

**AFRIKANER AND FRENCH CANADIAN NATIONALISM:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

**MAURICE IVOR BENATAR
B.A. (Honours) (McGill)**

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Abstract

This dissertation seeks to expose comparatively the ideological, institutional and economic underpinnings which have contributed to evolving nationalisms within two dual societies, those being Canada and South Africa. It attempts to explain the parallel historical development of Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalisms as they contend with a hostile and dominant English element beholden to the Empire.

Expansion and rebellion coincides with the advent of British colonialism as French Canadian and Afrikaner segments find their previously dominant positions reversed. Their rural, agrarianist, peripheral culture evolves in isolation from the increasingly metropolitan British core culture. Demographics are here determined in conjunction with the interplay of alien cultures including that of the indigenes. Ethnic pre-nationalist consciousness is assessed according to intergroup contact.

Religion and its institutional accessories are then looked at as they contribute to an evolving consciousness. Fragmented cultures are firmly imbued with a religious character, and religio-ideological development adapts to new circumstances by preaching messianism, pre-destination as well as analogising the plight of their respective disciples with that of the ancient Israelites. The lines between temporal and heavenly matters are here smudged as Dutch Reformed and Catholic churches promote group enclosure mobilising members around core cultural and language issues so as to preserve clerical power.

After numerous conflagrations pertaining to cultural, political and economic matters, a modus vivendi is achieved in both societies as fragment elites for varying reasons negotiate a binding constitution. The stratification system, however, is characterised as a cultural division of labour whereby French Canadian and Afrikaner national consciousness becomes a function of Anglo economic domination. The new dominions are not devoid of their connections with the Empire and nationalist ideologues are not hesitant to express the dismay and frustrations which accompany this power imbalance. Dominion comes to be seen increasingly as domination.

The social transformations associated with urbanisation, industrialisation and secularisation further disturb ethnic relations between contending segments. The eclipse of rural agrarianism highlights the more pronounced cultural division of labour. Nationalist proponents are forced to deal with new social consciousness as peripheral fragment cultures are increasingly threatened by the alien urban environment. Ethnic conflagrations surrounding Imperialist ventures (the Two Great Wars) and economic power differentials usher in more exclusivist ethno-nationalist movements who stress autonomy and republicanism in Quebec and South Africa respectively. Eventually conservative nationalism is triumphant and its ideological doctrine, after a fascist interlude, succumbs to the realities of a modern era. The conservative monolith begins to crack as an increasingly interdependent global context spawns a trend towards democratisation. Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalisms are forced to redefine themselves dramatically. Their respective orientations and options vary in accordance with the most conspicuous demographic and constitutional variables which differentiates these two societies.

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INTRODUCTION

The duality of a young child, voluntarily banished from his country of birth and consequently "settled" in a new land. Unable to choose between two habitats. Confronted by his past in the new and conversely restricted by his present in the old. A body complex having to deal with, among other things, the confrontational dichotomies within. Such was the story of a young lad forced by circumstances at an early age to leave rife-torn South Africa on his way to the winter-land of Canada. Not fully being able to comprehend the influence and pull imposed upon him by his land of origin, those being his formative years; and again only gradually gaining consciousness and insight into his being within a strange new environment, those then being the years of his awakening. Neither here nor there or more precisely both here and there. Elements of both lands attempting to gain a foothold, to thwart the other and achieve dominance within the body.

Not dissimilar is the body politic, the state in which ethnic combatants struggled to reaffirm their presence and to establish cultural supremacy. Both in Canada and South Africa, French Canadians and Afrikaners alike had to contend with a dominantly hostile English element. Both rejected an assimilationist formula which would have signalled their timely demise. Both were cast out like children from their motherlands, aliens to their beloved new environments; clinging strongly to their faith and resisting even further intrusion upon a newly adopted reality.

"Resistance", here, is a word which speaks loudly for it connotes not simply physical resistance. It can be more so a psychological resistance which makes each group take precautionary measures so as to prevent a similar condition of alienation from occurring; "alienation" not being exclusively a Marxist tenet. Used more loosely, it can be applied to the brimming urban industrial centres, to a harsh new environment like the frontier or more vaguely to a territorial displacement.

Taking into account the broadness of this work and the wide body of material available, it is immediately apparent that few scholars possess the necessary knowledge and skills to do justice to this comparative study. This thesis, therefore, presents a raw preliminary work so as to prepare the way for other projects of a

similar sort. Hence, it is my intention to initially highlight the most conspicuous similarities and differences, to compare and contrast these two ethno-nationalist movements and then attempt to account for them within their respective historical frameworks. While this dissertation strives to make use of historical processes, it is primarily a comparative analysis which admittedly at times appears to convolute a vast historical body so as to highlight certain structural and institutional parallels.

The founding of new societies reflects the fragmentation of European culture and ideology. Louis Hartz¹ argues that fragmented populations represent an escape from the past subsequently stifling future developments. The fragments attempt to disengage from the continuous process of ideological renewal in Europe, thereby lapsing into immobility. Nevertheless, the constrictive European ideological sphere which locks various "teleologies" together "in a seething whole" no longer governs ideological developments within the fragments. Thus, the fragment is permitted to develop without inhibition. A fragment ethic develops to cope with the "identity vacuum" brought about by an increasingly distant European homeland. Out with the old and in with the new characterizes the emergence of new generations who conceive of themselves as being members of the fragmented "nation". Old world ideologies are refined and simultaneously converted into new nationalisms. Afrikaner and French Canadian fragments are forced to renew themselves from within so as to protect their new found boundaries. A conservative and traditional nationalist ethos developed to insulate the fragments and stave off immigrants and particularly, the threat they posed with their old world approaches.

Unable to stop the hands of time, the fragment is eventually forced to contend with the impact of the Western Revolutions. The fragment develops "the passion to flee again, to duplicate in the face of all reality the original voyage, which comes out in isolationism."² Nationalism intensifies in the process. Nevertheless, the reactionary fragment undergoes a historical reversal and with it comes a moral liberation and an enlargement of consciousness. New generations shatter the confines of the fragments deserting their own milieu (as had been the case in

Europe) and exposing the relativity of their ethic. The new struggle becomes not an era of escape but an era of return, whereby mass communications and pressures of global political struggles breach the insularity of the fragments.³

The fragmentation theory is flawed. It makes assumptions concerning homogeneity and consensus existing within the fragment. It is inherently deterministic insisting that the fragment ethic remains constant over time without being susceptible to internal social processes. It also discounts the interplay between contending fragments and the potential repercussions that this may have upon the development of national consciousness.⁴ Furthermore, the impact of modernization and the spread of mass communications has not contributed to the dissipation of ethnic consciousness. As Walker Connor suggests, nationalism correlates with "unsocial communication". Increased contact between ethnically diverse fragments, rather, accelerates and reinforces a divisive consciousness.⁵

Nevertheless, the fragmentation theory does convey a sense of disjointed development, of longing, and of waiting which seems to embody the emotive aspects of a developing nationalism. It recognises the ideological push and pull which intimately connects (both positively and negatively) the fragment to its point of origin. Its emphasis upon escapism, isolationism, ethos, and extrication lends itself to the vocabulary of nationalism as determined by historical analysis. The cyclical and deterministic nature of nationalism is, here, well captured.

Nationalism remains a relevant topic as evidenced by the high profile which it currently commands upon the political agenda of numerous states. Distinctions have been made between ethnic mobilisation and nationalism. This is significant particularly when discussing nationalism as a movement aimed at wresting state power in the interests of ethnic constituencies. Ethnic mobilisers strive to furnish in-group members with the necessary consciousness so as to empower them in the construction of "nationhood". Nationalism has also fallen victim to the interpretations of academia determined to account for it within their particularistic

frameworks. At the first opportunity, one has to draw a distinction between nationalism and its third world counterpart, referred to as nation-building. Nationalism in itself contains the notion of an exclusivist ethnicity while nation-building attempts to bond, to fuse diverse ethnic elements into an amalgamation under a common single authority.⁶ This distinction is significant in both Canada and South Africa. Throughout their complex histories, it is clear that struggle between contending ethnic and racial groups and within them to some degree has centred around this dichotomy. Canadian politics even until the present day is ripe with federalist versus separatist conflict; the former seeking to preserve the constitutional arrangements and the fabric of a bi-ethnic (not to mention multicultural) state structure; the latter endorsing the destruction of the state structure through regional ethno-political (in Quebec) disengagement. In South Africa, ethnicity has been more forcefully politicised and ominously so under the cloak of apartheid. State separation of racial groups has cultivated a culture of exclusivity rendering necessary nation-building difficult indeed.

Recent developments in Eastern Europe have generated a revival of interest in the on-going debate on nationalism. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire and its subsequent fragmentation prompted previously repressed ethnic entities to rediscover and express that which had been declared off limits by Marxist-Leninist inspired internationalist doctrine. While the fragmentation of "Communist" Eastern Europe into national entities had not significantly influenced similar movements outside of that region, it had in fact mirrored developments less than a century earlier. The break up of Britain had produced a movement toward national sovereignty. "New worlds" which had become appendages to the Empire had sought to assert their individual notions of independence and self-determination. Even European fragments which constituted the Dominions pondered re-evaluation of their existing links with their colonial motherlands.

The disintegration of the British Empire, referred to in academic circles as decolonization, marked the most notable similarity contextually of Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalism. Each

ethnic entity (its degree of cohesiveness subject to changing circumstances) became subject to British colonial policies in one way or another. As such, both fragments developed a national consciousness which to varying degrees became a function of their reactions to Anglo economic domination. What differentiates these two case studies from numerous other colonial situations (commonly associated with third world struggles) draws upon the fact that in each case, double-layered colonialism can be said to have occurred. Alternatively, one could say that both Afrikaners and French Canadian, themselves colonizers, were in turn to find themselves playing the unenviable role of the colonized. With the withering of empire came the critical reassessment of its psychic and material rewards in which ethnic "minorities" partook. It also contributed to the demystification and decline in the legitimacy of the centralized state authority.

A form of internal colonialism came to exist intricately binding the culturally distinct peripheral collectivities to the core. National discrimination painted a picture not unlike the third world colonial situation. As such, trade and commercial endeavours tended to be monopolised by core members forcing the peripheral economy into a state of dependence. Thus, a cultural division of labour existed whereby economic differences correlated with cultural ones. Internal colonialism focuses upon "political conflict between core and peripheral groups as mediated by the central government." Peripheral cultures evolve in isolation from the rest of the world and are aggravated by increased transactions with the core collectivity. The survival of nationalism, however, would depend upon the continued existence of a stratification system giving cultural distinctions political salience by linking them to opportunity accessibility.

A specialised occupational structure worked to strengthen intra-ethnic bonds of solidarity. This promoted the interaction of status equals within group boundaries thereby increasing the prevalence of common economic interests amongst members. Collective mobilisation depended upon group enclosure, itself a function of, a collectively perceived, inadequate access to resources. Group enclosure would be maximised under conditions of

extreme social isolation and where selective incentives were apportioned to promote compliance. Furthermore, residential segregation frequently existed thus rigidifying the lines of division which already were present within the occupational structure. As such, peripheral regions tended to be relatively impoverished and prone to an arrested development. The emergence of a cultural division in labour reflected the super-imposition of cultural differences upon economic inequalities. These cleavages of interest arose in response to the differential advantage conferred upon each group as a result of an uneven wave of industrialisation over territorial space. This cultural division of labour, in turn, contributed to the development of ethnic identity thereby constraining the individual in all his/her activities. The major obstacle to nation-building related, then to the malintegration of the periphery with the core according to terms perceived to be unjust and unrepresentative by the former.⁷ The upsurge of nationalism, then, relates to the declining authority and effectiveness of the political core. "Undermining its moral claims on the allegiance of peripheral groups and reducing the economic and psychic satisfactions it is able to deliver"⁸ lends credence to the claims of ethno-nationalist élites for autonomy and self-determination.

The internal colonial model is readily applicable to Afrikanerdom, its secluded agrarianist development dissipating and its members increasingly peripheralized both culturally and economically within the Anglo dominated urban hub. Complications arise as Afrikaner nationalism appears triumphant usurping the role of superordinate group and seeking to stabilize its advantages through policies aimed at institutionalizing the existing stratification system. Although Africans are notably victimized in this process, likewise are the Anglo industrialists who previously formed the core particularly with regard to state sector employment. The internal colonial model only deals with two actors while changes relating to the South African context paint a ménage à trois in which the superordinate position shifts from one group to the next while each group occupies the subordinate position at one time or another. This model generates greater confusion when one notes that political, economic and cultural superordination do not necessarily

fall together onto the lap of a particular group. This model, furthermore, discounts the significant influence wielded by the metropole in dealing with settler-indigenous relations during the decolonization period.

The internal colonial model better describes ethnic relations within Canada. French Canadian agrarianist ideology and rural development inadequately prepared group members who increasingly occupied lower strata occupations within the Anglo dominated urban realm. Nevertheless, again the roles would become confused after the "Quiet Revolution". Bilingualism tended to favour French Canadians within Federal Government structures, although their minority status tempered the decision making influence that they were to wield. Furthermore, greater autonomy for Quebec would prove to shift the focus upon a newly subordinate group, that being the English minority within the province who became increasingly peripheralized in tandem with more nationalistic francization policies. Nevertheless, the internal colonial model is useful in both cases particularly prior to 1960. The cultural division of labour, a stratification system and the peripheralization of subordinate groups (particularly in the economic sphere) well explain the survival of nationalism and its intensification with greater inter-group contact. The internal colonial model seems to be highly interpretive.

The opening up and closing of the frontier in both Southern Africa and North America produced a two-fold effect. Firstly, the exportation of colonial land agents and settlers to far reaching areas signalled the beginning of an era characterized by pre-industrial rural development and the extension of European feudalism. Social pressures in Europe and aristocratic commercial undertakings had led to the creation of new settlements. The formative years were characterized by environmental hardships and an inter-play with alien native inhabitants. Ethnic consciousness was racially defined. Changing circumstances on the frontier and the struggle for land in particular provided opportunities and set the limits for human activity there.

The Canadian and South African frontier were similar in that rival segments within both the indigenous and colonial population found themselves competing with one another. Cross cutting ties were fostered in the process. Furthermore, both the Africans and the Indians became subject to manipulative European schemes as evidenced by continuously shifting alliances. Conversely, the indigenes in both cases were, at opportune moments, to exploit those cleavages which developed between contending European segments.

The expansion of Europe (and ultimately capitalism) appeared to follow a similar chronology. While Europeans moved westwards in North America, they moved northward and eastward in Southern Africa. Notably, expansion was accompanied by devastating disease, the effects of which determined regional demographics. Lamar and Thompson suggest that vulnerability to disease seemed to correlate with varying degrees of isolation among the indigenous population. The Indians, who were historically isolated for a substantial time period remained a genetically uniform population while the people of South Africa were far less isolated and notably far less vulnerable. This hypothesis seems to have relevancy when one notes that the far less isolated Bantu populace was also far more resistant to the effects of disease than were the more isolated Khoikhoi herders and San hunter-collectors.⁹ As such the crippling effects of disease upon the Indian population radically altered the demographic equation in that region, and coupled with a tide of white immigration, war and a shrinking land-base relegated the "red man" to a negligible numerical proportion. The apocalyptic impact of disease upon the Indians was not quite as dramatic with regard to the Bantu Africans who managed to weather the plague. Coupled with the fact that the South African landscape offered relatively fewer intrinsic attractions (prior to the diamond and gold discoveries) and presented much more formidable barriers to the expansion of settlements, fewer Europeans colonized the area so ensuring the continued numerical preponderancy of the African population. As such, while sufficient European settlement in North America made any subsequent reversal of power unattainable, white settlement remained inconclusive throughout Africa. These developments are significant. While the marginalization and

acculturation of the Indians had lent itself to a proportionately significant French Canadian population (about 26% at present), frontier developments had cast Afrikaners as a less significant (about 7% presently) proportionality.

Merchant capitalism's seizure and shaping of the native economy both in Canada and South Africa can initially be seen to have been spearheaded by British imperialist ventures. Frontiersmen in both societies exercised their exit options so as to act independently within the open parameters of the frontier. As such, elements in both cases subjected themselves willingly to the hazards of frontier society. The threat of military force, whereby the colonial power attempted to subjugate unruly adventurers, met with resistance. For the most part, however, rural-based resistance was crushed by military force. Frequently, rebellious movements fell victim to native "predators" as was the case with both Piet Retief and Dollard des Ormeaux. When contending European foes were engaged in military struggle, the casualties were more extensive as was the case with the 1885 Northwest Rebellion and most notably the Boer War.

Assimilationist designs and the more powerful British counter-culture supplemented increasingly entrenched Anglo economic domination producing cultural anxieties within both fragment societies. Cultural concerns revolved primarily around language and educational issues. Despite these similarities, one need be cognisant of the fact that Canadian French, although dialectically different, could continue to regenerate itself in tandem with European French and its developing literature. The French language itself in Europe remained unscathed; and although cultural strains in French Canada gave birth eventually to a "bastardized" "Fringlish" lingo, the dilapidated "joual" lingua franca remained an embarrassment in the French Canadian courts. The French language remained sacrosanct as a barometer of status and, in spite of linguistic aberration in some areas, remained the official language of Quebec even unto the present day.

The Afrikaans language, described by some as a "kitchen language" achieved official recognition alongside English in the Union

supplanting high Dutch both in the courts and in the educational sphere. Afrikaans became a newly developed language forced to struggle on its own account without the aid of an established European language and its literary accessories. The Afrikaans language had to, therefore, generate its own development without a securely established catalyst.

Nevertheless, these differences, while undoubtedly relevant, were overshadowed by the similar views which Quebecois and Afrikaners held of their country of origin respectively. Conversely, even early on both were perceived by Europe as aberrant and underdeveloped Diaspora. These perceptions were fuelled by images of colonial boorishness, national proximity (to the European motherland) and an increasingly diluted and degenerative spoken language.

Confrontations between founding pioneers and Imperialist agents set the stage for a subdued compromise (in Canada, the BNA Act of 1867; in South Africa, the Union of 1910) in which both French Canadians and Afrikaners were respectively co-opted into the parameters of a new state. Sensing that the terms of the new dispensation were clearly biased toward Anglo hegemonic interests, each persisted in the struggle against Imperialism adhering to respected principles (notably, self-determination) wherever instrumental. The legacy of Imperialism remains a recurrent theme as evidenced by subsequent ethnic conflagrations surrounding conscription, language, educational and immigration issues.

Contextual transformation within each case study becomes most pronounced after Dominion particularly as both societies are forced to adjust to new social consciousness arising from the effects of what is termed the industrial revolution. Others have dubbed this period as the inset of modernisation, commonly associated with urbanization, and significantly with secularization. Significantly, here, because institutional religion in both fragmented societies would serve as the sedimentary rock, the ideological underpinnings for an ethnically-based movement. The cohesive ideological force provided by institutional religion imbued each fragment with a sense of exclusivity (defined according

to changing circumstances), differentiating between those who were the select part of the Christianizing mission and the "heathen savage" population. Shrouded in mythological garb, clerical nationalists in both Afrikaner and French Canadian camps would analogise the plight of their "chosen" peoples with that of the Children of Israel as described in the Old Testament.

The mind set of both fragmented ethnicities would rely heavily upon religious principles. Institutional religion strove to reinforce bonds of exclusivity by redrawing the line between temporal and heavenly matters according to changing contexts. Sensing that religious tenets, too, had to adapt to unsettling circumstances lest they should lapse into obsolescence, clerical nationalists were forced to overlap reality and testament. The historicity of each group, thus, had to be interpreted through a skewed clerico-nationalist lens.

Righteous suffering provides the flysheet for a nationalist tent propped up on the pliable pillows of ethnic constituencies. Pegged down with morality doctrines, the opening is strictly reserved for the compliant soldiers. Remaining solid and resistant to the roughest conditions, the camp ripples with the winds of change. No more room to pitch and the rain comes down hard. A peg loosens and is discarded. Another follows suit and shortly the faith no longer anchors the structures that be.

A retrospective nationalist revival draws upon historical images depicting the bonding process in its progressive stages. A picture forms; the icy white alienation; the dark and sinister invader; all splattered blood red and of course the sun always remains overhead. The stage shifts from rural green pastures to grey concrete heights.

The impact of industrialisation on ethnic relations and more specifically the ways in which the problem of inter-group competition for industrial jobs was addressed is a relevant subject for analysis. The industrial revolution and resulting urbanisation would significantly alter the sphere of operation for Afrikaners and French Canadians who were thrust unwittingly into the urban

domain. Outdated land-farm systems contributed in both cases to the gradual eclipse of rural agrarianism. The closing frontier made exit options no longer viable. No more was land a disposable commodity. New land could no longer be acquired at will.

Anglo industrial principles set the standards for newly urbanised Afrikaners and French Canadians who increasingly found themselves lacking the necessary skills to compete openly on the market. Here, the differences between developing Afrikaner and Quebec nationalism are more pronounced. Vital differences relate to the use of indigenes for labour purposes. South African history has, from its beginning, witnessed an increasingly capitalist economy in which the indigenous African formed an integral part. The South African infrastructure was built upon the sweat of imported slaves and indigenous labour. Some found employment working as herdsmen or domestic servants in exchange for squatting rights. Still others braved the darkness peopling the underground mines so as to extract resources for the enrichment of wealthy magnates. The development of Canada relied primarily on European emigrant labour. The Indians served no practical economic function (save the fur trade) and were constantly removed from the paths of European advance. Denigrated and assimilated, Indians in the pre-industrial era were few in numbers yet they were not similarly enslaved.

The Imperialist export-oriented market economy had become entrenched within the South African system. African reservations were maintained, their size limited so as to induce a constant flow of migrant labourers required to man the factories and mines which characterized the white establishment. The industrial capitalist society was not, however, initially colour-conscious. Impoverishment was not solely a black phenomenon. Afrikaans-speakers were for the most part unskilled and the alien urban environment threatened to denationalize them. Vulnerable on two fronts, Afrikaners found themselves in competition with cheaper African labour while simultaneously having to contend with profit-seeking English capitalists. Francophone Canadians likewise experienced the transitional trauma which plunged them into an environment clearly dominated by powerful English money interests. Yet for reasons aforementioned, the battle lines were clearly

drawn. No indigenous third front existed within the urban realm. Thus, one need be sensitized to differing definitions of "peoples" and "sides" which were applicable in each case.

Later developments were to reveal that even upon attainment of political power and in spite of concerted efforts aimed at repressing the African population, Afrikaner nationalists could not defeat their indigenous opponents and increasingly had to rely on their labour and co-operation. One could posit the hypothesis that the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism and even its early evolution at the start of the century within the union had been a racial confrontation. This hypothesis could in fact reason that the co-optation of Afrikaner leaders to within an inherited Imperialist framework (which divided the territory along racial lines according to the 1913 Land Act) after the Boer War clearly signalled where the battle lines were to be drawn. While not altogether untrue, the notion of a flexibly homogeneous white racial block prior to 1960 superficially minimizes consequent ethnic antagonism which would mobilise Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers into different camps.

Similarly, there is a tendency to characterize the Canadian debate as a duel of sorts between French and English combatants rather than one between Federalists and Separatists. Ethnic antagonism has captured the spotlight, historically, in part due to erratically buoyant French Canadian nationalism. The battle lines within an ethnic framework between contending European fragments are more easily marked in Canada than they are in South Africa. This is due to the fact that the Quebecois have a clearly defined territory while the Afrikaners are interspersed. Canadian Federalism gives Quebec nationalists a political base from which to "stand their ground" against perceived opponents. Those attempting to dispute this "ethnic standoff" approach tend to redefine conflict on a constitutional plane. That is, conflict is rather viewed as a jurisdictional power-play between Federal and Provincial Government structures. While this relationship tends to be most problematic with regard to Quebec, gripings in the ranks of other Provincial Governments are, here, not marginalised.

Nevertheless, in spite of decades of successive efforts, the Federal-Provincial conferences have not resolved the impasse. Underlying these failures is disagreement which centres upon the terms and spirit of Confederation. Despite divergent outlooks within English Canada itself, there exists a loose consensus with regard to one issue. English Canada out-rightly rejects the notion of two founding nations and arrogantly refuses to make concessions acceptable to French Canadians. As a result, the present constitutional arrangements have increasingly fallen out of favour with a disgruntled Quebec. English Canada disputes and rejects the ethnic equation preferring to take solace in the words rather than the spirit of the British North America Act. Conversely, French Canada thrives upon this cleavage which is perceived to be more a national than a constitutional dilemma (albeit recognising that the two are inseparable).

Comparative studies must necessarily give full attention to the socio-economic and institutional underpinnings of nationalism. This is not to exclude ideological developments and expression which are significantly stressed in this work. The orientation of this project is emphatically ethno-nationalist. Nevertheless, adequate consideration has been awarded to those analysts and researchers who differ across the political spectrum in their terminology and approach. Avoiding a fully fledged theoretical analysis on nationalism, this work recognises the pitfalls associated with tackling the complex debate, which is a separate topic in itself. Drawing on both literatures, and selecting certain features, this thesis attempts to comparatively describe two diverse societies.

Despite the overwhelmingly descriptive character of this project, a number of questions implicitly arise thus revealing explanatory objectives which strive to insert this study into a larger context. Questions of ethnicity and those processes which contribute towards the evolution of nationalism necessarily spring to mind. Competing interpretations squabble over the essence of consciousness and those factors which impact upon its progressive development. Few reject the significant applications which the principle of nationalities imposes upon society. Yet, whether nationalism is but a transient phenomena or a procreative reality remains unanswered.

This unsolved mystery touches upon the very heart of consciousness and changing identities which vary according to the needs and circumstances of individuals and associative collectivities.

This comparative thesis seeks to distance itself from scientific approaches which attempt almost obsessively to find sociological rules, operationalise concepts and coherently situate data within the confines of changing paradigms. While models for fragmented societies can provoke a plethora of interesting "revelations", paradigmatic constraints inevitably detract from and falsely influence conclusions forthcoming.¹⁰ There are those who proclaim that consciousness recognises itself in others, and knows the other in itself. "What is true for the individual is even more so for societies. There is no nation without other nations."¹¹

This paper progresses in sequence, each sequence historically connected and intrusive upon the next. Like a drama or a play each chapter depicts a new sequence in which new actors and novel props are infused into the continuing saga. To achieve a coherent organisation and analysis of the vast subject matter, the development and evolution of ethno-nationalism has been divided into parallel phases or aspects, associated primarily with specific historical periods and sometimes with broad ideological and thematic influences. Being the producer in this instance, it was my aim to highlight and display significant actors and historical events so as to endear this project with some form of thematic relevance; ethnic nationalism being the theme of sorts.

Political analysts, historians and sociologists have documented and commented upon the theoretical, institutional, economic, religious and political underpinnings of nationalism. It is such texts regarded as expert studies upon Afrikaner society, Afrikaner nationalism and Afrikaner political thought which lay the foundation for this project; similarly, with the French Canadian experience. Although these academic works may be seen as secondary materials, they are in this context primary, remembering that the comparative aspect be the ultimate objective. Frequently, the nationalists are themselves cited while at other junctures anti-nationalist spokespersons bring greater clarity to the debate.

Newspaper articles and smaller essays also form part of the resource base, yet they are few and far between. The study recognises the vast literature available and succinctly strives to incorporate a workable resource centre. Historical review enables one to better draw out similarities and differences thereby making this project accessible to the common reader. Personal contacts with individuals from diverse backgrounds within both societies have perhaps provided me with more insightful perspectives. These non documented sources have proven to be motivators. My personal interest in this topic arises from my unique circumstances outlined in brevity. This thesis is expository and based solidly upon varying academic works.

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER I:

SECTION I

THE FORMATIVE YEARS:

The Settlement of a New Land
The Cape Colony and New France:
The Nature of a Society
Pre-Conquest Consciousness

The curtain opens revealing a sparsely inhabited land, 'unfounded' from a Eurocentric perspective until the arrival of colonists, the Dutch in South Africa and the French in Canada. This chapter attempts to recount the formative years of settlement and of national awakening. It is, furthermore, divided into two sections. The first deals with the nature of society in New France and the Cape Colony. It describes pre-Conquest consciousness as determined by the caste-like feudal structure in which the metropolitan company officials ranked above the more rural colonist population. Company business dictated the orientation and objectives of each colony which basically revolved around a single primary commodity. Trade also to a large extent depended upon the indigenes, various African and Indian tribes in South Africa and Canada respectively. The disposition and plight then of the native populations in both societies need be examined in-so-far as they affect the changing and evolving consciousness of the Euro-settlers. Pioneer expansionism is also given voice once again within the context of a colonist-Company cleavage whereby pastoral adventurers chose to disengage from the rigidity and restrictions imposed by the latter. This section concludes with an evaluation of pre-Conquest consciousness as it relates to national development.

The second section begins with an assessment of the Conquest, its legacy and the consequent struggle for survival. It concentrates primarily upon disengagement and pioneering movements which would eventually determine the demographics and territorial limitations of the future state in each case study. Disengagement refers to both a mass migration as in the form of a Great Trek and/or a rebellion. Charismatic and key personalities are also highlighted so as to show the significance of national figures within a developing nationalist mythology. The early dawning of British imperialist arrogance is discussed as is the sprouting of anti-imperialist national consciousness. This chapter concludes with an historical appraisal demonstrating some comparative elements within each society.

The Cape Colony: 1652-1795

The arrival of the Dutch in South Africa in 1652 and the establishment of the Dutch East India Company as a colonial trading post marked the beginning of a white settler society at the foot of Africa. The Cape Colony consisted primarily of traders, colonial officials or company servants, and free burghers.¹ Slaves and aliens (the Khoikoi and Bushman) filled the bottom rungs of the social ladder. Company farm land was awarded to the freeburghers who drew closer into an interdependent relationship with company officials dependent on their produce. The caste-like society which came to be set the stage for a pigmentocracy as racial consciousness developed in sync with privilege and status. The arrival in 1688 of French Huguenots fleeing persecution at home coupled with German and other European immigrants formed the ethnic base of what later came to be the Afrikaner. These European migrants became stock farmers in the 18th Century valuing land in a relatively open frontier.² By 1800, they were welded into a separate people with distinct characteristics and a unique language. Their simple rural based pattern of life and the hardships faced in the open veld carved a pioneering spirit which fostered personal values of independence, dexterity, stubbornness, resoluteness against force, and love of freedom and open land space. At the start of the 18th Century, the Cape was firmly an agricultural colony. Various economic constraints attributed to the autocratic nature of the Company inspired a revolt by the colonists in 1705 under the rule of governor Van der Stel. It was two years later that Hendrik Bibault first used the term "Afrikaner" to identify himself. An "Africaan" referred to a white colonist physically born in South Africa and in the 19th century, the term "Africaander" was in general use among white colonists to identify themselves as a group.³

Further grievances between the colonists and officials developed. Young Adam Tas became a hero as he successfully petitioned the removal of an exploitative governor. The widening gap between officials and colonists, and the latter's intolerance with the

former's practice must be noted.⁴ Each set of farms became a state in miniature; and the spirit of independence only grew as a slew of "Kaffir Wars" reinforced bonds of solidarity and attachment to the soil. The political and economic bankruptcy of the Company and its blatant disregard for colonist concerns would foreshadow the anti-colonial struggle which would intensify with the arrival of imperialist Britain and its consequent control. Patterson states plainly that the Dutch Hollanders, who occupied influential posts in the church, schools and civil service were widely disliked for what the Boers 'regarded as supercilious sophistication and liberal views'; this was similar to the way in which the mainland French were regarded in Quebec.⁵

Company restrictions upon the economic advancement of the free burghers existed in the very nature of its role as a trading body holding political power.⁶ The perceived economic heartlessness of the V.O.C. and the increasing hardships encountered by the 18th Century crop farmers of the Cape Peninsula and Stellenbosch led to the emergence of the trekboer as the Cape's first white frontiersman. This roving pastoralist driven by an adventurous spirit became enticed by the hunting and land which the interior presented before him.⁷ Under the informal loan farm system, the trekboer could lay claim to huge tracts of land paying an annual fee in recognition of the Company's dominion. Yet in practice, he was unlikely to be evicted if he did not pay and so in essence lay outside Company control. The advance of the white frontier and their contact with the indigenous Khoisan hunting bands led to conflict. They were forced to accept incorporation or else retreat.

Crapanzano's analysis reveals that from the beginning of Dutch settlement, there existed tension between the Company and those Cape residents outside of its employ. It was these rebellious renegades and adventurers who became trekboers, semi-nomadic pastoralists who lost more of their European heritage as they moved farther from Cape Town. Sir John Barrow displays his biased ethnocentrism describing the trekboers as (an) unindustrious, primitive, unenterprising gluttons, cigarettes/pipes in mouth and constantly getting drunk on spirits, laziness and mindless

racism; Crapanzano cites such an attitude as revealing in that it prompted, as did others like it, the Boers to trek into the country.⁸

The Khoikoi's experience of trading with European vessels seeking fresh provisions made them initially unalarmed by the Dutch intrusion. Yet they gradually came to realize that the Dutch were not passing ships in the night but rather had come to stay, increasing in numbers as well as in land holdings.⁹ Thus the encroachment of white farming on the pasture lands led to conflict and war (1659-60; 1673-1677). The exploitation of the indigenous Khoikoi revolved around the cattle trade and of course, land. The unreliability of the former (as the Khoikoi supplied cattle) led the colonists to begin setting up a competing livestock economy. It also prompted them to use coercion as to deprive the Khoikoi of their remaining cattle. The disintegration of the Khoikoi economy and way of life resulted in Khoikoi migration to remote semi desert regions; some retreated to more mountainous areas where they adapted and blended in with the Khoisan hunters; still others hung around the white farms and settlements seeking casual labour. In 1713, a devastating smallpox epidemic wiped out most of the Khoikoi population in the vicinity of areas of white habitation. Fredrickson sums it up well commenting on the fate of the Khoikoi and the coastal Indians. He states, "Again a weaker and less organized people gave way to a more powerful and unified invader. In both instances, there was a pattern of trade that turned out to be destructive to the indigenes".¹⁰

New France: 1534-1759

The founding of New France in 1534 by explorer Jacques Cartier and the consequent establishment of a French trading post by navigator Champlain in 1603 marked the beginning of the French regime's colonial control in the new world.¹¹ Exploitation of the fur trade through manipulation of the native Indian populations led to firm commercial monopolies established by the Company.¹² The influx of merchants facilitated the economic exploitation of resources for the benefit of the metropolis. The companies were the legal owners of the land awarding strips known as "seigneuries" to various individuals.¹³ The recipient of the land became known as a

seigneur, ranked just lower than the French nobility on the caste-type social ladder. There were approximately 100 "censitaires" in each seigneurial domain, cultivating the land, paying taxes to the seigneur and receiving but three quarters of the grain ground at the mill. The seigneur in turn was responsible to the authorities for collecting rents, taxes, grains and accounting for them. As 'socialist' historian Léandre Bergeron amply states, "the colony is a milk-cow (for the metropolis) that must find its own hay."¹⁴

Guerilla warfare by the Iroquois against the colonists prompted the arrival of 100 French soldiers to protect Ville Marie (later to be known as Montreal) from such attacks. The Monarch Louis XIV tightened his grip on the colony, appointing a governor directly to control external relations and command the army. The "intendant", another civil servant, would be responsible for trade settlement, cultivation, finances and justice. Control of the fur trade became a priori obsession as Frontenac, then governor in 1672, traded for furs with brandy. Expeditions into the Great Lakes, trading posts in Louisiana and English competition would eventually lead to territorial treaties between the two colonial powers. The 17th century saw the metropolis saturated with beaver pelts. France lost interest in Canada setting the colony adrift. The French colonial presence grew encompassing Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, the Mississippi Valley and Louisiana. Yet it was sparsely populated and badly organized. Various forts were constructed especially around Quebec and Montreal and in the Lake Champlain area. Between 1713 - 1739, the white French settler population increased from 18000 to 43000 due to a high birth rate. The King's illegitimate daughters of grand French ladies, orphans and prostitutes, the rejects and outcasts, prisoners, and stranded soldiers mixed to form the foundation stock of the Quebecois. The Metropolitans were distinguished from the "Canayens" (people of French origin born in Canada) by their aristocratic manners, clothes and their refined language. It was not uncommon for a Canayen to sometimes leave the seigneurie to become a free coureur-de-bois rejoicing in his independent spirit despite being exploited.¹⁵ It soon became obvious that France had little interest in the development of New France. Only 10 000 migrants had come to Quebec, one-third of those consisting of military personnel.¹⁶

Prior to the arrival of imperialist Britain, there had been little agricultural development as settlers lived on a river frontage divided into long narrow strips, giving each farm access to water, transport and forest resources. These rangs were feudalistic in nature despite the fact that the social gap between seigneurs and habitants (Canayens) was not insurmountably wide. Thus seigneurs could be likened, as does Postgate and McRoberts, to colonial land agents rather than feudal lords. Some were former farmers while some were drawn from the French nobility.¹⁷ Farms became self-sufficient economic units as other economic activity had been banned either due to French mercantilist policy, or as in the fur trade, because France directly controlled it. The habitants were unskilled labourers, idle men and vagabonds cast out by France to create indigenous industry, develop agriculture and populate.¹⁸ They were but "paupers" and prisoners pithy in comparison to the French merchants who wanted New France to remain a trading post and a source of raw materials (particularly the fur trade which was monopolised by a few French from France merchants). Fighting battles for the King, a continuous influx of soldiers with each war; and after each treaty, these soldiers now penniless remained to swell the ranks of the habitants. The seigneuries became overpopulated causing the land to deteriorate with resulting hunger strikes.¹⁹

Guindon describes the feudal trading society of New France as one initiated, financed, directed and stymied by the administration of the French Court. The caste system ranked in stature: the colonial administrators, soldiers, businessmen of the fur trade, clergy, and an emigrant population. Final authority rested in the hands of an appointed governor.²⁰ Jean C. Bonenfant and Jean-C. Falardeau, in their analysis of French Canadian nationalism, put forward that only a latent form of patriotism existed in French Canada. Collective traits developed which made French Canadians different from the France born French. Yet, nationalism did not exist in French Canada prior to the British conquest.²¹ Nationalism involved a scale of values of which they were not yet aware. Marcel Rioux, in his academically acclaimed "La Question du Quebec" describes the original habitants as rather homogeneous, and as a result of the considerable Church influence upon the colony, the dangers faced

against the Amerindians and Iroquois, and the binding internal elements of values, institutions, language and religion, the Quebecois had to unite to survive. The habitants, furthermore, differed to the French in that the former were rural while the latter were metropolitan and lived in the cities.²² The habitant was a man cut off bit by bit from the grand tradition, that isolated himself from other strata of society and became the pivot of Quebecois society. Falardeau compares the parish of New France to that which existed in France at the same time (17th century). Three institutions shared the social and political power, the village Assembly, the seigneur and the curé.²³ In describing the rangs along the river, Rioux states that the habitations were not grouped around a central core as were French villages. The seigneur was preoccupied with administration and the war leaving the colonists to live independently.

