

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
Department of Political Studies

**The Impact of the 2004 Election Campaign on the Quality of
Democracy in South Africa**

Thesis Presented for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Submitted By

Cherrel Jane Africa

AUGUST 2008

Supervisor: Professor Robert Mattes

DECLARATION

I, Cherrel Jane Africa, hereby declare that, that apart from the normal guidance from my supervisor, this thesis is my own unaided work, both in concept and execution. Neither the substance nor any part of the above thesis has been submitted in the past, or is being, or is to be submitted for a degree at this University or at any other university. Each contribution to, and quotation in, this thesis from the work(s) of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. I am now presenting the thesis for examination for the degree of PhD.

University of Cape Town

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to

The loving memory of my parents, Daniel Francis and Delia Jane Thebus, who died before they could taste the fruits of democracy in South Africa.

And

My husband John and my sons, Joshua and Daniel: Your presence, encouragement and support kept me moving forward: I love and thank you – you are my lifeblood.

University of Cape Town

ABSTRACT

Despite the critical relationship between election campaigns and the quality of democracy, it is an understudied phenomenon. Moreover, in South Africa, there has never been a systematic study of an entire election campaign. In this thesis I assess whether the 2004 election campaign hindered or enhanced the quality of South Africa's democracy. I adapt Lasswell's model of persuasive communication (which views the source, content, medium, recipient and effect as crucial parts of the communicative process) as well as concepts set out by Diamond and Morlino (2005), Powell (2005) and Buchanan (2001) to develop an integrated analytical model to assess how an election campaign can contribute to the quality of democracy.

I bring together a wide set of data, much of it original, into a unique body of evidence which I use to evaluate the extent to which South Africa's 2004 campaign contributed to or detracted from the quality of democracy. I thus provide a systematic assessment of the caliber of information and choices offered by political parties to voters in 2004 election.

Juxtaposing my empirical findings against my analytical model reveals a bleak picture of campaigning in South Africa. Every component of my model received a predominantly negative assessment. A substantial body of voters without firm partisan attachments (but with low levels of internal efficacy and largely negative images of opposition parties and their leaders) had unprecedented access to the mass media and were available to be persuaded by political parties. However, parties failed to provide distinctions between their policies, instead promising similar outcomes without adequately communicating their strategies. Campaign messages therefore blurred rather than illuminated the choices for voters. The poor communication by parties was further compounded by the media's pre-occupation with conflict and hostility between party leaders. I therefore find that in the 2004 election the campaign damaged, rather than enhanced, the quality of democracy in South Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the A.W. Mellon Foundation; the National Research Foundation (NRF); the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD); the Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) at the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) and the Centre for African Studies at UCT.

I owe particular appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Robert Mattes, who has mentored me for more than a decade, who has always pushed me to go one step further and whose high standards, expertise and overall guidance have inspired me. I am also especially appreciative of the substantive feedback and assistance given to me by Dr Per Strand.

I would also like to express my appreciation to:

- Washeelah Kapery and the staff at Citizen Surveys for their professionalism, willingness to “go the extra mile” and for producing a set of good quality focus group discussions;
- Wadim Schreiner and the staff at Media Tenor, who faced a colossal task during the compilation of the content analysis data-set, for their attention to detail and to Wadim in particular, for his willingness to answer my continuous stream of questions;
- My husband John Africa, who proof-read several versions of both my proposal and thesis;
- Gavin Davis for his valuable input into the conceptualization phase of this study, the groundwork that he did on the Comparative National Elections Project and the use of the interviews that he conducted with political party media strategists;
- Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Mary Kinney, Glen Mpani, Danga Mughogho, Joao Pereira, Carlos, Shenga, Kimberly Smiddy and Dadisai Taderera at the Democracy in Africa Research Unit for their insights and support during this long journey;
- The staff at the Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, particularly Libby Downes and Kathy Forbes and the Post-graduate Funding office, particularly

- Zerina Davis, for their administrative and logistical support;
- Dianne Steele from UCT library for her referencing expertise.

I would also like to express my gratitude to family, friends, colleagues and fellow-students, too many to mention individually, who encouraged and supported me in various ways.

Finally, I am thankful to Almighty God for sustaining me and enabling me to complete this thesis.

University of Cape Town

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
DA	Democratic Alliance
CNEP	Comparative National Elections Project
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSSR	Centre for Social Science Research
DARU	Democracy in Africa Research Unit
ID	Independent Democrats
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
EISA	Electoral Institute of South Africa
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MMP	Media Monitoring Project
MT	Media Tenor
NNP	New National Party (National Party before 1997)
PR	Proportional Representation
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PEB	Public Education Broadcasts
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAARF	South African Advertising Research Foundation
SETA	Sector Education Training Authority
UCT	University of Cape Town
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDM	United Democratic Movement
VAP	Voting Age Population

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	I
DEDICATION	II
ABSTRACT	III
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	IV
ABBREVIATIONS.....	VI
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 OVERVIEW	1
1.2 TOPIC	1
1.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT.....	5
CHAPTER TWO: ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY	11
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....	11
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.....	11
2.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY	13
2.4 ASSESSING CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS	15
2.4.1 The Message Source	17
2.4.2 Campaign Messages	19
2.4.3 Campaign Strategies and Media Coverage	21
2.4.4 Voters	23
2.4.4.1 Cognitive Awareness	23
2.2.4.2 Partisan Identification.....	24
2.2.4.3 Consumption of Political Information.....	25
2.2.4.3 Political Efficacy	26
2.4.5 Campaign Impact.....	26
2.4.6 The Election Campaign Assessment Model	27
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY	29
3.1 INTRODUCTION.....	29
3.2 THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT MODEL APPLIED TO THE 2004 SOUTH AFRICAN	
ELECTION CAMPAIGN.....	30
3.2.1 Perceptions of Political Parties and Leaders	30
3.2.2 Choices Offered to Voters in the 2004 Election	30
3.2.3 Campaign Strategies in the 2004 Election	31
3.2.4 Media Coverage of the Campaign	31
3.2.5 Profile of the Electorate	32
3.2.6 Impact of the Campaign.....	32

3.3	DATA	33
3.3.1	Survey Data	33
3.3.1.1	Idasa Post-Election Study (1994).....	34
3.3.1.2	Opinion 99 (1998 and 1999)	34
3.3.1.3	Afrobarometer (2000 and 2004).....	34
3.3.1.4	Comparative National Elections Project (2004).....	35
3.3.1.5	SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 (2004).....	35
3.3.2	Content Analysis Data	35
3.3.3	South African Advertising Research Foundation Data.....	36
3.3.4	Nielsen Advertising Expenditure Data	36
3.3.5	Media Reports.....	37
3.3.6	Qualitative Interviews with Media Officers in Political Parties	37
3.3.7	Campaign Material	37
3.3.8	Focus Group Discussion Data.....	38
3.4	LIMITATIONS	39
CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA.....		41
4.1	INTRODUCTION.....	41
4.2	PARTY FORTUNES	41
4.3	HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	42
4.3.1	The ANC.....	42
4.3.2	The DA	43
4.3.3	The IFP	43
4.3.4	The UDM.....	44
4.3.5	The ID.....	45
4.3.6	The NNP	45
4.4	PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY LEADERS	47
4.5	PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETENCE	53
4.6	PERCEPTIONS OF INCLUSIVENESS.....	57
4.7	PERCEPTIONS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS.....	62
4.8	THE NEED FOR VISIBILITY	64
4.9	GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS.....	65
4.10	CONCLUSION	67
CHAPTER FIVE: CAMPAIGN MESSAGES IN THE 2004 ELECTION		70
5.1	INTRODUCTION.....	70
5.2	OVERVIEW	71
5.3	CAMPAIGN MESSAGES	74
5.3.1	The ANC's Campaign Messages.....	74
5.3.2	The DA 's Campaign Messages.....	83
5.3.3	The IFP 's Campaign Messages.....	90

5.3.4	The UDM 's Campaign Messages	99
5.3.5	The ID's Campaign Messages	103
5.3.6	The NNP's Campaign Messages	108
4.4	CONCLUSION	111
CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNICATING THE CAMPAIGN MESSAGES.....		114
6.1	INTRODUCTION.....	114
6.2	PARTY FUNDING AND SPENDING.....	114
6.3	THE "PAID" CAMPAIGNS	117
6.3.1	The ANC.....	117
6.3.2	The DA	118
6.3.3	The IFP	119
6.3.4	The UDM.....	120
6.3.5	The ID.....	121
6.3.6	The NNP	122
6.4	CONTACT WITH VOTERS	123
6.5	CONCLUSION	124
CHAPTER SEVEN: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN		126
7.1	INTRODUCTION.....	126
7.2	PROFILE OF THE MEDIA IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	126
7.2.1	Radio.....	127
7.2.2	Television	129
7.2.3	Newspapers.....	130
7.3	CONSUMPTION OF NEWS	132
7.4	COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN	134
7.4.1	All Media.....	134
7.4.2	Radio Coverage	136
7.4.3	Television Coverage	136
7.4.4	Print Coverage	137
7.5	COVERAGE OF THE PARTIES	138
7.5.1	All Media.....	138
7.5.2	Television Coverage	141
7.5.3	Print Coverage	143
7.6	MESSAGES COMMUNICATED BY THE MEDIA	145
7.6.1	Media Messages about the ANC	145
7.6.2	Media Messages about the DA	151
7.6.3	Media Messages about the IFP	159
7.6.4	Media Messages about the UDM.....	164
7.6.5	Media Messages about the ID.....	167
7.6.6	Media Messages about the NNP	172

7.7	MEDIA COVERAGE OF VOTER CONCERNS	177
7.8	MEDIA BIAS IN THE 2004 CAMPAIGN	181
7.8.1	Citizen Perceptions of Media Bias	182
7.8.2	Political Parties Views of Media Bias	183
7.8.3	Content Analysis.....	185
7.9	CONCLUSION	187
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTORATE		191
8.1	INTRODUCTION.....	191
8.2	DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE	191
8.3	EDUCATIONAL PROFILE	194
8.4	POLITICAL INTEREST	196
8.5	CAMPAIGN INTEREST	198
8.6	ATTENTION TO CAMPAIGN NEWS	199
8.7	PARTY IDENTIFICATION.....	200
8.8	PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL INTEREST.....	201
8.9	POLITICAL EFFICACY	203
8.10	CONCLUSION	204
CHAPTER NINE: THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ON THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA		205
9.1	INTRODUCTION.....	205
9.2	ASSESSING THE 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN.....	206
9.3	PARTICIPATION PATTERNS	209
9.4	RECOMMENDATIONS	212
REFERENCES		218
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES.....		246
APPENDICES		256
APPENDIX 1: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS		256
APPENDIX 2: FOCUS GROUP METHODOLOGY NOTES.....		258
APPENDIX 3: FOCUS GROUP RECRUITMENT FORM		259
APPENDIX 4: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDES		260
APPENDIX 5: FOCUS GROUP CONSENT FORM		262
APPENDIX 6: FOCUS GROUP TRANSCRIPTS		263
APPENDIX 7: MEDIA TENOR METHODOLOGY NOTES		334
APPENDIX 8: CODING FRAME FOR RECODE OF MEDIA TENOR ISSUES.....		336
APPENDIX 9: MEDIA MONITORING PROJECT METHODOLOGY NOTES.....		339
APPENDIX 10: SOUTH AFRICAN ADVERTISING RESEARCH FOUNDATION METHODOLOGY NOTES ..		340
APPENDIX 11: NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH METHODOLOGY NOTES.....		341
APPENDIX 12: NIELSEN MEDIA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE FIGURES		342

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: PARTIES TRUSTED TO DEAL WITH ISSUES, 2004 (MULTI-MENTIONS ALLOWED).....	54
TABLE 2: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS, 2004.	66
TABLE 3: PARTY MANIFESTO TITLES, 2004.	72
TABLE 4: KEY ELECTION SLOGANS, 2004.	72
TABLE 5: PARTY INCOME AND EXPENDITURE: 2003/2004 FINANCIAL YEAR.....	116
TABLE 6: ANC ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	117
TABLE 7: DA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	119
TABLE 8: IFP ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	120
TABLE 9: UDM ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	121
TABLE 10: ID ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	122
TABLE 11: NNP ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	123
TABLE 12: REPORTED PARTY CONTACT DURING 2004 CAMPAIGN PERIOD.	124
TABLE 13: LISTENERSHIP OF RADIO IN 1,000'S [PAST 7 DAYS], FEBRUARY - APRIL 2004.....	128
TABLE 14: TELEVISION VIEWING [PAST 7 DAYS] 1,000'S 2004.....	130
TABLE 15: READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS IN 1,000'S 2004.....	131
TABLE 16: CONSUMPTION OF NEWS MEDIA, 2004 (AFROBAROMETER).....	133
TABLE 17: CONSUMPTION OF NEWS MEDIA, 2004 (COMPARATIVE NATIONAL ELECTIONS PROJECT) .	134
TABLE 18: COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ALL MEDIA TYPES.....	135
TABLE 19: HIGHEST COVERAGE OF CAMPAIGN.....	135
TABLE 20: CAMPAIGN COVERAGE BY RADIO STATION.....	136
TABLE 21: CAMPAIGN COVERAGE BY TELEVISION CHANNEL.....	137
TABLE 22: CAMPAIGN COVERAGE BY PRINT MEDIUM.....	137
TABLE 23: COVERAGE OF PARTIES IN ALL MEDIA TYPES.....	139
TABLE 24: COVERAGE OF PARTIES BY RADIO STATION.....	140
TABLE 25: EXTENT OF COVERAGE OF PARTIES ON TELEVISION (ALL STATIONS).....	141
TABLE 26: TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF PARTIES BY CHANNEL.....	142
TABLE 27: EXTENT OF COVERAGE OF PARTIES IN ALL PRINT MEDIA.....	143
TABLE 28: PRINT NEWS COVERAGE OF PARTIES BY PAPER.....	144
TABLE 29: OVERALL CONTENT OF COVERAGE – ALL MEDIA.....	178
TABLE 30: CONTENT OF PARTY COVERAGE – ALL MEDIA.....	179
TABLE 31: PROPORTION OF POLICY-RELATED STATEMENTS IN COVERAGE OF PARTY CAMPAIGNS.....	180
TABLE 32: CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA BIAS.....	182
TABLE 33: EXTENT OF TRUST BY CITIZENS IN NEWS MEDIA.....	182
TABLE 34: EDUCATION PROFILE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2004.....	195
TABLE 35: INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS.....	197
TABLE 36: EXTENT OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION.....	197
TABLE 37: INTEREST IN THE CAMPAIGNS (MARKINOR OPINION 2004).....	198
TABLE 38: INTEREST IN THE CAMPAIGN (COMPARATIVE NATIONAL ELECTIONS PROJECT).....	198

TABLE 39: DISCUSSION OF CAMPAIGN ISSUES, 2004.....	199
TABLE 40: ATTENTION PAID TO CAMPAIGN NEWS, 2004.....	199
TABLE 41: INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION.....	202
TABLE 42: EXTENT OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION.....	202
TABLE 43: INTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY, 2000 AND 2004.....	203
TABLE 44: ANC OUTDOOR MEDIA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	342
TABLE 45: ANC RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	342
TABLE 46: ANC ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, PRINT MEDIA (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	343
TABLE 47: DA OUTDOOR MEDIA AND DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	343
TABLE 48: DA RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	344
TABLE 49: DA PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	345
TABLE 50: IFP PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	346
TABLE 51: IFP RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	346
TABLE 52: UDM OUTDOOR MEDIA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	347
TABLE 53: UDM PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	347
TABLE 54: UDM RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	347
TABLE 55: ID PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	348
TABLE 56: ID RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	348
TABLE 57: NNP PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	349
TABLE 58: NNP RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004).....	350

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: THE LASSWELL MODEL OF PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION.....	16
FIGURE 2: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT MODEL	28
FIGURE 3: IMAGES OF PARTY INCLUSIVENESS, 1998-2004.....	57
FIGURE 4: INDEPENDENT VOTERS' IMAGES OF PARTIES INCLUSIVENESS-EXCLUSIVENESS	58
FIGURE 5: INDEPENDENT VOTERS' IMAGES OF PARTIES TRUSTWORTHINESS	63
FIGURE 6: MEDIA USAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1994-2004	132
FIGURE 7: COVERAGE OF PARTIES ON RADIO DURING 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN.....	140
FIGURE 8: COVERAGE OF PARTIES ON TELEVISION DURING 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN	142
FIGURE 9: COVERAGE OF PARTIES IN NEWSPAPERS DURING 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN	144
FIGURE 10: VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF MOST IMPORTANT CAMPAIGN ISSUE	177
FIGURE 11: EXTENT OF POLICY-RELATED COVERAGE IN THE 2004 CAMPAIGN	180
FIGURE 12: RATINGS OF CAMPAIGN COVERAGE IN 2004 ELECTION (MEDIA TENOR)	186
FIGURE 13: RATINGS OF CAMPAIGN COVERAGE IN 2004 ELECTION (MEDIA MONITORING PROJECT) .	187
FIGURE 14: NUMBER OF ADULTS (16+) IN EACH PROVINCE - 2004	192
FIGURE 15: LANGUAGE GROUPINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA - 2004.....	193
FIGURE 16: TRENDS IN EDUCATION 1995-2004	194
FIGURE 17: FUNCTIONALLY LITERACY: 1994 -2004	195
FIGURE 18: POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND POLITICAL INTEREST, 1995 -2004	196
FIGURE 19: LEVELS OF PARTISANSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1994 -2004.....	200
FIGURE 20: THE 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	208
FIGURE 21: TURNOUT IN SOUTH AFRICAN GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1994-2004.....	210
FIGURE 22: TURNOUT AND ELECTORAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1994 – 2004	211

LIST OF FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOXES

FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 1: POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF PATRICIA DE LILLE.....	49
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 2: POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT GENERAL HOLOMISA	50
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 3: POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT CHIEF BUTHELEZI	50
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 4: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF PATRICIA DE LILLE.....	51
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 5: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF CHIEF BUTHELEZI.....	52
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 6: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF TONY LEON	52
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 7: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE ANC	54
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 8: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DA’S COMPETENCE	56
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 9: POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DA’S COMPETENCE	56
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 10: HISTORY OF THE ANC	58
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 11: PERCEPTIONS OF THE IFP’S REPRESENTATIVENESS.....	59
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 12: PERCEPTIONS OF THE NNP’S REPRESENTATIVENESS.....	61
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 13: PERCEPTIONS OF THE UDM’S REPRESENTATIVENESS	61
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 14: PERCEPTIONS OF THE DA’S REPRESENTATIVENESS.....	62
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 15: PERCEPTION THAT POLITICIANS SHOULD BE MORE VISIBLE	64
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 16: PERCEPTION THAT THE ID AND PATRICIA DE LILLE SHOULD BE MORE VISIBLE.....	65
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 17: PERCEPTIONS OF EMPTY PROMISES MADE BY POLITICIANS	66
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 18: PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONAL ENRICHMENT BY POLITICIANS	67

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Campaigns are a means of choosing leaders, but they are also a way for the governed to connect with each other. They tell us what we should expect from our leaders, how we should evaluate them, which actions are good and which are bad, and what constitutes success or failure. In this sense, among others, campaigns matter (Jamieson, 2000:17).

To be sure, many important aspects of society have nothing to do with election campaigns, but in a democracy's electoral practices are found the influence and imprint of much that makes a culture as it is. Thus election campaigns speak beyond themselves (Swanson and Mancini, 1996:247).

Campaigning is a good thing because [the politicians] come to the people, they make the point to go to the people and sit on their mats, just to convince the people that they care (South African voter, 2004).

1.1 Overview

In this thesis, I explore the relationship between election campaigns and the quality of democracy. In particular, I focus on the ways in which election campaigns can enhance or hinder democratic responsiveness and vertical accountability. I conduct my study in South Africa since it provides a particularly useful setting to examine how campaigns affect the quality of democracy. While South Africa's young democracy is entrenched in a celebrated constitutional framework it is plagued by questions about its responsiveness. The central question which I answer in this thesis is: "Did the 2004 election campaign contribute to or detract from the quality of democracy in South Africa?"

1.2 Topic

There is consensus among scholars that competitive elections are an essential component of a democratic political system.¹ If competitive elections are an essential component of

¹ Dennis (1970:819), for example, notes that "if any single institution serves as popular democracy's sine qua non it is that of elections". Lijphart (1994) contends that "the electoral system is the most fundamental element of representative democracy". Kavanagh (1995:1) argues that free competitive elections are inseparable from representative democracy and according to Ward (2004:5), "elections are one of the central instruments employed by nation-states to ensure that the democratic rights of citizens and the will of the public are channeled into the political decision-making process."

democracy and such elections require good quality campaigns, then, by extension, good quality election campaigns are also critical to the quality of democracy. A good quality election encompasses more than smooth running administrative systems and a free and fair process. Competitive elections require a national conversation about salient political issues, how the government has been addressing these issues, what the government should be doing to resolve them and which party or political leader would be best placed to do so. Such a national conversation typically occurs during election campaigns. Often it is the only time that such issues are discussed more broadly within the polity.

An election campaign is a process in which competing parties try to influence public opinion (Holbrook, 1996:43-56). Through their election campaigns, politicians and political parties seek to persuade the voting public to vote for them; to keep them in office or to put them there. It is an active process, in which political institutions communicate information in an effort to convince voters that it will be worth their trouble to vote for them. Schnur (1999:144) argues, “the success or failure of political parties and candidates depends on their ability to reach, engage and persuade voters”. Political parties thus need to persuade citizens to vote for them. And as Swanson and Mancini (1996:1) assert, politics is “always persuasive, forcing us consciously or subconsciously to interpret, to evaluate and to act”. Persuasion also inherently involves agency on the part of the recipient, as they need to assimilate and consider the information being presented to them.

How do election campaigns relate to democratic responsiveness and accountability? Powell (2005:62) indicates that “democratic responsiveness is what occurs when the democratic process induces the government to form and implement policies that the citizens want”. Broadly speaking, accountability can be defined as “the obligation of elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizen electors or other constitutional bodies”, and more specifically, *vertical* accountability is “that which citizens as electors can demand from their officials in the course of campaigns and elections” (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xix). By allowing citizens to make informed choices and competing parties to articulate themselves (Street, 2001:253) and giving citizens unfettered access to alternative sources of information including independent media and divergent opinion (Diamond, 1996:11), election campaigns can enhance democratic responsiveness and vertical accountability. Responsiveness and

vertical accountability both require the same supporting contextual conditions: high turnout levels combined with the credible threat of electoral alternation. This is made possible by: information on political actions, knowledgeable and engaged voters, institutionally strong parties which offer pragmatic alternatives and an independent pluralistic mass media (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xx).

Effective campaign messages and carefully-devised campaign themes are critically important to voters, particularly to voters without party loyalties, because in and of themselves they may persuade voters to support a particular candidate or party. Voters are cognitive misers without the time or inclination to sort through each and every campaign appeal. They seek cognitive shortcuts that help them make rational choices with limited effort. A carefully constructed campaign theme serves as such a cognitive link (Marquette, 1996: 148-149). This has been confirmed by empirical studies. Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986: 523) show that mental schemata can and will be evoked during campaign periods as specific stimuli trigger people's pre-existing cognitions. Rhan (1993) also demonstrates that voters can and do respond to the implications of candidate messages. Schmitt-Beck (2004:318) concludes that "the reception of persuasive messages, carrying evaluative content, from the mass media can indeed be consequential for individual electoral behaviour".

Campaigns matter because voters reason about parties, candidates, and issues, using low-information rationality or "gut-reasoning" by combining information gained from experiences, daily life, the media and political campaigns (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991 and Lupia, 1994). While people forget most of the campaign information to which they are exposed, they develop an overall evaluation which is adjusted in response to their immediate assessment of campaign messages and events (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995). Thus, people with limited information use reasoning shortcuts to make prudent political choices (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991 and Lupia, 1994). As Popkin (1991:70) argues, "if voters had full information and no uncertainty, they would not be open to influence from others and hence there would be no campaigns". Achen (1992: 198) also aptly argues "voters do not ignore information they have, do not fabricate information they do not have, and do not choose what they do not want".

Ideally campaigns should provide incentives for people to vote. However, campaigns also have the potential to harm democracy. Campaigns can be used as platform to evoke prejudices and fears (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000). They can also overload voters with irrelevant information which blurs the distinctions between parties. In these situations campaigns can turn people off politics, resulting in them abstaining from voting, thus reducing the quality of democracy. Like money which can be used for noble or terrible purposes, campaigns, depending on their format, can exert a positive or negative influence on democracy.

Despite the critical relationship between election campaigns and the quality of democracy, it is an understudied phenomenon. By and large, studies of campaigns proceed from a marketing perspective while analyses of electoral competition and voter turnout tend to focus on individual behavioural motivations and decision-making processes.

These micro-level analyses fail to take cognizance of the quantity and quality of information and choices offered to voters by political parties. This pre-occupation with individual decisions is flawed because, as Sniderman (2000:68-69) argues, political institutions - rather than voters - fix and organize the confusion of politics. Viewing political participation as primarily dependent on the characteristics of the voter (i.e. levels of education, political knowledge, efficacy and cognitive engagement) is problematic. Even if voters were highly educated, keenly interested in the campaigns and took time to consider the policies and programmes of competing parties, such factors alone are insufficient to ensure voter participation. Voters would still need political parties to offer them a good reason to actually go out and vote. While individual decision-making processes are critically important, voters are only one part of the electoral equation; political parties and the choices they offer constitute the other part.

Clearly campaigns are important for democracy. They “select decision-makers, shape policy, distribute power, and provide avenues for debate and socially approved expressions of conflict” (Mancini and Swanson, 1996: 1). They also allow voters to hear politicians defend their records, criticize those of their opponents and propose policies (Kavanagh, 1995:1). Thus, voters need campaigns to discern which party/candidate

would best represent their interests, and parties need campaigns to harness support from voters.

If campaigns do matter, we should pay far more attention to the *quality of choices* offered to voters via campaigns. We should ask questions about the extent to which they provide voters with the basis to make informed choices and scrutinize the conditions under which campaigns enhance the quality of democracy.

In this thesis I use Lasswell's model of persuasive communication (which views the source, content, medium, recipient and effect as crucial parts of the communicative process) as well as concepts set out by Diamond and Morlino (2005), Powell (2005) and Buchanan (2001) to develop an integrated analytical model with which to assess whether election campaigns contribute to the quality of democracy.

1.3 The South African Context

There is widespread consensus that South Africa is now a democracy: South Africa has a democratic constitution, a Constitutional Court, an extensive judicial system, transformed political institutions as well as a wide range of political and socio-economic rights. South Africa has also conducted a series of free and fair democratic elections and electoral contestation has been "relatively free" (Friedman, 2005:3) with the election in 2004 the best administered and the freest and fairest to date (Piper, Hendricks, Masterson and Letsholo, 2004: 1)

Campaigning in the country's first three national elections in 1994, 1999 and 2004 was by no means docile, with fierce competition displayed by all parties. In contrast to what might have been expected, given the results of the 1994 and 1999 elections in which the African National Congress (ANC) won landslide victories, political parties did not appear to take the 2004 election results as a foregone conclusion. They spent vast sums of money to mobilize and persuade voters (Davis, 2005: 231). Moreover, these campaigns were characterized by extensive news media coverage, widespread direct canvassing, numerous events and rallies organized by a range of political parties, as well as visits by high-profile party leaders to various localities. There has also been a vast

improvement in media access, with an increase in radio sets from 10.4 million in 1994 to 33.7 million in 2004, and an increase in television sets from 5.4 million in 1994 to 8.1 million in 2004 (Allerman, 2004).

In South Africa election campaigns are particularly important given the negative effects of the country's closed list Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system for elections to national and provincial assemblies. In this electoral system, voters elect parties and not party representatives. A party contests an election after establishing a list of its candidates, and party candidates get awarded seats in the assembly depending on the percentage of votes won by the party. Voters elect "slates of candidates rather than individuals" (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:7-8). The PR system ensures that a broader range of minority political parties can gain representation than what would be the case under a majoritarian electoral system. This is a positive effect in a country as culturally heterogeneous as South Africa. However, the system has link between voters and their elected representatives since no Member of Parliament owes his or her seat to a specific geographical constituency. As a way of strengthening such bonds between MPs and voters, MPs in the South African parliament are allocated a "constituency" on the basis of other criteria. But research has found that there is limited direct contact between voters and 'their' allocated representatives between elections.² During the campaign period, which starts in earnest once the election date is announced by the President, political party representatives and leaders make a concerted effort to connect with communities. During this period they make face-to-face contact with voters and find out more about the challenges and problems which they face. The media also turns the spotlight on political matters and political parties, media houses, research companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) often collaborate to conduct surveys and other research projects to assess the mood of voters.

At face value, it would appear that election campaigns constitute an integral and valuable part of South Africa's democratic system. However, South Africa's election campaigns are not seen to play the role of helping voters discern which party would best represent their interests. Analysts assume that campaigns fail in this role because of their

² For a comprehensive assessment of the PR system in South Africa, please see Southall, 2004b as well as Southall and Mattes, 2002.

interpretations of the behavioural motivations of the voting public. Many analysts (for example, Giliomee, 1994; Schlemmer; 1994; Johnson, 1996; Giliomee, 1998; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; Schlemmer, 1999 and Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer, 2001) see South African voter motivations as “determined by symbolic or identity concerns” (Schlemmer, 1999: 288). These analysts tend to see campaigning primarily as a process of mobilizing voters based on their ethnic or racial identity by playing on their fears of majority domination.

According to Mattes and Piombo (2003:102), prevailing analyses of voter motivations in South Africa see voting as a desire to express communal solidarity with political parties, or maintain/obtain government patronage. Alternatively, they argue, these analyses view voting as the result of a fear of communal pressure or cultural norms or predispositions hostile to the larger concept of political pluralism, multi-party politics and opposition in general. Concerns around voting behaviour have also been linked to the electoral dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) and the potential for democratic erosion via the emergence of a one-party state. In Giliomee’s (1998:133) words “if a liberal democracy is about capturing an “undecided middle”, party alternation, and minorities with a real hope of becoming part of a new majority, then the prospects of such a system evolving in South Africa are distinctly unpromising”.

Friedman (2004) argues that while South African elections are not simplistic ethnic censuses, elections are not determined by policy issues. South Africans vote on the basis of race, language and religion. According to Friedman (2004:3) “voter preferences are shaped by considerations other than competing technical solutions to economic and social problems”, and to “claim that a ballot will be decided by this or that ‘issue’ is to misunderstand the electorate and the campaign”.

Others have argued that a primarily racial analysis of voting behaviour is too crude, as values, perceived interests and judgments as well as many other factors have important effects on partisan support (Mattes, 1994; Eldridge and Seekings, 1994; Mattes and Gouws, 1998; Mattes, 1995; Mattes and Piombo, 2000; Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999; Habib and Naidu, 2004 and McLaughlin, 2007). Feree (2006:814) presents a more nuanced view, concluding that racialized party images play a critical role in shaping South African voting behavior because these images interact with evaluations of the

incumbent party's performance. Some analysts, such as Daniel (2004), have begun to see issues as playing a role in voter deliberations. Daniel predicted that the job situation in South Africa, the President's position on HIV/AIDS, the government's position on Zimbabwe, and service delivery issues related to housing and utilities could influence voter preferences in the 2004 election.

This debate around voter motivations and preferences has important ramifications for the conduct of election campaigns and the way parties convey messages to voters. Identity-based interpretations of voting behaviour leaves little room for information and campaigns to play a role in voters' decisions, other than to reinforce racial modes of behaviour. If Friedman is correct that considerations other than competing solutions to economic and social problems shape voter preferences, then parties need not provide information on how they would deal with the problems facing the electorate and the nation. Furthermore, if those who argue that election outcomes in South Africa are essentially pre-determined by the demographic composition of the electorate are correct, then the prospects for cultivating a culture of accountability and responsiveness between the electorate and elected representatives are slim.

Studies of elections in South Africa generally focus on the character of opposition parties and or the electoral dominance of the African National Congress; explore the impact of various factors on individual-level voting behaviour and party choice or focus on the campaigns of one or two parties.³ To date, there has been no single study of an entire campaign. In this thesis I aim to reduce the gap in our knowledge of how South African campaigns work and how they build or undermine the quality of democracy by providing a systematic assessment of the caliber of information and choices offered by political parties to voters in the 2004 election. My focus is thus on the "supply" side of election campaigns. I assess what South African voters "had to work with" in the 2004 election.

³ See for example Lodge, 1994; Welsh, 1994; Giliomee, 1994; Mattes, 1994; Schlemmer, 1994; Mattes, 1995; Johnson, 1996; Mattes, Giliomee and James, 1996; Seekings, 1997; Giliomee, 1998; Mattes and Gouws, 1998; Puta-Chekwe, 1998; Sadie, 1998; Southall, 1998; Booysen, 1999a; Friedman, 1999; Habib and Naidu, 1999; Habib and Taylor, 1999; Humphries, 1999; Khosa, 1999; Mattes, Taylor, and Africa, 1999; Mare, 1999; Lodge, 1999a; Lodge 1999b; Muthien, 1999; Muthien and Khosa, 1999; Rule, 1999; Schlemmer, 1999; Welsh, 1999; Breytenbach, 1999; Maseko, 1999; Giliomee, 1999; Piper, 1999; Butler, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 2000; Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer, 2000; Schire, 2001; Southall, 2001; Taylor and Hoeane, 1999; Nijzink, 2001; Mattes and Piombo, 2001; Brooks, 2004; Southall, 2004; Hamill, 2004; Mattes, 2005; Lodge, 2005; Booysen, 2005; Piper, 2005; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005; Hoeane, 2005; and Naidu and Manqele, 2005; Seekings 2005; Letsholo, 2005; McLaughlin, 2007.

In contrast to previous analyses of electoral dynamics in South Africa, I view South African voters as active agents and presume that voters, whatever level of access they have to the campaign, actually interpret and evaluate the campaign as well as other politically relevant stimuli. Needless to say, I do not discount the historical context in South Africa in which many voters decide which party they will vote for and whether in fact they will vote well prior to the election campaign. Clearly, imaginative and well-run campaigns that resonate with voter concerns would not necessarily cure all of South Africa's electoral ills, but at the very least voters should be provided with adequate information and incentives to vote.

Based on my adaption of the Lasswell model, which views the source, content, medium, recipient and effect as crucial parts of the communicative process, I consider the perceived credibility of political parties, the quality of campaign messages, the accessibility and credibility of media through which these messages were conveyed, the attentiveness of the electorate and finally whether the campaign process "drew voters in" or "turned them off". I argue that for campaigns to make a meaningful contribution to the quality of democracy: *Political parties perceived as competent, trustworthy and inclusive by the voting public must transmit a high volume of comparative policy-relevant campaign messages through a widely accessible and credible range of media to an interested and efficacious electorate, providing them with an incentive to go to the polls and cast their ballot.* The unique set of data that I have collated on parties, voters and the news media in the 2004 campaign enables me to assess the 2004 campaign using these evaluative criteria.

I start my overall assessment by looking at voter perceptions of political parties and then evaluate the key campaign messages, themes and strategies used by ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP. I extract the key campaign messages and examine the main thrust of each party's campaign, looking specifically at its internal consistency and consistency with previous campaigns. I examine the channels through which the parties conveyed their campaign messages and describe their campaign strategies (in particular the "paid" components of these strategies). I also consider the information communicated by the media *about* these parties. In this section I give an overview of South African media and media use patterns in 2004. I then present a profile of the South African electorate and examine the extent of cognitive engagement, partisan loyalty, media consumption and

political efficacy among voters. Finally, I provide an overall assessment of the quality of the 2004 campaign, outlining the potential consequences of the way the campaigns were conducted, and ask whether it contributed to or detracted from the quality of democracy in South Africa.

In conducting my investigation I analyze several different sources of data. The data includes (1) a comprehensive content analysis data-set consisting of campaign-related print, television and radio material for the period 9 February to 14 April 2004, compiled by Media Tenor; (2) the Idasa 1994 post-election survey, (3) the Opinion 99 surveys, (4) the 2004 Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) post-election survey; (5) the Afrobarometer surveys; (6) the SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 survey; (7) data on media use from the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF); (8) Nielsen Media Research campaign expenditure data; (9) the Media Monitoring Project's (MMP) analysis of campaign material; (10) campaign-related electronic news articles; (11) campaign material namely manifestos, posters, and speeches available on party websites and (12) qualitative interviews conducted by the MMP and a University of Cape Town (UCT) CNEP researcher.

CHAPTER TWO: ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I look at the ways in which the literature can help us understand the relationship between election campaigns and democratic quality. In particular I focus on the complex relationships that exist between voters, political parties and the media. The interactions between these key actors are integral to both election campaigns as well as the institutional arrangements that characterize a responsive democratic system with high levels of accountability. I also develop an integrated analytical model by which to assess how an election campaign can contribute to the quality of democracy.

2.2 Overview of the Literature

There is a rich volume of literature on micro-level voting behaviour. Many studies explore the impact of campaigning on individual-level political choices.⁴ Most prominent of the various theoretical perspectives are the party identification approach, rational-choice approach and cognitive awareness approach. Within the party identification approach Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960:143-149) indicate that “for many voters the details of the political landscape may be quite blurred until they are brought into sharp focus during the campaign period”. Rational choice theorists like Downs (1957: 38-45) argue that election campaigns must make voters aware of the benefits they will receive and that it is possible to change a voters mind by “providing him with better information”. The Downsian model rests on voter comparisons of competing political parties by voters - a comparison enabled in part by campaigns. According to the cognitive awareness approach campaigns provide cues that enable voters to make sense

⁴ See for example Downs, 1957; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Fiorina, 1981; Kinder, 1986; Roseman, Abelson and Ewing, 1986; Popkin, 1990; Achen 1992; Lodge and Stroh, 1993; Wyer and Ottati, 1993; Ottati and Wyer, 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1993; Jervis, 1993; Popkin, 1993; Tetlock, 1993; Bartels, 2000; Dalton, Greene and Huckfeldt, 2002. For a succinct outline of the various approaches see Dalton and Wattenberg (1993).

of candidates and their messages (Rhan, 1993).

In their work *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, Mutz, Sniderman and Brody (1996) provide an impressive overview of past research and conduct an empirical assessment of the impact of campaigning on individual attitude change, focusing on the mass media, political elites and individual citizens.

At a macro-level, many other scholars have explored the place of the media and media practices in democracy and contemporary society.⁵ These studies often stem from divergent perspectives.⁶ Some, for example Herman and Chomsky (1988), begin from the premise that mainstream media exists solely to serve powerful interests that control and finance them. Others see the media as at least having the potential to play a positive role in a democratic system. They believe that the media can be a critical intermediary (Selnow,1994:5) which can provide a platform for interest groups [such as political parties] to publicize their claims and concerns (Street,2001:253) contributing to mobilization into the political system (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004:8). Indeed, Gunther and Mughan (2000:421) argue that, as the major vehicle for communication between the governors and the governed, it is the responsibility of the media to maximize the opportunities for voters to make political decisions and cast ballots on the basis of informed choice.

Another school prefers to focus on the changes in the nature of campaigning due to technological advancements, or what Pfetsch and Esser (2004:5) call the “fundamental transformation of media systems” caused by changes in information technology and communication infrastructure. A substantial number of these works analyze the developments and challenges posed by modernization and globalization and outline the rise of professional election campaign specialists. These studies usually focus on the transformation of campaign communications in advanced industrial democracies.⁷

⁵ Herman, and Chomsky; 1988; Selnow, 1994; Cook, 1998; Chesney, 1999; Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Norris, 2000; Cook, 2001; Street, 2001; Jacobs, 2004; Word, 2004; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2007 and Richardson and Beck, 2007.

⁶ Scholars from a range of disciplines have studied the media resulting in a contradictory literature with conflict over theory, assumptions, foci and methods of analysis (Williams,2003:17). While I draw on material from various disciplines, my study is located within Political Science as a discipline and therefore the theories which draw on are primarily normative in nature. For a comprehensive overview of theoretical approaches in media and communication studies, please see Tan, 1985, Hardt, 1992, Williams, 2003, Baxter and Babbie, 2004 and Laughy, 2007.

⁷ See for example Mickiewicz and Firestone, 1992; Selnow, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Shea, 1996; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Nimmo, 1996; Asp and Esaiasson, 1996; Schoenbach, 1996; Jakubowicz,

There is however an absence of knowledge on the link between the “supply side” of election campaigns (i.e. the quality of choices offered to voters) and the quality of democracy. While “the underlying assumption throughout the literature of individual political behaviour is that citizens have a storehouse of political information they can draw on to inform their behaviour” (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995:309), most studies attempt to understand individual political behaviour without paying sufficient attention to the basis of this “storehouse of political information”.

A notable exception is James Stanyer’s study of the relationship between election campaigns and the quality of democracy, undertaken by in the United States and the United Kingdom in which he examines how political advocates, media organizations and citizen audiences adapt to changes in political communication systems. Stanyer (2007:182) concludes that political communicators have no incentive to pay attention to the health of the broader political system and that these communicators are motivated by the aim of achieving particular objectives which have unintended and detrimental impacts on the system as a whole.

2.3 The Relationship between Election Campaigns and the Quality of Democracy

A democracy encompasses many features such as regular, competitive free and fair elections, individual rights and freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, equality of all citizens and an accountable and responsive system of government.⁸ With regard to

1996; Rospir, 1996; Caspi, 1996; Mayobre, 1996; Mancin, 1999; Wring, 1999; Butler and Collins, 1999; Kinsey, 1999; Lebel, 1999; Mitchell and Daves, 1999; Hofrichter, 1999; Varoga and Rice, 1999; Falkowski and Cwalina, 1999; 1999; Norris, 2000; Carpini and Williams, 2001; Cook, 2001, Neuman, 2001; Jamieson, 2001; Bennett and Entman, 2001; Dahlgren, 2001; Sparks, 2001; Underwood, 2001; Slater, 2001; Bennett and Manheim, 2001; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Norris, 2004; Lang, 2004; Holtz-Bacha, 2004; Zittel, 2004; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004a. Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Swanson, 2004; Rogers, 2004; Donsbach and Patterson, 2004, Foot and Schneider, 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006; Jackson, 2006; Carlson and Strandberg, 2007; Van Os, Hagemann, Voerman and Jankowski, 2007; Oblak and Zeljan, 2007; Gregor, 2007; Foot, Schneider and Dougherty, 2007; Mirandilla, 2007; Tekwani and Kluver, 2007; Ward, 2007; Tekwani and Shetty, 2007; Aquilla, 2007; Hameed, 2007; Kim and Park, 2007; Foot, Schneider, Kluver, Xenos and Jankowski, 2007; Schneider, Kluver, Jankowski and Foot, 2007 and Stanyer, 2007).

⁸ Modifications to the term democracy have not occurred in uncontested fashion with vigorous disagreement and debate about what democracy is (Diamond, 1996 and Collier and Levitsky, 1997). Democratic theorists distinguish between “electoral” and “liberal” democracy. The former meets only the most basic requirements of regular elections while the liberal type meets a wider range of the ideals of a democratic system.

elections, all citizens should have the universal right to vote and predictable rules governing elections and campaigns (Diamond, 1996). Diamond and Morlino (2005:x-xii) differentiate between an ordinary democracy and a “quality democracy” which provides its citizens with a high degree of freedom, political equality and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions”. They see quality as consisting of precise procedures, sound content and satisfaction with results.⁹

Diamond and Morlino identify eight dimensions of democratic quality that interact and reinforce each other, ultimately converging into a whole system. Democratic responsiveness and vertical accountability are the dimensions of democratic quality that relates most directly to election campaigns. Vertical accountability requires genuinely competitive elections in which the performance of the incumbent is reviewed, policy alternatives are debated and voters reward or punish incumbents (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xix). Powell (2005:63) asserts that democratic responsiveness is a complex process involving the systematic eviction of unresponsive or inept policy makers. Vertical accountability and the chain of democratic responsiveness is strengthened when citizens take the opportunity to gather and process accurate information, parties develop a nationally coherent policy agenda and there is an active independent mass media (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xxi and Powell, 2005:64-71).

Thus, three sets of actors are critical to both election campaigns and the quality of democracy. According to Buchanan (2001:365), the behavioural exchanges between candidates, the media and voters are likely to generate instrumental consequences such as fostering community or alienation as well as policy consensus or confusion.

⁹ Diamond and Morlino list the following procedural dimensions: The rule of law: All citizens are equal before the law; laws are clear, publicly known, universal, stable, non-retroactive and fair and consistently applied to all citizens by an independent judiciary; Participation: All adult citizens are granted formal rights of political participation; Competition: Regular free and fair electoral competition between different political parties; Vertical Accountability: The obligation of elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizen-electors or other constitutional bodies; and Horizontal Accountability: Office-holders are answerable to other institutional actors that have the expertise and legal authority to control and sanction their behaviour. The substantive dimensions include: Freedom: Political rights: the rights to vote, to stand for office, to campaign and to organize political parties; civil rights: personal liberty, security and privacy; freedom of thought, expression and information; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, association and organization; freedom of movement and residence and the right to legal defense and due process; and social or socio-economic rights: the rights to private property and entrepreneurship as well as the rights associated with employment; and. Equality: Every citizen and group has the same rights and legal protections.

Both Buchanan and Powell note that reality seldom matches the ideal. According to Buchanan (2001:365), the actors rarely meet ideal expectations due to the interplay of differing candidate, media and citizen incentives. Buchanan (2001: 366-368) notes that the candidates incentive of electoral victory combines with certain traits of the electorate (such as voter ignorance) and the media (such as aggressive prying) to invite and offer rationalizations for the use of manipulation and deception. Three principle types of subversions threaten citizen's choices in working democracies: 1) defects in the willingness or ability of citizens to gather and process accurate information; 2) parties that are incoherent when it comes to national policies; and 3) limitations on alternatives (Powell, 2005:68).

How can the relationship between election campaigns and the quality of democracy be empirically assessed? This is a complex matter. Powell concludes his chapter by saying "...I suggest a more complex research agenda, involving multiple, context-sensitive measures of procedure, substantive content, and citizen evaluation. Impatience with so ambitious an agenda is understandable but overlooks the rich dividends that such research could yield, not only for our ability to describe and compare this dimension of democratic quality in and across new democracies but also for our understanding of the possibilities and limits that reside within the nature of democracy itself" (Powell, 2005:75).

2.4 Assessing Campaign Communications

In order to empirically examine campaigning as it relates to the broader issues of democracy and the deepening of the quality of democracy, it is necessary to have an effective tool to look at the different components of the campaign process. Lasswell's model of persuasive communication provides the basis by which to develop a comprehensive analytical model to examine the contribution of campaigning to the quality of democracy.¹⁰


¹⁰A model is a drastic simplification of the critical elements of the complex reality we are interested in. It gives a general picture of the various instances or manifestations of a system or structure by abstracting the formal properties of the object it describes. It does not refer to or represent reality but, rather, aims to provide an analytical tool with which we can understand and talk about reality (Marsen, 2006:11).

The Lasswell model ties in well with the three critical actors (political parties, the mass media and citizens) identified by Diamond and Morlino, Buchanan and Powell as being important for elections and election campaigns.¹¹ In his work on the structure and function of communication in society, Lasswell (1949:102) stated that: “A *convenient way to describe an act of communication is to answer the following questions:*

Who
Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What Effect?”

This question formed the basis for the Lasswell Communications model. This has been transformed into the graphic model depicted below.

Figure 1: The Lasswell Model of Persuasive Communication



Source, McQuail and Windahl (1981)

The Lasswell model thus consider the characteristics of the source of the message; the content of messages; the channels through which messages were conveyed; the features of the audience and the effect of the messages. By adapting the Lasswell model of persuasive communications, I develop an election campaign assessment model to evaluate how election campaigns can contribute to the quality of democracy, specifically the ways in which political parties, the mass media and citizens can strengthen the chain of democratic responsiveness.

¹¹ The Lasswell model has been criticized for a range of reasons (Mutz, Sniderman and Brody, 1996, Marsen, 2006 and Laughey, 2007), however, I view it as appropriate because my emphasis of my thesis is on the “supply side” of the campaign process of a single election campaign. For an outline of the various communication models see McQuail and Windahl (1981), Tan (1985) and Marsen (2006).

2.4.1 The Message Source

The “who?” component of the model focuses on political parties and political leaders as the source of campaign messages.

According to Newman and Perloff (2004:27) “persuasion experts unquestionably agree that the source of a message can significantly influence political attitudes”. Indeed, the literature reveals that in most situations, people accept or reject persuasive messages based on their evaluation of the credibility of the source of the message. (Hovland, Janis and Kelly, 1954; Milburn; 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 2000; Iyengar and Valentino, 2000; Popkin and Dimock, 2000 and Newman and Perloff, 2004). In the context of election campaigns, party competence perceptions of trust and inclusiveness are particularly important.

Lupia and McCubbins (2000:48) assert that “without trust there is no persuasion, without persuasion, people cannot learn from others and without learning from others it is very difficult for citizens to learn what they need to know”. Farrel and Web (2000:124) also emphasize that “it is one thing to think that a politician has a good policy for alleviating unemployment, but it is quite another to believe that he or she is likely to (a) keep their word if returned to office or (b) prove competent to follow through on the promised intent of the policy” and “therefore it is rational and important for any organization campaigning for office to concentrate part of its efforts on fostering a reputation for integrity, veracity and competence”. Perceptions of competence are also important for voters because they are likely to care more about which party or candidate can deliver the most than about an ideal match with their policy preferences (Popkin, Gorman, Phillips and Smith, 1976: 793).

Within the South African context, images of “inclusiveness” or “exclusiveness” are also important. Feree (2004) finds that in South Africa, people seek to find parties who will look after the interests of all groups and are unlikely to vote for a party they perceive as being exclusively concerned about the interests of another group. According to Mattes (2005:112), an image of inclusiveness is a necessary but insufficient condition for South

Africans to vote for a party.

Perceptions of campaign leaders are also important because in many instances, campaigns centre on the style and personalities of party leaders. Character traits (such as competence, warmth, activity, strength, integrity, honesty and empathy) of leaders are considered important to voters political attitudes (Page,1978; Kinder,1986 and Masters and Sullivan,1993).

The logical extension of these arguments is that voters will be less likely to pay attention to campaign messages coming from a party or leader they see as exclusively concerned about the interests of another group, or which they see as being incompetent or untrustworthy. Negative perceptions of parties and leaders can lead voters to question the content of campaign messages, rendering the most compelling campaign strategies ineffective. Indeed, if the message is inconsistent with the party's previous actions, voters could reasonably question whether it makes sense to believe the message.

Thus, campaigning is of little worth if the recipients of the campaign see the messages as "tainted" by the characteristics of the *source* of the message. Messages from an untrustworthy source will either be interpreted through a negative mental schema or simply ignored. The result will be rejection or limited engagement with the substance of the message. This, in turn, shrinks the space available for reasoned debate. There is also a more severe consequence of negative perceptions than not engaging with campaign content. If voters perceive all or most political parties as incompetent, exclusive or untrustworthy, they could disengage from the entire process and decide to not vote at all.

On the other hand, voters are more likely to engage with campaign messages if they trust the political party issuing the message and see it as competent and inclusive. This, in turn, contributes to the quality of political debate because voters can engage more with the content of the message, ultimately enhancing the electoral process because robust debate results in a more competitive process.

2.4.2 Campaign Messages

The “said what?” part of the model relates to the content of the campaign messages.

Beyond the characteristics of the key actors, any examination of the relationship between election campaigns and democratic quality must consider the actual information transmitted to voters. The content of the messages delivered by political parties is of critical importance for political decision-making processes (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis, 1999:244) because choices about parties and candidates requires information about desired policies and representatives and also to assess whether incumbents have delivered on what they promised (Street, 2001). Indeed Gunther and Mughan (2000:422) see information as being “the lifeblood of democracy”.

Mattes and Bratton (2003:30) indicate that “information about incumbent political leaders creates a point of vicarious contact between citizens and the political system, as well as a means by which they can better follow the process of decision-making”. And according to Druckman (2005:517) “there is clear evidence that the amount of information one possess shapes attitudes and behaviour, including such things as participation, voting behaviour, tolerance and information processing strategies”.

However, as noted previously, politicians may present messages not distinct from each other isolated, unrepresentative facts and frame issues tendentiously (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000:168). What, then, makes for a good campaign message?

There are three types of messages: positive, negative and comparative. In positive messages the candidate introduces himself or herself to voters, reminds them of past achievements or outlines future plans. Negative messages involve a critique of opposing parties and/or candidates. Comparative messages present contrasting information about the party and/or candidate and the opposition (Schnur, 1999: 148-149). Schnur argues that the comparative message is the most effective. Jamieson (2000: 220) concurs saying

that “although there is nothing wrong with accurate, fair attack, contrast is a form of communication that is more helpful to voters” because it relays the relevant information, voters prefer it and are more readily mobilized by them. Buchanan (2001:368) indicates that “aggressive campaign rhetoric, even when it conveys factual information potentially useful to voters, reinforces the well- documented public distaste for candidates, politics, parties and government”.

A more contentious issue is the array of information to be provided to voters. On one hand, some analysts feel that parties should give voters an expansive assortment of information. For example, Wheeler (1997) argues that voters should be provided with the broadest range of information, interpretation and debate over public choices. Richardson and Beck (2007:198) describe multiple sources of information as “one of the hallmarks of democracy” and Gunther and Mughan (2000:421) argue that voters need a considerable volume of accurate, policy-relevant information about politics. On the other hand Mutz (2004:14) argues that exposure to those with differing political views is more likely to lead to ambivalence, delayed voting decisions and lower levels of political participation in general, while exposure to like-minded views appears to spur people on to political activity. Thus, too many dissenting messages could paralyze voters.

Therefore, while voters need competing information to make choices *between* parties, each party should keep their campaign messages short, simple and direct (Schnur, 1999:144), consistent, i.e. not at odds with each other (Weaver, 1996: 204), and integrated by means of a carefully-devised campaign theme (Marquette, 1996). According to Marquette (1996: 151-153) a theme should rarely change and should fit all salient issues into an overarching message and should focus on unifying rather than divisive concerns. According to Marquette, the best themes are often emotive as well as urgent and once established must be used to formulate a clear and simple thematic statement. This will allow voters to have an adequate sense of what each party is saying.

Taken together, the literature teaches us that campaign messages are effective when the party weaves its messages together into a well-blended and internally consistent theme congruent with previous campaigns using comparative messages. Moreover, voters should be able to distinguish between political parties on the basis of the information provided to them. If campaign messages are not distinct from one

another, they do not provide the basis on which voters can choose a political party and then competitiveness of the electoral process is hampered.

2.4.3 Campaign Strategies and Media Coverage

The “through which channel?” component of the model relates to the mechanisms by which information is conveyed to voters. Aside from the characteristics of the source and the content of the messages, persuasive and compelling campaign messages drafted by parties perceived as trustworthy will have little effect if voters cannot hear them. As Wheeler (1997) indicates, citizens require universal access to information to pursue their rights. Thus, widespread access by voters to media that convey political information is vitally important for election campaigns. There are several media or channels through which campaign messages can be communicated to voters. This part of the model is divided into two components namely the strategies of political parties and the mass media’s coverage of the election.

Party communications should be well co-ordinated via the prior development of a campaign plan or strategy. A campaign plan is a written blueprint for winning elections (Marquette, 1996:159). This plan should define what needs to be done, when it should occur, who should be doing it and what resources are needed. It should create order out of an otherwise chaotic process filled with scores of details, deadlines and changing circumstances (Denton, 1996:19).

Party communications generally include what analysts call “paid media”. Paid media encompasses “any form of message dissemination that incurs a direct financial cost to the communicating agency” and includes advertising on radio, television, news magazines, newspapers and the internet”. The advantage of paid media is that political parties have control over it, messages are delivered precisely as intended without interference or distortion (Schnur, 1999: 145) and it allows candidates to communicate the superiority of his or her attributes over those of opponents (Kaid,1999:423). The disadvantage of paid media, according to Schnur, is that voters often do not treat the information provided as compelling or new because they instinctively attach less credibility to partisan messages.

In addition to paid media, parties can use party volunteers to communicate campaign messages. According to Weaver (1996:241), direct voter contact is more effective per voter because it allows for two-way communication and humanizes the candidate but is less efficient in reaching large numbers of voters.

The mass media also plays a critical role in disseminating campaign messages. To a large extent, it is the mass media that integrates the vast array of activities and events, defines the important issues and themes of the campaign, differentiates the positions of the political parties and assesses the performance of the parties (Kavanagh, 1995:177). The media can provide a vital stage for the presentation of party ideologies as well as provide the public with the opportunity to scrutinize and gather information on a broad array of manifestos (Word, 2004:5).

Media coverage of party activities or messages is classified as “free media” because the transmitting agent does not receive direct financial compensation (Schnur, 1999: 146). Free media is not necessarily more independent than paid media.¹² The notion of objective “news” coverage of a campaign has been widely challenged. According to Johnson-Cartee (2005:146) the news media plays “an increasingly powerful role in the process of constructing political reality”. The media can “highlight, underplay or diminish particular features of a candidate or a candidate’s position on issues, casting these in a positive or negative light” and “these images become powerful symbols that identify and/or define a candidate...”(Kotler and Kotler, 1999: 5).

There is also a lack of consensus around the relationship between media “objectivity” and democracy. On the one hand Gunther and Mughan (2000:420-428) argue that media impartiality, which they consider to be the balanced reporting of competing news with a minimum of partisan bias, is an important component of a quality democracy. Others do not see an “unbiased” media as being beneficial to democracy or voter participation. Lemert (1984) argues that when the press in America moved from promoting partisan goals to non-partisan coverage, it discouraged political activity. Similarly, Mutz

¹² It is widely recognized that there is an ongoing battle over which information should be presented to voters. Graber, McQuail and Norris (1998:1) argue that this conflict centers on the substance of news, the stories to be covered, the framing of the news and the perspectives into which it should be cast. “News” then is socially constructed (Johnson-Cartee, 2005:146). It is not a mirror of reality but a selective representation of the world (Schudson, 2003:33). O’Shaughnessy and Stadler (2005:59-72) also explore how language structures and demonstrate that language is not neutral but is a site of power and struggle.

(2004:11) argues that professional norms of objectivity by journalists who opt for an "informational" approach promotes politically bland news that fails to expose people to forceful political arguments from any particular party.

Irrespective of this debate, the acceptance or rejection of persuasive messages based on an evaluation of the credibility of the source of the message (Hovland, Janis and Kelly, 1954; Milburn; 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 2000; Iyengar and Valentino, 2000; Popkin and Dimock, 2000) is as applicable to the news media as it is to political parties. The news media not only conveys information but is also a political actor in its own right (Kavanagh, 1995; Mazzoleni and Schultz, 1999 and Kriesi, 2004). Audiences will have tarnished views of messages delivered through media which they regard as biased or untrustworthy.

Thus, to contribute to the quality of the democratic system campaign messages should be conveyed as widely as possible and through accessible and credible mechanisms.

2.4.4 Voters

The "to who?" component of the model concerns the recipient of the messages. Mattes and Bratton (2003:12) indicate that "democracy works best" when citizens are well informed and involved in the political system. Indeed, for campaigns to have any worth, they cannot simply fall on "deaf ears".

2.4.4.1 Cognitive Awareness

Clearly, voters who are more interested in political matters are more likely to take note of campaign material. Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) point out that "central processing", used when attention and motivation are high, employs more mental resources and enables people to think more systematically, allowing data to shape their inferences. Peripheral processing, used when attention and motivation are low, employs fewer resources and relies on simple heuristics and stereotypic inferences. Thus, the level of cognitive mobilization among voters has important consequences for their receptiveness to political communications. Disengaged voters can render the most sophisticated campaign

impotent, while cognitively mobilized voters are open to persuasion.

2.2.4.2 Partisan Identification

Partisan identification can have important implications for both the assimilation of campaign material and voter participation.¹³ Campbell et al (1960:121-122) define party identification as “a psychological identification which can persist without formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support.” They argue that “party identification has a wide range of intensities in each partisan direction and that national politics are deeply affected by the individual’s enduring party attachments. According to Campbell et al (1960:133) ‘identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation’.

The earlier literature held a predominantly negative view of non-partisans or independents in which they were seen as uninvolved and uninterested in elections (Dalton, 2000:31). Dalton (1984) has advanced a more refined view by developing four categories of voters namely ritual partisans, cognitive partisans, apartisans and apoliticals. Dalton classifies as ritual partisans those who vote habitually for the same party due to strong partisan attachments and are less educated and interested in political matters while cognitive partisans identify with a party but are cognitively engaged. Apartisans are free of affective party ties, well-informed and have the political resources to follow the complexities of politics. Apoliticals are not attached to any party but are less educated and are uninterested in the political process (Dalton 1996: 213-216).

Partisanship is an important voter characteristic because as Wattenberg (2002:37) argues, it provides a highly effective tool by which to organize political information, evaluate

¹³ There has been considerable debate about what partisanship is as well as the merits of its use as an explanatory indicator. Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986, 552) argue that “the notion of a perceptual screen is seen as a static and limited view of cognitive processes” and that the assumption that people have a need for consistency has been challenged. Dalton (2000:20) on the other hand argues that “a strong case can be made that the concept of party identification is the most important development in modern electoral behaviour research. Many analysts adapted the concept of party identification into a far more cognitive one. For example, for Fiorina (1981) party identification is based on an evaluation of political parties past performance and for Popkin (1991) party identification is used as an informational shortcut. Roseman, Abelson and Ewing (1986:294) also investigated the relationship between emotions and political cognition and found that “political issues have natural emotional structures that people can evaluate in terms of what they know and want, and identify with, partly through the resonance of these issues with their own emotions”.

political stimuli and guide electoral choices.¹⁴

2.2.4.3 Consumption of Political Information

It is relatively well-established that voters obtain information about political parties, leaders and the broader political system through the consumption of mass media products. The operative word here is *consumption*.

Voters can choose to ignore information. Having persuasive and compelling campaign messages drafted by parties perceived as trustworthy presented in widely accessible formats cannot ensure that voters will actually consume or engage with that information. Indeed consuming political information has a cost attached to it. As Popkin (1991: 22) indicates the process of procuring, analyzing and evaluating information requires the investment of time and energy.

While democratic theorists search for signs of voter interest based on an appreciation of voting as part of their civic duty, marketing analysts simply assume that voters are unlikely to be motivated to consume political information. For example Kotler and Kotler (1999:14) assert that “voters rarely get to know their candidates because they lack the time or interest to explore their political choices”. Schnur (1999: 143) argues that “the most difficult thing for most candidates and campaign workers to remember is how little interest most people have in what they are doing”. And according to Marquette (1996:146), “it is a serious mistake to assume that voters are paying close attention to your election or any election”. Given these assumptions, the onus lies with the party to outdo the competition and attract the attention of the voter.

In light of the importance of information about political parties and their leaders (Mattes and Bratton, 2003 and Druckman, 2005), the consumption of campaign media by voters

¹⁴ According to cognitive psychologists, partisan identification consists of rich cognitive categories which contain valuable information about performance, competence and reliability and helps voters sort through the confusion created by the volumes of campaign messages provided by parties (Marquette, 1996; Popkin, 1991 and Rhan, 1993). According to this approach, individuals cope with the complexity of the world by relying on processes of classification using informational shortcuts, schemas or cognitive structures in which new people, events or issues are treated as an instance of an already familiar category (Fiske, 1986; Kinder, 1986; Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk, 1986; Conover and Feldman, 1986; Sears, Huddy and Schaffer, 1986; Miller, 1986; Brody, 1986; Lane, 1986; Jervis, 1986; Hamil and Lodge, 1986 and Rhan, 1993).

is clearly a critical component of competitive elections and healthy democracies.

2.2.4.3 Political Efficacy

Once persuasive campaign communications have been consumed, voters who feel efficacious about voting are most likely to be mobilized to vote. Internal efficacy refers to the citizens' feelings of personal competence "to understand and to participate effectively in politics" (Morrel, 2005:51). Pateman (1970:45) connected political participation and political efficacy when she argued that "the experience of participation in some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further participation in the future" and indeed empirical studies (Finkel, 1985; Finkel, 1987; Rudolph, Gangl and Stevens, 2000, Morrel, 2005 and Pinkleton and Austin, 2004) have demonstrated the importance of a sense of internal efficacy for engagement in democratic processes. As Morrel (2005:50) asserts, citizens without a sense of internal political efficacy will "likely become apathetic about, indifferent to and disengaged from the democratic process".

