

Explaining the rise of Populism in Hungary since 2010: The analytic power of anti-establishment theory

by

Siyabonga Robert Khuzwayo

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Department of Political Studies

University of Cape Town

In Partial Fulfilment of the requirements

for the Master of Social Sciences in International Relations

November 2023

Supervisor: Professor Anthony Butler

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

Plagiarism Declaration

1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another's work and pretend that it is one's own.
2. I have used the **Harvard convention** for citation and referencing. Each contribution to and quotation in this report from other people's work(s) has been attributed, cited, and referenced.
3. This Dissertation is my work.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work to pass it off as their work.

Name: Siyabonga Robert Khuzwayo

Signature:

Date:

Abstract

There is a great debate regarding the causes of populism. Most research done on the causes of populism uses the comparative method. However, a single case study allows the researcher to uncover underlying factors fueling populism in a specific country. This dissertation investigates the factors that explain the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010 to interrogate the prominent ‘anti-establishment’ theory with the hope of identifying ways to deepen this theory’s analytical power. The research reveals that the anti-establishment theory helps us to understand the rise of populism in Hungary. However, it is insufficient because it omits critical factors that contributed to the emergence of populism in the case under investigation. These include socio-cultural and socio-economic factors, charismatic leadership, liberal democracy’s lack of mechanisms to prevent an outbreak of populism, and the effects of state capture. The anti-establishment theory can be more analytically robust by incorporating these omitted factors.

Acknowledgements

During our postgraduate orientation, we were taught that your supervisor plays a significant role in ensuring you achieve the desired outcome in your research journey. In the fall of this year, I never set foot to work due to an illness I am battling to manage. I found my workplace to be very stressful during that period.

However, when it came to working on my dissertation, it felt like reading a foreign affairs journal, which I enjoy doing a lot. This would not have been possible had I not been under the supervision of Professor Butler. His patience, compassion, kindness, work ethic, expert knowledge of political science, and most importantly, maturity made the writing process very enjoyable. I had a “home ground” advantage because I took one of his courses before being supervised by him

To Tamsi Mbobo, my partner who is my “interpersonal skills coach”, I would say approaching Professor Butler as my supervisor was a wise decision I have made in a while.

Table of Contents

1. Chapter 1: Introduction	5
1.1. Aim and Significance.....	6
1.2. Research Question.....	7
1.3.Hypothesis.....	7
1.4.Literature Review on the Concept of Populism.....	7
1.4.1. Political movement.....	8
1.4.2. Political style.....	9
1.4.3. Discourse.....	9
1.4.4. Political Logic.....	10
1.4.5. Ideology.....	11
2. Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework	15
2.1. Causes of Populism.....	15
2.1.1. Demand-Side Factors.....	15
2.1.1.1. Economic Grievances/Inequalities.....	15
2.1.1.2. Theory of Modernisation.....	16
2.1.1.3. Cultural Backlash.....	16
2.1.2. Supply-side Factors.....	18
2.1.2.1. Theory of Mobilisation.....	19
2.1.2.2. Leadership.....	20
2.1.2.3. Party Organisation.....	21
2.1.2.4. Voluntarism Theory.....	22
2.1.2.5 Anti-Establishment Theory.....	23
2.1.2.5.1. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s Ideational Approach.....	23
2.1.2.5.2. Barr’s thesis of a "maverick" and an "outsider"	24
2.1.2.5.3. Hartleb’s Characteristics of Anti-establishment Parties Theory.....	26
2.2. Electoral Structures.....	26
3. Chapter Three: Research Methodology	27
3.1. Case Study.....	28
3.2. Anti-Establishment.....	28
4. Chapter 4: The Rise of Populism under the Leadership of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz since 2010	28

5. Chapter 5: Anti-establishment.....	35
5.1. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s Ideational Approach.....	36
5.1.1. The People and The General Will.....	36
5.1.2. The Elite and The General Will of The People.....	41
5.2. Barr’s theory of "maverick" or "outsider and Laclau’s Crisis of Representation.....	48
5.2.1. The Austerity measures.....	50
5.2.2. Failed Reform Policies.....	52
5.2.3. Corruption Scandals.....	54
5.3. Hartleb’s Characteristics of Anti-Establishment Parties.....	55
5.4. Discussion of Findings	56
5.4.1 Research Question.....	56
5.4.1.1 Sub-Research Questions.....	56
5.5. Main Findings of Anti-establishment Theory.....	56
5.5.1. Strengths of the anti-establishment theory.....	57
5.6. Limitations of the anti-establishment theory.....	58
5.6.1. The anti-establishment theory is only a supply-side theory	58
5.6.2.1.1. Deactivation of controls.....	59
5.6.2.1.2. Milking of cash-cows.....	60
5.6.2.1.3. Manipulation of Political Institutions	60
5. 6.2. Leadership.....	61
5.7. Theory development: Improvements of the Anti-establishment Theory.....	62
5.8. Contribution to Current Literature.....	62
6. Conclusion.....	62
Bibliography.....	63

1. Chapter 1: Introduction

Populism poses a significant threat to liberal democracy. It can subvert freedom of speech and expression, threaten press freedom, undermine constitutionalism and the principle of separation of powers, and weaken the rights of marginalised minority ethnic groups. The second re-election of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz–Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) precipitated a significant erosion of liberal democratic norms and values (Diamond, 2017). Authoritarianism and repression are on the rise, reverting to what used to be the status quo before the demise of the Soviet Union. V-dem (an independent institute that measures the qualities of regimes/governments) published data that provide evidence of this autocratisation. Every V-dem democratic indicator for Hungary has been declining since 2010 (V-dem 2022). In 2020, a Freedom House Report downgraded the status of Hungary's democracy from democratic to hybrid; the report cites the undermining of the rule of law, interference in the affairs of independent organisations, the gradual amendment of the constitution, and the restrictions imposed on parliament to play its oversight role, stifling press freedom and other undemocratic policies (Freedom House, 2020).

To ensure that their political agenda takes centre stage and to divert attention from the autocratization direction that the country is moving towards, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz–Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) have adopted a “populist discourse.” This rhetoric allows them to rally the “people” (public) against seemingly constructed enemies by the government (e.g., the immigrants, European Union) and fight the war against those civil society groups that are critical of the government. Autocratisation has spread to a point where it is now affecting the credibility of elections (Liboreiro, 2022). The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe designated the 2014 and 2018 elections as “free but not fair.” What has enabled populism to flourish (OSCE, 2022) in Hungary? To what extent does the so-called “anti-establishment” theory explain the rise of populism?

Structure of the Dissertation

This Dissertation will follow this structure:

Chapter 1: Introduction

The chapter will set out aims, significance, and hypothesis and provide a literature review regarding populism.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

Chapter two provides a theoretical framework for understanding the causes of populism, looking at ten widely touted causes of populism, including the anti-establishment approach. The anti-establishment theory discussion will contain perspectives from various scholars.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Chapter three provides a road map as to how the research question will be addressed and explains the methods that will be used to answer it.

Chapter 4: Overview of the rise of populism since 2010

This chapter explores the surge of populism in Hungary since Orbán and Fidesz took power in 2010.

Chapter 5: Anti-Establishment Theory

This chapter will view Populism in Hungary through the lens of the Anti-establishment theory, per the research design in chapter three.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The last chapter discusses the study's main findings and how it helps answer the research question and matters raised in chapter one.

1.1. Aim and Significance of the Dissertation

This dissertation investigates how the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010 can be explained. The study also questions the cogency of the anti-establishment theory in explaining the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010. It explores how this theory can be made more analytically

robust. The autocratization developments are the driving force for the selection of Hungary as a case study. Populism in Hungary has been undertaken from various theoretical perspectives, and rich empirical and historical literature explores contemporary Hungary. Therefore, The case provides an excellent opportunity to assess the relative merits of these analytical frameworks and see how they might be refined. Although the scope of this study is limited to this single case, conventional analytical frameworks for understanding populism can also be informed by considering instances of populism in quite different settings, for example, in Asia and contemporary Africa.

Case studies can be used in contexts such as post-colonial Africa and Latin America, where the left/right ideological classification is not always relevant in explaining populism. Analysis of populism in the global south emphasises social movements' role. In this context, populism tends to be deployed to mobilise the poor and disillusioned from urban areas and more concerned about domestic problems rather than global ones. The case studies can be used to explain the failures and successes of movements in emancipating “the people” from the failures of the post-colonial state. African populism does not have a prominent link to ideology but is centred on ethnic mobilisation (Beresford et al., 2023). Case studies can be used to understand populism by comparing countries with similar histories, such as the comparative study of South Africa and Brazil. These two countries share a common history of urbanisation, industrialisation, authoritarian rule, and liberation struggles (Mbetse 2015)

The primary significance of this dissertation is that it will contribute to the literature that provides tools that help us better understand populism and its causes. Populism must be well understood since it threatens the ideals of liberal democracy. The current literature on populism often uses the comparative method. This analysis, in contrast, uses a case study to investigate the deeper underlying causes of populism in a more limited and specific terrain. Although this cannot produce generalisable propositions about populism, it can help contribute to the existing literature on populism by helping refine and develop a critical theoretical framework to understand and explain it.

1.2. Research Question

How can the rise of 'populism' in Hungary since 2010 be explained?

1.2.1. Sub-Research Question

To what extent does the anti-establishment theory explain the rapid rise of Populism in Hungary?

1.3. Hypothesis

Populism has been rising in Hungary under the rule of Victor Orbán and his party, Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, since 2010 due to the anti-establishment stance of Orbán and Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance. The anti-establishment stance refers to the position against the elite (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014: 6). Chapter five will investigate this theory. This theory states that citizens vote for populist parties because the party depicts a so-called “anti-establishment” stance.

1.4. Literature Review on the Concept of Populism

Populism is probably one of the most contentious concepts in contemporary social science. There are many different perspectives on the definition of populism. Most of these perspectives are imprecise, and some even go as far as simply equating populism with demagoguery (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014:3). Even in scholarly work, there is no consensus as to what the exact definition of populism is. The concept defines a "broad variety of host ideologies and political actors" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014: 3).

In this dissertation, the author explores the different definitions of populism in literature. The first definition of populism the paper explores is the definition put forward by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014). These authors posit that populism can be regarded as a movement, a political style, or a discourse. These approaches have proven to be very influential in academia and beyond.

1.4.1. Political Movement

The first perspective defines populism as a political movement. This definition is grounded on the work done by Seymour Martin Lipset in his book "Political Man" (1960). This definition became very influential in Latin American politics (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2015: 5). Lipset argues that the emergence of Vargas in Brazil and Peron in Argentina should be "analysed as a

phenomenon similar to the rise of fascism in Europe since both cases stand for the emergence of extremist mass movements" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:5). Building from this approach, Gino Germani (1978), asserts that populism is a movement made up of different classes that mobilise around a strong and charismatic leader, he further argues that these movements appeal to mostly heterogeneous social groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:5). Populism tends to unite the different classes in society. Populist leaders and parties create a unique concept of what "the people" are. They regard the people as consisting of various social groups with a common idea: they are no longer sovereign; a corrupt elite has stolen sovereignty.

Nevertheless, forming alliances among the different classes is not a prerequisite for populism but is a critical element of mass mobilisation politics. Alan Knight (1998:238-40) proves this point by drawing attention to the fact that Europe has political parties that do well in mobilising and representing a wide range of different social groups (including other classes), parties such as the Social Democrats, but they are never regarded as populist (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014: 6)

1.4.2. Political style

The second perspective conceived populism as a political style marked by the propagation of a specific type of relationship between politicians and the electorate, a kind of link that is loosely constructed and opportunistically designed to appeal to the 'people' to win the legitimacy to exercise political power (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014: 6). Peter Mair (2002:84), as quoted by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014:6), defines populism as a "means of linking an increasingly undifferentiated and depoliticised electorate with a largely neutral and non-partisan system of governance". According to this perspective, populism assigns political action or discourse; as a result, all movements, politicians, and parties are compatible with Populism (Tajuiet, 1995). Social democrats in countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom can be regarded as some of the cases where this populist political style is used; the politicians not only governed by using surveys and spin doctors, but they also made decisions that were against the wills of their political parties to implement reforms that were necessary to appease the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6).

This approach has an inherent flaw of conflating populism with concepts such as opportunism and demagoguery. This results in almost all kinds of political actors, especially during the election period, being labelled populist (Mudde 2004:543). Therefore, defining populism as a

political style presents many challenges when conducting comparative research, as populism becomes a catchword instead of a concept of analysis. Some political styles, such as using surveys and spin doctors and bypassing political parties/institutions to enact policies that appeal to the people, are not unique to Populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6).

1.4.3. Discourse

The third approach to defining populism is conceiving it as a discourse. Ernesto Laclau (1977, 2005a, 2005b) is the leading advocate of this perspective (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014: 6). This approach came about as a response to Marxist theories centred around economic determinism. Populism is here perceived as a political logic instead of multiclass alliances (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6). In brief, Laclau posits that this political logic comes about through the confrontation of different hegemonic discourse that exists in a society that brings about polarisation between two other social groups, the powerful ruling elite, and the people. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014) cite Nielsen (2006) to explain that this discourse does not come out of nowhere or by accident, "it is rather the product of a three-step process involved in radical parties: first the linkage of very different demands, then the formation of a collective identity through the recognition of an enemy (the establishment) and finally the effective investment in an element (the leader) that represents the people" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6). However, Laclau's approach has its shortcomings since it is very problematic with regards to conducting concrete analysis of populism. Yannis Stavrakakis (2004) criticises Laclau's approach for equating populism with politics, stating that this is detrimental to the ability to carry out an empirical analysis of Populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6)

1.4.4. Political logic

Muller (2016:19) defines populism as "a moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior." However, criticising the elite is an essential element that qualifies one as a populist. However, it is not the sole determinant of designating someone a populist (Muller, 2016: 20). Otherwise, everyone critical of the ruling establishment and the status quo will be considered a populist. Muller (2016:20) identifies anti-pluralism as another essential element that qualifies a political figure or political entity as a populist. Populists only believe that the people who matter are the ones who are good and poor,

and the populists are the only ones who have divine power to represent "the people." Nobody else is worthy of representing the people. Political opposition is immoral, corrupt, and can never enjoy legitimacy (Muller, 2016:20). Other political actors contesting power are the people's enemies. Everybody among the citizens who does not support the populist is not part of "the people." The people know who they are and who is fit to govern them. Populism arises as the inherent failure of representative liberal democracy. In any majoritarian democracy, there are always multiple segments of the population, predominantly the minority, that are not well represented, and their grievances are not considered. The populist tends to exploit such fractures in liberal democracy. After targeting minorities, the populist will mobilise the masses or those people based on the political ills that exist in society and blame it all on the elite. Uniting the 'peoples' into a 'people' stifles pluralism and is not in the interest of public contestation guaranteed in constitutional democracies. No society speaks with one voice.

Other authors define populism as a strategy (Moffit, 2016:20). Weyland's (2001:14) minimal definition of populism, as quoted by Moffit (2016:20), posits that populism is "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, institutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers" (Moffit, 2016:20). This definition has gained popularity as a tool of conducting empirical analysis in Latin American literature (Moffit, 2016:20). While it is true that the leader acts as a central pillar in populism, the problem with this definition is that using direct mode or strategy of mobilising and organising is not only done by populist (Moffit, 2016:20). A plethora of social movements adopt this method to manage. Social groups such as religious groups or even secular movements often use this method (Moffit, 2016:20). This will lead to even apolitical organisations being designated populist. Another problem with this definition is that in some cases, populists blossom in polities with solid institutions and well-organized. Populist parties in countries such as France, Netherlands, and other countries attest to this. Roberts (2006), as cited by Moffit (2016:20), provides the reader with four alternative methods of organisation used by populists: "organic, labour, partisan, and electoral. " Another shortcoming of this perspective is that it needs to be more leader-centric. It excludes the core of populism, the 'people.' Without the people, populism can never exist.

1.1.5. Ideology

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017:5) introduced another approach to defining populism as an ideology. This approach is usually referred to as the ideational approach. This approach also entails the critique of the elite or establishment and rhetoric that appeals to moral people. In this approach, populism is defined as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017:6). This definition of populism is beneficial when it comes to understanding the malleability of the concept (Mudde and Kaltwasser,2017:6). Ideologies establish norms and values of how humans organise their society and the meaning of society. Populism, as an ideology, can be regarded as a prism through which the people perceive and understand political reality (Mudde and Kaltwasser,2017:6). The conception of populism is not as coherent as other ideologies, is characterised by a range of ideologies that sometimes contradict each other.

Every definition or approach of populism has three “fundamental concepts: the people, the elite, and the general will” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:8). Hence, it is merely impossible to understand what populism is without unpacking these key concepts. The concept of “the people” is very vague and ambiguous. However, there is consensus that it is a construction of simplifying or interpreting reality (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:9). Many scholars have cited its vagueness as why they view it useless. Laclau, as quoted by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 9), argues that the notion that “the people” is an “empty signifier” makes populism a powerful political ideology and phenomenon. Populism can be used loosely to appeal to a diverse range of sectors and constituencies in society and can also be used to champion the course of the objectively and subjectively marginalised in society. It can create a common identity among the different social groups, uniting them based on common sense (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:9). The people as construction provides flexibility, as it combines “three meanings; the people as sovereign, as common people, and as a nation” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:9). All these unique aspects of “the people” distinguish the people from the elite on “secondary features such as political power, socio-economic status, and nationality” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:9).

The idea that the people are sovereign is based on the democratic principle that regards the people as rulers, not just people with political power. This idea of the people as rulers has its roots in the French and American Revolutions (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:9). The former president of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, was the first person to define democracy as "a

government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Nevertheless, the establishment of a democratic government does not necessarily do away with the gap between the ruled and the rulers (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6). In some cases, "the people" who were meant to be sovereign may feel marginalised or not adequately represented by the ruling elite and political establishment. This may result in the demand for populist leaders and parties "who return government to the people" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:9). The principle of people being sovereign is shared across all forms of populism. This reminds everyone that in every democracy, political power rests on a collective body, which must be included in all matters of democratic representation; otherwise, "the people," if marginalised, will mobilise and rebel.

A second meaning is the notion that the people are "the common people" "referring explicitly or implicitly to a broader class concept that combines socio-economic status with specific cultural traditions and popular values" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:9). The concept of "the common people" serves as a vital tool for criticising hegemonic ideas, norms, and cultures. Values of ordinary citizens are treated with suspicion, especially if they are not in line with the populist ones (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:10). The "common people" differ from the elite perspective since it advocates for the dignity and values of social groups who are being objectively and subjectively being left out from political power due to their "sociocultural and socio-economic status" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:10). This explains the reason why populists tend to use inflammatory rhetoric that exploits the anxieties that exist between the hegemonic culture that is usually perceived as superior and the other least dominant culture that is considered as inferior.

Almost all populists believe they exist to champion the cause (ideas, values, interests) of the "common people." They claim to be involved in politics to liberate the forgotten people, legitimate people, people that have the same outlook of political reality (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:11). This strategy of mobilising people tends to polarise society, as it spreads anger and hatred to the "other people, who are deemed as enemies of the people. The enemies of the people are not only the elite, but certain institutions qualify as enemies of the people, institutions such as "political parties, big organisations, and bureaucracies, which are accused of corrupting the minds of "the people" through propaganda (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:11).

Finally, the third meaning of the people is the idea of the people as a nation. In this regard, the term "the people" refers to the "national community, defined either in civic or ethnic terms" e.g., "the people of South Africa" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:11). This means all the natives of the

country are included, they are all part of the community that shares a common way of life (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:11). Consequently, the variety of communities of "people" constitute of specific and distinct nations that are usually founded on myths. However, it is almost impossible to define the exact boundaries of a nation. However, populists tend to be very simplistic when considering "the people" as every citizen of a given state. Some territories are multinational; in this regard, some nations are founded on characteristics such as ethnicity (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:11).

