

**National Identity in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

**MICHELLE ROMO**

RMXMIC001

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**COMPULSORY DECLARATION**

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study investigates the changes in national identity in South Africa over time and examines conditions and perceptions that inform national identity. It has three areas of focus: examining the levels of national identity in South Africa in 2008, the most current year of survey data available; mapping the levels of national identity overtime from 1995 to 2008, and identifying sources of national identity from 2002 to 2008. Using statistical analysis, this study tests for interaction effects between race and notions of inclusive citizenship in the South African population to examine predictors of national identity. The paper explores the extent to which the ANC's program of nation building with its emphasis on inclusive citizenship, as represented by freedom and equity, both political and economic, has influenced the development of national identity. Findings indicate that the factors that inform national identity are not uniform across all races, neither in type nor degree; however, certain indicators prove significant across all races. Certain elements of the ANC nation building discourse, such as the perception of political freedom, affect national identity more than other elements, such as economic equity and equality before the law.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

After the transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994, one of the first priorities of the newly-elected African National Congress (ANC) was to actively engage the citizenry in a process of nation building that emphasized inclusive citizenship. This thesis examines to what extent the ANC was successful in its endeavor to redefine South African national identity in the post-apartheid period. By focusing on ANC policies and the rhetoric of inclusive citizenship that supported these policies, this paper examines the degree to which elites can shape national identity. Following from the constructivist position, identity is seen as fluid and malleable. It investigates how the ANC leadership conceptualized the South African ‘nation’ and engaged in a nation building program. By using national identity as the dependent variable and perceptions of the conditions that embody the concept of inclusive citizenship as the key independent variables, this paper tests the effect of elite-driven identity construction on individual attitudes. The ANC discourse of inclusive citizenship that was central to nation building focused on political and economic aspects of freedom and equity. This study examines whether individuals’ national identities are informed by those preconditions that the ANC prescribed as crucial to building the South African nation.

I assert that a “New South Africa” was constructed after 1994. The South African ‘nation’ was created through free and fair elections and an aggressive nation building project by the ANC that sought to establish political legitimacy. In that way, the process of identity construction, of mobilizing and constructing a South African political identity, was prescribed from above. Although individuals have agency in forging their own identities, the idea of a South African nation is a given in this context. What is not a given is the adherence to this identity.

Therefore, this study focuses on identity choice in South Africa, specifically, when and why South Africans choose a South African national identity. Keeping in mind the relevance of elite roles, I examine whether the ANC political rhetoric of inclusive citizenship has informed a source of national identity.

The ANC nation building strategy, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter four, focused on non-racial nation building. Nation building is the process of constructing or reconstructing a national identity that engenders loyalty to a polity. As John Bendix notes, “nation-building and the inclusion of new groups into citizenship is a process of finding a basis for authority in a new polity” (Bendix 2003: xiii). ANC policy statements, from the Freedom Charter to statements outlining guidelines for a democratic future in South Africa, emphasized the importance of establishing political freedoms and providing economic opportunities for every South African, regardless of race. It was declared that a non-racial, inclusive society was needed to build South African nation and solidify its democratic future. Several policies were established to carry out these goals, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme and affirmative action policies. Hence, the notion of inclusive citizenship, as defined by freedom and equity, both in the political sphere and economic sphere, is central to the ANC discourse on nation building.

Although the interest of this study lies in the effects of ANC discourse, I conduct statistical analysis of individual level data using Afrobarometer public opinion surveys rather than a discourse analysis.<sup>1</sup> By testing for the effect of inclusive citizenship — namely the perception of freedom and equity — we can see whether the notion of inclusive citizenship informs national identity in South Africa. I conceptualize freedoms to include political and

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<sup>1</sup> See Roper (1997) for discourse analysis of right wing discourse in constructing a South African National Identity and De Celia et al. (1999) for discourse analysis relating to Austrian national identity.

economic freedoms and equity to include economic equity and equality before the law. I sketch ANC nation building discourses before and after 1994, and outline several public policies that served to implement these nation building projects. In that way, I set the context for understanding the ANC's conception of the South African 'nation', and the justification for testing these explanatory variables through statistical analysis. By using regression analysis with national identity as the dependent variable and the concepts that comprise what it means to have inclusive citizenship- political freedom, political equity, economic satisfaction and economic equity- as the explanatory or independent variables, we can see whether what was assumed by the ANC to inform national identity in South Africa, actually does.

Because of the nature of the survey questions, perceptions of equity and freedom are inevitably performance based evaluations of ANC nation building policies that have incorporated the values of inclusive citizenship. For example, the political freedom index is comprised of three questions: In this country, how free are you to say what you think?; In this country, how free are you to join any political organization you want?; and In this country, how free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? By correlating the responses to these questions in an index with the national identity index, comprised of questions that measure the respondent's attachment to the nation<sup>2</sup>, we can test whether there is a relationship between the respondent's perceptions of his or her own political freedoms and that person's levels of national identity. Invariably, this incorporates a performance evaluation of the state's ability to provide those political freedoms. This is a different exercise than establishing the relationship between political freedoms and national identity by simply asking respondents whether political freedoms

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<sup>2</sup> To create the national identity index, I take the mean score of the responses to the survey questions: It makes you proud to be called a South African; You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself. See Appendix D for complete list of index constructions.



are important or necessary to one's national identity. I test whether the idea and manifestations of inclusive citizenship has been essential to establishing legitimacy of the nation, and creating a shared sense of "South Africanness" (African National Congress 1992).

Understanding how South Africans define themselves gives insight into the successes and failures of nation-building practices in post apartheid South Africa. In addition, understanding the causes of national attachment is interesting because, in South Africa, there has been a conscious effort to construct or re-write national identity in the post-apartheid era. Further, by testing for the effect of the perceptions of equity and freedom, we can determine the relevance of ANC ideas of inclusive citizenship to building the 'nation'.

By analyzing which components of inclusive citizenship impact national identification in South Africa, we are able to test the relevance of the ANC's understanding of what was important to nation building and the policies based on these ideas on inclusive citizenship. In addition, we are able to understand better the elite-level influences on identity construction and identity choice. If the ANC discourse on inclusive citizenship is successful in informing the individual's sense of national identity, this would have implications for national identity construction in other deeply divided societies. Countries struggling with national unity could learn much from the relative successes or failures of the ANC's nation building project.

### **Research Questions**

This paper has four areas of investigation: (1) It examines the levels of national identity in South Africa; (2) it maps the trends of national identity overtime from 1995 to 2008, (3) it

identifies predictors for national identity from 2002 to 2008, and (4) it examines race as a moderating variable on the predictors for national identity.

### **Hypothesis and Logic**

The focus of this study is to examine the extent to which national identity has taken hold in South Africa. What are the current levels of national identity in South Africa and how have they changed over time? What informs a person's sense of national identity? And, given South Africa's unique history of racist governance, are the variables that inform national identity the same across all races? An investigation of how national identity is being captured and measured by public opinion surveys and which factors influence feelings of national identity is crucial to understand national identity in South Africa.

To fully answer these questions, I outline the following hypotheses. I would expect that as South Africa consolidates its democracy, as more children emerge from integrated schools taught by a new curriculum, and as more adults live under the 'new South Africa', that national identity on the whole would be higher today than in previous years. I also expect that national identity is affected by ANC nation building policies designed to promote a sense of inclusive citizenship and that positive perceptions of rights and equity are positively correlated with levels of national identity in South Africa.

Given South Africa's divided history of racial segregation, I also expect that the explanatory variables that inform national identity will not be uniform across race. Perceptions of equity and freedom will have a stronger positive effect on populations that were denied full citizenship rights during Apartheid (Black, Coloureds, and Asians). I expect that the importance of the perceptions of rights and equity would reflect the extent of rights enjoyed by that

population group under apartheid. The perceptions of equity and freedom will have a stronger positive effect for Blacks than other racial groups because that population suffered the most stringent denial of citizenship rights, such as voting rights, equal access to education, the labour market, and property. As such, I expect that rights and equity would feature more prominently in informing the levels of national identity for Black South Africans than for any other racial group. This study will simultaneously test the opposite prediction- that perceptions of rights and equity would be more important to minority groups who might be concerned with being marginalized in an ANC-dominated regime.

As stated earlier, the South African nation in its current manifestation came to be as a result of the democratic elections of 1994. As such, it was a nation born from civic ideals and not one of ethnic nationalism. Given that the South African nation was one that was constructed as a civic nation, identity with the nation involved a certain degree of identity choice.<sup>3</sup> Members of the polity choose if and how much they identified with the new South African nation.

There are several ways a nation building project can take form. One is a rhetoric or discursive manner, where, to draw from Billig's notion of banal nationalism, symbols, myths and memories are either created or shaped and consistently reinforced (1995). This can take the form of new national holidays, state flags, education curriculum, or the renaming of official buildings or streets. In the case of South Africa, some of these projects have already occurred, such as curriculum reform, the creation of a national flag, anthem, motto and public holidays. Other

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<sup>3</sup> Note that just as civic nations can be constructed, so can ethnic nations. There is much literature around the constructed nature of ethnicity. To say that a civic nation is constructed and involves identity choice is not to say that an ethnic nation is not. Where they do differ, however, is in the relative exclusivity and inclusivity of each type of nation. A civic nation is able to be more inclusive since it is based around a set of ideals, in South Africa's case a set of democratic ideals, and participation in the polity. Ethnic nations, depending on how fluid the boundaries of group identity are, tend to be more exclusive than civic nations. Because ethnic nations are often based on the boundaries of certain 'ethnic' characteristics, such as language, lineage, religion, place of birth, or physical characteristics, membership into these groups is more exclusive than that of civic nations. Boundaries that are rigid, or appear to be rigid, create more exclusive groups than boundaries that are fluid.

projects, such as the renaming of streets and buildings and establishment of cultural institutions, such as Freedom Park, continue to be in process. In this case, a citizen can be habituated to the new symbols, myths, and memories, and engender an identity to the new nation. Likewise, being exposed to civic education programs would also habituate the citizen. It is also possible that younger citizens would feel more attachment to the nation since they would have little experience or memory of the old nation. For the youngest in the population, they only have a cognitive awareness of the new nation. In addition, as time passes, older generations may undergo an attitude shift, where they grow to identify with the new nation. Finally, with the passing of older generations, in absolute numbers, there are fewer in the population that remembered the previous nation.

Some may be driven by economic factors and material gain in the new nation. This follows a rational choice model, where a cost-benefit analysis can be taken into consideration and citizens' decisions to adhere to a given community are guided by economic or material factors, such as income or poverty. This also borrows from the concepts of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, where the more basic needs of safety, such as security and employment must be met before needs of love, affection and belongingness (1954: 18-20).

Institutions can also shape personal identification with the nation. In the South African context, institutional reform was necessary to create the new South African nation. A new national imagining rested upon universal suffrage and rights for all race groups. Full citizenship in the form of voting rights, freedom of movement rights, and property rights, affected a sense of belonging in the nation. The inclusive and comprehensive rights granted by the Constitution in addition to a system of proportional representation also reflect the inclusive nature of the nation building project.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### National Identity in South Africa

Just before the 1994 elections, James Barber asked what kind of identity South Africa would have. He wondered whether a single overriding national identity would emerge and whether a post-apartheid society would provide the necessary conditions to build a strong common identity (1994:70). While certain authors predicted that specific prerequisites, such as non-racialism, democratic governance, socio-political conditions, reduced violence, and gender equality, would be necessary to build a democratic nation, few have explored what forms public opinion towards national identity.<sup>4</sup> Little systematic and empirical testing of the factors that influence national identity has been done.

Examinations of national identity in South Africa consist of three main areas of investigation: identity studies, xenophobia studies, and democracy studies. The first area of investigation centres on shifting identities in South Africa and have been broadly theoretical in nature. Sociologists have investigated issues of changing social identities (such as racial, ethnic, national, or class) in South Africa but have not examined or measured national identity empirically (See Erasmus and Pieterse 1999; Marais 2001; Maré 1999). Studies that have engaged with the relationship between xenophobia and national identity have done so by examining national identity as an independent variable, predicting national identity and disaggregating results by race.

Likewise, studies on democratic transition and consolidation have explored national identity over

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<sup>4</sup> See *National Identity and Democracy in Africa* (1999) for scholarly articles outlining prerequisites. As discussed later, Mattes, Crush, and others engage with public opinion surveys to measure levels of national identity, but do not explore what informs national identity.

time in relation to democratic attitudes, but also treat national identity as an independent variable and do not disaggregate levels of identity further than by race.

Others explore the relationship between race and class, and argue that race informs class divisions today or that inequalities among the classes are what drives the current economic disparities in South Africa (See Buhlungu 2007; Seekings and Natrass 2005). Instead of finding that inequalities have shifted from race to class, as Seekings and Natrass assert, Buhlungu describes the phenomena of widening class cleavages between apartheid-era racial categories as an emerging pattern of non-racialism and a continued racialization of class (Seekings and Natrass 2005: 46; Buhlungu 2007: 82). Racial hierarchy remains mostly unaltered, with non-Whites comprising an overwhelming majority of the unemployed. Buhlungu sees the eradication of racial inequality as the only basis for a sustainable and substantive form of patriotism in South Africa (2007: 93), a hypothesis which will be tested later in this paper.

Buhlungu argues that the two “social worlds” between the haves and have-nots are a major obstacle to a shared South African identity (ibid: 91). Because contact and social interaction between racial groups remains necessity driven, there are no arenas where South Africans can engage in common meaning construction and identity formation (ibid). Buhlungu argues that elements of inclusive patriotism have emerged, but a fully-fledged nation has not yet. He describes South African patriotism as contingent kind of patriotism with fragile and inchoate symbols where South Africans retreat to their separate social or racial worlds and withdraw from allegiance to the nation when faced with a crisis (Buhlungu 2007: 93). For some scholars, the realization of policy goals into tangible economic and social goods, which can be described as substantive citizenship, is directly related to the feeling of national unity.<sup>5</sup> Melissen exemplifies

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<sup>5</sup> See Buhlungu (2007) and Maré (2007) for arguments centred on growing inequalities and the failures of the nation.

this in his statement, “Nation-branding accentuates a country’s identity and reflects its aspirations, but it cannot move much beyond existing social realities” (2005: 20).

Gerhard Maré steps back from the nationalism debate and first asks the question: *should* a nation be created? (Emphasis original, 2007: 107). Collective memory is central to Maré’s argument of the impossibility of the South African nation. He questions the possibility of the creation of a South African nation because he argues that there is a lack of shared history and imagined community (ibid: 104). Maré borrows from John Comaroff and finds that collective identities and attachments occur in the “minutiae of everyday life” (ibid: 108). Maré posits that the challenge for South Africa is not in whether symbols of unity, such as flags, are hung in shared institutions, such as public buildings. Rather, he questions whether shared institutional life even exists given the inequality and segregation in South Africa. This is an important distinction to make from the argument that racial equality must precede the nation. Maré argues that shared space must precede the shared collective memory which is necessary to constitute the nation.