Thus, recipients' who are interested in and engage with campaign messages; who participate in an overall debate about policy and performance and who reason about the information enhance the quality of democracy. Ideally then, recipients' of a campaign should be interested in, consume and engage with campaign messages as well as feel a strong sense of internal political efficacy.

2.4.5 Campaign Impact

The "with what effect?" section of my model deals with potential consequences of the preceding components of the model. In particular, I focus on the extent to which the campaign process provide the basis to "draw voters in" to the electoral process.¹⁵

¹⁵ Of course, there are many other potential campaign effects. Campaigns can increase party identification, kindle an interest in political matters, enhance political efficacy and stimulate electoral fluidity which occurs when people vote for different parties at national and provincial level (vote-splitting) or switch between political parties between elections.

Participation in the political system is seen a key component of a healthy democracy. As Dalton (1988:222) indicates, “Democracy should be a celebration of an involved public. Democracy requires an active citizenry because it is through discussion, popular interest and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out in a democracy. Without public involvement in the process, democracy lacks both its legitimacy and guiding force.” And if, as Popkin (1991:8) argues, “campaigns temporarily change the basis of political involvement from citizenship to partisanship; and in the process attract interest and votes from people who generally find politics uninteresting and remote” then well-run, imaginative campaigns transmitted by trustworthy political parties through accessible and credible media should draw voters into the electoral system by providing them with an incentive to vote.


Campaigns which motivate large proportions of the electorate to vote enhance the quality of democracy. As Diamond and Morlino (2005:xvi) note “democratic quality is high when citizens participate in the political process”.

2.4.6 The Election Campaign Assessment Model

Putting all the previously discussed steps together, I generate the following ideal model which demonstrates how an election campaign can contribute to the quality of democracy. For election campaigns to enhance the quality of democracy:

Political parties perceived as competent, trustworthy and inclusive by the voting public must transmit a high volume of comparative policy-relevant campaign messages through a widely accessible and credible range of media to an interested and efficacious electorate, providing them with an incentive to go to the polls and cast their ballot.

Figure 2: The Election Campaign Assessment Model



University of Cape Town

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

To restate, the central and over-arching research question to be addressed in this thesis is the extent to which South Africa's 2004 election campaign contributed to the quality of democracy provided voters with an *incentive* to vote.¹⁶ I thus attempt to answer a chain of research questions that test different parts of an integrated analytical model. This chain of research questions involved assessing the images South African voters had of political parties, the content of the choices on offer, the accessibility and credibility of the mechanisms through which this information was communicated, the levels of interest and efficacy among voters as well as the extent to which the campaigns provided voters with an incentive to cast their ballot.¹⁷

As Babbie and Mouton (2001:388-389) indicate, researchers often face a choice between depth and specificity of understanding and they conclude that "the best solution to this dilemma is to use both methods". To capture both specificity and depth, I used both qualitative and quantitative data-analysis techniques. Thus, this thesis rests on a remarkable amount of "methodological pluralism", which characterizes much of the research on political persuasion (Swanson and Mancini, 1996:3).

¹⁶ While I recognize that campaigning occurs during the entire period between elections, in this study I will limit my focus to the period between the announcement of the election date and the Election Day.

¹⁷ Social constructivists, for example Louw (2005:4), would argue that attempting such an assessment is naïve because "all observation of the world is subjectively guided" and that "people using different paradigms are effectively living in different worlds". According to Johnson-Cartee (2005:2) social constructivists argue that by naming, labeling and categorizing observable behavioural phenomenon empiricists force upon the world their own pre-determined order.

3.2 The Election Campaign Assessment Model Applied to the 2004 South African Election Campaign

3.2.1 Perceptions of Political Parties and Leaders

I start this section by briefly sketching the history of the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP. I then look at perceptions of the leaders of these parties. Using post-election focus group discussions as well as a series of surveys conducted in South Africa between 1994 and 2004, I look at perceptions of these parties. Given that I have argued that competence, inclusiveness and trustworthiness are critical components of how parties are viewed, the primary consideration in examining “the who” i.e. political parties will be citizens’ perceptions of party competence, inclusiveness and trustworthiness.

3.2.2 Choices Offered to Voters in the 2004 Election

This section focuses on the content of the campaign messages delivered by political parties to South African voters in the 2004 general elections. I use a content analysis data-set of media statements compiled by Media Tenor to examine the messages communicated and which political parties communicated them. Overall I assess whether parties articulated their messages in a way that could enable voters to distinguish between competing parties. To extract the key campaign themes and campaign messages of the above-mentioned parties I examine party-issued campaign material.¹⁸ There was a vast amount of campaign material (some of which differed by geographical region). To be even-handed, I examined each party’s campaign manifesto; prominent slogans and posters as well as the content of their websites, specifically published press releases; speeches and newsletters.¹⁹ I also supplemented this analysis by drawing on the work of other analysts who also reviewed campaign material to obtain a more comprehensive

¹⁸ Parties, to differing degrees, tailored their messages to different audiences in different areas; however, all parties delivered key central messages at a national level.

¹⁹ Brochures and paid advertisements were specifically excluded because I had no way of developing a systematic sample of such material.

picture of each campaign.²⁰ For each party I outline the main thrust of the campaign (i.e. its theme) and evaluate their messages using the following questions:

1. What was the nature of the messages i.e. was it primarily positive, negative or comparative?
2. Did the party weave the messages together into a well-blended and internally consistent theme?
3. Was the overall theme congruent with previous campaigns?

3.2.3 Campaign Strategies in the 2004 Election

Next I consider campaign strategies of the political parties. In this section, I describe the campaign strategies (in particular the paid components of these strategies) used by the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP to convey its messages to voters. To gain insight into the campaign strategies of parties, I use data which details spending on campaign advertising compiled by Nielsen Media Research. I also carry out secondary analysis of interviews conducted with the media officers of political parties by the Media Monitoring Project and CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis. Finally I consider survey data on the extent of reported contact between voters and political parties during the campaign period.

3.2.4 Media Coverage of the Campaign

In this section I turn to the media's coverage of the campaign. I start by giving an overview of South African media and media use patterns during 2004. I then ask how extensive the mass media's coverage of the campaign was, which media gave the coverage, what messages were communicated, whether the media was biased in its coverage and what the extent of policy-related coverage was. I also ask whether this coverage was provided via media that are easily accessible and regarded as unbiased by voters.

²⁰ These analysts may have referred to campaign material, such as brochures and paid advertisements, which I have not included in my assessment.

To examine the media's coverage of the campaign I again analyze the Media Tenor content analysis data-set. I also utilize the Media Monitoring Project's (MMP) content analysis data. To further evaluate the information communicated by the media about political parties, I did a close reading of reports available on Independent Online (IOL), news24, Business Day and the Mail and Guardian. This was done to complement Media Tenor's comprehensive content analysis data which answered questions about the extent of policy-related coverage and media bias. I also analyze political party and voter perceptions of media bias.

3.2.5 Profile of the Electorate

This section examines the characteristics of voters in the 2004 election.²¹ I ask whether voters felt competent to play an active role in politics, whether they were interested in following the campaigns and paid attention to the campaign messages. I look at patterns of partisanship and ask whether voters in 2004 were open to persuasion by political campaigns and campaign stimuli. I also look at the education profile of voters as well as the frequency with which they reported paying attention to campaign news.

3.2.6 Impact of the Campaign

Firstly, to answer the question of whether the campaign provided voters with an incentive to cast their ballot, I revisit the findings of each component of my analytical model. I then look at trends in participation and at the insights provided by the focus group discussions.

²¹ Given that the Comparative National Election Project and Afrobarometer surveys were both done after the elections had taken place I will also present longitudinal data which demonstrate that perceptions of political parties and leaders have remained relatively stable.

3.3 Data

3.3.1 Survey Data

I used a series of surveys conducted in South Africa between 1994 and 2004. The survey data includes the following nationally representative studies: the Institute for Democracy in South Africa's (Idasa) 1994 post-election study; study, Opinion '99; Afrobarometer South Africa rounds 2000, 2002 and 2004; the 2004 Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) and SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004.

Interviews for these surveys were conducted in the language preferred by the respondent. Questionnaires were translated into languages relevant for the surveys and interviewers were proficient in all languages of the areas in which they conducted their fieldwork. The samples for these surveys were designed as representative cross-sections of all citizens of voting age in South Africa, namely, all South African citizens 18 years and older.

The goal of the samples was to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection for interview. Samples were selected in four stages: the primary sampling units (PSUs), starting points, households, and individual respondents. Primary sampling units were randomly selected with probability proportionate to population size and were disproportionately stratified by province, population group and community size (metro, city, large town, small town, village and rural). In some cases a gender quota was used at the stage of individual selection. Due to the disproportionate sampling, it was necessary to weight the data-sets up to the universe, i.e. the South African voting public. The samples were weighted according to province, type of area and race and then projected onto the universe i.e. the electorate at the time.

Thus, each sample is representative of the wider South African population at the time that the surveys were conducted. Sturgis (2003:15) points out "if a sample is collected properly, it is possible to make valid and reliable generalisations to the broader population within known bounds of error".

3.3.1.1 Idasa Post-Election Study (1994)

This survey was conducted after the 1994 general election and examined issues such as voting intention, attitudes towards democracy and economic evaluations. Fieldwork was conducted between 26 August and 16 September 1994 by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd. Face-to face interviews were conducted with 2517 respondents.

3.3.1.2 Opinion 99 (1998 and 1999)

This series of surveys were undertaken by a consortium consisting of the SABC, Idasa, Markinor (Pty) Ltd and the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA). They examined South Africans' views of the political, social and economic developments since 1994 as well as key issues related to the conduct of free and fair elections, voter participation, and other economic, political and partisan trends.

1. 1998: 2200 face-to-face interviews were conducted by Markinor (Pty) Ltd from 1 to 30 September 1998;
2. 1999: 3384 face-to-face interviews were conducted by Markinor (Pty) Ltd from 6 April to 30 April

3.3.1.3 Afrobarometer (2000 and 2004)

The Afrobarometer surveys form part of a larger comparative series of public attitude surveys in countries across Africa. The surveys measure public attitudes to democracy, governance and economic performance, perceptions of the consequences of democratic governance on people's everyday lives and a range of actual and potential economic and political behaviours. In each round 2400 face-to-face interviews were conducted.

1. 2000: Fieldwork was conducted from 6 July until 6 August 2000 by Research Surveys.
2. 2004: Fieldwork was conducted during October and November 2004 by AC Nielsen.

3.3.1.4 Comparative National Elections Project (2004)

The South African CNEP survey was also part of a larger international project. The 2004 survey examined public attitudes to political parties and elected representatives as well as the impact of media bias on electoral behaviour. A range of complementary questions measured the frequency with which respondents were exposed to political information through television, radio, newspapers and magazines during the campaign period as well as perceptions of partisan bias by each specific medium. Fieldwork was conducted between 7 October and 27 November 2004 by AC Nielsen. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 12 00 respondents.

3.3.1.5 SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 (2004)

Fieldwork for the SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 survey was undertaken from 29 January to 20 February 2004 and personal in-home interviews were conducted with 3500 randomly chosen respondents.

3.3.2 Content Analysis Data

The CNEP project also included a content analysis data-set consisting of transcripts of radio and television news, as well as newspaper clippings collected during the months preceding the elections (9 February – 14 April). This comprehensive content analysis data-set was compiled by Media Tenor, a research institute which specializes in the analysis of media content. The data-set consists of 57953 individual campaign-related print, television and radio media statements across all languages. The content analysis data-set allowed for a systematic account of the issues which were raised, who raised them, which media focused on which parties and candidates, and whether it was done in a neutral way. For more details on this data, please see appendix 7. Where applicable, I supplemented this analysis with material from the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) which also conducted content analysis. For more details on the Media Monitoring Project data, please see appendix 9.

3.3.3 South African Advertising Research Foundation Data

I used data on media use from the South African Advertising Research Foundation to provide an overview of media use in South Africa. SAARF specializes in media audience and product consumption measures. I used SAARF AMPS, the SAARF All Media and Products Survey; SAARF RAMS, the SAARF Radio Audience Measurement Survey and SAARF TAMS, the SAARF Television Audience Measurement Survey. The television monitoring technology of SAARF provides television viewing information, minute by minute, using so-called ‘peplemeters’ an electronic device that is connected to a households’ television to record television viewing time automatically (SAARF, 2004d). For more details on this data, please see appendix 10.

3.3.4 Nielsen Advertising Expenditure Data²²

I used advertising expenditure data from Nielsen Media Research to gain insight into the campaign strategies of political parties. Nielsen Media Research is a division of the Nielsen Company which specializes in media research and analysis. The AdEx division of Nielsen Media Research provides industry standard data on advertising expenditure across all main stream advertising media. These figures capture gross expenditure by political parties, and excluded discounts negotiated between political parties and media owners. The data includes the amounts spent by parties on radio, print, direct mail and outdoor advertising (Nielsen Media Research, 2004). For more details on this data, please see appendix 11.

²² These figures were made available to me by the Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) which purchased them as part of the Comparative National Elections Project.

3.3.5 Media Reports

I made use of 147 electronic articles published on Independent Online (IOL), News24, Business Day and the Mail and Guardian between the 9th of February and 13th of April. IOL and News24 are South Africa's largest news websites. News24 is operated by 24.com and includes articles from *Beeld*, *Daily Sun*, *Die Burger*, *Son*, *Witness*, *Volksblad*, *City Press*, *Rapport*, *Sondag*, *Sunday Sun*, and Media24 community newspapers. IOL consists of a compilation of articles printed in Independent News & Media's national and regional newspapers and includes articles from *The Cape Argus*, *The Cape Times*, *Daily News*, *Isolezwe*, *Post*, *Pretoria News*, *Sunday Independent*, *Sunday Tribune*, *The Independent on Saturday*, *The Mercury*, *The Star*, *Saturday Star*, *Saturday Argus* and *Sunday Argus*. *Business Day* is a daily publication and *The Mail and Guardian* is published weekly.

3.3.6 Qualitative Interviews with Media Officers in Political Parties

I used qualitative interviews conducted by the Media Monitoring Project and CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, with media officers in parties to gain the perspective of parties on the campaign process.

3.3.7 Campaign Material

In South Africa political parties develop a campaign manifesto for each election. I examined campaign manifestos, posters, speeches as well as internet sites to extract their campaign themes and key campaign messages.²³

²³ A manifesto is a declaration of principles, policies and intentions (Kabemba, 2004).

3.3.8 Focus Group Discussion Data

The focus groups were used to complement the survey data i.e. to gain a deeper perspective into the views of voters. Recruitment for the focus groups was facilitated by the research company Citizen Surveys. I used the principles set by Krueger (1998) to guide the structure of my discussion guides (see appendix 4 for the discussion guide).

The groups consisted of different types of voters who expressed some level of interest in the campaigns and were used to gain insight and understanding into the underlying reasons for non-participation; the reasons parties were unable to convince people to vote for them and perceptions of the usefulness of campaigns. The following focus groups were conducted.²⁴

1. Voted ANC across all elections
2. Voted IFP across all elections
3. Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999 but did not vote in 2004
4. Voted for an opposition party in 1994 and 1999 but did not vote in 2004
5. Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999 but changed to UDM in 2004
6. Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999 but changed to DA in 2004

All groups were presented with a campaign picture of the parties that they had not voted for (non-voters were provided with pictures of all six parties considered in this study). They were then asked why each particular party was unable to convince them to vote for that party. The focus group data yielded detailed and nuanced information and added a considerable amount of depth to my analysis. Please see appendix 6 for the transcripts of the six focus groups.

²⁴ Unfortunately, I did not do a focus group discussion with NNP voters due to funding constraints.

3.4 Limitations

Elections and election campaigns are extra-ordinary multi-faceted events which take place in complex political environments and a research project which attempts to capture the vibrancy and texture of such an event inherently means that much of the richness of what actually occurred will be lost during the representation of the event. Mancini and Swanson (1996:3) correctly point out that election campaigns are complicated to study because they “reflect a single coming together of history, opportunity, circumstance, tradition, personality, political culture and other things”.

One of the vexing questions in planning a project such as this is deciding whether to concentrate on one or two parties and going into a significant amount of detail or choosing several parties and going into less detail. In this study I decided to focus on the parties who took the top six places at national level. While focusing on a single party would have allowed me to go into considerable depth, I would have lost the overall picture which an examination of several parties provides. Furthermore, by focusing on several parties, I could give a more holistic view of campaigning in South Africa.

A particular limitation within the quantitative component of the study is that the concepts are constrained by the comparative nature of the study. In order to ensure comparability, the wording of questions must conform to that which occurs within the larger study.

A further limitation is the fact that my examination of campaign material was, of necessity, conducted in English. While parties generally followed a national strategy, South Africa has eleven official languages and some messages were communicated in these languages. The Media Tenor clippings included all languages but were coded using an English code-frame. Furthermore, all the campaign material and media articles which I analyzed were English. Language groupings in South Africa often parallels different locations and target groups, for example, Zulu-speakers living primarily in Kwa-Zulu Natal and this may have resulted in messages in Zulu being tailored to deal with the concerns of voters in KwaZulu-Natal. Therefore, there may have been nuances between the different languages which I would not have been aware of.

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, a systematic empirical examination of the campaigning in South Africa is an important task to undertake because of its critically important role in enhancing South Africa's young democracy.

University of Cape Town

CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

As previously indicated, perceptions of the characteristics political parties and party leaders are critically important. In the absence of relevant information, these perceptions are used as informational shortcuts to make far-reaching political decisions. Furthermore, as the source of campaign messages, they assist voters to make judgments about the authenticity and persuasiveness of those messages. Campaign messages delivered via political parties and leaders perceived as competent, trustworthy and concerned about the needs of all groups will be received in a more positive way, allowing voters to engage more with the content of the message. This, in turn, contributes to the quality of democracy.

In this chapter, I present a short profile of the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP and then assess the extent to which they were viewed as competent, inclusive and trustworthy by South African voters in 2004. These parties hold 380 of the 400 or 95 percent of the seats in South Africa's National Assembly. I also present survey ratings of the leaders of these parties as well as comments made about them by the focus group participants.

4.2 Party Fortunes

The ANC won all three national democratic elections by overwhelming majorities. The ANC's proportion of the vote, taken as a proportion of total votes cast, increased from 62 percent in 1994 to 66 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2004. The DA steadily improved in its performance in the three national democratic elections. The DA's proportion of the vote increased from 2 percent in 1994 to 10 percent in 1999 to 12 percent in 2004. This consistent improvement resulted in it becoming the second largest party and the "official opposition" to the ruling party. The IFP emerged as the second largest opposition party in all three elections. However, the IFP has seen a steady decline in its performance in the three national democratic elections. The IFP's proportion of the vote decreased from 11

percent in 1994 to 9 percent in 1999 down to 7 percent in 2004. Furthermore, in 2004 the IFP lost power to the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. The UDM increased its position to fourth in the National Assembly but was unable to improve on its initial performance of 3 percent in 1999, obtaining 2 percent in 2004. The ID competed for the first time in the 2004 elections and received 2 percent of the votes. The party that saw the most dramatic decline in its performance in the three national democratic elections was the NNP. The NNP's proportion of the vote decreased from 21 percent in 1994 to 7 percent in 1999 to a mere 2 percent in 2004 and subsequently disbanded (Piombo, 2005:251-279).

4.3 Historical Overview

4.3.1 The ANC

The ANC has been South Africa's ruling party since 1994. Initially named the South African Native National Congress, the ANC was founded in 1912 (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005: 10) and was the key agent of South Africa's political transition working in the second half of twentieth century as an exile movement to liberate South Africans from apartheid rule (Butler, 2007: 35). For the ANC, the task of transforming itself from a liberation movement into a political party with a coherent organisational structure was a particular challenge (Dubow, 2000:12).

The ANC perceives itself as a liberation movement with a historical mission to "unite all the people of South Africa, Africans in particular, for the complete liberation of the country from all forms of discrimination and national oppression" (Deegan, 1999b:40). The ANC is often characterized as a "broad church" accommodating diverse views and interests seeking inclusivity through alliances such as the Tripartite Alliance between ANC, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and presenting itself as a "strongly multi-racial and multi-ethnic party" (Lijphart, 1998:148). The ANC succeeded in accumulating enormous reserves of symbolic capital because of its longevity as a resistance movement, its position of inclusivity, moderation and its accommodation of a range of social groups and ideological positions (Dubow, 2000:108).

4.3.2 The DA

According to Lodge and Scheidegger (2005:12), the historic roots of the DA can be traced to the defection in 1959 of 12 United Party Members of Parliament, who supported common role African enfranchisement, to form the Progressive Party (PP). Only Helen Suzman survived the 1961 election, however, the party's ranks were augmented in 1975 and 1976 by floor crossing from the United Party. The party, renamed the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in 1977, and later the Democratic Party (DP) in 1987 advocated federalism, power-sharing and proportional representation during the 1980s (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:12). The Democratic Party and New National Party announced in June 2000 that they would join together as the Democratic Alliance with the aim of building a political movement that would effectively challenge the ANC for political power. However, the merger was never institutionalized and by November 2001 the alliance had sprung apart primarily due to former NNP office-holders dissatisfaction with the leadership of Tony Leon (Lodge, 2002:157). Kotze (2001:123) indicates that the DP and NNP had no shared historical roots and very little ideological common ground. The name Democratic Alliance was retained by the DP.

4.3.3 The IFP

The Inkatha Freedom Party, previously the the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, was formed by Chief Mangosotho Buthelezi in 1975. By July 1990, the movement had transformed itself into a political party. However, by the time of the 1994 election, Chief Buthelezi's aspirations for national leadership had been shattered by extensive media exposure of the IFP's extensive and intimate collaboration with apartheid security forces (Southall, 1998: 460). As the 1994 election drew nearer, the IFP turned increasingly to Zulu nationalism, endorsing the Zulu king's call for a sovereign Zulu state (Piper, 2005:151). After 1994, requests for a special status for KwaZulu/Natal were viewed as antagonistic to the renewed constitution-making process and withdrawal from the Constitutional Assembly served only to isolate the IFP (Southall, 1998:461).

After 1994 the IFP was the leading party in KwaZulu-Natal. It joined the ANC at the national level and Chief Buthelezi received a place as a senior minister in national

government. Despite continued ANC/IFP rivalry, the ANC focused on constructively engaging and including the IFP in government and embraced a more strategic constructive orientation resulting in a period of pragmatic engagement from 1996 to 2002. In 2004 the ANC managed to elect 'Sbu Ndebele as provincial premier by obtaining the support of the United Democratic Movement, the African Christian Democratic Party and the Minority Front. At a national level, Thabo Mbeki offered two deputy positions to the IFP but awarded the positions to others after being frustrated with waiting for the IFP's response (Piper, 2005:150-162).

According to Piper (2005:148-149), the IFP's strategic movement toward inclusive liberal-democratic politics was incomplete because of its nature as an organization as well as the fact that most South Africans think of the IFP as a party for traditional Zulus. Piper therefore argues that "the IFP's post-apartheid politics has not so much transformed from militant Zulu nationalism to an inclusive conservative-liberalism as it has become trapped between the two".

4.3.4 The UDM

The United Democratic Movement was established in 1997 by General Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer.

General Holomisa was part of the Transkei Bantustan government and built up contacts with the ANC leadership when it was unbanned in 1990. In May 1994, General Holomisa was appointed as the Deputy Minister of Tourism and Environment and in 1996 he was expelled from the party because of his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and for his public criticism of the ANC. General Holomisa then formed the National Consultative Forum (Koeble, 1998: 156-157).

Roelf Meyer was a member of the National Party but gained a reputation as a reformer due to his central role in developing the interim constitution and the negotiation process that brokered the demise of apartheid. Meyer had internally advocated the dissolution of the National Party and the formation of a coalition movement made up of all opposition parties, earning him fierce criticism within the National Party and leading to his

resignation. He subsequently formed the New Process Movement (Ndletyana, 1999:183).

The United Democratic Movement was established in September 1997 out of a merger of the New Process Movement and National Consultative Forum. However, in 2000, Roelf Meyer came to the conclusion that the UDM was not a credible opposition party and left the party (Ndletyana, 1999:183).

4.3.5 The ID

The Independent Democrats (ID) was formed about a year before the 2004 election in March 2003 by Patricia De Lille.

Patricia De Lille is a former trade unionist and was a long-time member of and MP for the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (www.southafrica.info, 2006). In 1989, she was elected into the National Executive Committee of the Pan Africanist Movement, a wing of the PAC. When the PAC and other political organisations were unbanned in 1990, she was appointed as foreign secretary and relief and aid secretary of the party. During the negotiations, Ms De Lille led the PAC delegation and after the first democratic elections, she was appointed as a member of parliament. Between 1994 and 1999, she was the chairperson of the Transport committee and the chief whip for the PAC in parliament. She also served in various portfolio committees including Health, Mineral and Energies, Trade and Industry, Communication and the Rules Committee (www.sahistory.org.za, 2006). Ms De Lille then left the Pan African Congress to form the Independent Democrats.

4.3.6 The NNP

The National Party (NP) dominated South African government without interruption from 1948 to 1994. The New National Party thus “has an uneasy past as the architect of the apartheid system” (Deegan, 1999:58). The National Party was established in 1914 by J.B. Hertzog and was involved in a series of splits and mergers that date back to pre-world war II. The National Party formalized the system of apartheid under D.F. Malan in 1948

(Eaton; 1999:11). In the 1960's and 1970's, the National Party's image was that of a monolith prepared to sacrifice the rule of law and international respectability in its attempts to crush the forces of African nationalism (Southall and Daniel, 2005: 47).

When P.W. Botha came to power in 1983, the National Party began a process of limited change in South Africa. In September 1989, F.W. De Klerk succeeded P.W. Botha as the President of South Africa and at the opening of parliament on the 2nd of February 1990 introduced sweeping reforms when he announced the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC, the SACP and the imminent release of hundreds of political prisoners (Dubow, 2000:100-101). The NP engaged in a process of continuous and difficult negotiations with significant disagreement within the party about the extent of compromise with the ANC (Sisk: 1995). In March 1992, De Klerk held a white referendum to approve constitutional change and received overwhelming support for change. Its participation in the Government of National Unity (GNU) symbolized its commitment to national reconciliation. However, once the new constitution had been promulgated, tensions within the party became apparent (Southall, 1998: 462).

In September 1997, F.W. DeKlerk resigned and was replaced by Marthinus Van Schalkwyk (Southall, 1998: 462). The National Party changed its name to the New National Party in 1998 (Kotze, 2001:119). The party faced a series of crises and in June 2000, the NNP joined with the DP, to form the DA. The DP's Tony Leon became the national leader and NNP's Marthinus Van Schalkwyk became the deputy leader. The objectives of the DA were to present a challenge to the ANC's electoral dominance and to strengthen opposition politics. As the stronger party in the alliance, the DP set the terms of the merger, which led to a struggle for control between the leaders. These tensions were exacerbated by differing values and philosophies and the fact that they operated as separate parties at provincial and national level. In October 2001, the NNP exited the DA. The merger and subsequent split with the DP had stretched its resources and the DA had effectively absorbed the NNP's grassroots structures. Shortly after its withdrawal from the DA, the NNP decided to enter into a cooperative agreement with the ANC and thereafter disbanded entirely (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005:166).

4.4 Perceptions of Party Leaders

As previously indicated, voters often look to characteristics of party leaders to help them make important political decisions. Positive or negative character traits are inferred to the party which these leaders represent. In South Africa, party leaders play a pivotal role in the life of a party. Perceptions of parties are integrally linked to perceptions of the party leader. As a result of this, campaigns often revolve entirely around the national party leader. Given the inter-relatedness of perceptions of parties and party leaders, it is useful to assess what the prevalent view of party leaders was in 2004.

How then were party leaders perceived in 2004? Looking firstly at the approval ratings of President Thabo Mbeki, leader of the ANC; Tony Leon, leader of the DA; Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the IFP; General Bantu Holomisa, leader of the UDM; Patricia De Lille, leader of the ID and Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, leader of the NNP, it is evident that South African voters had negative perceptions of all opposition party leaders.

By 2004, President Mbeki remained the most popular party leader, receiving the best average rating. President Mbeki was the only politician who was rated higher than 6 on a scale of 0 to 10 with a rating of 6.7. All the other leaders scored continually low scores and thus South African's feelings towards these leaders can be described as being more negative than positive. Of the leaders rated in table 1 below, Marthinus van Schalkwyk was the least liked political leader with a low rating of 2.8. Chief Buthelezi's rating of 3.6 and General Holomisa's ratings of 3.3 are actually an improvement of their consistently low ratings. Patricia De Lille received higher ratings than other opposition leaders. However, although Patricia DeLille ranked second, her rating was actually negative at 3.7.

Table 1: Overall Leader Ratings: 1995 - 2004

	May '95	Nov '95	May '96	Nov '96	May '97	Nov '97	May '98	Jul '98	Sep '98	Oct - Nov 98	Feb-Mar 99	Apr 99	Feb 04**
Mbeki	6.2	6.2	6.2	5.5	5.6	6.0	5.9	6.3	6.5	6.7	6.7	6.9	6.7
Leon	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3.1	3.2	4.0	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.6
Buthelezi	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.6
Holomisa	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.3
De Lille	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3.7
Van Schalkwyk	NA	NA	4.7	3.8	--	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.8

Sources: Markinor and Opinion 99.

And now, using a scale (where 0 means you strongly dislike and 10 means you strongly like), I'd like to ask you how much you like or dislike some political leaders. Again, if I come to a leader you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so.

**How would you rate XXXXXX on a scale from 10 to 0, where 10 means you are totally in favour of him/her and 0 means you are totally against of him/her?

Markinor in their 2004 survey also included an item which measured the extent to which voters could trust these politicians to be a leader of a political party. With regard to trust, the patterns were fairly similar to the general ratings. President Mbeki was the most trusted as the leader of a political party, with a rating of 6.7. Marthinus van Schalkwyk was the least trusted with a rating of 2.7 followed by General Holomisa with a rating of 3.1. Both Chief Buthelezi (3.4) and Tony Leon (3.4) scored slightly higher than Patricia De Lille who scored 3.4 on this dimension.

Table 2: Politicians Trusted To Be A Leader of A Political Party

	Average
Thabo Mbeki	6.69
Mangosuthu Buthelezi	3.42
Tony Leon	3.41
Patricia De Lille	3.36
Bantu Holomisa	3.13
Marthinus van Schalkwyk	2.71

Source: Markinor, 2004.

Question: To what extent do you trust XXXXXX to a leader of a political party on a scale from 10 to 0, where 10 means you are trust him/her totally and 0 means you do not trust him/her at all?

I now turn to the comments made by focus group participants about these leaders. It should be noted that these comments were unprompted. No comments were made about President Mbeki. Positive comments about Chief Buthelezi and General Holomisa came only from those participants that had voted for the IFP and UDM respectively. Some participants, who voted for opposition parties in 1994 and 1999 but had not voted in

2004, had positive views of the ID and Patricia De Lille. Participants were very vocal in giving negative comments about Tony Leon, Chief Buthelezi, General Holimisa and Patricia De Lille.

Participants who had positive comments about Patricia De Lille mentioned the fact that she had exposed fraud in the government's controversial armaments contract, commonly referred to as "the arms deal". One said that he would "give her a fair chance" in future elections. Participants who voted for the ANC in all three elections also had some positive comments about her, citing the fact that she had "an impeccable history" and is a strong woman. They also expressed concerns about other leaders in her party. The participant who made the comment about her impeccable history also said that she showed signs of opportunism. Some comments related to aspects of her personality – saying for example, that she is "direct"; that she "stands up for what she believes in" and that she is "a strong person". One felt that she could bring about change for women and children.

Focus Group Comment Box 1: Positive Perceptions of Patricia De Lille

I think, look, she is a personality, and she exposed a lot of fraud, like you said. **[Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004]**

I do like her, I like what she stands for, she is very direct. The reason why she did not get my vote is because it is a new party, and casting my vote for a new party is a bit tacky. But I do like her, I think she is wonderful, she is great, and I do think she can make a change, giving her the opportunity she can make a change, especially for the women and children **[Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004]**

I just think people like Patricia De Lille; I have got to give her a fair chance. And through a vote of mine, it is going to put her into a seat of power, and for the next elections I definitely will educate myself more onto the different parties, their stances, what they offer, what they believe in, the core, the core of our country. So I have really got to educate myself more and not just vote this one or this one because they are the bigger party **[Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004]**.

When I look at the leader of the ID, Patricia De Lille, yes she is a strong woman and a very promising person but looking at the leadership in her party, its worrying. She can die tomorrow as an individual. I'm wishing the Lord might give her many many years. She might make ordinary citizens view the country in another way...she's a strong woman **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

If you take Patricia, she can come far. She stands up for what she believes in. This whole armament deal that is going on in Durban she is the one that started it. She wanted to know what is happening to the money and who is spending it **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and DA in 2004]**.

Positive comments about General Holomisa related to the fact that he was frank in his dealings; was approachable and had a good track record in the Transkei.

Focus Group Comment Box 2: Positive Comments About General Holomisa

...there was that time that General Holomisa took over from Matanzima, everybody in Transkei was very happy, and there was a time when peoples could get, when they were underpaid they could get a lot of bonus, and it was through funding that Transkei was prospering at that time. So now I decided in 2004, no, what Holomisa was doing in the former Transkei, in that little Transkei he does have the capability to do such thing in this big South Africa, if he can be given a chance. That is why my X goes straight to next to Holomisa [**Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004**].

In 1994, I was working in Transkei, and then that time then Bantu General Holomisa was the leader of that country, and we were very free [**Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004**].

The reason why I voted for UDM, I saw many things were not going, Holomisa used be someone who speak frank and freely, and he was discovered during his time in Umtata, a welcome was freely and now I say, and now I decided to vote for UDM, the General, he is frank [**Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004**].

he was a ruler in the former Transkei, and that is why I'm saying that he must be given a chance and he can be seen, and judging from the things that he did in the past [**Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004**].

I never saw him with body guards, he was not as if he was a big person, he was just alone, one man, now you can see these people have a lot of body guards [**Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004**].

Positive comments made about Chief Buthelezi were that he is consistent in his approach; did not make promises that he could not keep and encouraged people to be self-sufficient.

Focus Group Comment Box 3: Positive Comments About Chief Buthelezi

I voted the IFP because its leader speaks one language; he does not speak this today and tomorrow changes. He stands for the truth. What he said in the past years, is what he is saying today, he does not go off the line. I love IFP because it has humanity (Ubuntu), it respects. I go to church on Sundays and I am respected, but when there is a rally for IFP, I do not go to church if that rally is on Sunday; I go to attend the rally. We are taught of respect at all times. IFP is able to look after its people and the nation. When he speaks, at all times he likes people to be happy and live a good life [**Voted IFP in 1994, 1999 and 2004**].

On my side, Baba Shenge is the only person I see, he has a good record for governing people. He speaks one language, he promises a better life to all people [**Voted IFP in 1994, 1999 and 2004**].

When Shenge speaks, Baba Shenge has spoken, even if he is in other places he makes no promises, IFP has nothing, it makes no promises but he encourages people to make things for themselves [**Voted IFP in 1994, 1999 and 2004**].

I now turn to the negative comments. Several participants had negative views of the ID and Patricia De Lille. These negative views were primarily linked to her relations within the PAC and the fact that she had left the PAC. One participant felt that she was unreliable and another said that she had formed the ID for personal gain.

Focus Group Comment Box 4: Negative Perceptions of Patricia De Lille

She belonged to a very radical party. The PAC. Now if you belong to a radical party and you are a radical person, then my belief is you stick to your radical views. You don't try to use the housewives of Mitchell's Plain to forward a party that forms after that, because that, I believe, is only for personal gain. She formed this party for personal gain. Because if you are really a radical and your heart is really in being a radical and being a member of the PAC, not even being a member of the ANC, and then you move over and try to woo the housewives of Mitchell's Plain, which are the underprivileged people and the people of Guguletu and Bonteheuwel and all that to vote for your party because you are going to be the fairy godmother. That is my opinion about that **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and DA in 2004]**.

The only thing is she is really opportunistic, because, firstly she was in the PAC, she was speaking a lot and then she just, and then she go to the top structures of the PAC, then she decided, and then she just decided to cross the floor, and then you could see, that the only thing that she want is to gain from the politics, financially. And the second problem then they criticise a lot, and she criticise and provides no solution to the problems. She cannot express what must be done, or say what must be done **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]**.

really she is not reliable **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]**.

And she is always involved in this political gossip in parliament, but you could really you could see that when she always uses this gossip to put her on the top **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]**.

This Patricia De Lille, she decided to quit her own party to form another party...so from that point I see no reason to vote for her because she never even made right in her own party. **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

On my side when I analyse, when you analyse the Independent Democrats, you could see, for me, you could see that this person would not be will not be willing to listen to other people's views, because she would be independent, she would not appreciate the support, now you could see even from what she did in the PAC, she spoke a lot from within the PAC, and she was mobilising within the PAC, then she decided to move out **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]**.

when she was campaigning and people were asking her certain questions, and she couldn't come up with a direct answer, for me it is pointless going to vote for somebody that can't give you a direct answer, so once they are in Parliament, what are they going to do to the public, they are undecided. So for me it is not voting for somebody that can't give you an answer direct **[Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004]**.

Another thing, I think she wanted to outdo UDM. Because while she wasn't kicked out of them, she left. And now she goes for another party. Why? Because it's still the same thing. She will preach what this guy preaches and this guy preaches, trying to outdo the ANC, but nothing happens **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]**.

Participants felt that Chief Buthelezi was like the biblical "Judas" because they believed that he had worked with the apartheid government and felt that he was used by it to kill ANC supporters. They also mentioned that he was primarily concerned about the needs of Zulu people in KwaZulu/Natal.

Focus Group Comment Box 5: Negative Perceptions of Chief Buthelezi

Here, the problem here is Gaja, he was working with a Batete, before 94, he had some police protection, this police people, they were fighting against the UDF, they didn't want to see the members of the United Democratic Front, his police guards, Gaja's police guards, were working with the apartheid regime, and I could see that this person was not really, he is the same as Tony Leon, **[Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004]**.

he likes the Zulu people, the culture, the tradition of the Zulu, he did not want anything that would destroy the Zulu nation, and the nationality **[Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004]**.

Gatcha was used by the then regime...you see... to kill ANC supporters...this guy...there is nothing good about him **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

For Mangosuthu my feeling or opinion with him is that he was an informer...he betrayed his people...you know he was like Judas...when I think of the IFP, I just see his face and I think of impimpi **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

Participants felt that Tony Leon was only concerned about the interests of white communities; that he criticized without presenting alternatives and that he was an opportunist. One participant questioned Tony Leon's logic in expecting him, as a voter, to believe that the DA would bring change just because he said so.

Focus Group Comment Box 6: Negative Perceptions of Tony Leon

...I'm asking myself what was Tony Leon doing in 1993...to me he is like an opportunist...and he is misleading people because one...he is the opposition...he is a person who...like...always criticizes you know...if he criticizes he doesn't come with constructive criticism. For instance, when they were saying to the Minister of Transport...saying that he must resign...he was not coming with an alternative...you must come with alternatives **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

I even heard about something about DP on the TV, I could see Tony Leon is a bit of a racist **[Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004]**.

I want to say that...he is said to be a custodian of white privilege...that's the first thing. **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

What he is, is a custodian of white privilege...and he's just going to stay like that. I was listening to the stats...if you look at the voting patterns...Rondebosch, Carlton, Constantia, Sea Point, Muizenberg, Camps Bay...they know that if they vote DA someone is going to fight to preserve their privileges **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]**.

I think he's there for people from the white communities **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]**.

To sum up then, the focus group data is congruent with the survey ratings. Sentiments about opposition leaders were more negative than positive. In some cases very strong opinions with terms such as opportunistic, unreliable, "custodian of white privilege" were used to describe them.

4.5 Perceptions of Competence

I now turn to perceptions of competence. Did South African voters view political parties as competent? President Mbeki and the ANC-led national government received positive evaluation ratings. Government's performance was also seen in a generally optimistic light. On the other hand, all opposition parties were seen as insufficiently competent to run national government.

In 2004 the ANC enjoyed the position of being the incumbent party. With regard to approval of presidential performance, more than three quarters (76%) in 2004 indicated that President Mbeki was doing his job "very well" or "fairly well". Two thirds of South Africans (66%) approved of the performance of national government.

In some policy areas, voters were extremely critical of government. In 2004, less than one in three (30%) said that it was performing well in attempts to "fight employment by creating jobs" and only 38% said that it was performing well in attempts to keep prices stable. Negative evaluations were also given in the area of narrowing the gap between rich and poor, only a third (35%) said it was performing well in this regard. Another key area of criticism related to efforts to control crime and fight corruption. Less than half (40%) saw the government as performing well in controlling crime and 37% thought they were doing a good job of fighting corruption.

However, positive evaluations were given in other policy areas. Almost three quarters (73%) felt that the government was performing well/very well in distributing welfare grants. Majorities also indicated that the government was doing a good job of delivering household water (68%); addressing educational needs (58%) and combating HIV/AIDS (55%). Overall, 58 % gave a positive evaluation of the governments' management of the economy. South Africans were also generally positive about the promotion of affirmative action (57%) and national unity (64%), with majorities giving positive assessments.

Thus, as Mattes (2005: 51) argues, South Africans did not turn a blind eye to the problems of joblessness or criminal violence, but rather in some way balanced these assessments of government performance with its impressive achievements in other policy

areas. Indeed, an SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 poll revealed that the ANC was still seen as the party most trusted to successfully address these challenges.²⁵ Majorities said that they trusted the ANC to “eradicate unemployment”, “lower the crime rate”, “clean government of corruption” and “maintain a competent civil service” compared to less than a fifth who trusted the DA to do so.

Table 3: Parties Trusted To Deal With Issues, 2004 (Multi-mentions allowed)

	Eradicating unemployment	Lowering the crime rate	Cleaning the government of corruption	Maintaining a competent civil service
ANC	54%	57%	54%	59%
DA	18%	19%	18%	15%
IFP	6%	8%	7%	7%
UDM	2%	1%	2%	1%
NNP	11%	12%	10%	9%
ID	3%	3%	4%	2%
OTHER	4%	6%	6%	4%
NONE	15%	11%	9%	6%
Don't Know	7%	6%	8%	12%

SOURCE: SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004.
Question wording not given.

At the same time, focus group participants raised the issue of nepotism, poor service delivery and unfulfilled promises by the ANC. These comments are given in the box below.

Focus Group Comment Box 7: Negative Perceptions of the ANC

What the ANC is doing is promising us things and then after that not doing it. But when the ANC want us to vote these things are coming forward before and then after that – nothing. **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 but did not vote in 2004].**

...they promised housing, and up till today a lot of people are still struggling, for 12 years, been living on the ground, struggling for toilets, there's no water, there are no toilets, up till today they still don't have a house**[Voted for Opposition Parties in 1994 and 1999 but did not vote in 2004].**

The whole thing is just in reverse. I mean the ANC are doing the exact thing that the NNP did years ago. So we are living back in Apartheid, but in a nice way, you know what I am saying. Because now the Blacks are getting work, and the Whites are not getting work. And the Indians and the Colored might get work**[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

²⁵ SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004. Party Performance. Released 1 April 2004. Fieldwork for this study was undertaken from 29 January to 20 February 2004. Personal, in-home interviews were conducted with a random representative sample of 3500. This indicator relates more to competence in dealing with the issues listed than extent of trust in particular parties.

Focus Group Comment Box 7 continued: Negative Perceptions of the ANC

One other thing that made me not to vote for ANC is their promises. Not all of their promises, but some of their promises were not met with things that were expected to be met. And other things, is this thing of – I won't say it is nepotism, if you go to the council there in town, 5th floor, 6th floor, you will find they are all *chommies* (friends) [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

...the ANC didn't actually fulfill what they always said they were going to do [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

They promised me a house, and I am still sitting without a house. That is ten years ago. And to be honest, I became very frustrated. I am so full of - on the news I see it: ANC will build houses, ANC will do this, ANC will do that – they did nothing for me yet [**Voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 2004**].

Their token was 'Vote ANC' and then this will be done and this will be done and all of this. But in the ten years nothing happened [**Voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 2004**].

The ANC promised us a lot of things, but we never got it [**Voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 2004**].

The majority of South Africans did not view the other opposition parties as being sufficiently competent to run national government. Less than one in five voters expressed confidence in the competence of these parties. Only 16% saw the ID and the NNP, 15% the IFP and 14% the UDM as competent to run national government. Majorities or a significant proportion felt that the IFP (60%), NP (55%), UDM (53%), ID (48%) and DA (43%) would do a "poor" or "very poor" job of running the national government. Voters generally demonstrated an inability to rate opposition parties on their levels of competence. About a third of the electorate was not able to formulate an opinion on how the opposition parties might perform. Overall 36% said that did not know whether the ID would do a good job of running national government or not. The NNP did not fare much better at 32%, the UDM at 31% and the DA at 29%.

Table 4: Perceptions of Opposition Party Competence to Run National Government, 1998-2004.

	September 1998			April 1999			October 2004		
	Good/very good job	Poor/Very poor job	Don't know	Good/very good job	Poor/Very poor job	Don't know	Good/very good job	Poor/Very poor job	Don't know
DA	21%	34%	45%	23%	41%	36%	28%	43%	29%
IFP	14%	61%	25%	13%	62%	25%	15%	60%	24%
UDM	10%	29%	61%	14%	38%	48%	14%	55%	31%
ID	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	16%	48%	36%
NNP	28%	55%	17%	23%	57%	21%	16%	53%	32%

SOURCE: Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004

Question: Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with their views, please tell me whether you think each of the following political parties would do a good or poor job of running the national government if elected, of haven't you heard enough about them to say?

By 2004, a plurality of voters (43%) said that the DA would do a “poor” or “very poor” job of running the national government. Just over a quarter (28%) said that it would do a “good” or “very good” job. Another quarter could not offer an opinion on the competence of the DA. As seen below, focus group participants felt that the DA needn’t wait until they were voted into office to make a difference.

Focus Group Comment Box 8: Negative Perceptions of the DA’s Competence

There was one part where the DA stated ‘we’ve got a plan to bring down crime’ I think something like that. But now if he has a plan to bring down crime, why must he hold it till he gets his vote to be President? Why make this promise that he can make this promise if he becomes President. Only if he becomes President. So that’s empty promises **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

I wanted to vote for them, seriously, but now, for the past ten years I have been following these politics just a little bit. But they don’t come with constructive things. Like maybe if the Government says this thing, they always oppose, every time. They will come with their own initiative, something that they came up with and then they said ‘no, here is this thing, let’s do this thing’. For me to be convinced by hearing the fighting, it is really putting me down instead of making me want to be their follower. It doesn’t help me in order to be their follower **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

Focus group participants who gave positive comments about the DA mentioned that that they “keep their promises”, are a strong party to vote for and are taking control of corruption.

Focus Group Comment Box 9: Positive Perceptions of the DA’s Competence

one thing about the DA, it keeps its promises, because he has money. He is not using the states money, he has money. It is in the news, they will go to Atlantis, and they will bring blankets, groceries for all the poor people. The ANC will just go there and will be eating at the table and the poor people will be watching them eat. That is one thing, the DA does deliver. **[Voted for Opposition Parties in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

The DA is the next strongest party to vote for. At least when they decide a thing, they are trying to solve your problem. They are not just doing this or doing that, they are trying **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted DA in 2004].**

Probably because the DA is taking control of the corruption that is going on **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted DA in 2004].**

While perceptions of the NNP’s competence deteriorated between 1994 and 2004, the majority of South Africans had consistently negative opinions about the IFP in this regard. In 1994, 61% felt that the IFP would not perform well in running the national government and this figure increased to 62% in 1999 but then dropped to 60% in 2004. The proportions of people unable to offer a response on the UDM’s perceived


competence decreased from 61% in 1998 to 48% in 1999 down to 31% in 2004. This indicates a “firming up” of opinions about the UDM’s perceived competence. At the same time, there was a steady increase in negative perceptions of the UDM.

This data shows that while voters had a broadly positive view of government performance, their image of the competence of opposition parties were largely negative.

4.6 Perceptions of Inclusiveness

Overall, only the ANC was seen by a wide majority voters as an inclusive party. Since 1994, the majority of South Africans have viewed the ANC as being an inclusive party. At any given point, not less than 70% of South Africans saw the ANC as an inclusive party although this represents a slight drop compared to the 77% who in 1994 felt that the ANC represented the interests of all South Africans.

Figure 3: Images of Party Inclusiveness, 1998-2004.



SOURCE: Idasa 1994, Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004

Do you think that _____ (READ IN NAME OF PARTY) looks after the interests of all in South Africa or after the interests of one group only, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?

The history of the ANC was an important component of focus group participants' views of its representativity. One focus group respondent indicated that he would vote for the ANC "for the rest of his life" because it is "committed to" all races.

Focus Group Comment Box 10: History of the ANC


...looking at the history of the ANC...when it formed it was named ANNC, African National Natives Congress, it was predominantly for blacks. So now seeing the fact that the ANC is committed to other races I feel ANC...I see that as...I am not a racist so then this is the party to vote for, for the rest of my life...because I like that we are a multi-racial country so we must have a multi-racial party. So I am still voting ANC because it is looking out for all Africans and all South Africans. [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].

the ANC was the only organisation that was central and vocal, fighting for the liberation of our country[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].

the ANC, it has worked hard, and now at least now all people are equal and have rights, and they have shown some of the improvement[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].

It is important to note that it not only people who identify with the ANC that say the ANC represents the interests of all South Africans. A majority of those who do not feel close to any party felt that the ANC looks after the interests of all South African.

Figure 4: Independent Voters' Images of Parties Inclusiveness-Exclusiveness



Source: Comparative National Elections Project 2004

Do you think that _____ (READ IN NAME OF PARTY) looks after the interests of all in South Africa or after the interests of one group only, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

The majority of South Africans simply did not know whether opposition parties were concerned about the interests of all groups or not. Not surprisingly the highest level of uncertainty related to the ID with 71% saying that they could not offer an opinion on its inclusiveness. By 2004 more than two-thirds (68%) were also unable to articulate an opinion about the inclusiveness of the NNP. Two-thirds of voters (66%) were unable to offer a response about the UDM's representativeness. This is actually an improvement – in 1998 three quarters (74%) could not offer an opinion on this matter. A majority of South African voters (57%) also could not offer an opinion on whether the IFP and the DA takes into account the needs of everyone in South Africa

Table 5: Perceptions of Party Inclusiveness: 1994 - 2004

	September-October 1994			Sep-98			Apr-99			Oct-04		
	All	One Group	Don't know	All	One Group	Don't know	All	One Group	Don't know	All	One Group	Don't know
ANC	77%	17%	6%	71%	25%	4%	75%	21%	4%	70%	14%	17%
DA	39%	14%	47%	24%	20%	56%	28%	22%	49%	33%	11%	57%
IFP	16%	54%	30%	6%	36%	57%	8%	36%	55%	26%	18%	57%
UDM	NA	NA	NA	7%	34%	59%	9%	46%	46%	28%	6%	66%
ID	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	25%	4%	71%
NNP	39%	38%	24%	32%	44%	24%	35%	37%	28%	27%	10%	63%

SOURCE: Idasa 1994, Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004

Do you think that _____ (READ IN NAME OF PARTY) looks after the interests of all in South Africa or after the interests of one group only, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

The IFP was seen by one in four voters (26%) as inclusive of all South Africans. Focus group participants felt that the IFP and Chief Buthelezi were only interested in the interests of Zulu people and that of KwaZulu/Natal:

Focus Group Comment Box 11: Perceptions of the IFP's Representativeness

he likes only the Zulu's, he is not interested about everyone in South Africa [Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004].

On my side I could say without the political leader the Zulu National itself could not mix to the Xhosa. I don't know from what side that came from, if you are Xhosa and you go to Gauteng, they look as if you are someone who is, who is a skelm, or who is a crook, there is nothing to come out good from a Xhosa person, when what about you as a Xhosa person, when you get under the Zulu's? [Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004].

I decided not to vote for IFP, because they are for the Zulu [Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004].

Focus Group Comment Box 11 Continued: Perceptions of the IFP's Representativeness

they are not in the Western Cape, they are more in Natal. He grew up in Natal; he doesn't know what's happening where we come from, where we call it the Cape Flats. So it's pointless if people are going to vote for the IFP [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

I think the IFP is very regional, you know, confined to Kwa-Zulu Natal [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

his party is more focused for KZN, it doesn't have interest for people living here in the Western Cape. So I can't vote for somebody whose interest is in KZN and doesn't have interest in other parts of South Africa [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

this guy doesn't have the interests of the people, he sees only now the people of Natal, he has been too long in that province [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

One other thing about this party, he does have members here in the Western Cape, but only a few members. I know of one person, he is living in my street, he is a member of the IFP and one other member, it is a family, and they all come from KZN [**Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004**].

If you look at the history of the IFP...culturally... it was an organisation that was there for cultural purposes, to say 'us as Zulus, we need to remind ourselves of who we are'...it was an identity kind of thing...I think its difficult to evolve into a political party that would encompass other people...because as a political party you have to encompass all. In 1994 I did see a few posters in the Eastern Cape of the IFP...they were struggling to become an all-encompassing political party. That was their biggest problem and they've not been able to transcend that and...the destructive nature ...just recently people were watching TV...this area Ulundi...it has significance to the King Shaka...it was almost a no-go area for the ANC...the Minister of Defence and Correctional Services had to go there because the IFP did not want the ANC to go canvass...that is part of their destructive nature [**Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004**].

They say a leopard never changes its colours...the thing is...this guy (Mangosuthu Buthelezi) his whole party...his zulu party...they don't accommodate other people, that's why I don't vote for them [**Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004**].

The NNP was seen by about one in four voters (27%) as inclusive of all South Africans. Some focus group respondents indicated that the NNP had not changed, that it was racist and only concerned about the needs of white voters. As seen in the box below, some focus group participants still had decidedly negative views of the NNP.

Focus Group Comment Box 12: Perceptions of the NNP's Representativeness

Because part of the NNP was still the old order. Even though they tried to recruit some other faces, like our faces, in order to get the people to vote. But the core was still the old kind. **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

the NNP is racist, the majority of the people in the NNP are the white people, and the majority of them did not care much about other on the feeling of the non-white people**[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

the majority of the people in the NNP are the white people, and the majority of them did not care much about other on the feeling of the non-white people. Now this party wanted to fulfil the interests of the white people **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].**

My point with the NNP it's worse than slime, getting all it's people, then joining the ANC **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

I don't care if it is changed or not, but I hate that name; National Party **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

there is no way I can go back to Pharaoh, I never saw any change. **[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].**

To me the NNP is a waste of time. The guy can't make up his mind where he wants to be. He jumps from the one place to the other. That is what I feel about him **[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 2004].**

Just over a quarter (28%) felt that the UDM represented the interests of all groups. Focus group participants felt that the UDM and Bantu Holomisa were primarily concerned about people in the Eastern Cape:

Focus Group Comment Box 13: Perceptions of the UDM's Representativeness

his (Bantu Holomisa) support, if you can say support – for the mines – people who are coming from the Eastern Cape and the people who are staying in Lower Crossroad, they are also coming from the Eastern Cape. It doesn't have people who were born and bred here **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

he is only focusing for the people who are living in the Eastern Cape, not on the people who are living in other parts of South Africa **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

He (Bantu Holomisa) wants power, he is fighting for power more than the interest of the people. **[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

This is also a party that was actually established in the Eastern Cape. So to me, in the Western Cape it doesn't make sense to go and vote for somebody in the Eastern Cape, because at the end of the day if he should come in, he is going to see more to the Eastern Cape, like Transkei and Ciskei and Umtata and so to me, it doesn't interest me to vote for somebody that is not going to look after our province **[Voted for Opposition in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

To me a party must be popular in all provinces, not only one. Because then it is not going to matter **[Voted for Opposition in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].**

By 2004 a third of voters (33%) felt that the DA was representative of all groups in South Africa. Focus group participants were particularly vocal in expressing their opinions about the DA's representativeness. Some felt that the DA was protecting white privileges and merely included people from other race groups to appear representative of all.

Focus Group Comment Box 14: Perceptions of the DA's Representativeness

I think the DA is a racist party. It appeals to the White upper middle class, even if the Deputy Chair of the DA is an African [Voted for Opposition Parties in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].

I just see white faces! [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004].

these things, more work, less crime...these are issues that are being raised by Civil Society and NGOs and we find that Tony Leon...the opportunist that he is...capitalizing on these things...create more jobs, less crime...50 000 police on the streets...these are the issues...he's playing on the emotions of the people... [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].


That thing about the DA...part of the problem of the DA...white people oppressed us for all these years and now I'm seeing a white man saying "Vote for me, I'm going to bring change". I ask myself, does he think that I'm crazy...that he wants me to believe that he will bring more jobs. That is part of the baggage...the majority of South Africans are blacks and as long as that's the case, white parties are going to suffer. I've noticed...they are the official opposition largely because white people voted for them...and they are still voting for them...they are privileged. Transformation is taking place in this country...because of that, the ANC is stepping on their toes. So I'm saying that all of these changes are not to the favour of those having privileges, unfortunately [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].

4.7 Perceptions of Trustworthiness

It is important to note that while voters reported that they did not know whether opposition parties were inclusive or exclusive, *majorities had an opinion about the trustworthiness of parties*. Two thirds (66%) of the South African electorate saw the ANC as being trustworthy "always" or "most of the time" compared to majorities who saw all opposition parties as being trustworthy "only some of the time" or "never".

As with perceptions of representativeness, it is not only people who identify with the ANC that say the ANC is trustworthy. Among independent voters, a majority of 54% felt that the ANC is trustworthy while majorities simultaneously viewed all opposition parties as not trustworthy.

Figure 5: Independent Voters' Images of Parties Trustworthiness



SOURCE: Comparative National Elections Project 2004

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

South African voters saw opposition parties as untrustworthy. Majorities said that they could trust the DA (58%), ID (60%), UDM (63%); IFP (64%) the NNP (65%) only be some of the time or not at all. Less than a fifth said that they could trust the DA (25%), ID (18%), UDM (17%), IFP (17%) and the NNP (16%) “always” or “most of the time”. On average, about one in five said they did not know whether the party in question was trustworthy or not.

Table 6: Perceptions of Party Trustworthiness: 1998 - 2004

	September 1998			April 1999			October 2004		
	Always/Most of the time	Only some of the time/Never	Don't know	Always/Most of the time	Only some of the time/Never	Don't know	Always/Most of the time	Only some of the time/Never	Don't know
ANC	57%	41%	2%	65%	32%	3%	66%	28%	6%
DA	12%	45%	43%	14%	73%	33%	25%	58%	18%
IFP	9%	67%	24%	8%	70%	22%	17%	64%	19%
UDM	7%	34%	59%	9%	46%	46%	17%	63%	21%
ID	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18%	60%	23%
NNP	18%	66%	16%	14%	68%	19%	16%	65%	20%

SOURCE: Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

One focus group respondent made a comment about Chief Buthelezi saying “This is the one person I don’t trust! He just doesn’t give me that – something about this man just doesn’t give me the impression that I can...” Two focus group participants also specifically mentioned that the DA was not trustworthy saying that the DA had “a hidden agenda” and another simply that she “did not trust them”.

4.8 The Need for Visibility

A key theme that emerged from the focus groups was that politicians need to be more visible in communities. Participants felt that political parties and their leaders only emerge during the run-up to the elections and then disappear when they no longer need to canvas for votes. This perception was the source of much disillusionment among these participants with some indicating that it was for this reason they had decided to not vote in the 2004 election. Indeed, as seen in the previous section, large proportions of the voting public had insufficient information to form opinions about key attributes of opposition parties.

Focus Group Comment Box 15: Perception That Politicians Should Be More Visible

They must come to the townships, or let me put it this way, they must be visible in order to convince me (to vote) [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

I will vote if the politicians become more visible in our areas. And not for one or two weeks or once in a blue moon, they must be very active in the communities [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

...they must start being more involved in the community [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

as a leader, you need the people’s support, you must mingle, get involved. Not just do your speech and then leave as if you don’t care [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

they are only visible when they need your vote. After that, quiet, nothing happens [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

Don’t come only when it is time for election, and then you come. You must always be part and parcel of people’s actions [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].

they mustn’t just be visible when there is an election [Voted for Opposition in 1994, 1999, but did not vote in 2004].

They must be visible throughout. They should be visible; I mean after all, they are our leaders Voted for Opposition in 1994, 1999, but did not vote in 2004].

Given its short history, it is unsurprising that voters did not have a firm opinion about the ID. However, besides mentioning a general lack of visibility of politicians, focus group participants singled the ID out in this regard. They felt that Patricia De Lille did not mix sufficiently with ordinary people. These sentiments are expressed below.

Focus Group Comment Box 16: Perception that the ID and Patricia De Lille Should Be More Visible

I never saw her (De Lille) addressing problems, in our areas [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].

This is one person I wanted to vote for, but she didn't come to the township as well [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

I have seen Patricia De Lille at my niece's valedictory. She was the main speaker there, and she spoke nice, but again, she just sat there at her table, she didn't mix. You know, it was a hall, with everyone in it, and she didn't go around and greet the people. I mean she doesn't have to know everybody's name, but go around and greet the people [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

She was elected by the school to be a main speaker, so she felt honored, but then thing is, show back the support, sit among the people. Move from table to table. She delivered her speech, handed out the awards, and left. With the bodyguard. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

On my side, I didn't hear anything, her (De Lille) campaigning, I don't want to lie, really, I never saw this lady in Guguletu [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].

She is a friend of a friend of mine. And then she came to me and she said to me I must vote for her friend... Yes, and she said I must vote for Patricia. So I said 'who's Patricia, I don't know Patricia' and she said she's ID and all that. So I said no, I don't vote for someone that I don't know. [Voted for Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004].

4.9 General Perceptions of Politicians

The 2004 Afrobarometer survey asked a series of questions about politicians and election promises. The data also revealed widely negative perceptions of politicians. A large majority of more than three quarters (86%) felt that politicians "always" or "often" make promises simply to get elected. 71% indicated that politicians "rarely" or "never" keep their campaign promises after the elections. Furthermore, 70% said that politicians "rarely" or "never" do their best to deliver development after elections.

Table 7: General Perceptions of Politicians, 2004.

	Politicians simply make promises to get elected	Politicians keep their campaign promises after elections	Politicians do their best to deliver development after elections
Never	4%	37%	33%
Rarely	8%	35%	37%
Often	27%	16%	19%
Always	59%	9%	6%
Don't know	3%	4%	4%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: Afrobarometer, 2004.

Question: In your opinion, how often do politicians do each of the following? Make promises simply to get elected; Keep their campaign promises after elections; Do their best to deliver development after elections

The notion that politicians make promises simply to get elected was a sentiment also expressed by the focus group participants. No specific question on this issue was posed but participants spontaneously raised the issue at various junctures. Focus group participants indicated that politicians are not concerned about ordinary people. They felt that they make a concerted effort to connect with them during election times but that “nothing happens” thereafter.

Focus Group Comment Box 17: Perceptions of Empty Promises Made By Politicians

They make promises to the people, and they don't fulfill their promises, and I think that is very unfair towards the man in the street...[Voted for opposition Parties in 1994, 1999 but did not vote in 2004].

There are a lot of promises being made, and as far as I have seen it hasn't been laid on the table, I don't see anything; it is just talk, talk, talk, but no doing. I want to see doing, not just talking [Voted for opposition Parties in 1994, 1999 but did not vote in 2004].

They go out of their way, they even go to your home or houses to see how you live and give you big promises, and at the end of the day nothing happens. But they got the vote and nothing happens after that [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

But no matter how many parties there are, it is still going to be the same, the same promises. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

Another view was that the primary goal of politicians is to enrich themselves and become “fat cats”. The following are some statements made regarding this:

Focus Group Comment Box 18: Perceptions of Personal Enrichment By Politicians

It’s like a little game they play, they don’t worry about the next person. It’s like playing monopoly or something. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

These people become fat cats. That is what they are, they just want the money at the end of the day [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

It’s all about the money. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

It comes back to power. Power hungry. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

It comes back to power. Power hungry. I don’t know if they are already disbanded, but before they disbanded, they joined DA, ID, all these other parties, leaving their followers alone, you see. And it is the leaders disbanding. What about their supporters that are faithful to them, who are voting for them all these years. Now they must follow them. I mean it doesn’t work like that[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].

