis of the economic dimension of power resources for South Africa shows that the positive behaviour of the economy experienced after the fall of apartheid is slowing down. And although there are predictions for it to bounce back, the short-term economic performance is not very promising. Nevertheless, South Africa has one of the most

important, stable and diversified economies on the African continent and that cannot be overlooked. Even if it is only in relation to its African neighbours, South Africa is undoubtedly a powerhouse in the region and that, in turn, contributes largely to the country's emerging status in the world.

This section has demonstrated that Johannesburg is the heart of South Africa's economy. The city's diversified economy has been responsible for a large share of South Africa's economic growth during the past few years. Johannesburg is home to the largest share of the country's labour market, as well as most of its largest companies and its stock market. Also, due to its highly developed infrastructure and its international connectivity, Johannesburg is the city of choice for foreign companies wishing to enter the African markets. As South Africa's biggest and most important city, Johannesburg plays a key role in the country's economic emergence in the world. The opposite is also true: Being part of South Africa has helped Johannesburg to become an important emerging city in the Global South. The economic connection between national and local is clear, however, the political link in which both levels of government engage with each other to emerge in the world as part of a coordinated strategy is not.

6.4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION: OVERCOMING INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA


More than two decades after the arrival of democracy, apartheid is still a key determinant of South Africa's current socio-economic situation. The inequalities brought about by decades of racial segregation still affect the country's human development indicators. This analysis of the socio-economic dimension of power resources demonstrates that even with significant progress, South Africa still faces a major challenge in overcoming inequality and poverty, and improving the quality of life of its population. By including Johannesburg in the discussion, this section demonstrates that the improvements in socio-economic indicators have been more noticeable in the city than in rural areas, thereby making the city a crucial location for the national government's aim to provide quality of life for its citizens.

South Africa was classified as a 'medium human development' country by the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) in 2015 (UNDP, 2016). With an HDI of 0.666, South Africa is currently ranked 119 in the world, an improvement of only 0.045 since the first report in 1990 and of 0.028 since 2010 (UNDP, 2016). South Africa's HDI improvement of two places between 2010 and 2015 has been somewhat limited when compared with other countries in the region. Seychelles, for example, jumped 11 places during the same period, while Mauritius and Gabon jumped five. Furthermore, even with the progress mentioned previously in this chapter, South Africa has been unable to radically improve its indicators for health, education and quality of life since the end of apartheid. Consequently, the ranking not only shows eight African countries above South Africa, but also war-torn Palestine and Iraq are extremely close in places 114 and 121 respectively (UNDP, 2016).

On the same topic, the city of Johannesburg has slightly better indicators for health, education and quality of life than the rest of South Africa. Its HDI in 2004 was 0.67, similar to that of South Africa in 2015, and it grew to 0.72 for 2013, the last available data for the city (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2015). If Johannesburg was a country and its HDI was compared with the world rankings for 2013, the city would be ranked 91st between Tunisia (90th) and the People's Republic of China (91st) (UNDP, 2014). Figure 6.22. clearly shows how the HDIs of the city of Johannesburg and Gauteng Province were much higher than those for Republic of South Africa between 1996 and 2011.

In terms of GDP (PPP) per capita, South Africa registered USD 13,195 for 2015 (ranking 84th in the world), doubling the USD 6,493 the country had in 1994 when apartheid came to an end (See Figure 6.23.) (The World Bank, 2016h). The country's poverty indicators have also improved considerably since 2000; however, the most recent indicator dates from 2011. According to the MDG country report by Statistics South Africa (2015), the proportion of population living with less than USD 1.25 (PPP) a day went from 17% in 2000, to 9.7% in 2006, to 7.4% in 2011. With that, South Africa achieved the MDG target of having less than 8.5% of the population in this category by 2015. On the contrary, the country had not achieved the target of 16.8% of the population living with less than USD 2 (PPP) a day by 2015 as the latest indicator from 2011 shows that 20.8% of the population falls under this category.


FIGURE 6.22. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI) FOR THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG PROVINCE AND SOUTH AFRICA (1996-2011)



Note 1: Human Development Index data for South Africa is not available for every year. The Figure shows a tendency line of the available data.

Note 2: Data from “The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy and other Key Indicators”, by The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 2014, (<http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20Report.pdf>) Copyright 2014 by The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC); and from “Human development report 2013: The rise of the South Human Progress in a Diverse World - South Africa”, by UNDP, 2013, (<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/ZAF.pdf>) Copyright 2013 by UNDP. Reprinted with authorisation.

FIGURE 6.23. GDP PER CAPITA IN SOUTH AFRICA (IN USD THOUSANDS) (1990-2016)



Note: Data from “GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=ZA>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

Palmer, Moodley and Parnell argue that “South Africa has a capable state, [however] the capacity of the state in South Africa must be seen as vulnerable rather than robust” (I. Palmer, Moodley, & Parnell, 2017, p. 252). Consequently, in the absence of a robust State, the economic, social and demographic legacies of apartheid are still visible in South Africa as the country faces major internal problems in distribution, inequality, poverty and even service delivery (OECD, 2011). When the poverty indicators are disaggregated, it becomes evident that rural South Africans are almost twice more likely to be poor than urban South Africans. According to the World Bank, the urban poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines went from 52% in 2005 to 39.2% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2016aa), whereas the rural poverty headcount went from 87.6% in 2005 to 77% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2016u). Both indicators showed a significant decrease between 2005 and 2010, the only two years with available data, but the road to poverty eradication, especially for the rural population, is still undoubtedly very long.

Continuing with inequality, the Gini Index ranks South Africa as the second most unequal country in the world after Lesotho. South Africa’s index of 62.5 is 2.6 times larger than that of Slovenia, the most equal country on earth, and twice as large as Egypt’s, Africa’s most equal country. Nonetheless, South Africa is not alone in the region as it is closely followed by the Central African Republic (ranked 3rd), Botswana (6th), Namibia (7th), Zambia (9th) and Swaziland (18th) (CIA, 2016b).

The CPI ranks South Africa as the 64th least corrupt country in the world – tied with Montenegro, Oman, Senegal and Suriname (Transparency International, 2017) with 45 points. Corruption has gradually worsened in the country. In 2000, South Africa was ranked 34th (Transparency International, 2016b) and in 2010, it went down to 54th (Transparency International, 2016b). Corruption perception is more than likely to keep worsening in the following years. Thuli Madonsela, the then Public Protector of South Africa, produced the “State of Capture” report in October 2016 (Madonsela, 2016) in which she found conclusive evidence of acts of corruption involving President Jacob Zuma and the Gupta family. The ‘State Capacity Research Project’, an inter-university research partnership, also demonstrated the widespread corruption in the current South African Government in its report ‘Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is being stolen’ (Swilling et al., 2017). Furthermore, ‘State Capture’ has been featured extensively in domestic and international media and, according to experts, it could have catastrophic

consequences for the South African economy in the near future (BBC, 2016e; S. M. Muller, 2017; Newham, 2013; Omarjee, 2017; The Guardian, 2016).

In terms of economic performance, the city of Johannesburg appears to be ahead of South Africa in most indicators. In turn, Johannesburg's GDP per capita was USD 16,370 in 2014 (Parilla, Leal, Berube, & Ran, 2015), USD 3,273 higher than that of South Africa for the same year (The World Bank, 2016j). The poverty head-count and the poverty gap for the city³⁵ were respectively 12.6% and 0.8% lower than the national average for 2013 (City of Johannesburg, 2015a). With a Gini coefficient of 65 for Johannesburg and 62.5 for South Africa, this seems to be the only indicator in which the country outperformed the city³⁶ (City of Johannesburg, 2015a).

Finally, in line with the increase of corruption in South Africa during the Zuma government, the City of Johannesburg has also had its share of corruption scandals. The Metropolitan Police Department appears to be in the centre of corruption in the city. According to Corruption Watch's 2012 report, systemic weaknesses have caused this "law enforcement agency to become synonymous with corruption" (Bruce, 2012, p. 1). But the Police Department is not the only one. Under the government of Herman Mashaba, the "new anti-corruption unit identified 106 African National Congress officials responsible for R14 million lost to corruption under the previous administration" (Claymore, 2017) across various agencies.

It must be noted that, while there was a mandate to fight corruption in various official documents of the City of Johannesburg during the previous ANC administration, references to this matter were extremely vague, scarce and came from other spheres of government. For example, the City of Johannesburg's 2016 International Relations Strategy includes only two references to corruption, one recommended by the National

³⁵ "In South Africa poverty indicators are domesticated based on national poverty lines derived from the cost of basic needs of households. These domesticated indicators include a lower-bound poverty line (LPL) of R433 per person per month (in 2011 prices) and an upper-bound poverty line (UPL) of R620 (in 2011 prices)" (City of Johannesburg, 2015a, p. 30). The data for poverty head-count and poverty gap used in this thesis is based on the upper-bound poverty line for South Africa as stated in the 2012/2016 Integrated Development Plan for the City of Johannesburg.

³⁶ It must be noted that the Gini coefficient data is not available for the same year for the city of Johannesburg and South Africa. Therefore, data for the city of Johannesburg is from 2015 and data for South Africa was estimated by the World Bank in 2013 (CIA, 2016b; City of Johannesburg, 2015a, p. 28).

Planning Commission and the other one by the Gauteng Provincial Government (City of Johannesburg, 2016i). None of the references to corruption came from the city administration itself. The 2012/2016 Integrated Development Plan mentions the word corruption just twice, one in a list of actions to be undertaken, and another when it states that “Focus on eradication of corruption in vulnerable departments such as Metro Police and Revenue is yielding positive results” (City of Johannesburg, 2015a, p. 19). Finally, the Joburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy only talks about the consequences of corruption but it does not include a call to fight it (City of Johannesburg, 2011).

In turn, the crackdown on corruption implemented by the new DA government and its Mayor, Herman Mashaba, represents a major shift from the previous administration. In his own words, “the days when corrupt officials would get a gentle slap on the wrist... are over. I will not rest until a clean, responsive and caring administration that puts our residents first becomes a reality in Joburg” (BusinessTech, 2017). It is still too early to know if the new measures will have an impact on corruption in the city. However, what is true is that national corruption scandals involving President Zuma have somewhat overshadowed the severity of corruption within the City of Johannesburg.

To conclude, even after achieving outstanding improvements, South Africa and Johannesburg still face some of the most important challenges commonly seen in countries in the Global South, such as poverty, inequality and low quality of life for a large portion of their populations (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2000; Boraine et al., 2006; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). Nonetheless, as it is with the case of Colombia, this section demonstrated that city governments tend to be more effective in addressing these problems than national governments – for South Africa, this issue is further explained by Palmer, Moodley and Parnell (2017) –. The considerable difference between urban and rural indicators are proof of this. Therefore, in terms of the socio-economic dimension, the contribution of the city of Johannesburg to the overall power resources of South Africa is undeniable. And while there is coordination in terms of domestic policy, this coordination is absent in the international strategies of both city and country. This topic will be further explored in Chapter 8.

6.5. SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY: FROM THREAT TO PEACEKEEPER

South Africa's approach to military power underwent a radical shift with the end of apartheid. Before 1994, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was the muscle used by the government to crack down opposition to the apartheid regime both within the national borders and in neighbouring countries. Not only was it used to support the União Nacional de Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Movimento de Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) in order to destabilise the governments of Angola and Mozambique, but also in Rhodesia against Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (Friedland, 1982; Saul, 1985; Sidaway & Simon, 1993). Furthermore,

For South Africa, making trouble in Angola and Mozambique was relatively cheap and easy and served a variety of its regional strategic aims. There was no serious intention to install either Unita or Renamo in power, rather to damage the ideological appeal of the MPLA and Frelimo, weaken their support for the ANC, and keep the inland Frontline States dependent on South Africa. Non-aggression pacts were signed but not honoured by Pretoria, yet Washington made no attempt to punish Pretoria for that failure (R. Palmer, 1996, p. 506).

Domestically, the SADF was used by the government for two main objectives. First, it was responsible for the occupation of South West Africa – Namibia today – and the crackdown of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), the nationalist group fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa (Batchelor, Dunne, & Lamb, 2002; Seiler, 1982; Wood, 1984). Secondly, it was used to suppress black resistance against the apartheid State (South African History Archive, 2017). In fact, “from 1984, SADF troops were deployed in many of the country's black townships in an attempt to quell the growing political unrest” (Batchelor et al., 2002, p. 342). Consequently, the use of SADF to support the police force within the national borders during apartheid meant that, like Colombia, South Africa modified its armed forces mandate to deal with public order and internal security.

Two additional elements have to be taken into consideration at this point as they enhanced SADF's military capacity in Southern Africa during apartheid (Gould & Hecker, 2005). The South African Nuclear Warfare Programme and the South African

Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Programme – also known as Project Coast – were the reaction of the Afrikaaner nationalist government to the security threats posed by internal black rebels, especially in the townships and Bantustans, and revolutionary activities in Rhodesia and Namibia during the second half of the 20th century (Husain, 1982; Purkitt & Burgess, 2002; Walters, 1976). In addition, fuelled by a shared perception of being ‘God’s chosen people’ and a heightened sense of isolation, the governments of South Africa and Israel cooperated “with each other on armaments development, including nuclear weapons and missile programmes. It is suspected that they also cooperated on chemical and biological warfare research and development” (Purkitt & Burgess, 2002, pp. 231–232).

While the nuclear programme was perceived as a blackmailing tool “against Angola or Mozambique to force them to seal their borders and intern guerrillas, by threatening the destruction of Luanda, Maputo or Cuban cantonments” (Betts, 1979, p. 100), the CBW programme was aimed at suppressing the black opposition and securing the survival of white South Africa. As stated by Purkitt and Burgess,

[I]t is known that some research efforts under the auspices of Project Coast were dedicated to producing a ‘black bomb’, using bacteria or other biological agents that would kill or weaken blacks and not whites. The black bomb could be used to wipe out or incapacitate an entire area where an insurrection was taking place (Purkitt & Burgess, 2002, p. 245).

But the geopolitical situation for the apartheid government started to change towards the end of the 1980s.

[A]fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of Namibia, the cessation of hostilities in Angola, and the withdrawal from that country of 50,000 Cuban troops – South Africa saw clearly that the nuclear deterrent was becoming superfluous. Furthermore, the government increasingly realized that accession to the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] would have distinct advantages for South Africa’s international relations, especially those with African countries. Pretoria saw that the solution to South Africa’s problems lay in the political rather than the military arena and that the nuclear deterrent, along with strategic ambiguity, was becoming a burden rather than a benefit (De Villiers et al., 1993, pp. 102–103).

Furthermore, the imminent end of apartheid and the prospects of a new ANC-led government accelerated the dismantling of South Africa's nuclear, chemical and biological programmes, mostly as doubts about the ANC's fitness as a nuclear custodian grew in the country and the international community (De Villiers et al., 1993). Consequently, South Africa became the first country in the world to voluntarily and unilaterally relinquish nuclear weapons just before Nelson Mandela came to power (De Villiers et al., 1993; D. Fischer, 1995; V. Harris et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the scientific knowledge on how to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons still remains in South Africa.

The end of apartheid came with additional radical changes for South Africa's military. While initially efforts were made to downsize the SADF between 1989 and 1993, it was later dismantled and replaced by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in April 1994. The new SANDF "comprised personnel from the former SADF, the former TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) defence forces and the liberation armies of the ANC and the PAC" (Batchelor et al., 2002, p. 348). Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the legalisation of opposition groups in South Africa and the country's economic deterioration after 1989 contributed greatly to the reduction of Pretoria's military budget (Batchelor et al., 2002).

As seen in Figure 6.24.a., the military budget peaked in 1976/1978 with the Soweto uprisings (Batchelor et al., 2002) and then in 1987/1989 during the South African invasion of Southern Angola (Manby, 1992). From that moment onwards, the military spending decreased steadily until it stabilised between 1% and 1.5% since 1997, approximately the same levels of military spending South Africa had before 1960. This decrease can also be seen in Figure 6.24.b. where South Africa went from being the 24th country with the largest military spending in the world in 1988 to being number 94th in 2015.

FIGURE 6.24. MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN SOUTH AFRICA




FIGURE 6.24.A. MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN SOUTH AFRICA (% OF GDP) (1951-2015)

Note: Data from “Military expenditure data: 1949–2015”, by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2017, (<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-Milex-data-1949-2015.xlsx>) Copyright 2017 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Reprinted with permission.




FIGURE 6.24.B. RANKING OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN THE WORLD (1988-2015)

Note: Data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, by The World Bank, 2016, (<http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?downloadformat=excel>) Copyright 2016 by the World Bank. In the public domain.

Even with an outstanding decline in its military budget, post-apartheid “South Africa remains sub-Saharan Africa’s most powerful state in terms of military spending. On the continental level, only the military spending rates of Algeria, Egypt and Morocco are comparable to South Africa’s” (Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014, p. 20). Nonetheless, the country’s approach to its military role in Africa seems to lack hegemonic aspirations. In turn, the inclusion of ‘Human Security’ in SANDF’s mandate in 1994 (Mongwaketse, 2016), Pretoria’s foreign policy focus on peace and security affairs with an emphasis on consolidating an African peace and security architecture (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2016; Mabera, 2016) and even the use of the military to protect South Africa’s endangered wildlife (Ellis, 1994) are clear proof of the country’s current stand on its military role in the continent and the world.

On this particular topic, Flemes and Costa Vaz state that South African

Policymakers are conscious that a pronounced claim to regional leadership or unilateral use of military force like in Nigeria (1995) and Lesotho (1998) would undermine its legitimacy on the African continent (cf. Flemes, 2009b). Even though the issue is subject to political controversies, South Africa does not seem to be prone to hegemonic aspirations—not even in its immediate sub-regional context, where it has been committed to self-restraint [...]. South Africa's regional policies are driven foremost by ideas rather than by power and/or hegemonic aspirations (cf. Geldenhuys, 2010). If South Africa would have hegemonic intents, military considerations certainly played a stronger role in its security approach (Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014, pp. 20–21)

To conclude, it can be argued that while South Africa remains the most powerful country in Africa in military terms, the government in Pretoria abandoned the use of the military force to destabilise or exert its influence on neighbouring countries after apartheid (Evans, 1996). “The government strongly favours peacekeeping over peace enforcement, and insists that external military deployments require the approval of the UN Security Council” (Nathan, 2005). It is true that this new approach to the military does respond to the foreign policy guidelines of democratic South Africa, however, after SANDF's failed intervention in the Central African Republic, Louw-Vaudran argues that “at the moment, [South Africa does] not seem to have the military capacity to act as a superpower on the continent” (Louw-Vaudran, 2016, p. 106).

Consequently, nowadays, SANDF's mandate is limited to a defensive approach to national security and an outstanding engagement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, particularly in Africa (Sidiropoulos, 2007b). Nonetheless, the military power is still present in South Africa and it is used politically as part of its strategy to emerge in the Global South. The non-aggressive joint military exercises with Brazil and India (Flemes & Costa Vaz, 2014) are clear proof of that.

Also, since the defence policy depends only on the national government, the participation of cities is quite limited. Furthermore, for the South African case, most of the defence apparatus is located in Pretoria, not in Johannesburg. Consequently, given the shift in South Africa's defence policy after 1994 in which the military is only used for external security and not for domestic public order, no references to the city of Johannesburg were made in this section.

6.6. SOUTH AFRICAN POWER RESOURCES: A CONCLUSION

An analysis of the power resources of South Africa shows two main trends. The first one includes substantial improvements in most indicators for the country since the end of apartheid. The second one demonstrates the legacy of apartheid in most of the variables that determine the country's power resources and, consequently, there is still a long way to go in solving South Africa's problems, mainly poverty and inequality. It is, therefore, a country "with a foot in two worlds" (Hentz, 2005, p. 22). Nonetheless, the combination of the power resources is enough to consider South Africa as an emerging power from the Global South. In fact, with a base big enough to support the country's new status in the world, the improving indicators contribute to the emerging process for South Africa.

There is one additional point to be taken into consideration. Supported by its power resources, South Africa's behaviour in the continent reflects Nolte's three characteristics of a regional power: a) it "articulates the pretension [...] of a leading position in a region"; b) "displays the material (military, economic, demographic), organisational (political) and ideological resources for regional power projection"; and c) "truly has great influence in regional affairs" (Nolte, 2010, p. 893). In turn, the country's outstanding relative weight when compared with most other States in Africa, and especially within the SADC region, makes it undoubtedly a regional and continental power and, consequently, increases its possibilities of becoming an emerging power in the world. In other words, being the most powerful player in Africa contributes greatly to South Africa's current international standing.

This chapter also demonstrated that Johannesburg and South Africa are closely linked in terms of power resources. The consolidation of Johannesburg as the country's most important metro means that, as the city emerges, it also greatly contributes to the national emergence. However, even with the clear interdependence between the local and the national, there is no coordination in the emerging strategies of both spheres of government. Again, it is a disconnected approach between South Africa and Johannesburg when it comes to using their power resources that will be further analysed in Chapter 8.

After engaging with the power resources of both Colombia and Bogotá, and South Africa and Johannesburg in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 will analyse the two remaining variables proposed by Nolte – leadership and international recognition – as a complement of the previous chapters on power resources.

CHAPTER 7: LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION: TWO PARALLEL PROCESSES FOR NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN COLOMBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

This chapter builds on the power resources debate proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) and Breuning (2007), and engages in an analysis of an associated dynamic of national advancement: the international leadership of Colombia and South Africa. Since there are no metrics available to quantify this variable, this thesis solves the problem by taking a close look at the evolution of both countries' foreign policies throughout the 20th century. For Colombia, there is a particular emphasis in the international engagements and strategy of the two last governments: Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) and Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (2010-2018). For South Africa, the analysis focuses on the country's international relations during and after apartheid and highlights the radical transformation of South Africa's foreign policy in 1994. The purpose of this section is to examine the nature of Colombia's and South Africa's emergence in the world through their foreign policy actions and to probe the role Bogotá and Johannesburg have played in their global realignment.

Then, the chapter focuses on the international recognition of Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers. Again, since the matter at hand is mainly subjective as it deals with perception, very few metrics are available in the literature. Consequently, this section starts by analysing the two countries' performance in the Fragile States Index (FSI) and then continues to explore the shift in the countries' international images through newspapers, magazine articles, travel guides and foreign investment reports that reflect popular perception on how Colombia and South Africa are seen in the world. The analysis also reveals how Bogotá and Johannesburg have shaken off their images as chaotic and dangerous cities to become emerging cities from the Global South in ways that contribute to the countries' improved international images.

Finally, building on the focus on power resources documented in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter demonstrates that Colombia and South Africa can indeed be considered emerging powers and that Bogotá and Johannesburg, as their powerhouses and most

important cities, contribute greatly to their country's emerging status. However, the mechanisms and instruments that Colombia and South Africa have used to emerge in the International System are mostly city-blind. The opposite is also true. Bogotá and Johannesburg can be considered emerging cities but their strategies to emerge are not coordinated with the national level. Consequently, there are two parallel emerging processes in both countries as a result of a disconnect between the national and the local spheres of government.

Now, while the reader might find that the overarching argument for both Colombia and Bogotá and South Africa and Johannesburg is quite similar, it must be pointed out that their actual trajectories in terms of their emerging power status and how they position themselves in the world are very different because their realities are very different. On one side, Colombia has struggled to achieve its status as an emerging power because of its image as a place of war and drugs, whereas, on the other side, South Africa's triumphant re-entry to the international arena during the democratic transition had an outstanding positive impact in the country's emerging power status. In other words, while for Colombia it is about achieving the status as an emerging country, for South Africa it is about maintaining it.

Although the analysis undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6 on the power resources of Colombia and South Africa is crucial to understand the countries' role in the International System, it is true that power resources are mainly a domestic variable. When taking a close look at the five dimensions – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic and military –, it becomes clear that they depend greatly on what the countries *are* and what they *have*, and much less on international factors that influence a nation's trajectory. Also, power resources are difficult to modify as they require government programmes to be implemented over a long period of time. In fact, while some components of the power resources such as size or location are almost immutable, others like the military, demographic or socio-economic variables are somewhat more flexible. The previous two chapters demonstrated that they can indeed be modified, although the pace at which change can occur is quite slow.

On the contrary, the two variables examined in Chapter 7 are much more fluid and manageable by governments. Unlike power resources, leadership and international

recognition are effectively about a country's standing in the world and truly depend on international interactions. Consequently, foreign policy and country/city promotion are two of the ways in which they can be modified. Additionally, they are also a result of the countries' domestic policies and, above all, positive public policy results. The decrease in violence brought about by the peace agreement with the FARC in Colombia or the end of apartheid in South Africa addressed in this chapter clearly demonstrate that a positive shift in domestic policy can translate in an increasing leadership and an improved international recognition of the country.

7.1. COLOMBIA'S TAKE OFF AS AN EMERGING POWER

7.1.1. GOING GLOBAL, A SHIFT IN COLOMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Building on the power resource analysis for Colombia and Bogotá in Chapter 5, the second variable drawn from Nolte's work is leadership, which he understands as a country's "political influence in diplomatic forums" (Nolte, 2010, p. 890). In order to understand Colombia's strategy to improve its international standing, this section focuses on an analysis of the country's foreign policy. It starts with a historic account of Colombia's peripheral and shy approach to its role in the world and, then, engages particularly with the foreign policies under the governments of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) and Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (2010-2018). The purpose of this analysis is to highlight Colombia's improvements in developing an active foreign policy that allows it to defend its national interest abroad, while, at the same time, largely ignoring any possible contribution from its cities.

During most of its independent years, Colombia has been a marginal, quiet State in Latin American and International Relations. When compared with the active foreign policy of other countries in the region such as Cuba, Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, Colombia seems to be extremely small and almost invisible. Bagley explains it as a "self-imposed dwarfism" (Bagley, as cited in Borda & Tickner, 2011, p. 52) while former president Alfonso López Michelsen talks about a self-absorbed and isolated Colombia, a "South American Tibet" (López Michelsen, as cited in Borda & Tickner, 2011, p. 53) that seems extremely distant from its neighbours and the rest of the world.

The reason behind that isolation is explored by Gerhard Drekonja Kornat:

The fact that Colombia, as the successor state of the Great Colombia, had lost one third of its original territory in the course of the last century so that its neighbours could benefit from it, or that it was mutilated as a result of manipulated revolts (such was the case in Panama!), is a significant fact of the traumatic experience left by foreign policy, and that is why inactivity has been considered as the lesser evil³⁷ (Translated by the author from Borda & Tickner, 2011, pp. 53–54).

But even within its inactivity, Colombia had clear international interests. The most important of them being its almost unconditional alliance with the United States. As stated by Diego Cardona, starting with the presidency of Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-1921), the large majority of Colombian governments have “placed the United States as the centre of their aspirations and concerns” (Translated by the author from Cardona Cardona, 2011, p. XVII). Furthermore, during the two governments of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), Colombia even assimilated the antiterrorist discourse of President George W. Bush without any restrictions (Cardona Cardona, 2011; Forero Rodríguez, 2011). Colombia has, therefore, cemented its foreign policy around the concept of *respice pollum*, an unconditional allegiance towards Washington that implied renouncing an autonomous approach to its own relations with the world (Borda & Tickner, 2011).

However, during the 1970s, president Alfonso López Michelsen introduced a new concept in Colombian foreign policy: *respice similia*, that is, to look at those who are similar to you (Borda & Tickner, 2011). The efforts to focus on its neighbours did not replace the previous *respice pollum* but did allow for a better engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, the natural space for Colombian foreign policy. Consequently, starting in the 1980s, Colombia increased its participation in regional fora such as the Contadora Group, the Plan Puebla-Panama, the Andean Community and the G3 with Mexico and Venezuela (Cardona Cardona, 2011). During that period, Colombia also started looking

³⁷ Original text in Spanish: “El hecho de que Colombia, en su calidad de Estado sucesor de la Gran Colombia, hubiese perdido en el transcurso del último siglo una tercera parte del territorio inicial para que de él se beneficiaran los vecinos, o que fuera mutilada a consecuencia de revueltas manipuladas (¡tal fue el caso de Panamá!), es un hecho significativo de la traumática experiencia que ha dejado la política exterior, y es por eso que la inactividad ha sido considerada como el mal menor” (Borda & Tickner, 2011, pp. 53–54).

at the developing world and increased its participation in organisations like UNCTAD, the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (Borda & Tickner, 2011).

But the impetus to engage with Latin America, the Caribbean and the broader Global South would not last long. Starting in 1990, César Gaviria's neoliberalism, Andrés Pastrana's Plan Colombia and Álvaro Uribe's 'democratic security' turned the country back to the United States and created a closer-than-ever relationship with Washington (Borda & Tickner, 2011; Cardona Cardona, 2011). The consequences were clear for Colombia. During Uribe's two terms, the country's foreign policy was extremely *securitised, concentrated and bilateralised* with the United States while neither Latin America, Europe, Asia or Africa received the attention they should have had (Pastrana Buelvas, 2011b). Uribe's lack of interest in the rest of the world was evident with the closing of 14 embassies and 10 consulates in 2002³⁸ (See Figure 7.1.a. and Figure 7.1.b.) (Barco, 2003).

The breaking point in Colombian foreign policy took place in 2010 when President Juan Manuel Santos came to power. His National Development Plan (NDP) included, for the first time in decades, explicit references to the need to conduct a diversified and collaborative foreign policy for Colombia. As stated in the sixth objective of the NDP,

The sixth objective, the defence of national interests through the consolidation of Foreign and International Co-operation policies, is understood as the scenario in which the presence and positioning of Colombia in multilateral, sub-regional, regional and global instances will be consolidated in order to guarantee the defence and promotion of national interests. By 2018, Colombia will consolidate bilateral relations with its neighbours in Latin America and the Caribbean, and will strengthen its relations in Africa, Eurasia and Central Asia and Asia Pacific. It will work to maintain and diversify the sources and modalities of co-operation, and position the Colombian knowledge of good practices in the world, in line with the National Strategy for International Co-operation (ENCI). Likewise, it will continue with its active participation in the multilateral forums and in the regional conciliation and

³⁸ As part of the government's austerity plan, President Álvaro Uribe decided to close the Colombian embassies in Australia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland, Indonesia, Morocco, Haiti, Greece, Romania, Iran, Belize, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. He also closed the consulates in Bonn, Hamburg and Munich in Germany, New Orleans in the United States, Vancouver in Canada, Barquisimeto in Venezuela, Cuenca in Ecuador, Monterrey in Mexico as well as Singapore and Aruba (Revista Semana, 2002).

integration mechanisms. Colombia will have complied with most of the instruments to which the country agreed on through the "Initial Memorandum" to become a full member of the OECD³⁹ (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2014, p. 426).

The National Guidelines for Foreign Policy (LPE in Spanish) established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also contain this new approach to the world and materialised it through five key foreign policy objectives (Translated by the author from Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010):

- 1. To deepen integration with Latin America and the Caribbean to generate more opportunities for trade, investment and technological exchange.*
- 2. To boost Colombia's relations with Asian and Pacific countries through a strengthened diplomatic presence, the opening of new markets and investment attraction.*
- 3. To position topics such as science and technology, innovation, quality education, vocational and professional training, agricultural technology and knowledge, energy, climate change, biodiversity and security cooperation, in the international management for prosperity.*
- 4. To identify political, economic and investment opportunities for Colombia in groupings such as CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and by joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).*
- 5. To strengthen South–South Co-operation.*

Attention must be brought to three issues at this point. First, Colombia keeps recognising the importance of North America and Western Europe in its foreign policy when it states "Relations with the United States, Europe and Canada are fundamental to the country as they are our main economic partners" and "[Colombia] will deepen the political dialogue

³⁹ Original Text in Spanish: "El sexto objetivo, defensa de los intereses nacionales mediante la consolidación de la Política Exterior y la Cooperación Internacional, se entiende como el escenario en el cual se consolidará la presencia y posicionamiento de Colombia en instancias multilaterales, subregional, regional y global para la defensa y promoción de los intereses nacionales. A 2018, Colombia consolidará las relaciones bilaterales con sus vecinos de América Latina y el Caribe, y fortalecerá sus relaciones en África, Eurasia y Asia Pacífico y Central. Se trabajará en mantener y diversificar las fuentes y modalidades de cooperación, y posicionar las buenas prácticas de Colombia en el mundo, en línea con la Estrategia Nacional de Cooperación Internacional (ENCI). Así mismo, continuará con su activa participación en los foros multilaterales y en los mecanismos de concertación e integración regional. Colombia habrá cumplido con la mayoría de los instrumentos a los que el país adhirió mediante el "Memorando Inicial" para su ingreso como miembro pleno de la OCDE" (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2014, p. 426).

and economic and investment relations with the United States, Canada and Europe” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010, p. 4). However, these countries are only mentioned in one of the five key points of the LPE. This, in turn, means that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue its work with the Global North but only as one of the main objectives and not, as used to be the case up until this point, as the most important foreign policy goal.


Second, the remaining four key foreign policy objectives deal with countries of the Global South, an area that, apart from Latin America and the Caribbean, has so far been absent in Colombian foreign policy. There is, therefore, an explicit recognition of the importance of being part of the emerging Global South. Consequently, there are references to usual organisations and countries like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Pacific Alliance, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile and Peru, as well as new groupings and countries that have never been seen before in the country’s priorities. Amongst them are: BRICS, CIVETS, APEC, ASEAN, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Egypt and South Africa (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010).

Third, a new approach to international co-operation is also evident. Colombia changed its historical role as a recipient of Official Development Assistance and promoted itself as a donor willing to share good practices with other countries of the Global South. For that, Colombia aims to continue the co-operation with Central American and Caribbean countries but gives a special place in its policy to Haiti, CIVETS and BRICS countries and the African continent – mentioned twice in the document, the same number as the United States (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010).


The three issues discussed in the previous paragraphs provide evidence of Colombia’s new approach to its foreign policy, one that abandons the historic limitations of its international engagements and, instead, promotes an active insertion of the country in the world by diversifying its partners, topics and mechanisms. Colombia’s aim to play a more important role in the International System by presenting itself as an emerging power from the Global South is clear at this point.

The radical shift in Colombian foreign policy started in 2010 with the strengthening of the Pacific Alliance, a regional forum with the like-minded countries of Mexico, Peru and Chile aimed at creating an area of free trade, movement of people, capital and services. It also promotes economic development through a joint action in the world with an emphasis in Asia-Pacific (Alianza del Pacífico, 2016a). The results are already evident. The four countries together already represent the sixth largest economy in the world and the largest number of companies registered in the stock market in Latin America (Alianza del Pacífico, 2016b). It also began a process of joint diplomatic expansion that favours the four countries' intentions to actively engage with the broader Global South. Thanks to the Pacific Alliance, Colombia currently has six new shared embassies with the member countries in the Global South: Ghana (with Mexico, Chile and Peru), Vietnam (with Peru), Morocco, Algeria and Azerbaijan (with Chile), and Singapore (with Mexico) (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014b).

The inclusion of Colombia in the CIVETS grouping (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) also had a significant impact in the country's foreign policy. After that, the government started an aggressive insertion in the Global South that included the opening of Colombian embassies in Azerbaijan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Morocco and Ghana (See Figure 7.1.a. and 7.1.b.) (Holguín Cuéllar, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). In 2012, Colombia also invited the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for the first "South-South Co-operation Dialogue for CIVETS+" in Cartagena as a first step for these countries to increase their knowledge about each other (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2012).

FIGURE 7.1. COLOMBIAN EMBASSIES IN THE WORLD IN 2000 AND 2016**FIGURE 7.1.A. COLOMBIAN EMBASSIES IN 2002**

Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2002-2010”, by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002-2010 (<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes>) Copyright 2002-2010 by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain.

**FIGURE 7.1.B. COLOMBIAN EMBASSIES IN 2016**

Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2010-2016”, by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010-2016 (<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes>) Copyright 2010-2016 by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain.

In terms of international relations with the Global South, the period 2010-2016 saw an outstanding diversification in Colombia’s bilateral agenda. President Santos visited Turkey (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2011) and the Philippines (Presidencia de la República, 2015b), President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey visited Bogotá (Presidencia de la República, 2015a), and the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs made official visits to Vietnam, Jamaica, Guyana, Cambodia, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Suriname, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Antarctica, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines (Holguín Cuéllar, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). Figures 7.2.a. and 7.2.b. show the difference between the international official visits of Presidents Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2016). Also, Figures 7.3.a. and 7.3.b. confirm the outstanding increase in high level relations between Colombia and countries in the Global South during the same two periods of time.

FIGURE 7.2. COUNTRIES VISITED BY COLOMBIAN PRESIDENTS BETWEEN 2000 AND 2016




FIGURE 7.2.A. COUNTRIES VISITED BY PRESIDENT ÁLVARO URIBE (2002-2010)

Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2002-2010”, by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002-2010 (<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes>) Copyright 2002-2010 by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain.




FIGURE 7.2.B. COUNTRIES VISITED BY PRESIDENT JUAN MANUEL SANTOS (2010-2016)

Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2010-2016”, by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010-2016 (<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes>) Copyright 2010-2016 by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain.

FIGURE 7.3. HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES (2002-2016)




FIGURE 7.3.A. HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES (2002-2010)

Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2002-2010”, by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002-2010 (<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes>) Copyright 2002-2010 by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain.




FIGURE 7.3.B. HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES (2010-2016)

Note: Data from “Memorias al Congreso 2010-2016”, by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2010-2016 (<http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministry/strategy/informes>) Copyright 2010-2016 by Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. In the public domain.

Up to this point, the strategy undertaken by Colombia to improve its international standing originated from the President and has been implemented by both him and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is clear that foreign policy is exclusively the prerogative of the national government while other domestic actors, including cities, are largely overlooked. These legal and constitutional provisions, as well as the disconnection between national and local governments in foreign policy and the role of paradiplomacy will be analysed in Chapter 8 as part of the findings of this thesis.

There is, however, one particular topic in which Bogotá greatly contributed to Colombia's engagements with the Global South and that is public transport. The successful experience of the bus rapid transit (BRT) system Transmilenio (Bassett & Marpillero-Colomina, 2013; Zamora Avilés, 2013) in the city generated a great interest from countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa that approached the Colombian government and requested South-South Co-operation projects in that regard. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Colombian Agency for International Co-operation and the City of Bogotá have worked with the governments of South Africa, Bangladesh, Philippines, Iran, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Singapore, Tanzania, Senegal, Uganda, Vietnam and Botswana, amongst others in South-South co-operation initiatives aimed at developing similar systems in their main cities (Delgado Caicedo, 2011; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2015a; Transmilenio, 2010).

However, this inter-governmental co-operation has not been as strong or functional as it seems for the Colombian case. Sebastián Giraldo, an active diplomat working at the South-South Co-operation Desk at the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that a co-ordinated response to international demands on public transport from Bogotá is not easy. According to Giraldo, the City of Bogotá manages Transmilenio, but the operation and security of the system are in the hands of the private sector. Consequently, working with private actors and the different spheres of government poses additional difficulties on international co-operation initiatives and that is why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prefers to work with Medellín, where transportation systems are city-owned (Giraldo, 2015). More on inter-government co-operation on foreign policy issues will be addressed in Chapter 8.