Maré does not place much value in nation-building as an aid to democratic transition or consolidation. He sees commitment to democracy as an alternative to the solidarity that is offered by nation and patriotism, both of which rely on the social identity of the “imagined community” (ibid: 99). Instead, he argues that a commitment to democracy is much wider and carries less “baggage of difference” than a commitment to the nation (ibid). This is similar to Ivor Chipkin’s argument for what he identifies as a “democratic limit” instead of a “national limit”. Ivor Chipkin addresses the question of national identity in South Africa, but uses no empirical data and is inconclusive regarding his answer to the question (2007). Chipkin argues that the only real defining feature of South African identity, as defined in the Constitution and Freedom Charter, is

territory. South Africa's history to date has yet to provide a definition or delimitation of South African national identity and he finds that territory is not sufficient to satisfy a national limit because territory is not a basis for affective bonds among citizens (ibid: 190).

By following developments in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Moufe, Chipkin proposes a solution to the problem of a demos that is not constituted of any particular measure of population, such as race, culture, religion, or ethnicity (ibid). According to Laclau and Moufe, the concept of 'the people' "emerges through the construction of equivalential bonds and the demarcation of an internal frontier" (ibid: 207). This bond can crystallize around a desire, for example, allowing blacks the right to vote, and this investment becomes an affect (ibid: 208). Thus 'the people' are defined by this desire and their affection for the groups solidifies. Solidarity is very important and, although Chipkin does not explicitly say it, an individual will to be part of the group is also crucial. Thus, the democratic limit is focused around citizenship, and not the nation.

Despite a thorough discussion of national identity in South Africa, none of these studies incorporate public opinion in the evaluation of a South African identity. As Buhlungu and Seekings et al. note, there remains vast economic inequality in South Africa that is often racialized. As Maré elaborates, there is a lack of shared space that is formed by inequality and segregation in South Africa.<sup>6</sup> Despite this, a majority of South Africans are proud to be South African and find that being South African is an important part of how they see themselves.<sup>7</sup>

The second area of investigation explores national identity as it relates to xenophobic attitudes in South Africa (Croucher 1998; Crush and Pendleton 2004; Crush 2008; Peberdy 2001). South African Migration Project publications have often used national identity as an

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<sup>6</sup> See Durrheim and Dixon (2010) for a discussion on the frequency of contact and quality of contact between racial groups.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter 5 for descriptive statistics on national identity.



explanation of xenophobic attitudes, with the underlying assumption that national identity is correlated with higher levels of xenophobia. In this case, national identity is treated as the independent variable, rather than the dependent variable, as in this paper. Crush and Pendleton posit that South Africa's inclusive and aggressive nation-building project redefined citizenship and caused a growth in intolerance towards outsiders (2004: 4). Not only does this assume the success of the ANC's nation building project, it posits a direct and positive relationship between national identification and xenophobic attitudes.

Perhaps because national identity is only treated as an independent variable, investigations in the literature on xenophobia are often limited to analyses by race (Crush 2008). Limiting the analysis to categories of race is worrisome. It ignores a myriad of other factors that may influence attitudes such as class, employment, age, education, perception of well being, trust of the state, etc. Utilizing race in this manner does what Erasmus warns against- it flattens the complexity of race (Erasmus 2010). Further, the continued reproduction of these categories of analysis in study after study further reinforces the idea that "racialised groups are bounded, homogenous, and stable" (ibid). Rigorous analysis would tease out the factors behind race that influence certain xenophobic attitudes.

The third area comprises empirical investigations of national identity as it relates to maintaining and stabilizing democracy in South Africa (Mattes 2002a; Mattes 2002b; Mattes 2004; Robinson 2009). Nation-building in new democracies with heterogeneous populations is often seen as a critical factor in conflict resolution and democratic consolidation. At the very least, agreement on who constitutes the nation has been seen as a precondition for democracy (Rustow 1970). Additionally, several scholars have described the negative impact of ethnic politics on democracy indicating that an overarching, national identity should be forged to ensure democratic

stability (Neuberger 2000; Robinson 2009; Horowitz 1985). As such, attention has been paid to the relationship between national identity and democratic attitudes and behaviour. Because the primary focus of the literature is to identify what factors effect democratic transition and consolidation, national identity has been explored as it relates to democratic political culture. Although also descriptive in nature, there have been efforts to track levels of national identity over time and provide a more nuanced description of national identity.

Mattes tracks responses to questions of national identity by race from 1994 to 2000 using IDASA and Afrobarometer survey data (2002b). He also explores primary identification of respondents from 2000 Afrobarometer data. Mattes questions assumptions from the literature that pre-existing identities are in tension with post independence national identity and finds that high levels of national identity can coexist with equally high levels of identification with sub-national social identity groups. His findings imply that nation-building projects haven't necessarily transformed group identities into a national one, but have created a transcendent national identity. As with the literature on xenophobia, it would have been interesting to analyze levels of national identity beyond race by incorporating other categories that ranked high as a primary identification, such as ethnic group, class, or religion. Similarly, Grossberg, Struwig, and Pillay find that national identity was not incompatible with having any group-based identity using data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (2006: 65-6). Analyzing survey data from 1997 to 2000, Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier also find that national identity and sub-group identity are not mutually exclusive (2001: 105).

Garth le Pere and Kato Lambrechts refer to what happened in South Africa at the end of Apartheid as a "*renationalization* of identity (emphasis original, Le Pere and Lambrechts 1999: 12). They find this to be a necessary condition of nation-building. Rather than a cultural or social

construct, the reconstruction of the 'nation' in South Africa is one of the "gradual building of public consensus around particular constitutional principles and values shared among various ethnic, language, class, religious, and cultural groupings, irrespective of their historical experiences" (ibid). In this way, multiple identities are able to coexist with one's national identity. Further, as Smith finds, in the contemporary world, the number and scale of possible cultural identities is increasing, and these identities may either cut across or reinforce national identities (1992: 58-9).

A study of identity construction and choice in South Africa would not be complete without a discussion of racial identities. As such, it is useful to note a subset of literature that examines racial identities in South Africa. White minority rule in South Africa relied on an official classification into four race groups: Africans, Whites, Coloureds, and Asians. Africans were further classified into a dozen ethnic groups. This classification formed the basis for the allocation of rights. Substantively, allocation of rights awarded Whites full citizenship, Coloureds and Asians partial citizenship, and Blacks no citizenship. In a discussion of apartheid racial classifications, Posel raises the important point that the power of these categories resulted from the imprecision rather than the precision of these categories (2001: 57). Although the Tricameral Constitution of 1983 was a major reform of apartheid, it continued to deny Africans the national franchise and allowed the other 3 groups the right to elect separate chambers of parliament (Lijphart 2001: 13). Instead, Africans were granted citizenship in the independent homelands.

There is evidence of how the program of Apartheid hardened race categories. Mattes reports that 20% of South Africans surveyed in 2000 continued to use racial category as their primary identification (2002b: 85). South African Social Attitudes Survey data from 2003 brings that figure to 22%, indicating that Apartheid racial classifications remain salient in South Africa,

and an important to the way people define themselves (Grossberg et al. 2006: 66). Further, use of racial categories in the census, bureaucracies, policies and programs such as affirmative action, and even survey research continue to play a role in the hardening of these identities.<sup>8</sup> This draws from Nagel, who asserts that formal ethnic labels and policies are more powerful forces of identity than informal ethnic meanings and transactions (1994: 156). Although specifically referring to ethnic identities, Nagel's discussion of formal and informal identity labels can apply to racial identities as well. As a result, race is often treated as fixed in many studies, as described above.<sup>9</sup>

Van Evara, who I describe as a soft primordialist later in this chapter, reminds us that identities can solidify based on certain factors (2001). In the South African case, Apartheid created and harden racial identities to the extent that many treat South Africa's racial categories to be fixed, despite the understanding that race is a social construct. Most scholars have discarded a biological conception of racial classifications. However, when scholars use race as the foremost explanatory variable to explain attitudes, they submit to the hardening of these categories and also perpetuate them. Despite this, disregarding race completely as a variable in any study of South Africa would be careless. It would not take into consideration the vast and lingering effects that the apartheid system had on group identification and identity construction. For these reasons, I disaggregate the levels of national identity by race as other scholars have done. However, instead of concluding the analysis there, I go further by testing for interaction effects between race and elements of inclusive citizenship.

The literature on democratic political culture provides a useful base for my study because the empirical analysis of national identity is treated in a more nuanced way than the literature on

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<sup>8</sup> See Loveman (1999) for a discussion on reifying race by treating race as an objective category in census categories and scholarship.

<sup>9</sup> Chandra (2001: 8) gives a comprehensive overview of the constructivist contributions to understanding the fluidity of ethnic identity and argues that despite this, many scholars continue to treat ethnic identities as fixed. This applies to racial identities as well.

xenophobia. Some studies examine explanatory variables for national identity beyond race, such as age, province, class, and language, but they provide little analytical leverage in explaining national identity (Grossberg et al. 2006). Because South Africa under apartheid was divided by race, examining responses to questions of national identity by race is a logical and necessary starting point. However, it is likely that race alone is not the sole determinant of national identity. Treating identity in this way allows for a shallow analysis of a complex problem and does not assist in understanding what “lives behind the categories of race” (Erasmus 2009). Because the purpose of this study is to identify what elements of inclusive citizenship inform national identity, race is treated as a moderating variable, one of many that influences national identity.

### **Identity and the Sociological Perspective — Primordialist, Constructivist, Instrumentalist, and Institutional Debates**

I assert that national identity is primarily seen as constructed, involving a sphere of shared values, a sentiment of solidarity (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1948: 175-6), based on an imagined community (Anderson 1983). It is sometimes achieved through the invention of tradition (Hobsbawm 1983) and the transformation of aspects of pre-existing culture (Gellner 1983). As this paper explores the factors that influence post-Apartheid South African national identity, national identity is taken as a constructed civic identity. Because South African nation building formed around notions of civic ideals- namely freedom and equity- and not the membership of a specific ethnic group, the South African ‘nation’ can be seen as a civic nation, rather than an ethnic nation.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Ivor Chipkin’s argument for a democratic limit focused around citizenship instead of a national limit (2007: 207). By suggesting what he calls a democratic limit, an identity based on a set of ideals, Chipkin implies that a national limit would be rigid and fixed. Because South Africa has several languages, races, and ethnic groups, it wouldn’t be possible to create a ‘nation’ with national limits that incorporated such diversity. Working with this narrow concept of ‘nation’ Chipkin subscribes to a primordial notion of identity, rather than a constructed one. If Chipkin took a

As Heribert Adam argues, the ideology of non-racialism itself rejects an ethnic nation in favour of a civic nation, one built on the foundation of equal individual rights and based on consent rather than descent (Adam 1994: 17). Considering this, the constructed nature of identity choice and formation is relevant. However, it is useful to discuss the theories of identity from a sociological perspective as this academic field has examined this subject in depth and sheds light on understandings of identity choice and construction.

A discussion of primordial and constructivist approaches to the understanding of ethnic identity is necessary for several reasons. First, these approaches are useful frameworks to understand identity construction in general, and not only ethnic identity construction in specific. Secondly, the difference between ethnic group and nation is not always clear and scholars often conflate the two. Scholars sometimes use ethnic group and the nation interchangeably.<sup>11</sup> In other studies the emergence of the nation is considered solely a phenomenon of modernization and often associated with the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Hobsbawm 1990: 80; De Celia et al. 1999: 154). In some scholarly research, nation, ethnic group, ethnic nation, and nation-state are often confusingly interwoven (Connor 1994: 40).

Crawford Young identified a framework for the study of identity that is comprised of three approaches: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist (1993). The essence of the primordialist position on identity assumes that identities are fixed. Clifford Geertz elaborates two central tenets of the primordialist perspective, that individuals have a single ethnic identity and that ethnic identity is fixed in the present and future (1973). Although these identities are fixed, the origins of these fixed identities are not always clear. Biological or natural primordialism incorporates ideas of human biology in identity construction (Reynolds et al. 1987). While some

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constructivist standpoint, a diverse civic nation, woven together by a set of ideals, would be possible. A democratic limit and a national limit would not be mutually exclusive, as Chipkin presents.

<sup>11</sup> For example, in Dragović 2005.

attribute these identities to biological differences, others, so-called 'soft primordialists', attribute these identities to social construction in the past (Connor 1994; Van Evera 2001). In either case, these identities are presumed to be fixed once acquired. The 'primordial' ties of language, religion, race, ethnicity, and territory are deemed crucial to identity (Shils 1957).

Constructivists on the other hand, have shown that ethnic groups are fluid and affected by social, political, and economic processes.<sup>12</sup> Individuals can have multiple identities. In some theories, modernization is an important variable for ethnic group or nation formation. Deutsch, Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm, Breuilley, and Mann attribute the development of an identity to certain aspects of modernization (Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990 Breuilley 1995; Mann 1995). In the case of Anderson, the rise of print capitalism is essential to the formation of imagined communities. Deutsch asserts that industrialization and the increased communication facilities lead to national communities (1953). Gellner attributes the rise of industrialization and urbanization as the influential variable in nationalism (1983). Resource competition and the rational choice perspective would assume that individual actors make decisions on their identity based on cost-benefit analysis or the perceived benefits of certain identification over another (Laitin 1995; Banton 1983; Barth 1969; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1989; Olzak 1992). Competition over resource niches can shape or shift ethnic boundaries (Banton 1983; Barth 1969) as can competition over shares of the informal labour market (Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1989; Olzak 1992).

Institutionalism can be seen as another component of the constructivist approach. Wimmer and Posner highlight the importance of the institutional context in explaining group identification (Wimmer 1997; Wimmer 2008; Posner 2005). In his book, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in*

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<sup>12</sup> Chandra (2001:7) and Nagel (1994) give an excellent overview of constructivist contributions to the theory of identity construction and choice.

*Africa*, Posner highlights how institutions can shape identity with the case of Zambia, where he shows that the ethnic identities people choose can be effected by institutions, state policies, regulations, and administrative structures (2005: 7). Posner examines how multiparty rule creates an environment where language becomes salient, and one party rule incentivizes the use of ethnic identification.

Even the process of nation state formation makes the drawing of boundaries possible, creating an incentive structure which promotes certain identity choice (Miles 1993; Hobsbawm 1990; Tilly 1996).<sup>13</sup> Nagel discusses the influence in external forces shaping ethnic boundaries and the ways that identity can be negotiated, defined, and produced by political policies and institutions (1986). “As the state has become the dominant institution in society, political policies regulating ethnicity increasingly shape ethnic boundaries and influence patterns of ethnic identification” (1994: 156-7).

In addition to modernization and the effect of institutions, political entrepreneurship is another factor in the construction of ethnic groups. This area of study is informed by the instrumentalist approach, where ascriptive identity, such as race, ethnicity, tribe, language and religion, is seen a function of the modern nation state and a tool of political elites (Toffolo 2003: 3). In this approach, Barth notes that identities are fluid, malleable, responsive to political mobilization, ethnic entrepreneurs, and state policies (1969). “Playing the ethnic card”, or when political elite use ethnicity and the notion that ethnic groups must stick together to safeguard its interests in order to win political support, has been investigated in several studies (Eifert et al. 2010; Ferree 2006; Posner 2004; Posner 2005; Young 1976). Most recently, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner explore the use of ethnicity as a political tool for power through their examination of the saliency of ethnic identity

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<sup>13</sup> Tilly argues that top down nationalism generates bottom up nationalism by creating an incentive structure which promotes certain identity choice. Although Hobsbawm emphasizes a culturalist approach to understanding identity, he also emphasized a top down approach and the role of the state in creating nationalism.



during election time (2010). This approach can be seen as a variation of either primordialism or constructivism, depending on whether the tools in questions are deemed to be fixed or constructed. However, the mere fact that identities can be shaped by political elites or political entrepreneurs denotes that identities, whether ethnic or national are, in fact constructed.