Much work still needs to be done about theorising about what the elite is. One that is apparent is that populists use morality to classify who the elite are. The "elite" are considered corrupt instead of "the pure people." This classification needs to be more specific. However, the populists criticise the elite's dominance of the economy, culture, and the media. The elite is depicted as a homogenous bunch of people united against the "general will" of the people. While morality is the central defining feature of classifying the elite, it is not the only criterion (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:11). The elites are identified based on power (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:12). These people are usually people who hold high offices in politics, economy, the media, and arts. Since the populists are staunch critics of people in power, they may find it hard to sustain their support when they are voted into power when they become the rulers. They may end up turning to authoritarianism to find new enemies. Populists usually argue that the economic classes that exist in society are the making of the elite; they create classes so that they can oppress the people, "the political elite is in cahoots with the economic elite and putting "particular interest above the "general impact of the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:12). The populist uses the link between the dominance of the economy and political power to question the robustness of democratic institutions.

The third and final central concept of populism as an ideology is the idea of the existence of a "general will" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:12). Populists strongly support the existence of the general will. This emanates from the fact that they view political reality in a moralistic and monist manner; they put the evil elite against the holy people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:16). Populists usually believe that they are the only ones who are enlightened enough to know what the general will is. They alone possess the required traits to unite the people to collaborate and cooperate towards a common goal (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:17). They are critical of representative government.

“Representative democracy is seen as an aristocratic form of power, in which citizens are treated as passive entities, mobilised periodically through elections, in which they do nothing more than select their representatives” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:17). They believe in direct democracy where the citizens are both makers and executors of law, hence the prevalence of referendums in populists governed countries. Direct democracy promoted by populists has a massive advantage as it tends to bridge the gap between the governing populists and their constituencies and strengthen institutions that advance the "presumed will" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:17). Populism can sometimes play a positive role by promoting democracy as it puts popular sovereignty at the centre of its discourse to include the segments of the citizenry that are neglected and failed by representative democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:18). Nevertheless, Populism has its evil side. Populist monist nature and particularly the "general will" may engender authoritarianism. Populism is founded on the notion that legitimate people share a homogenous outlook of political reality, which results in intolerance for dissent (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:19).

This chapter has explored how academics have defined and conceptualised populism. A wide range of political phenomena fall under these understandings of what comprises populism. The next chapter examines efforts to create theories explaining populism and its rise.

2. Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks

2.1. Causes of Populism

One of the significant debates regarding populism is the explanation of its causes. The primary debate is between two perspectives; one posits that populism emerges because of the needs of the people. This approach is also known as the "demand-side explanation of populism (Mudde, 2007:202). Since demand-side explanations focus on citizens' grievances, demand-side explanations can also be deemed bottom-up explanations. Similarly, since the supply-side explanation of populism focuses on political institutions and political players, it can be regarded as a top-down explanation. Demand-side explanations are bottom-up explanations focusing on citizens' changing grievances or demands. In contrast, supply-side explanations, focusing on political actors and institutions, be top-down explanations (Berman, 2021: 71–88).

Various demand-side reasons have been cited for an increase in the probability of someone supporting populist ideas (Mudde, 2007: 202). Scholars of economics and the political economy tend to stress economic grievances, while sociologists and political scientists usually emphasise social and cultural grievances in their studies of demand-side reasons (Berman, 2021: 71–88). Another widely cited explanation for populism is the structure of the electoral system. Heywood (2011) argues that populists do well in a proportional representation electoral system.

2.1.1. Demand-side factors

2.1.1.1. Economic grievance

The economic grievance thesis argues that economic factors, such as deindustrialisation, economic liberalisation, and deregulation, are causing the formation of a 'left behind' precariat with low job security, high inequality, and wage stagnation, who then support populism. The economic concerns theory posits that rapid economic changes such as liberalisation and decline in industrial activity are why some people feel they are being 'left behind' (Norris and Inglehart, 2021:202; Broz et al., 2019:464–494). Specific theories emphasise economic catastrophes (Mudde, 2007:205–206) or inequalities (Flaherty and Rogowski, 2021:495–523). There is clear evidence of growing economic disparities and household incomes, especially in countries like Brazil, the United States, and even South Africa (Berman, 2021: 71–88; Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014: 303–310; Hacker, 2019). Among the scholars who stress the importance of economic grievances is Martin Wolf (Wolf, 2019). They argue that these trends worsen resentment and may make people vulnerable to populist ideas. However, the evidence supporting

this argument is inconclusive. In the studies conducted by political scientists at the macro level, it was found that anti-immigrant sentiment, xenophobia, and resentment of people considered the 'other' or out-group tend to be elevated during economic crises. (Berman, 2021: 71–88; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, pp. 149–150; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 6; Abi-Hassan 2017, p. 427). Economic recessions such as the 2008 Global Financial Crisis positively correlate with the electoral growth of right-wing populist political parties (Klapisis, 2014: 189–198; Funke, Schularick; Trebesch, 2016: 227–260). Nonetheless, at the micro level, little evidence suggests a link between economic concerns and support for populists (Berman, 2021: 71–88; Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 134–139).

2.1.1.2. Theory of Modernization

The modernisation loser's theory states that certain features of the modernisation process have caused the demand for populism (Mudde, 2007:203). Some commentators argue that moral and social standards have been shaped by industrialisation to such a point that social cohesion in civil society has dissipated, fragmented, and ultimately been transformed, by default driving the increase in individualisation (Betz & Johnson, 2004:311-327). Populism suggests a comprehensive identity meant to return sovereignty to the once marginalised masses, "the people." (Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, Espejo, Ochoa, and Ostiguym, 2017: 269–270). Empirical evidence reveals that support for radical right-wing populism is prevalent across the social spectrum. The fact that a person is deemed a "modernisation loser" does not make them more likely to support populism (Gisela & Gastón, 2021).

2.1.1.3. Cultural backlash

Some theories argue that socio-cultural grievances are the primary reason people support populism rather than economic factors (ABC News, 2018). For instance, the theory of cultural backlash posits that the emergence of right-wing populism is a reaction to the worldwide proliferation of post-materialist values and ideologies such as multiculturalism, environmentalism, feminism, and many other ideologies (Nedelcu, 2015:99). This theory asserts that the spread of these new values and ideas throughout society clashes with existing and widely accepted norms until a 'tipping point' is reached, which leads people to react by supporting right-wing populism, as they feel their way of life is threatened (Norris, 2007:132). These people reminisce about the good old times when they were not forgotten and were not dispossessed by the progressive cultural tide. Most of these cohorts are older voters consumed with nostalgia (Inglehart & Norris, 2019:13).

These groups of people are traditionalists harbouring conservative values and norms that are very protective of their cultures and believe that their way of life is, if it ain't broke, do not fix it". Multiculturalism as a postmodern value is at loggerheads with the principle of protecting their identity, diluting the pureness of their cultures and identities. To retain their identity or counter this wave of adverse changes, the group resorts to supporting parties and leaders such as populists since they promise to prevent further losses and restore everything lost to postmodernism. This theory may not be relevant to every society, but it is central to any scholarship on populism. Norris posits that the cultural backlash analysis by Inglehart may be primarily prevalent in industrialised countries (Inglehart & Norris, 2019:1-4); however, some form of cultural preservation is more commonplace from an economic perspective, and it exists in almost every society that has populists. It is safe to conclude that the cultural backlash is synonymous with populism. Inglehart and Norris argue that for one to understand support for populism by the electorate better, one must take into consideration cultural values along with important demographic and social factors.

Specific theories focus only on the ethnic transformation brought about by immigration (Norris, 2007:132). Political scientists and sociologists studying world politics prefer these theories the most (ABC News, 2018). Empirical evidence obtained during the testing of this theory has produced inconclusive results; some even contradict each other significantly (Norris, 2007:135). At the micro- or individual level, there are strong connections between unique positions on socio-cultural issues (such as immigration policy and "racial animus") and right-wing populist voting. Nonetheless, at the macro level, there is no evidence of a correlation between populist attitudes and actual voting into the offices of right-wing populist parties (ABC News, 2018). Nevertheless, there is credible evidence from studies conducted by political scientists and other social scientists recording the power of ethnic identity threats on the electorate. Those voters who are under the impression that their group identity is threatened are most likely to support someone who vows to preserve their identity and status in society. (ABC News, 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2016:2; (Outten; Schmitt; Miller; Garcia, 2012:14:25; Tajjfe, 1970:96–102).

2.1.2. Supply-Side factors

Supply-side theories of populism emphasise the political players and institutions and how governments fail to be responsive enough to meet the evolving needs of citizens. The social, cultural, and economic realms are perceived to be shaped by political institutions. In this approach, since the government is seen as failing to tackle the problems it is confronting, voters

end up supporting populism in the hope that the populists will be effective in addressing their grievances (Berman, 2021: 71–88; Stein; Helen; Longstreth, 1992). A significant number of studies have provided some evidence for the assertion that populists are most likely to blossom when the establishment political parties are out of touch with the prevailing needs of the citizens. Populism tends to thrive when too many coalitions result in certain voices of the electorate not being heard (Berman, 2021: 71–88). Berman (2021) acknowledges the economic and socio-cultural grievances, but he argues that these only stir up anger, resentment, and susceptibility to being attracted to populism; the failure of the mainstream and establishment political parties, leaders, and governments is the main factor that breeds populism.

Huntington (1968) argued that citizens' demands grow as rapid economic or social changes occur in a society. If political institutions are lethargic and not robust enough to cater to the increasing demands of citizens, they will turn to populism. Similarly, suppose the political system needs to be stronger or become less efficient in responding to the needs of the citizens. In that case, citizens become frustrated, and political chaos and even political violence are possible. Political institutions that are so rigid that it becomes impossible for them to adjust to the changing economic and social environment will likely fail. A responsive and flexible political system adjusts more quickly to the most acute challenges than an archaic and unresponsive one. Huntington's analysis was of Third World countries but also applies to the developed world. (Huntington, 1968).

The supply-side factors in Western politics can be perceived as signs of a breakdown of political institutions. It can be argued that the failure of representative democracy causes this. This can be caused by the monopolisation of the political space by special interest groups that lobby governments and use their financial muscles to dominate and distort the economic and political discourse. This results in politicians being accountable to these lobby groups instead of ordinary citizens. This increases the chances of citizens pinning their hopes on the "messiah", who promises to revive these democratic institutions and return sovereignty to "the people". Parallels can be drawn between this argument and what happened with the Guptas in South Africa, who are accused of capturing the state. It can be argued that the rise of populist Economic Freedom fighters, led by the "maverick" Julius Malema, who was once a leader of the African National Congress Youth League, resulted from failed institutions that unwanted third forces have infiltrated.

Some experts observe that international organisations such as the European Union might have had unintended consequences. This is because when states sign up for these regional organisations, they tend to surrender a significant amount of their sovereignty. These organisations make binding policies and laws without direct consultation with the electorate of their member states. This might result in institutions needing to be more responsive to some member states' voters, particularly the least strong states. (Berman, 2021: 71–88). For instance, powerful financial institutions such as the EU Central Bank sometimes make decisions that are oceans away from the wishes of the member states' voters. Decisions such as imposition of austerity measures in the wake of the financial crisis are a testament to this argument. (Tucker, 2019). Mair (2013) argues that there is consensus that political parties have become detached from the societies they are meant to serve diligently.

2.1.2.1. The Mobilization Theory

The Mobilization Theory argues that there are three ways of political mobilisation: mobilisation of a populist leader, populist movement, and political party (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017:42–43; Gagnon et al. 2018, vi). Citizens support populism for various reasons, but what usually precipitates the emergence of populism is an economic crisis or improper conduct of the ruling establishment, such as fraud and corruption woes that ruin the reputation of the governing political parties. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 100). For example, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and its effect on some European countries such as Spain (Podemos) and Greece (Syriza) saw a wave of populist parties being voted into office. In Italy, it can be argued that former Prime Minister Mani Pulite's victory in the polls resulted from Silvio Berlusconi's corruption scandal. For instance, the Great Recession of 2007 and its impact on the economies of southern Europe were catalysts for the rise of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, while the Mani Pulite corruption scandal of the early 1990s played a significant role in the height of the Italian populist Silvio Berlusconi. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 100).

Sometimes, citizens vote for populists because there is a general idea that the political system does not serve their interests (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 101). This usually emerges when governments present policies not supported by most of the electorate; these policies are adopted and implemented because they are regarded as "prudent and responsible." Some elected governments introduce these policies because they are under pressure from supranational institutions, which set terms and conditions before disbursing any loan or grant to countries in dire need. For instance, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed debilitating

Structural Adjustment reforms in Africa, which led to many socio-economic catastrophes. In Europe, the austerity measures adopted in the aftermath of the Great Recession had a similar impact. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 101). Populists associate themselves with the governed, "the people on the ground." They believe in decentralising power and speaking directly to the target audience (Kenny, 2017).

2.1.2.2. Leadership

The personality of a leader and how it affects the citizens' voting patterns have always fascinated political scientists and other social scientists. King (2002) argues that the effect of a leader's personality becomes more critical when voters have begun to lose confidence in a political party. (King, 2002:41-42). Recent studies on populism provide evidence that even if voters have lost faith and become disillusioned with the party's policies, some people remain loyal due to the charisma of the populist leader (Mudde, 2007:261). Mudde posits that charisma is vital in the breakthrough stage, while persistence requires solid organisational structures. (Mudde, 2007:262). Studies also reveal that charismatic leaders' personalities are often polarising since they are based on the binary code and the idea that the populist leader is a saviour who knows what is good for everybody. (Smith, 2000: 101–111.) This means that voters have only two choices: either be friends with the leader by voting for them or be foes by voting against them. The fact that the populist leader uses unapologetic rhetoric can be perceived as revolutionary and suitable for transforming the political and economic status quo.

Using charisma as a way of analysing populist leaders does present potential conceptual issues. The question becomes, what is charism? Moreover, Who determines what makes up charism? The meaning of charism is not fixed; instead, it is subjective and depends on how the voters view a particular leader. Eatwell (2014) asserts that charism depends on the prevailing political culture and how it is affected by what is considered a charism in a leader. (Eatwell, R., 2014: 3–18). In addition to being a charismatic populist leader, his peculiar political style may appeal to certain people. These may include what Moffit calls bad manners and a sense of superiority. (Crasovschi, 2018; Moffit, 2016: 51–58). Moffit further argues that unconventional discourse is essential to populist rhetoric and makes populists more unique than ordinary politicians in mainstream parties. (Crasovschi, 2018; Moffit, 2016: 58)

The "bad manners" language that populists use is equivalent to politically incorrect language. The populists are not as restricted as established or mainstream parties. (Crasovschi, 2018; Moffit, 2016: 51–58) Populists profess to be in proximity to "the ordinary people, and they use

the language that the people want to hear, not what other mainstream politicians say. They do this to give the impression that they deal with pressing issues head-on, "calling a spade a spade," as opposed to the established political actors that are restricted. Populists tend to depict themselves as being the epitome of excellence. They give the impression that they are demigods who oversee the destinies of the people and themselves (Ostiguy, 2009: 38). During Donald Trump's campaign, he promised to "make America great again alone," while his opponent was insulted by being called "crooked Hillary Clinton."

2.1.2.3. Party Organisation

A charismatic leader may be instrumental in performing well in the polls; however, Mudde points out that the internal organisation and leadership of the party are also crucial for a populist to thrive (Mudde, 2007:263). He argues that organising a political party is essential for the sustenance of populist leaders but not that important for forming the party. (Mudde, 2007:264). Carter posits that organising the party is necessary for persistence, long-term gains, and winning elections (Mudde, 2007:267). Although there is a diversity of opinions about the role of party organisations in ensuring that populist leaders blossom, there are three aspects in which consensus exists. Firstly, Eatwell argues that charismatic leaders may win over the support of voters by personalising politics (centripetal charisma), making themselves synonymous with politics, and personalising the political party itself to appeal to the top brass of the political party (coterie charisma) (Eatwell, R., 2014:2). This decreases the possibility of factionalism taking place and almost guarantees that the party members remain disciplined. Secondly, populist parties are usually structured in a minimalistic way, with a handful of members who play hierarchical roles that evolve around the charismatic leader (Mudde, 2007:267). However, the structure of a populist party is not always known in the public domain, as some populists tend to mistrust researchers and academics. Thirdly, Segert observes that populist parties often adopt the principle of centralising democracy with an authoritarian structure. (Segert, 2008: 49–61). Certain populist parties are open about not adhering to democratic principles, while others may be forced by law to uphold democratic values.

2.12.4. Voluntarism Theory

Another salient debate in the scholarship of populism is the contrast between voluntarist and structural perspectives. The agency-based, or voluntarist, theory emphasises how populist political parties and politicians behave. Berman, 2021: 71–88). The central aspect of this research area is evaluating how political parties evolve and how they are received. Successful

political parties and leaders have a big say regarding agenda-setting and determining which issues are essential to further their interests. (Berman, 2021: 71–88)

There are several ways mainstream parties can react to the emergence of a populist. The most common stance is to respond by being adversarial, accommodative, and adversarial. If the issues raised by a populist party are not essential and short-term, a dismissive view may be practical. However, if the issue is critical and long-term, it allows the populist party to own the problem, which might increase support for the populist party. When an established party adopts an adversarial strategy, it vigorously engages with the situation and declares its staunch criticism of the new populist party's stance (Berman, 2021: 71–88). This brings the issue into the spotlight; it becomes a subject of fierce debate and can lead to increased ownership of the problem by the new populist political party. It can be of enormous benefit to adopt an adversarial stance if the position taken by the populist party on an issue does not enjoy enough support from the electorate (Berman, 2021: 71–88).

When the established parties choose to accommodate the stance that the new populist political party takes, they bring the new party closer to them and cooperate. They do this to keep voters who care about a particular issue. This is only effective if done very early before the populist party has become synonymous with the problem. This approach is very suitable when the subject is important, long-term, and beneficial to the citizens (Meguid, 2005:347–359). Similarly, a populist party founded on authoritarianism may grow its support by reforming into a more democratic party. Right-wing populists tend to be more efficient when garnering support on issues the establishment ignores that are important to the citizens.

An example of this is how they gain support by tackling the issue of migration and "cultural dilution" in their countries. Uncontrolled immigration comes with many challenges, e.g., the burden on public services, and cultures sometimes clash, e.g., the challenges Muslims face in the West and the association of Islam with terrorism. Victims of globalisation are very likely to support a populist party that adopts xenophobic rhetoric. (Berman, 2021: 71–88).

2.12.5. Anti-establishment Theory

2.1.2.5.1. Mudde and Kaltwasser's Ideational Approach

This theory helps determine the relevance of the anti-establishment stance. This theory posits that populists adopt an anti-established stance, i.e., a position that is against the mainstream

parties/ the establishment, whom they accuse of being "the elite" whom they depict as marginalising, excluding, and alienating "the people" (Roberts, 2017). This approach also entails the critique of the elite or establishment and rhetoric that appeals to moral people. In this approach, populism is defined as "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017:6). The populist argue that the elite does not know what the will of the people is. This definition of populism is beneficial in understanding the malleability of the concept (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:6). Ideologies establish norms and values of how humans organise their society and the meaning of society. Populism, as an ideology, can be regarded as a prism through which the people perceive and understand political reality (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017:6). Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational approach posits argue that there are three interpretations of the people:

1. "The people are sovereign."
2. The notion that "the people" are commoners or the forgotten ones.
3. The idea of the people as a nation

Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational approach states the following about the elite.

1. The elite are selfish and in power for their benefit.
2. The elite are fake politicians, not honest politicians.
3. The elite are part of a corrupt/faulty system.
4. The elite are not part of the nation but are foreign.