7.1.2. THE NEW SHINING STARS: THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ


Finally, an indicator that is not mentioned by Pastrana Buelvas et al. (2012) or Nolte (2010), but explains Colombia's progress as a country during the past two decades, is the Fragile States Index (FSI), produced every year since 2005 by The Fund for Peace in Washington, DC. To measure the overall stability of the nation, the FSI measures 12 indicators separated in three different categories: 1. Social indicators which include demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, group grievance and human flight and brain drain; 2. Economic indicators amongst which are uneven economic development and poverty and economic decline; and 3. Political and military indicators that analyse State legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalised elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace, 2016g).

In 2005, Colombia was categorised as the 14th most fragile State in the world and the FSI located it between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (13th) and Zimbabwe (15th) with 95 points – where 120 is the worst possible score (Fund for Peace, 2016d). The overall situation in Colombia was so unstable that countries like Burundi, Guinea or the Central African Republic were better placed in the index, all within the 'high alert' category. However, Colombia has been in a recovery path ever since. In 2010, the country reduced its points to 88.2 and went from the 14th place to the 46th (Fund for Peace, 2016c). Finally, in 2016, the improvement in the general situation was even more noticeable. Colombia is now in 67th place with 80.2 points, being the last country in the 'high warning' category and only 0.4 points behind Honduras, the first country located in the 'elevated warning' category (Fund for Peace, 2016a).

The forecast for Colombia's performance in the FSI is very positive. The ceasefire (Caracol Radio, 2016; Revista Semana, 2016b) and the signing of the peace agreement with FARC (El Espectador, 2016b; Noticias Caracol, 2016; Vera & Carrascal, 2016), and the start of the peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) (ELN) (El País, 2016; El Tiempo, 2016f) will surely help the country improve in the FSI rankings in the following years. An end to the six decades long war should bring an increase in the government's social spending and, thus, generate an important

improvement not only in the quality of life of its citizens but also in the international perception of Colombia.

FIGURE 7.4. COLOMBIA IN THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX (2005-2016)



Note: Data adapted from “The Fragile States Index Data”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2006to2014.xlsx>) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data adapted from “Fragile States Index 2015”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015>) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data adapted from “Fragile States Index 2016”, by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016>) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace. Printed with permission.

But the way a country is perceived in the world does not depend only on indicators and rankings. There is an abstract, intangible, immaterial element that plays an even more important role and that is the perception of the country in the collective imaginary around the world (Qobo, 2017). Do people want to go there? Do people think it is safe? Do people believe their investments are going to be safe? Of course, this perception is closely linked to the indicators and rankings, but it is more than that. It is about mental images, not about facts.

Consequently, the improvement in the general security and institutional situation since 2000 has had an outstanding impact in those mental images outside of Colombia’s borders. A country that used to be avoided at all costs is now being portrayed as a tourism hotspot. In fact, the Lonely Planet – the largest travel guide book publisher in the world (Fildes, 2007) – chose Colombia as the second “destination you cannot afford to miss” in 2017 (Lonely Planet, 2016). According to the travel guide,

Decades of civil war and violent crime meant Colombian passport stamps were once for hardcore travellers only. Fast forward to the present day, and the lost years seem but a dust speck in Colombia's rear-view mirror. There are no world wonders, but the country's mix of vibrant culture, nature and hospitality is a rich tapestry woven by welcoming arms. Over a decade into its dramatic about-face, this South American jewel is even expecting a visit from the world's number-one Catholic. When Pope Francis kisses Colombian soil in 2017, it will mark the Andean nation's first papal visit in 30 years (Lonely Planet, 2016).

And that is not the only reference. In the Australian edition of Lonely Planet, Kevin Raub stated:

Years of violence and instability caused by paramilitaries, armed rebels and drug cartels are (largely) a thing of the past in Colombia, with the country focused on bringing a final peace to the decades of conflict with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels, which still sadly defines the country to many people. The reality of modern Colombia is very different, in fact: economically dynamic and fast changing, it's a nation where tourism is simply booming (Raub, 2015).

The Lonely Planet is not alone. Media around the world has been talking about a 'new Colombia' for a few years now. The economic headlines recognise that "Colombia is leading the CIVETS, the new emerging countries group" (América Económica, 2011), include Colombia as one of "The Civets: a guide to the countries bearing the world's hopes for growth" (Allen, 2011) and one of "the countries bucking the downward global market trend" (Fletcher, 2016). At the same time, the Telegraph in London gives its readers "21 reasons why Colombia should be your next holiday destination" (Haines, 2016); the Huffington Post not only talks about the "3 Misconceptions About Colombia (And Why You Should Go)" (Seper, 2012) but also gives "7 Reasons Everyone Should Consider Retiring In Colombia" (Haskins & Prescher, 2016) while the Miami Herald promotes the country for gay tourism saying "As Colombia shakes off its troubled past it's emerging as an LGBT hotspot" (Wyss, 2014). Even the fashion industry is focusing on Colombia: "many fashion executives are now looking to Colombia, South America's third biggest economy, to help boost their balance sheets as the country shakes off its violent image" says Robb Young in his article "Colombia, Open and Ready for Business" (Young, 2014).

Another indicator that shows how the international image of Colombia has radically improved in recent years is the elimination of visa requirements for Colombian nationals by many countries around the world, the Schengen area being the most significant. In 2014, when the European Commission started the process aimed at eliminating the visa requirements for Colombians, it stated in its reports that only 4,8% of visa applications in the country are denied showing an increased confidence in the country. It also stated that the probability of illegal immigration is relatively low and there has been an outstanding improvement in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Colombia (El Tiempo, 2014). Consequently, apart from the 26 members of the Schengen area, other countries like Turkey, Russia, Belize, Guyana, Antigua and Barbuda, Montenegro, Kosovo, Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Suriname have eliminated the visa requirements during the past few years (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016a).

In line with the improvement of Colombia's image in the world, Bogotá went through a similar process of attracting increasingly positive global attention and not just because of relief from the threat of armed conflict (Beall, Goodfellow, & Rodgers, 2011). The city's inclusive urban transformation became an international point of reference in various topics such as public transport, bike paths, public libraries and public spaces (Duque Franco, 2011; Martin & Ceballos, 2004; Rhinehart, 2009; Sustainable Cities Collective, 2014). Consequently, Bogotá received the urban sustainability prize at the VII World Urban Forum in Medellín in 2014, the C40's world prize on 'climate leadership and the city' in 2013 and the World Travel Awards prize for South America's leading business travel destination in 2014 and 2015, amongst others (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2016b; World Travel Awards, 2016).


Flor Ángela Durán explains Bogotá's transformation in the following terms:

Bogotá used to have a very bad reputation but has evolved to become an important destination for tourists and businesses. Transmilenio, the public libraries and other social programmes undertaken during the past few decades have contributed to improve the international perception of the city. At the same time, internationally, Bogotá has brought the attention back to Colombia. Bogotá has positive repercussions for Colombia's image because it changes the perception of a country besieged by drugs, the country at war, to show a country that seeks progress and creates solutions for its many problems. Bogotá is

currently capable of sharing its experiences with other cities in the Global South, unfortunately, those experiences have never been included in the country's official foreign policy⁴⁰ (Translated by the author from Durán, 2017).

As a result, during the past eight years, Bogotá almost doubled the number of international tourists – See Figure 7.5. – and, consequently, a new airport had to be built (El Tiempo, 2016d). Furthermore, in order to respond to the expected rise in air traffic from 30 million passengers a year in 2015 to 69,2 million in 2041, the national government already started the construction of a second airport – linked to the first one – in Bogotá (Gómez, 2016; Vicepresidencia de la República, 2015).

FIGURE 7.5. INTERNATIONAL VISITORS TO BOGOTÁ (2007-2015)



Note: Data adapted from “Informes de Turismo”, by Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, 2007-2015, (<http://www.mincit.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=16590>) Copyright 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016 by Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. Reprinted with permission.

Finally, the change of perception and the consolidation of Bogotá as an important tourism and business centre in the heart of Latin America has brought new airlines to the city

⁴⁰ Original text in Spanish: “Bogotá solía tener una muy mala reputación pero ha evolucionado hasta convertirse en un destino importante para turistas y negocios. Transmilenio, las bibliotecas públicas y otros programas sociales llevados a cabo durante las últimas décadas han contribuido a mejorar la percepción internacional de la ciudad. Al mismo tiempo, internacionalmente, Bogotá ha devuelto la atención a Colombia. Bogotá repercute positivamente sobre la imagen de Colombia porque cambia la percepción de un país asediado por las drogas, del país en Guerra, para mostrar un país que busca el progreso y crea soluciones para sus múltiples problemas. Bogotá actualmente está en capacidad de compartir sus experiencias con otras ciudades del Sur Global pero desafortunadamente esas experiencias nunca han sido incluidas en la política exterior oficial del país (Durán, 2017).

during the past few years. The city went from having very few international connections during the worst days of the war to being served by 51 international airlines linking the city with the most important cities in the Americas and Europe (Aeropuerto El Dorado, 2016a). And the number is expected to keep growing with the arrival of Emirates and other Arab carriers (Portafolio, 2015).

7.1.3. COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ EMERGING IN PARALLEL: A CONCLUSION

Colombia has undoubtedly gone a long way to securing a reputation as an emerging power since the dangerous and troubled times during the 1980s and 1990s. Security has improved substantially, the sustained economic growth has already left the country with a larger middle class than ever before (El Espectador, 2015) and the international perception of the country seems to be shifting from a no-go zone to a promising land. Aware of all these changes, the Santos administration has engaged in an aggressive foreign policy aimed at diversifying not only the topics that are important for Colombia but also its partners. For the first time in decades, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognised the importance of the Global South and engaged constructively with it. The results so far are outstanding and have impacted Colombia's emergence in the world significantly.

Bogotá has gone through a similar process and is now considered an emerging city and a point of reference for other cities from the Global South. This section showed how the city is Colombia's economic, political and demographic powerhouse and, therefore, largely responsible for the country's success during the last two decades. It would be inaccurate to analyse Colombia's role in the world while ignoring Bogotá as a fundamental part of it. The city and the country are linked and both have benefited from each other's success stories.

When analysing the evolution of Colombia and Bogotá during the last two decades, the improvements are evident. By using Nolte's contributions in addition to the emerging metrics put forward by Pastrana Buelvas et al. and Breuning, this section was able to demonstrate that the combination of the five dimensions, its current active foreign policy and a shift in the international perception add up to make Colombia an emerging power

from the Latin American region. And while it is almost impossible for it to surpass other bigger countries in the continent like Brazil or Mexico, it is true that Colombia appears to have what it takes to become a more relevant actor not only in the American Continent but also in the world as an emerging power.

A bigger narrative comes out at this point. This section proved that Colombia is an emerging country and Bogotá an emerging city. However, it is clear that these two emerging processes are not coordinated. Consequently, although the trajectories followed by the country and the city look alike, and often for similar reasons, they are not part of one single strategy but, instead, they are two separate parallel processes. In turn, Bogotá is clearly important for Colombia in terms of power resources, leadership and international recognition, but not so important that it gets included in the country's foreign policy strategy. In other words, Bogotá is a fundamental part of Colombia because it is located within the national borders and because it contributes greatly with the three variables, but not because it is part of Colombia's efforts to improve its international status.

To conclude, the analysis carried out in Chapter 2 showed how the International Relations literature is mostly city-blind. In this section, a similar phenomenon occurs in practice. The national government in Colombia engages in a strategy aimed at improving the country's international standing and become an emerging power, but the mechanisms and instruments that it uses are mostly city-blind. In turn, the result is a disconnection between the national and the local spheres of government that keeps Bogotá out of Colombia's official emerging strategy.

7.2. SOUTH AFRICA: FROM PARIAH STATE TO AN EMERGING POWER

7.2.1. FROM ISOLATION TO THE RAINBOW NATION, THE SHIFT IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

With the purpose of understanding South Africa's international strategy to become an emerging power, this section analyses the evolution of the country's foreign policy. It focuses on the changes experienced by the international engagements of South Africa

before and after the democratic transition in 1994. Even though there are outstanding historical and operative differences with the Colombian case, this section finds similar dynamics between the two countries: a national foreign policy aimed at improving the international standing of South Africa through the normalisation of its international relations after apartheid while, at the same time, mostly ignoring its cities in the process.

A nation that embarks upon a policy of racial discrimination could not help losing the minds of the coloured nations of the earth... At this point... the traditional distinction between foreign affairs and domestic policies tends to break down (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 194–195).

Indeed, racial discrimination was the single most important issue affecting South Africa's foreign relations during the second half of the 20th century. Ever since the National Party came to power in 1948, the country's diplomatic relations with the rest of the world started deteriorating to the point where, by 1960, South Africa had closed its embassy in Egypt – its only one in Africa – and, with that, “none of the 68 states of the extensive African and Asian grouping maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa” (Christopher, 1994, p. 440).

On this topic, Christopher states that

The symbolically most severe form of sanctions that can be adopted in peacetime [...] is the refusal of one government to recognise the legitimacy of another. This form of sanction was widely adopted to register international condemnation of the South African government's policy of apartheid, based on racial classification and discrimination. International sanctions rendered the country one of the “pariah” states (Geldenhuys, 1990). Thus the pattern of South African foreign representation was highly skewed between 1948 and 1994 and not commensurate in extent with a country of its size and power (Christopher, 1994, p. 439).


Furthermore, according to Deon Geldenhuys,

[t]he history of South Africa's post-war international relations shows quite clearly that no 'normal' foreign relations are possible for such an 'abnormal' society. South Africa finds itself in a state of chronic high tension with the international community because its domestic political order is universally rejected. What is more, the outside world is committed to remedying the abnormality of apartheid, rooted as it is in racial discrimination and white domination. Apartheid [...] is responsible for the uniquely hostile external environment confronting South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1989, p. 7).

The foreign relations of the apartheid government went through different stages from 1948 to 1994, nonetheless, all of them were highly affected by confrontation. At first, South Africa maintained a small number of diplomatic missions in countries in Western Europe and North America with which it had important economic interests, mainly mining investments. Then, in the early 1960s, mandatory comprehensive sanctions from the Organisation of the African Unity and the United Nations came to place and, thus, increased South Africa's isolation from the international community (Christopher, 1994; Mugomba, 1975).

During the 1970s, Prime Minister John Vorster pursued an outward foreign policy in which the country established diplomatic relations with other pariah and isolated States, namely the dictatorships in South and Central America, Taiwan and Israel. Under Prime Minister Botha (1977-1989), the number of embassies fell again as a result of South Africa's military involvement in Southern Africa and political changes taking place in South America. Finally, with F.W. De Klerk, apartheid's last president, countries started to open up to South Africa as they believed the process of political reform in the country "could be encouraged by diplomatic recognition rather than confrontation" (Christopher, 1994, p. 444). The most important countries in this grouping were Gabon, Ivory Coast and Lesotho in Africa and Japan and the People's Republic of China in Asia (Christopher, 1994). The evolution presented in the previous paragraphs is elaborated in Figures 7.6. and 7.7.

FIGURE 7.6. NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN SELECTED YEARS



Note: Data adapted from "The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994", by A. J. Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers; and from "Foreign Relations", by Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2016, (<http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/index.html>) Copyright 2016 by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. Printed with permission.

FIGURE 7.7. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSIES OVERSEAS IN SELECTED YEARS




FIGURE 7.7.A. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSIES IN 1965

Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994”, by A. J. Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted with permission.

Note 2: Embassies in dark blue and consulates in light blue.




FIGURE 7.7.B. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSIES IN 1979

Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994”, by A. J. Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted with permission.

Note 2: Embassies in dark blue and consulates in light blue.




FIGURE 7.7.C. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSIES IN 1989

Note: Data adapted from “The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994”, by A. J. Christopher, 1994, Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted with permission.

Note 2: Embassies in dark blue and consulates in light blue.




FIGURE 7.7.D. SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSIES IN 2016

Note: Data from “South African Representation Abroad”, by Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2016, Copyright 2016 by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. Reprinted with permission.

While most of South Africa’s isolation came from the international community, Pretoria also played an important role in isolating itself. For example, in 1954, the Soviet Union was asked to close its consular office in South Africa after parliament passed the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 (Christopher, 1994). Also, after Zambia gained

its independence in 1964, the apartheid government considered establishing diplomatic relations with Lusaka. However, the sole idea of having a black ambassador in 'white' Pretoria was enough to cancel the plans (Christopher, 1994).

With 1994 came drastic changes for South Africa's domestic and foreign policies. A negotiated political solution to apartheid was implemented and the new Nelson Mandela government was faced with the need to pursue a new and radically different foreign policy. The starting point could have not been better. In fact, Greg Mills calls the period between 1994 and 1999 the 'honeymoon years of international courtship' (Mills, 2000b). The ecstasy with which South Africa was received at the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) provided a new moral space for the country and its highly respected new president (Spence, 1997). South Africa knew it could exploit this momentum in its favour.

Consequently, South Africa's strategy focused on five key strategies to adapt its foreign policy to the new realities of the post-apartheid era:

1. ***Restoring civilian control over the security apparatus*** so that the military would only be used for national self-defence and could only be deployed overseas for internationally mandated peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief exercises and the restoration of democracy (Schraeder, 2001, p. 231).
2. ***Restructuring the foreign policy establishment*** to include diplomats from the former apartheid regime, the ANC's Department of International Affairs and the four homelands' foreign ministries so that the new Department of Foreign Affairs could be capable of responding to South Africa's new role in the international community (Schraeder, 2001, p. 232).
3. ***Self-promotion as the leader of the 'African Renaissance'*** to emphasise the centrality of Africa in South Africa's foreign policy. Six further objectives were included in this concept: regional integration and development, nuclear non-proliferation, territorial integrity and state sovereignty, peaceful resolution of conflicts, promotion of democracy and human rights, and free trade and investment (Schraeder, 2001, p. 233).
4. ***Adherence to the foreign policy principle of 'universality'*** through which South Africa underscores its willingness to establish diplomatic relations with all countries of the world regardless of political systems or foreign policy priorities (Schraeder, 2001, p. 234).

5. *Assuming a leadership role in international organisations to emphasise its firm commitment to the strengthening of international norms associated with the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, the Organisation for African Unity and other international organisations (Schraeder, 2001, p. 234).*

This foreign policy strategy saw the largest diplomatic expansion in South Africa's history going from 39 foreign missions in 1993 (Christopher, 1994) to 106 in 2016 (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2016c). Apart from the historic relationships with Western Europe and North America, Pretoria's new diplomatic network included embassies in all but six African countries and the most important nations in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. Also, a total of 134 countries opened embassies in Pretoria after 1993 (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2016b), making it the second most important diplomatic city in Africa after Cairo.

Similarly, as a consequence of its domestic peaceful political transformation, South Africa started occupying a moral high ground that enabled it to be at the forefront of world efforts to promote human rights and democratic governments (A. F. Cooper, 1998). This, in turn, allowed for a larger engagement, both political and military, in UN, SADC and OAU peace initiatives and mediation efforts in countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Libya, Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Burundi, Iran and Ivory Coast, amongst others (A. F. Cooper, 1998; Nathan, 2012; Spence, 1997; Van der Westhuizen, 1998). The end result saw a new role in the world for South Africa in which its

foreign policy actually reflects the dynamics of a new middle power emerging in the developing world. South Africa is not simply another 'goody-two-shoes state' as middle powers are often caricatured. Rather, South Africa is being propelled into such a posture by a variety of interrelated forces. Change at the level of world order, its position within the international political economy, and diverse social forces operating in its state-societal complex all drive the kind of internationalist activity that typifies middle power behaviour. Playing a mediatory role not only helps the South African state make diverse foreign policy goals more compatible, it also goes some way in thwarting criticism levelled at its foreign policy. In short, its middle power orientation represents the external extension of domestic politics organised along corporatist lines (Van der Westhuizen, 1998, p. 436).

In line with South Africa's new status as middle power, the City of Johannesburg also went through a radical transformation in its international engagements after the end of apartheid (P. Harrison, 2015). And even though official foreign policy is an exclusive responsibility of the national government, the guidelines of the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) to focus the country's foreign policy on Africa and the Global South also generated a shift in the City of Johannesburg's international priorities; mainly to legitimate its own actions in terms of the dominant approach in national policy. According to Harrison, the city's strong shift towards Africa and BRICS countries did support the foreign policy objectives of DIRCO, although in an indirect and uncoordinated way with national government (Harrison, 2016). In terms of foreign engagements, there are two parallel processes of emergence at the national and the local level, but again, they are not coordinated as part of one single foreign policy strategy. Evidence can be found in South Africa's 2011 white paper (Government of South Africa, 2011) that contains DIRCO's foreign policy guidelines, which are almost completely city-blind.


7.2.2. THE BIRTH OF A GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN AND THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF SOUTH AFRICA

As with Colombia, the FSI serves as a starting point to analyse South Africa's perception in the International System. However, since the Fund for Peace only started measuring the FSI in 2005, there is an important absence of information for the last years of apartheid, the transition period between 1990 and 1994, and the first 11 years of democracy in South Africa. Nonetheless, it can be argued that, due to the highly unstable internal and external situations in the country during apartheid, including low State legitimacy, serious human rights violations, uneven economic development and economic crisis (Fund for Peace, 2016g), South Africa would have been considered an extremely fragile State right before the start of the democratic transition.

Fast forward to 2006, the first year in which the Fund for Peace included South Africa in the index, the country ranked 110th or, in other words, the 36th least fragile State in the world. That year, South Africa was located between the European Union countries of

Latvia (109th) and Estonia (111th) (Fund for Peace, 2006), an outstanding position to be after apartheid. Yet, South Africa's ranking has worsened considerably ever since, as Figure 7.8. shows. Its score of 57.4 in 2007 (Fund for Peace, 2007) increased to 69.9 in 2016 (Fund for Peace, 2016a), meaning a loss of 25 places in the ranking and going from 'Stable' to 'Warning'. Moreover, according to the FSI Decade Trends, South Africa experienced a 'significant worsening' between 2007 and 2016 similar to that of Greece, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, and ranked it only one place away from the 'critical worsening' category (Fund for Peace, 2016b). Only six countries in the world had worse results than South Africa during the past decade.

FIGURE 7.8. SOUTH AFRICA IN THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX (2006-2016)



Note: Data adapted from "The Fragile States Index Data", by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2006to2014.xlsx>) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data adapted from "Fragile States Index 2015", by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015>) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace; data adapted from "Fragile States Index 2016", by The Fund for Peace, 2016, (<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016>) Copyright 2016 by The Fund for Peace. Printed with permission.

Although the FSI forecast is not promising, other intangible and unmeasurable elements also play a role in the country's perception in the world. Perhaps the most important one is the fact that South Africa still enjoys the status of a 'good international citizen' it gained with its peaceful transition to democracy after apartheid and the leaderships of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. In turn, according to Cooper, a strategy of "external validation" (A. F. Cooper, 1998, p. 707) was key in the establishment of new South Africa

as it would conform with the country's triumphant return as an active, accepted and constructive player in the International System.

Furthermore, by focusing its new foreign policy on promoting human rights, regional integration and peaceful resolution of conflicts, amongst other principles, South Africa was able to claim a higher moral ground internationally and, therefore, be perceived as a trustworthy emerging or middle power from the Global South (Van der Westhuizen, 1998). In other words, South Africa had arrived with a "world-view driven by ambition to do good and a belief that the coin of idealism still holds value in an increasingly Darwinian world" (Alden & Le Pere, 2004, p. 289). This improved perception of South Africa in the world allowed it to engage in international mediation and peace building initiatives during the past two decades (Louw-Vaudran, 2016). Consequently, since 1994, South Africa was able to mediate in 14 countries, 13 of them in Africa, and by March 2014, the country's troops were involved in African peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur and South Sudan (Dieckhoff, 2014; Mabera, 2016).

It must be mentioned, however, that "there are legitimate concerns that this capital, agency, and stature are fast depreciating because of recent missteps and strategic blunders in the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy, especially under President Zuma's watch" (Le Pere, 2014, p. 32). Some of the most important ones being not granting the Dalai Lama a visa to enter the country (Institute for Global Dialogue / Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014), the military failure in the Central African Republic in 2013 (Saunders, 2013; Van der Westhuizen, 2016; Vreÿ & Esterhuyse, 2015), the Zuma-Gupta corruption scandal (Le Pere, 2014; Swilling et al., 2017), the slow and vague response to the xenophobic attacks against other African nationals in South Africa in 2008 and 2015 (Qobo, 2017), the decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court in 2016 (Cornelissen, 2017) and Zuma's refusal to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in Johannesburg in 2015 (Bosco, 2017; Murphy & Sieff, 2015). On this topic, Liesl Louw-Vaudran goes further and blames President Zuma for what she calls the "moral decline of a former superpower" (Louw-Vaudran, 2016, p. 181) in Africa.

Another decisive aspect of South Africa's new role in the world is its perception as Africa's regional power. South Africa's large economy and its share in the continent's economic market, its perception as a major African leader supported by its robust foreign

policy in Africa and its participation in finding African solutions for African problems make it the strongest candidate, even over Nigeria, to be Africa's regional hegemonic power (Ogunnubi & Isike, 2015). Regional and continental organisations are key for South Africa's power in Africa. The country has had a leading role in the establishment and development of organisations such as the African Union, NEPAD, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Peer Review Mechanism, the African Standby Force or the Southern African Customs Union (Alden & Soko, 2005; Bohler-Muller, 2012; Fledes & Wojczewski, 2010; Lechini & Giaccaglia, 2016; Qobo, 2010; Saunders, 2013; Schoeman, 2003).

However, South Africa does not only stand out in Africa. It is undoubtedly the country of choice to represent the continent in international forums and organisations. On this topic, South Africa is the only African full member of the G20 and the G8+5 (A. F. Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008; Landsberg, 2011), it is one of the most important countries leading the African quest for permanent UN Security Council representation – along with Egypt and Nigeria – (Spies, 2008; Venter, 2003), it was invited to join BRICS in 2010 (J. A. Smith, 2011; Xinhua, 2010), it was also a fundamental part in the creation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 (Alden & Vieira, 2005; De Sousa, 2007a), and, as previously mentioned, it was included in some other important groupings of emerging powers from the Global South such as CIVETS (Allen, 2011; América Económica, 2011; É. Vieira, 2011), NEST (BBVA, 2015), and VISTA (Rodrigues, 2007). Furthermore, hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup had an enormous impact in South Africa's visibility in the world as Africa's most important emerging power (Cornelissen, 2010).

In line with South Africa's international recognition, the city of Johannesburg has undergone a similar trend. Despite its bad reputation as a 'crime city' (Dirsuweit, 2002; K. Harrison, 2006; Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004; Palmary, Rauch, & Simpson, 2003; Wafer, 2009), Johannesburg has been able to position itself as the gateway to Africa and as Africa's most important international city (Harrison, 2016; Lipietz, 2008). In turn, South Africa's image has greatly benefitted from the advantages Johannesburg poses for international businesses and politics. The city has Africa's largest stock exchange, its biggest and best capitalised banks and its busiest and best-connected airport, amongst others (Games, 2012). Johannesburg also hosts the Pan-African Parliament (Pan African Parliament, 2017) and an African branch of the New Development Bank – formerly

known as BRICS Development Bank – will open this shortly in the city (New Development Bank, 2016; Times Live, 2016).

7.2.3. SOUTH AFRICA'S EMERGING POWER STATUS, A CONCLUSION

South Africa is a *sui generis* nation. Perhaps, no other country has undergone such a radical transformation during the past few decades. Since 1990, South Africa went from international pariah to an active, accepted and constructive player in the International System, and an emerging power from the Global South. Furthermore, South Africa has not only been considered an emerging power. Other concepts such as 'regional power' and 'middle power' have also been used to describe the country during the past few decades. However, as it was mentioned previously, the recent missteps in the conduct of South African foreign policy, the economic and political drawbacks of the current Zuma government and the growing debate on whether the country is punching above its own weight in its international relations are proof of the ambiguities faced by South Africa and its perception in the world. Nonetheless, the international recognition of the country's emerging power status is unquestionable.

The situation for Johannesburg is quite similar. As an emerging city, it faces most of the problems of cities in the Global South (Bremner, 2000; Murray, 2008; Tomlinson, Beauregard, Bremner, & Mangcu, 2003), while, at the same time, it has been recognised as one of Africa's most important global cities, or a 'world-class African city' as the city presents itself (City of Johannesburg, 2016a; Lipietz, 2008). Chapter 6 showed how Johannesburg is currently the economic, financial and demographic powerhouse of South Africa and, as such, a large portion of South Africa's power resources and international recognition originate in the city. Johannesburg is a fundamental part of South Africa, so much so that the history of the country would be radically different if gold had not been discovered in the city at the end of the 19th century. Johannesburg and South Africa are closely linked and the country's status as an emerging power cannot properly be addressed without considering the city as a fundamental part of it.

Unlike Bogotá, which can be perceived as an important city in a region with many important cities, Johannesburg is *the* important city not only in the SADC region but also

in Sub-Saharan Africa. In turn, while other countries in the continent grow, their cities are not likely to surpass Johannesburg that will, at least in the foreseeable future, maintain its status as Sub-Saharan Africa's powerhouse and most international city. Therefore, Johannesburg has consolidated its position as an emerging city and one of the most important from the Global South for three different reasons. First, it is the heart of South Africa, Africa's most recognised emerging power. Second, by virtue of its own power resources, leadership and international recognition. And third, because of the nature of South Africa's Sub-Saharan African neighbours, the importance of Johannesburg is, by far, larger than that of any other city in the region.

Yet, as it was the case with Colombia, the strategy used by South Africa to obtain and maintain its status as an emerging power does not include Johannesburg. The country uses its official foreign policy to advance its national interest without much regard for the city. At the same time, the city is big enough to act on its own and, therefore, largely ignores South Africa. The result is that the city and the country engage in two parallel but disconnected processes of emerging.

7.3. THE EMERGENCE OF COLOMBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: TWO CITY-BLIND PROCESSES

When the cases of Colombia and South Africa are analysed together, a bigger narrative stands out. It is clear that the two processes share some important characteristics. They are both abandoning a troubled past and trying to make it into the emerging power leagues by solving those major problems and inserting themselves into the world. For Colombia, it is the internal armed conflict, while for South Africa, it is the legacy of segregation that characterised apartheid.

However, the historical differences, their approaches to foreign policy and, most of all, the way they are perceived by the rest of the world, have meant that the roads followed by both countries are radically different. On one side, Colombia is still struggling to achieve its emerging power status; while on the other, South Africa was catapulted to this category after 1994 and has consolidated its influence – although limited – not only in Africa but also in the world. For South Africa, it is not about reaching the emerging power

status, but about maintaining it. This is an important issue as it breaks the idea that there is a linear progression or a unique way into becoming an emerging power. Colombia and South Africa demonstrate that the status can be achieved through different paths.

When trying to become an emerging power, both Colombia and South Africa have actively used their own power resources. Not only do they acknowledge these resources to be significant, they are also aware that an improvement in the five dimensions previously analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 will, in turn, increase their international status and their possibilities of defending their national interest abroad. Nonetheless, it is when they realise the importance of their power resources that it becomes clear how little they actively use the power resources of their cities. While Bogotá and Johannesburg are a fundamental part of their countries' international capacities and recognition, they are not included in their foreign policy strategies that, in turn, have showed to be almost completely city-blind.

Consequently, Part 3 of this thesis demonstrates an overarching dynamic that shows emerging countries on one side and then emerging cities on the other in two parallel processes. And although the national and local emerging trajectories might seem similar, they are unconnected. Neither Colombia or South Africa have been able – or wanted – to include their most important cities in their emerging strategies. The two spheres of government follow a similar path, but they do it on their own as if cities did not have a place in foreign policy. The following chapter (Chapter 8) engages with and explains this mismatch between national and local governments in the international projection of Colombia and South Africa.

But while power resources, leadership and international recognition are mostly city-blind, the nature of this blindness is quite different. For instance, cities are intrinsically included in a country's power resources as part of the whole. Consequently, even if their contribution to national power is not officially recognised or actively used by the State in their quest to become an emerging power, they still add to the country's capabilities in the world. On the contrary, leadership depends on foreign policy – an exclusive domain of the State – and, as such, a national emerging strategy can be carried out with a complete disregard for cities. In this scenario, sub-national governments will most likely follow parallel routes to internationalise their territories and search for contacts and co-

operation on their own. Finally, international recognition seems to work both ways: countries can be recognised as 'emerging powers' and cities can be recognised as 'emerging cities'. Both national and local governments can work towards altering their international perception but, as it was demonstrated in this chapter, they do this in a separate, unconnected way.

As the process of emerging involves improving a country's status in the world over time, there is a need to address the possibilities of change for each one of the three variables. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the fluidity of the five dimensions of power resources can vary largely from one to another. While the territorial dimension is almost immutable, the rest of them are somewhat more flexible. This part demonstrated that power resources can indeed be modified and improved, however, it is not an easy task as their fluidity is quite slow. On the contrary, leadership and international recognition are far from static and they can be modified in various ways. First, the foreign policy of the State can actively be used to improve the country's standing and perception in the International System. Second, country and city promotion programmes can also affect the leadership and the international recognition of both the State and sub-national entities. And third, they usually respond to domestic changes that can both support a change in a country's foreign policy and trigger a response from the international community.

Finally, an additional conclusion that arises from the previous three chapters is the fact that the paces of change for Colombia and South Africa are radically different. While both countries have emerged, Colombia has shown a faster and more aggressive growth in its power resources than South Africa during the past few decades. As Colombia's three variables keep improving rather steadily, for South Africa, the large debate about its true international capabilities and the contradictions between the guidelines and the practice of its foreign policy seem to slow down the emerging pace for the country. Nonetheless, because of their relative weight in Latin America and Africa respectively, South Africa is undoubtedly more visible in the international arena than Colombia, a country somewhat overshadowed by South America's giant, Brazil.

PART 4

**UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CITIES
IN THE OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY OF
EMERGING POWERS: THE CASES OF
BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA AND
JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA**

The previous Chapters 5, 6 and 7 analysed the way nations are positioned – and can change – their place in the global hierarchy of States, with or without giving attention to their cities. The countries' emergence was defined in terms of their power resources, leadership and international perception. The discussion on Colombia and South Africa proved conclusively that the two countries can indeed be considered as emerging middle powers from the Global South, while, at the same time, demonstrated that Bogotá and Johannesburg are located at the core of these three variables. In other words, the two cities are tightly linked to the national dynamics of Colombia and South Africa and, therefore, could and should play a driving role in their nations' emerging strategy.

However, Part 3 has already provided a first indication that while Bogotá and Johannesburg are crucial for the international emergence of Colombia and South Africa, they are not overtly considered in their countries' international strategies. So far, the way in which the two countries have emerged seems to be almost completely city-blind. The opposite is also true. Bogotá and Johannesburg have used their own power resources, leadership and recognition to position themselves in the world but, while doing so, have almost completely disregarded the International Relations functions of the State. In turn, there are two unrelated, parallel processes of 'emerging', one for the State and one for the city.

In order to build on that first indication, the thesis now shifts to analyse the role of cities in the official foreign policy of emerging powers. A number of questions can be raised at this point. Are the interests of the cities included in the countries' official foreign policy? Is there co-operation between national and local governments in the design and implementation of foreign policy? Are cities considered when States identify the national interest? Using Colombia and South Africa as examples, is it possible to understand the role cities play in the foreign policy of emerging powers?

Part 4 is divided in three Chapters. Chapter 8 takes a close look at the constitutional and legal interfaces between cities and States and gives particular weight to issues of foreign policy. It analyses the existing hierarchy of power in the legal frameworks of both countries that largely prevents national and local governments to co-operate in the design and implementation of foreign policy. Chapter 9 moves to address the operational and practical reasons found both at national and local spheres that also affect their ability to

work together as part of a unified emerging strategy for the country and the city. In other words, Chapter 8 deals with why they cannot co-operate while Chapter 9 explains why they do not do it. Finally, the Conclusions (Chapter 10) go one step further to explain the reasons behind the disconnection between national and local governments in foreign policy and address the consequences these reasons pose for Colombia and South Africa when they appear as a composite.

The analysis conducted in this Part is based on the constitutions and official foreign policy documents from the Colombian and the South African governments as well as international relations documents from the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Cape Town and Johannesburg. Interviews conducted in Spanish and English to key current and former national and local government officials in Bogotá, Medellín, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town were also included and considered for the analyses. Finally, specialist academics and applied researchers from both Colombia and South Africa were consulted to augment and verify the interpretations drawn from a reading of the law and the views of practitioners.

CHAPTER 8: CITIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF EMERGING POWERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MISMATCH

As the holder of the constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy, the national government through the executive branch is entitled by law to design and implement the international relations of Colombia and South Africa. Considering that foreign policy is based on the national interest, it should include all actors within the country to ensure their interests are also satisfied. However, this is not often the case. Evidence shows that national governments in Bogotá and Pretoria consider foreign policy to be the exclusive prerogative of the State and, therefore, regional and local governments have little to no say in the issue of international relations.

While cities increase their demands for decentralisation and access to the multilateral bodies, the issue of how, if at all, they might be bound by a national law and the de facto practices of national government becomes crucial. This chapter explains the mismatch between the different spheres of government in foreign policy by taking a close look at the constitutional and legal frameworks in Colombia and South Africa as well as the reasons emanating from the national level, namely the Presidencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bogotá and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Pretoria. It also explores the consequences these reasons have on local governments both in Colombia and South Africa.

8.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AMBIGUITIES ON DECENTRALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Perhaps the most important reason for the evident mismatch between national and local governments in foreign policy for Colombia and South Africa lies in the conception and implementation of their decentralisation processes. Although it can be argued that there were previous decentralisation initiatives and measures, the 1991 Constitution for Colombia and the 1996 Constitution for South Africa provided the current legal and constitutional framework for decentralisation for both countries (Lodge, 2005; Soto, 2003).

Over two decades later, Colombia has undergone one of the most advanced decentralisation processes in Latin America (Finot, 2007; Giraldo, 2003) and South Africa innovated in the continent by using its transition to democracy to further decentralise resources and policymaking authority to sub-national governments across the entire territory (Stanton, 2009; Tyler Dickovick, 2005).

What is interesting, however, is that both Colombia and South Africa developed a very clear and advanced constitutional and legal framework that define the characteristics and limits of their decentralisation processes in most topics *except* international relations. With one clear exception for Colombia – which will be discussed later – both countries limit the competencies of sub-national entities to regional and municipal issues. In other words, neither the constitutions nor the decentralisation laws in Colombia and South Africa explicitly allow sub-national governments to engage in relations with entities outside the national borders. The following paragraphs examine the constitutional and legal ambiguities in both countries.

As the fundamental laws of the States, both Constitutions stipulate that foreign policy and international relations are the exclusive responsibility of the President of the Republic as head of the National Executive. In turn, according to Part 2 of Article 189 of the Colombian Constitution,

[It] corresponds to the President of the Republic as Head of State, Head of Government and Supreme Administrative Authority [to c]onduct international relations. Appoint diplomatic and consular agents, receive the respective agents and sign with other States and entities of international law treaties or agreements to be submitted for the approval of the Congress⁴¹ (Translated by the author from Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, p. 54).