The instrumentalist approach, another variant of the constructivist approach, is especially relevant to the role of elites in identity construction, as elites are the most likely to mobilize these instruments to reach a political end. Several scholars have examined elite-driven models of identity construction (Cruz 2000; Dragović 2005; Handler 1984).<sup>14</sup> The instruments in question can either be an existing group identity, such as ethnicity, race, or class, a characteristic associated with a particular group identity, such as language, religion, or a physical characteristic, or principles, such a democratic values or citizenship. The latter instruments are most relevant to this study of national identity in South Africa as I test whether elite messages of the ANC nation-building rhetoric of inclusive citizenship have an effect of national identity. In this case, the instruments of inclusive citizenship in use are the ideals of a non-racial society built on political and economic freedom and equity. As South Africa can be seen as a civic nation rather than an ethnic nation, these ideals are more relevant to nation building than nation building strategies that mobilize around certain characteristics that can be considered ethnic, such as language.<sup>15</sup>

Much of the argument between constructivism and primordialism lies in disagreement over how fixed or fluid these identities are. Stephen Van Evara argues that it makes sense to maintain the assumptions that ethnic identities are fixed for analysis. He does not argue that ethnic identities are a result of biology as some other primordialists do. He adheres to socially constructed nature of ethnic

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<sup>14</sup> Nasr (2001) analyzes the strategies of political elites in state-initiated Islamization in Malaysia and Pakistan. De Cilia et al. (1999) analyze the construction of Austrian national identity through political and elite.

<sup>15</sup> For example, Dragović (2005) examines the role of elites in utilizing language as a tool for Croatian identity construction. and Barreto (2001) analyzes the use of the Spanish language as a defining national trait by elites in Puerto Rico.

identity, but argues that they should be treated as fixed because they harden as a result of certain factors- such as literacy and violent conflict with others.

Regardless of the debates around the fixed or constructed nature of national and ethnic identity, the post apartheid South African case in particular, is one of a constructed national identity, focused around a set of democratic ideals in a plural society. As such, measuring the success of a constructed social identity and the factors that correlate with those successes is helpful to understanding the dynamics of identity construction and choice.

Many would say that South Africa has a long way to go in terms of nation building. For those who assert that social and racial equality precedes the creation of the nation, the continued economic disparities between the races indicate that a nation has not yet been created. Instead of examining racial and class disparities or relying on a theoretical framework that places equality before the nation, I borrow from Anthony Smith and try to measure how South Africans *feel*, despite what other authors have referred to as obstacles in the nation building process (1999).

This study departs from the literature in national identity in South Africa in that it takes into account public opinion of national identity instead of relying on a theoretical framework to explain attachment to the nation. It also acknowledges that race is not ‘homogenous, bounded, and stable’ (Erasmus 2010: 390) as it is often treated in empirical studies, while at the same time taking into consideration the effects of South Africa’s racialized history on individual’s sense of belonging.

## CHAPTER 3

### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

South Africa's emergence as a democracy in 1994 has been referred to by some as the negotiated revolution of 1994. This was followed in 1996 by the adoption of a comprehensive constitution, granting citizens rights to housing, food, healthcare, education, social security, and outlawing discrimination in more than 15 categories. However, challenges to peace and stability still remain. Existing economic and social inequality continues to be experienced along racial lines. Despite government policies and programs that encourage social and racial integration, such as affirmative action policies in higher education and the workplace, South Africa continues to be an extremely divided society in terms of education, employment, and wealth (Van der Berg and Louw 2003: 11, 18; Banerjee et al. 2008: 733). Segregation in today's democratic South African society is affected by the racialized identities that stem from the apartheid era.

In 1948, the South African government, led by the National Party, undertook a systematic program that excluded a vast majority of the population from formal citizenship. In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act restricted political participation for Black to the Bantustans. For the majority of the population, exclusion from formal citizenship continued until 1983, with a few reforms. The Coloured Persons' Representative Council, established in 1964 and the South African Indian Council, established in 1968 allowed for limited political participation in ethnic affairs. The Constitution of 1983 allowed for a tricameral parliament with a House of Assembly for Whites, a House of Representatives for Coloureds, and a House of Delegates for Indians, although the House of Assembly had decisive influence on the outcome of legislative debates. The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the talks that led to the 1994 election resulted in a systematic program that sought to undo the exclusive citizenship of the past. A newly

democratized South Africa saw the emergence of inclusive citizenship, where all race groups were awarded formal citizenship and equal representation through universal suffrage. Yet, new institutions, bureaucracies, and policies were also devoted to including formally excluded populations.

### **Public Policy and the Nation Building Agenda in South Africa**

As the governing and dominant political party, the ANC has been the primary source of nation building policy in South Africa. Some argue that it is the ANC that set the nation building agenda (Bekker et al. 1999; Mattes 2011). The ANC has emphasized a non-ethnic South African nationalism, focusing on economic and social equity along with non-racialism (Barber 1994: 70). One of the most ambitious nation-building projects to date was reinventing South Africa's identity as a cohesive nation after apartheid. South Africa has taken many strides towards the realization of this goal, but continues to battle with the lingering effects of racial policy during apartheid. This chapter will identify nation-building policies, symbols and practices that have been used in cultivating a sense of national identity.

In practical terms, the nation-building agenda in South Africa continues to be set by national policies of the ANC. Bekker notes that the ANC defined the political objectives for South Africa during the period leading up to the constitutional negotiations and the general elections. These objectives included a non-racial democratic nation-state, and this would be established by cultural homogenization (1999: 2). The ANC-dominated Constitutional Assembly resulted in a majoritarian, centralized system with very few effective checks on power (Mattes 2011: 5) creating a situation where the ANC dominates the creation of state institutions and

controls the government apparatus, and therefore the political objectives for the country, almost exclusively.

As the victorious party in constitutional negotiations and dominant governing party since 1994, the ANC's ideas on nation building have been the primary influence on government policy, effectively setting the agenda. By examining this agenda, we can analyze the effect that these policies, and the underlying assumptions that inform these policies, has had on national sentiment in South Africa. Before discussing the ANC's nation-building agenda, it is important to first describe the ANC's vision of the 'nation'.

### **Conceptions of the nation prior to 1994**

Since its birth in 1912, the ANC has endeavored to fight for African participation in representative institutions that were dominated by the white minority. In the 1940s, the ANC advocated the elimination of economic and legal barriers to African advancement, and after the beginning of Apartheid in 1948, advocated more forcefully for economic democracy (Johns and Davis 1991: 8). Since the inception of the ANC, economic rights have been central to the struggle and have informed what type of "nation" South Africa should be. In this way, an economic and social democracy informed what the vision of the nation should be. Who would be included in the nation is a debate that came later.

The Freedom Charter of 1955 broadly outlined the ANC's goal for social democracy that remains central to the party's core beliefs (ibid). Despite contestation on whether the ANC should advocate an exclusively African nationalism or more inclusive, non-racial nationalism, the ANC chose the latter. According to the Freedom Charter, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it" (ANC 1955) and the ANC maintained this core value despite challenges. Advocates

for an Africanist identity resulted in the Pan African Congress (PAC) splitting from the ANC in 1959 (Johns and Davis 1991: 8). The ANC discourse of rights and equality are the cornerstone of nation-building policy in South Africa. Eventually, the ANC opened membership to non-Africans in 1969, and then to the executive committee in 1985, although the ANC always maintained African leadership. This is a fundamental difference between ANC ideology and the other “Africanist” ideologies of the PAC and Black Consciousness. Although the ANC recognized the history of colonialization and land dispossession, the “rights discourse” of the ANC included whites as an integral part of the nation and defines legal citizenship as the determinant of “belonging” to the nation (ibid: 181).

The Freedom Charter of 1955 broadly outlined the ANC’s goal for social democracy that remains central to the party’s core beliefs (ibid: 8). Despite contestation on whether the ANC should advocate an exclusively African nationalism or more inclusive, non-racial nationalism, the ANC chose the latter. The ANC maintained this core value despite challenges from the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) to advocate for an Africanist identity (ibid). Reddy identifies three main counter-discourses during the apartheid era: the “rights discourse” of the ANC, the “anti-colonial/psychological discourse” of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the “class analysis discourse” of the South African Communist Party (SACP) (2000: 170). The ANC discourse of rights and equality are the cornerstone of nation-building policy in South Africa. Eventually, the ANC opened membership to non-Africans in 1969, and then to the executive committee in 1985, although the ANC always maintained African leadership. This is a fundamental difference between ANC ideology and the other “Africanist” ideologies of the PAC and Black Consciousness. Although the ANC recognized the history of colonialization and land dispossession, the “rights discourse” of the

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The Freedom Charter called for a democratic state that granted equal rights and opportunities. Here we can see the beginnings of inclusive citizenship. Included in the idea of a democratic state was universal suffrage, “equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races,” as well as the preservation of language and culture (ANC 1955). Beyond democratic participation, the Freedom Charter also laid the framework of what is core to ANC ideology, economic and social equity. The Freedom Charter made clear that economic wealth, in the form of mineral wealth and industry, as well as the freedom to enter trades should belong to all South Africans. In order to facilitate this economic equity, the end of land ownership restrictions was also called for, in addition to the freedom of movement and the end of labor exploitation in the form of forced labor and farm prisons. This was crucial in order to realize the idea of an inclusive citizenship.

Political equity, or equality before the law, was also stipulated through the demand for fair trials and imprisonment within the law. Welfare and labor rights were also highly emphasized in the stipulation that there should be freedom to form and join trade unions, access unemployment benefits, receive equal pay for equal work, and set a national minimum wage (ibid). The rights of the worker were central to ANC’s Freedom Charter. The Charter also called for opening of the education system, and a respect for culture. There was also the demand for the freedom to be decently housed and have access to state healthcare.

The Freedom Charter clearly endorsed a mixed economy where state power would be harnessed to remedy inequalities of wealth and access to opportunities that existed along racial

lines during Apartheid (Johns and Davis 1991: 8). Addressing the political and economic inequalities of Apartheid was tantamount to building a new and democratic nation.

### **ANC Nation-Building Agenda in South Africa after 1994**

After 1994, the ANC maintained its commitment to non-racialism and sought to create a single citizenship and a broad “shared sense of South Africanness” (ANC 1992). The ANC stated that the “national character” of the National Democratic Revolution is to reconcile the contradictions between the oppressed majority and their oppressors by creating a “united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society” (ANC 1997). Although the ANC placed an emphasis on the psychological element of national identity, and the importance of promoting the feeling of pride in being South African, they noted that “the social psychological phenomenon on its own is not sustainable without socio-economic transformation” (ibid). This exemplifies a materialist understanding of the drivers of national identity. Rhetoric on nation-building included all aspects of inclusive citizenship, however, economic equity was more emphasized in the public policy realm. The ANC nation building program didn’t give life to political freedoms beyond the rights awarded in the constitution. This continues to be the case as reflected in the ANC’s 2009 Election Manifesto states that “the socio-economic challenges are closely bound with our task of nation building” (ANC 2009).

Nation building during the Mandela and Mbeki years remained consistent, although Mandela focused more on social cohesion based around tolerance. He supported Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s vision of a Rainbow Nation and consistently promoted the spirit of Ubuntu. Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech moved towards a homogenous notion of Africanism. By embracing the whole continent, Mbeki pushed an indigenous, homogenization of African



identity. Although his speech emphasized a homogenizing Africanist approach to identity, it remained inclusive, reaffirming that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it” (Mbeki 1996).

Mattes argues that in the quest to create legitimacy after 1994, the ANC concerned itself with a nation building project that endeavored to create a feeling of loyalty to the state (2011: 7). He argues that it was necessary to build an enduring and diffuse support that would not have to rely on the constant delivery of political and economic goods (ibid: 6-7). The ANC continues to address inclusive citizenship as a goal in fostering national identity and nation building (Govender 2010). However, the discourse of socio-economic transformation surrounding nation building policies makes it so that the delivery of economic goods cannot be divorced from the idea of what it means to be a nation.

### **Policies and Programmes that Reflect the Nation Building Agenda**

<b>Table 3.1 Key ANC Policies and Frameworks that Reflected a Nation-building Agenda</b>	
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) (1994)	Economic development and poverty alleviation policy framework aimed at redressing inequalities of Apartheid
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy (1996)	Neo-liberal economic strategy aimed in increasing the GDP, increasing employment, and redistributing income and socio-economic opportunities in favor of the poor
Integrated National Disability Strategy (1997)	Aimed to establish a system of monitoring to increase opportunities and prevent discrimination of those with disabilities
Employment Equity Act (1998)	Prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, HIV status, religion, language, and culture and implements affirmative action measures.
National Policy Framework for Women Empowerment and Gender Equality (2000)	General policy framework to guide gender equity in the 27 sectors, making the National Office on the Status of Women the center for this coordination
The National Language Policy Framework (2002)	Aimed at promoting language equity and the use of South Africa's official languages
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) (2003)	Aimed at changing the racial composition of those who manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets. Expands goals of economic empowerment to include women, workers, youth, and people with disabilities.

Given the ANC's materialist understanding of national identity, policies, such as the RDP and GEAR, which are developmental policies aimed at improving economic and social welfare can be categorized as nation building policies. Economic development policies not only have development goals, but also aim to redress inequalities of the past. In that way, these policy goals are also rights based, as they address the need for equal rights among South Africans, even in the economic realm.

Policy goals associated with inclusive citizenship as rights based and equity based are reinforced by the ANC discourse of rights and equality. On one end of the spectrum, there is the Constitution, which enshrines the rights of all South Africans to participate in the democratic process and protects them from unjust treatment. On the other end are policies that aim to address social and economic inequality. Of course, in many ways, these goals cannot be divorced from each other, as the ANC discourse has maintained that it is a fundamental right of citizens to have equal access to freedom and goods. In other words, equity can be seen as a right.

Nation-building efforts include policies aimed at correcting the inequalities of the past. These policies can be seen as both practical and symbolic. Separating these policies into rights-based policies and equity policies helps to understand the framework established by ANC understandings of inclusive citizenship. Rights based policies include South Africa's inclusive language policy, discrimination policy, religious freedom policy, and other rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Equity policies are geared toward the economic advancement of previously disadvantaged segments of the population such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), women's empowerment policies such as the National Policy

Framework for Women Empowerment and Gender Equality, the National Disability Strategy, and the Employment Equity Act.

Several policies acknowledged loosely defined nation building as goals. The RDP focused on the economic equity aspect of the ANC's vision of what it meant to have and build a nation. Other policies did not directly state nation building as a policy objective, but had nation building as a subtext or underlying theme in the policy. Examples of this include affirmative action policies, GEAR, BEE and BBEE.