From my point of view, is there is more millionaires in Parliament now than anything else. [Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004].

4.10 Conclusion

As previously indicated, images of political parties and party leaders have far-reaching effects. In the absence of sufficient information these images are used by voters to help them decide which party to vote for and whether it is worth their while to vote at all. It is also the lens through which campaign communications are evaluated. Based on their perceptions of the source of the message, focus group participants made judgments about the credibility of their messages. This lends support to the view that negative perceptions can cause campaign messages to be tainted resulting in either a complete rejection of the message or limited engagement with it.

It is against this backdrop that the prevalent images of political parties and their leaders should be considered. A large majority felt that most politicians simply make promises to get elected. The data also revealed widely-held negative perceptions of opposition parties and their leaders. All opposition party leaders received a negative rating in the series of surveys conducted between 1995 and 2004. Focus group discussions exposed strongly negative opinions of these leaders. Furthermore, all opposition parties were perceived as

insufficiently competent to govern South Africa. Majorities or significant proportions felt that they would do a “poor” or “very poor” job running the national government and saw them as being untrustworthy.

Furthermore, large proportions of the electorate were unable to offer opinions about many of the attributes of the opposition. The majority of South Africans simply did not know whether opposition parties were concerned about the interests of all in South Africa. Some focus group participants saw Tony Leon and the DA as predominantly concerned about the interests of white voters, Chief Buthelezi and the IFP as concerned about the interests of Zulu people and those living in KwaZulu/Natal, General Holomisa and the UDM as concerned about the interests of people living in the Eastern Cape and Marthinus Van Schalkwyk and the NNP as still being part of the “old order”. These negative images of opposition parties formed a critical component of the way in which their campaign messages were interpreted by the participants.

Thus, with regard to opposition parties, the informational shortcuts provided by perceptions of parties were either negative or completely missing. Mattes (2006:113) correctly asserts that with the exception of the ID as a newly-formed party, survey results about the trustworthiness and exclusivity of opposition parties present “a damning indictment of opposition strategists’ failure to use the resources available to them to implant a clearer image in the minds of voters about who they are and what they stand for”.

Simultaneously, voters generally approved of the ANC-led government’s performance and gave President Mbeki positive approval ratings. While critical of the government on some specific policy areas (such as job creation and crime reduction), voters commended it in others (such as welfare and development and gave a broadly positive assessment of overall government performance (Mattes, 2005). And in contrast to opposition parties, majorities of South Africans across all racial groups, including those who said that they did not feel close to any party, saw the ANC as an inclusive and trustworthy party.

The finding that large proportions of the electorate lacked information or had a poor image of opposition parties while not new has important implications for the

development of campaign messages.²⁶ Opposition parties facing this situation needed to connect with voters and work out ways of undoing these negative perceptions. *Then*, they needed to present compelling evidence that they would deal with issues important to voters. The survey data revealed, voters were aware of these failures but still gave the government a positive evaluation overall. Thus, only criticizing the government for its failures would be insufficient to convince voters to vote (for them). Simply saying so via evermore sophisticated means would give voters little reason to believe that they would perform any better than the ANC. Additionally, merely critiquing the government would not help voters overcome their view that opposition parties are untrustworthy and lacking in competence.

These findings pointed to a situation in which opposition parties would need to work hard to convince and persuade voters of the merits of voting for them. It also represents a poor score for the first component of my campaign assessment model because only one party was seen by a majority of voters in a positive light. A competitive election implies the existence of a choice between two or more alternatives - these results indicate that voters did not feel that there was more than one viable option. Secondly, these negative perceptions could have harmful repercussions for the assimilation of campaign messages.

²⁶ See for example Mattes and Piombo (2003) and Mattes (2006).

CHAPTER FIVE: CAMPAIGN MESSAGES IN THE 2004 ELECTION

5.1 Introduction

As previously indicated, message content is critically important because it provides the basis for choice. A situation where voters do not have sufficient information about the intentions of parties hampers the competitiveness of the electoral process, thus harming the quality of democracy. At a macro level, campaign messages should enable voters to distinguish between parties. Candidates should propose and explain solutions to important problems as well as elect campaign themes and styles that inform and interest voters rather than repel or confuse them (Buchanan, 2001:365). A predominantly negative campaign turns voters off; a lack of consistency between the campaign messages of a party confuses voters and the absence of a coherent campaign theme leaves the voter to pull the strands of campaign messages together.

Given the poor images of opposition parties outlined in the previous chapter, it is clear that these parties could not simply rely on broad appeals to mobilize voters. Rather, they needed to persuade voters of the merits of voting for them via credible and compelling messages. These messages would need to convince voters of their capacity to deliver on their promises.

In this chapter I examine the “what” i.e. the content of the campaign messages the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP sought to communicate to South African voters in the 2004 general election. I ask whether the information provided to the South African public was sufficient to enable voters to select between the competing parties. I draw out these themes and messages via an examination of communications which they developed. For each party I consider the main theme and ask whether the messages were primarily positive, negative or comparative; whether the party weaved their messages together into a well-blended and internally consistent theme and whether the overall theme was congruent with previous campaigns.

5.2 Overview

The evidence I reviewed shows that in general the top six parties all campaigned around the same issues and their *aims* around those issues were virtually identical. Various analysts, for example Davids (2004), Rankhumise (2004) and Kabemba (2004) highlighted the high level of consensus around the primary challenges facing South Africa. Parties promised to address the same major problems: unemployment; crime; poverty; HIV/AIDS; housing; education; health care and services such as electricity and water. According to these views, the real difference between parties related to the proposed solutions to these issues. Piper (2005:100) presents a more nuanced view and argues that the style of the ANC's campaign did reflect a notable ideological difference from the major opposition parties, namely "a left-leaning concern with the poor, the unemployed and the working class". For Piper, the ANC did not speak about these issues "in the neo-liberal register of the DA and IFP or, for that matter, of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (Gear), but in the left register of its alliance partners".

My analysis of the campaign manifestos reveals that there was substantial differentiation between the parties in terms of their plans to deal with these problems. Yet, while the party manifestoes generally contained considerable detail of their strategies to implement their policy positions, the vast majority of voters are unlikely to read (or have access to) them. Furthermore, the general communications of campaign information via more accessible means failed to differentiate between the salient positions of parties. Manifesto titles, slogans and posters showed significant similarities because they tended to focus on the goals which, as indicated above, were basically the same.

Slogans and poster content often echoed manifesto titles - it is therefore instructive to do a comparison of these. A rudimentary analysis of manifesto titles illustrates the point that parties failed to sufficiently differentiate their policy approaches to voters. All parties could essentially have had any of the titles listed in the table below as their manifesto title. The ANC primarily emphasized a partnership with voters and focused on the need to create work and fight poverty. The IFP also emphasized a partnership with voters with a more wide-ranging goal of "making a difference". The DA and UDM's title wording also was quite general, simply arguing for "a better South Africa" and "better future

plan”. The ID’s title pointed to the need to overcome South Africa’s divisive past. The NNP’s slogan implied that some people were not receiving their deserved share of South Africa. With the exception of the NNP’s title, these slogans all talked about improving and/ or uniting South Africa and were forward-looking in nature.

Table 8: Party Manifesto Titles, 2004.

Political Party	Manifesto Title
ANC	“A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty”
DA	“A better South Africa”
IFP	“Making a difference together”
UDM	“Better Future Plan”
ID	“Bridging the Divides: Uniting South Africa behind a Common Vision”
NNP	“You Deserve a Fair Share”

The key slogan of the ANC attempted to convey the primary policy objectives of the ANC, i.e. that it would “create work and fight poverty” through “a people’s contract”. This broad slogan could subsume a host of interpretations. The DA’s chief slogan was that “South Africa deserves better” and could be interpreted as a critique of what other parties, primarily the ANC, had to offer. The IFP’s slogan echoed that of its manifesto title i.e. that they would “make a difference together”. Both the ID and the NNP’s slogans related to issues of representation. The ID’s primary slogan said that they would give voters “more voice for their vote” while the NNP’s implored voters to “let us be your voice”. Only the UDM’s slogan was explicitly negative indicating that “ten years of unemployment undermined the people’s freedom”. All the selected slogans (except the UDMs) talk about working together, making a difference, improving South Africa or the party as being an effective voice for voters.

Table 9: Key Election Slogans, 2004.

Political Party	Key Election Slogan
ANC	“A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty”
DA	“South Africa Deserves Better”
IFP	“Making a difference together”
UDM	“Ten years of unemployment undermine the people’s freedom”
ID	“More voice for your vote”
NNP	“Let us be your voice”

Thus, an examination of key campaign slogans used by opposition parties during the 2004 campaign did not reveal many clues as to what parties would uniquely do to advance their particular goals and objectives.

Negative campaigning was a key feature of the campaign. All parties highlighted the shortcomings of their opponents. Some parties even launched scathing attacks on each other. The ANC lambasted opposition parties with the exception of the NNP due to the co-operative agreement between the two parties. This primarily involved President Thabo Mbeki's newsletter which he used to assault the IFP and DA. The IFP was unable to refrain from being drawn into a reactive campaign in which it defended itself against the ANC. This was particularly evident in the heated exchanges between Chief Buthelezi and President Mbeki. Opposition parties also spent a considerable proportion of their energies critiquing the government's performance and attacking each other.


Aware of the increasing strength of the ANC in a context of declining voter participation, several opposition parties, most notably the DA, IFP and UDM, spent efforts making the general point that the dominance of the ANC was a danger to democracy in South Africa. The DA was virulent in pointing out that a vote for the ANC would increase the strength of the ANC and a vote for an opposition party, besides the DA, was a "wasted" vote. The DA also took pains to draw attention to the NNP's alliance with the ANC. The DA delivered its messages about the ANC, NNP and ID in a particularly harsh tone. Tony Leon launched scathing attacks on Thabo Mbeki, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk and Patricia De Lille.

The UDM's entire campaign focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of the ANC to the neglect of its own plans and policy preferences. The ID managed to keep out of the fray to some extent, but was also drawn into a reactive campaign with the DA. The ID argued that the DA was unpatriotic and opposed the ANC simply for the sake of doing so. ID messages countering the DA were relatively hostile and negative. This also detracted from the core messages the ID sought to communicate to voters. The NNP devoted much time to painting the DA as an adversarial party which would not achieve much and was particularly harsh in their messages regarding the DA, with Van Schalkwyk aggressively tackling the DA and Tony Leon. Furthermore, as Schulz-Herzenberg (2005:173) indicates, NNP messages in 2004 still pandered to fears of

exclusion and this compromised the party's call for nation-building and compromise.

5.3 Campaign Messages

5.3.1 The ANC's Campaign Messages



The ANC ran its campaign around the themes of the celebration of ten years of democracy, emphasizing its achievements, acknowledging its shortcomings and drawing attention to their unique strength, experience and commitment as well as setting out their future plans. Incumbents face more restrictions when developing a theme – they need to find positive aspects of their record and focus on, for example, their strength, integrity, competence and legitimacy (Weaver, 1996: 152). The ANC performed well in this regard, weaving together its campaign messages into a simple well-blended and internally consistent theme.

The main thrust of the ANC's campaign was that it was the only legitimate party that had the competence to improve the lives of ordinary people in South Africa. A key message related to its partnership with "the people" in pursuing this goal. This is evident in their 2004 election manifesto and primary campaign slogan 'A people's contract to create work and fight poverty'. Other posters simply stated 'Create work - Vote ANC' and 'Fight poverty - Vote ANC'. ANC posters featured a smiling Thabo Mbeki with the slogan 'Vote ANC – A better life for all'.

The ANC adopted a roughly 7-pronged approach in their communications. This included:

- Outlining the apartheid past and the ANC's contribution to overcoming apartheid;
- Emphasizing the fact that the achievement of ten years of democracy, delivered by the ANC, should be celebrated;
- The achievements of the ANC since coming into power;
- Acknowledging challenges and shortcomings in relation to their goals (as well as providing reasons for them);
- Highlighting the reasons that opposition parties lacked the capacity to deal with these issues;
- Drawing attention to the ANC's unique strength, experience and commitment to deal with the pressing social and economic challenges facing South Africa; and
- Setting out their future plans for dealing with their stated goals.

The ANC in their manifesto, entitled "A People's Contract to Create Work and Fight Poverty", gave an account of past performance indicating what they had done in the previous ten years. The manifesto also presented future policy positions showing

continuity with previous policy positions. It provided a 10-year plan of action for achieving their goals (African National Congress, 2004a). The manifesto was divided into the following sub-sections:

- Message from the President
- Celebrating Freedom
- Celebrating South Africa
- Actual progress gives us real hope for the future
- Learning from experience: We can do more, better: Why a people's contract?
- Vision 2014 - Forward to the second decade of freedom
- The next five years: The practical steps
- The next five years: How will this be done?
- Confidence in the future

The message from President Mbeki summarized and highlighted key aspects laid out in more detail in the manifesto. That South Africa was celebrating ten years of freedom and democracy was highlighted along with the fact that transformation had taken place as a result of struggle and sacrifice led by the ANC. In his newsletters, President Mbeki also gave extensive details of the ANC's struggle against apartheid thus emphasizing a shared history of struggle. Mbeki asserted that through a protracted struggle led by the ANC, the apartheid system of white minority domination was defeated and the ANC would continue to do everything possible and necessary to eradicate the terrible legacy inherited from centuries of racist and apartheid rule.²⁷

A significant component of the ANC's message was to outline their achievements of the previous decade. The ANC's manifesto provided an extensive list of the government's achievements during the first decade of democracy. These achievements were outlined with various statistics used to support the report card given. The manifesto indicated that in the ten years between 1994 and 2004 the government had given water and electricity to millions of households; built houses accommodating millions of South Africans; opened up access to quality education; removed discrimination in access to professions; turned the economy around to become more productive and globally competitive and placed South Africa in a strategic position to deal with international affairs. President

²⁷ See for example African National Congress, 2004f.

Mbeki also reported that the ANC government “has transformed a fractured, poorly managed and badly resourced state into a single, coherent state which was progressively improving its capacity to meet the needs of all South Africans”.²⁸ The party outlined the advances that had been made by the ANC-led government to address the challenges of poverty while stressing that significant work still needed to be done”.²⁹ Extensive detail on programmes to deal with poverty;³⁰ health care transformation;³¹ public service transformation;³² employment creation³³ and crime prevention strategies³⁴ was outlined in the ANC Today.

A critical aspect of the ANC’s campaign was to acknowledge the shortcomings of their performance. President Mbeki in his newsletter stated that “We have achieved much, but we have also learnt a lot. And because we have this unique experience of leading a country through the first ten years of its transformation, we have the capacity to do more, and to do it better”³⁵. As Booyesen (2004) indicates the ANC’s campaign turned disappointments into continuous struggle, rather than a reason for sanction. The manifesto also offered an assessment of its own performance and noted problem areas and challenges which still face them. The *‘People’s Contract’* emphasized that government relied on partnerships to drive societal transformation. The manifesto argued that many of the things that needed to be done could not be carried out by government acting alone. It called on individual citizens, communities, trade unions and other organisations to help monitor and report violation of rights and claim their rights. It also asked citizens to co-operate with the police, provide information and refuse to buy stolen goods. With regard to employment, it called for strategies for growth in key sectors of the economy as well as the skills development and the provision of learnerships in both the public and private sectors to provide work experience. The manifesto requested the co-

²⁸ See for example African National Congress, 2004v.

²⁹ See for example African National Congress, 2004g.

³⁰ See for example African National Congress, 2004g and African National Congress, 2004o.

³¹ See for example African National Congress, 2004j.

³² See for example African National Congress, 2004j.

³³ See for example African National Congress, 2004m.

³⁴ See for example African National Congress 2004r.

³⁵ See for example African National Congress, 2004v.

operation of business, workers and all South Africans to promote the country's image and to provide good service to investors, tourists and others.

In particular, the ANC sought to highlight the campaign message of its commitment and competence to solve the problems facing South Africa. President Mbeki asserted that: "The achievements of the last 10 years have confirmed that the ANC has the correct policies to progressively push back the economic and social legacy of apartheid. They also confirm that the ANC is the only party with the capacity to effectively implement these policies. While every party claims to be able to create jobs, only the ANC has shown the ability to effectively manage the economy; the capacity to start tackling unemployment; and the honesty to acknowledge that creating work will not be achieved overnight."³⁶

Vision 2014 indicated that it aimed to reduce employment and poverty by half by developing skills, helping small businesses, providing social security, land reform and improving the asset base of the poor, paying particular attention to the following programmes:

- A Growing Economy
- Sustainable Livelihoods
- Access to services
- Comprehensive Social Security
- Crime and Corruption
- Constitutional rights and governance
- Africa and the world

A considerable proportion of the campaign messages related to opposition parties, primarily the DA and the IFP. The ANC's strategy regarding the opposition was to marginalize the opposition's campaign strategies and simultaneously elevate the ANC's image of being the only competent and credible party in South Africa. As Lodge (2005:117) reports, the ANC refused to assign them the status of serious rivals.

³⁶ See for example African National Congress, 2004v.

The themes that emerged from ANC campaign communications regarding the ANC's view of opposition parties in South Africa included the following:

- Their policy stances were at odds with the interests of voters while the policies of the ANC had the best interests of voters in mind;
- They were simply interested in obtaining votes compared to the ANC which has always been there for voters;
- They are right-winged in nature and wanted to retain apartheid privilege while the ANC wants to unshackle the country from its oppressive past;
- They used the ANC to obtain media attention because they are too weak to generate it themselves;
- They feared the free expression of the people's will i.e. support for the ANC while the ANC welcomes a mandate from voters;
- They were sowing division among the electorate while the ANC wants to unify South Africa into a non-racial, caring society;
- They were destined to remain in the role of an insignificant and ineffectual opposition while the ANC would fulfill its historic mission; and
- They are incapable of solving South Africa's social and economic problems while the ANC has the commitment and experience to tackle these problems.

In his newsletter, President Mbeki was at pains to distinguish between the policies of the ANC and opposition parties. According to Mbeki "the principal parties that are sworn to oppose us during the forthcoming elections" adopted different positions on issues that are central to the historic mission of the ANC i.e. "to build a people-centred and caring society". He asserted that parties such as the DA, the IFP and the ACDP "agitate for wholesale privatisation of all publicly owned productive enterprises"... "which provides basic goods and services to the people as water, electricity, transport and telephones. He also criticized their support for "a flexible labour market" , a "free market" and a "minimal state" as well as their opposition to minimum wages and conditions for employment equity. "In reality", he argued "what these parties, the DA, the IFP and the ACDP and others want is as faithful a return to the old system of unregulated capitalism as possible. In our situation, this is the real and undisguised meaning of such phrases as "a flexible labour market", "the free market", "a minimal state", "privatisation and

deregulation”.³⁷

A recurrent campaign message of the ANC was that the IFP and DA are right-winged in nature and that those parties wanted to retain apartheid privilege. In ANC Today, vol. 4, no 12 President Mbeki wrote: “The anti-ANC ‘coalition for change’ ... is, in fact, a coalition for backward change that would return our country to the days of tension, conflict and crisis”. Campaign messages against the IFP related to the IFP’s past history, intolerance and violence of the IFP as well as the party’s coalition with the Democratic Alliance. President Mbeki described in his internet newsletter how in 1992 and 1993 the IFP joined in alliances aimed at derailing the process of negotiations and was now again joining in a right-wing coalition with the DA.³⁸

As the campaign heated up, the ANC launched harsh attacks on the opposition parties, particularly regarding their campaign strategies. President Mbeki stated that opposition parties feared the free expression of the people’s will, i.e. the massive support for the ANC and thus questioned their commitment and loyalty to the democratic system. In ANC Today, vol 4, no 9 President Mbeki argued that “Perhaps the most fashionable fear that is being peddled this time round is a fictional threat of a one-party state. In this context, some are marketing themselves as the best choice in the political supermarket, on the basis that a vote for them, and therefore a vote against the ANC, is a vote against a one-party state, and therefore a vote for democracy”. He further asserted that “Those who advance this argument must be exposed for what they are, people who mouth the principles of democracy but fear the very democracy they pretend to espouse”.

In response to the DA’s request for a televised debate with President Mbeki, the ANC issued three direct statements. The ANC asserted that it would not waste its time in a “meaningless dialogue” with the DA and brushed off the request as “nothing more than a transparent attempt by the DA to elevate the profile and stature of its leader”. It argued that the request “reflects the DA's inability to find anything of substance to offer the South African people” and stated that “if the leader of the DA wants to improve his image and profile among South Africans, he should do so on his own account - and not

³⁷ See for example African National Congress, 2004f.

³⁸ See for example African National Congress, 2004s; African National Congress, 2004t and African National Congress, 2004u.

hang onto the coat-tails of President Mbeki". The ANC also asserted that the "DA's posturing and grandstanding" was "nothing more than a façade" aimed at diverting attention from the fact that the DA did not have anything constructive to offer the South African electorate.³⁹

A strong message that opposition parties were sowing division among the electorate was used as part of the ANC's campaign. In his last newsletter before the elections, President Mbeki described opposition parties as undermining the ANC's objective of building a non-racial South Africa: "The ANC is determined to unite our people in the struggle to build a non-racial society, speaking for all South Africans. However, some among the opposition are equally determined to emphasise our racial and ethnic divisions, to polarise our country along these lines, informed by the "prejudices and sectarianism" of the past. To this end, these opposition parties claim special status as representatives not of our people as a whole, but of particular ethnic or racial groups. They argue against affirmative action, such interventions as the Employment Equity Act, minimum wages and other measures for the protection of workers' rights."⁴⁰

Another campaign message regarding opposition parties was that they had the sole aim of being in opposition and/ or opposing the ANC, i.e. "cutting the ANC down to size". President Mbeki argued that "the weakening of the ANC, "cutting it down to size", has become the beginning and the end of the campaigns of these opposition parties, rather than the projection of their programmes."⁴¹

Finally, the ANC sent out a message that opposition parties were destined to remain in the role of an insignificant and ineffectual opposition. Mbeki concluded in ANC Today, Volume 4, No. 9 that "we will leave the scaremongers and the tellers of false stories to define themselves as actors that have excluded themselves from this people's contract, destined to be the permanent professional Opposition". The ANC thus sought to highlight, alongside its own commitment and competence, that opposition parties were incapable of solving South Africa's social and economic problems.

³⁹ See African National Congress, 2004c; African National Congress, 2004e and African National Congress, 2004q.

⁴⁰ See for example African National Congress, 2004y.

⁴¹ See for example African National Congress, 2004y.

To sum up, the ANC's campaign showed significant consistency with the preceding elections in 1994 and 1999. The theme of "a better life for all", the presentation of the role of the ANC in ending apartheid as well as the importance of contracts and partnerships with various social actors was consistent with previous campaigns. As Lodge (2005:117) indicates, the language used also revived the "people centred" rhetoric of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Piper (2005: 100) argues that "Election 2004 saw the ANC return to the left ground it occupied in 1994". However, gradual changes were also evident. In the founding elections of 1994 a large focus was on the end of apartheid as embodied in the slogan 'Now is the time', whereas in 2004 a more practical and hands-on approach was used to present the ANC as competent within their role as the government of the day. The message that "the tide has turned" became institutionalized and indicated to voters that the ANC-led government was successful in ushering in change in South Africa (Booyesen, 2005:131).

Not only did the ANC develop a clear overarching campaign theme consistent with previous campaigns, it also used primarily comparative messages. A key characteristic of the ANC's campaign was to contrast itself with the opposition parties. Shortcomings of an otherwise unassailable campaign was the aggressive way in which opposition parties were criticized and the fact that the policy differences highlighted in the weekly newsletter were conveyed in a way that would appeal almost entirely to its existing constituency.

5.3.2 The DA 's Campaign Messages



The DA ran its campaign primarily by asserting that it had the capacity and the appropriate policies to deal with South Africa's key problems. The DA highlighted the fact that it was ready to take office because it had the means to deliver. It presented itself as an alternative government rather than just an opposition party (Booyesen, 2005:137). The DA also contrasted itself against the ANC and other opposition parties. It communicated the message to voters that other parties lacked sound policies, competence and integrity or they simply served to fracture the opposition. The primary theme used by the Democratic Alliance during the 2004 campaign was "South Africa deserves better". The party's message strategy was three-pronged ranging from the projection of DA strengths and its policy alternatives, to highlighting ANC weaknesses with reference to integrity and policy as well as the weaknesses of other opposition parties (Booyesen, 2005:136).

The DA emphasized the following key messages to the electorate:

- That the DA had experienced and was continuing to experience significant growth since 1994;
- That the DA had strengthened its position through its alliance with the IFP;
- That it had a series of workable policies that would deal with South Africa's social and economic problems;
- That the democratic health of South Africa depended on a strong and powerful opposition;
- That the ANC's strength should be reduced so as to avoid the risk of sliding into one-party authoritarianism;
- That the ANC's policies are weak, they had performed poorly since coming into power and had failed South Africa in a number of key areas;
- That the ANC lacked integrity as illustrated by high levels of corruption and through President Mbeki's personal beliefs; and
- That other opposition parties lack the capacity to deal with these issues and to tackle the ANC.

The DA in their manifesto, entitled "A Better South Africa", gave a detailed outline of their policy positions (Democratic Alliance, 2004a). They also provided a plan of action indicating how they would attempt to achieve their goals if elected. In his introduction,

Tony Leon indicated that the Democratic Alliance spent two years drafting the manifesto in conjunction with the people of South Africa and the country's top thinkers. He further stated that it represented a programme for real change that would deliver "to the people of our great country proper security and lasting prosperity; and bring opportunity and hope to their lives and justice into their midst". The manifesto outlined how the DA would:

- Create opportunities;
- Fight crime;
- Improve living conditions;
- Build communities; and
- Safeguard democracy.

The manifesto set the DA out as South Africa's only serious alternative to the ANC. It stated that they were the only political organisation in South Africa, other than the ANC, that had political reach in every province and were therefore capable of forming the central pillar of a democratic alternative. The manifesto acknowledged the progress and achievements of the past ten years but argued that "for millions of South Africans, these successes have been overshadowed by the ANC government's broken contract with the people of South Africa: its failure to deliver the better life it promised in 1994". The manifesto further criticized the ANC government for having "failed to achieve meaningful gross domestic product growth and to break the cycle of unemployment and bring down levels of violent crime". It indicated that since the ANC government has been in office, "at least one million jobs have been lost; a quarter of a million South Africans have been murdered; and violent crimes like rape and child abuse have increased dramatically and disastrously". Furthermore, it indicated "the disposable income of the poorest South Africans has fallen whilst a staggering 21 million South Africans still live in poverty". The manifesto was also particularly critical of the ANC government's response to HIV and AIDS. It argued that the ANC had accumulated power for itself while leaving the people of South Africa behind.

In its manifesto, the DA set out its policies on how it would create a jobs-friendly environment with more investment and less regulation; develop skills for a booming economy; create harder-working schools with more effective teaching; conduct more effective land reform with meaningful post-settlement support; construct a police force

that meant business; tackle corruption and provide justice for victims; provide access to water, food, shelter, health services, welfare grants and a basic income grant; develop a new framework for healthcare, provide anti-retroviral treatment; provide care for AIDS orphans; alleviate poverty; end homelessness by building sustainable communities and develop a trustworthy transport system. The DA manifesto also argued that a culture of entitlement caused by the format of affirmative action would undermine democracy and that steps to overcome historical disadvantage should not help those who no longer needed it. The manifesto asserted that by interpreting affirmative action as discriminatory quotas, the ANC government had sown seeds of new bitterness in society, excluded many skilled capable people and placed severe constraints on economic growth. It indicated that the DA would amend the Employment Equity Act to make it more attractive to employers and incorporate sunset clauses into affirmative action laws so that they would automatically expire in 2010.

The message that the DA wished to highlight through its “Coalition for Change”, entered into with the IFP, was that it could challenge the ANC for government over the next five years through a multi-identity liberal movement (Booyesen, 2005). Tony Leon asserted “we are confident that we will make new and historic gains in every province. We will double our support from the 1999 election. Together with our allies in the Coalition for Change, we will win up to 30 percent of the national vote, and we will co-govern in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal... We will no longer just be the official opposition; we will become the core of an alternative government”.⁴² Tony Leon also argued in his weekly newsletter that “the Coalition for Change has sent a clear message of hope to the people of South Africa-hope for an end to one-party domination, and hope for a more prosperous and peaceful future. He argued that “Together, the DA and the IFP can win up to 30 percent of the vote. We can roll back the dominance of the ANC at the national level and win in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. We will use our growing power to push for strong alternatives to the governments failed policies. We will make sure that South Africa creates jobs, fights crime, provides anti-Aids drugs, and upholds the constitution.”⁴³

⁴² See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004i.

⁴³ See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004h.

Tony Leon in his newsletter explained that the DA would spend over R1,5bn to fight crime; R4bn to improve education and training; over R1bn for transport, infrastructure and land reform; and over R4bn on a basic income grant and opportunity vouchers. He also outlined proposals for tax breaks to encourage employment and investment. He argued that their proposed spending cuts would save over R16-billion which would impose a total additional fiscal cost of just under R1bn, which will see the budget deficit rise to only R42 billion, or 3,2% of the GDP. This, according to Leon, would have a stimulatory effect on the South African economy, would not require new taxation and would result in a significant decrease in the debt burden, thereby preserving macroeconomic stability while moving the economy to a higher growth path”.⁴⁴

Tony Leon and other DA members were virulent in their messages questioning the integrity of the ANC.⁴⁵ The DA characterized the ANC as an intolerant and arrogant party.⁴⁶ DA attacks on ANC integrity included the following: corruption in officialdom, provincial governments; enriching only the few; president seeking third term and a poor choice of international friends (Booyesen, 2005). Tony Leon argued in one of his weekly newsletters that numerous ANC policy documents revealed a hunger for absolute power.⁴⁷ Leon in another newsletter asserted that “the conduct of the President—around the issues of the third term, the succession, the fate of the Deputy President, the appointment of Cabinet ministers, and the nomination of premier candidates—has arrested the development of South African democracy. It will take years of hard work to undo the damage that this imperial presidency has done—to restore transparency and openness to South African political life”. He added that “The Democratic Alliance and the Coalition for Change will see to it that the third term never becomes a possibility. We intend marshalling enough votes to prevent that from ever happening”.⁴⁸ In February 2004, Tony Leon challenged Thabo Mbeki to a live televised debate.⁴⁹ The DA asserted that Mbeki’s refusal to conduct the debate was a sign of arrogance and unaccountability.

⁴⁴ See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004g.

⁴⁵ See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004j.

⁴⁶ See for example Democratic Alliance 2004f.

⁴⁷ See for example Democratic Alliance 2004e.

⁴⁸ See for example Democratic Alliance 2004d.

⁴⁹ See for example Democratic Alliance 2004b.

Tony Leon stated that the “people are tired of a President who runs away from a debate...”⁵⁰ Tony Leon also stated that President Mbeki is running scared. He continues to avoid the DA’s challenge for a live, televised debate.⁵¹

The DA presented an extensive critique of the ANC’s performance. In addition to attacking the ANC’s integrity, the DA also had a series of campaign messages which highlighted the fact that ANC policies had failed, that poverty was rife, that the government didn’t care about the poor and AIDS sufferers and that the ANC refused to acknowledge policy failures (Booyesen, 2005). Tony Leon asserted in his weekly newsletter that the ANC was creating poverty and fighting work.⁵² Leon argued that “on every major social issue facing the people of South Africa, the President and the ANC are in the wrong. And the DA has the right answers. The DA supports economic policies that will create millions of real jobs by unleashing the private sector and boosting growth. The ANC does not. The DA supports a basic income grant. The ANC does not. The DA has a proven track record of providing anti-Aids drugs. The ANC does not.”⁵³

The DA presented the message that small opposition parties lacked the capacity to deal with social and economic issues and the strength to tackle the ANC and so votes for such parties serve primarily to fracture the opposition to the ANC. These messages were primarily aimed at voters considering voting for the NNP and the ID. Thus, in addition to targeting messages against the ANC, the DA also developed a series of messages designed to swing voters away from other smaller parties. The DA pointed out that a vote for the NNP was in reality a vote for the ANC (Southall and Daniel, 2005). According to Booyesen (2005), DA campaign messages regarding the NNP branded the party as bankrupt and a “lap dog” of the ANC and the Independent Democrats as a one-woman show lacking a comprehensive and well-researched policy platform.

Overall, the DA’s campaign was consistent with its previous campaigns in 1994 and 1999. Key elements of consistency with previous DA campaigns were the focus on the

⁵⁰ See for example Democratic Alliance 2004h.

⁵¹ See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004g.

⁵² See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004c.


⁵³ See for example Democratic Alliance, 2004h.

electoral dominance of ANC, criticisms of ANC performance and the presentation of the DA as the only viable alternative to the ANC. The goal of having a basic income grant represented a key shift for the DA. Analysts also point out that the emphasis on policy alternatives was a new area for the DA (Davis, 2005; Hendricks, 2005 and Southall and Daniel, 2005). Furthermore, the DA did not give an adequate account of their past performance.

An otherwise high-quality campaign was spoilt by the party's continued preoccupation with attacking other political parties. The campaign style was marginally softer than the 1999 'Fight Back' campaign, however, the ambiguous subtext of the DA's slogans and its messages about affirmative action are likely to have been offensive to many. While the DA probably meant to deal with change in the material living conditions of voters, the slogan "Vote DA for *real* change" raised questions such as what type of change had occurred prior to this and was the change from apartheid to democracy artificial. Furthermore, inherent in its theme (that South Africa deserves better) was a negative critique of the ANC. This slogan automatically raised the question: better than what? As Booysen (2005) argues these slogans were interpreted "as being polarizing". Edigeli (2004) went as far as saying that the DA predicated its election campaign on "fear-mongering" and "alarmism".

While the DA presented a series of comparative messages contrasting itself as a policy-oriented alternative ready to sort out the ANC's failed policies, this was marred by the lack of internal consistency *between* the messages. As Booysen (2005:132) indicates, the DA's policy solutions were "overwhelmingly free market which constituted a policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party's proposal for a basic income grant". Southall and Daniel (2005: 50) also correctly argue that adopting "an unconvincing, somewhat populist platform to attract blacks" while simultaneously campaigning "against black economic empowerment, affirmative action and minimum wages in favour of a largely unrestricted free market and more flexible labour laws" amounted to contradictory messages.

5.3.3 The IFP's Campaign Messages



The IFP set out to run its campaign by contrasting itself against the ANC around the theme of government performance, emphasizing the issue of HIV and AIDS. This was communicated in the campaign manifesto and official communications. The IFP's campaign emphasized "making a difference together". Campaign communications generally centred on Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who featured on most IFP election posters. Much of the IFP's campaign messages focused on policy issues such as HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, corruption and education.

The IFP emphasized the following key messages to the electorate:

- That it had a series of workable policies that would deal with South Africa's social and economic problems;
- That the IFP had strengthened its position through its alliance with the DA;
- That the ANC's strength should be reduced so as to avoid the risk of sliding into one-party authoritarianism;
- That the ANC had performed poorly since coming into power and had failed South Africa in a number of key areas most notably HIV/Aids, corruption, crime, unemployment and poverty;
- That on previous occasions those that were dissatisfied with the ANC's performance had abstained from voting but that they should not make the same mistake in 2004; and
- That KwaZulu/Natal had performed better than other provinces under the leadership of the IFP and this demonstrated the capacity and the will of the IFP in dealing with critical issues.

The IFP manifesto, entitled "Real Development Now: Let Us Make a Difference – Together" (Inkatha Freedom Party, 2004a), was divided into the following sub-sections:

- Introduction by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi
- HIV/AIDS
- Corruption
- Job Creation and Economic Growth
- Poverty

- Crime
- Foreign Policy

In his introduction Chief Buthelezi indicated that South Africa's democracy "is facing grave risks" and that a "democratic alternative is needed to win the wars against HIV/AIDS, unemployment, crime, poverty and corruption and prevent the consolidation of a one-party state". The IFP in their manifesto presented an extensive critique of the ANC's performance. The manifesto contended that the ANC abused its power by amending the constitution to allow for floor-crossing legislation to be introduced. The manifesto criticized centralized power as being an autocratic threat to democracy and indicated that the IFP would champion federalism and decentralisation of power. The manifesto was particularly critical of the ANC's performance in its response to HIV/AIDS.

The manifesto provided an extensive outline of the IFP's policy positions. It also provided an in-depth outline of the steps the IFP would take to achieve their goals on the key issues of HIV/AIDS, corruption, job creation and economic growth, poverty, crime and foreign policy, if elected. In particular, the manifesto promises that the programme of providing anti-retroviral drugs for infected mothers and for all living with HIV/AIDS would be extended to other provinces. The manifesto set out three 'C's' to characterize the nature of the IFP: Caring, Capable and Clean. The manifesto argues that they had developed common-sense proposals to address HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, corruption and poverty. It outlined each component as follows:

Caring - The IFP cares about how decisions taken by government affect people's lives.

Capable - The IFP will provide capable, effective leadership in government.

Clean - The IFP is committed to transparent and corruption-free government.

With regard to their past performance, the manifesto outlined the position the IFP took in ensuring the distribution of Nevirapine to all HIV-positive pregnant women in KwaZulu/Natal and its defence of this decision against the central government in the Constitutional Court. Chief Buthelezi also outlined the policies of the IFP at the numerous rallies which he attended. He promised to provide anti-retroviral drugs for infected mothers and for all those living with HIV/Aids, as well as extending testing and

drug provision sites. He also indicated that the IFP would identify all children in exceptional need and promote support for their well-being in the community. Furthermore, the IFP would prioritize the development of a crime strategy and implement crime prevention programmes.⁵⁴

At the end of March the IFP released a series of pledges. The IFP's Job Creation Pledge committed the IFP to “moving away from theory into action” and pledged to: promote investments in order to create jobs; ensure a free market economy; establish the necessary infrastructure and economic environment to allow industry and commerce to flourish; promote small business as the engines of employment growth; ensure that the participation of disadvantaged people in the active economy was not limited to a selected few; and implement programmes that would significantly reduce levels of unemployment. The programmes would include small business development, agricultural co-operative arrangements, cash-crops for export and public works programmes.⁵⁵

In the IFP's “Pledge for Clean Governance”, the party committed itself to clean, corrupt-free governance and pledged to act quickly and decisively should any of its public officials be convicted of corruption. It also pledged to ensure that all IFP officials sign an anti-corruption pledge committing themselves to:

- Upholding the highest levels of integrity;
- Remaining above reproach in the execution of their duties and in their private lives;
- Not accept material or financial gain arising from their public positions beyond their official positions;
- Offer their immediate resignation from public office should they fail the public or the IFP in this undertaking;
- Encourage a whistle-blowing culture, by civil servants, the public and the private sector, which acts as a watchdog and a deterrent; and

⁵⁴ See for example Buthelezi, 2004c.

⁵⁵ See for example Inkatha Freedom Party, 2004b.

- Strengthen the protection of individuals who provide information on corruption.⁵⁶

In the IFP's "Pledge for a Safer South Africa", the IFP pledged to: have a zero tolerance approach towards crime of any kind; use local government as an instrument to uproot crime; extend the role of communities in the Community Police Forums; establish Urban and Rural Crime Watches to enable the community to safeguard each other's and their own properties more effectively; support the establishment of a Crime Victim Fund to assist victims of crime in their respective expenses; have more visible policing and make police stations user and community friendly; upgrade the police service by providing better and targeted training; call for a referendum on the death penalty and encourage a whistle-blowing culture.⁵⁷

The IFP also sought to communicate that it had strengthened its position through its alliance with the DA. At a rally in the Eastern Cape, Buthelezi said that "Our partnership with the DA has come together not because of issues of ideology, or race, but on the basis of concrete strategies, policies and solutions to deal with the issues of HIV/Aids, corruption, crime, unemployment and poverty. Together we can generate the million additional jobs that South Africa needs and put hundreds of thousands of law enforcement agents on the streets. Together we can run civic education programmes, not only in schools, but in communities, workplaces and all building blocks of our society, to ensure that the culture of crime is eradicated from the hearts and minds of our people."⁵⁸ In a speech at a joint DA election rally, Buthelezi exclaimed that "as we stand together on this podium, our respective strengths are not just compounded, but they are indeed multiplied. Today, one plus one does not make two, but makes three, and we need to bring the added value of this coalition into an electoral victory on April 14, not for our sake, but to give substance to the hope that the South African people now have, for a new beginning".⁵⁹

⁵⁶See for example Inkatha Freedom Party, 2004c.

⁵⁷ See for example Inkatha Freedom Party, 2004d.

⁵⁸ See for example Buthelezi, 2004g.

⁵⁹ See for example Buthelezi, 2004e.

The IFP also argued that the ANC's strength should be reduced so as to avoid the risk of sliding into one-party authoritarianism. Buthelezi argued that "...the ANC is blinded by its desire of seizing control over KwaZulu Natal. There is no doubt that a one-party state is rapidly consolidating. The ANC will not rest until it has consolidated in its hands the totality of power in South Africa. The totalitarian Government is one which has the power of controlling any aspect of Government and civil society. We are now on the edge of a totalitarian government and only the IFP stands on its path."⁶⁰ At a rally in the Eastern Cape, Buthelezi said "the coalition for change is also about defending our democracy. I have often stated that there are powerful centralistic and authoritarian tendencies at work in our democracy. Our democracy is not moving forward but is moving backwards. The ANC has the unfettered power to change the Constitution, not only at will, but also at whim. The ANC must be cut down to a size where it cannot unilaterally change our Constitution. We need to ensure that our democracy is saved from the impending threat of a one-party state. We cannot move down the path like some countries north of us."⁶¹ At the signing of an agreement between the IFP and Freedom Front Plus, Buthelezi said that "the facts of our democracy are that in the past ten years we have witnessed an ever-increasing concentration of power, which has undermined the many promises contained in our Constitution and its scheme of provincial and local government autonomy. We may be witnessing the consolidation of a one-party State, if South Africa is not provided with a democratic alternative".⁶²

The IFP's campaign messages regarding the ANC related mostly to poor government performance on key issues. The primary campaign message relating to the ANC was that it had performed poorly since coming into power and had failed South Africa in a number of key areas, most notably HIV/AIDS, corruption, crime, unemployment and poverty. At his campaign launch, Buthelezi acknowledged the successes of the past decade: "The past ten years have been a history of many successes. There is no doubt that the past ten years have seen one miracle after the other. Our country has grown in many respects". He then outlined the five major crises facing South Africa: "They are the crises

⁶⁰ See for example Buthelezi, 2004f.

⁶¹ See for example Buthelezi, , 2004g.

⁶² See for example Buthelezi, 2004d.

of HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, corruption and poverty... The fact is that the majority of our people are much worse off now than they were in 1994". He asserted that the IFP had the solutions and the political will to implement them: "For the past ten years the IFP has identified the existence of these problems and has pointed out the standard solutions which exist in order to solve them. We have the political will to match the required solutions with the necessary determination to implement them".⁶³

The critique of ANC performance centered primarily on South Africa's HIV/AIDS crisis. At the launch of the IFP's AIDS pledge, Chief Buthelezi was harsh in his criticism of both government policy and performance saying that: "Unfortunately, the real crisis with HIV/AIDS is that it became engulfed in a most pernicious and insane syndrome of denial, which has paralyzed government's actions. Only history will be able to explain why it had to take an order of the Constitutional Court to force government to save newborn children from premature and horrible deaths, because of their contracting HIV/AIDS from their mothers at birth". He added that South Africa had for many years had the drugs capable of preventing mother to child transmission of HIV/AIDS and that hundreds of thousands of children had died because of government's laissez faire attitude. No sudden U-turn in the government policy can compensate for the cost millions of South Africans that have had to already pay, for the government's apathy and failure"⁶⁴ Buthelezi argued that "HIV/AIDS alone is an issue which demands and dictates a profound change in the leadership of our country. South Africa faces a holocaust and its leaders are complacent about it. We believe that South Africa needs an IFP led government at the national level to bring sanity, not only in the fight against HIV/AIDS, but also in respect of the crisis of crime, unemployment, poverty and corruption".⁶⁵

An analysis of Chief Buthelezi's initial speeches reveals an effort to avoid overt general criticisms of the ANC. However, once the campaigns had heated up, the IFP was unable to refrain from being drawn by the ANC into a reactive campaign in which it simultaneously defended itself against Mbeki's online accusations of intolerance and violence and harshly criticized the ANC. This is particularly evident in the interactions

⁶³ See for example Buthelezi, 2004a.

⁶⁴ See for example Buthelezi, 2004b.

⁶⁵ See for example Buthelezi, 2004b.

between Chief Buthelezi and President Mbeki. Chief Buthelezi said at an IFP rally” “I did not attack the President even though he should have been held accountable for the shambles in which our hopes for industrial growth really are in due to a lack of long-term vision...Therefore I was flabbergasted when the President himself went out there for no rhyme or reason, to attack me personally in order to discredit the IFP. I could not understand why he would do a thing like that. Finally, I understood why he did it. He did it to move the attention of the South African people away from the real issues, which are those of HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, poverty and corruption.... I will not be dragged into responding to such lies, which belong to an age which we should have long forgotten and buried... The people of this region know that my conscience is clear, and at no point in my life have I ever spoken the language of violence or have I ever authorised, ordered, condoned or ratified any human rights violations...I only wonder how he can be such a hypocrite because if I was the man the TRC portrayed me to be then how could he have kept me for five years in his own Cabinet.”⁶⁶ Once civilities had ceased between the parties, the IFP National Spokesperson issued a statement which said: It is a little rich of the ANC to typify the essence of the Coalition for Change as 'right wing' and as about the maintenance of 'white privilege'. After all is it not the ANC that is saddled with the rotting albatross of the NNP, the architect and government of apartheid, in a macabre Faustian Pact?”⁶⁷

In all of his speeches at the numerous rallies which he spoke, Buthelezi implored voters to not abstain from voting if they were dissatisfied but to rather make their mark against the ANC, preferably for the IFP. For example, Buthelezi said at the IFP’s campaign launch: “It is essential that the South African people realize the urgency of voting and motivating as many people as they know to do the same. By not voting on election day, is indeed almost a crime and it is a vote to leave things the way they are, and the way in which they will not be solved. I urge all of you to urge other people to have the courage to hope and become motivated to motivate others to go and vote on election day. It is essential that all those who are politically aware, make arrangements, not only to go and vote on April 14th, but also to transport to the voting station, as many people as

⁶⁶ See for example Buthelezi, 2004f.

⁶⁷ See for example Inkatha Freedom Party, 2004e.

possible”.⁶⁸ At an election rally Buthelezi also said that “If South Africa settles for the ANC, it settles for a future which will continue to be characterized in an ever increasing manner by the problems of HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, poverty and corruption”.⁶⁹

A key message of the IFP was that KwaZulu/Natal was in a better position than other provinces due to the leadership of the IFP. Buthelezi gave the example of how the IFP-led provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal ensured the distribution of Nevirapine to all HIV-positive pregnant women in the province and how it defended this decision against the central government in the Constitutional Court. This, he argued, gave South Africans an opportunity to see how they would govern the entire nation.⁷⁰ The IFP also launched a tailored version of their national manifesto “Growth and development blueprint for KwaZulu-Natal” with specific plans for the province which indicated that the Office of the Premier would “take the lead role in working to create the framework to make KwaZulu-Natal an economic powerhouse, and a haven for direct foreign investment”.⁷¹

To sum up, the IFP’s campaign was internally consistent. The party presented its track record in KwaZulu/Natal and offered a series of comparative messages contrasting its policies against its critique of ANC policies. The IFP’s campaign of 2004 which emphasized “making a difference together” was consistent with its “a revolution of goodwill” campaign of 1999 (Davis, 2005). Key elements of consistency with the IFP campaign of 1999 are the focus on federalism and the focus on policy issues such as crime, unemployment and corruption. These two campaigns however, differed markedly from that of 1994 where the IFP had “imperiled the democratic transition by threatening to boycott the founding elections” (Southall and Daniel, 2005:51). Thus, the messages presented in 2004 were inconsistent with its previous public communication in 1994. And while the party could not necessarily do anything to undo this, as seen in chapter four, this would continue to tarnish any campaign messages which the IFP may devise. Furthermore, it is likely that building the campaign primarily around Chief Buthelezi was

⁶⁸ See for example Buthelezi, 2004a.


⁶⁹ See for example Buthelezi, 2004h.

⁷⁰ See for example Buthelezi, 2004b.

⁷¹ See for example Buthelezi, 2004c.

a strategically adverse decision. As Piper (2005:156) argues, the IFP was overly reliant on the statesmanlike appeal of Chief Buthelezi.

5.3.4 The UDM 's Campaign Messages



In the 2004 election, the overall theme of the UDM's campaign was its critique of the ANC, focusing on the shortcomings of the ANC's performance. A key message was that the ANC had neglected voters and that its policies had shortchanged them. Naidu and Manqele (2005:217) note that "the focus of the UDM's campaign was to attack the ANC's electoral strategy and convince voters that the ANC had abandoned them through neo-liberal policies that tended to exacerbate poverty and unemployment". Not surprisingly then the policy areas which the UDM chose to call attention to related to economic development and job creation. The campaign centred on party leader, General Bantu Holimisa. Some UDM posters included a photo of a disillusioned-looking General Holomisa simply stating "vote UDM". Another widely used poster did not have any photo, indicated that ten years of unemployment had undermined the people's freedom.

The UDM emphasized that they had a series of policies which would focus on creating jobs, developing the economy and alleviating poverty. In the UDM manifesto, entitled 'Better Future Plan', the UDM presented its policy positions and plan of action. The manifesto stated that the UDM and its leadership understood the fundamental values that South Africans apply when choosing their government and asserted that voters want and would get the following by voting for the UDM:

- A sense of ownership of government;
- Direct control of government;
- An accountable, ethical and incorruptible government;
- Mutual trust between voters and government;
- To be in charge of their own destiny; and
- A say in the management of the country's resources.

The manifesto set out a detailed list of mechanisms which the UDM would use to create jobs, strengthen the economy, alleviate poverty as well as improve health care and education. The manifesto also outlined their past performance. Regarding its past performance the manifesto indicated that the UDM "has established itself as a significant player on the political landscape" gaining 16 seats in Parliament in 1999, and with representation in six provincial legislatures and became the official opposition in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo legislatures. It also listed the fact that the UDM contested floor-crossing legislation by going to court to try and prevent its introduction. The

manifesto pointed out that the UDM took a leading role in challenging the arms deal. It also outlines the way in which the UDM, together with taxi associations, campaigned for government to address concerns about taxi recapitalization. These examples, argued the manifesto, are indicative of the UDM's active role in national politics and demonstrated that it is a viable, trustworthy and reliable opposition party, up to the task of governing.

According to Naidu and Manqele (2005:217), the UDM more specifically promised to:

- Set up a sustainable development program to create jobs and a productive and safe environment for the electorate;
- Set up a domestic-led growth strategy through small business development;
- Set up a skills development program to train people to find work;
- Devote 1 percent of income tax to fund a properly paid, trained and resourced police force;
- Increase public expenditure for education and health care, and reduce the budget for defense;
- Provide a basic service subsidy for the poor; and
- Develop a national consensus plan of action around HIV/AIDS

During his speeches, Holomisa also highlighted various aspects of the UDM's policies. He emphasized their policies around skills development, small business development and the need for tax havens and subsidies to encourage economic growth and job creation (Holomisa, 2004d). He also indicated that a UDM Government would invest more on irrigation schemes (Holomisa, 2004b), help both established and new farmers to expand their enterprises (Holomisa, 2004c) and would increase spending on education and healthcare (Holomisa, 2004a). Additionally, he pointed out that the UDM had grown and had support across all racial groups and all South Africans (Holomisa, 2004d).

In its manifesto and at public events the UDM spent a significant amount of time criticizing the ANC's performance. The UDM emphasized the following campaign messages about the ANC:

- That the ANC had failed South Africa in a number of key areas, in particular unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS;
- That the ANC lacked integrity as illustrated by high levels of corruption and

through President Mbeki's personal beliefs;

- That the ANC was a politically intolerant organisation; and
- That the ANC was simply interested in obtaining votes.

The UDM's manifesto while acknowledging the political freedoms obtained since 1994, argued that the level of freedom depends on socio-economic conditions. In the manifesto's review of ten years of freedom, it argued that true freedom is not a once-off event but an ongoing process. The manifesto emphasized weaknesses in the ANC's performance in the following areas: jobs, education, health, security and property ownership. The manifesto asserted that the South African economy was suffering from jobless growth due to the confusion created by the ambivalent ruling clique tripartite alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP which, it argued, preached elimination of unemployment in the streets and legislated retrenchments and greater unemployment in parliament.

During all his campaign speeches listed on the internet, Bantu Holomisa directed most of his time to criticizing the ANC. For example at a rally in Soweto, Gauteng, Holomisa asserted that they might appear to have the right policies, but without political will it could not be trusted to deliver" (Holomisa, 2004c).

The UDM's 2004 campaign strategy was consistent with the strategy used in 1999. During that campaign, the UDM also focused on issues such as the need to combat crime, solve unemployment, build more houses and improve access to health and education whilst simultaneously focusing on the failure of the ANC to live up to its promises (Maseko, 1999). Within its manifesto and some campaign speeches the UDM gave an account of past performance. The campaign was internally consistent. However, the fact that the campaign was centered on General Holomisa could have been counterproductive because as the focus group discussions revealed, images of General Holomisa negatively affected how campaign messages were interpreted –these messages were regarded as tarnished at the outset. The UDM's campaign messages were also predominantly negative, focusing primarily on shortcomings and failures rather than indicating how proposed solutions would be implemented.

5.3.5 The ID's Campaign Messages



The main thrust of the ID's campaign was to present itself as a credible and trustworthy party. The campaign of the ID also centred primarily on its leader Patricia De Lille. The focus groups suggested mixed views of De Lille. Some viewed her as being opportunistic because she left the Pan African Congress and formed the ID during a floor-crossing period. Amongst others she had a reputation of being a decisive no-nonsense person who had no involvement with any apartheid structures. At the time of the election, the ID was the only party headed by a woman. Posters donned a professionally-dressed De Lille who offered a smiling "thumbs up. The accompanying slogan detracted from the visually pleasing image by vaguely promised "more voice for your vote".

The ID presented the following key messages to the South African electorate:

- That it would bridge the divides that exist in South Africa;
- That as the fastest growing political party, the ID will defy predictions of a small showing;
- That the ID had support across traditional social and political divides in SA;
- That the ID would not resort to coalitions for political expediency;
- The DA's approach was damaging to democracy in South Africa.
- That the ANC had performed poorly in certain areas, most notably its stance towards Zimbabwe, corruption, abuse of woman and children as well as HIV and AIDS;
- That the ID has the necessary capacity and infrastructure; and
- That the ID offers constructive, effective and principled opposition.

The ID's manifesto was entitled "Bridging the Divides: Uniting South Africa behind a Common Vision". In some aspects, the ID's manifesto presented details of the ID's own policy positions and in others the manifesto indicated how it would hold the government to account in implementing existing policies. Although the party could not give an account of its past performance, the manifesto outlined the role that Patricia De Lille had played in uncovering irregularities in the arms deal. The ID'S manifesto pledged to bridge ten divides of the South African nation. These were listed as follows:

- Government and People - bringing politics back to the people of South Africa and ensuring that the voices of communities are not silenced by government;

- The Cultural Divide - building bridges between the different social groupings;
- Rural / Urban Divide - ensuring that rural areas are provided with the infrastructure and development they need to become integrated into the mainstream economy;
- The Economy – bringing the informal and formal sectors of the economy together so that the benefits of future economic growth will translate into substantial job creation;
- Inequality - ensuring that more destitute South Africans gain access to grants and striving to close the poverty gap;
- Human Security - tackling crime that is dividing the nation and communities through fear;
- HIV/AIDS - making HIV/AIDS every South African's responsibility and breaking down the persistent and destructive divide of the stigmatisation of HIV positive people;
- Education - ensuring that no South African child will be denied their constitutional right to basic education;
- The Digital Divide - effecting changes in the telecommunications sector to ensure that every South African can gain affordable access to the digital world and the internet;
- Global Divide - ensuring that South Africa plays a leading role in fighting for global justice on issues such as trade and human rights violations.

The manifesto indicated that it looked to the constitution for its guiding principles. The manifesto argued that alternative policies and holding the government accountable for their promises was critical. The manifesto also indicated that the ID stood for an “open and free society” that “believes in entrepreneurship and the market”. It qualified this by adding that government must protect those who are vulnerable and destitute.

The manifesto outlined challenges to democracy, citing the arms deal, delays in dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and actions around Zimbabwe, as undermining the separation of powers between the Executive and Parliament. It also criticized the concentration of power in the Presidency; parliament’s failure in providing oversight, the PR system and floor-crossing legislation. The manifesto criticized the government’s performance with regard to job creation, the success of public works programmes and

poverty eradication.

The ID's solutions for job creation included support for small and micro-enterprises; enhancing the public works programmes; rural development; a well-funded land reform programme; establishing Organic Farming Centres of Excellence as well as evaluating and revising trade policy. In addition, the manifesto indicated that the ID supported the formation of an influential block of developing countries to lobby for the reciprocal removal of industrialised countries' agricultural subsidies.

The ID advocated a comprehensive social security net and cited the Universal Basic Income Grant as a temporary measure for enlarging the social security net. The manifesto also indicated that in addition to free health care for all children, there should be a National Food Security Programme to combat severe child malnourishment in South Africa. It argued that pensions should be increased annually in line with the cost of living, not inflation. With regard to HIV/AIDS, the manifesto indicated that the ID would ensure that the government complies with the Operational Plan for complete HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment.

The manifesto also set out a series of steps to deal with:

- Human security;
- Rape and Women Abuse;
- Education;
- Corruption;
- Land; and
- Ways to enhance South Africa as a society.

While dealing with the same key areas as other parties and directing criticism at the ANC, its message of "bridging the divides in South Africa" was unique. The ID resorted to negative campaigning in response to campaign messages presented by the DA but largely presented a positive message in its overall campaign. According to Hoeane, (2005:202) the ID effectively presented itself as a party that was different from other parties, i.e. without baggage and was prepared to challenge the ANC through "constructive" and "patriotic" opposition. A key campaign message utilized by the ID was that the ID offers constructive, effective and principled opposition.

A substantial proportion of ID campaign messages countered DA messages directed against them. Lance Greyling, policy co-ordinator for the ID, cited a Markinor study which, five months after the launch of the ID, showed the ID's support at 2% nationally. This, Greyling (2004b) argued, positioned the ID as the fastest-growing political party in the country. Greyling additionally pointed out the ID had a broad support base which cut across traditional groupings; that the leadership had skills in a range of fields; and that the party was committed to not form coalitions. He cited the party's "Access to Education Initiative" as one way in which the ID was helping communities overcome the challenges facing them. In another article Greyling (2004a) asserted that the only way in which a vote could be wasted was if a political party did not reach the threshold of being able to deliver a representative to Parliament. He added that the DA existed solely to be anti-ANC.

In sum, the ID managed to develop a unique internally coherent campaign theme and while not able to present a track-record, details of Patricia De Lille's achievements were outlined. According to Kotler and Kotler (1999:6), a key challenge for first time candidates is to build an appealing message and then capture high level visibility. The ID's messages, as previously outlined, while not necessarily striking could appeal to a broad range of voters. The campaign was comparative in nature with an emphasis on a positive message, namely bridging the divides in South Africa. The ID did criticize the ANC but steered clear of major clashes with the ruling party. As Hoeane (2005:204) indicates, the ID ran a targeted campaign that singled out specific issues which were not the main priorities of the ANC and thus managed to avoid direct competition with the ANC.

5.3.6 The NNP's Campaign Messages



In the 2004 campaign, the NNP contrasted the aggressive style of the DA against itself as the mediator between voters and the ANC. The NNP's primary campaign theme was that they provided a voice for voters via their coalition arrangement with the ANC. The main thrust of the NNP's election campaign in 2004 was that they would provide access to government decision-making processes and resources. This strategy was evident in all their campaign communications. One poster included a smiling Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, urging voters to let the NNP be their voice in government. The Western Cape's New National Party launched its own election manifesto called the Cape Plan.

The NNP emphasized the following key messages to the electorate:

- That the NNP had an extensive battery of policies that would deal with South Africa's social and economic problems;
- That the NNP had strengthened its position through its alliance with the ANC and thus provided minority voters with a voice in government;
- That the NNP was still distinct from the ANC; and
- That the DA's aggressive style of politics was unsuitable and damaging to democracy.

In his introduction to the NNP manifesto, entitled '*You Deserve a Fair Share*', Marthinus van Scalkwyk framed the NNP as the only opposition party that could ensure a voice in a multi-party government for opposition voters. He argues that the NNP's consensus politics would be influential in dealing with the ANC and would encourage stability while the aggressive style of the DA encourages instability. The manifesto set out the key policy positions of the NNP and then listed areas for negotiation. The manifestos account of past NNP performance framed the party as having taken the initiative to transform South Africa by listing the NNP's "timeline of courage". The manifesto outlined how voters would benefit from the NNP's dialogue with the ANC but also took pains to indicate how the NNP differed from the ANC (on issues such as the death penalty, abortion, affirmative action and Zimbabwe). The manifesto was divided into the following sub-sections:

Part I: Message from the National leader; What does the NNP want to achieve? What does the NNP offer you that other opposition parties can't?; The role of the NNP; Our

countries challenges; What South Africa needs; Policy that works; Your Party in the new South Africa; Remember, your vote is a powerful tool and the road ahead.

Part II: Core Values of the NNP. Political freedom; Economic freedom; Individual freedom; Cultural freedom and Religious Freedom.

Part III: Core Positions on Key Issues. Abortion on demand; Affirmative Action; Braindrain; Changing of place and street names; Compulsory community service; Corruption; Crime and the death penalty; Economy; Euthanasia; Gang violence; HIV/AIDS; Housing; Land reform; Minimum wages; Mother tongue education in schools; Nepad; Payment for municipal services; Phasing out of commandos; Poverty and job creation; Religious instruction in schools; Section 49 of the Criminal Procedures Act; Sustainable Development; Women's and children's rights and youth.

The New National Party did not have a functioning website. Furthermore the manifesto did not provide a plan of action as to how they would achieve their objectives other than negotiating with the ANC.

Consistency with previous campaigns was the theme that the NNP had ended apartheid and that the NNP was a multi-racial party that welcomed all groups. Rhetoric around the potential exclusion of minority groups from the political system was also consistent with previous campaigns. However, the NNP's campaign message of co-operation with the ANC was completely inconsistent with previous NNP campaigns. Previously the NNP had run predominantly negative campaign's depicting the ANC as a dangerous, violent, authoritarian, politically intolerant party with an economic policy that would bring the country to its knees therefore making it not fit to govern (Giliomee, 1994 and Eldridge and Seekings, 1995). The collaborative arrangement with the ANC, as well as the assertion that this would benefit voters, essentially communicated that the NNP's previous assessment of the ANC was completely inaccurate. It is likely that these messages were regarded as completely ludicrous and therefore ineffective. This is particularly important given Iyengar and Valentino's (2000:110) argument that campaign communication is most persuasive when it interacts with voters prevailing expectations and evokes what voters already "know".

Not only was the 2004 campaign incongruent with previous campaigns but there was also a lack of internal consistency *between the NNP messages* presented to voters in the 2004 campaign. The core messages, that the NNP had strengthened its position through its alliance with the ANC but that it was distinct from and would hold the ANC to account on issues such as the death penalty, abortion and affirmative action, were contradictory. As Southall and Daniel (2005:48) state the messages of: i) the NNP being committed to constructive opposition, reconciliation and consensus political; ii) differing from the ANC on key aspects such as being tougher on crime and the handling of Zimbabwe and iii) its presence in government giving important leverage to minority groups was as confusing as it was unconvincing. Scultz-Herzenberg (2005) also correctly points out that the NNP's stated ideological shift to the centre of the political spectrum was undermined by its overall policy stances.

4.4 Conclusion

Did the content of the campaign provide voters with a basis to make a decision and an incentive to cast their ballot? Definitely not! South Africa's campaigning process receives a negative score on this second component of the model.