There is, however, one exception in the Colombian Constitution that allows Departments⁴² and Municipalities in border regions – which does not apply to Bogotá –

⁴¹ Original text in Spanish: Corresponde al Presidente de la República como Jefe de Estado, Jefe del Gobierno y Suprema Autoridad Administrativa: 2. Dirigir las relaciones internacionales. Nombrar a los agentes diplomáticos y consulares, recibir a los agentes respectivos y celebrar con otros Estados y entidades de derecho internacional tratados o convenios que se someterán a la aprobación del Congreso.

⁴² Departments (Departamentos in Spanish) are first-level administrative and political subdivision in Colombia. Consequently, the three levels of government in the country are: national, departmental and municipal. There are two additional exceptional divisions, namely special districts and indigenous

to engage in foreign activities under very particular and restrictive conditions. It must be noted that this authorisation is not regarded, under any circumstance, as foreign policy by the constitution or the law. This exception can be found in Article 289 of the Constitution:

Under the terms of the law, departments and municipalities located in border areas may directly engage with same-level bordering territorial entities of the neighbouring country, in co-operation and integration programs aimed at promoting community development, the provision of public services and the preservation of the environment⁴³ (Translated by the author from Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, pp. 80–81).

As for South Africa, the Constitution deals with foreign affairs in various articles and sections. Nonetheless, it is clear that the President and the National Executive are responsible for foreign policy, diplomacy and the signing of international agreements. Some of the most important articles are:

CHAPTER 5: THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
ARTICLE 84: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

(2) *The President is responsible for –*

(h) receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives;

(i) appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives; (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1301)

CHAPTER 14: GENERAL PROVISIONS / INTERNATIONAL LAW
ARTICLE 231: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

(1) *The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1331 (31)).*

territories which are, according to the law, essentially equivalent to municipalities (Congreso de Colombia, 2013). Departments in Colombia are the equivalent of provinces in South Africa.

⁴³ Original text in Spanish: Por mandato de la ley, los departamentos y municipios ubicados en zonas fronterizas podrán adelantar directamente con la entidad territorial limítrofe del país vecino, de igual nivel, programas de cooperación e integración, dirigidos a fomentar el desarrollo comunitario, la prestación de servicios públicos y la preservación del ambiente (Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, pp. 80–81).

In terms of decentralisation, both Colombia and South Africa recognise three levels of government, namely national, departmental/provincial and municipal, and provide which functions fall under their jurisdiction. Article 287 of the Colombian Constitution stipulates that “[t]erritorial entities enjoy autonomy for the management of their interests, and within the limits of the Constitution and the law”⁴⁴ (Translated by the author from Gobierno de Colombia, 2015, p. 80) while the *Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial* [Organic Territorial Planning Law] – Law 1454 of 2011 – explicitly grants functions to each level of government in the country, all of them in regards of public administration, finances, fiscal policy, urban planning and land use (Congreso de Colombia, 2011). Consequently, in the Colombian case, with the exception of article 289 of the Constitution, no reference to international relations or foreign engagements of sub-national entities can be found in the legal framework.

The South African case is very similar. Article 40 of the Constitution starts by stating that “[i]n the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1267) while Article 41 goes further in establishing the requirements for co-operative government and intergovernmental relations in South Africa and emphasises the prohibition to “assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution” (Constitutional Assembly, 1996, p. 1269). This is extremely important as, for South Africa, any function assumed by sub-national governments that is not mentioned in the Constitution appears to be illegal.

The South African legal framework on municipal governments is complemented by Chapter 7 of the Constitution on Local Governments (Constitutional Assembly, 1996) and the three laws regulating municipalities in the country: the Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 (Government of South Africa, 1998a), the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (Government of South Africa, 1998b) and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (Government of South Africa, 2000). As with Colombia, all of the above legal instruments focus on local government issues such as land use, fiscal policy, loans, provision of services and social and economic development, amongst others, but none mention any explicit reference to the possibility for sub-national entities to engage in international

⁴⁴ Original text in Spanish: “Las entidades territoriales go- zan de autonomía para la gestión de sus intereses, y dentro de los límites de la Constitución y la ley”.

relations. Consequently, according to Constitutional Law expert Pierre de Vos (personal communication, June 2, 2017) and taking into account Article 41 of the Constitution, since it is not explicitly allowed in the law, any international engagement undertaken by local governments appears to be illegal in South Africa.

Some new questions arise at this point: can the *de facto* international engagements of sub-national governments in Colombia and South Africa be regarded as illegal according to the laws of both countries? Is there only an absence of legislation on the topic? Or, is there a contradiction in the current legislation? When addressing the issue of foreign policy, there is a clear ambiguity between the legal and constitutional provisions on international affairs and decentralisation in both countries. On one side, the legal framework only allows the National Executive to conduct foreign policy and, on the other, sub-national entities argue that the current decentralisation laws grant them enough political autonomy to pursue international engagements aimed at satisfying their own local interests. The following paragraphs take a closer look at this ambiguity.

The first issue that needs to be addressed is the interpretation of the law. Both constitutions grant autonomy to its sub-national governments within the framework of a unitary State (Constitutional Assembly, 1996; Gobierno de Colombia, 2015) and, with the complementary laws (Congreso de Colombia, 2011; Government of South Africa, 1998a, 1998b, 2000), set the boundaries as to what particular actions sub-national governments can undertake to fulfil their constitutional duties, none of which mention international relations. However, in line with the decentralisation trend in both countries, departmental/provincial and municipal governments in Colombia and South Africa have justified their international engagements with a broad, and often not so accurate, interpretation of the law.

In this regard, under the decentralisation legal framework, the Mayor of Bogotá created the City's Directorate for International Relations through Decree 425 of 2016 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2016a). This Decree informs in the preamble that the Mayor has the faculties to modify the administrative structure of the City according to parts 1, 4, 6 and 9 of Article 38 of Law 1421 of 1993 (Presidente de la República de Colombia, 1993) which set out the legal functions of the Mayor:

1. *To enforce the Constitution, the law, the decrees of the National Government and the agreements of the Council*⁴⁵.

4. *To exercise the regulatory power, issuing the Decrees, orders and resolutions necessary to ensure the proper execution of the agreements*⁴⁶.

6. *To distribute functions according to their nature between the secretariats, administrative departments and decentralised entities*⁴⁷.

9. *To create, suppress or merge the jobs of the central administration, indicate their special functions and determine their emoluments according to the corresponding agreements. Based on this option, [the Mayor] will not be able to create obligations that exceed the total amount set for personnel expenses in the initially approved budget*⁴⁸ (Translated by the author from *Presidente de la República de Colombia*, 1993).

What is interesting is that, while the previous law allows the Mayor to modify the administrative structure of the city government within the country's decentralisation scheme, no mention regarding the possibility of the City of Bogotá to engage in international activities can be found. Something similar happens with the International Co-operation Agency of the City of Medellín. In its *Manual de Cooperación Internacional Descentralizada* [Manual of Decentralised International Co-operation] (Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012), the Agency explains the Colombian legal framework for decentralised co-operation and cites Article 226 of the Constitution: "The State will promote the internationalisation of political, economic, social and ecological relations on the basis of equity, reciprocity and national

⁴⁵ Original text in Spanish: "Hacer cumplir la Constitución, la ley, los Decretos del Gobierno Nacional y los acuerdos del Concejo".

⁴⁶ Original text in Spanish: "Ejercer la potestad reglamentaria, expidiendo los Decretos, órdenes y resoluciones necesarios para asegurar la debida ejecución de los acuerdos".

⁴⁷ Original text in Spanish: "Distribuir los negocios según su naturaleza entre las secretarías, los departamentos administrativos y las entidades descentralizadas".

⁴⁸ Original text in Spanish: "Crear, suprimir o fusionar los empleos de la administración central, señalarles sus funciones especiales y determinar sus emolumentos con arreglo a los acuerdos correspondientes. Con base en esta facultad, no podrá crear obligaciones que excedan el monto global fijado para gastos de personal en el presupuesto inicialmente aprobado".

convenience”⁴⁹ (Translated by the author from Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012, p. 27). It then continues by explaining the importance of decentralisation in Colombia:

In the case of territorial entities – departments and municipalities –, it is important to emphasise that Article 13 of the Political Constitution of Colombia establishes the decentralisation and autonomy of territorial entities. This feature is reiterated in Articles 287 and 288, the latter delegates the division of powers between the Nation and territorial entities to the Organic Territorial Planning Law, 1454 of 2011⁵⁰ (Translated by the author from Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012, p. 27).

And this is where the broad interpretation of the law comes in. The Agency continues to provide its explanation on how Article 28 of the Organic Territorial Planning Law (Congreso de Colombia, 2011) provides sub-national entities with the ability to engage in international relations:

This law clearly states in Article 28 that departments and municipalities will have autonomy to determine their internal structure and central and decentralised administrative organisation; as well as the establishment and distribution of their functions and resources for the adequate fulfilment of their constitutional duties. From here a permission from the national level to engage in international relations is deduced, and therefore, to seek and manage co-operation relations. Thus, by constitutional and legal provision, territorial entities have the absolute power to seek, encourage and foster relations of technical, economic and knowledge management exchange with juridical persons of the international level⁵¹

⁴⁹ Original text in Spanish: “El Estado promoverá la internacionalización de las relaciones políticas, económicas, sociales y ecológicas sobre bases de equidad, reciprocidad y conveniencia nacional”.

⁵⁰ Original text in Spanish: “Para el caso de las entidades territoriales –departamentos y municipios-, es importante resaltar que en el Artículo 13 de la Constitución Política de Colombia, se establece la descentralización y autonomía de las entidades territoriales. Esta característica se reitera en los artículos 287 y 288 de la misma, siendo este último, el que delega la repartición de competencias entre la Nación y los entes territoriales a la Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial, la 1454 de 2011”.

⁵¹ Original text in Spanish: “Esta ley establece claramente en el Artículo 28 que los departamentos y municipios tendrán autonomía para determinar su estructura interna y organización administrativa central y descentralizada; así como el establecimiento y distribución de sus funciones y recursos para el adecuado cumplimiento de sus deberes constitucionales. De acá se deduce una permisión del orden nacional para el relacionamiento internacional, y por lo tanto para la búsqueda y gestión de relaciones de cooperación. De esta manera entonces, por disposición constitucional y legal, las entidades territoriales tienen la absoluta potestad de buscar, fomentar y propiciar las relaciones de intercambio técnico, económico y de gestión del conocimiento, con personas jurídicas del orden internacional”.

(Translated by the author from Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana, 2012, p. 27).

The previous explanation is highly debatable as there is no clear causality between the text of the law and the Agency's interpretation of it. Also, it fails to mention paragraph 1 of the same Article that clearly establishes that "[t]he municipalities are holders of any competence that is not expressly attributed to the Departments or the Nation"⁵² (Translated by the author from Congreso de Colombia, 2011, p. 11), in this case, international relations under the authority of the national executive as per Article 189 of the Constitution (Gobierno de Colombia, 2015).

Sub-national governments, then, use the autonomy given to them by decentralisation laws to justify their international engagements, even if they are not explicitly allowed in the legal framework. Something similar can be found in the South African case. The City of Johannesburg's integrated international relations agenda explains why the local government is allowed to have its own international engagements as follows:

The Constitution establishes local government as a sphere of government which has the "right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community." In addition, municipalities must "participate in national and provincial development programmes". Hence the mandate for the establishment of a robust international relations programme for the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) is derived for the independence of local government on the one hand and the requirement to participate in national programmes which would include national government's international relations policies and programmes on the other (City of Johannesburg, 2012b, p. 5).

It can be argued that the causality in the South African case is also absent as the autonomy given to local governments according to decentralisation laws does not mention international relations. Also, considering the decentralisation process only gives sub-national entities authority over their own territories, an international mandate cannot legally be assumed in the absence of an explicit legal authorisation. But the City of Johannesburg is not the only sub-national entity that assumes this mandate. The City of Ekurhuleni stated that "[t]he Constitution of the Republic of South Africa acknowledges

⁵² Original text in Spanish: "Los municipios son titulares de cualquier competencia que no esté atribuida expresamente a los departamentos o a la Nación".

local authorities as a distinct sphere of government with considerable latitude in its functioning, including the right to establish International relationships” (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2010, p. 3).

Interestingly enough, the available scholarship on decentralisation in Colombia (Calderón Álvarez & Velásquez Betancur, 2008; De la Cruz, Pineda Mannheim, & Pöschl, 2011; Giraldo, 2003; Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 2005; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010; Nogales Rodríguez, 2009; Sánchez & Pachón, 2013; Soto, 2003) and South Africa (Bahl, Young, & Smoke, 2003; Calitz & Essop, 2012; Feinstein, 2015; Koelble & Siddle, 2013; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Parnell & Pieterse, 2014; Siddle, 2011; Siddle & Koelble, 2013; Yemek, 2005) does not deal with these issues of how cities engage matters of foreign affairs. First, the scholarship focuses mostly on the domestic, regional and local effects of decentralisation. Second, it does not question the causality argued by regional and local governments that would allow them to pursue international engagements according to the Constitution and the law. And third, it fails to address the fact that the legal limits to how sub-national entities can act internationally are set at the national scale, and consequently, even with a reform at the UN level, local and regional governments would still need the national legal framework to be changed in order to authorise them to do more internationally.

The second issue that needs to be addressed is the foreign policy itself. All government officials interviewed for this thesis, both at the national and local levels (V. Cañón, personal communication, November 6, 2015; N. Currea, personal communication, August 5, 2016; F. Á. Durán, personal communication, February 5, 2016; J. Erasmus, personal communication, August 23, 2016; E. Falla, personal communication, September 4, 2015; S. Giraldo, personal communication, August 20, 2015; S. Mokgalapa, personal communication, May 26, 2016; A. M. Moreno, personal communication, February 26, 2017; F. Nacerodien, personal communication, June 24, 2016; C. Rath, personal communication, June 24, 2016; M. Tena, personal communication, June 27, 2016; M. P. Ávila, personal communication, September 4, 2015) agreed that the international engagements of cities cannot be considered as foreign policy for two reasons: first, they are actions carried out outside of the official diplomatic channels of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and DIRCO; and second, they are mainly co-operation initiatives with same-level foreign authorities aimed at fulfilling their constitutional mandates.

Consequently, since local authorities are not compromising the national government as they are not persons of international law, their actions cannot be regarded as foreign policy.

Again, the legal framework does not support those two arguments. In Colombia, the official mandate given to the MFA by the law includes, amongst other functions (Translated by the author from Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2017):

1. *Formulate and propose to the President of the Republic the foreign policy of the Colombian State*
2. *Execute, directly or through the various entities and agencies of the State, the foreign policy of the Colombian State*
6. *To act as interlocutor, coordinator and liaison for all the official actions that are carried out between the governmental entities and the governments of other countries, as well as with the international organisms and mechanisms*
7. *Participate in the formulation, orientation, integration and harmonisation of sectoral policies and programs that are the responsibility of the different state entities, when they are related to foreign policy*
8. *To articulate the actions of the different State entities at all levels and of individuals, when appropriate, with regard to the country's international relations and foreign policy, in the areas of politics, security, economy and trade, social development, culture, environment, human rights, international humanitarian law, science and technology and international cooperation, based on principles of equity, reciprocity and national convenience*
10. *To participate in the negotiation processes, with the cooperation of other national or territorial entities, as the case may be, of international instruments, as well as follow up, evaluate their results and permanently verify their compliance*
12. *Participate in the formulation and implementation of the foreign trade and trade integration policy in all its aspects*
13. *Orient and formulate the policy of international cooperation in its different modalities and evaluate its execution*
18. *Formulate, guide, execute and evaluate foreign policy in the area of integration and border development in coordination with sectoral authorities of the national and territorial order, when applicable*

19. *Promote, articulate, finance or co-finance the implementation of border development and integration programs and projects in coordination with national sectoral authorities, territorial entities and international cooperation agencies responsible for their implementation, in accordance with the National Development Plan*⁵³.

As for South Africa, the legal mandate for DIRCO can be found in Section 2 of the 2011 White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy. Some of DIRCO's functions relevant for the thesis are (Government of South Africa, 2011, p. 9):

The Department and its Missions abroad carry out its mandate by:

- ◆ *Aligning, coordinating, and managing South Africa's international relations and related activities*
- ◆ *formulating foreign policy options;*
- ◆ *conducting economic diplomacy;*
- ◆ *conducting public diplomacy;*
- ◆ *establishing and managing structures and mechanisms for achieving foreign policy objectives;*
- ◆ *managing development cooperation and partnerships;*
- ◆ *advising on international law matters and acting as custodian for all South Africa's international agreements;*

Furthermore, Section 6 of the White Paper clearly states that

In 2009, the Department of Foreign Affairs was renamed as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in order to respond in order to better align South Africa's foreign policy and domestic objectives. This provided the Department with an opportunity to redefine its role in building deeper and more expansive relations and using these partnerships to advance South Africa's national interests. Global issues shaping the environment in which South Africa operates are increasingly complex and multidimensional and require a coherent cross-sectoral approach and a coordinated response across all spheres of government, public enterprises, the private sector, labour, civil society, and other non-state actors (Government of South Africa, 2011, p. 35).

⁵³ Original text in Spanish. Due to the size of the quote, the Spanish version can be accessed at: http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministerio/mision_vision_objetivos_normas_principios_lineamientos#4

Both mandates state that it is the responsibility of the MFA and DIRCO to conduct economic and co-operation initiatives and partnerships with foreign actors. Also, it is clear that both the MFA and DIRCO must articulate, coordinate and liaise with other government entities, including sub-national governments, any international engagement originating in Colombia or South Africa. Ultimately, what the two mandates imply is that there should not be any actions carried out outside the official diplomatic channels of both the MFA and DIRCO or, at least, not without their consent.

The result of failing to coordinate the international engagements of local governments with the MFA or DIRCO, as well as the lack of constitutional and legal clarity in the boundaries of what cities can do internationally can have serious foreign policy consequences for countries (Beall & Adam, 2017). On this topic, South Africa faced a very difficult situation in January 2017 with its most important trading partner, the People's Republic of China, when the Mayor of the City of Tshwane visited Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, a territory not recognised as a country by South Africa. After being aware of the visit, DIRCO reacted with a Media Statement directed to all spheres of government that stated:

The Department [sic] of International [sic] Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) wishes to place it on record that the recent trip to the city of Taipei in Taiwan, undertaken by Councilor [sic] Solly Msimanga, Executive Mayor of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, was in breach of South Africa's foreign policy and is highly regretted.

The Department was made aware of the visit and advised Mayor Msimanga not to undertake the visit as it would constitute a breach of our One China Policy. In a move that is highly regrettable, Mayor Msimanga disregarded DIRCO's advise and proceeded with the visit.

[...] Representatives of any sphere of government must ensure that their engagements with international entities are aligned to existing mechanism and programmed and that such relations are coordinated in a manner that advances South Africa's foreign policy and national interests (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2017).

In turn, while it is difficult to argue that international engagements of sub-national entities are illegal in both Colombia and South Africa, it is possible to talk about some ambiguities in the law that generate a constitutional, legal and operational mismatch in foreign activities between the national and the local levels in both countries. These

ambiguities can be summarised as follows: even though the constitutions establish that foreign affairs are the absolute domain of the national executive, a broad interpretation of the decentralisation laws has been used by sub-national governments in both countries to justify their international engagements. At the same time, there is a consensus in public officials at the different spheres of government that international activities by sub-national entities are not regarded as foreign policy even if the MFA and DIRCO mandates say otherwise.

Consequently, reality differs greatly from the law as local governments are generally allowed to engage in foreign activities or paradiplomacy as long as they do not clash with national foreign policy priorities and objectives, often even without the accompaniment of the national executive. At the same time, the national government conducts the official foreign policy of the State with little regard for departmental/provincial or local governments. These two dynamics will be further discussed throughout this chapter.

8.2. A STATE-CENTRED APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

As it was explained in Chapter 4, foreign policy must be informed and determined by national interest (Bohler-Muller, 2012). Constitutionally for both Colombia and South Africa, the national executive is responsible for foreign policy and, in turn, it means that it is responsible for identifying the national interest according to the country's domestic and external needs. What is key at this point is the fact that national interest is indeed national; there is one for the whole country and, while it should, at least in theory, consider the interests and priorities of all relevant actors within the national borders, including sub-national entities, it is undoubtedly the full prerogative of the national government.

Sovereignty is also a crucial concept. Since the Peace of Westphalia (Goss, 1948) and reaffirmed by the Montevideo Convention (Organization of American States, 1933), the only sovereign entity in the International System has been the State and, as such, it monopolises the capacity to enter into official relations with other States. In other words, the State is the only person of international law that is able to conduct official foreign policy.

And while the International System has the previous principles at its core, it does not mean that there are not various voices that question them. The emergence of other important international actors such as sub-national entities, NGOs, international organisations and even persons is indisputable as they continue to increase their influence in today's key international discussions. The notion of an 'absolute sovereignty' is also under debate with various authors even questioning if international law is itself eroding the concept of State sovereignty (Benhabib, 2012; Chertoff, 2009; Ferreira-Snyman, 2007; Hunter, 2016; Macklem, 2008).

But even with a changing international environment, assuming the State has lost its pivotal role in the International System would be inaccurate. Ian Brownlie writes:

Seeking signs of the 'rebirth of statehood' is more than a little premature: there is no evidence that the State has died. It is an intellectual fashion to preach the end of the State and to attack sovereignty. But such iconoclasm has had no impact on the real world (Brownlie, as cited in Grant, 1998, p. 407).

Consequently, it seems as if Morgenthau's realist perception of the International System has remained unchanged, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned. The State continues to be the central actor with its foreign policy being determined by its national interest and the power resources available to pursue these objectives (Morgenthau, 1949). But the previous statement is not only found in the theory, it is also present in the designing and implementation of both the Colombian and South African foreign policies.

After interviewing various diplomats at the MFA and DIRCO, it became clear that both ministries share this perception. Foreign policy is dictated by the national executive – the president and the foreign ministries – and any international engagement pursued by other government agencies, either at the national, regional or local level, is not regarded as the official foreign policy of the State. The dominant political narrative that foreign policy is the exclusive domain of national governments was undoubtedly adopted in Colombia and South Africa, and consequently, the foreign ministries in Bogotá and Pretoria concentrate all decision-making capacities while other actors within the national borders are mostly overlooked.

In Colombia, a formal mechanism for the MFA to engage with departmental and local governments does not exist. Sub-national entities are rarely consulted or included in the designing and implementation of foreign policy by the MFA and there does not seem to be an interest in changing that. Furthermore, the participation of the City of Bogotá in Colombia's foreign policy is almost non-existent. As stated by Flor Ángela Durán (2017), an active diplomat from MFA,

Bogotá is the centre of power in Colombia, it is seat of the national government, it is where the Foreign Ministry is and where all State visits take place. It is where the Colombian foreign policy is dictated and carried out, and it is where the instructions for embassies and consulates come from. But the role of Bogotá is minimal. The city's government is not included in any way in the formulation or implementation of foreign policy⁵⁴ (Translated by the author from Durán, 2017).

Ana María Moreno (2017), another active Colombian diplomat, further explains the MFA's perception on the role of cities, particularly Bogotá, in the country's foreign policy:

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state; it recognises foreign policy to be under the domain of the president and all actions of the state have to stick to that. Also, in terms of international law, the subjects of international law are unquestionably the States, not cities. Consequently, in international organisations or tribunals, the actions of Bogotá do not matter much as they cannot legally compromise the Colombian State⁵⁵ (Translated by the author from Moreno, 2017).

Furthermore, the perception at the MFA is that, under particular circumstances which will be explained in Chapter 9, cities are not even considered when it comes to city-related topics. María Paula Ávila, former General Coordinator of the Latin American Network of Cities at the City of Bogotá, explained it as follows:

⁵⁴ Original text in Spanish: "Bogotá es el centro de poder en Colombia, está el gobierno nacional, es donde está la cancillería, es donde tiene lugar todas visitas de Estado. Donde se lleva a cabo y se dicta la política que se lleva a cabo en embajadas y consulados y donde se dicta la política exterior colombiana. Pero el rol de Bogotá es mínimo. La alcaldía no está incluida de ninguna forma en la formulación o implementación de política exterior.

⁵⁵ Original text in Spanish: "La Constitución en la ley fundamental de Estado; reconoce que la política exterior está en cabeza del presidente y todas las acciones del estado se tienen que ajustar a eso. Además, en términos de derecho internacional, los sujetos de derecho internacional son indudablemente los estados, no las ciudades. En consecuencia, en organizaciones internacionales o tribunales, lo que haga Bogotá no tiene mucha importancia porque no puede comprometer legalmente al estado colombiano".

During the preparation for Habitat III in Quito, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said "cities have nothing to do here", when those who will implement what is adopted in Quito are the cities. No national government has the capacity to do what cities can do to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Especially in Colombia where effective decentralisation began 20 years ago⁵⁶ (Translated by the author from Ávila, 2015).

There is, however, one exception in which the MFA includes and consults departmental and local governments in the implementation of its activities, the *Plan Fronteras para la Prosperidad* [Plan Border Regions for Prosperity]. It includes 13 departments and 77 municipalities located on the border areas with 11 countries and it is aimed at improving the quality of life of its inhabitants by increasing State presence and public investments (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2015b). This is a *sui generis* plan because while it falls under the responsibilities of the MFA, it is technically not foreign policy as it is focused on territories inside the national borders.

The South African case, on the contrary, does have a formal mechanism to include the three spheres of government in the formulation of foreign policy: the Consultative Forum on International Relations (CFIR). Established by DIRCO in 2008, the CFIR aims to "encourage greater coordination, information-sharing and accountability among international relations stakeholders in the three spheres of government" (Nganje, 2016a, p. 163). The forum should work in both ways. In the words of Mr Fadl Nacerodien, Chief Director of the Policy Research and Analysis Unit at DIRCO:

We get the international relations people within the Premier of the provinces' office, from other government departments that have their own international relations divisions, and down to the city level. We get them to come to this meeting which takes place at least once a year and our Director General chairs that. And they get briefed on events that will happen... South Africa is going to host the World Cup or it is going to host the climate change meeting; and number two, we let them tell us what some of their things are. So, there is that exchange of information (Nacerodien, 2016).

⁵⁶ Original text in Spanish: "Durante la preparación para Hábitat III en Quito, la Cancillería colombiana dijo "las ciudades no tienen nada que hacer acá" cuando las que van a poner en práctica lo que se adopte en Quito son las ciudades. Ningún gobierno nacional tiene la capacidad de hacer lo que pueden hacer las ciudades para cumplir los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible del Milenio. Especialmente en Colombia que lleva 20 años de descentralización efectiva".

The problem, however, is that the CFIR has not been as effective as it was envisioned. Mr Nacerodien continued to state: “Our new Director General just left and we have to wait and see if the new Director General will take this up enthusiastically because it was not as active in the past few years as it should be” (Nacerodien, 2016). On the same lines, Nganje argues that

consistent with the idea of an institutional hierarchy in which the national government has the final say on foreign policy issues, Pretoria’s interventions to coordinate sub-state diplomacy have often come with a supervisory undertone. Although sub-national officials generally acquiesce to the national government’s overall authority on matters of foreign affairs, perceptions that coordinating measures are intended to control rather than facilitate sub-state diplomacy have tended to weaken compliance with, and undermine the effectiveness of such measures. This is the case with the most recent effort to coordinate sub-state diplomacy at the national level through a Consultative Forum on International Relations (CFIR). [...] [T]he forum and its accountability mechanisms have had limited impact on the efficiency of sub-state diplomacy mainly because of the erratic compliance and participation of sub-national officials, but also because of insufficient leadership at the level of DIRCO (Nganje, 2016a, p. 163).

In terms of the City of Johannesburg, the perception is quite similar. During the interview with Jan Erasmus, Director of Strategy and International Relations at the City of Johannesburg, the question of whether the city’s International Relations Strategy mentions anything about its relationship with DIRCO was raised. His answer also shows a disconnection between national and local spheres in foreign policy:

Yes, under the third leg, the international relations intergovernmental relations. It is vertical with the province as well as with DIRCO. But with DIRCO, they call a meeting once a year but it is a top-down “we tell you what we are doing”. They never ask us what we are doing. [...] I cannot remember of one example where we have been requested to submit what we are after or what we are doing. So, is there any interest? And we are fairly active, probably more active than many of DIRCO departments (Erasmus, 2016).

The previous paragraphs suggest that, even though the CFIR was supposed to have both a top-down and a bottom-up approach, the reality shows not only that Pretoria keeps control of all foreign affairs issues, but also fails to recognise the importance of sub-State international engagements, and as a result, the co-ordination efforts fall short. The situation in Colombia is quite similar and, consequently, reality shows two foreign

ministries that function with a top-down approach and leave sub-national governments with little room, if any, to influence national foreign policy (Nganje, 2015). This in turn means that there is a disconnection between the national interest and that of the sub-national governments that translates in both levels of government acting on their own internationally. Finally, even with the increasing importance of cities in the international arena, the State-centred approach to foreign policy does not seem to be changing for Colombia and South Africa.

8.3. CONCLUSION

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 demonstrated that cities are an essential contributor to the State's power resources, leadership and international recognition and, in the case of emerging powers, to the countries' increasing importance in the International System. As such, both the International Relations literature and the Colombian and South African legal frameworks suggest that cities should be included in the design and implementation of the national foreign policy. However, Chapter 8 identified a clear constitutional and legal mismatch that prevents local governments from being an active actor in their countries' official foreign policy mechanisms.

Reality shows national and local governments taking two different paths. While the former makes use the official diplomatic channels of the State to advance its national interest, the latter follows a parallel route that allows it to place its urban concerns in the international agenda. The main explanations for this mismatch can be found in the State-centred approach to foreign policy, followed by constitutional and legal ambiguities both on decentralisation and international relations and the increasing importance of the city as a global actor.

In turn, even if the Constitutions dictate that the relationship between the three spheres of government must be interdependent and interrelated, the cases of Colombia and South Africa demonstrate that there is a clear hierarchy of power when it comes to foreign affairs in which national government is in charge, while sub-national entities are mostly marginalised. What is interesting, however, is that these dynamics are limited only to the official foreign policy of the State. In fact, national governments are mostly willing to

adopt a policy of laissez-faire with regards to the international engagements of sub-national entities – although the legal frameworks do not explicitly authorise them – when they do not interfere or affect the national interest. The following Chapter 9 complements the constitutional and legal analysis in Chapter 8 by taking into consideration the operational and practical mismatch found in the relationship between national and local governments when dealing with foreign policy issues in Colombia and South Africa.

CHAPTER 9: BEYOND THE LAW: THE OPERATIONAL AND PRACTICAL DISCONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Apart from the constitutional and legal reasons that prevent national and local governments to co-operate in the design and implementation of foreign policy in Colombia and South Africa, there are several additional dynamics that also contribute to the isolation of these two spheres of government when dealing with international relations. While Chapter 8 focused on the legal obstacles, Chapter 9 takes into consideration seven operational and practical reasons why national and local governments do not co-operate in foreign policy. The emphasis in this chapter is on the nature of the everyday functioning relationship between the two spheres of government, as well as the particular characteristics of both the domestic political systems and the International System.

However, when analysing the operational and practical dynamics of the national-local relationship, it becomes evident that there are a few exceptions or anomalies where cities and States are either willing or forced to work with each other. Chapter 9 examines these exceptions and addresses their consequences for the participation of cities in the design and implementation of foreign policy in Colombia and South Africa.

9.1. PERCEPTION VS. REALITY: AN EVIDENT MISMATCH

In foreign policy, often the important issue is not about what cities can actually do or what they are allowed to do to position themselves both within the country and in the world, but how they are perceived by national government and the population in general. If the way a city is perceived differs greatly from reality, evidence shows that the State – and also policy-makers within the national government – will more likely respond to these external perceptions and adapt them in the country's international strategy. In other words, if a city is perceived as successful, its chances of becoming a useful point of reference for the country's foreign policy increase considerably. On the contrary, a city

with a bad perception may be overlooked by national government. The issue of perception is particularly visible for international co-operation initiatives, as will be explained throughout this section.

Perception is, then, the first reason undermining a possible co-operation between national and local governments in foreign affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 discussed the territorial, strategic, economic and demographic importance of Bogotá and Johannesburg for Colombia and South Africa and analysed how most socio-economic indicators have been improving in both cities during the past few decades. In other words, it is evident that Bogotá and Johannesburg have been mostly effective in the process of tackling the problems of cities of the Global South and improving the quality of life of its inhabitants. Of course, the road is still long, but the results so far are undeniable.

Nonetheless, the general improvement of most socio-economic indicators are often not visible to the majority of the population. For example, big infrastructure projects are easier to notice in everyday life than social programmes aimed at specific population groups. Also, existing problems are frequently augmented and sensationalised by politicians and the media to be used for political or economic purposes. This can be true for crime, the environment, traffic congestion or even the provision of public services. And here is where perception can differ greatly from reality. There is abundant available literature linking the role of the media and the perception of citizens on problems or issues in the city, particularly crime (Callanan, 2012; Cárdenas Ruiz, 2015; Mazur, 2006; Sacco, 1982), but the main idea can be summarised with the words of Buvinić and Morrison:

Print and television media around the world decry rising violence as an endemic and worsening phenomenon. But do such depictions mirror reality? The phrase "if it bleeds, it leads" is a shorthand description of the media's tendency to sensationalize episodes of violence, whether or not they are particularly newsworthy or even characteristic of underlying trends (Buvinić & Morrison, 2000, p. 58).

The question posed by Buvinić & Morrison can be extended to other areas. Do media depictions mirror reality in terms of traffic, homelessness, poverty, health, education or provision of services? The following paragraphs take a close look at this issue for Bogotá

and Johannesburg and the impacts it has for the relationship between national and local governments.

Bogotá has a dark past. The generalised perception of the city included widespread crime and violence, drug trafficking, chaotic traffic, poverty and a failing infrastructure. It is, after all, the capital city of one of the most dangerous countries in the world during most of the 1980s and 1990s. But as it was explained in Chapter 6, Bogotá, like Colombia, bounced back and rose from the ashes during the first years of the 21st century. Moreover, the success of the successive local administration catapulted the city to a paramount position in the International System. Bogotá had become the shining star, a role model for other cities trying to overcome the problems of the Southern urban. In the words of the 2007 Venice Biennale,

This city has in the last decades addressed the problems of social inclusion, education, housing and public space especially through innovations in transport. Bogotá has applied Mies van der Rohe's dictum 'less is more' to the automobile: less cars means more civic space and civic resources for people. The city provides a model for streets which are pleasing to the eye as well as economically viable and socially inclusive. Bogotá is, in short, a beacon of hope for other cities, whether rich or poor (2007 Venice Biennale, as cited in Crawford, 2009, p. i).

But Bogotá's innovative spirit eventually came to an end. While the administrations of Antanas Mockus (1995-1997), Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000) and again Antanas Mockus (2001-2003) are generally recognised as those responsible for the dramatic improvement of the quality of life of Bogotans (Casas Dupuy & González Cepero, 2005; Crawford, 2009; Fisman & Werker, 2011; Mockus, 2012), the following administrations of Luis Eduardo Garzón (2004-2007), and most importantly Samuel Moreno (2008-2011) and Gustavo Petro (2012-2015), all from the leftist Polo Democrático party, jeopardised these improvements through corruption and inefficiency.

In 2011, Mayor Moreno was suspended and stripped of his office on corruption charges, leaving the city with two successive interim Mayors (El Tiempo, 2016c; Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2015; Revista Semana, 2011, 2015b). The following Mayor, Gustavo Petro, not only faced an unsuccessful recall process led by the opposition, but was also temporarily removed from office for two months in 2013, adding to the political

instability of the city (Caracol Radio, 2014; El Espectador, 2013; El Universal, 2016; Revista Semana, 2014).

Yet, even in the presence of corruption and political instability, the social and economic indicators of the city continued to improve during the three administrations. Bogotá had undergone another dramatic change, one in which the left governments had abandoned the gigantic infrastructure and public space projects of the three previous Mayors and focused on social policies. With that, the city's physical appearance started to deteriorate, traffic got worse, the perception of insecurity rose and the long-term sustainability of Transmilenio, Peñalosa's most important legacy, started to come into question (Bassett & Marpillero-Colomina, 2013). The media in Colombia documented extensively the negative change citizens started to see in their everyday life and produced many analyses on how the left had lost Bogotá (El Heraldó, 2014; Morales, 2015; Revista Semana, 2015a).

But perhaps one of the most important consequences of the three leftwing governments was a constantly deteriorating perception of the city. Bogotá had gone from being innovative to becoming a chaotic place, even if the government programmes were tackling the city's social problems. And this change was crucial in the relationship between the national government and the City of Bogotá. On this topic, Viviana Cañón, former Chief Director for Asia, Africa and Eurasia at the Presidential Agency for Co-operation (APC in Spanish), states:

In Bogotá, there was very little satisfaction with the Mayor and the city administration. Everyone in Bogotá felt, first as citizens and then as public officials, that Bogotá was not on the right track. Many decisions to offer knowledge from a city are made like that... If there is a negative perception of Bogotá, then how can I offer that city? Then, for example, Transmilenio: How can I offer that system if my children hate it every day?⁵⁷ (Translated by the author from Cañón, 2015).

⁵⁷ Original text in Spanish: "En Bogotá había una muy poca satisfacción con la alcaldía. Todos en Bogotá sentíamos, primero como ciudadanos y después como funcionarios públicos, que Bogotá estaba mal. Muchas decisiones se toman así cuando uno ofrece el conocimiento... Si hay una percepción negativa de Bogotá, ¿entonces cómo voy a ofrecer yo esa ciudad? Entonces, por ejemplo, Transmilenio: ¿Cómo voy a ofrecer yo ese sistema si mis hijos lo odian todos los días?"

The same perception can be found in all other interviews carried out with national government officials in Colombia. All of them agreed that Bogotá had an innovative period in which it became a point of reference for other cities not only in the country but also in the Global South, and then the innovation stopped. The overall perception is that other cities such as Medellín are doing things better and, therefore, they do not feel Bogotá is 'good enough' to be offered for international co-operation initiatives or as a valid counterpart in foreign policy.

Similar shifts in the global profile of the city, in both reality and perception, can also be found throughout the history of Johannesburg. Lauren Kruger explains the evolution of the city as follows:

Since its beginnings, 125 years ago, Johannesburg has reinvented itself several times over, from the lawless booming mining town in the 1890s to its arriviste self-promotion on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary (and the first Empire Exhibition outside Britain) as "Africa's Wonder City," to the bastion of apartheid capitalism on the eve of the Soweto uprising in the 1970s, to the capital of crime, grime and decline in the 1990s, to the current aspiration, heading up the official city web site, to make Johannesburg "a world-class African city" (Kruger, 2012, p. 195).