### The Symbols of Nation Building

Another area of nation-building was expressed through the active promotion of state symbols, such as a new national flag, holidays, and place names, in addition to the development of museums, heritage sites, and the arts (Mattes 2011: 7-8). South Africa began the reinvention of its image when it became an independent nation in 1994. South Africa needed to reinvent its image to itself as well the greater international community. With independence, came a need create the symbols necessary to define an identity to South Africans and to the world.

In the ANC document, *Ready to Govern*, the ANC acknowledged the role of arts and culture in forging national unity. The document called on the creation of a department to promote arts and culture, which today manifests itself in the Department of Arts and Culture. Public symbols and names were meant to represent the diversity of the whole population (ANC 1992). The South African Geographical Names Council (SAGNC) is charged with this responsibility (Department of Arts and Culture n.d.). One of the focuses of the Social Cluster in implementing the Government Programme of Action (POA) has been the promotion of national identity and social cohesion. The government has emphasized the importance of these symbols by installing

flags in schools and embarking on an educational campaign on the importance of the flag (Tshablala-Msimang 2008).

Many symbols express nation-building desires of the post-apartheid government. Symbols include the multi-colored flag, national anthem, coat of arms, pledge of allegiance, and renaming of cities, towns, and streets. Examining the choice of national symbols in post-apartheid South Africa is a natural first step to understanding the tools used to create, present, and reinforce South Africa's national identity. In line with the notion of inclusive citizenship, South Africa adopted the motto "Unity in Diversity" (!ke e:/xarra//ke) in 2000. The motto, !ke e:/xarra//ke, is written in the Khoisan language and means 'diverse people unite.' This motto is a strong departure from the motto of the previous coat of arms, utilized from 1932 to 2000, which, written in Latin, says 'Unity is Strength.'

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also formed a powerful symbol of national healing and nation building. Established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, the TRC was carried out under the auspices of the Government of National Unity, which included the ANC and the National Party. South Africa's reconciliation process informed the intent to define a national identity as a common and non-racial identity. It was established to investigate political crimes during apartheid and heal the nation by providing platforms for dialogue on these crimes. Archbishop Desmond Tutu served as the chairman of the commission and often spoke of the healing process the commission would allow South Africans. The aim of the commission was to "promote reconciliation in South Africa's divided society through truth about its dark past" (Barrow 1998).

The Rainbow Nation campaign and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission greatly utilized the media to disseminate its message of unity and cooperation. First coined by

Archbishop Desmond Tutu to describe South Africa after 1994, the concept of the Rainbow Nation was used in Mandela's inauguration speech to denote the unification of a multicultural South Africa. Some say that the Commission's success owes much to the media coverage of the reconciliation process (Verdoolaege 2005: 186). "The Commission listened to personal narratives of apartheid victims, considered applications for amnesty by apartheid perpetrators, recommended reparations for survivors of apartheid, and was thus charged with archiving South Africa's collective memory of the past" (ibid: 182). Media coverage of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission brought the hearings into people's homes for two years. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was crucial in communicating the message of national unity (Baines 1998). For those who had television, every Sunday, the TRC Special Report was broadcast and summed up the hearings of the previous week. This aggressive media campaign left an indelible mark on the collective memory of South Africans and informed South Africa's developing national identity.

### The Policies of Nation Building

The Constitution is the preeminent authority on the rights and freedoms awarded to the South African populace. The Bill of Rights stipulated that all are equal before the law. All South Africans have the right to freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, association, movement, trade, adequate housing, a basic education, language use and cultural life. In addition, all citizens have the right to vote, join political parties, and access healthcare, sufficient food and water, and social security and the courts (RSA Constitution 1996a).

Several policies were put in place in order to carry out some of these goals. Many rights based policies, such as language policy, also reaffirmed the ANC's commitment to and

protection of cultural diversity. The National Language Policy Framework is one such commitment. The framework acknowledges the linguistic diversity of South Africa and encourages the use of indigenous languages to “foster and promote national unity.” (DAC 2003: 1.1.7). In addition, the policy refers to the principle of promoting “language equity and language rights,” as required for democracy (ibid: 2.2.1).

The Employment Equity Act of 1998 seeks to eliminate unfair discrimination in the work place by prohibiting the discrimination on many grounds, including race, gender, sexual orientation, HIV status, religion, language, and culture. It also provides a framework for affirmative action in order to diversify the workplace and eliminate employment barriers (RSA Employment Equity Act 1998). Likewise, empowerment policies such as the National Policy Framework for Women Empowerment and Gender Equality of 2000, and the National Disability Strategy were put in place to further equality.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) lays the groundwork for equity based nation building in South Africa. Section 1.3.5 cites the divisions and inequalities left by apartheid as the central crisis to nation building (RSA 1994). The document states that nation building must “link reconstruction and development” which is predicated on the democratization of South Africa (ibid: 1.3.6). In the RDP, nation building and development go hand in hand. Further, it was hoped that the RDP would create the material basis for nation building since the ANC saw eliminating the wide economic and social gap as a prerequisite to nation building (Mattes 2011: 8). “In other words, the implementation of the RDP is an essential part of addressing the national question” (ANC 1997).

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy did not mention nation building as a goal, but clearly outlined that it was an economic strategy that kept in line with the

goals of the RDP (RSA 1996b: 1.1). It sought to create an environment for rapid growth and rapid service delivery based on universal access. Rapid job growth, job creation, and development were the goals that fell in line with implementing the RDP (ibid: 9). It is clear that realizing a democratic South Africa required a sound economic base and equal access to economic goods.

Service delivery policies, such as housing and water delivery, health care delivery, and education, serve as developmental policies aimed at providing universal access to goods and services. In terms of inclusive citizenship, this is most reflected in the ANC's strategies to facilitate people's access to welfare. Such policies attempt to realize the nation building goals of the ANC.

Putting the above goals into practice, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act of 2003, provided a policy implementation strategy to carry out some of the RDP and GEAR's goals of creating employment and redressing the injustices of the past. Those who were classified under apartheid as Black, Coloured, or Indian were broadly referred to as "Black." The stated goals of the policies were to increase the number of "Black people" that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets. Preferential procurement and changing the racial composition of ownership were steps to promote "economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of black people in the economy" (RSA 2003: 2). BBBEE also addressed gender and social inequality by gearing economic empowerment to all "black people" including women, workers, youth, and people with disabilities (ibid: 1).

## Contradictions

The continued use of racial categorizations in affirmative action policies and in state administration, such as the census, is in direct conflict with the unifying discourse on nation building and non-racialism.<sup>16</sup> The ANC constantly defends the use of apartheid categorizations in affirmative action policies, arguing that there is no way to measure the progress of social and economic equity policies if these categories are not maintained (Nongena 2007). According to the ANC, these categories are seen as an evil, but a necessary evil that responds to the history of inequality and the need to redress the injustices of the past. However, the ANC has long recognized the racial differentiation of the South African population. The ANC charter refers to four “national groups,” African, White, Coloured, and Indian, which Neville Alexander, who remains critical of the use of apartheid categories, labels as the “four nation thesis” (Reddy 2000: 182). In fact, as Maré points out, even the discussion of “non-racialism” implicitly accepts there are four ‘races’ and therefore serves to reify race (1999: 247).

Examining the intentions of public policies aimed at nation building would not be sufficient to measure the relative successes and failures of the South African government’s attempts to forge a unified national identity. As such, it is important to examine public opinion to understand the successes and failures of the nation building project. South Africa’s peaceful transition to democracy has provided the country with stability and security. It has led to increased foreign investment, tourism, greater social integration, rising employment, and improved standard of living for all citizens. There remains, however, gross disparities among income, employment, literacy, and HIV/AIDS rate, indicating that South Africa’s past is far from reconciled.

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<sup>16</sup> See Moodley and Adam (2000) for a discussion on the tensions between colour blindness and the need to recognize race in order to diminish racial inequality.



Nation building policy in South Africa rests on the ideas of inclusive citizenship, which heavily emphasize political and economic equality. It is evident that rights and equity are core to the ANC understanding of nation building. However, there are also contradictions which are embodied in affirmative action policies that discriminate along racial lines in order to promote equality, thus reifying race in what should be a “non-racial” society.

As stated before, nation-branding can't move beyond existing social realities. In order to exhibit South African society as a Rainbow Nation, with principles based on democracy and equality, reality would have to closely follow through continued policy reforms. The ANC has demonstrated a nation-building agenda that has informed a broad policy framework which provides the reasoning behind, or perhaps the justification to, several developmental policies. The principles of nation-building though rights and economic equity is one of the long term goals that form the basis of the overall direction of organization and policy making in South Africa.

## CHAPTER 4

### THEORETICAL CONCEPT FORMATION AND RESEARCH METHODS

#### Conceptions of the 'Nation'

From a constructivist standpoint, the nation is an “imagined political community” (Anderson 1983: 6). Hobsbawm argues that nations are based on the invention of tradition (1983: 1). He discusses the invention of symbols and tradition as a powerful means to an end, such as the legitimization of state power or social cohesion, such as patriotism. Such traditions are attempts to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. Although nationalism uses aspects of pre-existing cultures, it often transforms them, giving them new meanings (Gellner 1983: 55). Smith argues that myths, memories, traditions, and symbols are central to modern national identities (1999: 9). The reproduction of symbols in everyday, routine life serves to reinforce a nation’s invented history, in what Michael Billig refers to as “banal nationalism” (1995: 8).

Underlying the empirical literature, as found in the literature on xenophobia and democracy is a one-dimensional definition of national identity, that of the individual relating to the nation (Crush and Pendleton 2004; Crush 2008; Mattes: 2002a; Mattes 2002b; Mattes 2004; Robinson 2009). Missing is the second aspect of national identity, the relationship of the individual to others within the nation. As Anthony Smith finds, members should *feel* an intense bond of solidarity towards the nation and other members (Emphasis original, Smith 2001: 26). Conceptually, this is easily understood when relating it to the concepts of vertical and horizontal citizenship. Vertical citizenship is defined by identification with the polity. Horizontal citizenship is defined by identification with the community (Kabeer 2005: 23). The crucial factors in national identity are not only the intense bond of solidarity to the nation, but also the solidarity to other members in

the group. Keeping this in mind, conceptions of vertical and horizontal relationships of national identity are crucial in understanding the levels national identity in South Africa.

### **Measuring National Identity**

Although qualitative analyses of national identity tackle the multiple dimensions of identity (Erasmus and Pieterse 1999; Marais 2001; Maré:1999), there have not been any empirical studies that examine national identity as a twofold concept, as not only relating or having bonds to the nation, but also relating and having bonds with others within the nation. Studies, for the most part, have focused on vertical relationships of national identity possibly because a lack of conceptual understanding, but definitely because of a lack of data.

Idasa surveys, conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1998, and Afrobarometer surveys, conducted in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2008, ask several questions relating to the individual's sense of national identity. Questions ask whether the respondent thinks that being a South African is an important part of how they see themselves, whether they want their children to see themselves as South African, and whether they are proud to be South African all measure varying attachments to the nation. They do not, however, measure attachments to others in the national community.<sup>17</sup> Crush and Pendleton analyze the above questions from a South African Migration Project (SAMP) survey conducted in 1999 and report that over 90% of respondents responded to these questions with either "agree" or "strongly agree" (Crush and Pendleton 2004: 29-30). These questions measure levels of vertical national identity. Although this seems to be an indication of a strong national identity, the nation in question is not defined. We have no evidence to suggest the contents of that national imagining are or whether citizens are imagining the same type of

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<sup>17</sup> The 1997 Idasa survey does ask: "Are there any groups living in this country who you think should not be part of the South African nation?"

nation. In the same study, respondents were asked whether they feel strong ties with people who call themselves South Africans and only 68% agreed or strongly agreed (ibid: 31).

In another SAMP study, Crush reports from the 2006 SAMP Xenophobia Survey that when asked: “In South Africa, it is clear that citizens of all races and religions share a common culture,” less than 50% agreed or strongly agreed. (Crush 2008: 23). These questions measure levels of horizontal national identity. These findings mark a significant drop compared to questions asking about one’s pride in being South African, where over 80% of South Africans felt proud to be South African. It can be argued that members of a nation share a common national culture. By phrasing the question to include all races and religions, the question implies a more inclusive culture that accepts diversity, however, the exact wording of the questions does not specifically refer to a common national culture. The question from the 2005 SAMP report referring to strong ties with other South Africans is a better proxy for horizontal national identity, i.e. attachment to others within the nation.


This indicates that national identity in South Africa has been mismeasured. If the nation is made up of an imagined community, as Anderson puts it, the difference in responses indicates that South Africans may not be imagining the same type of nation or relating to other members within the nation. It is not clear who is and who is not deemed to fit in the nation.<sup>18</sup> Not sharing a common understanding of what the community means results in an attachment to the nation that only relies on the relationship between individual and the nation, and not to the community, which makes national unity impossible. This denotes the need for an improved conceptual

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<sup>18</sup> The exception is a question from the IDASA 1997 survey which specifically asks whether there are groups living in South Africa who should not be a part of the South African nation. 22.3% of the population identified a group who should not be part of the nation. Unfortunately, this question was only asked in 1997, so an analysis of these responses over time is not possible. It does, however, give an indication that the horizontal aspect of national identity is not being addressed. A more accurate measure is the SAMP survey question: “it is clear that citizens of all races and religions share a common culture.”

framework for national identity. The measurement of national identity needs to be corrected to adequately encompass the concept of national identity as vertical *and* horizontal. These data limitations preclude this study from measuring horizontal national identity. (See discussion of data limitations in this chapter).

### Conceptual Framework



### Argument

National identity is the dependent variable. I conceptualize national identity as multi-dimensional, with facets of vertical and horizontal identities. This paper will be limited to measuring and analysing levels of vertical national identity. My research seeks to expand the current literature on national identity by identifying factors that influence levels of national identity. See Table 1 for a conceptualization of inclusive citizenship and a list of dependent and independent variables. I also report findings from reliability analysis and factor analysis for all indices created in Appendix D.

Scholars have often cited gross inequalities as a hindrance to nation-building in South Africa (Croucher 1998), leading one to expect perceived economic status as a factor in determining levels of national identity. Age may also be a determining factor, with a distinction between those born or raised under apartheid and those born or raised after.

The ANC nation-building discourse during and after apartheid has stressed inclusive citizenship. One could expect that national identity during apartheid correlated with the degree of citizenship. Under apartheid, the Asians and Coloureds were grouped in the same category, with partial citizenship, while Whites had full citizenship and Blacks no citizenship. One could expect that Whites, who had full citizenship rights during Apartheid, would have stronger levels of national identity than Coloureds and Asians, who had partial citizenships rights, and that Coloureds would have stronger levels of national identity than Blacks, who had no citizenship rights. One could also expect that levels of national identity rose for Coloureds and Blacks after the end of apartheid, although this is not able to be tested with Afrobarometer data. Alternatively, because of the ANC-led National Democratic Revolution and consequent ANC-led government, one could also imagine that Whites would feel excluded in the new regime, unless of course they identified with the ANC, and subsequently would not feel a part of the new South African nation. In either case, it is suspected that national identity levels will differ by race and partisanship.