Firstly, with regard to the need for voters to be able to distinguish between parties, the growing number of non-partisan voters received minimal clarity as to why they should support a particular candidate or party. Parties presented their policies extensively in their manifestos, but less so in the more accessible aspects of their campaigns. This information therefore did not filter through into the remainder of their campaigns and was thus not communicated to voters. The focus on ANC failures was not sufficiently coupled with remedies for the situation. As Southall and Daniel (2005:45) argue, "all the major parties' economic platforms were, in essence, so similar, that the opposition was simply reduced to saying and saying unconvincingly that, 'we could do better'". By and large, opposition parties in 2004 did not effectively specify how they would deal with the problems facing the nation. Therefore campaign messages blurred rather than illuminated the distinctions between parties.

Had South African voters known nothing about their political context and had no prior knowledge or perceptions of South African political parties, they would have faced

severe difficulties in making choices relating to the 2004 election. The campaign messages of opposition parties carried the implicit conclusion that the ANC would win by a wide majority. Based solely on the campaign messages conveyed to voters, it would be reasonable for a voter to have concluded that:

- The ANC would win the election by a large majority;
- That opposition parties have little different to offer voters than that already offered by the ANC; and
- Therefore, their individual vote would not count for much.

That the overall campaign failed in its function of shedding light on the distinctions between parties in terms of their policy preferences is made worse by the fact that when parties highlight the same problem without communicating different solutions, voters turn to other attributes such as trustworthiness, inclusivity and competence as the basis from which to make decisions. And as the previous chapter demonstrated, these were either absent or viewed in a largely negative light.

In terms of consistency, the focus on progress made and democracy celebrations by the ANC and the message to “bridge the divide” by the ID were internally consistent and largely positive in nature. The campaigns of the UDM and IFP were also internally consistent but the messages were predominantly negative. There was a lack of internal consistency between DA messages on a free market economy and other messages such as the basic income grant. There was also a lack of internal consistency between the NNP messages of holding the ANC to account while simultaneously securing a voice through co-operation with the ANC. The NNP’s campaign message of co-operation with the ANC was completely incongruent with previous NNP campaigns.

With regard to the type of messages conveyed to voters, each party included in this study focused a great deal of energy on the shortcomings of their opponents, with some parties launching scathing attacks on each other. The ANC lambasted opposition parties with the exception of the New National Party. Opposition parties spent their energies negatively by criticizing the government’s performance and attacking each other. Aware of the increasing strength of the ANC in a context of declining voter participation, several opposition parties, most notably the DA, IFP and UDM, emphasized the general point that the dominance of the ANC was a danger to democracy in South Africa. The DA was

virulent in pointing out that a vote for the ANC would increase the strength of the ANC and a vote for an opposition party, besides the DA, was a “wasted” vote. The DA took pains to draw attention to the NNP’s alliance with the ANC and delivered its messages about the ANC, NNP and ID in a particularly harsh tone. Tony Leon launched scathing attacks on Thabo Mbeki, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk and Patricia De Lille. The UDM’s entire campaign focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of the ANC, to the neglect of the UDM’s own plans and policy preferences. The ID managed to keep out of the fray to some extent, yet was drawn into a reactive campaign with the DA. The ID argued that the DA was unpatriotic and opposed the ANC simply for the sake of doing so. ID messages countering the DA were relatively hostile and negative. The NNP devoted much time to painting the DA as an adversarial party which would not achieve much, and was particularly harsh in their messages regarding the DA with Van Schalkwyk aggressively tackling the DA and Tony Leon.

In some instances the messages were clearly articulated but the harsh tone in which they were conveyed detracted from the content being communicated. The assessment conducted in this chapter supports Landsberg’s (2004) view that the campaign of 2004 was characterized by “acrimony, bitter attacks and rivalry”, as well as Schulz-Herzenberg’s (2004) view that the style of politics in South Africa limits constructive debate. And if, as Buchanan (2001:368) asserts, “aggressive campaign rhetoric, even when it conveys factual information potentially useful to voters, reinforces the well-documented public distaste for candidates, politics, parties and government”, this continuous mud-slinging could well have had the effect of drowning out the messages that parties sought to convey.

CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNICATING THE CAMPAIGN MESSAGES

6.1 Introduction

As previously indicated, persuasive and compelling campaign messages will have little effect if voters cannot hear them. To contribute to the quality of the democratic system, campaign messages should be conveyed as widely as possible. In this chapter I outline what parties did to communicate their messages to voters.⁷² I describe the campaign strategies (in particular the paid components of these strategies) used by the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP to convey their messages to voters. As the basis of this examination, I analyze Nielsen Media Research's data on advertising spending as well as the extent to which survey respondents report party contact with them during the campaign period.⁷³

6.2 Party Funding and Spending

In the 2004 campaign in South Africa, political parties *did not appear to take the election results as a given*. They spent vast sums of money to give effect to their campaign strategies (Davis, 2005). Advertising expenditure data calculated by Nielsen Media Research revealed that in the period January to the end of April 2004, the top six political parties collectively spent R46, 672, 219 million on advertisements.⁷⁴ And according to Davis (2005:236), the main political parties in South Africa all have media strategists and departments that aim to get their party covered in the media through writing press releases; alerting the media to the movements of the leaders on the campaign trail as well as through paid advertisements.

⁷² Campaign strategies clearly consist of more than simply mechanisms to transmit information to voters. According to Marquette (1996), campaign strategies consist of five components, namely: determining which voters in the electorate to approach; creating the message to communicate; obtaining necessary resources; timing the activities; and tactics. However, given the conceptual design of this study the focus of this chapter will be on the ways in which parties sought to communicate their messages.

⁷³ It should be noted that the Advertising expenditure include April 2004, whereas Davis (2005) includes on January to March 2004.

⁷⁴ This does not take into account the cost of media such as the internet, preparation of press releases and press conferences as well as the distribution of pamphlets, posters and other campaign paraphernalia not captured by Nielsen Media Research. For a detailed breakdown of advertising expenditure figures by party, please see appendix 6.

The Independent Broadcasting Authority of South Africa (ICASA) also allocated free radio broadcasting time to all parties that registered candidates. This was done in such a way that even parties without parliamentary representation received at least a quarter of the time available to the largest represented party (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005: 6). Free two-minute advertising slots, called Public Election Broadcasts (PEBs), were provided to all political parties contesting seats in the National Assembly during prime listening time on all national radio stations. The PEBs were allocated to each party through a formula that considered the amount of seats each party held in national and provincial legislatures and the amount of candidates fielded by each party (Davis, 2005:236).

In South Africa, parties represented in the national and provincial legislatures are funded on the basis of a formula consisting of proportional and equitable components of a fund appropriated by Parliament and managed by the IEC. The formula is tied to the number of elected public representatives in each party in the national and provincial legislatures. Through this fund R66.6 million was allocated in the 2003/4 tax year to 22 parties. Public funding of parties is regulated by the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 1997 and the Regulation under Section 10 (1) of the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 1997 (Regulation R117, 1998) issued on 20 November 1998.⁷⁵ Parties are required to organize their audited financial statements in accordance with six descriptive categories: Personnel Expenditure, Accommodation, Travel, Arrangement of meetings & rallies, Administrative and Promotions and publications (Kotze; 2004a:27-44). In 2003/2004, R42 million was allocated to the ANC; R7 million to the DA; R5 million to the IFP; R4.7 million to the NNP; just under 1.8 million to the UDM and R270 000 to the ID.

As can be seen in table 7 below, the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM and NNP primarily spent their allocation on personnel and administration. The ANC spent almost R15 million of its allocation on promotion and publications. The ID spent practically all of its funds arranging meetings and rallies (which was hardly surprising given that it was only formed shortly before the 2004 election).

⁷⁵ For a detailed discussion of the public funding regulatory framework, see Kotze; 2004a.

Table 10: Party Income and Expenditure: 2003/2004 Financial Year

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	ID	NNP
Allocation for the year	42 573 853	7 087 154	5 050 841	1 779 752	270 277	4 702 101
Less: total expenditure	42 572 100	6 949 563	5 111 225	1 655 704	257 609	4 723 160
1) Personnel Expenditure	21 556 123	4 934 463	3 159 309	356 597	--	1 224 106
2) Accommodation	59 805	--	--	37 360	--	35 740
3) Travel	614 781	21 798	84 714	277 378	--	240 278
4) Arrangement of meetings & rallies	13 510	--	195 442	89 499	257 000	227 825
5) Administrative	5 482 659	1 857 816	1 354 148	471 939	609	1179 875
6) Promotions and publications	14 845 222	135 486	52 053	422 931	--	1 815 336
Fixed Asset Expenditure	--	--	265 559	--	--	--
Unspent money at year-end	145 456	137 591	60 384	124 048	12 668	21 059
Plus: Interest and other income	14 160	15 352	22 678	5 657	56	--
Surplus/(deficit)	131 296	152 943	37 706	129 705	12 724	21 059

Source: Kotze, 2004a.

Political party funding and the financing of electoral activities are virtually unregulated in South Africa, with no legal limits on the amount parties may spend on electioneering, nor any requirements for disclosure of the sources and amounts of private donations. The IEC allocates funding for supporting electoral activities, proportionate to the size of each party's existing representation at the inception of the campaign (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:34). As a result, the already strong parties gain the most advantage. Currently, powerful parties automatically receive far larger shares of resources and are therefore able to command more media coverage, resulting in a situation where power structures are reinforced, leaving little opportunities for smaller parties. This, as Kotze (2004b:100) argues, "entrenches the minorities and majorities of previous elections".

Kotze (2004a:43) argues that "access to financial resources will always be considered by contesting parties as the crux of their success or failure". However, Faull (2004) in his analysis of advertising expenditure per vote won, points out that the ID spent relatively little on advertising, R531,189 compared to the NNP's R2,682,721 or R1.97 and R10.41 respectively, per vote. The NNP was allocated R4, 702, 101 million compared to the ID's R270 277 in the 2003/4 tax year (Kotze, 2004a:42). Thus, while campaign strategies are dependent on adequate resources, money on its own does not translate into effective campaigns. The issue seems to be more complex than insufficient funds, given that the ID as a small relatively new party which had far less funds than other parties performed better than the New National Party.

6.3 The “Paid” Campaigns⁷⁶

6.3.1 The ANC

The ANC clearly wanted to rekindle its image in the minds of voters. It primarily invested its money in outdoor media advertising, which provides a good way to increase identification (Weaver, 1996:210). The ANC spent a total of R12 million on outdoor media. Of this, 77% or 9.5 million was spent on billboards and 22% or R2.7 million on moving media (advertising on buses, trains and taxis).

Table 11: ANC Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
ANC Outdoor	4,267,348	4,655,324	3,000,533	435,392	12,358,597
ANC Print	1,515,554	37,790	2,241,941	4,069,437	7,864,722
ANC Radio	5,520	621,953	4,350,949	2,310,418	7,288,840
ANC Total	5,788,422	5,315,067	9,593,423	6,815,247	27,512,159

Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004

The ANC spent a total of R7, 2 million on radio advertising. The party advertised on numerous radio stations, targeting those with the largest listenership figures. Newspaper advertising is regarded as the least persuasive of the media commonly used for political campaigning due to their inherently passive nature (Weaver; 1996: 207). Nevertheless, the ANC also spent R7,8 million on advertisements in the print media. The ANC’s print advertisements primarily targeted the weekend papers, some regional dailies as well as several community newspapers. This money could arguably have been put to better use

⁷⁶ Unfortunately, I was unable to conduct a full assessment and comparison of campaign activities. What is clear though is the ANC and DA had very active campaign trails (Davis, 2005; Booysen, 2005 and Southall and Daniel, 2005) and were able to generate more news than other parties. The DA held a series of mass rallies jointly with the IFP and on its own. Southall and Daniel (2005:50) note that Tony Leon’s campaigning in the townships had “razzmatazz, colour and the aura of a party on the move”. The ANC engaged in a series of meet-and-greets, “walk-about” and door-to-door work (African National Congress, 2006). Cabinet ministers and other senior party figures were dispatched at taxi ranks, railway stations, community centres, hostels, apartment blocks and shopping malls (Lodge, 2005). The IFP also had an active campaign. As (Piper, 2005:154) indicates Chief Buthelezi attended no fewer than twenty nine meetings and rallies, three alliance-formation public announcements, eleven walkabouts and meet-and-greet sessions, six major press conferences as well as five DA/IFP rallies. The UDM conducted rallies in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape and in Gauteng (www.udm.org.za, 2008). Patricia De Lille visited a cross-section of residential areas concentrating mainly on the working class and poor coloured communities of the Western Cape and Northern Cape (Hoeane; 2005:196).

for radio advertisements, given that it is far more widely used than print media.

The ANC's website also formed a key component of the ANC's campaign strategy. The ANC's weekly newsletter, *ANC Today* (published on ANC's website), constituted a large component of President Mbeki's communication with the South African public and opposition parties during the campaign period. The newsletter also produced much earned media with numerous stories being generated around it.

6.3.2 The DA

Undoubtedly the DA also sought to reach as many potential voters as it could during the campaign period. The DA spent a substantial sum of money on paid media, spending a total of R9.5 million on various advertising formats. The DA was the only party recorded as having invested in direct mail, spending just over R70 000 on this form of voter contact. The DA invested R1.2 million in print advertising, placing adverts in various newspapers and also spent just under R200 000 on outdoor media.

The use of radio advertisements formed the largest component of the DA's campaign strategy with R8 million being spent on radio advertisements. The DA spent over R2 million on stations with a predominantly black listenership, with R775 000 spent on the Zulu-medium station Ukhozi alone. The DA spent R1.3 million advertising on stations with a white listenership such as 5fm, Cape Talk, Highveld, Ofm and Radiosondergrense. The remainder was allocated to stations such as East Coast Radio, Jacaranda, Radio 702 and SAFM. According to Weaver (1996; 207), radio is a better medium through which to launch a negative attack because it lacks the visual power of television. The DA took this view to heart and used a series of radio election advertisements to target its campaign against the ID.

Table 12: DA Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
DA Direct Mail	7,589	0	41,262	23,371	72,222
DA Outdoor	0	137,350	62,350	0	199,700
DA Print	24,772	630,881	147,118	459,115	1,261,886
DA Radio	0	2,284,103	3,739,007	2,022,861	8,045,971
DA Total	32,361	3,052,334	3,989,737	2,505,347	9,579,779

Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004

The DA also used their internet site to enhance their campaign strategy. Tony Leon used his weekly newsletter *South Africa Today* (published on DAs website) to respond to President Mbeki's newsletter and as a key communication tool during the campaign period. This newsletter also generated earned media with several newspaper stories being produced around its content.

6.3.3 The IFP

The IFP spent its funds primarily on radio advertising. The IFP invested just under R1.4 million in radio adverts, of which over R500 000 was directed at the Zulu-medium station Ukhozi FM. This was a prudent decision given that many IFP supporters are Zulu-speaking and likely to hear messages delivered via radio. Another R209 196 was spent on advertising with the Xhosa-medium station Umhlobo Wenene FM.

The IFP spent R269 802 on advertisements in print media, the bulk of which went to *Rapport*, an Afrikaans-medium newspaper with a readership base of 1.5 million people. A minor amount of R22 500 was spent on outdoor media. Thus, the IFP spent a total of R1.6 million on advertising, R1 688 113 less than the amount spent by the UDM.

Table 13: IFP Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
IFP Outdoor	0	0	15,000	7,500	22,500
IFP Print	7,254	7,254	0	255,294	269,802
IFP Radio	0	0	497,631	861,032	1,358,663
IFP Total	7,254	7,254	512,631	1,123,826	1,650,965

Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004

According to Piper (2005:154) the IFP spent most of its money on rallies rather than door-to-door campaigning and it lamented the fact that they could only afford 60 000 posters nationally, a handful of cars and nine election trucks. According to Reverend Zondi the IFP had a “fully-fledged Communications Directorate of about ten people”. He also indicated that the IFP prioritized radio through placing adverts and PEBs but “did not advertise much in the print media due to lack of resources”. He added that the IFP used billboards where they could and placed op-ed pieces in newspapers as well as announced campaign events through the media⁷⁷. The IFP also had an internet site with scripts of Chief Buthelezi’s campaign speeches as well as the IFP’s series of pledges and links to the posters used by the IFP during the 2004 campaign.

6.3.4 The UDM

The UDM spent R3.3 million on paid media. Despite the view by Siviwe Nzwelini, UDM National Coordinator, that radio is the most effective medium to reach voters⁷⁸, the UDM did not make the most of radio. The largest proportion of the UDM advertising expenditure (R1.8 million) was used on outdoor media. The UDM spent half a million on radio advertisements investing R128 130 on radio adverts with the Zulu-medium station Ukhozi FM and another R117 750 with the English-medium station Metro FM. A series of smaller amounts was used for adverts with Good Hope FM, SA FM, Ikwewezi FM, Lesedi FM, Ligwalagwala FM, Lotus FM, Motsweding FM, Munghana Lonene FM, Phalaphala FM, Thobela FM and Umhlobo Wenene FM. Of the expenditure on outdoor media R1.8 million went to billboards and R31 375 went to moving media which is

⁷⁷ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

⁷⁸ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

comprised of mobile billboards and billboards at train stations.

Table 14: UDM Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
UDM Outdoor	0	695,400	724,150	416,575	1,836,125
UDM Print	0	826,313	80,920	34,440	941,673
UDM Radio	0	0	308,520	252,760	561,280
UDM Total	0	1,521,713	1,113,590	703,775	3,339,078

Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004

The UDM spent just over R900 000 advertising in the print media. The largest proportion of this, amounting to R284 580, went to the *Sunday Times*. In addition to this, R210 576 worth of advertisements were placed in the *Mail and Guardian* and R108 000 in the now-closed daily *This Day*. The UDM had an internet site with scripts of General Bantu Holomisa's campaign speeches.

6.3.5 The ID

Of the parties considered in this thesis, the ID had the least amount of resources and therefore spent the least on paid advertisements. In total, the ID spent just over half a million rand, with almost all of it on radio advertisements. Of the total of R531 189 spent on advertising, they spent R463 246 on radio advertisements. This was a sensible decision given that radio is so widely consumed in South Africa. The largest proportion of R121 208 was spent on advertisements with Metro FM. An additional R102 516 was invested in advertisements with 5FM and R63 468 with SAFM. These are all English-medium radio stations. A series of smaller amounts was used for adverts with community radio stations. The ID spent R67 943 on print advertisements, primarily advertising in community newspapers. The decision to advertise in community newspapers was also quite clever since it is a free newspaper delivered directly to people's houses. The only exception to this was the Cape Times in which it bought R23 499 worth of advertising space.

Marlon Kruger, Media Officer of the Independent Democrats, indicated that the ID had a

dedicated media strategy.⁷⁹ According to Kruger, the ID made use of PEBs and an SMS campaign, rather than advertisements, due to their limited resources and she added that posters were used late in the campaign due to a lack of resources.⁸⁰

Table 15: ID Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
ID Print	5,789	13,662	16,618	31,874	67,943
ID Radio	0	0	69,660	393,586	463,246
ID Total	5,789	13,662	86,278	425,460	531,189

Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004

According to Hoeane (2005:195), the ID ran a sophisticated and technologically advanced election campaign concentrating on novel technological methods such as connecting potential voters to the party through sending of SMS messages and placing advertisements in classified sections of newspapers. The ID's website had an email link to Patricia De Lille; pages which provided information on the various components of their manifesto; a digital democracy forum page; links to pages; the Young ID page and links to pages with information on the elections such as Election 2004 page (Hoeane; 2005:195).

6.3.6 The NNP

The use of radio advertisements formed the largest component of the NNP's campaign strategy with R1.75 million being spent on radio advertisements. The NNP spent over R2 million on stations with a predominantly black listenership, spending R775 000 on the Zulu-medium station Ukhozi alone. While this meant that NNP messages would reach a broad audience, it is unlikely that these messages would have been well-received by listeners given their perceptions of the party. Again, Iyengar and Valentino's (2000:110) view that campaign communications need to resonate with voters' prevailing expectations or dispositions to be credible and compelling is pertinent.

⁷⁹ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

⁸⁰ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

The NNP also spent R1.3 million advertising on stations with a white listenership such as 5fm, Cape Talk, Highveld, Ofm and Radiosondergrense. The remainder was allocated to stations such as East Coast Radio, Jacaranda, Radio 702 and SAFM.

Table 16: NNP Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
NNP Print	45,184	151,409	353,385	374,217	924,195
NNP Radio	0	23,815	1,096,468	638,243	1,758,526
NNP Total	45,184	175,224	1,449,853	1,012,460	2,682,721

Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004

Carol Johnson, Media Director of the New National Party, indicated that the NNP emphasized canvassing through their “national leaders programme”. She added that they alerted the media where Marthinus Van Schalkwyk would be, working closely with journalists and political editors at the SABC, giving them a week’s schedule in advance. The NNP also distributed press releases to a database of 700 media contacts. It generated op-ed pieces by editing speeches of party leaders, giving them a ‘media hook’ and then sending them to publications. Johnson added that the NNP also ‘trawled’ the South African Press Association looking for pieces to respond to and made use of PEBs. Johnson indicated that the NNP distributed approximately 300 000 posters and more than a million pamphlets but did not use billboards because they were too expensive.

6.4 Contact With Voters

An important part of the dissemination process is personal canvassing conducted by party volunteers or direct contact between party leaders and voters. As previously noted by Weaver (1996:241) such direct voter contact is more effective per voter because it allows for two-way communication and humanizes the candidate.

As seen in the table below, one in four CNEP respondents (24%) indicated that they had been contacted by the ANC and almost one in five (18%) had been contacted in person by the ANC. These figures are in line with reports that indicated that the ANC concentrated its efforts on an unprecedented rank-and-file national door-to-door canvassing campaign focused on voters’ doorsteps, taxi ranks, railway stations,

community meetings, hostels, shopping malls, blocks of flats and townhouses (Lodge, 2005:118). Lodge indicates that the ANC relied on mass party membership mobilization and that in every ward, ANC branch members were given lists of houses they were to visit and report back on. In door-to-door campaigning, major ANC notables were accompanied by councilors, mayors and other local officials who could address any grievances raised by residents. This was made possible by the ANC's revitalization of its branch structures prior to the election (Southall and Daniel; 2005:43).

Table 17: Reported Party Contact During 2004 Campaign Period.

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	ID	NNP
No contact	76%	88%	91%	90%	91%	90%
Mail	1%	1%	.2%	.1%	.2%	.4%
Telephone	.4%	1%	.1%	.2%	.1%	.4%
In person	18%	3%	1%	3%	1%	2%
E-mail--	--	.1%	--	--	--	--
Can't Remember Method	3%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%
Don't Know	3%	5%	6%	6%	6%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source of Data: Comparative National Elections Project 2004.

Question: Please tell me whether any of the following political parties or candidates or their representative contacted you during the recent election campaign? [If Yes] Was that contact you in person, on the telephone, by mail, or by email?

However, only one tenth of CNEP respondents said that they had been contacted by opposition parties. Furthermore only negligible proportions those that said they were contacted by opposition parties, could say *how* they had been contacted. Minimal amounts of voters were contacted by opposition parties in person. Despite the fact that, according to Piper (2005:154), IFP local structures were central to voter registration and party information dissemination, a mere 1% said that they had been contacted by the IFP in person.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter revealed a vast disparity in the resources available to parties which further stacked the odds against smaller parties while advantaging parties that are already strong. Additionally, the survey data revealed a striking lack of contact between opposition parties and voters compared to the extensive door-to-door canvassing conducted by the ANC.

The ANC and the DA were able to mount impressive strategies due to their unrivalled access to resources through public and private funding (Davis, 2005:242). They were also able use their leaders' internet newsletters to have a public sparring match and generate publicity for themselves. Despite having far less funds, the ID was innovative in its campaign strategy. The NNP, however, spent over two million rand advertising on radio station where the target audience was likely to have predominantly negative images of it. The UDM failed to fully utilize the reach of radio instead choosing to spend most of its money on outdoor advertisements.

To increase voter access to campaign messages, parties should increase the extent of direct contact with voters and move away from print to radio advertising. This would enhance their capacity to reach more voters and be a more effective use of resources. Given the fact that large proportions of the South African speak a diversity of languages and live in predominantly rural areas, it is important for parties to tailor their advertising to these realities.

CHAPTER SEVEN: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN

7.1 Introduction

The mass media has several functions during an election campaign. In addition to being the vehicle for political advertisements from the parties, analytical or political commentary in the media synthesizes a large number of campaign activities and events, it influences which campaign issues and themes that will become most important, it crystallizes the differences in policy positions of the political parties, and it assesses the performance of the parties (Kavanagh, 1995:177). In order to contribute to the quality of the democratic system, broadcast and print media organizations should ideally cover campaigns in ways that emphasize candidate policy proposals that draw attention to the larger meanings of the choices that voters face and that accurately portray the content and the tone of candidate presentations. Journalists should avoid various forms of reporting that detract from such coverage, such as overemphasizing personal conflicts between candidates (Buchanan, 2001:365).

I start this chapter by giving an overview of South African media access and media use patterns during 2004. I then assess whether campaign coverage was provided by media that are easily accessible to voters. I describe the media's coverage of the campaign, specifically the information communicated by the mass media *about* the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP in the 2004 election campaign. I also assess the extent of policy-related coverage and whether the media focused on issues of concern to voters. I check whether voters trusted and perceived the media as unbiased as well as verify these perceptions by checking the content analysis data for evidence of bias. Taken together, these assessments will determine whether the media's coverage of the campaign helped clarify the issues for voters.

7.2 Profile of the Media in South Africa

Post-apartheid South Africa has a well functioning and diversified media (Jacobs and Johnson, 2003). In addition to the public broadcaster, a lively privately-owned newspaper

industry as well commercial television and radio exists in South Africa.

7.2.1 Radio

In South Africa, as in the rest of Africa and the developing world generally, radio is a particularly important form of mass media – it has the advantage of reaching illiterate or semi-literate voters and those living in rural areas in the preferred language of the voter. Radio is thus a versatile and effective way of communicating political messages (Weaver, 1996: 206). Moreover, as the figures below very clearly show, in 2004, a very high proportion of South African voters could gain access to campaign information through radio, *if such information was provided to them*.

With the deregulation and liberalization of broadcasting in the late 1990s, there was a proliferation of radio stations. By 2004, South Africa had over 100 community stations broadcasting in all eleven official languages. The SABC provides both a commercial and a public service, each administered separately, with commercial radio stations subsidizing the public service stations (www.southafrica.info, 2006).

By 2004, 33.7 million owned radio sets, compared to 10.4 million in 1994 (Allerman, 2004). In addition to high levels of ownership, South Africans spent a substantial amount of time listening to the radio in 2004. In terms of radio listenership, 91% of adults South Africans interviewed by SAARF said that they had listened to the radio in the past seven days (SAARF, 2004a). The average time spent listening to the radio in 2004 was approximately four hours per day and 32 hours per week. South Africans living in provinces with metropolitan areas spent less time listening to the radio than those living in more rural provinces such as the Free State, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Listening time was lowest in the Northern and Eastern Cape (SAARF, 2004c).

The vast majority of South Africans listened to SABC's African language radio stations. In 2004 Ukhozi FM, the SABC's Zulu cultural service was the most popular radio station with 6.5 million listeners. Metro FM, the SABC's largest national commercial station in South Africa, targeting 25- to 34-year-old black urban adults and broadcasting in the metropolitan areas, followed closely behind with 5.8 million listeners (www.southafrica.info, 2006).

Table 18: Listenership of Radio in 1,000's [Past 7 days], February - April 2004

SAARF AMPS 2004		
	Number of listeners	% of Adult Population (30 656 000)
Ukhozi FM	6507000	21.6
Metro FM	5872000	19.9
Umhlobo- Wenene FM	5075000	15.5
Lesedi FM	4160000	13.4
Thobela FM	3274000	10.5
Motsweding FM	3134000	11.2
Jacaranda FM	2743000	8.2
94.95 East Coast Radio	2100000	6.1
Rodiosondergrense	1762000	5.6
99.2 YFM	1573000	6.4
Ligwalagwala FM	1570000	5
Munghana FM	1497000	4.2
5FM	1414000	4.4
Ikwewezi	1406000	4.7
94.7 Highveld Stereo	1373000	4.8
KFM 94.5	1224000	3.8
Kaya FM	1100000	4
Phalaphala	891000	2.5
RMFM	887000	2.2
CKI FM Stereo	762000	2
P4 KZN	662000	2.1
Radio Pulpit	573000	2.1
Good Hope FM	557000	1.9
P4 Cape Town	556000	1.8
SA FM	525000	2
OFM 94-97FM	490000	1.5
Lotus	471000	1.5
Algoa FM	436000	1.5
702 Talk Radio	278000	0.9
Radio 2000	211000	0.9
Classic 102.7FM	169000	0.6
567MW	116000	0.4
BRFM	51000	0.1
<i>Total Community*</i>	<i>5484000</i>	<i>15.6</i>

***Community radio stations include approximately 100 religious, student and other radio stations.**

Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation

Umhlobo FM, the SABC's isiXhosa cultural service, broadcast in the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, North West and KwaZulu-Natal, had over 5 million listeners. Lesedi FM, a seSotho radio station, had over 4 million listeners and broadcast to audiences living in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West, Free State, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal. Thobela FM, the SABC's Sepedi cultural service, had over 3 million listeners in Limpopo. Motsweding FM is a Setswana community service station broadcasting in Gauteng, North West, Limpopo, the Northern Cape, and the Free

State also had over 3 million listeners (www.southafrica.info, 2006). Radio stations could thus be a powerful way of bringing information about political parties and elections to voters.

7.2.2 Television

While political parties are prohibited from advertising on television in South Africa, coverage of the campaigns via television results in powerful visual images (Weaver, 1996:207) giving many voters the opportunity to see their leaders in a way not possible through other forms of media (Kavanagh,1995:216).

The SABC's television broadcasting was a powerful propaganda vehicle for the apartheid state. After 1994 it has been accused of serving the same purposes for the ANC government (Davis, 2005: 233). The SABC broadcasts on three domestic channels, with a mixed entertainment and public service mandate. SABC1 broadcasts in a wide range of languages, carrying news, entertainment and sports. SABC2 also carries programming in a range of languages, including most of the SABC's Afrikaans programming. SABC3 runs most of the SABC's English content. Launched in 1998, E-TV is South Africa's only free-to-air television channel. The station carries a mix of news, sports and entertainment. E-TV broadcasts mainly in English, although does carry some programming in other languages in order to comply with its license requirements (www.southafrica.info, 2006). All channels dedicate half an hour to news, of which a portion is given to a market report, sports news and a weather forecast.

A substantial proportion of South African voters could gain access to campaign information through television in 2004. By 2004, 8.2 million people owned television sets compared to 5.8 million in 1994. Ownership of television sets thus increased by over 2 million between 1994 and 2004 (Allerman, 2004). Television was previously regarded as an urban media form due to the poor infrastructure and servicing of rural areas; however, by 2004 almost 45% of rural households had TVs (compared to 27% in 1994). Television penetration in urban areas by 2004 stood at 84% of all households (www.saarf.co.za, 2004e). South Africans spent an average of three hours watching television on a daily basis (SAARF, 2004c).

According to SAARF data, SABC 1 had the highest proportion of viewers with approximately 21 million people (or 70% of an adult population of 30.6 million people) saying that they had tuned in to this channel in the past seven days. This was followed by E-TV almost 18 million viewers or 59% of adults and SABC 2 with almost 17 million viewers or 55%. SABC 3, which screens the English news, lagged behind with about 12 million viewers or 40% of adults.

Table 19: Television Viewing [past 7 days] 1,000's 2004

	SAARF AMPS 2004	
	Number of viewers	% of Adult Population (30 656 000)
E-TV	17726 000	58.5
M-Net – Main Service	3336 000	11.0
M-Net CSN	630 000	2.1
SABC 1	21473 000	70.8
SABC 2	16702 000	55.1
SABC 3	12085 000	39.9
Total DSTV	1649 000	5.4
Total TV	24383 000	80.4

Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation

7.2.3 Newspapers

Newspapers are important in election campaigns because they provide a deeper analysis than is often possible on radio and television due to its unrivalled investigative capacity (Davis: 2005:237).

There has been a transformation of print media ownership in South Africa compared to 1994 when, as Davis (2005:237) indicates the newspaper industry was dominated by the pro-apartheid Nasionale Pers and the Anglo-American Corporation which supported the parliamentary opposition. By 1999 Jacobs (1999:154-155) noted that whites still made up the bulk of mainstream newspapers but that ownership and control patterns in the newspaper industry were being transformed. By 2004, Davis indicated that print media had diversified and the demographic profile of editors had changed substantially.⁸¹ In 2004 there were four newspaper groups in South Africa: Independent Newspapers, Johnnic Communications, Naspers and CTP/Caxton with 20 daily and 13 weekly newspapers, most in English. Johnnic publishes *The Sunday Times*, the largest weekly

⁸¹ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore the profile of the media ownership and the impact this has had on political reporting.

newspaper with a readership base of 3.2 million people. Among the daily newspapers, *The Daily Sun* (which is published by Media24 a division of Naspers sold in Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West) had the highest readership figures of 2.3 million. This was followed by the *Sowetan*, published by Johnnic, with a readership of 1.54-million people.

Table 20: Readership of Newspapers in 1,000's 2004

	SAARF AMPS 2004	
	Number of readers	% of Adult Population (30 656 000)
Sunday Times	3239 000	10.7
Daily Sun	2292 000	7.6
City Press	2066 000	6.8
Soccer Laduma	2025 000	6.7
Sunday Sun	1956 000	6.5
Rapport	1600 000	5.3
Sowetan	1544 000	5.1
Sunday World	1062 000	3.5
Son	744 000	2.5
Burger (Sat)	661 000	2.2
Sunday Tribune	672 000	2.2
The Star	616 000	2
Die Burger	562 000	1.9
Ilanga	523 000	1.7
Citizen Weekend Edition (Sat)	487 000	1.6
Saturday Star	447 000	1.5
Citizen	466 000	1.5
Sat Weekend Argus	410 000	1.4
Isolezwe	391 000	1.3
Cape Argus	407 000	1.3
Beeld	364 000	1.2
P0st (Wed)	321 000	1.1
Weekend Sunday Argus	298 000	1
Daily News	308 000	1
Cape Times	316 000	1
Independent On Saturday	270 000	0.9
Mail & Guardian	233 000	0.8
Naweek-Beeld (Sat)	245 000	0.8
Mercury	213 000	0.7
Daily Dispatch	226 000	0.7
Sunday Independent	179 000	0.6
Herald	193 000	0.6
The Teacher	150 000	0.5
Weekend Post	155 000	0.5
Weekend Witness (Sat)	159 000	0.5
The Witness	167 000	0.5
Volksblad (Sat)	112 000	0.4
Business Day	113 000	0.4
Volksblad	126 000	0.4
Saturday Dispatch	85 000	0.3
Pretoria News	86 000	0.3
Pta News Weekend (Sat)	89 000	0.3
D.F. Advertiser	55 000	0.2


Source: www.southafrica.info, 2006

In 2004, just over a third (39%) of the South Africans interviewed by SAARF said that they read any newspaper. One in five (21%) said that had read daily newspapers. About a third (31%) read a weekly newspaper. Use of print media was considerably higher in the Western Cape and Gauteng with 66% in the Western Cape and 59% of adults in Gauteng reading newspapers compared to around a third or less in other provinces (SAARF, 2004b).

7.3 Consumption of News

In 2004 South Africans showed relatively high levels of news media consumption with large majority accessing news either through radio or television or both. Survey data confirms that radio was the most widely used and accessible medium, followed by television. Print media lagged far behind, see figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Media Usage in South Africa: 1994-2004



Source: Mattes, 2005

In terms of following news, 79% of Afrobarometer respondents indicated that they listened to news on the radio everyday or a few times per week. Less than one in ten (5%) said that they never listened to the news on the radio. In the Afrobarometer survey, consumption of television news was also relatively high with 69% saying they watched news on television “everyday” and 10% saying they watched it “a few times per week”. Less than a fifth (15%) indicated that they never watched the news on television. Print was the least used of media among Afrobarometer respondents. Just more than a third of Afrobarometer respondents said that they read the newspaper on a daily basis. About one in five (18%) indicated that they obtained print news “a few times per week”. Another 12% said that they received print news “a few times per month”. A quarter (25%) said that they never read newspaper news.

Table 21: Consumption of News Media, 2004 (Afrobarometer)

	Radio	Television	Newspapers
Never	5%	15%	25%
Less than once a month	2%	3%	10%
A few times a month	2%	3%	12%
A few times a week	12%	10%	18%
Every day	79%	69%	35%
Don't know	.1%	.4%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: Afrobarometer 2004

Question Wording: How often do you get news from the following sources?

The CNEP survey asked to what extent respondents followed the campaign via the news. Patterns of consumption followed similar trends to the Afrobarometer but were consistently lower. Almost two-thirds (65%) said that they never used newspapers to follow the campaign. Less than one in ten (8%) said that they followed the campaign via newspapers on a daily basis and a fifth (22%) of voters indicated that they followed the campaign via print media at least a few times per week.

Table 22: Consumption of News Media, 2004 (Comparative National Elections Project)

	Radio	Television	Newspapers
Daily / Almost every day	22%	24%	8%
3-4 days a week	12%	8%	4%
1-2 days a week	11%	9%	9%
Less frequently	14%	11%	12%
Never	41%	48%	65%
Don't know	.4%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, South Africa Survey 2004.

Question wording: During the electoral campaign, how frequently did you follow political news through:

Only one in five South Africans said that they followed the campaign via radio news on a daily basis, another 44% of South Africans say they get news about politics from radio at least a few times a week. Almost half (41%) said that they never followed the campaign on the radio. A higher proportion (24%) indicated that they followed the campaign on television on a daily basis. Another 41% said they followed the campaign on television at least a few times per week. Almost half (48%) said that they never followed the campaign on television.

7.4 Coverage of the Campaign

7.4.1 All Media

While voters mostly use radio and television and not print media in their everyday lives, content analysis reveals that the election campaign was predominantly covered by the print media.⁸² Thus, the media that provided the most campaign information was used the least by voters, indicating a fundamental disjuncture between the media where voters seek campaign information and the media where it is most frequently and most elaborately reported.

⁸² The analysis did not include paid advertisements. For print, all articles in the political, news, editorial, opinion as well as the business section were included. Excluded were 'advertorials', letters to the editor and other sections of the newspaper clearly indicated as of non-editorial content. On TV, all news reports were coded including sport and weather but excluding the re-broadcast of 'highlights' after advertisement breaks.

Table 23: Coverage of the Campaign in all Media Types

	Number of Campaign-related Statements	Percentage of all Campaign-related statements	Average number of statements per day
Print media	50636	87%	779
TV news	4571	8%	70
Radio Stations included in the dataset	2746	5%	42
Total Number of Campaign-related Statements	57953	100%	892

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

For the content analysis each campaign-related statement, rather than article, was analyzed. A ‘statement’ was defined by Media Tenor as a unit of analysis within an article or story, which contains a subject, an issue, a rating, and a source. Newspapers produced an average of 779 statements per day compared 70 campaign-related statements screened on television. Clips were collected for a cross-section of radio stations. It is therefore instructive to compare the newspaper, television channel and radio station that produced the highest number of campaign-related statements. Among newspapers, the English-medium daily *This Day* produced the most campaign related statements⁸³. Among the television channels, E-TV had the highest campaign-related coverage while SAFM was the leader of the radio stations. SAFM had 537 campaign-related statements compared to the 5177 campaign-related statements produced by *This Day* during the same period of time. E-TV broadcasted 1215 statements.

Table 24: Highest Coverage of Campaign

	Number of Campaign-related Statements	Average number of statements per day
This Day	5177	80
E-TV	1215	19
SAFM	537	8

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

⁸³ This Day was formed in 2004 and closed down after a short period of time, therefore SAARF did not have readership figures for it.

7.4.2 Radio Coverage

As indicated, radio stations did not have a large volume of campaign coverage. South Africa's most popular station with 6 million listeners daily, Ukhozi FM, had an average of only 4 campaign-related statements per day or 280 for the entire campaign period. Motsweding FM and Thobela FM produced 7 and 5 campaign-related statements per day respectively. SAFM, with a listener base of half a million, had the largest amount of campaign coverage relative to other channels included in the data-set. Radiosondergrense had a listener base of 1.8 million people and produced an average of 6 campaign-related statements per day. 702 Talk Radio had a low listenership base of 278 000 people and produced an average of 7 campaign-related statements per day.

Table 25: Campaign Coverage by Radio Station

Radio Station	Number of Campaign-related Statements	Percentage of all Campaign-related statements	Average number of statements per day
SA FM	537	20%	8
Motsweding	469	17%	7
Radio 702	460	17%	7
Radio Sonder Grense	378	14%	6
Thobela	336	12%	5
Ukhozi	280	10%	4
Metro FM	188	7%	3
Radio Jacaranda	82	3%	1
East Coast Radio	16	1%	> 1
Total	2746	100%	42

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

7.4.3 Television Coverage

Among the TV channels it was E-TV, with about 18 million viewers, which had the largest amount of campaign coverage. The Zulu/Xhosa news programmes on SABC 1 had the most campaign coverage of all SABC's programmes. Broadcasting in African languages, SABC 1 had the highest viewership figures, followed by the mainly Afrikaans speaking SABC 2. English speaking SABC 3 had lower viewership figures than E-TV. .

Table 26: Campaign Coverage by Television Channel

Television Channel	Number of Campaign-related Statements	Percentage of all Campaign-related statements	Average number of statements per day
E-TV News	1215	27%	19
Zulu/Xhosa News	883	19%	14
English News	785	17%	12
Afrikaans News	749	16%	12
Sotho News	704	15%	11
Business Focus	235	5%	4
Total	4571	100%	70

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

7.4.4 Print Coverage

Print media covered the campaign extensively with over 50 000 campaign-related statements. However, this coverage was predominantly in regional English and Afrikaans-medium newspapers which did not have very high readership bases. Among the daily newspapers, *This Day* had the highest volume of campaign coverage relative to other newspapers. This was followed by *Die Burger*, *The Cape Times*, *Natal Witness*, *Beeld* and *The Star*. *Die Burger* had an average of 75 campaign-related statements per day during the campaign period. *The Cape Times* produced an average of 60 campaign-related statements per day. Of the weekly newspapers, *The Mail and Guardian* led the way with the highest level of coverage.

Table 27: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium

	Number of Campaign-related Statements	Percentage of all Campaign-related statements	Average number of statements per day
This Day	5177	10.2	80
Die Burger	4851	9.6	75
Cape Times	3870	7.6	60
Natal Witness	3739	7.4	58
Beeld	3380	6.7	52
The Star	3209	6.3	49
Citizen	2997	5.9	46
Business Day	2957	5.8	45
Sowetan	2718	5.4	42
The Mercury	2693	5.3	41
Cape Argus	2499	4.9	38
Pretoria News	2436	4.8	37

Table 27 continued: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium

Daily News	1768	3.5	27
Mail & Guardian	1482	2.9	23
City Press	1351	2.7	21
The Sunday Times	1176	2.3	18
Rapport	830	1.6	13
Daily Sun	694	1.4	11
Sunday Independent	615	1.2	9
Isolezwe	608	1.2	9
Ilanga	521	1	8
Financial Mail	348	0.7	5
Independent on Saturday	236	0.5	4
Sunday World	130	0.3	2
Sunday Sun	130	0.3	2
Sake	70	0.1	1
Business Report	65	0.1	1
Finance Week	43	0.1	1
Sake Rapport	43	0.1	1
Total	50636	100.0	779

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

7.5 Coverage of the Parties

7.5.1 All Media

Regarding the volume of media coverage of the top six parties, Media Tenor data shows that the ANC and DA received a large amount of media coverage, the IFP, ID and NNP received a medium amount of coverage and relative to the ANC and DA the UDM received a low amount of coverage.

The ANC received the highest proportion of media exposure with one in three statements analyzed by Media Tenor relating to the ANC. It is important to note that while the ANC did receive the highest volume of coverage, it did not secure the majority of all statements and the proportion of coverage was not vastly more than other parties. That the ANC received the most coverage is not unexpected. As Weaver (1996:210) points out, the “disparity between incumbent and challenger earned media is profound” because incumbents have stronger ongoing relations with news reporters and editors. Although some segments of the media has quite antagonistic relations with the ruling party, this is likely to be true in South Africa as well. Davis (2005:236) also argues that the ruling

ANC received additional media coverage by having its policies and campaign activities mentioned and discussed by other parties and journalists, as well as because of the prominence of its leaders.


Table 28: Coverage of Parties in all Media Types

	Number of Campaign-related Statements	Percentage of all Campaign-related statements	Average number of statements per day
ANC	19182	33%	295
DA	13254	23%	204
IFP	7131	12%	110
UDM	1487	3%	23
ID	2413	4%	37
NNP	5491	10%	84
Other	8995	16%	138
Total Number of Campaign-related Statements	57953	100%	892

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

The DA also managed to attract a sizable proportion of media coverage with almost one in four statements relating to it - there was only a 10 percentage point difference between the ANC and DA's coverage. Davis (2005:247) points out that the DA's strong media presence was due to its ability to sustain a strong media presence in the run-up to the elections. Other parties were unable to generate noteworthy amounts of coverage, with 12% of media statements being about the IFP and 10% about the NNP. The ID, at 4%, received slightly more media attention than the UDM which drew 3% of all media statements.

Figure 7: Coverage of Parties on Radio during 2004 Election Campaign



Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

Coverage of the ANC was highest on Radio 702, Ukhozi, Motswedding and Thobela while the DA received most of its coverage from Radio Jacaranda, Radio Sonder Grense and SA FM. The IFP faired best on Ukhozi FM and Radio 702. The NNP received most of its coverage from Radio Jacaranda while the UDM and ID generally received minimal coverage.

Table 29: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium

	SA FM	Motswedding	Radio 702	Radio Sonder Grense	Thobela
ANC	37%	40%	42%	33%	40%
DA	23%	15%	15%	24%	15%
IFP	12%	10%	15%	9%	12%
UDM	2%	2%	2%	1%	5%
ID	1%	4%	2%	5%	2%
NNP	8%	9%	10%	13%	11%
Other	17%	19%	12%	15%	16%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Campaign-related Statements	537	469	460	378	336

Table 29 Continued: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium

	Ukhozi	Metro FM	Radio Jacaranda	East Coast Radio	Total
ANC	41.8%	38.8%	37.8%	--	38.6%
DA	16.4%	26.6%	30.5%	18.8%	19.1%
IFP	16.8%	12.2%	8.5%	6.3%	12.3%
UDM	2.9%	1.1%	1.2%	--	2.4%
ID	3.9%	--	4.9%	--	2.8%
NNP	3.9%	5.3%	12.2%	--	9.1%
Other	14.3%	16.0%	4.9%	75.0%	15.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Number of Campaign-related Statements	280	188	82	16	2746

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

7.5.2 Television Coverage


The data on television news coverage revealed fairly even coverage of the main parties. The ANC also received the highest proportion of media exposure on television. Overall, just over one in five statements (23%) on television news related to the ANC. The DA again came in at second with 15% of statements relating to it and an 8 percentage point difference between the ANC and DA's television coverage. The IFP managed to secure 12% of campaign-related television news statements. The UDM fared slightly better on television (4.4% of statements) than on radio (2% of statements). The ID also received slightly more attention from television (5% of statements) than from print media (4% of statements) and radio (3% of statements). On television 8% of statements were about the NNP.

Table 30: Extent of Coverage of Parties on Television (All Stations)

	Frequency	Percentage	Average number of statements per day
ANC	1051	23%	16
DA	692	15%	11
IFP	544	12%	8
UDM	203	4%	3
ID	248	5%	4
NNP	383	8%	6
Other	1450	32%	22
Total Number of Campaign-related Statements	4571	100%	70

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

Figure 8: Coverage of Parties on Television during 2004 Election Campaign



Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

The ANC enjoyed marginally more coverage on the SABC Zulu/Xhosa and Sotho news compared to SABC's Afrikaans and English news as well as E-TV. Overall, almost one in five news statements on SABC channels related to the DA. The DA received far less exposure on E-TV than the SABC, with only one in ten statements being made about the DA. The NNP fared best on the Afrikaans news.

Table 31: Television News Coverage of Parties by Channel

	Afrikaans News (SABC2)	English News	E-TV News	Zulu/Xhosa News	Sotho News	Total
ANC	23.4	21.8	20.6	26.5	25.0	23.0
DA	15.8	17.3	10.0	18.1	17.5	15.1
IFP	9.9	14.9	9.3	14.9	11.5	11.9
UDM	3.7	4.5	4.9	3.9	4.1	4.4
ID	6.8	5.2	4.8	3.9	6.8	5.4
NNP	10.1	8.9	7.4	8.5	6.3	8.4
Other	30.3	27.4	43.0	24.2	28.8	31.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of statements	749	785	1215	883	704	4571

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

7.5.3 Print Coverage

The ANC received the most newspaper coverage, with 34% of all press statements in the Media Tenor data-set referring to it. Thus, the greater part of campaign-related statements was not about the ANC and the proportion of coverage was only 10 percentage points more than the DA received.


Table 32: Extent of Coverage of Parties in All Print Media

	Frequency	Percentage	Average number of statements per day
ANC	17070	33.7	263
DA	12038	23.8	185
IFP	6248	12.3	96
UDM	1219	2.4	19
ID	2088	4.1	32
NNP	4858	9.6	75
Other	7115	14.1	109
Total	50636	100.0	779

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

The DA received a relatively high level of coverage in most newspapers. Overall one in four press statements analyzed by Media Tenor was about the DA. The IFP also received a relatively fair amount of coverage – 12% of all press statements. The NNP ranked fourth in terms of the volume of exposure given to parties by the print media. The ID, at 4.1%, again received slightly more newspaper attention than the UDM which drew 2.4% of all statements.

Figure 9: Coverage of Parties in Newspapers during 2004 Election Campaign



Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

Almost two-thirds (61%) of Sunday World’s campaign-related statements and about half of the campaign coverage in *The Business Report*, *Sunday Times* and *Mail & Guardian* was about the ANC. Coverage of the ANC was lowest in the *Daily Sun*, *Sake* and *Rapport*. The DA received most its coverage from *The Citizen*, *The Cape Times* and *This Day*. DA presence was lowest in *Sunday World*, *Ilanga*, *Sunday Sun*, *Isolezwe*, *Daily Sun* and *City Press*. The IFP received most of its coverage from *Ilanga*, *Isolezwe* and newspapers based in KwaZulu-Natal such as *The Mercury* and *Natal Witness*. The UDM received negligible coverage from newspapers, with the exception of the *Sunday Sun*. Coverage of the NNP was highest in the Afrikaans newspapers *Rapport*, *Die Burger* and *Beeld*.

Table 33: Print News Coverage of Parties by Paper

	This Day	Burger	Cape Times	Natal Witness	Beeld	The Star	Citizen	Bus Day	Sowe-tan	Mercury	Cape Argus	Pret News	Daily News
ANC	33%	33%	30%	31%	31%	32%	34%	39%	38%	34%	27%	34%	35%
DA	27%	22%	29%	25%	22%	24%	34%	25%	26%	22%	24%	23%	21%
IFP	11%	7%	10%	19%	13%	9%	8%	9%	11%	24%	3%	12%	21%
UDM	2%	3%	2%	1%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	1%	4%	2%	1%
ID	5%	4%	6%	4%	4%	5%	3%	6%	4%	2%	8%	4%	1%
NNP	8%	17%	13%	5%	11%	8%	10%	8%	7%	6%	14%	12%	6%
Other	14%	14%	9%	13%	16%	20%	9%	11%	12%	12%	21%	14%	14%
Cases	5177	4851	3870	3739	3380	3209	2997	2957	2718	2693	2499	2436	1768

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

Table 29 continued: Print News Coverage of Parties by Paper

	M & G	City Press	Sunday Times	Rapp-ort	Daily Sun	Sun Indep	Isolezwe	Ilanga	Financial Mail	Indep on Sat	Sunday World	Sunday Sun
ANC	48%	33%	49%	24%	19%	38%	39%	24%	53%	30%	61%	31%
DA	17%	15%	19%	23%	14%	22%	13%	7%	21%	19%	6%	10%
IFP	11%	15%	11%	8%	11%	10%	38%	53%	10%	14%	6%	15%
UDM	2%	3%	2%	3%	9%	4%	4%	5%	--	3%	2%	7%
ID	2%	3%	2%	3%	7%	2%	--	--	--	5%	--	11%
NNP	7%	4%	8%	20%	9%	8%	1%	2%	12%	9%	3%	8%
Other	13%	27%	11%	19%	31%	16%	4%	10%	4%	20%	22%	18%
Cases	1482	1351	1176	830	694	615	608	521	348	236	130	130

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

7.6 Messages Communicated by the Media

In addition to knowing the *volume* of coverage about a given party, it is also important to know the *content* of the coverage being communicated to the target audience. It is possible to receive a high volume of damning coverage which would not be to the benefit of the party.

7.6.1 Media Messages about the ANC

The messages communicated via media had the effect of contrasting the strengths of the ANC as the governing party with the weaknesses of opposition parties, largely because of the coverage of President Mbeki's views given in his weekly newsletter. Much of the media's coverage of the ANC focused on events and "walk-about" of high-profile ANC leaders. These events often involved miscellaneous messages about the optimism of South Africans and the importance of voting. Messages issued by the ANC, such as its contribution to overcoming apartheid; achievements in office; plans for fulfilling stated goals and its unique strength, experience and commitment to dealing with challenges facing South Africa, were not highlighted. However, the media echoed some of the ANC's intended campaign messages. The following key themes emerged from the analysis of the media's coverage of the ANC's campaign:

- It was a given that the ANC would win by a wide majority;

- The ANC wanted to reassure “minority” voters;
- The ANC acknowledged its shortcomings; and
- The ANC had scathing views of opposition parties, primarily the DA and the IFP;

Numerous media reports emphasized the fact that a resounding ANC victory was assured and that it would win the election by a wide margin.⁸⁴ Many articles were, as a matter of course, prefaced with statements such as “It is a given that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) will again win easily on April 14”⁸⁵ or “with the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) dominance assured, opposition parties have been left to fight among themselves over the scraps, with little chance of making significant inroads into ANC support”.⁸⁶ While such statements later proved to have been accurate predictions, it is likely that they enhanced ANC’s campaign.

ANC leaders managed to generate a substantial amount of media coverage. Much of the coverage focused on reporting of public events about President Mbeki and other senior ANC leaders. News coverage of an accessible and responsive president meeting his fellow citizens and listening to their concerns communicated a powerful message that capitalized on Thabo Mbeki’s rising trust ratings in opinion polls (Lodge, 2005:118).

While some reports did cover President Mbeki’s views on poverty⁸⁷, by and large the media gave scant attention to the content of the ANC’s existing or proposed policies. An important feature of the ANC’s campaign that did receive media attention was its acknowledgement of the shortcomings of its performance.⁸⁸ Reports covered ANC Secretary General, Kgalema Motlanthe, indicating that the campaign of the ANC would “involve admitting some of the difficulties of the past ten years”.⁸⁹ Another report cited Mbeki indicating that there would be “massive changes to the structure, powers,

⁸⁴ See for example Election campaign winds down. News24.com, 12 April 2004.

⁸⁵ See for example Exclusive: ANC wins. Business Day, 6 April 2004.

⁸⁶ See for example ANC win sure, Western Cape and KwaZulu up for grabs, DA’s future on line. Business Day, 13 April 2004.

⁸⁷ See for example Poverty the issue – Mbeki. News24.com, 19 March 2004 and Mbeki: SA will tackle poverty in the next decade. Mail and Guardian, 19 March 2004.

⁸⁸ See for example ANC needs to work harder: Mbeki. IOL, March 11 2004.

⁸⁹ See for example ANC goes for a ‘three-thirds’ majority. City Press, 14 March 2004.

functioning and financing of local government” because he had “come face-to-face with the load of work that local governments carried” and seen that “they did not have the manpower, finances and other logistical resources to fulfill their functions”.⁹⁰

The media covered the ANC’s portrayal of itself as a political home for all and the reassurance of minority voters. For example, President Mbeki was quoted as stating that he “had not realised the extent of the poverty among the poor sections of the white community”.⁹¹ In response to rumours about extending his term of office and amending the constitution, Mbeki was cited as saying that “the African National Congress would not seek to change the constitution even if it won a two-thirds majority in the elections.”⁹² Reports also discounted rumours that President Mbeki might want to spend a third term as the President of South Africa⁹³ and refuted the idea that the ANC would change the constitution for that purpose.⁹⁴ Assurances given by Archbishop Desmond Tutu about safeguards to prevent a slide towards authoritarianism also received news coverage.⁹⁵

A considerable proportion of media coverage related to the ANC’s views of opposition parties, primarily the DA and the IFP. The ANC’s weekly newsletter *ANC Today* received a considerable amount of attention, with a focus primarily given on antagonistic issues such as confrontations with the DA and the IFP.

Several newspapers provided coverage of President Mbeki’s views regarding the coalition between the DA and the IFP as ‘right-wing’ coalition’⁹⁶. They cited President Mbeki as having launched a scathing attack on the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party. Reports quoted President Mbeki saying that “the DA’s predecessor, the

⁹⁰ See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004

⁹¹ See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004

⁹² See for example ANC not planning a third term — Mbeki, Business Day, 8 March 2004.

⁹³ See for example ‘King Thabo’ says he won’t stand for a third term. Mail and Guardian, 24 March 2004; Mandela defends Mbeki on third term rumours. IOL, 4 April 2004 and Third term ‘never discussed’ News24.com, 2 April 2004.

⁹⁴ See for example ‘ANC has no plans to change constitution’ IOL, March 07 2004 and ANC ‘won’t touch constitution’ News 24.com, 13 April 2004.

⁹⁵ See for example Tutu allays fears about ANC win. Mail and Guardian, 13 April 2004.

⁹⁶ See for example Mbeki blasts DA, IFP. News24.com, 26 March 2004.

Democratic Party, displaced the New National Party as the official opposition in 1999 "by appeasing and absorbing much of the white right wing, which felt that the NNP had betrayed it by working to transform itself into a party working for the construction of a non-racial democracy". The article concludes with Mbeki saying that "We have an intelligent electorate. I have no doubt that it has the capacity to see the reality behind the disguise of seemingly seductive words."⁹⁷ Another newspaper article under the title "DA-IFP an 'apartheid alliance', says Mbeki", reported President Mbeki's claims that the DA and IFP constituted a "Coalition for backward change" that would bring back the conflicts and tensions of the past.⁹⁸ Other reports listed him as saying that "the Inkatha Freedom Party-Democratic Alliance coalition was nothing but a conspiracy to retain apartheid privilege"⁹⁹ and that voters would decide the fate of this "right-wing coalition".¹⁰⁰ An additional media report stated that President Thabo Mbeki launched a scathing attack on the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party and that Mbeki accused the IFP of siding with various rightwing groupings to protect "white interests".¹⁰¹

The bitter interactions between the ANC and the IFP were further highlighted in the print media due the prominent legal battle between Chief Buthelezi, as the Minister of Home affairs, and President Mbeki regarding controversial immigration regulations in which Mbeki authorized Chief Buthelezi to be held personally liable for costs of a Cape High Court battle between the two.¹⁰² Newspaper reports highlighted the conflict between the two party's leaders saying that President Thabo Mbeki has, once again, taken off the kid gloves and laid bare-fisted into Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party. The reports cited Mbeki as saying that "the IFP was the primary non-state perpetrator of gross human rights abuse" and had "collaborated with the apartheid regime". The report added that Mbeki borrowed the descriptions from the Truth and Reconciliation

⁹⁷ See for example Mbeki: Coalition for Change is 'right-wing'. Mail and Guardian, 26 March 2004.

⁹⁸ See for example Mbeki attacks 'right-wing' coalition. IOL, 26 March 2004

⁹⁹ See for example DA-IFP an 'apartheid alliance', says Mbeki. Saturday Star, 26 March 2004

¹⁰⁰ See for example Mbeki attacks 'right-wing' coalition. IOL, 26 March 2004

¹⁰¹ See for example Mbeki blasts DA, IFP. News24, March 26, 2004

¹⁰² See for example Make Buthelezi pay, says Mbeki. News24, 5 April 2004

Commission (TRC) report to make the point that the IFP had always been a common denominator in violence.¹⁰³

Regarding political intolerance, the print media cited David Makhura ANC party provincial secretary in KwaZulu/Natal saying that “we are convinced that there are organized individuals within the IFP trying to stop the ANC from campaigning.”¹⁰⁴ A report in the Mail and Guardian indicated that the ANC had laid 20 charges of intimidation, assault and disruption of political events primarily against the IFP in KwaZulu/Natal.¹⁰⁵ Reports cited President Mbeki accusing the IFP leadership of “directly orchestrating the intimidation of campaigning political opponents.”¹⁰⁶ At the same time, President Mbeki promised that “the talk of violence in KwaZulu/Natal will cease if the African National Congress took the province” in the election.¹⁰⁷

Another message carried by the media was the ANC’s view that opposition parties were simply interested in obtaining votes from people. Pallo Jordan asserted after the opening of parliament that “while the DA complains of the ANC’s hunger for power, it is equally hungry to monopolize opposition politics”.¹⁰⁸ Reports cited President Mbeki urging voters at a rally to not vote for “silly parties” like the DA, NNP or ACDP and quoted him as saying that “No other party can solve the problems of this country”¹⁰⁹.

The print media also covered the message that the DA was using the ANC to obtain media attention. The exchanges regarding the DA’s request for a televised debate with President Mbeki were covered by the media. The ANC was cited as saying that “The ANC has never needed to, nor ever will, ask the DA for help in profiling our leaders. Why should we accede to their request to profile theirs?”¹¹⁰ ANC spokesperson,

¹⁰³ See for example Mbeki attacks Buthelezi. Weekend Argus, 2 April 2004

¹⁰⁴ See for example ANC says the IFP isn’t playing fair. Mail and Guardian, 17 March 2004.

¹⁰⁵ See for example ANC has laid 20 charges I run-up to elections. Mail and Guardian, 5 April 2004

¹⁰⁶ See for example Mbeki turns heat on IFP/DA. News24, April 2, 2004

¹⁰⁷ See for example ANC victory in KZN will end violence: Mbeki. Mail and Guardian, 18 March 2004

¹⁰⁸ See for example SA’s opposition: monkey biz? City Press, 15 February 2004

¹⁰⁹ See for example Don’t vote for ‘silly parties’ says Mbeki, Mail and Guardian, 22 March 2004 and IOL, 22 March 2004.

Dumisani Makhaye, was also quoted as saying that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial ANC branch invited the leader of the Democratic Alliance to a public debate on national radio or television with "any branch member of his choice" from the ANC or its youth or women's leagues.¹¹¹

President Mbeki's views regarding the campaign strategies of opposition parties were also covered by the media. In a media report entitled "Mbeki: Opposition wants it black and white", IOL, 9 April 2004, President Mbeki was cited as having launched a stinging attack on his political opponents in his last weekly website newsletter ahead of the elections. Mbeki, according to the IOL report, stated that "One of the central issues that will face the electorate will be to decide whether we want to conduct ourselves as a diverse but united nation, or prefer to divide ourselves into polarised and competing political, ethnic and racial factions". Another report quoted him saying that the opposition "created all manner of scarecrows intended to terrify the people about the prospect of a decisive ANC victory".¹¹²

The media also reported on the fact that the ANC viewed the opposition as being weak because their aim was simply to oppose the ANC or be the opposition. President Mbeki is cited as saying that "if you want to be the opposition you have already been defeated."¹¹³ Reports cite him saying that "The DA says it is the largest party that represents national minorities. What is that? This should not be a factor of pride, but of shame. Why are they not representing the people of South Africa?"¹¹⁴ Reports also cited President Mbeki as saying that "cutting the ANC down to size" was the sole aim of the opposition".¹¹⁵

Reports covered President Mbeki commenting on the optimism of voters in the country. He was quoted as saying he was surprised by the enthusiasm shown in all communities

¹¹⁰ See for example Mbeki is running away from voters' IOL, 17 February 2004

¹¹¹ See for example Anytime, anywhere, ANC tells Leon. Mail and Guardian, 17 February 2004

¹¹² See for example 'Voters will not be swayed' News24.com, 5 March 2004.