The consequences were significant instilling in the habitants, early on, a spirit of independence and liberty that they had not been exposed to in France. They also adopted quickly a life-style of a small enclosed group where all were regarded equally and shared the same ideals in life. With regard to Falardeau's comparison of 17th Century France and Quebec, Rioux states that while France had three institutions, each representing a certain weight, in Quebec the parish priest-curé stood alone. His role permeated all sectors of life notably education.²⁴ Mason Wade refutes common claim that the French Canadians were primarily an agriculturally disposed people. Rather, they were soldiers and adventurers and artisans, somewhat gregarious in nature. Rather than isolating themselves in the country, they tended to cluster together in the towns. This is apparent when one notes that Montreal, by the beginning of the 18th century, had already become the commercial center of the colony. New France was really only made up of two classes, the ruling élite of administrators, clergy and noble seigneurs on the one hand and the masses on the other.²⁵ The élite were French (native or by assimilation) while the people identified themselves as Canadians and were jealous of Frenchmen. Jesuit visitor Père Charlevoix describes the habitants as putting all their happiness in liberty and independence. Their negative characteristics include "avarice, conceit, lack of scientific

knowledge, ingratitude, over-weaning pride, impetuosity..." On the positive side, they were pious, religious, brave and clever. Charlevoix found the free and lax climate of Canada as ample to "retain those whom Providence has caused to be born there", yet the habitants' frivolity and aversion to regular labour, and their spirit of independence have always led a number of young men to leave and so "prevented the colony from peopling itself".²⁶ The success of the fur trade would largely be dependent upon the "coureurs-de-bois" (roving fur trappers and traders). Thus many French settlers were lured away or "escaped" from the habitant way of life through this alternative route. This in turn acted as to prevent the consolidation of a thorough going regime of seigniorial feudalism in French Canada. It is therefore understandable that seigneurs and clergy alike denounced the fur trade for fostering a spirit of individualism, independence and materialism within the lower class.²⁷

Bergeron plots out the chain of the fur trade. New France comprised of the Company, the Coureur-de-Bois and the Red Man. The Company is described as middlemen (for traders in the metropolis) of a bourgeois social class taking 60% of all profits while not providing any productive labour (Bergeron considers amassing capital as unproductive labour). The Coureur-de-Bois are portrayed as carriers and middlemen taking but 4.99% of profits while contributing 5% of productive labour. The Coureur-de-Bois is described as quasi-proletarian. The sub-proletarian Red Man, on the other hand, takes but .01% of profits while accounting for 65% of productive labour. The Indian was therefore the real producer and the biggest loser in the commercial chain.²⁸ The Indians viewed the rapid expansion of white settlement with alarm. The resistance of the Indians in Canada to territorial loss and cultural disintegration was predictably limited by tribal rivalries which prevented unified action against the invaders.²⁹ The Iroquois watched the French and their "allies", the Hurons and Algonquins advance into their territory. Advancing on Trois Rivières and Ville Marie, they inflicted heavy losses upon the French. Supported by arms supplies from the Dutch at Fort Orange (Albany) and by the English of "New England", the Iroquois, in 1658, intensified their guerrilla attacks. Dollard des Ormeaux and his men were

slaughtered as they attempted to hold off the Iroquois, and in 1662, Ville Marie nearly fell. Finally, however, the Iroquois onslaught fell victim to smallpox contracted from blankets left behind by the French to cover their sick. Iroquois morale was furthermore dealt a crippling blow as widespread famine set in and another hundred French soldiers arrived.³⁰

Concluding Synthesis

The settlement in the Cape Colony and New France can be seen in a similar light prior to the British conquest. Both developed as splinterings of Europe serving as trading posts to furnish the needs of their Euro-metropolis. The hierarchical nature of both societies approached a caste-like superstructure in which status and social class correlated with identification or "national proximity" to Europe. In the Cape, the Company made up of Hollanders exerted control upon the free burghers, an ethnic *mélange* of colonists disposed toward a rural and agricultural pattern of life. The solidification and development of these stock farmers into a separate people drew its blood from common language ties, and a harsh environment, in which unity was a prerequisite to withstand sporadic attacks and conflict with the indigenous populations. The autocratic rule of colonial governors and the economic and political monopoly of Company interests further polarized officials and colonists. In New France, monopolizing Companies exploited the colony for its raw materials, particularly with regard to the fur trade. The "habitants" of New France were similarly disposed to primary industry including hunting and agriculture. They came from the backwoods of rural France and soon formed common bonds in their dealings with the various Indian tribes. Their sense of being different further found cause in their rural isolation from their metropolitan brethren. Different etiquette distinguished the French nobility and its Company colonial land agent "seigneurs" from the Canayen masses. These seigneurs were not unlike the landdrosts in co-ordinating the clustering of individuals to be exploited for Company profit. The development of farms and parishes in the Cape and New France respectively constituting self sufficient economic units gives substance to further parallels. Company rigidity of control spurred frontiersmen in both cases. In South Africa, the trekboer with his

pioneering spirit set out to the interior to evade the clutches of his Company brethren. These semi-nomadic pastoralists encountered African tribes and indigenous Khoikoi and San sometimes without incident and often in a fierce struggle for land and especially cattle. In French Canada, it was the coureur-de-bois who became the roving rebel evading Company policy. These bandits took readily to aboriginal life-styles venturing among new tribes and regions in pursuit of beaver pelts and simultaneously fuelling the brandy trade. Though one may perhaps not consider the Company to be a "State" in the current sense, it was nevertheless the administrative centre of the colony dictating the rules in the primitive jural community bounding its inhabitants to a set of laws and orders. One may wish to classify French Canadian and Afrikaner society as stateless in this historical context. Yet initially, it must be regarded as neo-Statal due to the overbearing influence exerted by the metropolis in Europe. In this light the trekboer and coureur-de-bois in South Africa and Canada respectively can be seen as dissent groups, ethnically comprised and disengaging from the jural community. These pioneers may further be seen as segments of the civil society, albeit small ones, exercising their exit options, venting their frustrations and so resisting the encroachment of a predatory "State". Serving as a primary form of resistance to state growth, their resistance to state servants trying to capture society weakened the established authority. All this took place in an area of society captured by the state with a segment of society partly uncaptured.

The exploitation, manipulation and partial destruction of the indigenes revolved around the cattle trade in South Africa and the fur trade in Quebec (New France). Yet it was smallpox which eventually crippled the native populations affirming the domination of the white man in his newly adopted world.

Pre-conquest nationalism was without doubt absent. Ethnic mobilization based upon a consciousness unique to a self conceived ethnic entity was still a far cry away. Collective mobilization was in its pioneering stage as clusters formed to deal with a harsh new environment. And the rigid and exploitative nature of colonial Company agents also began to foster colonist unity based on

grievances. Contact with native populations and group competition for resources further contributed to the development of pioneering group identities. The rural-metropolitan cleavage largely correlated with the widening colonist-Company one. The formers' interests lay within his new environment while the latter's lay in his European homeland. If any identity consciousness did exist, it was more of a racial consciousness. The "savage" image given to the "heathen" native populations and the class-like structure which placed the Indian and Khoikoi at the bottom of the status ladder fuelled by contact between the European and these native groups entrenched white supremacy in the histories of both societies. The major difference between the Cape settlement and that of New France lay in demographics. The importation of black slaves by the Dutch in the Cape and the relatively huge number of migrating black population groups vis-à-vis europeans would relegate the position of the white man to a threatened minority group for time to come. Thus, their sense of racial consciousness became magnified to the extreme.

CHAPTER I: SECTION I

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SECTION II

EXPANSION AND REBELLION

South Africa

With the first British occupation of 1795 and the return of the British in 1806, Afrikanerdom was to undertake a journey which would become a focal point of their historical mythology. Unlike the German and French immigrants who were absorbed and assimilated, the English were incapable of being assimilated. This was due to their sheer numbers and the fact that they came out in families. English became the language of advancement and except for minor mutual assimilation, these two ethnic entities remained separate.¹ British colonial rule would plant the seed of Afrikaner nationalism, it being anti-colonialism.² With the closing of the frontier and a shortage of land, a crisis developed. This crisis was aggravated as the government insisted that the Khoi receive equal protection. There were signs in the Cape that the Khoi and slaves were no longer prepared to accept European hegemony. This threatened the colonists' sense of superiority. Thus prior government proclamations which confirmed the racial rather than the class order of the Cape became blurred; and though the racial nature of the social order was not rigid, this crisis in social relationships that was taking place threatened the colonists' group position and security, particularly that of the poor whites. These bywoners as they were called derived their rights, protection and respect through identification with the white élite social strata.³ This crisis prompted the Great Trek. The Great Trek was not a direct response to British occupation. In fact, Davenport states that the British were cautious so as not to alienate more people than necessary. They guaranteed property and the Roman-Dutch legal system. They ended torture and monopolies and tried to control officials by putting them on a salary basis. They attempted to buy the élite with entertainments at the castle yet they do not seem to have caught the imagination and support of the ordinary citizen to any degree.⁴

Giliomee suggests that the prerequisites for national consciousness were present at the start of the 19th century. The Afrikaners spoke a distinctive language; they possessed a single religious faith, a common historical heritage and a consciousness of belonging to a separate ethnic group. They also had special status in a slave-holding society. The absence of national consciousness

was due to improper or inadequate channels for its expression and development. This was a reflection of the educational and church facilities which were not oriented to satisfy and propagate this type of consciousness. There were furthermore, no intellectual leaders to press for and stimulate awareness. In the first half of the 19th Century, English became the language of the public service and judiciary while pressure on urban Afrikaners to adopt English culture and values increased.⁵ This resulted in the anglicization of some Afrikaans families. Yet it was the equalization policies undertaken by the British which spurred the Great Trek. The burghers saw such a policy as contrary to the laws of G-d and so moved in order to uphold their faith and the Gospel in its pure form.⁶ The British continued the policies of the Dutch East-India Company forcing the eastern frontiersmen to trek away from British control.⁷ The action of departure, however, could not be interpreted in the sense of nationalism. These Afrikaners left due to the peculiar circumstances prevailing on the Eastern frontier including having to deal with organised Bantus. The eastern frontier farmers were in despair. They developed a stronger feeling of solidarity as a result of their isolation, common dangers, and struggles.

Van Jaarsveld points out that no cultural awareness was mentioned nor was any historical dimension to their self consciousness. They did feel, however that equality with the coloured races would lead to the destruction of their own race. Thus, the growth and development of national self assertion was not a causal factor of the Great Trek but rather a consequence.⁸

Shingler cites four general reasons contributing to the Trek. These were (1) the anglicization of the Dutch in the Cape Peninsula and beyond; (2) the overall problem of control by the central government specifically the collection of taxes and attempts to impose order on the hinterland; (3) the emancipation of the slaves and the mode of emancipation; and (4) the long standing Dutch Republican tradition which (including the establishment of republics in America and France) spurned the ZAD republic in the 1880's. These republican orders were not so much territorial as ethnic. Citizenship was determined on an ethnic basis rather as

evidenced by the exclusion of African, 'coloureds' and uitlanders in the ZAD republic.⁹ This republican zeal will be expanded upon later yet it is to be noted as a crucial and significant contributant to nationalist development in South Africa.

Sheila Patterson looks at the Trek in a more retrospective manner. That is she looks at the pre-Trek years in terms of events which became part and parcel of Afrikaner nationalist mythology. She cites Afrikaner grievances under British rule as prompting the move away. One key event was the 1812 Black Circuit which called for whites to answer for mistreating their Hottentot servants. This involved the introduction of circuit courts aimed at bringing justice nearer to the plaintiff on the frontier. This presented an affront to an Afrikaner identity which contained a consciousness of special status in a slave-holding society. The outcome of discontent showed up three years later in what became known as the Slagters Nek Rebellion. Frontier Boer F. Bezuidenhout refused to answer a court summons on a charge of cruelty to his Hottentot servant. A white officer and twelve Hottentot troops were sent to his home. A shoot-out followed in which Bezuidenhout was killed. His brother then raised a rebellion with the aid of a Xhosa chief. It was suppressed and its leaders executed at Slagters Nek. The execution which involved rehangings after the gallows broke down left bitter scars in the memories of those who witnessed the inhumane execution. In the next twenty years, the Boers adapted their way of life to a slow rhythm of movement, one of semi-nomadic pastoralism. The loan place system of farming caused insecurity of tenure resulting in overgrazing and restlessness. The spirit of self reliance and independence of the Boer governed his life and came from his isolation (self-imposed). Thus when a centralized liberal authority began to spread its tentacles to the frontier, migration took place. Patterson does, however, assert that drought, floods, and kaffir raids on Boer cattle herds on the eastern border convinced Boers to trek as they saw the government as unprotective of their needs. They wished to be free from the government and from taxation.¹⁰

The Great Trek would determine the demographic nature of white South Africa as well as serve as an initial anti-imperialist and

anti-modernist event in the history of Afrikaner nationalist development. It was a form of rebellion. "Had there been no land available outside the Colony there might have been a rebellion... As it was the Boers trekked. Once the movement had begun, it gathered speed by its own momentum."¹¹

De Kiewet affirms the demographic significance of the Great Trek. He amply states:

"The Great Trek indissolubly linked the future of all South Africa with the Boer race. Within fourteen years a thin layer of Dutch settlement had spread over the most desirable parts of the interior, leaving no considerable areas vacant which might, like Ontario, have become a region of almost exclusive British settlement."¹²

The next stage of Afrikaner history produced a slew of "heroes" as ethnic clashes between the pioneering Boers and the colonial British set the pattern of separation between the conflicting groups for time to come. It was also to bolster a sense of national consciousness subjectively perceived by the rebellious Boers. Territorial separation of the Boers would eventually be transcended as blood ties would wipe away borders and assert a brotherhood of Afrikanerdom.

The British authorities prohibited trade with the Trekkers, banned ammunition supplies to them, and established treaties with the Basuto and Griqua tribes in 1843 to secure northern borders. This created a buffer area in which "Europeans" would find themselves under non-white control.¹³ British colonial policy was one of indirect rule. At the time it was a liberal creed encouraging multiplicity and promoting ethnicity. Motivated by a divide and rule doctrine, it calculatingly used tribalism as a tactic to create division by delegating access to positions of differential advantages in ethnic terms. This involved appealing to the loyalty of certain people to compete for scarce resources.¹⁴

Group consciousness and solidarity began to develop among the newly established Trekkers in Natal. They had left the country as discarded ones hoping to maintain the old republican society in

continuity with Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet. They had shared also the historical experience of fighting the Matabele and Zulu tribes.¹⁵ Maritz and Retief were at the forefront of the newly established Natal settlement requesting the government to recognize them as free and independent people. Retief and his party were murdered in 1838 by Zulu chief Dingane after signing a land treatise. Dingane followed this up by destroying most of the Voortrekker presence in Natal. Andries Pretorius responded with a commando of 470 men toppling Dingane on 16 December 1838 in what came to be known as the battle of Blood River. Before the battle, the Boers had made a vow to treat the occasion as holy if they were victorious.¹⁶ This "covenant" or "vow" became a convenient focal point in what came to be interpreted as the "sacred" history of the Afrikaner.

French Canada

The British conquest of New France in 1759 consolidated and augmented the place of the Roman Catholic Church as the major integrating force in French Canadian society. The military defeat of the French meant major commercial interests were discontinued and furthermore, prompted the withdrawal of government and economic leaders leaving the Church without competing national institutions.¹⁷ As in colonial Africa where the British conquered central parts of the states recognizing the power and religion of the paramount chiefs, so it was in French Canada with regard to the Church. In Africa, British rule actually attributed more power to the "tribal" chiefs.¹⁸ In French Canada, the British likewise manipulated or took advantage of the hierarchical system as evidenced in the Quebec Act. Co-optation was the underlying aim.

Thus British colonial policy attempted to co-opt and utilize indigenous authority structures rather than impose alien systems of authority upon its colonized subjects. The Quebec Act of 1774 made the Catholic Church the cornerstone of the colonial state, gave it the right to tax the peasantry and control schools. It also restored French civil law and protected French language rights. In protecting the cultural autonomy of the French, it also deprived the English minority of traditional rights such as trial by jury and habeas corpus.¹⁹ Canayen society remained feudal while English

merchants moved in to exploit their economic vulnerability; of course, English policies restricted the financial advancement and power of the religious communities. Political concessions to the Church and French Canadian power structures were not a reflection of British graciousness. The American Revolution which denounced British imperialism threatened to expand northwards. Therefore, British colonial policy was aimed at preventing or minimizing discontent in Quebec so that influential French Canadian power brokers not entertain rebellious notions in co-operation with American rebels. Bergeron notes that at the crucial conflict, the habitants chose passive resistance, refusing to enlist in the militia and denouncing the clergy for actively defending British interests. As the American forces made gains and then were subsequently pushed back by British forces, the Canayens came to realize that their liberation could only come from themselves.²⁰ American freedom would simply replace British colonization with an American form. The influx of Loyalists into Canada firmly ensured numerical superiority in favour of the English. With the loyalists came demands for a separate district where British law and tenure have jurisdiction and power. This resulted in the Constitution of 1791 in which Upper Canada was carved out of Quebec Province thus establishing a border between Upper Canada (later Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec). The habitants originally hoped and felt that it would de-inferiorize their position. Yet the Lieutenant governor, executive council and legislative council, all nominated in London, entrenched the colonial nature of British rule.²¹

T.R.H. Davenport, in his essay entitled "Nationalism and Conciliation: The Bourassa-Hertzog Posture", suggests that because historically the coureurs-de-bois failed to gain a foothold on the interior as did the voortrekkers, French Canada found itself obliged to accept territorial limitations, "which led to a far more restricted constitutional status than that eventually enjoyed by Afrikanerdom".²² Davenport insinuates that diverging developments defuse comparative analysis of these two societies. Were my analysis to revolve around constitutional development, his conclusions would undoubtedly have critical relevance. It does not. The coureurs-de-bois and French Canadian exploration or expansion did take place. For the reasons put forth by Davenport,

French Canadian settlement of Western Canada is not seen in the light of a spiritual Trek intertwined and central to a developing nationalist fabric spiced with mystical overtones. The Hudson Bay Company attempted to extend their interests in the fur trade to the West, particularly in what became known as the region of Manitoba. The majority of the population was Canayen metis and their leader was Jean Louis Riel. British Canada, however, had little intention of allowing the creation of another French Province, buying and annexing the territory from the Company. Riel, however, had other ideas setting up a provincial government and demanding recognition. Manitoba was created in 1870 and massive repression followed. The Métis were persecuted and murdered.²³ Despite the successive re-election of Riel (up to 1874), he was likewise expelled from the House of Commons, and had to seek refuge in Quebec and later the United States. The metis retreated westwards before the advancing frontier to the valley of Saskatchewan. The métis and Indians along the Saskatchewan River combined forces in an uprising known as the second Northwest Rebellion in 1885. Louis Riel who led the uprising, was captured and sentenced to hang by an English speaking judge and jury. Quebec opinion, which had clamoured for a repeal for Riel, was neglected falling victim to political expediency.²⁴ The rebels were linked by race and creed with French Canada which defended them against the hostility of Ontario. The hanging of Riel, according to Conservative journal "La Minerve", "wounded a whole people".²⁵ The Riel affair seemed to demonstrate that an Anglo-Canadian federal government had little concern for French Canadian interests and sentiments.²⁶ Riel stood as a French "martyr", and a "brother" who had been the victim of an unjust trial and condemned to an unjust death.²⁷ Figures like Riel, Dollard and Papineau became popularized characters, focal points for a hero-worshipping myth transforming nationalism which would develop.

Louis Joseph Papineau became a hero of sorts to the habitants demonstrating perhaps the earliest form of violent reactionary nationalism. He orchestrated and commandeered an armed uprising of patriotes. The creation of classical colleges by the clergy produced a small class of rising petty bourgeoisie. It was this class and a man like Papineau which attempted to change the conciliatory attitude of the governor with the colonial oppressor.

Through the British parliamentary imposed system, the budget came under the control of the Assembly of which Papineau became president. His radical approach to the budget forced a split within the "Parti Canadien". The duty of the Assembly was aimed at restraining British commerce in Lower Canada and limiting the profits of English capitalists. Papineau urged the Canayens to boycott English goods and withdraw their deposits from banks controlled by these merchants.²⁸ Though himself a seigneur of Montebello and a firm upholder of existing rights of property, Papineau was a strong republican and highly anti-clerical.²⁹ Papineau prepared 92 resolutions adopted by the Lower Canada Assembly in 1834. They included demands for an Executive responsible to the people's representatives; reform of the land tenure system, and adequate French Canadian representation in public office.³⁰ The Patriote leaders held public meetings to spread the gospel of economic revolt. Smuggling was encouraged, anything to avoid paying duties. Simultaneously, Canada was undergoing a terrible depression, the farmers having just weathered a crop failure and the financial market in a panic both in London and the United States.³¹ Though Papineau remained committed to the constitutional struggle, the paramilitary wing of the patriotes "Fils de la liberté" passed into more extreme hands. Gosford, then governor, abandoned hope of conciliation dissolving the last assembly of Lower Canada by proclamation.³² Bishop Latrigue then intervened warning against complicity with the rebels. He was met with anger, demonstrations and renunciation of the clergy by the Patriote Press. La Minerve, the Patriot newspaper fanned the flames of rebellion; disorders in the outlying regions of Montreal broke out against the English merchants, the seigneurs, and the Chouayens (this referred to sell out French Canadians who would not join the Patriote movement). Ethnic feeling was aroused by rival parades culminating in a street fight. The troops were called in and martial law was proclaimed.³³ Warrants were issued for the arrest for treason of 26 principal Patriote leaders. Some, including Papineau managed to flee. Further skirmishes and a little bloodshed ensued. The rebellion ended as the rest of the province heeded the voice of the bishops and stayed quiet.

An assessment of the 1837-1838 rebellion shows it to be a rural phenomenon, localized and divorced from the cities, which provided more fertile ground for the seeds of revolution. Yet Groulx viewed the uprising as significant. It was an awakening event as the French Canadians often accused of political backwardness, "heard the call to freedom and political emancipation" sooner than peoples in other provinces.³⁴ Vallières is more critical of the Patriote movement. Eloquence masked the class interests of its leaders. The Patriotes, he said, had no intention of creating a popular revolution but rather had wanted control of trade. The failure of the insurrection and the many sentences of ex-communication handed down to the rebels by the submissive turncoat clergy struck a severe blow to the hopes of the habitants. The failure became to be interpreted as a sort of fatalistic resignation to the will of G-d. Vallières reaffirms his class-based explanation of the events. The English decided to co-opt the petty bourgeoisie by meeting some of the Patriot demands after the rebellion. The French petty bourgeoisie reconciled with the clergy as the English granted "responsible government" to both Ontario and Quebec.³⁵

Concluding Synthesis

Whether one can really make relevant comparisons on a chronological scale is a matter of debate. Yet it is difficult to ignore events and the people who play them out. Is there not, when looking through a nationalist lens, an undeniable parallel between the attributed martyrdom of Dollard des Ormeaux, bloodied at the hands of an indigenous Iroquois force on the one hand and Piet Retief also thrust into the annals of hero worship by his fatal misfortune at the spears of the Zulus on the other? Writing names in the pearly book of martyrdom and subscribing to a growing list of folk heroes in itself presupposes some primitive form at least of group solidarity. And if the writers and subscribers are ethnically oriented and if their writings and subscriptions command popular appeal, their created myth or folk-like nationalist stories cannot be devoid of all truth. It is really not the aim to make Andries Pretorius an ideological clone of Joseph Papineau. Their struggles need not be seen in a narrow and specific comparison of events; rather they should be seen as proud ethnically conscious (perhaps latent and subconscious) figures united in a pioneering spirit,

grappling to build for themselves a place in a foreign and harsh new world. While a confrontation with the colonial British State took the form of a rebellion in Lower Canada, disengagement through a mass exodus characterised inter-ethnic conflict in the Cape.

One has to admit to the anti-imperialist factor of a growing national sentiment. Perhaps the conquests in both lands merely replaced one colonial ruler with another. Yet differing values of the two Euro-fragments quite evidently created societal strains. Contact between different languages, cultures and values would eventually develop into contact between two conscious ethnicities. A liberally disposed British strata bent on dominating an isolated feudal (in New France) and Calvinist (in South Africa) strata could only lead to conflict. And though the nature of constitutional development and the structure of these respective societies differ in accordance with pioneering developments, there is a common theme. Riel, Pretorius or Potgieter. A "half breed deranged" French Canadian métis being seen in the same light as a Voortrekker pioneer. Stranger comparisons have been made. Fleeing on the heels of an encroaching British imperialism, trying to retain an independence of spirit and of territory and preaching or declaring autonomy can surprisingly demonstrate a brotherhood of purpose in the face of a common 'enemy'.

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CHAPTER II:

THE CHOSEN PEOPLE:

A Mission Toward Salvation
The Catholic Church and the Dutch Reformed
Church in French Canada and South Africa

Religious doctrine, customs, beliefs and institutional mechanisms are all significantly part and parcel of a developing national consciousness in both South Africa and French Canada. This chapter seeks to highlight the spiritual elements within both societies in-so-far as they relate to national development. The ideological origins of each society are explored as are driving religious influences aimed at strengthening the bonds between Church and State. The fragmented nature of these new societies are examined in terms of ideological continuity or discontinuity with the 'mother' country. One is asked to observe the manner in which religion is forced to adapt to the harshness of a new environment. This adaptation often takes the form of a civil religion in which historical truth is often doctored so as to serve the interests of religious conformity. The Afrikaners and French Canadians are prone to reinterpretation of their respective histories, goals and orientations. The Bible is frequently brought in for support.

Institutional religion perhaps forms the foundation of both societies. This chapter, while limited in scope due to the enormity of this subject, seeks to outline the orientation and pervasiveness of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa and French Canada respectively. While making certain so as not to equate vastly different religious doctrines, this chapter does, however, attempt to reveal the similarities in-so-far as institutionalized religion has contributed to group enclosure and the preservation of each societies' cultural assets. The struggle here between Church and State then is undoubtedly relevant.

Finally, this chapter concentrates upon self conceptions in the sense that each fragmented group perceived itself to be a product of Divine creation, with a calling as a select nation in the midst of a heathen population. Again the Bible was called in to support this consciousness which was innately deterministic in that each 'nation' saw itself as having to fulfil a predetermined mission. In brief, this chapter's main objective is to demonstrate the importance of religion in-so-far as it fosters group consciousness both ideologically and institutionally. With the movement of time, one is asked to extrapolate this consciousness to within the parameters of nationalism.

South Africa: The Calvinist Mission, The D.R.C. and The Social Structure of the Rural Dorpe

When the Voortrekker forces led by Andries Pretorius overcame tremendous odds and quashed Dingaan and his Zulu warriors at Blood River, the covenant between the Afrikaner people and God came into being. It was to become a central focal point in the Afrikaner civic religion. It is pointless, however, to analyze the civic religion of Christian Nationalism without first examining the ideological roots which imbued the Boer pioneers with an uncompromising faith.

The Afrikaner people was born from a Christian society spurred to independence by the Reformed Church which possessed considerable influence. Church disputes had resulted in Calvinist victory. Yet the intolerance of the Church did not carry over to the civil authorities. The Dutch Republic became a 'seedbed of the rational spirit which was to flower in the European Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century'. The Dutch Reformed Church, however, played a more dominant role in the shaping of the Afrikaner people than did the civil authorities. Reformed congregations were established 'at Cape Town (1665), Stellenbosch (1686), Drakenstein (1691), Roodezand (1743), Swartland (1745), and Graaff-Reinet (1792)'. The Reformed ministers were company employees while the church council presidents were senior company officials.¹ The church establishment was, thus, in a sense a branch of the government. The colonial churches adhered to primitive Calvinism and to doctrines emphasizing the Old Testament, predestination, and rejection of emotionalism and an embryonic nationalism, particular to the harsh environment. The Afrikaners perceived themselves and their place in the world, not to mention their relations with others in a Calvinist mould.²

De Klerk speaks of the isolation of the frontier Boer remarking that despite the minimal free intellectual discussion with regard to religion, the Calvinist tradition had remained alive.³ The confession of Dort had been reduced to its own basic essentials emphasizing the pervasiveness and supremacy in all spheres, of the world of God. Calvin believed that 'man's utter dependence on

Grace, Divine election and Christian liberty were at the heart of human existence'. Calvin did acknowledge the independence and governing jurisdiction of civil authority yet the Divine was the supreme authority and was not to be opposed. Calvin's insistence, therefore, that Church and State each have their fields of operation constituting autonomous behaviour was not to imply a separation of the two in a sense of their being sealed off from one another. It means that each had its own particular function in 'the wider concept of the Christian religion.'⁴ The State had no spiritual authority over the Church while the latter had a particular political mission.

Adam interprets Calvinism as making a two class distinction between the elect and the damned. He argues that the relatively decentralized organisation of the Calvinist churches would be expected to be more responsive to new needs as compared to highly centralized churches such as the Roman-Catholic Church. Yet he admits in the same breath that even such rigid organisational structures as Catholicism have relaxed sacred rules in the light of new circumstances.⁵ He is here distinguishing between the authority of the centralized Roman Catholic Church which gave natives a certain protection in law against settler rule absent in Protestant settlements. The specific organisational form of religious praxis was far more important than the doctrinal content of the religion thereby acknowledging that no religion stood immune to changing socio-economic processes. Such a realisation makes comparisons far less irrelevant.

O'Meara, Bloomberg and Moodie stress as well the significant influence of Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper in fostering Dutch Reformed theology and the Afrikaner civil religion. Kuyper, a Reformed Church minister, opposed growing liberalism and pushed for Christian education. He viewed the State as the institutional embodiment of God's sovereignty.⁶ Furthermore, he did not see the State in a totalitarian light; rather each sphere of social life was to exist independently of the State and of the other spheres being subject only to God. Education belonged to the sphere of the family and consequently he viewed State denial of the right to

teach doctrine in public Schools as a challenge to the authority of the family.⁷ Kuyperian doctrine of God's sovereignty in all spheres made it possible for church ministers to take temporary leave of absence from the pulpit to serve God in parliament. Furthermore the distinction between volkspolitiek and party-politic facilitated the adoption of the full civil faith by volkskerk adherents.⁸

Kuyper proposed an up-dated Calvinism in the form of Christian nationalism. He believed that Boer possession of South Africa was inevitable if they never abandoned the Reformed faith of their fathers. Afrikaners embraced his theology but also a right wing legacy. Potchefstroom University was modelled on the Free University in Amsterdam founded by Kuyper.⁹ Potch. (abbrev.) is significant in that it nurtured the Christian nationalist ideology and produced a theocratic élite which would later build up the Afrikaner Broederbond, an élitist nationalist fraternity. Afrikaner nationalist theologians viewed Calvinism as a 'worldly' and 'open' doctrine thus permitting it to incorporate valid features of other doctrines (ie. nationalism).¹⁰ These theologians proposed the Afrikanerisation of South Africa on Christian nationalist lines. By invoking the Old Testament, it was reasoned that each nation had its own particular mission. That of the Afrikaner was to rule, to Christianise and to civilise. Thus any subversion of nationality was deemed a subversion of God.

Nationalism came to be a religious obligation. This ideal equating the maintenance of the volk with accepting God's will and disposition came close to revering the nation in place of God.¹¹ Afrikaner religious thought married the Bible with race. The Church was seen as an organ of nationalist upliftment. Afrikaner Calvinists did not subordinate themselves to the State but rather attempted to be vanguards in the Nationalist movement. The Church attempted to Christianise the nationalist movement.¹² Afrikaner Christian Nationalism with its strongly based Kuyperian element equated Calvinism with political conservatism. Pragmatically this entailed the confessionalization of society by a network of Calvinist bodies in the secular area.¹³ The Kuyperian notion of self isolation was a means of preserving identity and of defending a threatened system of values. This is a baseline and one on which

parallels with the ecclesiastical institutions of Quebec can be made.

The absolute sovereignty of God in every sphere, as put forth by the Gereformeerde Kerk with its Kuyperian theological outlook, stressed the organic relationship between 'people' and church. This made Afrikaner nationalism synonymous with Christian nationalism.¹⁴ Christian nationalism preached Divinely ordained national differences. Its strong kultuurpolitiek emphasis attempted to confront the intense cultural, class and political divisions present within Afrikaner circles. The primordial struggle to attain Afrikaner cultural unity and to combat the severe poor white problem and its subsequent denationalization of urban Afrikaners took root with the formation of the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB). This cultural organization cum secret brotherhood strove to foster a truly Christian National Society defined in culturally exclusive terms, "an exclusivity fired in past struggle and destined to be realised in a republican nirvana."¹⁵ Although Christian nationalism had not yet entered the popular consciousness at the start of the century, the AB and its politico-eco-cultural offshoots would serve the cause of 'volkseenheid' by infiltrating all aspects of Afrikaner life and bonding them 'chemically' into a Christian nationalist organism.

The activities of the Bond were largely driven by religious enthusiasm. Members had to be professing Christians; the Afrikaans language was viewed as God-given cultivating a distinctive Afrikaner outlook rooted in the religion and the history of the people to be attained by an all-embracing programme of popular education.¹⁶ Christian National Education aimed to restore the influence of the Church over the youth by securing the principle of confessional religious instruction in the schools, it was also to protect those minds from the dominant Anglo culture.¹⁷

Turning Afrikaner minds inwards towards their own 'natural' traditions and way of life can be seen in the work of S.J. du Toit entitled 'Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk'. This first Afrikaans historical account portrayed the Afrikaner Boer as a hero, a romantic folklike pioneer central to the development of

the country. It was to serve as a good foundation for a nationalist mythology which was to develop with time. Du Toit's unpopularity in ecclesiastical circles stemmed from his austere neo-Calvinism together with his support for Afrikaans as the language of worship. The former preached predestination and proclaimed as a rule of church government the autonomy of the individual congregation against the over-riding authority of the central synod. This drew the wrath of moderate Calvinists in the Cape Dutch Reformed Church who regarded their orthodoxy to have been vindicated by their successful opposition to modernist trends. For the creators of the Bond, there was a clear connection between the idea of decentralized church government and the principle of extreme decentralization on which the 'society' was to be based.¹⁸ Afrikaner civil religion held the Boer nation as an "elect" people. Separate nationhood replaced separate race, nations being the product of Divine will.¹⁹ The northern republics of the Free State and Transvaal had developed a concept of themselves as a chosen people using the precepts of the Old Testament. This became legislated in the sense that they saw themselves as a separate group superior to the non-whites.²⁰ Mingling with these Canaanites (Ham) was forbidden. Interpretation of their historical plight and particularly the Great Trek was seen in the light of the ancient Israelites fleeing the oppression of their Egyptian masters, wandering in the desert and forging a covenant with God as his elect. Collective Afrikaner nationalism became directly related to a greater interest in the national past. Unity was projected into firmly isolated events of history embodied in a national myth. History was recruited in the service of nationalism.²¹ The Great Trek became a central theme depicting the spread of the Afrikaner nation. The Trekkers had not left an English colony but rather their fatherland emigrating to another corner of their homeland.²² The "religious calling" of this "chosen" people idealized Afrikaner leaders in the history of the nation. The Afrikaner was to open up the interior for civilization and Christianity as well as the propagation of the Gospel among the heathens.²³

The chosen people image of the Boer was expressed by such influential and key leaders as Malan. Suggesting that Afrikaner history reveals a determination and definiteness of purpose, one

can but only feel Afrikanerdom as willed by God. The Divine right to be Afrikaners predestined and elected was imbued with a Calvinist sense of personal responsibility and discipline.²⁴

De Klerk elaborates in the Old Testament and its use in serving to justify separation and in particular, national separateness. Scripture was called upon to show that as God had given the various nations their separate existence, so it was that they should remain so. Deuteronomy 32:8 states:

"When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance
when he divided the sons of man
he fixed their bounds according to the numbers of the sons of
God ..."

Acts 17:26 states:

"From one single stock he not only created the whole human
race so that they could occupy the entire earth, but he
decreed how long each nation should flourish and what the
boundaries of its territory should be."

There was, above all, the building of the Tower of Babel in the book of Genesis II which spoke of men attempting to preserve the unity and homogeneity of the human race; by confusing the tongues of the builders, God sabotaged their sinful plans. Consequently, he then ordained the division and distribution of nations over all the earth.²⁵ This is invoked by nationalists in support of apartheid signifying, they say, God's desire to preserve a pluri-racial, pluri-cultural, polyglot world.

The primitive Calvinism of the Afrikaner became embodied in the Heidelberg catechism and the decrees of the Synod of Dort. These held that all men were depraved totally and that God had unconditionally elected a few to salvation. The atonement of Christ was limited to these few. A sovereign God and the intrinsic sinfulness of man (as a result of the falls) was emphasized. Predestination had ordained the elect to be saved while condemning the non-elect to eternal damnation.²⁶

John M'Carter, a Calvinist minister, wrote of the Afrikaners in 1869, 'The Word of God in the Old Testament has been to them not

only a means of Grace, but in a sense what it was to the Israelites of Old, the means, in times of social dilapidation, of preserving and keeping them alive as a people. It had been their bond of union, their code of manners, their motive to educate their children when none other existed.²⁷

The Afrikaners lived on isolated farms in the rural hinterland and for them the Bible, the Heidelberg catechism and the Book of Psalms served as their sole sources of knowledge.²⁸ The Boer's struggle to survive in a harsh environment and to preserve his identity in the face of racial and cultural extinction was interpreted as a way of preserving God's kingdom on earth. Of the trekboers and their social structure, Crapanzano states, that given their isolation and later the isolation of the Voortrekkers, their world view and religious outlook may well have 'regressed' to a more primitive theological and biblical understanding, 'one in which the dualisms of Calvinism, of Christianity itself were given great importance.' He goes on to assess that 'such reversions to basic unelaborated structural contrasts (of the elect and non-elect, of the order of grace and of nature, of the faces of good and evil) are not infrequent in isolated areas and among those who live in harsh and stressful environments'. To apply this anthropological analysis to rural Quebec would not be a leap of any form but rather obviously relevant.²⁹

The social institutional structure of the Afrikaner in the rural hinterland and initially in the Boer Republics consisted of a self-contained volk living in isolated pockets on their widely scattered farms. They would come together infrequently perhaps only at quarterly intervals for the Lord's supper (Nagmaal). It was viewed as a natural precaution fostering group survival at a time when frontiers shifted and state institutions were relatively unsettled.³⁰ The Boer way of life can be seen then as primitive patriarchalism; the family heads claimed personal independence and arbitrary authority in their 'domestic' affairs. A spirit of autocratic self-reliance untempered by a weak government over a far flung and sparsely settled colony had conditioned the isolated frontier farmers into 'natural anarchists' in their relations with the outside world. Distrusting external authority, they often

found it difficult to even cooperate with their peers or neighbours in projects of common interest. Defense of small scale authoritarianism in the 'family' unit was sacrosanct. Constituted authority was rejected as ineffective and intrusive upon their customary ways of maintaining discipline.³¹

Du Toit recounts the development of small villagers or dorpe mostly centred around the DRC containing a few traders, a school and occasionally a local bank. The 1840's saw major social institutions like the church establishing a more effective presence outside the few older towns. By 1850, there were forty-five dorpe in the Cape Colony, only a few with a population exceeding a thousand. The DRC congregations numbered forty-nine in 1854 as compared to fourteen in 1824.³²

Crapanzano's anthropological analysis of a typical Afrikaner community reveals the 'kerk' to be the spiritual, social, cultural, in many respects the material, and undoubtedly the symbolic centre of the Afrikaner community. Membership in one of the three closely related Dutch Reformed Churches was an essential prerequisite for membership in the Afrikaner community. Thus, it was impossible to separate the Afrikaner from his religion. Ninety percent of all white Afrikaans speakers were members of the Dutch Reformed Church.³³

The dominee is the most highly respected and most influential member of the community. He sits on the school board and is rumoured to be a Broeder aided by twelve deacons who are responsible for church collection and by twelve elders responsible for the spiritual welfare of designated sections of the parish, they conduct weekly prayer meetings. The dominee visits anyone in difficulty, and so has a social worker at his disposal. This ensures that parishioners not have the opportunity to escape the vigilance of the church. Ex-DRC parishioners have complained that the minister and the church are too conservatively rigid, critical and overly judgemental with regard to individual lifestyle preferences.³⁴

The dominating role of religion in the life of the Dutch colonists and the high prestige of the clergy painted the Dutch Reformed Church as defender and cherisher of Afrikanerdom. Yet in the first two centuries after settlement, the church lacked sufficient ministers and actually opposed the Trekkers regarding their venture as one without a Moses. No minister accompanied the adventurers until a decade later. The Dutch Reformed Church, however, was instrumental in contributing to the failure of British anglicization policies. It stood at the forefront in the fight to gain official recognition for the Dutch language in the 1880's having already established a Theological College in Stellenbosch over two decades earlier. The church did set up schools for the training of Dutch teachers yet it did not follow up its "lost sheep" until British rule was extended to Natal (1843) and the Orange Free State (1848). The Transvaalers, regarded as the more unruly elements of the Trekkers, came to see the Cape church as a collaborationist institution and therefore rejected its jurisdiction.³⁵ This facilitated the splinter churches, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika (N.H.K.) and the Doppers church (G.K.). Holding the banner of Calvinism high in all spheres and standing against alien influences, the G.K. stood as the vanguard in the triumph of 17th century orthodoxy over nineteenth century liberalism. Like the Catholic church in Quebec, the Dutch Reformed Church became representative of a society battling to preserve its traditions, beliefs and general way of life. By the start of the twentieth century, the D.R.C. had become firmly entrenched as the leaders of the Boer nation pioneering Dutch education and championing the Dutch language. It was only in 1919 that the N.G.K. finally accepted Afrikaans as its official language.³⁶ The D.R.C.'s political fight for language and group survival, its encouragement of old style Boer family life with strong paternal authority, its original anti-urbanisation and pro-land rehabilitation outlook, and its denouncement of trade unions;³⁷ this orientation of the church as in French Canada, came to be seen as ambiguous with regard to the development of nationalism. Despite its cultural orthodoxy and isolationist view, the D.R.C. was seen by many particularly the new urban proletariat and intelligentsia as detrimental to nationalist development. The D.R.C.'s inability to adapt to the prevailing realities of

industrialisation led the Carnegie Poor White Commission (1929-1932) to blame the church for ultra conservatism which loosened the bond between those degenerate poor whites and their church and people. Furthermore, there was a tendency of the church to look on poverty as "part of God's planState thereafter." It encouraged dependency and pauperism. The urban proletariat viewed the church as representing only the affluent sectors of society. Its opposition to trade unions and its maintenance of the status quo approach in the economic sphere by preaching return to an ideal past was largely condemned by some sectors of the Afrikaner population.³⁸

Brady sees the Dutch Reformed Church as having encouraged nationalism. He credits the predikant of the D.R.C. with having taught and instilled the isolated and conservative platteland farmers with a "distrust and fear of British influence; whether peaceful or militant, as a force which menaced the entrenched customs of their lives and that rugged independence developed when their forefathers had trekked and fought northward across the coastal mountain ranges."³⁹

French Canada: The Catholic Mission, The R.C.C. and The Social Structure of the Rural Parish

Brady, in his discussion of nationalism and parties, goes on to compare the Dutch Reformed Church in the Afrikaner community with the Roman Catholic Church in French Canada. Both, he professes, "played a distinguished role in sustaining the elements of nationality." Though admitting that the D.R.C. was less exclusive citing its intimate links with the Protestantism of the English speaking world, Brady states that it has been only a little less traditionalist than its French Canadian counterparts; it too has for generations "exhorted" its congregations to cling to their cultural identity and to let the past sustain its grip. Taking advantage of a society relatively simple and isolated, clerical leadership has been very influential fostering national fidelity.⁴⁰ Throughout the French régime, the Catholic church, though independent in doctrinal matters, remained under strict state control. Ironically, with the British conquest, the church enjoyed far more independence than previously. It also became a rallying

point for the defence of French Catholic culture. This involved closing ranks, repelling the intrusion of alien ideals and clinging to the past so as to stress cultural identity. The conservatism and traditionalism of the fragment hardened while concentrating in the hands of the clergy the "full force of an authoritarian heritage previously shared with secular officials." Thus the political, social and religious expansion of the church reaffirmed its central stature in French Canada.⁴¹

The reverberations of their religio-ideological struggles in 17th century France may serve to illuminate the ideological nature of its fragments. The Catholic Renaissance accompanied the proliferation of religious communities. The religious revival gave rise to theological-political contests between capital Jansenists and Jesuits who opposed one another on the question of grace; the Jansenists were close to the followers of Calvin asserting that man's state was utterly dependent on the will of God. The Jesuits held that it came to man by its own free will to secure salvation. The Jansenists rejected the alliance between Catholicism and worldly power. The Jesuits accepted these compromises and were taken aback by the severe morality of the Jansenists, so much as to arrange for their condemnation by the pope and king.⁴² The Jansenist movement with its mysticism, austerity and proselytism attempted a foothold in new France.