2.1.2.5.2. Barr's thesis of a "maverick" and an "outsider"

This theory is relevant in understanding how populists break away from the mainstream or establishment. Bar argues that if the actions of the ruling establishment result in the breakdown of linkages with the electorate, this will lead to an anti-establishment position. For outsiders and mavericks to rise to prominence, Lawson argues that one must first understand the relationship between political players and what makes up linkages (Lawson, 1980). What would be the

reasons for linkages to break down? Barr and Lawson identify four linkages: clientelist, directive, participatory, and electoral (Lawson, 1988). The clientelistic linkages pertain to how material goods are exchanged for support; the directive linkages deal with whom the target groups benefit; the participatory linkages are related to the role that the supporters play in government; and the electoral linkages refer to the distribution of material goods during critical periods, such as the election season (Lawson, 1988).

There is a fifth linkage, which refers to representation. It is an extension of participatory linkage. However, it is done without direct involvement or interaction. Many people may only be occupied by politics during election periods; nonetheless, they are open to the term of office of a mainstream party. They still care about their interests, and whether they participate directly or indirectly does not matter. Roberts' work comes in very handy here. He posits that the failures of the incumbent establishment party are the main reason people become drawn toward populist parties (Roberts, 2017).

When it comes to citizens having faith in the establishment, perception does become a reality. If citizens view the establishment as ineffective, irresponsible, and incapable of governing, a breakdown in linkages is most likely to take place (Roberts, 2017). The breakdown of linkages tends to be rampant during crisis periods, such as economic calamities, corruption scandals, or when the ruling party has proven incompetent and incapable of ruling. Populists take advantage of these fertile grounds, using common sense and simplistic rhetoric to appeal to the citizens or electorate. They profess to be the messiahs who are the only ones capable of ruling since they know who the problem (the elite) is, who is aggrieved (the people), and what needs to be done (the general will of the people).

2.12.5.3. Hartleb's Characteristics of Anti-Establishment Parties

Although the development of affinity for populist sentiments among the electorate may be caused by the failure of the mainstream or anti-establishment to rule effectively and represent the interests of the citizens, which leads to a crisis of representation, the process is more complex and primarily nonlinear than the linkage between the governing party and the electorate deteriorating. Populists do not indifferently wait for the breakdown in linkages; they aggressively propagate the anti-establishment position, sometimes so that the rhetoric becomes more effective than the poor performance in the elections. One may argue that if populist parties that use anti-establishment discourse did not exist, people might lose interest in politics or continue to vote for a different establishment party.

Hartleb posits that "populist parties tend to be defined more by what they are not than what they are" (Hartleb, 2015:44). He argues that anti-establishment parties have the following characteristics:

- The principle that they are the credible alternative party
- The construction of a homogeneous population that conflicts with establishment parties and the political elite
- The image of being an outsider, the underdog, who represents the marginalised and excluded
- Giving labels to opposition parties
- The claim of being unorthodox and unconventional (brand new)
- strongly advocates for direct democracy.
- Vows to root out pressing issues using new ways, e.g., cleaning up, rooting out corruption
- Simplification of complex political issues
- A claim to be the defender of the weak
- Cynicism toward politics
- Polarizing by using morality, e.g., the evil elite and the good people
- hostile toward rivals
- They formulate their message.

Hartleb argues further that anti-establishment parties usually form in a very short period and often lack strong leadership structures" (Hartleb, 2015:44). Most foot soldiers lack proper training, leading to a flareup of scandals. If the media uncover these scandals, they will be vilified and accused of working in cahoots with the elite.

2.2. Electoral structures

The idea of democracy is often regarded as only open to one interpretation or unambiguous (Heywood, 2011:93). However, in fact, this is not the case. For example, South Africa and the US have different electoral systems; South Africa uses the parliamentary system to elect a president, while the United States uses the Electoral College system; however, both are considered legitimate democracies. If the United States had changed its electoral system before the 2016 presidential elections and the electorate had voted similarly, Hillary Clinton would have been elected president. This empirical example demonstrates how electoral rules can be conducive or hostile to populism's flourishing (Heywood, 2011:93).

Norris explains the effect of electoral structure changes by stating, "Electoral laws and regulations structure opportunities for party competition within each country. Far from being neutral, these can provide formidable constitutional, legal, and administrative barriers" (Norris, 2005:83). The different rules tend to affect the entire electoral process, from the nomination to the campaign to the election. Some countries require a registration fee and a certain minimum number of signatures in the nomination phase. This can be a barrier for new parties that have fewer members initially. In addition, some countries are stringent on social groups that are considered extremist. Populists tend to blossom in societies where equality is enshrined in the constitution and is practised by authorities and where the incumbent does not have a monopoly on public funds and mass media (Norris, 2005:83). Populists are favoured by a low vote threshold, which is why proportional representation tends to be conducive to the rise of populism (Heywood, 2011:207).

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, just like there is a considerable debate as to what populism is, there is another massive debate as to what the natural causes of populism are. Does populism emerge because the economic and socio-cultural conditions aggrieve the citizens and because they have become the causalities of modernisation? Or do they feel that the establishment has neglected their needs and the political institutions have been captured by special interest groups at the expense of the masses? What role do the structures of the electoral system play in the rise of populism? The author seeks to answer some of these questions in this project using the anti-establishment theoretical framework to understand the rise of populism in Hungary. Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational theory, Barr's theory of "maverick" or "outsider," and Hartleb's anti-establishment party's characteristics will be used to construct the anti-establishment stance.

3. Chapter Three: Research Methodology

3.1. Case study

This research will be carried out using a mixed method which uses qualitative and descriptive quantitative data. This is a theory-developing case study. The hypothesis comes from the three tentative theories. The study uses data from a variety of primary and secondary documentary sources.

Stake posits that an intensive individual study enables the research to understand a single political issue from a micro-level to understand multiple political problems at the macro level. (Stake, 2006: 65). In this study, populism is the dependent variable, and the anti-establishment theory is the independent variable.

Case studies are very suitable for research that explains relationships between phenomena (Almeida et al., 2017:377). It is very convenient when collecting data from various sources or means (Jolobe, 2014: 7). A case study allows a researcher to investigate the deeper underlying causes of phenomena.

Case studies are limited when it comes to generalising results from one case study to other settings (Stake, 2006:73). An examination of anti-establishment in Hungary is limited because it represents only one approach of many and cannot be generalised as the only universal theory that explains the rise of populism in a country (Stake, 2006:73). Many other factors need to be taken into consideration when it comes to populism. The advantages of using the case study method outweigh the disadvantages. This case study seeks to develop and assess the populist theory of anti-establishment in Hungary. The case study is a way of seeing if the anti-establishment theory has analytic power. It is also intended to help develop the theory so that it can better explain what happens when populism rises.

3.1.1. Anti-establishment

This study interrogates the “anti-establishment” approaches of Mudde and Kaltwasser, Laclau, Hartleb, and Barr, first combined by Carstens (2019) to explore how well these anti-establishment approaches can account for the rise of populism in Hungary under Orbán and his party Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance).

- Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational theory will be used throughout this research. In this framework, the "good people" are set against the "evil elite," therefore creating an anti-establishment stance (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 5–19). The three interpretations of the "people" theorised by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017:9–11) will be utilised/applied. The four interpretations of the elite theorised by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017:11–18) will be used or applied.
- Barr's theory of "maverick" or "outsider" deserting the establishment will be used to interpret the anti-establishment theory (Barr, 2009: 30). Laclau's Crisis of Representation: The crisis of representation takes place if the governing party's (mainstream or establishment) behaviour results in the breakdown of linkages with the electorate, engendering an anti-establishment position (Barr, 2009: 34).
- Hartleb's anti-establishment party characteristics will be applied in this study of populism (Hartleb, 2015:44).

4. Chapter Four: The Rise of Populism under the Leadership of Orbán and Fidesz Since 2010

The success of a populist leader and party in Hungary is somewhat astonishing, considering the development of Hungarian politics. After the Second World War, Hungary played a leading role in the struggle against the Soviet Union's oppression (Denver, 2016). The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a significant sign of Hungary's resolve to bring about democracy and a free market economy (Centre for European Populist Studies, 2020). Hungary's "goulash communism" (a type of socialism after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 which prioritised economic policy reforms to improve the quality of standard of living) practised from the 1960s to the demise of the Soviet Union is a classic example of how early the country started crafting its political system away from totalitarianism to a more open society and economy (Centre for European Populist Studies, 2020). The Hungarians combined their non-free market economy with some free market economy. This entailed allowing small businesses to operate, thus making Hungary an exception from other countries ruled by the Soviet Union (Denvers, 2016).

The citizens of Hungary also ripped down the barrier separating Hungary from Austria a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Denvers, 2016). This was an early indication that most Hungarians wanted to join the Western bloc, be part of Europe, and adopt Western values and politics. Ironically, Viktor Orbán was among the leaders of the time. In 1989, he voiced his unhappiness with the presence of Soviet troops within the borders of Hungary (Denvers, 2016). Despite the Soviets being a formidable threat, Orbán called for removing the Soviet forces from Hungary (Zalan, 2016). A year before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1988, Orbán and a few of his friends founded the Alliance of Young Democrats, or Fidesz (Kirchick, 2012).

Orbán and his party (Fidesz) promoted the ideal of democratic and open elections and parliament (Centre for European Populist Studies, 2020). They supported a free market-based economic system. They aspired to be part of Western Europe and to have a pluralistic and inclusive society. They adopted liberal values. Orbán planned to be part of Hungary's economic and political transformation, and he regarded Fidesz as an engine for this transformation. Fidesz started as a movement. It morphed into a political party during the 1990 elections. (Zalan, 2016), However, as time progressed, Orbán's political philosophy changed from that of an idealist to that of a populist leader who is driven by the vaulting ambition of permanently hanging onto power instead of upholding the liberal values that he once supported.

In 1990, Fidesz formed a partnership with the liberal party; however, in 1994, the party abandoned the alliance when Orbán and his fellow party members realised that a political vacuum brought about the Hungarian Democratic Forum's failures (Zalan, 2016). This cunning move to neglect previous allegiances to liberal values propelled Fidesz to victory in the 1998 elections, making Orbán prime minister. Despite his impeccable performance on the economic front, Hungary's Gross Domestic Product grew by an average of above 4% in the period between 1998- 2002 (World Bank Open Data, 2024), Orbán did not win the 2002 elections. He was only re-elected in 2010 and has governed Hungary ever since (Zalan, 2016).

It would be an understatement to say that Orbán won the 2010 elections because of a disgruntled electorate. Nevertheless, just like the rest of Europe, Hungary was not spared from the economic calamities brought about by the 2008 Global financial crisis. In 2008, Hungary's economy contracted by seven per cent, making it one of the worst-affected countries in Europe. Hungary approached the International Monetary Fund for assistance. This assistance provided by the IMF came with terms and conditions (Schleifer, 2014). The government had to adopt austerity measures. The economic calamities allowed Fidesz to run on simplistic economic solutions. The party promised to raise taxes paid by multinational corporations doing business in Hungary and to eradicate economic inequalities. Orbán became highly critical of the European Union, especially its bureaucracy. He claimed that foreign forces were bullying Hungary (Schleifer, 2014).

Orbán may have campaigned as a reformer, but he learned from past electoral losses that "he became more of a political operator than a reformer" (Denvers, 2016). He moved away from conventional conservative politics toward right-wing populism. His quest for maintaining power has resulted in him swiftly embracing right-wing politics. In 2010, Fidesz obtained a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections, which gave Orbán the authority to introduce significant changes in Hungary's government and political system (Orenstein et al., 2015). He started amassing power by launching an onslaught on institutions he deemed standing in his way. For instance, he introduced amendments to the Constitutional Court, the highest court in Hungary, to prolong his time in office and manipulate the electoral system whenever he wished to deal with unforeseen political developments (Kelemen & Orenstein, 2016). He created a procedure in which the majority party, Orbán's party (Fidesz), had the power to appoint judges without input from the opposition parties. He increased the number of Constitutional Court judges from 11 to 15, filling it with people loyal to Fidesz. Later, Orbán made further amendments to the

constitution, making specific laws widely regarded as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, further weakening the authority of the Constitutional Court (Kelemen & Orenstein, 2016).

Orbán also started attacking the press, especially free and independent media houses. He created a commission that punished journalists for "vague attacks on "human dignity," increased the state-backed media networks with people that are pro-Fidesz (Kirchick, 2012), and imposed heavy regulations on media outlets that are critical of the Fidesz government while providing rewards in the form of rights and privileges to the media outlets that are loyal to the government (Greenstein & Tensley, 2016). He also imposed new taxes on advertising to influence non-state media (Karolewski & Benedikter, 2016).

In 2012, Orbán hastily passed a new constitution in parliament in two weeks. This constitution included the declaration that marriage should only be legal between a man and a woman and the statement that "life begins at conception" (Kirchick, 2012). This new constitution also institutionalised the judicial system amendments that were made earlier, which included the prohibition for judges to challenge laws related to the budget and lowering the compulsory retirement age for judges (Kirchick, 2012). Orbán also established a National Judicial Office occupied by government loyalists who appoint judges (Kirchick, 2012). Moreover, Orbán manipulated the electoral system to favour Fidesz's ends. He made use of gerrymandering to create a conducive political atmosphere. He enacted legislation that allowed Hungarians living overseas to acquire passports and be able to vote in Hungarian elections, which helped Fidesz increase support in the 2014 elections (Orenstein et al., 2015). These changes ensured that Orbán and Fidesz hung on to power for as long as possible.

Orbán has also repeatedly taken actions that undermine civil society. For instance, he has opened investigations into a few "academics who are critical of his government" (Kirchick, 2012). He appointed his cronies to institutions that were supposed to be apolitical and independent. e.g., He oversaw the National Cultural Fund, a member of Fidesz, which funds arts and culture in Hungary (Kirchick, 2012). He has been a staunch critic of George Soros, who supports civil society through his philanthropy. Soros is an American philanthropist who was born in Hungary. Orbán has accused him of creating turmoil in Hungary by funding non-governmental organisations (Karolewski & Benedikter, 2016). In 2011, several academics, including the late president of the Czech Republic, wrote an open letter that was very critical of Orbán's government. They expressed unhappiness with abuse of power, such as doing away with the system of checks and balances (Kirchick, 2012).

Furthermore, Orbán has expressed his intention of taking back the territory that was historically part of Hungary. His rhetoric sounds like that of the president of Russia, who believes that the current borders do not demarcate the true extent of the territory belonging to Russia. It is probably unrealistic for Orbán and his party to invade any modern-day European country, but his expansive rhetoric is a cause for concern. Orbán believes Hungary's territory ends elsewhere in Europe, such as Serbia and Romania (Orenstein et al., 2015). The same sentiments also drive Putin's war on Ukraine. The ethnic Russians living in Ukraine are courted as citizens of Russia, so the land they occupy belongs to Russia (Orenstein et al., 2015).

In 2014, due to the political threat posed by the ultra-right party, Jobbik, Orbán shifted even more to the right. The Jobbik political threat increased when the party increased its vote at the polls from 17 per cent in 2010 to 20.5 per cent in the parliamentary elections. However, the danger lessened when Jobbik suffered defeat in the European parliamentary elections after they increased support in the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections (Kirchick, 2012). Orbán and Fidesz typically care about politics as opposed to policy, so it was no surprise for them to adopt Jobbik's platform as soon as they realised Jobbik was rapidly becoming more popular. For example, the government recommended the inclusion of works by anti-Semitic scholars in the National Core Curriculum of Hungary and that the state media promote the national identity of Hungary (Verseck, 2013). Fidesz also pledged support for some Hungarian militia groups, booted the International Monetary Fund out of the country, and implemented unconventional, financially reckless policies that furthered the government's interests politically (Verseck, 2013).

When the refugee crisis erupted in the European Union, including in Hungary, Orbán and Fidesz positioned themselves at the forefront of the European anti-immigrant/refugee movement, calling refugees "rapists," "criminals," and "terrorists" (Puddington, 2016). His government vowed to erect a 160-kilometre fence along its border with Serbia (Krekó & Juhász, 2015). Orbán put refugees into delapidated camps and shot tear gas and water cannons at them (Keleman, 2015). When the European Union announced the refugee quotas, he responded in a classic populist manner, equating the EU with foreign forces wanting to take over Hungary. He went as far as reiterating the statement: His government belongs to the people of Hungary. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in France (Paris), Orbán made another typical populist statement: " We do not want to see a significant minority among ourselves that has different cultural characteristics and backgrounds." We want to keep Hungary as Hungary". This was quite a blatant attack on Muslims (Orenstein et al., 2015)

The fact that Orbán has become one of the prominent leaders in Europe who have adopted an anti-immigrant and anti-refugee stance is ironic since only 4.5 per cent of the Hungarian population is foreign-born. Most of them are Hungarians born abroad. A country like Germany, which welcomes immigrants and refugees, has a foreign-born population of over 12 per cent (Krekó & Juhász, 2015). Orbán has admired controversial authoritarian leaders such as Turkish President Recep Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has been preaching anti-liberal, anti-elite, and sometimes anti-EU rhetoric. He uses the "us-versus-them" strategy. He is indifferent to political correctness and has labelled people who disagree with him as "elites" who have no idea what the "general will" of the people is (Nolan, 2014).

On April 8, 2018, Hungarians went to the polls to elect parliamentarians. This was the second election since a new constitution was adopted on January 1, 2012 (Zalan, 2018). These elections were a resounding victory for the alliance of Fidesz and KDNP, which led to preserving the two-thirds majority and Orbán maintaining his position as prime minister. Orbán and his party's campaign was mainly centred on the migrant threat, foreign interference, and meddling (specifically targeted at the European Union) (Zalan, 2018). This re-election of Orbán and Fidesz was a triumph for right-wing populism in Europe (Than & Szakacs, 2018; Zalan, 2018; Khera et al., 2018). The outcome of these elections reinforced the stature of Orbán in Hungarian politics (News, 2018; Buckley, 2018), granting him the opportunity to change the constitution again (Zalan, 2018). Many perceived this as a massive setback for the European Union project (Harris, 2018; Santora, 2018).

There was a very high voter turnout in these elections, probably the highest since the collapse of communism (Harris, 2018). This worked in Fidesz's favour, despite the pundit's predictions. (Zalan, 2018; Khera et al., 2018; News, 2018; Csaky, 2018). Fidesz and its allies won most of their seats in rural areas and small towns, while the opposition won most of its seats in the capital, Budapest (Simon et al., 2018; BBC, 2018). Orbán used public resources to spread the pro-peasant rhetoric/propaganda and monopoly over rural media. Many described this as a defeat for left-wing opposition politicians (McAuley, 2018).

Zselyke Csaky attributes Orbán's victory to the economy's growth, his gradual centralisation of power over the past eight years, and his growing near monopoly over the media, which spreads brutal propaganda against his imaginary and real enemies (Csaky, 2018). Other analysts cite the opposition to immigrants and "a coordinated, expensive, and sophisticated sting operation" on NGOs, including those providing humanitarian aid to immigrants (Santora & Bienvenu, 2018).

A report on the elections provided by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mentioned concerns over electoral conduct, taking issue with how the Orbán government used state resources to campaign for re-election (Santora & Bienvenu, 2018). The OSCE's spokesperson described the language used during campaigning as aggressive and xenophobic (Brussels, 2018). The report also took issue with the fact that the public broadcaster was not impartial. It served as the mouthpiece of Orbán's Fidesz and the entire ruling coalition. The playing field was tilted to favour the people in power as the lines between the parties and the state's resources were blurred (Brussels, 2018).