For Johannesburg, the issue of crime is extremely significant as it has affected the city image since the end of apartheid. In the words of Mfaniseni Sihlongonyane, "crime has turned the once beautiful Jozi into [an] unfamiliar scary jungle" (Sihlongonyane, 2016, p. 1610). In fact, crime is what defines Johannesburg in the minds of most locals and visitors (Dirsuweit, 2002) and it is present in the works of many academics and policy makers studying the city such as Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2000, 2002), Lipietz (2008), K. Harrison (2006), Palmary, Rauch and Simpson (2003), Hungwe (2013) or Morris (1998), amongst others. Furthermore, Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall provide two particular references to this issue when they discuss Johannesburg:

[T]he legibility of this extraordinary place has been reduced in most recent (and less recent) literature to an experience of the pathological and of the abnormal — the "crime city" — is not without parallels elsewhere. [...] The loathing of Johannesburg in the social sciences should be seen as part of an antiurban ideology that has consistently perceived the industrial city, in particular, as a cesspool of vice (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, p. 354).

[Johannesburg] is an elusive metropolis because either it is denigrated as being a set of ugly urban agglomerations, a crime city, or a security-obsessed dystopia, or it is elevated as a place of rapacious survival, “making do,” and chance encounters (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, p. 367).

Even though the disregard for Bogotá is a lot more noticeable in Colombia than it is for Johannesburg in South Africa, perceptions do affect the relationship between foreign policy officials at the national level and the cities’ administrations in international relations. This dynamic is particularly evident in international co-operation initiatives in which the knowledge of cities is needed, as will be explained in the following paragraphs.

When faced with the need to interact with cities, evidence from the interviews shows that there is a tendency for national government to work with the cities they perceive not only to work better administratively but also cities they think would create a better image of the country. Furthermore, it helps when the city administration is more willing to engage with the national level, which is not usually the case with big cities like Bogotá or Johannesburg.

This tendency is extremely clear within the Colombian government. Viviana Cañón from APC argues that the MFA likes to work with what she calls the ‘winning departments and cities’ because, that way, they do not take unnecessary risks (Cañón, 2015). She continued to state that “At APC, we always had to make the country look good, so we avoided Bogotá and worked with Medellín. In the end, we were ‘selling’ the country, we need the people who visit us to end up being ambassadors for Colombia”⁵⁸ (Translated by the autor from Cañón, 2015).

Other MFA officials shared Cañón’s views. Sebastián Giraldo, an officer from the South-South Cooperation desk at the MFA, argues that the interaction with the City of Bogotá is not easy. According to him, the advantage held by Medellín lies in the Agencia de Cooperación Internacional [Agency for International Co-operation], which centralises all interactions with the national government, while in Bogotá, requests from National

⁵⁸ Original text in Spanish: “En APC siempre teníamos que hacer que el país quedara bien, entonces evitábamos Bogotá y trabajábamos con Medellín. Al final uno vende el país. Uno necesita que la gente que viene termine siendo embajadores de Colombia”.

Government get lost in the bureaucracy and the City does not usually respond. Consequently, when South Africa, Ghana and El Salvador requested co-operation on mass transport systems in 2014, the MFA referred them to Medellín instead of Bogotá (Giraldo, 2015).

In South Africa, this tendency is not so clear but it is nonetheless present. First, as Pretoria concentrates all national government agencies including DIRCO, it is only logical that it becomes the first choice for foreign affairs meetings and events in the country. And second, the fact that other cities such as Durban or Cape Town have engaged in city-branding initiatives at a global scale means that their city administrations are better prepared to co-operate with DIRCO than other municipalities. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), explains:

Certainly, in the case of Durban, the Ethekewini municipality has said that they want to make themselves globally recognised as a conferencing centre or a global meeting centre. So, we had the Durban Anti-Racism conference. As a sporting centre, they bid for the Commonwealth games. Cape Town has done something similar. In Johannesburg, we probably have not articulated it as clear as that because there is so much else to Johannesburg as well, but clearly that is a dimension (Sidiropoulos, 2016).

In turn, the disposition and willingness of a city to work with national government as well as its efficiency have an enormous impact when the MFA or DIRCO need to choose local allies for foreign policy and international co-operation initiatives and programmes. The main reason for this is that communication with these cities flows better and, therefore, the success rate is higher and the image of the country improves in the eyes of international partners and allies.

9.2. SHIFTING AWAY FROM THE CITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Finally, the last reason that explains the legal and operational mismatch between national and local governments in foreign policy is the absence of the city in the international relations sections of the National Development Plans (NDP) in Colombia and South Africa. An analysis of both documents shows that no reference to or consideration of

cities is made in Section IX, Objective 6 of the Colombian NDP on “promoting and ensuring national interests through foreign policy and international co-operation” (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015a, 2015b) or Section 7 of the South African NDP on “positioning South Africa in the world” (National Planning Commission, 2011).

When reading the two NDPs, it becomes evident that the top-down approach in foreign policy is not only a problem of the MFA and DIRCO, it is also present in the national government as a whole. It is clear in both countries that foreign policy is perceived as a national tool for national interests, and therefore, leaves little to no place for cities either in the priorities or the implementation of the NDPs.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that cities could be included in the international co-operation sections as they can be both donors or recipients of good practices. Historically, cities of the Global South have been at the recipient end of international co-operation; however, with the improving status of Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers, this situation has started to change. María Paula Ávila comments on this issue:

There has been a shift in co-operation because countries no longer see Colombia as an underdeveloped or low-income country. We are now a middle-income country. Bogotá is not on the international cooperation priorities for local development because, in that sense, other African and Asian countries weigh more⁵⁹ (Translated by the author from Ávila, 2015).

And indeed, this same phenomenon seems to be happening in Johannesburg. According to Mokgadi Tena, former Deputy Director of International Development Cooperation at the Department of National Treasure in Pretoria,

The city of Johannesburg is a power on its own. The things that the city is doing are much bigger than what the country can comprehend. If I am from Limpopo, I do not care about green buildings, but in Johannesburg that matters and they can do it. The city runs with the concept of being an emerging power because the city on its own is a power (Tena, 2016).

⁵⁹ Original text in Spanish: “Ha habido un cambio en la cooperación porque los países ya no ven a Colombia como un país subdesarrollado o de renta baja. Ahora somos un país de renta media. Bogotá no hace parte de las prioridades de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo local porque, en ese sentido, pesan más otros países africanos y asiáticos”.

This would leave these cities, not as recipients of international co-operation, but as donors. Cities as tools for national governments to position both Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers in the International System through international co-operation by using the good practices developed and implemented in Bogotá and Johannesburg. But again, there is a problem. All interviews conducted in both countries showed that the knowledge of Bogotá and Johannesburg has not been included in national databases or programmes for international co-operation by either the MFA in Colombia (Giraldo, 2015; Durán, 2017) or DIRCO in South Africa (Erasmus, 2016; Nacerodien, 2016).

Consequently, cities are mostly ignored due to a shift in both NDPs towards national topics in foreign policy priorities: conflict resolution, transitional justice, security, drugs and arms control, education and eradication of poverty for the Colombian case (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015a, 2015b) and regional integration, South-South co-operation, BRICS or human security, amongst others, for South Africa (National Planning Commission, 2010). It seems as if the national governments in Colombia and South Africa could not – or were not willing to – find a place for cities in foreign affairs. It is as if cities were invisible in foreign affairs, not only for the MFA and DIRCO, but also for the national planning entities.

There is, however, a shift being signalled by the United Nations in its ‘New Urban Agenda’ that calls for close co-operation between national and local governments in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the achievements of the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 11 (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). This shift should, at least in theory, have an impact not only on the way cities are perceived by national governments as partners in achieving the SDGs, but also on the way they are included in the foreign policy priorities of the NDPs. On this topic, the United Nations General Assembly states:

The New Urban Agenda reaffirms our global commitment to sustainable urban development as a critical step for realizing sustainable development in an integrated and coordinated manner at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels, with the participation of all relevant actors (United Nations General Assembly, 2017, p. 3).

9.3. CITIES AS CRUCIAL INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, JUST NOT THROUGH FOREIGN POLICY

Along with the constitutional and legal ambiguities, the other important reason that contributes to the mismatch between national and local governments in foreign policy is the recent recognition of cities as key international actors. Historically, Peter Taylor considers that “cities are and have always been linked to other cities and other places, and this connectivity is not just a feature of present-day conditions, but of millennia of geopolitical “tangos” with states, empires and global processes” (as cited in Acuto, 2015, p. 3). However, these ‘tangos’ have not been enough for cities to be considered as international actors capable of influencing official international policies until recently.

As was explained in previous chapters, the International System has been organised in such a way that States are the quintessential actor as they are the only ones capable of having sovereignty. For example, the United Nations as the most important international organisation does not have just ‘members’ but, instead, it has “193 Member States” (United Nations, 2017). The same is true for other regional organisations such as the European Union (2017), the African Union (2017), the Organisation of American States (2017) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2017), and thus, leaving little or no space to other actors in these organisations, at least according to their charters.

But the International System has changed dramatically during the past few decades. Cities have gained such international importance that it is impossible for States or organisations to ignore them anymore, especially in key topics of the global agenda such as urbanisation, climate change or sustainable development. On this topic, Susan Parnell explains:

Looking back over the decades of international debate on development priorities shows not only that there is now greater acceptance of the importance of defining and agreeing to ‘an urban agenda’ but that global policy on urban and regional issues has indeed evolved. There is no longer a question of whether cities are important for sustainable development, but rather why and how the urban condition affects our common future (Parnell, 2016, p. 529).

Furthermore, the city’s importance does not only revolve around its role as the economic and demographic powerhouse of countries, but also as a complement for the State

because it is the only sphere of government that can effectively tackle some of the problems dominating the current international agenda and put the objectives for sustainable development into practice (Curtis, 2016). In turn, a disconnect between national and local governments would have a severe impact in the possibility for States to effectively solve many of the urban-related problems. Such disconnection could even constitute an obstacle to governability in the country.

But while it is clear that, nowadays, cities and States should be working together, the reality is rather different. For example, the City of Bogotá was not invited by the Government of Colombia to participate in the preparations for Habitat III in Quito, Ecuador. And Bogotá was not alone in this oversight. Michael Müller, Mayor of Berlin, complained that “countries are largely agreeing on preparatory work [for Habitat III] without the contribution of cities, even though it is the future of cities that is in question. This is absurd” (As cited in Curtis, 2016, p. 457).

Following what has just been set out above, States would be responsible for bypassing the city in foreign policy issues. However, the causality can also be reverted. After being overlooked for decades, cities too have been bypassing the national governments. The main consequence has been a proliferation of city associations that provide a platform where urban issues can be discussed by city governments with their equals from other parts of the world. These groupings have also become the space used by cities to influence international, regional and domestic policies and even promote the urban agenda at the United Nations and its agencies.

The United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and the C40 Climate Leadership Group are two important networks focused on climate change (Curtis, 2016), but the topics around which cities mobilise internationally can vary greatly. For example, the Mayors for Peace grouping is engaged with disarmament and peacebuilding initiatives, while the Healthy Cities Network focuses on health policies (K. Fischer et al., 2015). There are also some smaller associations that have a regional or a continental approach to their mandate, such as Africities for Africa, BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Government Cooperation Forum for the BRICS countries (City of Johannesburg, 2016a; P. Harrison, 2015) or Mercociudades for South America (Calvento, 2014).

During the interviews with national and local government officials in Colombia and South Africa, it was apparent that the Cities of Bogotá and Johannesburg favour their participation in these associations as a way to overcome the challenges of not being part of the official foreign policy of their countries. In the case of Bogotá, María Paula Ávila stated:

The foreign relations of Bogotá ignore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are carried out within international alliances of cities such as Mercociudades. [...] Cities are beginning to generate instruments and tools aimed at influencing their local interests on the global agenda through associations such as UCLG. Cities are beginning to see that national governments, on the one hand, do not represent them and, on the other, those who have the most direct contact for solving problems are not national governments but local governments. As a result, Bogotá's position in the international system is closely related to this new vision of an internationalisation process that encompasses several dimensions, one of which is international leadership. Bogotá begins to see how it positions itself in the city networks to influence the global agenda, to promote its vision of the city, to understand that the solution of local problems transcends both national and local administrative policy frameworks⁶⁰ (Translated by the author from Ávila, 2015).

As for the City of Johannesburg, an active participation in city networks is crucial for the fulfilment of the objectives identified in the city's international relations strategy. In fact, pillar number 2 of this document prioritised 'strategic international networks' with the goal of "targeting a shift from ad hoc attendance to the appointment of City leadership [...] to positions in key urban, environmental, finance and urban safety networks, to influence international dialogues and debates and to build the City's brand" (City of Johannesburg, 2016i, p. 7). Jan Erasmus mentioned Metropolis, the Fonds Mondial de

⁶⁰ Original text in Spanish: "Las relaciones exteriores de Bogotá ignoran a Cancillería y se realizan en el seno de alianzas internacionales de ciudades como Mercociudades. [...] Las ciudades empiezan a generar instrumentos y herramientas destinados a incidir para que sus intereses locales incidan en la agenda global a través de asociaciones como UCLG. Las ciudades están empezando a ver que los gobiernos nacionales por un lado no las representan y por otro, quienes tienen el contacto más directo para la resolución de los problemas no son los gobiernos nacionales sino el gobierno local. En consecuencia, el posicionamiento de Bogotá en el sistema internacional está muy relacionado con esa nueva visión de un proceso de internacionalización que abarca varias dimensiones, una de ellas es el liderazgo internacional. Bogotá comienza a ver cómo se posiciona en las redes de ciudades para incidir en la agenda global, para promocionar su visión de ciudad, para entender que la solución de problemas locales trasciende los marcos político administrativos tanto nacionales como locales".

Développement des Villes (FMDV), C40⁶¹ and specially UCLG, for which Johannesburg proposed its then Mayor, Mpho Parks Tau, as candidate for UCLG presidency in the elections held in Bogotá in October 2016 (Erasmus, 2016). He has subsequently been elected as UCLG president (UCLG, 2017). On Mr Tau's possible election, Jan Erasmus stated:

If he gets that position, we basically want to transform it to make sure that it is politically driven and then also that it meets the needs of the various regions. Up until now, it was ad hoc, so it is to ensure that local governments get a voice at the United Nations, that local government is recognised as one the most pertinent spheres of governments... and here the issue of decentralisation becomes very important. Lack of decentralisation in Latin America, Africa, many other places where the Mayor cannot even travel without the minister being present. So basically, there is no voice to a Mayor, it is the Minister who needs to tell the Mayor what to say (Erasmus, 2016).

In turn, this new role played by cities in the International System, either as individual actors or as part of global or regional networks of cities, is undoubtedly changing the historic relationship national and local governments have had in terms of foreign policy. At the same time, these associations of cities are becoming increasingly important in shaping the global agenda as they provide strong platforms for cities to voice their concerns and participate in decision-making processes in the international arena. Finally, even with the current international status of cities, the governments of Colombia and South Africa on one side and Bogotá and Johannesburg on the other do not yet understand the importance of working together. It seems as if, for these two countries, the global and urban agendas have not found a meeting point and, therefore, there is an evident mismatch between the official foreign policy of the State and the international engagements of cities.

⁶¹ In 2014, Johannesburg was the first city from an emerging market (OECD, 2015) and the first within the C40 network (C40, 2017) to issue a Green Bond as a way to support social and environmental projects in the city (Audouin et al., 2015). As a result, the City of Johannesburg received the C40 Finance & Economic Development award in 2015. According to C40, "The Green Bond was a step in the right direction in creating funding opportunities to assist the City in preparing and implementing integrated inclusive and long-term adaptation strategies [to climate change] designed to reduce vulnerability, thus cementing its commitment" (C40, 2015).

9.4. THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROJECTION OF CITIES

The ambiguous role national governments can play in the international projection and engagements of cities also affects the relationship between the State and the city. Bogotá and Johannesburg are strong enough to pursue their international relations on their own; however, there comes a point in which even the most important of cities cannot – or does not want to – engage in foreign activities on its own. And this is when the ambiguity becomes important. Cities abandon their generalised perception of the State as an obstacle for their international engagements and shift it to one in which the national government acts as a protector for the city in key issues of the international agenda.

There are two main scenarios when this phenomenon occurs. The first one takes place when there is a need to organise or participate in special meetings, events or international visits. And this scenario is quite clear. It would be impossible for Johannesburg, Cape Town or Durban to organise their participation in the FIFA World Cup successfully without the support of the national government in Pretoria (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011). Also, the organisation of important international meetings, such as the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg or the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban, require a high degree of coordination between DIRCO in Pretoria and the host cities (Nacerodien, 2016).

Although Colombia has not hosted global events of such magnitude, two examples can be used at this point. One is the collaboration between the City of Medellín, the MFA and UN-Habitat in organising the 2014 World Urban Forum in Medellín (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2014a). The other is even more revealing. Bogotá was chosen to host the UCLG world meeting under Mayor Gustavo Petro; however, the event took place after Mayor Enrique Peñalosa had assumed office. Initially, the City of Bogotá refused to work with the MFA in the organisation of the meeting (Falla, 2015; Ávila, 2015) but when the Peñalosa administration came to power, only 10% of the preparations were completed. At this point, the city called on the MFA and the Colombian embassies around the world to be able to finalise the preparations between February and October 2016 (Currea, 2016).

The second scenario deals with matters under the jurisdiction of the national government that have a direct impact on cities, such as economic and commercial policy, national security, international migration or internally displaced persons. In all these topics, it is the national government that is responsible for defending its cities (J. Julio, personal communication, August 20, 2015). International migration is probably one of the most visible examples as Bogotá and Johannesburg have both become a preferred destination for regular and irregular migrants. In fact, the political and economic crises particularly in Venezuela and Zimbabwe have brought hundreds of thousands of migrants to Bogotá and Johannesburg respectively in search for a better future (El Tiempo, 2016e; Hungwe, 2013; Revista Semana, 2016a).

In Colombia, there have been many coordination meetings between the City of Bogotá, the MFA and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to discuss ways in which all involved parties can better handle the influx of migrants not only to Bogotá, but also to other Colombian cities such as Cúcuta, Barranquilla, Cartagena or Arauca (Durán, 2017; Ávila, 2015). Something similar happens in South Africa where “in terms of illegal migration, there is constant conversation between national and city governments, but the topic of migration does not fall under DIRCO but Home Affairs. But since our missions are involved, DIRCO is obviously part of that” (Nacerodien, 2016).

But other situations also require the national government to protect its cities beyond the allocation of specific power functions and resources. For example, Johannesburg is the largest city in the world that is not built on the sea, a lake or a river (Nacerodien, 2016). Consequently, efforts had to be made by both the national and local governments to ensure a continuous water supply for the growing city. Since there was no water available in the surrounding areas, the Government of South Africa worked together with the Government of Lesotho on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which provides water to the whole of the Witwatersrand region where Johannesburg is located (Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, 2008). In turn, a local matter such as the provision of water as a public service became a foreign policy issue in which the City of Johannesburg and the Gauteng City Region participate actively (Nacerodien, 2016).

The final situation shows cities pursuing their own international engagements by themselves as national governments are often perceived as obstacles. However, when the

need arises and they realise they are not capable of satisfying their city interests on their own, national governments can offer a safety net. Two additional issues need to be explained at this point. First, section 9.4. shows how, in practice, there is a clear limit to the international capacities of cities. They are effectively autonomous to engage in international relations but, at the end, there are certain topics that force them to work with national governments as their own capabilities are clearly restricted. This, in turn, means that even with their increasing importance in the world, something that has not changed is the fact that cities are still playing in a State-centred International System.

And second, the interviews show that there does not seem to be a perception of partnership between national and local governments. The cities' perceptions of the State range from being an obstacle to being a protector, but the word 'partner' does not appear in the vocabulary of the interviewees. It seems as if it is a confrontational relationship, one that cannot be defined in terms of willing collaboration. Bogotá and Colombia and Johannesburg and South Africa work together reluctantly, as if they were forced either by law or by particular circumstances. And although it is more evident in the Colombian case in which the City of Bogotá is mostly not willing to work with the national government and vice versa, in South Africa it is usually a matter of lack of coordination and initiative on both parts.

9.5. LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY OF INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AT THE CITY LEVEL

The ways in which Bogotá and Johannesburg have modified their administrative structures to create their own international relations offices for coordinating and implementing the cities' foreign engagements have already been discussed in Section 8.1. However, at least in theory, these engagements should respond to a clear mandate from the local administration aimed at satisfying the city's interests in the world. In other words, they should be long-term city interests, not short-term mayoral interests. And this is crucial because a lack of continuity in the city's international relations strategy would pose a challenge for the ability of successive local governments to successfully satisfy those city interests.

The experience of Bogotá on this topic is clearly more chaotic than that of Johannesburg. In Bogotá, there is a tendency for each new Mayor to change the structure of the city administration to match his own vision of the city and, with that, his international relations priorities change as well. The functions granted to the Dirección Distrital de Relaciones Internacionales [District Directorate for International Relations] during the governments of Moreno, Petro and Peñalosa through Decrees 163 of 2008 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2008), 77 of 2012 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2012b) and 425 of 2016 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2016a) differ greatly from one another. For example, while for Mayor Petro, the directorate's mandate did not include a coordination with the MFA, for Mayor Peñalosa, this coordination was one of the key pillars.

But it is not only a legal matter. All officials interviewed at the City of Bogotá, the MFA and APC agreed, stating that people at the District Directorate for International Relations change constantly, and thus it is extremely difficult to coordinate actions between the three entities. Furthermore, this is a major problem for the city itself. Natalia Currea argued that the first six months are particularly complicated as they are still working with the previous development plan and they need to write a new one, so not much gets to be done in terms of international relations. Also, she pointed out that each administration comes with its own – usually untrained – people, its own priorities and its own interests and this usually translates in halting most of the previous programmes and starting new ones (Currea, 2016).

On this same topic, Sebastián Giraldo from the MFA went further and explained the difference between Bogotá and Medellín. He argued that, while in Bogotá the constant reshuffle of people and interests in the Directorate for International Relations makes it difficult to create a working interaction, in Medellín the ACI has managed to keep a clear continuity between Mayors, making it a lot easier to work with them. This issue has a direct relation with the politics of political parties and the politics of people, which will be further discussed in section 9.6.

The situation in Johannesburg is quite different as the ANC has managed to have a continuity in the city's international relations policies. However, after the local elections in August 2016 in South Africa, the Democratic Alliance (DA) came to power in Johannesburg in a coalition with other smaller parties and this continuity was put at

stake. During the interview with Jan Erasmus in June 2016, he mentioned that the international relations strategy for the City of Johannesburg should be approved in the following weeks. After contacting him again in August 2016, he declared that a new DA Mayor, Herman Mashaba had just been elected and the city now has a loose coalition government in power. Consequently, the new international relations strategy now needed to be approved by the incoming political body and he was not sure how it would be received (Erasmus, 2016).

For now, the new government in Johannesburg approved the international relations strategy (City of Johannesburg, 2016i), but it is unclear if the continuity will be guaranteed in the future as the ANC has lost significant support not only in the city but also in other metros in the Gauteng Province and throughout South Africa. Bogotá, on the other hand, has a long way to go in articulating a true city policy that does not change with every Mayor. Only then will the international objectives of the city be achieved.

9.6. THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE POLITICS OF PEOPLE

The last reason explaining the mismatch between national and local governments in foreign policy is directly related to who is in power in both the State and the city, and how they interact with each other. This issue can be broken down in two parts: the politics of political parties and the politics of people, even if most of the time, they are closely related.

Evidence from the interviews in Colombia and South Africa shows that the political systems of these two countries are permeated by the dynamics and confrontations between political parties. In other words, if the same party – or a political ally – is in power both at the national and local levels, co-operation between the two spheres will be greater than if different opposing parties are in power. For Bogotá, Ernesto Falla, former Director of the District Directorate for International Relations at the City of Bogotá made it clear when he stated that

In Colombia, if you are not from my own party, you are my enemy. It is much easier for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to talk to Aníbal Gaviria [the Mayor of Medellín] than to talk to Petro. Even if we agree on the essentials (climate change, security, right to the city, sustainable urbanism), the fact that there are different parties in power makes it difficult or eliminates the possibilities of dialogue with the national government⁶² (Translated by the author from Falla, 2015).

Natalia Currea went further and characterised the distance between the left in Bogotá under Mayor Gustavo Petro and the right in the national government as “unintelligent and very unprofessional” (Currea, 2016). She emphasised that it seemed as if there was an explicit order from the Mayor’s office to work internationally without the MFA or APC as he had a clear political project that differed greatly from that of the national government. The same problems were highlighted in interviews with Flor Ángela Durán (2017), Sebastián Giraldo (2015) and María Paula Ávila (2015).

However, as soon as Petro left the office, local and national spheres of government started talking almost immediately, thereby proving the highly politicised nature of the relationship between Bogotá and the MFA. Again, according to Natalia Currea,

Bogotá was disconnected from the public entities in charge of international cooperation and international relations in the country. I do not know how much you want to describe the issue of political inclination, but there was a disconnection with APC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ever since Peñalosa came to power, APC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insistently sought Bogotá because it is definitely a city of capital importance for these entities. Not only because of its size but because it is able to leverage processes in the rest of the country and generate good practices for the rest of the country⁶³ (Translated by the author from Currea, 2016).

⁶² Original text in Spanish: “En Colombia, si no eres de mi mismo partido, eres mi enemigo. Es mucho mejor para Cancillería hablar con Aníbal Gaviria que hablar con Petro. Así estemos de acuerdo en lo esencial (en cambio climático, seguridad, derecho a la ciudad, urbanismo sustentable), el hecho de que haya diferentes partidos en el poder dificulta o elimina las posibilidades de diálogo con el gobierno nacional”.

⁶³ Original text in Spanish: “Bogotá venía desconectada de las entidades públicas que tienen al frente la cooperación internacional y las relaciones internacionales del país. No sé qué tanto quieras describir el tema de inclinación política pero sí había una desconexión con APC y con cancillería. Desde que llegó Peñalosa, APC y Cancillería buscaron insistentemente a Bogotá para tener ese acercamiento porque definitivamente es una ciudad de importancia mayúscula para estas entidades. No sólo por su tamaño sino porque es capaz de apalancar procesos en el resto del país y generar buenas prácticas para el resto del país”.

The South African case shows the other side of the story. When national and local governments come from the same party, there seems to be more willingness to collaborate and support the city in its international engagements. However, being part of the same party does not guarantee a totally smooth relationship between the two spheres of government, as explained by Jan Erasmus from the City of Johannesburg:

When it was agreed that the Mayor will avail himself as a candidate for the presidency of UCLG, obviously he needs to get the support of the party and also the official structures. His candidacy was endorsed by the party, the ANC, and it was endorsed by SALGA. The one missing meeting is the one with DIRCO although they should know already because of all the lobbying meetings we've had. What makes the meeting difficult is because of all the divisions within the party because the Mayor is not the direct voice of current activities although he's a staunch party member. The party's endorsement is important because it's before the local government elections. If you nominate someone as UCLG president and they say they're going to deploy someone else as Mayor of Johannesburg, it can become a very embarrassing situation for the country (Erasmus, 2016).

Aside from political parties, the Mayor himself can also have an outstanding impact in the international relations of his city and the relationship with national government in foreign policy. On this issue, Bogotá provides two examples that cannot be found in Johannesburg. First, the personality and particular beliefs of a Mayor can be included at the core of a city's international engagements. Being a demobilised guerrilla member, Gustavo Petro disagreed with the Federación Latinoamericana de Ciudades, Municipios y Asociaciones de Gobiernos Locales [Latin American Federation of Cities, Municipalities and Municipal Associations] (FLACMA), the regional branch of UCLG for Latin America, and created the RedCisur, a network of South American cities organised around the logic of leftist governments. At the end of Petro's term, this network had not shown any results and the new Peñalosa government simply dissolved it (Currea, 2016). Along the same lines, Petro also blocked the city's participation in the Compact of Mayors as he considered it to be "owned by the yankees" (Currea, 2016). As it would be expected, all the previous measures had an important impact in the willingness of the national government to work with Bogotá in foreign policy.

And second, the 'cult' of the Mayor also plays a key role in the international projection of the city. Even with his current very low popularity ratings in Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa was responsible for many of the positive changes in the city during his previous

administration (Bassett & Marpillero-Colomina, 2013; Crawford, 2009; Fisman & Werker, 2011; Sustainable Cities Collective, 2014). Consequently, he is perceived as a worldwide authority in solving the problems of cities in the Global South. Ernesto Falla (2015), María Paula Ávila (2015) and Natalia Currea (2016) all agreed in recognising Peñalosa as an urban 'rock star' and that is why many cities are currently contacting Bogotá again for South-South co-operation projects. This, in turn, shows that a city can become a point of reference in the world when the Mayor's profile is internationally recognised. An adverse effect can also be present as his high profile may lead him to conduct the City's foreign engagements with disregard for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the South African case, the Mayors' profiles have affected foreign policy and the international engagements of provincial and local governments in a different way, mainly in the continuity of policies. Fadl Nacerodien from DIRCO gave an example when he discussed the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoU) between South African and foreign regional and local governments:

We have placed a moratorium on signing new MoUs because what we found was that Mayors were keen to go and travel overseas, sign an MoU with another city and then a new Mayor comes and says: it wasn't my legacy, I want to sign it with another city and so these things pile up but they mean nothing. We put a moratorium on that and said let's reflect on that so that at the city level, at the provincial level, we take a national approach on what is the competitive and comparative advantage of that province or that city and who should then logically therefore be twinned with and if the motivation is strong enough, we know that the agreement will outlast the Mayor or the premier (Nacerodien, 2016).

9.7. CONCLUSION

While Chapter 8 focused on the legal framework, Chapter 9 demonstrates that the mismatch is more complex as other reasons also contribute to prevent national and local governments from co-operating in foreign policy. Negative perceptions of emerging cities such as Bogotá or Johannesburg portrayed by the media and politicians usually focus on problems and not solutions, and thus affect greatly the willingness of the State to work with city administrations. Also, a preference for smaller cities that are perceived to work better, a shift away from the city in the international priorities of the National

Development Plans or the tensions between political parties or politicians at both spheres of government all come together to deepen the national-local disconnection in foreign policy.

Yet even if there is a clear tendency for national and local governments to act on their own internationally, evidence shows that cities have limits as to how far they can go in their foreign engagements and, at that point, they appeal to the State for assistance and protection. Consequently, as demonstrated in the cases of Bogotá and Johannesburg, two particular scenarios fall under this category. First is the organisation of international events and conferences; and second, matters under the jurisdiction of the national government, especially economic and commercial policy, national security, international migration or internally displaced persons.

It must be highlighted, however, that this co-operation between national and local governments in foreign policy does not seem to occur voluntarily. The State largely ignores the city in its international relations engagements and only looks down to the local level when forced either by topics that can only be resolved by national government or when cities request the support of the State. Once more, this reinforces the idea that the way in which decentralisation has been implemented in Colombia and South Africa does not facilitate a dialogue between the national and the local levels in foreign policy, mainly because of the legal and operational difficulties explained in Chapters 8 and 9.

To conclude, given the fact that they are so closely linked together, logic dictates that cities and States should work together to advance the national interest internationally through foreign policy. However, due to the eight reasons explained in the last two chapters, national and local governments in Colombia and South Africa face a legal and operational disconnection that portrays the other as an obstacle and not as an ally. This, in turn, has an impact on the implementation of the constitutional mandate which states that, under the decentralisation framework, the relationship between the different spheres of government must be interdependent and interrelated.

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS

The world is currently experiencing a very significant power shift. The influence of traditional superpowers such as the United States, the United Kingdom or France in the International System is declining – even if it is a relative decline. At the same time, new countries from the Global South are rapidly emerging, playing a stronger and more visible role in global politics and economics. Beyond the increasing importance of Russia, China or India, other smaller nations are following a path of increasing global prominence and influence and, while their limited capabilities do not allow them to become superpowers, they are individually and collectively altering the power dynamics in the world.

The realignment of the hierarchy and distribution of power between States is not the only significant shift of the early twenty first century. Cities are also becoming key players in the International System. Increasing population and urbanisation trends translate into cities growing faster and larger than before, concentrating more power as their share of the national GDP grows. New centres of urban wealth and power are more obvious in countries of the Global South, where urbanisation and economic growth is fastest. Consequently, the cities of emerging powers appear as increasingly important sites, not only for national political action, but also of global dialogue.

The thesis has demonstrated that the global realignment of power means that there is a need to reassess how the International System operates and which countries are currently driving the shifting global dynamics of power. Alongside the growing importance of emerging powers in this process, the general increase in attention to the question of cities makes understanding their position and function in the recalibration of the international context crucial. The nature of the relationship between these two trajectories, of a southernward tilt in the International System and the increasingly urban character of global deliberation, is poorly understood. Examining this relationship formed the foundations of this thesis.

When trying to analyse the emergence of countries and cities in the International System as a composite, this thesis found that there is a disconnect that precludes city-national

trajectories from aligning at the global scale. This disconnect originates in a clear dominance of the State in international politics and the inability of the urban and global leadership to address the domestic institutional reform that would allow both spheres of government to co-operate in a country's emergence strategy. These problems appear to be more serious in emerging powers where cities are stronger and de facto play a critical role in their countries' emergence in the world but weak institutional frameworks of devolution mitigate against cities acting effectively beyond their territories.

Given the increasing concern in the International System to ensure greater subnational engagement with global commitments such as the SDGs or agreements on climate change, urban development or disaster risk, the inability to maximise local-national collaboration to harness global processes is serious. Understanding the barriers to improved city-national collaboration is imperative, not just streamlining individual countries' international relations operations, but also facilitating and maximising local (city) engagements and leadership around global challenges. The exploration of the interactions of local and national actors using the Bogotá and Colombia, and Johannesburg and South Africa cases reveals critical explanations for why current configurations of international relations are city-blind and outmoded given the realities of current global political practices and future multilateral demands.

10.1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMING OF THE CITY ON THE NATIONAL AND GLOBAL NEXUS

The thesis set out to assess the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers of the Global South. To achieve this objective, a geopolitical analysis of both emerging countries and cities was provided. The starting point was to assume that cities play a pivotal role in the making and consolidation of emerging powers of the Global South in the International System, ascertaining how this catalytic action was conceptualised and operationalised in the specific contexts of Bogotá and Colombia and Johannesburg and South Africa.

The study focus on the international dimension of the city-State relationship is not well defined in any disciplinary tradition and so the paucity of material on the topics

necessitated an interdisciplinary approach to forge a new perspective by deriving theoretical ideas from diverse traditions. Concepts that illuminate the city-State nexus were identified by engaging mainly with the International Relations and Urban Studies scholarships. At some points during the thesis, contributions from Political Science and Economics were brought into the discussion, specifically to understand the State and its power resources. While it was possible to draw ideas and concepts of use from fragmented secondary theoretical literatures, the overall lacunae in work on the problem of cities in the rise of emerging powers was evident, as was the overall spatial mismatch of theoretical approaches. First, the International Relations field is almost entirely State-centred and leaves almost no place for the city in its analyses. And second, Urban Studies understands the city as an actor that is powerful enough to act on its own in the International System, even to shape global change, but has not hitherto addressed the question of how cities engage the international aspirations of nations through the vehicle of foreign affairs, the *de jure* mode through which global engagements are structured. Further insight into the rigidity and incompatibility of the conceptual and operational terrain of the city-national nexus was revealed through the detailed review of both English and Spanish literature that showed that, across linguistic traditions, these are two self-absorbed disciplines that rarely communicate with each other demonstrating that the city and the State are rarely seen as linked.

Located at the interface between two bodies of academic communities of practice, the thesis brought an interdisciplinary approach to the topic and highlighted the imperative of approaching complex problems from diverse starting points, least the issues of how cities engage in international relations and how States draw in their major urban centres be further ignored. From this cross disciplinary reading, it was possible to demonstrate that cities are a crucial component of the power resources of emerging powers, but since there is no dialogue between disciplines, the relationship between cities and States in foreign policy has not been conceptualised in the scholarship. The literature on city-national interactions is structured in a dissonant way that leaves an intellectual gap, which then, is mirrored in the operational gap found in the cases of Bogotá and Colombia and Johannesburg and South Africa. Failure to confront the interdisciplinary disconnect leaves a fragmented base for rethinking the imperative of bridging the city-national nexus at a time when it is clear, especially for emerging powers, that cities are critical drivers of global profile and power.

The thesis makes a particular contribution by drawing together and translating across languages. Further nuanced insight into the under-researched terrain of cities in emerging powers came from invoking multilingualism and including different linguistic sources, cultures and practices. Reading beyond the Anglo literature that dominates Urban Studies, the thesis was able to engage in a comprehensive analysis of the literature that combined the geographical and theoretical Anglo-Western tradition with sources and authors from the Global South. This allowed access to a large scholarship in Spanish and Portuguese, and to a lesser extent, French and German that is usually overlooked in English language studies. The value of the multilingual approach is that it puts the different linguistic traditions into dialogue and this juxtaposition catalyses new perspectives on the city-national nexus.

The value of the multilingual approach was found primarily in the works of Pastrana Buelvas et al. and their metrics on how to measure emerging powers. By conducting an analysis that is scarce in the English literature, these Latin American scholars were able to fill a gap that was fundamental for the development of this study. Including different linguistic sources also helped in identifying the different handling of concepts in Spanish and English throughout the thesis. For example, a concept like 'international insertion' that is widely used in Spanish, is quite absent in the English literature. And that was not the only case. A joint engagement with the scholarship from various regions and in different languages allowed for a better complementarity between the concepts and definitions found in each one of them.

Apart from the interdisciplinarity and multilingualism, this was also a multi-scalar study as it deals with both the State and the city. This thesis was not concerned about the debate around city rankings or how the Northern city is usually perceived as ahead of the Southern city. Instead, this research was interested in the role of two important cities from the Global South (Bogotá and Johannesburg) within their own countries (Colombia and South Africa) and as part of their nations' emerging strategy in the International System. In other words, ultimately, the object of study was not the city itself but the State in the world through a multi-scalar approach aimed at understanding how much the city is a causal mechanism of change in the shifting global relations of nations.

Ultimately, the methodological findings of this thesis emerge from the fact that the object of study, the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers, is one that cannot be easily positioned in an existing debate, but, instead, is located in the new interface between International Relations and Urban Studies. In turn, part of the contribution of the thesis was to generate a theoretical framework out of fragmented sets of ideas that allowed not only to understand that gap between disciplines, but also to produce the methods and assert the use of literatures across linguistic barriers as necessary points of departure for research on the city-State nexus. Using this approach to explore the Bogotá/Colombia and Johannesburg/South Africa cases proved highly generative.

10.2. SUBSTANTIAL FINDINGS: UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE STATE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF EMERGING POWERS

In order to come to terms on the particularities of the power realignment in the world, a deeper look at the current International System was needed. Three interconnected dynamics were identified in the thesis. First, the growing importance of cities has turned them into crucial actors that challenge the traditional organisation of the International System. Second, even with an increasing importance of cities, the system is still centred in the State as the lone sovereign actor and, therefore, the only one capable of engaging in foreign policy. And third, the emergence of the Global South is challenging the abyssal way in which the world was organised by giving a voice to new countries and cities in the international arena. In turn, reality shows that while it is true that cities are becoming increasingly important international actors, it is also true that States are not becoming decreasingly important in foreign affairs. It is not one or the other, it is both at the same time.