The dominant ideology expressed itself in three main isms: absolutism, Gallicanism and mercantilism. The first founded kingly legitimacy on divine right despite in practice initiating the progressive secularization of the temporal power. Kingly absolutism came to be, under Louis XIV, a justification for tyranny and arbitrariness in the Rousseauian sense. His sovereignty was sacred. The state's interest were of priority and so the clergy would be at the king's service. Richelieu attempted to reconcile Christian morality and this immunity of government by dressing the latter in the cloak of the former.

For Boussuet, another theoretician of absolute monarchy, "nothing was more opposed to genuine Christianity than the spirit of revolt." He stressed order and legitimacy of established power as

well as the themes of obedience and submission. These themes would have a profound influence on the clergy and bishops of New France. Boussuet's Gallican doctrine also gained much ground. It held that Divine ordinance dictated that kings were not subject to ecclesiastical power in temporal matters; the latter, it added, were not exempt from obedience they owed to the monarch. This doctrine in effect, aimed to check theocratic tendencies. Opposing this outlook were the Ultramontanist who believed in the pope's supremacy over princes. The pope had the right to intervene in the temporal business of the sovereigns. The clergy must be independent of the royal powers. The royal power was an earthly institution and not directly Divine. The Gallicans argued that the king was the sovereign master of the church, and only God was his superior. This movement led to the creation of "national" churches subject to royal authority.⁴³ These two significant ecclesiastical disputes between Jesuit and Jansenists, and the struggle between Gallican and Ultramontane were to leave their mark on the colony. Wade states that despite the dominance of the Jesuits in New France, the ascetic and pietistic influence of Jansen was felt through the close connections of the religious in Quebec and Montreal with their mother houses in France. Therefore, he sums up, "French Canadian Catholicism has ever since had a strain of Jansenism in it."⁴⁴

With regard to Gallicanism, two of Boussuet's four fundamentals were reversed in the colony. Under the Jesuits and Bishop Laval, the spiritual power came close to dominating the civil one while the authority of the pope was deemed supreme even over the national church. Unlike in France, Ultramontanism triumphed in New France and ever since, "French Canada has remained a stronghold of clericalism and very conscious of its spiritual dependence upon the Holy See."⁴⁵

The role of the Catholic church in fostering nationalism is a matter of contention and debate. There are those that view the survival of a French Canadian Catholic culture as attributed to clerical policies and political power; isolationist and traditional, and clerically dominated parishes stressed language and religion and the unique cultural mission of the French Canadian

people. On the other side, there are those who curse and accuse the church for its backward inward looking approach which prevented French Canadian progress and so kept them in a state of submission and relative inferiority.

The spiritual authority of the church was unchallenged. Its economic resources were considerable and its jurisdiction included providing education, health care services, and welfare support. Furthermore, its ideological coherence and bureaucratic capacity translated into political power. One could say then that it contributed to the retardation of Quebec's social, political, and economic development. The 1774 Quebec Act which made the Catholic church the cornerstone of the colonial state also protected the cultural autonomy of the French. The church accommodated the Crown as evidenced in its denunciation of the 1837 uprising. However, when the Union Act of 1840 was passed creating an Anglo majority of seats and forbidding the use of French in the legislative assembly, there came strong opposition from the church hierarchy. Thus the dual role of the church in supporting the colonial regime in exchange for the protection of French cultural integrity consolidated clerical dominance over the population. The church hierarchy preached "La survivance". Church education prevented rather than encouraged education.⁴⁶ It reproduced the non-competitive position of the Francophone vis-à-vis the English. The religious agrarian mission of the French Canadian was emphasized. The church became a major integrating factor in French Canadian society during the period of settlement acting on behalf of the state and commercial interests. It exercised a monopoly over migration, ran the schools and hospitals, provided welfare functions and performed quasi-legal services. The conquest actually augmented and consolidated the place of the church. The withdrawal of government and economic leaders left the church firmly in control. The church projected the nation's missionary purpose in a continent hostile to Catholicism.⁴⁷ It did serve as a bulwark against the forces of anglicization.

Nevitte proposes conditions whereby the religious factor is contributive to nationalism. One such condition is where the national minority differs from the dominant state culture by

religion. A second is where the national church has the institutional capacity to speak for the nation; while the last is where religious values make up an important part of the culture in question.⁴⁸

Traditional Quebecois society smudged the line between religion and politics. State infrastructure was undeveloped, remote and unpopular leaving the national churches as one of the few institutions capable of speaking to the nation. The national churches provided the opportunity for social mobility within the nation spawning a national clerical élite. The church's strategic position linking the dominant state culture to the national minority made it dependent on both external links with the state as well as internal support from the national community.⁴⁹ The Roman Catholic Church saw no serious secular challenges. To keep the people French was to keep them Catholic. The village church became a symbol of social unity.⁵⁰

Bergeron is more sceptical with regard to the positive role of the church in fostering nationalism. He insinuates that the church is merely trying to preserve its monopoly on power by fabricating myths hailing the Canayens as a chosen people called upon to convert the world. It is predictable then that one of a socialist persuasion, as is Bergeron, would interpret an institution preaching glorification of the farm and vocations of the Canayens (as missionary, civilizer and farmer) as a bourgeois exploiter bent on keeping a nation perpetually in a state of medieval darkness.⁵¹ The church's hold on the people became even more pronounced after the failed rebellion of 1837. The clergy, at this time, began to realise the power of nationalism and its mobilising (or demobilising) value. Contrary to historian Garneau who credits the clergy with the preservation and survival of the Canayens, Bergeron accuses the clerical élite of national betrayal in an effort to retain a monopoly on power. Poet Cremazie also argues along the line of Garneau stressing language and religion as the guardians of French Canadian nationality.⁵²

Bergeron is extremely critical of this clerical nationalism which overshadowed and alienated the revolutionary nationalism of the

rebellion. He describes it as a conservative, reactionary, monarchist nationalism looking to the past; it is the nationalism which promoted the myth of a chosen people. The paternalism of the clergy was ingrained with the nationalism steeped in reactionary Catholicism. It attempted furthermore, to awaken an allegiance to a mother country long rejected so as to stunt the growth of self-reliance and Canayens anti-colonial identification. The church aristocracy preached obedience and submission to Divine right.⁵³

This nationalism laced with Ultramontanism rejected compromise with modern freedom and reconciliation with liberalism. For them, the religious sphere was bound to the secular so that social legislation rested on the precept of the church. They rejected everything that had come out of the French Revolution. Bishop Bourget saw the advantages for his church, after 1837, of using nationalist arguments to win the people's confidence and "gently, discreetly, tell them their duty." This Ultramontanist nationalism combining nation and faith was clearly articulated by Bishop Laflèche when he stated, "The faith will be the cement of the nation." Bourget put forward a cultural nationalism which was conservative and defensive; it was guided by the slogan, "our institutions, our language, our rights."⁵⁴

Bishop Laflèche of Trois Rivières was yet another propagator of Ultramontanist nationalism. He saw nations and societies as being built and guided by Providence; the family was seen as inherently Divine. He states, "the family is but the nation in the seed, writ small, and the nation is the family writ large." He reiterated the authority of government as being Divine and so held that the government had responsibilities towards the church and could not be neutral in the religious sphere. Laflèche condemned modern society as well as state education of the children. The government, he proposed, should pass laws, "to ensure respect for Divine law, the sole interpreter of which would be the church." The state would have to be Catholic. The ideological idealisation of the feudal past of New France, the assertion that agriculture was a guarantor of prosperity, the extolment of French Canadian society as a model of civilization and the rejection of industrialization and materialistic cosmopolitanism formed the crust of this nationalism.

The aim was the creation of a clerical society anchored in a Catholic nationality.⁵⁵ The clergy élite preached cultural nationalism and the defensive nationalism of survival. Religion was the primary national characteristic and served as an institutional base. Thus, by the development of a system of confessionalised schools, the defence of the language became secondary to the defence of the faith.⁵⁶

"Every nation must fulfil its own destiny, as set by Providence. It must understand its mission fully and strive constantly towards the goal Divine Providence has assigned it."

There is no denying the similarities in religio-nationalist outlook between our two societies as one reads the above principle of nationalities put forward in 1866 by the renowned Mgr. Laflèche. Evoking Holy Texts, Laflèche concludes unequivocally that the dispersion of man, and the confusion of his language by God forced him to separate into family units and linguistic groups who so ventured to found new homelands elsewhere. Thus, nationalities were of Divine creation and their journeys and consequent settlement of lands were likewise God-sent. According to Laflèche, the Divine blueprint had it that each nation fulfil a special mission as predetermined. Deviation from this righteous path would invoke the anger of the Lord.⁵⁷

The Old Testament is made use of to support the concept of national territory suggesting that each nation was led, "as if by an invisible hand" towards the country it was meant to live in. The vocation of Abram is set out in the Scriptures:

"And the Lord said to Abram: Go forth out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and out of thy father's house, and come into the land which I shall show thee. And I will make of thee a great nation...So Abram went out as the Lord had commanded him...into the land of Canaan...And the Lord appeared to Abram and said to him: To thy seed will I give this land...Lift up thine eyes, and look from the place wherein thou art, to the North and to the South, to the East and to the West. All the

land which thou seest, I will give to thee, and to thy seed forever. And I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth; if any man be able to number the dust of the earth, he shall be able to number thy seed also."

The judgment of prevaricating races by the Divine and the destruction of the Canaanites and the promise of their land to Abram reveals that the unrighteous nation will, if unheeding to virtue and piety, incur the wrath and punishment of the Almighty.⁵⁸ Each nation had its own particular calling and would succeed if remaining so faithful. However restricted to its territory, God would protect it even if it be surrounded by more powerful and ambitious nations. Thus the fate of the French Canadian nation was in its own hands. Those few families who had come to settle on the banks of the St. Lawrence were two centuries later to number a million souls. Providence had brought the enlightenment of the Scriptures and the principles of Christian revival. As it said in the Bible: "There I shall make your posterity multiply like the stars in the skies, so that the number of your descendants may equal that of the sands on the sea-shore." Laflèche attributes the noble accomplishment of his forbearer's mission to the heroic and glorious accounts of French Canadian history.⁵⁹

Laflèche puts forward a religio-historical account, backward looking and in the service of nationalism. Casting the hand of Providence, he traces the settlement, giving "evidence" of the sacred mission, the "striking" resemblance between Jacques Cartier and Abraham the Patriarch, Divine selection of the first settlers as well as the inspirational influence of missionaries at the inception of the French Canadian nation. The mission of the French Canadian nation, he states, is religious in nature; "It is, namely, to convert the unfortunate infidel local population to Catholicism, and to expand the Kingdom of God by developing a predominantly Catholic nationality."⁶⁰ Mgr. Paquet, in his sermon on the vocation of the French race, confirms this religious and civilising mission notion. Furthermore, he holds that the mission is less to handle capital than to stimulate ideas; less to light the furnaces of factories than to maintain and spread the glowing fires of religion and thought, and to help them cast their light into the distance.

And of his dispersed brethren in Western Canada, Villeneuve speaks of French of the Diaspora.⁶¹ The French race of Canada is compared to a modern day Israel in the midst of an emerging Babylon.⁶² Canon Lionel Groulx perhaps best conveys the spiritual calling of the race. He recounts the story of an anglicised French Canadian lawyer, alienated in lifestyle from his own people, until ceased by a desire to play a more important role in life. Awakened by a stirring nostalgia for the past deep within him, this lost soul began to realise that the loss of his love for the nation had left his heart dry and barren. Distressed by the disintegration of his moral fibre, he sought the help of one Father Fabien. Aiming to reveal the truth, Father Fabien directed him to French culture thus restoring his wholeness of being. His nostalgia for his upbringing and family surroundings, however, persisted. Returning to his roots and village, he came into contact "with the very soul of a very fine and sensitive race, governed by spiritual values and drawn by higher things." His full recovery of his French soul, however, came at the ancient parish cemetery alongside the river banks, where he rediscovered his forefathers and renewed his allegiance to them. Vowing to pursue a Christian future for his children and to return them to their first education, this newly enlightened soul went on to plead the profound affinity existing between the French race and Catholicism.⁶³

Separate development between ethnic fragments in pre-industrial Canada derived its practical existence from the ideological traditions and inherited social structures particular to each ethnic composition. A seigneurial system in new France formed the implanted feudal structure which was to preserve the isolationism and traditionalism of French Canadian society. As stressed above, the church was directly involved in governing the colony. The parish became the social, political as well as religious unit at the local level. It was governed by an elected council of which the parish priest acted as chairman. It consisted of an integrated authority, highly paternalistic and non-participatory. It was neither tyrannical nor democratic. The parish was free of direct confrontation with Anglo-American culture rapidly developing in the South.⁶⁴ The rural parish had a self-sufficient economy, isolated from the urban influences and commerce. The agrarian myth

distinguished French Canada as a separate culture. Despite economic shifts, farming maintained its dominant rôle at the fulcrum of French Canadian society. The parished council had an aversion to post-elementary education viewing it as corruptive towards accepted norms. Tenacious family ties made the family farm a physical and symbolic focal point. Furthermore, the strong Catholic faith supported the local curé's influential position with titles granting him authority over local affairs including education.⁶⁵

Vallières sees the clergy and in particular, the higher clergy as a self-complacent nobility, organised into parishes and bent on leading a resigned collectivity down the path to "redemption". The clergy created elementary schools and classical colleges, defined ideology and indoctrinated its followers into submissiveness. Their vocation was to bear poverty, hard labour and isolation with patience; and soul-saving would be the ever-lasting reward.⁶⁶ He furthermore, accuses the clergy of falsifying history to idealise the life of the habitants under the French régime. The church was but a propaganda disseminating institution which through its doctrines maintained and propagated the passivity of the masses. It was an instrument to give the poor subjugated masses an escape instead of preaching action and the up-rooting of the exploitative capitalist system. The church preached equality and salvation but only a few were chosen; the poor would be the first in heaven. Action, he states is not a word which the reactionary nature of the church preaches.⁶⁷ The liberation theology socialist approach of Vallières displays the roots of a more liberal secular nationalism aimed at mobilising the masses according to egalitarian humanist ideals rather than retrospective, collective, ethnically-based ones.

Guindon describes the social organisation of Quebec prior to massive industrialisation as consisting of subsistence farming by land-holding families grouped in parishes. The parish was indeed the pivot of rural organisation. As such, Quebec became a complex of these localised expanding communities. The economic and social relations of the majority of its population existed completely within its limits. The parish grouped the local habitants; the

land-holding families tilled the soil and were settled in the rungs of the parish. In the villages, the retired farmers, the local small businessmen, a few professionals and the parish priest settled near the church together. This local rural bourgeois linked the local community with others like it thus strengthening supra parochial institutions of business, politics and religion. The local bourgeois was clerically created and the avenues of social promotion were clerically controlled. Thus politics, with its territorial basis for representative governments, strengthened the importance of the parishes. Invoking the wrath of God, the fear of hell, and the threat of ex-communication, the clergy became an indispensable ally to the competing bourgeois cliques vying to gain support of the local population. The clerical conception of the world was that their control was natural and in accordance with God. A healthy society, uncorrupted by the evils of 19th century modernism with its doctrine of separation of church and state, became their cherished ideals.⁶⁸

Bourassa commenting on the role of the clergy in fostering patriotism credits the clerical élite with preserving French Canadian loyalty to the faith, language, traditions, love of the land, and the spirit of unity and of passive resistance - "the only kind then possible". Though admitting to the political and variable nature of the clergy with regard to the wars of the Empire and the 1837 rebellion to mention just two, he stresses that unless history is ignored or read idly, the "clergy's role was at once firm, reconciling, well-informed, and deeply patriotic."⁶⁹ The responsibilities and duties of the parish priest included preaching, instructing the young, stimulating religious practices, exercising control over public morality and matrimonial discipline, engendering respect for the confessional, as well as setting a personal example of piety and temperance. They were also to ensure collection of the tithes as well as co-ordinating and undertaking educational tasks.⁷⁰

Jaenen concludes that the parish priests were never really able to establish themselves as undisputed leaders in the parishes or seigneuries. They did speak out on a variety of issues from the pulpit yet they were unable to coerce the colonists into obedient

submission when the latter were unconvinced or opposed. The rural areas were quite different in that the church had a small embryonic village growing up about it. It usually was made up of a rectory, the school and a few tradesmen's dwellings; yet the majority of the censitaires lived on their strip farms far from the church or the manor house.⁷¹

Jaenen goes on to explain accusations reeled against the church in New France, accusations of Jansenist rigorism and puritanical tyranny. It is common belief that the clergy wielded an undue influence in the everyday aspect of colonial life, prying into the private affairs of parishioners and intervening in the economic and political life of the province. Heavy-handed clerical control "imposed an oppressive conformity on the colonial population and created a subservient and closed society." Jaenen holds that religious life in New France seemed more intensive and religion seemed to play a more prominent role because of the zeal of the missionaries and clergy in establishing European forms and practices in an alien environment. The church was unable to combat brandy trafficking nor to impose standing tithing or provide regular religious services to all the inhabitants of the over-extended colony. The catechetical method of instruction provided the habitants with a system of reasoned thought which could be applied to non-religious situations. Thus a population which held obstinately to its views on tithing and church/rectory construction could scarcely be accused of being docile, inarticulate and oppressed into civility.⁷²

Concluding Synthesis

It was never my aim to do a comparative analyses of Calvinism and Catholicism. That would be an absurdity. This is a political thesis and, thus, when religion and the church step on to the analytical stage, they must be scrutinised in the analytical context undertaken. Therefore, in a context of state-society relations and the development of nationalism, the interplay of church and state has a significant bearing. Likewise the influence of religion and its institutions upon society is of critical value. The overlap between religion and ideology must be noted for it is not in the scope of this essay to trace ideological thought in tandem with history.

The coincidence of temporal and heavenly matters and the overlap of church and state jurisdictions in our two societies is crucial to an understanding of developing nationalism. The decentralised super structure and institutional autonomy in Calvinist Afrikaner society is theoretical truth, yet it must be qualified by stressing the underlying Christian religious foundation. The omnipervasiveness of the church facilitated pulpit politics. Thus, religious tentacles took hold of the state moulding it along Christian nationalist lines. It is clear that religious doctrine served to underpin French Canadian society as well. Though it is commonly held that the Roman Catholic Church be a centralised and rigid institution, the disjointed parish developments in French Canada and the tight control of individual churches upon their respective parishioners illustrates a more decentralised religious tradition.

It cannot be denied that religion rather than religious institutions propelled Afrikaner society, while in French Canadian society, it was the religious institution clearly dominating the scene; therefore, in a sense the Catholic church was more centralised. One can then say that due to a more balanced interacting and overlap between civic and religious authorities in South Africa, religious faith often fell victim to doctrinaire political orientations (ie. nationalism). French Canadian clergy, however, did not share their power with civic officials in an interchangeable manner. That is, even though religious ministers were wielding the province's political muscle, the Catholic Church and its religious doctrines were not as open to being diluted or re-directed to accommodate outside theoretical ideologies (ie. nationalism). Thus, though the Catholic Church and the Dutch Reformed Church without doubt contributed to the early development of nationalism (through their struggle for language, religious education and an "unenlightened" approach), the latter was perhaps more politically conscious in fostering national unity while the former more subconsciously served the interests of nationalism. Afrikaner Christian nationalism became the ensuing struggle while French Canadian Catholicism and its controlling mechanisms more firmly entrenched group solidarity leaving nationalism latent. At the core, however, it is evident that religion and its

institutional mechanisms served the interests of nationalism in both societies by maintaining group enclosure and struggling for the survival of the national essence (language, religion, race) in its wide political domain.

It is perhaps presumptuous at present to suggest that amongst the Afrikaner and French Canadian community, there is a perception which regards that nation as a chosen people with a Divinely ordained spiritual mission. Yet, from settlement up until the start of the century, both Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalist alike viewed his nation as being Divinely instilled with a specific and particular culture, sacrosanct and separate. The founding of these new lands and the consequent collective attachment by its venturing inhabitants similarly drew its justification in the notion of a people with a calling and a spiritual mission to Christianize and civilize the heathen native populations. Pre-industrial nationalist development wielded religion as its cementing instrument to co-opt ethnic straddlers and authoritatively explain the tide of circumstances which repeatedly crashed onto the shores of a trodden on but awakening nation. Invoking the Holy Scriptures to fuel ethnocentrism and making parallels with the ancient Israelites affected to instil a fear of Almighty repercussion should the vocationed nation stray from the righteous and pious path. Where these two societies diverge is in their emphasis. The Afrikaner nationalist myth was to bound the volk more intimately with its creator. There was no Day of the Covenant in Quebec. Furthermore, the nature of the South African state highlighted ethnic conflict thus prompting the Afrikaner to actively and aggressively enforce his God-given national separateness. The Canadian Federal System and more particularly, Confederation conversely diluted French Canadian nationalist intensity. While similarly (and perhaps to a greater extent) preserving its cultural assets, its emphasis upon patience and humility would lead the French Canadian nation down the path of inaction, a paralysis which would stunt national development for decades to come.

CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER III:

THE BIRTH OF A NATION:

Post Conquest French Canadian and Afrikaner Society
Ethnic Schism and the Division of Labour
Dominion or Domination?

This chapter opens refocussing upon the Conquest and British imperialist endeavours as they affect the Afrikaner and French Canadian fragments respectively. Ethnic relations are assessed along various lines of conflict as political, economic and cultural cleavages became more pronounced. British arrogance and domination in implementing co-optive and confrontational policies toward subordinate ethnicities are here examined. This chapter deals with encroachment and absorption whereby the dominant ethnic group attempts to systematically capture that segment of society outside its realm of control, this being the subordinate ethnic group. The ethnic division of labour supplants the cleavages which had previously existed between 'Frenchman' and 'Canadien' on the one hand and 'Dutchman' and 'Boer' on the other. This cleavage which had also taken on a metropolitan versus rural character now marked the divide between Englishman and Afrikaner and Englishman and French Canadian in South Africa and Canada respectively.

Ethnic consciousness is analysed as it develops in reaction to Imperialist policies. This chapter looks at national awareness from the time of Conquest to that of Dominion. Ethnic conflict persists until a modus vivendi is reached. At this stage nationalist leaders within the two camps are summoned by a perceived need, to build bridges with one another rather than burn them. Under British rule, the path to Confederation in French Canada and to Union in South Africa is not an easy one. The struggle, however, is telling in that the crisis and conflict beckon the emergence of a nation. The culmination of this sequence hails the birth of a nation, the awakening of a national group, bound together in consciousness, itself tied closely to a common historical development, culture, language and religious zeal. Nationalism is then pitted against imperialism and vice versa. This chapter concludes with a legislative union in South Africa and a federal union in Canada. These constitutional agreements between competing ethno-nationalist fragments are then assessed in terms of the viability of the new state entity in guaranteeing coexistence and fairness between two adversarial segments.

South Africa: From Conquest To Dominion 1795-1910

The rural-urban cleavage which came to exist between Boer and Dutchman soon took on an ethnic dimension as British tradesmen and officials established Anglo socio-economic dominance in the Cape and consequently, the Natal region. This dominant English strata with some assimilated Afrikaners administered the British policy of indirect rule. The majority of Afrikaners with some English formed the agriculturalist strata of a society vertically separate from the Boer Republics and African societies. With their defeat in the Boer War, Afrikaners became an increasingly impoverished substrata of religious ministers and teachers. While white hegemony governing all African societies remained entrenched, the Afrikaners found themselves increasingly in competition for jobs with skilled coloured workers, Indian service tradesmen and some Africans.¹

Boer-British schism fell along various lines of conflict in the political, economic and cultural realms. It is efficacious to examine briefly the change in British ideas in the late 18th and 19th century and the consequences for British policy in South Africa. The British were the main slave traders being a focal player in the triangular slave trade with West Africa and the Americas. Yet Quaker opposition to slavery in the late 17th century, the creation of the Negrophiles Aborigines Protection Society and the subsequent Christian Reformation stressing evangelism and piety spurred the rise of the Missionary movement and the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. John Philip of the London Missionary Society was instrumental in contributing to the passage of Ordinance Fifty in 1828 which repealed the previous pass law for native agricultural workers. England had by then firmly established itself as the industrial and manufacturing centre of the global community. The 1832 Reform Bill spearheaded a trend of democratization and secularization in ideas (science); it also led to a rise in scientific racism moving away from Christian racism. "Cape liberalism" described master-servant relationships. The native was seen as friendly but also child-like and so in need of instruction and upliftment.² Paternalism in sheep's clothing.

The British attempted to modernize the efficiency of the colonial administration as well as to further its power in the colonies. It involved modernizing the civil service, instituting trial by jury and introducing circuit courts to the frontier districts.³ Encroachment by the colonial British State upon the frontier independence of the Boers coupled with England's refusal to grant them a representative assembly affected to sow the seeds of resentment within the post-Dutch pioneer society.⁴ The Cape was not a base but rather a colony "whose Afrikaner inhabitants' loyalty was (to put it mildly) not beyond dispute". In this respect there was no parallel with the French in British Canada.⁵ Strain and hatred sunk in further as British policy of auctioning Crown lands instead of freely granting them came into being. Even the system of local administration intensified Afrikaner resentment as Dutch landdrosts and local heemraden or council representatives of the burghers were supplanted by foreign resident magistrates and civil commissioners.⁶

Du Toit holds that the 1840's marked the expansion and consolidation of a "more modern State" in the Cape Colony. The 1820 British Settlers had introduced commercial agriculture in the eastern regions thus drawing the economy into "the dynamic new imperialism of free trade."⁷

The British attempted to tie the Boer farmers more tightly to their land. They wished to modernize the unproductive form of agriculture practised by the Boers by replacing the loan farm system with one of permanent tenure and commercial farming. This was to be achieved by creating greater land scarcity and so making the land more valuable. This would facilitate their aim at creating an agricultural surplus which would effectively incorporate South Africa into the world economy.⁸ Needless to say, the Boers were resistant to any attempts at controlling their migrational freedom and wander-lust.

The British annexation of the Cape in 1806 claimed what was then seen to be a strategic possession for the powerful Empire. There were approximately 23000 whites prior to the occupation, most of whom were Afrikaans speakers. The British colonial administration

set out to promote and encourage immigration so as to imbue the colony with an increasingly British character. Despite various organized immigration schemes from Britain, the 1820 Settlers (approximately 4000) to the eastern Cape and the subsequent 1848-49 Byrne Byrne settlers to Natal (which failed terribly yet deposited 3000 men, women and children on poor lands with inadequate water) "being the most notable," the flow was gradual and on a much smaller scale than in Canada.⁹ The emigration of more than 30 000 Afrikaners during and after the Great Trek did not drain the Cape Colony leaving it to develop as a bastion of English settlement. The white population in the Colony actually increased to 140 000 in 1854 from 66 000 in 1832. Most of these circa 80%, were Afrikaners.¹⁰

While the majority of Afrikaners were farmers, the English were primarily craftsmen and labourers (white collar workers) and from the outset, urban in orientation. In spite of them being organized agricultural immigrants and intended to act as somewhat of a human bulwark against the Xhosa, within three years of their arrival less than one-third of the 1820 settlers remained on the land. As de Kiewiet states, "The lack of intensive cultivation and the exceedingly low rates of pay for agricultural labour discouraged the crafters and labourers who went so numerously to Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the middle of the century."¹¹ Between 1815-70, less than 50 000 British immigrants settled in South Africa.¹² The failure of British immigration policies coupled with nativist Boer rural isolationism and the demographic significance of the Great Trek ensured continuing numerical supremacy of the Afrikaans over the English. Not until the large diamond and gold mineral discoveries some decades later, did British immigration take place in any substantial number.

Unlike the Huguenots who were easily absorbed into the native Afrikaner population, the English settlers, backed by the anglicization policies of the Somerset regime, retained a self awareness. It was such policies, (which aimed to, among other things, replace Dutch by English "in all spheres of public life") that have commonly been credited with the later development of Afrikaner nationalism.¹³ British commercial endeavours backed by

imperial trade preferences carved out a market in which the Briton established a dominant position for himself. Not only were British institutions able to structure the politico-cultural life of the Cape Colony, but they were successful at penetrating the interior where British merchants set up shop to cater to Boer basic domestic needs (ie. gunpowder and coffee). These shops and canteens concentrated their activities in those areas which served as congregational centres for the pastoralist Boers. These centres which developed into the first towns of the interior, soon "became outposts of British culture even in the Boer republics."¹⁴ Growing pressures upon Afrikaners in Cape Town to adopt English cultural values and the consequent anglicization (or semi anglicization) of a number of Afrikaans families prompted other Afrikaners to stress nationality in a defensive reaction. Although Dutch remained the home language of the majority of Boers, English became the language of public life.¹⁵ The status of English as the language of commerce and industry would eventually entrench and highlight the developing urban-rural cleavage which came to exist between Briton and Boer. With increasing British encroachment upon Boer settlements in the interior, especially after the gold and diamond discoveries, the Afrikaners increasingly became disenchanted with the English urban culture and its resultant effects upon the nature of their society (ie urbanization).

At the time of the Great Trek, however, there was little cultural awareness amongst the Boers. They had not yet consciously perceived the English language and cultural mores as a real threat. Anglicization did not really affect the isolated frontier farmers. Their solidarity had thus far come as a result of common experiences and values within a harsh and dangerous environment on the frontier. Therefore, as Van Jaarsveld aptly states, "the growth and development of national self-assertion was a result of the Great Trek rather than a cause of it."¹⁶

The search for "freedom" through rebellious disengagement from imperial jurisdiction (by way of the Great Trek) could not be interpreted as ethnic nationalism, however, it did serve as a springboard for national awakening as found in British policy toward the politically assertive republican north. While it is not

desirable to convolute "self determination", "republicanism", "independence" or "secessionism" as synonymous ideals, the historic act of leaving a State can be seen to umbrella them. Resistance by a neglected periphery against an encroaching centralization is not far off the mark here (although one should be aware that the emigrant Boers did not disengage uniformly or cohesively but rather in a dispersive manner).

Developing group consciousness and solidarity in Natal prompted prominent Voortrekker leaders (Maritz, Retief) to request recognition by the colonial government as a free and independent people (1837). The attempt to declare a "Republic of Natal" was met with disapproval as the emigrants were consequently defeated at Congella (1842). While it is true that consciousness of their freedom grew (the Trekkers established two independent Boer republics north and east of the Cape Province), sentiments of solidarity diminished as a result of geographical factors which crippled the struggle for unity on the Highveld and encouraged dispersion.¹⁷

Disengagement from the British sphere of influence coupled with a developing republican zeal, rather than fostering greater unity, encouraged a laissez-faire attitude thus demagnifying those forces which had previously bound them. National or ethnic consciousness lay dormant as evidenced by the unreactionary response by Cape Afrikaners to Somerset's language law and consequent anglicizing influences. While these attempts at "denationalization" had little significant impact upon the Afrikaans inhabitants of the Colonial South, they did not affirmatively demonstrate support for their northern brethren and in spite of moderate sympathy, continued to condemn the emigrant withdrawal from the colony.

Van Jaarsveld reaffirms his interpretation of the disunity of Afrikaans-speakers in general and between North and South inhabitants. He states that there was no national awakening without an external stimulus.¹⁸ This conception of "them" and "us" as intensifying ethnic solidarity can be seen when remarking upon those Transvaal Afrikaners compared to those in the Free State. While the former were relatively embattled and disunified by party

interests along regional lines, the presence of English settlers in the latter fostered a greater degree of self-consciousness in the sense of maintaining independence.

The power-play between British interests and various attempts within colonial and republican territories pushing for unity or federation in varying combinations only affected to cause further division. Differential maturity between the North and South stunted the development of ethnic bonds of solidarity. Independent political development in the Northern Republic was a step toward realizing nationhood; however, in the absence of a foe against which to unite, the disintegrative influences were more pronounced than those of nation building. As Van Jaarsveld aptly states, "the Emigrants were more a "people" than a "state".¹⁹ Yet they were not a conscious nation. The State had been formed before the nation. National self-assertion was soon to draw its impetus from the discovery of the Witwatersrand Gold Fields in 1886 and the subsequent encroachment of imperial interests and other "uitlanders" upon the independence and isolationism of the Boer republics. The influx of English development capital and emigrants to the previously pastoral setting ignited Afrikaner national self-assertion. Boer nationalism was soon to come head to head with an expanding British imperial combatant. Territorial disputes between the Free State and the Basutos became political fodder for imperial interests. Yet in spite of opportunistic attempts by the English to gain a foothold in Southern Africa by federating the Republics with its other colonial acquisitions, the Boers rallied in realization of their mutual dependence. Feeling the injustice of British aggression, again coupled with a "nationalist" republican zeal, the Republics under the unificatory influence and leadership of Brand emphatically rejected any vision of a federation under the Union Jack.

At the same time, Cape Afrikaners began to realize their inability to assert effective political decision making influence with regard to the policies of Imperial Britain. A feeling of downtroddenness forced them to appreciate their blood ties with those in the North. They realized they could not take up arms against "one section of (their) own race".²⁰ While the Republican North had matured in the

political sphere, Cape Afrikaners asserted themselves in the cultural sphere. Their self-consciousness grew in relation to what was seen as alien. Language, religion and nationality became intertwined. Translation of portions of the Bible into Afrikaans, the formation of the Genootskap (1875), the Patriot (1876) and the Afrikaner Bond heightened self discovery and specifically that of their history. Du Toit's publication of "The History of Our Country in the Language of Our People", the first Afrikaans history book, can perhaps be seen as the culmination of a developing premature historical consciousness; it also marked a spiritual transcendence of divisive geographical and political boundaries. It marked the beginning of the history of a nation.

Again, Imperial Britain attempted to further its interests by concocting the image of a dangerously expansionist Transvaal Republic citing attacks upon native populations outside of its boundaries. Britain, thus became "forced" to annex the Northern Republic. Unable, due to Conventions, of assailing the Free State directly, Britain's annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 in support of the Briton and uitlander elements there (who were rendered politically disenfranchised by Boer President Kruger) attempted to isolate the Free State into resigning itself to a British Federation. The Republics had other ideas, however, as contingents of commandoes pushed back British aggression. This was seen in the First War of Independence. Free State and Cape Afrikaner sympathies with their brethren intensified as British press villanized the Boers accusing them of betrayal and unruliness. Spurning Lord Carnarvon's attempts to unite South African states and colonies into a Federation (which had succeeded in Canada with the Confederation of 1867), Britain was forced to back-off after being routed at Majuba. The Republic was restored. The First War of Independence was significant in that Afrikaner nationalism came to the front in spiritual brotherhood against a common "enemy". It also fired the cultural awakening of the Afrikaner as bonds of blood and race (and consciousness of cultural characteristics), shared suffering and an urge toward self preservation emphasized the dawn of an Afrikaner "nation" united in one free fatherland.²¹

The demographics of the Transvaal Republic soon changed in favour (numerically) of the Uitlanders who by this time outnumbered the Boers by two to one. Yet their frustrations grew in light of their disenfranchisement status and heavy taxes imposed upon the mining industry by the Kruger regime. The 1895 Jameson raid plotted by mining magnate Cecil Rhodes which aimed to oust the Boer order ended in failure. It was to, furthermore, poison Boer-Briton relations for time to come.²²

The culmination of this developing feud between two competing ethno-nationalist entities was the Anglo-Boer War (1898-1902). Also known as the Second War of Independence, the scale of this conflict took on international proportions as Britain's imperial forces attempted to subdue the smaller numbered Boers and those foreigners who enlisted in sympathy with their cause. Boer commandoes, realizing they could not take on the mighty Empire on the front, embarked on a bush war which lasted until 1902. Memories of the 26000 women and children who died in concentration camps set up by the British inflicted heavy scars on the Afrikaner psyche.

British hegemony, however, was short-lived in a political sense. International furore over British military arrogance and the appearance of more moderate faces in the British government gave rise to a united Union of South Africa, which came into being in 1910. English and Dutch were dually recognized as official languages. Boer generals Botha and Smuts were key figures in the reconstruction process. Yet coming on the heels of concentration camps and Kitchener's scorched earth policy, Union was problematic from the outset. War and oppression inevitably would become mobilizing elements aimed at perpetuating the laager mentality of the Boer "minority" group and thus Afrikaner nationalism. The Boers perceived themselves as a dispossessed people, their entire way of life uprooted by British aggression, and their consequent status inferiorized by the dominant English counter-culture. The resulting poor white (bywoner) problem would ultimately serve as a focal point around which Afrikaner resources would mobilize. The Afrikaner, driven off his farmland into the cities found himself in economic competition with the black man.

The Act of Union which was based upon the notion of political and cultural equality between English and Afrikaner was a "bad deal" for the latter in the light of Anglo economic and industrial/commercial dominance. The bias also took on an urban-rural character as most cities were primarily English speaking. Afrikaner negotiators were no doubt tempered or even restricted by this power differential. Thus reconciliation and co-operation with the English in a single stream toward achieving certain common ends was seen to be in the best interests of the Afrikaner nation and South Africa as a whole.

French Canada: From Conquest To Dominion 1759-1867

The historical development of French Canada, the significance of the Conquest and the post-conquest division of labour between English and French must be seen in the light of a rising French Canadian nationalism and the subsequent ascendancy of clerical nationalism. Uneven development and a cultural division of labour laid the basis for commercial monopolization by the English. Church education rather than encouraging competition, prevented it. Thus one need not forthrightly interpret the nature of French Canadian society as one characterized by ethnic oppression of the metropole. Rather, differential patterns of colonization can generally be cited. Political concessions to the French aimed to create an arena in which French Canadian group interests could be articulated.²³ Consequently ethnic conflict was better contained and did not flare up into resistance politics to the extent that exclusionary measures prompted such action in South Africa.