On April 3, 2022, Parliamentary elections were held in Hungary to elect members of the National Assembly (Pállinger, 2022). Orbán's governing party, Fidesz, emerged victorious, extending their terms in office to the fourth. Fidesz also attained a two-thirds majority in these elections, which some analysts fear grants the government *carte blanche* to centralise power and weaken institutions that safeguard democracy even further. The victory was attributed to the power and influence that the government exerted over the media terrain and the voters' fear of the instability that might be caused by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine (Cage, 2022). A similar trend observed in the recent elections is that Fidesz performed exceptionally well in areas where the birth rate was high (Hungary Today, 2022), there were lower levels of education, and there was a lower economic class (Hungary Today, 2022), while the opposition excelled in urban areas, particularly in Budapest (Ciobanu, 2022).

A 2022 Human Rights Watch report reveals that the misuse of people's private data was another issue that undermined the fairness of the Hungarian election, ((Human et al., 2022). The report documents new ways the governing party misused personal data for political campaigning in the 2022 elections. Orbán and his party have invested heavily in building sophisticated "databases of voters, online political advertising, petitions, data collection through consultations, use of social media, and direct communication through SMS messaging, emails, and robocalls" (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Such data misuse undermines the voters' privacy and robs them of the opportunity to participate in fair democratic elections, which require a free market of voters for competition.

Orbán and Fidesz bear all the hallmarks of populists and anti-establishment parties—a leader who was once at the forefront of the struggle against communism and true liberal reform. Orbán can be perceived as what Barr labels a maverick. A maverick politician is a politician who emerges on the political scene as part of the establishment and then later breaks away to form or

join a populist party. This theory will be developed in Chapter Five. Orbán has adopted an anti-elite stance and become a staunch European Union critic. He has cracked down on non-governmental organisations that do not agree with him, labelling them foreign forces that seek to take over Hungary. He has defined "the people" as ethnic Hungarians both inside Hungary and in the diaspora. Orbán seems to believe he is the only one enlightened enough to know the people's general will.

The Fidesz party bears all Hartleb's characteristics of an anti-establishment party. So, it is worth exploring both Hartleb's theory of anti-establishment parties and Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational theory in Chapter 5. Orbán and Fidesz won the 2010 parliamentary election after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Was there a correlation between Fidesz's and Orbán's rise to power and the debilitating effects of the financial crisis? Did most people who were the main losers during the financial crisis vote for Fidesz? Some analysts believe Fidesz and Orbán's re-elections can be attributed to sound economic growth.

In contrast, other analysts believe that Orbán and Fidesz received the most votes in rural areas, where people have low education levels and low economic prosperity. In contrast, the opposition received most of its votes in urban areas, particularly Budapest. At first glance, it is almost evident that economic calamities did propel Fidesz to power in 2010, but what about the subsequent three re-elections? Chapter six sheds light on the relevance of the theory of economic grievances/inequalities in explaining the rise of populism. The dissertation also considers that populism may not be the only reason for the sustained support for Orbán and Fidesz.

5. Chapter Five: Anti-Establishment

This chapter will apply the following anti-establishment approaches to develop the anti-establishment characteristics of populism in Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, first combined by Carstens (2019)

- Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational approach
- Barr’s theory of the "outsider" or "maverick" breaks away from the mainstream or establishment. Laclau’s representation crisis led to the breakdown of linkages.
- Hartleb’s anti-establishment party’s characteristics

5.1. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s ideational approach

"The people"	The Elite"	General Will of the People" (volonté Générale)
The people are sovereign.	The elite are selfish; they are in power for their benefit	The elite does not know the will of the people. They are indifferent
The people are commoners or the forgotten ones	The elite are fake politicians, not honest politicians	Simplify governance by using common sense.
The people are a nation.	The elite are part of a corrupt or faulty system The elite are not part of the nation. They are foreign.	Not necessarily an anti-representation system Strong support for symbolic representation

5.1.1. "The People" and the "General Will" of the People

In Hungary, Prime Minister Orbán identifies the people as pure white Europeans and condemns mixing Europeans with other races. (The Guardian, 2022). He states, "We Hungarians are not mixed. Countries where the European races mingle, those are no longer nations" (The Guardian, 2022).

This rhetoric is in keeping with populist rhetoric that identifies people as a nation and as the forgotten ones. The new mixed race is growing to replace the original Hungarian race. Orbán supports his thesis by citing the great replacement theory. In his theory, Orbán posits that:

There is a plot to dilute the white population of the United States of America and European countries through immigration," an ideological trick of the internationalists left to say the European population is already mixed race. (The Guardian, 2022)

This statement supports the idea that the people are sovereign. They are free to make their own decisions regarding the affairs of their own country. Populists tend to vilify their rivals. They use moral discourse to discredit their opponents. Orbán and his party are against the LGBTQ+ movement, the so-called "woke culture" and has adopted a law like the "Russian propaganda" law, which bans gay people from being featured in school educational materials or TV shows aimed at minors. (The Guardian, 2022). This action by Orbán and his party sends the message that they are not willing to conform to the norms and values set by the Western elite. They have agency and free will. They can set unique standards and values

The populist idea of "the people" as a nation, sovereign and forgotten, is made appealing to the electorate by the impact of the Treaty of Trianon. On June 4, 1920, "Hungary signed a peace treaty with the allied forces and an associate power. Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territory and almost 60% of its population" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2023). This event is regarded as tragic by many Hungarians, and this justifies Orbán's claim that the current borders of Hungary do not delineate the actual size of the Hungarian nation and its territory. The ethnic Hungarians are scattered throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Orbán has been courting the ethnic Hungarian diaspora throughout his premiership. He even covertly granted citizenship at some of its consulates (Verseck, 2022). These ethnic Hungarians have proven loyal to Orbán since they have helped him and his party win elections. Orbán has proposed the establishment of a "sovereign state between Russia and Central Europe; for the sake of simplicity, now call it Ukraine" (Verseck, 2022).

Hungary's prime minister has used the "plight of the diaspora" to his advantage, arguing that their land will be taken away if voters do not support him. They will become stateless people, dominated by a foreign majority. They will be forgotten, have no sovereignty, and their nation will disappear (Verseck, 2022). Orbán has grungily supported the sanctions against Russia for the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. He has used the sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU to advocate for Hungary's sovereignty as a nation. He said,

"This is not our war" (Verseck, 2022). He has repeatedly stated that this war is between Russia and Ukraine. So, Hungary should not just follow the West's imposition of sanctions without the approval of "the Hungarian people." Hungary may be part of the European Union but still has national interests. To this end, Orbán requested exemptions from some sanctions, such as the boycott of Russian oil. The prime minister and his government have embarked on a campaign to promote the notion that the European Union's sanctions on Russia are ruining the economy of Hungary (Verseck, 2022).

Due to his concerns over the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, Orbán has little to no sympathy for Ukraine. Orbán has expressed his displeasure over the proposed law mainly aimed at curbing "the influence of the Russian language in Ukraine" (Verseck, 2022). Orbán believes that this legislation will also target the Hungarian language in Ukraine. The Hungarian government has been so hostile towards Ukraine that it has sometimes vetoed cooperation. In February 2022, the Hungarian government rejected NATO Cooperation with Ukraine, citing its concerns over Ukraine's Policy on minority rights. Soon after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, Orbán made "a speech in which he called for: "autonomy, collective rights, and the right to citizenship for the ethnic Hungarian minority" (Verseck, 2022).

This separatist rhetoric is usually targeted at the right-wing electorate, which still regards the Trianon Treaty as a tragedy and a humiliating event in the history of Hungary (Verseck, 2022). So Orbán's Ukraine policy prioritises domestic and other foreign policy issues instead of the country itself (Verseck, 2022).

Orbán distinguishes between the people of Hungary and the invaders. The invaders are evil, and they pose an existential threat. Immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are the evil invaders. Orbán posits. Europe is now under invasion" (Verseck, 2022). Orbán argues that the invaders have internal accomplices within Hungary and the European Union. He regards these people as enemies. He calls them the global elite, mainly the European Union and the West. At the March 15th rally in Budapest, Orbán said to the attendees, "Their (the opposition) task is to win power and implement the grand plan; to break Hungary, which is part of immigrants" (Than 2018).

In an interview on Good Friday in 2015, Orbán further warned about the threat of migration and its recent consequences:

My task would be more difficult if there had not been that attack when they kicked down the door on us, invaded Hungary, violated our laws, and marched across Hungary in their hundreds of thousands. However, that is what happened, and we all saw it. It was not so long ago, but in 2015. (Roylance, 2018)

Orbán Calls on conservative Hungarians who share the same sentiment to protect the identity of Hungary by saying "the people" that populists claim to be fighting are regarded as homogenous. In the case of Hungary, Orbán believes that these people, "true Hungarians," share one religion, Christianity. In the summer of 2017, Orbán delivered a speech at a gathering in Transylvania titled "Europe is de-Christianising." This speech warned of the erosion of Hungarian identity. Here, he also cites the great displacement conspiracy; in this case, the "national identity of Hungary is being replaced by a new, mixed, Islamised Europe (Than, 2018). He blames the corrupt global elite aided by the European Union's bureaucrats in Brussels, to whom Hungary has surrendered a significant amount of its sovereignty and is poised to permit the flooding of the continent with millions of Muslim migrants. Orbán emphasises his point by saying, "The main question over the next few decades is this: Will Europe remain the continent of the Europeans?" (Than 2018). Orbán has, on many occasions, vowed that he is the right person to preserve Hungarian sovereignty and the Christian way of life. On March 2, 2018, in an interview on Kossuth Radio, Orbán uttered disparaging remarks warning of the existential threat immigrants present:

The reason we do not want to become an immigrant country is not only because that would bring with it terrorism and crime and would expose our womenfolk and daughters to danger, but also because our cultural identity, too, would weaken and gradually evaporate. We know all this. (Roylance, 2018)

Another interview with Pannon RTV in Subotica, Serbia, on March 27, 2018, again Orbán alludes to the existential threat migration poses:

Hungarians are an endangered species. We are a community that, once it makes a mistake in an election, can find itself in deep trouble. I think many people would like to see the end of Christian Europe. They believe that if they replace its cultural subsoil and bring in millions of people from new ethnic groups not rooted in Christian culture, they will transform Europe according to their conception, making the continent a better place. We utterly reject this. (Roylance, 2018)

This rhetoric fits the populist notion that the people are the forgotten ones. Orbán does not only argue that "the people" are the forgotten ones, but he emphasises that an influx of migrants will lead to "the people" becoming even more marginalised in the future.

Before the April 8, 2018, elections, Orbán delivered an alarmist and anti-migrant speech at the inauguration of a new facility in the village of Szirmabesenyő on March 27, 2018, where he said:

If the country makes the wrong decision on April 8, if we fail to learn from the mistakes of Western European countries, and if we take the same direction with our immigration policy, the growth of the Hungarian economy will come to a standstill. The burden accompanying such a policy would crush the life out of us. (Roylance, 2018)

Here, he uses the economic insecurity rhetoric, which natives of many countries fear will happen if their immigration uncontrollably takes place.

On March 7, 2018, in an interview with the local council newspaper of Józsefváros, Orbán dramatically alerted Hungarians by adopting a social-cultural insecurities argument to substantiate his position that the people who are forgotten and marginalised now will further suffer more losses if they entertain the idea of an open-door policy to migration:

The spectacular display of power from the non-Christian cultures of Africa and Asia that we experienced in 2015 alerted everyone to the fact that we must change our way of thinking. The economy, healthcare, education, and city development are all important, but these achievements are worth nothing if, in the meantime, we lose our own culture. (Roylance, 2018)

In his March 15, 2018, speech commemorating the 170th anniversary of the 1848 revolution, Hungary's prime minister further raised the alarm over the dangers of Europe being too welcoming of migrants; Europe and Hungary stand at the epicentre of a civilisational struggle:

We are confronted with a mass population movement that is an imminent danger to the order and way of life we have known up until now. Europe is now under invasion. If we allow it to happen, in the next one or two decades, tens upon tens of millions will set out for Europe from Africa and the Middle East. (Roylance, 2018)

Orbán is at odds with the European Union for refusing to comply with the EU-mandated "quota" of asylum seekers. In 2015, Orbán built a razor-wire fence to keep migrants at bay. Orbán has used the quota plan as a weapon against Brussels. He has gone as far as approaching the Court of Justice. When he did not prevail in court, he resorted to the classic tactic of populism and held a referendum on this issue. Ninety-eight per cent voted against the EU-mandated "quota"; however, the turnout was only 44 per cent. He then sent "National consultation letters" to every household in Hungary, "with a poster encouraging the citizens to "Stop Brussels" (Buckley & Byrne, 2018). The use of a referendum and the "national consultation" bodes well with the populist idea that Orbán is close to "the people," he is accessible, and he knows the general will of the people, the *volonté Générale*.

The idea of the “general will” of the people is central to populist rhetoric. Populists tend to be anti-pluralists. They believe they are the only ones who are competent enough to represent the people. Orbán is no different from any other populist. Orbán's government has used "the general will of the people" rhetoric to justify passing a new constitution. He has argued that the new constitution was designed to restore some of the sovereignty wrongly surrendered to the global elite (mainly the European Union and the United States of America). Some analysts have expressed concern over the independence of the judiciary. These concerns are reinforced by the fact that Orbán has appointed most of his cronies to critical positions (Buckley & Byrne, 2018). Orbán has used propaganda to control the narrative of who is fit to "lead the people." The state-owned media has become a mouthpiece and propaganda machine for the Orbán government. The government has also helped pro-government oligarchs purchase independent media (Buckley & Byrne, 2018). Since Orbán and his party regard themselves as the only chosen ones to further the people's will, only their voices should be heard by the people. Everyone who disagrees with them is the enemy of the people and not worth being listened to. These enemies of the people range from opposition parties and civil groups to non-governmental organisations.

In keeping with the idea that all his decisions are dictated by the general will of the people, in an interview with the German newspaper Bild, Orbán said this about migration:

I can only speak for the Hungarian people, and they do not want any migration, in my understanding, the people can't have a will on a fundamental issue and for the government not to comply with it.(Schultheis, 2018)

So, Orbán argues that by investing time and resources to curb the influx of migrants, he is merely fulfilling the people's will. Orbán has in the past implied that Angelo Merkel's open-door refugee policy backfired because the policy went against the people's general will (Schultheis, 2018.)

Orbán has rebuked those leaders who have been critical of his stance on migration. He has at times complained that Hungary has never colonised any country. Why should Hungary bear the consequences of the failures of the former colonisers? He argues that the global elite "Should focus on fixing conditions "where the problem lies" and prevent potential migrants from reaching the continent (Schultheis, 2018). The fact that most countries that have Christianity as the majority religion tend to experience less civil unrest, while Muslim-majority countries are marred in civil strife, which has resulted in the Islam religion being associated with terrorism, provides ammunition to opportunists like Orbán to use moral values founded on the Christian faith to "other" Muslims. Since the general will is based on morality and is anti-pluralism, it is straightforward for people who are deprived of exposure to an independent press to believe that

Muslim migrants and, to some degree, any other religious followers are evil (comparable to 'devil worshipers'), a threat, not part of "the people," and deserve to be kept out of Hungary.

5.1.2. The Elite and the General Will of the People

According to Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, the “elite” in Hungary mainly consists of foreign or external actors. It comprises the European Union, the West, multinational corporations, international liberal institutions, Soros and his civil organisations/non-governmental organisations, and pro-EU and West Hungarian actors: the left-wing opposition. This section attempts to prove that the populist rhetoric used by Orbán to win the citizen's votes centres around the thesis that the elite are selfish: everything they do is for their benefit; they are fake politicians, part of a corrupt or faulty system; and they are not part of the nation but foreigners (unwelcome guests). Populists' rhetoric argues that the elite is evil, and they threaten everything that "the people" need to preserve. The elite's interests are mutually exclusive to those of "the people." Since the elite is a threat to people's sovereignty, responsible for the marginalisation of "the people, and is foreign, they do not have the nation's interest at heart and should never be given a chance to govern the country.

In a March 15, 2018, Speech commemorating the 170th anniversary of the 1848 revolution, Orbán gave a brave and concise statement on the state of the elite and "true Hungarian relations. He argued that there is constant conflict between: “True Hungarians and a transnational conspiracy that also includes the domestic nemesis of the people" (Freedom House, 2018).

Orbán also implies that some global elite behaves like imperialists and colonists. They are carrying out advanced and sophisticated modern-day conquests. They believe that the whole world is their homeland. In this speech, Orbán mentions that the elite is attacking the identity of Hungary. A divided people are easier to rule, and the elite is obsessed with globalisation because it dilutes the purity of "the people." A mixed-race/impure nation will result in a divided nation, and the elite's wishes will be fulfilled. The entire nation will be under the rule of the "evil elite" (Freedom House, 2018). Orbán utters these words:

We must fight against an opponent different from us. Their faces are not visible but are hidden from view; they do not fight directly but by stealth; they are not honourable but unprincipled; they are not national but international; they do not believe in work but speculate with money; they have no homeland, but feel that the whole world is theirs. They are not generous but vengeful and always attack the heart—especially if it is red, white, and green. (Freedom House, 2018.)

In this speech, Orbán further warns that the elite is coaxing the people to hand over their country to foreigners who have no roots in Hungary and have 'alien' cultures and traditions. Orbán says that the global elite has already co-opted the domestic opposition parties. They have joined the global elite to assimilate the rest of the Hungarian population, including "the people." In his own words, Orbán posits:

Now they want us to hand our country over to others voluntarily. They want us to hand it over to foreigners from other continents who do not speak our language and do not respect our culture, laws, or way of life—people who want to replace what is ours with theirs. They want that; henceforward, it will increasingly not be us and our descendants who live here but others. External forces and international powers want to force all this upon us with the help of their allies here in our country. (Freedom House, 2018)

The utterances made in the March 15, 2018, Speech commemorating the 170th anniversary of the 1848 Revolution are consistent with Mudde and Kaltwasser's view that populists perceive the elite as foreign and not part of the nation. Hungary's prime minister regards the EU as the leader of the global elite that is part of a faulty or corrupt system hellbent on stifling the sovereignty of Hungary. Following the suspension of Orbán's political party Fidesz from the European People in March 2019 for a poster campaign criticising the former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, Orbán took a swing at the EU leaders on the radio: "Brussels politicians ``live in a bubble" and have created a system that has "lost touch with reality." Emma Anderson 2019). In an interview on a Hungarian radio "Sunday News" program, Orbán told the listeners that the only way to restore Hungary's sovereignty and mitigate the damage that the corrupt and faulty Brussels system is causing Hungary is by voting for Fidesz in the following 2019 European Parliamentary elections and "showing Brussels that what happens in Hungary is what Hungarians want." (Emma Anderson 2019)

Orbán argues that the criticism he is receiving from Brussels is because he has been exposing the ineptness of the EU. He posited, "The people in Brussels are a little cross with us because, at the beginning of the election campaign, we carried out an information campaign, which exposed the machinations in Brussels. We should not give in; we should not be afraid because the opponent complained and attacked us with the indignation of someone whose agenda was exposed". (Emma Anderson 2019)

In the same speech, Orbán further argues that the politicians in Brussels pride themselves on being champions of democracy, yet they lack democratic legitimacy. They lack the discernment and foresight to detect the weaknesses and faults of the system they are running. These render

them fake politicians and, therefore, fit the populist view of the elite as mock politicians and part of a faulty system (Foy, 2016). Orbán makes the following statement:

The EU bloc is run by Western elites who lack democratic legitimacy. The EU has a severe democratic deficit. Everything in the West is cracking; there is a serious lack of legitimacy. (Foy, 2016)

Orbán points out that EU member states with large economies benefit more than states with small economies. There is an asymmetrical relationship between the great powers and less powerful states (Foy, 2016). According to Orbán, the dependency on the Western economies deprives the vibrant Eastern economies of the opportunity to be led by the leaders elected by the citizens of these countries. The power and influence that the EU wields in Hungary must be re-evaluated. (Foy, 2016). The prime minister further lambasts the global elite by citing their failed foreign policy decisions, such as their failed attempts at exporting democracy to countries such as Libya and Egypt through backing regime change (Foy, 2016). This rhetoric reinforces Orbán's views on the elite. He reiterates that wherever they go, they leave a trail of destruction and suffering; they are not part of the nation, are foreigners who interfere in other nations' affairs for their benefit and are incompetent. Orbán does not argue for a complete exit from the EU, but Orbán and his party do not want EU laws and policies to encroach on the sovereignty of Hungary (Foy, 2016).