¹¹³ See for example Battle for control of KZN heats up. The Mercury, 5 April 2004

¹¹⁴ See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004

¹¹⁵ See for example Mbeki: Opposition wants it black and white. IOL, 9 April 2004

for the election, and in people's confidence in the country's future and the government.”¹¹⁶ Reports also covered Nelson Mandela campaigning activities, in particular his endorsement of Thabo Mbeki's performance as the president of the ANC and South Africa.¹¹⁷ ANC messages appealing to voters, particularly the youth¹¹⁸, to cast their ballot¹¹⁹ and stressing the importance of voting were also covered by media reports.¹²⁰ Other reports focused on the importance of having free and fair elections with reports of President Mbeki appealing for “all South Africans to ensure the election is genuinely free and fair”.¹²¹

7.6.2 Media Messages about the DA

A considerable proportion of the media coverage of the DA related to the ANC's views of it, particularly its relationship to the IFP. As indicated earlier, attacks on the DA conducted via the ANC's weekly newsletter *ANC Today* received a substantial amount of media attention. The more sensational and confrontational components of their campaign featured prominently in the media. The media gave limited attention to the DA's plans and policy proposals, however, much of the coverage of the DA's campaign messages did echo messages which the DA itself sought to communicate to voters. Media coverage highlighted the DA's messages that:

- The DA had experienced significant growth since 1994 and would perform well in the election;
- It was necessary to create a stronger and more efficient opposition and simultaneously reduce the power of the ANC;
- The ANC was inefficient, lacked integrity and had performed poorly;

¹¹⁶ See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004

¹¹⁷ See for example Mandela puts shoulder to ANC wheel in KwaZulu. Business Day, 7 April 2004; Madiba mobbed, News24.com, 6 April 2004; Madiba draws crowds, News24.com, 6 April 2004 and Mandela lobbies for the ANC, News24.com, 6 April 2004.

¹¹⁸ See for example Forget kwaito and vote – Mbeki. Cape Argus, 1 April 2004.

¹¹⁹ See for example Zuma: Vote in your millions. News24.com, 6 April 2004.

¹²⁰ See for example Madiba: With freedom comes responsibility. IOL, 5 April 2004

¹²¹ See for example Battle for control of KZN heats up. The Mercury, 1 April 2004

- Other opposition parties lacked competence and workable policies as well as the capacity to challenge the ANC;
- The DA had strengthened its position through its alliance with the IFP; and
- It had a series of workable policies to deal with the key challenges facing South Africa.

Media reports highlighted the DA's message that it would perform well in the elections¹²². One report cited Tony Leon as saying that "millions of people, all across SA, are going to cast their votes for the Democratic Alliance" and that they had grown significantly between 1994 and 2004"¹²³ Other reports highlighted the view that the DA's support predictions were unrealistic¹²⁴

A key message of the DA's campaign which received coverage from the media was the call for voters to help them create a stronger and more efficient opposition by reducing the power of the ANC. ¹²⁵ Tony Leon indicated that the goal of the DA was to unite and strengthen the opposition via the voters: "We are not talking about unifying every political party that springs up because somebody wants a political movement. It is absolutely critical for the democratic health of this country that we have the strongest, most united and powerful opposition that we can at national level..."¹²⁶ Media reports cited Tony Leon at a rally in Mpumalanga urging voters to not vote for the ANC. According to the report, he was quoted as saying "I have a message for black South Africans today. You are not obliged to vote for the ANC. You do not owe the ANC your vote. You owe your vote to one person only, yourself. If the political party fails you, then you have the right to give your vote to another party".¹²⁷ Douglas Gibson told reporters in Johannesburg it was important to have a strong opposition "to cut the government

¹²² See for example Leon counts on rural support. Business Day, 8 April 2004.

¹²³ See for example DA offers hope of a better SA, Business Day, 3 March 2004 and Vindication or the scrapheap for opposition DA. Business Day, 13 April 2004

¹²⁴ See for example Support claims 'unrealistic'. News24.com, 26 March 2004.

¹²⁵ See for example DA calls on voters to unite opposition. Business Day, 30 March 2004.

¹²⁶ See for example Mbeki: Opposition wants it black and white. IOL, 9 April 2004

¹²⁷ See for example Leon uses Mandela inaugural speech to explain DA policy. Cape Times, 7 April 2004.

down to size”.¹²⁸ Tony Leon, according to media report, said “we want to co-govern at the provincial level in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape; we want to roll back the power of the ANC at the national level.”¹²⁹ In another report Tony Leon warned that “April 14 is the time when the voice of the South African people must be heard. If the voice of the South African people is not heard on this occasion, it might never be heard again because the ANC (African National Congress) will grow to believe that they may rule without listening to the South African people”¹³⁰

Media reports also highlighted the DA’s accusation that the ANC lacked integrity and was lying to the South African public¹³¹. One report noted Douglas Gibson’s comments that the ANC was willing to change the constitution for “short-term political considerations”¹³². Tony Leon was cited by media reports as saying that “human rights are not fundamental for President Thabo Mbeki, but flexible depending on the political interests and allegiances of the ANC because he “sides with oppressors like Saddam Hussein and Mugabe against their people”.¹³³ Reports also covered the Democratic Alliance “hitting out” at the ANC regarding allegations that they may have benefited from a private oil deal with the government of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.¹³⁴ Leon was also cited by media reports as accusing President Mbeki of “deliberate distortions” in a “bizarre historical account” devoid of truth as well as saying that “South Africans are tired of this two-faced, childish approach to politics.”¹³⁵ Other reports listed him as saying that he “misrepresents his opponents, mischaracterises their motives and maligns their integrity” and that “there is nothing so calculated to polarise the people of South Africa as the idea that anyone who disagrees with the ANC is seeking to divide the

¹²⁸ See for example DA 'bullish' about election SAPA, News24 29 March 2004

¹²⁹ See for example Leon predicts up to 30% of vote for DA, IFP. Mail and Guardian, 16 March 2004.

¹³⁰ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority'. IOL, 4 April 2004

¹³¹ See for example The ANC's five big lies by Tony Leon. IOL, March 05 2004 and Leon: ANC tells 5 big lies, News24.com, 5 March 2004.

¹³² See for example ANC 'not tied to constitution' News24.com, 12 March 2004.

¹³³ See for example Mbeki has become Mugabe's best friend' Mail and Guard, 22 March 2004

¹³⁴ See for example DA demands answers on ANC/Iraq oil link. IOL, 26 February 2004

¹³⁵ See for example DA-IFP an 'apartheid alliance', says Mbeki. Saturday Star, 26 March 2004

country and to re-impose a system of apartheid on its people.”¹³⁶

Reports cited the DA’s assertion that Mbeki’s refusal to conduct a televised debate between him and Tony Leon was a sign of arrogance and unaccountability.¹³⁷ According to reports, DA chief whip Douglas Gibson said the refusal was a sign of growing presidential arrogance, disregard for the democratic process, and disrespect for the people. “It is only Thabo Mbeki who does not have the time, or the courage, to engage in public debate. By running away from a debate with Tony Leon, Mbeki is running away from the voters of South Africa...”¹³⁸

The media reported on the DA’s “ANC Cards of Shame” – which featured candidates who had “set back the fight against Aids, upheld human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, misused public funds and enriched themselves through the abuse of their public positions”. Douglas Gibson, cited reports, said that the “cards represent an overwhelming moral corruption within the ranks of the ANC”. President Thabo Mbeki appeared as the Ace of Hearts as “the leader of the Aids denialists in the ANC” and Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang as Queen of Hearts because she is a “committed Aids denialist and flouter of court orders”.¹³⁹ The DA also took pains to point out that the ANC was not committed to multiparty democracy. In particular, Jacob Zuma’s statement that “the ANC will rule South Africa until Jesus comes back” raised the wrath of the DA.¹⁴⁰ According to reports, the DA’s national chairperson, Joe Seremane, indicated that such a statement implied that it will be in power forever," and “raised serious questions about the ANC's understanding of, and commitment to, liberal democracy in South Africa”. He argued that it “is the language of a one-party state” and that “a government may enjoy a majority of popular support, but unless it is willing to allow the opposition to come to power through the ballot box, then it is a dictatorship not a democracy” and

¹³⁶ See for example Mbeki wants it black and white. IOL, 9 April 2004

¹³⁷ See for example Top ANC leader enters fray over debate with DA: Refusal called sign of ‘presidential arrogance’ Business Day, 18 February 2004.

¹³⁸ See for example Mbeki is ‘running away’ from voters. Mail and Guardian, 16 February 2004

¹³⁹ See for example DA launches ‘ANC cards of shame’ IOL, 10 April 2004

therefore “emphasised the importance of the opposition doing well in this election”.¹⁴¹

Media reports emphasized Tony Leon’s assault on Mbeki. He was quoted as saying “My problem with Mbeki is that he does not practice at home what he preaches abroad and this doesn't reflect very well on someone who flits the world stage preaching about multiparty competition. Mbeki helps me with the voters.” He was also quoted as saying that “He makes it easier for me. With Nelson Mandela, his embraces made it more difficult - taking him on was like a betrayal of friendship. There is no such thing with Mbeki - he just makes his own life difficult.”¹⁴² Tony Leon was also cited as labeling Mbeki “a ruthless hypocrite” to accuse the IFP of intolerance “because “the ANC is the most intolerant party across the whole of South Africa” and that “the DA had been on the receiving end of ANC abuse and disruption”.¹⁴³

An additional DA critique of the ANC, evident in media coverage was that the ANC had weak policies, that they had performed poorly since coming into power and that they had failed South Africa in a number of key areas.¹⁴⁴ Media reports cited Tony Leon as having told voters at a rally that he agreed with the ANC's election slogan “Only the ANC can deliver...it had delivered eight million people without jobs, 22,5 million people living in poverty, a quarter of a million people murdered in the last decade, and five to seven million people infected with HIV and AIDS”.¹⁴⁵ Reports also covered the DA’s assertion that the government’s black economic empowerment policies had only benefited a small elite.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ See for example Zuma must apologise for Jesus comment – DA. IOL, March 15 2004.

¹⁴¹ See for example DA wants 'offensive' Zuma to apologise. Mail and Guardian, 16 March 2004 and Zuma's comment offends DA. SAPA, Media24, 15 March 2004.

¹⁴² See for example Scent of blood in air as opposition gears up. Sunday Independent, 4 April 2004

¹⁴³ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority'. IOL, 4 April 2004

¹⁴⁴ See for example DA, ANC clash over SA’s job losses. Business Day, 7 April 2004; Leon hits overdrive ahead of poll battle, Business Day, 9 February 2004 and Opposition attacks ANC policies, Business Day, 11 February 2004.

¹⁴⁵ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority'. IOL, 4 April 2004 and Election campaign winds down.news24. 12 April 2004

¹⁴⁶ See for example Empowerment fails millions — DA. Business Day, 24 March 2004.

Another central DA campaign message highlighted by media was that other opposition parties lacked the capacity to deal with South Africa's problems and to tackle the ANC. Media reports featured Tony Leon as saying that Van Schalkwyk was the "most dishonourable figure in South African politics". According to the report he said "Somehow, I think Marthinus van Schalkwyk is nearing the end of his political career. He is not a leader; he is a loser".¹⁴⁷ He was also quoted as saying that "voters will judge the New National Party which had "betrayed the voters" by "climbing into bed" with the African National Congress.¹⁴⁸ Speaking at the DA's final Western Cape election rally, Tony Leon, according to reports, declared that since the ANC-NNP alliance had taken over, the province had developed "the worst and the fastest-growing crime situation in the country" and that "ANC and NNP rule in the Western Cape had been like the locust years - lost opportunities, bloated government and stalled delivery". According to the report, he added that "The voters of this province [the Western Cape] will never forget that Marthinus van Schalkwyk and the NNP sold out the people of the Western Cape".¹⁴⁹ Another article reported on him taking Marthinus van Schalkwyk to task for election promises he was making to voters.¹⁵⁰ The DA featured Marthinus van Schalkwyk as the Joker on their cards of shame saying that he qualified for this position by virtue of "being in bed with the ANC".¹⁵¹ Reports covered Douglas Gibson calling the NNP "a Maltese poodle begging for scraps at the African National Congress's table" and saying that "Van Schalkwyk is not credible with the voters" because he turned his back on the mandate he got from them "in exchange for a few perks and positions".¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ See for example Van Schalkwyk is a loser, says Leon. IOL, 1 April 2004

¹⁴⁸ See for example Voters will judge NNP - says DA. News24, 9 April 2004 and Sparks fly between Gibson and De Lille. Cape Argus, 2 March 2004.

¹⁴⁹ **See for example** Tony Leon stirs up a hornets' nest. Mail and Guardian.,9 April 2004

¹⁵⁰ See for example Leon slams Van Schalkwyk's pie in the sky. Mail and Guardian, 11 Mar 2004

¹⁵¹ See for example DA launches 'ANC cards of shame' IOL,10 April 2004

¹⁵² See for example DA hits back at 'Maltese poodle' Mail and Guardian, 4 April 2004

A considerable amount of DA media coverage related to the ID.¹⁵³ Douglas Gibson was reported as saying that the ID was a “one-woman show” that “voters have never heard of anyone other than Patricia De Lille” and the ID had no properly researched, comprehensive, coherent policy platform to offer, and no significant structures or leadership across South Africa”. Athol Trollip was also reported as saying that “Patricia De Lille is the beginning and the end of the ID party... She must grow up and know that we are in an election campaign now -and she must realise that going to parliament is no easy walk”.¹⁵⁴ Reports said that “in a no-more-Mr-Nice-Guy statement on Wednesday, the DA said the Independent Democrats leader... had been getting a “free ride” ahead of the elections, with no other party attacking her.¹⁵⁵ Gibson now provided a short list of De Lille's "misdemeanours", dating back to 1993.¹⁵⁶ Media reports also indicated that Helen Suzman said at a DA fund raiser that “those party faithfuls that felt attracted to De Lille should note that she offered little substance and she did not have an enthusiastic constituency”.¹⁵⁷ Tony Leon was also quoted as saying that he was “amazed at the fetishisation of De Lille by the media”.¹⁵⁸ The DA also accused ID leader Patricia De Lille of being a “political chameleon” and the ID of being a “tiny” party hell-bent on being an “opposition to the opposition”.¹⁵⁹ Reports also covered the DA dismissing claims by Patricia De Lille that the ID could win 10% of the national vote, with DA director of strategy Ryan Coetzee quoted as saying that this was a “fantasy” and that she was “desperate to convince disbelieving voters that her party will amount to something after the election”.¹⁶⁰

The DA received media coverage of the message that it had a series of workable policies that would deal with South Africa's social and economic problems. Reports cited Tony

¹⁵³ See for example De Lille 'won't last the pace' News24.com, 25 March 2004.

¹⁵⁴ See for example DA ad defames De Lille: ID. SAPA, News24.com 16 April 2004

¹⁵⁵ See for example No more free ride for De Lille: DA. Mail and Guardian, 17 March 2004

¹⁵⁶ See for example Lay De Lille's 'racist' past bare, says DA. IOL, 18 March 2004.

¹⁵⁷ See for example De Lille: Suzman was a minority of minorities. Mail and Guardian 26 March 2004

¹⁵⁸ See for example Scent of blood in air as opposition gears up. Sunday Independent, 4 April 2004

¹⁵⁹ See for example Size does matter, at least for the DA and ID. Business Day, 7 April 2004

¹⁶⁰ See for example DA snubs ID prediction. www.News24.com. 8 April 2004

Leon's plan to "put together a workable alternative to the government and challenge them for power in the next election".¹⁶¹ Reports cited Tony Leon as saying that the DA "had policies which would work in curbing the country's high levels of unemployment, crime, HIV and Aids, poverty and corruption if they were brought into power".¹⁶² Another article reports him as saying that "the DA would use its growing power to push for strong alternatives to the government's failed policies".¹⁶³ A report on Tony Leon's visit to Atlantis in Cape Town cited him as giving a detailed explanation as to how the DA would create jobs in the area.¹⁶⁴

Finally, the message that the DA had strengthened its position through its alliance with the IFP also received news coverage. Tony Leon was quoted as saying that "there were only two forces in the election: the Coalition for Change and ANC with its NNP ally".¹⁶⁵ Reports cited him asserting that "Together, the Coalition for Change will save KwaZulu-Natal from the dead hand of ANC control. Together, we will save South Africa from becoming a one party state... Working together, we can turn KwaZulu-Natal into a South African success story, so much better than the failures presided over by the ANC."¹⁶⁶ He was further quoted as saying that "the real majority wanted the ANC to have less power, not more" and that the Coalition for Change "was laying the foundation for a new majority in KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa".¹⁶⁷ Reports also covered Tony Leon defending the IFP's Growth and Development Plan (GDP), saying that "there is nothing offensive" about it. Reports quoted him saying that he was not subjected to any lack of tolerance by the IFP, but that the intimidation he received from the ANC made "anything the IFP does look like small beer."¹⁶⁸ Reports cited Tony Leon asserting that voters

¹⁶¹ See for example Leon: 'We need to unite the opposition'. Cape Argus, 30 March 2004

¹⁶² See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority'. IOL, 4 April 2004

¹⁶³ See for example DA-IFP an 'apartheid alliance', says Mbeki. Saturday Star, 26 March 2004

¹⁶⁴ See for example Leon slams Van Schalkwyk's pie in the sky. Mail and Guardian, 11 Mar 2004

¹⁶⁵ See for example Van Schalkwyk is a loser, says Leon. IOL, 1 April 2004

¹⁶⁶ **See for example** Battle for control of KZN heats up. The Mercury, 5 April 2004

¹⁶⁷ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority'. IOL, 4 April 2004

¹⁶⁸ See for example Scent of blood in air as opposition gears up. Sunday Independent, 4 April 2004

should take power back by voting for the DA”.¹⁶⁹

7.6.3 Media Messages about the IFP

The IFP received some policy-oriented coverage; however, the media did not give much exposure to IFP’s events for example the IFP’s launch in Durban.¹⁷⁰ Reports about the IFP focused primarily on the public altercations between Chief Buthelezi and President Mbeki. Some of the coverage of the IFP’s campaign messages did echo messages which the IFP itself sought to communicate to voters. Media coverage highlighted the following IFP messages:

- That it was important for voters to cast their ballot;
- That the IFP issued a series of pledges at the end of March;
- The IFP’s assertion that KwaZulu/Natal was in a better position than other provinces due to the leadership of the IFP;
- The IFP’s contention that the ANC had performed poorly and that it had failed South Africa, particularly in dealing with HIV and AIDS;
- The ANC’s views that the IFP had a right-wing coalition with the DA and Chief Buthelezi’s views regarding the importance of and reasons for the coalition; as well as
- The conflict between Chief Buthelezi and President Mbeki.

In several of his campaign speeches, Chief Buthelezi implored voters to cast their ballot. This received some media coverage. One report quoted him saying that “the needs of the country’s citizens had been ignored by politicians who had grown detached from the majority. April 14 is the time when the voice of the South African people must be heard. If the voice of the South African people is not heard on this occasion, it might never be heard again because the ANC will grow to believe that they may rule without listening to

¹⁶⁹ See for example Van Schalkwyk is a loser, says Leon. IOL, 1 April 2004

¹⁷⁰ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

the South African people.”¹⁷¹

The series of pledges released by the IFP at the end of March received coverage from the news media.¹⁷² Reports indicated that the party had developed five “common-sense” proposals - each of which addressed key issues in its election campaign. One report indicated that five election issues were: HIV/AIDS, poverty, unemployment, corruption and crime, along with job creation.¹⁷³

The message of the IFP that KwaZulu/Natal was in a better position than other provinces due to the leadership of the IFP was picked up in media reports. Buthelezi was quoted as saying that the province had already made greater progress than other provinces in spite of the fact that “the IFP-led government of this province had been undermined and frustrated by the ANC.”¹⁷⁴ The IFP’s specific plans for KwaZulu/Natal were also highlighted.¹⁷⁵ Chief Buthelezi was quoted as saying that the “Growth and development blueprint for KwaZulu-Natal” would put the province on the road to success and prosperity. Reports cite Buthelezi as saying that the IFP provincial government would also ensure its budget was used to stimulate economic growth which would cut through the “structural conditions” that produced large-scale poverty.¹⁷⁶

The message that the ANC had performed poorly and had failed South Africa in the areas of HIV/AIDS, corruption, crime, unemployment and poverty also received media coverage.¹⁷⁷ A media report quoted Buthelezi as saying: “It is also for the South African people to judge whether the same leaders who have thus far handled the HIV/Aids crisis should continue to be relied upon in dealing with the greatest tragedy, emergency and

¹⁷¹ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority' IOL, 4 April 2004

¹⁷² See for example How the IFP plans to rub out crime. IOL, March 23 2004

¹⁷³ See for example IFP pledges to 'make work' News24, 20 March 2004 and IFP says govt has failed twice. News24, 23 March 2004

¹⁷⁴ See for example Buthelezi: Give me an outright win. IOL, 29 March 2004

¹⁷⁵ See for example IFP has big plans for KZN if... News24.com, 29 March 2004.

¹⁷⁶ See for example Buthelezi: Give me an outright win. IOL, 29 March 2004

¹⁷⁷ See for example Buthelezi slams 'decade of hunger'. IOL, February 15 2004 and Election campaign winds down.news24. 12 April 2004

disaster our country and our people have ever faced, the social and economic consequences of which are beyond our worst nightmares. I do not think there are enough words to express how deeply hurt I feel for the cavalier way and almost criminal neglect with which our government has dealt with the lives, deaths and suffering of hundreds and thousands of our people. We are all infected or affected by HIV/Aids and yet government policies have not registered the dramatic and imperative nature of this emergency".¹⁷⁸ Reports cited him saying that he was insulted by the government using announcements about antiretroviral drugs for election purposes.¹⁷⁹ Reports also quoted Buthelezi saying that AIDS is the ANC's "Achilles' heel"¹⁸⁰ and covered his criticism of the announcement by the ANC government a week before elections to provide free anti-retroviral drugs.¹⁸¹ According to the report he criticized the rollout delay and said that "the programme would be rolled out in its fully fledged form only in one year". And according to another report Chief Buthelezi said that the "government action has been trapped in a syndrome of denial which has not moved us forward. Many South Africans have accepted that our country may remain a mediocre one, and feel that there is nothing that can be done in the next elections to solve the problems of HIV/Aids, crime, poverty, unemployment and corruption".¹⁸² Reports noted Buthelezi's assertion that the onus was on voters to vote the ANC out of power so that these issues could be dealt with.¹⁸³

The IFP received negative media coverage regarding its alliance with the DA. Initial reports highlighted Buthelezi's statements that the floor-crossing legislation had forced him into forming an election pact with the Democratic Alliance.¹⁸⁴ Reports then focused on President Mbeki's assertion that the IFP had joined in a right-wing coalition with the DA.¹⁸⁵ Chief Buthelezi's views regarding the coalition were also presented in the media. He was quoted as saying that he had formed the Coalition for Change with Tony Leon's

¹⁷⁸ See for example Buthelezi blasts ANC on a range of issues. Cape Argus, 4 March 2004

¹⁷⁹ See for example Buthelezi slams late promises. News24.com, 23 March 2004.

¹⁸⁰ See for example Aids is the ANC's Achilles' Heel, says IFP. IOL, March 08 2004

¹⁸¹ See for example Buthelezi blasts ANC's Aids drug rollout. IOL, February 21 2004

¹⁸² See for example No party must get more than 50% - Buthelezi. SAPA, IOL, 20 March 2004

¹⁸³ See for example SA's 5 crises 'up to voters' News24.com, 16 March 2004.

¹⁸⁴ See for example IFP slams third term for Mbeki. News24, 9 February 2004

¹⁸⁵ See for example ANC Today, Volume 4, No.12 • 26 March—1 April 2004

Democratic Alliance so that the electorate would have a choice “between having five more years of the same, and the hope of a new beginning”.¹⁸⁶ In one report he is cited as saying that “he had begun the policy and politics of coalition by developing the Coalition for Change with the Democratic Alliance (DA) “to show how different political parties can work together on the basis of a similar commitment to development, development, development”.¹⁸⁷ According to another, he said that South Africans all faced the same problems and that they had formed the alliance to put the economy on an accelerated growth path.¹⁸⁸ He was also quoted as saying that “the coalition was not opportunistic”.¹⁸⁹

Media reports noted the IFP’s initial attempts at diplomacy towards the ANC. One report argued that Buthelezi “seemed to steer clear of direct attacks on the African National Congress government, but opted rather to couch his criticism in diplomatic terms”.¹⁹⁰ Buthelezi was quoted in early February as saying that it was “regrettable that Mbeki had failed to properly address the challenges” facing South Africa.¹⁹¹ But as the campaign period wore on, and the IFP responded more and more to the ANC, media reports rapidly highlighted the growing animosity between the IFP and the ANC and in particular between its two leaders. The harsh exchanges between the ANC and the IFP became a common feature in the media with one report saying that relations between the two parties had “reached rock bottom” and another referring to the “growing tensions” between the parties.¹⁹² One report quoted Communist Party secretary-general Blade Nzimande as saying that “there is no bigger a political dinosaur than a bantustan leader”.¹⁹³ Media coverage also highlighted the legal battle between Buthelezi, and President Mbeki regarding immigration regulations.

¹⁸⁶ See for example Buthelezi blasts ANC on a range of issues. Cape Argus, 4 March 2004

¹⁸⁷ See for example No party must get more than 50% - Buthelezi. SAPA, IOL, 20 March 2004

¹⁸⁸ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority' IOL, 4 April 2004

¹⁸⁹ See for example 'I am not a prophet' Mail and Guardian, 24 March 2004

¹⁹⁰ See for example Battle for control of KZN hots up. The Mercury, 5 April 2004

¹⁹¹ See for example IFP slams third term for Mbeki. News24, 9 February 2004

¹⁹² See for example 'IFP turned on ANC' www.news24.com, 11 April 2004. Buthelezi speaks his mind, news24.com, 31 March 2004.

¹⁹³ See for example IFP turned on ANC' News24.com, 11 April 2004.

As indicated earlier, attacks on the IFP conducted via the ANC's weekly newsletter *ANC Today* received a substantial amount of media attention in particular President Mbeki's views of the IFP as an organization had tried to derail the negotiation process, engaged in human rights abuse and was still guilty of political intolerance. Newspaper reports highlighted Mbeki's positions on the IFP, who was described as the "primary non-state perpetrator of gross human rights abuse"¹⁹⁴, that had played a role in trying to derail the negotiation process¹⁹⁵. Media reports also covered the ANC's charge that the IFP was attempting to stop the ANC from campaigning.¹⁹⁶ Reports indicated that the ANC had laid several charges of intimidation, assault and disruption of political events against the IFP.¹⁹⁷ Reports also cited President Mbeki as accusing the IFP leadership of "directly orchestrating the intimidation of campaigning political opponents".¹⁹⁸

Reports also covered Chief Buthelezi's response to President Mbeki's views. According to a media report, Chief Buthelezi accused the ANC of being driven by ideology, saying it was too concerned with what political parties stood for instead of addressing the needs of South Africans.¹⁹⁹ Media reports also cited Chief Buthelezi as lambasting Mbeki for being an "ideologue and hypocrite who ducked real issues and harboured bizarre ideas on HIV and AIDS". Another report said he "heaped criticism on Mbeki" and quoted him as saying that "the ANC had chosen to run away from debating substantive and real issues facing the country".²⁰⁰ Another report quoted Buthelezi saying that Mbeki and the ANC had "resorted first to ideology and then to smear tactics, resuscitating the old campaign of lies and vilification".²⁰¹

¹⁹⁴ See for example Mbeki attacks Buthelezi. *Weekend Argus*, 2 April 2004

¹⁹⁵ See for example *ANC Today*, Volume 4, No.12 • 26 March—1 April 2004

¹⁹⁶ See for example ANC says the IFP isn't playing fair. *Mail and Guardian*, 17 March 2004.

¹⁹⁷ See for example IFP blamed as ANC activist is killed in KwaZulu-Natal, *Business Day*, 23 February Business Day and ANC has laid 20 charges I run-up to elections. *Mail and Guardian*, 5 April 2004

¹⁹⁸ See for example Mbeki turns heat on IFP/DA. *News24*, April 2, 2004

¹⁹⁹ See for example DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority' IOL, 4 April 2004

²⁰⁰ See for example Buthelezi lashes out at 'hypocrite' Mbeki. *The Mercury*, 6 April 2004

²⁰¹ See for example Buthelezi lashes out at 'hypocrite' Mbeki. *The Mercury*, 6 April 2004

7.6.4 Media Messages about the UDM

The extensive detail on policy positions of the UDM as set out in their election manifesto did not receive much media coverage. Instead, the messages relayed by the media focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of the ANC to the neglect of the UDM's own plans and policy preferences.

The media emphasized the following UDM messages to the electorate:

- The UDM's view that the ANC had failed South Africa in a number of key areas, in particular, unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS;
- The UDM's view that the ANC lacked integrity as illustrated by high levels of corruption and through President Mbeki's personal beliefs;
- The UDM's view that the ANC was a politically intolerant organisation; and
- The UDM's view that the ANC was simply interested in obtaining votes.

A key UDM campaign message that received media attention was that the ANC had failed South Africa in a number of key areas, in particular unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS²⁰². Party leader Bantu Holomisa was cited by the media as saying that "Cosatu had lost members because the ANC government had carried out policies which were detrimental to workers, making a handful of rich individuals richer".²⁰³ In line with the UDM's view that freedom depends on socio-economic conditions, Holomisa was quoted saying that "there could be no talk of real freedom for poor people in South Africa today" because "freedom from apartheid when you are imprisoned by poverty is not real freedom."²⁰⁴ Holomisa was cited as criticizing the ANC's economic policies, which he said had "not increased the size of the economic cake".²⁰⁵

²⁰² See for example Holomisa blasts 'recycled' ANC promises. IOL, February 21 2004

²⁰³ See for example Holomisa slams Cosatu. IOL, 20 March 2004

²⁰⁴ See for example Holomisa: Mbeki is still an Aids dissident. Mail and Guardian, 4 April 2004

²⁰⁵ See for example Smaller parties must choose'. Business Day, 29 March 2004

The UDM's critique of the ANC's performance in its response to HIV/AIDS also received media attention. Media reports indicated Holomisa said at a party rally in Umtata that "Thabo Mbeki is still an Aids dissident" and that "when Mbeki first took office in 1999 he asked the people of South Africa a "silly question" which was "who told you that HIV causes Aids?" and as a result the process of Aids-awareness education started by former president Nelson Mandela and then health minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma took a dive"²⁰⁶ He also questioned COSATU in this regard, saying that "the same Cosatu that claims to be concerned about HIV and AIDS asks workers to vote ANC. This would be a vote for an ANC whose president has disputed the link between HIV and AIDS, and who questions statistics that indicate how many of our people are dying of the pandemic".²⁰⁷

Another key message of the UDM communicated by the media was the view that the ANC lacked integrity and was not accountable. For example, Holomisa was quoted saying that "it was simply unacceptable" and "patently immoral"... "that a political organisation could have business interests in companies that benefited from government tenders". He was further quoted saying that "the youth of the country still wondered when the Umsombuvo Fund was going to start distributing the millions that lay dormant in its accounts."²⁰⁸ Other reports cited Holomisa's assertion that the ANC was abusing state resources for campaign purposes, it quoted him asking: "When will this looting of the country's resources by the ANC stop?"²⁰⁹

An additional message regarding the ANC's integrity related to the ANC's electoral promises. Holomisa was quoted by media reports as saying that "the agenda of political, social and economic freedom offered by the ANC was retrieved from the dustbin and recycled for campaign purposes".²¹⁰ Holomisa also described politics in the Western Cape as nauseating²¹¹, saying the ANC, DA and NNP had failed to deliver on their

²⁰⁶ See for example Holomisa: Mbeki is still an Aids dissident. Mail and Guardian, 4 April 2004

²⁰⁷ See for example Holomisa slams Cosatu. IOL, 20 March 2004

²⁰⁸ See for example Holomisa slams ANC's 'lack of accountability'. Mail and Guardian, 8 March 2004.

²⁰⁹ See for example 'ANC abusing govt resources' News24.com, 9 March 2004.

²¹⁰ See for example 'ANC promises empty' News24, 21 February 2004

promises and continued to campaign for votes on racial lines.²¹²

The UDM's charge that the ANC lacked tolerance towards other parties also received media attention. Reports outlined the UDM's formal complaint with the IEC that a group of ANC supporters violently disrupted a UDM rally and threatened members of the UDM.²¹³ Malizole Diko, the UDM premiership candidate in the Western Cape was quoted as saying that the UDM believed ANC members could be involved in a plot to intimidate voters and that he feared supporters of the ruling party could run amok at polling stations in several townships such as Samora Machel, Crossroads, Philippi, Nyanga, KTC and Langa.²¹⁴ According to another report, Diko called on the ANC leadership to "tighten the chains around their members when it comes to political tolerance".²¹⁵

The media also covered the UDM's assertion that the ANC was not genuinely concerned about voters and that the ANC was simply interested in obtaining votes from people. Holomisa was quoted saying that "as the elections are drawing nearer, the ANC is going through the convulsions of its political schizophrenia. We have all witnessed the two faces of the ANC. The one face of the ANC was the greedy expression of the Black Economic Empowerment that only gave opportunities to the few in the elite. This face was a careless sneer that pursues policies, which destroyed a million jobs, the stubborn frown that refused to deal with HIV/Aids. The other face of the ruling party was the smiling expression that promised job creation. This is an expression that professes concern about poverty, and the heroic expression that speaks of "the struggle" and "the revolution."²¹⁶ He was also quoted in another report as saying that "we know with certainty that after the election this promises will not be kept, because President Thabo Mbeki has already during the opening of Parliament said that nothing would change."²¹⁷

²¹¹ See for example SA politics is nauseating, says Holomisa. IOL, March 21 2004.

²¹² See for example Holomisa finds politics 'nauseating'. Mail and Guardian, 22 March 2004

²¹³ See for example UDM lodges complaint against ANC. Mail and Guardian, 29 March 2004

²¹⁴ See for example UDM fears ANC 'plot' to intimidate its voters. Cape Argus, 14 April 2004

²¹⁵ See for example UDM lodges complaint against ANC. Mail and Guardian, 29 March 2004

²¹⁶ See for example 'ANC promises empty' News24, 21 February 2004

²¹⁷ See for example 'ANC promises empty' News24, 21 February 2004

7.6.5 Media Messages about the ID

The ID managed to receive some media coverage on its aims and objectives as outlined in the party manifesto. Some of the ID coverage related to public events attended by Patricia De Lille.²¹⁸ Other coverage related to its conflict with the DA. Media coverage highlighted the following messages about the ID:

- That the ID was focused on creating a prosperous and united South Africa;
- That the ID' offered a principled and effective opposition party, distinct to other opposition parties;
- That the ID had grown and would perform well in the 2004 election;
- That the ID would not form political coalitions;
- That the ID would transcend racial politics;
- The ID's view that the ANC had performed poorly in dealing with the situation in Zimbabwe as well as HIV and AIDS in South Africa;
- the DA's message that the ID was a "one-woman show" which lacked the capacity to deal with South Africa's problems and to tackle the ANC; and
- The ID's response to the DA's negative campaign messages.

Reports indicated that the ID's manifesto focused on creating a prosperous and united South Africa with core priorities being the economy - especially job creation, poverty eradication, human security, HIV/AIDS and education.²¹⁹

The ID's attempt to distinguish itself from other parties also received media attention. De Lille was reported as saying that "The IDs manifesto is different from other political parties in that it is realistic, balanced and positive" and based "firmly on making the Constitution of South Africa a living document". She was cited as saying that other

²¹⁸See for example De Lille receives movie star welcome in KZN. Mail and Guardian, 2 April 2004.

²¹⁹See for example De Lille wants to bridge the gaps in society. IOL, 29 March 2004 and 'Bridge the divide': De Lille. News24, 29 March 2004 and De Lille a 'thorn' in executive sides: Independent democrats asks voters to take on corruption in April elections, Business Day, 1 March 2004.

features that distinguished the manifesto was an emphasis on women and child abuse as a major priority, a strong environmental approach, a holistic approach to society as well as a position on the arts and animal rights.²²⁰ De Lille also said that her party would serve the interests of those suffering from AIDS and that the ID cares about women and children.²²¹ De Lille was reported as saying that her party was “rocking the vote” by bringing a new, principled and effective voice to the country's troubled political landscape²²² and that unlike other parties had dedicated their energy into addressing issues such as corruption, HIV/AIDS and poverty.²²³ The ID also urged voters to let them be the reliable opposition “voice” in the battle against corruption and nepotism.²²⁴

Another key campaign message that received media coverage was the ID would perform well in the election. Reports indicated that the ID expected 10% to 12% of the vote nationally.²²⁵ Reports cited Lennit Max, the ID premiership candidate for the Western Cape, as saying that the ID would remove the DA as the official opposition. He was quoted as saying that “it is not the size of the dog in a fight - it is the size of the fight in that dog that matters”.²²⁶ Reports also quoted the ID's Eastern Cape provincial co-ordinator, Fred Darke's assertion that the party was getting stronger as well as his claim that in the Eastern Cape people were joining the party at a rate of between 250 and 600 members per day. He was also quoted as saying that the ID would make inroads into DA and UDM support in the province.²²⁷ Patricia De Lille was also quoted as saying that the ID was confident of obtaining five percent of the votes in KwaZulu/Natal.²²⁸ Another

²²⁰ See for example De Lille wants to bridge the gaps in society. IOL, 29 March 2004 and 'Bridge the divide': De Lille. News24, 29 March 2004

²²¹ See for example De Lille attacks Manto and Mugabe. The Star, 1 March 2004

²²² See for example ID expects 5% of KZN votes. Media24, 1 April 2004

²²³ See for example DA, ID clash over official opposition status after poll. Business Day, 8 April 2004

²²⁴ See for example Independent democrats asks voters to take on corruption in April elections. Business Day, 1 March 2004

²²⁵ See for example De Lille expects 10% of votes. Mail and Guardian, 23 March 2004 and ID expects 10% in elections. www.News24.com, 7 April 2004.

²²⁶ See for example De Lille takes the high road. Sunday Argus, 28 March 2004

²²⁷ See for example 'DA sees De Lille's party as its biggest threat' Mail and Guardian, 16 March 2004

article noted that she “was extremely proud of the progress of the ID” and the “overwhelming support South Africans from all walks of life have shown for the Independent Democrats”²²⁹ Several reports gave coverage of a Markinor survey, the results of which found Patricia De Lille to be the “most popular opposition politician”²³⁰ and that the ID had higher levels of support than the DA²³¹ - these findings were, of course, strongly repudiated by the DA.

Another key message of the ID covered by the media was its promise that it would not form political coalitions. Reports cited Patricia De Lille saying that “coalitions have been miserable failures in the Western Cape and elsewhere. I would never betray the voters. The constitution allows for minority governments, and it is not necessary for parties to form coalitions.”²³² One report noted De Lille’s dismissal of comparisons with the United Democratic Movement – she was quoted as saying that it “had been a collection of New National Party and African National Congress interests who could not work together”.²³³

An additional ID campaign message covered by the media was that the ID would transcend racial politics. Reports outlined Patricia De Lille assertion that the ID’s growth was a result of the party’s strategy to break the racial mould in South African politics.²³⁴ Another report noted De Lille saying that women in particular supported the ID as a party led by a woman and that she “was confident of her support among women across South Africa”.²³⁵

Another campaign message covered by the media was the ID’s assertion that the ANC had performed poorly in areas of corruption, abuse of woman and children, dealing with

²²⁸ See for example ID expects 5% of KZN votes. Media24, 1 April 2004

²²⁹ See for example De Lille's 'baby' is nearly a year old. Cape Argus, 26 March 2004

²³⁰ See for example De Lille 'best-liked opposition leader' Business Day, 13 April 2004 and De Lille 'more popular' than Leon. Mail and Guardian, 13 April 2004.

²³¹ See for example DA, ID clash over official opposition status after poll. Business Day, 8 April 2004. De Lille expects 10% of votes, Mail and Guardian, 23 March 2004.

²³² See for example NNP’s grip on Cape hot seat up for grabs. Business Day, 13 April 2004

²³³ See for example De Lille says defectors weren't members. Mail and Guardian, 29 March 2004.

²³⁴ See for example ID denies it is a one-woman party. Business Day, 17 March 2004

²³⁵ See for example De Lille takes the high road. Sunday Argus, 28 March 2004

HIV and AIDS and in its stance towards Zimbabwe.²³⁶ With regard to corruption, De Lille, reports said would “finish off the ANC” in the Western Cape and produce a dossier, exposing the corruption in the province”.²³⁷

The ID’s view that the ANC had performed poorly in dealing with HIV and AIDS in South Africa also received media coverage. Reports highlighted the public HIV test undertaken by De Lille and party leaders on the eve of the election²³⁸. She was quoted as saying that: “South Africa is moving from an HIV into an AIDS pandemic” and that “the first step to effectively counter this pandemic is for South Africans to know their HIV status and to be empowered to take preventative measures.”²³⁹ Reports cited De Lille labeling Dr Tshabalala-Msimang as a human rights abuser and a “useless minister” responsible for the severe delays in the rollout of ARV’s.²⁴⁰

The ID’s criticisms of the ANC’s performance in dealing with the situation in Zimbabwe also received media coverage. The media reported on De Lille’s assertion that President Thabo Mbeki and the ANC government had ignored the plight of Zimbabwe. She was quoted as saying that women and children were raped while the government remained dead silent on the issue...we have the best constitution in the world, which respects human rights and the rule of law. Yet when a country, north of South Africa, abuses human rights, our government leaders maintain their quiet diplomacy...we condemn the government of Zimbabwe. If our government can't support Zimbabwe, we, the people of South Africa, should support Zimbabweans”.²⁴¹

The ID received considerable negative media coverage as a result of DA campaign messages. The DA directed a large segment of their messages towards voters they

²³⁶ See for example DA, ID clash over official opposition status after poll. Business Day, 8 April 2004

²³⁷ See for example De Lille takes the high road. Sunday Argus, 28 March 2004

²³⁸ See for example ANC’s track record on AIDS fails to enliven voters. Business Day, 7 April 2004.

²³⁹ See for example De Lille attacks Manto and Mugabe. The Star, 1 March 2004

²⁴⁰ See for example De Lille attacks Manto and Mugabe. The Star, 1 March 2004

²⁴¹ See for example De Lille attacks Manto and Mugabe. The Star, 1 March 2004

thought would consider voting for the ID. Media reports dubbed these interactions as a “war of words” between the two parties.²⁴² Reports noted the list of De Lille’s “misdemeanors” dating back to 1993 the series of radio election advertisements in which the DA claimed that a vote for a smaller party such as the ID is a wasted vote.²⁴³ DA provincial leader Athol Trollip, according to reports, said that this “reflected the truth about the ID i.e. that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted vote and that smaller parties split the votes.”²⁴⁴ In response to the DA’s campaign against the ID, Patricia De Lille was quoted as saying “The DA has never been our target. We have higher moral ground than their negative campaign, and the voters will decide for themselves”.²⁴⁵ Media reports highlighted the ID leadership’s complaint against DA advertisements with the Independent Electoral Commission saying the broadcast advertisements mislead the public into voting for the DA and that the DA advertisement used the name of De Lille and the ID in a defamatory manner.²⁴⁶ The ID also responded to the DA’s strategy by saying that the DA had launched its campaign against the ID “in a desperate attempt to win back the substantial ground they have lost among their core constituency to the ID”. According to reports De Lille attributed the DA’s “vitriolic attack” on her to her refusal to join that party, and to the findings of a DA-commissioned study that said the ID would attract 30% of the official opposition party’s supporters.²⁴⁷ Patricia De Lille was quoted saying that the DA’s negative leadership style and campaign was well documented “as dividing and not building our nation with an agenda that wants to take us back to the pre-1994 period”. She was also quoted saying that the DA “is not loyal to the country” and that “SA does not need a party that does not add value to the building of this country”.²⁴⁸ Another report noted De Lille’s assertion that “the DA is no longer part of that legacy of liberal ideas and values” because “they have abandoned everything Helen Suzman

²⁴² See for example 'DA sees De Lille's party as its biggest threat' Mail and Guardian, 16 march 2004

²⁴³ See for example Lay De Lille's 'racist' past bare, says DA. IOL, 18 March 2004.

²⁴⁴ See for example DA ad defames De Lille: ID. SAPA, News24, 16 April 2004

²⁴⁵ See for example Will the DA be snubbed after the election? Saturday Star, 9 April 2004

²⁴⁶ See for example 'DA sees De Lille's party as its biggest threat' Mail and Guardian, 16 March 2004

²⁴⁷ See for example ID denies it is a one-woman party. Business Day, 17 March 2004

²⁴⁸ See for example DA, ID clash over official opposition status after poll. Business Day, 8 April 2004

represented”.²⁴⁹

Reports noted the ID’s rebuttal of allegations that the ID existed solely around Patricia De Lille.²⁵⁰ The premier candidates of the ID issued a statement, covered by the media, which said that “while De Lille was a charismatic leader who held the foreground, she was not a one-woman party. She is part of a ground swell of voters that are looking for a voice, because the official opposition has got the message all wrong. We have a positive leader who appeals to voters from all walks of life. De Lille has taken the government to court several times and won. Patricia has a track record of having made a real difference to people’s lives, particularly in the areas of HIV/AIDS and human rights.”²⁵¹

7.6.6 Media Messages about the NNP

Much of the coverage of the NNP’s campaign messages echoed the messages which the NNP itself sought to communicate to voters. Additionally a considerable proportion of the media coverage of the NNP related to the DA’s views of it. As indicated earlier, attacks on the NNP conducted via a series of advertisements received a substantial amount of media attention. Media coverage highlighted the following:

- Information from the NNP’s manifesto, which covered their policy proposals in detail;
- The Western Cape New National Party election manifesto called the Cape Plan;
- The NNP’s assertion that it was the only party that could ensure a voice for opposition voters via their co-operative agreement with the ANC;
- The NNP messages on how it differed from the ANC;
- The DA’s message that a vote for the NNP was essentially a vote for the ANC; that the NNP was opportunistic and a “lapdog of the ANC”;
- The NNP’s response to the DA’s negative campaign messages; and
- The ANC’s decision to not give Marthinus Van Schalkwyk the Western Cape

²⁴⁹ See for example De Lille: Suzman was a minority of minorities. Mail and Guardian, 26 March 2004

²⁵⁰ See for example DA takes flak for sidelining little parties: ID denies it is a one-woman party. Business Day, 17 March 2004.

²⁵¹ See for example ID denies it is a one-woman party. Business Day, 17 March 2004

premiership if it won a majority in the province.

The NNP's comprehensive manifesto, which covered their policy proposals in detail, was covered by several media reports. These reports listed the NNP's economic plans to "create one million permanent new jobs by 2008, achieve national economic growth of four percent within three years, and ensure three times the number of opportunities for adult basic education, further training, and entrepreneurship".²⁵²

According to media reports, the NNP also committed itself to building almost a quarter of a million houses by 2010 as part of a blueprint for eliminating the Western Cape's housing backlog by 2019. The manifesto, according to reports, committed the NNP to: bringing the HIV infection rate below 10%, effectively eliminating HIV-positive births; creating a provincial poverty fund of R100m for targeted alleviation projects; working with national and local government to halve crime by 2010; and establishing a "one Nation Fund" with R10m start-up funding, to advance reconciliation and nation-building.²⁵³ With regard to education, reports indicated the NNP's intention of improving the student-teacher ratio in primary schools from the current 39:1 to 33:1²⁵⁴ by adding an additional 27 000 teachers so that pass rates could be improved in key subjects, such as mathematics, science and technology".²⁵⁵ Also covered by the media was the NNP's "no mercy policy" on violent crime and re-instituting the death penalty"²⁵⁶.

The Western Cape New National Party election manifesto called the Cape Plan was also covered by the media. Aspects highlighted were the goals of attracting R5 billion in new investments by 2008; creating 120 000 short-term jobs; skills training through a public works programme; building a new 240-bed hospital by 2007 to service the communities of Mitchell's Plain and Khayelitsha; reducing crime by 50%; increasing police officers

²⁵² See for example NNP offers SA 'a fair share' Media24, 20 February 2004; NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA' Mail and Guardian, 20 February 2004 and NNP launches election manifesto, IOL, 20 February 2004

²⁵³ See for example NNP promises homes galore. News24, 16 February 2004

²⁵⁴ See for example NNP promises homes galore. News24, 16 February 2004

²⁵⁵ See for example NNP offers SA 'a fair share' Media24, 20 February 2004; NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA' Mail and Guardian, 20 February 2004 and NNP launches election manifesto, IOL, 20 February 2004

²⁵⁶ See for example NNP offers SA 'a fair share' Media24, 20 February 2004; NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA' Mail and Guardian, 20 February 2004 and NNP launches election manifesto, IOL, 20 February 2004

from 18 000 to 24 000 by 2010; appointing 2 868 new teachers by 2010 and the creation of a provincial poverty fund of R100m that would target poverty alleviation projects to supplement social security grants.²⁵⁷

Media reports also carried the NNP's message that it was only opposition party that could ensure a voice in a multi-party government for opposition voters via their co-operative agreement with the ANC.²⁵⁸ For example, Van Schalkwyk was cited as saying that NNP would continue to talk with the ANC because it was the only way to "reconcile the interests of different constituencies and communities".²⁵⁹ Other reports quote him as saying that the alliance created a future for white people which they otherwise would not have had.²⁶⁰ He was also quoted as saying that the agreement between the NNP and the ANC represented a sincere hand of partnership that has been held out by the majority community in South Africa to minorities and that "through the NNP/ANC agreement, voters had a unique chance to make their voices heard in the highest levels of government - even if they disagreed with the ANC on some issues of principle".²⁶¹ Van Schalkwyk's view that "the NNP, unlike other parties, could negotiate towards influencing decisions successfully and therefore promote the interests of, and co-operation between, all communities" was noted.²⁶²

NNP messages on how it differed from the ANC (on issues such as the death penalty, abortion, affirmative action and Zimbabwe) also received media exposure. Van Schalkwyk was quoted as saying that "we do have a strong policy platform...we are much tougher than the ANC on crime; we strongly believe in bringing back the death penalty... there are important differences with regard to the labour market and...in

²⁵⁷ See for example NNP unveils 'Cape Plan' for economic growth. Cape Times, 17 February 2004

²⁵⁸ See for example NNP looks to ANC for Cape role. Business Day, 17 February 2004; De Klerk campaigns for NNP, News 24.com, 20 March 2004, Nats may be in decline but they are singing, Mail and Guardian, 31 March 2004 and Schoeman: NNP vote adds value. News24.com, 2 April 2004.

²⁵⁹ See for example NNP offers SA 'a fair share' Media24, 20 February 2004 ; NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA' Mail and Guardian, 20 February 2004 and NNP launches election manifesto, IOL, 20 February 2004

²⁶⁰ See for example NNP still alive, says Kortbroek. City Press, 14 March 2004

²⁶¹ See for example NNP: Vote for DA short-sighted. News24, 6 April 2004

²⁶² See for example 'NNP has voice within govt' News24, 27 March 2004.

foreign policy...Zimbabwe being one.²⁶³ Van Schalkwyk was also reported as saying that the NNP had not consulted its coalition party - the ANC - before drawing up its manifesto. According to the report, he indicated that "the NNP makes its own manifesto which we will introduce to the coalition after the election." and commended the ANC for the way in which it helped govern the province, but said the NNP would like the majority vote in the province.²⁶⁴

The DA's campaign messages regarding the NNP ensured considerable negative coverage for the NNP.²⁶⁵ Examples of this included coverage of the DA's listing of Marthinus van Schalkwyk as the Joker on their cards of shame²⁶⁶, DA members calling Van Schalkwyk "a Maltese poodle begging for scraps at the African National Congress's table",²⁶⁷ "a loser" and "the most dishonourable figure in South African politics" who had "betrayed the voters" by "climbing into bed" with the African National Congress²⁶⁸ as well as and the description of ANC and NNP rule in the Western Cape as "the locust years".²⁶⁹ This was exacerbated by the media's use of the nickname for Marthinus van Schalkwyk - "kortbroek", [translated as "shortpants"].

The NNP's response to the DA also received media attention.²⁷⁰ Reports noted the NNP brushing off predictions of the party's impending extinction as DA propaganda.²⁷¹ Van Schalkwyk was cited as saying that a vote for the DA was a one-way ticket to political irrelevance which would end up "reinforcing walls of division between our communities and selling out the future of our children".²⁷² Van Schalkwyk was also

²⁶³ See for example 'We're born team players' Mail and Guardian, 23 February 2004

²⁶⁴ See for example NNP unveils 'Cape Plan' for economic growth. Cape Times, 17 February 2004

²⁶⁵ See for example Poll will be end of the NNP — Leon, Business Day, 17 March 2004.

²⁶⁶ See for example DA launches 'ANC cards of shame' IOL, 10 April 2004

²⁶⁷ See for example DA hits back at 'Maltese poodle' Mail and Guardian, 4 April 2004

²⁶⁸ See for example Voters will judge NNP - says DA. News24, 9 April 2004

²⁶⁹ See for example Tony Leon stirs up a hornets' nest. Mail and Guardian, 9 April 2004

²⁷⁰ See for example No room for DA in Cape coalition. Business Day, 7 April 2004

²⁷¹ See for example Who are the major players in KZN politics? Daily News, 16 February 2004

quoted as saying the NNP had underestimated the "levels of cynicism" in the DA leadership and that "The (former) Democratic Party saw the DA as a vehicle not for change, but for the protection of privilege."²⁷³ André Gaum of the NNP was also reported as saying that "under DA rule, the province's economic growth rate dropped from more than 4% to 2% and that under DA rule, the province was scandal-ridden and marked by political instability."²⁷⁴ Reports noted Daryl Swanepoels assertion that "it is clear from the DA's latest tirade [against F.W. De Klerk for coming out in support of the ANC/NNP relationship] that they cannot comprehend that this country does not need their arrogant, colonial to hell with the rest attitude".²⁷⁵ Van Schalkwyk said, according to reports, that "British Westminster opposition-style politics was not appropriate for complicated societies, such as South Africa".²⁷⁶

A few days prior to the elections, reports highlighted the ANC's decision to not give Van Schalkwyk the Western Cape premiership if the ANC received a majority in the province.²⁷⁷ The NNP tried to play down the speculations regarding the premiership with Carol Johnson, the NNP's media director saying that both parties were "fighting very hard to be the strongest in the Western Cape" and that there was "absolutely no rift or tension".²⁷⁸ However, these reports clashed with the NNP's primary campaign message i.e. that it was in a unique position of strength to negotiate with voters due to the coalition agreement. Subsequently, reports indicated that President Mbeki would endorse Ebrahim Rasool as the ANC's candidate of choice.²⁷⁹

²⁷² See for example NNP: Vote for DA short-sighted. News24, 6 April 2004

²⁷³ See for example NNP offers SA 'a fair share' Media24, 20 February 2004; NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA' Mail and Guardian, 20 February 2004 and NNP launches election manifesto, IOL, 20 February 2004

²⁷⁴ See for example Voters will judge NNP - says DA. News24, 9 April 2004

²⁷⁵ See for example Tony Leon's attacks on De Klerk make very little political sense. Sunday Argus, 8 February 2004

²⁷⁶ See for example NNP offers SA 'a fair share' Media24, 20 February 2004; NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA' Mail and Guardian, 20 February 2004 and NNP launches election manifesto, IOL, 20 February 2004

²⁷⁷ See for example Marthinus's position in doubt. News24.com, 12 April 2004.


²⁷⁸ See for example Kortbroek to get the boot. IOL, 11 April 2004

²⁷⁹ See for example Mbeki lets W Cape premier plan slip. IOL, March 15 2004 and NNP's grip on Cape hot seat up for grabs: Contradictory signals from ally ANC, Business Day, 13 April 2004

7.7 Media Coverage of Voter Concerns

After reviewing media statements about the different parties, it is time to ask a different question: to what extent did the media report on the issues that voters wanted to hear about? The analysis in this section will show that media failed voters in this regard. The CNEP survey asked respondents what they thought was the most important issue in the election campaign. One in three (35%) cited unemployment as the most important. Crime/justice was mentioned by 18%, Health/HIV/AIDS by 16%, poverty and service delivery 10% and housing by 9%. These findings are broadly in line with several surveys which had asked South Africans what they perceived to be the most important problem facing the country.²⁸⁰

Figure 10: Voter Perceptions of Most Important Campaign Issue



Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, 2004.

Question: During the election campaign, the candidates and parties discussed many different issues. In your view, which of the following was the most important issue in the recent election campaign?

²⁸⁰ See for example Mattes, Taylor and Africa (1999).

More than three-quarters of all campaign-related statements (76%) *did not* relate to the issues identified by analysts and public opinion polls to be the primary campaign issues and were certainly not the ones earmarked by political parties in their manifestos and other campaign material. The Media Tenor content analysis revealed that media coverage predominantly related to public appearances by politicians with one in four statements (24%) focusing on such events. A fifth of the media statements (21%) coded by Media Tenor were statements regarding the political parties and politicians and their characteristics i.e. whether they were competent, suitable to govern, etc. Another fifth of all statements (20%) related to elections and voting. I also classified one in ten statements (11%) as “other” – this category consisted of one hundred and twenty categories each with small proportions of statements bearing little relevance to the campaign.²⁸¹

Overall six percent of campaign statements related to issues of democracy, human rights and governance. Another five percent concerned the economy. The “burning issues” of the day such as crime, unemployment, health, HIV and AIDS, education and housing received no more than three percent of media statements.

Table 34: Overall Content of Coverage – All Media

	Number of Statements	Percent
Public Appearance	13750	24%
Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern	11752	21%
Elections and Voting	11133	20%
Other	6110	11%
Democracy, Human Rights and Governance	3195	6%
Economy	3085	5%
Crime	1863	3%
Welfare and Social Policy	1408	3%
Unemployment	1556	3%
Health	361	1%
HIV and AIDS	1250	2%
Education	549	1%
Housing	719	1%
Agriculture	107	.2%
Transport	65	.1%
Total	56903	100.0
Missing Data	1243	
Total	58146	

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

²⁸¹ Please see appendix 7 for a comprehensive list of the categories used by Media Tenor and the codes which I allocated to each category.

As seen below, coverage of the top six parties followed a similar pattern to overall trends with slight variations. All parties had public appearances, views of parties/leaders and elections and voting as their top three categories. No more than 4% of statements with the ANC or DA as protagonist related to crime, unemployment, health, HIV and AIDS, education or housing. Sixteen percent of the statements which had the UDM as its protagonist related to the economy and unemployment. One in ten (8%) of the statements which had the IFP as its protagonist related to crime. Overall seven percent of statements relating to the ID focused on HIV and AIDS.


Table 35: Content of Party Coverage – All Media

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	ID	NNP	Other
Public Appearance	4998 26.5%	3262 25.2%	1825 26.1%	274 18.6%	510 21.6%	1129 21.0%	1752 19.8%
Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern	3845 20.4%	2533 19.6%	1509 21.6%	259 17.5%	600 25.4%	1374 25.5%	1632 18.4%
Elections and Voting	4165 22.1%	2158 16.7%	1217 17.4%	290 19.6%	437 18.5%	1045 19.4%	1821 20.5%
Other	1706 9.0%	1579 12.2%	662 9.5%	139 9.4%	205 8.7%	563 10.5%	1256 14.2%
Democracy, Human Rights and Governance	1081 5.7%	795 6.1%	273 3.9%	75 5.1%	108 4.6%	332 6.2%	531 6.0%
Economy	820 4.3%	841 6.5%	338 4.8%	147 10.0%	114 4.8%	293 5.4%	532 6.0%
Crime	693 3.7%	271 2.1%	557 8.0%	37 2.5%	53 2.2%	69 1.3%	183 2.1%
Unemployment	424 2.2%	514 4.0%	99 1.4%	81 5.5%	54 2.3%	141 2.6%	243 2.7%
Health	108 .6%	114 .9%	12 .2%	13 .9%	9 .4%	32 .6%	73 .8%
HIV and AIDS	280 1.5%	304 2.3%	240 3.4%	43 2.9%	162 6.8%	65 1.2%	156 1.8%
Education	128 .7%	111 .9%	46 .7%	17 1.2%	25 1.1%	84 1.6%	138 1.6%
Housing	161 .9%	121 .9%	40 .6%	21 1.4%	24 1.0%	98 1.8%	254 2.9%
Transport	15 .1%	14 .1%	6 .1%	2 .1%	2 .1%	21 .4%	5 .1%
Agriculture	8 .0%	17 .1%	24 .3%	11 .7%	6 .3%	14 .3%	27 .3%
Welfare and Social Policy	440 2.3%	305 2.4%	150 2.1%	68 4.6%	56 2.4%	122 2.3%	267 3.0%
Total Number of statements	18872 100.0%	12939 100.0%	6998 100.0%	1477 100.0%	2365 100.0%	5382 100.0%	8870 100.0%

Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis

Media Tenor also coded the statements in their data-set according to whether it was policy-related or not. According to Media Tenor data, all the parties received a low volume of policy coverage. The MMP also argued that “coverage tended towards event-based, non-analytical reports on party campaigning, without sufficient interrogation of the issues raised” (www.mediamonitoring.org.za,2006).

Figure 11: Extent of Policy-Related Coverage in the 2004 Campaign



Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004

Only the UDM had a majority of policy-related statements. Fifty five percent of the statements which had the UDM as its protagonist were policy-related. The ANC had the lowest proportion of policy-related statements (42%).

Table 36: Proportion of Policy-related Statements in Coverage of Party Campaigns

	ANC	DA	IFP	UDM	ID	NNP	Other	Total
Non policy- related Statements	11221 58.3%	6993 52.6%	3849 53.8%	671 44.9%	1323 54.7%	3080 55.9%	4177 46.3%	31314 53.9%
Policy –related Statements	8039 41.7%	6298 47.4%	3304 46.2%	822 55.1%	1097 45.3%	2434 44.1%	4838 53.7%	26832 46.1%
Total Statements	19260	13291	7153	1493	2420	5514	9015	58146

Source of Data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004.

In their interviews with the MMP, *all* political parties highlighted the fact there was not enough space or time in the media for sufficient analyses. The general consensus from the parties interviewed was that the media were shallow in their analyses of party manifestos and campaigns most parties noted the need for greater depth of coverage in these instances (Media Monitoring Project, 2004).

According to the MMP Mr Smuts Ngonyama of the ANC said that “there was lack of depth in the explanation of certain policies in the manifestos. Policies, like job creation and the ANC’s broad economic policies were not well explained by the media. Mr Ngonyama was also quoted as saying that “Election coverage needs to be more than a compilation of sound bites from different parties. It needs to seek [and] to delve into the issues and manifestos of parties in a critical and detailed manner”. Mike Moriarty, DA leader in Johannesburg, in his interview also indicated dissatisfaction with the depth and analysis that the media allocated to addressing party manifestos. He felt that “the media did not communicate their manifesto as the party had intended”. Bantu Holomisa in his interview with MMP concurred with this view saying that “there is a need for more space to be allocated for manifestos and also space for politicians to explain what their policies are,” ID media liaisons, Brent Meersman and Thulani Sithole, were also “not convinced that the print media had done enough research to provide good analyses”. Daryl Swanepoel, secretary-general of the NNP was recorded by the MMP as saying that the NNP was not satisfied with the way the media had handled various party manifestos because they had not done enough to explain the differentiated approaches of parties providing only shallow analyses of party messages (www.mediamonitoring.org.za, 2006).

7.8 Media Bias in the 2004 Campaign

Were the messages presented by the media biased towards a particular political party? The following section examines both perceptions of bias as well as the extent of media bias. It explores data from two media monitoring groups, interviews with representatives from the selected political parties conducted by the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) as well as perceptions of voters in the Comparative National Elections Project survey.

7.8.1 Citizen Perceptions of Media Bias

Respondents did not see the media in South Africa as favouring a particular political party. A strong majority of 85-89% regarded the coverage on television and radio and in the newspapers as objective in that regard. Among the small proportion of news media consumers who found a bias in the media, most understood this to be a bias in favour of the ANC.

Table 37: Citizen Perceptions of Media Bias

	No	Yes
Newspaper read	77%	23%
Radio station listened to	85%	16%
TV News watched	89%	11%

Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, South Africa Survey 2004.

Question: Do you think [X] favoured a political party?

While a large majority of South Africans did not see a political bias in the media, they also had little trust in the media, and least of all in the print media. . About a third of respondents said that they trusted the SABC (35%) and E-TV (31%) compared to a fifth who said that they trusted independent newspapers (19%).