Since South Africa's rights-based constitution and equity-based public policies are aimed at redressing the injustices and inequalities of the past, one would expect that these policies have an effect on South African national identity. If this is true, those who perceive that they are benefiting from such policies should show higher levels of national identity.

### Race as a moderating variable

When looking at the effect of ideas of inclusive citizenship on national identity in South Africa, I also examine whether race has a moderating effect on other variables. Because citizenship rights during apartheid were awarded on the bases of racial differences, it is suspected that the elements on inclusive citizenship would have differing effects on national identity based on race. For example, perceptions of political freedom may be more important to a person's level of national identity if their race group were denied this freedom during apartheid. I examine this by first testing for the effect of the perceptions of inclusive citizenship on national identity with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model on all South Africans. Then I run a second regression controlling for race by adding a dummy variables. The third regression model adds the interaction variables of race and elements of inclusive citizenship. These three regression models are run for years 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2008.

This method provides a better understanding of how race moderates the effect of inclusive citizenship on national identity. It allows us to see whether perceptions of political freedom and economic conditions inform national identity differently across race groups. Utilizing interaction variables allows the study to tap into the lingering effects of racial classification during apartheid on identity construction and choice.

### **Data Selection**

I use micro level analysis of public opinion surveys. The unit of analysis the individual respondent. Where possible, I use a longitudinal design. I use data from 5 rounds of Afrobarometer and 2 rounds from IDASA in order to track levels of vertical national identity over time from 1995 to 2008. Using Afrobarometer and Idasa data, I compile data from these surveys and analyze

responses on questions relating to national identification. The dependent variable is a created index of national identity.

### VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

The following table lists all indicators used in the linear regression. Where possible, I used multi-item indices. Factor analysis and reliability analysis (Cronbach's alpha) were used to establish validity, which are also reported in Appendix D. I applied the most stringent methods of maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation. Reliability and factor analysis statistics are reported to establish accuracy of indices, however means were computed in order to calculate the index scores. This assumes that each item contributes to equally to each index item.



**Table 4.1: Variables in the Analysis**

<b>Concept</b>		<b>Survey Item(s)</b>
National Identity	Index	It makes you proud to be called a South African. You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.
Political Freedom <sup>19</sup>	Index	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, or are they about the same: Freedom to say what you think? Freedom to join any political organization you want? Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?
Equality before the Law	Item	In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law?
Economic Equity	Item	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor? <sup>20</sup>
	Item	In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other South Africans?
Lived Poverty	Index	Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Enough clean water for home use? Medicines or medical treatment? Enough fuel to cook your food? A cash income? Electricity in your home?
Present Economic Conditions	Index	Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country? Your living conditions? In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country? Your own present living conditions?
Future Economic Conditions	Construct	Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time? Your living conditions in twelve months time?
News Media	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources? Newspapers
	Item	Television?
	Item	Radio?
ANC Opposition		Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that? <sup>21</sup> Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that? <sup>22</sup>
Youth	Item	Youth is calculated as 16 years or older in 1990
<b>Control Variables</b>		
Age	Item	How old were you at your last birthday?
Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Urban	Item	Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Answered by interviewer)
Gender	Item	Respondent's gender (Answered by interviewer)
Race	Item	Respondent's race (Answered by interviewer)

<sup>19</sup> Wording on 2002 compares the present system of government with the former system of Apartheid rule.

<sup>20</sup> Wording on 2008 survey refers specifically to Mbeki government.

<sup>21</sup> Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress.

<sup>22</sup> Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Muslim Party (AMP), African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), Christian Party, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Alliance, Federal Democrats, Freedom Front, Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, National Democratic Convention (NADECO), New National Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Christian Democratic Party (UDCP), United Democratic Movement (UDM), Independent Democrats (ID), United Independent Front, ANC Breakaway Party / new Lekota or George or Shilowa Party or Movement / National Conference Party or Movement, or Other.

When deciding how to best operationalize perceptions of economic performance, I first sought to group variables about past, present, and future perceptions of economic performance by country and individual. I sought to have one index for perceptions of personal economic conditions and an alternate index for perceptions of country level economic conditions. However, a correlation matrix reveals that perceptions of individual living conditions are highly correlated to perceptions of country economic conditions for a given time frame, meaning that citizens aligned their perceived individual economic performance with their perceived economic performance of the nation for the years in the analysis (See factor loadings in Appendix D). Reliability analyses confirm that categorizing perceptions of economic conditions temporally is more appropriate. I also grouped perceptions of current economic conditions and conditions compared to one year ago in the variable ‘present economic conditions.’ Both measure perceptions of economic condition in the present, one perception simply relates to conditions in the present. The other relates to present conditions relative to the past year. Both capture the perception of current economic conditions.

To keep the regression model parsimonious, it would have been ideal to create an index of news consumption. However, newspaper, radio and television media are included as separate independent variables rather than one independent variable of a news media consumption index. Factor analysis and reliability analyses confirm that the three items are not highly correlated. Newspaper media has more breadth and depth than television news, and is more likely to contain investigative journalism. Television news, on the other hand, is limited in content and in number. SABC and ETV are the only local providers in South Africa with news programming and lacks investigative reporting. Radio news can be seen as a middle ground for news coverage. Although not as investigative as newspapers, news programs often have expert panel discussions covering

relevant issues in depth. It is also the most immediate source of news, able to report events immediately, or soon after it occurs, and is the most accessible to the population. Radios are less expensive than televisions, they do not require literacy as newspapers do, and there is public broadcasting in the 11 official languages in addition to community radio stations.

### **Data Limitations**

Afrobarometer asks several questions relating to the individual's sense of vertical national identity. Questions asking whether the respondent thinks that being a South African is an important part of how they see themselves, whether they want their children to see themselves as South African, and whether they are proud to be South African all measure varying attachments to the nation. Afrobarometer document responses to the abovementioned questions on a five point scale that ranges from Strongly Disagree to Strong Agree. They do not, however, measure attachments to others in the national community. Findings from previous reports on xenophobia indicate that there are lower levels of horizontal national identity than vertical national identity (Crush and Pendleton 2004: 23). This would indicate that the national identity in South Africa is not as strong as it appears in studies that have only measured vertical notions of national identity.

There is a lack of indicators for horizontal national identity in Afrobarometer, Idasa, and World Values Survey, another survey that asks questions relating to national identity. There is also a lack of longitudinal data, making it difficult to compare levels of national identity before and after 1994. Idasa and Afrobarometer surveys, which offer the greatest number and most appropriate measures, only date back to 1995. The World Values Survey dates back to 1980, however the measures of national identity are limited in scope and the representation of the black population prior to 1995 is problematic. Because surveys were not allowed to be conducted in

the tribal areas, the sampling of the black population was limited to those living in the urban areas.

There are several limitations to using public opinion surveys. The obvious example is the disparity between the subject's response and the subject's true feelings. Often the subject may be embarrassed to tell the truth to the enumerator, especially if their feelings are considered shameful in the public eye. Also, surveys of this nature cover many areas of study.

Afrobarometer surveys collect data on individual attitudes on many topics, including democracy, participation, governance, and markets. A survey that is focused exclusively on national identity would be ideal because it would provide for more opportunity for open ended questions and focused questions that address the many aspects of national identity, including vertical and horizontal identity.

## CHAPTER 5

### DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

This chapter will address the first research question: what are the current levels of national identity in South Africa and how have they changed over time? The following chapter will address in what way elements of inclusive citizenship affect national identity and test for racial effects. This chapter analyzes trends in levels of national identity in South Africa by tracking responses to questions of national identity from 1995 to 2008.

As stated earlier, I expect there to be a relationship with time, and that national identity would increase in South Africa as citizens are habituated to the new symbols, myths, and memories of the nation. As time passes, South Africans would feel more connected to the nation. This could be the result of several reasons. South Africans could undergo an attitude shift, where they grow to feel an attachment to the new nation if they did not feel before. A younger generation, with little cognitive awareness of the previous regime and exposure to a new curriculum, would feel a strong sense of national identity. Also, the passing of time means the passing of older generations who experienced both regimes and may feel an attachment to the past. Finally, I expect that the attachment to the nation will not be uniform across race.

Table 5.1 shows indicators for national identity found in survey data from Idasa and Afrobarometer.<sup>23</sup> By tabulating responses of “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” to the questions “It makes you proud to be called South African,” “You want your children to think of themselves as South African,” and “Being South African is an important part of how I see myself,” we can see that

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<sup>23</sup> “Don’t Knows” were recoded into the middle value of “Neither Agree nor Disagree.” For Idasa 1995 data, the response options are “Very Proud,” “Proud,” “Not Very Proud,” and “Not at all Proud.” In this case, a middle value was created.

South Africans have a strong sense of national identity with a slight decline over time and variations in race.

In contrast to my hypothesis, South Africans, as a whole, are less proud to be South Africans in 2008 than they were in 1997, moving down 7 percentage points. Whites showed the most significant drop in South African pride, moving down 15 percentage points.

**Table 5.1: Strength of National Identity  
South Africa 1995 - 2008**

	1995	1997	1998	2000	2002	2004	2005	2008
Proud to be called South African								
Black	93	95	95	94	90	82	90	85
White	86	85	73	74	85	80	78	68
Coloured	92	94	95	87	89	88	88	87
South Asian	91	89	84	84	70	83	95	80
Total	92	94	91	90	88	82	89	83
I want my children to think of themselves as South African								
Black	N/A	N/A	94	92	89	82	91	84
White	N/A	N/A	77	75	81	81	78	68
Coloured	N/A	N/A	96	93	88	91	90	87
South Asian	N/A	N/A	89	84	70	87	96	80
Total	N/A	N/A	92	89	86	83	89	82
Being South African is a very important part of how I see myself								
Black	N/A	91	93	91	86	82	88	82
White	N/A	85	73	75	80	80	75	70
Coloured	N/A	93	95	89	84	91	86	84
South Asian	N/A	87	84	80	67	76	94	84
Total	N/A	90	90	89	84	82	86	81

Source: Idasa 1995, 1997, 1998 Afrobarometer: 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008


Note: Percentages of total respondents in each survey period that selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree."

Wording on 1995 survey: "Proud" and "Very Proud"


When isolating by race, we see that black South Africans generally have higher levels of national identity than others. Since 1995, levels of national identity had generally been declining, with a slight peak in 2005, and then another decline in 2008.

Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show responses to each questions over time, disaggregated by race. Black South Africans are most likely to be proud to be called South Africans (Figure 5.1). Among those who want their children to think of themselves as South African, Coloured South Africans have displayed the highest levels of any race group over time (Figure 5.2). The importance of being South African has declined for each race group (Figure 5.3).


**Figure 5.1:**



**Figure 5.2:**



**Figure 5.3:**






Each question showed similarities in trends that would indicate the questions to be measuring the same underlying concept of national identity. To simplify further analysis, I created an index of national identity with variable information from the responses to the above three questions for years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. The index is on a five-point scale, from zero to four, with four indicating the highest sense of national identity. The scale mirrors the response categories found in the survey. “Strongly disagree” is equal to zero; “Disagree” is equal to one; “Neither” is equal to two; “Agree” is equal to three; and “Strongly Agree” is equal to four. A factor analysis for each year, with factor loadings are large and similar, indicates that these items are measuring a single underlying concept of national identity (see APPENDIX A). A reliability analysis for each year confirms that a single index of these variables is appropriate.<sup>24</sup>

Figure 5.4 shows that South Africans score high on the national identity index. The trend line shows that the strength of national identity is on a slight decline.


**Figure 5.4:**




<sup>24</sup> Reliability analysis for the three questions reported the following Cronbach’s Alphas: Idasa 1998: .827 , AB 2000: .856; AB 2002: .913, AB 2004: .952 , AB 2005: .886, AB 2008: .874.

The three questions: “It makes you proud to be South African,” “You want your children to think of themselves as South African,” and “Being South African is an important part of how I see myself” are only available for years 1998 to 2008. All three questions were not asked in 1995 and 1997. To illustrate levels of national identity for the 1995 and 1997 survey years, I graphed the mean scores of the pride question with the means of the index over time. The mean responses for the question, “It makes you proud to be South African,” are almost identical to the means of the index over time (Figure 5.5 and APPENDIX B).

**Figure 5.5:**




**Figure 5.6:**



Disaggregating by race, we see that the mean index score for black South Africans is higher than the national average on the scale of national identity. Whites score the lowest on the index. All races show a trend downwards, except for South Asians. The trend line in Figure 5.7 shows that, in contrast with the rest of the population, national identity for South Asians is inclining.

**Figure 5.7:**




Two other metrics that also speak to national identity are questions that measure whether South Africans desire a united South African nation and whether they think such a nation is possible. Instead of asking about the respondents' attachment to the nation, these questions ask respondents about their vision of the nation and whether it includes 'the other'. The desire to create a united South African nation out of different groups comments on the respondents' inclusivity and desired content of the nation. The possibility of creating such a united nation comments on the perception of the future nation. Unfortunately no questions in the Afrobarometer survey ask whether the respondent feels that such a united South African nation already exists.

Table 5.2 shows a steady increase in the desire to create a united South Africa and the possibility of doing so until a decline in 2008. For every year, and every race, more South Africans desire a united nation than think it is possible.

<b>Table 5.2: Perceptions of the Nation South Africa 1997 - 2008</b>							
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2008</b>
It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this county							
Black	86	89	88	85	80	84	75
White	58	66	63	71	67	77	72
Coloured	94	91	95	72	88	86	83
South Asian	88	91	95	69	81	96	86
Total	83	86	85	80	80	84	76
It is possible to create such a united South African nation.							
Black	72	82	82	81	79	78	69
White	32	41	45	57	54	59	58
Coloured	70	78	84	71	71	76	77
South Asian	72	69	78	64	79	93	80
Total	67	75	77	75	75	76	69


Source: Idasa 1997, 1998 Afrobarometer: 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008  
 Note: Percentages of total respondents in each survey period that selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree."

**Figure 5.8:**




The percentage of people who think that it's possible to create one united South Africa range from 16 to 5 percentage points lower than those who think it's desirable. The greatest gap between respondents who desire a united South Africa and those who think it's possible occurred in 1997, with a 16 point difference. The points almost converge in 2004, with 85% of South Africans desiring a united South Africa and 77% thinking that such a nation is possible.

**Figure 5.9:**



**Figure 5.10:**



Isolating by race, we can see in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 that White South Africans had the least desire in creating a united South Africa and the least faith in its possibility in 1997. However, there is a steady increase in both, and White South Africans show the largest increase over time in the desire and perception of the possibility to create a united South Africa. Other race groups have declined in their desire to create a united South Africa.

Black and Coloured South Africans show a steady decline over time in the desire to create a united South Africa with a net decrease of 11 percentage points from 1997 to 2008 (Figure 5.11). South Asians show a very slight decline. White South Africans show the largest increase over time in the desire to create a united South Africa (Figure 5.12).

Figure 5.11:






Figure 5.12:



Black South Africans are the only group with a decline in the possibility to create a united South Africa, although this is a slight net decrease of 3 percentage points. Coloured South Africans have increased their faith in the possibility only slightly over time (Figure 5.13).