Since Orbán has monopolised the media space in Hungary, the media critical of his government almost emanates from the West. Orbán has expressed his displeasure at the dominance of Western media by the liberal elite. He perceives these media outlets as hostile toward conservatives in Hungary. Orbán believes that the elite media networks tend not to report on the negative things the migrants do to ruin Europe for Europeans. According to Orbán, global privilege promotes freedom of speech, but whose freedom of speech? Address of those people who are puppets of the elite. When Trump was banned from several social media platforms, Orbán was vindicated since he had been preaching about the bias and monopoly of the Western media. The elite media cares more about political correctness than diversity of views. Banning people considered to have transgressed on social media has been very selective in Orbán's eyes. The Western elite media does not paint an honest picture of the effects of migration; they do not broadcast the events where migrants are doing harmful things. In his speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student on July 28, 2018, in Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), Prime Minister Viktor Orbán expressed his anger over the censorship and bias of the Western elite media:

The argument we can provide to support our assertion that democracy is absent is that in Western Europe, censorship, and restrictions on freedom of speech have become general phenomena. Working together, political leaders and technology giants filter news items uncomfortable for the liberal elite. If you do not believe this, visit these websites and social media sites, and you will see the ingenious and cunning means by which they restrict access to negative news reports on migrants, immigrants, and related topics and how they prevent European citizens from facing reality. The liberal concept of freedom of opinion has gone so far that liberals see the diversity of opinion as important until they realise, to their shock, that there are different opinions. Liberals' vision of press freedom reminds us of the old Soviet joke: "However, I try to assemble parts from the bicycle factory, I end up with a machine gun." However, when I try to assemble the parts of this liberal press freedom, the result is censorship and political correctness. (Freedom House, 2018.)

As mentioned earlier, according to Orbán and Fidesz, George Soros is another critical elite agent. Soros is a 92-year-old multi-billionaire who lives in the United States. He is a hedge fund investor and philanthropist born in Hungary in 1930. "His family left Hungary for the United Kingdom in 1947 after they were able to hide their Jewish origin during the holocaust" (Archive and Feed, 2019). Soros' Open Society Foundation spends many funds supporting organisations and individuals fighting for democracy, accountability of governments, freedom of speech and expression, law and order equality, and other liberal democratic values worldwide, including in Hungary. Out of the \$105 million spent in Europe, almost \$7 million went towards promoting liberal and democratic values in Hungary (Open Foundations, 2022) in 2020. Orbán has been consistently at loggerheads with Soros, whom he accuses of promoting the great replacement conspiracy. He passionately argues that Soros plans to flood Hungary and Europe with migrants. Soros has been subjected to intense criticism, even anti-Semitism at times. In public places, posters of Soros laughing with the caption "Do not let Soros have the last laugh" (Archive and Feed, 2019). Other billboards were utterly antisemitic. One was defaced with new words saying, "Stinking Jew" (Archive and Feed, 2019).

On March 30, 2018, in a Good Friday interview on Kossuth Radio, Orbán likened Soros and the pro-democracy non-governmental organisations and individuals to a private army operating in Hungary to try and overthrow the government. He asserted that the success of these mercenaries would result in the fruition of Soros' Plan to hand over the country to immigrants. To quote his words: "According to the statements of officers in the Soros mercenary army, we know that around two thousand people in Hungary are being paid to work towards bringing down the government in the current election campaign and to create a new pro-immigration government acceptable to George Soros.... We know precisely who these people are; we know names." (Freedom House, 2018.).

In the March 15, 2018, Speech commemorating the 170th anniversary of the 1848 revolution, Orbán equates Soros and the non-state actors that he funds to the actual political opposition in Hungary. He regards the internal de jure opposition as too weak to pose the same threat that Soros and his stooges pose. Hungary's prime minister seems to argue that the "true Hungarian people" should perceive the Soros camp as aspiring modern-day colonists. In this speech extract, he warns:

We do not need to fight the anaemic little opposition parties, but an international network that is organised into an empire. We are up against media outlets maintained by foreign concerns and domestic oligarchs, professionally hired activists, troublemaking protest organisers, and a chain of NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up by and embodied in the name 'George Soros. (Freedom House, 2018)

According to the ideational approach, populists regard the elite as motivated by greed, foreign, corrupt, part of the faulty system, and not honest politicians. Associating the Soros camp with colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and neo-imperialism serves Orbán well in his mission of vilifying whoever he considers part of the elite, including Soros and his partners and allies. Invaders tend not to care about the socio-cultural setting of the country they are invading, the tangible material benefits of the natives, the exploitation of the people, or the resources of a nation. Populists also argue that the elite are not honest politicians. The way Orbán and Fidesz depict Soros and his non-governmental organisation supports this populist argument. They consider Soros and his domestic "enemies of the people" de facto political parties. Orbán believes that Soros indirectly stood for office in the Hungarian elections through his self-funded independent candidates to further his interests in Hungary's political system (Freedom House, 2018). He opines:

We must be prepared for a situation in which ultimately, in every constituency, our candidate will be standing against one Soros candidate... We must be prepared for them to adopt disguises, like last time, when they hid behind a candidate posing as an independent. They dare not admit the identity of their master. After the election, we will seek amends—moral, political, and legal amends—but we cannot waste our strength or our time on that now (Freedom House, 2018).

Orbán refutes the argument that immigration is good for Europe, as the continent is experiencing negative population growth. According to data from Euronews, the natural population of the European Union has been declining since 2012 (Euronews, 2023). Internationalists argue that negative growth results in a decrease in the labour force and an increase in citizens relying on state social security such as pensions; therefore, immigration can help increase the labour force, especially for young and skilled people. Orbán substantiated his

argument in a speech he delivered at the closing event for the National Consultation on June 27 in Budapest. He states that immigration is unnecessary since unemployment has increased in Europe. He asserts that most immigrants who reach Europe are not skilled enough to enter the European labour market. "Yet another such argument is that it would best serve our economic interest to use immigration to manage Europe's serious demographic problems and the resulting labour shortage. Those putting forward this argument do not seem to be bothered by the fact that the cat is now out of the bag: throughout Europe, except for a few countries, unemployment is high, particularly among the young, and only a tiny proportion of the immigrants who have arrived so far have entered work." Hungary Today, 2017)

In the same speech, Orbán admired former US President Donald Trump's 'America First policy'. He said:

We have enthusiastically applauded the President of the United States for thinking precisely as we do when he says, America First. We say the same: Hungary first, and then everyone else. (Hungary Today, 2017).

Orbán Argues that if Hungarians are out of work, immigrants should not be given jobs. He posits that even menial jobs must be reserved for native Hungarians. The minimum wage must be increased to make low-skill and menial jobs more appealing to "the true people of Hungary. The prime minister calls himself a Eurorealist and believes that no nation may be given orders on who it should live alongside in its own country, as that can only be a nation's sovereign decision. On this question, national and community sovereignty must take priority over the interests and arguments of the global elite (Hungary Today, 2017).

According to Orbán, although Hungary has been experiencing macroeconomic success, his detractors have not stopped criticising him. Here, Orbán uses one of the leading populist views of the elite: the view that the elite is selfish and in power for their benefit. Orbán argues that he is not credited for his economic policy success because he prioritises "the people of Hungary" over anyone else. The elite and their cronies despise him for this, and he makes this statement:

This means that when we are successful—as you have also heard the figures—the money that we generate and the performance we deliver benefit someone. Who receives this benefit? That is the question. We will always be in dispute with the global elite—the global political and economic elite—because they would like the Hungarian national economy to succeed in producing fine macroeconomic indicators that benefit them first and the Hungarian people only secondarily. We believe the opposite, however: we want an economic policy that primarily benefits the Hungarian people and only secondarily benefits the global elite. (Hungary Today, 2017).

Concluding Remarks

Orbán vehemently argues that "the People" in Hungary are pure white, Christian, and ethnic Hungarians. The government must protect the true "Hungarian people" from evil invaders in the form of migrants and the global elite. The people are sovereign in their country. The global elite has marginalised most people. The global elite wants to flood Hungary with migrants to take over the country. Multiculturalism threatens the unity of Hungarians. The elite seeks to divide and conquer Hungary as they did "darker nations" in the past. Ethnic Hungarians need to be protected inside Hungary and in the diaspora. The ethnic Hungarians who lost Hungarian citizenship during the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920, are part of "the True Hungarian nation." The territory lost during the Treaty of Trianon needs to be returned to its rightful owners, "the Hungarian people." Orbán has adopted policies that he believes protect Hungarians from aliens, such as refusing to accept the EU migrant quotas, overtly and covertly providing citizenship to ethnic Hungarians scattered around Eastern Europe, advocating for dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians in the diaspora, and protesting sanctions imposed on Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine. Orbán's hostility towards Ukraine is because of its alleged treatment of ethnic Hungarians. Another critical policy decision Orbán took that was not discussed extensively in the ideational approach is the policy incentivising fertility growth for ethnic Hungarians. To mitigate the demand for migrants and ensure that the country remains in the hands of "the true Hungarian people," Orbán introduced some tax income exemptions for larger families (Archive and Feed, 2019). This has resulted in a modest increase in the fertility rate.

The Fidesz party and Orbán believe they are the only ones who know what "the general will of the people" is. There is no need for "the people" to listen to what the opposition has to say. Only the government's voice matters. There is no need for plurality. Hungary has two homogenous groups: "the good and pure people" and the other homogeneous group that is evil, corrupt, fake, selfish, and anti-Hungarian nation elite. Unlike in most parties, where the elite usually is domestic actors, in this Hungary case study, the focus is on the external elite, the global elite, the EU, and the rest of the West. However, George Soros and his domestic non-governmental organisations are Orbán's and Fidesz's 'sworn enemies.' The civil organisations that Soros funds promote liberal values and an open society. Fidesz and Orbán believe they are the only ones enlightened enough to know what people want (what the general will is). The elite is hellbent on taking away Hungary's sovereignty. Orbán argues that he is there to defend Hungarians'

sovereignty and way of life. To that end, all he needs is for "the true Hungarian people" in Hungary and the diaspora to pledge allegiance to him and his political party, Fidesz.

5.2. Barr's theory of "maverick" or "outsider" and Laclau's crisis of representation

An anti-establishment position is a stance usually considered irrelevant to the dominant established or mainstream political terrain; however, it will not be accurate to expect all populists to emerge outside of the establishment. Barr argues that populists appear in two different ways: as an outsider, somebody who is genuinely independent and got into the political sphere as an alternative to the mainstream or establishment (Barr, 2009: 30), and as a maverick who started at the core of the establishment but has "changed their ways and broken away (Barr, 2009: 34).

It would be appropriate to view Orbán as a maverick. As extensively discussed in Chapter 4, Orbán and Fidesz started as part of the establishment, promoting the principal liberal democratic ideals: pluralism, an open and inclusive society, and a free market-based economy, but as time progressed, Orbán abandoned the liberal democratic plans and adopted populism to remain in power as long as possible (Zalan, 2016). Fidesz and Orbán have used the failures of liberal democracy in several election campaigns to launch their populist agenda. The prime minister has dubbed his form of democracy "illiberal democracy" (Zalan, 2016). Now that he and his party are in power, he is an autocrat who has found a new elite to vilify.

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Laclau posits that whenever there is a crisis of representation, the established system breaks down, and the electorate loses faith and trust in the establishment. This makes the citizens vulnerable to populist rhetoric, which offers simple solutions for complex problems (Laclau, 2005:137). They may even abandon the democratic process as they are courted by a "messiah" or "strongman who is going to rescue them from a crisis they are experiencing and transform the system so that it works in favour of "the people." As discussed earlier, the "outsider" presents himself/herself as brand new and has played no part in the crisis of representation. At the same time, the maverick portrays himself as "a born again" politician, who, as soon as they realised that the system was no longer representing the people, decided to break away and establish a new platform where they can advocate for the interests of "the people" (Roberts, 2017: 290).

Laclau's breakdown of Linkages will be used in this research to explain the breakdown of linkages between the establishment (the Hungarian Socialist Party) and the electorate (Lawson, 2017:290) and to show how Orbán and Fidesz capitalised on the failures of the MSZP (the

Hungarian Socialist Party). In this dissertation, the author argues that since Orbán and Fidesz took office, the domestic elite has been neutralised through the capturing of the state: the capture of public institutions, the appointment of a loyalist in the judiciary, manipulation of the electoral system; using rouge methods of collecting personal data during the election, amendment of the constitution, monopolising the media; Turning state media into his propaganda machine, helping his cronies buy-out the independent press, stripping rights and rewards to media outlets that are critical of him, imposing advertising tax to non-state owned media, suppressing civil society and academic freedom, waging a war of words through bias media against influential advocates of democracy (such as George Soros), vilifying any opposition in Hungary, using the state resources to win-over mostly those who are vulnerable and many other methods. As discussed in the fourth chapter, Hungary has been experiencing democratic backsliding or autocratisation since Orbán took office. The new elite are now mostly external players (global elite). The author assumes that Orbán regarded the elite as the establishment before Fidesz came to power, mainly the Hungarian Socialist Party and their coalition) Moreover, from 2010 to today, the elite is identified by Orbán, the EU, George Soros, his non-governmental organisations, and the West in general (global elite). According to Orbán, these key foreign players are the mortal enemies of "the people".

A few reasons may cause a breakdown of linkages between the establishment and voters. In this dissertation, all five linkages are relevant: clientelist, directive, participatory, electoral, and representational. Orbán and Fidesz took power from the Hungarian Socialist Party in 2010. As a result, to explain the breakdown of linkages between the Hungarian Socialist Party and the electorate, the author will provide a brief background on the events before the fall of the last Hungarian Socialist Party's term in office, between 2006 and 2010.

The Hungarian Socialist Party dramatically lost popularity. Some analysts argue it was the worst decrease in public support since Hungary transitioned into the new democratic dispensation (Enyedi 2007: 116–134). According to Nagy & Róna (2012), the drop-in help was not caused by a sudden change in attitudes or structural characteristics of Hungarian society. The breakdown of linkages can be attributed to three fundamental problems: austerity measures, failed reform policies, and corruption scandals (Nagy & Róna, 2012: 1). The constant news of adverse events pushed even further away those who were disgruntled with the Hungarian social party. This laid fertile ground for the emergence of a populist party and leader (Fidesz and Orbán) who offered simplistic solutions to complex problems.

5.2.1. The Austerity Measures

After winning the elections in April 2006, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MZSP) adopted austerity measures. Despite the austerity measures going against the promises made during the election campaign, the austerity measures were called the New Balance Program. In this program, austerity measures such as increased gas by 30% and electricity by 10%–14% were implemented, while the average VAT rate was raised by 15%–20%, and workers' contributions towards their social security were also presented. This package also included the rise of enterprise taxes and retrenchment in the public sector (Financial Times, 2006).

The increase in electricity rates, VAT, and gas marked a significant breakdown of linkage. These breakdowns of linkages fall under clientelistic, directive, representational, and participatory examinations of linkages. This is the reason for this classification: austerity measures betrayed the electorate. During its campaign trail, the Socialist Party vowed that it would never implement austerity measures, so the decision to implement austerity measures did not represent the interests of the party's supporters. The voters neither participated in the crafting of the austerity measures policy nor were they consulted. The gas, electricity, and VAT rate increase will directly affect everyone, including those with low incomes and the working class. The increase in business tax affected the employment rate since running a business became unaffordable to some companies. The private sector employs many people, some loyal to the socialist party. The layoffs in the public sector decreased the popularity of the prime minister and the Hungarian socialist party. The increase in the contribution towards social security affects every citizen. However, they were never allowed to consent (before the referendum) to this policy decision or be made aware of it during the Hungarian socialist party's election campaign.

The political turmoil worsened for the Hungarian socialist party, particularly during the debate regarding healthcare reforms, the time when the social referendum took place, and then again when the coalition between the Socialist Party and liberal SZDSZ The Socialist Party lost in the referendum, which was about healthcare reforms: the abolition of fees for certain medical services; hospital care fees; doctor's consultation fees, and education reforms; reduction of education fees. All the prices were revoked. The public's trust in the government decreased rapidly, from 40% in June 2008 to 72% by August 2008 (Medián, 2010). Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's ratings also plummeted (Nagy & Róna, 2012: 10). Any increase in health and education costs is bound to hurt every citizen, directly or indirectly. The failure of this referendum represents a clientelistic and direct breakdown in linkages between the voters and the

Hungarian party. It also proves that the party no longer represents the interests of most Hungarians; hence, it also shows a breakdown in representation linkages.

In the wake of the leak of a secret speech of the then prime minister Gyurcsány, in which he admits to lying for a year and a half about the state of the Hungarian economy and the dire need to adopt policy reforms to win the elections (Aljazeera, 2006), the popularity of the Hungarian socialist party continued to decline drastically. The study conducted by the Median Research Institute revealed that in May 2006, 55% of respondents said they still had faith in the Prime Minister; that figure decreased to 34% by August (Median, 2010). The decrease in the government's credibility preceded the leak of the secret speech, and the address reinforced the damaging process. The deceitful private speech before the elections represents a breakdown of electoral linkages. Some supporters might have even regretted voting for the Hungarian Socialist Party in the first place. It can also be regarded as another breakdown of representation linkages since they are no longer sure if they would have chosen the party to represent them had they known everything the Socialist Party hid from them.

The first round of austerity measures corresponded with a loss of political trust and credibility, which exacerbated Prime Minister Gyurcsány's predicament. His response to the financial crisis and the loss in approval ratings catalysed his resignation. The global financial crisis led to an economic catastrophe, which compelled the Hungarian government to approach the IMF and the EU for assistance. Specific Changes in the public sector had to occur, such as making the 13th-month salary available to public servants 62 years old and above and limiting the amount to 260 Euros (Wall Street Journal). When the new prime minister took office, the Hungarian socialist party had 15% in the polls, while by December 2009, the figure had increased slightly to 16% (Median, 2010). As societies modernise, advances in core industries such as medical technology allow people to live longer. This means that the number of senior citizens who are reliant on the state social security system is increasing, so any changes that are made regarding pension funds and other state grants result in a significant decline in support among senior citizens and younger citizens who pay taxes (some of whom benefit from their elderly relatives' pensions). This is another breakdown of direct and clientelistic linkages.

5.2.2. Failed Reform Policies

The Hungarian Socialist Party government's initial strategy was to restore balance in the fiscus and implement policy reforms in the early days of its term, hoping that the economic growth and gains of the reforms would increase the chances of them being voted again into office in the

following elections (New York Times 2007). The reform policies did not just yield the desired results; they also broke down the linkages between the Socialist Party and the electorate, even for those who had not deserted the party due to implementing the austerity measures. After the 2006 electoral victory, out of all the reform policies that Ferenc Gyurcsány promised to adopt, i.e., healthcare, education, and public administration, healthcare reforms were at the core of his political agenda (Median, 2010). The proposed reforms in public administration did not have that much of a negative effect, while reforms regarding education did result in sporadic social unrest as students organised public protests. Healthcare reforms and education policies marked a breakdown of both clientelistic and direct linkages because an increase in healthcare and education affects every citizen directly or indirectly. These were perceived by some voters as austerity measures by other means.