Even without the issue of how cities are positioned in international affairs, the thesis found the existing literature on emerging powers lacking in some particular respects. While it engages in a thorough analysis of regional powers and superpowers, there is no clarity as to what constitutes or how to measure other categories within the international hierarchy such as 'emerging powers', 'middle powers' or 'secondary powers'. The result is that this multiplicity of terms darkens the debate more than it illuminates it. In order

to solve this problem, a combination of the works of Nolte and Pastrana Buelvas et al. provided a useful framework to deal with the absence of information on measuring emerging powers, not just as originally intended by them at the national scale, but also, as shown in this thesis, in relation to the role of the city in the State.

The joint application of the three variables provided by Nolte – power resources, leadership and international recognition – and the five dimensions of power resources proposed by Pastrana Buelvas et al. – territorial, demographic, economic, socio-economic and military – demonstrated that it is possible to engage with the categories of power meaningfully across scales. It allowed to engage in a first attempt at putting metrics into the analysis not only of emerging powers, but also of their cities. By doing this, the thesis was able to apply a geopolitical analysis – which is usually applied only to States – to the cities in an effort to examine the real power and influence of the urban in their nations' emerging process.

The discussion at this point highlighted the need to assess the issue of how countries become emerging powers in the International System – which, as was demonstrated, is dealt with in a very superficial way in the literature. The thesis reveals that, when exploring the shifting balance of global power, it is imperative to acknowledge the importance of large cities for these emerging powers' trajectories. Consequently, given the outstanding importance of Bogotá and Johannesburg, this study used the cases of Colombia and South Africa to demonstrate that it is much more helpful to discuss the process of international emergence of countries in ways which recognise the crucial importance of cities in the shifting international status of the nations in which they are located. The two cases showed evidence that while the International System is State-centric, the countries' emergence, elevation and persistence in international profile are actually quite city-centric.

The analysis of the two case studies for Colombia and South Africa also showed that both countries have the power resources, leadership and international recognition to be considered emerging powers and that their cities have played a fundamental role in their emergence. In other words, both the State and its cities – especially the largest ones – are drivers of the global reorganisation of power. Nonetheless, Colombia and South Africa also demonstrated that the path to becoming an emerging power is not the same for every

country. While the five dimensions of power resources are present in every case, they do not weight the same or are used in the same way by different nations. Also, the process of emerging is highly influenced by historic, political, demographic and even military particularities. Consequently, when looking at the power resources, leadership and international recognition as a composite, the result for each country will be radically different even when the destination as 'emerging power' is the same. There is no single route to emerging powership and thus, no simplistic understanding of how cities may be a more overt part of an emergent global transition.

In this regard, this study showed that Colombia was in fact initially quite slow in becoming an emerging power. The armed conflict, a very shy and limited foreign policy and a very negative international image had significantly influenced the country's ability to emerge in the past. It was only in the last decade that political and economic circumstances in Colombia allowed it to effectively use its power resources and its foreign policy to consolidate and accelerate its journey towards becoming an emerging power. For that, the peace agreement with the FARC has up to now played a crucial role.

As for South Africa, its democratic transition, its power resources, the highly positive international perception of the country after 1994 and its relative strength compared to other Sub-Saharan African nations came together to grant the country an almost immediate status as an African emerging power in the world. For the government in Pretoria, it has been not so much about becoming but about maintaining the status. South Africa was, in turn, faster and more effective than Colombia in taking advantage of its international standing and domestic strength – highly determined by the power resources and recognition of Johannesburg – to position itself in the world. The problem nowadays, regardless of what happens in Johannesburg, is how to maintain the emerging power status while the country's general power resources suffer some considerable drawbacks.

Colombia and South Africa also gave evidence of two parallel unconnected emergence processes for the national and the local. The two countries are gaining importance in the world and they do so by using their official foreign policy. At the same time, this study showed that Southern cities such as Bogotá and Johannesburg are particularly important as they are consolidating themselves not only as their countries' powerhouses

respectively, but also as important actors from the Global South in the world-wide network of cities. The problem, however, is that even if these two processes occur at the same time and in the same direction, there is no coordination between national and city governments. Again, the nation's emergence is city-blind and the city's emergence is State-blind.

The gap relating to the framing of the city-national nexus previously identified in the literature became evident in practice for both Colombia and South Africa. Consequently, the thesis inquired about how Bogotá and Johannesburg operationalise their importance through the official foreign policy tools and instruments. In other words, by probing the role of these cities in the official foreign policy of Colombia and South Africa as emerging powers from the Global South, it was possible to demonstrate that there is a clear mismatch between local and national governments in foreign policy, and this claim is supported by eight reasons, ranging from the constitutional and legal framework to the operational and practical scope. Out of all the reasons identified and explored in the case studies, three of them stood out as being crucial determinants of the mismatch between national and city interactions on global platforms.

First, the Constitutional and legal ambiguities on decentralisation and foreign policy found in Colombia and South Africa make it extremely difficult to determine the how far sub-national entities can go in their international engagements. Furthermore, given the limits posed on the international activities of sub-national governments by the Constitutions of Colombia and South Africa, the thesis was able to determine that most of the international engagements of cities in both countries appear to be illegal. They are happening and they will continue to happen, but will do so outside of the law, the design of the State architecture and, by implication, outside of the foreign policy mandate and institutions.

Second, the State-centred approach to foreign policy in both countries contributes greatly to a hierarchy in which national governments generally disregard the city in the foreign relations of Colombia and South Africa. Consequently, the role of cities in the international projection of their countries is quite constrained because the system is still focused on the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty in which only States are capable of engaging with foreign actors. In turn, foreign policy is perceived as an

exclusive domain of the State, not the city. The spill over of this configuration of cities and countries for the International System, where States, not cities, are the responsible parties, cannot be underestimated.

Finally, in the absence of an effective, legitimate and legible city-national nexus that allows simultaneous global interactions of cities and States, *ad hoc* processes have emerged that put cities, especially those in emerging powers, into forums of global dialogue. The thesis revealed the increased importance of the city in the global agenda and the proliferation of international associations of cities provide emerging cities such as Bogotá or Johannesburg with an alternative space in which they can defend their own city interests without the help of the national governments. In the context of the Global South, this thesis demonstrated that cities are particularly important as their actions and international engagements usually have an outstanding impact in their countries' overall global standing. However, because cities are not being included in the official foreign policy of the State, the international associations of cities and the global urban agenda have become the natural – but parallel – space in which cities can engage with foreign actors and emerge as major actors not only in a regional context, but also globally.

Apart from the three previous reasons, other serious constraints have affected the ability to operationalise more effectively the city–national interface and the urban innovation in foreign policy. Amongst them, this thesis identified the following five: 1) a clear mismatch between the reality of the city and the perception national governments have of it, mainly because of political or mediatic manipulation of public opinion; 2) a generalised disregard for the city in the foreign policy guidelines of the National Development Plans in both Colombia and South Africa; 3) a conflicting and ambiguous approach to foreign policy topics in which, depending on the issue at hand, the State can be seen as both a protector or an obstacle in the satisfaction of the city's international interests; 4) The continuous change of city officials usually translates in a lack of institutional continuity of international policies at the city level; and finally, 5) the political orientation and ideas of the parties and people in power both at local and national level can foster or block co-operation between both spheres of government in foreign policy.

While the reasons related to the constitutional and legal framework appear to be dominant explanations for the city-national international relations mismatch, the apparently less important formal and informal operational and practical edges are also crucial. In fact, this thesis was able to demonstrate through the case studies of Colombia and South Africa that the mismatch is not the fault of any of these reasons on their own as most of them would be manageable by the State and/or the city. However, when these reasons start to appear at the same time and complement each other in such a way that they form a composite, that is when the mismatch occurs and thus, creates a rupture between the local and national spheres in foreign policy.

The particular dynamics found in Colombia and South Africa also demonstrated that there is a clear tension between the local and the national because it is not as simple as saying that States must make a place for cities in their internal procedures regarding foreign policy. Undoubtedly, Colombia and South Africa ought to pay more attention to what they do with cities and they must include them in their foreign policy systems and strategies. However, the analyses of Bogotá and Johannesburg show that cities of the Global South are actually engaging in city-to-city relations and that is not going to stop, even if they are included as an important actor in the official foreign policy of the State. Institutional reform thus needs to account for the evolution of *de facto* as well as *de jure* changes in the city-State global nexus.

Reconfiguring the link between cities and States in a shifting global power regime is not without tensions. The previous paragraph brings the discussion to two issues that can potentially go in different directions. On the one hand, national governments need to make sure cities have a voice in the International System because they are already engaging with foreign same-level counterparts as a way to achieve their own interests, and they will continue to do so. On the other hand, in order to address the eight reasons explaining the city-national mismatch in foreign policy, changes need to be made at the domestic level, both in national and local governments, in order to accomplish functioning levels of understanding and co-operation between the city and the State. Again, it is not only about granting the city a voice in the world, it is also – and as important – to grant the city a voice within the official foreign policy mechanisms of the State.

Including cities in the official foreign policy of the State does not necessarily mean that they will achieve more on the path to becoming emerging powers. This thesis does not suggest that by coupling city and State, they will necessarily work better. It could be that, by working together, they actually slow each other down. Under the current circumstances, the cases of Colombia and South Africa show that they are bound only by the speed of the nation which is the actor dictating the emerging strategy. However, if city and State are coupled in a better way, a working interaction between them can be developed and, in turn, accelerate the speed at which they both emerge, this time as a composite.

The hierarchy in which national governments dominate sub-national entities in foreign policy and the tensions of the *de facto* practices in both Colombia and South Africa translate in an unresolved national-local relationship. The terms in which States and cities should interact in the design and implementation of foreign policy are not currently clear and, given the rising importance of cities, it seems as if the relationship is only getting more complicated and, at times, contradictory. The tensions between both spheres of government are long-term and, by nature, fluid and difficult at the same time. The ambition of the multilateral system is that this all be resolved; however, the disposition of how to resolve it varies from case to case. What is clear is that, even when international organisations are calling national and local governments to work together, both States and cities are not willing to give up the spaces they already hold in the International System. Again, even if cities are becoming increasingly important, States are not becoming decreasingly important, at least when it comes to foreign policy, and, with that, the relationship between them continues to be tense and unresolved.

On this issue, some authors, Acuto amongst them, and international organisations have called for cities to be given a seat at the UN system where they can actively participate in the decision-making process in relevant topics around the global urban agenda. This is, in fact, the only debate that has so far engaged with the interface between the State and the city. Now, even though this thesis only focused on the role of cities in the foreign policy of emerging powers, it has potential ramifications beyond this topic as cities become more active players in the UN system. In other words, this study also provides insights into what is becoming one point of this city-State interface for wider issues,

particularly regarding the participation of cities in an organisation such as the UN, which has traditionally been the States' domain.

In turn, as cities become more important in today's world and as global powers realign, it is imperative to operationalise more effectively the city-national interface. What this thesis has demonstrated is that it is not only about asserting the importance of cities or inviting them to the UN table. There are some real barriers at the domestic level that also need to be overcome in order to achieve a functional relationship between cities and States in the International System.

In summation, the current power shift in the world has brought about substantial changes in the way States and cities interact in foreign policy, especially in emerging powers. However, this thesis demonstrates that these changes have not been studied in the academic literature. Neither the International Relations nor the Urban Studies fields have engaged constructively or systematically with the topic and, in turn, the questions brought to this study were generated through an assemblage of quite disconnected elements in the academic literature.

This thesis demonstrated that it is possible, even from an amalgamatedly constructed framing of a research question, to innovate methodologically and identify an important unstudied domain between the fields of International Relations and Urban Studies that, as it is presently constructed, has considerable limits to it. Therefore, by bringing particular methodological and conceptual understandings to a conventional case study approach in order to engage with that unknown, unspecified gap between them, this thesis was able to discover that there is an imperfect fit, with an important mismatch between national and local governments in the foreign policy of emerging powers.

REFERENCE LIST

PEER REVIEWED ACADEMIC MATERIAL

BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS

- Acuto, M. (2015). City Diplomacy. In C. M. Constantinou, P. Kerr, & P. Sharp (Eds.), *SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* (pp. 1–17). London, United Kingdom: SAGE Publishing.
- Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana. (2012). *Manual de Cooperación Internacional Descentralizada* (Quinta Edición). Medellín, Colombia: Agencia de Cooperación e Inversión de Medellín y el Área Metropolitana - ACI.
- Akoon, I., Archer, E., Colvin, C., Davis, C., Diedericks, G., Engelbrecht, F., ... Maherry, A. (2010). *South African Risk and Vulnerability Atlas*. Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Science and Technology.
- Aldecoa, F., & Keating, M. (Eds.). (1999). *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments* (1st Edition). London, United Kingdom: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Ardila, M., Cardona, D., & Ramírez, S. (Eds.). (2005). *Colombia y su política exterior en el siglo XXI*. Bogotá, Colombia: Fondo Editorial Cerec & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung en Colombia - FESCOL.
- Bahl, R., Young, A., & Smoke, P. (Eds.). (2003). *Restructuring Local Government Finance in developing countries: lessons from South Africa*. Cheltenham, United Kingdom & Northampton (MA), United States: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Barber, B. R. (2013). *If mayors ruled the world: Dysfunctional nations, rising cities*. New Haven (CT), United States: Yale University Press.
- Barco, C. (2003). *Memoria al Congreso Nacional 2002-2003*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.
- Beall, J., Crankshaw, O., & Parnell, S. (2002). *Uniting a divided city. Governance and social exclusion in Johannesburg*. New York City (NY), United States: Routledge.
- Beavon, K. (2004). *Johannesburg: The making and the shaping of the city*. Pretoria, South Africa & Leiden, Netherlands: University of South Africa Press & Koninklijke Brill.
- Bell, J. D., Johnson, J. E., Ganachaud, A. S., Gehrke, P. C., Hobday, A. J., Ove, H.-G., ... Waycott, M. (2011). *Vulnerability of Tropical Pacific Fisheries and Aquaculture to Climate Change: Summary for Pacific Island Countries and Territories*. Nouméa, New Caledonia: Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
- Borda, S., & Tickner, A. B. (Eds.). (2011). *Relaciones internacionales y política exterior de Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes - Universidad de los Andes.
- Braveboy-Wagner, J. A. (2003). *The Foreign Policy of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Framework*. Boulder (CO), United States: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Breuning, M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis. A Comparative Introduction*. New York City (NY), United States: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Calderón Álvarez, L. F., & Velásquez Betancur, J. A. (Eds.). (2008). *¿Veinte años de democracia local en Colombia?* Medellín, Colombia: Centro de Estudios Ciudad de Medellín ITM.

- Cardona Cardona, D. (Ed.). (2011). *Colombia: una política exterior en transición* (1st edition). Bogotá, Colombia: Fundación Friedrich Ebert Stiftung en Colombia (FESCOL).
- Casas Dupuy, P., & González Cepero, P. (2005). *Políticas de seguridad y reducción del homicidio en Bogotá: mito y realidad*. Bogotá, Colombia: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia.
- Chua, A. (2009). *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall* (Reprint). New York City (NY), United States: Anchor.
- City of Johannesburg. (2011). *Joburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy "A promising future."* Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg.
- Clark, G., & Moonen, T. (2017). *World Cities and Nation States*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Wiley Blackwell.
- Cooper, A. F. (1997). A Conceptual Overview. In *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (Cooper, A., pp. 1–24). Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cooper, A. F., & Antkiewicz, A. (2008). *Emerging Powers in Global Governance. Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process*. Waterloo (ON), Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Cornelissen, S., Cheru, F., & Shaw, T. M. (Eds.). (2012). *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*. London, United Kingdom and New York (NY), United States: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cox, R. W., & Sinclair, T. J. (1996). *Approaches to World Order*. New York City (NY), United States & Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press.
- Cruz Rodríguez, E. (2016). *Fuerza pública, negociaciones de paz y posacuerdo en Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Desde Abajo.
- Curtis, S. (Ed.). (2014). *The power of cities in international relations*. New York City (NY), United States: Routledge.
- De la Cruz, R., Pineda Mannheim, C., & Pöschl, C. (Eds.). (2011). *The Local Alternative: decentralization and economic development*. New York City (NY), United States: Palgrave Macmillan.
- De Sousa Santos, B. (2009). *Una epistemología del sur: la reinención del conocimiento y la emancipación social*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - CLACSO.
- De Sousa Santos, B. (2010). *Para descolonizar el occidente: Más allá del pensamiento abismal*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - CLACSO; Prometeo Libros.
- Death, C. (2016). Green Land and State Territory. In *The Green State in Africa* (pp. 69–107). New Haven (CT), United States: Yale University Press.
- Delgado Caicedo, J., & Sáenz Peñas, A. (2013). Deconstruyendo el Sur Global: Una aproximación a las nuevas estrategias de la Cooperación Sur - Sur frente a los saberes hegemónicos. In L. Rodríguez de la Vega & F. Lavolpe (Eds.), *Diversidades. Asia y África en perspectiva desde América del Sur* (pp. 104–120). Lomas de Zamora, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de Lomas de Zamora.
- Ducháček, I. D. (1986). *Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations*. Boulder (CO), United States: Westview Press.
- Duminy, J., Andreasen, J., Lerise, F., Odendaal, N., & Watson, V. (Eds.). (2014). *Planning and the Case Study Method in Africa*. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave McMillan.
- Floor, B. C. (1985). *The history of national roads in South Africa*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2011). Case Study. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (4th edition, pp. 301–316). Thousand Oaks (CA), United States: SAGE Publishing.
- Garcés González, J. L. (2010). *Montería a sol y sombra*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones El Túnel.
- Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge (MA), United States: Cambridge University

- Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664267>
- Glaeser, E. L. (2012). *Triumph of the city: How our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier*. New York (NY), United States: Penguin Press.
- Goldman Sachs. (2007). *BRICs and beyond*. New York City (NY), United States: Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group.
- Gray, C. S. (1988). *The geopolitics of super power*. Lexington (KY), United States: The University Press of Kentucky.
- Gugler, J. (Ed.). (2004). *World Cities beyond the West: Globalization, Development, and Inequality*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Gyngell, A., & Wesley, M. (2007). *Making Australian foreign policy* (2nd Edition). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Heller, H. (1942). *Teoría del Estado*. Mexico City, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Hobb, H. (1994). *City Hall Goes Abroad: The Foreign Policy of Local Politics*. Thousand Oaks (CA), United States: SAGE Publications.
- Hobbes, T. (2007). *Del Ciudadano y Leviatán* (6th edition). Madrid, Spain: Editorial Tecnos.
- Hocking, B. (1993). *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy*. New York City (NY), United States: St. Martin's Press.
- Hu, A. (2011). *China in 2000: A New Type of Superpower*. Washington (DC), United States: Brookings Institution Press.
- Hurrell, A. (2008). *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society*. New York City (NY), United States: Oxford University Press.
- Iglesias, E., Zubezú, G., & Iglesias, V. (Eds.). (2008). *Las provincias argentinas en el escenario internacional Desafíos y obstáculos de un sistema federal*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: CARI / UNDP.
- Institute for Global Dialogue / Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (2014). *A foreign policy handbook: An overview of South African Foreign Policy in context*. Cape Town, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue / Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales. (2005). *Descentralización en perspectiva comparada: España, Colombia, Brasil*. La Paz, Bolivia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung / Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales.
- Jacques, M. (2009). *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*. London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books.
- Jonson, L. (2004). *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The shaping of Russian Foreign Policy*. London, United Kingdom and New York, United States: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Jost, S. (Ed.). (2012). *Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior*. Bogotá, Colombia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Kagan, R. (2008). *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. New York City (NY), United States: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton (NJ), United States: Princeton University Press.
- Khilnani, S., Kumar, R., Mehta, P. B., Menon, P., Nilekani, N., Raghavan, S., ... Varadarajan, S. (2012). *Nonalignment 2.0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the twenty first century*. New Delhi, India: National Defence College & Centre for Policy Research.
- Kincaid, J. (1990). Constituent diplomacy in federal polities and the nation-state: conflict and co-operation. In H. J. Michelmann & P. Soldatos (Eds.), *Federalism and international relations: the role of subnational*

- units* (p. 322). New York City (NY), United States: Oxford University Press.
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2010). *25 años de la descentralización en Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2011). *Sustainable Mega-Events in developing countries: experiences and insights from Host Cities in South Africa, India and Brazil*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Lechini, G. (2006). ¿La cooperación Sur-Sur es aún posible? El caso de las estrategias de Brasil y los impulsos de Argentina hacia los estados de África y la nueva Sudáfrica. In A. Borón & G. Lechini (Eds.), *Política y Movimientos Sociales en un mundo hegemónico. Lecciones desde África, Asia y América Latina* (pp. 313–342). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - CLACSO.
- Lechini, G., & Giaccaglia, C. (Eds.). (2016). *Poderes Emergentes y Cooperación Sur-Sur: Perspectivas desde el Sur Global*. Rosario, Argentina: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario.
- Lennon, A. T. J., & Kozlowski, A. (Eds.). (2008). *Global Powers in the 21st Century: Strategies and Relation*. Cambridge (MA), United States: MIT Press.
- Lo, B. (2003). *Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*. London, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing.
- Louw-Vaudran, L. (2016). *South Africa in Africa: Super Power or Neocolonialist?* Cape Town, South Africa: Tafelberg.
- Mabin, A. (2014). Grounding Southern City Theory in Time and Place. In S. Parnell & S. Oldfield (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South* (p. 21-36). New York City (NY), United States: Routledge.
- Mahbubani, K. (2009). *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*. New York City (NY), United States: PublicAffairs.
- Mansbach, R. W., Ferguson, Y. H., & Lampert, D. E. (1976). *The Web of World Politics: Nonstate Actors in the Global System*. New York City (NY), United States: Prentice-Hall.
- Maquiavelo, N. (2004). *El Príncipe* (1st edition). San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.
- Marcovitch, J., & Dallari, P. B. A. (Eds.). (2014). *Relações Internacionais de Âmbito Subnacional: A Experiência de Estados e Municípios no Brasil*. São Paulo, Brazil: Instituto de Relações Internacionais - Universidade de São Paulo.
- Martin, G., & Ceballos, M. (2004). *Bogotá: Anatomía de una Transformación: Políticas de seguridad ciudadana 1995-2003*. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Marx, K. (1975). *El capital: crítica de la economía política*. Bogotá, Colombia: Siglo XXI Editores.
- McGranahan, G., & Martine, G. (Eds.). (2014). *Urban Growth in Emerging Economies: Lessons from the BRICS*. London, United Kingdom and New York, United States: Earthscan.
- McRae, R., & Hubert, D. (2002). *Sécurité Humaine et Nouvelle Diplomatie. Protection des personnes, promotion de la paix*. Montréal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Mills, G. (1994). *From pariah to participant: South Africa's evolving foreign relations, 1990-1994*. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Mills, G. (2000b). *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy, and Globalisation*. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Mohan, G. (2016). Emerging Powers in International Development: Questioning South-South Cooperation. In J. Grugel & D. Hammett (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of International Development* (pp. 279–296). London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-42724-3>

- Montesquieu, C. de S. (2003). *Del espíritu de las leyes*. Madrid, Spain: Alianza Editorial.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). *Politics amongst Nations* (5th ed.). New York City (NY), United States: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1986). *Política entre las naciones: La lucha por el poder y la paz*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.
- Muller, C., & Wright, M. (1996). *Dictionary of South African English on Historical Principles*. (P. Silva, Ed.), *Dictionary of South African English on Historical Principles*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, M., & Steyaert, C. (2013). The geopolitics of organizing mega-events. In J. M. S. Munoz (Ed.), *Handbook on the geopolitics of business* (pp. 139–150). Cheltenham, United Kingdom and Northampton (MA), United States: Edward Elgar Publishers.
- Murray, M. (2008). *Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg after Apartheid*. Ithaca (NY), United States & London, United Kingdom: Cornell University Press.
- Nathan, L. (2012). *Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in Southern Africa*. Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- National Planning Commission. (2011). *National Development Plan 2030. Our future - make it work*. Pretoria, South Africa: The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa.
- Nogales Rodríguez, C. E. (2009). *Violencia y descentralización en Colombia* (Primera Edición). Cali, Colombia: Universidad Santiago de Cali.
- Nye, J. S. (2008). *The powers to lead: soft, hard and smart*. New York City (NY), United States: Oxford University Press.
- OECD. (2011). *OECD Territorial Reviews: The Gauteng City-Region, South Africa*. Paris, France: OECD Publishing.
- OECD. (2016b). Developments in Individual OECD and Selected Non-Member Economies: South africa. In *OECD Economic Outlook* (Vol. 2016, pp. 101–258). Paris, France: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2016-2-en
- OECD. (2016c). *Trends Shaping Education 2016*. Paris, France: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/trends_edu-2016-en
- OECD, & Ministerio de Educación Nacional. (2016). *Revisión de políticas nacionales de educación. La educación en Colombia*. Paris, France: Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico - OCDE. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264250604-en>
- Olowu, D., & Wunsch, J. S. (2004). *Local Governance in Africa: the challenges of democratic decentralization*. Boulder (CO), United States: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1981). *The War Ledger* (New Edition). Chicago (IL), United States: University Of Chicago Press.
- Otero Prada, D. (2016). *Gastos de la Guerra en Colombia. 1964-2016: 179.000 millones de dólares perdidos* (Primera Edición). Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz - INDEPAZ.
- Overholt, W. H. (2008). *Asia, America and the Transformation of Geopolitics*. New York City (NY), United States: Cambridge University Press.
- Palmary, I., Rauch, J., & Simpson, G. (2003). Violent Crime in Johannesburg. In *Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Postapartheid City* (First Edition, pp. 101–122). New York City (NY), United States & London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Palmer, I., Moodley, N., & Parnell, S. (2017). *Building a Capable State. Service Delivery in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. London, United Kingdom: Zed Books Ltd.

- Parnell, S., & Oldfield, S. (Eds.). (2014). *The Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South*. New York City (NY), United States: Routledge.
- Parnell, S., & Pieterse, E. (Eds.). (2014). *Africa's Urban Revolution*. London, United Kingdom and New York, United States: Zed Books Ltd.
- Pastrana Buelvas, E. (2011b). La Política Exterior Colombiana hacia Sudamérica: de Uribe a Santos. In Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (Ed.), *XI Curso para Diplomatas Sul-Americanos: Textos Acadêmicos* (pp. 67–82). Brasília, Brazil: Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil.
- Pastrana Buelvas, E., & Gehring, H. (Eds.). (2016). *Política Exterior Colombiana: Escenarios y desafíos en el posconflicto*. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Pastrana Buelvas, E., Jost, S., & Flandes, D. (Eds.). (2012). *Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica?* Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Perkins, D., & Syrquin, M. (1989). Large countries: the influence of size. In H. Chenery & T. N. Srinivasan (Eds.), *Handbook of Development Economics, Vol 2* (pp. 1691–1753). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.
- PNUD. (2011). *Colombia rural: Razones para la esperanza. Informe Naacional de Desarrollo Humano 2011. Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2011*. Bogotá, Colombia: Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PNUD.
- Ren, X., & Keil, R. (Eds.). (2018). *The Globalizing Cities Reader* (Second Edition). Oxon, United Kingdom & New York City (NY), United States: Routledge.
- Robinson, J. (2006). *Ordinary Cities: Between modernity and development*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2017). *The geography of transport systems* (Fourth Edition). New York, United States: Routledge.
- Rosstat - Statistics of Russia. (2015). *BRICS: Joint Statistical Publication 2015*. Moscow, Russia: Rosstat - Statistics of Russia.
- Rousseau, J. J. (2003). *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*. Barcelona, Spain: Espasa-Calpe.
- Sassen, S. (1990). *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1996). *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York City (NY), United States: Columbia University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1999). *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York City (NY), United States: New Press.
- Sassen, S. (2000). *Guests and Aliens*. New York City (NY), United States: The New Press.
- Sassen, S. (2001). *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton (NJ), United States: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2002). Global Cities and Disaporic Networks: Microsites in Global Civil Society. In *Global Civil Society 2002* (pp. 217–238). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2010). La Ciudad Global: Introducción a un concepto. In W. S. Broecker, J. Canals, P. Dicken, R. Foa, P. Ghemawat, H. U. Gumbrecht, ... R. Väyrynen (Eds.), *Las múltiples caras de la globalización* (pp. 50–62). Madrid, Spain: BBVA.
- Sassen, S. (2011). *Cities in a World Economy (Sociology for a New Century Series)* (4th edition). Thousand Oaks (CA), United States: SAGE Publications.
- Scartascini del Río, J. (2010). *La (Re)Inserción Báltica en la Comunidad Internacional, a través del ingreso a la Unión Europea*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales - CAEI.
- Schoeman, M. (2003). South Africa and the world. In R. Daniel, John; Habib, Adam; Southall (Ed.), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004* (pp. 349–367). Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press.

- Seekings, J., & Natrass, N. (2005). *Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa*. New Haven (CT), United States: Yale University Press.
- Siddle, A., & Koelble, T. A. (2013). *The Failure of Decentralisation in South African Local Government: Complexity and Unanticipated Consequences*. Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press.
- Slaughter, A.-M. (2011). International Relations, Principal Theories. In R. Wolfrum (Ed.), *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Stairs, D. (1998). Of medium powers and middling roles. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Statecraft and Security: the cold war and beyond* (p. 372). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Steele, B. J. (2008). *Ontological security in International Relations. Self-identity and the IR state*. London, United Kingdom and New York, United States: Routledge.
- Stewart-Ingersoll, R., & Frazier, D. (2012). *Regional powers and security orders: a theoretical framework*. New York City (NY), United States: Routledge.
- Tammen, R. L., Lemke, D., Kugler, J., Alsharabati, C., Efirid, B., & Organski, A. F. K. (2000). *Power Transitions Strategies for the 21st Century*. New York City (NY), United States: Seven Bridges Press, LLC / Chatham House.
- The World Bank. (2009). *Doing Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times*. Washington (DC), United States: The World Bank / IFC / Palgrave MacMillan. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-7961-5>
- The World Bank. (2014a). *Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency. CESifo Forum* (12th Editi, Vol. 17). Washington (DC), United States: The World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0351-2>
- Timberlake, M. (1985). *Urbanization in the World Economy*. Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Tokatlián, J. G. (Ed.). (2007). *India, Brasil y Sudáfrica. El impacto de las nuevas potencias regionales*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Libros del Zorzal.
- Tomlinson, R., Beauregard, R., Bremner, L., & Mangcu, X. (Eds.). (2003). *Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Post-Apartheid City*. New York City (NY), United States & London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Turok, I. (2012). *Urbanisation and Development in South Africa: Economic Imperatives, Spatial Distortions and Strategic Responses*. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- UNDP. (2010). *Human Development Report 2010 The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development* (Second Pri). New York City (NY), United States: Palgrave Macmillan.
- UNDP. (2014). *Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. Human Development Report 2014*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations Development Programme - UNDP.
- UNDP. (2015b). *Human Development Report 2015. Work for Human Development*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations Development Programme - UNDP.
- UNDP. (2016). *Human Development Report 2016 Human Development for Everyone*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations Development Programme - UNDP.
- Velosa Porras, E. (2012). Las ideas en la relación Colombia-Brasil. Institucionalismo y constructivismo. In E. Pastrana Buelvas, S. Jost, & D. Flandes (Eds.), *Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica?* (pp. 51–71). Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Vital, D. (1967). *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*. New York City (NY), United States: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, M. (1959). *El Político y el Científico*. Madrid, Spain: Alianza Editorial.
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods* (4th edition). Los Ángeles (CA), United States:

SAGE Publications.

Yueh, L. (2013). *China's Growth. The making of an economic superpower*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

JOURNALS

- Actis, E., & Zelicovich, J. (2016). "Not all that glitters is gold": Continuities in international order and limits to the reconfiguration of the Global South. *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia Y Seguridad*, 11(2), 25–47. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>
- Acuto, M. (2010). Global Cities: Gorillas in Our Midst. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 35(4), 425–448. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/030437541003500405>
- Acuto, M. (2013). City leadership in global governance. *Global Governance*, 19(3), 481–498.
- Akokpari, J. K. (1999). Changing with the Tide: The Shifting Orientations of Foreign Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 8(1), 22–38.
- Alcalde Cardoza, J. (2010). El liderazgo sudamericano de Brasil: los difíciles caminos del consenso y la hegemonía. *Agenda Internacional*, XVII(28), 237–248.
- Aldana Díaz, J. (2012). Twinning Agreements, a decentralized international cooperation tool towards the strengthening of the South - South cooperation: The current case of Antioquia (Colombia) and the provinces of Jalisco (Mexico) and Minas Gerais (Brazil). *Revista de Negocios Internacionales*, 5(1), 83–101.
- Alden, C., & Le Pere, G. (2004). South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity? *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(100), 283–297. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262293>
- Alden, C., & Le Pere, G. (2009). South Africa in Africa: Bound To Lead? *Politikon*, 36(1), 145–169. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340903155443>
- Alden, C., & Soko, M. (2005). South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(3), 367–392. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X05001011>
- Alden, C., & Vieira, M. A. (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(7), 1077–1095. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500235678>
- Alderson, A. S., & Beckfield, J. (2004). Power and Position in the World City System. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(4), 811–851. <https://doi.org/10.1086/378930>
- Alger, C. F. (1990). The world relations of cities: closing the gap between social science paradigms and everyday human experience. *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(4), 493–518. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600609>
- Alger, C.F. (2010). Expanding Governmental Diversity in Global Governance: Parliamentarians of States and Local Governments. *Global Governance*, 16, 59-79.
- Allison, R. (2008). Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to "coerce Georgia to peace." *International Affairs*, 84(6), 1145–1171. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00762.x>
- Alvargonzález, D. (2011). Multidisciplinarity, Interdisciplinarity, Transdisciplinarity, and the Sciences. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 25(4), 387–403. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2011.623366>
- Amin, A., & Graham, S. (1997). The ordinary city. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 22(4),

- 411–429.
- Ardila, M. (2014). Características de inserción internacional de potencias regionales latinoamericanas. A propósito de Colombia y Venezuela. *Observatorio de Análisis de Los Sistemas Internacionales - OASIS*, 19, 87–101.
- Ardila, M. (2015). Colombia y México: ¿hacia diplomacias democráticas de baja intensidad? *Desafíos*, 27(II), 221–252. <http://dx.doi.org/10.12804/desafios27.2.2015.07>
- Armstrong, H., & Read, R. (2000). Comparing the economic performance of dependent territories and sovereign micro-states. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 48(2), 285–306. <https://doi.org/10.1086/452459>
- Baena Rojas, J. J., & Fernández Pons, X. (2016). Aproximaciones a la inserción de Colombia en el Sistema Multilateral de Comercio en 1995-2015. *Análisis Político*, 87(Mayo-Septiembre), 114–131. <https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v29n87.60755>
- Baron, J. B. (1999). Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity. *The Yale Law Journal*, 108(5), 1059–1085. <https://doi.org/10.2307/797370>
- Baruch, Z. (1984). Ordination and classification of vegetation along an Altitudinal Gradient in the Venezuelan Páramos. *Veggetatio*, 55(2), 115–126.
- Bassett, T. E., & Marpillero-Colomina, A. (2013). Sustaining Mobility: Bus Rapid Transit and the Role of Local Politics in Bogotá. *Latin American Perspectives*, 40(2), 135–145. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X12468867>
- Batchelor, P., Dunne, P., & Lamb, G. (2002). The Demand for Military Spending in South Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(3), 339–354. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039003005>
- Beall, J., Crankshaw, O., & Parnell, S. (2000). Local government, poverty reduction and inequality in Johannesburg. *Environment and Urbanization*, 12(1), 107–122. <https://doi.org/10.1177/095624780001200108>
- Beaverstock, J. V., Smith, R. G., & Taylor, P. J. (2000). World-City Network: A New Metageography? *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 90(1), 123–134. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0004-5608.00188>
- Benhabib, S. (2012). Carl Schmitt's Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law. *Political Theory*, 40(6), 688–713. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591712460651>
- Besada, H., & Tok, E. (2014). South Africa in the BRICS: Soft Power Balancing and Instrumentalization. *Journal of International and Global Studies*, 5(2), 76–95.
- Betts, R. K. (1979). A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa? *International Security*, 4(2), 91–115. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2626745>
- Bijian, Z. (2005). China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(5), 18–24. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20031702>
- Black, D. R., & Hornsby, D. J. (2016). South Africa's bilateral relationships in the evolving foreign policy of an emerging middle power. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 54(2), 151–160. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2016.1151164>
- Black, D., & Van Der Westhuizen, J. (2004). The allure of global games for "semi-peripheral" polities and spaces: A research agenda. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(7), 1195–1214. <https://doi.org/10.1080/014365904200281221>
- Blank, Y. (2006). The City and the World. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 44(3), 868–931.
- Bonilla Montenegro, J. D. (2014). Los BRICS: una crítica desde el postdesarrollo. *Observatorio de Análisis de Los Sistemas Internacionales - OASIS*, 19, 7–19.
- Boraine, A., Crankshaw, O., Engelbrecht, C., Gotz, G., Mbanga, S., Narsoo, M., & Parnell, S. (2006). The

- state of South African Cities a decade after democracy. *Urban Studies*, 43(2), 259–284. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500416990>
- Borda, S. (2012). ¿Todo cambia para seguir igual? La estrategia internacional y de seguridad en Colombia. *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, 12(1), 19–27.
- Borja, J. (2007). Revolución y contrarrevolución en la ciudad global: las expectativas frustradas por la globalización de nuestras ciudades. *Revista Eure*, 33(100), 35–50.
- Boshoff, W. H., & Fourie, J. (2010). The Significance of the Cape Trade Route to Economic Activity in the Cape Colony: A Medium-term Business Cycle Analysis. *European Review of Economic History*, 14(3), 469–503. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1361491610000134>
- Bremner, L. (2000). Reinventing the Johannesburg inner city. *Cities*, 17(3), 185–193. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-2751\(00\)00013-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-2751(00)00013-5)
- Brenner, N. (1998). Global Cities, Glocal States: Global City Formation and State Territorial Restructuring in Contemporary Europe. *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(1), 1–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922998347633>
- Brewer, G. D. (1999). The challenges of interdisciplinarity. *Policy Sciences*, 32, 327–337. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004706019826>
- Brigagão, C., & Seabra, R. (2011). Atlântico Sul: Área de Influência do Brasil. *Mural Internacional*, II(1), 16–21. <http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2011.5376>
- Buvinić, M., & Morrison, A. R. (2000). Living in a More Violent World. *Foreign Policy*, 118, 58–72. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149670>
- Cadena, A., Dobbs, R., & Remes, J. (2012). The Growing Economic Power of Cities. *Journal of International Affairs*, 65(2), 1–17.
- Callanan, V. J. (2012). Media Consumption, Perceptions of Crime Risks and Fear of Crime: Examining Race / Ethnic Differences. *Sociological Perspectives*, 55(1), 93–115.
- Calvento, M. (2014). La inserción Internacional de los actores subnacionales: análisis de un proceso contemporáneo. *Interações - Revista Internacional de Desenvolvimento Local*, 15(2), 301–313. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1518-70122014000200009>
- Cárdenas Ruiz, J. D. (2015). Los medios de comunicación como actores (des)legitimadores. Algunas reflexiones acerca del rol de los medios de comunicación sobre la construcción de la opinión pública en torno al Proceso de Paz de La Habana. *Análisis Político*, 85(Septiembre-Diciembre), 38–56. <https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v28n85.56245>
- Carvajal, L. (2007). Morgenthau: ¿el Maquiavelo de la política internacional? *Observatorio de Análisis de Los Sistemas Internacionales - OASIS*, (12), 253–269.
- Carvajal, L. (2009). Posmodernismo y constructivismo: su utilidad para analizar la política exterior colombiana. *Observatorio de Análisis de Los Sistemas Internacionales - OASIS*, (14), 201–218.
- Chen, M., Zhang, H., Liu, W., & Zhang, W. (2014). The Global Pattern of Urbanization and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Three Decades. *PLoS ONE*, 9(8), 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0103799>
- Chenoy, K. M., & Chenoy, A. M. (2007). India's Foreign Policy Shifts and the Calculus of Power. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42(35), 3547–3554.
- Chertoff, M. (2009). The Responsibility to Contain: Protecting Sovereignty Under International Law. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(1), 130–147.
- Chin, G. T. (2010). Remaking the architecture: The emerging powers, self-insuring and regional insulation. *International Affairs*, 86(3), 693–715. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00906.x>