Where the similarities are more obvious is on the economic front. British colonization was an economic matter which challenged the traditional, pre-capitalist social structure of Quebec with a more dynamic mercantile capitalism. As noted previously, British colonial experience held it more effective to co-opt and manipulate indigenous power structures instead of attempting to impose alien authority upon colonized subjects.²⁴ Thus, British augmentation of the Roman Catholic Church, which acted on behalf of state and commercial interests (in exchange for various jurisdictional powers), was a pragmatic course of action. Bergeron passionately acknowledges the captive tactics of the English, who through the

guaranteeing of French civil law and Church religious power, bound the Canayens to feudal structures and simultaneously gave British merchants a carte blanche to exploit resources.²⁵

McRoberts comments on the agrarian, traditional nature of French Canadian society which was to be confronted with a modernization trend that surrounded it. With the new export staple, at the end of the 19th century, being timber and the development of railroads, farming still remained at the fulcrum of French Canadian society.²⁶ Compared with farmers of Ontario, those of Quebec were "more traditional, more deeply rooted in the soil, less commercial in thought, somewhat endowed with goods of this world, finding on the land a way of life and not merely an occupation."²⁷

McRoberts attests to the division of labour along class and ethnic lines. Though, he admits that they do not coincide perfectly, the average income of French Canadians was said to be but one quarter of his British counterpart in Montreal.²⁸ The French Canadian ranked very low on the income scale and this was not merely a rural-urban cleavage. French Canadian cultural and value systems discouraged large scale economic activity which placed risk before security and growth before stability. Furthermore, the destruction of French Canadian entrepreneurial elements by the Conquest meant that essential capital investment was never in the hands of French Canadian interests. Lagging political power in the province furthermore blocked access to techniques and capital. French Canadians were structurally entrenched in labour intensive, lower production industries, institutions which supplied and serviced Anglo-Canadian investment capital.²⁹

Ouellet takes a different perspective suggesting that English policies turned out to favour the French segments of the community. Bilingualism mainly affected the English minority in Quebec. Agriculture was more prosperous after the Conquest (due to increased foreign trade) and the peasants at times verged on the point of "Anglomania". England had cautiously refrained from introducing the parliamentary system until the influx of Loyalists and until colonial life became "imbued with capitalism".³⁰ He goes on to suggest that England had erred in giving too much voting

power too soon to the population which had given space for the airing of extremist views. The consequence was that French Canadians could not properly adjust gradually to the new system. French Canadian conservative and unenterprising approaches to business accounted for their economic positions weakening relative to their Anglo conquerors. Ethnic group relations deteriorated as the new rising middle class French Canadians, rather than welcoming the radical changes implied by the encroachment of capitalism, stressed a defensive isolationist nationalism, with the English merchant as the villainous "enemy".³¹

French Canadian nationalism, which had initially not opposed colonialism shifted after 1826. The failings of the colonial system and more aggressive British attitudes coupled with a severe agricultural crisis (1826 - 1837, agriculture in Lower Canada produced a surplus only in two years) facilitated the seepage of the nationalist message to the peasantry. Traditional structures were coming down and the people began to point an accusing finger.³² Monière holds in line with the writings of Brunet. Britain's political ambitions were superseded by economic ones, in the Quebec context, "to seize the rich commercial empire of the St. Lawrence, Great Lakes, and Mississippi basin, and to eliminate the French rivals". French Canadian merchants who were supplanted by British traders, lost control of the fur trade and were relegated to agent status. No longer able to draw on capital and reliable distributors, in the light of the Conquest, they were forced to vacate the rich fields in favour of others. The Conquest brought structural changes to the colony which saw the emergence of a double class structure whose classes were differentiated by nationality and by their economic bases. While the overall capitalist mode continued, the Anglos were predominantly the capitalists and the French Canadians were petty producers. The former focused upon commerce, the latter on subsistence. The masses overall generally withdrew into agriculture increasing their dependence on this sector of the economy. From 1760 - 1792, about 80% of French Canadians were engaged in this sector not by inclination but by necessity of circumstances brought about by the Conquest. Their social distance from the co-opted clerical aristocracy also increased. The class interests of this decaying

group, its uncreative economic orientation and a reactive ideology would lead the French Canadian nation down the road of subjection and subordination.³³

Monière alludes unintentionally to Hartz's fragmentation thesis in his explanatory remarks concerning ideological development in Quebec and the effects of the Conquest. He explains that the Conquest diverted ideological development in French Canada from following the course of its mother country. A democratic ideology was able to develop and a mass awareness that was individualistic despite the French clerical élites collaborationist ideology. The emergence of a local petty bourgeoisie used the democratic ideology against both the clergy and the British aristocracy, as well as the commercial middle class. In spite of this anomaly, Monière concludes emphatically, "ideological development of (French) Canadian society ... eliminating its dynamic class layer, breaking the rhythm of its development, removing it from the intellectual sources that were natural to it, and allowing a reactionary, regressive ideology to become first entrenched and later dominant." Speaking of the backward looking clerical élite, he states that they led an "ideological blockade", a "break" occurred and "the flow of new ideas from the old motherland was choked off, and there was a new field of ideological influence from Britain and her American colonies."³⁴ McRae continues along this line. He suggests that many French Canadians wrote not of the Conquest but rather of Cession. He states that "there is an almost Freudian transfer of a deep resentment from the outsider to the parent." He goes on to say that "French Canada was left in 1763 like a lonely and fearful child not removed by force from its mother's arms but callously abandoned."³⁵

While the British remained a minority, their objectives of political control and parliamentary democracy as means of achieving hegemony remained in conflict. An important line of cleavage was demographic. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 and instructions given to then governor Murray implied the rapid assimilation of the conquered population. Yet the French Canadians had already formed a collectivity, "the members of which were bound together by specific ties of cultural homogeneity."³⁶ The American independence

and the resulting immigration of Loyalists made British Canadian aspirations more tangible. The Constitutional Act of 1791 which divided the Province of Quebec into two Canadas was, however, not conducive to the implementation of assimilative policies. The French Canadians were able to control the Legislative Assembly. This system of representative government enabled the cultivation of new and more responsible French Canadian leaders motivated by nationalist ideals. The Act of Union which attempted to remedy the situation merely exacerbated ethnic conflict.

The proponent of this unified arrangement was Lord Durham, an Imperial Government despatch assigned to investigate the ethnic conflict in the colony. Durham characterized the French in Lower Canada as having "clung to ancient prejudices, ancient customs and ancient laws, not from any strong sense of their beneficial effects, but with the unreasoning tenacity of an uneducated and unprogressive people... They remain an old stationary society, in a new and progressive world".³⁷

Durham's recommendations were interpreted by French Canadians as being a direct threat to their community. He concluded that the way to resolve the situation of "two nations warring within the bosom of a single state" was to extinguish the French nation by means of assimilation.³⁸ Durham remarked that "there can hardly be conceived a nationality more destitute of all that can invigorate and elevate a people than that which is exhibited by the descendants of the French in Lower Canada, owing to their retaining their peculiar language and manners. They are a people with no history and no literature."³⁹ He concluded then that "it is to elevate them from that inferiority that I desire to give to the Canadians our English character."⁴⁰

At the time of the Rebellion (1837), the French population of Quebec (then Lower Canada) numbered 450 000 while the growing English population stood at 150 000. Ontario (then Upper Canada) was entirely English (400 000). Thus Montreal merchants agitated for political union of the two Canadas so as to reverse the demographic balance in their favour; this would cast the French Canadians as a minority in the new assembly so rendering them

helpless to the whims of government policy. The 1840 Act of Union marked the collapse of French Canadian political power after the Rebellion. This implied English institutional domination.

Furthermore, to put a few nails in the coffin, the use of French in Parliament was abolished leaving English as the sole official language. French regained its status in 1848.⁴¹ Rioux argues that the 1837 Insurrection and the 1840 Act of Union marked an important event and turning point in the history of Quebec; for it put the ideal of independence on the backburner as French Canadian leaders were forced to struggle against assimilation, against anglicization. An ideology of conservation by way of the clergy would have to supersede any independence ideology. This narrowing enclosure was tragic as Quebec could no longer pursue self-determination in an independent society but instead had to protect their culture. The Québécois were not to be a nation but an ethnic group with a particular culture (religion, language, customs). They would have to preserve their culture as a sacred heritage.⁴²

Therefore, regardless of its actual importance, incidents involving cultural differences and/or conflicting interests were magnified to the point of distortion. It was at this time, when violence became symptomatic of national frustration, that the "wicked stepmother" image of England began to fuel nationalist sentiment. Previously, the French Canadian middle class, clergy and seigneurs were sincerely loyal to England admiring her British liberal values in contrast to the revolutionary democracy in France and America which was viewed with distrust. The Rebellion marked a shift to revolutionary action as a means to achieve and establish a fully representative and Parliamentary system in the colonies. It was perhaps more a call for major reconstructive surgery on French Canadian society which perpetuated the economic inferiority of the French Canadian. The failure of the Rebellion and the 1840 Union was a direct consequence of an ineffective middle class, and the rise of clerico-anti-liberal nationalism ensued. This nationalism was conducive to cultural isolationism. Yet Ouellet remarks that by this time "the foe was hardly any longer symbolized by "the English", but rather by "the liberals", namely those bent on converting institutions and society to a broader view of world affairs."⁴³

Brunet holds that the Act of Union actually marked the birth of Canadianism. The "Canadiens" (French Canadians) were forced to realize that their Anglo conquerors and respective subjects were not going to return to the motherland. Lafontaine, the French Canadian leader at the time, recognized this and urged the "Canadiens" to give up the idea that only they could be Canadians. Brunet depicts this historical evolution in a very fatalistic light. He views the unevenly based alliance as an acknowledgment of the victory of London, that the land was not of the vanquished but of their British Canadian masters. He states, "From the "Canadiens", who had already lost control of their destiny, even their name was taken."⁴⁴ Several years later the demographic balance shifted as the population of Upper Canada exceeded that of Lower Canada. The "Canadiens" were now to be a conquered minority unable to return to the past.

This evolving noteworthy perception by French Canadians is significant in defining the context, that of competing ethnic groups or national fragments. The realisation and/or recognition of the Anglo fragment as an "indigenous" collectivity with a "Canadian" character must all but dispel the notion or image of a French Canadian populace struggling to up and out the colonial yoke. While it shall be argued later that in both case studies, overarching transcendental Canadianisms and South Africanisms have fallen by the wayside in the light of intensifying ethnic nationalisms, the dualism and the more conciliatory collaborationist nature of ethnic politics in Canada has permitted such bridging ideologies to flourish in that context. This is not to denounce or ignore the significant anti-colonial element which undoubtedly fuelled the early growth of nationalism. As history has shown in both societies, these nationally inclusive "isms" were often spouted by nationalist statesmen in opposition to colonialism and the export-oriented loyalties of its settler subjects. Needless to say, such sentiments continued to fuel the nationalist fires especially with the conscription crises of the Great Wars. Ultimately, however, the underlying national "ism" drew its nourishment from unflinching strands of ethno-political aspirations. A republican/separatist zeal gave power to the rising global call for the right of self-determination. Its variant

doctrinal programmes accounted (and still account) for the respective paths and developments of each society.

Garneau, in his "Preliminary Discourse to History of Canada", characterizes this period as one of British domination. This, he says, takes the form of "parliamentary antagonism of the colonists to all infractions of their nationality and designs against their religion."⁴⁵ His natural sympathy for minorities struggling against foreign oppressors thrust Garneau into the nationalism current which was at that time challenging the old order in Europe. Garneau became the national historian of French Canada (as S.J. du Toit had been for the Afrikaners). His history discussed the relationship between "our language, our laws, and our customs" and also between faith and nationality. These assertions were to become "French-Canadian dogmas".⁴⁶

Averting the death sentence pronounced upon the French Canadian nationality by Durham and the consequent Act of Union, Lafontaine managed to transcend ethnicity temporarily by forging an alliance with Robert Baldwin's Upper Canadian Reformers in opposition to Britain's refusal to grant the regions responsible government. French Canadian constitutional resistance had been successful and their political power had increased. As the then governor Bagot came to realize, "It is impossible to conceal from oneself that the French members of the Assembly possess the power of the country and whoever directs that power, backed by the most efficient means of controlling it, is in a situation to govern the Province most effectually."⁴⁷

Discarding Durham's opposition to French Canadians sharing in the government, Bagot pursued a policy of compromise finding no other solution. Tory elements protested vehemently and, upon passage of the Lower Canada Rebellion Losses Act (and particularly, its sanctioning on behalf of the empire by Lord Elgin), English mobs rioted for several days in Montreal. On June 14, 1849, the "British House of Commons proclaimed Canada's full achievement of responsible government."⁴⁸

In spite of constitutional compromise, ethnic polarization had not been more evident as each ethnic group had displayed rebellious tendencies actively when dominated by the other. The MacDonald-Cartier administration which succeeded the Lafontaine-Baldwin government was however, able to pacify ethnic nationalism by ushering French Canadians to support the Confederation of British North America into a Canada which was to be both English and French in character. Breaking with Papineau's republican nationalism, Cartier believed that French Canadians were "monarchists by religion, by custom and by tradition" and thus an English-French Canadian *modus vivendi* was possible.⁴⁹

Wade revealingly gives voice to the "curious mixture of political radicalism and economic conservatism" which would for time to come characterize French Canadian leaders. He cites the example of Papineau, a patriot who claimed to champion the rights of the people while simultaneously decrying outdated feudal tenure. Yet unsurprisingly in retrospect, this democrat was himself a seigneur, an elitist and indeed an aristocrat. It was he, who when the question regarding the abolition of seigneurial tenure arose, vehemently defended the wisdom and justice of that system exclaiming that his reformist approach entailed matters where political changes were necessary; while on matters regarding the preservation of property rights he was a staunch conservative.⁵⁰

One can remark that nationalism which Papineau put forth was squarely in line with American democratic influences and as such was foreign to the French Canadian tradition. Such influences can be accounted for by his renewed contact with France at this time; Yet American democracy never really became grounded in the rigidly hierarchical structure of French Canadian society.

The 1867 British North America Act which united four provinces under a single federal government arose from the need to centralize and develop the state for economic growth. Under Confederation, religious rights were guaranteed but bilingualism was protected only in the legislatures and courts and in course, was not preserved outside the province of Quebec. The French Canadian population were split on the issue of Confederation. The "Rouges"

faction saw it as a scheme of annihilation while the "Bleu" faction saw it as a means to prevent French Canadians from being absorbed by American interests.⁵¹ Federalism, for the French, was viewed as a means of preserving their culture in the face of demands by the more populated Upper Canada for representation according to numbers. This was perceived as an attempt to destroy the dualism that existed. From its inception, Confederation had a centralist bias with the Canadian Senate unintended to be protective of provincial interests.⁵² The Federal government became the treasurer and executive of all "significant" power particularly in the economic realm. It retained the means of financial control (ie. Bank of Canada), commercial control, national defence, justice, prisons, civil law, population control, foreign relations while the provincial powers consisted mainly of local administrative functions.⁵³ Despite these limits, Quebec would have certain powers over its own affairs and it would be a concrete political unit protected by the Constitution. While it is true that French Canadians were relegated to the position of a minority at the federal level, bi-ethnic parties and electoral necessity of winning some French Canadian support in national elections tempered their dominated position to some extent.⁵⁴ While a federal rather than a legislative union had ensured the existence of a semi-autonomous French Canadian political unit, it simultaneously facilitated the eventual assimilation of French Canadian segments located outside of the Province. Thus, one can argue that French Canadian ethnic consciousness was, in the light of the federal arrangement, to undergo a transformation that would shift its regional resource base to an increasingly more narrow provincialism. It was to be the birth of the "Quebecois" and consequent assertive provincialism would mark the prospect of now plausible separatist influences infiltrating nationalist thinking.

Vallières depicts Confederation as the "institutional domination of business".⁵⁵ It was undertaken with indifference to the masses. Confederation served the interests of the Anglo Saxon bourgeoisie. Suggesting some form of capitalist conspiracy, Vallières describes how American entrepreneurs and financiers invaded Quebec and the rest of the country connivingly co-opting and greasing the hands of local businessmen and politicians alike (not to mention the

collaborationist clergy) in order to pacify and diffuse nationalist sentiment.⁵⁶

Assessing Confederation is once again historically dependant and needs to be viewed in the light of the successes and failures of ethnic co-habitation in Canada. Though of a radically different mould, Canon Lionel Groulx is at one with Vallières in his ambivalence towards foreign capitalists and their exploitation of local resources. His views, once marginalised, became the mobilizing slogan of the later emergent French Canadian new middle class which decried "Maîtres chez nous" (Masters in our own home) in its Liberal party platform. Putting Confederation on probation clarifies that it was never seen as something intrinsically valuable. Rather it would be judged according to its merits as a means to achieving national aspirations. As Brunet records, it has for a long time been interpreted as an instrument of British Canadian nationalism and the rise of ethnic tensions attests to this view.⁵⁷

It must be stressed, however, that liberal approaches and analyses were incompatible and divorced from the slant of nationalism which at that time leant toward an unswerving conservatism. Clerical nationalism aimed at entrenching cultural isolationism, although devoid of a strong separatist appeal, continued to disseminate the methodological agricultural vocation of French Canadians. In spite of the sporadic vitality of the liberal movement and splintering separatist movements, it never really gained a foothold amongst the masses.

Confederation must be seen as a compromise between the two ethnic groups and the expansion of Canadian economic independence from the United States. The fathers of Confederation had no doubt felt that by constitutionally reaching a formula which implied the acceptance of diversity and met the urgent need for a strong central government, the ethno-co-signatories would move toward common aims for the betterment of the society as a whole and in particular, for the gradual realization of national aspirations within a bi-cultural framework.

Demographics, however, cast Confederation in a different light. While French Canadians were numerically dominant in their homeland (more than 3/4 of the population), they were outnumbered 2:1 in the new Dominion of Canada. Furthermore, their actual influence in Quebec did not correlate with their numbers. The countryside which was occupied by 85% of the population was primarily French while the cities were more English than French. The English controlled trade and industry while labour was primarily French.⁵⁸

Nationalism, which began to surface more vigorously in response to the new situation created by Confederation, often used politics for religious ends while at other times, it used religion to achieve the separation of Church and State as embedded in their cultural tradition. Such antipathy on their part further intensified the French Canadian "minority complex" apparent in their acute consciousness of being a political minority (only 30% of the Canadian population) and a cultural minority (consisting of less than 2% of the neighbouring Anglo-American counter-culture). Wade argues that a subconscious inferiority complex forces one to react often with "arrogant and aggressive attitudes which are a form of defence mechanism, so the minority complex produces similar manifestations which intensify the conflict between the majority and the minority."⁵⁹ Thus Confederation which attempted to blend old loyalties into a more "modern" one, it being Canadianism, witnessed more acute, racial, cultural and religious conflicts in the next few decades.

Concluding Synthesis

With gratitude to their history, French Canadians and Afrikaners alike had confused racist and nationalist ideas with religious ones. Striving to deal with an intensifying predicament of a dominant imperialist element and its respective cultural influence, both were rapidly forced to develop an ethnic consciousness in order to preserve their inherent differences. Ethnic conflict was the inevitable result at a time when self-determination and sovereignty began to challenge and uproot the old world order. It was the dawn of nationalism as populations with similar traits and values found it prudent to bond in solidarity as a means to protect their interests from being "overseen" by perceived foreigners. In

both societies, Britain's imperialist ambitions directly encroached upon their traditional ways of life. With impudence and of course subtle diplomacy not to mention English immigration, Britain was able to pursue her economic interests by simultaneously playing her foes off one another.

The contextual framework accounts for varying policies and strategies undertaken by the English in South Africa and Canada. There was no Quebec Act in the Cape Colony. While careful for the most part not to provoke Boer passions and trans-geographical solidarity particularly in the light of the Boer's numerical supremacy, Britain attempted to absorb the backward people with its strong counter culture which it enforced in the political, cultural and economic realm. Attempting to stunt growing Boer republicanism which came on the heels of the Great Trek became a necessity for the British who hoped to forge a federation of territories under the banner of the Union Jack. Furthermore, by denying representative government to the people, Britain would be able to retain a firm hand ensuring and facilitating the exploitation of its ethnic counterparts and their conquered land. The Conquest of New France and Britain's political and economic ambitions were however frustrated not only by a reactionary and for the most part localized ethnic entity but by a growing annexationist movement and an increasingly powerful southern neighbour still reeling from the fervour of its republican democratic revolution. Fear and wisdom dictated a more compromising course which aimed to co-opt and pacify the French Canadian clerical leadership; by doing this they were assured of loyalty against the Americans as well as the indirect control over the complacent and backward masses. English economic dominance was thus a priori.

The French Canadian inclination was not uncompromisingly republican or separatist in nature. Liberal influences and elements were to flare up temporarily yet they were devoid of power in relation to the staunchly unbending conservatism and clericalism. While cherishing their cultural assets and demanding participation in decision making and governing, French Canadians were not vilely opposed to sharing their lot with their English counterparts provided this was done independently from British exploitive and assimilative designs.

The Boers too might have opted for compromise and co-existence had the British not so aggressively provoked national sentiment by breaking Conventions, waging war on disgruntled (and resourcefully wealthy) republics and practising cultural oppression against the Afrikaners. However, it was blatant imperialism specifically the Jameson Raid and the tragic Anglo-Boer War which poisoned relations between the ethnic groups to such an extent that an apparent compromise in the Act of Union was more of an act of resignation on the part of the Boers.

There was no culmination of ethnic conflict in Canada which could historically claim the bitter intensity of the Boer War. French Canadian consciousness, though in a sense benign, had already developed notably while the more dispersed Boer population (as such due to the Great Trek) were still struggling to realize their developing ethnic consciousness. The French Canadian masses were complacent in their sense of ethnicity while the Boer masses were assertive in their quest to realize their ethnicity. Circumstances in North America had already started to turn the wheels of French Canadian ethnic enclosure. The Boer laager had not yet taken shape except on the battlefields of the frontier.

The French Canadians, in contrast to the Boers, were a more tightly knit ethnic group in terms of its cultural assets yet ethnic mobilization was the prize of the Boer War, an encounter which forced the Afrikaner populace to strive toward the attainment of nationhood, to step back from the brink of extinction at the hands of their English foes. This is why republicanism became so attractive to the numerically superior Boers. By achieving statehood, they would be able to consolidate their group structure, facilitate enclosure, perhaps develop symbols and so protect their rural way of life. The French Canadians were more purposely kept to their way of life which was agrarian. With the complicity of the clergy, England could capitalize economically by exploiting the French Canadian rural labour supply. Confederation was then an attempt to constitutionalize economic disparity along ethnic lines under the protective and seemingly legitimate guise of compromise. A policy of internal colonialism which though perhaps only moderately threatening in the cultural realm could have devastating

consequences in the economic and political one. Contrary to the connotations of the term "Confederation", the deal struck at that time was but a quasi federalism evident when noting that the federal government frequently resorted to disallowance and reservation to curb the growth of provincial powers of self-government. As many scholars and academics have noted, the relationship was much more that of a mother country and colony whereby the institutions of control were basically those of colonial rule.

Not dissimilar was the deal struck in South Africa which riding on the wings of an imperialist victory attempted to crush the Boers into a shameful co-optation, their farms and livelihoods destroyed by the destruction of families and Kitchener's scorched-earth-policy. The Boers became the dispossessed and soon found themselves and particularly their poverty ridden bywoner brethren in competition with the natives for underpaid jobs to support British capitalist interests. This is where the greatest comparisons can be made. The rural/urban cleavage which had existed previously between Boer and Dutchman, and "Canadian" and Frenchman soon came to take on an ethnic dimension which placed the Englishman directly at the helm of commercial and industrial affairs in both societies. The vibrant entrepreneurial culture of the Englishman stood in stark contrast to the lacklustre of the French Canadians and the Afrikaners who were located primarily in the rural areas. Ideological disengagement and its resulting isolationism reinforced the agrarian "backwardness" of those ethnic communities thereby dictating the ethnic nature of the socio-economic structures within both societies.

Politically, Britain was able to retain indirect control through the given acceptance of its democratic Parliamentary structures. By way of selective class co-optation, the English elements were able to retain their influence despite their numerical inferiority to the Boers. Similarly in Canada, through selective class co-optation and their numerical preponderancy, Britain was able to cast the French Canadian into the role of a permanent minority, silenced and disempowered by a quasi-federalism which handed that ethnic entity a cosmetic government.

The differing variants of nationalism or rather the differing course upon which nationalism embarked was to a large degree rooted in demographic differentials between the component ethnic groups within each society. In South Africa, the Boer War gave impetus to a growing nationalism which was able to transcend geographical boundaries. The demographic balance which weighted in favour of the Afrikaners made ethnic mobilization potentially politically effective within the franchise guaranteed by the Union Constitution in vesting power from the dominant English element. Thus, the republican dream of the Afrikaners which at the time of Union looked unattainable, remained a theoretical possibility. In Canada, the federal experiment and the demographic English dominance made French Canadian nationalism unable to transcend geographical boundaries to a significant degree. Though much of the consequent ethnic conflict can be attributed to perceived injustices of the Anglo majority against the Francophone communities outside of Quebec, many of those communities would soon suffocate at the hands of a vibrant English and American culture. The centralist bias of federalism in favour of the Anglophone population further made French Canadian national power an impossibility; after-all, the French Canadians were at this juncture a permanent minority. Thus with their resource base narrowed to a provincial context, republicanism too had to be narrowed. Separatism was the only theoretical route to political emancipation.

CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER IV

URBANIZATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE MOBILIZATION

The Movement Toward Nationhood

Crises: WWI, WWII and the Great Depression

Cracks in the Monolith of Conservative Power

This chapter opens with two competing ethnic entities constitutionally committed to a new deal geared toward reconciliation. When the real exigencies of a modernizing order relegate traditional agrarianism out of the realm of fact to that of myth, political manoeuvring responsible for the 'compromise' of Dominion unveils a harsh environment characterized by an ethnic division of labour and one in which ethnic relations may only be termed structurally as domination. This is not to suggest that political wrangling be only window dressing to serve as justification or to legitimize the adversarial bi-ethnic nature of each society. This line would follow that political agreements would not in fact reflect co-operation but rather would conceal the bullying tactics of the dominant group in being successful at imposing a settlement upon the subordinate ethnic group. Were one to accept this proposition fully, one would have to assume paralysis and lack of cohesion and representation in the subordinate group. A more balanced approach is needed.

This chapter provides a framework of competing ethnic nationalisms unequal in power as determined by demographics, access to resources and longevity. The structural erosion of traditional rural patterns of life brought about by industrialization and urbanization creates a transitional environment in which subordinate ethnicities are forced to adapt to new social arenas characterized by conflict. The economic imbalance running along ethnic lines makes group enclosure an attractive option for those who sense that they are being increasingly marginalised and peripheralised from the core mainstream of society.

Ethnic mobilization and unity is no longer a given in a context which emphasizes new forms of social consciousness based upon individual economic interests and values determined by capitalist economic principles. It is therefore the task of an evolving nationalist leadership self appointed to lure ethnic straddlers into bonds of ethnic conformity particularly in the subordinate group which is more prone to the appeals of class consciousness and institutionalized political propaganda masquerading as democratic fairness and justice.

Not only are Afrikaners and French Canadians vulnerable in their economic and political subordination to the more powerful British imperialist element but likewise they are susceptible to a vibrant Anglo hegemonic culture bent on their cultural dissolution. This chapter seeks to outline the terms of ethnic relations as determined by a post Dominion changing and modernizing order. The social repercussions inflicted upon Afrikaner and French Canadian alike in response to these changes and their resulting alienation in a new urban environment will be examined.

Most significantly of course, the evolutionary development of nationalist ideology within each society will be scrutinized. Moderate pan-Canadian and South African appeals aimed at nation-building will more often give way to ethno-nationalism its parameters moving from a broadly defined inclusiveness to a more narrowly defined exclusiveness. The rise of a national bourgeoisie struggling to attain national self determination in the face of an imperialist 'enemy' and hoping to take command of a new power structure would characterize both ethnic entities. Three significant crises bring the currents of ethnic antagonism to the fore. The First Great War, the Depression and the Second Great War highlight the differences and the struggles embarked upon by nationalists in French Canada and South Africa respectively. The historical similarities are frequently remarkable and the chapter concludes with the movement toward and consolidation of an intensely reactionary sectional nationalism propelled by a republican ideal and a more provincial-cum-separatist one in South Africa and French Canada respectively. A consolidated ethnic nationalism propped up on the pillars of ideological conservatism and supported by traditional clerico-bourgeoise élites demonstrate the forcefulness and resolve of an uncompromising nationalism imprinted in the foundations of each society.

South Africa: The Road to Afrikaner Dominance and the Triumph of Nationalism 1910-1961

The persisting cultural division of labour with continued Anglophone economic domination marked Afrikaner society in the early and mid-twentieth century. Yet the single stream South Africanist character of the Union had been ushered in with bloody

hands. The trend towards imperial consolidation did not go unchallenged as elements within the Dominion resisted active participation in the wars waged by Britain. Furthermore, after the Union, many struggles were engaged in to secure the language and education rights of the Afrikaners. New political parties began to break onto the political scene, some of which stressed a more extremist ethnic nationalism which opposed the notion of reconciliation and common goals in an imperialist context.

The Afrikaner had been spared in the physical sense but he would have to now struggle to prevent his spiritual and cultural obliteration. This prompted the rise of the Second Language movement and entailed a battle for the minds of the Afrikaners. Afrikaans eventually became recognised as an official language of the Union in 1925. Just prior to Vereeniging, political and financial considerations prevented Christian National education from taking root thus causing more rifts within Afrikanerdom. Despite various elements (ie. Doppers) pushing a republican ideology in continuity with the Transvaal Republic, Afrikaner leaders at the time discouraged such thinking seeing the merits of conciliation with the British.¹

Ultimately, responsible government denigrated republican thinking and the sectional promotion of Afrikaner interests. The Imperial connection lay at the root of conflict between the Unionist and the republican strands within Afrikanerdom. Hertzog was at the forefront of the latter strand embarking on a campaign in 1912 to assert the Union's "right" to control her own international destiny. This was in itself a challenge to the terms of Union which basically placed the Union at the beck and call of Britain in that respect. This came to a head as war loomed on the horizon. General Louis Botha's government had not wished to antagonize Imperial elements within the country. A split occurred as Hertzog and his nationalist caucus formed a new National Party (1913) on a "platform of South African self sufficiency, dual medium education and compulsory bilingualism in the public service."² The Government sought to gain Unionist rather than Nationalist support, and the consequence was a revival of anti-capitalist sentiments among the Afrikaner masses.

With the development of commercial farming, the poor whites known as bywoners were driven from the land. A rift developed between the wealthy Afrikaner farmers and these bywoners.³ In the absence of a job bar in the agricultural sector, most white workers were severely affected by high unemployment and so had to disengage from that sector. These landless tenants (bywoners) and failed farmers were forced to find work in the towns.⁴ Droughts, locusts and cattle diseases contributed greatly to this phenomenon as did the Anglo-Boer War.

Historian, de Kiewet, relates the inherent weaknesses of Boer agriculture arising from the limited supply of available new lands.⁵ Boer farming relied on an abundance of cheap black labour and was therefore reluctant to incorporate and experiment with new and improved agricultural technology. It was poor, just above subsistence level and the plots were too large to implement efficient working. The Act of Union had fixed the boundaries and land values soared as a result of growing scarcity and rising gold price.⁶ This land shortage prevented the rehabilitation of these poor whites and "back to land" calls faltered. Furthermore, too many lacked sufficient initiative.⁷ Poor whiteism increased steadily and was estimated to number 150 000 by 1915. They were practically all rural people although many had been forced into the slums of the towns surviving mainly on charity. The Boer land system was to blame for this rural poverty. The Boer had been accustomed to leave his land in equal shares to his children. The continuous subdivision, generation after generation resulted in minimum holdings which could not support a decent living. Undivided land jointly run by a family unit was frequently plagued by domestic disputes which hindered efficient running of the farm. Allocating water rights to each holder further prevented adequate cultivation.⁸

Nationalist leaders saw in poor whiteism a divisive condition which could potentially prevent ethnic enclosure. These "lost sheep" would have to be reclaimed by the flock lest they should pursue their interests through socialist labour oriented action irrespective of ethnicity. Thus in a sense, poor whiteism presented both a severe point of concern in nationalist circles as

well as a focal point around which ethnic mobilization could be pursued. In any event, poor whiteism had heightened ethnic consciousness, and the fact that it had become an ethnic concern in the first place demonstrated a level of ethnic consciousness firmly entrenched. Class conflict within Afrikanerdom would have to be averted.

While early nationalism had infected a relatively classless society consisting of mainly uneducated and industrious farmers and a few educated predikante, the intermediate phase saw wide class differentials. This period showed class cleavages with Afrikaner society comprising educated, semi educated and bywoner elements. This gulf would soon narrow as Afrikaner nationalism intensified in a concerted effort to rescue the poor whites.⁹

The rapid development of South Africa into an industrial empire must be seen to have taken place in conjunction with an early anti-colonial movement. The struggle between English capital and the Afrikaners over state control was for the latter farming group the sole avenue to which they could hope to grab a share of the wealth generated by foreign mining houses. Political power, however, and the substantial Afrikaner economic mobilization was but the culmination of a long process of ethnic "activation". "Cultural "remoralization" centered around the suppressed Afrikaans language and heritage symbols."¹⁰

Thus, while recognizing the legitimacy of the South African State, Hertzog opposed the single stream compromise of the Union. He was of the belief that the Afrikaner retain his unique nationality, having an historical claim as the pioneers of South African civilization. Furthermore, he was unflinching in his belief that South Africa need develop independently from the Empire. Along with Dutch Reformed Minister Malan, Hertzog envisioned a two stream development whereby English and Afrikaner streams would flow separately until the stage when the Afrikaner had reached the level of the Englishman. This nationalist outlook came to the fore in 1914. The Rebellion represented a violent criticism of the Botha one stream policy and it came to symbolize the alienation, anxiety and insecurity of the Afrikaner in the new order.¹¹ It also

highlighted the divisions within Afrikaner society. When the Union entered World War I on the side of Britain, it triggered painful memories that had not as yet been healed. Botha and Smuts were seen to have defected to the imperialist cause, and although an Afrikaner citizen force was eventually to put down the rebellion, the retrospective nationalist mythology came to interpret the crisis in an anti-imperialist light. Furthermore, one rebel, killed by firing squad by order of Smuts came to embody the continuing struggle of Afrikanerdom. His name was Japie Fourie.¹²

Hertzog was able to capitalize on the war. He continued to stress his then nationalist "South Africa first" policy. At that time it must be remembered that the ethnic criterion for an Afrikaner was such that it could include both English and Dutch speakers. Dual ethnicism and complete ethnic equality, the core of nationalist doctrine, was in a broader sense an endorsement of white supremacy. The urban migration of unskilled bywoners compounded the situation. Faced with mine owner preferences for cheap black labour over expensive white labour and the consequent attempts by management to promote blacks to skilled positions, the Rand became embroiled in a civil war. The 1922 miners strike escalated into a confrontation between commandoes and the Defence Force.¹³ Two hundred whites met their fates. While the Rand Rebellion was at face value a class conflict which saw a newly urbanised Afrikaner proletariat join with an established English working class, the former viewed it as a national struggle against foreign English capital. The coincidence of national and class interests must be understood in light of the perceptions held by Afrikaners which equated those mining magnates with British imperial interests.¹⁴ This psychology would perpetuate the oppression complex of the Afrikaner, an insecurity which would characterize in some ways the secret appeal of nationalism.

The National Party and the Labour Party defied the incompatibilities of their platforms to form an unstable alliance which ushered in the Pact government of 1924. Setting aside its secessionist aims, the NP coalesced with dissatisfied white labour elements as a bulwark against the interests of big finance capital which characterised the Smuts regime. "Civilised labour" was the

rallying cry as the Nationalists carried the call of farmers and labour alike to alleviate poor whiteism and to simultaneously transform agriculture by undertaking land settlement schemes aimed at arresting the proletarianization of Afrikaners by keeping the smaller white farmers on the land.¹⁵ Capital transfers to agriculture and industry from the mining sector were enacted through taxes levied on the latter.¹⁶

The victory of Hertzog has been interpreted by various authorities in nationalist literature. Moodie states that the NP victory was based upon a "primal Afrikaner nationalist feeling combined with the fear of black competition and capitalism." While acknowledging that it reflected the political exigencies of the day rather than the true civil religion, he makes no bones in speaking about the "general feeling of Afrikanerness."¹⁷ Davenport is less dramatic in his interpretation. The historian describes the government as one comprising a *mélange* of dissatisfied elements. "As an Afrikaner nationalist government", he states, "it was a pale reflection of what was to come later." Yet it did cater to the furtherment of Afrikaner cultural needs which had previously been neglected. After-all, Malan had successfully campaigned for bilingualism in the civil service thus advancing the economic and subsequently the political opportunities for the Afrikaner. The Afrikaans language received official recognition bringing the constitution in line with schools and the Dutch Reformed Church which had already adopted it.¹⁸ O'Meara rejects any such analysis rooted in ethnic mobilization. Pact, he asserts, was the product of unstable class alliances. The Afrikaner nationalist alliance underwent many changes internally as a result of shifting constituent forces and their responses to such changing social conditions. Therefore, viewing Afrikaner nationalism as an ideological arena for class struggles, O'Meara succinctly analyses Pact as a class alliance between sections of agriculture and industrial capital together with a segment of organized white labour.

He cites contradictions, for example, within agriculture itself pointing to the regional differences which made Cape farmers export oriented and those of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State internally market oriented. This accounted for the republicanist

sentiments of the latter two and the pro-imperialist interests of the former. These regional differences and their divergent interests coupled with the devoluted institutional structure of the NP itself all the more contributed to the instability of the alliance. It also showed that any talk of a monolithic Afrikanerdom was but a concoction of class based ideologues.¹⁹

Bloomberg accredits the Afrikaner Broederbond as having eclipsed the National Party as the embodiment of Afrikaner ideals (and therefore representative of Afrikaner nationalism). The purist nationalists had opposed the Pact as they were against ethnic co-operation with the English. Furthermore, the NP had allied with Labour, a party "tainted by atheistic Bolshevism." The NP had also compromised its republican ideals. The internal debate within the Afrikaner Broederbond had ended with the secret society parting ways with Hertzog's nationalists.²⁰ The Afrikaner Broederbond's subsequent embrace of Christian Nationalism and its expandatory recruitment of Afrikaners cutting across class lines showed that ideology and the civil religion in an ethnic context were to serve significantly as mobilizing instruments having a transcendent appeal irrespective of class.

Hertzog was indeed to become weary of sectional nationalism run amok yet he was by no means neglectful of Afrikaner interests when it came to language, education and the Imperial connection. Despite envisioning a broader South African patriotism in a dualistic sense, he adamantly opposed imperial consolidation prior to the Great War. Dominion autonomy was necessary to safeguard the interests of the Afrikaners who were a cultural minority relative to the empire as a whole. After-all Hertzog had secured equal rights for English and Dutch. To him, language was a "medium of expression for the people's thoughts ... the form of expression whereby a people can maintain and enlarge its cultural distinctiveness and yearning for autonomy."²¹ He furthermore felt that speaking one's language was to honour one's people. Hertzog saw the Afrikaner culture as being in need of protection and as such opposed cultural fusion.

After the war however, the poor white problem had increased in severity and despite Hertzog's "civilised labour policy" some years later, there were no signs of the problem going away. By 1929, their number hovered around 220 000, an affliction experienced by 1/5 of all Afrikaners. The ensuing great drought from 1929-34 coupled with the Depression exaggerated the problem. Economic degradation had caused social degradation. By 1934 approximately 1/4 of all Afrikaners had fallen into this category.²³ The stream of Afrikaners to the towns in itself posed serious problems for their traditional isolationist way of life. The proportion of Afrikaners in the cities was increasing rapidly from 10% (1900) to 29% (1911) to 41% (1926) and 75% (1960).²⁴

Disrupting the social milieu of the platteland had not only created deepening class rifts but it had also created a situation in which rural farm life was passing out of the realm of fact to that of myth. Afrikaner nationalist leaders would have to facilitate and incorporate that transition. Urbanization entailed the transition from a rural subsistence economy to a highly intricate money one in which the agents of Imperialism set the standards. The English fragment controlled the economy and English was the language of business and therefore a crucial key to advancement.