**Figure 5.13:**




On the other hand, White South Africans show the greatest increase in the belief that a united South Africa is possible, with a net increase of 26 percentage points, although they remain the least convinced of all the races, with only 58% in 2008 believing that it is a united South Africa is possible. A trend line also shows that belief in the possibility of a united South Africa is increasing for South Asians over time (Figure 5.14).

If 81% of the population feel that being South African is an important part of how they see themselves, but only 76% desire to create a united South African nation, and even fewer (69%) think that is it possible to created a united South African nation, that begs the question – what type of nation are they imagining? Who is in this imagined community and who is not? It’s clear that on the individual level, South African feel themselves a part of the nation. What is not clear is who else belongs in this political community, in other words, who belongs in the nation. These results give us a glimpse that South Africans do not have as high a sense of communal national identity as the preliminary results (the response to questions of South African pride)



would indicate. Although South Africans have a strong personal attachment to the nation, it is not matched with a willingness to extend nationhood to other South African citizens. Juxtaposed with the realities of growing inequality and poor race relations (Roefs 2006: 93), it is clear that although South Africans are imaging themselves as part of the nation, the second and perhaps more crucial aspect of national identity, the horizontal aspect of identifying with others in the nation, is lacking. It is also suggests that the survey questions that speak to national identity- pride in the nation, wanting one’s children to identify with the nation, and the nation being an important part of how people see themselves- are only measuring the vertical attachment to the nation.

**Figure 5.14:**




### **Perceptions of Inclusive Citizenship**

Before analyzing the effect of inclusive citizenship on national identity, it is first useful to understand how South Africans have viewed the state of political freedoms, equality before the

law, economic conditions, and economic equity. The following figures graph the mean scores on these indicators. (See Appendix C for tables of these scores).

**Figure 5.15:**



**Figure 5.16:**




Figure 5.17:




Figure 5.18:





Figure 5.19:



All these indicators show the mean score for each race and year. Overall, we can see that South Africans rate political freedoms the highest out of the indicators of inclusive citizenship. However, it is important to note that there has been a steady decline in how politically free South Africans feel themselves to be.

Perceptions about how the government is handling economic inequality fare the worst. South Africans are very dissatisfied with the way the government is handling the gap between the rich and poor, although there is a very slight improvement over the years.

Although the perception of current economic conditions has varied over the years, in 2008, it dropped to its lowest levels over the four years, indicating that South Africans are not satisfied with the current state of the country's economy and their own living conditions. This is juxtaposed with higher means for the perception of future economic conditions. Overall, South Africans are more optimistic about their future economic conditions than their present. Only for Whites and South Asians did the perception of future conditions mirror the perception of current conditions.

South Africans' perception equality under the law also ranked low, with a decline over the years. This indicates that South Africans are not satisfied with current state of justice. Of all the indicators of inclusive citizenship, the perception of political freedoms is the indicator that South Africans are satisfied with, although it barely reaches that mark. The other aspects of inclusive citizenship- economic equity, equality under the law, and present economic conditions- by 2008, all have mean scores below 2, meaning that South Africans are not satisfied with the state of these citizenship goods. Despite this, South Africans remain optimistic about their economic conditions in the future compared to their present economic conditions. However,

when comparing to previous years, South Africans are less optimistic about what the economic situation the future will be.

There is not much variation by race, with the exception of the perception of economic conditions in the future. Blacks and Coloureds are the most optimistic about their economic conditions in the future. On the other hand, the perception of future economic conditions for Whites and Coloureds are very much reflective of their current economic conditions, with very little increase, if any, between their perceptions of their current economic well-being with their perceptions of their future economic well-being.

When examining national identity over time, we see the levels of attachment to the nation decreasing rather than increasing as expected. There are variations among race, as expected, but all races, with the exception of South Asians, have decreasing levels of national identity over time. In so far as the ANC has realized the goals of inclusive citizenship, there is an overall dissatisfaction with economic equity, present economic conditions, and equality under the law. Further, South Africans are barely satisfied with the state of their political freedoms. The following chapter will test for the relationship between these elements of inclusive citizenship and national identity to understand how important these deliverables are to a sense of South African national identity.

## CHAPTER 6

### ANATYTICAL STATISTICS & HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The previous chapter demonstrated that South Africans, in general, have high levels of national identity although this has been in decline over the last ten years. Only South Asians showed a slight net increase in the national identity index over time. In order to address what informs this vertical sense of national identity, the following regressions will identify the relationships between elements of the ANC nation building program of inclusive citizenship and the dependent variable national identity.

Utilizing three separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions allows for testing the relationship between the independent variables that are believed to comprise the concept of inclusive citizenship and national identity, the dependent variable in question. OLS regression assumes a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. All independent variables that measure aspects of inclusive citizenship are on a continuous scale, making OLS regression an appropriate and easily understood method to use in determining the relationship between inclusive citizenship and national identity. Party affiliation, gender, age, urban/rural location, and race are treated as binary variables and therefore also appropriate in an OLS regression. OLS regressions allow us to ascertain the strength, direction, and statistical significance of any independent variables while holding other independent variables constant.

Examining the unstandardized Beta coefficients allows one to see the unique contribution of each independent variable in the prediction of the dependent variable. It can be considered a raw score, and is especially useful when comparing the effect of independent variables across years. However, the values of the Beta coefficients depend on the range of the independent variables, and they may vary in scale. To understand the relative contributions of each

independent variable on the dependent variable, the standardized Beta is especially useful.

Because the Beta coefficients are standardized, it allows one to compare the relative contributions of each independent variable on the dependent variable within the same model.

ANC nation-building discourse in South Africa has emphasized inclusive, non-racial nationalism (Muiu 2008:181). Critical to this discourse is the concept of inclusive citizenship. Essential to inclusive citizenship are notions of political freedom and equity. I further deconstructed equity into economic equity and equality before the law. To test whether perceptions of political freedom and equity have an effect on national identity, I include these concepts in the regression. Because economic justice and empowerment was so central to the ANC discourse on inclusive citizenship, I include economic indicators such as a lived poverty index, perceptions of present and future economic conditions, perceptions of relative economic well-being compared to other South Africans, as well as perceptions of how well the government is narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor.

Standard controls for socio-economic status are also included in the model. These are gender, urban location, education, and age cohorts. Including age enables testing of whether younger generations of South Africans (the 'born frees') identify with the nation more than older generations. In the analysis, I group age cohorts by age 16 or younger in 1996, when the South African Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Court. If being in this age group proves to be statistically significant, it would suggest that there is a socialization effect and that citizens can be socialized into feeling a part of and pride in the nation. To take into account the various ways citizens can receive the ANC's message of inclusive citizenship, I test for partisan support and affiliation. ANC supporters and opposition supporters are included as dummy variables in the regression models, with Non-Partisans included in the constant. Because the rhetoric on

inclusive citizenship was crucial to nation building in the ANC's message, it follows that ANC supporters would be the most receptive to it. News media consumption was also taken into account by including independent variables for newspaper, television, and radio news consumption.

I ran the three regression models for 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008. Lack of continuity in questions asked over the earlier rounds makes it impossible to run the same model for any years before 2002. There are slight variations in wording for political freedom items in 2008, which are noted in Appendix D. In 2002, the survey questions asked respondents to compare their political freedoms in the present to political freedoms during Apartheid. The wording in the 2004 and 2005 survey rounds ask respondents to compare their political freedoms to a few years ago and the 2008 survey simply asks about political freedoms in South Africa. Despite this slight variation, these items still embody the underlying concepts that measure the extent of perceived political freedoms.

By running OLS regressions for these years, we are able to see how the model fits over the 2002 to 2008 period. It sheds light on what informs national identity and how it has changed over time while allowing for comparisons by race. The first model tests for the relationship between the elements of inclusive citizenship with national identity with the entire population. The second model tests the same, while controlling for race. The third model tests for the added interaction effects of race and key variables of inclusive citizenship: perceptions of political freedom, equality before the law, economic equity, and future economic conditions. Due to the history of racial inequity in South Africa and the exclusion of those who were not White from the nation, how the elements of inclusive citizenship affect national identity may vary across



racial groups in terms of magnitude and direction. For this reason, including interaction effects allows me to test if the factors that affect national identity vary across races.

#### Model 1, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4

The first model for years 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008 shows that perception of political freedom has a strong and positive effect on national identity. In each survey year, political freedoms had the highest standardized Beta score, indicating that within each regression model, the perception of political freedoms has a stronger relationship to national identity than any other independent variable. ANC partisanship also has a strong relationship with national identity, which is to be expected since the ANC has been the ruling party since 1994 and many may be conflating the ANC (government) with South Africa (regime). The perception of equality before the law has a statistically significant relationship with national identity for each survey year, although the Beta coefficients are slight, ranging from .036 in 2002 to .072 in 2004. Among economic indicators, lived poverty has a negative relationship with national identity, which is to be expected given Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of needs—that those with deep poverty would feel less attachment to the nation. Since political freedoms have higher Beta coefficients than any of the other indicators of economic conditions, such as lived poverty, economic conditions compared to others, and perceptions of future economic conditions, this indicates that within the concept of inclusive citizenship, perceptions of political freedoms matter more for national identity than perceptions of economic well being. The perception of future economic conditions remains statistically significant over time and varies in the strength of the relationship with the weakest relationship in 2002 ( $B=.040$ ) and the strongest relationship in 2004 ( $B=.130$ ). In terms of news media consumption, when significant as in 2002 and 2008, newspaper consumption has

a negative relationship with national identity ( $B = -.046$  and  $-.034$ , respectively). Television news consumption, on the other hand, has a positive relationship with national identity (2008,  $B = .042$ ). This is to be expected, as newspaper media are more likely to feature investigative reporting, often with negative appraisals of government performance. Television news, with only two news providers (SABC ETV), tend to be more positive and provides less in depth news coverage. Gender, youth, age, radio news consumption, present economic condition, and opposition affiliation did not have a statistically significant effect on national identity for any of the survey years.

Model 1, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4

	2002		2004		2005		2008	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
(Constant)	2.426*** (.145)		1.704*** (.180)	.196	2.050*** (.122)		2.433*** (.155)	
Political Freedom	.170*** (.022)	.185	.242*** (.029)	.074	.201*** (.021)	.215	.178*** (.025)	.164
Equality Under the Law	.036** (.016)	.049	.072*** (.021)	-.021	.028 (.015)		.047** (.020)	.053
Gov Narrowing Income Gap	.048** (.021)	.053	-.024 (.026)		.034 (.018)		-.031 (.020)	
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	.062*** (.018)	.085	-.034 (.027)		.054** (.017)	.080	.000 (.021)	
Lived Poverty	-.072*** (.022)	-.079	-.002 (.027)		.032 (.019)		-.048** (.024)	-.049
Present Economic Conditions	.029 (.024)		-.002 (.039)		-.004 (.025)		-.032 (.027)	
Future Economic Conditions	.040** (.018)	.056	.130*** (.030)	-.028	.073*** (.020)	.090	.081*** (.019)	.107
Newspaper News	-.046*** (.013)	-.092	-.020 (.018)		.010 (.011)		-.034** (.015)	-.058
Television News	-.003 (.015)		.026 (.019)		.005 (.013)		.042** (.019)	.056
Radio News	.048 (.031)		.010 (.020)		-.017 (.016)		-.003 (.018)	
ANC	.212*** (.039)	.135	.156** (.052)	.022	.145*** (.033)	.100	.216*** (.043)	.119
Opposition	-.002 (.050)		.092 (.093)		-.039 (.057)		.066 (.057)	
Age	-.003 (.001)		.003 (.002)		.000 (.001)		.003 (.002)	
Youth	-.060 (.057)		-.023 (.069)		.002 (.046)		-.011 (.057)	
Education	-.004 (.012)		.027 (.017)		.020** (.010)	.049	-.019 (.014)	
Urban	-.095** (.038)	-.060	.101 (.055)		.077** (.034)	.051	.056 (.043)	
Male	-.027 (.034)		.015 (.047)		.047 (.030)		.024 (.038)	
Adjusted R Square	.146*** N=1862		.084*** N=2085		.128*** N= 2109		.081*** N=2055	

Dependent Variable = National Identity p≤.05\*\* p≤.01\*\*\* (Standard Error)  
 2002 youth = age 18-22; 2004 youth = age 18-24; 2005 youth = age 18-25; 2008 youth = age 18-28

Model 2, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4

When binary variables for race are added to the regression model, the adjusted r-square for each model increases for each year, indicating that these models are a better fit for predicting changes in levels of national identity. This could also be the result of the additional three

variables in the model, however it is important to note that the adjusted r-square values did not decrease in the second model. A strong race effect is also evident. Among the statistically significant relationships, being White has a strong relationship with national identity, although always negative. In 2005, being White had a B coefficient of .144 and 2008, the B= -.215. The direction of the coefficient shifts for Coloureds, with a positive relationship in 2004 (B=.261) and a negative relationship in 2005 (B= -.167). Being South Asian is only statistically significant in 2002 and has a negative relationship with national identity (B=-.220).

Despite this strong race effect, political freedom continues to have the highest Beta value in each year's model, meaning that perception of political freedoms accounts for the most difference in levels of national identity when compared to other independent variables in the model, including race. ANC partisanship also remains the second most important predictor for national identity except in 2004 and 2005, when the perception of future economic conditions has the second highest Beta loading in the model (.106 and .083, respectively).

When looking at statistically significant economic indicators, in general, perceptions of individual living conditions compared to others have higher Betas than other measures of economic conditions indicating that economic equity (that is, economic conditions relative to others) is more important to national identity than absolute economic conditions. As in the first model, the perception of future economic conditions has a positive and statistically significant relationship with national identity for each year, and perceptions of present economic conditions are not significant for any year. This indicates that, in terms of economic satisfaction, South Africans are more forward thinking when it comes to identity and belonging and what matters more is faith in the future rather than the conditions of the present. In terms of economic equity

evaluations for narrowing the gap between the rich and poor, this indicator of economic equity was only significant in 2002 with a B coefficient of .043.

As in the first model, perceptions of equality before the law have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable although not in 2005 (2002, B= .039; 2004, B= .072; 2008, B= .045). Also, as in the previous model, opposition partisanship, gender, age, youth, radio news consumption, and perceptions of present economic conditions do not have statistically significant relationships with national identity for any year. This indicates that having an allegiance to an opposition party is not necessarily associated with being unpatriotic. Likewise, since youth is never statistically significant in any model for any year, being 'born free' doesn't have an effect on national identity compared to those who are not 'born frees', i.e. lived under Apartheid. This indicates that there is less of a socialization effect on national identity than would be expected and that experiencing life (as someone who was 16 years or younger in 1996) in the 'New South Africa' doesn't necessarily affect one's sense of belonging in the nation.

Education has a positive relationship with national identity in 2004 and 2005, although the relationship is weak relative to other independent variables in the model (B= .038 and .024, respectively). One interesting finding is that in 2002, being from an Urban setting had a negative effect on national identity, but in 2005 the results were the opposite (B=-.88 and .097, respectively). This statistical anomaly might be affected by migration from rural to urban areas, but I am hesitant to draw that conclusion without further investigation.