- Choi, B., & Pak, A. (2006). Multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity in health research, services, education and policy. *Clinical & Investigative Medicine*, 29(6), 351–364. <http://dx.doi.org/10.25011/cim.v30i6.2950>
- Choi, Y. J. (2009). South Korea's Regional Strategy and Middle Power Activism. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 23(1), 47–67.
- Choplin, A. (2012). De-Westernising Urban Theory. *Métro Politiques*, 5(December), 1–4.
- Christopher, A. J. (1994). The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1949-1994. *GeoJournal*, 34(4), 439–446.
- Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (2012). Theory from the South : Or, how Euro- America is Evolving Toward Africa. *Anthropological Forum*, 22(2), 113–131.
- Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (2013). Writing Theory from the South: The Global Order from an African Perspective. *The World Financial Review*, (September-October), 17–20.
- Connell, L. (2004). Post-Colonial Interdisciplinarity. *Critical Survey*, 16(2), 1–6. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/001115704782351708>
- Cooper, A. F. (1998). The multiple faces of South African foreign policy. *International Journal*, 53(4), 705–732. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209805300408>
- Cooper, A. F., & Flemes, D. (2013). Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory review. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(6), 943–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802501>
- Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. A., & Nossal, K. R. (1991). Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict. *Political Science Quarterly*, 106(3), 391–410. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2151739>
- Cornelissen, S. (2008). Scripting the nation: sport, mega-events, foreign policy and state-building in post-apartheid South Africa. *Sport in Society*, 11(4), 481–493. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17430430802019458>
- Cornelissen, S. (2010). The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration: Sport Mega-events and Emerging Powers. *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 27(16–18), 3008–3025. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2010.508306>
- Cornelissen, S. (2017). National Meaning-Making in Complex Societies: Political Legitimation and Branding Dynamics in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Geopolitics*, 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1278695>
- Cox, M. (2007). Is the United States in Decline -- Again? *International Affairs*, 83(4), 643–653. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00645.x>
- Crankshaw, O. (2008). Race, Space and the Post-Fordist Spatial Order of Johannesburg. *Urban Studies*, 45(8), 1692–1711. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098008091497>
- Crawford, C. (2009). Learning from Bogotá: An Introduction to the Study Space Articles. *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review*, 40(2), i–iii.
- Curtis, S. (2011). Global cities and the transformation of the International System. *Review of International Studies*, 37(February 2009), 1923–1947. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001099>
- Curtis, S. (2016). Cities and Global Governance: State Failure or a New Global Order? *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 44(3), 455–477. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829816637233>
- Dallanegra Pedraza, L. (2012). Claves de la política exterior de Colombia. *Revista Latinoamérica*, 54(1), 37–73.
- De San Eugenio Vela, J., & Ginesta Portet, X. (2013). La construcción de la marca “Qatar” a partir del deporte: “sports place branding” y prensa deportiva catalana. *Estudios Sobre El Mensaje Periodístico*, 19(1), 533–550. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_ESMP.2013.v19.n1.42537

- De Sousa, S.-L. J. (2007b). La India, el Brasil y Sudáfrica: ¿potencias emergentes o países en desarrollo? *El Debate Político, Revista Iberoamericana de Análisis Político*, 4(6/7), 36–48.
- De Sousa, S.-L. J. (2008). Brasil, India y Sudáfrica, potencias para un nuevo orden. *Política Exterior*, 22(121), 165–178.
- De Sousa Santos, B. (2007). Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledge. *Review*, XXX(1), 45–89.
- De Villiers, J. W., Jardine, R., & Reiss, M. (1993). Why South Africa gave up the Bomb. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), 98–109. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045817>
- Destradi, S. (2010). Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership. *Review of International Studies*, 36(4), 903–930. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001361>
- Dieckhoff, M. (2014). International Mediation: A Specific Diplomatic Tool For Emerging Countries? *European Review of International Studies*, 1(2), 107–123. <https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v1i2.16506>
- Dirsuweit, T. (2002). Johannesburg: Fearful city? *Urban Forum*, 13(3), 3–19. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-002-0006-1>
- Draper, P. (2011). For how long can South Africa “punch above its weight”? *European View*, 10(2), 207–213. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-011-0191-1>
- Duque Franco, I. (2011). Bogotá: entre la identidad y el marketing urbano. *Revista Colombiana de Geografía*, 20(1), 29–45.
- Ellis, S. (1994). Of Elephants and Men: Politics and Nature Conservation in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 20(1), 53–69. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057079408708386>
- Evans, G. (1996). South Africa in Remission: The Foreign Policy of an Altered State. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(2), 249–269. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00055324>
- Fan, Y. (2010). Branding the Nation: Towards a Better Understanding. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 6(4), 97–103. <https://doi.org/10.1057/pb.2010.16>
- Ferreira-Snyman, A. (2007). Sovereignty and the changing nature of public international law: towards a world law? *The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa*, 40(3), 395–424.
- Ferreira, A., & Segura, R. (2000). Examining the Military in the Local Sphere: Colombia and Mexico. *Latin American Perspectives*, 27(2), 18–35. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X0002700202>
- Finot, I. (2007). Los procesos de descentralización en América Latina. *Investigaciones Regionales*, (10), 173–205.
- Fischer, D. (1995). The Pelindaba Treaty: Africa Joins the Nuclear-Free World. *Arms Control Today*, 25(10), 9–14.
- Fisman, R., & Werker, E. (2011). Innovations in governance. *Innovation Policy and the Economy*, 11(1), 79–102. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030701763161>
- Fitzgerald, J. (2003). Multilingual reading theory. *Reading Research Quarterly*, 38(1), 118–122.
- Flemes, D. (2009). India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) in the New Global Order Interests, Strategies and Values of the Emerging Coalition. *International Studies*, 46(4), 401–421. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600402>
- Flemes, D. (2010a). A visão brasileira da futura ordem global. *Contexto Internacional*, 32(2), 403–436. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-85292010000200005>
- Flemes, D. (2010b). O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: Soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança? *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53(1), 141–156. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292010000100008>
- Flemes, D., & Castro, R. (2016). Institutional Contestation: Colombia in the Pacific Alliance. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 35(1), 78–92. <https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12411>

- Flemes, D., & Costa Vaz, A. (2014). Políticas de Segurança da Índia, Brasil e África do Sul: contexto regional de segurança e os limites para uma agenda comum. *Mural Internacional*, 5(1), 10–27. <https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2014.10863>
- Flemes, D., & Gomes Saraiva, M. (2014). Potências emergentes na ordem de redes: o caso do Brasil. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 57(2), 214–232. <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400312>
- Flemes, D., Nolte, D., & Wehner, L. E. (2011). Una comunidad de seguridad regional en formación: la UNASUR y su Consejo de Defensa. *Estudios Internacionales*, 170, 105–127. <https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.2011.19428>
- Foreign Policy. (2010). The Global Cities Index. *Foreign Policy*, 181(September / October), 124–125.
- Forero Rodríguez, M. (2011). Enfoques y dinámicas de la política exterior colombiana: del bilateralismo al multilateralismo. *Revista Análisis Internacional*, (4), 33–52.
- Freres, C. (2013). Cooperación Sur-Sur: un elemento clave para el despegue del Atlántico Sur. *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 102–103(Septiembre), 125–146.
- Friedberg, A. L. (1993). Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia. *International Security*, 18(3), 5–33. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539204>
- Friedland, E. A. (1982). South Africa and Instability in Southern Africa. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 463(September), 95–105.
- Furniss, E. S. J. (1952). The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Politics. *World Politics*, 4(3), 382–401. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009129>
- García Segura, C. (1996). La actividad exterior de las entidades políticas subestatales. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 91, 235–264.
- Geldenhuis, D. (1989). Critical Issues in South Africa's Foreign Relations. *Harvard International Review*, 12(1), 7–9, 63.
- Giraldo, C. A. (2003). Descentralización Colombiana, un producto de exportación - Mirada positiva al proceso -. *ÓPERA*, 3(3), 175–186.
- Glosny, M. A. (2010). China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World. *Polity*, 42(1), 100–129. <https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.14>
- Goble, P. (2011). Azerbaijani Eurovision Victory Puts Baku in a New League. *Azerbaijan in the World*, 4(10), 1–2.
- Goldstein, A. (2001). The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice. *The China Quarterly*, 168, 835–864. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000944390100050X>
- Goss, L. (1948). The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948. *The American Journal of International Law*, 42(1), 20–41.
- Gould, C., & Hecker, M. (2005). Armes chimiques et biologiques: leçons d'Afrique du Sud. *Politique Étrangère*, 70(1), 109–121.
- Grant, T. D. (1998). Defining statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its discontents. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 37(403), 403–457.
- Guerra-Barón, A. (2014). Un estudio comparado de las políticas exteriores económicas: el caso de los países CIVETS. *Revista Papel Político*, 19(1), 179–210. <https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.PAPO19-1.ecpe>
- Gupta, B. Sen. (1975). Waiting for India: India's Role As a Regional Power. *Journal of International Affairs*, 29(2), 171–184.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2011). Evaluating State Performance: A Critical View of State Failure and Fragility Indexes. *European Journal of Development Research*, 23(1), 20–42. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2010.53>
- Guy, J. J. (1990). Cuba: A Regional Power without a Region? *The World Today*, 46(8/9), 165–169.
- Haass, R. N. (2008). The Age of Nonpolarity: What will Follow U.S. Dominance? *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3), 44–

56.

- Hancock, K. J. (2007). Russia: Great power image versus economic reality. *Asian Perspective*, 31(4), 71–98.
- Harris, J. (2005). Emerging Third World powers: China, India and Brazil. *Race & Class*, 46(3), 7–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396805050014>
- Harris, V., Hatang, S., & Liberman, P. (2004). Unveiling South Africa's Nuclear Past. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30(3), 457–475. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305707042000254074>
- Harrison, K. (2006). Falling down the rabbit hole: crime in Johannesburg's inner city. *Development in Practice*, 16(2), 222–226. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520600562504>
- Harrison, P. (2014). South Africa in the BRICS. *Observatorio de Análisis de Los Sistemas Internacionales - OASIS*, 19, 67–84.
- Harrison, P. (2015). South–south relationships and the transfer of “best practice”: the case of Johannesburg, South Africa. *International Development Planning Review*, 37(2), 205–223. <https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2015.16>
- Hentz, J. J. (2005). South Africa and the political economy of regional cooperation in Southern Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(1), 21–51. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0400059X>
- Hirsch, J. (1995). Nation-State, International Regulation and the Question of Democracy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 2(2), 267–284. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692299508434320>
- Hungwe, C. (2013). Survival strategies of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg. *Journal of Community Positive Practices*, XIII(3), 52–73.
- Hunter, C. O. (2016). The submission of the Sovereign: An Examination of the Compatibility of Sovereignty and International Law. *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 44(4), 521–536.
- Huntington, S. P. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(2), 35–49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049207>
- Hurrell, A. (2006). Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers? *International Affairs*, 82(1), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00512.x>
- Husain, A. (1982). The West, South Africa and Israel: A Strategic Triangle. *Third World Quarterly*, 4(1), 44–73.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? *Foreign Affairs*, 87(1), 23–37.
- Ismayilov, M. (2012). State, Identity, and the Politics of Music: Eurovision and Nation-Building in Azerbaijan. *Nationalities Papers*, 40(6), 833–851. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2012.742990>
- Jabour-Green, J., & Nicol, D. (2003). Bioprospecting in Areas outside National Jurisdiction: Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 4(1), 76–111.
- Jacobs, J. A., & Frickel, S. (2009). Interdisciplinarity: A Critical Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 4365. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-115954>
- Käkönen, J. (2014). Brics As a New Power in International Relations? *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 6(2), 85–104.
- Kaur, P., & Kaur, K. (2015). New allies for BRICS--Egypt or Indonesia. *Abhigyan*, 33(3), 16–27.
- Kende, M. S. (2014). Enforcing the South African Constitution: The fight for Judicial Independence and Separation of Powers. *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems*, 23(35), 35–49.
- Kenkel, K. M., & Martins, M. T. (2016). Emerging Powers and the Notion of International Responsibility: moral duty or shifting goalpost? *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 10(1), 1–27. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1981-38212016000100003>
- Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian's Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. *International*

- Organization*, 23(2), 291–310. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003160X>
- Khadiagala, G. M., & Nganje, F. (2016). The evolution of South Africa's democracy promotion in Africa: from idealism to pragmatism. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(4), 1561–1581. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1058655>
- Klein, J. T. (2008). Evaluation of Interdisciplinary and Transdisciplinary Research. A Literature Review. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, 35(2S), 116–123. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2008.05.010>
- Koelble, T. A., & Siddle, A. (2013). Why Decentralization in South Africa Has Failed. *Governance*, 26(3), 343–346. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12022>
- Korkut, U., & Civelekoğlu, İ. (2012). Becoming a regional power while pursuing material gains: The case of Turkish interest in Africa. *International Journal*, 68(1), 187–203. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201306800112>
- Kruger, L. (2012). City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg, by Martin J. Murray, and Marginal Spaces: Reading Ivan Vladislavič, ed. Gerald Gaylard. *Research in African Literatures*, 43(2), 195–199. <https://doi.org/10.2979/reseafritlite.43.2.195>
- Lake, D. A. (2007). Escape from the State-of-Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics. *International Security*, 32(1), 47–79. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.47>
- Lamo de Espinosa, E. (2010). El Nuevo Mapa del Mundo: Globalización y Potencias Emergentes. *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Político*, 28, 49–67.
- Landsberg, C. (2011). Transformation, continuity and disffusion: South Africa's foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. *Foreign Policy*, 29, 64–75.
- Landsberg, C., & Georghiou, C. (2016). The foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state: South Africa as case study. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22(4), 479–495. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1124805>
- Lawrence, R. J., & Després, C. (2004). Futures of Transdisciplinarity. *Futures*, 36, 397–405. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2003.10.005>
- Layne, C. (1993). The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise. *International Security*, 17(4), 5–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539020>
- Le Pere, G. (2014). Critical Themes in South Africa's Foreign Policy: an overview. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 36(2), 31–56.
- Leonard, R. L. (2013). Traveling Literacies: Multilingual Writing on the Move. *Research in the Teaching of English*, 48(1), 13–39.
- Levander, C., & Mignolo, W. (2011). Introduction: The Global South and World Dis / Order. *The Global South*, 5(1), 1–11.
- Lieb, D. (2004). The Limits of Neorealism: Marginal States and International Relations Theory. *Harvard International Review*, 26(1), 26–29.
- Lipietz, B. (2008). Building a vision for the post-apartheid city: What role for participation in Johannesburg's City development strategy? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 32(1), 135–163. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00767.x>
- Lodge, T. (2005). Provincial Government and State Authority in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 31(4), 737–753. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070500370480>
- Mabera, F. (2016). The Peacemaking-Peacebuilding-Development nexus: marrying South Africa's peace diplomacy and development agenda. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 38(2), 77–99.
- MacFarlane, S. N. (2006). The "R" in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power? *International Affairs*, 82(1), 41–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00514.x>

- Macklem, P. (2008). Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International Law. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 22(4), 369–393. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2008.00172.x>
- Mahbubani, K. (2005). Understanding China. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(5), 49–60.
- Malamud, A. (2011). A Leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53(3), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00123.x>
- Mamadouh, V. D. (1998). Geopolitics in the nineties: One flag, many meanings. *GeoJournal*, 46(4), 237–253. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006950931650>
- Manby, B. (1992). South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions. *Journal of International Affairs*, 46(1), 193–217.
- Marshall, E. (1980). Navy Lab Concludes the Vela saw a Bomb. *Science*, 209(4460), 996–997. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.209.4460.996>
- Mazur, A. (2006). Risk Perception and News Coverage across Nations. *Risk Management*, 8(3), 149–174. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rm.8250011>
- Mbembe, A., & Nuttall, S. (2004). Writing the World from an African Metropolis. *Public Culture*, 16(3), 347–372.
- McFarlane, C. (2010). The comparative city: Knowledge, learning, urbanism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 34(4), 725–742. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00917.x>
- Merino Fernández, J. V. (1982). Fundamentos y alcance de la interdisciplinariedad en la investigación pedagógica. *Revista Española de Pedagogía*, 40(155), 47–65.
- Mills, G. (2000a). El renacimiento africano y el papel del Estado. *Política Exterior*, 14(78), 133–142.
- Mockus, A. (2012). Building “citizenship culture” in Bogotá. *Journal of International Affairs*, 65(2), 143–146.
- Monaghan, A. (2016). Putin’s Way of War: the ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.’” *Parameters*, 45(4), 65–74.
- Mongwaketse, T. B. (2016). The SANDF as a Human Security Instrument post-1994. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 38(2), 28–52.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 52(1), 229. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550536>
- Moreira Júnior, H., & Sérgio Figueira, M. (2014). O Banco dos BRICS e os cenários de recomposição da ordem internacional. *Boletim Meridiano* 47, 15(142), 54–62.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1945). The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil. *Ethics*, 56(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1086/290471>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1946). Diplomacy. *The Yale Law Journal*, 55(5), 1067–1080.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1949). The Primacy of the National Interest. *The American Scholar*, 18(2), 207–212.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1964). Modern Science and Political Power. *Columbia Law Review*, 64(8), 1386–1409. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1120764>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1967). Common Sense and Theories of International Relations. *Journal of International Affairs*, 21(2), 207–214.
- Morris, A. (1998). “Our fellow Africans make our lives hell”: the lives of Congolese and Nigerians living in Johannesburg. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(6), 1116–1136. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419879808565655>
- Mugomba, A. (1975). The Emergence and Collapse of South Africa’s Black African Policy. *Journal of Eastern African Research & Development*, 5(1), 19–36.
- Nathan, L. (2005). Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy. *International Affairs*, 81(2), 361–372. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00455.x>

- Nel, P., & Nolte, D. (2010). Introduction: special section on regional powers in a changing global order. *Review of International Studies*, 36(4), 877–879. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001348>
- Nel, P., Taylor, I., & Van der Westhuizen, J. (2000). Multilateralism in South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for a Critical Rationale. *Global Governance*, 6(1), 43–60.
- Nganje, F. (2015). Intergovernmental Relations on Foreign Affairs in South Africa: a Twenty Year Review. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 37(2), 52–74.
- Nganje, F. (2016a). Historical Institutionalism and the development of sub-state diplomacy in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary History / Joernaal Vir Eietydse Geskiedenis*, 41(1), 149–168. <https://doi.org/10.18820/24150509/jch.v41i1.8>
- Nganje, F. (2016b). Sub-state diplomacy and the foreign policy- development nexus in South Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 23(1), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2016.1154889>
- Njoya, J. (2010). Mondialisation et insertion internationale de l'Afrique: l'anthropologie d'une dynamique récusée. *Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, 43(4), 482–504. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2010-4-482>
- Nolte, D. (1992). Gobiernos Locales y Participación Política en America Latina: Procesos de Descentralización y Cambios electorales. *Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, 25(1), 21–36.
- Nolte, D. (2010). How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics. *Review of International Studies*, 36(99), 881–901. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021051000135X>
- Novăcescu, I. (2013). Ion I. C. Brătianu's ethics and realist principles with regard to Romania's foreign policy. *Studia Europaea*, 58(2), 75–102.
- Nye, J. S. (1984). Can America Manage Its Soviet Policy? *Foreign Affairs*, 62(4), 857–878. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20041911>
- Nye, J. S. (1988). Understating U. S. Strength. *Foreign Policy*, 72, 105–129. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148823>
- Nye, J. S. (1990a). ¿Decadencia de Estados Unidos? *Política Exterior*, 4(16), 162–167.
- Nye, J. S. (1990b). The Changing Nature of World Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2), 177–192. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2151022>
- Nye, J. S. (1992). What New World Order? *Foreign Affairs*, 71(2), 83–96. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045126>
- Nye, J. S. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(4), 22–35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049361>
- Nye, J. S. (2000). The US and Europe: Continental Drift? *International Affairs*, 76(1), 51–59. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00119>
- Nye, J. S. (2002). Limits of American Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 117(4), 545–559. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12478>
- Nye, J. S. (2006). Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy. *Foreign Affairs*, 85(4), 139–145, 147–148. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20032047>
- Nye, J. S. (2010). The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective. *Foreign Affairs*, 89(6), 2–12.
- Nye, J. S. (2013). On Leadership and American Power: A Discussion about the Role of Leadership in U.S. Foreign Policy. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 14(2), 109–113.
- Ogunnubi, O., & Isike, C. (2015). Regional Hegemonic Contention and the Assymetry of Soft Power: A comparative analysis of South Africa and Nigeria. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 37(1), 152–177.
- Ong, R. (2009). China's strategic convergence with Russia. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 21(3), 315–328. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163270903087329>

- Ostapenko, N. (2010). Nation Branding of Russia through the Sochi Olympic Games of 2014. *Journal of Management Policy and Practice*, 11(4), 60–63.
- Özkan, M., & Akgün, B. (2010). Turkey's opening to Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 48(4), 525–546. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X10000595>
- Palmer, R. (1996). Pretoria's Wars. *The Journal of African History*, 37(3), 506–507.
- Pape, R. (2005). Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, 30(1), 7–45. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894607>
- Parnell, S. (2016). Defining a global urban development agenda. *World Development*, 78, 529–540. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.028>
- Parnell, S., & Pieterse, E. (2016). Translational Global Praxis: Rethinking Methods and Modes of African Urban Research. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 40(1), 236–246. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12278>
- Patrick, S. (2010). Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers. *Foreign Affairs*, 89(6), 44–53.
- Pereira Pinto, P. A. (2008). China e Índia - A disputa por "Soft Power" (II). *Meridiano 47 - Journal of Global Studies*, 9(90), 5–6.
- Philpott, D. (1995). Sovereignty: An introduction and brief history. *Journal of International Affairs*, 48(2), 353–368.
- Puerto Castro, D. C. (2011). Un nuevo amanecer: el giro de la política exterior colombiana y su impacto en el conflicto interno. *Revista Del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales*, 11, 87–120.
- Purkitt, H. E., & Burgess, S. (2002). South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme: A Historical and International Perspective. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28(2), 229–253. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070220140685>
- Puyana Valdivieso, J. R. (2005). Colombia frente a los retos del multilateralismo. *Observatorio de Análisis de Los Sistemas Internacionales - OASIS*, 11, 85–102.
- Pyper, W. (2011). Subantarctic islands in the spotlight. *Australian Antarctic Magazine*, (21), 22.
- Qobo, M. (2010). Refocusing South Africa's economic diplomacy: the "African Agenda" and emerging powers. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 17(1), 13–28.
- Qobo, M. (2017). Africa's Foreign Policy and Nation Branding: Regional Leadership and its Discontents. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39(1), 9–28.
- Qobo, M., & Nyathi, N. (2016). Ubuntu, public policy ethics and tensions in South Africa's foreign policy. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 23(4), 421–436. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1298052>
- Ramadier, T. (2004). Transdisciplinarity and its challenges: The case of urban studies. *Futures*, 36, 423–439. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2003.10.009>
- Ramírez, S. (2012). Alcances de la nueva política exterior Colombiana. *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, 12(1), 38–46.
- Ramousse, D. (2007). Zones franches et Maquila en Amérique du Sud: un champ d'expérimentation pour les politiques de développement et d'insertion internationale / Free trade zones and maquila in South America: a field of experimentation for policies of development and intern. *Annales de Géographie*, 116(658), 586–607. <https://doi.org/10.3917/ag.658.0586>
- Rasheed, M. F. (1995). The Concept of Power in International Relations. *Pakistan Horizon*, 48(1), 95–99.
- Reybold, L. E., & Halx, M. D. (2012). Coming to Terms with the Meaning of Interdisciplinarity: Faculty Rewards and the Authority of the Discipline. *The Journal of General Education*, 61(4), 323–351.

- <https://doi.org/10.5325/jgeneeduc.61.4.0323>
- Rhinehart, N. (2009). Public Spaces in Bogotá: An Introduction. *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review*, 40(2), 197–211.
- Roberts, C. (2010). Russia's BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an Insider. *Polity*, 42(1), 38–73. <https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.18>
- Robinson, J. (2002). Global and world cities: a view from off the map. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26(3), 531–554. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00397>
- Robinson, J. (2011a). Cities in a world of cities: the comparative gesture. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00982.x>
- Robinson, J. (2011b). Comparisons: Colonial or cosmopolitan? *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 32(2), 125–140. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9493.2011.00423.x>
- Robinson, J. (2016). Comparative Urbanism: New Geographies and Cultures of Theorizing the Urban. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 40(1), 187–199. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12273>
- Robinson, J., & Roy, A. (2016). Debate on Global Urbanisms and the Nature of Urban Theory. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 40(1), 181–186. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12272>
- Robson, M. (2000). Nuclear disarmament: two initiatives. *New Zealand International Review*, 25(6), 13–15.
- Rogerson, C. M. (2002). Urban tourism in the developing world: The case of Johannesburg. *Development Southern Africa*, 19(1), 169–190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835022012392>
- Rolandi, M. L., & Merello, M. (2017). Consideraciones teóricas-metodológicas para el análisis de la política internacional subestatal. *Colombia Internacional*, 90(Abril-Junio), 223–250. <https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint90.2017.08>
- Ruhiiga, T. M. (2014). Urbanisation in South Africa: a critical review of policy, planning and practice. *African Population Studies / Étude de La Population Africaine*, 28(1), 610–622. <https://doi.org/10.11564/28-0-519>
- Ruiz Alanís, L. (2009). Las relaciones internacionales de los municipios. *Convergencia*, 49(Enero-Abril), 253–275.
- Ružić, M. (2013). Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics. *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, (01–02), 128–131.
- Sacco, V. F. (1982). The Effects of Mass Media on Perceptions of Crime: A Reanalysis of the Issues. *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 25(4), 475–493. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1388925>
- Salama, P., & Fernández Ayala, A. I. (2014). Las economías emergentes, ¿el hundimiento? *Foro Internacional*, 54(1), 5–30.
- Salvatore, R. D. (2010). The postcolonial in Latin America and the concept of coloniality: A historian's point of view. *A Contracorriente - Una Revista de Historia Social y Literatura de América Latina*, 8(1), 332–348.
- Sanahuja, J. A. (2014). Desarrollo global y países emergentes: retos para la política de cooperación de la UE. *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, (108), 67–93.
- Sánchez-Diez, Á., & Matesanz, D. (2011). The international insertion of Africa: New characteristics of an old natural resource-based dependency. *Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies*, 11(1), 81–108.
- Saul, J. S. (1985). Socialist Transition and External Intervention: Mozambique and South Africa's War. *Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, Capital et Société*, 18(1), 153–170.
- Saunders, C. (2013). Military Intervention in Conflict Situations in Africa: Thoughts on South Africa's Role. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 35(2), 152–156.
- Schoeman, M. (2015). South Africa as an emerging power: from label to “status consistency”? *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22(4), 429–445. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2015.1119719>

- Schraeder, P. J. (2001). South Africa's foreign policy: From international pariah to leader of the African renaissance. *The Round Table*, 90(359), 229–243. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530120050080>
- Schweller, R. (2011). After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline. *International Security*, 36(1), 41–72. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00044
- Schwengel, H. (2008). Emerging Powers as Fact and Metaphor: Some European Ideas. *Futures*, 40, 767–776. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2008.02.006>
- Sclar, E. (1992). Back to the city. *Technology Review*, August / September, 29–33.
- Seiler, J. (1982). South Africa in Namibia: Persistence, Misperception, and Ultimate Failure. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20(4), 689–712. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00000306>
- Severo, C. G. (2013). Política(s) lingüística(s) e questões de poder. *Alfa: Revista de Lingüística*, 57(2), 451–473. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1981-57942013000200006>
- Shaw, T. M., Cooper, A. F., & Antkiewicz, A. (2007). Global and/or regional development at the start of the 21st century? China, India and (South) Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(7), 1255–1270. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590701591804>
- Sidaway, J. D., & Simon, D. (1993). Geopolitical Transition and State Formation: The Changing Political Geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19(1), 6–28.
- Sihlongonyane, M. F. (2016). The global, the local and the hybrid in the making of Johannesburg as a world class African city. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 1607–1627. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1159507>
- Sinha, A., & Dorschner, J. P. (2010). India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations? *Polity*, 42(1), 74–99. <https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19>
- Smith, R. (2002). The nuclear disarmament chimera. *New Zealand International Review*, 27(1), 7–11.
- Soldatos, P. (1991). Strategic cities alliances: An added value to the innovative making of an international city. *Ekistics*, 58(350/351), 346–350.
- Soto, D. (2003). La descentralización en Colombia: centralismo o autonomía. *ÓPERA*, 3(3), 133–152.
- Southall, R. (1994). The New South Africa in the New World Order: Beyond the Double Whammy. *Third World Quarterly*, 15(1), 121–137.
- Spence, J. E. (1997). South Africa: on becoming “just another country.” *The World Today*, 53(3), 67–69.
- Spies, Y. K. (2008). The Multilateral Maze and (South) Africa's quest for permanent United Nations Security Council Representation. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 30(1), 96–122.
- Suárez Sipmann, M. (2011). India y Suráfrica: dos países en el mismo espejo. *Política Exterior*, 25(142), 150–161.
- Subacchi, P. (2008). New power centres and new power brokers: Are they shaping a new economic order? *International Affairs*, 84(3), 485–498. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00719.x>
- Taşan-Kok, T., & Van Weesep, J. (2007). Global-local interaction and its impact on cities. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 22(1), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10901-006-9063-4>
- Taylor, P. J., Hoyler, M., Walker, D. R. F., & Szegner, M. J. (2001). A new mapping of the world for the New Millennium. *The Geographical Journal*, 167(3), 213–222. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4959.00019>
- The Economist. (1993). Bombs away: South Africa. *The Economist*, 326(7804), 48–49.
- Tickner, A. B. (2007). Intervención por invitación: Claves de la política exterior colombiana y de sus debilidades principales. *Colombia Internacional*, (65), 90–111.
- Tokatlián, J. G. (2001). El plan Colombia: ¿un modelo de intervención? *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, (54–55), 203–219.

- Tow, W., & Albinski, H. (2002). ANZUS - Alive and well after Fifty years. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 48, 153–173. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8497.00256>
- Tsvetov, A. (2016). After Crimea: Southeast Asia in Russia's Foreign Policy Narrative. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38(1), 55–80.
- Tucker, M. J. (1978). Review. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique*, 11(3), 691–693.
- Turner, S. (2009). Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order: The danger in the undefined. *Asian Perspective*, 33(1), 159–184.
- Turner, S. (2011). China and Russia After the Russian-Georgian War. *Comparative Strategy*, 30(1), 50–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.545687>
- Turok, I., & McGranahan, G. (2013). Urbanization and economic growth : the arguments and evidence for Africa and Asia. *Environment and Urbanization*, 25(2), 465–482. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247813490908>
- Tyler Dickovick, J. (2005). The measure and mismeasure Decentralisation: Subnational Autonomy in Senegal and South Africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(2), 183–210. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X05000807>
- Ugarriza, J. E., & Nussio, E. (2015). ¿Son los guerrilleros diferentes de los paramilitares? Una integración y validación sistemática de estudios motivacionales en Colombia. *Análisis Político*, 85(Septiembre-Diciembre), 189–211. <http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v28n85.56254>
- Vale, P., & Maseko, S. (1998). South Africa and the African Renaissance. *International Affairs*, 74(2), 271–287. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00016>
- Van der Westhuizen, J. (1998). South Africa's emergence as a middle power. *Third World Quarterly*, 19(3), 435–455. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599814334>
- Van der Westhuizen, J. (2016). South Africa's soft power conundrum: how to win friends and influence people in Africa. *Journal of Political Power*, 9(3), 449–465. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2016.1232290>
- Väyrynen, R. (1979). Economic and Military Position of the Regional Power Centers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 16(4), 349–369. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234337901600405>
- Venter, A. (2003). Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A comment on the South African position. *International Journal on World Peace*, 20(4), 29–47.
- Vergara Crespo, R. A. (2012). Análisis de política exterior en Colombia: gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos, ¿continuación de un proceso o cambio de rumbo? *Equidad & Desarrollo*, 17(Enero-Junio), 149–175.
- Vieira, M. A., & Alden, C. (2011). India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA): South-South cooperation and the paradox of regional leadership. *Global Governance*, 17, 507–528.
- Vigevani, T., & Cepaluni, G. (2007). Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(7), 1309–1326. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590701547095>
- Vreÿ, F., & Esterhuysen, A. (2015). South Africa and the Search for Strategic Effect in the Central African Republic. *South African Journal of Military Studies*, 44(2), 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.5787/44-2-1174>
- Walters, R. E. (1976). Apartheid and the Atom: The United States and South Africa's Military Potential. *Africa Today*, 23(3), 25–35.
- Weitz, R. (2012). Superpower Symbiosis: The Russia-China Axis. *World Affairs*, 175(4), 71–78.
- Wohlforth, W. C. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security*, 24(1), 5–41. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560031>
- Wood, B. (1984). The Militarisation of Namibia's Economy. *Review of African Political Economy*, 29(Jul), 138–

144. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056248408703574>

Zysk, K. B. (2009). Russian Military Power and the Arctic. *Russian Foreign Policy (EU-Russia Centre's Review)* 8, 80-86.