The rural-urban cleavage between Afrikaner and English began to fuel Afrikaner nationalism in the context of industrialization and urbanization. The Afrikaners felt embattled by the urban English culture and direct economic competition by non-whites. According to H.J. and R.E. Simons: "The British had many initial advantages. Backed by the imperial State and representing a world-wide culture, they behaved with the arrogant assurance of conquerors. They dominated mining industry and commerce, controlled banks and finance houses, and supplied most technical skills. Their urban culture engulfed the Afrikaner, left a permanent imprint on his style of life, fostered class divisions, introduced a liberal and a socialist radicalism, and undermined the values of his traditional agrarian society."²⁵ The Afrikaner trek to the cities had painted the industrial centres as the new frontier. The already developing racial consciousness of the Afrikaner intensified as realities of status and class placed his poor

brethren in direct competition with the African proletariat in the new urban setting. The Afrikaners appeared to be hemmed in by English capital and African workers. Welsh aptly relates the effects of urbanization in that it "had led directly to a diversification of interest groups within Afrikaner nationalism, and indirectly to internal conflicts posed by the absorption of a traditional agrarian-rooted nationalism in a wider scale industrial society."²⁶ While striving to prevent miscegenation and the erosion of racial consciousness, Afrikaner nationalists became equally uncompromising with regard to conciliation with their English counterparts. Thus, when Hertzog declared that the 1926 Balfour Declaration had resolved the question of South African constitutional freedom (in spite of its continued reference to the British Empire), many ardent republicans began to lose faith in his nationalist credentials.²⁷

Cleavages between rural Boers and the urban English were reflected in party politics. Afrikaners were divided into those who favoured co-operation with the English and those who sought to dominate or even absorb the British fragment.²⁸ Hertzog's efforts to uplift the Afrikaner and give him a feeling of self-respect and equal status had given birth to a "Nationalist Frankenstein" who was bent on domination in an Afrikaner republic.²⁹ Feeling alienated and locked out of the new urban environment of commerce and industry, national minded Afrikaners realised that through political action they could regain their independence. Stripped of their land by circumstances, politics and public service provided an alternative way of life for young Boers.³⁰ The old Boer way of life had been smashed by the great socio-economic revolution. The Nationalists remained in power until, in 1933, the Depression ravaged economy forced them into a coalition with the South African Party. Two years later, these two parties fused into the United Party. To some it seemed possible that a single South African nation was on the horizon. Hertzog remained prime minister while Smuts was the deputy prime minister.

Hertzog's position was that in light of the Imperial Conference and the Westminster Act, "independence" had been achieved. A new flag, anthem and equal language status had ensured the dualism of

the state. The national integrity of the Afrikaner had been restored. The next logical step was to consolidate the Dominion and move towards ethnic conciliation. Condemnation of fusion was not absent. Most significant was Cape leader and former minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. Defending the exclusiveness of the Afrikaner, Dr. D.F. Malan seceded from the party with some followers to form the Purified Nationalist Party thus emulating the Hertzog of 1912.³¹ Criticising fusion through journalistic instruments Die Burger and Die Volksblad, Malan saw Hertzog's leadership of the nationalists as dictatorial. Malan firmly supported the British Parliamentary system and believed in hereniging (reunion) but viewed this alliance with imperialists and capitalists as deplorable. The soul of the Afrikaner was here at stake. His staunch republicanism, furthermore, required severing the connection with the Empire completely. Fusion, by incorporating financial interests on the Rand, would create party cleavages on class lines rather than on ethnic lines. Afrikaner nationalism would, therefore, be forever destroyed as an effective political force.³²

The Cape based purists had come into synchronization on republicanism with the Afrikaner Broederbond. The Bond welcomed the new party eyeing it as a political front for spreading their Christian Nationalist doctrine. Close bonds were formed and, although the Bond purported to be a society for the advancement of cultural goals, its "senior party" relationship to the PNP, its extra-parliamentary offensive and ideological counter-offensive coupled with hostile confirmation by Hertzog made its political character undeniable.³³ The Afrikaner Broederbond was a driving force and reputed by some to be the single most important organisational influence on nationalism in the 1930's.³⁴

The Afrikaner Broederbond had in effect taken over the reigns of Afrikaner nationalism yet this republican strand was primarily based in the north. It comprised the northern Afrikaner intelligentsia, was elitist and almost exclusively petty bourgeois. Although originally founded by a collection of railway clerks, policeman and clergy as a small semi-religious organisation, its subsequent recruitment of teachers and academic clergy

(particularly from the University of Potchefstroom) soon eclipsed the founding leadership. Aggravated by Hertzog's abandonment of republicanism and subsequently the fusion crisis, the Bond deputized the FAK with its cultural portfolio to assume the role as directing body of Afrikaner nationalism.³⁵

Fusion had received much support in the rural north from large groups of poor whites. Their co-optation and mobilisation by working class organisations had to be averted for it would ring the death knell of Afrikaner nationalism. The underlying commitment of the Bond to unite Afrikaners of all classes was steadfast. Imperialism was an economic affliction. The Afrikaners had been excluded from all sectors of the economy apart from agriculture. The rapid denationalization of the urban Afrikaner was a cause for great concern.

This linkage of class and ethnicity has been echoed by Merle Lipton. She asserts that Afrikaner "Militants" who were dissatisfied by Fusion had their sentiments rooted both in ideological and economic causes. Expanding upon the latter, it is argued that Malan's electoral base consisted of the rural Cape and small constituencies in the OFS and Transvaal. Drawing on economically disadvantaged regions, Malan also drew some support from wealthier embittered Cape farmers who felt that imperial preference had not born the fruits as it was in reality a one-sided trade agreement between Britain and its exported fragment. These wine, fruit and wool farmers were furthermore supported by SANLAM, the ethnically (Afrikaner) oriented finance and insurance group which owned Nasionale Pers and the Cape newspaper, Die Burger. Malan's support in the north was more ideologically rooted. Grippled by racism and xenophobia, these poorer farmers and the rising petty bourgeoisie in the cities and towns rejected Hertzog's policies which were geared towards white unity and more amicable relations with the coloureds. They were anti-imperialists, anti-semitic and staunchly anti-African. Social separation and tightening of the pass laws and job colour bars was desired. Their prejudice also took the form of organized boycotts against the more frugal Jewish and Indian merchants.³⁶

The position of the Afrikaner was inferior to the English along the lines of education, occupation, income, and capital ownership (outside agriculture). Afrikaner workers were the lowest paid and were semi-skilled operators working machines. The dominant English unions guarded the apprenticeship system. In 1936, Afrikaners were 27.5% white collar, 31.3% blue collar and 41.2% in agriculture. The annual per capita income of Afrikaners was 86 as compared to 142 for other whites.³⁷ Afrikaner leaders strived to channel the intense resentment felt by Afrikaners in an effort "to conquer the cities and the economy, dominated by the English; a goal they termed their second Great Trek."³⁸

The Broederbond was at the forefront attempting to pull the ox and wagon back into the laager formation. Developing a volkskapitalisme was its ultimate aim as it embarked on a campaign to promote class breaking exclusive Afrikaans religious, cultural, social and economic organizations. The dominant ideology amongst the Afrikaner faced two great economic problems: the economic inferiority of the Afrikaners themselves, and the broader crisis in the capitalist economy. To solve the first problem, they had advocated an agriculturist economic philosophy, improvement of the educational system with the aim of developing a competent business elite, and the practical steps of "buy Afrikaans" and the co-operative Bond network. To remove some of the warts from capitalism, they turned to volkskapitalisme. This was the period then which witnessed the awakening of the Afrikaners' interest in economic issues. The social supremacy of the church was no longer an adequate guarantee of national survival. Survival was also dependent upon the emergence of a national bourgeoisie that could control economic development. The Bond was the embryonic formation.

The work of the petty bourgeoisie organised in the Bond facilitated the ideological transformation of Afrikaner nationalism into Christian nationalism. The structure of South African capitalism offered few opportunities for Afrikaans speakers. The Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie laid the blame on imperialism and monopoly capital. The fusion crisis had disorganized and confused the petty bourgeoisie as it seemed to imply the recognition by agricultural

capital that their interests were no longer irreconcilable with those of imperialist mining. Thus, the petty bourgeoisie ideological function as the primary class ally of agriculture was undergoing erosion. Being displaced by monopoly mining capital in this regard called for an overhaul and an ideological redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism.³⁹ The Afrikaans language and culture were to serve as the focus for this redefinition.

Even before Fusion, the Bond had embarked on language projects in order to modernise the Afrikaans language and so adapt it to the industrial society. The Bond spawned the FAK as the vanguard of a growing network of cultural bodies and local language oriented organisations. These numbered roughly about 300 in 1937.⁴⁰ Parallel - Afrikaans national cultural organisations in all spheres were set up. Subsidiary organisations of the FAK included the Afrikaans Language and Cultural Society (ATKV) 1930, the Spoorbond (The Rail Bond) 1937, the Institute for Christian National Education 1938, the Voortrekker Movement (1931), the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentbond (1933), Noodhulplig (Red Cross) 1935, and the Instituut vir Volkswelstand (Institute for People's Welfare) 1938.⁴¹

Geoff Cronje best spells out the reason behind these community-oriented efforts:

"The Boer culture must be carried into the English cosmopolitan life of the city ... It is an appalling struggle and more than one Boer has already been demolished in this difficult transition period in our ethnic life. But our hope is that the organised Afrikaner action in the city will day by day become more purposeful and more irresistible ... We must not allow the urbanisation of the Afrikaner to divide our people. We must not allow our city Afrikaner to become a different kind of Afrikaner from the fellow on the farm."⁴²

Probably the most significant cultural achievement of the FAK was the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations of 1938 in which Christian Nationalism was linked to the Voortrekker ethos thus attaining historical legitimacy. The popular re-enactment of the Trek furthermore revived Afrikaner nationalism in an urban context. The new economic inner trek was also highlighted as was

republican sentiment. Paying homage to now almost mythological heroes created an up-surge of national sentiment and these militant energies were craftily channelled by a slew of prominent orators. Christian nationalism had at last penetrated the popular Afrikaner consciousness and it was to be seen as the logical outgrowth of their historical emancipation.⁴³

The renewed cultural awareness and the heightened message of volkseenheid which would override the real and potential splits of party politics and regionalism and those inspired by British imperial interests gave new impetus to Afrikaner economic nationalism. The ever present poor white problem was an even greater cause for concern in the midst of the industrial revolution.

The 1934 "Poor White" Conference and a number of related studies showed the urgency with which Afrikaner leaders regarded this problem. Firmly believing that only ethnic mobilization could hope to relieve their poor brethren, they encouraged businessmen to be "innovators" in their own communities with consumers being asked to support Afrikaans business interests. Such contributions were reasoned as a demonstration of the moral worth of such individuals.⁴⁴ The 1930's saw the first successful ventures of the new Afrikaner capitalists. They were in the banking sphere and included Boere Saamwerk, Volkskas and Uniewinkels. The year 1939 marked the First Afrikaans Peoples' Economic Congress which committed itself to promoting the interests of the middle class. A Reddingsdaadbond fund ("act of rescue" fund) was set up and its purpose was the investment of capital in Afrikaner business ventures and particularly in Federale Volksbeleggings, a new investment house. Only 10% was allocated to poor relief.⁴⁵ The executive of the FVB spelled out the organisations' principles at a meeting on September 27, 1940; "Federale Volksbeleggings BPK operates on the principle that it is a people's institution, established on the mandate of the Ekonomises Volkskongress of 1939, to serve as means of furthering the Afrikaners' drive for economic independence. But the company is nevertheless a business undertaking which wishes to pay its shareholders in clinking silver and not just in sentiment."⁴⁶

A notable threat to ethnic unity lay in the trade unions and their socialist orientation. Thus, a primary task and necessity was to prevent the independent class development of Afrikaner labour. Albert Hertzog's Reform League launched an offensive against the English dominated unions particularly the Mine Workers Union. The underlying aim was to heighten Afrikaner consciousness and create exclusive Afrikaans Christian national unions so as to enhance their bargaining position versus English capitalists. These efforts bore fruit as the Reformers were successful in wresting control of the MWU, fomenting splits in other union bodies and establishing some new ones (ie. Spoorbond). Lipton argues convincingly that Afrikaner nationalism here was not merely "drummed up" by ambitious leaders but had deep grass roots support. Competing liberal and radical challenges to Christian national trade unions tempered their optimism realising the difficulties in weaning Afrikaners into unions with English and black workers. Their shared affinity for "their own" with whom they shared a common language, culture and history was not a negligible barrier to say the least. Lipton is, however, quick to acknowledge that in spite of a core of "militant" nationalists whose commitments were both emotionally and economically based, there were nationalist elements who were unreliable in the sense that economic interests prevailed over ethnic loyalties. It was these elements that took some of the beat out of the ethnic drum on the march to political victory.⁴⁷

Afrikaner business power received a boost as businessmen organized themselves into a separate association, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Commercial Institute) 1942 as distinct from the English dominated Chamber of Commerce. Afrikaner private businesses had begun to accumulate wealth merely by exploiting Afrikaner sentiments. Furthermore, state favouritism for white business ventures and particularly for Afrikaner entrepreneurs after the Second World War was supported by well controlled and large reserves of cheap black labour. The rapid economic development of South Africa since 1939 and the capital accumulated by the Afrikaner controlled farming sector set off a flow of funds through Afrikaner banks to Afrikaner businesses.⁴⁸ In 1943 Saambou, a young Afrikaans building society was established to set up and found numerous companies.

O'Meara asserts with regard to the economic movement that north/south differences were pervasively hidden beneath the rhetoric of Afrikaner nationalism. Furthermore, poor whiteism was not of primary concern and was subordinate to the creation of Afrikaner entrepreneurship and profit. Rather than solely attempting to Afrikanerise commerce and industry and win over more Afrikaner workers, the economic movement aimed to develop Afrikaner capitalists. Therefore, while condemning the capitalist "Hoggenheimer" image, the Afrikaner alliance of farming capital, worker savings and the petty bourgeoisie employed such techniques of capitalism to form co-operatives under the guise of nationalism. The southern based Sanlam group had developed a rapport with the Bond in the north to undertake a joint business venture. While the former capitalist oriented Cape enterprise needed the Bond to mobilise potential resource capital to facilitate its growth and expansion, the latter anti-capitalist petty bourgeoisie Bond camp lacked the business experience and capital to pursue its ideological and economic initiatives and hoped to off-set growing fear of economic and political domination by established interests in the Cape. The co-operatives were seen to be an appropriate form of volks-capitalisme as they did not entail monopoly practices or individualism but rather drew on all groups for mutual support. The redefined relation between classes was significant in that it redefined Afrikaner nationalism itself through the advent of an economic consciousness.⁴⁹ There was then a symbolic shift from the old outlook on Hoggenheimer to an enthusiastic embrace of the new "People's Capitalism" without in any way casting off their traditional civil religion. Afrikaners were urged to cultivate the virtues of an urban industrial society.⁵⁰

Magubane asserts that "Afrikaner Nationalism then is a product of bourgeoisie society which manifested itself as a means to advance sectional economic interests."⁵¹ He reasons that the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie erred in adopting a strategy of capital accumulation which was dependent upon holding state power. In its absence, the very basis of its economic power would be destroyed. Control of the state by the nationalists enabled them to accumulate capital at the expense of other groups.⁵²

Welsh, however contests this class based theory of Afrikaner nationalism holding that economic motivations do not underlie nationalism. This assumption merely "infers causes from consequences." Convincingly refuting Marxist interpretations, Welsh argues that individual ambitions are not solely pumped by material ambitions but also by status, prestige, power and idealism. Class is rather woven into a racial and ethnic fabric. Therefore, Afrikaner nationalism provided the impetus and served as a foundation for economic motivations. At the very least it defined the parameters in which these class variables could act.⁵³

H. Lawson highlights the weaknesses of Afrikaner capital and the significance of state control: "The overwhelming strength of the established capitalist groups made it impossible to force them by purely economic means to share the fruits of exploitation. Thus the further progress of Afrikaner capitalism had of necessity to depend on the use of political means for economic ends. The two political trump cards in the game were the numerical superiority of the Afrikaner and the corrosion of his political consciousness by the poison of racialism. Together, they could be used to give the Afrikaner capitalist a position of power in the country which its economic position alone never could give him."⁵⁴

The PNP was the only political instrument capable of expressing the true Afrikaner will. Its aim was to gain control over every aspect of life in South Africa, to again establish a new Republic and to sever the imperialist tie. Hitler's invasion of Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War gave the necessary impetus and created the circumstances which would realign Afrikaner class alliances into a hegemonic "monolith".

When Smuts carried South Africa into the war pushing aside Hertzog's parliamentary "petition" for neutrality, it was interpreted by many as a reassertion of British imperialism. The pro-war Smuts group had settled the split in the Cabinet and House of Assembly by passing an amendment to break off relations with Germany by 80 votes to 67. Hertzog immediately resigned signalling the demise and failure of fusion. Taking his followers across the floor, he renegotiated with the Malanite nationalists only to again

resign in disarray over a Federal Council's (NP) programme which denied the English equality of status and political rights.⁵⁵ Although Hertzog had entered into a reunion with the republican nationalists and had even accepted a republican formula with safeguards, his dominion nationalism could not be reconciled with the neo-nationalism of the PNP.⁵⁶ The instability of the nationalist alliance was clearly evident as the new Smuts government won a landslide victory in the elections of 1943. The quick resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism after the outbreak of war had given republicanism renewed emphasis and made it an enduring theme of debate.⁵⁷

The NP did not go unchallenged, however, even within nationalist circles. The vast ideological forces that were on the move throughout the world soon touched down on South African shores. The mobilizing republicanism and heightened expectations arising from the Ossewatrek, and the subsequent intensification of Afrikaner nationalism in reaction to the imperialist war created again an arena for broedertwig. Anti-British sentiments led to the development of sympathies for the axis powers amongst Afrikaners. Furthermore, the constitutional form of parliamentary democracy (exclusive of Africans) was, among some, felt to be a relic of foreign imposition. Thus, republicanism and Afrikaner nationalism more broadly became tainted by national socialist doctrines and the spirit of Nazism. Afrikaner nationalist variants attempted to capitalize on the volatile instability and emotional frustration caused by urbanization and the wartime industrial boom. The incorporation by Afrikaner nationalism of wartime ideologies would throw up rigorous debates and disrupt the limited enclosure achieved by bourgeois ideologues and political leaders.

Pro-German attitudes were widespread amongst Afrikaners in the years preceding the war and the first years of the war. The Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel), a "cultural" organisation born from the centenary trek attempted to channel these pro-Nazi sentiments. Its founder Colonel J.C.C. Laas was soon eclipsed by Dr. J F J van Rensburg an admirer of Hitler. Professing to perpetuate the ox-wagon spirit, the movement was nationalistic, militaristic, sympathetic to National Socialism and fascism,

dedicated to a unified Afrikanerdom and a South Africa purified of English and Jewish influence, and not averse to sabotage and terrorism."⁵⁸ Its membership reached in excess of 300 000 by the turn of the decade and it had a strong anti-semitic philosophical bent. The radicalism of the movement, however, prompted many of its followers to switch allegiance to Malan and the National Party. While Malan had at times flirted with the organisation, the looming allied victory and the threat posed to the NP from within led him to sever the connection.⁵⁹

Inter-ethnic antagonism flared up as imperialist symbols deepened the rifts. Not only was the heightened political consciousness of the English an affront to the "autonomy" of the dominion but the requirement that all South Africans rally to the glorified imperialist cause reignited the suppressed anger within the Afrikaner rank and file. Butler, in his liberal historiography, exclaims that this "new Imperialism" had utterly alienated Afrikanerdom at a crucial moment, driving it back into a volk ethnicity, and away from a convergence with the liberal forces of modernity in South Africa."⁶⁰

Afrikanerdom had not yet consolidated itself on the political front. There arose a number of organisations and parties which challenged the PNP as the torchbearer of Afrikaner nationalism. Aside from the Ossewabrandwag, the anti-semitic Greyshirts and Oswald Pirow's New Order emerged as did the post-Hertzogite Afrikaner Party committed to the outdated "dual stream" conciliatory policy with Havenga as its leader. The former three exemplified expressions of the mimetic stage of nationalism, preaching variants of national socialism and sometimes the dissolution or destruction of parliamentary government. The prevalence of a number of rival groups steadfastly retaining their own identities rather than combining in oppositional unity created a major organisational problem for Malan. Attempting to eclipse the NP by professing to be a transpolitical Afrikaner organisation, the Ossewabrandwag threw down the gauntlet at Malan in violation of the Cradock Agreement. This agreement had relegated the O.B. to the non-political realm and restricted its subversive activities against friendly political movements. Malan countered by purging

the O.B. members from NP ranks.⁶¹ He also publicly declared war on the movement for its subversive activities. O'Meara argues that Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd had decided to destroy the O.B. as its socialist component had alienated agricultural capital. It had also caused concern and lacked appeal to the businessmen of the reddingsdaadbond movement. Portraying the PNP-OB conflict as an inter petty bourgeoisie struggle, O'Meara reasons that NP leaders recognised their need to form an alliance with agricultural capital especially in the north.⁶² Malan had similarly dealt, a few years prior, with the New Order "caucus" by banning the formation of groups within its own ranks. The 1943 general election attested to the dominant PNP position as the political mouthpiece of Afrikanerdom. By 1945, Malan had become the undisputed volkleier.

Most Afrikaner nationalists saw national socialism as conflicting with traditional Afrikaner values.⁶³ Naziism was disenchanting to Malan. Afrikaner sympathies for Nazism and fascism were in part the outgrowth of historical and common ancestral ties with their Nordic "brethren". The Kaiser had offered moral support to Kruger, Krupps and supplied Staats artillery, and imperial Germany was a rival of the British Empire. Furthermore, many Afrikaners viewed Germany as a victim of British imperialism and likened the treaty of Versailles to that of Vereeniging. The Blackshirts and the Greyshirts espoused a common anti-semitism. Young nationalists had been invited to attend the anti-Comintern school in Berlin and nationalist youth movements enjoyed some Nazi organisational techniques. Ideologically, the elitism, aristocracy and authoritarianism of Calvinism had been magnified in black-white racial relations. Nazism and Christian Nationalism deified the nation as a collective organism to which its individual members were subordinate. Liberalism was villainized as an alien ideology. Both creeds saw the state as an instrument to achieve national or racial ends. Both repudiated the French Revolution and idealized an absolute state or a totalitarian volk.⁶⁴

Bloomberg argues that the Afrikaner Broederbond had been attracted to totalitarianism as an alternative to the parliamentarianism which had eased the nationalists into coalition and in turn betrayed their principles. Smuts had in fact accused the Bond in

parliament of being "a kind of Gestapo" and others had concurred that the organisation had at times been "a dangerous, cunning, political Fascist organisation" intent on perpetuating Afrikaner domination in all spheres.⁶⁵ Liberal Anglo-Saxon constitutional concepts should be swept aside and all parties should be abolished. Such broeders as Meyer, du Plessis, Diedrichs and Eloff had sought to incorporate Nazi ideas yet the notion of a volk state was equally as foreign as the Westminster system. Corporatism was juggled around but it soon waned until its revival by the O.B. less than a decade later.⁶⁶

Nazi eugenics had also lent support to those of an anti-semitic persuasion. Despite Afrikaner pre-Nazi sympathies with Jews, the Nazis and the likes of du Plessis, Verwoerd and Donges introduced anti-semitism based on religious, political and racial foundations. Jewish liberalism and capitalism tied to imperialism served as a convenient scapegoat for a mobilizing fascism. The Jews were accused of non-assimilability and were painted as economic threats to Afrikanerdom. Jewish competitiveness and economic success prompted accusations that they had robbed the population of its heritage. This appealed to the new Afrikaner business class and the poor whites. Jews were also portrayed as cultural carriers of internationalism, non-racialism, liberalism and socialism.⁶⁷

While the anti-semitic credentials of key nationalist personalities had been obvious and while Hitler had been praised by many elements within Afrikaner ranks, Afrikaner nationalism cannot be equated with Nazism. Afrikaner Calvinism rejected any glorification of leaders, race, blood and nation. While the lines separating Divine worship and nation worship are often smudged, Afrikaner Calvinism did not subordinate itself to the state. Instead these religious elements sought to guide and Christianize the nationalist movement. Even influential figures outwardly anti-semitic (ie. H.F. Verwoerd) acknowledged that while Naziism and fascism were perhaps good recipes for the Wehrmacht Republic, they were a fatal import to the Afrikaner context.⁶⁸ It seems plausible to argue that heightened xenophobia stemming from the war and industrialisation often expressed its frustration in an anti-semitic mode. Imported Nazi doctrines for reasons discussed managed to penetrate the Afrikaner

consciousness feeding off a latent and suppressed anti-imperialism. While perhaps not vehemently anti-semitic but rather pro-German, Afrikaner leaders saw in scapegoating a means to mobilize the rank and file, particularly those rural platteland elements. Naziism, while bearing some similarities to Christian Nationalism was not a real option for the Afrikaners. The political wrangling or broedertwig was a contest for nationalist leadership, and support by some factions for Nazism was but a warped outgrowth of pro-German (and more precisely anti-British) sentiment. The looming demise of the axis forces and the proportional decline of fascist inclined movements provides confirmation. The voice of Afrikanerdom was a parliamentarianist party which had, after initial flirtation, scorned political bodies with fascist and Nazi predispositions.

World War II had witnessed a 116% increase in the development of the manufacturing sector and a real gain of 65% in manufacturing output. The arms industry developed into a highly profitable industry and was based upon a labour force of non-whites and white women during the war. The proportion of white males in the South African army was particularly high so as not to arm the black population. As a result the social structure underwent a change as white women entered the labour force. Furthermore, non-white jobs were better during the war temporarily due to the need for more labour. The white/non-white wage differential in the manufacturing sector (skilled) stood at 5:1 which was not so great compared to the huge wage gap in the mining sector. This prompted mass black migration to South Africa. After the war, people were perturbed at the increasingly black face of the cities. White nationalists were fearful and this led to an anti-liberal backlash. This paved the way for the purist white nationalist party to take power.

Apartheid or separate development which had previously connoted the separation of Afrikaans from English now came to be termed as a separation from non-white races. This horizontal separation or segregation marked the end of a slow, liberal veneer and of the rhetoric of democratic liberalism which characterized Smuts' U.P. government. What followed the Nationalist electoral victory would

come to be known as the most racially oppressive set of legislation ever unleashed. Apartheid legislation entailed the institutionalization of racism to harden the lines of horizontal segregation. It, furthermore, enforced the lopsidedness of the South African economy which was characterized by backward agriculture, management-labour relations and wage scales all based on race. Afrikaner nationalism had been propped up on the dual pillars of racial segregation ("separate and unequal") and anti-liberalism. The Nationalist victory in the 1948 election may be seen as the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism. With the mainstream political orientation of the NP and the underpinning reparative unity efforts of the AB network, postwar difficulties highlighted the inefficiency of the Smuts UP government. The political environment in nationalist terms was a far cry from the disastrous schism of 1941. Moodie attributes the NP's marginal electoral victory to the civil religion encompassing the Christian National ideology and practical assistance from the AB. He further argues that the civil religion was dealt a significant blow by the unexpected political triumph. Its theme of righteous suffering fought strain to accommodate this new power. Furthermore, practical priorities and the need to develop a bureaucratic party machine detracted from the civil religion. The long awaited republic had still not been realised and the Broederbond lapsed into a maternal role securing the xenophobic enclosure of its members. Afrikaner exclusivism would soon be supplanted by an ideological fervour around which the policy of separate development ("apartheid") would gain notoriety.⁶⁹

Wilson and Thompson attribute the Nationalist victory to the rallying cry of Malan which called for the "bring[ing] together [of] all who, from inner conviction, belong together". The disunity and frustration of pre-war and the war years facilitated the amalgamation of the National Party and Afrikaner Party on nationalist principles. While one-third of Afrikaners still remained outside the nationalist kraal. Afrikaner Nationalism had come to power without extraneous assistance and could rule alone.⁷⁰ O'Meara interprets the election in terms of the changing political economy of the Union. The twofold movement towards the H.N.P. firstly involved the Transvaal farmers who deserted the U.P.;

protesting against the Smuts government for not attending to their needs for a cheap black labour supply. The influx of Africans into the cities during the war years was facilitated through the relaxing of controls on black urbanisation. The paralysis of State policy after the war was apparent in the UP government's inability to defuse strident African demands for change and to restore stability through reform. The ideological bankruptcy of the U.P. heightened its control vacuum. Rejecting the conclusions of the U.P. appointed Fagan Commission which catered to commerce and industry in holding that African urbanization was irreversible, the NP policy of apartheid was designed to secure labour for agriculture thus insisting that natives in the urban areas be regarded as migrants. O'Meara furthermore argues that the Marketing Act of 1937 as passed by the government undermined the financial interests of the farmers by interfering with producer control in holding down food prices. The HNP moved to promote the sound and profitable marketing of agricultural products.⁷¹

The drift of white workers towards the H.N.P was given impetus by a number of incursions into the rights of white labour made in the name of war. The Labour Party had entered into a close wartime alliance with the U.P. Mechanisation had rendered some skilled labour redundant, real wages fell and African wages increased. White workers perceived that their jobs were being threatened by the large scale movement of Africans into operative positions. Furthermore, their traditional trade unions were targeted by Christian National agencies who waged an ideological struggle against the labour movement. The ethnic division of labour served as "political fodder to advance the interests of Afrikaner unity and prevent Afrikaner proletarianisation."⁷²

Edward Tiryakian argues that the political slogan of "apartheid" had won the elections so upsetting the pre-election odds. Van den Berghe too acknowledges the primacy of ideology in South Africa as self-evident. Stultz views the 1948 alliance partners' triumph as a repetition of the electoral success of Hertzog and the NP nineteen years earlier. The traditional ethnic political alignment last manifest in 1929, had been restored. The HNP-AP alliance stood for a policy of racial exclusion in contrast to the

liberalizing race policies of the UP. and playing on the "Black Peril" and the rising cost of living after the war ousted the helpless Smuts government.⁷³ Either way, it is clear that 1948 did not hail the rebirth of the Afrikaner monolith. In spite of the "landslide" victory, the AP-PNP alliance polled 140 000 fewer votes than the opposition due to the rural vote loading or over-representation. The Afrikaner Broederbond had to now broaden Afrikaner unity to include the 250 000 Afrikaners who had voted for Smuts. Ethnic enclosure remained incomplete.

Afrikaner exclusivism was no more an untradeable commodity as the ideological fervour of Afrikaner intellectuals in the following decade connivingly redressed stark racism under the banner of separate development and Christian nationalism.⁷⁴ While apartheid had certainly not represented a break from traditional paternalism and overt racism, it did attempt to somehow justify and legitimize white supremacy in response to the liberal challenge and the context of decolonisation. Classic apartheid was clearly an intensification of the policy of segregation.⁷⁵ Afrikaner nationalism had been radically transformed from the humanistic expressivism evident in the struggle against British imperialism to a policy which was reactionary and chauvinistic in character.⁷⁶ While the Nationalists had refrained from halting the industrialization process as many liberals and businessmen had feared, they had attempted to control and adapt it to the traditional hierarchical race structure so as to preserve the white (particularly Afrikaner) identity. They, therefore, proceeded to rigidify the lines of cleavage between the white and non-white races resorting to further legal intervention.⁷⁷ The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, the Population Registration Act of 1950 and the Immorality Act not to mention the Group Areas Bill undertook to categorize and prevent mixing between biologically defined population groups. Afrikaner social engineers, furthermore, legislated the South African Citizenship Bill of 1949 which restricted immigrant acquisition of citizenship making it more difficult and expensive to do so just as it had been in Kruger's Republic between 1890 and 1899. This, therefore, reversed the advantages previously enjoyed by British subjects over aliens so disenchanting English-speakers further.⁷⁸

However, while the Afrikaner Nationalists had political control, the British owned the diamond and gold mining industry, the latter serving as the fulcrum of South Africa's political economy. That is to say, South Africa's capitalist development has revolved around gold mining and was seen after 1910 as an appendage of Britain and the world economy. The struggle for control of the gold mines pitted English speaking mining magnates against the rising Afrikaans speaking petty bourgeoisie. Industrialization came to be more and more a function of the state as the Afrikaner political elite continued to threaten nationalising the gold mines so as to exact profits and subsidies with which to consolidate their control. State directed industrialization also managed to exact severe criticism from mine owners who lambasted the regime's increasingly protectionist policies. Most of the profits from gold mining, however, still went overseas and most of the huge mining corporations were London based. This prompted the Nationalist Party to launch an offensive against British capital dominance. Attempting to "restore the economic heart to its political body", the Nationalist capitalists made a takeover bid for Central Mining, a huge international group constituting the second largest holding in the South African mining industry. The bid was eventually defeated and the threat put down with British and American help. Nevertheless, in order to preserve British capital interests, prominent Afrikaner financiers were incorporated into the Chamber of Mines.⁷⁹

Thus, one can say that O'Meara is not altogether mistaken when suggesting that apartheid is more than a policy to advance the interests of NP supporters but in fact secures the interests of the entire capitalist class enabling all capitalists to intensify exploitation of African workers and so raise general rates of profits.⁸⁰

Lipton succinctly outlines the effects of political apartheid upon the mining industry. After 1948, some mine owners supported the campaign against apartheid and even helped to foster the liberal PFP. Yet, most mine owners tacitly supported many racist policies and were not altogether out of step with the regime's repressive measures particularly with regard to black trade unions. Apartheid

measures which had a direct impact upon the industry were restrictions on mobility (influx control), the job colour bar and closed compounds. The mine owners were resistant to these measures in part, because they were deprived of additional labour to the benefit of agricultural farming sector. Thus, their need for compounds was closely connected to the existence of the job bar and dependence on foreign labour which in turn was a function of political preference for farmers.⁸¹

One can, therefore, note that while the Afrikaner political elite had attempted to make inroads into British capital, it had not carried out threatened nationalisation schemes opting instead to empower nationalist capitalists within the current framework. Furthermore, while state policies were frequently criticized by predominantly English capital, they were not resisted as such. Political apartheid was not economically neutral as it changed in accordance with the changing interest of the white oligarchy. English capital became dependent upon repressive legislation in response to state directed apartheid policies which garnered support for specific economic interests to the detriment of others. Therefore, state and capital were mutually interdependent, the former relying on the latter to create wealth with which to industrialize and diversify the economy in conjunction with the changing interest of the white oligarchy; Likewise, capital was somewhat dependent upon the state power structure which guaranteed a pool of cheap black labour and a decapitated black trade union movement.

Yudelman discusses the relationship between state and capital with regard to resolving the tension between legitimation and accumulation. The state needed to legitimate itself vis à vis the white population by mobilizing political constituencies so as to gain minimal acceptability. Simultaneously, the state had to protect the accumulation process so as to ensure continued economic growth. Private enterprise would optimize the accumulation function while the state would perform the legitimation function. He refers to this relationship as a symbiotic one whereby state and capital are mutually reinforcing, not necessarily equal, and susceptible to even radical changes within each and in the balance

of their relationship. As Yudelman states, "...when a relationship between mining capital and the Afrikaner government was characterized by fairly regular public threats of nationalisation, particularly in the 1950's, a solid structural relationship of symbiosis between state and capital persisted."⁸²

To carry this argument further, it is clear that Afrikaner capital has been more politically significant in its efforts to achieve increasing prosperity amongst its ethnic brethren, the Afrikaners being the most important political constituency for the state. Conversely, English capital has been more significant economically, being larger and better placed on the international circuit. Therefore, while Afrikaner capitalists were more responsive to the state's legitimation imperatives, English capital was more so to the state's accumulation imperatives. Conflicting policy differences saw a greater toleration within Afrikaner capital for state intervention in the economy.⁸³ Conditions for the greater growth of Afrikaner capitalism had to be ensured.

The Afrikaners' economic advance between 1939 and 1950 was most significant in trade and commerce where small English and Jewish shop-merchants were displaced from the rural areas. Furthermore, the political and educational advances amongst Afrikaners forced businesses to employ more of them. While the Reddingsdaadbond was unable to achieve its financial objectives and was subsequently abolished in 1946, the Afrikaner economic movement had succeeded in promoting Afrikaner enterprises not to mention the opportunities it created for an up-coming business élite. With state initiated corporations designed to improve secondary industry and the progressive Afrikanerisation of the expanding public sector, Afrikaners were able to make headway in narrowing the English-Afrikaner gap although the former continued to occupy the higher categories of employment influentially in the private sector. The strict enforcement of bilingualism in the public sector worked to the advantage of the Afrikaners as the English moved more and more to the private sector. From 1946 to 1973, the share of the private sector decreased from 63,5% to 53%. The increasing role of the state in the economy and the deliberate appointment by the government of Afrikaners reveals that the growth of state capital meant in essence the growth of Afrikaner capital.⁸⁴

Afrikaner economic advance in this period has been the result of ethnic mobilisation, political control (after 1948) and rapid economic development which benefited both English and Afrikaner businessmen alike. The relaxing influence of the Nationalist political victory and economic prosperity soon led to intergroup differences, growing extremism and exclusiveness.⁸⁵ Post-war developments were to re-focus attention upon racial consciousness and apartheid rather than Afrikaner exclusivism. H.F. Verwoerd, heralded by many as the architect of apartheid, was seen to have sacrificed the ideal of Afrikaner dominance to the exigencies of racial politics.⁸⁶ While the threat of anglicization had receded, Africans were growing increasingly important in a fast industrializing economy. Afrikaner nationalism was seen to be incompatible with the economic integration of the Africans. Furthermore, the growth of black nationalism prompted the nationalists to divide the African population along ethnic lines.

Building upon the Lagden Commission, the Thomlinson Commission assessed the policy of "separate development" which had increasingly become a more humanistic euphemism for crude apartheid. Vigorous capitalist investments, mass removals and relocations were all to be part and parcel of a policy to stem growing African urbanization. The Native Areas would be rehabilitated and its social structure designed so as to conform with the particular native culture. Africans were to be migrant labourers in white South Africa just as the Gastarbeit in Germany. Eventually and ideally the African population in the white areas would decline and urbanisation would be reversed. The Bantustan System would sustain the population but in reality would serve as reserves of cheap black labour. Border industries were promoted so as to facilitate this arrangement. Verwoerd and Eiselen were the key proponents.

It soon became clear to all that the predictions were but a laughing stock as South Africa moved towards a common social and economic order. Against a background of increasing tension which reached a climax at Sharpeville, Verwoerd pressed ahead submitting the republican issue to a referendum of white voters. 52,14% of the votes cast were favourable. The Union became the Republic of

South Africa on May 31st, 1961 ceasing to be a member of the British Commonwealth.⁸⁷

In the years preceding the referendum, a rift between left wings and right wings within the National Party had become more evident. While liberals were easy targets for the right wing, simultaneously the seeds of non-racial ideas drew wider currency among middle and upper class Afrikaners. A number of Afrikaner intellectuals moved even further left of the UP and even Verwoerd had shifted to the left choosing not to flaunt racist policies as the NP had previously. Even a rift developed between the church and state to some extent.⁸⁸

Munger interprets the referendum as a watershed in English-Afrikaner relations. Afrikaner nationalism had mellowed making conciliatory gestures towards the English. The Afrikaner Broederbond promoted cultural and institutional ties with the English.⁸⁹ The growing business sophistication of the Afrikaners and the bringing in of English economists to government advisory positions marked the trend towards greater unity of the English economic elite and the Afrikaner political elite. The Afrikaners split as businessmen began to side with the English against pre-industrial apartheid practices. The mutual inter-penetration between economic and political elites marked their convergence within a broader white meritocracy.⁹⁰ As Moodie states, the Republic seemed to herald a new Afrikaner-English rapprochement. Verwoerd realised that a narrow ethnic appeal was no longer appropriate. The winds of change were sweeping across the globe making the African a more imposing threat to the Afrikaners' survival. The sought after exclusive Afrikaner Republic would be supplanted by an exclusive white republic in which the English would be regarded as junior allies. White unity would only be achieved through a Republic thereby severing the British connection which had always divided the English from Afrikaans speakers. Many Afrikaners found it difficult if not impossible to mitigate that xenophobic introversion which had largely been responsible for their political success as a people.⁹¹ Afrikaner nationalism could no longer flourish on exclusivism. The monolith had begun to crack.

French Canada: Nationalism, Ethnic Integration and Provincial
Autonomy 1867-1960

While the "compromise" of Confederation had not been born from a bloody battlefield, it had given political legitimacy to and institutionally entrenched the persisting cultural division of labour. The Conquest and the continuing Imperial connection had made Anglophone economic domination a rigidity that could not easily be transformed. Mercantile capitalism had challenged the traditional, pre-capitalist, social structure of Quebec and the French Canadian nationalist notion of "La survivance" embodied continual threats facing the Quebec national culture. This would take the form of infringements by the Federal and other Provincial Governments on the rights and privileges of French Canadians outside Quebec; The forces of industrialization would challenge traditional anti-materialism and the rural ideal. Furthermore, the participation of French Canadians in Imperial campaigns became an emotional issue as did the economic penetration of Quebec by foreign interests which resulted in the exclusion of the Quebecois from increasingly powerful economic institutions. French Canadian minority status had made it a culture under siege. Modernizationist trends, urbanization and industrialization would create structural changes thereby altering the nature and historical sequences of inter-group contact and consequent patterns of stratification and interaction between class and ethnicity.