The effect of the implementation of healthcare reforms was so damaging that the Hungarian Socialist Party's popularity declined more than in the period after the secret *Őszöd* speech. In March 2007, the support of the prime minister and the Hungarian socialist party plummeted by 5%. The healthcare reform policies caused a fragmentation in relations between the socialist party and its coalition partner, the Liberal Free Democrats. Comprehensive reports in the media regarding this conflict gave Fidesz a golden opportunity to spread its anti-market rhetoric. The fact that the health minister was from the liberal party made things even more complicated for the social party. The Socialist Party suffered a heavy loss of support from the healthcare policy reform; ironically, most party members disapproved of the healthcare reforms. The 25% MZSP enjoyed in September 2007 dropped to 20% (Median, 2010). The reform policies' disagreements between the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Liberal Party resulted in a protracted debate among the MSZP party leaders. (Eurofound 2008). This fragmentation inside the Socialist Party and the ruling coalition with the Liberal Free Democrats reveals that the parties probably no longer represent the interests of the people who voted for them (Nagy & Róna, 2012:12).

Gyurcsány was torn between the proverbial rock and a hard place since he acknowledged that some forms of liberal solutions that were being suggested by their coalition partner (the liberal SZDSZ) were plausible, while most of the Socialist Party's members were utterly opposed to such policy reforms. The Socialists vociferously argued that the state should continue to play a dominant role in providing healthcare services. The results were a combination of several private and public health insurance providers. This is another severe policy decision the government took without broad public consultation. They should have held elections so that their drastic policy changes were in the voters' interest. This is a classic example of a breakdown of

representation and participatory linkages. The 'social referendum that was held in 2008 was a failure for the Socialist Party as people voted for the abolishment of the policy reforms that he was proposing, but a success for participatory democracy (Nagy & Róna, 2012:13). The prime minister's liberal policies harmed the orthodox leftist nature of the Hungarian Socialist Party. A survey conducted in 2009 revealed that only 25 per cent of the population considered the Socialist Party a party representing the interests of people experiencing poverty and the working class. In contrast, more than 60 per cent regarded the Hungarian Social Party as a conduit for furthering the interests of the elite (Tóth 2011:187).

5.2.3. Corruption Scandals

Besides the policy reforms and austerity measures that were the centre of attention in the first two years, another issue that dominated the 2006–2010 MSZP term was the corruption scandals implicating the MSZP politicians. These scandals began a year and a half into the second Gyurcsány government; however, when the first scandal erupted, the *Zuschlag*-affair, a corruption affair involving the leadership of the youth wing of the Hungarian Socialist organisation, created massive pandemonium. The arrest of János Zuschlag and the following trial dominated the press to a point where it became the top news matter on the political agenda in May 2008 and February 2009 (Nagy & Róna, 2012: 14).

The gravity of corruption cases in determining the political agenda was evident again when a real estate scandal in Erzsébetváros district (Budapest) had a similar impact in the last two years of MSZP's term. When the scandal first surfaced in December 2008, only 'local' SZDSZ (MSZP's coalition partner) politicians were regarded as suspected culprits. However, the story spread like wildfire and became a significant item on the political agenda. The subsequent arrest of György Hunvald, the MSZP's mayor, dominated the media, taking centre stage in the political agenda (Budapest Times, 2009). However, the main item about these corruption scandals that proved to be the most damaging for the Socialist Party was the revelation that the former mayor continues to be on the state's payroll while still under arrest.

Under the premiership of Bajnai, financial crime scandals continued to play a damaging role until the defeat of the Hungarian Socialist Party in the 2010 elections. The failure of the efforts made by the Bajnai government to curb the crisis was made worse by the four BKV corruption scandals and the Hunvald matter discussed above. The awarding of a 300,000-euro severance package for the human resources manager of the Department of Transport topped the news item that influenced the political agenda for the entire summer season. This scandal went as far as

implicating the socialist Vice mayor of Budapest, Miklós Hagyó (Budapest Times, 2010). From the beginning of 2010, voters were bombarded with more news of the Department of Transport's corruption scandals, such as the Nokia Box affair, which revealed that politicians were using mobile phones to launder cash. These corruption scandals provided ammunition for the opposition to capitalise on anti-corruption and anti-establishment rhetoric during the 2010 election campaign. The populists used this message to distance themselves from the failures of the ruling establishment. Orbán and Fidesz brand themselves as the enlightened ones with what it takes to rescue "the people " from this crisis. (Nagy & Róna, 2012:15).

Corruption represents a breakdown of all five linkages: clientelistic linkages, directive linkages, participatory linkages, electoral linkages, and representational linkages. Citizens vote politicians into office so that they can improve their lives. This entails receiving materialistic and non-materialistic benefits (clientelistic linkages). For a party to remain relevant and in office, it must care for voters, especially those who voted them into office. It requires much assistance from the state, mainly the working class and people experiencing poverty (direct linkages). Corruption tends to have more of a negative effect on the marginalised. When politicians get involved in corruption, it goes against the interests of the citizens or voters; therefore, they are no longer representing the voters (representational linkages). Since corruption is bad for society, the electorate is always kept in the dark and does not participate in the decision-making process (participatory linkages). Regarding the electoral linkage in Hungary's context, Why vote into office people who will bribe you with food parcels during the election campaign and then do as they please once they resume their term of office?

5.3. Hartleb's Characteristics of Anti-Establishment Parties.

Before the fall of the Hungarian Socialist Party's coalition, Fidesz met almost all Hartleb's characteristics of anti-establishment parties. The author argues that Fidesz is no longer an anti-establishment party within Hungarian domestic politics. They are now a right-wing populist party in power. Their political stance has become part of the mainstream position in the national political landscape. As discussed earlier, Fidesz has captured the state and its core institutions that uphold democracy to the point where the threat posed by domestic political actors has been surpassed by the threat from what the Fidesz party calls "the global elite" (the neutralisation of domestic opposition was thoroughly discussed earlier in this dissertation). However, as discussed earlier, Fidesz is an anti-establishment party regarding regional and global affairs, particularly within the EU and the West. Fidesz labelled the West and the EU "the global elite." The Fidesz

party challenges the EU and other non-EU Western countries' cultural, economic, and political hegemony. Orbán's party can be regarded as a Eurosceptic party. However, it will be inadequate only to reduce what Fidesz sees as the global establishment or elite to the European Union. Fidesz and Orbán call their form of democracy "illiberal democracy." Therefore, it is fair to say that in Fidesz's eyes, anyone who regards their "illiberal democracy" as illegitimate is the enemy of the "true Hungarian people."

Hungary has been experiencing rapid autocratization and democratic backsliding; this has meant that the ruling Fidesz's political philosophy has become part of the establishment domestically, while the opposition's political views are strongly suppressed. The author argues that, in global politics, Fidesz exhibits Hartleb's characteristic of anti-establishment parties. Fidesz positions its form of "illiberal democracy" as an alternative, pits "the Hungarian people" against "the global elite," position itself as not a party of the dominant global elite, give labels to its opposition (global elite), positions itself as the defender of the weak and marginalised as they are the underdogs and outsiders, claim to be unconventional and unique (a breath of fresh air), supports some form of direct democracy, e.g., the referendum on migration quotas and National Consultations Survey campaigns against George Soros Plan attributes its economic success to clean governance, simplifies complex issues, cynical about the current global world order/politics, uses divisive language in international relations, harbours much hostility towards rivals and articulates its message clearly (Hartleb, 2015:44).

5.4. Discussion of Findings

5.4.1 Research Question

How can the rise of 'populism' in Hungary since 2010 be explained?"

5.4.1.1 Sub-Research Questions

To what extent does the theory of anti-establishment explain the rapid rise of populism in Hungary in 2010?

5.5. Main Findings of Anti-establishment Theory

From the findings of this study, the politics of anti-establishment broadly correspond with the rapid rise of populism in Hungary. This section will discuss both the strengths and weaknesses of the anti-establishment stance in explaining the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010.

5.5.1. Strengths of the anti-establishment theory

The anti-establishment theory helps explain the rise of populism in Hungary. The theory helps explain the anti-establishment stance adopted by Fidesz to vilify international critics (global elite) in Hungary. The anti-establishment stance taken by Fidesz and Orbán is used to mobilise domestic support by exaggerating the fear of the foreign "existential" threat posed by the "invading" migrants and the imperialist global elite in the form of the European Union and other dominant Western liberal institutions. Fidesz only regards ethnic Hungarians as "true Hungarian people". The anti-establishment stance has been reinforced by state capture. Fidesz has used tactics and strategies to exploit national crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 migrant crisis, to strengthen its anti-establishment stance against the global elites. The party has incapacitated the legislative checks and balances through various methods such as stifling media freedom, appointing loyalists to crucial state administration institutions and turning state media into the government's propaganda machine. These actions allow the government to control the political agenda.

The control over these critical institutions allows the government to determine the media narrative. As discussed in Chapter One, Laclau defines populism as a discourse resulting from the confrontation of different hegemonic discourses in a society that polarises two other social groups, the powerful ruling elite, and the people. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014) posit, "It is rather the product of a three-step process involved in radical parties: first the linkage of very different demands, then the formation of a collective identity through the recognition of an enemy (the establishment) and finally the effective investment in an element (the leader) that represents the people" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2014:6). Control over the media allows Fidesz to spread the anti-establishment discourse successfully. The loyalists in key positions also ensure that the government narrative is dominant. Orbán and Fidesz have used EU procurement-related funds to reward their political allies in the media business through cronyism, nepotism, clientelism, and favouritism. Resources are used to silence dissenting voices while amplifying pro-Fidesz voices; in this process, Fidesz's populist rhetoric flourishes at the expense of opposing views. The anti-establishment stance adopted by Fidesz has also been facilitated by the ability of the government to manipulate critical democratic institutions. Populism is anti-pluralism, so

Fidesz influences institutions such that they deactivate oversight while consolidating control over the government.

Hartleb's characteristics of anti-establishment parties were also used to develop the anti-establishment theory of populism. This research concluded that the Fidesz party inside Hungary had become part of the establishment. The country is experiencing rapid democratic backsliding due to Fidesz's capture of the state and its core institutions. In the global system, Fidesz is an anti-establishment party contesting the dominance of Western liberal values in the international arena, choosing to advocate for its form of democracy, which it calls "illiberal democracy." Therefore, the theory of anti-establishment is applicable in explaining the rise of populism in Hungary, with the elite being "hostile" external actors that pose an existential threat to the "true Hungarian people." (ethnic Hungarians). However, the anti-establishment theory has its limitations. The section below discusses the limitations of the anti-establishment party.

5.6. Limitations of the anti-establishment theory

The anti-establishment theory has four fundamental limitations. Firstly, it does not consider the role played by the demand side: socio-economic and socio-cultural factors. Secondly, it fails to mention the part of institutional weaknesses caused by the effects of state capture. Thirdly, it does not consider the lack of mechanisms to stop an outbreak of populism in a liberal democracy. Finally, It does not acknowledge the role charismatic leadership played in the rise of populism in Hungary. Orbán played a central role in the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010. The following section discusses the limitations and offers solutions for how the anti-establishment theory can be improved/developed.

5.6.1. The anti-establishment theory is only a supply-side theory.

The theory does not consider the demand-side factors such as economic grievances and socio-cultural factors. An economic calamity or a failed economic policy can create a demand for a populist party or leader. For example, the devastating effects of the global financial crisis, in which Hungary's economy shrunk by seven per cent, could have caused a longing for a populist party and leader who promises heaven and earth and claims to know everything wrong about the country. In this, Orbán and Fidesz are the people who promise just that. Orbán and Fidesz won

the 2010 elections by running on the promise to fix the political, economic, and social crisis. Therefore, the anti-establishment does not consider that support of populism can be bottom-up.

The anti-establishment theory does not consider that negative values and attitudes towards migrants have existed since Hungary transitioned to democracy in 1989-90. Fidesz and Orbán did not invent the anti-immigrant sentiments: xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and islamophobia. They exploited the already existing attitudes, which have been more prevalent in Hungary than in other countries. In a study by the Political Capital Institute, the percentage of people who expressed xenophobic values and attitudes increased from 15 per cent in 1992 to 39 per cent by 2014 and peaked at 67 per cent in 2014 (Hunyadi et al., 2020). The percentage of people with positive views about migrants declined way before Fidesz took office. The 2015 migrant crisis helped Fidesz reinforce the resentment of foreigners and those liberal organisations who promoted the migrant quotas—sustained support for Fidesz in Hungary. The following section discusses how Fidesz captured the Hungarian State.

5.6.2. Institutional Weaknesses

The anti-establishment theory does not acknowledge weak institutions' role in the rise of populism. This allows parties with divergent policies and ideologies to emerge. Liberal democracy lacks mechanisms to stop an outbreak of populism. In Hungary, institutions have been weakened through state capture. Drawing from Auerbach & Kartner's State Capture Theoretical Framework, the author seeks to substantiate the argument that the anti-establishment theory overlooks the weakening of Hungary's state institutions through state capture in explaining the rise of populism since 2010.

5.6.2.1. Auerbach & Kartner's State Capture Theoretical Framework

Fidesz has captured the state in Hungary using the following strategies: (1) manipulation of crisis, deactivation of controls, (3) milking of cash-cows, i.e., seizing public resources and turning them into party's assets, and (4) manipulation of institutions to further their ends. (Auerbach & Kartner, 2023: 552).

5.6.2.1.1. Deactivation of controls

Fidesz has shown a massive appetite for incapacitating the legislative checks and balances since their first term in office. For example, patronage: staffing the key institutions with Fidesz loyalists, such as the head office of the Prosecutor General, the constitutional court, the

precedency of the central bank, and tax revenue (Barrett,2002: 233–287). The Fidesz government has transformed the state administration through the replacement of non-loyalists with loyalists at all levels in the public sector (Barrett,2002: 233–287; Tóth, 2011:183-203; Auerbach & Kartner, 2023: 552; Magyar, 2016: 50–51). Media freedom has become almost non-existent in Hungary due to government harassment and intimidation of independent media outlets. State media has become the government's propaganda machine. Most private media are no longer accessible since Orbán's cronies own them. The pro-government media outlets were rewarded with funds, special rights, and privileges. This allows the silencing of critics and lowers the chances of government cronies being investigated and prosecuted (Bátorfy, 2018; Erdélyi et al.,2014; Freedom House, 2016; Kingsley & Novak, 2018; Pethő & Szabó, 2019).

5.6.2.1.2. Milking of cash-cows

For Fidesz, the admission of Hungary to the European Union in 2004 opened floodgates for the milking of cash cows. The EU public procurement process linked to the European Union funds was the cash cow that was looted (European Commission, 2015). The EU funds were meant to be distributed equitably to every citizen of Hungary; however, Orbán succumbed to cronyism, nepotism, clientelism, and favouritism in general (Budapest Sentinel, 2016; Kovács,2015). Investigative journalists discovered that the primary beneficiaries of Fidesz's clientelism were businesses linked to three men: Mészáros (Orbán's old friend), Simicska (a mayor of Orbán's hometown and Tiborcz (son-in-law of Orbán). It might not be easy to accurately link these businesses' prosperity with benefits for the ruling party and Orbán. However, all these men have been dedicated supporters of Fidesz and Orbán (András, P. 2017). Another classic example of cash cow milking by Fidesz is the renationalisation of the tobacco industry, creating a monopoly for the Fidesz-ran state and offering his patrons special concessions through awarding public tenders to small tobacco stores. The government tender process was legitimately met with a massive outcry from the opposition parties due to favouritism towards Fidesz's supporters (Thorpe, 2013)

5.6.2.1.3. Manipulation of Political Institutions

When Fidesz returned to power with a qualified majority, that gave them enough support in parliament to radically change the legislative system. Within the first two years, Fidesz weakened the constitutional court's powers, subverted media freedom, and manipulated the electoral system. For instance, Fidesz introduced legal obstacles barring opposition parties from

mobilising and coordinating their election campaigns. This is an effective strategy for fragmenting the opposition parties. Eventually, manipulating intuitions has created an inherent bias in favour of the ruling party (Kovács & Tóth, 2011:183-203; Ilonszki & Várnagy, 2016:169-172). Fidesz also executed the third set of tactics, ensuring they cemented power inside the state administration. For instance, Fidesz changed the selection process of appointing constitutional judges by granting appointment powers to the legislature/parliament dominated by Fidesz (Auerbach & Kartner, 2023: 552).

Fidesz has implemented all three sets of tactics to manipulate the political system of Hungary since it took office in 2010, successfully modifying institutions to further their interest at the expense of any possible form of opposition. Under the pretense of reforming the institutions to make them work better for everyone, Fidesz has made several legislative amendments to deactivate oversight over how they govern while consolidating its control over government. Other changes introduced by Fidesz include reducing parliamentary sessions from once a week to once every three weeks. The evolution of this procedure decreased parliamentary oversight and gave Fidesz more power over legislative agenda-setting (Barrett, 2002). The manipulation of institutions has been discussed at length in this research.

5. 6.2. Leadership

Populism tends to be dependent on the rise of a populist leader. The anti-establishment party fails to acknowledge the role of the personality of the populist leader.

The anti-establishment theory does not consider the relevance of Victor Orbán as a charismatic populist leader in explaining the rise of populism in Hungary. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has become the defender and protector of the marginalised and the defender of the entire nation fighting for Hungary's sovereignty. According to Orbán, the European Union and its allies' interests are mutually exclusive to those of the true Hungarians, so Orbán has positioned himself as the only legitimate and competent Hungarian freedom fighter. Orbán's prime airship has become synonymous with "ensuring that Hungary stays Hungarian," and the migrant existential threat is kept at bay. (Waller, 2016). Orbán took advantage of the fact that he was part of a leadership that fought against communism and ushered Hungarians into the new democratic and prosperous European political system. The fact that the oppression of communism is fresh to many Hungarians works in Orbán's favour. The prime minister understands the gravity of

promoting the national interest and security of the country in winning elections (Rajcsányi, 2018:127).

5.7. Theory development: Improvements of the Anti-establishment Theory

The theory omits key factors pivotal in the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010. To refine the anti-establishment theory to provide a more accurate and encompassing account of the rise of populism, the theory will have to include the demand-side factors: socio-cultural (cultural backlash) and socio-economic factors (economic grievances).

The theory will also have to incorporate charismatic leadership as the supply-side factor. - Viktor Orbán, a charismatic leader, played a critical role in the rise of populism. The fact that liberal democracy lacks mechanisms to prevent an outbreak of populism and the effects of state capture should also be included

State capture has allowed the Fidesz government to exploit crises, e.g., the refugee crisis and global economic crisis incapacitated the legislative checks and balances, looted the state coffers to dish out patronage to its cronies and silencing its critics, manipulated political institutions by making changes in the legislative system, weakening the powers of the constitutional court, subverting media freedom, e.g. harassing and intimidating independent media outlets and manipulating the electoral system.

5.8. Contribution to Current Literature

The current literature on populism heavily exploits the comparative method, which has been productive. However, this dissertation has used the single case study method to understand the underlying causes of populism in a specific country. This Hungary case study contributes towards improving one of the critical theories of populism. It reveals the significance and prevalence of other existing theories that are often neglected in the study of populism. This case study also provides some insight into what happens when a populist is voted into office, particularly the prevalence of capture of the state. The dissertation also points out the pitfalls of liberal democracy when preventing the emergence of populism. The research has suggested that the elite, which populists often vilify, can comprise anyone who does not share the populist's

views. It does not have to be a state-actor or non-state actor, a foreign or a domestic actor. This research also provides some insight into democratic backsliding/autocratisation.

6. Conclusion

This dissertation sought to answer the research question: “How can the rise of 'populism' in Hungary since 2010 be explained?” and the sub-research question: “To what extent does the theory of anti-establishment explain the rapid rise of populism in Hungary in 2010?”