OTHER ACADEMIC MATERIAL

WORKING PAPERS

Anand, R., Perrelli, R., & Zhang, B. (2016). *South Africa's Exports Performance: Any Role for Structural Factors?* (IMF working Paper No. WP/16/24). Washington (DC), United States: International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1624.pdf>

Beall, J., & Adam, D. (2017). *Cities, Prosperity and Influence: the role of city diplomacy in shaping soft power in the 21st century*. Manchester, United Kingdom: British Council. Retrieved from https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/g229_cities_paper.pdf

Beall, J., Goodfellow, T., & Rodgers, D. (2011). *Cities, Conflict and State Fragility* (Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers No. 85). London, United Kingdom: London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ae440f0b652dd00097c/wp85-2.pdf>

Bohler-Muller, N. (2012). *Nuanced Balancing Act: South Africa's National and International Interests and its "African Agenda"* (Occasional Papers No. 120). Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from <https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/28-nuanced-balancing-act-south-africa-s-national-and-international-interests-and-its-african-agenda/file>

Calitz, E., & Essop, H. (2012). *Fiscal centralisation in a federal state: the South African Case* (Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers No. 10/12). Stellenbosch, South Africa: Universiteit Stellenbosch. Retrieved from <https://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2012/wp102012/wp-10-2012.pdf>

Carvajal, L. (2012). *Colombia como país puente en Política Exterior: Retos y desafíos* (Análisis Latinoamericano No. 2). Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Pensamiento Estratégico - Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/pensamiento_estrategico/documentos_sobre_regio_n/b.Colombia%20como%20Pa%EDs%20Puente%20en%20Pol%EDtica%20Exterior%20Retos%20y%20Fortalezas%20-%20Mayo%202012%20-%20Leonardo%20CARVAJAL.pdf

De Almeida, P. R. (2007). *New Powers for Global Change? Brazil as a Regional Player and an Emerging Global Power. Foreign Policy Strategies and the Impact on the New International Order* (FES Briefing Paper Vol. 8). Berlin, Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04709.pdf>

De Bruyn, T. (2013). *Challenging Development Cooperation? A Literature Review of the Approaches of the Emerging Powers* (Paper No. 10). Leuven, Belgium: KU Leuven. Retrieved from [https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/445338/1/\(10\)+De+Bruyn.pdf](https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/445338/1/(10)+De+Bruyn.pdf)

De Sousa, S.-L. J. (2007a). *India, Brasil, Sudáfrica (IBSA) ¿Un nuevo tipo de multilateralismo interregional del Sur?* (Fride Comentario Abril de 2007). Madrid, Spain: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior - FRIDE. Retrieved from http://fride.org/download/COM_IBSA_ESP_abr07.pdf

Delgado Caicedo, J. (2011). *La diáspora africana y la sexta región de la Unión Africana: oportunidades y desafíos para Colombia* (Working Documents 4). Bogotá, Colombia: Academia Diplomática Augusto Ramírez

- Ocampo - Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from <https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Colombia%20-%20Sexta%20Región%20UA%20-%20Jerónimo%20Delgado%20Caicedo.pdf>
- Destradi, S. (2008). *Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership: Developing a Research Framework for the Study of Regional Powers* (GIGA Working Papers No. 79). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp79_destradi.pdf
- Dördrechter, S., Flemes, D., Strüver, G., & Wojczewski, T. (2010). *Aufrüstung neuer Mächte: China, Indien, Brasilien und Iran* (GIGA Focus No. 1). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_global_1001.pdf
- Ebert, H., Flemes, D., & Strüver, G. (2012). *The Politics of Contestation in Asia: How Japan and Pakistan Deal with their Rising Neighbors* (GIGA Working Papers No. 206). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp206_flemes_ebert_struever.pdf
- Flemes, D. (2007a). *Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case* (GIGA Working Papers No. 53). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp53_flemes.pdf
- Flemes, D. (2007b). *Emerging middle powers' soft balancing strategy: state and perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum* (GIGA Working Papers No. 57). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institute für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007692
- Flemes, D., & Costa Vaz, A. (2011). *Security Policies of India, Brazil and South Africa: Regional Security Contexts as Constraints for a Common Agenda* (GIGA Working Papers No. 160). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institute für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp160_flemes-vaz.pdf
- Flemes, D., & Seith, E. (2014). *Südafrikas regionale Herausforderer* (GIGA Focus No. 7). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institute für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf_afrika_1407.pdf
- Flemes, D., & Wojczewski, T. (2010). *Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa* (GIGA Working Papers No. 121). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institute für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_10_wp121_flemes-wojczewski.pdf
- Games, D. (2012). *South Africa as Africa's Gateway: A Perspective From Business*. (Policy Briefing 46). Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from <http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/187-south-africa-as-africa-s-gateway-a-perspective-from-business/file>
- Gratius, S. (2008a). *India , Brasil y Sudáfrica: Lecciones de la Cumbre de Nueva Delhi* (Fride Opinión, Octubre de 2008). Madrid, Spain: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior - FRIDE. Retrieved from http://fride.org/descarga/OP_IBSA_Cumbre_Delhi_oct08.pdf
- Gratius, S. (2008b). *Las potencias emergentes: ¿Estabilizadoras o desestabilizadoras?* (Fride Comentario, Abril de 2008). Madrid, Spain: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior - FRIDE. Retrieved from http://fride.org/descarga/COM_Potencias_emergentes_ESP_abr08.pdf
- Harrison, P. (2013). *South Africa's "cities of hope": Assessing the role of cities in creating opportunity for young people*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for Development and Enterprise. Retrieved from <http://www.cde.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Paper-Philip-Harrison-final.pdf>
- Huijgh, E. (2016). *The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 2: The Case of Indonesia* (CPD Perspectives

- on Public Diplomacy Paper No. 4). Los Angeles (CA), United States: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School. Retrieved from <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/Public%20Diplomacy%20of%20Emerging%20Powers.pdf>
- Huijgh, E., & Warlick, J. (2016). *The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1: The Case of Turkey* (CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy Paper No. 1). Los Angeles (CA), United States: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School. Retrieved from <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/The%20PD%20of%20Emerging%20Powers.pdf>
- Humphrey, J., & Messner, D. (2006). *Instabile Multipolarität: Indien und China verändern die Weltpolitik* (Analysen und Stellungnahmen No. 1). Bonn, Germany: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Retrieved from https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/1_2006_DE.pdf
- Hurrell, A., Cooper, A. F., González González, G., Ubiraci Sennes, R., & Sitaraman, S. (2000). *Paths to power: foreign policy strategies of intermediate states* (Working Paper 244). Washington (DC), United States: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Retrieved from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF14A1.pdf>
- Kappel, R. (2010). *On the Economics of Regional Powers: Comparing China, India, Brazil, and South Africa* (GIGA Working Papers No. 145). Hamburg, Germany. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp145_kappel.pdf
- Malamud, C. (2003). *El conflicto colombiano y las amenazas a la seguridad regional* (ARI No. 86/2003). Madrid, Spain: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos. Retrieved from <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/856ed2804f0186b4bb15ff3170baead1/ARI-86-2003-E.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=856ed2804f0186b4bb15ff3170baead1>
- Mohan, R., & Kapur, M. (2015). *Emerging Powers and Global Governance: Whither the IMF?* (IMF Working Papers No. WP/15/219). Washington (DC), United States: International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15219.pdf>
- Nolte, D. (2006). *Potencias regionales en la política internacional: conceptos y enfoques de análisis* (GIGA Working Paper No. 30). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_06_wp30_nolte.pdf
- Nolte, D., & Hoffmann, B. (2007). *Latin America's New Geopolitical Position and its implications for Europe* (Discussion Paper June 2007). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from <https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Latin%20America's%20New%20Geopolitical%20Position%20and%20Its%20Implications%20for%20Europe.pdf>
- Nolte, D., & Wehner, L. (2013). *The Pacific Alliance Casts Its Cloud over Latin America* (GIGA Focus No. 8). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/the-pacific-alliance-casts-its-cloud-over-latin-america>
- OECD. (2015). *Green Bonds: Mobilising the debt capital markets for a low-carbon transition* (Policy Perspectives). Paris, France: OECD. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/Green%20bonds%20PP%20%5Bf3%5D%20%5Blr%5D.pdf>
- Pérez, G. J. (2005). *La Infraestructura del Transporte Vial y la Movilización de Carga en Colombia* (Documentos de trabajo sobre Economía Regional No. 64). Cartagena de Indias, Colombia: Centro de Estudios Económicos Regionales - Banco de la República. Retrieved from <http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/DTSER-64.pdf>
- Sánchez, F., & Chacón, M. (2005). *Conflicto, Estado y descentralización: del progreso social a la disputa por el control local 1974-2002* (Documento CEDE 2005-33). Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico - Universidad de los Andes. Retrieved from

- https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/files/Descentralizacion_y_conflicto_1974-2002.pdf
- Sánchez, F., & Pachón, M. (2013). *Descentralización, Esfuerzo Fiscal y Progreso Social en Colombia en el Nivel Local, 1994-2009: ¿Porqué Importa la Política Nacional?* (Documentos CEDE No. 38). Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico – Universidad de los Andes. Retrieved from https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/dcede2013-38.pdf
- Scholvin, S. (2010). *Emerging Non-OECD Countries: Global Shifts in Power and Geopolitical Regionalization* (GIGA Working Papers No. 128). Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp128_scholvin.pdf
- Sidiropoulos, E. (2007a). *African Regional Powers: The Foreign Policy of South Africa* (IPRI Working Papers No. 33). Lisbon, Portugal: Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais – Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Retrieved from http://www.ipri.pt/images/publicacoes/working_paper/pdf/WP_33_ES.pdf
- Sidiropoulos, E. (2007b). *South Africa's regional engagement for peace and security* (FRIDE Comment, October 2007). Madrid, Spain: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior - FRIDE. Retrieved from <http://fride.org/descarga/south.africa.comment.pdf>
- Steinberg, F. (2008). *El impacto de las potencias emergentes en la economía mundial* (ARI No. 4/2008). Madrid, Spain: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos. Retrieved from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/ARI2008/ARI4-2007_Steinberg_potencias_emergentes.pdf
- van der Pluijm, R., & Melissen, J. (2007). *City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in international politics* (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 10). The Hague, Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Retrieved from https://www.uclg.org/sites/default/files/20070400_cdsp_paper_pluijm.pdf
- Van der Westhuizen, J., & Smith, K. (2013). *South Africa's role in the world: A public opinion survey* (SAFPI Policy Brief No. 55). Cape Town, South Africa: Open Society Foundation for South Africa – South African Foreign Policy Initiative. Retrieved from <http://osf.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/South-Africas-role-in-the-world-A-public-opinion-survey.pdf>
- Vieira, É. (2011). *Las naciones o mercados emergentes del CIVETS* (Borrador de Administración No. 49). Bogotá, Colombia: Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración. Retrieved from <http://repository.cesa.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10726/252/BI49.pdf?sequence=6>
- Yemek, E. (2005). *Understanding fiscal decentralisation in South Africa* (Occasional Papers July 2005). Cape Town, South Africa: Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa . Retrieved from <http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/cc107.pdf>

THESES

- Delgado Caicedo, J. (2007). *Repensar el Concepto de "Seguridad" en África: La "Seguridad Humana" en proceso de construcción y consolidación de la paz* (master's thesis). Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Externado de Colombia. Retrieved from http://portal.uexternado.edu.co/pdf/2_centroEstudiosAfricanos/001_Seguridad_Humana_en_Africa.pdf
- Leite, A. C. C. (2007). *O projeto de desenvolvimento econômico chinês - 1978-2008: a singularidade de seus fatores políticos e econômicos para um ambiente internacionalizado* (PhD thesis). São Paulo, Brazil: Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo. Retrieved from

- <https://sapiencia.pucsp.br/bitstream/handle/3344/1/Alexandre%20Cesar%20Cunha%20Leite.pdf>
- Marx, V. (2009). *Las ciudades como actores políticos en las relaciones internacionales* (PhD thesis). Barcelona, España: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. Retrieved from <http://www.tdx.cat/handle/10803/5095>
- Siddle, A. (2011). *Decentralisation in South African Local Government: A Critical Evaluation* (PhD thesis). Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town. Retrieved from https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/11049/thesis_com_2011_sidldle_a_phd.pdf?sequence=1
- Stanton, A. (2009). *Decentralisation and Municipalities in South Africa: An Analysis of The Mandate to Deliver Basic Services* (PhD thesis). Durban, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal. Retrieved from <http://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/623/Stanton%20A%20PHD.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
<http://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/623/Stanton%20A%20PHD.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Wafer, M. (2009). *Invisible: Johannesburg Seen and Unseen, an exploration of the imaged / imagined city* (Master's thesis). Johannesburg, South Africa: University of the Witwatersrand. Retrieved from <http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/8138/invisible%20.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Zamora Avilés, É. A. (2013). *Política Exterior de las Ciudades Colombianas: Análisis de Caso Bogotá D.C. (2001 - 2013)* (Master's thesis). Quito, Ecuador: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar. <http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/3739/1/T1293-MRI-Zamora-Politica.pdf>

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

- Käkönen, J. (2013). *BRICS as a New Constellation in International Relations?* Paper presented at the International Association for Media and Communication Research 2013. Dublin, Ireland: IAMCR. Retrieved from <http://www.uta.fi/cmt/tutkimus/BRICS/materials/BRICS%20as%20a%20New%20Constellation%20in%20International%20Relations51.pdf>
- Leite, A. C. C., & Máximo, J. (2011). *The Rise of Two Giants: The International Insertion of Brazil and China – a comparative analysis of the period of 1990 to 2010*. Paper presented at the Third Global International Studies Conference. Oporto, Portugal: Universidade de Porto.
- Nolte, D. (2008). *Ideas, Interests, Resources and Strategies of Regional Powers*. Paper presented at the 1st Regional Powers Network (RPN) Conference: Ideas, Interests, Resources and Strategies of Regional Powers – Analytical Concepts in Comparative Perspective. Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
- Pastrana Buelvas, E. (2011a). *Colombian Relations with Venezuela and Ecuador in the Regional Security Scenario: Recent Dilemmas and New Tendencies*. Paper presented at the VII Conference of Forte de Copacabana International Security A European–South American Dialogue. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Retrieved from <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/5174-1442-5-30.pdf>
- Prys, M. (2010). *The variability of regional powers*. Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on International Relations. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from <http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Prys%20SGIR%20Stockholm.pdf>
- Ryerson, C., & Dewitt, D. (2006). *Middle Powers and Regional Security*. Paper presented at the Conference IBSA, Argentina and Global Security. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Universidad de San Andrés.
- Schirm, S. A. (2006). *Leadership in Regional and Global Politics: Why Do Emerging Powers (Sometimes) Fail to Reach Their Goals*. Paper presented at the Workshop The Rise of (New) Regional Powers in Global and

- Regional Politics. Hamburg, Germany: Leibniz-Institute für Globale und Regionale Studien. Retrieved from http://www.sowi.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/mam/content/lsip/leadership_paper.pdf
- Thies, C. G. (2014). *Power, Status and Conflict Behavior: Brazil as an Emerging Power in the International System*. Paper presented at the FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference. Buenos Aires, Argentina: FLACSO - ISA. Retrieved from <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferencias/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/f77d5074-6932-488e-b636-d940057f9482.pdf>
- Ugalde Zubiri, A. (2005). *La acción exterior de los gobiernos no centrales en la unión europea ampliada*. Paper presented at the Cursos de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2005. Bilbao, Spain: Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea. Retrieved from http://www.ehu.es/cursosderechointernacionalvitoria/ponencias/pdf/2005/2005_1.pdf

GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION DOCUMENTS

- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. (2008). Decreto 163 de 2008 por el cual se modifica parcialmente la estructura organizacional y funcional de la Secretaría General de la Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, D.C. y algunas funciones de la Secretaría Distrital de Planeación. Bogotá, Colombia: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá Distrito Capital. Retrieved from <http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=30740>
- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. (2012a). *Bogotá Humana - Plan de Desarrollo Económico, Social, Ambiental y de Obras Públicas*. Bogotá, Colombia: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá Distrito Capital. Retrieved from http://www.sdp.gov.co/portal/page/portal/PortalSDP/ciudadania/PlanesDesarrollo/BogotaHumana/2012_2016_Bogota_Humana_Plan_Acuerdo489_2012.pdf
- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. (2012b). Decreto 77 de 2012 por medio del cual se modifica la estructura organizacional de la Secretaría General de la Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, D.C. Bogotá, Colombia: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá Distrito Capital. Retrieved from <http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=46198>
- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. (2016a). Decreto 425 de 2016 por medio del cual se modifica la Estructura Organizacional de la Secretaría General de la Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. Bogotá, Colombia: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá Distrito Capital. Retrieved from <http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=67103#36>
- City of Johannesburg. (2012a). *2012/16 Integrated Development Plan (IDP)*. Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg. Retrieved from <http://joburg-archive.co.za/2012/pdfs/idp/idp201216.pdf>
- City of Johannesburg. (2012b). *An integrated international relations agenda for the City of Johannesburg*. Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg.
- City of Johannesburg. (2013a). *City of Johannesburg: 2012/16 integrated development plan: 2013/14 Review*. Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg. Retrieved from http://www.joburg.org.za/images/stories/2013/June/2013-16_idp_17may2013_final.pdf
- City of Johannesburg. (2015a). *2012/2016 Integrated Development Plan "Turning Challenges into Opportunities."* Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg. Retrieved from http://www.joburg.org.za/images/stories/2015/June/2015-16_IDP_Review.pdf
- City of Johannesburg. (2015b). *Economic Development Strategy for the City of Johannesburg*. Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg. Retrieved from

- <http://joburg.org.za/images/stories/2016/Jan/Pdf/CoJ SITPF.pdf>
- City of Johannesburg. (2016a). *An assessment of the City of Johannesburg's (CoJ's) International Relations approach – and emerging recommendations*. Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg.
- City of Johannesburg. (2016i). *The City of Johannesburg's 2016 International Relations Strategy*. Johannesburg, South Africa: City of Johannesburg.
- Congreso de Colombia. Ley 1454 de 2011 por la cual se dictan normas orgánicas sobre ordenamiento territorial y se modifican otras disposiciones (2011). Bogotá, Colombia: Congreso de Colombia. Retrieved from <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/ley145428062011.pdf>
- Congreso de Colombia. Ley 1617 de 2013 por la cual se expide el Régimen para los Distritos Especiales (2013). Bogotá, Colombia: Congreso de Colombia. Retrieved from <http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/2013/LEY%201617%20DEL%2005%20DE%20FEBRERO%20DE%202013.pdf>
- Constitutional Assembly. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Statutes of the Republic of South Africa - Constitutional Law (1996). Cape Town, South Africa: Constitutional Assembly. Retrieved from <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/images/a108-96.pdf>
- DANE. (2014a). *Cuentas Trimestrales de Bogotá D.C. - Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) - Primer, segundo y tercer Trimestre de 2013*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved from https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/Bol_PIB_Bta_III_trim_13.pdf
- DANE. (2014b). *Cuentas Trimestrales de Bogotá D.C. - Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) - Primer Trimestre de 2014pr (preliminar)*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved from https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/bol_PIB_Itrime14.pdf
- DANE. (2016a). *Boletín Técnico: Pobreza Monetaria 2015: Bogotá, D.C.* Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved from http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/condiciones_vida/pobreza/2015/Bogota_Pobreza_2015.pdf
- DANE. (2016b). Colombia, exportaciones totales, según CIIU Rev. 3. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/comercio_exterior/exportaciones/2016/anexos_export_ago16.xls
- DANE. (2016c). Colombia, importaciones según clasificación CIIU revisión 3. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved from https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/comercio_exterior/importaciones/impor_ciiu_ago16.xls
- DANE. (2016d). *Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) Trimestral de Bogotá D.C. Primer Trimestre de 2016*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved from https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/Bogota/Bol_PIB_Bta_I_trim_16.pdf
- DANE. (2016e). *Proyecciones de Población hasta 2020*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/proyepobla06_20/ProyeccionMunicipios2005_2020.xls
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación. (2014). *Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014-2018. Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014-2018*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Retrieved from <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/cdt/prensa/bases%20plan%20nacional%20de%20desarrollo%202014>

- [-2018.pdf](#)
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación. (2015a). *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, Todos Por un Nuevo País 2014 - 2018. Plan Nacional De Desarrollo 2014-2018: Tomo 1*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Retrieved from <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/PND/PND%202014-2018%20Tomo%201%20internet.pdf>
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación. (2015b). *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, Todos Por un Nuevo País 2014 - 2018. Plan Nacional De Desarrollo 2014-2018: Tomo 2*. Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Retrieved from <https://www.dnp.gov.co/Plan-Nacional-de-Desarrollo/Paginas/Que-es-el-Plan-Nacional-de-Desarrollo.aspx>
- Department of Basic Education. (2016). *Education Statistics in South Africa 2014*. Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Basic Education. Retrieved from <https://www.education.gov.za/Portals/0/Documents/Publications/Education%20Statistics%202014.pdf?ver=2016-05-13-144159-067>
- Department of Government Communication and Information System. (2015). Land and its People. In *South Africa Yearbook 2014/15* (pp. 1–12). Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Government Communication and Information System. Retrieved from <http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.za/files/docs/resourcecentre/yearbook/Land and People2015.pdf>
- Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (2012). *Annual Report 2011 - 2012*. Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/report_2011-2012/annual_report_2011-2012.pdf
- Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. (2010). *Municipal International Relations Policy*. Ekurhuleni, South Africa: Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. Retrieved from <https://www.ekurhuleni.gov.za/238-pol-158/file>
- Gauteng Provincial Government. (2015). *Gauteng Provincial Government Socio-Economic Review and Outlook*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Gauteng Provincial Government. Retrieved from <http://www.treasury.gpg.gov.za/Documents/Socio-Economic Review and Outlook 2015.pdf>
- Gautrain Management Agency. (2015). *The Gautrain Management Agency Socio-Economic Development Progress*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Gautrain Management Agency. Retrieved from http://www.gautrain.co.za/contents/brochures/sed_brochure_final_print.pdf
- Gobierno de Colombia. (2015). *Constitución Política de Colombia* (Edición especial). Bogotá, Colombia: Corte Constitucional de Colombia. Retrieved from <http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/inicio/Constitucion%20politica%20de%20Colombia%20-%202015.pdf>
- Government of South Africa. (1998a, July 3). Wet op Plaaslike Regering: Munisipale Afbakening, 1998 / Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998. *Staatskoerant van Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika*, p. 30. Cape Town, South Africa: Department of Government Communication and Information System. Retrieved from <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a27-98.pdf>
- Government of South Africa. (1998b, December 18). Wet op Plaaslike Regering: Munisipale Strukture, 1998 / Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998. *Staatskoerant van Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika*, p. 104. Cape Town, South Africa: Department of Government Communication and Information System. Retrieved from http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a117-98_0.pdf
- Government of South Africa. (2000, November 20). Wet op Plaaslike Regering: Munisipale Stelsels, 2000 / Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000. *Staatskoerant van Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika*, p. 120. Cape Town, South Africa: Department of Government Communication and Information System.

- Retrieved from http://www.energy.gov.za/files/policies/act_municipalsystem_32of2000.pdf
- Government of South Africa. (2011). *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Pretoria, South Africa: Government of South Africa. Retrieved from http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf
- Guerrero Albarracín, Á. M. (2016). *Boletín Mercado Laboral*. Bogotá, Colombia: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, D.C. Retrieved from <http://observatorio.desarrolloeconomico.gov.co/base/descargas/public/BoletinMercadoLaboralN66Enero2016Anual.pdf>
- Holguín Cuéllar, M. Á. (2011). *Memorias al Congreso 2011*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion_estragica/Memorias_al_Congreso_2010-2011.pdf
- Holguín Cuéllar, M. Á. (2012). *Memorias al Congreso 2011-2012*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion_estragica/Memorias_al_Congreso_2011-2012.pdf
- Holguín Cuéllar, M. Á. (2013). *Memorias al Congreso 2012-2013*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion_estragica/memorias_al_congreso_2013_mre.pdf
- Holguín Cuéllar, M. Á. (2014). *Memorias al Congreso 2013-2014*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion_estragica/informe_al_congreso_2013-2014.pdf
- Holguín Cuéllar, M. Á. (2015). *Memorias al Congreso 2014-2015*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/FOTOS2015/memorias_al_congreso_2014-2015.pdfhttp://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/FOTOS2015/memorias_al_congreso_2014-2015.pdf
- Holguín Cuéllar, M. Á. (2016). *Memorias al Congreso 2015-2016*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Fotos2016/memorias_al_congreso_2015-2016.pdf
- Invest in Bogotá. (2012). *Invest in Bogotá*. Bogotá, Colombia: Invest in Bogotá. Retrieved from http://es.investinbogota.org/sites/default/files/bogota_general_brochure_ib_2012_en.pdf
- Invest in Bogotá, & EY. (2016). *Guía de Inversión en Bogotá 2016*. Bogotá, Colombia: Invest in Bogotá. Retrieved from <http://en.calameo.com/read/0041520206a56d6a106b5>
- Kganyago, L. (2016). *Address by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at the Agricultural Business Chamber Congress 2016*. Somerset West, South Africa: South African Reserve Bank. Retrieved from https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/Speeches/Attachments/467/AGBIZ_Congress_2016.pdf
- Madonsela, T. (2016). *State of Capture - Report on an investigation into alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family's businesses*. Pretoria, South Africa: Public Protector South Africa. Retrieved from http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-17/State_Capture_14October2016.pdf

- Martínez Piva, J. M., & Pérez, E. (2003). *The Quality of International Insertion and Competitiveness in the Greater Caribbean Applying ECLAC Instruments in Assessing Competitiveness*. Mexico City, Mexico and Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved from <https://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/13503/WP2003-11.pdf>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2008). *Turismo Diciembre 2007*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=56950&name=OE-2007.pdf&prefijo=file>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2009). *Turismo Diciembre 2008*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=56938&name=OE-Diciembre2008.pdf&prefijo=file>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2010). *Turismo Diciembre 2009*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=56926&name=2009-TurismoDiciembre.pdf&prefijo=file>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2011). *Turismo Diciembre 2010*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=56918&name=2010-Turismodiciembre.pdf&prefijo=file>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2012). *Informe Turismo Diciembre 2011*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from https://www.google.com.co/search?q=Informe+turismo+Diciembre+2012&oq=Informe+turismo+Diciembre+2012&aqs=chrome..69i57.2655j0j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2013). *Informe Turismo Diciembre 2012*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from https://www.google.com.co/search?q=Informe+turismo+Diciembre+2012&oq=Informe+turismo+Diciembre+2012&aqs=chrome..69i57.2655j0j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2014). *Informe Turismo Diciembre 2013*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=69770&name=INFORME DE TURISMO A DICIEMBRE DE 2013.pdf&prefijo=file>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2016c). *Boletín Mensual Sección Turismo Diciembre 2015*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=77374&name=OE DO WA Turismo Diciembre 05-02-2015.pdf&prefijo=file>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2016d). *Seguimiento a los Acuerdos Comerciales firmados y en negociación*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. Retrieved from <http://www.mincit.gov.co/tlc/descargar.php?id=77756>
- Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (2009). *Gasto en defensa y seguridad, 1998-2011*. Bogotá, Colombia: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia. Retrieved from <https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios%20sectoriales/Serie%20Prospectiva/Gasto%20en%20defensa%20y%20Seguridad%201998-2011.pdf>
- Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (2016a). *Logros de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad Todos por un Nuevo País. Logros de la Política de Defensa y Seguridad. Todos por un nuevo país*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Retrieved from

- https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios_sectoriales/info_estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf
- Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (2016b). *Política de Defensa y Seguridad. Todos por un nuevo país*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Retrieved from https://www.dimar.mil.co/sites/default/files/attach/politica_de_defensa_y_seguridad_2015-2018_diagramada_feb_17_16.pdf
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2010). *Lineamientos de la Política Exterior de Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.colombiaun.org/Colombia/Politica_Exterior.pdf
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2015b). *Plan Fronteras para la Prosperidad*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion_estrategica/plan_fronteras_para_la_prosperidad.pdf
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2016a). *Estados y territorios que exigen y eximen de visa a los colombianos*. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Retrieved from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/FOTOS2015/paises_que_exigen_visa_a_colombianos_14ene2016.pdf
- Organization of American States. (1933). *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention)*. Montevideo, Uruguay: Organization of American States - OAS. Retrieved from <https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf>
- Presidente de la República de Colombia. Decreto Ley 1421 de 1993 por el cual se dicta el régimen especial para el Distrito Capital de Santa Fe de Bogotá (1993). Bogotá, Colombia: Presidencia de la República de Colombia. Retrieved from <http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=1507>
- Statistics South Africa. (2012). *Census 2011 - Census in brief*. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa. Retrieved from http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf
- Statistics South Africa. (2015). *Millennium Development Goals: Country report 2015*. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa. Retrieved from http://www.statssa.gov.za/MDG/MDG_Country_Report_Final_Feb2016.pdf
- Statistics South Africa. (2016a). *Community Survey 2016 Statistical Release. Community Survey 2016*. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa. Retrieved from http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/NT-30-06-2016-RELEASE-for-CS-2016-Statistical-releas_1-July-2016.pdf
- Statistics South Africa. (2016b). *General Household Survey 2015*. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa. Retrieved from <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182015.pdf>
- Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Statistical Release P0441 Gross Domestic Product Fourth Quarter 2016*. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa. Retrieved from <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04414thQuarter2016.pdf>
- United Nations General Assembly. (2017). *New Urban Agenda A/RES/71/256*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations. Retrieved from <http://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/New-Urban-Agenda-GA-Adopted-68th-Plenary-N1646655-E.pdf>

INTERVIEWS

- Ávila, M. P. (2015, 09 04). General Coordinator of the Latin American Network of Cities - Government of the City of Bogotá. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Bogotá, DC, Colombia.
- Cañón, V. (2015, 11 06). General Coordinator for South - South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation - Presidential Agency for International Cooperation - Government of the Republic of Colombia. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Paris, France.
- Currea, N. (2016, 08 05). Deputy Director for International Relations - City of Bogotá. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Bogotá, DC, Colombia.
- de Vos, P. (2017, 06 02). Claude Leon Foundation Chair in Constitutional Governance. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Cape Town, WC, South Africa.
- Durán, F. (2017, 02 05). Consul: Consulate General of Colombia in Santiago, Chile. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Santiago, Chile.
- Erasmus, J. (2016, 06 22). Director: Strategy & International Relations - Office of the City Manager - City of Johannesburg. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa.
- Falla, E. (2015, 09 04). Director of the District Directorate for International Relations - Government of the City of Bogotá. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Bogotá, DC, Colombia.
- Giraldo, S. (2015, 08 20). South - South Cooperation Officer - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Bogotá, DC, Colombia.
- Harrison, P. (2016, 06 26). South African Research Chair in Development Planning and Modeling at the University of the Witwatersrand / Former Executive Director: Development Planning and Urban Management - City of Johannesburg. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa.
- Julio, J. (2015, 08 20). Urban Studies Professor - Universidad Externado de Colombia. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Bogotá, DC, Colombia.
- Mokgalapa, S. (2016, 05 26). Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs - Republic of South Africa. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa.
- Moreno, A. M. (26 de 02 de 2017). Third Secretary - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Entrevistador) Bogotá, DC, Colombia.
- Nacerodien, F. (2016, 06 24). Chief Director - Policy Research and Analysis Unit - Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa.
- Patrick, S. M. (2016, 02 02). James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance and Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program - Council on Foreign Relations. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa.
- Rath, C. (2016, 06 24). Deputy Director: Mexico, Central America & Andean Community - Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa.
- Sidiropoulos, E. (2016, 06 23). Chief Executive - South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa.
- Tena, M. (2016, 06 27). Deputy Director: International Development Cooperation - Department of National Treasury. (J. Delgado Caicedo, Interviewer) Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa.

MEDIA

- Al Jazeera. (2016, November 29). Jacob Zuma survives no-confidence vote at ANC meeting. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/jacob-zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote-anc-meeting-161129133129724.html>
- Allen, K. (2011, November 20). The Civets: a guide to the countries bearing the world's hopes for growth. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/nov/20/civets-guide>
- América Económica. (2011, September 26). Colombia lidera los CIVETS, el nuevo grupo de los países emergentes. *América Económica*. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.americaeconomica.com/noticia.php?id=11457>
- BBC. (2016a, October 11). Colombia and ELN rebels announce historic peace talks. *BBC*. Retrieved November 9, 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37614809>
- BBC. (2016b, October 14). Jacob Zuma corruption report blocked in South Africa. *BBC*. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37655939>
- BBC. (2016c, November 2). South Africa: Jacob Zuma report points to possible corruption. *BBC*. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37845606>
- BBC. (2016d, August 11). South Africa regains Africa's "biggest economy" title from Nigeria. *BBC*. Retrieved March 7, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37045276>
- BBC. (2016e, November 2). The Guptas and their links to South Africa's Jacob Zuma. *BBC*. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410>
- BBC. (2017, April 3). South Africa's credit rating has been cut to junk status. *BBC*. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-39476903>
- Blanco Ríos, A. (2016, October 21). Tren de carga llega a La Dorada, desde la Costa. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/transporte-en-colombia-tren-llega-a-la-dorada/16731286>
- Bloomberg Business. (2012, August 7). Goldman Sachs's MIST topping BRICs as smaller markets outperform. *Bloomberg Business*. Retrieved May 22, 2015, from <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-07/goldman-sachs-s-mist-topping-brics-as-smaller-markets-outperform>
- Blu Radio. (2015, July 30). Denuncian presunta corrupción en Alcaldía de Petro en contratos de Línea 123. *Blu Radio*. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from <http://www.bluradio.com/106489/denuncian-presunta-corrupcion-en-alcaldia-de-petro-en-contratos-de-linea-123>
- Bosco, D. (2017, January 24). How international justice makes it harder for dictators to step down. *Washington Post*. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/01/24/how-international-justice-makes-it-harder-for-dictators-to-step-down/?utm_term=.819bf1979e77
- BusinessTech. (2015, October 18). Here are South Africa's 26 universities. *BusinessTech*. Retrieved March 2, 2017, from <https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/101412/here-are-south-africas-26-universities/>
- BusinessTech. (2016, October 19). Nigeria overtakes South Africa as Africa's biggest economy. *BusinessTech*. Retrieved March 7, 2017, from <https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/140681/nigeria-overtakes-south-africa-as-africas-biggest-economy/>

- BusinessTech. (2017, January 10). 106 Joburg officials to be arrested on charges of corruption: DA. *BusinessTech*. Retrieved April 18, 2017, from <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/149845/106-joburg-officials-to-be-arrested-on-charges-of-corruption/>
- Caracol Radio. (2014, March 18). Cronología del caso de destitución e inhabilidad al alcalde Gustavo Petro. *Caracol Radio*. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from http://caracol.com.co/radio/2014/03/18/bogota/1395142620_033722.html
- Caracol Radio. (2016, November 4). El 7 de noviembre empezará el monitoreo del cese el fuego bilateral. *Caracol Radio*. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from http://caracol.com.co/radio/2016/11/04/nacional/1478274577_645197.html
- Chirinos, C. (2008, March 4). Se profundiza la crisis andina. *BBC*. Retrieved November 9, 2016, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7276000/7276249.stm
- Claymore, E. (2017, January 11). DA's Johannesburg mayor to have 106 city officials arrested for corruption. *The South African*. Retrieved April 18, 2017, from <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/das-johannesburg-mayor-to-have-106-city-officials-arrested-for-corruption/>
- Cohen, M. (2016, November 15). DA lays corruption charges against President Zuma. *The Mail & Guardian*. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-15-da-lays-corruption-charges-against-president-zuma>
- Cohen, M. (2017, February 21). Zuma-Gordhan battle takes centre stage in SA budget. *Fin24 – Business & Finance News*. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://www.fin24.com/Budget/zuma-gordhan-battle-takes-centre-stage-in-sa-budget-20170221>
- Davies, M. (2012, March 30). Punching above our weight. *The Mail & Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-30-punching-above-our-weight>
- Davies, M. (2017, April 4). South Africa's tough road out of junk status. *BBC*. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39489571>
- Doya, D. M. (2016, August 10). S. Africa's Economy Regains Rank as Africa's Biggest on Rand. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved March 7, 2017, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-10/south-africa-s-economy-regains-rank-as-africa-s-biggest-on-rand>
- El Espectador. (2013, December 9). Procuraduría General destituyó e inhabilitó por 15 años a Gustavo Petro. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/procuraduria-general-destituyo-e-inhabilito-15-anos-gus-articulo-463082>
- El Espectador. (2015, September 18). En Colombia hay más clase media que pobres: Santos. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/primera-vez-colombia-hay-mas-clase-media-pobres-santos-articulo-587079>
- El Espectador. (2016a, February 1). A juicio cinco alcaldes locales de la administración de Gustavo Petro. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/juicio-cinco-alcaldes-locales-de-administracion-de-gust-articulo-614079>
- El Espectador. (2016b, October 31). “Estamos muy cerca de la definición de un nuevo acuerdo”: Santos. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/estamos-muy-cerca-de-definicion-de-un-nuevo-acuerdo-san-articulo-663287>
- El Heraldo. (2014). Entre polémica y polémica, Bogotá lleva 5 alcaldes en 7 años. *El Heraldo*. Retrieved from <https://www.elheraldo.co/nacional/entre-polemica-y-polemica-bogota-lleva-5-alcaldes-en-7-anos-147022>
- El País. (2014, February 28). Colombia supera a Argentina como la tercera economía latinoamericana. *El País*. Retrieved from <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/economia/noticias/colombia-supera-argentina-como-tercera-economia-latinoamericana>

- El País. (2016, October 28). Suspenden órdenes de captura contra delegación negociadora del ELN. *El País*. Retrieved from <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/proceso-paz/noticias/suspenden-ordenes-captura-contradelegacion-negociadora-eln>
- El Tiempo. (2014, October 29). Los motivos y reparos de Europa para eliminar la visa a colombianos. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/eliminacion-de-la-visa-schengen-colombia-cumple-requisitos/14758975>
- El Tiempo. (2016a, January 14). Treinta megautopistas 4G ya prendieron motores. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/vias-4g-30-proyectos-ya-prendieron-motores/16480384>
- El Tiempo. (2016b, March 11). Los servicios financieros fueron los que más crecieron en el 2015. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/indicadores/crecimiento-economico-en-colombia-2015-por-sectores/16533751>
- El Tiempo. (2016c, March 29). Samuel Moreno es inhabilitado de por vida para ejercer cargos públicos. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/condena-a-samuel-moreno-por-carrusel-de-la-contratacion/16548741>
- El Tiempo. (2016d, May 10). Así van las obras de modernización de los aeropuertos grandes. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/modernizacion-de-aeropuertos-en-colombia/16587049>
- El Tiempo. (2016e, August 9). Situación de migrantes venezolanos en Bogotá. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/situacion-de-migrantes-venezolanos-en-bogota-31886>
- El Tiempo. (2016f, October 16). Abecé del proceso de paz que se iniciará con el Eln. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/todo-lo-que-debe-saber-de-la-negociacion-con-el-eln/16727649>
- El Universal. (2016, April 5). Gustavo Petro se defiende y espera que revoquen su destitución. *El Universal*. Retrieved from <http://www.eluniversal.com.co/colombia/gustavo-petro-se-defiende-y-espera-que-revoquen-su-destitucion-223093>
- eNCA. (2017a, April 4). S&P downgrades SA to junk status. *eNCA*. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://www.enca.com/south-africa/sp-downgrades-sa-to-junk-status>
- eNCA. (2017b, April 4). What junk status means for South Africans. *eNCA*. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://www.enca.com/money/what-junk-status-means-for-south-africans>
- EWN. (2017). Fitch downgrades South Africa to junk status. *EWN*. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/07/breaking-fitch-downgrades-south-africa-to-junk-status>
- Fildes, N. (2007, October 1). BBC gives Lonely Planet guides a home in first major acquisition. *The Independent*. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/bbc-gives-lonely-planet-guides-a-home-in-first-major-acquisition-395739.html>
- Fletcher, N. (2016, February 9). The countries bucking the downward global market trend. *The Guardian*. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/09/global-stock-market-turmoil-continues>
- Franco García, D. (2012, November 22). Colombia se raja en infraestructura vial. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/colombia-se-raja-infraestructura-vial-articulo-388669>
- Gómez, L. (2016, March 14). Éste será el plan para construir el Aeropuerto El Dorado II. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/aeropuerto-el-dorado-ii-de-bogota/16536021>
- Haines, G. (2016, September 27). 21 reasons why Colombia should be your next holiday destination. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/south-america/colombia/articles/21-reasons-why-colombia-should-be-your-next-holiday-destination/>

- Haskins, S., & Prescher, D. (2016, September 14). 7 Reasons Everyone Should Consider Retiring In Colombia. *The Huffington Post*. Retrieved November 12, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/suzan-haskins-and-dan-prescher/retiring-on-colombia_b_8098436.html
- Hlomendlini, H. (2016a, June 1). SA's economic growth slows as impact of drought and uncertainty relating to trade policy direction in US continues. *Times Live*. Retrieved March 24, 2017, from <http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/businesstimes/2016/12/20/SA's-economic-growth-slows-as-impact-of-drought-and-uncertainty-relating-to-trade-policy-direction-in-US-continues>
- Hlomendlini, H. (2016b, December 20). SA's economy feels the effects of crippling drought. *Business Live*. Retrieved March 24, 2017, from <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-12-20-sas-economy-feels-the-effects-of-crippling-drought/>
- Holodny, E. (2015, June 24). China's GDP is expected to surpass the US' in 11 years. *Business Insider*. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-gdp-is-expected-to-surpass-the-us-in-11-years-2015-6>
- Jammine, A. (2015, December 13). Zuma's blunder on Nene costs SA billions – when will taxpayers call enough? *Fin24 – Business & Finance News*. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://www.fin24.com/BizNews/zumas-blunder-on-nene-costs-sa-billions-when-will-taxpayers-call-enough-20151213>
- La Nación. (2008, March 3). Operativo anti-FARC desata grave crisis diplomática. *La Nación*. Retrieved from http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/20080302/pags/20080302213525.html
- Molano Jimeno, A. (2016, October 29). Farc y Eln, las dos caras de la paz. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/farc-y-eln-las-dos-caras-de-la-paz>
- Morales, C. (2015, October 25). Después de 12 años, izquierda pierde su bastión: la Alcaldía de Bogotá. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-16412794>
- Muller, S. M. (2017, April 1). South Africa has lost a key line of defence against corruption. What now? *eNCA*. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from <https://www.enca.com/opinion/south-africa-has-lost-a-key-line-of-defence-against-corruption-what-now>
- Murphy, B., & Sieff, K. (2015, June 15). Sudanese leader flees South Africa in private jet, avoiding arrest. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudanese-leader-flees-south-africa-in-private-jet-avoiding-arrest/2015/06/15/4097e2e8-1362-11e5-8457-4b431bf7ed4c_story.html?utm_term=.dfc7d2d02f82
- Noticias Caracol. (2016, November 4). No levantarse de la mesa hasta tener un nuevo acuerdo: Santos a negociadores. *Noticias Caracol*. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from <http://noticias.caracoltv.com/acuerdo-final/no-levantarse-de-la-mesa-hasta-tener-un-nuevo-acuerdo-santos-negociadores>
- Omarjee, L. (2017, March 31). SA at crossroads as state capture undermines democracy – Jonas. *Fin24 – Business & Finance News*. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from <http://www.fin24.com/Economy/sa-at-crossroads-as-state-capture-undermines-democracy-jonas-20170331>
- Portafolio. (2012, September 1). El día que Colombia superó a Argentina. *Portafolio*. Retrieved from <http://www.portafolio.co/economia/finanzas/dia-colombia-supero-argentina-111796>
- Portafolio. (2015, March 13). Colombia, en el radar de Emirates. *Portafolio*. Retrieved from <http://www.portafolio.co/negocios/empresas/colombia-radar-emirates-24592>
- Raub, K. (2015, August 4). Why everyone's going to Colombia. *Lonely Planet – Escape*. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.escape.com.au/world/central-america/conflict-and-drug-wars-make-way->