In spite of the fact that Montreal was the epicentre of financial and industrial power, French Canadian church education had encouraged the rejection of urban-capitalist endeavours and instead concentrated its efforts towards the legal and political realms. An 1871 census showed that of the one million people in Quebec, approximately three-quarters were French Canadian. Furthermore, 85% of the population were rural dwellers and most of those were Francophones. French Canadians were employed in poorly paid jobs in the English dominated cities. While most were on the farm, agricultural development was relatively insignificant in Quebec Province.⁹²

The family propriety system which had emerged by 1867 employed minimum labour from outside the family, domestic crafts continued to thrive, and mechanisation had not really taken hold. As Brady notes, "the habitants resemble[d] a European peasantry in deep attachment to the soil, in loyalty to a traditional life, and in the simple but impressive cohesions of their parishes." While this rugged traditionalism remained, innovations were able to penetrate and gradually transform the agrarian system in Quebec.⁹³ Productive land was very small indeed and they were soon unable to support an expanding population.

The Riel affair in Manitoba Province led to heightened ethnic tension and a political backlash in Quebec. Bishop Laflèche's response was to compare the newly created Confederation to a house of cards awaiting collapse. Evoking nationalist appeals, Honoré Mercier came to power in 1887 in Quebec, and his Parti National was ethnically based riding high on the coalition which the Riel crisis had forged between French Canadian Liberals and Conservatives.⁹⁴ Perpetuating the agrarian calling of the French Canadian nation, Mercier created the Ministry of Agriculture and Colonization which encouraged high fertility rates by awarding plots of land to large families. Political corruption soon marked the end of the Parti National thus ushering the Conservatives back into power. Despite occasional impetuosity, Mercier had reaffirmed Quebec's French and Catholic tradition. He had been politically astute in channelling the deepest current of French Canadian national sentiment, and his eloquent appeals for French Canadian solidarity could be heard in his rallying cry "Let us cease our fratricidal strife and unite."⁹⁵

Mercier and his Parti National were significant to the development of French Canadian nationalism. Firstly, his objectives and his continued reference to "autonomy" envisioned the development of a French Canadian state on the banks of the St. Lawrence, with the French Canadians of Quebec reinforced by the exiled Franco-Americans of New England. A separatist ethnic nationalism had been voiced. Secondly, it was to highlight two different concepts, that might be called the provincial and the national, or the French Canadian and the Canadian. These two ideas of nationalism would stand in opposition throughout the history of the French Canadians.

One attempted to bind together state and nation while the other wished to place state above nationalities.

Counter-imposed on this dichotomy was the inter-play of two great opposing forces, those of Canadian nationalism and British imperialism. The ethnic division which flowed from the Riel affair and continuing bitter disputes surrounding the rights of the French language outside Quebec had the effect of aligning English Canadians primarily in the Imperialist camp and French Canadians largely in the Nationalist one. Yet in the post-Confederation era, Canadian nationalism was more English in origin while French Canadians wavered between reliance on the British connection (as it provided a certain security to their minority group status) and an ethnic French Canadian nationalism which increasingly became provincial in focus.⁹⁶

The accession to power of Wilfred Laurier and his Liberal Party in the 1896 Federal election received overwhelming support by a margin of 3:1 in Quebec. Laurier was a parliamentarian who attempted to fuse liberal ideas with Catholicism rather than stressing an unpopular secularist and anti-Catholic republicanism.⁹⁷ He was a Canadian nationalist in a single stream sense as Louis Botha had been in South Africa. While initially acknowledging the desired "inevitability" of cessation of relations with Britain "as the relations of colonies with the mother country do cease, by independence, just as a child becomes a man," he later moderated his position firmly stating that any such course of disengagements from the Empire would be folly and a crime.⁹⁸ Laurier set a pan-Canadian idea against an autonomist and exclusively French Canadian concept of nationalism.

Laurier's premiership (1896 - 1911) once again testified to the ability and right of French Canadian leadership in Canada. Yet one could better point to his democratic credentials rather than his French Canadian nationalist ones. His Canadianism encouraged political independence from clericalism, insisted on the state's autonomy within the empire, and envisioned the single stream progression of unified French and English Canadian. Advocating the end of rural isolationism, universal suffrage, the abolition of

feudalism, the separation of church and state, and French Canadian autonomy within the democratic Confederationist framework, Laurier and the young French Canadian democrats of the Dorion school were voicing the aspirations of the growing French Canadian industrial bourgeoisie.⁹⁹

The political ramifications of this ensuing challenge were hard-felt. The program of the democratic "Parti Rouge" liberals was a blatant attack on the clerical élite; The pillars of semi-feudal privilege with their strong support for English Canadian banks and railway power had to consolidate their rule and avert the disturbing effects of the democratic revolution. An Ultramontanist revival which attempted to invoke papal intervention coupled with a fierce denouncement of "Catholic liberalism" as an "impious document" met a resounding defeat with the accession to power of the Liberals. The struggle for political independence from clerical control had gained much ground in spite of the controversy surrounding the issue of the Manitoba separate schools. The Provincial Liberal administration in that Province had passed an Act which abolished denominational control in education thereby doing away with French instruction in the schools of the French Canadian minority. Laurier, prior to his ascendancy to power, had called for negotiations with the Manitoba government, himself placing provincial autonomy above claims of clerical educational control. While upholding the right of French instruction in the spirit pledged at the time of Confederation, Laurier firmly rejected a clergy supported Conservative "remedial Bill" which aimed to nullify the Manitoba Act. The negotiated provision for religious instructions after school hours was met with furious criticism on the part of the clericals but the Liberal compromise and Laurier's "refusal to submit" had called forth a massive wave of French Canadian popular support.¹⁰⁰

Despite gaining a majority of Canadian votes under the Liberal banner, Quebec nationalism remained conservative in essence. Conservative nationalism, as Dion points out, flourished in three different "cultural contexts". That is, it transgressed class divisions. It had held sway within the political culture of the higher élite who had supported its essential tenets, those being

Catholicism, Messianism, anti-liberalism, agrarianism and political autonomism. This had become intermingled with Anglo-cultural patterns. Conservative nationalism had also gained a strong foothold amongst the lower élite or men who were prominent regionally or locally. These included doctors, notaries, parish priests, college professors and many small businessmen. Most significantly, conservative nationalism had pervaded the political culture of the masses. Their basic training and socialisation had prepared them for simple lives as farmers, unskilled labourers, factory workers and craftsmen. Their lower socio-economic status and subservience had been ingrained at an early age. Thus, Dion entertains the notion that perhaps conservative nationalism, in upholding the status quo, had in fact been responsible for the survival of French Canada in spite of that survival involving the betrayal of the masses by the upper élites. Dion conclusively remarks that conservative nationalism had been consistently manipulated by both Federal and Provincial Governments, and although French Canadian leadership had consequently been forced to adjust to the institutions of Anglo-dominance (so limiting their own historical contribution to any full test of conservative nationalism), former solidarities re-emerging could not be discounted in the future.¹⁰¹ Thus, while liberal nationalism had made some headway, it was still to draw inspiration from the Christian and Catholic tradition and remain faithful to ideas of autonomism.

The 1896 Federal Liberal electoral victory had challenged the church hegemony, yet the secularisation and de-ethnicization of Canadian politics became short-circuited by Federal immigration policies, the effects of industrialization, and imperial policy on the Quebec economy.

Ryerson outlines the retardation of capitalist development in Quebec agriculture. He attributes this legacy of rural backwardness to persistent feudal relationships over three and a quarter centuries. Furthermore, this backwardness in agricultural development had hampered progress in the whole of French Canada and not merely in the rural milieu. Citing feudalist obstacles (which disrupts the social division of labour, commodity circulation and

"free" wage-labour) as hindering the development of industrial capitalism, Ryerson goes on to explain various legal obstacles preventing the "censitaire" from adapting to changing circumstances.

The seigneurial concession-deeds prevented the censitaire from "selling marketable timber, sawing deals, or creating any industrial establishment." These restrictions were intended to keep the habitants tethered to the soil and confined to a backward agriculture. This agriculture in turn, itself constituted a major obstacle to the creation of a market for such industry as was able to develop.¹⁰²

The problem is compounded when one notes that the primitive rural economy based on co-operative family labour was undergoing from generation to generation, a peculiar system of sub-division (as had been the case within the Afrikaner rural milieu). The rectangular seigneuries were sub-divided amongst the children of large families discouraging rotation of crops and making this form of land division uneconomical from a perspective of effort; it furthermore, hindered technical progress. Large families continued to be raised for the self-contained agrarian economy, and the clergy did its utmost to keep the population on the land so as to maintain their influence not to mention the tithe. The result was an increasing surplus population stranded on unproductive land with nowhere to go. Settlement outside the seigneuries had been restricted by the land monopoly and colonization of other parts were subject to strict clerical control. Soil in the north was inferior and farmers were often forced to supplement their produce with wage labour in the camps and mills. Urban industry had not yet received the financial impetus and so was incapable of absorbing the surplus of landless habitants. The crisis of feudal backwardness had spawned an immigrant French Canadian population in the United States estimated at roughly two million. It was not until the advent of large scale industrial expansion in the Twentieth Century that the task of absorbing the surplus landless French Canadians fell to English Canadian industrialism.¹⁰³

Brady comments on the rural-urban population movement which generally accompanies industrialism. While the urban population of Quebec had increased six-fold from 1881-1931, the rural population had remained stagnant. Urban industrialism had received a boost with the developments of hydro-power and metals. Structural changes contributed to the erosion of traditionalism, a declining birth-rate and adaptation to popular habit and thought prevalent on the continent. It also disrupted the working of Canadian democracy by creating "urban masses responsive to nationalist as well as proletarian agitations."¹⁰⁴

The depopulation of the rural areas concerned the clergy and petty bourgeoisie who viewed it as the erosion of their support base. The rural milieu was seen as the true nation and these classes disseminated "return to land" ideology citing it as the redemptive avenue for self-preservation. Colonization of the vast undeveloped regions of Quebec was encouraged by both French and English Canadian bourgeoisies. Business and government financing of such colonization projects and the creation of an infra-structure was motivated by self-enrichment irregardless of the non-viability of such reform initiatives.¹⁰⁵

Vallières describes how foreign American and British economic imperial interests were to buy up local businessmen and politicians and with complicity of the clergy and the press "lull the masses to sleep." The French Canadian petty bourgeoisie had developed rural trading centres and thousands of small family manufacturing enterprises had sprung up. These continued to be characterised by low wages in the guise of patriotism. Furthermore, imperialist and capitalist interests had bought up seigneuries and drove the farmers out. They proceeded to exploit the rich forest of Quebec for export and the textile industry for cheap labour. Thousands of these "colonists" became lumberjacks as lumbering and mining concessions were granted by the Provincial Government. Farmers sold their labour to lumber companies and the French Canadian peasants were characterized as "a people of hewers of wood and drawers of water." It appeared as though the proletarianization and urbanization of the French Canadians had become irreversible. While the clergy preached "buy at home" and "call of the race",

American and English imperial interests continue to vie for economic control and entrenchment of economic domination.¹⁰⁶

Guindon argues that the impact of industrialisation on the rural society, rather than displacing traditional clerical élites, in fact contributed to their rejuvenation by providing structural relief. While "the structural pivot of power" shifted from the rural land-holding class towards the urban centres, the "structurally significant" group was not the urban workers but the new middle class. It was made up of salaried white-collar workers who staffed the developing bureaucracies of government, business and church; these individuals possessed no collective ideology. While profit-seeking capitalists facilitated change which gave a surplus population something to do, local power élites in exchange for undisrupted political power let the capitalists dictate the industrial guidelines (which shunned unionism). In turn, the new middle class engaged in operating the administrative revolution for the benefit of traditional élites.

The clergy, fearfully drawing upon the European experience of crumbling bourgeois Catholic institutions and the consequent de-Christianization of the masses, were psychologically prepared to ward off similar perils perceived to be embodied in industrialization. Aggressively embarking on an administrative revolution, it began rapidly building and investing in a variety of large scale institutions. They became "bureaucratic overlords" bent on establishing clerical bureaucracies within the world of business. Its growing para-religious institutional holdings were financed and supplemented with a privately operated taxation system and continuing weekly contributions from the "faithful". Its centralized administrative and financial holdings attested to the phenomenal growth of its bureaucracies, and the parishes became de facto administrative units accountable to the "corporation episcopale." The church, realising that it had to branch out and specialize to maintain its institutional roles began to open its own channels of social promotion. Industrialization had prompted an administrative revolution.¹⁰⁷

One may then conclude that the traditional power élite was forced to transform its institutions into large scale bureaucracies in order to service the needs and wield influence over the newly urbanized French Canadian population. This process was to spawn a new middle class acting as administrative agents within traditional institutions headed by the clerical élite. These institutions were also to undergo fundamental changes to meet the demographic needs of the urban population. The social hegemony of the church was no longer an adequate guarantee of national survival. Survival was now also dependent upon the emergence of a new national middle class which could act as episcopal agents for economic development.

From the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie class came one Henri Bourassa, a deeply religious, idealistic and independent-minded individual who attempted to reconcile liberalism with Ultramontanism. Bourassa was very critical of party politics although he had campaigned for Mercier in 1887 and had supported Laurier at a later stage. Bourassa may be likened to General Hertzog in that they had both stressed Dominion autonomy while holding firm in their opposition to imperial consolidation. Bourassa was a Canadian nationalist who was anathema to an encroaching imperialist movement which was increasingly anti-French. Heightened ethnic conflict had stimulated a more enclosed group awareness in French Canada; Bourassa was at the forefront of this raised consciousness.¹⁰⁸

The Boer War had marked the battleground between nationalism and imperialism and its symbolic implications were to have far reaching effects. Imperial encroachment had come head to head with an enclosed anti-colonial/anti-imperialist national resistance movement. Fragile nation-building had received a tumultuous blow as ethnic antagonism deepened the cleft between French and English Canadians. A request for a Canadian contingent to fight the Boers had sparked off a wave of British sentiment in Ontario while Quebec had remained unmoved. The independent "La Presse" had then articulated the deep held French Canadian attitude toward foreign wars stating: "We French Canadians belong to one country, Canada; Canada is for us the whole world; but the English Canadians have two countries one here and one across the sea". Attempting to

diffuse a sensitive situation, Laurier bowed to a compromise side stepping authorization of an official contingent while simultaneously undertaking to equip and transport up to 1000 volunteers.¹⁰⁹ Bourassa's consequent resignation from Liberal Party ranks and ensuing street fights between Anglophone and Francophone students in Montreal beckoned the question as to whether the people of Quebec had received due consideration. Laurier's response was telling: "My dear Henri, the Province of Quebec has no opinions, it has only sentiments."¹¹⁰ And he was not mistaken although he may have underestimated the political power that those nationalist sentiments were to wield. Attempting to convey his own personal sentiments on the South African war issue, Bourassa said in June 1900, "...as a representative of the French Canadians, remembering the past, remembering the nefarious policy that sent to the gallows free men asking for their countrymen the rights of British subjects, I protest against the same policy which today those who happen to be in power are trying to impose on South Africa." Bourassa's parliamentary speech had not provoked understanding nor sensitivity; rather it was met with an arrogantly aggressive response as members of the House summoned applause for the Queen and then proceeded to sing "God Save the Queen." British fanaticism was prevalent in the press as well. Bourassa and French Canadians in general were lambasted facing accusations of disloyalty and being parochial.¹¹¹ Bourassa began to take more solace in French Canadian customs and institutions. He had recognized the similarities between the French Canadians and the Boers. Both had had their culture trampled upon and were denied rights guaranteed to them in their Constitutions. Disillusionment with imperial policies prompted the founding of the Ligue Nationaliste. Unofficially headed by Bourassa, the group platform envisioned maximum autonomy for Canada inside the Empire and maximum autonomy for Quebec inside federal Canada. They demanded an independent immigration policy, independence in trade, the right to make bilateral commercial treaties, the right to representation at international congresses, and Canadian non-participation in imperial wars outside its borders.¹¹²

While the Ligue Nationaliste was essentially Canadian, expressing a nationalism which incorporated both English and French cultures

and languages in a staunch anti-imperialist union, it had little influence in English Canadian circles. Its newspaper, *Le Nationaliste*, further proved to be source of embarrassment for Laurier. Bourassa saw the anglicization of Laurier as a further indication of his acceptance of imperial Britain. Bourassa's dual stream approach moved him to warn against French Canadian contact with "English elements" in Parliament. He cited the dangers that would leave French Canadians paralysed by splitting them into contesting factions. He also foresaw their increasing isolation in opening themselves up to the racial hatreds of the English Canadians.¹¹³

1903 also marked the formation of another nationalist student group. "L'Association catholique de la jeunesse Canadienne française" (A.C.J.C.), under the guidance of the newly ordained Abbé Lionel Groulx. Groulx offered a nationalism that was "more Quebecois" and so differed to the "more Canadian" nationalism of Bourassa and his disciples. While Bourassa had stressed cultural duality he had scorned political separatism, his messianistic nationalism had perhaps excluded Quebec as "too small a stage for God's plan". Monière further reasons that Bourassa had fallen prey to the retarding French Canadian complex of "hereditary powerlessness."¹¹⁴ Groulx diverged from Bourassa in that while the latter had attempted to keep language separate from faith, Groulx consciously strove toward the formulation of a nationalist doctrine which emphasized collective cultural homogeneity. The homogeneity of the French Canadian nation implied a classless society driven by Catholicism and underpinned by culture, history, territory and race. His Ultramontanist outlook married nationalism with religion; and he saw language as the protector of the faith: "We have remained Catholic because we have remained French."¹¹⁵

The A.C.J.C. called for "Piety, Study and Action". This prompted public demonstrations, large scale nationalist action and a popularization of the historical destiny of the French Canadians in which figures such as Dollard, Papineau and Riel took their places as national heroes, defenders or martyrs. Although non-political in orientation, the political campaigns of Bourassa had inspired them to action. Many provincial leaders soon began

opportunistically siding themselves with the nationalists sensing their political muscle and hoping to use it against Laurier.¹¹⁶

One can acknowledge the significant contribution that Bourassa and his anti-imperial campaigns made if not to nationalism then to the 1911 electoral defeat of Laurier. By opposing Dominion contributions to the imperial navy in 1910 to 1911 (as Hertzog had done in South Africa) and by asserting Dominion non-participation in imperial wars, nationalist leaders had capitalised on war-time sentiments so forging an alliance with the Federal Conservatives. While this golden alliance was soon forgotten by the new Government, the dethroning of the patriarch of Canadian liberalism marked an uncompromising nationalist exercise aimed at wielding political might within the imbalanced federal structure. The Nationalist Movement was a political organisation which Bourassa refused to organise into a viable third party in Quebec. He stated, "Canadian Nationalism is neither a party, a racial organisation nor a separatist movement. Its apparent weaknesses and real strength come largely from the fact that its leaders and the exponents of its principles have run all sorts of risks rather than let it become a mere political faction or the machine tool of existing parties."¹¹⁷

World War I and the consequent conscription crisis further deepened the cleavages between the two ethnic fragments. English Canadian loyalty to the British Empire led them to impose compulsory military service upon the French Canadians who in turn did not feel that their interests were best served in this regard. George Grant was to point out that English speaking Canadians in not having had broken with their Western European origins demonstrated that they were perhaps more a colony than a nation. But he does acknowledge that there were important figures who believed in the British connection as a means of preserving religious, educational, political and social forms of living which distinguish Canada from the United States.¹¹⁸ Yet former Prime Minister Trudeau would readily admit that "the French Canadian denizens of a Quebec ghetto stripped of power by centralization were expected to recognise themselves in a national image which had hardly any French traits, and were asked to have the utmost confidence in a central state

where French Canada's influence was mainly measured by its (not inconsiderable) nuisance value."¹¹⁹

Although Trudeau's criticism was directed more at the trend towards centralisation which alienated French Canadians outside of Quebec than at all visions of Canadian Nationalism, he acknowledged that a Canadian Nationalism sporting Union Jacks, loading immigration laws in favour of The British Isles, and parading Royalty would never be able to provide the basis for a lasting consensus. This would prompt counter nationalist movements in Quebec, many of which would be separatist in orientation.

Bonenfant argues that the people of Quebec were historically preoccupied with autonomy and were therefore prone to frustration and feeling helpless whenever they were marginalised in the functioning of the federal system. The formation of the Union government and the imposition of conscription in 1917 was one such instance. The official reaction in Quebec came to be expressed one year later in a motion presented to the Quebec Legislative Assembly by a Government supporter, J-N. Francoeur:

"This house is of the opinion that the Province of Quebec would be ready to accept the dissolution of the federal pact of 1867, if, in the opinion of the other Provinces, Quebec is considered as an obstacle to the union, to the progress and to the developments of Canada."¹²⁰

François-Albert Anger's article entitled, "Why We Shall Never Accept Conscription for Overseas Service" suggests that conflict arises when the basically uncommitted French Canadians are bullied by demanding, tactless and obtrusive English Canadians who are imperialist at heart in the sense of national defense or international relations. Many French Canadians were, furthermore, of the opinion that the war was not really a fight for democracy or Christianity as it had been presented but was rather a conflict of imperial interests. Quite simply French Canadians were unwilling to play the imperialist game as it was felt to be contrary to the national interests of Canada. Besides they would never agree to be forced into compliance of this policy, which even if successful, would undoubtedly benefit English Canadians more so than the French

Canadians. Stopping short of painting French Canadians as isolationists, Anger reasons that "Our Freedom to develop according to our nature and in a way we ourselves determine" has been inhibited relative to the English Canadians. The French Canadians need focus their energies on the home front so as to guard against a numerically stronger and more powerful competitor who would not hesitate to exploit unprotected vulnerabilities. On the battle front, the "equality of sacrifice" demanded by conscription would, in light of English Canadian economic dominance and conversely French Canadian high fertility rates, mean a depletion of the latter fragment.¹²¹

The adoption of conscription in 1917 by the Union Government of Borden instilled fear within the hearts of the bourgeois nationalist leadership. Thus, when street fighting broke out the following year in Quebec City, the anti-imperialist movement of the French Canadians withered in the absence of firm leadership and organised support.¹²² Venom-spitting English Canadian and French Canadian Press clashed over the conscription issue so popularising and magnifying ethnic antagonism. Within French Canada, the lower clergy situated in the country side parishes reflected the anti-war sentiments of the French Canadian masses so taking the lead in defiance of the pro-war city based upper clergy. Contravening the tenet of strict discipline embodied in the Church demonstrated the intensity and sincerity of their anti-war feelings. The ensuing sporadic violence, verbal and otherwise in Montreal ended with the arrest of four of the leaders. Arrested after a public meeting, Villeneuve had called for annexation or independence saying: "We have had enough of the Union Jack."¹²³

Although the Federal Government had consequently suspended habeas corpus and issued a decree for the immediate enlistment of all the rebels, Borden was somewhat conciliatory in conceding to the formation of an entirely French Canadian brigade. Approximately 19 500 Canayens were persuaded or forced into joining while another 18 827 managed to evade the draft. The end of the war in 1918 had seen 15 000 French Canadians having had fought at the front, 5000 in the navy and 15 000 still in training.¹²⁴

War and the conscription crisis had once again highlighted the problems of federal cohabitation for English and French Canadians just as it had between Afrikaner and English segments within the legislative Union. The squabbling of the period lent credibility to autonomous and even separatist options in Quebec. A new nationalism emerged out of the rubble of attacks upon the French language in 1905 and 1912. *L'Action française* was its chief organ and under the editorship of Omer Héroux, the new magazine was launched by the "Ligue des Droits de Français." The growth in Quebec of a narrow nationalism which was increasingly economic rather than political was evident as members of this group committed themselves "to use French in business relations, even with English firms and to give preference to firms which recognise the rights of the French language."¹²⁵

The movement had its foundations in the A.C.J.C. movement and soon Abbé Groulx supplanted Héroux as editor of *L'Action française*. Like Hertzog who had fallen prey to the more republicanist sectional nationalism of the Malanites so it was with Bourassa. His Canadian nationalism was also to be eclipsed by a narrower variant which sought to divide French Canadians from the English Canadians. Groulx led the attack building upon the provocative article, the Jesuit Père Louis Lalande's "La revanche des berçeaux" (Revenge of the Cradles). Its tone was one of vengeance vowing that the French Canadians would retaliate from their oppressed and inferior position in that period by their eventual numerical dominance in Canada due to their higher birth rate. The "revenge of the cradle" idea armed English Canadian racists whose paranoia envisioned an expansionist and cancerous French Canadian entity overflowing in all directions to gain dominance in Eastern Canada. *L'Action française's* publication in 1920 of Emile Bruesi's "Si la Confédération disparaissait" which spoke of an Eastern Canadian republic in which Quebec dominated did not alleviate racist fears. Groulx's nationalism had been influenced by the doctrines of 19th century French racist, the Comte de Gobineau; Groulx was also greatly influenced and incorporated many of the ideas of anti-democratic, romantic nationalist literature. His nationalism was founded upon "a cult of the homeland and of the French language, folk hero worship, Catholicism as a national unifying force, a

tendency towards Caesarism or monarchism, and corporatism." An emphasis upon history was a crucial element.¹²⁶

The anti-imperialist struggle had diverted French Canadian attention from the changing nature of society and the problems arising from urbanisation and industrialisation. The proportion of French Canadians in the cities was increasing rapidly from 12% (1825) to 23% (1871) to 48% (1911) and 60% (1921). The proletarianisation of the French Canadians had inadvertently created a situation in which rural farm life was passing out of the realm of fact to that of myth. The habitant became an unskilled worker in the cities. This once semi-autonomous producer lived in dwellings he did not own and found himself subjected to the conditions of constant competition that tended to lower his worth. His psychological make-up was to undergo a transformation as community homogeneity dissolved away in proportion to the increasingly weakened influence exercised by the parishes. The erosion of the family unit, inadequate housing, lax urban morals and no technical instruction placed the newcomer at the mercy of a powerful capitalism.¹²⁷

The post-war economic consciousness of French Canadians was still only partially developed; rapid industrialisation marked by the construction of hydro-electric plants, mines and pulp and paper mills revealed the economic weakness of the French fragment as British and American capital flooded into the Province. Not only did the French Canadians lack the technical expertise and the required teams of capitalists and scientists to facilitate their playing an active part in such development but "lack of initiative, narrow individualism, a preference for strictly safe investments, an aversion to long-term planning, along with love of routine and extravagant taste, were the typical characteristics of most of [their] business executives."¹²⁸

The economy of Quebec was for the most part controlled by English Canadians and Americans further advancing the image of the Province as an economic satellite. The laissez-faire orientation of the Quebec Government did not discourage this trend. With the challenge of modernization, the inability of French Canadians to

exercise control over their economy meant they would not possess the means to secure their cultural autonomy. Perhaps attributable to agrarianist unenterprising clerical education and the stigma attached to the vagaries of urban materialism and big business, French Canadians were not quick to "exchange the security of the liberal professions and public administration for the alien and socially intimidating world of big business." Even if they had wished to venture out into the entrepreneurial Anglo-Saxon world, they lacked both the technical expertise and capital necessary to compete with the wealthier and more powerful American and English Canadian interests.¹²⁹ As Patterson had rightfully acknowledged with regard to both Boer and French Canadian, each had respectively been locked out of the new urban environment of commerce and industry so realising that only through political action could they regain their independence. Stripped of their land by circumstances, politics and public service provided an alternative way of life for young French Canadians.¹³⁰ The traditional French Canadian way of life had been severely upset by the great Industrial Revolution.

French Canadians soon came to deplore the system introduced and controlled by an alien population. The economic invasion produced an economic nationalism with the nationalist press as the vanguard. The press protested against "foreign exploitation of our natural resources" and conversely agitated in favour of home grown French Canadian business and industry. Traditional hatred of English Canadians peaked and a new anti-Americanism took root. The ethnic division between capital and labour was heightened prompting the new economic nationalists to form "exclusively French Canadian labour unions, credit unions, farmers and fisherman's co-operatives," and other such efforts to promote provincial economic self-sufficiency.¹³¹

While there is an automatic inclination to analogise the down-troddenness of both Afrikaner and French Canadian segment populations, there are those who would be quick to point out the discrepancies. A Marxist would most probably consider such a comparison ironic and would more likely be inclined to focus upon the proletarianisation of the African population rather than the

increasingly dominant Afrikaner segment. Even one-time insurrectionary Pierre Vallières would toe this line as evidenced in his work entitled "White Niggers of America" decrying the "colonial" third world status of the French Canadians. It is however problematic to conflate ethnic nationalism with its powerful anti-imperialist element and the third world variant of nation building. The overlap though is interesting and enlightening. While it has been argued that positions of economic and socio-political inequality and inferiority have somewhat similarly affected and contributed to the evolving nationalism of both Afrikaner and French Canadian, one need be sensitive to the plight of the oppressed African population in the Union as it bears upon the changing shape of Afrikaner nationalism. While it is true that Quebec's determination to end English domination over the economy of the Province had been unconsciously fuelled by the American example of Africans rebelling against their economic conditions, the French were hesitant to accept a vision of themselves as "les nègres blancs d'Amerique" and did not wish to equate their status with Africans, Puerto Ricans, or women.

McLeod Arnpolous and Clift give air to the sentiment by suggesting that in spite of the temptation to adopt affirmative action legislation, successive Quebec governments have opted for francization programmes in business and restriction of access to English schools. Although both ethnic segments had to contend with the image of being likened to an oppressed African population with all its racial baggage, this image was grounded in the realities of a racially diverse economic realm which characterised the Union. While the French Canadian occupied the lower ranks of a bi-class structure as a somewhat homogeneous ethnic entity, the Afrikaner found himself spread thin in a sandwich between English capital and African workers. Thus, unlike the French Canadians, the Afrikaners found themselves embattled on two fronts and their continuing struggle to prevent miscegenation exacerbated their racial consciousness and intensified their enclosure.

The marginalisation in nationalist academia of contributions made to the furtherment of nationalism by secret societies in Quebec reflects their limited role. One cannot compare the tentacled pervasiveness of the Afrikaner Broederbond within the Union to the

more limited influence of the secret "Order of Jacques Cartier". Perhaps their differential effectiveness need not reflect successes or failures of organisational structure as much as the necessity of each society for such a covert network to promote nationalism in the social, political and economic realm. It might be argued that the more homogeneous nature of the French Canadian segment and the more inclusive and conciliatory tone of Confederation made recruitment to the ranks of a secret nationalist fraternity less appealing. One could likewise reason that the Confederationist "pact" between the two founding nations had off-set nationalist sentiment to some degree especially in the light of the growing tendency towards Quebec Provincialism and the majoritarian security attached to it. No matter which way you look at it, secret societies existed within both societies and their nationalist programmes, while surrounded in controversy, did anything but shrivel with impotence.

The secret Order of Jacques Cartier was no exception. Founded in 1928 and head-quartered in Ottawa, this hierarchically organised society had been given full endorsement from the Church.¹³² Its strategy was to infiltrate most influential decision-making bodies within the Province so as to create greater employment for French Canadians in the public service. It also set out to restrain foreign investments in "local" trade and was staunchly anti-semitic in this regard. By destroying Jewish small businesses which had sprung up throughout the Provinces, the Order hoped to return small business to the French Canadian domain "where it belonged."¹³³ The thirties movement "Achat chez-nous" (buy at home) was initiated by the Order.

The arm of the O.J.C. extended to politics, government, nearly all the St. Jean Baptiste societies, Catholic syndicates, city school commissions, municipal councils, and junior boards of trade. The secret society was furthermore not without its media organs. La Boussole was its open organ while l'Emerillon was its secret publication. The secret Order envisioned as its final goal an independent French and Catholic state.¹³⁴

Milner and Milner (1973; 159-160) in their discussion on O.J.C. recruitment signify that society membership only consisted of middle-class men in positions of influence. Thus, while it is difficult to estimate the effectiveness of the O.J.C., membership estimates of 11000 and 18000 in the thirties and forties respectively and l'Emerillon's recognition of 30 000 members in 1956 is significant "given the class nature of its membership and its stringent recruitment policy."

The influence wielded by the O.J.C. would frequently come into question. Public debate surrounded a blistering attack unleashed by one provincial Liberal Party Senator T.D. Bouchard against the organisation. His scathing attack painted the O.J.C. to be a fascist inclined nationalist society bent on exploiting the divisive national situation for its own ends. This implied the eventual disbandment of Confederation and a reversion to a view in which nation-states exclusively hostile to one another would supplant the fragile expanded plural and multicultural "nation". Bouchard cited the Bloc Populaire as "The open political tool of the Jacques Cartier Order."¹³⁵ While Bouchard had not minced words in articulating his political slant, the intensity of the protest generated and his subsequent dismissal could well demonstrate the near-accuracy of his accusations.

The resurgence of French Canadian nationalism after a brief period of relative decline surrounding divisive separatist proponents and the formation of the British Commonwealth came on the heels of economic turmoil. The 1930 Depression was to refocus attention upon the uneven development between French and English Canada. The lower standard of living in Quebec afforded it less of a margin for subsistence and thus made the intensity of economic woes much more hard-felt there relative to its neighbouring provinces.

Corporatism was put forth as a viable economic alternative to laissez-faire capitalism, which was interpreted by nationalist critics particularly during the Depression, as being responsible for social anarchy not to mention moral decadence. Business was frowned upon as an alien venture bent on the destruction of French Canadian society while some reformists stressed agriculturalism,

others endorsed the co-operative movement and called for a "Buy Quebec" policy in support of local Quebecois businessmen. These proponents desired the preservation of French Canada's agricultural vocation while simultaneously planning its entry into the stream of industrialisation. This would appease the Church by ensuring the place of religious power in Quebec society. Furthermore, the petty bourgeoisie could hope to retain political power in the sense that the state would be required to exercise control in the economic sphere restricting the power of monopolies and putting a stop to immigration.¹³⁶

Among the proponents of economic nationalism were Asselin, Montpetit and Edras Minville. They envisioned an economy in which industrialisation would proceed as a function of agricultural growth. Through the control of natural resources, economic solidarity for French Canadians, improving management education, capital accumulation in family businesses and co-operatives, and of course, support for the farmers, industrialisation could be taken to the rural areas. Efforts would be concentrated on the upliftment of the French Canadian lower middle and middle class as well as minimizing greater dependence upon Anglo-American capital.

The shortage of capital and credit sources amongst French Canadians made it virtually impossible for them to compete with outside capitalists. Co-operativism emerged as an attempt to merge within the capitalist system for the economic liberation of French Canada. Savings Banks or Credit Unions marked the movement of "Caisses Populaires" (not unlike Volkskas). This co-operative was parish based and provided low interest loans to members consisting primarily of farmers and small businessmen. Other co-operatives cropped up with Church influence and guardianship. L'Ordre Jacques Cartier was instrumental in setting up the farmers co-operative.¹³⁷ Christian morality and the social doctrine of the Church attempted to engender French Canadians as to the virtue of savings and sacrifice. The national goals of the co-operative movement were that through capital accumulation and the development of an administration and financial elite, the "caisses" could supply French Canadians with the means to economic emancipation so promoting national survival.¹³⁸

Minville, in his discussion on corporatism and national concerns, proposes a programme combining national education and social education whereby destructive individualism would give way to organisations which recognise ethnic and cultural particularities. Powerful business interests would be regulated by political authorities mandated by the majority. The corporative re-organisation of society would involve transforming the agricultural population, the working class, professional associations and trade unions into corporations. Rural based small businesses, small and middle-sized urban industries, the liberal professions and considerable rural and even urban land-holdings were in the French Canadian domain and many pre-corporative organisations (ie. College of Physicians, the Bar, Farmers' associations, trade unions) already existed in the Province so facilitating the incorporation of corporatism.¹³⁹ Societies would comprise professional bodies or guilds rather than classes perpetually in conflict. One would be defined and groupé not according to his/her position in the labour market but according to his/her social activity. The Jesuit "Ecole Sociale Populaire" attempted to fuse Church and corporatist doctrines, stressing the organic national character and the integration of individuals into guilds. Corporatism criticised the centralising tendency of the state as well as urbanisation which was the product of outside economic interests.¹⁴⁰ The Ecole Sociale Populaire were to present a "programme of social restoration" in which corporative institutions figured prominently. This project was intended to counter-act political theories being then put forward by Social Reconstructionists.¹⁴¹

Corporatism as an ideology had few tangible results. The anti-statist ruling ideology prevented a movement towards a stronger government with regard to economic difficulties. Corporate political power, arguably never envisioned, was limited by a degree of political pluralism within the corporate community. Thus, one may argue that a monolithic business political force was unable to develop in light of the differences in values of the corporate elite. This guaranteed the existence of pluralism within the economic system.¹⁴² Corporatism was however able to impede the development of class consciousness by sabotaging the work of labour unions. It furthermore, heightened opposition towards foreign

enterprises, and its organic theory which connected society and nation reasserted a sense of national consciousness and self-preservation.¹⁴³

It is poignant to note that although Quebec and its intelligentsia had clung to agrarian traditional values in the face of industrial development, this "submersion of the real world in a dominant ideological stream" did not prevent the emergence of a social awareness reflecting the real exigencies and structural changes then taking place. Yet socialism remained marginalised failing to attract and co-opt petty bourgeoisie elements. Nevertheless, an authentic working class consciousness had taken root ever so slightly. Catholic unionism was aimed at countering the dangerous influence exerted by neutral unions affiliated with United States based internationals:

"The C.T.C.C. (Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada) expressed a largely negative, anti-socialist, anti-Communist, anti-international, anti-American, anti-English, anti-Protestant, and anti-foreign-capital point of view. In a positive sense, the C.T.C.C. supported the nationalist ideas of the time: Corporativism, the return to land, and provincial autonomy."¹⁴⁴

The Church (using the same logic which had prompted the creation of exclusive C.N. Unions) saw the advent of unions as a means for slowing down the advance of socialism, recognising the right to unionise if unions be guided by principles of Christian morality and faith. The Church of Quebec furthermore, prescribed a complementary non-hostile relationship between capital and labour. The C.T.C.C. not only emphasised its Catholic nature but also its national one. That is the C.T.C.C. proclaimed the necessity for Canadian organised labour to remain independent from its American counter-parts in light of differences in laws, customs, attitudes and related problems. Thus unions were to resist the presence of foreigners rather than the capitalist system so as to remain in line with the "genius of their own race." The Catholic labour movement was then an anti-revolutionary one headed by a clerical bourgeoisie elite rather than a movement generated by aware members of the Quebec working class. As Monière sums up, "... the Church

social doctrine that lay behind the movement was a hoax: its picture of the world was the opposite of reality. It presented an upside down universe as the truth. Here was ideological alienation pushed to the limit."¹⁴⁵

The Depression exacerbated a situation in which class distinctions were super-imposed by ethnic ones. The class-struggle became a French-English one in which the former's precarious economic situation made it the worst hit. The Depression, furthermore gave rise to a number of nationalist political organisation hoping to capitalise on the sagging political fortunes and economic woes of the Taschereau Government.

The Depression had paralysed Quebec as 394 American companies were forced to lay off Quebecois workers. The year 1932 saw a staggering unemployment rate reaching 30%. The previous year witnessed 20% unemployment of unionised workers alone. This prompted the government to again propose a "back to farm" scheme to alleviate this problem. Disgusted with the corruption of the Taschereau government, Paul Gouin founded l'Action liberale nationale stressing the economic and social emancipation of Quebec. Conservative Party leader Maurice Duplessis forged an alliance with Gouin hoping to defeat the Liberals in the 1935 election. Taschereau, however, managed to preserve his power with a weakened majority. The Gouin and Duplessis alliance broke down with the latter exploiting the situation to attract most of Gouin's supporters. Rebaptising his party the Union Nationale, Duplessis was victorious one year later as elections were called in response to a corruption scandal. Foregoing nationalisation policies in favour of private enterprise, Duplessis endorsed the Padlock Law (1937) outlawing insurrectionaries. A Communist paper was closed down while the Christian National Socialist Party, a fascist organization commandeered by Adrien Arcand, was left unrestricted. Lionel Groulx's Action Française was revitalized working closely with "Les Jeunes Patriotes" a right wing nationalist movement of university students who demanded provincial control over industry and a proportionate share of federal jobs for Francophones. "Jewish liberalism" felt the brunt of their attacks. Vague allusions to separatism were made and they urged the adoption of the Carillon flag.¹⁴⁶

The Canadian government declaration of war on Nazi Germany in 1939 once again set off the sparks of ethnic tension in Quebec. While the majority of Quebecois were not opposed to military service in defence of their country, they strongly resisted pressures towards conscription in service of imperial interests. In 1942 Plebiscite for conscription met a resounding "no" vote in Quebec. The 71,2% response was actually 85% if the English factor be discounted. The disaster at Dieppe in which 6100 soldiers were slaughtered at the French coast by the Germans merely contributed to popular impressions of the colonised serving as cannon fodder for imperialism. Of the 4963 Canadians who fought there, only 2211 survived the ordeal.¹⁴⁷

World War II marked the economic revitalisation of Quebec as 120000 French Canadians managed to escape unemployment through the armed forces. The Quebec interior also opened up as its resources were exploited to finance the industrial boom in war production so creating an expansion in secondary and tertiary activities.¹⁴⁸ Quebec, however, continued to play the role of an occupied country not only with regard to its deepening economic dependence upon the United States but also as a result of a federal plebiscite which predictably came out in favour of conscription. Quebec nationalists under the spokespersonship of Maxime Raymond had proved successful in mobilising the Francophone masses against conscription. Ironically attempting to mobilise Canadian nationalism in the Bourassian sense, George Pelletier and André Laurendeau organised the League for the Defence of Canada campaigning for the "no" vote and asking Canadians to "put country ahead of race."¹⁴⁹ Lambasting ethnicity certainly appealed to French Canadian nationalists. Separatist platforms again gained strength on the heels of anti-conscriptionism.