The first chapter set out the aims, significance, and hypothesis and provided a literature review regarding populism. The chapter sought to ascertain a concrete definition of populism. However, the literature revealed no consensus on the meaning of populism. The concept of populism is very contentious.

The second chapter provided a theoretical framework for understanding the causes of populism, looking at ten widely touted causes of populism, including the anti-establishment approach. The anti-establishment theory was discussed in detail.

The third chapter provided the research methodology and design drawn from Carstens' (2019) research. The chapter discussed how Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational approach, Barr's theory of the "outsider" or "maverick", Laclau's crisis of representation, Barr's breakdown of linkages and Hartleb's anti-establishment party's characteristics were going to be combined to ascertain the relevance of the anti-establishment theory in explaining the rapid rise of populism in Hungary since 2010.

The fourth chapter provided a detailed overview of the rapid rise of populism in Hungary since 2010. This chapter sheds light on the fast pace of democratic backsliding in Hungary.

The fifth chapter applied the anti-establishment theory in the case of Hungary as set out in the research methodology. This chapter revealed that the anti-establishment theory is very illuminating in explaining the rise of populism. However, more is needed. It leaves out key factors also responsible for the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010.

The theory omits key factors pivotal in the rise of populism in Hungary since 2010. To refine the anti-establishment theory to provide a more accurate and encompassing account of the rise of populism, the theory will have to include the demand-side factors: socio-cultural (cultural backlash) and socio-economic factors (economic grievances). Viktor Orbán, a charismatic leader, played a critical role in the rise of populism. Moreover, state capture has allowed the Fidesz government to exploit crises, such as the refugee and global economic crises. It

incapacitated legislative checks and balances, facilitated the looting of state coffers to dish out patronage to its cronies, helped silence critics, encouraged manipulation of elections, political institutions and the legislative system, weakened the powers of the constitutional court, and subverted media freedom by justifying harassment and intimidation of independent media outlets. For all these reasons, an illuminating theory needs to address the absence of mechanisms in liberal democracy to prevent an outbreak of populism and to incorporate the role of state capture. An analytically robust theory will also have to include the role of charismatic leadership as the supply-side factor.

References

ABC News (2022) World Reactions to US Presidential Election, ABC News, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/photos/world-reactions-us-presidential-election-43399207/imagehong-kong-43406580> (accessed 20 October)

Ahmari, S. (2019). Why Western elites should stop lecturing Hungary. *New York Post*. [online] 2 Oct. Available at: <https://nypost.com/2019/10/02/why-western-elites-should-stop-lecturing-hungary/> [Accessed 3 Oct. 2023].

Aljazeera.com. (2006). Hungarian leader admits to lying. [online] Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/9/18/hungarian-leader-admits-to-lying>. (Accessed 05 Jun. 2023)

Anderson, E (2019). Orbán slams Brussels ‘elite’ who’ve ‘lost touch with reality’. [online] POLITICO. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-viktor-orban-slams-brussels-elite-whove-lost-touch-with-reality/>. Accessed: 12 May 2023).

András, P. (2017). How EU-funded projects secretly contributed to the Orbán family’s enrichment. [online] Direkt36. Available at: <https://www.direkt36.hu/en/rejtett-allami-munkakbol-is-jott-penz-az-orban-csalad-gyorsan-szerzett-milliardjaihoz/> (Accessed 8 Jul. 2023).

Auerbach, K.R. and Kartner, J. (2023). How Do Political Parties Capture New Democracies? Hungary and North Macedonia in Comparison. *East European Politics and Societies*, 37(2), pp.538-562.

Balogh, E. S. (2013) “The Fidesz Robber Barons, Part I,” *Hungarian Spectrum*, 23 November 2013, <https://hungarianspectrum.org/2013/11/23/the-fidesz-robberbarons-part-i/> (accessed 07 July 2023)

Balogh, E. S. (2015) “Jewish Conspiracy Theories in the Wake of the Refugee Crisis,” *Hungarian Spectrum*, 1 December 2015, Jewish conspiracy theories in the wake of the refugee crisis – *Hungarian Spectrum* (accessed 8 July 2023)

Barigazzi, J. and Von der Burchard, H. (2015) “Countries Rethink Commitments to Accept Refugees,” *Politico*, 15 November 2015, www.politico.eu/article/countries-rethink-commitments-to-accept-refugees-paris-attacks/ (accessed 29 June 2023)

Barr, R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. *Party Politics*, 15(1), pp.29–48. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808097890>. (Accessed: 27 May 2023).

Barrett, E. (2002) “Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Hungary,” in *EU Accession Monitoring Program*, ed. Open Society Foundation (Budapest: OSF Print, 2002), 233–287

Batory, A., 2013. Post-accession malaise? EU conditionality, domestic politics and anti-corruption policy in Hungary. In *Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe* (pp. 65-78). Routledge.

Baum, M. “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2002): 263–98, doi:10.1111/1468-2478.00232.

Bayer, L. (2020) “Hungary’s Viktor Orbán Wins Vote to Rule by Decree,” *Politico*, 30 March 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-viktor-orban-rule-by-decree/> [accessed 30 June 2023)

BBC News (2014). Hungary election: PM Viktor Orban declares victory. (2014). BBC News. [online] 6 Apr. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26908404>.

Weyland, K., 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, written by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Populism*, 2(2), pp.14-24.

Benoit, K. and Hayden, J. (2004) “Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland’s Electoral System 1989-2001,” *Journal of Politics* 66, no. 2 (2004): 396–427, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00157

Beresford, A., Beardsworth, N., Findlay, K. and Alger, S. (2023). Conceptualising the emancipatory potential of populism: A typology and analysis. *Political Geography*, 102, p.102808. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102808>.

Berman, S., 2021. The Causes of Populism in the West. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24(1), pp.71-88.

Berman, Sheri. "The life of the party." (1997): 101-122

Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), pp.5–19.

- Betz, Hans Georg & Johnson, Carol (2004) Against the current – stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right *Journal of political ideologies*.. (1996-) Abingdon: Carfax, Oct2004, Vol. 9 Issue 3. p. 311-327
- Bieber, F. (2018), “Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans,” *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (2018): 337–54, doi:10.1080/21599165.2018.1490272
- Boda, Z. ; Gábor, S. (2021). "When Illiberalism Meets Neoliberalism: State and the Social Sciences in Present Hungary". *Political Science in the Shadow of the State: Research, Relevance, Deference*. Springer International Publishing. pp. 203–230 [208]
- Boda, Z.; Gábor, S. (2021). "When Illiberalism Meets Neoliberalism: State and the Social Sciences in Present Hungary". *Political Science in the Shadow of the State: Research, Relevance, Deference*. Springer International Publishing. pp. 203–230 [208]
- Boin't et al., (2010) “Crisis Exploitation”; C. Chowanietz, “Rallying around the Flag or Railing Against the Government? Political Parties’ Reactions to Terrorist Acts,” *Party Politics* 17, no. 5 (2010): 673–98, doi:10.1177/1354068809346073.
- Boin't, A. P. Hart, and A. McConnell, (2009): “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 16, no. 1 (2009): 81–107, doi:10.1080/13501760802453221.
- Boix, C. (1999) “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies,” *The American Political Science Review* 93, no. 3 (1999): 609–24, doi:10.2307/2585577
- Braun, M. and Raddatz, C. (2010), “Banking on Politics: When Former High-Ranking Politicians Become Bank Directors,” *World Bank Economic Review* 24, no 2 (2010): 234–79.
- Broz, J., Frieden, J., & Weymouth, S. (2021). *Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash*. *International Organization*, 75(2), 464-494. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000314
- Brussels, S.W.D.B. in (2018). Hungary election: OSCE monitors deliver damning verdict. *The Guardian*. [online] 9 Apr. Available at:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/09/hungary-election-osce-monitors-deliver-damning-verdict>. [Accessed 21 March. 2023].

Buckley, N & Byrne, 2018. Viktor Orbán: the rise of Europe's troublemaker. Financial Times. [online] Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/dda50a3e-0095-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5> (Accessed: 16 May 2023).

Buckley, N. (2018) Orban secures crushing victory in Hungary. Financial Times. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/f8b648dc-3b74-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4> (Accessed: March 12, 2023).

Budapest Sentinel (2016) "The Fidesz Crime Syndicate: Interview with Ákos Hadházy," Hungarian Spectrum, 11 February 2016, <https://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/02/12/the-fidesz-crime-syndicate-interview-with-akos-hadhazy/> (accessed 09 July 2023)

Budapest Times (2009): The secret society of corruption.
http://www.budapesttimes.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12335&Itemid=27

Budapest Times (2010): BKV scandal curbs MSZP.
http://www.budapesttimes.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13890&Itemid=27

Čačić, D. (2021). Vucic and Orban formalise their 'special relationship'. [online] www.euractiv.com. Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/vucic-and-orban-formalise-their-special-relationship/> [Accessed 5 Dec. 2022].

Cage M. (2022) In Hungary, Orban wins again — because he has rigged the system. Washington Post. [online] Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/06/orban-fidesz-autocratic-hungary-illiberal-democracy/>. [16 Apr. 2023].

Carstens, J. (2019.). The rise of populism within the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa: A theoretical case study of anti-establishment, economic inequalities and a cultural backlash. [online] Available at: https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/32540/thesis_hum_2020_carstens_joshua.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 18 Sep. 2023].

Central Intelligence Agency. 2022. The World Fact Book. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20180212083454/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2050.html#hu>. [Accessed 6 December 2022].

Centre for European Populist Studies, (2020). Viktor Orbán: Past to Present - ECPS. [online] Available at: <https://www.populismstudies.org/viktor-orban-past-to-present/>. [Accessed 22 Apr. 2023].

Cianetti; Dawson; Hanley (2018). "Rethinking "democratic backsliding" in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland". *East European Politics*. 34 (3): 243–256

Ciobanu, T.G., Edit Inotai, Edward Szekeres, Claudia (2022). Democracy Digest: Aftermath of Hungary Election. [online] *Balkan Insight*. Available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/08/democracy-digest-aftermath-of-hungary-election/> [Accessed 23 Apr. 2023].

Cosovschi, A. (2018). Benjamin Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism. Performance, Political Style, and Representation*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2016. *Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society*, 29(4), pp.51-52

Council of Europe (2021). The Basic Law of Hungary. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.eui.eu/Documents/General/DebatingtheHungarianConstitution/TheBasicLawofHungary.pdf>

Courts of Hungary (2021) Curia of Hungary. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://birosag.hu/en/curia-hungary>. [Accessed 2 December 2022].

Cox, G. and Katz, J. (2007) "Gerrymandering Roll Calls in Congress, 1879–2000," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 108–19

Cox, G. and McCubbins, (2005) M. D. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005);

Csaky, Z. (2018) Viktor Orban is just getting started, *Foreign Policy*. *Foreign Policy*. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/12/viktor-orban-is-just-getting-started-hungary/> (Accessed: April 13, 2023).

Democracy Reports (2022) Available at: <https://www.v-dem.net/publications/democracy-reports/> (Accessed: 13 September 2023).

Denver W. (2016). Orbán's Hungary. Centre for American Progress [online] Available at: <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/orbans-hungary/>. [Accessed 31 March 2023].

Diamond, L. (2017). When Does Populism Become a Threat to Democracy? | Larry Diamond. [online] diamond-democracy.stanford.edu. Available at: <https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/speeches/when-does-populism-become-threat-democracy>.

Doval, P.G. ; Gastón, S. (27 July 2021). Global Resurgence of the Right: Conceptual and Regional Perspectives. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge. ISBN 9781000415032. Retrieved 14 October 2022

Dresden J. R. and M. M. (2016) Howard, "Authoritarian Backsliding and the Concentration of Political Power," *Democratization* 23, no. 7 (2016): 1122–43, doi:10.1080/13510347.2015.1045884

Eatwell, R. (2014) The concept and theory of charismatic leadership. In *Charisma and fascism in interwar Europe* (pp. 2): (pp. 3-18). Routledge.

Eddy, K. (2015) "Orbán Surfs the Migration Wave," *Politico*, 10 September 2015, www.politico.eu/article/orbansurfs-the-migration-wave-budapest-mp-government-party/ (accessed 02 July 2023)

Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2023). Treaty of Trianon | World War I [1920]. [online] Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Trianon>. [Accessed 22 May 2023].

Engstrom, E. (2014) *Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2014)

Enyedi, Z. (2007) 'Stability in the Shadow of Chaos. The Hungarian Party System in 2006', in Housek, Vit and Chytilék, Roman (eds) *Parliamentary Elections and Party Landscape in the Visegrad Group Countries*, pp. 116-134. Brno: Masaryk University.

Eurofound (2008): Government performs unexpected U-turn on health reform bill 21 <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/06/articles/hu0806029i.htm> (Accessed 1 Jun. 2023)

European Commission (2023). Available at: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/HU_SWD_2023_617_en.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2023).

European Commission, (2015) Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Cohesion Fund, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund (accessed 08 July 2023)

Eurydice. "Compulsory Education in Europe (2013/2014)" (PDF). European Commission. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 November 2013.

Fazekas, M. and Tóth, I.J. (2016). From Corruption to State Capture. *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(2), pp.320–334. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639137>.

Flaherty, T., & Rogowski, R. (2021). Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order: *International Organization*, 75(2), 495-523. doi:10.1017/S0020818321000163

Fong, C. and Krehbiel, K. (2018) "Limited Obstruction," *American Political Science Review* 112, no. 1 (2018): 1–14, doi:10.1017/S0003055417000387.

Foy, H. (2016). Viktor Orban of Hungary lashes out at 'western elites' running EU. *Financial Times*. [online] 8 Jun. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/46a04494-2d8f-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc> [Accessed 22 May 2023].

Freedom House, (2016), "Hungary," 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/Hungary/freedom-net/2016> (accessed 29 June 2023)

Freedom House. (2018.). In *His Own Words: The Preoccupations of Hungary's Viktor Orbán*. [online] Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/his-own-words-preoccupations-hungarys-viktor-orban> [Accessed 22 May 2023]

.Funke, Manuel; Schularick, Moritz; Trebesch, Christoph (September 2016). "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014". *European Economic Review*. 88: 227–260. doi:10.1016/j.eurocorev.2016.03.006

Gabriel, J. (2016). A COUNTRY REPORT BASED ON DATA 1918-2012. [online] Available at: https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/cr012_hungary.pdf.

Gaille, B. (2018) 12 case study method advantages and disadvantages, BrandonGaille.com. Available at: <https://brandongaille.com/12-case-study-method-advantages-and-disadvantages/> (Accessed: March 1, 2023).

GaWC - globalisation and World Cities. 2010 Available at: <https://www.lboro.ac.uk/microsites/geography/gawc/> (Accessed: December 6, 2022).

GDP growth (annual %) - Hungary (2024) World Bank Open Data. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=HU> (Accessed: 06 March 2024).

Germani, G. (1978) Authoritarianism, fascism, and national populism. RoutledgeGlobal 500 (no date) CNNMoney. Cable News Network. Available at: <https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/countries/Hungary.html?iid=smlrr> (Accessed: December 6, 2022).

Golshan, T. (2019). “Trump’s Manufactured Border ‘Crisis’ Scares Republican Voters—but Not Lawmakers,” Vox.com, 10 January 2019, <https://www.vox.com/2019/1/10/18174230/trump-border-crisisrepublican-base> (accessed 11 March 2020).

Greenstein C and Tensley B, (2016) “Hungary, Sixty Years After the Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2016, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-09-01/hungary-sixty-years-after-revolution>. (Accessed: March 25, 2023).

Grzymala-Busse, A. (2018), “Beyond Clientelism”; S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Broadway Books, 2018); M. Svoboda, “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents” (Working Paper, 2018), doi:10.2139/ssrn.3243470.

Hacker, J. (2019). *The significant risk shift: the new economic insecurity and the decline of the American dream* (Expanded & fully revised second ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190844141

Hale, H. E. (2011) “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” *World Politics* 63, no. 4 (2011): 581–617

Hale, H. E. (2007) "Correlates of Clientelism: Political Economy, Politicized Ethnicity, and Post-Communist Transition," in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, ed. H. Kitschelt and S. I. Wilkinson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 227–50

Hanrahan, Brian (9 May 2009). "Hungary's Role in the 1989 Revolutions". BBC News. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8036685.stm> Accessed: March 29, 2023).

Hargitai, Q. (2017). Two countries are as close as brothers. [online] www.bbc.com. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20170210-two-countries-as-close-as-brothers> [Accessed 5 Dec. 2022].

Harris, C. (2018) Hungary's crunch election: Five things we learned, Euronews. Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/2018/04/06/hungary-election-live-updates-as-favourite-orban-seeks-fourth-term> (Accessed: April 14, 2023).

Hawkins, K.A., Carlin, R.E., Littvay, L. and Kaltwasser, C.R. eds., 2018. *The ideational approach to populism: Concept, theory, and analysis*. Routledge.

Hellman, J. S. (1998) "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 203–34, doi:10.1017/S0043887100008091; Innes, "The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe."

Hellmeier, at. Al (2021). "State of the world 2020: autocratization turns viral". *Democratisation*. 28 (6): 1053–1074.

Heywood, A. (2011) *Politics* (Cape Town: Palgrave Macmillan, 2 011): (p 93) (p 207)

Higgott, R. A.; Cooper, Andrew Fenton (1990). "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations": Available at : <https://web.archive.org/web/20170608120246/http://www.mkik.hu/en/magyar-kereskedelmi-es-iparkamara/benefits-of-eu-membership-2630>

Human Rights Watch. (2022) Hungary: Data Misused for Political Campaigns. [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/01/hungary-data-misused-political-campaigns>. [Accessed 24 Apr. 2023].

Hungarian Statistical Office (2022) First External Trade in Goods. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.ksh.hu/gyorstajekoztatok/#/en/home>. [Accessed 6 December 2022]

Hungary Academy of Science (2016) MTA.hu. Available at: <https://mta.hu/english/hungarys-nobel-prize-winners-106018> (Accessed: December 1, 2022).

Hungary Today. (2017). ‘The Issue Of Migrants Is Therefore An Issue Of Identity As Well As Sovereignty’ – Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s National Consultation Speech In Full. [online] Available at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/migrants-issue-identity-sovereignty-hungarian-orban-speech-full-20779/>. [Accessed 22 May 2023].

Hungary Today. (2022). Hungarian People of Lower Education Level Show Overwhelming Support for Fidesz. [online] Available at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-lower-education-level-support-fidesz-opposition-2022-elections/> [Accessed 10 Apr. 2023].

Hungary Today. (2022). Hungary’s Poorest Villages Vote Overwhelmingly in Favor of Fidesz. [online] Available at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-fidesz-voters-villages/> [Accessed 24 Apr. 2023].

Hungary Today. (2022). More People Vote for Governing Fidesz in Places with Many Children. [online] Available at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/more-people-vote-for-governing-fidesz-in-places-with-many-children/> [Accessed 24 Apr. 2023].

Hungary Today. (2022). Voting: Support for Fidesz Less Defined in Wealthier Municipalities. [online] Available at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/fidesz-support-hungary-election/> (Accessed 1 Jul. 2023). [online] Available at: <https://www.hngary.com/tips-doing-business-in-hungary/> [Accessed 6 Dec. 2022].

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies* (PDF). New Haven: Yale University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on Retrieved 18 October 2022.

Ilonszki, G. and Várnagy, R. (2016). Parliamentary elections in Hungary, 2014. *Electoral Studies*, 43, pp.169–172. Doi <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.04.003>.

Inglehart, I. “Changing Values Among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006,” *West European Politics* 31, 1-2(2008), 145.