Model 2, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4

	2002		2004		2005		2008	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
(Constant)	2.467*** (.147)		1.663 (.180)		2.114*** (.123)		2.498*** (.157)	
Political Freedom	.172*** (.023)	.187	.237*** (.029)	.192	.193*** (.021)	.206	.170*** (.025)	.156
Equality Under the Law	.039** (.016)	.053	.072*** (.021)	.073	.027 (.014)		.045** (.020)	.050
Gov Narrowing Income Gap	.043** (.021)	.047	-.026 (.026)		.030 (.018)		-.032 (.021)	
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	.063*** (.018)	.086	-.032 (.027)		.055*** (.017)	.082	-.002 (.021)	
Lived Poverty	-.075*** (.023)	-.082	.005 (.027)		.021 (.019)		-.074** (.025)	-.074
Present Economic Conditions	.035 (.024)		.002 (.039)		-.005 (.025)		-.033 (.027)	
Future Economic Conditions	.036** (.018)	.050	.123*** (.030)	.106	.067*** (.020)	.083	.070*** (.019)	.092
Newspaper News	-.043*** (.013)	-.086	-.022 (.018)		.012 (.011)		-.029 (.015)	
Television News	-.002 (.015)		.019 (.019)		.006 (.013)		.042** (.019)	.056
Radio News	.048 (.031)		.014 (.020)		-.022 (.016)		-.004 (.018)	
ANC	.213*** (.040)	.136	.158** (.054)	.072	.117*** (.034)	.081	.168*** (.045)	.093
Opposition	.000 (.050)		.088 (.093)		-.012 (.057)		.077 (.058)	
Age	-.003 (.001)		.003 (.002)		.000 (.001)		.004 (.002)	
Youth	-.059 (.057)		-.015 (.069)		.003 (.046)		-.014 (.057)	
Education	-.013 (.012)		.038** (.018)	.057	.024** (.010)	.058	-.011 (.014)	
Urban	-.088** (.038)	-.056	.087 (.056)		.097** (.034)	.065	.078 (.044)	
Male	-.028 (.033)		.012 (.047)		.046 (.030)		.023 (.038)	
White	.092 (.062)		-.087 (.091)		-.144** (.056)	-.064	-.215*** (.065)	-.092
Coloured	-.074 (.053)		.261** (.084)	.070	-.167** (.054)	-.068	-.069 (.060)	
South Asian	-.220*** (.082)	-.063	.043 (.110)		.025 (.092)		-.171 (.091)	
Adjusted R Square	.151*** N=1862		.089*** N=2085		.132*** N=2109		.094*** N=2055	

Dependent Variable = National Identity p≤.05\*\* p≤.01\*\*\* (Standard Error)

2002 youth = age 18-22; 2004 youth = age 18-24; 2005 youth = age 18-25; 2008 youth = age 18-28

### Model 3, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 with race and interaction effects

The final model adds interaction effects to better understand how race has a moderating effect between elements of inclusive citizenship and national identity. Again, the adjusted r-squares in the final model are higher for every survey year than the previous models, indicating that adding interaction effects of race and elements of inclusive citizenship, results in a regression model that is a better fit model for predicting national identity than the previous models. Although, as in the previous model, this may be the result of the additional twelve independent variables in this model.

The constant, which would be a Black rural female with no education, no party affiliation, no age, and a zero score on the other measures, is highest in 2008 ( $B=2.891$ ) and lowest in 2004 ( $B=1.575$ ) on the national identity index. Radio news consumption, opposition party affiliation, youth, age, and gender do not have a statistically significant relationship with national identity.

Controlling for race and interaction effects within economic indicators, economic equity, when significant as in 2001 and 2005, has higher standardized Beta coefficients than any other economic indicator, suggesting that relative economic satisfaction is more pertinent to national identity than absolute economic conditions.

ANC partisanship continues to have a strong and positive effect on national identity, which is to be expected. The effect of urban location and education play out in much the same way as in the previous model, with education having a positive, but small effect on national identity in 2004 and 2005 ( $B=.037$  and  $.025$ , respectively), and being from an urban setting having a negative effect in 2002 and a positive effect in 2005 ( $B=-.099$  and  $.093$ , respectively).

Considering that the third model tests for interaction effects, we still see that race has a statistically significant impact on national identity and that it varies over time. For example, in 2005 and 2008, being White had a strong and negative effect on national identity ( $B = -.455$  and  $B = -1.364$ , respectively). Being South Asian in 2008 had a very strong, negative relationship with national identity ( $B = -.770$ ) and in these models, being Coloured also had a strong and negative relationship in 2005 ( $B = -.919$ ).

To explore whether and how elements of inclusive citizenship matter to people of different races, we look at the interaction effects. Among the interacted variables, the perception of political freedoms continues to have the strongest effect on national identity among the independent variables that relate to inclusive citizenship. To understand the relationship of the interacted term with the dependent variable, one needs to calculate the slope for each race by adding the B coefficient of each interacted term to the control variable.

For Blacks, the perception of political freedom was statistically significant for each year (2002,  $B = .215$ ; 2004,  $B = .273$ ; 2005,  $B = .176$ ; 2008,  $B = .084$ ). For Whites, the perception of political freedoms were only significant for 2002, 2004, and 2008 (calculated slope =  $.007$ ,  $.021$  and  $.315$ , respectively). For Coloureds, the perceptions of political freedoms is statistically significant in 2002, 2004, and 2005 (calculated slope =  $.033$ ,  $.129$  and  $.335$ , respectively). Only in 2002 and 2008 was the relationship between political freedoms and national identity statistically significant for South Asians (calculated slope =  $.366$  and  $.307$ , respectively). Results from 2002 illustrate how the perceptions of political freedoms matter differently to national identity for different races. Political freedoms barely have an effect on national identity for Whites and Coloureds in 2002. However, for Blacks and South Asians, the perception of political freedom matters greatly for their sense of national identity. Over the years, these



relationships change drastically. For Blacks, the importance of political freedoms decline over the years. In contrast, for Whites and Coloureds, the perceptions of political freedoms become more important to a sense of national identity over the years. For South Asians, the importance decrease slightly, but is still quite high on par with Whites and Coloureds.

Economic equity is another important variable in determining the strength of national identity, but changes depending on race. The perception of how well the government is improving the gap between the rich and poor are only statistically significant for Blacks in 2008 ( $B = .077$ ). For Whites, the perception of economic equity is significant in 2002 and 2008 (calculated slope = .171 and .112, respectively). For Coloureds this relationship is significant in 2005 (calculated slope = .192). Surprisingly, the relationship between economic equity and national identity is negative for South Asians (2005, calculated slope = -.249; 2008, calculated slope = -.350). There is not much change in the importance of economic equity over time within each race group, but there is a change in the relative importance compared to political freedoms over time. For Whites, in 2002, economic equity had a stronger relationship with national identity than political freedom. By 2008, the reverse is true. Political freedoms are more important to a sense of national identity than economic equity.

Another measure of economic well-being, the perception of future economic conditions, are statistically significant for Blacks in 2004, 2005, and 2008 ( $B = .135, .054$  and  $.055$ , respectively), for Whites in 2005 (calculated slope = .162), and for South Asians in 2008 (calculated slope = .288). This indicates that, when significant, the perception of future economic well-being affected a sense of national identity more so to Whites and South Asians, than for Blacks.

The remaining interaction term of note is the perception of equality under the law. Statistically significant for Blacks in 2002 and 2005 ( $B = .045$  and  $.075$ , respectively) and for Whites in 2008 (calculated slope =  $.160$ ), it is interesting to note that for Whites in 2008, the perception of justice matters less than the perception of political freedoms, but slightly more than economic equity.

To address the question of whether notions of inclusive citizenship matter to national identity, we see that these elements of inclusive citizenship do matter. However, the effects of freedoms and equity on national identity vary. Overall, the perceptions of political freedoms have a stronger effect on national identity than perceptions of economic well being.

We can see that in the final model race still has a statistically significant effect on national identity. However, the effect of race isn't consistent over the years. The adjusted  $r$  squares of each model range from  $.091$  in 2004 to  $.162$  in 2002, meaning that at best, this model is only explaining about 16% of the variation in national identity. This is perfectly acceptable by political science standards, but it also indicates that there are other things, which as Erasmus says, 'lives behind the categories of race' that are not being represented in the model.

From the final regression model, we see that notions of inclusive citizenship matter in different ways to South Africans of different races. There are statistically significant interaction effects, which indicate that notions of inclusive citizenship do matter differently, in type and degree. However, these effects change over time and are not consistent. For Blacks, the importance of political freedoms, one of the strongest predictors for national identity, is decreasing over time, whereas for Whites, it is increasing, the same is true for Coloureds and South Asians.

Perhaps, more importantly, the fact that they are inconsistent may indicate that the different ways the elements of inclusive citizenship matter to different races is not influenced by a legacy of the denial of formal and substantive citizenship under apartheid, but rather a reflection of the political and economic climate of the time the survey was taken.

Model 3, Afrobarometer Rounds 2, 2.5, 3 and 4 with race and interaction effects

	2002		2004		2005		2008	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
(Constant)	2.350*** (.164)		1.575*** (.187)		2.220*** (.132)		2.891*** (.171)	
Political Freedom	.215*** (.031)	.234	.273*** (.033)	.221	.176*** (.025)	.188	.084** (.032)	.077
Equality Under the Law	.045** (.019)	.061	.075** (.024)	.076	.028 (.016)		.021 (.023)	
Gov Narrowing Income Gap	.032 (.024)		-.046 (.028)		.030 (.020)		-.077** (.024)	-.081
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	.059*** (.018)	.081	-.032 (.027)		.055*** (.017)	.081	-.009 (.021)	
Lived Poverty	-.072** (.023)	-.079	.003 (.027)		.017 (.019)		-.089*** (.025)	-.089
Present Economic Conditions	.041 (.024)		.004 (.039)		-.011 (.025)		-.053** (.027)	-.054
Future Economic Conditions	.033 (.020)		.135*** (.033)	.115	.054** (.022)	.067	.055** (.023)	.073
Newspaper News	-.042*** (.013)	-.085	-.021 (.018)		.012 (.011)		-.020 (.015)	
Television News	-.002 (.015)		.018 (.019)		.009 (.013)		.041** (.019)	.054
ANC	.209*** (.040)	.134	.159** (.054)	.072	.116*** (.034)	.080	.178*** (.045)	.098
Education	-.012 (.012)		.037** (.018)	.055	.025** (.010)	.060	-.009 (.014)	
Urban	-.099** (.038)	-.062	.084 (.056)		.093** (.034)	.062	.080 (.043)	
White	.349 (.193)		.235 (.363)		-.455** (.170)	-.202	-1.364*** (.172)	-.577
Coloured	.411 (.224)		.639 (.388)		-.919** (.324)	-.374	-.282 (.224)	
South Asian	-.335 (.295)		.305 (.487)		.722 (.513)		-.770** (.350)	-.195
White_PolFree	-.222*** (.062)	-.255	-.252 (.115)	-.176	.034 (.055)		.231*** (.060)	.230
Coloured_PolFree	-.182** (.066)	-.238	-.144 (.106)		.159** (.081)	.207	-.011 (.077)	
SouthAsian_PolFree	.151** (.074)	.122	-.106 (.133)		-.147 (.132)		.223** (.113)	.142
White_Gov Narrowing Income Gap	.139** (.069)	.123	.155 (.099)		-.026 (.057)		.185** (.059)	.169
Coloured_Gov Narrowing Income Gap	-.014 (.064)		.177 (.096)		.162** (.065)	.130	.120 (.063)	
SouthAsian_Gov Narrowing Income Gap	-.073 (.105)		-.038 (.133)		-.279** (.113)	-.150	-.273** (.127)	-.125
WhiteFutureEcon	.000 (.053)		.017 (.097)		.108** (.053)	.123	.041 (.054)	
ColouredFutureEcon	.036 (.050)		-.151 (.103)		.000 (.070)		-.039 (.050)	
SouthAsianFutureEcon	.030 (.085)		-.026 (.127)		.097 (.118)		.233** (.081)	.132
WhiteEqualUnderLaw	.047 (.050)		-.014 (.076)		.001 (.047)		.139** (.060)	.095
ColouredEqualUnderLaw	.007 (.050)		.037 (.076)		-.028 (.049)		.054 (.059)	
SouthAsianEqualUnderLaw	-.105 (.085)		.090 (.098)		.053 (.095)		.025 (.095)	
Adjusted R Square	.162*** N=1862		.091*** N=2085		.138*** N=2109		.111*** N=2043	

Dependent Variable = National Identity p≤.05\*\* p≤.01\*\*\* (Standard Error)

2002 youth = age 18-22; 2004 youth = age 18-24; 2005 youth = age 18-25; 2008 youth = age 18-28

\* The independent variables Radio News, Opposition, Age, and Youth were tested in this regression model but were excluded from the table because they did not have a statistically significant effect on national identity for any year.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

Results from Afrobarometer support the argument that a majority of South Africans subscribe to a national identity. National identity, when measured vertically, is strong in South Africa. However, levels of this identity are in an overall decline from 1995 to 2008. Further, there is some variation in levels of national identity by race. While a sense of national identity is in decline for most South Africans, for South Asians, there is a slight increase in the strength of national identity between 1998 and 2008.

When examining whether South Africans desire a united South African nation and whether they think it is possible, there are notable variations among race. Overall, there is a decline in the desire to create a united nation, with the exception of White attitudes. More dramatic, is the attitude shift of Whites in their opinion of whether a united nation is possible. With a 25 percentage point increase between 1997 and 2008, more Whites feel that it is possible to have a united South African nation than they did before. While Blacks are becoming less optimistic about the possibility of having an inclusive South Africa, Whites, Coloureds and South Asians are becoming more optimistic about uniting a diverse nation.

The ANC rhetoric of nation building stressed inclusive citizenship which encompassed the ideals of freedom and equity, both political and economic. Despite this rhetoric of inclusive citizenship, the ANC's nation building program focused its policies on economic development and equity. When breaking these concepts down into measurable indicators, such as perceptions of political freedoms, equality under the law, economic equity, economic conditions, and lived poverty, analysis of public opinion demonstrates that South Africans are dissatisfied with these deliverables. Among these indicators, South Africans are most satisfied with the state of their

political freedoms, although this satisfaction has declined over the years. They are most dissatisfied with the state of economic equity in South Africa, specifically with the way the government is handling narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor.

Based on statistical analysis, certain elements of the nation building discourse of inclusive citizenship have a stronger relationship to national identity than others. Perceptions of political freedoms were more often a significant indicator of national identity than was economic equity or equality before the law, indicating that despite the efforts of the ANC nation building efforts that focused on economic development, South Africans find political freedoms more important to their sense of national identity than economic conditions, either relative or absolute. However, when looking among economic indicators only, the perception of a person's relative economic well-being compared to other South Africans had a stronger relationship with national identity than any other economic indicator, such as perceptions of current and future economic conditions and poverty. This suggests that the materialist argument to explain national sentiment is not valid in the South African case. Likewise, evidence from this analysis suggests that there is no socialization effect since the 'born frees' were not more likely to identify with the nation than older generations who lived under the previous apartheid regime.