With the Canadian majority voting in favour of overseas service, resistance now meant desertion and demonstration. Prime Minister McKenzie King's endorsement of a Bill calling for limited conscription induced demonstrations in which 2000 people raced through the financial district smashing windows of the Bank of Montreal. In Chicoutimi and Rimouski, union jacks were burned to the ground.¹⁵⁰ Once again French Canadian bitterness and resistance

although mild in comparison to the first conscription crisis came to be interpreted by English Canadians as a testament to and affirmation of the French Canadian traitor's heart. French Canada's military record was cited as evidence. It showed that Quebec had the lowest rate of volunteering and that Quebec's military districts had the greatest number of deserters together numbering 11513 out of a total of 18943 for all of Canada.¹⁵¹

While separatism had not yet received its popular calling, Provincial autonomy had in response to resurgent war feverous British loyalism. French Canadian nationalist leaders, while not sharing an ancestral brotherhood with Germany as did the Afrikaners, were not immune nor unreceptive to the influence of fascism and national socialist doctrine.

Vallières (1971:40) attributes the "exacerbated nationalism" of Bourassa and Groulx as stemming from their sympathies with Hitler, Mussolini, anti-semites and racists. The anti-conscriptionist, corporatist, Bloc Populaire viewed socialism as an international conspiracy against the people of Quebec. The virulent resurgence of anti-semitism and the scapegoating of Jews in French Canada may be explained as an ideological reflex to power and class structures in which French Canadians were dominated. The consequent French Canadian inferiority complex was not directed at the real causes of their situation but rather at a weaker group, the Jews, who were simultaneously the object of envy for having survived and prospered through solidarity. Stereotypical accusations levelled against Jews reflected deeply ingrained anti-semitic currents within both French Canadian and Afrikaner societies, ironic when noting that both ethnic groups had adapted their respective historical mythologies to the tenets of the Old Testament. Jews were portrayed as permanent conspirators, anti-nationalists for not assimilating and responsible for the death of Christ. Their economic "appropriation" of a considerable portion of the economy's vitality and wealth complemented the ominous accusation that Jews were bent on ruling the world and destroying Christian society.¹⁵² Jews were vilified and their businesses targeted. Yet according to Bergeron (1971: 185) it was in reality English and American interests which sought to attach a fascist stigma on to Quebec by playing off Jews

versus French Canadians. One cannot, however, contest the Bloc Populaire's flirtation with national socialism as determined by its state-centric programme favouring the nationalisation of resources. Sympathetic tendencies towards fascist syndicalism fired by opposition to Britain's imperial war and the conscription issue attest to this claim.¹⁵³

Ryerson is much more assertive in his depiction of the Bloc Populaire and the Union Nationale as part and parcel of the "Fascist Fifth Column."¹⁵⁴ He speaks of a "coalition" of all the fascists and semi-fascists organisations in Quebec which had crystallised around the conservative Union Nationale. Prominent amongst them was the National Socialist Party of Adrien Arcand linked directly with Berlin. Arcand furthermore acted as publicity chief for the Duplessis administration editing the government organ, *L'Illustration*. Linked closely with Italian fascist organisations were a number of separatists and clericalist youth movements including the Party Autonomiste, the Jeunesse Patriotes, Jeunes Canada and Jeunesses Laurentiennes. A number of these had also had ties with various fascist elements within the leadership of popular Church youth organisations.¹⁵⁵

Discussing the character of Quebec fascism, Ryerson distinguishes between four central components contributing to Duplessis's accession to power. The first, he calls "reactionary Big-Business circles" who contributed financially to Union Nationale electoral drives and supported politically conservative organisations through the press (particularly the *Montreal Gazette*). The second, he attributes to political clericalism bent on strengthening the fusion of Church and state in Quebec by way of a conservative nationalist revival. Such elements viewed corporatism as a bulwark against the growth of radicalist and progressive trends among the French Canadian masses. The third he describes as "a foreign fascist network, centred in Berlin and Rome" attempting to exploit national friction so as to establish a base of operation in its fight against democracy. The last component centres around French Canadian petty bourgeoisie nationalism which had rejected a democratic alliance with labour. It consequently became co-opted by reactionary class forces and the interests of monopoly and all

its agencies. The fascist ideology had been buttressed and similarly defined by sympathy toward the Axis powers, "pathological hatred of the Soviet Union, Loyalist Spain, France of the People's Front; anti-English Canadian, anti-semitic chauvinist nationalism ...[which had] all entered into the theory and practice of the Union Nationale coalition."¹⁵⁶

The Quebec variant, however, found it necessary to incorporate the traditionalism of Quebec life so as to pacify the masses into accepting "their peasant destiny" while halting the development of a post-industrial social consciousness. Middle class complacency had been bought with promises of power in a future national state. A leadership cult was to ensure this. An ethnic capitalism aimed at dislodging "foreigners" from influential posts by investing capital and directing purchasing power toward French Canadian enterprises exclusively complemented and utilised an hysterical anti-semitism. The Union Nationale clamped down on civil liberties and labour rights under the banner of anti-Communism. The Padlock Law empowered the regime in its curtailment of individual liberties, search and seizures, house raids and book-burnings. Storm troop detachments were trained and prepared for an assault upon Canadian democracy.¹⁵⁷ These included various separatist-fascist groups such as the Greyshirts.

Furthermore, Duplessis used "anti-Communism" as a cloak to artfully enact legislation aimed at breaking the neck of labour with the eventual elimination of trade unions and the entrenchment of low wage levels for workers. Bill 19 and 20 provided for the imposition of wage decrees as well as the virtual annulment of any collective agreements. Yet resurgent democratic, anti-Duplessis sentiment and the consolidation of various trade union movements coupled with the outbreak of the war lent to the defeat of the Union Nationale administration in 1939 and the consequent disruption of the fascist offensive in Quebec. The capitalist class, realising that ultimately their survival was at stake, chose to support the war effort so withdrawing financial backing previously aligned to "the fascists". Furthermore, Church spokesman Cardinal Villeneuve also put his lot behind the war.¹⁵⁸ The Cardinal's decision had probably come as quite a surprise to

many Protestants, who previously, at a time when relations between England and Italy had been strained not to mention on-going separatist activities in the Province, had frantically seen the beginning of a Church-State. Cardinal Villeneuve himself had been opened to the accusation of favouring a fascist form of government two years earlier when he declared his support for "full corporatism."¹⁵⁹ In retrospect the volatile political environment had lent itself to misconceptions.

Despite a setback, Duplessis and his Union Nationale were not to be outmanoeuvred by the opposition. Focusing primarily on the vote-loaded rural districts, his opposition to conscription, and criticising the provincial Liberals under Godbout for nationalising Montreal Light, Heat and Power led to a resurgence of traditional nationalist sentiment and the re-inauguration of the Duplessis regime. Duplessis followed the trend of consecutive Quebec provincial governments, retaining a relatively passive character and refusing to regulate the behaviour of private corporate interests. One major exception was with regard to unions of which the government attempted to stifle their independent action.

Government lacklustre rested on the premise that economic initiatives were the responsibility of private corporations. This attitude was not much different with regard to education, health and welfare services in which clerical control remained unchallenged. Coupled with a relatively small and poorly developed bureaucracy, the Union Nationale government had merely retrenched and reinforced the ethnic division of labour and the stunted political development of Quebec province. Nationalist leaders chose not to focus upon the economic well-being of French Canadians in the urban areas but rather remained complacent in their continued reliance upon autonomous traditional French Canadian institutions.¹⁶⁰ Not all nationalist organisations, however, remained closed to the idea of using the state to deal with socio-economic difficulties in the urban areas. Among them, already noted, was the Bloc Populaire and L'Action libérale nationale who to varying degrees advocated increased state intervention in the economy. Yet it soon became clear at that stage that only a minority of the French Canadian intelligentsia supported programs

of state intervention. According to Posgate however, French Canadians remained attached to the traditional belief system upon which New France was founded as they lacked the cultural resources necessary to develop new models of the French Canadian nation. Furthermore, they were isolated by the Conquest from ideological development in France.¹⁶¹

Brunet reasons that in fact traditional ideology was not the result of a fragmented culture but was a direct consequence of the Conquest. He argues that agrarianism served to compensate French Canadians for their inability to succeed economically as a result of economic domination by the British. French Canadians were forced to seek refuge in an agrarianist mythology and so succumbed to clerical anti-étatisme.¹⁶²

Duplessis' bases of electoral support comprised of small businessmen and farmers. Rural dwellers benefitted from Union Nationale policies which offered easier credit systems, rural infra-structure and the apportioning of new settlement areas. His agrarian reforms, furthermore, greatly pleased the Church hierarchy. Duplessis demanded respect for his power. With regard to the English economic elite, its job was to develop the province and create employment. The traditional elite saw the world of big business as being the exclusive domain of the Protestant industrialists. They were, therefore (aided by the language barrier which gave them a virtual monopoly on the flow of ideas and information within the Francophone community) able to create an ideological barrier between the masses and the foreign economic elite.¹⁶³

The Union Nationale had cultivated a network of patron-client relations in rural Quebec, which was grossly over-represented as compared to the cities. Surprisingly, the party was also able to attract the support of urban French Canadian ridings. The working class French Canadians, despite Duplessis' opposition and hostility to unions, voted for the Union Nationale seemingly against their own interests. This may be explained in part as that French Canadians shared nationalist suspicions of the federal government. Furthermore, Maurice Duplessis concocted an image of himself as

being a man close to the people. Again various issues namely conscription and provincial autonomy to varying degrees succeeded in politicising urban dwellers along ethnic lines.¹⁶⁴ Thus, Duplessis' electoral advantage came with his ability to politicize class divisions among urban French Canadians while maintaining a solid base among rural French Canadians.

The Union Nationale regime came to symbolize conservative feudalism and a petty chauvinism. Duplessis' sixteen year reign was an affirmation of Quebec autonomy at the cost of yielding, for virtually nothing to American capitalists, the natural resources of his country (provincially defined). Rioux cites an example whereby at the start of the 1950's, Duplessis granted an iron mine concession in Northern Quebec to an American enterprise for an average fee of one cent per ton of mineral extract. In that same period, the Province of Newfoundland was receiving thirty-three cents per ton for a similar venture in the same region. Supporting the rural areas at the expense of the cities, Duplessis had adopted progressive agricultural measures including electrification and agricultural credit. Simultaneously, he conducted a merciless policy against the government in Ottawa reproaching its excessive centralisation and stressing the greater autonomy of Quebec.¹⁶⁵

Duplessis was able to neutralise opposition with the moral backing of the Church. The Padlock Law gave legal justification to the suppression of opposition. The C.C.F., the Communist Party and the international unions were accordingly marginalised. The Action Libérale Nationale was co-opted and its support channelled into the ranks of the Union Nationale. The Bloc Populaire lapsed into submission, the end of the war and a return to prosperity signalling its progressive decline. Too strongly associated with the conscription crisis and the war, its party image could not cut into the old traditional loyalties. These radical nationalist groups, while supportive of the governments autonomist policy, had criticized its conservative economics. Thus, the Action Libérale Nationale, the Bloc Populaire and the paper "Action Nationale" had in fact served as vehicles for the movement to modernise.¹⁶⁶

The repressive Duplessis regime and the disproportionate benefits which continued to flow the way of the rich and the political elite soon gave rise to a tide of discontent. An anti-Union Nationale coalition comprising of intellectuals, organised labour, some elements of the church and even some industrialists who were weary of patronage politics began to organise. These manifestations of revolutionary forces were not indiscriminately checked by the once seemingly omnipotent state apparatus. Revolt had first expressed itself during the 1949 Asbestos strike whereby members of the church hierarchy broke with tradition and came out in support of the striking miners.¹⁶⁷ These clerical opponents called for the democratisation of Quebec's institutions with a social policy which would reflect the desires and interests of the working class. The old ruling ideology was seen to be breaking apart "and a process of ideological diversification was at work."¹⁶⁸ A strike settlement was eventually reached, however, the lay leaders of the strike were not left unpunished. The Catholic syndicates were, however, resilient in pressing their demands for better working conditions and higher wages. The 1957 Murdochville strike in the new Gaspé copper mines signalled a movement toward the consolidation of labour movements and the popular repudiation of the regime.¹⁶⁹

The secularization of Quebec intellectuals in the 1950's lent itself to growing support for political modernization, not within the Union Nationale but rather within the Liberal Party. *Cité Libre* was a magazine which served as a vehicle for intellectual comment attacking the traditional conception of political authority and proclaiming a liberal democratic government.¹⁷⁰ While continuing to revere religious values, *Cité Libre* was critical of Catholicism particularly its fatalistic conservatism which it saw as increasingly obsolete within a modernizing order. *Cité Libre* put forth a federalist vision stressing education and individual liberty with state intervention in the economy limited to specific social areas. The provincial government would continue to be limited by the federal division of powers. A mixed economy was proposed and labour was hailed as a progressive force. *Cité Libre*, therefore, took a hard line against Bills 19 and 20 legislated by the Duplessis regime to curb freedom of association.¹⁷¹

Although Cité Libre championed the cause of third world colonies struggling to achieve independence, it rejected the view that French Canada too was somehow similar. Nationalism was, therefore, scoffed at, and was seen to be a nonsensical diversionary tactic propagated by reactionary forces. A separatist formula would never sustain the French Canadian nation as it lacked the necessary socio-cultural and economic tools to overcome its hereditary conservatism alone. French Canadians needed to strengthen their bonds of association with English Canada so making Quebec an indispensable partner. Argumentatively, despite the apparent naivety of this perception, a spirit of pragmatism was an appealing alternative to a regime which promoted only continued stagnation. The monolith had begun to crack.

Concluding Synthesis

Quebec and Afrikaner society in the first decade of the 20th century were marked by stunted ideologies, underdeveloped in relation to structural changes then taking place. A non-antagonistic inconsistency existed between the dominant ideology and the role of the state. On the one hand, the state's role was forced to accommodate and cater to traditionalists clerico-religious sentiment particularly the church. On the other hand, capital used the state in order to ensure an abundance of cheap labour and resources. This assertion is perhaps somewhat understated in the South African context in which capital and state had a more symbiotic relationship. Both state and capital to varying degrees and depending upon the circumstances exercised influence one over the next. The underlying difference was that here the cheap labour force was to be racially homogeneous; that is, the state undertook to restrict capital insofar as it would proletarianize the Afrikaner segment in conjunction with the black African population. Legislation was therefore enacted by the state to enforce and consequently rigidify the horizontal segregation endorsed by the ideology of white supremacy.

The absence of a secularly assertive ethnic bourgeoisie worked to the benefit of a relatively autonomous ethnically exclusive state apparatus and its enlistment by "foreign" economic interests whose objectives were in contradiction to the prevailing ideology of the

traditional dominant political elite. This elite class subscribed to a pre-capitalist social model as a means of its own affirmation and protection against the arrival of an industrial society brought about by "outside" forces.

The manner in which these contradictions were expressed gave impetus to the ascendancy of corporatism and nationalism in Quebec, similarly to that of Christian nationalism in South Africa. The clerical elite promoted corporatism and Christian nationalism so as to direct organised labour and employer groups. The petty bourgeoisie stressed a nationalist doctrine which highlighted an ethnic awareness and emphasized mobilization around core values those being race, religion and the struggle for survival. These ideological orientations were to off-set and impede the development of class-consciousness.

Anti-capitalism had meaning in both societies in so far as it was a critique and a form of resistance to imperialism. It was not per se a direct attack upon the capitalist system but rather it was an alien system brought in by external forces so disrupting the hegemonic position of the traditional ethnic elite and inevitably the monolithic structure of a xenophobic once exclusively rural population. Thus, these ideological movements called for a lessening of class antagonism, and ethnic enclosure.

The rise to power of the Union Nationale marked somewhat the triumph of clerico-bourgeois conservative nationalism. While the ascension to power of the National Party had hailed the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism within the framework of a legislative union in South Africa, the Union Nationale could perhaps be similarly interpreted as having been an institutionalised expression of Quebec nationalism within the context of a Federal Canada. There are sharp differences, however. While the National Party had restructured the economy so as to alleviate poverty in the white (particularly Afrikaans-speaking) sector at the expense of the black African population, the Union Nationale saw little need for drastic economic adjustment in the absence of a prominent and discriminated sub-strata in that Province.

Both the Union Nationale and the National Party saw the merits in retaining the capitalist structure of the economy. Both had denounced big business once upon a time, yet they soon realised that their political fortune were not untied to economic growth and development. A compromise or even a pact with big business would ensure prosperity even at the expense of foregoing the interests of the working class.

In the absence of a sub-strata which could serve the needs of capitalism in providing a cheap labour force, the Union Nationale was in essence more pressed to address the ethnic division of labour in which French Canadians continued to overwhelmingly occupy an exploited position. No "black" population existed which could serve as labour fodder for French Canadian economic upliftment. Furthermore, the confederal structure of the Canadian state imposed significant restraint upon the Provincial governments. The Union Nationale perhaps can be seen as a strongest expression to date of autonomy in Quebec Province yet the Party was not separatist in orientation so implying that this institutionalisation of Quebec nationalism was miniscule in comparison to what would eventually be proposed.

While the differences are indeed significant, both the National Party and the Union Nationale had come to power with the aid of traditional rural support ethnically comprised and vulnerable to nationalist appeals. The longevity of the National Party as compared to the eventual decline of the Union Nationale may be explained by the lack of innovation in the latter. Anglo economic dominance had basically received tacit support from the Duplessis administration which backed away from state intervention. The National Party conversely enacted apartheid legislation to the detriment of the black African population. The symbiotic relationship between capitalism and apartheid in South Africa also, as in French Canada, created a "co-operation-in-conflict" relationship between political elites and economic ones. In South Africa, the political complacency on the part of the Anglo economic elites was underpinned by the fear of a change in the status quo which ensured the continuity of a cheap black labour supply. Relative to the ideological back waters which characterized a

French Canadian society bullied into submission and resignation, Apartheid may be seen, at its inception, as a rather innovative ideology attempting to deal with diversity through an aggressive nationalist program albeit unsuccessfully.

CHAPTER IV.

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CONCLUSION

While the curtain opens revealing the triumphant nationalist regime wielding power in accordance with traditional and rural support, the stage is set for the break-up of the conservative monolith. Propelled by the forces of industrialisation and modernisation, French Canadian and Afrikaner nationalist regimes alike are forced to realise that although traditional nationalist sentiment can be an invaluable commodity in the electoral market, status quo politics can no longer hold back the hands of time. The choices are either to adapt or die.

This chapter argues the parallel historical decline of Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalism up until its recent resurgence, yet it does not neglect to focus attention upon their divergence, it being more marked in this period. This chapter, furthermore, seeks to outline the catching up phase, whereby strongly nationalist and traditionally reactionary regimes are confronted by the realities of global politics. It covers the period starting from 1960 up until the present day. Equating Afrikaner nationalism with domination and Quebec provincialism with stagnation must be addressed taking into account the demographic nature of each state. Could it be that in a transitional global order, separatism may indeed prove to be desirable to some degree in both societies? Or for that matter, could one not foresee a failed federalism in Canada collapse into an uncertain separatism while a destructive separatism (in the form of apartheid) in South Africa sinks into the fabric of a new federalist equation? With nationalism once again pitted against internationalism, who will be the victor this time?

As suggested above, the differences with regard to the development of Afrikaner and Quebec nationalism are more pronounced in this period. While both ethnicities had achieved ethnic enclosure in the traditional sense, their differing frameworks of operation had actually created variance in terms of nationalist intensity. The racial construction of the Republic and the pigmentocracy which had been established permitted the Nationalist regime and its ideologues the space to enforce far reaching policies. Nationhood had been fully reached in its political sense within this context of domination. Thus, barring the possibility of an increasingly

global context which would endorse the status quo, nationalists would have the opportunity to embark upon the road of conflict or that of reform. Logically it would seem that in order to respect democratic principles and heed the global call to democratisation, the nature of the regime and the system for that matter would have to undergo radical change. That is, in so far as a nation or group valued membership in an increasingly interdependent world of nations, it would prerequisite a government deemed to be legitimate internationally-speaking. One would, in this scenario, foresee the necessary decline of an Afrikaner nationalism resting on the pillars of racial prejudice. This, however, is not to discount a new variant and the growth of Afrikaner nationalism according to accepted standards of fairness and justice.

The federal construction of Canada, however, too is subject to the alternatives of conflict or reform. The centralist bias of the system does not negate or off-set the continued growth of Quebec nationalism in so far as a distinct ethnic group strives to realise the national essence of self-determination. In fact, multiculturalism within an imbalanced "bilingual" framework seems rather to potentially encourage this development, nationhood for Quebec not as yet being a reality. Nevertheless, the perceived legitimacy of Canadian federalism lends itself to finding more compromising solutions particularly when one notes the historical record on separatism with its chaotic consequences. Thus, unlike South Africa, Canada already possesses the framework and superstructure for nation-building. Yet again, this theory is not as clear cut when one is asked to decide whether or not Canada is but one nation or in fact two. Therefore, this chapter notes the decline of Quebec nationalism but simultaneously recognises that it has not yet achieved nationhood, it being a viable alternative to the present set of circumstances. While political manoeuvring between collaborative bureaucracies in an increasingly global environment lends itself to status quo politics in Canada (and perhaps limited reform), the continuing adversarial relationship between Quebec and English Canada and the seemingly viable separatist option makes the scope for compromise that much narrower. Quebec nationalism must necessarily struggle to achieve independence. What form that independence will take is another question for debate.

While the non-viability of Grand Apartheid beckons the forces of radical reform, the seemingly viable federal system makes reform less pressing. The irony is that while conflict in South Africa has been the norm, compromise is now all that bars the way to full scale civil war. Conversely, while compromise has marked Canadian politics, that option seems less attractive and conflict (not necessarily violent) is now more probable lest that society suffocate from constitutional complacency. While it is certain that most reasonable political players in South Africa will seek a compromise recognising the unacceptable cost of the alternatives, the participants in the Canadian political arena are not as united in this goal, some in Quebec arguing that the costs of remaining within Confederation far outweigh the benefits.

South Africa: Post 1960 Epilogue

Confronted by the realities of the Cold War, decolonisation and a growing black "nationalism", the Nationalist regime opted for Grand Apartheid, a MacCarthyistic-style anti-communism and severe repression by way of propaganda and most blatantly with state violence. Verwoerd's new vision no longer mimicked his predecessors in their "ladida" approach to black politics. International outrage against the horrors of apartheid and particularly then in reaction to the Sharpeville massacre, had to be considered. The winds of change in Africa would not easily be weathered particularly if the white segments were to remain at odds with one another. As such, Verwoerd had undertaken to broaden Afrikaner nationalism to include English speaking whites as well. The republican referendum and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth were consistent with this strategy to ensure the survival of the white race at the foot of the "dark" continent. In response to the growth of political opposition, laws were enacted to administer a system of censorship. This permitted the agents of the state the legal capacity to wield co-ercive power as well as to use draconian measures to repress political dissidence. The politics of the early sixties was that of conflict whereby bannings, arrests and brutal repression crushed all opposition as a blanket of silence fell over South Africa.

The startling economic recovery following Sharpeville was not conducive to testing whether Afrikaners were primarily ethnically motivated or class motivated in light of their advancing entrepreneurial gains. What was apparent, however, was a definitive shift toward recognising and supporting the economic interests of industry. Apartheid economic predictions and theories were partially shattered as the pressure from industry for mass recruitment took precedence. The Nationalist regime became increasingly aware of economic matters as evidenced by the Second Economic Development Programme (1966) which concentrated more seriously upon African labour. Furthermore, increasing Afrikaner economic strength and the perceived longevity of the National Party by many English businessmen made it psychologically possible for the nationalists to break out of their original constituencies and canvass English support. Quite predictively, this rapprochement particularly between once villainized English-Jewish capitalists, notably Harry Oppenheimer, and Afrikaner capitalists forged widening divisions between left and right flanks within the National Party itself. It seemed likely that with the broadening of white society within the Republic, considerations of class would increase in importance barring a major crisis.¹

Divisions within nationalist ranks and class disparities within Afrikanerdom did not, however, signal the demise of the party or the submergence of Afrikaner nationalism in the white nation. Although the regime had increasingly become the spokesman for a white South African nationalism, it never stopped being the spokesman for Afrikaner nationalism above all. The English were to be welcomed in as junior allies yet with the understanding that Afrikaner values would have primacy in the Republic. Kenny is aptly sensitive to the inherent contradictions which afflicted nationalists with this broadening white South Africanism. The xenophobic exclusivity which characterized Afrikaner nationalism could not easily be discarded and reconciled with this broader white nationalism.² Enthusiasm was lacking to say the least.

The Verwoerdian era was characterised by an uncompromising authoritarianism. The quintessential ideologue possessed an incredible energy and was a driving ideological and intellectual

force. Yet economic realities increasingly dispelled the widely believed rhetoric which held that apartheid would surely achieve harmony of separate freedoms. Verwoerd's untimely death at the hands of a "deranged" parliamentary messenger in 1966 left no apparent political vacuum, nor did it seemingly disrupt the fluidity of government policy. Verwoerd had, however, created a swollen apartheid bureaucracy, a state within a state so to speak. Within the state structure lay a stronghold of defenders of separate development, an entrenched civil service reenforced by a biassed bureaucratic system of recruitment for cabinet ministers. Ideological orientation underpinned employment and status within the increasingly centralised decision-making civil service structure.³ As such, when the party passed into the hands of successor B.J. Vorster, he was soon forced to contend with party members "who were so caught up in the Verwoerdian slipstream" that they were staunchly opposed to any modification of his designs.⁴

Vorster's accession to power and his more pragmatic Chairman-of-the-Board-type approach sharply contrasted Verwoerd's more rigidly authoritarian and charismatic one. It also made little ground in diffusing mounting tensions surrounding the new "neo-conciliatory" doctrine and its related value substitutions; those being white nationalism for Afrikaner nationalism, white unity for Afrikaner unity, and anti-communism for Afrikaner ethno-centricism.⁵ This prompted what would come to be known as the *verligte-verkrampte* dichotomy within Afrikanerdom; the former advocating greater white unity and more harmonious race relations through the abolition of petty apartheid with the latter proposing undiluted Afrikaner domination and racial exclusiveness.⁶ While Vorster had initially been regarded as *verkrampte*, it soon became evident that he was better placed in the *verligte* camp. His cosmetic compromises and reforms, which included the admission of black ambassadors from foreign states as well as overtones encouraging Anglophones to join the National Party, were looked upon by party *verkrampte* elements with mistrust. The outcome was a split whereby a *verkrampte* faction within the party decided to pull out and reconstitute themselves as the *Herstigste* (Restored) National Party. The *Broederbond* opted to remain in the National Party's corner behind Vorster.⁷

The verligte/verkrampste struggle need not be seen merely as the realignment of economic interests. Status and symbolic issues figured significantly, notably those which had prompted the 1969 split. The conflict remained within the arena of Afrikaner nationalism itself and dealt with issues surrounding the purpose of the state and about the goals of Afrikaner nationalism.⁸

The electoral contest one year later witnessed the NP and HNP locked in a struggle for the right to represent the Afrikaner soul. The National Party was victorious gaining 54,4% of the vote just down a mere 4,2% from 1966. The HNP received but 3,6% of all votes. Stultz reasons that dominant Afrikaner values within the Republic had all but erased the former sense of social deprivation amongst Afrikaners which had been crucial to the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. Apter is cited to confirm the hypothesis which correlates material prosperity with increasing secularization and a weakening of ideology. The politics of security which characterised this era was flawed and vulnerable as maintenance and protection of a social order had been valued above the creation of one. The entrenchment of Afrikaner values in South African society led the new generations of Afrikaners to take them for granted.⁹ Coupled with low levels of information, political cynicism, a declining ideology and the progressive loss of legitimacy by the Nationalist government, the prospects for a reinvigorated nationalism looked bleak indeed.

The swelling of the apartheid bureaucracy itself fell victim to internal struggles as various departmental ministries within the National Party government began vying for power and influence. Much of this power play was but an extension of the verligte-verkrampste dichotomy. For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs in the verligte sphere of influence clashed continuously with the Department of Information, a verkrampste ministry under the control of Dr. Connie P. Mulder. Thus, a shift occurred whereby the interests of contending departmental bureaucracies replaced former support bases which had run primarily along provincial lines.¹⁰

The global context in a sense partially gave rise to these departmental divisions. The economic difficulties of the seventies intensified in response to the political drama which increasingly contributed towards Pretoria's pariah status. The Soweto uprising, the Angola debacle, the death in detention of Black Consciousness activist Steve Biko, and mass resistance to apartheid which took on an increasingly anti-capitalist rhetoric further contributed to the deterioration of the economy characterised by high unemployment and an outflow of foreign capital. It soon became painstakingly clear to hardline Nationalists that volkseenheid had been sacrificed for the unity of the capitalist class. This class and the military were to become strange bed-fellows allying to bring about political and economic reforms essential to the defence of the state.¹¹

While Vorster had taken the first steps towards socio-economic reform, he did not envision an alternative society but rather reassured the white electorate with an increasingly moral persuasion that their objectives could be realised within the context of an evolving apartheid. Thus, cloaking white supremacy under the banner of "multinationalism" (not to be confused with Canadian multiculturalism) meant the continued emphasis upon ethnic groups termed "nations" as opposed to individuals. This new doctrine, however, allowed for the erosion of various apartheid measures which were justified as having been temporary restrictions.¹²

The changing balance of political power stemmed from growing class divisions among Afrikaners. By 1970, 88% of Afrikaners were urbanised as opposed to 8% who were still economically active in the agricultural sector. White collar jobs amongst Afrikaners had increased dramatically (to 65%) while 27% retained blue-collar work. Significant share increases both in the manufacturing and mining sector coupled with a narrowing English-Afrikaner per capita income ratio lent itself to the changing class structure of Afrikaners. The Afrikaners, however, were still over-represented in the state sector (36% compared with 14% of English). As their economic interests converged, attitudinal changes reflected increasing support amongst Afrikaners for more verligte policies. Yet, although class was an important factor shaping attitudes,

other factors remained; separatist indoctrination and apartheid structures not to discount the significant class differences which still existed between English and Afrikaners in spite of the latter's upward mobility.¹³

The declining power of white agriculture and the growing influence of mining capital prompted some Afrikaner capitalists to lend voice to the concerns of English businessmen and their criticisms regarding state sector encroachments. While more amicable advances towards English and foreign capital seemed to gage the declining strength of Afrikaner nationalism, nationalist policies continued to reflect ambiguity towards foreign capital. Although anxiety to attract it prompted generous concessions to foreign oil companies like Shell, Nationalists remained stubborn and steadfast "restricting foreign shareholdings in banks and insurance companies to 50%."¹⁴ Therefore, while English-Afrikaner relationships had improved, the English were still locked out of the decision-making public sector despite remaining the country's most powerful economic group.

The so-called Information or "Muldergate" scandal in 1978-1979 exposed the South African Department of Information's use of large secret government funds to propagandize for the National Party by way of setting up and paying for a new national daily paper, the Citizen. Illicitly channelling funds through individual government departments in order to covertly influence the formation of opinions within the Republic and abroad ultimately brought Vorster's premiership to an end.¹⁵ Furthermore, the involvement of his likely successor Dr. Connie Mulder, then Minister of Information, prompted a challenge within the National Party caucus. Cape leader, P.W. Botha was eventually to usurp the leadership position.

Botha continued to pursue the Bantustan policy which had been accelerated under Vorster yet he was not prepared to force independence upon unwilling Bantustans. He openly recognised the failure of apartheid, recognised the permanence of urban Africans and pushed ahead with promises to re-incorporate "coloureds" and Indians within the political sphere. The Botha regime proceeded to

implement what was termed "Total Strategy", a package of domestic and regional modifications designed to break up the block of hostile political forces then developing. Using carrot and stick tactics, Botha aimed to coddle various black leaders so as to divide growing opposition. The dissipation of the buffer states with the collapse of the KATANO regime in Portugal, the decolonisation of Mozambique and Angola, and mounting insurgency in Rhodesia, prompted the Pretoria regime to implement its "Total Strategy" against the increasingly hostile Front Line States. This entailed an attempt to reorganise the South African state into a Constellation of South African States (CONSAS) so as to entrench the existing patterns of economic domination. It was consequently reformulated in response to the damaging effects of Mugabe and his ZANU party's unexpected electoral victory in Zimbabwe. The formation of the South African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), a network of eight regional players excluding the Republic, furthermore, sabotaged CONSAS with their joint strategy to reduce dependence on the South African economy.

The alliance between big business and the South African military reflected in essence a coup d'état. It marked a shift in the social base and strategy of the state. The State Security Council handled all matters pertaining to national security and were now responsible only to the State President. The military influence was clearly dominant as Botha's state imposed reformist initiative unleashed unparalleled coercion and brutality to cope with what the government presented as "total onslaught" by Marxist enemies against the Republic. The State Security Council comprised senior military commanders and some high level bureaucrats; it could override a decision made at any level within the state apparatus. The so-called parliamentary system soon came to be but a euphemism for an increasingly powerful shadowy council.

Aiming to co-opt "coloured" and Indian communities into the NP power structure, Botha legislated the Tricameral system in accordance with the wishes of white voters. The new constitution, approved by referendum, brought these previously excluded communities into the legislative body of government. White supremacy, however, was preserved when noting the 4:2:1 ratio

existing between whites, "coloureds", and Indians respectively. Each parliamentary chamber would be responsible for their "own affairs", while general affairs including foreign policy and defence would require each house to pass relevant information through the President's Council. The dispute breaking mechanism was, therefore, under white control.

The symbolic inclusion of these communities came in response to mounting pressures to reform the existing system which excluded blacks. Although many whites viewed the new dispensation as a step in the right direction, others supported its co-optive character viewing it as a means to create a buffer or front-line to absorb an expanding onslaught from the "enemy". Nevertheless, despite the fact that this new arrangement invited conflict rather than co-operation, opinion polls confirmed that the result was indeed a vote for reform. There "was growing support for more verligte policies and for 'power-sharing' with blacks, including Africans."¹⁶

Although the Nationalists had consolidated their power, the so-called power-sharing was stringently opposed by rightist elements who saw the new dispensation as clearly compromising Afrikaner sovereignty. The interests of profit-seeking big business were fingered as having undermined the racially protectionist status-quo.¹⁷ Botha's rival verkrampte dominee Andries Treurnicht had earlier warned delegates that "free markets would jeopardize the whole edifice of apartheid." More in tune with the Transvaal wing of the NP, it representing the centre of petty bourgeoisie/working class interests, Treurnicht confronted Botha's Cape wing which had long been the stronghold of the most developed sections of Afrikaner capital. The ensuing stand-off was, furthermore, underpinned by a structural crisis characterized by skilled labour shortages, the limits of the white consumer markets and the high black unemployment rate. Economic adjustments would also require political and ideological reform.¹⁸

The showdown between verligte and verkrampte elements within Nationalist ranks saw a break-away by the Conservative Party from the National Party in 1982. Yet unlike the split which had taken place thirteen years earlier, the establishment of the CP with its

power base in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, immediately politicized local government. The new challenge was formidable as the Party received representation on a number of local councils as a result of defectors from the NP in the Transvaal. The NP's reform programmes, thus, came under harsh scrutiny particularly as it affected local government. The CP purported to be the institutionalised defender of traditional Afrikaner nationalist beliefs and values. The rightist challengers were unflinching in their attempts to paint the NP and its reformist directives as traitorous and as having abdicated its position in the aforementioned role. Contesting municipal by-elections so as to mobilise support for its policies, the CP succeeded in ousting the Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition in the 1987 general election. Furthermore, CP triumphs in three Transvaal by-elections in 1988 seemed to suggest, as not unrealistic, the possibility of a general election victory in the next two years.

The ensuing schism concerned different approaches to Afrikaner survival and conflicting strategies to maintain Afrikaner power. The National Party had not abdicated its position, reasoning that it could best defend the state by under-stressing exclusivist racial symbols. While the posturing of the party and even its manifest did not promote the image of an ethnic body within white politics, its underlying cohesion derived from Afrikaner nationalism and its role within the racially constructed political realm need not be discounted; nor can the possibility that ethnic sentiment will again mobilise if sufficiently threatened. Regardless of the shift in image, the National Party remained committed to Afrikaner values and its socialising agencies. Throwing down the referendum gauntlet, President F.W. de Klerk had received an overwhelming mandate in favour of reform thereby neutralising the party political Conservative opposition.

Afrikaner nationalism's decline can be attributed to its own success which forced it to bureaucratise its institutional structure and broaden its appeal, so breaking with traditional exclusivity. The decline of nationalism in Quebec did not follow similar lines. Although the "Quiet Revolution" had been ushered in by a new technocratic élite which represented a departure from the

traditional hierarchy, separatist nationalism had only been quelled temporarily as Franco-phone political power brokers increasingly experimented with the idea of using the Quebec State as a lever with which to further their lot both socially and economically.

Quebec: Post 1960 Epilogue

A central feature of the Quebec state in this period was that it actively sought to aid French Canadian economic aspirations. This was significant in that nationalism had until then contributed to a "lag" in political modernisation which had unfortunately arisen in the absence of government initiatives within the economic realm. Nationalism came to be viewed as a progressive force breaking with the stigma of conservatism. "Rattrapage" replaced "la survivance" as the new bureaucratic élite cultivated a growing appetite for change. The growth of public sector unionism accompanied demands that the Quebec government restructure recruitment practices as well as the internal operations of private corporations. Although the new middle class and the technocratic intelligentsia had facilitated the expansion of public sector employment, education and administration, the persisting cultural division of labour at élite levels in private industry and commerce continued to highlight economic grievances.¹⁹ Anglophones still occupied top management jobs while French Canadians were under-represented in professional and financial categories. The new acclerical élites had not as yet dislodged ecclesiastical control particularly within the educational sphere.²⁰ The French Canadian masses still remained prisoners of the belief system upon which New France had been founded.

The lag in political modernisation undoubtedly accounts for the slow development of nationalism in Quebec. It was only at this time that the new government petty bourgeoisie constituency began to look to political power as the root to satisfactory entry into the country. Cultural revitalisation accompanied the successful manoeuvre by the new leadership class in which it laid hold to the state apparatus so as to further its economic and political position. The "volkskapitalisme" which had been partly responsible for the later development of Afrikaner nationalism prior to 1948 was only now being felt in Quebec. The de-

clericalisation of educational, health and welfare structures marked the decline of "laissez-faire" policies and an increase in state interventionism which was viewed as being more consistent with the needs of growing monopoly capitalism.²¹

The "state" actively sought, henceforth, to encourage an entrepreneurial spirit within the greater population. Its role consisted primarily of providing assistance to French Canadian businesses by making public resources available. This included the construction of super highways as well as the nationalisation of power companies. The fruits of the revolution were, however, most notable within the social sphere. The strengthened social security system and the state-run hospital insurance scheme of 1961 (the latter serving as the fore-runner to the socialisation of medicine less than a decade later) proved to be but the beginning of a liberalising process which consequently rationalised the system of education.²² This entailed the expansion of French universities, the replacement of church-run classical colleges with CEGEPS (Collège d'Education générale et professionnel), and the radical revision of school curriculum in line with the recommendations of the Parent Royal Commission.²³

The cultural renaissance which ensued was marked by the mutual rediscovery of French Canada and France (This reaffirmation of links had been relatively absent within the Afrikaner context in all likelihood due to language and particularly, ideological cleavages which had postured hostility between the Netherlands and its long abandoned former colony). Closer links in the form of the Quebec Délégation Générale in Paris, cultural agreements, and the France-Quebec Office de la Jeunesse were given political salience in 1967 as visiting dignitary Général de Gaulle euphorically saluted the independentist cause when proclaiming the nationalist slogan, "Vive le Quebec libre." The reverberations and the honeymoon which followed between the two French "states" was illustrative in that it signified that the French Canadian collectivity, while remaining distinct from its continental brethren, shared a common link, it being the French language. Implicit in this reaffirmation was the acknowledgement that the linguistic dimension remained central to the Canadian conflict. It

also seemed to suggest that the revolution had not as yet been concluded. The French Canadian masses had relished the opportunity to vent their frustrations and display their nationalist sentiments. Despite the Creditist phase and the re-election of the Union Nationale, the currents of change had not subsided.