Table 38: Extent of Trust by Citizens in News Media

	Trust government broadcasting service	Trust independent broadcasting services	Trust independent newspapers
Not at all	6%	6%	9%
Just a little	17%	17%	25%
Somewhat	36%	34%	34%
A lot	35%	31%	19%
Don't know/Haven't heard enough	6%	12%	14%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, South Africa Survey 2004.

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Government broadcasting service (SABC TV or radio) Independent broadcasting services (E TV) Independent newspapers 0 = Not at all, 1 = A little bit, 2 = a lot, 3 = A very great deal

7.8.2 Political Parties Views of Media Bias

In contrast to South African citizens, who did not see the media in South Africa as favouring a particular political party, political parties tended to feel aggrieved by what they perceived as media bias during the campaign period. The Media Monitoring Project interviewed the main political parties to assess their views of the media's coverage of the 2004 election. Several of the opposition parties interviewed by the MMP complained of SABC bias in favour of the ANC, with particular criticism being leveled against the SABC's English TV news. Opposition parties were generally more satisfied with the SABC's coverage in other languages as well as with the coverage by e-tv and radio. The IFP, UDM and NNP argued that key components of the print media were biased towards the ANC. The ANC, on the other hand, claimed that they did not receive enough coverage from the media in general, and the SABC in particular (Media Monitoring Project, 2004).

According to the MMP, ANC spokesperson, Smuts Ngonyama, was concerned about equity in coverage - they quoted him as saying that "without pre-empting the outcome of the elections, the media is required to determine how to allocate space and time to parties which broadly reflects the extent of their support and influence". The DA's Mr Moriarty indicated that "the media made all efforts to be as fair as possible, but that the SABC seemed to be struggling", "SABC TV had a stance or a slant toward the ANC... SABC English TV news was particularly notorious for being pro-ANC, as opposed to the African languages news [on SABC] that was much fairer in their coverage of the elections." For Mr Moriarty, print and radio were much fairer in the coverage of opposition events and stories, although some of the media "showed a lot of favour towards the ID leader, Patricia De Lille, much more than was due to her." The IFP's national spokesperson, Reverend Keith M. Zondi indicated to the MMP that the IFP was satisfied with the coverage from E-TV and the print media but voiced dissatisfaction with the coverage supplied by the SABC. He said that the SABC favoured the ANC at the expense of the smaller parties. In a separate interview, Rev Zondi indicated that the SABC refused to cover the IFP's launch in Durban, but covered the ANC. In this interview, he argued that the print media often painted a negative picture of the IFP

because many journalists are not investigative journalists but activism journalists who sympathise with the ANC (Media Monitoring Project, 2004).

In his interview with the Media Monitoring Project, UDM party leader Bantu Holomisa felt that most of the radio and print media had adhered to their mandate of equal coverage for political parties. However, according to the MMP, General Holomisa found the SABC television channels to be biased towards the ANC and questioned the manner in which the media judged what was newsworthy. Mr Holomisa claimed that during the election period, when “the ANC says something it is considered news, but if the UDM (or any other opposition party) said the same thing before, it wouldn’t be newsworthy (Media Monitoring Project, 2004). In a different interview, Siviwe Nzwelini National Coordinator for the UDM, echoed these views. He argued that ...“the media plays an important role in shaping public opinion. The problem is that the SABC is government and ANC orientated and therefore tends to be biased.” The print media also tends to be biased. Some newspapers appear democratic but are pro-DA and pro-IFP. Newspapers such as the Sowetan, City Press and Sunday Times are clearly pro-ANC...we would organize a rally and then the ANC would organize a rally nearby with a high profile speaker. The media would then be more concerned in covering the ANC than the UDM”.²⁸²

ID’s media liaisons, Brent Meersman and Thulani Sithole indicated to the MMP that the print media’s coverage of the elections was fair and radio coverage was good but that the SABC television channels were unfair in their coverage during the run up to the elections with the opposition parties being neglected. However, the ID was happy with the coverage that the SABC television channels provided on election day (Media Monitoring Project, 2004). In a separate interview, Marlon Kruger, Media Officer of the Independent Democrats echoed these sentiments saying that the ID was satisfied with the coverage they received, adding that “of course it could have been better”. She felt that the ID received a strong presence in the media “largely because the ID had an issue-driven campaign ...and... because the ID has developed a very strong relationship with journalists”. She added that “the personality of Patricia De Lille was also a key factor... because..the media are interested in covering ID events because “there is a chance she

²⁸² Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

will say something good.” Kruger added that the ANC got a lot of coverage because Thabo Mbeki is also the president and the DA got a lot of coverage because they have very effective ways of getting media publicity, for example Tony Leon challenging President Mbeki to a debate.²⁸³

Carol Johnson, Media Director of the New National Party said that the NNP found the SABC to be very objective in their coverage of the election but that some print media was biased, putting their own spin on things. She argued that “a perpetual problem was the ridiculing of Marthinus Van Schalkwyk”. According to Johnson, he would be called ‘kortbroek’ in the same sentence as Tony Leon was referred to as Mr Leon. Ms Johnson added that “the print media also only wanted to cover the NNP once the election was over so that they could report on our demise”.²⁸⁴

7.8.3 Content Analysis

Voters’ perceptions (rather than party officials perceptions) of the media were corroborated by the content analysis conducted by Media Tenor and the Media Monitoring Project. Additionally, Davis (2005:239) conducted a survey of editorial endorsements and concluded that the print media was less partisan than in previous elections with both ‘liberal’ and Afrikaans newspapers primarily choosing to not endorse any party. Davis indicates that the *Sowetan*, *Sunday Times* and *Mail & Guardian* cautiously endorsed the ANC while the only *Pretoria News* indicated its preference for readers to go to the polls and vote against the ANC.

According to Media Tenor data, all parties received predominantly *neutral* coverage.²⁸⁵ The ANC, with the highest volume of coverage, generally received neutral coverage but had more negative than positive statements. Coverage of the DA and IFP followed a similar pattern – both generally received neutral coverage but also on balance had more negative than positive statements. The UDM and NNP received very similar proportions


²⁸³ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

²⁸⁴ Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004.

²⁸⁵ The rating score was calculated on two levels i.e. **explicit** use of words and **implicit** context which was then combined into an overall rating.

of positive and negative ratings. According to Media Tenor’s data the ID had the best image of the mainstream parties, receiving the least negative coverage.

Figure 12: Ratings of Campaign Coverage in 2004 Election (Media Tenor)




Source of Data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004.

The Media Monitoring Project also assessed the degree of bias exhibited by the media for and/or against any particular party in the 2004 election.²⁸⁶ The MMP declared that 91% of all items they analyzed were fair, i.e. without any clear bias, with 9% seen as having clear bias. They add that 3% of all items monitored displayed both bias against and bias in favour of a party or parties. According to the MMP, the trend was that parties received coverage that focused on both the positive and the negative and that this did not translate into unduly favouring or opposing any particular party (Media Monitoring Project, 2004).

²⁸⁶ The MMP defined bias as being multi-faceted i.e. as a result of the language utilised, the deliberate omission of a counter view to that initially put forward, and/or the overall presentation of the item in the context of the newspaper or broadcast media news bulletin. The MMP also argue that language bias is most clearly evident when allegation and exaggeration are involved and that bias can exist in a single item that favours one or a number of parties, and opposes others.

Figure 13: Ratings of Campaign Coverage in 2004 Election (Media Monitoring Project)



Source: Media Monitoring Project, 2004.

7.9 Conclusion

This chapter revealed that the problem of indistinct campaign messages was further compounded by the media's campaign coverage. In addition, the campaign appears to have been disproportionately covered by the print media while usage and ownership figures show radio to be the most widely used medium in South Africa. This would suggest that many voters were not exposed to campaign messages at all, or at least not frequently. This finding points to a potential blockage in the information dissemination process.

Unsurprisingly, the ANC and DA managed to generate the most media coverage. Despite opposition parties' allegations of media hostility towards them, the content analysis conducted by the Media Monitoring Project and Media Tenor, revealed that coverage of all parties was mainly neutral. Voters also felt that the media was not biased toward a particular party. Editorials endorsements were also less partisan than in 1999 and 1994. However, the media's coverage of the campaign added little value to the people sifting

through the vast array of material presented to them. Coverage was events-based, lacking in depth, and tended to focus on the scathing attacks and public confrontations between party leaders, further blurring rather than illuminating the choices for voters. There was limited policy-related coverage and the media did not focus on the issues of concern to voters. According to Media Tenor data, all the parties received limited policy coverage. Furthermore, in interviews with the political parties, the Media Monitoring Project indicated that all parties highlighted the absence of sufficient analyses in the media during the 2004 election. According to the Media Monitoring Project (2004), the general consensus from parties interviewed about the 2004 election, was that the media were shallow in their analyses of party manifestos and campaigns. While most parties noted the need for greater depth of coverage in these instances, it is unsurprising that the fierce mud-slinging between parties is what caught media attention. Newspaper reporting portrayed the content and the tone of candidate presentations but failed to cover the campaigns in ways that emphasized candidate policy proposals and draw attention to the larger meanings of the choices that voters face.

These findings support the assertions by Buchanan (2001) and Louw (2005). Buchanan (2001: 367-370) argues that in trying to hold the attention of the mass audience, the current market incentives for the media discourage detailed or substantive coverage of policies. According to Buchanan, in the media's aim to sustain and enlarge market share, their political coverage focuses on the most dramatic and conflictual features of campaigns. Louw argues that a symbiotic relationship tends to develop between journalists, pollsters and spin-doctors in which politicians need publicity, and journalists need news. For Louw, the resultant symbiotic relationship means that political news is built upon a mutually-reinforcing game, exacerbated by the pressures of commercialism which drives journalists to produce 'spectacle' news – a genre requiring celebrities and dramatic or entertaining stories. The result, Louw argues, is an arrangement in which political PRs supply journalists with celebrity politicians and hyped-up news to entertain the masses. According to Louw, journalists then evaluate political performers, picking 'winners' and 'losers', giving journalists the power to boost or undermine political careers. This, Louw argues, produces a watchdog-ism not based on evaluating policy-making abilities at governance, but on evaluating personalities, impression-management skills and politicians' abilities as performers. According to Louw, news as an entertaining spectacle in a racy, easy-to-understand reporting style, is profitable because

it facilitates the de-skilling and downsizing of newsrooms, since producing such stories does not require engagement with the complexities of policy-making and governance (Louw, 2005:70-89).

In South Africa, media professionals in South Africa themselves bemoan the state of their profession. Hadland (2005:13) contends that conflicting demands and roles facing journalists, have led to “tensions, frustration and an environment in which excellence has found it hard to be heard” and that “just over ten years after South Africa became a democracy, the media are still struggling to understand and fulfil their role in the new dispensation”. He further argues that the many roles of South Africa’s media: watchdog, corruption-buster, nurturer of goodwill, supporter of national unity, critical, constructive, reflective of mainstream opinion, a voice to the voiceless, uphold ethical and professional standards, create a diverse workforce alongside rapidly advancing technologies, all have led to tensions, frustration and a tough new world of difficult choices, moral dilemmas and sophisticated technical demands for journalists.

Some point to voters as the source of the problem - respondents in a survey of people engaged with the mass media reported that the South African public “wants sensationalism and easy-reads” and as a result, “journalists are instructed to give their readers what they want to read” (Mochaba, Raffinetti, Vallabh and White, 2003:67). Others in the survey were more introspective, arguing that “media houses hire young journalists because they are cheap to employ and are not a threat to the status quo”, resulting in journalists “performing half-heartedly” (Mochaba, Raffinetti, Vallabh and White, 2003:67).

However, Quintal (2005: 54) argues political journalism in South Africa has been neglected and deprioritized due to the belief that the political story was over. Quintal further asserts that the effect of this neglect was evident in the 2004 election coverage. Quintal (2005: 56) argues that much of the problem lies with inexperienced political reporters, poor newsroom leadership, over-reliance on press statements and little generated original copy. Weaver (2005:30) points out that one of the major problems in news is the pressure of the deadline and the need to provide instant news.

In sum, the media blurred rather than illuminated choices for voters in the 2004 election. The media's coverage of the campaign, despite emerging as unbiased, lacked depth and tended to be sensationalist focusing on events, public appearances as well as the scathing attacks and public confrontations between party leaders. Taken together media reporting of the 2004 campaign did not help clarify the issues for voters and therefore added little value to voters sifting through the vast array of material presented to them.

University of Cape Town

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTORATE

8.1 Introduction

The fourth component of the model is South African voters as recipients of the 2004 campaign. Citizens form an integral part of a good quality democracy. As key actors, well-informed voters who scrutinize candidate and media performance (Buchanan, 2001:365) gather and process accurate information (Bingham Powell, 2005:68) enhance the democratic process. Indeed for campaigns to have any worth, they cannot simply fall on “deaf ears”.

In this chapter I look at key demographic features, in particular education and literacy levels. Given that voters who are interested in and engage with campaign messages, as well as feel a strong sense of internal political efficacy, contribute to enhanced accountability and responsiveness, I examine whether voters felt competent to play an active role in politics; were interested in following the campaigns and paid attention to the campaign messages. I also look at patterns of partisanship and assess whether voters in 2004 were open to persuasion by political campaigns and campaign stimuli.


8.2 Demographic Profile

There were several key demographic features of the South African electorate in 2004. Large proportions of the electorate lived in rural communities. Additionally, voters spoke a diversity of languages and had relatively low levels of formal education. The electorate was relatively young with a sizable proportion of first-time voters with no-first hand memories of the political transition in South Africa or life under apartheid. For political parties devising campaign messages and strategies, this meant that these needed to be tailored to voters with a diversity of languages living in mostly rural areas. Additionally, messages need to cater for younger cohorts.

According to SAARF data, South Africa had an overall population 46.7 million in 2004. KwaZulu-Natal had the largest population with 6.1 million adults, followed by Gauteng with 6 million and the Eastern Cape with 4.6 million adults. The province with the

smallest population is the Northern Cape with just over 600 000 inhabitants or two percent of the overall population (SAARF, 2005). As at 2004, South Africa had a Voting Age Population of 27.4 million people (Piombo, 2004:255).

Figure 14: Number of adults (16+) in each province - 2004



Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation, 2005.
Graphical Image Used With Permission From SAARF.


South Africa still has many rural communities. In 2004, the largest proportion of the adult population i.e. 40.9% or 12.3 million lived in communities with less than 500 people and 12.4% or 3.7 million lived in communities with between 500 and 39 999 people. A third (33.3% or 10 million) lived in more densely populated areas with 250 000 people or more. Another 13.4% or 4 million lived in areas with between 40 000 – 249 999 people (SAARF, 2005).

In 2004, the gender composition of the adult population had an almost even split with 15 million adult males and females. In 2004, 27% of the population was in the 16-24 age category, 25% in the 25-34 age category, 27% in the 35-49 age category and 22% were over the age of 50 (SAARF, 2005). This meant that the oldest in the 16-24 category would have been fourteen years old at the time of the 1994 elections. The youngest age cohort would therefore not have much direct memories of experience with the apartheid system.

Unfortunately SAARF did not include race as an indicator in their instruments. According to Census 2001 data Black South Africans constituted more than three-quarters (79%) of the total population of, Whites 9.6%, Coloureds 8.9% and Indians 2.5% (Statistics South Africa, 2003). It is reasonable to assume that by 2004, Blacks still constituted the vast majority of the population.

There are eleven official languages in South Africa. As at 2004, the home language of most South Africans was Zulu, with one in five adults, almost 7 million, stating that it is their home language. The second largest language grouping was Xhosa. Almost 5 million adults said they spoke Xhosa as their home language. These were followed by Afrikaans and English, spoken by 15% or 4.5 million and 11% or 3.3 million respectively. Another 9.2% or 2.7 million said that they spoke North Sotho as their home language. Just over 8% cited either Tswana or South Sotho as the language which they speak at home. Smaller proportions i.e. less than three percent gave Tsonga, Swazi, Venda and Ndebele as their home language (SAARF, 2005).

Figure 15: Language Groupings in South Africa - 2004




Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation, 2005.

8.3 Educational Profile

A review of SAARF data reveals a slight reduction in the number of people without formal education from 12% in 1994 to 7% in 2004. There was also an increase in the proportion that had finished primary school from 66% in 1994 to 81% in 2004. Those who had completed matric and obtained some tertiary education also increased from 23% in 1994 to 33% in 2004 (SAARF, 2004b).

Figure 16: Trends In Education 1995-2004



Source of data: SAARF, 2004b.

SAARF figures show an increase in the proportion of people who completed matric from fourteen percent in 1994 to twenty five percent in 2004. Despite these improvements, by 2004 the vast majority of South Africans still only had a primary-school level education (SAARF, 2004b).²⁸⁷

In the 2004 Afrobarometer survey less than 17% reported having completed post-secondary education. About a quarter (26%) had completed high school and just under a third (30%) said that they had started but not completed secondary education.

²⁸⁷ For an overview of the explanations for these trends in education see Chisholm, 2005.

Table 39: Education Profile in South Africa, 2004


Educational Level	Percent
No formal schooling	6%
Informal schooling only	1%
Some primary schooling	11%
Primary school completed	9%
Some secondary school/high school	30%
Secondary school completed/high school	26%
Post-secondary qualifications, not university	10%
Some university	3%
University completed	3%
Post-graduate	1%
Don't know	.2%
Total	100%

Source of data: Afrobarometer, 2004

Question: What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Despite the lack of formal education, most South Africans can read. The proportion that can read and understand was 93% in 2004 while the proportion that can read and write was 80% in 2004 (SAARF, 2004a).

Figure 17: Functionally Literacy: 1994 -2004



Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation, 2004a.


Dalton (2000:31) classifies those who have at least some university education and/or are “very interested” in the political campaign as being “cognitively mobilized”. While the South African population did not fare very well with relatively low levels of formal

education, this does not automatically translate into voters who are not cognitively engaged. In a country such as South Africa, formal education is not necessarily a good indicator of political astuteness given the vast mobilization of ordinary members of society in the struggle against apartheid. In this context, citizens without formal education could end up being extremely politically active. Furthermore, on a range of issues, for example government performance, South African voters are willing and able to answer numerous survey questions.²⁸⁸

8.4 Political Interest

A broader question is, “how interested are South Africans in political matters. At a first glance, it appears that South African voters are not interested in political matters. Mattes (2005:44) argues that “the level of engagement amongst the South African public is relatively low”. As seen in the figure below, at any given point less than a fifth of South Africans said that they frequently discuss political matters or follow politics “almost always” or “most of the time”.

Figure 18: Political Discussion and Political Interest, 1995 -2004



Source: Mattes, 2005

²⁸⁸ Jacobs (1999:150) also argues that despite low levels of formal education, voters in South Africa are adept at assessing their situations.

Based on Afrobarometer data, Mattes shows that the size of South Africa’s “attentive” public is the smallest in Southern Africa. As Mattes (2005:44) indicates, “such low levels of engagement lead us to expect that South Africans are relatively ill-informed”. In the CNEP survey, only a third (36%) reported being very interested or somewhat interested in politics while almost two-thirds (64%) said that they were not very interested or not at all interested. However in the Afrobarometer survey, almost two thirds (61%) indicated that they were very interested (29%) or somewhat interested (32.2%) in following political matters. Just over a third (38%) said that they were not very interested or not at all interested in politics.

Table 40: Interest in Public Affairs

Interest in Political Matters	Afrobarometer* 2004	CNEP 2004**
Not at all interested	18%	41%
Not very interested	20%	23%
Somewhat interested	32%	22%
Very interested	29%	13%
Don't know	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%

Source: Afrobarometer, 2004 and Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004.

*Question wording: How interested would you say you are in public affairs?

** Question wording: More generally, how interested are you in politics?

Respondents in the Afrobarometer surveys were also asked about the frequency of their political discussions. Just under a third (34%) said that they never discuss political matters. Almost two thirds (65%) indicated that they discuss political matters frequently (19%) or occasionally (46%).

Table 41: Extent of Political Discussion

Extent of Political Discussion	Percentage
Never	34%
Occasionally	46%
Frequently	19%
Don't know	1%
Total	100%

Source: Afrobarometer, 2004.

Question: When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters:

8.5 Campaign Interest

Putting aside more general political interest, how interested were voters in following the 2004 election campaign? It appears that the election campaign did spark interest among voters. In the Markinor survey more than two thirds (69%) of those surveyed said that they were either very or somewhat interested in following the political campaigns in the election.

Table 42: Interest in the Campaigns (Markinor Opinion 2004)

	Percentage
Very Interested	18%
Somewhat Interested	51%
Not Interested	27%
Do Not Know	4%

SOURCE: SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004

Question: Are you interested in following the political campaigns for this year's national election?

Respondents in the CNEP survey also reported higher levels of interest in the campaign than in politics in general. Almost half (49%) indicated that they were very interested or somewhat interested in the campaign compared to the third who reported being very interested or somewhat interested in politics.

Table 43: Interest in the Campaign (Comparative National Elections Project)

	Percentage
Very interested	23%
Somewhat interested	25%
Not very interested	19%
Not at all interested	32%
Don't know	1%
Total	100%

Source: Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004.

Could you please tell me to what extent you were interested in following this election campaign-? 0= Not interested at all, 1= Not very interested, 2 = Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested

Low proportions of the electorate indicated that they discussed issues relating to the campaign in 2004. About a third said that they discussed the candidates, parties or issues

with family and friends “often” or “sometimes”. Less than one in five discussed the campaign with neighbours or co-workers.

Table 44: Discussion of Campaign Issues, 2004.

	Discuss candidates, parties or issues with family	Discuss candidates, parties or issues with friends	Discuss candidates, parties or issues with neighbours	Discuss candidates, parties or issues with co-workers
Never	53%	51%	72%	78%
Rarely	17%	13%	11%	7%
Sometimes	22%	25%	13%	9%
Often	9%	11%	5%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004.

Question: How frequently did you talk about the candidates, parties or issues with your: family; friends; neighbours; co-workers

8.6 Attention To Campaign News

While low proportions said that they discussed issues relating to the 2004 campaign, majorities indicated that they paid attention to campaign news presented via all media types. Overall 57% indicated they paid “much” or “some” attention to campaign news in newspapers. Similarly 57% and 60% said that they paid “much” or “some” attention to campaign news on the radio and television respectively

Table 45: Attention Paid to Campaign News, 2004.

	Attention to campaign news from newspapers	Attention to campaign news from radio	Attention to campaign news from television
Much Attention	18%	24%	25%
Some Attention	38%	33%	34%
Little Attention	33%	33%	30%
No Attention	11%	11%	11%
Missing	793	497	582
Total	407	702	617


Source: Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004.

Questions: Overall, how much attention did you pay to the election campaign news that you read in the newspapers? Overall, how much attention did you pay to election campaign news that you heard on the radio? Overall, how much attention did you pay to election news that you heard on television?

8.7 Party Identification

In South Africa, levels of partisanship have declined significantly between 1994 and 2004 and the numbers of independent non-partisan, potentially “floating voters” have simultaneously increased. Declared partisanship was highest after the momentous 1994 election, with 88% saying that they felt close to a political party and at its lowest in 1999 with under half (45%) identifying with a political party. By end of 2004, 60% of the South African electorate indicated loyalty to a particular political party.

Figure 19: Levels of Partisanship in South Africa, 1994 -2004



Source Schulz-Herzenberg, 2007.

Strikingly, eighty one percent of those who said that they identified with a party identified with the ANC i.e. the vast majority of party identifiers were ANC identifiers, while identification with opposition parties was minimal. We could reasonably assume that that identification with the ANC is a tight emotional attachment, not subject to cross-pressures such as campaign stimuli. This would explain Piombo’s (2005:279) observation that “the decreased share of the vote earned by the opposition as a whole suggests that it is mainly opposition voters who stayed at home”. They are probably from the same pool of voters who say that they do not feel close to any political party, given that negligible proportions of the electorate say they feel close to any other political party.

As at 2004, just under half of the South African electorate (48%) indicated loyalty to the ANC while identification with opposition parties was minimal. In the Afrobarometer 2004 survey, eighty one percent of those who said that they identified with a party identified with the ANC i.e. that the vast majority of party identifiers were ANC identifiers. As Schultz- Herzenberg (2007:119) indicates, party identification seems to be weakening for all parties - independents are disproportionately coming from the opposition parties, which have experienced a much higher rate of decline than the ANC.

Within the South African context, those people who had direct experience or contact with the political system such as experiencing the wrath of the apartheid regime or being the victim of a politically motivated crime are more likely to have an emotional attachment to the party with which they identify, such as the original identification which Campbell et al described. These partisans are more likely to have a tighter connection to that political party and be less resistant to contrary influences such as election campaigns, i.e. they could be classified as “ritual partisans”. Younger generations, who did not live through apartheid but heard stories about it through their parents or other significant people, are more likely to have a cognitive rather than strong emotional attachment to a party. Schultz-Herzenberg (2007:124) indicates in her longitudinal analyses of trends in party identification that there is tentative evidence of a decline in partisanship among younger voters, with the lowest level of partisanship being displayed among 18-29 year olds by 2004.

8.8 Partisanship *and* Political Interest

Using Dalton’s categorization of voters Mattes (2005:60) indicates that the proportion of “apartisans” has remained at ten percent or less over the past decade, and the proportion of “cognitive partisans” has remained at roughly 15% or less and so only about one quarter of the South African electorate met Dalton’s definition of a cognitively mobilized voter. Mattes (2005:60) therefore concludes that “even though South Africa has a relatively large proportion of non-partisan voters, the vast majority of these voters probably do not have the information or cognitive skills that would enable them to shift their party allegiances on the basis of ongoing party performance or policy issues”.

However, if one adds those that are “somewhat” interested to those who are very

interested, a different trend emerges. In the 2004 Afrobarometer survey, of those who do not feel close to a party, half the respondents say that they are interested and half say that they are not. This categorization would place the proportion of apertisans at a far more substantial 50%. Furthermore more than two thirds of those who say that they feel close to a political party (68%) say that they are somewhat or very interested in public affairs.

Table 46: Interest in Public Affairs by Party Identification

	No, not close to any party	Yes, feels close to a party	Refused to answer	Don't know	Total
Not at all interested	27%	14%	23%	15%	18%
Not very interested	24%	18%	24%	36%	20%
Somewhat interested	32%	33%	28%	23%	32%
Very interested	17%	35%	24%	23%	29%
Don't know	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Afrobarometer 2004.

Questions How interested would you say you are in public affairs?
Do you feel close to any particular political party?

Furthermore, a majority (57%) of those who did not feel close to any political party said that they discussed politics occasionally (46%) or frequently (11%). Among partisans, almost three quarters (70%) said that they discussed politics occasionally (47%) or frequently (22%).

Table 47: Extent of Political Discussion by Party Identification

	No, not close to any party	Yes, feels close to a party	Refused to answer	Don't know	Total
Never	42%	30%	42%	30%	34%
Occasionally	46%	47%	39%	51%	46%
Frequently	11%	22%	16%	9%	19%
Don't know	1%	1%	3%	11%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Afrobarometer 2004

Question: When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters: Never; Occasionally; Frequently. Do you feel close to any particular political party?

Thus, a less strict categorization of the South African electorate, i.e. not including tertiary education and including voters who were “somewhat interested” in politics and “occasionally” discussed political matters points to public open to persuasion during campaigns.

8.9 Political Efficacy

As indicated, numerous studies have demonstrated the importance of a sense of internal efficacy for engagement in democratic processes. A few of the surveys conducted between 1994 and 2004 asked South African respondents a range of questions related to political efficacy. The results indicate that in 2004 South African voters had a severe shortfall of internal political efficacy.

In 1999, a majority of respondents (54%) interviewed for the first Opinion 99 survey felt that they had “quite a good understanding of the important issues facing South Africa”, however only 35 percent indicated that they felt “well prepared for participating in political life”. In the first Afrobarometer survey, six in ten (62%) felt that they did not “have enough information about political life and the actions of government”. In the 2000 and 2004 Afrobarometer surveys, respondents were asked whether they could understand politics and government or if they felt that it was too complicated to understand. In both surveys, large majorities felt that politics and government affairs sometimes “seem so complicated” that they “can’t really understand what’s going on”.

Table 48: Internal Political Efficacy, 2000 and 2004.

Internal Efficacy	Afrobarometer 2000	Afrobarometer 2004
Strongly Agree	31%	25%
Agree	45%	41%
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	12%	14%
Disagree	10%	13%
Strongly Disagree	3%	4%
Don't know	.2%	4%
Total	100%	100%

Source: Afrobarometer 2000 and 2004

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on

As of 1995 South Africans displayed a high sense of optimism about the impact of voting with 64 percent saying that voting can make things better and 64 percent agreeing that “it is important who is in power because it can make a difference to what happens”. By 2000, South Africans retained this optimism, with six in ten (62%) Afrobarometer respondents saying that they way they vote “can make things better in the future” and 64

percent still agreeing that “it is important who is in power because it can make a difference to what happens”. Unfortunately these questions were not repeated in any of the 2004 surveys. It would have been interesting to see 2004 data on the efficacy of voting given the steady decline in voter participation. The 2004 Afrobarometer survey asked how well elections “enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want”. Overall, the largest proportion (46%) felt that elections *do not* perform this function well while 38 percent felt that it does.

8.10 Conclusion

The data revealed a previously unacknowledged interest in political and campaign matters. South African voters were interested in politics displaying a higher level of interest in election campaigns than politics in general. In the Afrobarometer survey a majority of those who did not feel close to any political party said that they discussed politics occasionally or frequently. The analysis thus revealed a substantial body of voters available to be persuaded through an election campaign.

However, the results also showed that while South African voters felt that voting is important, they had a severe shortfall of internal political efficacy. This and the declining levels of partisan loyalty (and by extension, the proportion of voters possessing a highly effective method of organizing and evaluating political information) had important implications for campaign management. Parties could not simply rely on broad appeals to mobilize their supporters; rather, they needed to use a variety of accessible media to convince voters of the merits of voting for them via persuasive and compelling messages. These messages would both need to deal with issues of concern of to voters. It would also need to convince voters of their capacity to deliver on those promises. Instead as seen in chapter 5, political parties engaged in destructive campaign tactics and promised similar policy outcomes without communicating their strategies to achieve these outcomes.

CHAPTER NINE: THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ON THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

9.1 Introduction

Among the basic criteria for designating a country as an *electoral democracy* are that voters have access to information about candidates and their platforms, that they can vote without undue pressure from authorities and that candidates can campaign free from intimidation (Freedom House, 2002). A *quality democracy* provides its citizens with a high degree of freedom, political equality and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: x-xii). As noted in chapter one, competitive elections require high turnout levels combined with the credible threat of electoral alternation. This enhances vertical accountability and responsiveness (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xix) because the threat of eviction induces policy-makers to give greater consideration to the needs of voters. Moreover, *good quality election campaigns* increase electoral competition and simultaneously strengthen vertical accountability and democratic responsiveness by allowing competing parties to articulate their stances (Street, 2001: 253) by giving citizens' unfettered access to alternative sources of information including independent media and divergent opinion (Diamond, 1996: 11) and by providing incentives for people to vote. In turn, election campaigns, responsiveness, vertical accountability and ultimately democracy all require strong opposition parties, sufficient information, independent and pluralistic mass media as well as active and engaged voters.

The *democratic impact* of an election campaign can be judged by the extent to which it drew voters into the electoral process thus facilitating accountability and responsiveness. To assess whether this occurred in South Africa's 2004 campaign, I revisit the findings of each component of my analytical model. I then look at trends in participation and insights provided by the focus group discussions. Finally, I provide a series of recommendations given the findings revealed by my analysis.

9.2 Assessing the 2004 Election Campaign

To answer the question of whether the 2004 campaign provided voters with an incentive to vote as well as contributed to an environment conducive to accountability and responsiveness I return to my analytical model. Based on this ideal model I argued that for election campaigns to enhance the quality of democracy: political parties perceived as competent, trustworthy and inclusive (by the voting public) must transmit a high volume of comparative policy-relevant campaign messages through a widely accessible and credible range of media to an interested and efficacious electorate, providing them with an incentive to go to the polls and cast their ballot.

I find that the campaign damaged rather than enhanced the quality of democracy in South Africa. As noted at the beginning of this thesis, South Africa now has freedom, free and fair elections, a democratic constitution, a Constitutional Court, an extensive judicial system, transformed political institutions as well as a wide range of political and socio-economic rights. However, it has poor quality election campaigns. In South Africa the campaigning process, which should “temporarily change the basis of political involvement from citizenship to partisanship; and in the process attract interest and votes from people who generally find politics uninteresting and remote” (Popkin, 1991:8), *appears to actually hamper voter participation.*

In 2004 a substantial body of voters without firm partisan attachments (but with low levels of internal efficacy) was available to be persuaded by political parties. These voters had unprecedented access to the mass media with vastly increased television access and almost universal radio coverage reaching into remote rural areas. However, they also possessed largely negative images of opposition parties and their leaders and/or lacked information about them. This meant that these parties needed to deal with those negative perceptions and work hard to convince and persuade voters of the merits of voting (for them).

Instead of doing this, campaign messages blurred rather than illuminated the choices for voters and failed to provide distinctions between policies, instead promising similar outcomes without adequately communicating their strategies to achieve these promises. Based solely on the campaign messages, it would be reasonable for a voter to have

concluded that the ANC would win the election by a large majority, that opposition parties had little to offer compared to what was already offered by the ANC and that therefore their individual vote would not count for much.

There was also a striking lack of direct contact between opposition party members and voters which meant that voters had limited opportunities to communicate with and question party representatives. Parties and party leaders also engaged in acrimonious attacks against each other. Negative campaigning was the norm rather than the exception.

The poor communication by parties was further compounded by the media's pre-occupation with conflict and hostility between party leaders. Despite emerging as unbiased, coverage of the 2004 campaign lacked depth and tended to be sensationalist and focused on events, public appearances and the scathing attacks and public confrontations between parties. The media's coverage thus provided little assistance to voters attempting to sift through the chaotic array of information presented to them. Moreover, the coverage was disproportionately provided by the print media even while voters were most likely to use radio and television to follow the campaign.

Juxtaposing my empirical findings against my analytical model reveals a bleak picture of campaigning in South Africa. To sum up: every component of the model received a predominantly negative assessment. Based on my analysis, a summary statement of South Africa's 2004 campaign would be that negatively perceived politicians and opposition parties engaged in destructive campaign tactics covered by news media which was sensationalist and lacking in depth, thus resulting in a dearth of pertinent, information contributing to a decline in voter participation.

Figure 20: The 2004 Election Campaign in South Africa.

<u>Who</u>	<u>Said What</u>	<u>Through Which Channels</u>	<u>To Whom</u>	<u>With What Effect</u>
Political leaders perceived as making promises simply to get elected; and opposition leaders perceived as untrustworthy and unable to deal with major issues	Promised similar outcomes without explaining strategies; and Attacked opponents and highlighted their shortcomings;	Via neutral, events-based, sensational coverage which focused on confrontations between leaders,	Voters who are interested in politics but lack internal political efficacy;	Contributing to a decline in voter participation

These results can best be understood by looking at Louw and Buchanan’s analysis of the relationship between candidates, journalists and voters. Buchanan argues that candidate incentives (of electoral victory) combine with media incentives (the need for peer respect, novelty, immediacy and the pressure of sustaining or increasing readership figures) and with certain traits of the electorate (such as alienation and indifference) to invite and offer rationalizations for the use of manipulation and deception. According to Buchanan the difficulties of motivating an often indifferent and inattentive public invites candidate appeals to narrow self-interest and to emotions like fear, prejudice and anger as well as “emotional appeals that covertly trigger racial resentment”. Media incentives evoke campaign coverage practices (such as a focus on the most dramatic and conflictual features of the campaign) and discourages extensive or detailed substantive coverage of policies (Buchanan, 2001: 366-370). The mutually-reinforcing, symbiotic relationship between journalists and candidates drives journalists to produce ‘spectacle’ news: a genre requiring dramatic or entertaining stories with a focus on evaluating personalities not policy-making abilities. At the same time, this results in voter cynicism towards politics as well as a growing apathy and withdrawal from participation, which then fuels the above-mentioned patterns (Louw 2005:270-89).

In 2004 the campaign was characterized by the features described by Buchanan and Louw. Rather than delving into their policy platforms, candidates appealed to voter’s fears, prejudices and anger and launched scathing attacks on each other. The media

focused on the most dramatic and conflictual aspects of the campaign. It is likely that this contributed to an increase in voter cynicism toward the democratic system and alienation from the political process. Thus, as aptly explained by Buchanan and Louw, it is the *interactions* between politicians, the media and voters that have a detrimental impact on the quality of South Africa's democracy.


Given this negative state of affairs, it is probable that the 2004 election campaign in South Africa offered modest value to voters and in many instances "turned them off" from voting. For focus group participants, the campaigns seemed to *amplify* pre-existing feelings of disillusionment. They felt that the campaigns were ultimately an exercise in impression management and displayed a distinct aversion for campaign rhetoric. They indicated that it would take far more than innovative communication strategies to improve the image of politicians and opposition parties. Several focus group participants did feel that campaigns were important because they gave people hope, connected leaders to voters and helped voters decide between political parties. However, others felt that campaigns were simply a waste of valuable resources with parties making the same promises every election. Both groups of non-voters indicated that a party could convince them to vote through increased visibility in communities, by keeping their promises and by delivering change. In other words they wanted to be convinced by the actions of party leaders between elections rather than by the rhetoric of a campaign. This supports Booyesen's findings of twenty three focus group discussions conducted in the run-up to the 1999 election. Booyesen (1999b:38) noted that, at that stage, South African voters were still highly motivated to vote but felt weary of election campaigns and rather wanted "feedback, progress reports and people coming to their communities to listen and hear".

9.3 Participation Patterns

Participation has declined sharply since the first democratic election in 1994. Participation as a proportion of the voting age population (VAP) declined from 86% in 1994 down to 72% in 1999 and 58% in 2004. As seen in the diagram below, participation in national elections, counted as a percentage of voting age population, has decreased by 30 percentage points between 1994 and 2004 (Piombo, 2005: 253). As Schultz-Herzenberg indicates, the number of votes cast (or overall turnout) has decreased by

roughly 3.9 million since 1994, despite growth in VAP and increases in registration. Taken differently, these figures indicate that 6.76 million eligible voters inadvertently or deliberately remained unregistered and 5.06 million registered voters stayed away from the polls, or were for one or other reason prevented from voting (Southall and Daniel, 2005:38).

Figure 21: Turnout in South African General Elections, 1994-2004




Source of data: Piombo, 2005.

While this decrease in voter turnout is not unique to South Africa, as Mattes (2006: 107) points out – it was not inevitable²⁸⁹. Mattes argues that neither South Africa’s choice of electoral system, its experience with democracy nor its level of development accounts for the level of voter participation. Whatever the underlying reason, the limited contact between voters and their representatives between elections and the fact that these elections occur only every five years makes the continuing decline in voter participation a cause for concern. Further declines would not bode well for South Africa’s fledgling democracy.

²⁸⁹ Some analysts indicate that many established western democracies have seen declining or low voter turnout and that this is a “normal” trend. Afrimap and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (2006:7), in their review of democracy and political participation in South Africa, note that “as a percentage of the registered electorate, the 2004 turnout in South Africa is roughly comparable with Western European levels and much higher than many African countries” and the overall rate of electoral participation in South Africa is “relatively good”.

Declining participation in South Africa also needs to be located within a context of increasing ANC margins. In South Africa the negative implications of declining levels of voter participation for democratic responsiveness and accountability are more severe due to the increasing electoral strength of the ruling African National Congress. The ANC's proportion of the vote, taken as a proportion of total votes cast, increased from 62 percent in 1994 to 66 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2004. In contrast, votes cast for opposition parties decreased from 33% in 1994 down to 22% in 1999 and down to 18% in 2004. As Mattes (2005:106) indicates turnout trends and voting patterns are not unrelated. As a proportion of all eligible voters, votes cast for the ANC decreased from 56% in 1994, down to 42% in 1999 and then down to 40% in 2004, a 39% decline in the size of the ANC vote bloc. By 2004, more people (42%) stayed at home than voted for the ANC. The disproportionate abstention of opposition supporters creates the appearance of increasing support for the governing party even as its actual active support across the population may be declining (Mattes, 2005:106-107). Piombo (2005:279) also argues that "the decreased share of the vote earned by the opposition as a whole would suggest that it is mainly opposition voters who stayed at home." Thus, while the number of seats the ANC obtained increased from 252 in 1994 to 266 in 1999 and 279 in 2004, the overall number of votes cast for them had decreased. The nearly 70 per cent ANC majority the ANC achieved in 2004 translates into a 40 per cent minority of the entire eligible population (Southall and Daniel, 2004:38).

Figure 22: Turnout and Electoral Trends in South Africa, 1994 – 2004



Source: Mattes, 2006.

Obtaining increasing proportions of the vote share from decreasing proportions of the electorate undermines vertical accountability and democratic responsiveness. Firstly, there is a diminished incentive for incumbents to anticipate and realize citizens' desires. Secondly, citizens may feel disempowered by their inability to evict unresponsive policy makers. The 2004 campaign reduced rather than fostered competition. Increasing ANC support, along with declining participation levels has thus lead to questions about the quality of South Africa's newly established democracy. The specter of continued ANC victories is not negative per se, what is problematic is that these victories may be the result of no other feasible alternative thus reducing accountability and responsiveness.

In the 2004 elections, the conditions that favour democratic responsiveness and vertical accountability were lacking. Opposition parties were not seen by voters as viable alternatives to the ANC; there was a lack of debate around policy alternatives; the media blurred rather than clarified choices and voters lacked political efficacy. Taken together, these results indicate a downward spiral. If South Africans are not presented with viable alternatives from competent inclusive trustworthy opposition parties, voters will find little incentive to cast their ballot and consequently the governing party has little need to be accountable and take seriously the opinions and needs of ordinary people.

The answer to the question of whether the 2004 election campaign contributed to the quality of democracy in South Africa has to be a resounding "no!" My study reveals a unflattering picture of campaigning in the 2004 elections. The 2004 election campaign offered minimal value and in many instances could have "turned voters off" from casting their ballot. If left unchecked, this situation could result in the weakening of the quality of democracy. The threat to a new democracy such as South Africa's is, as Huntington (1997:64) and Schedler (1998: 97) point out, not overthrow but incremental erosion and decay.

9.4 Recommendations

It is in the interests of both the ANC and opposition parties that voters return to the electoral process and turnout levels increase. For opposition parties, increased voter alienation means limited possibilities for an enlarged vote share given that abstainers are

predominantly non-partisan or opposition supporters. For the ANC a situation where only a minority of the voting population renews their mandate could lead to a decline in legitimacy and result in different set of challenges. Moreover, the fact that the problem lies primarily with broad structural arrangements and political institutions, exhorting voters to “get back into the game” is likely to yield limited results. Given the bleak situation outlined in this thesis, the pertinent question is, “What practical steps can be taken to progress to a situation where election campaigns provide citizens with the incentive to vote and enhance rather than hinder the quality of democracy in South Africa?”

Firstly, at a structural level, the disparity caused by the existing funding allocation system requires reconsideration. As Popkin (1991:67) notes, “elections are competitive when challengers have sufficient money to convey themselves and their messages to voters”. It is important that development of a regulatory framework, including mechanisms to address this disparity, be given strong consideration.²⁹⁰

Secondly, opposition parties need to develop strategies to improve the way in which they are perceived by voters. As a first step, opposition parties will need to consider what it is that underpins the negative perceptions of them. If parties fail to address these negative perceptions around trust, credibility and inclusiveness, the most innovative of future campaign strategies aimed at wooing independent voters, will be of little effect. As Mattes (2006:115) asserts a more competitive system in South Africa requires the rapid development of skills and capacity in opposition parties.

In addition to improving their image, opposition parties need to raise their profile because in many instances voters simply could not offer an opinion about them. This indicates that they have not branded themselves in the minds of voters. Leaders should make themselves more visible in communities and parties should increase the extent of

²⁹⁰ The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) has been advocating against the current system in which private donations are not fully disclosed to the public or regulated law, because of the “corrupting tendencies” of these donations (Matlosa, 2004a:2). A conference on party funding hosted by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) recommended that: a limit be established on the amount of funding parties may receive from private donors; a threshold be determined for expenditure on party campaigning; a situation where parties become too dependent on public financing, be guarded against as this would undermine the relationship between parties and their supporters; there should be fair and equal access to state-owned media by contending parties other than the ruling party and clear regulatory mechanisms should be put in place to ensure accountability and transparency with regard to private donations to political parties (Motlosa, 2004b:123).

direct contact with voters outside of election periods. Parties also need to plan their campaigns adequately, developing mechanisms to generate both free and paid media that reinforce each other. Parties should use radio more extensively, given the fact that it is such a widely accessed and powerful medium.

Another challenge for political parties is to move away from the mud-slinging that has characterized election campaigning in South Africa. The bitter animosity and vicious attacks on each other have clearly done little to draw voters into the electoral process. Not only should the content be transformed but also the style and tone with which it is delivered. While there is an Electoral Code of Conduct which commits all parties to a range of provisions concerning electioneering (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:7-8), parties still exercise choice over the ways in which they conduct their campaigns. Currently, there is little incentive for parties to engage in constructive campaigning practices. Thus, parties may operate within the framework of Electoral Code of Conduct but continue to engage in negative practices which turn voters off. Whilst this is a complex issue with no easy solution, a framework to guide parties away from this destructive pattern should be considered.

Furthermore, competing parties should articulate themselves adequately to allow citizens to engage fully with the content of their communications. As Dunn (1999:339) argues “a political system in which accountability is enacted on the basis of ignorance and incomprehension is unlikely to benefit anyone with much consistency”. Parties consequently need to consider transforming their campaign messages so as to provide the electorate with a comprehensive overview of their policy stances, and plans to implement them. Parties also need to develop messages that attract interest in the electoral process and motivate people to cast their ballot. As more young voters, without firm partisan attachments open to campaign stimuli, enter the electoral system it is imperative that parties present clear information to them during the campaign period so that they are given the means by which to make a well-informed choice. As seen in numerous surveys, voters are keenly aware of the problems facing the country and they also know the policy areas in which government has shortcomings. As Keys (1967: 1) said more than forty years ago “Voters are not fools”. Therefore, it makes very little sense to use the crucial period leading up to election day to *again* explain what the problems are and how the government has failed. Voters already know that. Having a national conversation

about performance failure must be balanced with a discussion about how to fix those failures. Therefore, opposition parties should move away from a critique of government performance as the primary basis of their campaign messages. Instead they need to provide clear details of how *they* will implement solutions.

However, a good campaign is only the starting point. Or in this case, it should be the end point of a productive inter-campaign period. Voter perceptions of political parties and party leaders are based on prior knowledge and experience. These perceptions are relatively deep-rooted and generally formed long before the campaign period begins. The action that parties need to take will require moving beyond improved communication strategies. Better communications, improved campaign themes, carefully-constructed policy-relevant messages and considerate campaign tactics *on its own* will no longer satisfy South African voters. As the focus groups revealed, the problem runs deeper than image management. Following the example of the professionalized campaign industry prevalent in more established democracies is likely to do South Africa's democracy more harm than good.²⁹¹ Slick well-constructed campaigns, which cost vast sums of cash, are offensive to people struggling to meet their basic everyday needs. Parties can develop methods to assist communities in dealing with some of their problems outside of election periods. For example, parties could partner with faith-based organizations and non-governmental organizations, and increase their efforts to tackle issues such as HIV and AIDS, substance abuse, crime, poverty and more. Genuine efforts to alleviate problems of importance to voters are likely to lead to increased visibility, improved party images and a willingness to vote for that party. Political parties should also consider extensive drives to establish functioning branch structures. This would, in turn, rebuild the stock of partisan identification and again provide the cognitive hook for voters to use, as they navigate their way through campaign material.

Finally, as previously stated, the media has a critical role in South Africa's young democracy because the provision of political information enables voters to both make political choices and hold government to account.²⁹² Gerwel (2005:1) points out that "after little more than ten years of democracy in South Africa, the need for quality

²⁹¹ Louw (2005:27) argues that there has been a growth of professionalized industry of impression managers who research the political environment to decide what sort of political face will be most popular, 'invent' such a face and then groom and coach candidates to perform this role.

²⁹² Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer (2007:122) also argue that the media has a particularly critical role to play in young democracies.

journalism is as urgent and important now as it has ever been”.

Jacobs (2004:37) describes the media in South Africa “as a potent and often ambivalent power centre that must be understood on its own terms.” The results of this study points to the emergence of a destructive campaign cycle, with long-term damaging effects. The way in which the media covered the campaign is a continuation of the coverage practices which emerged in the 1999 election. Even then, Jacobs (1999:150) noted that the media failed to grapple with the issues of concern to voters and focused primarily on vote-catching events. While media houses need to attract the interest of its audience (and a focus on the most dramatic and conflictual elements of a campaign might raise audience figures in the short-term), as seen above, in the long-term it has damaging effects.

Journalists can provide in-depth analysis, critically scrutinize proposed policies and set out the implications of these policies in a way that is understandable to ordinary citizens. In-depth news pieces could be done in consultation with relevant experts so that content can be put into a larger perspective. Hadland (2005:14) notes that “South Africa needs quality media, equipped to understand, analyze and convey our complex society and so contribute to the deepening of its fledgling democracy”.

Journalists and other media professionals, more than politicians, have the power to break the destructive cycle that is evolving in South Africa. As Louw (2005:90) indicates, the power of journalists comes from the fact that politicians need the media. Thus, as Louw argues, journalists potentially have the power to disrupt and undermine the work of spin-doctors by refusing to accept the line they are spinning and unearth the real issues. Media houses can choose to inject their coverage with policy-relevant material. This would help voters to sift through the vast array of information and distinguish between the policy platforms of parties. Radio stations in particular could increase their volume of campaign coverage and provide more information on the merits and logistics of voting. This would also assist in dealing with the lack of political efficacy revealed by the data.

It is apparent that media professionals in South Africa face a complicated series of challenges. However, given South Africa’s complex historical context, many in the media have faced tougher challenges and risen to the occasion. In South Africa, it is time for media professionals to stand back and consider the “rules of the game”, which for too

long have been played without sufficient self-reflection. Indeed Berger (2005:26) concludes that South Africa has the capacity to generate a new paradigm of journalism. Self-scrutiny and a cognisance of these relationships could well be the key to breaking the negative symbiosis developing between political parties and the media, aptly described by Louw in his analysis of the media and political processes.

Hopefully, the findings of this study will foster a renewed debate around the role and character of campaigning, as well as the complex relationship between political parties, voters and the mass media in South Africa's still fragile democracy.

University of Cape Town

REFERENCES

- Achen, C. H. 1992 Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research. *Political Behaviour*. 14(3):195-211.
- Afrimap and Open Society Foundation for South Africa. 2006. *South Africa: Democracy and Political Participation: a Review by Afrimap and Open Society Foundation for South Africa*. Cape Town: Open Society Foundation for South Africa.
- Allerman, A. 2004. What a Difference a Decade Makes. *Marketing Mix*. 22(3): 28.
- Aquilla, P. 2007. Web-based Citizen Engagement in the 2004 Australian Federal Election. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 165-177.
- African National Congress. 2004a. *Manifesto 2004: A People's Contract to Create Work and Fight Poverty*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2004/manifesto/manifestoprt.html> [2005, April 8].
- African National Congress. 2004b. Budget Takes us Closer to Realising our Dreams. *ANC Today*. 4(7) 20-26 February. [Online] Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004c. *DA's 'Debate' Ploy*. 16 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2004/pr0216.html> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004d. District Six Reminds us Never to Turn Back. *ANC Today*. 4(6): 13-19 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004e. *Feedback on Tony Leon Debate*. 19 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2004/pr0219b.html> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004f. District Six reminds us never to turn back. *ANC Today*. 4(6) 13-19 February. [Online] Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004g. Poverty alleviation: Government intensifies fight against poverty. *ANC Today*. 4(6): 13-19 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004h. Health care transformation: Certificate of Need is a tool for better health care provision. *ANC Today*. 4(7): 20-26 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004i. Opposition politics: The DA cannot disguise its policies of backward change. *ANC Today*. 4(7): 20-26 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].

- African National Congress. 2004j. Public service transformation: Women manage to break through artificial ceiling. *ANC Today*. 4(8): 27 February - 4 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004k. We must work to ensure free and fair elections. *ANC Today*. 4(8): 27 February - 4 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004l. Voters will not be swayed by fear or fiction. *ANC Today*. 4(9): 5-11 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004m. The myth of jobless growth. *ANC Today*. 4(9): 5-11 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004n. We need a people's contract to create work. *ANC Today*. 4(9): 5-11 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004o. Fighting poverty: If we work together, we can halve poverty in ten years. *ANC Today*. 4(10): 12-18 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004p. Our constitution reflects the values of the people. *ANC Today*. 4(10): 12-18 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004q. *ANC response to DA Request for a Debate*. 12 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2004/pr0312a.html> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004r. Fighting crime: Working together we can build safer communities. *ANC Today*. 4(11): 19-25 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004s. Litany of lies shows lack of respect for the people. *ANC Today*. 4(11): 19-25 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004t. Elections 2004: Only the ANC can unite South Africans for a better life. *ANC Today*. 4(12): 26 March-1 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004u. Voters will decide the fate of rightwing coalition. *ANC Today*. 4(12): 26 March-1 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004v. Elections 2004: Learning from experience, we can do more. *ANC Today*. 4(13): 2-8 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].

- African National Congress. 2004w. Our people must freely express their will. *ANC Today*. 4(13): 2-8 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004x. Solomon Mahlangu: Our duty to those who fell before the dawn of freedom. *ANC Today*. 4(14): 9-15 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- African National Congress. 2004y. South Africans of all races will vote for a people's contract. *ANC Today*. 4(14): 9-15 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/> [2008, July 7].
- Ansolabehere, S. and Iyengar, S. 1993. A Case of Judgment Under Uncertainty. In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W.J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. London: Duke University Press. 225-263.
- Ansolabehere, S. and Iyengar, S. 1996. The Craft of Political Advertising: A Progress Report. In Mutz, D., Sniderman, P.M. and Brody, R.A Eds. *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 101-124.
- Asp, K. and Esaiasson, P. 1996. The Modernization of Swedish Campaigns In Mancini, P and Swanson, D.L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 73-90.
- Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 1990. *The Practice of Social Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beck, P.A., Dalton, R.J., Greene, S. and Huckfeldt L.M. 2002. The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices. *The American Political Science Review* 96 (1): 57-73. [Online]. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117810> [2008, July 23].
- Bartels, L.M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science*. 44(January): 35-50.
- Bennett, W.L. and Manheim, J.B. 2001. The Big Spin: Strategic Communication and the Transformation of Pluralist Democracy. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 279-298.
- Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. 2001. Mediated Politics: An Introduction. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1-29.
- Berger, G. 2005. Current Challenges. In Hadland, A. Ed. *Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African Journalism*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 19-28.

- Bingham Powell Jr, G. 2005. The Chain of Responsiveness. In Diamond, L. and Morlino, L Eds. *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*. Johns Hopkins: Baltimore. 62-75.
- Booyesen, S.1994. *Democracy, Liberation and the Vote in South Africa's First Democratic Election: The Matla Trust Voter Education Survey*. Witwatersrand: Matla Trust.
- Booyesen, S.1999a. Election 1999 and Scenarios for Opposition Politics in South Africa. *Politikon*. 26 (2):249-258.
- Booyesen, S.1999b. *Election 1999: The Voters Speak*. Durban: Centre for Socio-legal Studies.
- Booyesen, S.2004. History weighs more than reality: ANC's win will be based on political identity, not delivery or its policies. 2004. *The Star*, April, 1. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Booyesen, S. 2005. The Democratic Alliance: Progress and Pitfalls. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 129-147.
- Breytenbach, W. 1994. The New National Party. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The campaigns, results and future prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 114-124.
- Brody, R.A. 1986. Candidate Evaluations and the Vote: Some Considerations Affecting the Application of Cognitive Psychology to Voting Behavior In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 297-302.
- Brooks, H. 2004. *The Dominant Party System: Challenges for South Africa's Second Decade of Democracy*. Occasional Paper 25. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
- Buchanan, B.I. 2001. Mediated Electoral Democracy: Campaigns, Incentives and Reform. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 362-379.
- Buthelezi, M. 2004a. *Launch Of The IFP Electoral Campaign In Limpopo*. February, 14. [Online]. Available: [http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/s Releases/](http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/s%20Releases/) [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi, M. 2004b. *Media Conference On The Launch Of The IFP Pledge Campaign On HIV/AIDS*. March, 8. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/speeches/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi, M. 2004c. *Launch of the KZN Growth and Development Plan*. March, 29. [Online]. Available: [http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/s Speeches /](http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/s%20Speeches/) [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi, M. 2004d. *Signing Of The Agreement Between The Inkatha Freedom Party And The Freedom Front Plus*. April, 1. [Online]. Available: [http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/s Speeches /](http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/s%20Speeches/) [2005, April 8].

- Buthelezi, M. 2004e. *IFP Election Rally – West Ridge Stadium*, Port Elizabeth. April, 4. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/speeches/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi, M. 2004f. *IFP Election Rally – Mtomuhle Sports Field*. April, 5. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/speeches/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi, M. 2004g. *IFP Election Rally – Park Sports Complex*, Port Elizabeth. April, 10. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/speeches/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi, M. 2004h. *IFP Election Rally – Nongoma*. April, 12. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/speeches/> [2005, April 8].
- Butler, A. 2000: Is South Africa Heading Towards Authoritarian Rule? Instability Myths and Expectations Traps in a New Democracy. *Politikon*. 29(2): 189-205.
- Butler, A. 2007. The State of the African National Congress. In Buhlungu, S. Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. Eds. *State of the Nation South Africa 2007*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 35-53.
- Butler, P. and Collins, N. 1999. A Conceptual Framework for Political Marketing. In Newman, B.I. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 55-72.
- Carlson, T. and Strandberg, K. 2007. Finland: the European Parliament election in a candidate-centred electoral system. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K. A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 29-42.
- Camay, P. and Gordon, A.J. 2000. *The People Have Spoken: A Review of the 1999 South African Election*. Johannesburg: Co-operative for Research and Education.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Carpini, M. and Williams, B.A. 2001. Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Environment. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 160-181.
- Caspi, D. 1996. American-style Electioneering in Israel: Americanization versus Modernization. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 173-192.
- Chisholm, L. 2005. The State of South Africa's Schools. In Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. Eds. *State of the Nation South Africa: 2004-2005*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 210-226.
- Collier, D. and Levitsky, S. 1997. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. *World Politics*. 49: 430-51.

- Conover, P.J. 1986 and Feldman, S. The Role of Inference in the Perception of Political Candidates. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 127-158.
- Cook, T.E. 1997. *Governing With the News: The New Media as a Political Institution*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Cook, T.E. 2001. The Future of the Institutional Media. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 182 – 202.
- Daniel, J. 2004. The South African Elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004: The (Non) Issues Then and Now. *Election Synopsis*. 1(1): 12-14.
- Dahlgren, P. 2001. The Public Sphere and the Net: Structure, Space and Communication. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 33-55.
- Dalton, R.J. 1984. Cognitive Mobilisation and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies. *The Journal of Politics*. 46 (1) 264-284.
- Dalton, R.J. 1988. *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France*. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House.
- Dalton, R. 1996. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New Jersey: Chatham House. 96-219.
- Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M.P. 1993. 'The Not So Simple Act of Voting' In Finifter, A.W. Ed. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington D.C.: The American Political Science Association. 193-218.
- Dalton, R.J. 2000. The Decline of Party Identifications. In Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M.P. Eds. *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19-36.
- Dalton, R.J., McAllister, I. and Wattenberg, M.P. 2000. The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment. In Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M.P. Eds. *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 37-63.
- Davids, Y. D. 2004. The People's Agenda vs. Election Manifestos of the Political Parties. *Election Synopsis*. 1(3): 12-15.
- Davis, G. 2003. *Bridges and Bonds: List Proportional Representation and Campaigning in South Africa*. CSSR Working Paper No. 50. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Davis, G. 2005. Media Coverage and the Election: Were some parties more equal than others? In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 231-249.

- Davis, P.J. and Newman, B.I. 2006. *Winning Elections with Political Marketing*. New York: Haworth Press.
- Deegan, H. 1999. *South Africa Reborn: Building a New Democracy*. London: University College London.
- Dennis, J. 1970. Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public. *American Political Science Review*. 64(3): 819-835.
- Democratic Alliance. 2004a. *The Democratic Alliance 2004 General Election Manifesto*. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/da/Site/Eng/campaigns/2004/manifesto.asp> [2005, April 8].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004b. I challenge President Mbeki to debate. *SA Today*. 13 February. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=51> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004c. The ANC: creating poverty and fighting work. *SA Today*. 20 February. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=52> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004d. Deputy President Jacob Zuma and the imperial Presidency of Thabo Mbeki. *SA Today*. 27 February. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=53> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004e. The Big Five Lies the ANC tells about itself. *SA Today*. 5 March. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=54> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004f. The ANC has violated the spirit and letter of the Pan African Parliament Protocol. *SA Today*. 12 March. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=55> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004g. The President Mbeki is running scared. *SA Today*. 19 March. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=57> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004h. The Coalition for Change stands for a better tomorrow. *SA Today*. 26 March. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=58> [2008, July 7].
- Democratic Alliance. 2004i. The Final Push has Begun. *SA Today*. 2 April. [Online]. <http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=59> [2008, July 7].

- Democratic Alliance. 2004j. Ten Reasons for South Africans to vote against Thabo Mbeki on 14 April. *SA Today*. 6 April. [Online].
<http://www.da.org.za/DA/Site/Eng/satoday/SAToday.asp?SATodayID=60> [2008, July 7].
- Denton, R.E. 1996. Foreword In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D.L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. ix-x.
- Diamond, L. 1996. Is the Third Wave Over. *Journal of Democracy*. 7(3):20-37.
- Diamond, L. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*. Johns Hopkins: Baltimore.
- Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. 2005. Introduction. In Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. Eds. *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*. Baltimore :Johns Hopkins. ix-xiii.
- Donsbach, W. and Patterson, T.E. 2004. Political News Journalists: Partisanship, Professionalism and Political Roles in Five Countries. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 231-250.
- Druckman, J. 2005. Does Political Information Matter? *Political Communication*. 22(4):515-519.
- Dubow, S. 2000. *The African National Congress*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
- Duncan, J. and Seleokane, M. 1998. Introduction. In Duncan, J. and Seleokane, M. Eds. *Media and Democracy in South Africa*. Johannesburg: HSRC Press. 1-53.
- Dunn, J. 1999. Situating Democratic Political Accountability. In Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C. and Manin, B. Eds. *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 297-325.
- Eades, L.M. 1999. *The End of Apartheid in South Africa*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Edighji, O. 2004. Fear Versus Freedom: Minority Parties and the ANC. *Election Synopsis*. 1(2): 16-18.
- Eldridge, M. and Seekings, J. 1995. *An Uphill Battle: Voter Attitudes and ANC Strategy in the 1994 South African Elections*. Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town.
- Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. 2004a. *Comparing Political Communication Theories*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. 2004a. Meeting the Challenges of Global Communication and Integration: The Significance of Comparative Research in a Changing World. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 384-410.
- Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. 2004b. Comparing Political Communication: Reorientations in a Changing World. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3-22.
- Falkowski, A. and Cwalina, W. 1999. Methodology of Constructive Effective Political Advertising: An Empirical Study of the Polish Presidential Election in 1995. In Neuman, B.I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 283-304.
- Farrell, D. M. and Web, P. 2000. Political Parties as Campaign Organisations. In Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M.P. Eds. *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 102-128.
- Faull, J. 2004. Elections Adspend in Mainstream Media. *ePoliticsSA*. 7. [Online]. http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FRID%3D624%26PID%3D44[2008, July 17].
- Feree, K. E. 2004. *The Microfoundations of Ethnic Voting: Evidence from South Africa*. Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 40. Cape Town: Idasa.
- Ferree, K. E. 2006. Explaining South Africa's Racial Census. *The Journal of Politics*. 68 (4): 803-815.
- Fiorina, M. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American Presidential Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1985. Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy: a Panel Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*. 29: 891-913.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1987. The effects of participation on political efficacy and political support: evidence from a West German panel. *The Journal of Politics*. 49: 441-64.
- Fiske, S.T. 1986. Schema-Based Versus Piecemeal Politics: A Patchwork Quilt, But not a Blanket, of Evidence. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 41-54.
- Foot, K.A., Schneider, S.M. and Dougherty, M. 2007. Online Structure for Political Action in the 2004 U.S. congressional electoral web sphere. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 92-104.