Further, as suspected, there is a race effect when examining the relationship between aspects of inclusive citizenship and national identity. However, these results are not consistent over the years, and we see a shift of the relative importance of political freedoms. For Blacks, political freedoms are becoming less important to a sense of national belonging. For Whites and Coloureds, it has become more important over the years. And for South Asians, the relevance of political freedoms to national identity has remained roughly the same over the years.

This analysis of the determinants of national identity in South Africa indicates that the ANC nation building program, that referenced inclusive citizenship but emphasized economic development, was misguided on two fronts. Not only are South Africans dissatisfied with the delivery of economic aspects of inclusive citizenship, this analysis shows that economic well-being and equity in the country are less relevant to a sense of national identity as other aspects of inclusive citizenship, such as the quality of political freedoms.

## **Suggestions For Further Research**

This study was an inaugural attempt to understand what informs a person's sense of national identity in South Africa. Because there has not been a systematic, quantitative study with national identity as the dependent variable, this is a useful beginning to explore how national identity is formed and influenced. It is also useful to explore to what extent ANC nation building discourse of inclusive citizenship affects national identity in South Africa.

Of course, the perceptions of freedoms and equity, both political and economic, are not the only factors that may influence a person's sense of national identity. Because South Africa is a civic nation, tied to democratic ideals and system of government, it may be useful to test for other measures of satisfaction with government performance, perceptions of corruption, and perception of political representation in government to future regression models.

I also suggest adding a measurement of national identity to future rounds of Afrobarometer that speaks to the respondent's attachment to others within South Africa. Currently, the multidimensional quality of national identity is not being adequately measured. In addition, I recommend that future rounds of Afrobarometer surveys allow for the respondent to self-identify their race, rather than the interviewer.

Finally, a simultaneous equation model (SEM) would enable testing of the independent variables on more than one dependent variable, such as vertical and horizontal national identity (if both of those measures became available). A SEM would also be able to measure the simultaneous effects of each independent variable on the dependent variable as well as the other independent variables within the model, providing a more accurate picture of what informs national identity.



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## APPENDIX A: National Identity Index Creation

### National Identity Index Creation – Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis

	Item Wording	Factor Loading	Treatment of 'Don't Knows'
<b>2008 Afrobarometer Round 4</b>			
Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.398) explains 69.988% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .874		recoded into middle category
	It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.856	
	You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.849	
	Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.804	
<b>2006 Afrobarometer Round 3</b>			
Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.445) explains 72.431% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .886		recoded into middle category
	It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.871	
	You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.881	
	Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.798	
<b>2004 Afrobarometer Round 2.5</b>			
Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.737) explains 86.944% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .952		recoded into middle category
	It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.925	
	You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.966	
	Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.906	

**2002 Afrobarometer Round 2**

	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.555) explains 77.809% of common variance.		recoded into middle category
Index	Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .913		
	It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.88	
	You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.908	
	Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.858	

**2000 Afrobarometer Round 1**

	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.331) explains 66.647% of common variance.		recoded into middle category
Index	Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .856		
	It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.801	
	You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.854	
	Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.793	

**1998 Idasa**

	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue =2.228) explains 61.597% of common variance.		recoded into middle category
Index	Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .827		
	It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.8	
	You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.728	
	Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.824	

## APPENDIX B: Univariate Analysis

Mean scores	1995	1997	1998	2000	2002	2004	2005	2008
National Identity Index			3.41	3.38	3.18	3.12	3.30	3.15
Proud to be called a South African	3.43	3.47	3.46	3.42	3.19	3.12	3.32	3.20

## APPENDIX C: Perceptions of Inclusive Citizenship

Perceptions of Political Freedoms				
	2002	2004	2005	2008
Black	3.22	3.04	3.20	2.38
White	2.31	2.23	2.59	2.04
Coloured	2.83	2.87	3.10	2.35
South Asian	2.53	2.62	3.30	2.40
Total	3.00	2.91	3.12	2.32

Scale = 0-4

Perceptions of Equality Under the Law				
	2002	2004	2005	2008
Black	1.71	1.69	1.78	1.55
White	1.24	1.41	1.56	1.26
Coloured	1.48	1.67	1.47	1.37
South Asian	1.59	1.39	1.94	1.28
Total	1.60	1.64	1.73	1.46

Scale = 0-3

Perceptions of How the Government is Handling Narrowing the Gap Between the Rich and Poor				
	2002	2004	2005	2008
Black	0.82	1.22	1.07	1.00
White	0.77	0.67	0.89	0.93
Coloured	0.76	1.06	0.79	0.78
South Asian	0.59	0.69	1.14	0.68
Total	0.79	1.11	1.03	0.94

Scale = 0-3

Perceptions of Current Economic Conditions				
	2002	2004	2005	2008
Black	1.84	2.14	2.19	1.79
White	1.62	2.11	2.18	1.49
Coloured	1.76	2.24	2.15	1.57
South Asian	1.80	2.10	2.49	1.90
Total	1.79	2.15	2.19	1.72

Scale = 0-4

Perceptions of Future Economic Conditions				
	2002	2004	2005	2008
Black	2.37	2.45	2.75	2.29
White	1.72	1.94	2.30	1.44
Coloured	2.08	2.47	2.68	2.03
South Asian	1.57	2.26	2.95	1.89
Total	2.20	2.38	2.70	2.09

Scale = 0-4

## APPENDIX D: Variables in the Analysis

### 2002 Afrobarometer Round 2

#### Variables in the Analysis

		Item Wording	Factor Loading	Treatments of 'Don't Knows'
<b>Dependent Variable</b>				
National Identity	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.322) explains 77.405% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .911 Here are some things people say about the way they feel about South Africa. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your opinion. Please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these statements: It makes you proud to be called a South African. You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.882 0.904 0.852	recoded into middle category
<b>Independent Variables</b>				
Gender	Item	Respondent's gender (Answered by interviewer)		n/a
Race	Item	Respondent's race (Answered by interviewer)		dropped
Urban	Item	Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Answered by interviewer)		n/a
Age	Item	How old were you at your last birthday?		dropped
Youth	Item	Age 18 to 22 = 1, Age 23-91 =0		n/a
Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?		dropped
ANC		Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that? <sup>25</sup>		n/a
Opposition		Do you feel close to any particular political party? If so, which party is that? <sup>26</sup>		n/a

<sup>25</sup> Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress.

<sup>26</sup> Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Muslim Party, African Christian Democratic Party, Afrikaner Unity Movement/Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging, Azanian Peoples Organization, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party/Demokratiese Alliansie – Demokratiese Party, Federal Alliance, Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront, Inkata Freedom Party/Inkatha Vryheidsparty, Minority Front, New National Party/Nuwe Nasionale Party, Pan Africanist Congress, United Christian Democratic Party, United Democratic Movement, or Other.

Political Freedom	Index	<p>Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.1) explains 69.324% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .867</p> <p>We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of Apartheid rule. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same:</p> <p>Freedom to say what you think? 0.822</p> <p>Freedom to join any political organization you want? 0.908</p> <p>Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 0.761</p>	recoded into middle category
Equality before the Law	Item	In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law?	dropped, scale reversed
Economic Equity	Item	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?	dropped
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	Item	In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other South Africans?	recoded into middle category
News Media	Item Item Item	How often do you get news from the following sources? Newspapers Television Radio	dropped
Lived Poverty	Index	<p>Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.804) explains 46.741% of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .831.</p> <p>Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without:</p> <p>Enough food to eat? 0.692</p> <p>Enough clean water for home use? 0.606</p> <p>Medicines or medical treatment? 0.704</p> <p>Enough fuel to cook your food? 0.782</p> <p>A cash income? 0.639</p> <p>Electricity in your home? 0.666</p>	dropped
Present Economic Conditions	Index	<p>Single unrotated factor (Initial Eigenvalue = 2.1) explains 52.558% of the total variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .691.</p> <p>Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago:</p> <p>Economic conditions in this country? .419</p> <p>Your living conditions? .440</p>	(Initial Communalities) recoded into middle category

		In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country? Your own present living conditions?	.338 .354	
Future Economic Conditions	Construct	The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .784. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .878.  Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time? Your living conditions in twelve months time?		recoded into middle category

## 2004 Afrobarometer Round 2.5

### Variables in the Analysis

		Item Wording	Factor Loading	Treatments of 'Don't Knows'
<b>Dependent Variable</b>				
National Identity	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.59) explains 86.322% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .949 Here are some things people say about the way they feel about South Africa. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your opinions. Please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these statements. It makes you proud to be called a South African. You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.918 0.964 0.905	recoded into middle category

### Independent Variables

Gender	Item	Respondent's gender (Answered by interviewer)		n/a
Race	Item	Respondent's race (Answered by interviewer)		dropped
Urban	Item	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit (Answered by interviewer)		n/a
Age	Item	How old were you at your last birthday?		dropped
Youth	Item	Age 18-24=1, Age 25-91=0		n/a
Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?		n/a

ANC		Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? <sup>27</sup>	n/a
Opposition		Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? <sup>28</sup>	n/a
Political Freedom	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.712) explains 57.072% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .778 Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, or are they about the same: Freedom to say what you think? 0.831 Freedom to join any political organization you want? 0.838 Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 0.565	recoded into middle category
Equality before the Law	Item	In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law?	dropped, scale reversed
Economic Equity	Item	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?	dropped
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	Item	In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other South Africans?	recoded into middle category
News Media	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources: Newspapers? Television? Radio?	dropped
Lived Poverty	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 3.202) explains 53.366% of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .863. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat? 0.750 Enough clean water for home use? 0.735 Medicines or medical treatment? 0.744 Enough fuel to cook your food? 0.848	dropped

<sup>27</sup> Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress.

<sup>28</sup> Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party (AMP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Alliance, Freedom Front, Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, New National Party, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement(UDM), Independent Democrats (ID), or Other.

		A cash income?	0.663	
		Electricity in your home?	0.623	
Present Economic Conditions	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.657) explains 41.433% of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .733. Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country? Your living conditions? In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country? Your own present living conditions?	.671 .767 .541 .571	recoded into middle category
Future Economic Conditions	Construct	The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .697. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .821.  Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time? Your living conditions in twelve months time?		recoded into middle category

### 2005 Afrobarometer Round 3

#### Variables in the Analysis

		Item Wording	Factor Loading	Treatments of 'Don't Knows'
<b>Dependent Variable</b>				
National Identity	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.185) explains 72.821% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .888 Here are some things people say about the way they feel about South Africa. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your opinions. Please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these statements. It makes you proud to be called a South African. You would want your children to think of themselves as South African. Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	.875 .882 .800	recoded into middle category

#### Independent Variables

Gender	Item	Respondent's gender (Answered by interviewer)	n/a
Race	Item	Respondent's race (Answered by interviewer)	dropped
Urban	Item	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit (Answered	n/a



		by interviewer)	
Age	Item	How old are you?	dropped
Youth	Item	Age 18-25=1, Age 26-91=0	n/a
Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	n/a
ANC		Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? <sup>29</sup>	n/a
Opposition		Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? <sup>30</sup>	n/a
Political Freedom	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.957) explains 65.229% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .844 Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were a few years ago, or are they about the same: Freedom to say what you think? 0.801 Freedom to join any political organization you want? 0.890 Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? 0.724	recoded into middle category
Equality before the Law	Item	In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law?	dropped, scale reversed
Economic Equity	Item	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?	dropped
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	Item	In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other South Africans?	recoded into middle category
News Media	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources: Newspapers? Television? Radio?	dropped
Lived Poverty	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 3.161) explains 52.676% of the common variance.	dropped

<sup>29</sup> Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress.

<sup>30</sup> Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party (AMP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), Christian Party, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Alliance, Federal Democrats, Freedom Front, Independent Democrats (ID), Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, National Democratic Convention (NADECO), New National Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Progressive Independent Movement, United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement (UDM), United Independent Front, United Party of South Africa, or Other.

Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .866.

		Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat?	0.685	
		Enough clean water for home use?	0.666	
		Medicines or medical treatment?	0.740	
		Enough fuel to cook your food?	0.809	
		A cash income?	0.750	
		Electricity in your home?	0.696	
Present Economic Conditions	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.816) explains 45.407% of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .758.		recoded into middle category
		Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago:		
		Economic conditions in this country?	.737	
		Your living conditions?	.783	
		In general, how would you describe:		
		The present economic conditions of this country?	.576	
		Your own present living conditions?	.572	
Future Economic Conditions	Construct	The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .753. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .859.		recoded into middle category
		Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse:		
		Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time?		
		Your living conditions in twelve months time?		

## 2008 Afrobarometer Round 4

### Variables in the Analysis

		Item Wording	Factor Loading	Treatments of 'Don't Knows'
<b>Dependent Variable</b>				
	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.166) explains 72.205% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .886		recoded into middle category
		It makes you proud to be called a South African.	0.867	
		You would want your children to think of themselves as South African.	0.860	
		Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	0.821	

### Independent Variables

Gender	Item	What is the respondent's gender? (Answered by interviewer)	n/a
Race	Item	Respondent's race (Answered by interviewer)	dropped
Urban	Item	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit (Answered by interviewer)	n/a
Age	Item	How old are you?	n/a
Youth	Item	Age 18-28=1, Age 29-97=0	
Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	n/a
ANC		Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? <sup>31</sup>	n/a
Opposition		Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? <sup>32</sup>	n/a
Political Freedom	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.010) explains 67.003% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .850.	recoded into middle
		In this country, how free are you: To say what you think?	.683
		To join any political organization you want?	.886
		To vote for without feeling pressured?	.871
Equality before the Law	Item	In your opinion, how often, in this country are people treated unequally under the law?	dropped, scale reversed
Economic Equity	Item	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? Narrowing gaps between rich and poor	dropped
Individual Living Conditions vs. Others	Item	In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other South Africans?	recoded into middle category
News Media	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources: Newspapers?	dropped
	Item	Television?	
	Item	Radio?	
Lived Poverty	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.952) explains 49.193% of the common variance.	dropped

<sup>31</sup> Coded ANC if respondent chose African National Congress.

<sup>32</sup> Coded Opposition if respondent chose African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party (AMP), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Alliance of Free Democrats, Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), Christian Party, Democratic Alliance-Democratic Party (DA-DP), Federal Democrats, Freedom Front, Independent Democrats (ID), Inkata Freedom Party, Minority Front, National Democratic Convention (NADECO), New National Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement (UDM), United Independent Front, ANC Breakaway Party / new Lekota or George or Shilowa Party or Movement / National Conference Party or Movement, or Other.

Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .844.

		Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without:	.722	
		Enough food to eat?		
		Enough clean water for home use?	.638	
		Medicines or medical treatment?	.692	
		Enough fuel to cook your food?	.834	
		A cash income?	.662	
		Electricity in your home?	.641	
Present Economic Conditions	Index	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.721) explains 43.026% of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .744.		recoded into middle category
		Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago:	.704	
		Economic conditions in this country?		
		Your living conditions?	.790	
		In general, how would you describe:		
		The present economic conditions of this country?	.547	
		Your own present living conditions?	.550	
Future Economic Conditions	Construct	The two items are correlated (Pearson's r) at .768. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .868.		recoded into middle category
		Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse:		
		Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time?		
		Your living conditions in twelve months time?		