Although the Cité Libre group had recoiled from an outright rejection of capitalism and an endorsement of socialism, its functional approach had recognised the labour movement as the only progressive force that could bring about change in Quebec. The Cité Libre group had in a sense served as a catalyst to the upsurge of left wing nationalism in Quebec. New opposition groups began to identify with African decolonisation, the Cuban Revolution and the African-American civil rights movement. Despite the plurality of foreign models, however, no one particular ideology could then be identified with the whole of Quebecois society. This, in all likelihood, accounts for its divergence from its Afrikaner counterparts which had up until recently been synonymous with Christian nationalism. The new petty bourgeoisie in Quebec, like the Afrikaners, had enlisted nationalism as a weapon, yet the liberal nationalism which it espoused aimed to shed the myths of the past rather than co-opt them. They, therefore, tended to break the ideological web which had until then nurtured a traditional and messianic conservative nationalism. The increased role of the state had an economic purpose which was initially to combat the recession. It represented a trend towards democratisation in its effort to dispense with the clericalism which had strangled and subdued Quebec society. Not so with the Afrikaner regime which presented itself as an expression of the volkswil and enacted legislation accordingly. Ideological rigidity had restricted the democratisation process from taking place within the Republic.

The modernisation of education, increased government planning with regard to industrial development, secularization and the bureaucratization of the welfare state marked a move towards democratisation. The erosion of clerical power and influence saw romantic nativism replaced with a more secular version of self-determination. Various manifestations of political nationalism came to the fore reflecting increased differentiation within Quebec

society. French Canadian nationalism intensified as a political response to social and economic development. The "Quiet Revolution" was characterised by, among other things, heightened ethnic and class divisions. The state served as the focus of intergroup struggle. Economic demands continued to mar federal-provincial relations while only Quebec conceived of this issue in terms of its cultural implications.²⁴

"Maîtres Chez Nous" (Masters in our own house) had originally conveyed a cultural meaning and had referred to an ideological liberation from the fatalistic complacency of the past and a movement towards cultivating a collective future. Nevertheless, this slogan increasingly began to connote a political nationalism which prompted even those within the ruling Liberals to make demands on behalf of Quebec. Constitutional expert, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, spoke of a "special status" for Quebec while René Levesque, an outspoken nationalist in the Lesage cabinet, proposed an associate state relationship between Quebec and English Canada. Lesage had confronted Ottawa with demands for increased provincial jurisdiction in taxation, social welfare, and foreign and cultural policy.²⁵

Milner and Milner argue that the quasi-nationalism of Lesage merely reflected the inability of reformists to meet growing expectations and hopes that they themselves had unknowingly built up. Vilifying Ottawa for not conceding jurisdictional power and failing in this regard exonerated the Liberal élite.²⁶ The Quiet Revolution witnessed primarily ideological change yet structural changes were not forthcoming except within the socio-cultural domain. French Canadians were still absent within the upper echelons of the economy as the Federal government regulated economic activity and continued to have primacy over immigration.²⁷ Foreign interests were dominant and their control actually enhanced with the modern economic infra-structure brought about through reform.

The passivity of the Quebec government had reflected its small and poorly developed bureaucracy. Yet, with developing new social consciousness, the anti-étatisme of the past gave way to a revitalised working class militancy tempered only by the efforts of

nationalist ideologues who obscured class differences. The working class succumbed to the tenets of nationalism sensing that their proletarian struggle could but only be achieved within the context of national liberation. Separatist platforms increased as politicians argued for independence.

The prevalence of separatist movements and journalistic reviews reflected a shifting nationalism which resolutely turned to the future rather than to the past (which had been the case with traditional nationalism). One could even say that independentism was not an ethnic nationalist movement but in fact, represented a wish and a strategy to conquer state power. Striving to keep astride with democratic principles, the independentist strategy contributed to the opening up of Quebec to the world.

Independentist platforms multiplied. L'Alliance Laurentienne under the leadership of Raymond Barbeau lasted between 1957 and 1962. Its objectives included the denunciation of the colonial situation in Quebec, criticism of the limits of traditional nationalism as well as promoting political independence as the instruments with which to liberate and develop the nation. Its attachment to traditional patriotism and its notable corporatist orientation contributed to its conservative image which ultimately detracted from its appeal. The Action Socialiste Pour L'Indépendance du Québec (ASIQ) was founded in 1960 with the intention of aiding to bring about the absolute independence of Quebec and a national proletarian liberation. It denounced the devastating effects of Canadian federalism and capitalism which plunged the French Canadians into the role of an oppressed colonized population. It, furthermore, recognised the obvious link between achieving independence and installing a socialist regime. The movement lasted five years becoming marginalised yet simultaneously giving birth to a number of other political organisations in the sixties. The Rassemblement Pour L'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) initiated by twenty young intellectuals, writers and artists eventually became transformed into a political party in 1963. It was essentially a movement of popular education which realised that only by achieving political independence could necessary powers be acquired. Tuning into the counter-culture of that period, it conducted popular assemblies,

sit-ins, strikes and music galas to spread its appeal. It presented seventy-six candidates in the 1966 provincial elections receiving 9% of the vote. Nevertheless, its president Pierre Bourgault proposed the dissolution of the party two years later encouraging members to give their support to the Parti Québécois. The RIN had also spawned splinter groups notably Marcel Chaput's Parti Républicain du Québec (PRQ).²⁸

Amongst the most notorious independentist movements was the Front De Libération du Québec (FLQ) which carried out acts of terror and sabotage against selected targets primarily symbols of the British Crown and federalism. Its covert operations intensified between 1968 and 1970 as a series of bombs were exploded against dominant capitalist institutions. The founders of the FLQ came from the ranks of the RIN as well as various lecturers of the Revue Socialiste. While openly adherents of leftist ideology, independentism was foremost on their agenda.

Anti-colonialist thinking had not fallen upon deaf ears as the independentist agenda remained unfulfilled. Left-wing nationalism found an audience as it could use third-world exploits as a reference. Democratic principles buttressed this idea. Nationalists within the South African Republic were keenly aware that their exploits were out of step with colonial struggles then taking place. Democratic principles threatened to dislodge Afrikaner power with a leftist majoritarian African government-in-waiting.

The new revolutionary (albeit "quiet") pitch of the masses reflected a growing disappointment with "lame" political parties who had committed the Quebec nation to a federalist formula characterised by Anglo eco-cultural domination. The Union Nationale and the Liberal Party were seen to have betrayed the interests of the working class. While the National Party had long institutionalised its leadership position as spokesman for an Afrikaner nationalism within the Republic, no one political party within Quebec had earned the right to carry a similar torch. Growing divisions within the rank and file Québécois, furthermore, made such an eventuality all the more intangible.

The Canadian crisis prompted revision of the existing bi-cultural arrangement. The clamouring of separatist movements demanded immediate attention. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi-Culturalism had not borne fruit. The existing political inequalities between the two communities had not been redressed. The RCBB recommendations had not significantly incorporated Francophones within federal state bureaucracies.²⁹ French Canadians outside of Quebec continued to be assimilated while immigrants within the province chose to identify with English-speakers. Furthermore, the "revenge of the cradle" had become irrelevant in light of the declining French Canadian birth rate.³⁰ English Canada had turned a deaf ear to bilingualism. French Canadians then comprised 28% of the total population of Canada yet they accounted for 70% of the bilinguals. Conversely, the Anglophones who represented 72% of the total population only contributed 30% of bilinguals; and half of those bilingual Anglophones resided in Quebec.³¹ Although the crisis had provoked the entrance of French Canadian élites within the federal civil service structure, their numbers were disproportional. The RCBB's language policy merely alienated the Quebec élite for it did not focus upon structural changes then taking place in Quebec. It did not attempt to integrate élites economically precisely because it failed to consider the territorial definition of bilingualism and the language frontiers in the political economy.³²

The new French Canadian élite decided to make their presence felt within federal structures. English Canadians had grown weary of nationalist provocations and separatist threats. What better way to silence the proverbial lambs than by summoning forth their respected leaders and neutralising them thereafter; retrospectively, it appears that prominent liberal and now former prime minister Pierre Trudeau had taken the bait. The one time social-democratic "revolutionary" and his entourage had feared the erosive effects that nationalism and a weak centre had inflicted upon the federal system. Reversing the causal factors, they felt, would revitalise the semi-defunct federalism. The new centralist liberal directive acknowledged the existence of a distinctive French Canadian culture and ethnic group, yet, it rejected the desirability of an ethno-regional nationalism. Trudeau and his

accomplices, the three doves, as they were dubbed, while addressing the cultural dimensions regarding the issue of nationality, remained ignorant of the economic and political dimension. Trudeau's functionalist approach assumed that "cold unemotional rationality [could] still save the ship."³³ On this account it seems he was sorely mistaken.

The federal Liberals under the leadership of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, prime minister since 1968, undertook to ensure equality of the French and English languages in the operations of federal political institutions. His "bilingual and bi-cultural solution" furthermore aimed to ameliorate the position of Francophone minorities outside Quebec as well as to promote the participation of Francophones within senior decision-making federal structures.³⁴ The Official Languages Act of 1969, however, disassociated language and culture by supporting bilingualism on the one hand and multi-culturalism on the other. Because nationality was defined in terms of language, Quebec nationalism had been confused as two tiers of government could claim to be the legitimate representatives of Francophones. This conflict had a diversionary effect "for it prevented the sense of Quebecois national identity from centring around the Quebec state".³⁵ Nevertheless, French Canadians were less forthcoming to changing federal perspectives regarding the ethno-linguistic issue. Bilingualism received attention only in so far as it presented a threat within the industrial urban hubs of Montreal and Quebec City. Heightened consciousness created a renewed awareness and sensitivity to the prevailing cultural division of labour. English Canadian efforts to appease the Quebecois with this seemingly more compromising policy was not capable of stemming the growing concern surrounding the survival of French. Brazeau and Cloutier argue that these mitigating factors had "been in part negated by a time lag at the national level between majority actions and minority expectations". The bilingualism initiative had been coolly received by most Quebec French Canadians who had become more provincially focused in light of census statistics which showed "an unrelenting rate of assimilation of French Canadians by English Canadians outside of Quebec."³⁶

Quebec French Canadians were not alone in their rejection of bilingualism. Their developing separatist cause found a strange bed-fellow with loyalist English Canadians, some going so far as to suggest that bilingualism constituted part of Trudeau's master plan which aimed ultimately to convert Canada to a French-speaking nation. Conspiracy theory adherents actually fear that the bilingualism strategy, which tends to favour French Canadians at the federal institutional level, will procreate networks of French communities which will automatically develop in response to demands for French services. The legality of these demands will eventually reverse occupational recruitment practices so as to favour French Canadians.³⁷

Claims such as these appear to be paranoid propaganda, yet they well illustrate the ambiguity which has coloured Trudeau functionalism. Rioux's sustained critique of Trudeau's anti-nationalism is illuminating. He reasons that functionalism itself took on the characteristics of an ideology which concerned itself only with the preservation of the stable relations which had been established between social classes and between nations. It was undesirable to destroy the equilibrium which a series of counterweights had succeeded in installing. As such, Trudeau opposed Quebec independence reasoning that it would be as abandoning French Canadians outside of the province; Quebec was also, he reasoned, not an economically viable political unit. Theoretically, Trudeau rejected nation-states and endorsed abstract states.³⁸ Be that as it may, Trudeau was willing to flex the muscles of a strongly revitalised federal government in order to emphasize this point. His offensive culminated in 1970 with the invocation of the War Measures Act, empowering the Canadian armed forces with emergency regulations; hundreds of suspected agitators were detained without trial in the wake of resurgent FLQ terrorism.

It appeared as though the violent "resistance" politics espoused by the FLQ merely reflected the anxieties of the Quebecois masses. Nevertheless, strategies involving the use of terror failed to create the revolutionary fervour which had preceded the Castro regime. French Canadians, while sympathising with FLQ demands, denounced their methods following the kidnapping and murder of

Pierre Laporte. The October Crisis, as it came to be known, divided nationalists over differing strategies setting back the separatist cause in spite of the in-coming PQ government procession six years later. The crisis, despite the coverage it has attained, remains a blip on the nationalist horizon. It can be likened to the AWB Ventersdorp incident which had forced nationalists to exchange blows. Both the FLQ and AWB have been presented as radical foils to institutionalised nationalist parties. Although the FLQ had been a product of Fanon and Che Guevara while the AWB identified more with *Mein Kampf*, each viewed violence as a means to captivate the vulnerable masses (ethnically defined). Both movements had gained notoriety as radical nationalist extremists, their divergent ideologies retrospectively less noteworthy. The FLQ, nevertheless, contributed towards the developing independentist cause. Its revolutionary ideology was forward-looking and, therefore, relevant in this respect while that of the AWB was outwardly reactionary and notably regressive; in this respect it had been side-lined by the democratic reform process.

The expanding French Canadian bureaucratic élite had tuned into the prevailing nationalist current so as to wage a political offensive against the fiscal powers of the Federal government. This signalled a move toward provincial centralization of local services as well as the balkanisation of an already struggling economy. This regionalist directive threatened to weaken existing national (in the federal sense) corporations which relied heavily upon centralised decision-making structures.³⁹

Restlessness and growing interest in nationalist projects continued with the language riots in the Montreal suburb of St. Leonard as the local Catholic school board eliminated English as a language of education. The ensuing state of flux gave way to premier Robert Bourassa and his heart-felt economic program which sought to alleviate ethnic tensions by concentrating on financial management and job creation. Nevertheless, unable to overcome the bias of private enterprise which inhibited the development of a competitive French business sector, the premier and his provincial Liberal Party were prompted to enact language legislation so as to address nationalist grievances. Bill 22 empowered the government to limit

access to English schools to those who already possessed a working knowledge of English. It, furthermore, established programmes for the francisation of firms doing business with the government, yet remained rather lax with regard to the use of French in business. Business, which was predominantly English speaking, refrained from harsh criticism of the new legislation sensing the need to placate nationalists and support the efforts by government to resolve the economic malaise.⁴⁰

While English business had had to remain servile in response to nationalist linguistic legislation within Quebec, so too had it refrained from voicing its disapproval with regard to apartheid legislation within South Africa as carried out by nationalists there. The expanding nationalist civil service bureaucracy had in both cases sought to protect and enhance its cultural, ethnic, racial, linguistic and/or status objectives which included economic empowerment. Labour legislation which prominently characterised apartheid served the interests of agriculture and, therefore, the expansion of Afrikaner power. Similarly, linguistic legislation aimed to curb the perpetuation of English-business patronage and the cultural division of labour.

Nationalism has been blamed in many sectors for having created the shift in economic activity westward. Disagreement surrounds cause and effect. Popular opinion suggests that the decline of Montreal has come about with nationalist and separatist agitation, while others proclaim that it is the decline of Montreal which has contributed to nationalism and separatism; that is, with the economic shift, French Canadian leaders were prompted to re-evaluate existing links with adjacent provinces as well as to question the federal link.

French Canadian leaders advocated a reformed federalism which would entail the enlargement of the legislative competence of Quebec in fiscal, social, linguistic and cultural matters. In this way, the duality of Canada would be strengthened as Quebec would be recognised as a province unlike others. After all, its borders contained the only Francophone majority and therefore, greater national responsibilities existed which exceeded other provinces.

Nevertheless, recurrent constitutional impasses which denied Quebec distinct status prompted the rise of a radical challenge to its place within the federation. The moderate nationalism which had until then attempted to reform institutions and broaden the economic arena came to be seen as a cultural, linguistic and even an ethnic crusade bolstered by the rise of the Parti Québécois.

Taking 41% of the popular vote, the Parti Québécois was catapulted to power in the 1976 provincial elections. The Bourassa government had been accused of worsening relations with the union movement. Numerous scandals had erupted and open collusion between the state and interest groups were reported to have existed. The Parti Québécois represented a sovereigntist strategy and constituted a major new political force; for it differed from its independentist predecessors. It had swallowed the smaller movements (notably the RN, RIN, and MSA) and coughed up a new beginning. René Levesque, its first president, was hailed as a true nationalist leader. The PQ had been born in 1968 and in a relatively short space of time had captured the aspirations of a marching nation. Rather than striking a blow at the reformist past, the PQ presented itself "in a line of evolutionary succession with reformist elements within successive Quebec governments."⁴¹ It was a natural conclusion of sorts. The party appealed to French Canadians with its openness and egalitarianism. It monopolised the independence issue as well as a social-democratic ideology.

The PQ programme aimed to defuse opposition as well as consolidate its support. Its political survival depended upon gaining the confidence of organised labour and pushing ahead with reforms benefiting the workers. The government, furthermore, wished to affirm its undaunting nationalist credentials.⁴² This entailed dealing with the unresolved language question. The Canadian divide had deepened. The administrative costs and responsibilities relating to the provision of bilingual services across the country prompted numerous provincial governments to shift away from the spirit of the British North America Act. That is, a new vision of Canada emerged which comprised two unilingual parts, those being French and English. Premier Levesque was no exception as the passing of Bill 101 was soon to demonstrate. The bill severely

curtailed access to English schools, directed new immigrants to French ones, introduced francisation programmes for all firms with more than 100 employees, and forcefully banned most English public signs. French was made the sole official language of the National Assembly and the courts, thus putting it on the same footing in Quebec as English in other provinces. Other provincial premiers rejected proposals for the reciprocal broadening of linguistic rights. As Arnopolous and Clift well sum up, "The two economic solitudes which used to exist on the same territory are now pulling apart geographically. Increasingly, Quebec is conceded to be a French economic territory where the use of English is reserved for communications with the outside ... For at that moment, Quebec will have achieved something unprecedented in its history: a new found unity resulting from the fusion of society and of the economy which in the past had been the opposing poles around which French and English had rallied."⁴³

The Parti Quebecois, however, had still not fulfilled the national dream. Furthermore, the wounded federalist octopus continued to spread its intimidating tentacles delivering a seemingly crushing blow to the separatist cause during the 1980 referendum. René Lévesque's catastrophic "beau risque" policy and promises of federal renewal had all but destroyed the pro-sovereignty party. The post-Referendum blues had cultivated an atmosphere of lethargy.

The business class had been staunchly opposed to separatism yet, with their new found self-confidence, they softened their opposition to an independentist formula. The Meech Lake Accord gained notoriety with its five conditions which premier Bourassa declared as non-negotiables. The business class subsequently fell in behind those demands while playing down the notion that sovereignty would necessarily invite catastrophe. Fears of an American reaction were, furthermore, dispelled. The Parti Quebecois had been rejuvenated under its new leadership. Jacques Parizeau made a solemn promise to return the party to its true nature and make Quebec sovereignty its absolute priority.

The failure of Meech Lake had augmented the new 1982 Constitution which had all but deprived Quebec of its veto powers regarding the

passing of constitutional amendments.⁴⁴ This led some to declare that Canada was finished. French Canadian Quebeckers increasingly realised that their lot as a "distinct society" was but a laughable invention, an exercise in wishful thinking within the confines of federalism. The French Canadian province had received a cultural indictment. And the sovereignty movement had once again been propelled on to the centre stage.

Concluding Remarks

The conflict and overlap between reality and myth are critical to an understanding of developing Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalisms. Initially, the harsh frontier realities created the need for a unifying myth. The myth was founded upon devoutly religious grounds so that it could gain acceptability and readily diffuse into the consciousness of practising faithfuls. The myth later became spiced with an agrarianist character so as to remain constant with the prevailing economic realities. With industrialisation, rural farm life increasingly passed out of the realm of fact to that of myth. Nationalism had been in part propelled by fact-based mythology. The developing crisis concerned the inability of the myth to adapt to changing circumstances.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, an element of messianism remained and ethnic realities did not detract from the continued appeal of the national myth. Eventually, these myths could no longer subsist without firm grounding. The protectors of the past were confronted with global realities. The myths were increasingly viewed by the masses as ideological sham and so rejected by new generations of pragmatic leaders: The shedding of myths may actually be seen as a re-evaluation of nationalism, exposing its treacheries and endorsing its legitimacy within the narrowed bounds of negotiated acceptability and democracy.

Emancipation from mental slavery was but a relative concept as nationalist ideologues wielded their own educational weapons. The rise of nationalism in both cases can be heralded as an evolutionary process whereby developing consciousness focused upon cultural, economic, territorial, and racial similarities and differences. Defining the game often tended to be obscured by new

forms of consciousness particularly those arising from industrialisation and its appendages (ie. urbanisation). The mythical web of destiny which had been weaved mostly as a defensive mechanism in response to encroaching "intruders" found its strength within the framework of ethnicity and eventually nationality.

The legitimation function provided by the myth significantly empowered nationalist ideologues providing them with a "moral" platform from which to mobilise the masses. Afrikaner nationalists were highly successful indoctrinating their followers, incorporating the myth into a broad consciousness and creating a civil religion of sorts. French Canadian nationalists relied heavily upon clericalism as a means to mobilise their followers (or subdue them for that matter). Contemporary French Canadian leaders, however, chose to dispense with the myths which had historically bound their "nation".

French Canadian provincialism did not have to contend with an overarching Canadian myth. Much of the Canadian problem related to the fact that it lacked a founding myth; nor did it possess any historical depth which could bridge geographical frontiers. In this way, French Canadians were able to retain their separateness in the midst of an English speaking majority. This also accounted for French Canadian perceptions which regarded the United States (with its mythical foundations, those being the American dream, melting pot unity and a worker's ethic) as a more ominous threat to its cultural survival than was its English Canadian counter-parts (although they were undoubtedly viewed in some sectors as an extension of Anglo-American economic and cultural proliferation). Afrikaner republicanism was forcefully able to permeate a wide cross-section of the white segment population. The Afrikanerisation of South African society after 1948 meant that the myth would continue to have a significant impact upon institutional and economic structures which constituted the state. With the broadening of Afrikaner identity after 1960, the myth became increasingly strained as nationalists attempted to extend it in part to other population group segments.

Afrikaner exclusivism which had been the pivot of nationalism had increasingly relied upon sections of other population groups, co-opting them in an effort to legitimize the prevailing state power structure (with its cultural symbols). The broadening process which stemmed from the victory of Afrikaner nationalism was, however, also to become its Achilles heel. Class cleavages (notably those between black labour and white privilege, and between verligte and verkrampte nationalists) became more pronounced as the so-called liberation movements enjoyed international sympathy and support.

Afrikaners, having "matured" politically, increasingly perceived their future to lie with ideological blocks rather than sticking to dwindling ethnic exclusiveness. Even those who rejected an integrative solution recognised that the unfair and imbalanced exclusivism of the past could not be carried forth to future generations. Boerestaaters accept that economic sacrifices will have to be made, yet, conflictual political sacrifices (previously in the CP vain) and confrontatory options have become anathema. The blatant racialization of ethnicity in the Republic beckoned its dramatic depoliticization, lest its abuses be repeated under a new dispensation. Political leaders, furthermore, understand that nationalising race has borne only bitter fruit and has contributed to the polarisation of ethnically and racially based opposition movements. As such, Afrikaner nationalism has been able to tread water on the political outskirts by condemning the racialism which had historically been its ideological mentor.

The ideological ascension of apartheid had undercut the theme of struggle characteristic of early Afrikaner nationalism for it had become forever tainted with white supremacist racial doctrine. Its decline had been prompted by its own success. Casting off the ideological albatross marked an about-face which could potentially amount to political suicide. The fruits of apartheid had reached an economic threshold prompting an ideological reappraisal albeit within the bounds of changing nationalist objectives.

The Achilles heel which had long crippled French Canadian sovereignty interests remained a fatalistic economic prognosis. Yet, unlike the ideological pitfall which afflicted Afrikaner nationalism, the French Canadian variant possessed not the seeds of its own destruction. It had lagged upon the fears of indigenous business and consoling promises of constitutional renewal culminating in the "non" referendum vote of 1980. Even the most ardent of nationalists, notably René Lévesque, had had cold feet compromising full independence with his proposals for sovereignty-association. The economic link within Canada had achieved an inflated value. French Canadians were unwilling to accept the exaggerated costs of independence. Consequently, Federalists within Quebec and most prominently premier Robert Bourassa were able to walk a middle road seducing the masses with nasty forecasts and promises of a "profitable federalism". Renegotiating the constitutional division of powers would likely further set back the sovereignty option. Nationalists could be deactivated, ironically, by their own reformist initiatives. Nevertheless, constitutional decay and changing economic realities meant that the tap could be reopened. That is, English Canadian intransigence and the removal of trade barriers with the United States radically cut the perceived risks associated with separatism.

Elite accommodation has only recently been jeopardized. The institutionalisation of separatist sentiment under the Parti Québécois banner supported by recessionary economic realities (partly due to deficient federal fiscal policies) underpin this phenomenon. French Canadian ethnicity now has an accepted territorial boundary in the wake of Trudeau's failed "bilingualism" farce. The progressive assimilation of French Canadian communities outside of these borders has renewed interest in exclusivist ethnic solutions including regional disengagement. Declining dependency upon the centre aided by the opening of trade borders with the United States has, furthermore, lent itself to the viability of dismembering the Canadian state. Separatism has ironically been hailed as a solution to the existing injustices presently associated with Quebec's ethnic nationalism. Political modernisation would, some argue, remedy the defensive posture of an exclusivist nationalism which has nationalised citizenship

regardless of the cultural preferences of non-French. Separatism would reduce the prospects of cultural assimilation because French Canadians would be more able to safeguard the French character of a new state. The threat posed by the English speaking minority would be consequently demagnified.

The divergent paths of Afrikaner and Quebec nationalism are a direct result of the modernisation process which vilified Afrikaner exclusivism and showed indifference or structurally promoted the Quebec variant. Symptomatic of these changes was the institutionalised structure of nationalism. The National Party has long occupied the position as volksleier and representative spokes-party of Afrikaner nationalism while French Canadian nationalism has never possessed a similar single institutional embodiment. Ironically, these realities have shifted. No longer does Afrikaner nationalism have one voice while the Parti Quebecois has increasingly been viewed as the spokes-party for a separatist ethnic nationalism.

Changing Afrikaner identities prompted by the modernisation process reflected a rejection of racism and discrimination. This must necessarily be attributed to political expediency whereby the National Party recognised that Afrikaner interests could best be secured by confronting change when it did instead of at a later stage. The opportunities created by the changing world order and particularly the end of the Cold War led nationalists to de-emphasize territorial ethnic nationalism probably hoping to negotiate reforms so as to ensure their cultural survival within a new dispensation (spearheaded by their power and resolve). The National Party took the initiative in an effort to partially reclaim the moral ground which had been severely compromised under its oppressive structures.

Changing French Canadian identities had gradually become more provincial in focus. The failure of Trudeau's "bilingualism" policy further prompted French Canadians to increasingly identify with the Quebec state although not necessarily with the government of the day. The changing world order also significantly affected the blooming of nationalism as the bipolar world gave way to an

increasingly multi-polar network of regional blocks. The opening up of trade borders within North America and specifically the North American Free Trade Agreement in tandem with a more confident national bourgeois élite made the previously negative consequences of separatism seem that much less ominous. French Canadian nationalism had already dispensed with the reactionary conservatism of the past during the Quiet Revolution. Nationalism had taken on a more aggressive tone and was not forced to retreat from any universally abhorrent doctrinal appendage (as had been the case with apartheid and the racial nationalism it espoused).

Political prognosis is a dangerous game for its predictive accuracy often comes into question. Generally, failures in political fortune-telling tend to discredit entire works. Occasionally, the expectations that are raised consequently become frustrated. Nevertheless, even the most modest of scholars succumb to the urge recognising that the successes and personal reward forthcoming make navigating the minefield ultimately worthwhile.

Afrikaner nationalism has entered a new phase. The multiplicity of proponents at the negotiating table demonstrates differing conceptions and strategies regarding survival. The National Party continues to represent the recoiling interests of "Afrikanerdom", striving towards the attainment of an order which will protect the rights of minorities. Its ideological disposition remains consistent with developing circumstances. Ultimately, it seeks to safeguard the cultural status and economic position which has thus far blemished the Afrikaner name. Casting aside the racialism upon which it has grown, and accepting democratic principles enshrined within a new constitution strengthens its compromising objectives. The National Party appears headed for a "power-sharing" formula in which it will continue to wield state power in conjunction with a new black African élite. The regime's power will undoubtedly impress itself upon the character of the new dispensation thereby ensuring the cultural survival of the Afrikaners. Of course, the sun will eventually set upon the National Party but not before the hands of revolution have been well checked.

The National Party has not hedged its bets. Needless to say, the National Party has not attempted to squeeze out other nationalist parties and organisations from the negotiation process. Ironically, the National Party encourages their proliferation rather than attempting to co-opt differing strategies within one Afrikaner institutional monolith. The existence of seemingly more radical nationalists indeed acts as a foil to the more compromising NP image. Simultaneously, other recognised nationalist organisations can further the interests of their followers so gaining additional concessions cumulatively in the interests of Afrikaners (this of course, keeps with the assumption here argued that Afrikaner core interests are generally the same). Appeasing various Afrikaner aspirations can surprisingly off-set renewed conflict (particularly when one notes that a proportionally high percentage of Afrikaners are well armed).

The Boerestaaters including the Afrikaner Volksunie and Professor Carel Boshoff's Afrikanervryheidstigting (Avstig) are likely to succeed in part in their efforts to secure a territorial "homeland" whereby Afrikaner values and customs would take precedence, albeit within the confines of non-racialism. Ironically, this faction of Afrikaners are aiming to co-opt themselves within apartheid structures almost masochistically it would seem. Afrikanerskaap deprived of baaskap would depend greatly on the extent to which ethnicity could be depoliticized. Down the line, Afrikaners living outside these established borders may themselves come to be seen as diaspora population. A Boerestaat could be the last preserve of Afrikaner ethno-nationalists. The interspersed nature of Afrikaners elsewhere would prevent a nationalist revival although a politically (and economically) viable Boerestaat could conceivably provide the mobilising impetus. The "common society" which will herald the new South Africa need not negate the existence of territorial homelands, for the offspring of apartheid have become part and parcel of the political landscape. Co-operative ethnic networks such as Cosag, may contribute towards the long-term acceptance of ethnicity as a just concept within the new South Africa; another winfall for Afrikaner interests. Finally, the existence of marginalised para-military organisations (ie. the AWB and Wit Wolf) could well absorb the brunt of post-apartheid

frustrations thereby enhancing the image of more moderate party political nationalist movements. Their disruptive capabilities could conceivably back-fire in this regard.

French Canadian nationalism will necessarily achieve formal statehood although the time frame remains subject to changing circumstances. The dissolution of the present Canadian entity need not wreak havoc and contribute to economic peril. Canada appears to be faced with two options, one along the lines of Yugoslavia (not to be discounted in South Africa), though its culture of tolerance makes this confrontatory scenario highly unlikely. The other can be termed the "Bophuthatswana option" whereby Canada can continue to exist as a fragmented and disjointed state in association with Quebec; unlike the South African homeland of course, Canada would have historical legitimacy and a sound economic structure. Alaska remains part of the United States despite its geographical placement; likewise could be the case with the Atlantic provinces although they may increasingly come to be seen as colonial outposts of Ottawa. Be that as it may, Quebec separatists will, in the final analysis, have done a "hatchet job" on Canada. At the very least, Quebec independence is likely to serve as a springboard for regional disengagement. Canada, however, may still survive as a disjointed geographical network of associated provinces or states including Quebec. Negotiating this transition, Quebec nationalists will be sensitized to the potential economic consequences of an abrupt departure.

From another angle, the extrication of Quebec from English Canada will destroy the cancer so to speak. Canada's remission has all but come to an end. Should it survive the amputation, a virtually non-existent English Canadian nationalism may indeed develop. Likewise, Quebec nationalists would no longer have cause to fear assimilation thereby moderating "oppressive" language laws. Although democratic values have significantly crept into the French Canadian culture, the existence of only one viable separatist political party (assuming that the position of the Bloc Quebecois at the federal level will lapse into irrelevance with separation) conjures up gloomy scenarios; for it foreshadows the rise of the South African

reich and the deification of the vanguard nationalist party which unilaterally delivered the fruits of Afrikaner aspirations (in the form of a Republic). Nationalist ideologues in Quebec may also be given a carte blanche should they succeed in stifling the development of other independentist parties seeking to contest the seats of power. The authoritarianist longevity of numerous so-called "liberation" movements throughout the third world further lends itself to this unsavoury possibility. Though remote, French Canadian politicians should take precautions and act upon the knowledge that diversification lends itself to moderation.

The constitutional dilemma afflicts both societies. Various options have been tabled by all parties concerned. Nevertheless, defining the players, equalizing the playing field and safeguarding basic rights deemed to be important continue to delay a negotiated settlement. The currents of nationalism persist and intensify as the impasse continues. The Federalist union in Canada differs significantly from the Legislative union in South Africa. The former recognises the viability and necessity of a semi-autonomous economic unit ethnically comprised within borders protected by the Constitution. Thus, even those who dispute the ethnic equation are forced to recognise that a base exists for an ethno-regionalist movement in Quebec should the population of that province deem it to be in their best interests. As such, taking into account the geographical boundaries which shape Canada, most political leaders who support Confederation have in fact been held hostage to Quebec nationalist demands; realising that Canada would cease to exist economically and as a geographical entity after Quebec separation. South African political power brokers are not similarly divided over the non/viability of the present constitution realising that the legislative union will have to give way to more decentralised power structures within a new dispensation. The current constitutional impasse concerns in part the degree to which regional power structures will be constitutionally guaranteed and protected. The dispersion of Afrikaners will preclude a regionally defined nationalist movement attempting to extract concessions and threatening disengagement from the centre should its demand not be met. Even a small Boerestaat would not necessarily threaten the integrity of the new South African state. Thus, the currents of

Quebec nationalism have a potentially destructive impact upon existing state structures while Afrikaner nationalism is relatively benign (except perhaps at the negotiating table) recognising that it will have to be subject to democratic principles.

Whether nationalism takes mythology to bed, whether it depends upon cultural austerity, whether it assails the hands of time or whether it destroys individual liberties, it necessarily reflects a crisis. Identity crises mark both Canadian and South African societies as well as their constitutional forums which seem to run along similar lines. The psychological war which fuels mutual fear and ignorance coincides with territorial struggle.

Much more relevant than state-imposed identities are in-group perceptions. Changing identities reflect in part this out-flowing self-expressionism which seeks to account somehow for variable circumstances. The Afrikaner collectivity developed after past labels such as Voortrekker and Boer had been relegated to the backlogs of history. Similarly, Quebec people were regarded as Canayens, then as French Canadians and then as Quebecois. More than merely semantics, these terms differentially (according to history) emphasized relations between ethnic group members and the state. The bi-ethnic state which came about in both cases had attempted to conjure up an over-arching co-optive identity supported by the force of law (and of course the enforcing power). The broadening of identity directly conflicted with ethnic nationalist perceptions. It marked a step toward internationalism, deemed to be progressive. Conversely, at different historical junctures, in-group perceptions were not conducive to ameliorating relations between competing ethnic groups and in fact stood in opposition to the real exigencies and structures which constituted the state. In another sense, statism may be at the root of this problem. This is the soil in which most of the antagonisms that beset these states have been nourished.

French vs. English, federalist vs. separatist, Quebec vs. English Canada, Afrikaans vs. English, capitalist vs. communist, Afrikaner vs. Africans. None of these would have acquired anything like their past and/or present intensities had the state not become so

critical to people's perceptions of their socio-cultural and economic interests. Unquestionably, the struggle for state power has inflamed existing linguistic, cultural and/or regional rivalries. New social and political superstructures propelled by external economic forces (particularly during the period of industrialisation and perhaps also unto the present age of information) have cultivated the emergence of a new national awareness which increasingly focused upon the changing power balance within the political and economic sphere. Strategies of growth based upon the use of political power for leverage aimed to control and set the rules of the game which unequally apportioned benefits; these benefits of course, being subjectively interpreted on all fronts. Collective self-assertion in a political structure is inevitably determined by whether the group in question controls or depends upon these state structures. Ethnic minority access to power prerequisites maximum solidarity. Cultural distinctions, then, which might otherwise co-exist peacefully are politicized by the necessity of each to gain its piece of the pie. Nationalism remains at the forefront of the struggle for liberation, no longer necessarily from colonial oppressors, but from those socio-economic processes which threaten to perpetuate the mythical canoe of internationalism as well as the loss of national identity.

This thesis has attempted to grapple with changing consciousness as it has evolved within two dual societies. While intentionally avoiding the complex debate on nationalism, it has implicitly sought to illuminate those factors which have significantly contributed towards the development and evolution of ethnic power. Identifying these contributants within a comparative context lends itself to social scientific research, and therefore, predictive analysis. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, demographic differentials, group perceptions, and the division of labour have figured prominently as variables influencing the course of nationalist development. The coincidence of class and ethnicity aligned under the auspices of mobilising actors with common objectives necessarily reflects built-in group constraints which have historically promoted compliance through the ordering of society perceptions. These perceptions are in turn, blanketed by a religious cloth of mythical destiny. Nationalism corresponds to

a mobilisation on the part of an ethnic movement, an in-group forged with similar traits and developed commonalities which has drawn upon its common experience so as to maximise its position vis-à-vis other groups. Nationalism, it has been argued, concerns itself not only with statist objectives and political power but with cultural motifs, status and survival issues. Group enclosure appears to be most pronounced when in-group members perceive that their interests have been threatened. Frequently, this sense of being wronged or inferiorized comes about with contextual transformation. Therefore, not only are in-group members forced to consolidate and mobilise in response to an encroaching centralising state entity but likewise must they stave off those perceived threats associated with social processes (ie. industrialisation, urbanisation, democratisation) which both directly and/or indirectly revile those bonds of exclusivity responsible historically for group survival.

CONCLUSION

- 1 Munger, op.cit., p.38-40.
- 2 Kenney, op.cit., p.150.
- 3 Giliomee, op.cit., p.221-225.
- 4 Davenport, op.cit., p.423.
- 5 Stultz, op.cit., p.166-175.
- 6 Giliomee, op.cit., p.217.
- 7 Davenport, op.cit., p.423-424.
- 8 Hermann Giliomee, "Changing Afrikaner Identities in the South African Transition from Apartheid, 1969-1991," Paper presented to the Political Studies Department, University of Cape Town, 1992, p.12.
- 9 Stultz, op.cit., p.184-188.
- 10 O'Meara, op.cit., p.251-252.
- 11 O'Meara, op.cit., p.253.
- 12 Lipton, op.cit., p.49-50.
- 13 Lipton, op.cit., p.307-308.
- 14 Lipton, op.cit., p.310-312.
- 15 Shaw in Butler, op.cit., p.296.
- 16 Lipton, op.cit., p.319.
- 17 Adam and Moodley, op.cit., p.70.
- 18 J.S. Saul and S. Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defence, Class Revolution, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1981, p.36-37.
- 19 Juan Linz, "From Primordialism to Nationalism," in Rogowski, op.cit., p.308.
- 20 Posgate, op.cit., p.52.
- 21 Monière, op.cit., p.252-253.
- 22 Monière, op.cit., p.254-255.
- 23 Thomson, op.cit., p.21.
- 24 McRoberts, op.cit., p.198.
- 25 Milner and Milner, op.cit., p.168.

- 26 Milner and Milner, op.cit., p.169.
- 27 McRoberts, op.cit., p.130.
- 28 Andrée Ferreti and Gaston Mirron, Les Grands Textes Indépendentiste: Écrits, Discours et Manifestes Québécois 1774-1992, L'Hexagone, Montreal, 1992, p.121-135.
- 29 Guindon, op.cit., p.57.
- 30 Monière, op.cit., p.256.
- 31 Dion, op.cit., p.46-47.
- 32 Guindon, op.cit., p.79.
- 33 Pierre E. Trudeau, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Reason", in Crepeau and Macpherson, op.cit., p.35.
- 34 Donald V. Smiley, "French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy," in Esmann, op.cit., p.186.
- 35 Monière, op.cit., p.307.
- 36 Jacques Brazeau and Edouard Cloutier, "Interethnic Relations and the Language Issue in Contemporary Canada: A General Appraisal," in Esmann, op.cit., p.206-207.
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- 38 Rioux, op.cit., p.142-146.
- 39 Arnopolous and Clift, op.cit., p.110.
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- 41 David Cameron, Nationalism, Self-Determination and the Quebec Question, Macmillan of Canada, 1974, p.135.
- 42 Monière, op.cit., p.299.
- 43 Arnopolous and Clift, op.cit., p.123-124.
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- 45 For a more insightful view, see Leonard Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985.

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