Inglehart, R. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p.5

Inglehart, Ronald F. and Norris, Pippa, *Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash* (July 29, 2016). HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026, Available at
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659> p.2

International Monetary Fund (2022). *World Economic Outlook Databases*. [ONLINE]
Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases>. [Accessed 6 December 2022].

Jancsics, D. and I. Jávör (2012), "Corrupt Governmental Networks," *International Public Management Journal* 15, no. 1 (2012): 62–99, doi:10.1080/10967494.2012.684019

Jávör, B. "Hungary: Corruption Funded by European taxpayers," Heinrich Böll Foundation, 24 June 2015, www.boell.de/en/2015/06/24/hungary-corruption-funded-European-taxpayers (accessed 10 July 2023)

Jolobe, Z. "Getting to Codesa: An analysis on why multiparty negotiations in South Africa began: 1984-1991," (Doctoral thesis presented at the University of Cape Town, 2014).

Jordan, M. (2002). "Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic," *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (2002): 19–52, doi:10.1353/sais.2002.0038.

Kaltwasser, R. C. ; Taggart, P. ; Espejo, P.O.; Ostiguy, P., eds. (6 November 2017). "The Oxford Handbook of Populism". *Oxford Handbooks Online*: 269–270.
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001. ISBN 9780198803560

Kaminski, M. (2015) "All the Terrorists Are Migrants," *Politico*, 23 November 2015, www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/ (accessed 10 July 2023)

Karolewski I and Benedikter R, "Poland Is Not Hungary," *Foreign Affairs*, September 21, 2016, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2016-09-21/poland-not-hungary>. (Accessed: April 20, 2023).

Katz, J. and M. McCubbins (2018), "Constitutions of Exception: The Constitutional Foundations of the Interruption of Executive and Legislative Function," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 174 (2018): 77–98, doi:10.1628/093245617X15120238641848.

Keleman, R. "Europe's Hungary Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, September 20, 2015, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2015-09-20/europes-hungary-problem>. (Accessed: April 23, 2023).

Kelemen D, and Orenstein A, "Europe's Autocracy Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, January 7, 2016, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2016-01-07/europes-autocracy-problem>. (Accessed: March 30, 2023).

Kenny P.D. *Populism and Patronage: why populists win elections in India, Asia, and Beyond*. Oxford University Press; 2017.

Khera, P. J. et al. (2018) Hungary's Orban claims victory as Nationalist Party takes sweeping poll lead, *The Times of Israel*. Available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hungarys-orban-claims-victory-as-nationalist-party-takes-sweeping-poll-lead/> (Accessed: April 25, 2023).

King, A. "Do leaders' Personalities Matter," in Anthony King (ed.), *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcome of Democratic Elections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 41- 42.

Kingsley, P. and B. Novak, (2018) "The Website That Shows How a Free Press Can Die," *The New York Times*, 24 November 2018; Stetka, "From Multinationals to Business Tycoons Media Ownership and Journalistic Autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe."

Kirchick, J. (2012) Wrong way down the Danube, *Foreign Affairs*. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2012-07-10/wrong-way-down-danube> (Accessed: March 30, 2023).

Klapsis, A. (2014). "Economic Crisis and Political Extremism in Europe: From the 1930s to the Present". *European View*. 13 (2): 189–198. doi:10.1007/s12290-014-0315-5.

Kopecký, P. Mair, and P M. Spirova, (2012), *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012]).

Körösényi, A., Illés, G. and Gyulai, A., 2020. *The Orbán Regime Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making*. 1st ed. London: Routledge.

Kovács, K. and Tóth, G.A. (2011). Hungary's Constitutional Transformation. *European Constitutional Law Review*, 7(2), pp.183–203. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1574019611200038>.

Kovács, Z. (2015) “Meet Lajos Simicska: Fidesz’s Enigmatic Oligarch,” *The Budapest Beacon*, 10 February 2015, <https://budapestbeacon.com/meet-lajossimicska-fideszs-enigmatic-oligarch/> (accessed 11 July 2023)

Krekó P. and Juhász A, “Scaling the Wall,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 30, 2015, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2015-07-30/scaling-wall>. (Accessed: April 01, 2023).

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachart, R., Dolezel, M., Bornschie, S. and Frey, T. (2006). Globalisation and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, [online] 45(6), pp.921–925. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x>.

Laclau, E. (2005). *On populist reason*. London: Verso

Lawson, K, (1988) “When Linkage Fails” in Kayeter Merkl and P, (ed.), *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organisation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 37.; Robert Barr, “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics,” 35

Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018.) *How Democracies Die*. London, Penguin, 2018.

Liboreiro, J. (2022). Hungary is no longer a full democracy, MEPs say in the new resolution. [online] *Euronews*. Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/15/hungary-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-but-an-electoral-autocracy-meps-declare-in-new-repor>. (Accessed 30 August 2023)

Lipset, S., 1960. *Political man*. United States: Doubleday & Company.

Loveman, B. (1993) *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

MacDowall (2015), “Embattled Orbán Weighs His Options,” *Politico*, 25 May 2015, www.politico.eu/article/embattled-orban-weighs-his-options/ [accessed 5 July 2023];

Magyari, E.P. and Plankó, G. (2014), "Deutsche Telekom, Hungarian Government Collude to Silence Independent Media," 444. hu, 5 June 2014, <https://444.hu/2014/06/05/deutsche-telekom-hungarian-government-collude-to-silence-independentmedia> (accessed 07 July 2023)

Mair, P. (2013). *Ruling the void: the hollowing of Western democracy*. New York: Verso Books. ISBN 978-1844673247

Malesky, E. (2009) "Gerrymandering—Vietnamese Style: Escaping the Partial Reform Equilibrium in a Nondemocratic Regime," *The Journal of Politics* 71, no. 1 (2009): 132–59

Mbete, S., 2015. The Economic Freedom Fighters-South Africa's turn towards populism? *Journal of African Elections*, 14(1), pp.35-59.

McAuley, J. (2018) Hungary votes to keep prime minister and right-wing in power. *Washington Post*. [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hungary-goes-to-polls-with-possibility-of-reelecting-viktor-orban-to-3rd-term-as-prime-minister/2018/04/08/c884984c-36b2-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html [Accessed 17 Apr. 2023].

McElwain, K. M. (2008) "Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 1 (2008): 32–47

McTague, T. (2017) "Hungary Hardens Immigration Line," *Politico*, 13 February 2017, www.politico.eu/article/hungarysnew-hardline-immigration-scheme-viktor-orban-refugees-migration-crisis-europe/ (accessed 15 July 2023)

Medián (2010): *Hogyan szavaztak a magyarok 2010 áprilisában?* <http://www.median.hu/object.7c017750-53b9-4a03-87c6-a771ee519bb8.ivy> [How did the Hungarians vote in April 2010?]

Meguid, B. M. (2005). "Competition between unequal: the role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success" (PDF). *Am. Political Sci. Rev.* 99 (3): 347–359. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051701. S2CID 145304603. Retrieved 18 October 2022

Meguid, B. M. (2008). *Party competition between unequal: strategies and electoral fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521169080

Miller, J. (2020). Politics, Education and the Imagination in South African and Brazilian student-led mobilisations (2015-16) [Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository].
<https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.51079>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13 March 2016) "International organisations in Hungary". Minority Rights Group. (2015). Hungary - World Directory of Minorities & Indigenous Peoples. [online] Available at: <https://minorityrights.org/country/hungary/>.

Moffitt, B. (2016) *The Global Rise of Populism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Montgomery, J. F. (2012) *Hungary: The unwilling satellite*. Literary Licensing.

Mudde & Kaltwasser, R. (2013), pp. 149–150; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 6; Abi-Hassan 2017, p. 427

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R. 2017, p. 43; de la Torre 2017, p. 197.

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R. (2013), pp. 149–150; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p. 6; Abi-Hassan 2017, p. 427.

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R. 2013, pp. 149–150; Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R. 2017, p. 6; Abi-Hassan 2017, p. 427.

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R. 2017, p. 62; de la Torre 2017, p. 204

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, R. 2017, pp. 42–43; Gagnon et al. 2018, p. vi

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and opposition*, 39(4), 541-563.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511492037, (p261 : p.263-267, : p262: p. 203

Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, R. 2017. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.

Muller, J., 2016. *What is populism?* United States of America: Penguin Books.

Mulvey, G. (2010) “When Policy Creates Politics: The Problematizing of Immigration and the Consequences for Refugee Integration in the UK,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 23, no. 4 [2010]: 437–62,

Nagy, A.B. & Róna, D. (2012). Freefall Political agenda explanations for the Hungarian Socialist Party’s loss of popularity between 2006-2010. [online] Research Gate, Hungary: Institute for Political Science, MTA Centre for Social Sciences, pp.1–17. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301340910_Freefall_Political_agenda_explanations_for_the_Hungarian_Socialist_Party's_loss_of_popularity_between_2006-2010 [Accessed 5 Jun. 2023].

Nalepa, M. (2016) “Party Institutionalization and Legislative Organization: The Evolution of Agenda Power in the Polish Parliament,” *Comparative Politics* 48, no. 3 (2016): 353–72; Yadav, Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries.

New York Times (2007): Hungary Coalition Stays the Austerity 2010 available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/world/europe/11hungary.html> [Accessed 28 May. 2023]

News, B. (2018) Orban's election win in Hungary tightens his grip on politics, *The Wall Street Journal*. Dow Jones & Company. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/orbans-election-win-in-hungary-tightens-his-grip-on-politics-1523298419> (Accessed: April 10, 2023).

Nolan D, “Hungary’s Corruption Scandal Is Becoming a Total Soap Opera,” *Vice*, November 17, 2014, available at <https://news.vice.com/article/hungarys-corruption-scandal-is-becoming-a-total-soap-opera>. (Accessed: April 23, 2023).

Norris, P. and Inglehart, R., 2021. *Cultural backlash*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108595841 p.1-4 & p13

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108595841 p.1-4 & p13

Norris, P., 2007. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.132.

Norris, Pippa; Inglehart, Ronald (11 February 2019). *Cultural Backlash*. Cambridge University Press. p. 134–139. doi:10.1017/9781108595841. ISBN 978-1-108-59584-1. S2CID 242313055

Norris, Pippa; Inglehart, Ronald (11 February 2019). *Cultural Backlash*. Cambridge University Press. p. 44. doi:10.1017/9781108595841. ISBN 978-1-108-59584-1. S2CID 242313055.

Open Society Foundations (2022). *The Open Society Foundations in Hungary*. [online] Available at: <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/newsroom/the-open-society-foundations-in-hungary> [Accessed 23 May 2023].

Orenstein A, Krekó P, and Juhász A, “The Hungarian Putin?” *Foreign Affairs*, February 8, 2015, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2015-02-08/hungarian-putin>. (Accessed: April 15, 2023).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013). "OECD Health Data: Social protection". OECD Health Statistics Database, available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/data/oecd-health-statistics/oecd-health-data-social-protection_data-00544-en (accesses 30 July 2023)

Örnebring, H. (2002) “Clientelism, Elites, and the Media in Central and Eastern Europe,” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 17, no. 4 (2012): 497–515, doi:10.1177/1940161212454329.

Ostiguy, P. “The High-Low Political Divide: Rethinking Populism and Anti-populism,” *Political Concepts: Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series*, (2009), p 38.

Outten HR, Schmitt MT, Miller DA, Garcia AL. Feeling threatened about the future: Whites’ emotional reactions to anticipated ethnic demographic changes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 2012 Jan;38(1):14-25.

Pállinger, Z.T., 2022. Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary. In *Politics and Society in Hungary: (De-) Democratization, Orbán and the EU* (pp. 99-120). Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Papp, Z. and Zorigt, B. (2017). Political Constraints and the Limited Effect of Electoral System Change on Personal Vote-Seeking in Hungary. *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures*, 32(1), pp.119–141. doi <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325417736809>.

Pethő A. and A. Szabó, (2019) “Inside the fall of the Oligarch Who Turned against Viktor Orbán,” *Direct36*, 14 January 2019, www.direkt36.hu/en/feltarul-simicska-bukasanak-titkos-tortenete/ (accessed 10 July 2023).

Population Pyramids of the World. (2016). *Population Pyramids of the World from 1950 to 2100*. [online] Available at: <https://www.populationpyramid.net/hungary/2016/> (Accessed 25 June. 2023).

Puddington A. “Hungary Fought for Freedom. Now It’s Content with Tyranny,” *Foreign Policy*, October 27, 2016, available at [Hungary fought for freedom. now it’s content with tyranny](http://hungary.foughtforfreedom.nowitscontentwithtyranny). (no date a) Freedom House. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/hungary-fought-freedom-now-its-content-tyranny> (Accessed: 12 June 2023).

Rajcsányi, G. (2018). Viktor Orbán's Hungary: Orbanist Politics and Philosophy from a Historical Perspective. In C. Echle, F. Kliem, & M. Sarmah, *Political Change* (pp. 123-134). Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ltd.

Roberts, K., “Populism and Political Parties,” in Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 290

Roylance, T. (2018) *In his own words: The preoccupations of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán* Freedom House. Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/his-own-words-preoccupations-hungarys-viktor-orban> (Accessed: 16 May 2023).

Rusheva, V. (2018). Hungary-Ukraine relations hit a new low over troop deployment. [online] *New Europe*. Available at: <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/hungary-ukraine-relations-hit-new-low-troop-deployment/> [Accessed 5 Dec. 2022].

Sadecki, A. (2014) “In a State of Necessity: How Has Orban Changed Hungary?” (*Point of View*, no. 41, *Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich*, Warsaw, 2014), 7

Santora, M. (2018) Hungary election give Orban Big majority and control of Constitution, *The New York Times*. *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/europe/hungary-election-viktor-orban.html> (Accessed: April 24, 2023).

Santora, M. and Bienvenu, H. (2018). Hungary Election Was Free but Not Entirely Fair, Observers Say. *The New York Times*. [online] 9 Apr. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/world/europe/hungary-election-orban-fidesz.html>.

Scheppele, K. (2018) "Autocratic Legalism," *University of Chicago Law Review* 85 (2018): 545–83

Schleifer, Y. "Hungary at the Turning Point," *Moment*, October 3, 2014, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/moment/2014/10/viktor_orban's_authoritarian_rule_the_hungarian_prime_minister_is_destroying.html. (Accessed: April 3, 2023).

Schultheis, E. (2018). Viktor Orbán: Hungary doesn't want 'Muslim invaders. [online] *POLITICO*. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-doesnt-want-muslim-invaders/> (Accessed: 16 May 2023)

Seymour Martin Lipset (1959). *Some social requisites of democracy are economic development and political legitimacy*. Indianapolis] Bobbs-Merrill. 69-105

Simon, D., Cook, L. and Clarke, H. (2018) Hungarian strongman's big victory poses a headache for EU, *CNN*. Cable News Network. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/09/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-election-intl/index.html> (Accessed: April 21, 2023).

Smirnov D. and Topolak, J. (2013) *Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe: The Transition Period* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)

Smith, P. (2000). Culture and charisma: Outline of a theory. *Acta Sociologica*, 43(2), pp.101-111.

Spike, J (2006) "Ferenc Gyurcsány Says Top Fidesz Circles Involved in Disturbance of 2006," *The Budapest Beacon*, 21 September 2016, <https://budapestbeacon.com/ferenc-gyurcsany-says-top-fideszofficials-behind-disturbances-of-2006/> (accessed 2 July 2023).

Stake, R. (2006) *Multiple Case Study Analysis* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2006), 65

StartupRanking. (2016). Hungary Top Startups - DogSurf, Meska, FOXPOST | Startup Ranking. [online] Available at: <https://www.startupranking.com/top/hungary> [Accessed 6 Dec. 2022].

Steinmo, S. ; Thelen, K. ; Longstreth, F. (1992). Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521428309.

Szabó, G., 2019. Populism in Hungary: A Study of the Fidesz-KDNP Government of Hungary in the Period between 2010 and 2019.

Taguieff, P.A., 1995. Political science confronts populism: from a conceptual mirage to a real problem. *Telos*, 1995(103), pp.9-43.

Tajfel, H., 1970. Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific american*, 223(5), pp.96-103.

Tan, N. (2013) "Manipulating Electoral Laws in Singapore," *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 4 (2013): 632–43, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.014

Than, K. (2018) Fear of migrants galvanises PM Orban's supporters in rural Hungary, Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-election-orban-voters-idUSKBN1GX1HW> (Accessed: 16 May 2023).

Than, K. and Szakacs, G. (2018) Hungary's strongman Viktor Orban wins third term in power, Reuters. Thomson Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-election/hungarys-strongman-viktor-orban-wins-third-term-in-power-idUSKBN1HE0UC> (Accessed: April 06, 2023).

The Atlas of Economic Complexity (2022) Country & Product Complexity Rankings. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/>. [Accessed 6 December 2022].

The Guardian (2022) Viktor Orbán Sparks outrage with an attack on 'Race mixing' in Europe (2022) The Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/viktor-orban-against-race-mixing-europe-hungary> (Accessed: 16 May 2023).

Thomas, N. (2012) *The royal Hungarian army in World War II*. London, England: Osprey Publishing.

Thomas, P.(2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Pp. 303-310

Thorpe (2018) “Hungary Defeat Shakes Ruling Fidesz,” BBC News, 25 February 2018, www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-31583696 (accessed 10 July 2023).

Thorpe, N. (2013). Hungary’s tobacco law: Leaked tape causes outrage. BBC News. [online] 2 Jul. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23146659> (Accessed 8 Jul. 2023).

Thorpe, N. (2018) “The Man Who Thinks Europe Has Been Invaded,” BBC News, 6 April 2018) Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43660162 (accessed 10 July 2023).

Tradingeconomics.com. (2023). Hungary Indicators. [online] Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/indicators>. (Accessed 2 Jul. 2023).

Tucker, P.M. W. (2019). *Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691196985

Van der Brug, W. Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2005). Why some anti-immigrant parties fail, and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(5), pp.537-573.

Verseck K. (2013)“Hungarian Leader Adopts Policies of Far-Right,” *Der Spiegel*, January 30, 2013, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ruling-hungarian-fidesz-party-adopts-policies-of-far-right-jobbik-party-a-880590.html>. (Accessed: April 23, 2023).

Verseck, K., 2022. Hungary: What’s Viktor Orbán’s Problem with Ukraine?. DW. com.

Wall Street Journal (2009): Pension Glut Lies at Heart of Crisis Wracking Hungary <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123793340762430957.html> (Accessed 17 May. 2023

Waller, L. (2016). Viktor Orbán. Accessed: July 20, 2023 from Politico: <https://www.politico.eu/list/politico-28/viktor-orban/>

Wenzelburger, G. König, P. and Wolf, F. “Policy Theories in Hard Times? Assessing the Explanatory Power of Policy Theories in the Context of Crisis,” *Public Organization Review* 19 (2019): 97–118, doi:10.1007/s11115-017-0387-1.

Wolf, M. (3 December 2019). "How to reform today's rigged capitalism". Financial Times. (Accessed 17 October 2022)

World Tourism Organisation (2022). UNWTO Tourism Highlights, 2015 Edition. [ONLINE] Available at: <https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284416899>. (Accessed 6 December 2022).

Zalan, E. (2016) Hungary is too small for Viktor Orbán, Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/01/hungary-is-too-small-for-viktor-orban/> (Accessed: March 23, 2023).

Zalan, E. (2018) Hungary's Orbán in a sweeping victory, boosting EU populists, EUobserver. EUobserver. Available at: <https://euobserver.com/eu-political/141539> (Accessed: April 11, 2023).

Kovács, Z. (2021) The őszöd speech: An anniversary of a shameful moment in recent history and a reminder of the dangers of poor leadership. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/blog/the-oszod-speech-an-anniversary-of-a-shameful-moment-in-recent-history-and-a-reminder-of-the-dangers-of-poor-leadership-60ae60c121038> (Accessed: 07 March 2024).