- Foot, K.A., Schneider, S.M. and Dougherty, M. 2007. *Web Campaigning*. Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press.
- Foot, K. A., Schneider, S.M., Kluver, R., Xenos, M. and Jankowski, N.W. 2007. Comparing web production practices across electoral spheres. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 243-260.
- Freedom House. 2002. *Survey Methodology*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/methodology.htm> [2004, June 14].
- Friedman, S. 1999: Who We Are: Voter Participation, Rationality and the 1999 Election. *Politikon*. 26(2): 213-223.
- Friedman, S. 2004: Why We Vote: The issue of Identity. *Election Synopsis*. 1(2): 2-4.
- Friedman S. 2005. A Voice for Some: South Africa's Ten Years of Democracy. In J. Piombo & L. Nijzink. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 3-22.
- Gerwel, J. 2005. Foreword. In Hadland, A. Ed. *Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African Journalism*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 5-6.
- Giliomee, H. Myburgh, J. Schlemmer, L. 2001. Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa. *Democratization*. 8: 161-182.
- Giliomee, H. 1994. The National Party's Campaign for a Liberation Election. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The campaigns, results and future prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 43-71.
- Giliomee, H. 1998. South Africa's Emerging Dominant-Party Regime. *Journal of Democracy*. 9(4): 128-143.
- Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C. 1999. *The Awkward Embrace: One Party Domination and Democracy*. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers.
- Gregor, M. 2007. The Consequence of e-excellence: party websites in the Czech campaign for the 2004 European Parliament. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A. and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 77-91
- Greyling, L. 2004a. Multiparty democracy is a gem to treasure. 2004. *Business Day*, 5 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

- Greyling, L. 2004a. Independent Democrats: New party offers fresh direction. 2004. *Business Day*, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Gunther, R. Montero, J. R. and Puhle, H. 2007. Introduction: Intermediation, Information and Electoral Politics. In Gunther, R., Montero, J.R. and Puhle, H. Eds. *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1-28.
- Gunther, R. Montero, J. R. and Mughan, H. 2000. The Political Impact of the Media: Reassessment. In Gunther, R. and Mughan, H. *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 402-447.
- Gunther, R. Nikiforos, D. P. and Puhle, H. 1996. O'Donnell's Illusions: A Rejoinder. *Journal of Democracy*. 7(4):151-159.
- Habib A. and Naidu, S. 1999. Election '99: Was there a "coloured" and "Indian" vote? *Politikon*. 26(2): 189-200.
- Habib, A. and Naidu, S. 2004. Are South Africa's Elections a Racial Census? *Election Synopsis*. 1(2): 4-7.
- Habib, A. and Taylor, R. 1999. Parliamentary Opposition and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*. 26 (80): 261-267.
- Hadland, A. 2005. Introduction. In Hadland, A. Ed. *Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African Journalism*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 7-18.
- Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. 2004. Americanization, Globalization, and Secularization: Understanding the Convergence of Media Systems and Political Communication. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 25-44.
- Hameed, S. S. 2007. Internet Deployment in the 2004 Indonesian presidential elections. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 194-209.
- Hamill, J. 2004. The Elephant and the Mice: Election 2004 and the Future of Opposition Politics in South Africa. *The Round Table*. 93(377): 691-708.
- Hamill, R. and Lodge, M. 1986. Cognitive Consequences of Political Sophistication. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 69-94.
- Hardt, H. 1992. *Critical Communication Studies: Communication, History & Theory in America*. New York: Routledge.

- Hemson, D. and Owusu-Ampomah, K. 2004. Will South Africans 'Give freedom a chance?' *Election Synopsis*. 1(1): 14-16.
- Herman, E.S. and Chomsky, N. 1988. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Random House Inc.
- Hoeane, T. 2004. Under Strain: The Racial/Ethnic Interpretation of South Africa's 2004 Election. *Journal of African Elections*. 3(2): 1-26.
- Hoeane, T. 2005. Struggling to Represent the Left: The Pan Africanist Congress, the Azanian People's Organisation and the Independent Democrats. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 187-206.
- Hofrichter, J. 1999. Exit Polls and Election Campaigns. In Newman, B.I. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 223-243.
- Holbrook, T. 1996. *Do Campaigns Matter?* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Holomisa, B. 2004a. *Address to Election Rally at Orlando Stadium, Gauteng*. March, 20. [Online]. Available: <http://www.udm.org.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Holomisa, B. 2004b. *Address to Election Rally at KwaNobuhle Stadium Uitenhage/Port Elizabeth*. March, 22. [Online]. Available: <http://www.udm.org.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Holomisa, B. 2004c. *Address to Election Rally at Peter Mokaba Stadium, Limpopo*. March, 27. [Online]. Available: <http://www.udm.org.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Holomisa, B. 2004d. *Address to Election Rally at Independence Stadium, Transkei*. April, 3. [Online]. Available: <http://www.udm.org.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Holtz-Bacha, C. 2004. Americanization, Globalization, and Secularization: Understanding the Convergence of Media Systems and Political Communication. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 184-212.
- Hovland, C.I., Janis, I., and Kelly, H.H. 1953. *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

- Humphries, R. 1999. Assessing the 1999 Election Machinery: Views of Political Parties and Other Stakeholders. In Muthien, Y. Ed. *Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council Publishers. 65-84.
- Huntington, S.P. 1997. Democracy for the Long Haul. In Diamond, L., Plattner, M.F., Chu, Y. and Tien, H. Eds. *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 3-13.
- Iyengar, S. and Valentino, N.A. 2000. Who Says What? Source Credibility as a Mediator of Campaign Advertising. In Lupia, A, McCubbins, M.D. and Popkin, S.L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 108-129.
- Independent Democrats. 2004. *Bridging the Divides: Uniting South Africa behind a Common Vision*. [Online]. <http://www.id.org.za/policies/existing-policies> [2005, April 8].
- Inkatha Freedom Party. 2004a. IFP National Manifesto January 2004. *Real Development Now: Let's make a Difference – Together*. [Online]. <http://www.ifp.org.za/2004/Downloads/IFP%20Manifesto.PDF> [2006, August 2].
- Inkatha Freedom Party. 2004b. *IFP to Unveil Pledge to Tackle Poverty Today, Durban: 20 March 2004*. [Online]. <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/Releases/> [2006, August 2].
- Inkatha Freedom Party. 2004c. *IFP to Unveil Clean Governance Pledge Today, Durban: 21 March 2004*. [Online]. <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/Releases/> [2006, August 2].
- Inkatha Freedom Party. 2004d. *IFP to Launch Pledge for A Safer South Africa Today, Durban: 22 March 2004*. [Online]. <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/Releases/> [2006, August 2].
- Inkatha Freedom Party. 2004e. *IFP Says It Is The ANC That Is Stuck In The "Old Groove" Of "Race" With The "Rotting Albatross" of the NNP*. 1 April 2004. [Online]. <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/Releases/> [2006, August 2].
- Jacobs, S. 1999. The Media and the Elections. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '99: The campaigns, results and future prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 147-158.
- Jacobs, S. 2004. *Public Sphere, Media and Democracy in Post-apartheid South Africa*. PhD Dissertation, School of Politics and Sociology. Birkbeck College: University of London. (Unpublished).
- Jacobs, S. and Johnson, K. 2007. Media, Social Movements and the State: Competing Images of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. *African Studies Quarterly*. 9(4):279-302. [Online]. <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v9/v9i4a8.htm>. [2008, June 8].
- Jakubowicz, K. 1996. Television and Elections in Post-1989 Poland: How Powerful is the Medium. In Mancini, P and Swanson, D.L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern*

Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences. London: Praeger Publishers. 129-154.

- Jamieson, K.H. 2000. *Everything You Think You Know About Politics... And Why You're Wrong*. New York: Basic Books.
- Jamieson, K.H. 2001. Issue Advocacy in a Changing Discourse Environment. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 323-341.
- Jervis, R. 1986. Cognition and Political Behavior. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 319-336.
- Johnson, R.W. 1996. The 1994 Election: Outcome and Analysis. In Johnson, R.W. and Schlemmer, L. Eds. *Launching Democracy in South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 301-322.
- Kavanagh, D. 1995. *Election Campaigning: The New Marketing of Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
- Key, V.O. 1967. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Khosa, M. 1999. Voting in Action: Focus Group and Workshop Findings. In Muthien, Y. Ed. *Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council Publishers. 83-106.
- Kim, H. and Park, H.W. 2007. Web Sphere Analysis for Political Websites: the 2004 National Assembly Election in South Korea. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A. and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 226-240.
- Kinder, D.R. 1986. Presidential Character Revisited. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 233-256.
- Kinsey, D. F. 1999. Political Consulting: Bridging the Academic and Practical Perspectives. In Newman, B.I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 113-128.
- Kooble, T. 1998. The ANC as an Agent of Democratization. In Kooble, T. Ed. *The Global Economy and Democracy in South Africa*. New Brunswick: Rutgers International Press. 149-171
- Kotler, P. and Kotler, N. 1999. Political Marketing: Generating Effective Candidates, Campaigns and Causes. In Neuman, B.I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 3-18.
- Kotze, D. 2004a. Political Party Funding in 2004 Election. *Journal of African Elections*. 3(2): 27-46.

- Kotze, D. 2004b. Public Funding regulatory mechanisms to prevent the abuse of state resources. In Matlosa, K. Ed. *The Politics of state resources: Party funding in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Kotze, H. A. 1999. The New National Party in the 1999 Election: End of the Road or a New Beginning?. *Politikon*. 26 (2):167-177.
- Kotze, H. A. 2001. Consummation Devoutly To be Wished: The Democratic Alliance and Its Potential Constituencies. *Democratization*. 8(1): 117-134
- Kriesi, H. 2004. Strategic Political Communication: Mobilizing Public Opinion in “Audience Democracies”. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 184-212.
- Krueger, R.A. 1998. *Developing Questions for Focus Groups*. California: Sage Publications Inc.
- Kuklinski, J.H. and Quirk, P.J. 2000. Reconsidering the Rational Public. In Lupia, A, McCubbins, M.D. and Popkin, S.L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 153-182.
- Landsberg, C. 2004. The Socio Political Implications of South Africa’s 2004 Election Results. *Election Synopsis*. 1(4): 25-29.
- Lane, R.E. 1986. What are People Trying to do With Their Schemata? In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 303-318.
- Lanegran, K. 2001. South Africa’s 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System. *Africa Today*. 48(2): 81-102.
- Lang, S. 2004. Local Political Communication: Media and Local Publics in the Age of Globalization. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 151-183.
- Lasswell, H. D. 1948. The Structure and Function of Communication in Society. In Bryson. Ed. *The Communication of Ideas*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Laughey, D. 2007. *Key Themes in Media Theory*. New York: Open University Press.
- Lebel, G. G. 1999. Managing Volunteers: Times Have Changed or Have They? In Newman, B. I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Lenart, S. 1994. *Shaping Political Attitudes: The Impact of Interpersonal Communication and Mass Media*. California: Sage Publications.

- Letsholo, S. 2005. *How the ANC Won the 2004 Elections: Perspectives on Voting Behaviour in South Africa*. Occasional Paper 31. [Online]
<http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/publications/publications.htm>
 [2008, July 22].
- Linz, J. and Stepan, A. 1996. Toward Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy*. 7(2): 14-33.
- Lijphart, A. 1998. South African Democracy: Majoritarianism or Consociational? *Democratization*. 5(4): 144-150
- Lipset, S. M. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Lodge, T. 1994. The African National Congress and Its Allies. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 23-42.
- Lodge, T. 1999a. Consolidating Democracy: South Africa's Second Popular Election. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
- Lodge, T. 1999b. The African National Congress. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '99: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 64-87.
- Lodge, T. 2005. The African National Congress: There is no Party Like It; Ayikho Efana Nayo. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 109-128.
- Lodge, T. and Scheidegger, U. 2005. *Political Parties and Democratic Governance in South Africa*. EISA Research Report No 25. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
- Lodge, M., Steenbergen, M.R. and Brau, S. 1995. The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation. *American Political Science Review*. 89(2): 309-326.
- Lodge, M. and Stroh, P. 1993. Inside the Mental Voting Booth: An Impression-Driven Process Model of Candidate Evaluation. In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W.J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. London: Duke University Press. 225-263.
- Lodge, M. and Taber, C. 2000. Three Steps Towards a Theory Of Motivated Reasoning. In Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D. and Popkin, S. L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 214-238.
- Louw, E.P. 2005. *The Media and Political Process*. London: Sage Publications.
- Lupia, A. 1994. Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behaviour in California Insurance Reform Elections. *American Political Science Review*. 88 (1): 63-76.

- Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. D. 2000. The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence: How Citizens Learn What They Need to Know. In Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D. and Popkin, S. L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 47-66.
- Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D. and Popkin, S. L. 2000. Constructing a Theory of Reasoning: Choice, Constraints and Context. In Lupia, A, McCubbins, M. D. and Popkin, S. L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 287-289.
- Mancini, P. and Swanson, D.L. 1996. Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 1-26.
- Mancini, P. 1999. New Frontiers in Political Professionalism. *Political Communication*. 16(3): 231-245.
- Mare, G. 1994. The Inkatha Freedom Party. In Reynolds, A. Ed *Election '94: The campaigns, results and future prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 73-87.
- Mare, G. 1999. The Inkatha Freedom Party. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '99: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 101-113.
- Marquette, J. 1996. Developing a Campaign Theme. In Shea, D. M. Ed. *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 147-156.
- Marquette, J. 1996. Devising a Campaign Strategy. In Shea, D. M. Ed. *Campaign Craft : The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 157-174.
- Marsen, S. 2006. *Communication Studies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Maseko, S. 1999. The PAC, Azapo and UDM. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '99: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 125-132.
- Masters, R. D. and Sullivan, D. G. 1993. Non-verbal Behaviour and Leadership: Emotion and Cognition in Political Information Processing. In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W. J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. Durham: Duke University Press. 150-182.
- Mattes, R. B. 1994. South Africa's First Non-Racial Election: A Racial Census? Paper Presented to the *Research Colloquium of the South African Political Science Association Broederstroom*. North-West Province, South Africa.
- Mattes, R. B. 1995. *The Election Book: Judgement and Choice in South Africa's 1994 Election*. Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa.
- Mattes, R. B., Africa, C. and Jacobs, S. 1998. *The Evolution of Party Support Since 1994*. Public Opinion Service Reports No. 1. February 1998. Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa.

- Mattes, R. B. and Bratton, M. 2003. Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance and Experience. *CSSR Working Paper No. 48*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Mattes, R. B., Giliomee, H. and James, W. 1996. The Election in the Western Cape. In Johnson, R. W. and Schlemmer, L. Eds. *Launching Democracy in South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mattes, R. B. and Gouws, A. 1998. Race, Ethnicity, and Voting Behaviour: Lessons from South Africa. In Sisk, T. D. and Reynolds, A. Eds. *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 119-142.
- Mattes, R. B. and Piombo, J. 2001. South Africa's General Election of 1999. *Democratization*. 8(3): 101-128.
- Mattes, R. B. Taylor, H. and Africa, C. 1999. Judgement and Choice in the 1999 South African Election. *Politikon*. 26(2):235-47.
- Mattes, R. B. 2005. Voter Information, Government Evaluations and Party Images, 1994-2004. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 40-59.
- Mattes, R. B. 2006. Voter Behaviour and Party Dominance in South Africa: Another View. In *Challenges to Democracy by one-party Dominance: a Comparative Assessment*. 10 October 2005, Vineyard Hotel. Cape Town, South Africa. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Ed. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Matlosa, K. and Mbaya, K. 2004. An Analysis of the utilisation of state/public resources during elections: A comparative survey of experiences in the SADC region. In Matlosa, K. Ed. *The Politics of State Resources: Party Funding in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 11-58.
- Matlosa, K. 2004. Conclusion and Lessons Learnt. In Matlosa, K. Ed. *The Politics of state resources: Party Funding in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 117-128.
- Mayobre, J. A. 1996. Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: The Case of Venezuela. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 227-246.
- Mazzoleni, G. and Schulz, W. 1999. Mediatization of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy. *Political Communication*. 16 (3): 247-261.
- McChesney, R.W. 1999. *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Illinois. University of Illinois Press.

- McQuail, D. and Windahl, S. 1981. *Communications Models for the Study of Mass Communications*. New York. Longman Inc.
- McLaughlin, E.S. 2007. Beyond the Racial Census: The Political Salience of Ethnolinguistic Cleavages in South Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*. 40 (4): 435-456.
- Media Monitoring Project. 2004. *Elections 2004*. [Online]. Available: http://www.mediamonitoring.org.za/Portals/0/E2004_Full%20Report.pdf [2008, August 22].
- Mitchell, P. and Daves, R. 1999. Media, Polls, Candidates and Campaigns. In Newman, B. I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 177-197.
- Mickiewicz, E. and Richter, A. 1996. Television, Campaigning and Elections in the Soviet Union Post-Soviet Russia. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 107-128.
- Mickiewicz, E. and Firestone, C. 1992. *Television and Elections*. Maryland: The Aspen Institute.
- Milburn, M. A. 1991. *Persuasion and Politics: The Social Psychology of Public Opinion*. California: Brooks Cole Publishing Company.
- Miller, A. H. Wattenberg, M. P. and Malanchuk, O. 1986. Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates. *The American Political Science Review*. 80(2):521-540.
- Miller, A.H. 1986. Partisan Cognitions in Transition. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 203-232.
- Milton, A. K. 2000. *The Rational Politician: Exploiting the Media in New Democracies*. Aldershot: Anthony Rowe Ltd.
- Mirandilla, K. A. 2007. Philippines: Poli-clicking as Politicking: Online Civic Action in the 2004 National Election. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N. W., Foot, K. A. and Schneider, S. M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 107-121.
- Mochaba, K. Raffinetti, C. Vallabh, S. and White, J. 2003. *A Comparative Overview of the Laws and Practice in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. SADC Media Law: A Handbook for Media Practitioners, Volume 1*. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
- Morrell, M. E. 2005. Deliberation, Democratic Decision-making and Internal Political Efficacy. *Political Behavior*. 27(1):49-69.

- Muthien, Y. 1999. Introduction: Evaluating Democracy and the 1999 Election in South Africa. In Muthien, Y. Ed. *Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council Publishers. 1-4.
- Muthien, Y. and Khosa, M. 1999. Conclusion: Exercising Democratic Citizenship Through Voting: Policy Implications. In Muthien, Y. Ed. *Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council Publishers. 129-134.
- Mutz, D., Sniderman, P. M. and Brody, R. A. 1996. Political Persuasion: The Birth of a Field of Study. In Mutz, D., Sniderman, P. M. and Brody, R. A. L. Eds. *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1-14.
- Mutz, D. 1998. *Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mutz, D. 2004. Citizens, Media and Partisanship: The Flow of Information and Opinion in Twelve Countries. Paper Presented to the *Comparative National Elections Project Conference*, 28 July. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Mzabalazo. 1994. *A Pictorial History of the African National Congress*. Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books.
- Naidu, S. and Manglele, M. 2005. The Smallest Parties: The ACDP, UCDP, FF+, MF and UDM. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 207-227.
- Nijzink, L. 2001. Opposition in the New South African Parliament. In Southall, R. Ed. *Democratization Special Issue: Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*. 8(1): 53-68.
- Newman, B.I. and Perloff, R.M. 2004. Political Marketing: Theory, Research and Applications. In Kaid, L.L. Ed. *Handbook of Political Communication Research*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 17-46.
- New National Party. 2004. *The NNP's CAPE PLAN 2010: Blueprint for a World-class Province*. South Africa: New National Party.
- New National Party. 2004. *Manifesto 2004: New National Party: you deserve a fair share*. South Africa: New National Party.
- Nimmo, D. 1996. Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: The United States. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 29 - 48.
- Nimmo, D. 1999. The Permanent Campaign: Marketing as a Governing Tool. In Newman, B. I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 73-88.

- Norris, P. 2000. *A Virtuous Cycle: Political Communication in Post-Industrial Societies*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Norris, P. 2004. Global Political Communication: Good Governance, Human Development and Mass Communication. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 115-150.
- Ndletyana, M. 1999. The United Democratic Movement: A Critical Assessment. *Politikon*. 26(2): 179-188.
- Neuman, W. R. 2001. The Impact of the New Media. In Bennett, W. L. and Entman, R. M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 299-320.
- Nielsen Media Research. 2004. AdEx Meeting: Measurement Methodology MMS Demonstration 21 APRIL 2004. Powerpoint Slide Presentation. (Unpublished).
- Oblak, T. and Zeljan, K. 2007. Slovenian Online Campaigning During the 2004 European Parliament Election: Struggling Between Self-promotion and Mobilization. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N. W., Foot, K. A. and Schneider, S. M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 60-76.
- O'Donnell, G. 1996a. Illusions About Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*. 7(2):34-51.
- O'Donnell, G. 1996b. Illusions and Conceptual Flaws. *Journal of Democracy*. 7(4):160-168.
- O'Shaughnessy, M. and Stadler, J. 2005. *Media and Society: An Introduction*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ottati, V.C and Wyer, R.S. 1993. Affect and Political Judgement. In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W.J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. London: Duke University Press. 225-263.
- Page, B. 1978. *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pateman, C. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pennings, P., Keman, H. and Kleinnijenhuis, J. 1999. *Doing Research in Political Science: An introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Pinkleton B. E. and Austin E. W. 2001. Individual Motivations, Perceived Media Importance, and Political Disaffection. *Political Communication*. 18(3): 321-334

- Piombo, J. 2005. The Results of Election 2004: Looking Back, Stepping Forward. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 250-290.
- Piper, L. 1999. Democracy for Bargain: The 1999 Election in KwaZulu-Natal. *Politikon*. 26 (2):145-154.
- Piper, L. 2004. The Election Result and its Implications for Political Party Configuration. *Journal of African Elections*. 3(2):97-120.
- Piper, L. 2005. The Inkatha Freedom Party: Between the Impossible and the Ineffective. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 148-165.
- Piper, L., Hendricks, C., Masterson, G., and Letsholo, S. 2004. *South Africa's 2004 Election: The Quest for Democratic Consolidation*. IESA Research Report 12. [Online] <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/souelectarchive.htm> [2008, July 22].
- Plasser, F. and Plasser, G. 2002. *Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and Their Practices*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Plasser, F., Scheucher, C. and Senft, C. 1999. Is there a European Style of Political Marketing? A Survey of Political Managers and Consultants. In Newman, B. I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Price, R. M. 1991. *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa: 1975-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Popkin, S. L. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter. Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Popkin, S. L. 1993. Decision-making in Presidential Primaries. In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W.J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. London: Duke University Press. 225-263.
- Popkin S. L. and Dimock M. A. 2000. Knowledge, Trust, and International Reasoning. In Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. and Popkin, S. L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 214-238.
- Popkin, S.L., Gorman, J.W., Phillips, C. and Smith, J.A. 1976. Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting. *The American Political Science Review* 70 (3): 779-805. [Online]. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1959867> [2008, July 17].
- Put-Chekwe, C. 1998. *An Election to Remember: Recollections of a United Nations Observer to the 1994 South African Election*. Cape Town: Inter-Africa Media Services.

- Quintal, A. 2005. Political Reporting. In Hadland, A. Ed. *Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African Journalism*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 53-60.
- Rhan, W. M. 1993. The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates. *American Journal of Political Science*. 37(2): 472-496.
- Rhan, W. M. 2000. Affect As Information. In Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D. and Popkin, S. L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 130-154.
- Richardson, B. and Beck, P.A. 2007. The Flow of Political Information: Personal Discussants, the Media and Partisan. In Gunther, R., Montero, J.R. and Puhle, H. Eds. *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 183-207.
- Reynolds, A. 1994. The Results. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip. 173-209.
- Roefs, M. 2004. One party Dominance, Racial Cleavages and Decreasing Voter Turnout. *Election Synopsis*. 1(1). 17-19 .
- Roseman, I., Abelson, R. and Ewing, M. 1986. Emotions and Political Cognition: Emotional Appeals in Political Communication. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Rospir, J. I. 1996. Political Communication and Electoral Campaigns. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 155-172.
- Rudolph, T. J., Gangl, A., and Stevens, D. 2000. The effects of efficacy and emotions on campaign involvement. *Journal of Politics*. 62: 1189–1197.
- Rule, S. 1999. Outcome of the Election. In Muthien, Y. Ed. *Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council Publishers. 107-128.
- Sadie, Y. 1998. Political Parties and Interest Groups. In Venter, A. Ed. *Government & Politics in the New South Africa*. Pretoria: J.L. Van Schaik Publishers.
- Schlemmer, L. 1994. South Africa's First Open Election and the Future of its New Democracy. In Giliomee, H. and Schlemmer, L. Eds. *The Bold Experiment: South Africa's New Democracy*. Cape Town: Southern Book Publishers. 149-167.
- Schlemmer, L. 1999. Democracy or Democratic Hegemony? The Future of Political Pluralism in South Africa. In Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C. Eds. *The Awkward*

Embrace: One Party Domination and Democracy. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers. 281-300.

- Schedler, A. 1998. What is Democratic Consolidation? *Journal of Democracy*. 9(2):91-107.
- Schire, R. 2001. The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences. In Southall, R. Ed. *Democratization Special Issue: Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*. 138-145.
- Schneider, S. M., Kluver, R., Jankowski, N. W. and Foot, K. A. 2007. Epilogue: Reflecting on Elections and the Web. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N. W., Foot, K. A. and Schneider, S. M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 261-264.
- Schoenbach, K. 1996. The "Americanization" of German Election Campaigns: Any Impact. In Mancini, P. and Swanson, D. L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 91-106.
- Schnur, D. 1999. Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Co-ordinating the Paid and Earned Media Message. In Neuman, B. I. Ed. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 143-158.
- Schultz-Herzenberg, C. 2005. The New National Party: The End of The Road. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 166-186.
- Schultz-Herzenberg, C. 2007. A Silent Revolution: South African Voters, 1994-2006. In Buhlungu, S. Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. Eds. *State of the Nation South Africa 2007*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 114-145.
- Schreiner, W. 2004. How-To-Guide for Using Media Tenor SA Data. (Unpublished).
- Sears, D.O., Huddie, L. and Schaffer, L.G. 1986. A Schematic Variant of Symbolic Politics Theory. In Lau, R.R. and Sears, D.O. Eds. *Political Cognition*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 159-202.
- Seekings, J. The Electoral Implications of Social and Economic Change Since 1994. In Piombo, J. and Nijzink, L. Eds. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 23-39.
- Selnow, G. W. 1994. *High-Tech Campaigns: Computer Technology in Political Communication*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers.
- Shea, D. M. 1996. The Importance of a Campaign Plan. In Shea, D. M. Ed. *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. 17-22.
- Sniderman, P.M., Brody, R. and Tetlock, P. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sniderman, P.M. 2000. Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory. In Lupia, A, McCubbins, M.D. and Popkin, S.L. Eds. *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 67-84.
- Schneider, S.M, Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W. and Foot, K.A. 2007. Epilogue: Reflecting on Elections and the Web. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 261-264.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. and Voltmer, K. 2004. The Mass Media in Third Wave Democracies: Gravediggers or Seedsmen of Democratic Consolidation. Paper Presented to the *Comparative National Elections Project Conference*. 28 July. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. and Voltmer, K. 2007. The Mass Media in Third Wave Democracies: Gravediggers or Seedsmen of Democratic Consolidation. In Gunther, R., Montero, J.R. and Puhle, H. Eds. *Democracy, Intermediation, and Voting on Four Continents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 293-322.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. 2004. Political Communication Effects: The Impact of Mass Media and Personal Conversations on Voting. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 75-134.
- SouthAfrica.info. (n.d.). *South Africa's political parties: Independent Democrats*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.safrika.info/about/democracy/polparties.htm> [2008, July 7].
- South African Advertising Research Foundation. 2004a. *The SAARF® Development Index 1994 – 2004*. [Online]. Available <http://archive.saarf.co.za/> [2008, July 7].
- South African Advertising Research Foundation. 2004b. *SAARF AMPS® 2004*. [Online]. Available <http://archive.saarf.co.za/> [2008, July 7].
- South African Advertising Research Foundation. 2004c. *SAARF RAMS® Radio Trends 2003 to 2004*. [Online]. Available <http://archive.saarf.co.za/> [2008, July 7].
- South African Advertising Research Foundation. 2004d. *All about SAARF and the AMPS Family of Surveys*. [Online]. Available <http://www.saarf.co.za/> [2008, July 7].
- South African Advertising Research Foundation. 2004e. *Big Improvement in South Africans Living Conditions Post 1994*. [Online]. Available <http://archive.saarf.co.za/> [2008, July 7].
- South Africa at a Glance. (n.d.). *The Constitution and Political parties*. [Online]. http://www.safrika.info/ess_info/sa_glance/constitution/polparties.htm. [2006, September 22].
- South African History. (n.d.). *Patricia de Lille*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/delille-p.htm> [2006, September 22].

- South African Broadcasting Corporation/Markinor Opinion 2004. 2004. *Perceptions and Party Performance*. [Online].
http://www.sabcnews.com/features/opinion_2004/interest.html#
 [2008, July 7].
- Southall, R. 1998. The Centralization and Fragmentation of South Africa's Dominant Party System. *African Affairs* 97 (389): 443-469.
- Southall, R. 2001. Opposition in South Africa: Issues and Problems. In Southall, R. Ed. *Democratization Special Issue: Opposition and Democracy in South Africa*. 1-24.
- Southall, R. 2004a. Containing Accountability. *Election Synopsis*. 1(1): 6-8.
- Southall, R. 2004b. Post-election South Africa: The Continuing Case for Electoral Reform. *Journal of African Elections*. 3(2): 154-165.
- Southall, R. and Mattes, R. B. 2002. *Popular Attitudes towards the South African Electoral System*. CSSR Working Paper No. 16. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- Southall, R. and Daniel, J. 2005. The State of Parties Post-election 2004: ANC Dominance and Opposition Enfeeblement .In Daniel, J. Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. Eds. *State of the Nation South Africa: 2004-2005*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.34-57.
- Slater, D. 2001. Political Discourse and the Politics of Need: Discourses on the Good Life in Cyberspace .In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 117-140.
- Sparks, C. 2001. The Internet and the Global Public Sphere .In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 75-95.
- Stanyer, J. 2007. *Modern Political Communication: Mediated Politics in Uncertain Times*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Statistics South Africa. 2003 *Census in Brief*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
- Street, J. 2001. *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy*. Palgrave: New York.
- Sturgis, P. 2003: *Statistical Modeling in Social Research*. Course Reader. Department of Sociology. University of Surrey. [Online].
<http://staff.soc.surrey.ac.uk/psturgis/SOCM20/0607/Coursepack0603.pdf>
 [2007, April 8].
- Swanson, D.L. Transnational Trends in Political Communication. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 45-63.

- Swanson, D.L and Mancini, P. 1996. Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction. In Mancini, P and Swanson, D.L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 1-26.
- Swanson, D.L and Mancini, P. 1996. Patterns of Modern Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences. Mancini, P and Swanson, D.L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 247-276.
- Tan, A.S. 1985. *Mass Communication Theories and Research*. 2nd ed. London: Collier Macmillan.
- Taylor, R. and Hoeane, T. 1999. Interpreting the South African Election of June 1999. *Politikon*. 26 (2):133-144.
- Tekwani, S. and Kluver, R. 2007. The Internet in 2004 Sri Lankan Elections .In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 122-135.
- Tekwani, S. and Shetty, K. 2007. Two Indias: the Role of the Internet in the 2004 Elections. Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 150-162.
- Tetlock, P. E. 1993. Cognitive Structural Analysis of Political Rhetoric: Methodological and Theoretical Issues. In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W.J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. London: Duke University Press. 225-263.
- Underwood, D. 2001. Reporting and the Push for Market Oriented Journalism: Media Organisations as Business. In Bennett, W.L. and Entman, R.M. Eds. *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 99-116.
- United Democratic Movement. 2004. *Better Future Plan: UDM Manifesto 2004*. [Online]. http://www.udm.org.za/docs/manifesto_2004.pdf[2005, April 8].
- Varoga, C. and Rice, M. 1999. Professional Research and Message Development. In Newman, B.I. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 243-258.
- Van Os, R., Hagemann, C., Voerman, G and Jankowski, N.W. 2007. The Netherlands: Party and Candidate Websites during the 2004 European Parliament Election Campaign .In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 43-59.
- Waisbord, S.R. 1996. Secular Politics: The Modernization of Argentine Electioneering. In Mancini, P and Swanson, D.L. Eds. *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*. London: Praeger Publishers. 207- 226.

- Ward, J. 2007. Addressing Young People Online: the 2004 European Parliament Election Campaign and Political Youth Websites. In Kluver, R., Jankowski, N.W., Foot, K.A and Schneider, S.M. Eds. *The Internet and National Elections*. New York: Routledge. 136-149.
- Weaver, M. R. 1996. Paid Media. In Shea, D. M. Ed. *Campaign Craft : The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. 201-218.
- Weaver, M. R. 1996. Returning to the Grassroots .In Shea, D. M. Ed. *Campaign Craft : The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. 239-252.
- Weaver, T. 2005. News Writing. In Hadland, A. Ed. *Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African Journalism*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 27-32.
- Ward, D. 2004. Introduction. In Lange, B. and Ward, D. Eds. *The Media and Elections: A Handbook and Comparative Study*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ix-x.
- Weaver, D. 1987. Media Agenda-setting and Elections: Assumptions and Implications. In Paletz, D.L Ed. *Political Communication Research, Approaches, Studies, Assessments*. New Jersey: Albex Publishing Corporation. 176-193.
- Welsh, D. 1994. The Democratic Party. In Reynolds, A. Ed. *Election '94: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip.88-100.
- Wheeler, M. C. 1997. *Politics and the Mass Media*. Cambridge: Blackwell Press.
- Wring, D. 1999. The Marketing Colonization of Political Campaigning. In Newman, B.I. *Handbook of Political Marketing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 41-54.
- Wyer, R.S. and Ottati, V.C. 1993. Political Information Processing . In Iyengar, S. and McGuire, W.J. Eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*. London: Duke University Press. 264-295.
- Zittel, T. 2004. Political Communication and Electronic Democracy: American Exceptionalism or Global Trend. In Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B. Eds. *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases and Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 213-230.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Aids is the ANC's Achilles' Heel, says IFP. 2004. *IOL*, 8 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

'ANC abusing govt resources'. 2004. *News24.com*, 9 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

ANC has laid 20 charges in run-up to elections. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 5 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

ANC has no plans to change constitution. 2004. *IOL*, 7 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za> . [2005, April 8].

ANC needs to work harder: Mbeki. 2004. *IOL*, 11 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

ANC not planning a third term — Mbeki. 2004. *Business Day*, 8 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

ANC 'not tied to constitution'. 2004. *News24.com*, 12 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

'ANC promises empty'. 2004. *News24.com*, 21 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

ANC says the IFP isn't playing fair. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 17 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

ANC victory in KZN will end violence: Mbeki. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 18 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

ANC win sure, Western Cape and KwaZulu up for grabs, DA's future on line. 2004. *Business Day*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

ANC 'won't touch constitution'. 2004. *News24.com*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

ANC's track record on AIDS fails to enliven voters.. 2004. *Business Day*, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Anytime, anywhere, ANC tells Leon. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 17 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Battle for control of KZN heats up. 2004. *IOL*, 5 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

- 'Bridge the divide': De Lille. 2004. News24.com, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi blasts ANC on a range of issues. 2004. IOL, 4 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi blasts ANC's Aids drug rollout. 2004. IOL, 21 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi lashes out at 'hypocrite' Mbeki. 2004. IOL, 6 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi slams 'decade of hunger'. 2004. IOL, 15 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- 'Bridge the divide': De Lille. 2004. News24.com, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi slams late promises. 2004. News24.com, 23 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi speaks his mind. 2004. News24.com, 31 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Buthelezi: Give me an outright win. 2004. IOL, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- 'Cut ANC down to size'. 2004. News24.com, 28 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- DA ad defames De Lille: ID. 2004. News24.com, 16 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- DA 'bullish' about Election 2004. News24.com, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- DA calls on voters to unite opposition. 2004. *Business Day*, 30 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA demands answers on ANC/Iraq oil link. 2004. IOL, 26 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA hits back at 'Maltese poodle'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 4 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- DA launches 'ANC cards of shame'. 2004. IOL, 10 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

- DA offers hope of a better SA. 2004. *Business Day*, 3 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA sees De Lille's party as its biggest threat'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 16 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- DA takes flak for sidelining little parties: ID denies it is a one-woman party. 2004. *Business Day*, 17 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA wants 'offensive' Zuma to apologise. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 16 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- DA, ANC clash over SA's job losses. 2004. *Business Day*, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA, ID clash over official opposition status after poll. 2004. *Business Day*, 8 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA, IFP alliance will bring 'new majority'. 2004. IOL, 4 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- DA-IFP an 'apartheid alliance', says Mbeki. 2004. IOL, 26 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- De Klerk campaigns for NNP. 2004. News24.com, 20 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- De Lille 'best-liked opposition leader'. 2004. *Business Day*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- De Lille a 'thorn' in executive sides: Independent democrats asks voters to take on corruption in April elections. 2004. *Business Day*, 1 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- De Lille attacks Manto and Mugabe. 2004. IOL, 1 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- De Lille expects 10% of votes. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 23 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- De Lille 'more popular' than Leon. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- De Lille receives movie star welcome in KZN. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 2 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

De Lille says defectors weren't members. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

De Lille takes the high road. 2004. *IOL*, 28 March. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2004, February 15].

De Lille wants to bridge the gaps in society. 2004. *IOL*, 29 March. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

De Lille 'won't last the pace'. 2004. *News24.com*, 25 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

De Lille: Suzman was a minority of minorities. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 26 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

De Lille's 'baby' is nearly a year old. 2004. *IOL*, 26 March. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

Don't vote for 'silly parties' says Mbeki. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 22 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Empowerment fails millions — DA. 2004. *Business Day*, 24 March. [Online]. Available: [http://www.businessday.co.za.](http://www.businessday.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

Exclusive: ANC wins. 2004. *Business Day*, 6 April. [Online]. Available: [http://www.businessday.co.za.](http://www.businessday.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

Forget kwaito and vote — Mbeki. 2004. *IOL*, 1 April. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

Holomisa blasts 'recycled' ANC promises. 2004. *IOL*, 21 February. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

Holomisa finds politics 'nauseating'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 22 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Holomisa slams ANC's 'lack of accountability'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 8 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Holomisa slams Cosatu. 2004. *IOL*, 20 March. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].

Holomisa: Mbeki is still an Aids dissident. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 4 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

How the IFP plans to rub out crime. 2004. *IOL*, 23 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

'I am not a prophet'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 24 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

ID denies it is a one-woman party. 2004. *Business Day*, 17 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

ID expects 5% of KZN votes. 2004. *News24.com*, 1 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

IFP blamed as ANC activist is killed in KwaZulu-Natal. 2004. *Business Day*, 23 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

IFP has big plans for KZN if... 2004. *News24.com*, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

IFP pledges to 'make work'. 2004. *News24.com*, 20 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

IFP says government has failed twice. 2004. *News24.com*, 23 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

IFP slams third term for Mbeki. 2004. *News24.com*, 9 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

'IFP turned on ANC'. 2004. *News24.com*, 11 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

Independent democrats asks voters to take on corruption in April elections. 2004. *Business Day*, 1 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

King Thabo' says he won't stand for a third term. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 24 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Kortbroek to get the boot. 2004. *IOL*, 11 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Lay De Lille's 'racist' past bare, says DA. 2004. *IOL*, 18 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Leon counts on rural support. 2004. *Business Day*, 8 April. [Online]. Available:

- <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Leon hits overdrive ahead of poll battle. 2004. *Business Day*, 9 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Leon predicts up to 30% of vote for DA, IFP. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 16 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Leon slams Van Schalkwyk's pie in the sky. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 11 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Leon uses Mandela inaugural speech to explain DA policy. 2004. IOL, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Leon: ANC tells 5 big lies. 2004. News24.com, 5 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Leon: 'We need to unite the opposition'. 2004. IOL, 30 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Madiba draws crowds. 2004. News24.com, 6 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Madiba mobbed. 2004. News24.com, 6 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Madiba: With freedom comes responsibility. 2004. IOL, 5 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Make Buthelezi pay, says Mbeki. 2004. News24.com, 5 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Mandela defends Mbeki on third term rumours. 2004. IOL, 4 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Mandela lobbies for the ANC. 2004. News24.com, 6 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Marthinus's position in doubt. 2004. News24.com, 12 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Mbeki attacks Buthelezi. 2004. IOL, 2 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Mbeki attacks 'right-wing' coalition. 2004. IOL, 26 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Mbeki blasts DA, IFP. 2004. News24.com, 26 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

'Mbeki has become Mugabe's best friend'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 22 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Mbeki is 'running away' from voters. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 16 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Mbeki lets Western Cape premier plan slip. 2004. IOL, 15 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Mbeki: Coalition for Change is 'right-wing'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 26 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Mbeki turns heat on IFP/DA. 2004. News24.com, 2 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

Mbeki: Govt set to change. 2004. News24.com, 11 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

Mbeki lets Western Cape premier plan slip. 2004. IOL, 15 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Mbeki: Opposition wants it black and white. 2004. IOL, 9 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

Mbeki: SA will tackle poverty in the next decade. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 19 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

Nats may be in decline but they are singing. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 31 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].

'NNP has voice within govt'. 2004. News24.com, 27 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

NNP launches election manifesto. 2004. IOL, 20 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

NNP looks to ANC for Cape role. 2004. *Business Day*, 17 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

NNP offers SA 'a fair share'. 2004. News24.com, 20 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

- NNP promises homes galore. 2004. News24.com, 16 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- NNP still alive, says Kortbroek. 2004. . News24.com, 14 March.[Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- NNP unveils 'Cape Plan' for economic growth. 2004. IOL, 17 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- NNP: Vote for DA short-sighted. 2004. News24.com, 6 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- NNP: 'You deserve your fair share of SA'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 20 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- NNP's grip on Cape hot seat up for grabs. 2004. *Business Day*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- NNP's grip on Cape hot seat up for grabs: Contradictory signals from ally ANC. 2004. *Business Day*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- No more free ride for De Lille: DA. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 17 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- No party must get more than 50% - Buthelezi. SAPA. 2004. IOL, 20 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- No room for DA in Cape coalition. 2004. *Business Day*, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Opposition attacks ANC policies. 2004. *Business Day*, 11 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Poll will be end of the NNP — Leon. 2004. *Business Day*, 17 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Poverty the issue – Mbeki. 2004. News24.com, 19 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- SA politics is nauseating, says Holomisa. 2004. IOL, 21 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- SA's opposition: monkey biz?. News24.com, 15 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

- SA's 5 crises 'up to voters'. 2004. News24.com, 16 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Scent of blood in air as opposition gears up.. 2004. IOL, 4 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Schoeman: NNP vote adds value. 2004. News24.com, 2 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Size does matter, at least for the DA and ID 2004. *Business Day*, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- 'Smaller parties must choose'. 2004. *Business Day*, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Sparks fly between Gibson and De Lille. 2004. IOL, 4 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Support claims 'unrealistic'. 2004. News24.com, 26 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- The ANC's five big lies by Tony Leon. 2004. IOL, 5 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- The tiny party that may spring a huge surprise. 2004. *Business Day*, 7 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Third term 'never discussed'. 2004. News24.com, 2 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Tony Leon stirs up a hornets' nest. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 9 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Tony Leon's attacks on De Klerk make very little political sense. 2004. IOL, 8 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Top ANC leader enters fray over debate with DA: Refusal called sign of 'presidential arrogance'. 2004. *Business Day*, 18 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.businessday.co.za>. [2005, April 8].
- Tutu allays fears about ANC win. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- UDM fears ANC 'plot' to intimidate its voters. 2004. IOL, 14 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iol.co.za>. [2005, April 8].

- UDM lodges complaint against ANC. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 29 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Van Schalkwyk is a loser, says Leon. 2004. IOL, 1 April. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].
- Vindication or the scrapheap for opposition DA.2004. *Business Day*, 13 April. [Online]. Available: [http://www.businessday.co.za.](http://www.businessday.co.za/) [2005, April 8].
- Voters will judge NNP - says DA. 2004. News24.com, 9 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- 'Voters will not be swayed'. 2004. News24.com, 5 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- 'We're born team players'. 2004. *Mail and Guardian*, 23 February. [Online]. Available: <http://www.mg.co.za/> [2005, April 8].
- Who are the major players in KZN politics? 2004. IOL, 16 February. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].
- Will the DA be snubbed after the election?. 2004. IOL, 9 April. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].
- Zuma must apologise for Jesus comment – DA. 2004. IOL, 15 March. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iol.co.za.](http://www.iol.co.za/) [2005, April 8].
- Zuma: Vote in your millions. 2004. News24.com, 6 April. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].
- Zuma's comment offends DA. 2004. News24.com, 15 March. [Online]. Available: <http://www.news24.com/> [2005, April 8].

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations in this study related primarily to the role of respondents within the survey of citizens and the focus group discussions. The compilation of the content analysis data-set did not involve human subjects. Transcripts of radio and TV material, as well as news paper clippings were collected during the months preceding the elections (9 February – 14 April 2004 and were coded, captured and collated into a data-set by Media Tenor.

Data collection involving human subjects was carried out by survey companies that are governed by the South African Market Research Association (SAMRA) code of conduct.

In all the surveys the participants had reasonable and sufficient knowledge about the projects under whose auspices they were conducted. Respondents were told by the interviewer which research institution was conducting the survey and that they did not represent the government or any political party. Respondents were given some information about the overall project and the content of the questionnaire to be administered to them. Confidentiality was assured and the length of time required for the interview was indicated. The person approached then had the option of refusing to be part of the study or agreeing to assist them further with respondent selection. If the respondent selected differed from the original person approached, this process was repeated. In some projects, respondents were given a token gift to thank them for their time.

The participants were given some information about the overall project, confidentiality within the group was assured and the length of time required for the discussion was indicated. The person approached then had the option of refusing to be part of the study. If the person agreed to participate, they were asked a set of preliminary questions to ensure that they qualified to be part of the discussion. Prior to the discussion groups, the purpose of the study was again explained as well as the need to keep the discussion confidential to the group. Participants were required to sign to say that they had

participated freely and would keep the discussion confidential. Respondents were given a payment to thank them for their time. Respondents had the right to refuse to answer any of the questions at any stage.

Informed consent was secured from the respondents in both the survey and in the focus groups. In the survey, verbal consent was obtained from the interviewer. In the focus group sessions, participants were required to complete a consent form stating that they have participated in the study of their own accord as well as binding them to keep the contents of the discussion confidential.

University of Cape Town

Appendix 2: Focus Group Methodology Notes

I used the principles set by Krueger (1998) to guide the structure of my discussion guides. According to Krueger, a successful focus group discussion usually has the following categories of questions: opening, introductory, transition, key and ending questions. The opening questions are designed to be answered quickly with the purpose of making participants feel comfortable. Introductory questions introduce the general topic, but are not normally part of the analysis. Transition questions move the conversation toward the key questions that drive the study, key questions drive the study and ending questions close the study.

The discussion started with an ice-breaker about the participants' favourite past-time. It then moved to a general question about the election and what people they speak to were saying about election and the campaigns. Participants were then informed that everyone in the room had voted in the same pattern or that they were all non-voters. If they had voted for the same party, they were asked why they had voted for that party again rather than choosing a different party. If they had voted for a different party, they were asked what had changed their minds caused them to not vote for the party they voted for previously. If they had not voted, they were asked why they decided not to vote given that they voted in the two previous elections. All groups were presented with a campaign picture of the parties that they had not voted for (non-voters were provided with pictures of all six parties considered in this study). They were then asked why each particular party was unable to convince them to vote for that party. Participants were then given the statement "Some people say that campaigns do not really matter in elections because people have already made up their minds; others say that they are important because they help voters to choose who to vote for" and then asked how they felt about election campaigns. Finally, they were asked what advice they would give to somebody in charge of a political party in terms of how they could improve their chances in the next election.

Appendix 3: Focus Group Recruitment Form

For the focus group discussions, participants were recruited the following questionnaire.

Focus Group Recruitment Form

<p>Good day, my name is I am working for a researcher from UCT who is doing a study on how political parties communicate to voters. We are doing group discussions on these issues. Confidentiality in these groups are assured and no comments will be linked to names in any form whatsoever. The group discussion will take about 2 hours. TRANSPORT AND REFRESHMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED. YOU'LL BE GIVEN A MONETARY GIFT for the 2 hours. Would you be interested in joining the group discussion? (If respondent says "NO", thank for their time and close interview. If the respondent says YES, continue with the questionnaire) First I need to ask you a few questions to ensure that you qualify to be part of the discussion.[IF NOT VERY INTERESTED/NOT INTERESTED IN CAMPAIGN, VERY CLOSE TO A PARTY OR MADE UP THEIR MIND A LONG TIME BEFORE ELECTION: THANK FOR THEIR TIME AND INDICATE THAT THEY UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT QUALIFY TO BE PART OF THE DISCUSSION]. To the rest, thank them and indicate IT WILL BE HELD AT (venue) on (date and time). Inform them that they will receive a follow-up phone-call to confirm the details.</p>
<p>How interested were you in following the recent election campaign? 1= Very interested, 2=Intersted, 3 = Not very interested, 4= Not interested at all</p>
<p>Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? 1= yes, 2=no</p>
<p>Which party is that? 1 =ANC, 2= ACDP, 3=DA, 4=ID, 5= IFP, 6=NNP, 7=PAC, 8=UDM</p>
<p>Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close or not very close? 1= Very close, 2=Somewhat close, 3=Not very close</p>
<p>For each of the following, which party did you vote for? 1=Nat 1994, 2=Prov 1994, 3=Nat 1999, 4=Prov 1999, 5=Nat 2004, 6=Prov 2004</p>
<p>In the past election, at what stage did you make up your mind ? 1=On election day, 2=A few days before, 3= About a week before, 4=About a month before, 5= A long time before</p>
<p>What is your age?</p>
<p>What is your highest level of education? 1=Finished primary, 2=Finished High school, 3= Tertiary</p>
<p>What is your contact details?</p>
<p>Race ? 1=Black 2=White 3=Coloured 4=Indian</p>
<p>Gender? 1=Male 2=Female</p>

Appendix 4: Focus Group Discussion Guides

Discussion Guide For People Who Voted

Good morning / evening. My name is _____. I would like to thank you for joining this discussion group. This discussion is being done as part of a research project for a student from UCT who is studying how political parties communicate to voters.

A few things to remember: there are no right or wrong answers in this kind of discussion, just feelings, ideas and opinions. So please feel free to say what you feel.

It is important that everyone must participate. What counts are your views and your opinions, no matter how insignificant you might feel your ideas to be. You are in a sense representing so many other people out there who feel and think the same as you do, so you are speaking on behalf of them and therefore you must have your say.

It doesn't matter if your views differ. Being honest about your ideas is more important, even if your opinions are different from everyone else's. We are tape-recording the proceedings for later analysis. We will use quotes, things you say, in her report but not even first names will be used. PLEASE SIGN THE CONFIDENTIALITY SLIPS

Only one person should speak at a time, otherwise we will not be able to hear properly. This is important for recording and transcription purposes.

We'll start off with everyone's name and (just briefly) your favourite past-time.

The election held on the 14th of April was a big event, what did people that you speak to say about the recent election and the campaigning before the election?

FOR THOSE GROUPS WHERE EVERYBODY VOTED FOR THE SAME PARTY

Everybody sitting in this room voted for the (READ IN NAME OF PARTY _____) in this election and the previous one. What made you decide to vote for them again this time around rather than choosing a different party?

FOR THOSE WHO VOTED FOR A DIFFERENT PARTY PREVIOUSLY

Everybody sitting in this room voted for _____ previously, what made you change your mind and decide to not vote for them this time around?

Looking at this image of _____, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them?

Looking at this image of _____, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them?

Looking at this image of _____, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them?

Looking at this image of _____, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them?

Looking at this image of _____, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them?

Some people say that campaigns do not really matter in elections because people have already made up their minds; others say that they are important because they help voters to choose who to vote for. How do you feel about election campaigns?

Thinking of all we've said and discussed here, what advice would you give to somebody in charge of a political party? How do you think that they can improve their chances in the next election?)

Do you have any final comments before we close? THAT CONCLUDES OUR DISCUSSION, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.

Discussion Guide For People Who Did Not Vote

Good morning / evening. My name is _____. I would like to thank you for joining this discussion group. This discussion is being done as part of a research project for a student from UCT who is studying how political parties communicate to voters.

A few things to remember: there are no right or wrong answers in this kind of discussion, just feelings, ideas and opinions. So please feel free to say what you feel.

It is important that everyone must participate. What counts are your views and your opinions, no matter how insignificant you might feel your ideas to be. You are in a sense representing so many other people out there who feel and think the same as you do, so you are speaking on behalf of them and therefore you must have your say.

It doesn't matter if your views differ. Being honest about your ideas is more important, even if your opinions are different from everyone else's. We are tape-recording the proceedings for later analysis. We will use quotes, things you say, in her report but not even first names will be used. PLEASE SIGN THE CONFIDENTIALITY SLIPS

Only one person should speak at a time, otherwise we will not be able to hear properly. This is important for recording and transcription purposes.

We'll start off with everyone's name and (just briefly) your favourite past-time.

The election held on the 14th of April was a big event, what did people that you speak to say about the recent election and the campaigning before the election?

Thinking back to the previous elections, everybody sitting in this room voted _____ previously, please explain your reasons for voting for _____ at that stage.

Thinking now of the elections held this year. Please explain the reasons that you changed your mind and decide to not vote in 2004?

What, if anything, would have convinced you to vote in the 2004 election?

Looking at this image of the ANC, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 elections?

Looking at this image of the DA, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 elections?

Looking at this image of the IFP, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 elections?

Looking at this image of the UDM, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 elections?

Looking at this image of the ID, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 elections?

Looking at this image of the NNP, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in

the 2004 elections?
How likely is it that you would vote in the next elections in 2009? What are your reasons for saying that?
What would a political party have to do in order to convince you to vote for them in 2009?
Some people say that campaigns do not really matter in elections because people have already made up their minds; others say that they are important because they help voters to choose who to vote for. How do you feel about election campaigns?
Thinking of all we've said and discussed here, what advice would you give to somebody in charge of a political party? How do you think that they can improve their chances in the next election?
Do you have any final comments before we close? THAT CONCLUDES OUR DISCUSSION, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.

Appendix 5: Focus Group Consent Form

I, _____(INSERT NAME, THE USE OF A SYNONYM IS ACCEPTABLE)

HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I AM PARTICIPATING IN THIS DISCUSSION GROUP OF MY OWN FREE WILL.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION GROUP HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME.

I WILL MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS DISCUSSION GROUP. I WILL THEREFORE NOT TALK

ABOUT ANY ASPECTS OF OUR DISCUSSION AFTER THE GROUP HAS FINISHED.

SIGNED: _____

Appendix 6: Focus Group Transcripts

VOTED FOR THE ANC IN 1994 – 1999, DID NOT VOTE IN 2004

He likes driving, going to town, sightseeing. And _____, he likes jolling!

He likes poetry, reading, driving, and sightseeing.

_____ is my name, and I spoke to _____ and _____. _____ likes dancing and laughing...

You like laughing!

...and _____ also likes laughing and jolling.

He likes laughing as well; his name is _____, that's the only thing he likes, laughing!

And make jokes!

Jokes, yes!

I am _____.

And what does he say, what does he like doing?

He likes working.

She is a student, and she studies at UCT.

What do you study?

Opera.

She loves singing. And another thing, she asked me for my phone number as well!

(Laughter)

As I said, my name is Cherrel and I have got two small kids. I enjoy spending time with them and going jogging as well. Okay, I am just going to run through how this is going to work, how the afternoon discussion is going to work. Thank you for joining in. It is part of a research project that is being done for a student of Cape Town University who is looking at how political parties communicate with voters. Just a few things, there is no right or wrong answer in the discussion. It is just your opinion, your feelings. So please, even if you disagree with each other, feel free to say what you want to. And then also, it is very important that every person participate so that I get a full idea of what everybody thinks. Your views are very important, so if you have something in your mind but then you don't say it, it's important to say what you are actually thinking. Just be honest and feel free in

the discussion. Then, also, we are tape recording the proceedings, this is for analysis. But when the report is written, no person's name – it will just be a long list of what everybody said, and there is four other groups that is also being done, so it will all just be in there together with everybody else and it will all be in a report, so we won't be able to say, 'okay, Wilfred said so and so'. Last thing, if just one person can speak at a time because of the recording. Because I see you guys have got a lot to say! Lastly, what we are saying is confidential, so I just need you to sign a confidentiality slip. So afterwards you won't go and phone somebody and say, 'You know what so and so said in the group?' So you are just acknowledging that you are taking part of your own free will.

And also that I did discuss it with you and you will maintain the confidentiality and not discuss it afterwards. That is all you are signing for. Also just remember to speak out so the recorder can hear you. Okay, the election held in April was a big event. What did people you speak to say about the recent event and the campaigning during the election time?

On my side I will say that the 2004 election was just – how can I put it? – in 1994 basically the election was about freedom, the Blacks. In 1999 it was ANC, but the ANC didn't actually fulfill what they always said they were going to do. So this year's election I actually didn't vote because I felt that it was kind of a waste of time.

And other people, what did people you spoke to say about the election?

I will just echo what he said; it was just a lot of promises. They go out of their way, they even go to your home or houses to see how you live and give you big promises, and at the end of the day nothing happens. But they got the vote and nothing happens after that.

It becomes obvious that we all know the ANC is going to win. What I actually read about, Patricia De Lillie's party coming up, and she is a new party, there are quite a number of new parties. But no matter how many parties there are, it is still going to be the same, the same promises. It's like when you get to work, you get the manager, the chairman, but you never get there, they tell you to do this and that and you will become this and that, but you never do and you always have to do the dirty work. There is one thing that is always bothering me, and that is people are looking for (inaudible) nations. I mean there is so much money around, I am sure there is a lot of money, people paying taxes and things, if it was fairly distributed, why not give donations to the poor and things. Because every time you have to give the person on the street, the person in church, wherever you go, why do you always give from your pocket, I mean and you still pay the taxes, now what are they doing with the taxes?

And others on this side, what did people say about the elections?

What I heard from people is it is a waste of time. It is the same ones over and over, and they aren't going to give us anything. Not jobs or anything like that. My main thing I can say is it is a waste of time – voting.

Voting?

Yes.

Yes, people who got jobs last year and two years back, they were happy, and people who got houses as well, they were happy. Especially these informal settlements, they were very happy because they had houses which they didn't have before, so some people were happy and some people were not happy.

Okay, thinking back then to the previous elections, everybody sitting in this room voted for the ANC at some stage. At that stage what was your reasons for voting for them?

Everyone was looking out for – in fact I was looking out for a new life, work. What we thought was that everything would just, you know, change. But it is now ten years and we are still living in that past.

The thing is, you know, when I voted in 1999, I thought ‘give them a chance’, you know, in five years, you can’t do much in five years. The previous Government had how many years to do what they wanted to. In five years you can’t do anything, give them another five years. But it is still the same thing. What I don’t like is the Affirmative Action. That doesn’t make sense to me. They have got the wrong concept of the thing. It happens in the workplace and it happens in sport, people don’t get into a team because of their ability to play, they are there for their skin colour, which is wrong. And then the team loses and they blame the coach, you know. But it is not a matter of the coach not coaching properly; it is because of the skin colour. You can’t just put anybody in there for their skin colour that can’t play!

Okay, and others, what were your reasons at that stage for voting for the ANC?

I thought better job prospects and better jobs. I applied and I wasn’t black enough, I didn’t get the job. So I think nothing has changed, well, it has changed reverse actually.

It’s the other way around. I think that is everyone’s reason for voting ANC, because they thought they were going to have a good home, a good job, and that they are going to live a better life. We are not going to live the life we lived before that, before Mandela became President. But it doesn’t seem that way.

What the ANC is doing is promising us things and then after that not doing it. But when the ANC want us to vote these things are coming forward before and then after – nothing.

My main reason for voting, why I got so serious about voting is because I thought I was going to get a house, or at least one of us, but no one I know got a house.

Individually I thought there was going to be a major change after the 1994 election, but there was a slight change, but not that much. After 1999 there was not such a development in the townships. People got houses, but not everyone. What I found out recently, after these elections more houses were built.

Another thing with this houses story is they just give it to any contractors and they just build these one bedroom houses...

And they’ve got like ten children in them!

...so long as they get the money from it, then they disappear and the houses are falling apart and nobody seems to care, nobody is complaining, but it shows that the ANC is giving houses. They wanted houses, there are the houses, but they aren’t worried what type of houses. They just issue houses. Why don’t they take some more money and let the people live in decent homes.

Livable at least.

Obviously if you are going to give people houses you are going to do a history about the people, he has got three children, he has got two, and I’ve got one child, so I am not going to get the three bedroom house. I will take a two bedroom house; you know what I am saying. He can’t be given a one bedroom house with three children, that is where crime comes in, where rape comes in. There’s a lot of things to consider.

What, if anything would have convinced you to vote this year in the 2004 election?

Honesty.

Honesty, yes, if they promised you then they have got to give it to you, so that they in the townships will feel it first, because they live like squatting, without water, without sanitary and they feel it more than what we feel it. So they must first do something to help those people and then they can convince us to vote again.

Okay, what would have convinced you to vote?

Individually, for me, from where I come there is not much done about the youth, about the crime. There is only bars, there is nothing like...

Sports, things like that?

Yes. I don't understand how come, there is only taverns, bars...

So if there was something for the youth, that would have convinced you?

Yes. Because they end up being criminals.

Okay, what would have convinced you?

You see, the idea, when they need a vote, they have a way of getting a vote. But now after that, nothing happens. They even put in a house before the vote and say 'this is your house', just vote for us and you will have it. They also have a tendency of giving people groceries just to get a vote. And then while you are waiting for the next thing to happen, nothing happens.

Okay, but just hypothetically then, what would somebody have had to do to get you to vote for them? What would have convinced you?

I would say honesty and justice.

The justice system is also down the drain.

I mean if a Government official steals they will spend a million more just to prove him wrong.

And yet there is a child stealing food and he gets sent to jail where there is 20 other prisoners waiting for trial because they don't know where to put him.

A political prisoner gets put in a separate cell and then he gets out and says he helped the community or he did something good. So there is no justice in the system, if you steal, you steal, whether you are President or not. You must be treated fairly. So whether you stole money or a food item and you are found guilty, you must be treated...

Equally.

...fairly.

So is there anything that they could have said that could have convinced you?

Not anything they could have said, what they could have done.

They should have done a lot of things, like firstly, employment. The rate of unemployment is

increasing instead of decreasing. And the housing, like Stephen said, they will build the one house and nine people are supposed to live in it. It's like a shack, a one bedroom house, there is no privacy in it. And the crime, the crime is still high, most especially the raping. You don't see people being charged guilty by the justice system. So there is still a lot to be done.

Anything else? Okay I am going to show you some images.

That is just a poster of the DA. Okay, looking at the picture of the DA, why was the DA unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 election?

I just see white faces!

Straight forward answer!

(Laughter)

Other people? It's a legitimate answer.

Same promises, nothing happens. There was one part where the DA stated 'we've got a plan to bring down crime' I think something like that. But now if he has a plan to bring down crime, why must he hold it till he gets his vote to be President? Why make this promise that he can make this promise if he becomes President. Only if he becomes President. So that's empty promises. But everybody else does the same thing.

My problem is – I don't have a problem with DA or any White parties at all, I can vote for any of them – but my problem is that I wanted to vote for them, but they were still representing the people who were in the old order are still in the DA, you see. Now all of a sudden they want my vote to get a seat in the Parliament. I can't vote for them, it is impossible for me to get my vote down, I can't just do that. I know he will still do the same things he was doing previously. So they say they are changing, that is fine, but they still have a lot of work to do. They must come to the townships, or let me put it this way, they must be visible in order to convince me.

Coming to visibility, what he is talking about, they are only visible when they need your vote. After that, quiet, nothing happens. All of them. Even if they put a black face there or a Colored face or whatever. But still, it is the same thing.

And this side of the table?

Where I still have the slight – I wouldn't say I would vote for the ANC, but I will give them attention if it's on the news, because of the jobs...

But what about the DA?

No, not the DA.

Why not?

Because I have heard them on TV and it doesn't make sense.

I don't trust them.