- [for-a-tourism-boom-in-colombia/news-story/deeee3131677685b7f19848c8fdbde8b](http://www.semana.com/noticias/articulo/for-a-tourism-boom-in-colombia/news-story/deeee3131677685b7f19848c8fdbde8b)
- Revista América Economía. (2016, March 10). Mejores ciudades para hacer negocios 2016. *Revista América Economía*. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from <http://rankings.americaeconomia.com/mejores-ciudades-2016/>
- Revista Dinero. (2016a, March 31). La economía bogotana creció 3,9% en el 2015. *Revista Dinero*. Retrieved from <http://www.dinero.com/economia/articulo/crecimiento-del-pib-de-bogota-en-2015/222002>
- Revista Dinero. (2016b, October 2). Gobierno alista recorte al presupuesto por caída del crudo. *Revista Dinero*. Retrieved from <http://www.dinero.com/economia/articulo/colombia-recortara-el-presupuesto-de-2016-por-desplome-del-petroleo/219107>
- Revista Semana. (2002, November 16). Cancillería anuncia fecha para cierre de embajadas y consulados. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved November 10, 2016, from <http://www.semana.com/noticias/articulo/cancilleria-anuncia-fecha-para-cierre-embajadas-consulados/55104-3>
- Revista Semana. (2011, June 8). Clara López, nueva alcaldesa (e) de Bogotá. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/clara-lopez-nueva-alcaldesa-e-bogota/241060-3>
- Revista Semana. (2012, August 31). Colombia es la segunda economía suramericana tras superar a Argentina. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved from <http://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/colombia-segunda-economia-suramericana-tras-superar-argentina/263928-3>
- Revista Semana. (2014, March 19). Cronología de la destitución de Gustavo Petro. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/cronologia-de-la-destitucion-de-gustavo-petro/380872-3>
- Revista Semana. (2015a, October 25). ¿Por qué la izquierda perdió a Bogotá? *Revista Semana*. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-izquierda-perdio-bogota-en-las-elecciones-2015-por-que/447659-3>
- Revista Semana. (2015b, August 4). Procuraduría destituyó a Samuel Moreno y lo inhabilitó por 18 años. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/procuraduria-destituyo-samuel-moreno-lo-inhabilito-por-18-anos/437382-3>
- Revista Semana. (2015c, November 23). Movilidad: denuncian a Petro por decisiones del SITP. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ante-la-fiscalia-denuncia-gustavo-petrobog/450974-3>
- Revista Semana. (2016a, July 23). El impresionante éxodo de venezolanos a Colombia. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/crisis-en-venezuela-cada-vez-mas-migracion-en-frontera-con-colombia/482976>
- Revista Semana. (2016b, October 13). Santos proroga el cese del fuego bilateral hasta el 31 de diciembre. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/juan-manuel-santos-proroga-el-cese-al-fuego-bilateral-hasta-el-31-de-diciembre/498970>
- Revista Semana. (2016c, September 3). Los contratos a dedo de la Alcaldía de Petro. *Revista Semana*. Retrieved from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/contraloria-de-bogota-encuentra-fallas-de-corrupcion/492262>
- Rodrigues, V. (2007, July 13). EMERGING FX VIEW-Investors may trade off BRIC for VISTA. *Reuters*. Retrieved May 4, 2017, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/markets-forex-emerging-idUSN1329374420070713>
- Russell, J. (2010, July 12). Geoghegan digests and delivers new acronym. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/citydiary/7886195/Geoghegan-digests-and-delivers->

[new-acronym.html](#)

- Seper, A. (2012, February 2). 3 Misconceptions About Colombia (And Why You Should Go). *The Huffington Post*. Retrieved November 12, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bootsnall/3-misconceptions-about-co_b_1209366.html
- Shenker, J. (2016, June 21). Which are the most corrupt cities in the world? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jun/21/which-most-corrupt-cities-in-world>
- Slater, M. (2014, December 4). Olympics and World Cup are the biggest, but what comes next? *BBC*. Retrieved March 1, 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/sport/30326825>
- Solano, M. A. (2015, May 5). Bogotá es el motor con 25% del PIB colombiano. *La República*. Retrieved from http://www.larepublica.co/bogotá-es-el-motor-con-25-del-pib-colombiano_251401
- The Guardian. (2016, August 28). Guptagate: family sells South Africa holdings after Jacob Zuma influence claims. *The Guardian*. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/28/guptagate-family-sells-south-africa-holdings-after-jacob-zuma-influence-claims>
- The Guardian. (2017, April 4). Jacob Zuma urged to quit after South Africa credit rating downgrade. *The Guardian*. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/south-africa-credit-rating-junk-status-sends-rand-tumbling>
- Thelwell, E. (2014, November 3). South Africa's looming water disaster. *News24*. Retrieved March 24, 2017, from <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/South-Africas-looming-water-disaster-20141103>
- Times Live. (2016, March 7). Brics Bank now hiring in Johannesburg. *Times Live*. Retrieved May 4, 2017, from <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2016/03/07/Brics-Bank-now-hiring-in-Johannesburg>
- Vera, J. A., & Carrascal, J. O. (2016, October 28). Santos espera un nuevo acuerdo de paz en noviembre y no descarta otro plebiscito. *EFE*. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from http://www.efe.com/efe/espana/eventos/santos-espera-un-nuevo-acuerdo-de-paz-en-noviembre-y-no-descarta-otro-plebiscito/10015-MULTIMEDIAE_3081039#
- Wright, C. (2014, January 6). After the BRICS are the MINTs, but can you make any money from them? *Forbes*. Retrieved May 22, 2015, from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/01/06/after-the-brics-the-mints-catchy-acronym-but-can-you-make-any-money-from-it/>
- Wyss, J. (2014, September 10). As Colombia shakes off its troubled past it's emerging as an LGBT hotspot. *Miami Herald*. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article2085097.html>
- Xinhua. (2010, December 24). South Africa joins BRIC as full member. *Xinhua*. Retrieved December 6, 2016, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/24/c_13662138.htm
- Yuda, H. P. (2015, August 15). Mayors' roles as diplomats. *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/15/mayors-roles-diplomats.html>

REPORTS

- Airports Company South Africa. (2010). *Airports Company South Africa Annual Report 2009 - A plan realised. A nation made proud*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Airports Company South Africa. Retrieved from <http://www.airports.co.za/FinancialResults/AnnualReportPart22009.pdf>
- Airports Company South Africa. (2015). *Integrated Report 2014 - Embracing forward thinking*. Johannesburg,

- South Africa: Airports Company South Africa. Retrieved from [http://www.airports.co.za/FinancialResults/2014 Integrated Annual Report 2014.pdf](http://www.airports.co.za/FinancialResults/2014%20Integrated%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf)
- Almeida Cravo, T., Hornsby, D., Nascimento, D., & José Santos, S. (2014). *African emerging powers*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. Retrieved from [https://noref.no/content/download/168108/728565/version/1/Cravo Nascimento Hornsby Santos NOREF African Emerging Porwers May 2014 FINAL.pdf](https://noref.no/content/download/168108/728565/version/1/Cravo%20Nascimento%20Hornsby%20Santos%20NOREF%20African%20Emerging%20Powers%20May%202014%20FINAL.pdf)
- ANDI. (2016). *Colombia: Balance 2015 y Perspectivas 2016*. Bogotá, Colombia: ANDI. Retrieved from <http://www.andi.com.co/Documents/Balance2015/ANDI%20-%20Balance%202015%20y%20Perspectivas%202016F.compressed.pdf>
- Arámbula Reyes, A. (2008). *Crisis en Sudamérica*. Mexico City, Mexico: Cámara de Diputados de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Retrieved from <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/spe/SPE-ISS-08-08.pdf>
- Audouin, M., De Lange, W., De Wet, B., Murambadoro, M., Stafford, W., & Nahman, A. (2015). *A Framework for Investment in Environmental and Natural Resources (ENRM) for a Green Economy*. Pretoria, South Africa: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). Retrieved from [http://www.sagreenfund.org.za/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ENRMWindow FinalReport 15January2016.pdf](http://www.sagreenfund.org.za/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ENRMWindow%20FinalReport%2015January2016.pdf)
- BBVA. (2014). *EAGLEs Economic Outlook: Annual Report 2014*. Madrid, Spain: BBVA Research. Retrieved from [https://www.bbva.com/KETD/fbin/mult/2014_EAGLEs Economic Outlook Annual tcm348-437158.pdf?ts=3132014](https://www.bbva.com/KETD/fbin/mult/2014_EAGLEs_Economic_Outlook_Annual_tcm348-437158.pdf?ts=3132014)
- BBVA. (2015). *BBVA EAGLEs Emerging and Growth Leading Economies Economic Outlook Annual Report 2015*. Madrid, Spain: BBVA Cross-Country Emerging Markets Analysis Unit. Retrieved from https://www.bbva.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BBVA-EAGLEs-2015_eng_final6.pdf
- Bogotá cómo vamos. (2015). *Encuesta de Percepción Ciudadana 2015*. Bogotá, Colombia: Bogotá cómo vamos. Retrieved from [https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2435461/ presentacion-encuesta-de-percepcion-ciudadana-2015.pdf](https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2435461/presentacion-encuesta-de-percepcion-ciudadana-2015.pdf)
- Bruce, D. (2012). *The Law for Sale: Endemic corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Corruption Watch. Retrieved from <http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Corruption-Watch-The-law-for-sale.pdf>
- Camacho, J. P., & Martínez, N. (2014). *Balance de Política y Relaciones Internacionales del gobierno Santos 2010-2014: Multilateralismo y Comercio Exterior*. Bogotá, Colombia: Observatorio de Política y Relaciones Internacionales - OPRIC - Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Retrieved from [http://www.opric-unal.org/images/Balance%20Santos%20I%20Multilateralismo% 20y%20Comercio%20Exterior.pdf](http://www.opric-unal.org/images/Balance%20Santos%20I%20Multilateralismo%20y%20Comercio%20Exterior.pdf)
- Cooper, J. (2006). *Antarctica and Islands*. Cape Town, South Africa: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Retrieved from [http://soer.deat.gov.za/dm_documents/Antarctica_and_Islands - Background Paper 1DXK5.pdf](http://soer.deat.gov.za/dm_documents/Antarctica_and_Islands_-_Background_Paper_1DXK5.pdf)
- Delgado Barrera, M. (2014). *La educación básica y media en Colombia: retos en equidad y calidad*. Bogotá, Colombia: Fedesarrollo. Retrieved from <http://www.fedesarrollo.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/La-educación-básica-y-media-en-Colombia-retos-en-equidad-y-calidad-KAS.pdf>
- Feinstein, A. (2015). *Decentralisation: The South African Experience*. London, United Kingdom: Global Partners Governance. Retrieved from <http://www.gpgovernance.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Decentralisaion-the-south-african-experience-feinstein1.pdf>
- Fischer, K., Dellas, E., Schreiber, F., Acuto, M., London, D., Tänzler, D., & Carius, A. (2015). *Urbanization and Climate Diplomacy: the stake of cities in global climate governance*. Berlin, Germany: Adelphi. Retrieved from [https://www.adelphi.de/en/system/files/mediathek/bilder/Urbanization and Climate Diplomacy.pdf](https://www.adelphi.de/en/system/files/mediathek/bilder/Urbanization_and_Climate_Diplomacy.pdf)

- Hawksworth, J., & Chan, D. (2015). *The World in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue?* London, United Kingdom: PwC. Retrieved from <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf>
- Hendrick-Wong, Y., & Choong, D. (2015). *MasterCard 2015 Global Destination Cities Index*. New York (NY), United States: Mastercard. Retrieved from <https://newsroom.mastercard.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MasterCard-GDCI-2015-Final-Report1.pdf>
- Hernández Moreno, Á. M. (2013). *La Internacionalización de la Paz y el Conflicto en Colombia: Participación de la Comunidad Internacional en el Proceso de Paz*. Bogotá, Colombia: Observatorio de Política y Relaciones Internacionales - OPRIC - Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Retrieved from <http://www.opric-unal.org/images/Papers/La%20Internacionalización%20de%20La%20Paz%20Y%20El%20Conflicto%20En%20Colombia.pdf>
- Karuri-Sebina, G. (2016). *State of South African Cities Report 2016*. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Cities Network. Retrieved from <http://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/SOCR/SoCR16 Main Report online.pdf>
- Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. (2008). *Strategic Plan 2008/09 - 2012/13*. Maseru, Lesotho: Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Retrieved from http://www.lhda.org.ls/Phase1/Reports/PDF/Strategic_plan_2008-2013.pdf
- National Planning Commission. (2010). *National Development Plan 2030. Our future - make it work. Executive Summary*. Pretoria, South Africa: National Planning Commission. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf>
- Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. (2015). *Educación de Calidad para una ciudad y un país equitativos*. Bogotá, Colombia: Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. Retrieved from <http://www.co.undp.org/content/dam/colombia/docs/Pobreza/undp-co-educacioncalidad-2015.pdf?download>
- Putzel, J., & Di John, J. (2012). *Meeting the Challenge of Crisis States*. London, United Kingdom: Crisis States Research Centre – London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from <http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Meeting-the-Challenges-of-Crisis-States-Exec.Summary.pdf>
- Swilling, M., Borat, H., Buthelezi, M., Chipkin, I., Duma, S., Mondli, L., ... Qobo, M. (2017). *Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa is being stolen*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Public Affairs Research Institute. Retrieved from <http://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Betrayal-of-the-Promise-25052017.pdf>
- The Human Sciences Research Council. (2014). *The City of Johannesburg (COJ) Economic Overview: 2013. A Review of the State of the Economy and other Key Indicators*. Johannesburg, South Africa: The Human Sciences Research Council. Retrieved from <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/4974/HSRC%20COJ%20ECONOMIC%20OVERVIEW%202013%20 Report.pdf>
- The South African National Roads Agency Limited. (2010). *Annual Report .09*. Pretoria, South Africa: The South African National Roads Agency Limited. Retrieved from http://www.nra.co.za/live/click.php?u=%2Fcontent%2FSanral_AR_09.pdf&o=Item%2B205&v=d0e1f0
- The South African National Roads Agency Limited. (2011). *Annual Report 2010*. Pretoria, South Africa: The South African National Roads Agency Limited. Retrieved from http://www.nra.co.za/live/click.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nra.co.za%2Fcontent%2FSanral_AR_e_p_10_Web.pdf&o=Item%2B205&v=b3bcfe
- UNDG. (2015). *The World We Want. Dialogues on the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations Development Group. Retrieved from

http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/UNDG_2nd_dialogues.pdf

UNDP. (2004). *Forging a Global South*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH-PR-Publications-UNDay-for-South-South-Cooperation.pdf>

UNDP. (2013). *Human development report 2013: The rise of the South Human Progress in a Diverse World - South Africa. Human Development Report - South Africa*. New York City (NY), United States: United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/ZAF.pdf>

WEBSITES

Aeropuerto El Dorado. (2016a). Aerolíneas | Aeropuerto El Dorado. Retrieved November 12, 2016, from <http://eldorado.aero/pasajeros/aerolineas/>

Aeropuerto El Dorado. (2016b). Destinos | Aeropuerto El Dorado. Retrieved February 15, 2017, from <https://eldorado.aero/sobre-el-aeropuerto/destinos/>

African Union. (2017). Member State Profiles. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from <https://www.au.int/web/en/memberstates>

Airports Company South Africa. (2016). O.R. Tambo International Airport. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from <http://www.airports.co.za/airports/or-tambo-international/the-airport/about-or-tambo>

Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. (2015). Ubicación de la Ciudad. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://bogota.gov.co/ciudad/ubicacion>

Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. (2016b). Logros y Reconocimientos. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://bogota.gov.co/internacional/logros-y-reconocimientos>

Alianza del Pacífico. (2016a). ¿Qué es la Alianza del Pacífico? Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <https://alianzapacifico.net/que-es-la-alianza/#la-alianza-del-pacifico-y-sus-objetivos>

Alianza del Pacífico. (2016b). MILA: La Alianza del Pacífico da el campanazo de apertura en Frankfurt. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <https://alianzapacifico.net/mila-la-alianza-del-pacifico-da-el-campanazo-de-apertura-en-frankfurt/>

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2017). ASEAN Member States. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from <http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/>

ATKearney. (2016). Global Cities 2016. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from <https://www.atkearney.com/research-studies/global-cities-index/current-research-detail>

Bogotá cómo vamos. (2014). Así vamos en Bogotá, según sus ciudadanos. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from <http://www.bogotacomovamos.org/blog/asi-vamos-en-bogota-segun-sus-ciudadanos/>

Brand South Africa. (2002). South Africa's geography. Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/tourism-south-africa/geography/geography>

Brand South Africa. (2013). South Africa's transport network. Retrieved December 13, 2016, from <https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/investments-immigration/business/economy/infrastructure/transport>

Brand South Africa. (2016a). The languages of South Africa. Retrieved March 6, 2017, from <https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/people-culture/people/language>

Brand South Africa. (2016b). To and from OR Tambo Airport. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from

- <https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/tourism-south-africa/travel/advice/transportjia>
- C40. (2015). C40 Cities Awards 2015. Retrieved August 8, 2017, from <http://www.c40.org/awards/2015-awards/profiles>
- C40. (2017). Johannesburg - Green Bond. Retrieved August 8, 2017, from <http://www.c40.org/awards/3/profiles/56>
- CERAC. (2017). Monitor del Cese el Fuego Bilateral y de Hostilidades. Retrieved August 1, 2017, from <http://blog.cerac.org.co/monitor-del-cese-el-fuego-bilateral-y-de-hostilidades-final>
- CIA. (2016a). Country Comparison: Area. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html>
- CIA. (2016b). Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income - Gini Index. Retrieved November 4, 2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html>
- CIA. (2016c). Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity). Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>
- CIA. (2016d). Country Comparison: Population. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html>
- CIA. (2016e). South America: Colombia. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html>
- CIA. (2017). Country Comparison: Roadways. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2085rank.html>
- City of Johannesburg. (2013b). City of Johannesburg - Banking. Retrieved March 29, 2017, from http://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=104&Itemid=9
- City of Johannesburg. (2013c). City of Johannesburg - Overview. Retrieved March 28, 2017, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&id=92
- City of Johannesburg. (2016b). City of Johannesburg - Region A. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=632:region-a&catid=46&Itemid=116
- City of Johannesburg. (2016c). City of Johannesburg - Region B. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=172:region-b&catid=47&Itemid=117
- City of Johannesburg. (2016d). City of Johannesburg - Region C. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=173:region-c&catid=48&Itemid=118
- City of Johannesburg. (2016e). City of Johannesburg - Region D. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=174:region-d&catid=49&Itemid=119
- City of Johannesburg. (2016f). City of Johannesburg - Region E. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=177:region-e&catid=50&Itemid=120
- City of Johannesburg. (2016g). City of Johannesburg - Region F. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=178:region-f&catid=51&Itemid=121
- City of Johannesburg. (2016h). City of Johannesburg - Region G. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=179:region-g&catid=52&Itemid=123

- City of Johannesburg. (2017a). City of Johannesburg - Transport Department. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from http://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1226&Itemid=78
- City of Johannesburg. (2017b). Construction Rea Vaya. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from <http://www.reavaya.org.za/construction-149>
- Convention on Biological Diversity. (2016a). Colombia - Main Details. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/?country=co>
- Convention on Biological Diversity. (2016b). South Africa - Main Details. Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/?country=za>
- Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries. (2016). Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS). Retrieved December 15, 2016, from <http://www.daff.gov.za/daffweb3/Branches/Fisheries-Management/Monitoring-Control-and-Surveillance/FISHPVESSELS>
- Department of Environmental Affairs. (2013). Prince Edward Islands declared a Marine Protected Area. Retrieved June 26, 2017, from https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/princeedwardislands_declaredmarineprotectedarea
- Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (2016a). Foreign Relations. Retrieved November 24, 2016, from <http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/index.html>
- Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (2016b). Foreign Representatives in South Africa. Retrieved November 24, 2016, from <http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/forrep/index.htm>
- Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (2016c). South African Representation Abroad. Retrieved November 24, 2016, from http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/sa_abroad/index.htm
- Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (2017). Foreign visits must be coordinated and seek to advance South Africa's foreign policy and national interests. Retrieved January 18, 2017, from <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2017/taiw0102.htm>
- Erickson, A. (2012). In Baku, a Citywide Coming-Out Party for Eurovision. Retrieved July 6, 2016, from <http://www.citylab.com/politics/2012/01/baku-citywide-coming-out-party-eurovision/652/>
- Eskom. (2017). What is load shedding? Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://loadshedding.eskom.co.za/loadshedding/description>
- Ethnologue. (2016a). Spanish. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <https://www.ethnologue.com/language/spa>
- Ethnologue. (2016b). Summary by language size. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <https://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size>
- Ethnologue. (2017). English. Retrieved March 6, 2017, from <https://www.ethnologue.com/language/eng>
- European Union. (2017). About the EU - Countries. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en
- Flanders Marine Institute. (2016a). Sovereign: Colombia · MRGID 8426. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http://marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=8426&all_territories=1&zone=eez
- Flanders Marine Institute. (2016b). Sovereign: South Africa · MRGID 8396. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http://marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=8396&all_territories=1&zone=eez
- Fund for Peace. (2006). Failed States Index 2006. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2006-sortable>
- Fund for Peace. (2007). Failed States Index 2007. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2007-sortable>
- Fund for Peace. (2016a). Fragile States Index 2016. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016>
- Fund for Peace. (2016b). Fragile States Index Decade Trends. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from

- <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/fsi-decadetrends>
- Fund for Peace. (2016c). The Failed State Index 2010. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2010-sortable>
- Fund for Peace. (2016d). The Failed States Index 2005. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2005-sortable>
- Fund for Peace. (2016e). The Fragile States Index 2015. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015>
- Fund for Peace. (2016f). The Fragile States Index Data. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2006to2014.xlsx>
- Fund for Peace. (2016g). The Indicators. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/indicators>
- Gauteng City-Region Observatory. (2016). The Gauteng City-Region. Retrieved December 11, 2016, from <http://www.gcro.ac.za/about/the-gauteng-city-region/>
- Gobernación del Archipiélago de San Andrés Providencia y Santa Catalina. (2016). Geografía del Archipiélago. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from http://www.sanandres.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116&Itemid=138
- Gramer, R. (2017). Watch: All the World's Global Trade in One Interactive Map | Foreign Policy. Retrieved February 22, 2017, from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/05/global-trade-international-finance-interactive-map/>
- Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi. (2001). República de Colombia - Mapa Oficial Fronteras Terrestres y Marítimas. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Contenidos-mapa-general-Colombia-Anexo_1_0.jpg
- Instituto Nacional de Vías. (2016). Mapa de Carreteras. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://hermes.invias.gov.co/carreteras/>
- International Monetary Fund. (2016). World Economic Outlook database. Retrieved October 26, 2016, from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/WEEOct2016all.xls>
- Invest in Bogotá. (2016). Bogotá en cifras. Retrieved August 4, 2016, from <http://es.investinbogota.org/descubra-bogota/datos-generales/bogota-en-cifras>
- Johannesburg Stock Exchange. (2013). History and Company Overview - Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Retrieved March 29, 2017, from <https://www.jse.co.za/about/history-company-overview>
- Logistics Cluster. (2015). Colombia Red Carretera. Retrieved February 15, 2017, from <http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.3+Colombia+Red+Carretera;jsessionid=CCCE6E8B9F7D3C69611663FF63A23A82>
- Lonely Planet. (2016). Lonely Planet's Best in Travel 2017 list. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/best-in-travel/countries>
- Makube, P. (2015). The impact of the current drought on the South African economy. Retrieved March 24, 2017, from <http://www.businessleadership.org.za/newsletter-content/The-impact-of-the-current-drought-on-the-South-African-economy/index.html?re=1>
- Marine Regions. (2016). Marine Regions Sources. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://www.marineregions.org/sources.php>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2016a). Acuerdo Comercial entre Colombia y Turquía. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from <http://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=685>
- Ministerio de Comercio Industria y Turismo. (2016b). Acuerdos Vigentes. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from <http://www.tlc.gov.co/publicaciones.php?id=5398>

- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2011). Resumen de la visita a Turquía del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos y la Canciller María Ángela Holguín. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/content/resumen-de-la-visita-turquí-del-presidente-juan-manuel-santos-y-la-canciller-mari-ángela-hol>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2012). Primer Diálogo de Cooperación Sur – Sur CIVETS +, se desarrolla desde hoy y hasta el 28 de junio en Cartagena. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/content/primer-diálogo-de-cooperación-sur—sur-civets-se-desarrolla-desde-hoy-y-hasta-el-28-de-juni>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2014a). Cancillería participa del VII Foro Urbano Mundial que se realiza en Medellín. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/en/newsroom/news/2014-04-05/8912>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2014b). Embajadas compartidas entre Chile, Colombia, México y Perú, uno de los logros de la Alianza del Pacífico | Cancillería. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/embajadas-compartidas-entre-chile-colombia-mexico-y-peru-uno-los-logros-la-alianza-del>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2015a). Embajadora de Colombia en Sudáfrica presentó Cartas Credenciales ante el presidente de la República de Botsuana. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/en/newsroom/news/2015-02-22/10992>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2016b). Símbolos patrios y otros datos de interés. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/colombia/nuestro-pais/simbolos>
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2017). Misión, Visión, Objetivos, Normas, Principios y Lineamientos. Retrieved June 1, 2017, from http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/ministerio/mision_vision_objetivos_normas_principios_lineamientos#4
- Ndebele, T. (2016). *2016 South Africa Survey: Demographics*. Johannesburg, South Africa. Retrieved from <http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/south-africa-survey/south-africa-survey-2016/downloads/demographics>
- New Development Bank. (2016). Opening Ceremony of New Development Bank First Annual Meeting. Retrieved August 11, 2017, from http://www.ndb.int/press_release/opening-ceremony-new-development-bank-first-annual-meeting/
- Newham, G. (2013). Why is corruption getting worse in South Africa? Retrieved April 3, 2017, from <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa>
- OECD. (2016a). ALFS Summary tables: Population growth rate. Retrieved October 25, 2016, from <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=27482#>
- OR Tambo International Airport. (2016a). Domestic Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from <http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/dom.php>
- OR Tambo International Airport. (2016b). International Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from <http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/inter.php>
- OR Tambo International Airport. (2016c). Regional Flights Route Map and Airline Contacts. Retrieved December 19, 2016, from <http://ortambo-airport.com/flights/reg.php>
- Organization of American States. (2017). Member States. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from http://www.oas.org/en/about/member_states.asp
- Oxford Dictionary. (2016). Definition of paramo in English. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/paramo>
- Pan African Parliament. (2017). Pan African Parliament. Retrieved May 4, 2017, from

- <http://www.panafricanparliament.org/>
- Parilla, J., Leal, T. J., Berube, A., & Ran, T. (2015). Global Metro Monitor. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-metro-monitor/>
- Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia. (2016). Parque Nacional Natural Sumapaz. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://www.parquesnacionales.gov.co/portal/es/parques-nacionales/parque-nacional-natural-sumapaz/>
- Peirce, N. (2015). A key moment for world cities — but are nation states listening? | Citiscope. Retrieved January 19, 2016, from <http://citiscope.org/story/2015/key-moment-world-cities-are-nation-states-listening>
- Presidencia de la República. (2015a). Declaración del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos luego de la firma de acuerdos con el Presidente de la República de Turquía. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from http://wp.presidencia.gov.co/Noticias/2015/Febrero/Paginas/20150210_04-Palabras-Presidente-Santos-firma-acuerdos-con-Presidente-Republica-Turquia.aspx
- Presidencia de la República. (2015b). Presidente Santos se reunirá este martes en Manila, Filipinas, con 40 empresarios para analizar oportunidades de negocios en Colombia. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from http://wp.presidencia.gov.co/Noticias/2015/Noviembre/Paginas/20151116_05-Presidente-Santos-se-reunira-este-martes-en-Manila-Filipinas-con-40-empresarios-para-analizar-oportunidades.aspx
- Procuraduría General de la Nación. (2015). Por actos de corrupción, procurador general de la Nación destituyó e inhabilitó por 18 años al exalcalde de Bogotá Samuel Moreno Rojas. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from <https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/portal/Porto-actos-de-corrupcion-procurador-general-de-la-Nacion-destituy-e-inhabilita-por-18-anos-al-exalcalde-de-Bogota-Samuel-Moreno-Rojas.news>
- Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2016a). Main Maritime Shipping Routes. Retrieved December 15, 2016, from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/main_maritime_shipping_routes.html
- Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2016b). Maritime Routes and Strategic Passages. Retrieved December 16, 2016, from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch1en/appl1en/maritimerroutes.html>
- Rodrigue, J.-P., Comtois, C., & Slack, B. (2016c). Oil Transportation and Major Chokepoints. Retrieved December 16, 2016, from <https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/appl5en/oiltransportation.html>
- Sea Around Us. (2016a). Catches by Taxon in the waters of Prince Edward Islands (South Africa). Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <http://www.seararoundus.org/data/#/eez/711?chart=catch-chart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonnage&limit=10>
- Sea Around Us. (2016b). Catches by Taxon in the Waters of South Africa (Atlantic and Cape). Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <http://www.seararoundus.org/data/#/eez/953?chart=catch-chart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonnage&limit=10>
- Sea Around Us. (2016c). Catches by Taxon in the Waters of South Africa (Indian Ocean Coast). Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <http://www.seararoundus.org/data/#/eez/954?chart=catch-chart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonnage&limit=10>
- Secretaría de Cultura Recreación y Deporte. (2016). Bogotá y sus localidades. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://www.culturarecreacionydeporte.gov.co/es/bogotanitos/bogodatos/bogota-y-sus-localidades>
- Secretaría del Tratado Antártico. (2017). Partes. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from

- http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=s
- Shaw, M. N. (2003). Customary international law. Retrieved July 14, 2016, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law
- Smith, J. A. (2011). BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard. Retrieved December 6, 2016, from <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/01/21/bric-becomes-brics-changes-on-the-geopolitical-chessboard/2/>
- South African Government. (2015). Geography and climate. Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <http://www.gov.za/about-SA/geography-and-climate>
- South African Government. (2016). South Africa at a glance. Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <http://www.gov.za/about-sa/south-africa-glance>
- South African History Archive. (2017). The militarisation of the South African state. Retrieved April 19, 2017, from http://saha.org.za/youth/the_militarisation_of_the_south_african_state.htm
- South African History Online. (2011). The Flag of the Union of South Africa is hoisted on Prince Edward Island. Retrieved December 15, 2016, from <http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/flag-union-south-africa-hoisted-prince-edward-island>
- South African National Antarctic Programme. (2016). Marion Island. Retrieved December 15, 2016, from http://www.sanap.ac.za/sanap_marion/sanap_marion.html
- South African National Antarctic Programme. (2017). About the South African National Antarctic Programme. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from http://www.sanap.ac.za/about_sanap/about_sanap.html
- South African National Roads Agency. (2016). SANRAL Network. Retrieved December 13, 2016, from http://www.nra.co.za/live/content.php?Session_ID=21a65cb621b174e2a2557bffb1bfc3fb&Category_ID=46#
- Statistics South Africa. (2016c). Media Release: Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa, 2015. Retrieved March 15, 2017, from <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=8615>
- Statistics South Africa. (2016d). Metropolitan Municipality | City of Johannesburg | Statistics South Africa. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=city-of-johannesburg-municipality
- Statistics South Africa. (2016e). Municipal Population. Retrieved February 27, 2017, from http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=270
- Statistics South Africa. (2016f). South African manufacturing production and the rand (an update). Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=8260>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2017). SIPRI Military Expenditure Data 1949-2015. Retrieved April 19, 2017, from <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-Milex-data-1949-2015.xlsx>
- Sustainable Cities Collective. (2014). Urbanism Hall of Fame: Enrique Peñalosa leads Bogotá's inclusive urban transformation. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.sustainablecitiescollective.com/embarq/1030186/urbanism-hall-fame-enrique-pe-alosa-leads-bogot-s-inclusive-urban-transformation>
- The Local Government Handbook. (2016a). City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. Retrieved December 16, 2016, from <http://www.municipalities.co.za/metropolitans/view/2/City-of-Johannesburg-Metropolitan-Municipality>
- The Local Government Handbook. (2016b). Gauteng municipalities. Retrieved December 12, 2016, from <http://www.localgovernment.co.za/provinces/view/3/gauteng>

- The Local Government Handbook. (2017a). City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from <http://www.municipalities.co.za/metropolitans/view/6/City-of-Cape-Town-Metropolitan-Municipality>
- The Local Government Handbook. (2017b). City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from <http://www.municipalities.co.za/metropolitans/view/4/City-of-Ekurhuleni-Metropolitan-Municipality>
- The Local Government Handbook. (2017c). City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from <http://www.municipalities.co.za/metropolitans/view/3/City-of-Tshwane-Metropolitan-Municipality>
- The Local Government Handbook. (2017d). eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from <http://www.municipalities.co.za/metropolitans/view/5/eThekweni-Metropolitan-Municipality>
- The World Bank. (2013). Export Competitiveness, Regional Trade Integration Could Spur South African Export Growth. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-economic-update-focus-export-competitiveness>
- The World Bank. (2014b). Greater competitiveness and regional integration critical for South Africa's growth and opportunity. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/02/04/greater-competitiveness-and-regional-integration-critical-for-south-africas-growth-and-opportunity>
- The World Bank. (2016a). Economy Rankings. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from <http://www.doingbusiness.org/Rankings>
- The World Bank. (2016b). Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) - Colombia. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016c). Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) - South Africa. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016d). Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$) - Colombia. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016e). Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$) - South Africa. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016f). GDP growth (annual %) - Colombia. Retrieved November 3, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016g). GDP growth (annual %) - South Africa. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016h). GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$). Retrieved April 2, 2017, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016i). GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) - Colombia. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?+locations=CO&locations=CO&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016j). GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) - South Africa. Retrieved November 24, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=ZA>

- The World Bank. (2016k). GDP per capita (current US\$) - Colombia. Retrieved August 1, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016l). Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP) - South Africa. Retrieved March 6, 2017, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016m). Military Expenditure (% of GDP). Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?downloadformat=excel>
- The World Bank. (2016n). Military expenditure (% of GDP) - Colombia. Retrieved August 1, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016o). Population, total - Colombia. Retrieved July 27, 2016, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/%20SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016p). Population, total - South Africa. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016q). Population growth (annual %) - Colombia. Retrieved July 27, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/%20SP.POP.GROW?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016r). Population growth (annual %) - South Africa. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016s). Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) - Colombia. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016t). Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural population) - Colombia. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.RUHC?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016u). Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural population) - South Africa. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.RUHC?locations=ZA&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016v). Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) - Colombia. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016w). Services, etc., value added (constant 2010 US\$) - Colombia. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.KD?locations=CO>
- The World Bank. (2016x). South Africa Economic Update: Promoting Domestic Competition Between Firms Could Help Spur Growth, Reduce Poverty. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-economic-update-promoting-faster-growth-poverty-alleviation-through-competition>
- The World Bank. (2016y). Urban population (% of total) - South Africa. Retrieved February 24, 2017, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=ZA>
- The World Bank. (2016z). Urban poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of urban population) - Colombia. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.URHC?locations=CO&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2016aa). Urban poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of urban population) - South Africa. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.URHC?locations=ZA&year_high_desc=true
- The World Bank. (2017a). Export (US\$ Thousand) | By Country | All Products | Export | - | WITS | Data. Retrieved March 23, 2017, from <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/country/by-country/startyear/LTST/endyear/LTST/tradeFlow/Export/indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/partner/WLD/product/Total>

- The World Bank. (2017b). Population, total. Retrieved July 28, 2017, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>
- The World Bank. (2017c). South Africa | Export to all country | | WITS | Data. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/all/>
- The World Bank. (2017d). South Africa | Export to all country | 2010 | WITS | Data. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/2010/TradeFlow/Export>
- The World Bank. (2017e). South Africa | Export to all country | 2011 | WITS | Data. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/2011/TradeFlow/Export>
- The World Bank. (2017f). South Africa | Export to all country | 2014 | WITS | Data. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/2014/TradeFlow/Export>
- The World Bank. (2017g). South Africa | Import Trade; Tariff | by Country 2015 | WITS | Data. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ZAF/Year/2015/TradeFlow/Import>
- Trading Economics. (2016). Colombia Crude Oil Production. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from <https://tradingeconomics.com/colombia/crude-oil-production>
- Transmilenio. (2010). Bogotá, destino turístico y accesible. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.transmilenio.com.co/es/articulos/bogota-destino-turistico-y-accesible>
- Transparency International. (2016a). Corruption Perceptions Index 2000. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2000/0/
- Transparency International. (2016b). Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results>
- Transparency International. (2016c). Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1956/12836/file/2015_CPI_data.xlsx
- Transparency International. (2017). Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016
- UCLG. (2017). UCLG Presidency. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from <https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/presidency>
- UNDP. (2015a). Human Development Index. Retrieved November 1, 2016, from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>
- United Nations. (2017). About the UN. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from <http://www.un.org/en/about-un/>
- United Nations Environmental Programme. (2014). *Megadiverse Countries. Biodiversity a-z*. Cambridge, United Kingdom. Retrieved from <http://www.biodiversitya-z.org/content/megadiverse-countries>
- Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas. (2017). Bogotá: Características. Retrieved August 2, 2017, from <https://www.udistrital.edu.co/universidad/colombia/bogota/caracteristicas/>
- Vicepresidencia de la República. (2015). Aeropuerto ElDorado 2 estará listo en cinco años”: Vargas Lleras. Retrieved November 12, 2016, from <http://www.vicepresidencia.gov.co/prensa/2015/Paginas/Aeropuerto-ElDorado-2-estara-listo-en-cinco-anos-150121.aspx>
- World of Maps. (2016). Map of South Africa (Political Map). Retrieved November 23, 2016, from <https://www.worldofmaps.net/en/africa/map-south-africa/political-map-south-africa.htm>
- World Travel Awards. (2016). World Travel Awards - Profile Bogotá. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <https://www.worldtravelawards.com/profile-33808-district-institute-of-tourism-of-bogota>

- Wray, C. (2015). An open data revolution for the Gauteng City-Region? Retrieved December 11, 2016, from <http://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-voices/an-open-data-revolution-for-the-gauteng-city-region/>
- Young, R. (2014). Colombia, Open and Ready for Business. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/market-gps/colombia-open-ready-business>