Okay, ladies?

I don't know anything about the DA.

Okay, you don't know enough about the DA.

The thing is the visibility thing is very good, becoming more involved in the community, I mean why does the minister have to have a body guard? I mean who is going to harm you if you don't do anything wrong?

Very good point there.

You see my point, only if you are doing something wrong do you need a body guard, you are either backstabbing somebody or you are doing something stupid. But I mean it is unnecessary expense! They are getting a fantastic salary, plus their perks are as high as their salary. And they talk a lot of nonsense and they still get paid for it. They don't make a lot of sense. They are passing bills which is not even proper bills, you know what I am saying? It's not to protect the community. I mean it is the community that they want funds for, but they don't want to give it to the community. They want to be on the receiving side all the time...

...they must start being more involved in the community. Even the President, if he has something going, he has always got a whole entourage with him. He's got everybody around him and he is talking. That is not being part of the community. Why not walk freely, who is going to harm you? Unless there is a psycho around or something, but a psycho only becomes a psycho when he is upset about something. But once you start feeling the warmth and the understanding – I am talking about any political party in general – if they become more involved in the community then we will have a better result in this country. Then everybody will be happy, our trade will grow stronger and things like that. That is how it works, don't just keep yourself one side because you are up there and you think you are untouchable or something like that. That is what they think they are.

One other thing, I wanted to vote for them, seriously, but now, for the past ten years I have been following these politics just a little bit. But they don't come with constructive things. Like maybe if the Government says this thing, they always oppose, every time. They will come with their own initiative, something that they came up with and then they said 'no, here is this thing, let's do this thing'. For me to be convinced by hearing the fighting, it is really putting me down instead of making me want to be their follower. It doesn't help me in order to be their follower.

You said you don't trust them. Before I go onto the next question, tell me more?

There is still racial problems. So basically I feel like, let's say I vote for DA, the same thing is still going to be there. So that is what I feel. Not that I am racist or anything!

Okay, I know we have spoken about the ANC previously, but just in this section now I am dealing with all the parties. Looking at the image of the ANC, why were they not able to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 election?

At one stage the President was more overseas than in his own country. There was problems in our own country, but he was busy helping other countries. Zimbabwe and things like that. Sort out your own mess inside here before you clean up someone else's mess. The thing is they are always running here, there, but never in their own country. They want you to vote and they will go to the townships like Mitchell's Plain and all over, but you don't see them, always. I mean they can just come around, show the community they are with them, just by doing something with them. I mean they must spend hundreds and thousands on parties, you know what I am saying, just finger lunches and things like that. Why can't they take that money and use it to have a fun day one day in the township. Then move around to another township. That is what people have to see.

One other thing that made me not to vote for ANC is their promises. Not all of their promises, but some of their promises were not met with things that were expected to be met. And other things, is this thing of – I won't say it is nepotism, if you go to the council there in town, 5th floor, 6th floor, you will find they are all *chommies* (friends)...

You've got to know someone.

I had no interest, because he didn't do the things that he promised us.

People are living worse than what he was supposed to give them. They are living more untidy.

I am not going to say something bad, I know it is not easy to do something we all want them to do. But why mention all these things and then you don't even do it.

Like _____ said, he is never around, he is always out of South Africa and not participating much in our problems. Always somewhere else.

I was going to say, people need employment. But now you are going to start your own thing. Now in my thinking, we don't think the same all of us. He will go and buy something and sell it. Now I will sell something that I feel will make money for me and my family. And the next thing the scorpions come and they pick you up because you are doing what is not right...

You are making money.

...you are making money.

They take all your stock and your money.

They take everything.

_____ is talking about the free enterprise thing, I mean many times I have seen where I stay they guys are selling smoked snoek and things like that, but they don't have a public license to sell on the pavement and things like that, and before you know it they take everything away from them. And now the people lose their stock and the money they pumped into it. And now they have to go back to the council and get a license and pay for it. some of them are doing it illegal for a long time. Free enterprise means that if you want to sell something it is free, you can do what you want to, but there is still rules and regulations, and you don't know if you are on or off yet, seriously.

Is there anything else on the ANC? Okay, looking at the image of the IFP, why was the IFP unable to convince you to vote for them?

This is the one person I don't trust! He just doesn't give me that – something about this man just doesn't give me the impression that I can –

Evil!

One other thing about this party, he does have members here in the Western Cape, but only a few members. I know of one person, he is living in my street, he is a member of the IFP and one other member, it is a family, and they all come from KZN.

You always get people who think 'that is my friend let me just go and be busy with that party so

that I can get the money at the end of the day'. You are not doing it out of your heart. And also, his party is more focused for KZN, it doesn't have interest for people living here in the Western Cape. So I can't vote for somebody whose interest is in KZN and doesn't have interest in other parts of South Africa.

And also, I think in the running in the last elections, this visibility thing – okay, some of the parties did come to the occasion, but guess where he went to, to canvas for people? Simonstown!

I mean what do you think of that? How will I vote for him if he goes to Simonstown?

I don't know much about them.

But didn't he have some fun with King (inaudible). His own king, he couldn't come to an agreement with him. He wants to outvote that man and then he wants to go to Simonstown...

I mean if you want to properly run for a country where you have control over people, you must have control over yourself.

And one other thing; I have seen him a long time ago, this guy doesn't have the interests of the people, he sees only now the people of Natal, he has been too long in that province, but he didn't do anything for the sewages, the housing, the hospitals. Only now when he saw people are busy with houses and hospitals, now he is talking about this thing. But before that he was quiet. It is very difficult to vote for somebody like this.

These people become fat cats. That is what they are, they just want the money at the end of the day.

Have you ever watched them on TV on channel three? From 2 to 3 or 3 to 4, I am not sure about that...

Oh, but they are sleeping!

They are sleeping! What does that bring to the people? That just shows you that at the end of the money he is getting paid.

He is getting paid for sitting there, yes.

Is there anything else? Okay, looking at the image of the UDM, why was the UDM unable to convince you to vote for them?

He looks like a Tsotsi.

No, this one rules like an iron fist. It is very dangerous to be ruled by someone with that background, who doesn't have a heart for someone else.

I don't know much about him, I just know he left the ANC on a bad note. I didn't do much research.

I don't know much, just that he was kicked out of the ANC. In other words he wanted sort of to revenge...

Keeping in competition with the ANC.

...that's it. In other words he is not there for himself, but to get back.

he wants power, he is fighting for power more than the interest of the people. And also, he is only focusing for the people who are living in the Eastern Cape, not on the people who are living in other parts of South Africa.

And his support, if you can say support – for the mines – people who are coming from the Eastern Cape and the people who are staying in Lower Crossroad, they are also coming from the Eastern Cape. It doesn't have people who were born and bred here. They've got this thing, man, like kings...

They want to be worshipped.

...yes, they want to be worshipped. They still believe in that old order where the man first eats before his family. And his family can't eat the meat, he must first eat the whole chicken...

And then his family gets the remains.

...yes. That is true, that is what is happening.

Okay, looking at the picture of the Independent Democrats, why was the ID unable to convince you to vote for them in 2004?

This is one person I wanted to vote for, but she didn't come to the township as well. I don't remember seeing her face. It is that visibility again.

Is this Patricia De Lille? She was coming from the PAC. But my question is, where are this number of parties coming from? Because when we were suffering there was no UDM and DA, and now they want to help us lately.

It's all about the money.

Even if you are going to a hospital and you are dying they don't help. How much money do you want, go to a doctor. The guy is bleeding, he's been stabbed, and the doctor says 'no money? Go somewhere else'. Things like that, it is all about the money.

The people in the day hospitals and that, they don't have the oath no more. The doctors take an oath. But there is no oath today, everything revolves around money. There is no oath to help people. Now it is all to do with medical aid and credit cards and nobody cares. If you have got money you are recognized. So these people, I don't know what they are doing. If they are honestly doing something they will put their heart and soul into it. I have seen Patricia De Lille at my niece's valedictory. She was the main speaker there, and she spoke nice, but again, she just sat there at her table, she didn't mix. You know, it was a hall, with everyone in it, and she didn't go around and greet the people. I mean she doesn't have to know everybody's name, but go around and greet the people.

Mix.

She was elected by the school to be a main speaker, so she felt honored, but then thing is, show back the support, sit among the people. Move from table to table. She delivered her speech, handed out the awards, and left. With the bodyguard.

As _____ was saying, as a leader, you need the people's support, you must mingle, get involved. Not just do your speech and then leave as if you don't care.

Most of these people, if you look at their background, they lead a classy life, I would say. If you look deeper, look, a someone like Mr. Mandela, and the way he was oppressed. And he has more

humanity. There is no such thing as money. When he was President, there was no complaints because he did his work properly. And me, I wouldn't vote for none of these people. Because why, because I would rather vote for Zola.

For who?

Zola Seven!

You know, where Mandela came from, being in the struggle, helping, being with people, and today he is honored as being the world's favorite person. None of these people would, you know what I am saying, the ANC President, he was studying in England, he wasn't among the people, fighting for the rights to win.

Another thing, I think she wanted to outdo UDM. Because while she wasn't kicked out of them, she left. And now she goes for another party. Why? Because it's still the same thing. She will preach what this guy preaches and this guy preaches, trying to outdo the ANC, but nothing happens.

It's all empty promises.

And then the one joins with the other one to win the vote.

It's like a little game they play, they don't worry about the next person. It's like playing monopoly or something.

They are all under the same thing, they fall under the same thing, because it has nothing to do with the people. None of them mention people. As they said, it is always bodyguards. For what? If you are an honest person, a sincere person, why worry about people killing you?

And where are they staying? They should be staying amongst us. I see what is happening. As soon as she is elected, she goes and stays in Constantia.

Okay, looking at the picture of the NNP, why was the NNP unable to convince you?

Because part of the NNP was still the old order. Even though they tried to recruit some other faces, like our faces, in order to get the people to vote. But the core was still the old kind.

The reason why the NNP didn't give me any reason to vote for them is because they joined forces with the ANC. So they showed that they have got no power at all. They needed a backup.

It comes back to power. Power hungry. I don't know if they are already disbanded, but before they disbanded, they joined DA, ID, all these other parties, leaving their followers alone, you see. And it is the leaders disbanding. What about their supporters that are faithful to them, who are voting for them all these years. Now they must follow them. I mean it doesn't work like that.

The whole thing is just in reverse. I mean the ANC are doing the exact thing that the NNP did years ago. So we are living back in Apartheid, but in a nice way, you know what I am saying. Because now the Blacks are getting work, and the Whites are not getting work. And the Indians and the Colored might get work.

They are still stuck in the middle.

Yes, they are still stuck in the middle. So everything is in reverse, but the White man suffers more now, you can see more the White man suffering. And the only reason why the ANC keeps

winning is because the Blacks wouldn't want another White man to be President again because they are going to lose all their luxuries that they have got now. Because they were suppressed all the time and now they have got all the luxuries. So if a white man like Tony Leon comes in then it is back to normal again, back to Apartheid. And we (the Coloureds) just sit in the middle of everything.

You can see people are still racist today.

Yes, very racist.

My point with the NNP it's worse than slime, getting all it's people, then joining the ANC.

And another thing, why was it changed from National Party to New National Party. Was it because van Schalkwyk took over?

They try to convince you thinking there is something new now.

I don't care if it is changed or not, but I hate that name; National Party.

Anything else on the New National Party?

I think for myself, when I was in school, I thought the National Party was the best. Everyone said it was. I grew up not knowing about the ANC. Only when I started hearing about the ANC.

Okay, how likely is it that you would vote in the next elections, in 2009?

If I see a dramatic change. Dramatic change in the sense that people get employment, houses getting built. I mean, change in the lives of people. And then I will vote.

I will vote if the politicians become more visible in our areas. And not for one or two weeks or once in a blue moon, they must be very active in the communities. And they must be honest with the community and they must allocate the money properly. The one thing I wanted to say earlier on, it is like beauty pageants, you know, when they come on TV. It is all for the sick children and the AIDS and everyone is taking photos of them with the children. And once they are crowned you never hear of them again. Now it is the same thing with politicians. Once you give them the vote to look after you, then you don't see them again.

Then you go ten years back on the waiting list for a house. Or you pay more school fees and education that your child can learn and the text books and all that.

One thing I liked about the NNP in the Apartheid years was that there was security, there was health and there was education. That we had. We might not have had the best schools, but...

But there was.

...we had education. There was books given to us and all our parents had to do was pay school fees and things like that. But now there is some system and the hospitals can't wait to get you out of the bed so they can give it to someone else. The nurses and the doctors is not doing their work.

How do you feel about campaigns? Do you think it is useful or not useful?

I think it is useful.

I think it is useful because of the squatter camps, because they can't go into the squatter camps

because of the mud.

Because of?

Because of the mud. You know, if it was raining last night, then you can't walk because of the mud. And then they will use that thing to shout...

A loudspeaker.

...because there is places were you have to go around this corner and this corner in order to get the message to the people.

That is what they do, yes. I mean campaigning is a good thing because they are promising. They come to the people, they make the point to go to the people and sit on their mats, just to convince the people that they care. And after they go, nothing happens. But it is good, because they bribe the people and all that. They even come to their house. Because they want you, the people, to see now things will happen.

You were saying it is useless?

At this stage it is useless because of the past and what they didn't do for the people. So I think they are just wasting their time.

I think it has got an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is there is people who only know ANC. It is good for the other parties to put their word across and let other people know there is other political parties. The disadvantage is they give a lot of empty promises and they sing the same old song over and over and over. That's the disadvantage. But for me actually, I don't think it is useful.

You were saying? Why do you say it is not useful?

I just don't see the point in doing it, everybody is confused, and nobody knows who to vote for. People just get cross because they feel 'I need to vote, I have to vote, something is going to happen if I don't vote'.

That's all they know, that they have to vote, because people tell them they have to vote.

If you register you have to vote, if you are not registered, you are not going to get a house.

It's useless, because people are making promises, the same promises, so people are confused, they don't know who to vote for.

I would say it is not really useless, because if they want what they are saying, it is fine. I wouldn't say it is useless, just be honest.

You say just be honest, but how long have the political parties been voting?

They haven't been honest for the past ten years.

What I am saying is you can come right.

Yes, but it is going to take another ten years, ten, fifteen years.

We'll be dead by then!

No, like you said, fine, the person can become honest, they can change their lives around and come forward and be honest. But the people are not going to be convinced now. They must make drastic changes.

My point is when there is changes, even if it is 15 years, my grandchildren will see it. We don't have to see it.

Anything else very important or useful about campaigns? Thinking of all we have discussed here, what advice would you give to somebody in charge of a political party? How do you think they can improve their chances in the next election?

They must mix with us.

They must mix.

They must be visible.

Be among the people.

Try to get people some work, some employment, houses, before we vote.

Long before we vote.

You must be able to see the change.

They must take some notes from Zola.

Yes, he helps the community.

I mean look at what he is doing. He's got a documentary and he actually goes and makes people's dreams come true. And he goes and researches, this person has got a problem, so he goes and researches, he helps the people. Why can't politicians do it.

So he is more like a role model. I didn't now about Zola Seven, but my child will say 'Zola Seven!'. He sits with the people and he talks to them.

He talks to everybody; old, young, rich, poor. Even if you are disabled. He can run for presidency. Most old people will even vote for him, because they see what he does.

I even seen him perform. He actually told the bodyguards 'move away, move away' and he actually came closer to the people and spoke to them.

It seems we are bringing Zola up...

More than the ANC...

Or our President!

Okay, is there any other final comment about anything we have discussed? Any other point you want to bring across?

Yes, there is two main things: (*inaudible*) and honesty. If I just take a drive in the evening, and see 16 or 18 people sleeping on the pavement. You can see how desperate these people are, their faces, how they are living. They give you a house the size of this...

Pumlani houses.

This is the size of the house (*gestures to room*) he has got six kids, his mother from Transkei is staying by him also, and that is the size of the houses. People are too scared to moan.

Just now the little they got is taken away as well.

They say they are going to give people a small piece of land and build a house. Today it is still a squatter camp.

Because they are cramped up.

The Wendy houses has been taken away, but it still looks like that because you have to extend. Because if you have six kids like he said, you have to extend the house. I mean we don't want double stories. If you look at the houses they stay in, it is two people.

They don't stay there half the time, they are flying all over the show.

They don't stay at home, yes.

What they spend can be put back into the communities, you know what I mean. Show the people that you care, that is the bottom line, because you must be able to care for somebody to win his heart over. You can't just expect to tell him and convince him. Most of the people, maybe they aren't educated and these politician they thrive on that, when people are illiterate and things like that...

...and people don't know what to do, they are scared. They put fear in these people. They tell them if they don't vote they don't get houses, these type of things. So the people are so scared, they just do what they say. And there is some people who just couldn't care less anymore whether they vote or don't vote, they just sit. They just don't want to talk about politics. Politics is becoming a very scary topic. It shouldn't be like that.

You don't know where to make your mark, because someone might see.

Yes, if you don't make a mark by the ANC, they will know, because your ID is there and this and that. There was this one guy who argued with me who said they know where you voted, so I said no, they don't know where you voted. And he said they do know, they do, and he was rather scared about it.

Or you have a friend who says 'vote for ANC' and that is not out of our hearts.

Or they just go to the poles because it is a holiday, so let's just go make our mark, it is a holiday.

Nobody here and nobody I know is asking for money. Give me a job and I will work for that money. I don't want money just like that. That is where the jobs come in. There is 5 million people unemployed, and unemployed is where it starts, because you can't feed your family.

The other thing is, there has been some changes in the area, there is cameras in the area and robots put up there. For years there was nothing like that. Just because he came in there now, there is things put up there where he was, or his parents or whatever. Does not put anywhere

else. You see now, that is where the money is going. Because he knows his parents are there. You know what I am saying? Why don't they do it in other areas. Other areas have got speed bumps. I don't think they are putting it there for the children.

A few months ago I went for a job at the council and it was another friend of mine. And his sister had got a job there and his uncle has got a job there. What must I do there, I don't know any one there. Not to say you want it that way, but be fair. A friend of mine, his father – he works for the council - applies for a house. And about two months later he got a house. I applied six years ago and still nothing. So today it is who you know.

Can I ask you this last question? Do you want to vote in the 2009 election?

No.

You don't want to?

No, I don't want to.

No.

No.

No.

And the main reason? Because of everything?

Yes.

Yes.

It's pointless, you must go make a cross there for somebody just to get a better scene. But those people don't think, that party doesn't think that if you had a brother in the opposition party, you would have sacrificed your life just to make a vote. They just take it, another cross.

All of us staying here, we are South Africans, we feel we are part of this country. So if they joined us – I am not saying they must come to my house, nothing like that, mix with part of us. Show they care.

Okay, you guys have been great. Thank you very much. That is the end of the discussion.

VOTED FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES IN 1994 – 1999, DID NOT VOTE IN 2004

Okay, just go around.

Okay, Cheryl has got two children and they keep her busy. And jogging.

This is _____; she has a full time job. She is a housewife. And she enjoys painting.

Do you do paintings?

Yes, I do paintings. I just do it for my own personal nature. This is Jason. He is working full time, what he does I do not know. His pastime is watching movies.

This is _____. He is a student. Basically he likes partying, having fun. He is outgoing, and likes challenges.

Where are you studying?

Cape Technikon.

Okay.

This is _____. Actually I am meeting him for the second time today. I met him in Knysna a few years back in camp.

Okay! That's a coincidence!

Yes, Cape Town, Western Cape...He is in business admin for a construction company.

Okay, this is _____; she is a Tae Bo gym instructor.

Wow!

She says she loves doing it. She's not giving class to children, mostly adults. That's basically it.

Thank you.

This is _____. He is married, he's got kids and he loves to take his grandchild for walks in the morning.

Thank you. Okay, I am just going to go through how these groups are going to work. Okay, firstly, thank you very much for coming to be a part of the discussion. It is being done as part of a research project for a student who is busy studying how political parties communicate to voters. Okay, just a couple of points; there are no right or wrong answers, so feel free to say what you want to. And your views are very important, so don't sit there and you are like thinking a point, but everybody is talking so you are not going to say your point. Rather just say what you feel, because your views are important. If your views differ, it is fine, we can disagree, just say what you feel. Then, also, as you can see, we are tape recording the discussion, but four other groups are also being done, so it all gets added together, so we won't be able to be able to say Amanda said so and so, it will all be just a whole long discussion, and then it will be put into the report, quotes will be put into the report. It's all confidential, in fact, each one of us needs to maintain the confidentiality of the group, so I am just going to hand out a confidentiality slip, if you could just sign that. What it says is basically that you are participating of your own free will, that the purpose has been explained to you, and that you won't discuss the group outside. You're not signing your lives away!

Okay, I am going to start off with the first question then. The election held on the 14th of April was a big event. What did the people that you spoke to say about the election and the campaigning before the election?

Can anyone speak?

Yes, but the one thing is, just one at a time, because of the recording, but just jump in whenever.

I think for myself that a lot of people were disillusioned, because a lot of people felt it wouldn't make a difference, because the ANC would have the majority and they would resound in victory, and I was also disillusioned with the party that I voted for.

Okay, others?

The people that I came in contact with the elections, most of them were undecided, they did not know which way to go, and some of them waited until the last minute, others didn't go vote at all because they thought their needs wouldn't be attended too. And basically with the last vote I didn't go, because I didn't think there was a party that good.

In my personal opinion, I also said I am going to vote, and at the last minute actually I decided not to vote because even the people in Parliament, they didn't even know what party they are going to join after the election, due to the fact that a lot of them jump on the band wagon, and when they see it is not working out, they sell themselves out to go and join another party. And at the end of the day, the people that vote for them, they make promises to the people, and they don't fulfill their promises, and I think that is very unfair towards the man in the street.

To me I think it was fairly obvious that the ANC was going to win. I didn't see much difference in the ratings, and so many people were going to vote, I didn't see what difference my vote would make at the end of the day.

My experience, because I was supposed to actually help someone out – stand in at the post, what I experienced wasn't nice, because there, if you don't vote for this party, this is going to happen, if you don't vote for that party, this is going to happen. I didn't vote that day, because I knew that if I am going to vote then I don't know who I am going to vote for, I trust no one from what I saw that vote. I trust no one and that is why I didn't vote. Because if I am going to vote for this party, what are they going to give me? What are they going to give them? Understand? What are those people going to get out of it? There are a lot of promises being made, and as far as I have seen it hasn't been laid on the table, I don't see anything; it is just talk, talk, talk, but no doing. I want to see doing, not just talking.

If I may ask, did you see any intimidation? I mean did you think people were like...threatened?

Yes, I've seen it. I've seen it with my own eyes.

But when you vote no one knows where you put your cross.

Yes, but I was outside, and as people come in they go to different, you know, and I am standing and

I am watching everyone. You can see the expressions on the people's faces...
So who threatened you?

Look I don't like to mention names, but different parties, if you don't work for that one then they say something, if you don't work for that one, then that one says something. It's very complicated.

There was only two parties actually competing this year, and where I come from, Guguletu, it is a black area. Because of the struggle, a lot of people, as I did, did not vote, because of empty promises, and still there was everybody having the same problems, and there wouldn't be so

many changes, and other black people wouldn't go vote for a white person, because of what the whites did before and all that.

Okay, thinking back to the previous elections, everybody in the room sitting around this table the opposition party. Okay, what was your reason at that stage for your voting choice, because you felt motivated to vote?

I wanted change.

Are you talking about '99?

No, I am talking about any of the previous elections.

'94 or '99.

We wanted to give a life to our kids, to give them the opportunities that we were denied. I can remember me being in Grade 1 being taken out of school. I was there one minute and gone the next, and I didn't know what happened. It was only later on in life when my parents told me. We were moved out of the areas that we lived in and we were forced into Mitchell's Plain and that is where we grew up. You want change. If you look at the situation in Mitchell's Plain, it has just gone down and down.

It's getting worse.

It's getting worse.

The others? The reason you voted the way you did at the previous elections?

I think that time there was jobs. That time you could just walk into a job, but now you can't just walk into a job, because I mean if you walk into a job – there's nothing. There is people that are not even educated that's got a post and there is people that is educated that hasn't got a post. How many educated people are sitting at home without jobs? And how many people that is not educated is in jobs?

Well, I confirm what you say, because my daughter has got 14 years experience in insurance and she has got all her diplomas and all her exams and she went for an interview and at the end of the interview they said 'I'm sorry, but it is AA'. So the whites are now being marginalized and the Coloureds are now being marginalized and the Indians are now being marginalized – with all due respect to you...

Okay.

...This is the reality...

That's a fact, yes.

...is this retribution for what happened in the past.

To put it to you this way, we were actually brainwashed by the previous Government actually. We are only realizing it now that we were brainwashed. They tell us this is what is going to happen if you don't vote for us, you know, all the wrong things, and people are going to come into the country and they are going to take over this and they are going to do this to you, so we were actually brainwashed, it is only now that we realize that all these years we were actually brainwashed, we were just doing as we were told, we didn't ask questions.

So is that why you voted as you voted?

Yes.

Never mind the Apartheid era and the racism in the country; every country has racism. For myself I believe that FW de Klerk ran the country much better than any other president...

Yes.

Yes.

...He never caused Apartheid, the people of the country caused Apartheid. I believe other political leaders get too much credit. Take for instance Nelson Mandela. People act like he was the only one in prison. There were a lot of people in prison, but he still got all the credit, you see. Before Whites used to get everything and Blacks got nothing. I wouldn't say it is revenge...

...but what's due to them.

...When the Whites were in charge they gave things to the Whites. Same as the Blacks. The Blacks are now in charge, they will do the same for their families; put them in power.

But what I want to know, what about the Coloureds. The Coloureds are always in the center.

No, the Coloureds are not always in the center, especially not in the Western Cape.

It's always the Whites, then the Coloureds, then the Blacks, now it is the Blacks and then the Whites and...

No, the Whites are still in charge, they are still in charge.

Okay, I missed this, because I was at the door.

I was saying that what is happening now is people are saying the Blacks are in charge. Not that the Blacks are in charge, but that the Blacks are in top positions. What they did is what the Blacks are doing right now, putting their families and friends in the right positions. It's not some sort of vendetta, you would also do that if you were in power; you put your family member, the one that is poor – now I don't see anything wrong with that, because everybody does it.

You put the best person for the job in the position.

Everybody is supposed to be like that, everybody is not like that.

If you are more qualified, then you deserve to get the job you apply for.

Look at the Deputy President. He's got no education, but he is the Deputy President. Nobody is complaining about that.

Alright, let me just steer back to this – I didn't hear from you guys your reason for voting.

My point of view, why I voted for a certain party, because I was looking for some party that would make employment. That was my biggest concern at the time. But before 1994 there was enough employment, and ever since 1994 there wasn't. They took the power but they didn't make employment. And crime as escalated since 1994.

Okay, so now thinking of the elections this year, what made you decide to not vote in the 2004 election?

I didn't think my vote would make a difference. I don't think a party I would vote for would put an extra loaf of bread into my tin. It's up to me to put food on the table, no one is going to give it to me, no matter what party I vote for, so that is why. If you are unemployed no Government is going to give you a job and say 'no, shame, she's got five hungry kids at home to feed, give her a job, give her husband a job, he may be over qualified or under qualified, but give him a job'. Nobody is going to do that for you, so that is why I decided I am not going to vote.

I feel the same. I didn't vote because they make promises and they don't deliver. They forget about you, they are in power they are sitting there. So that is why I didn't vote.

I didn't vote, because the party that I voted for originally, the DA – three years ago in 2001, the NNP crossed the floor and they joined the DA, and that was very disillusioning for me. That was a disillusion.

I believe in seeing is believing, and if I see something. I did see some changes, but I didn't see anything special for me, so...

The reason why I didn't vote is because somebody that was in a certain party was my role model and when he walked over and crossed the floor to another party I decided no, I can't put my vote down for him, and then he is going to have seat and I am still going to be sitting where I am sitting now. That is why I decided, you want to cross the floor, and you go on your own. I am not giving my vote to you again this year.

From 1994, 1995, everyone knows up to the next election...

1999.

...no, up until the next one, everyone knows the ANC is going to win...

...so why vote when you know you are not going to make a difference. Let's say the ANC was not going to win, there was a 50/50% chance, I wouldn't not vote for the DA, because of personal vendettas, my father and Tony Leon and all that. Sometimes you've got to face the facts, you see. Don't do something which you are not going to gain anything from. Today all these people say these parties promised something. That is what you must do when you campaign. You can't just go there and say 'I am DA, vote for me' you must stay in the game, you must promise, you must not lie to the people. The ANC is not giving out jobs, giving out money for people to start businesses. The ANC in the last elections never said they are going to employ people. People think when they vote they are going to get a better job, you are going to do this and you are going to do that. You are just increasing their budgets; they are just going to earn more money.

The reason I didn't vote is because I didn't know the parties. Everybody said to me 'vote for that' and I said 'but I don't know that person, give me some background and then I will vote'. But they couldn't.

You didn't get enough background.

I didn't get enough background from anyone. Even with Nelson Mandela, I knew his background, but still I didn't vote, because I was confused and I didn't trust any of the parties, because what can they give, I want them to lay it out on the table, say 'that is that'. Let the people see what they are about, you know.

Win the people's trust.

Like say for instance in the housing scheme. A lot of people are ANC, they promised housing, and up till today a lot of people are still struggling, for 12 years, been living on the ground, struggling for toilets, there's no water, there are no toilets, up till today they still don't have a house. There are a lot of illnesses there, there's a lot there. There's TB, there's cancer, there's AIDS, and I said 'no!'

Okay, what if anything would have convinced you to vote?

What would have convinced me to vote is that my husband became retrenched in 1999. He is a hard worker, he went through numerous interviews. He is either over-qualified or his degree is incomplete. Give him a chance, he is Colored, he is hardworking, he has got the figures to back up, and he was not given a chance. In 1999 I actually thought why did I go and cast my vote in 1994? In 1994 I thought putting my cross next to a certain party it is going to open up a world of doors for us; it is going to give us a better life, so...

You were very optimistic.

...I was very optimistic. That convinced me. I think small issues, gain the trust of people, and puts you in power. It is not for us to decide or come up with these things. They have got to make it public for us, say 'yes fine, we are going to commit to working in the poorer areas', once we see little homes starting to mushroom, and see eradicating poverty, it's going to win my trust back.

What would have convinced you to vote in April?

If they had improved the health system, and education, because that is the two most important aspects in any country, is your health and your education. But in this country talk is cheap, people are always saying 'no, we are going to improve the health situation, we are going to improve the education'...

...but I mean you must go there to the hospitals and experience it yourself and then you will see how many hours you are going to sit and wait for medication...

Yes.

Yes.

...the second thing is most people can't afford to pay school fees, so now what they do is they hold back the reports at the end of the year and you don't know if your kids has passed or what is happening. So I mean, for me that is something important in any society.

Is there anything that could convince you?

No, I would have seen there is a difference, and then I would have decided, but up till now they are telling everybody on the TV and in the newspaper it is improving, but it is getting worse, it is not getting better. It is pointless telling anybody that doesn't have the experience and don't see firsthand how the system works. Up till now it is just getting worse, you can go to any Government hospital or day hospital and you will see there is no improvement.

The crime rate is escalating...

Yes, the newspaper is publishing the murder rating in Cape Town is down by 3%, but the hijacking is up by 5%. We don't want to see all that; we want to make our safe communities for our kids. We want a safer environment. Figures means squat to me. I want to see it happening.

You see, why there is figures is because maybe they arrested 10 of the biggest hijackers, now automatically those figures are coming down now, but what happens when the other 10 comes out of jail, then it is just going to go up again.

Apparently the jails are 118% overcrowded. There is actually no place.

People actually want to go to jail, because in jail there is everything! I mean there is computers...they are living better than what we are living!

Okay, I am just passing this around. Casting back in your mind now, looking at the ANC, why was the ANC unable to convince you to vote for them in the April elections.

For me it wasn't a matter of convincing, it was a matter of they were going to win. I couldn't waste my vote, because whether I voted or not...

I don't have anything else to add, I am just backing up what I said, that is why I didn't vote, because of all my points that I stated earlier on.

They wouldn't have convinced me in any case because the ANC is very powerful, and it's going 15 years now and there was no improvement. There was slight improvement, but nothing major. So nothing would have changed my mind.

The ANC spent I don't know how many billions on armaments, and airplanes and warships, and South Africa isn't at war with anybody. That money could have well been spent on health – I mean I read in the Argus that women are in labour in the hospitals and there is not enough doctors and the women are giving birth in the corridors. They don't even have enough beds. It is a disgrace.

I think as citizens we must not forget one thing, the ANC is not the one controlling the thing of the country, the ANC can't make all the decisions, it is not their problem. (inaudible) does his budget every year February, March, February – he does a budget with what the economies can afford. Whether people want to give birth in corridors Mundi Shabalala cannot do more than what is given to her, because already teachers don't get paid enough, the teachers are on strike. It is not the ministers that control the ANC; it is the EU, the AU. Look at Zimbabwe; it was taken out of the African Union, just because Mugabe doesn't want to do certain things that are done by the African Union. Not everything is supposed to be done by the ANC. The thing that the ANC does is not so much in South Africa, like what you said, the Arms Deal, it wasn't the ANC, even though the fraud cases came from the ANC members because they were the party in charge, but it wasn't the ANC's decision to buy the weapons.

But you know something, we have the most liberal constitution in the world that promises education for all, free medical attention for all, so what is the point of the constitution being liberal if it can't deliver?

It's true. And who makes the constitution?

The ANC! It's the majority party, so they have to take the blame.

From my point of view I decided no, it is pointless. It is already – they are not going to lose again, because the first time when they won it is just going to improve more votes and more votes, so it is pointless going to vote for a party which is not going to have a platform to stand on.

But I think they should eradicate all the small parties. The KISS parties and all that.

The one man parties.

Yes.

They are just wasting time.

Yes.

Because those parties like KISS, they get a seat and then they cross floors to bigger parties for better positions.

Okay, that is a picture of the DA. In the 2003 election, why was the DA unable to convince you to vote for them?

As I said, I have got a personal vendetta with the guy, but one thing about the DA, it keeps its promises, because he has money. He is not using the states money, he has money. It is in the news, they will go to Atlantis, and they will bring blankets, groceries for all the poor people. The ANC will just go there and will be eating at the table and the poor people will be watching them eat. That is one thing, the DA does deliver.

Okay, so it's more personal.

Mine's more personal, yes.

Could you tell us why you have a personal vendetta, because you mentioned your father and Tony Leon? Did they have a fight? A disagreement? Is your father in politics?

No, my father is not in politics. The thing is, my father's boss is DA, my father is ANC. Tony Leon went to my father's work and since my father is an active person for the ANC, he was asked not to make a comment to any of the questions and statements made by Tony Leon, and he could never let down his party and listen to what the other party was saying, and he said something, he almost lost his job because of the exchange of words between him and Tony Leon, and why I took this personally, because if he had lost his job, I could have been suffering right now, because of him, you see.

Okay, this is not the party for me, so I am not even interested in who is the leader of this party, who is the members of this party, this is not the party that interests me, so I am sorry if I can't make any comments on this.

Okay, if I must say, I think the DA is a racist party. It appeals to the White upper middle class, even if the Deputy Chair of the DA is an African.

(inaudible) is also a black person, Colin Powel is also a black person, but they were put in power just to be puppets. They are using them.

They are just there because of the colour.

You represent the Blacks, but you still follow our rules, if you don't, get out. There must be puppets everywhere.

I just want to say, the DA, they are not right, at that time I did not think they were right, not a strong enough party. At that time I was looking for a party that was strong, that would at least win the election.

Did you really think the DA would win the election!

No!

Don't you think it would be a good idea to have a co-election for all the minor parties?

Okay, so that is the IFP over there. Why was the IFP unable to convince you?

Personally, in my opinion, we are Xhosa. We can't be controlled by a boy, by a Zulu. They don't go to the bush. So we can't be controlled by boys. So that is why I didn't want to vote.

I think the IFP is very regional, you know, confined to...

Kwa-Zulu Natal, yes.

It's not a well known party in the Western Cape.

I don't think we can identify really.

That is the same comment I was going to make, they are not in the Western Cape, they are more in Natal. He grew up in Natal; he doesn't know what's happening where we come from, where we call it the Cape Flats. So it's pointless if people are going to vote for the IFP.

Do you remember in 1994 there was so much violence in Natal?

In Natal, yes!

The ANC and the IFP were killing each other. It was before the elections and during the elections.

Okay, you've got the UDM in front of you. Why, in the 2004 elections was the UDM unable to convince you to vote for them?

He was doing what Tony Leon is doing, fighting against the ANC. They will not say anything about the UDM; they were just fighting, fighting against the ANC. Every statement was saying the ANC does this; it does not say what they can do. For a black person to fight another black person, it is looking stupid in front of the Whites and the Coloureds. Especially when he was ANC.

This is also a party that was actually established in the Eastern Cape. So to me, in the Western Cape it doesn't make sense to go and vote for somebody in the Eastern Cape, because at the end of the day if he should come in, he is going to see more to the Eastern Cape, like Transkei and Ciskei and Umtata and so to me, it doesn't interest me to vote for somebody that is not going to look after our province.

To me a party must be popular in all provinces, not only one. Because then it is not going to matter.

More important, they must be very, very active in the community throughout the time, they mustn't just be visible when there is an election.

Okay, you've got the Independent Democrats. Why was the Independent Democrats

unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 election?

Patricia. She is a friend of a friend of mine. And then she came to me and she said to me I must vote for her friend.

Your friend came to you?

Yes, and she said I must vote for Patricia. So I said 'who's Patricia, I don't know Patricia' and she said she's ID and all that. So I said no, I don't vote for someone that I don't know.

When they were campaigning for the election, and they always say when they look for votes they are the people's person and all that, but when you ask them once they are on that stage there and they give a discussion to the people why you must vote for them, they ask them questions, and they can't give them a direct answer. I mean if people can't give you a direct answer, it is pointless voting for them. Even now when she is in Parliament, she can come up with this fraud and all that, but when she was campaigning and people were asking her certain questions, and she couldn't come up with a direct answer, for me it is pointless going to vote for somebody that can't give you a direct answer, so once they are in Parliament, what are they going to do to the public, they are undecided. So for me it is not voting for somebody that can't give you an answer direct.

But Patricia is the second most powerful woman in South Africa next to Winnie Mandela. Coming back to my point, she will never run South Africa. So you can rather not waste your vote, you can rather not vote for anybody if you are going to waste your vote. But I think she can deliver. If this was Winnie Mandela in charge of the Independent Democrats, yes, I would vote for her...

Yes, but only if she is going to deliver, in which way is she going to deliver.

Let's say if the ID was in charge right now, they would do the same thing that the ANC is doing right now...

Yes.

...it's not a matter of the ANC is doing better or not.

Okay, the only difference is now, from my point of view, is there is more millionaires in Parliament now than anything else. I mean that is a fact, there is more people becoming millionaires, you know, in the previous years, nobody actually realized that South Africa was one of the most richest countries through the mines and the coal and all that. It is only now that people realize that this is one of the richest countries, even with oil. I don't know why we paying so much money for oil. And here by Mossgas, Saldahna, we are having our own oil, but still paying prices, they are importing oil from whatever country they are getting oil from and we are paying sky-high prices. And it is only now that people realize that this is one of the richest countries and I don't know if they have still got the goal that they used to have, but this is one of the richest countries, and people didn't realize it.

I didn't know much about the party at the time. It was a small party, and I didn't want to waste my vote.

I didn't even think about them.

You didn't even think about them. Okay.

I think, look, she is a personality, and she exposed a lot of fraud, like you said.

I do like her, I like what she stands for, she is very direct. The reason why she did not get my vote is because it is a new party, and casting my vote for a new party is a bit tacky. But I do like her, I think she is wonderful, she is great, and I do think she can make a change, giving her the opportunity she can make a change, especially for the women and children.

Okay, this is the last one...

Our favorite.

Okay, the last one, the New National Party. In 2004 elections, why were they not able to convince you?

They've been through too many changes, and when a party goes through too many changes, there is risk behind it. That is why they never got my vote.

In 1994 they did get my vote, because I believed at the time that they could deliver. But since 1994 so many changes were made, and the NNP walked over to other parties, and then I decided that if they could walk over from party to party, what would happen if they were in power.

Okay, in 1994 and 1999 they brainwashed me to vote for them, but in the last election I used my own discretion not to vote.

Not that I am racist or anything, but in terms of the colour, I wouldn't vote for them. Now if FW de Klerk was still President, I would vote for them.

Yes, the same, if he was still President I would also vote for him, because you never know, maybe some miracle still happens.

I think a lot of people still feel like that; if he had been in power they would have still voted for him.

Okay, that's interesting. Okay, how likely is it that you will vote in the next election, 2009?

I think for me, I haven't really educated myself much on the smaller parties. And I just think people like Patricia De Lille; I have got to give her a fair chance. And through a vote of mine, it is going to put her into a seat of power, and for the next elections I definitely will educate myself more onto the different parties, their stances, what they offer, what they believe in, the core, the core of our country. So I have really got to educate myself more and not just vote this one or this one because they are the bigger party.

I'd like to see now in the next four years will there be changes. Will pensioners, will children get more grants, will things improve and it is possible that one of the parties will get my vote.

I haven't decided for which party I am going to vote...

No, not which party, just if you are going to vote.

Oh, just if I am going to vote. Well, it is still another two or three years, so I haven't decided, it is still in the future. I will decide if it is worth my vote or not, otherwise I will rather stay away from it.

The same like _____ said, I would also like to educate myself more in the parties, and for my vote, if I decide to vote again, I want to see that there are more houses for the people, education, house, the death penalty, that I would love to see come back, because the crime in this country, it is...

Havoc.

...it is unbelievable. So I want to see that before I vote again. There must be a change.

Yes, the same, once I see some changes, then most definitely I will vote in the next election.

I might vote for the ANC in the next elections, for the following reasons: if the economic well being of the country remains the same as it is right now, or better. I won't talk about houses, because...

...people keep on coming into Cape Town where there is jobs, and the ANC and the ANC are not providing houses, you see. In the matter of education, one thing they promised is free education, and we still don't see that. You are still paying thousands. You can just take your child to those White schools – as they are still called – private schools and pay R30 000.00 per year, because these teachers in the Government schools, you go to the shebeen with them and the policemen and then just now they say they spend R45 Million for security at the police stations, because if you can't be safe at a police station, you can't be safe anywhere. If that had to change – I don't see any other party changing that now, but if the ANC had to change that, fulfill all those things – I won't say anything about a job, because it is up to each and every person to make a living for himself, because you are provided with the funds right now, these are the provident funds, if those things had to change, more things available, I would vote for the ANC.

The next question actually relates to what you said, which is what would a party have to do in order for you to vote for them in 2009?

Keep its promises.

It must deliver. They mustn't make empty promises and then at the end of the day there is nothing that has been done.

Pop into the townships and let the people know who they are. Communicate with the people. If you are not at that level, go down to that level and speak to them.

And not only at election time.

Yes, I mean that is not on.

They must be visible throughout. They should be visible; I mean after all, they are our leaders.

I mean, how do you – if you want to deliver to the people but you don't go into the community. You must actually go into the community, into the townships and see what they are all about, how do they live...

The living conditions.

...and then if you go through all that...I mean like my late father always used to say, you have to crawl before you walk. Go do all those things, and then you only deliver.

They should actually see to the needs of not certain people, they should see to the needs of everybody. And then we can actually say we are a community, doesn't matter what colour, because at the moment there is still racism, it doesn't matter where you go. And some people just put up a front because they are in the company of certain colour people, but once you go out there you will see certain people go that side and certain people go that side. So they should actually see to the needs of all the people and then these other things will fall away.

The important fact that he mentioned is that we are forgetting the major problem that we have in South Africa; the refugees and immigrants. On the way here we were talking about it; why there are so many refugees and immigrants in South Africa in places most of us can't afford, Sea Point, Moreesburg, Ottery, Mowbray, the most expensive places, they occupy those places. You go to any parking lot, who will be coming to your car asking for your R3 or R4, the refugees. You go anywhere, you go to Cape Town, it's all there, and we keep on complaining that we don't have jobs. Those people are coming into this country and doing what we were supposed to do; starting their own businesses...

Taking it away.

...not that they are taking it away, they are doing what we are not doing. The blame is on us.

I mean if you walk into a shop, we don't see our people that is the owner of the shop, you see them, they are the owner of the shop.

Yes, everywhere.

Okay, some people say that the election campaign does not matter because people have already made up their minds. Other people say the election campaign is important because it helps people to choose in the election. How do you feel about the election campaigns? Do you think it is useful or not useful?

It's almost like Gingos in America.

Gingos?

Yes, it's almost like a mass hysteria. Have you see how crazy they go in America? Everybody releases balloons and they play the Star-spangled Banner and people do get caught up in that hype.

Do you feel that it is useful?

Yes, it is useful, because it gets people interested.

And at least you can see who is the people that is in the party. Let's say for instance, we make an example of the DA. When they were campaigning on that bus with the open top, and at least you can see, okay, there's that guy that is always on TV, and you know, whatever party, at least you can see this is how they look, but they don't look so fat on TV, you know, but at least...it doesn't matter what they are saying to campaign, but at least you can see here's the people in your township only for that time period. Afterwards they forget.

I think it is a waste of money, it is like advertising coke. Coke wouldn't lose any money if they didn't advertise. Because you know you are going to vote for them. It's like you say now, people need to see, but if I ask you who is the Minister of Sports now, you wouldn't know. It's

not a matter of knowing those people, but knowing who you want to be President. You don't care about all the other people.

Do you people think campaigning is useful...?

Yes, I think it is useful, because there is a lot of people who is not into politics and it gives them a chance to decide. If you could look at a picture of a party, you could see which party is selling itself through advertising. It gives the people an opportunity to choose which party to vote for.

I think it is useful. Getting back to the point of coke, there is lots of competitors.

The other point is also, once you are campaigning, you are selling yourself to the public, so if you don't campaign people is not going to vote for you. Like if you advertise coke – okay, irrespective that coke is one of the famous cool drinks, but I am talking about the political parties. If they are not going to campaign, people are not going to know this is Mrs. So and So...

You've got to keep it fresh in people's minds all the time.

...because you must sell yourself to the voters so people can see this is Mr. So and So or Mrs. So and So.

You are shaking your head, but there are two views, which one do you agree with?

This one. It's very useful; it gets the people all excited.

The thing you should understand, for the past two or three elections, two elections, I am talking about the youth now. They have only seen the ANC in power, so convincing them to vote for another party wont go through their heads or through their minds, they just say the ANC is the right party to vote. And you can never convince an old person to do something wrong when she grew up doing something right. So she know she always votes for the ANC, whether the ANC flag changed or anything. Now for the youth which will be voting in the next coming elections, they also want to vote for what they have seen people voting for. They won't vote for a KISS party, they don't want a KISS party. It's the people in their 30's that are thinking 'who should I vote for?' I knew straight which party to vote for. I was never involved in the Apartheid era, because when I grew up I went to the color schools at the time that I wanted and I went to the White schools at the time that I wanted.

So how do you feel about campaigns then?

Campaigns? Like I said, it is a waste of money. You know who you want to vote for. It's like going to the movies. If you see a preview on TV you will go straight to that movie, you won't go to watch another movie.

But the campaigns are going to take place anyway.

Yes, they must take place.

I don't know how the other gentlemen and ladies in the room feel, but when I went to vote in 1994 for the first time I was so excited, because for me it was something unusual, we never had the opportunity to vote. You always hear people at that stage going to the poling stations so for me it was something exciting, it was a good feeling and experience to go and vote for a party that you want to vote for.

I think it can be useful and a waste of time. Like he said, it is for promoting, and like he said, it is a waste of time, it's money waste. For me it works actually both ways, it depends, you know.

To get back to your point about having, for a better word, lack of tunnel vision, you know who you are going to vote for – parents are disillusioned, grandparents are disillusioned, we are all in some way disillusioned and you know, we talk among each other, parents talk, people talk, and youth hear what we are talking. And it is though-provoking for them, you know, mother is saying that about the ANC, dad is saying that about the NNP, so it is also good that there is campaigning because it opens up a brand new world to the youngster that is about to vote. He is torn between the parties because he is hearing that opinion, that negative, that positive, so I think campaigning is good.

And then I also think our kids are going to grow, our grandkids are also going to vote, who is going to be in, you know. Maybe the ANC won't be in power anymore, maybe some other party will be.

...and you know, it wears people down and it just carries on. I just think that type of thing; it is the core of the family. I just think we are South Africans, and we are family, irrespective of face, color. And abortion. If my daughter must have an abortion, it effects me. It will effect the granny, the uncle, the aunt. It's all about emotions. So I think they need to take that kind of thing into consideration before a law can be passed.

They should actually go down to the communities and ask them 'what is your suggestion?' not only with the abortion, but with the death penalty, because I mean we are the people that stay in the Cape Flats or whatever area where the crime is escalating and the police is already negative towards the crime in the area, because if people go to the police to report a crime they take forever to come and see whatever investigation will have to be done. So the people should come down and see before they make any decisions, they must come and see what is happening, can't we change this, just to make everybody feel happy.

There is a lot of corruption in the force. And I would like that to stop. If you phone the station now, there is abuse in the house; they will take ages to come. If someone hits someone or something, they will go and sort it out, but if it is drugs or something like that they will stand back and they won't go, because they get paid for that. I don't say each and every one of them, but there is a lot of rotten apples. So I would like that to stop. For me to vote again, that must stop, as I said, the death penalty must come in, and I want to see more parties participate in the communities, getting involved with it, so we can see okay, he is doing something – then I will start voting again.

Okay, advice to the parties, if you were to advise them how they can improve their chances.

I would say they must deliver.

No empty promises.

Okay, is there anything related to anything we have discussed that you wanted to raise any points before we close? About any of the questions, it doesn't matter.

Not actually.

We've said our say.

One thing I would like to say to any party that would win at any time, even the one in charge right now. I am a citizen of the Western Cape; I am a student, and all that. They keep on

building houses and people keep on coming to Cape Town, building shacks and then say there is no houses. A lot of houses are being built. Since they see there is a lot of people, there won't be enough time to build houses. They give them building material to build houses themselves. Which is something good. But the more they keep doing that the more the people are going to come, and they have houses wherever they are coming from. Big homes, cars and all that, and they keep on coming to Cape Town. They should stop building factories in Cape Town, because people keep coming because there is work in Cape Town. There is Volkswagen, there is Mercedes, there is BMW. Places like I & J, they are delivering fish all over South Africa, their head office is here in Cape Town. They can build another one in Durban, so people can go to Durban. Factories like Levi, Truworths, they are all here, and people are coming here for job, and next month sending money for their family to come down, come see there is work here.

Anything else? No? Okay, that concludes the discussion. Thank you very much.

VOTED ANC 1994 AND 1999, VOTED DA IN 2004

_____ works from home and her children think she earns a lot of money. She says it's not the case.

_____ enjoys soccer...

And rugby.

...and rugby, and I was told his favorite player, but I can't remember it.

Sean Bartlett.

Sean Bartlett, yes.

I've got two boys, I spend a lot of time with them, and I like jogging and sleeping.

I am married, got four children, eldest one nineteen, youngest will be seven. And I love working for the company that I work for. I love my friends a lot, I am a very outgoing person, and I like meeting people. I like to socialize and do things like this. I love it. I didn't know anything about it when a friend told me, I had never done it, but I love it. Okay, so that is me.

I am 50, so I haven't got much to do anymore, I am on the dump. I know Sean Bartlett personally. I love the outdoor life. I have survived till 50 and I never thought I could. I grew up in the townships and here I am, 50 and still going.

I like to meet people. I am married, got three children. Youngest ones are five and two, eldest is eleven. And I am a sportsman; I love sports, any kind of sports.

So we've got a whole load of sportsman here.

We used to play each other, but he was much younger than me.

My name is _____, I've got one child. I like working, and I like partying. And I like any kind of sport, and that is all I can say, not much.

Okay, that is great. As I said, my name is Cherrel, and I just want to thank everyone for attending the discussion. It is being done as part of a research project for a UCT student who is examining how parties communicate to voters. Just a couple of points; there is no

right or wrong answer; it is just everybody's opinion. Your opinion is important, so don't sit with an idea in your mind and you don't share it with the group. It is important that everybody gets a chance to participate. And even if people's views differ, it doesn't matter. And everything is confidential. We are busy recording, but there is seven other groups that is being done, so it will just be a whole lot of text at the end of the day – I won't be able to say 'Ralph said this' or 'Phillip said that', it is basically added together for a report. And then also, when we speak, for the recording, just one person at a time, so that it comes clear when they do the recording. I just need to go and get you some pencils, because for the confidentiality it also applies not only for us involved in the report keeping, but you guys as well, that you don't discuss after the group at the soccer clubs and say 'so and so said this'...

We fully understand.

Basically what it says is you are participating of your own free will and that everything has been explained to you. Okay, so the first question. The election held on the 14th of April was a big event. What did people that you speak to say about the elections?

To me they were happy about it. Some felt they had to vote to do something for the country, to be part of the country.

I thought it was a good idea to vote, because in the past they couldn't vote. So when we voted we were like part of South Africa - how can I say? – Citizens of South Africa. Before the election our people were not – how can I say?

They were not represented.

They were not represented. Like they don't belong in this country.

Are we talking about the past elections or 2004?

2004

In 2004 it was the third election that everybody voted. 1994, 1999 and 2004. 1994 was a fantastic get-together for everybody. Everybody was allowed – for the first time – to become South African citizens, which I felt fantastic about. Everyday I stood three or four hours to wait to cast my vote, because I wanted everybody to vote. People who had never voted before were taken in slowly, two by two and shown how to vote. I personally, in previous elections, in four elections, in 1961, '66, '70 and '74, I was an electoral officer. But I felt upset, because the majority of the country was not allowed to cast their vote. That upset me very badly.

Okay, did other people want to say anything?

Yes, I wanted you to rephrase the question that you asked originally.

Okay, it was basically just asking you what people were saying about the 2004 election.

What were people saying, but no one answered what the people where saying. Just rephrase it again? What were people saying? People to us?

Yes. In 2004.

In 2004.

This year.

Yes, this year. But they never told you what people were saying, they were telling you their opinions. Now I will tell you what people were saying: 'Gaan julle weer vir die kaffirs vote?' (*Are you going to vote for the Blacks again?*)? I am being straight forward now; I am going to say it how it is. They were saying what they feels, but the question you asked – that is why I asked you to rephrase the question 'what were people saying'. He wasn't telling you what people were saying, he was telling you what he was saying...

Let's move on to the next question...

No, no, no, I don't want to be like a dummy, what you are asking, we are going to answer. You were asking what people were saying, but he answered you and he answered you what he was saying. Now I am going to tell you what people were saying to me.

That question is designed to move us into the meat of the questions.

I gave you just an honest answer.

No, that is exactly what I want.

But you are leading this meeting now. Couldn't you tell him that was not the question or rectify it and say 'that isn't what I want, the question was –'and explain the question. The question wasn't what your opinion was; it was what people were saying to you.

The reason why I didn't is because it is not one of the meaty questions.

Okay, sorry about that, but it is just if you ask me something then I answer it directly.

Okay, now thinking of your point, the elections in 1994 and 1999, everybody sitting around the table initially voted ANC. At that stage, what were your reasons for voting ANC?

They promised me a house, and I am still sitting without a house. That is ten years ago. And to be honest, I became very frustrated. I am so full of - on the news I see it: ANC will build houses, ANC will do this, ANC will do that – they did nothing for me yet. So why, I don't need to go vote, I don't know who to vote for because nobody is there for us, I mean we as individuals...

...I won't go into colour racial thingies...

I must just ask you, in the 2004 election, did you vote?

No. I didn't go vote, but my aim was to vote for the DA, but I couldn't get into the queue.

I am going to have to give you your incentive and then – because what they do is, when you fill in, they just double check that you voted ANC and then DA. Is that everybody around the table besides you?

I didn't vote, there wasn't enough time, by the time I got there it was totally blocked.

I couldn't get in.

You should have been patient like I was; I stood there for hours and hours and hours.

There's your incentive.

I didn't vote as well.

They will give you your incentive at the door. I am sorry, but it is for the profile of the group. Hopefully we can carry on smoothly from here. Okay, for the rest of you, we were talking about 1994 and 1999, everybody voted ANC. What were your reasons?

Mine were that at that time everything would have been equal, there would have been free education, free medicine, there was going to be houses for the poor; the poor were going to be uplifted. And to this day, they have done something, but they haven't done enough for the poor. I have seen Nelson Mandela's house that Winnie built for him while he was in prison, a beautiful house. And I just feel that they are spending thousands of rands and the poor are still eating dry bread and water.

I went to the different talks that the different parties had and then I just thought that if I did it – if my mother knew it she would have turned in her grave – but I mean I listen to all the talks and I knew nobody else would come in. And I thought that maybe they would keep to their promise.

Initially I was in the struggle. I took a rubber bullet here – I don't want to show you the scar, in '76 – but I thought that everything was going to fall into place, the majority rules now. It is just certain of ethics. When the abortion – I don't want to make it a religious issue, I am a Catholic – but when the abortion issue came in I just thought about it, and then another thing came in, like the equity. The way it was implemented, I was for the equity, but the way it was implemented in Cape Town and I have got a couple of connections, and then I realized that on the most Government jobs there were equity.

I am ANC, but the equity, it doesn't make sense to me, the abortion, it doesn't make sense to me. We are a third world country with housing and financially, but they want to practice first world things like with abortions and equity and whatever. It is not easy for someone who is in the struggle. It is not easy for me to be here even. I am in a difficult position really, but that is really my stand point. It is not even a moral issue, because morals aren't really involved, but what you think is morally right, I think is morally wrong. It is not even taken into consideration.

Okay, we can come back to that, let me just hear from the others.

For me it was hard, we were struggling then. So we couldn't vote for any party, must vote for Nelson Mandela.

So you voted because of Nelson Mandela and the struggle.

Yes.

Many years ago I met somebody I was working with. His name was Walter. He was named after Walter Sisulu. We became very good friends. He knew a lot about rugby. It was very interesting to hear an African talking about Afrikaners, but he had no hatred in him, and I thought to myself that I must do him a favor. We were in the same building one day and I called him away from his work and I said to him 'come upstairs with me, we are going to the third floor' and he said 'who is there, I can't go, I must get back to work' and I said 'no, I want you to meet somebody'. I took him to the third floor and I introduced him to a friend of mine. He wanted to cry, he said 'thank you very much, Frank'. That man was Judge Albie Sax of the ANC

with the one hand. And he couldn't get over it. So I said 'don't worry, you've got my vote'. I was a founding member of the Progressive Party, the old Progressive Party in Somerset West.

The PFP.

Not the PFP, before the PFP.

I don't mean to be rude ... but you guys also want to move on and I've got a series of questions.

I voted for the ANC because we were struggling, we were struggling in the past. Like I said before, the reason for voting was to become a citizen. So that we can also have something to say about sitting in Parliament. That is why we voted ANC, for a better future. Their token was 'Vote ANC' and then this will be done and this will be done and all of this. But in the ten years nothing happened.

Okay, _____?

I voted ANC because I was very disillusioned about the previous Government. And I have always looked up to Nelson Mandela. And I just thought it was like a new world and I saw better things for South Africa.

Okay, what made you change your mind and not vote for them in 2004?

Promises that they made and haven't kept. There is some that they have done, but like I said before, they were talking about free medical aid and schooling and basically housing and all that and uplifting the poor and all that. And we still get the poor; we still have to pay school fees. Now they are busy trying to cram 35 children into a classroom, I mean really, it is ridiculous.

Two nights before Chris Hani was killed I was sitting with my daughter watching Chris Hani being interviewed on TV. And she said to me, 'look how nice he talks and look how nice he is' and to think that two days later the way he was killed, and the first thing that went around South Africa was that the person that saw the shooting was an Afrikaans lady. I thought and we all thought that this country was going to come together and be one country, bugger the Afrikaner, and bugger the bladdy Boer, and the kaffir this and that – excuse my language. And for you I have more respect than for those that went overseas and live like bladdy kings. I don't have any more respect for these people that went overseas. Because they were living it up, I saw them in London. Our present President, he wasn't short, he married his wife in a castle! While his people remained behind, were beaten up, I saw them getting hit in Adderley street. I saw it with my own eyes. It hurt me very much.

Okay, in terms of why you changed your mind and didn't vote ANC 2004.

I didn't vote for the ANC in 2004 because for me there was too much corruption going on. And I thought one vote less for the ANC would be one vote less power for them. I know one vote doesn't count, but that is how I felt about it.

For me corruption isn't an issue, because corruption was happening more in the Apartheid government. For me it was more moral issues. They addressed moral issues where abortions were concerned, and the realizing of abortions – that was one of the moral issues. And the way that the Equity Act was implemented. I mean in Cape Town now I have got statistics, I've got friends that works in Government departments. No Colored male is on the list for any job as a senior or as a manager in the Western Cape. And the crime rate actually went up and so when

the DA addressed these areas on the equity, on the sentences, the death sentence policy and the abortion – they took a stance on that. That is basically where I made my decision.

Okay, can I just hear from the others?

The ANC promised us a lot of things, but we never got it.

Just to come back to _____, he said his reasons for voting for the DA, let me just ask the others, what were your reasons for choosing the DA in 2004? There were a lot of parties, what made you choose the DA?

The DA is the next strongest party to vote for. At least when they decide a thing, they are trying to solve your problem. They are not just doing this or doing that, they are trying.

The reason why I voted for the DA is because I voted for the ANC in the past and they never did anything. Now I am going to vote for the DA to see what is going to happen for the next five years. So I can't tell you for sure what party I am going to vote for next time.

Okay, _____?

I just felt I wanted to give the DA a chance because people were always putting the DA down.

Okay, others?

All my life I never voted for the National Party, for the simple reason that a child of ten – and that came in 1948 – I lived across the road, I knew nothing about politics in those days. There was a loudspeaker giving out the results, and I remember the result of Piet van der Berg, he was the first Cabinet Minister under Smuts to lose his seat. Our school principal's son – and I still remember his name and surname – he hit me over the head and he said 'Vanaand gaan julle Joode en julle hotnots en julle kaffirs vrek' (*Tonight the Jews, Coloureds and Blacks are going to die*) and I ran home screaming because I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know what he was talking about. Or why. What had we done? I was a little boy. And he was a tall chap, about 6 foot 3. Matric. And after that I wanted nothing to do with the National Party, I never liked their policies. I never liked the Group Areas Act and all those things like that.

To me if you take that time of year, the National Party was losing more and more of their eligibility. They couldn't control what they wanted and how they wanted it and the only party that basically could take over was the DA. You can't go vote for a losing party.

Is there anything else you wanted to say about why you voted for the DA?

The only thing that I can say is that you have to look at things realistically and you have to see what the next party has to offer...

...It wasn't easy for me coming from the struggle and changing to the DA, but the same things that were making sense to me, like I told you, on the abortions, on the sentences people were getting, on the equity, especially in the Western Cape. I mean you have to go to Jo'burg to get a job. Or Durban. Because on the equity list they advertise for the administration there is no position for a Black male. It gets re-advertised Coloureds woman. The Equity Act, they should have brought it a bit down. That is unacceptable. And Black empowerment where you have to have a black partner in your business. If you have a business and it is a private business nobody can tell you, so they have to downsize. So the DA, they were making waves on the Equity Act, they were making waves on the abortion.

Okay, is there anything else on why people voted for the DA, quickly, before we move on?

Probably because the DA is taking control of the corruption that is going on. There is a court case going on in Durban at this very moment that our Vice President might be involved in. I don't want to say he is involved, I am not the Judge, and I don't work for the Scorpions.

That happened after the elections.

No, this came along before the 2004 elections. The Scorpions were involved in it.

Okay, what I handed out is an election poster of the ANC. The question is, looking at the picture of them, why was the ANC unable to convince you to vote for them in 2004?

I didn't vote for the ANC because they made promises and nothing happened, and all the corruption which didn't come out as much as now. But I just will not vote for them again.

Mine was three major issues: the abortion, the Equity Act and the violent crime that is not really dealt with. They are not appointing people that have the qualifications that should be able to handle these violent crimes, because I watch TV and I could be a better spokesperson than any of one of the Generals that is running a section of policemen. I don't know how – I am not going to criticize his formal education or his degrees that he has – but a young journalist of 22 years old is cutting him apart with questions. Just questioning him why aren't they doing that and a policemen of that stature should immediately be able to answer the questions of the journalist saying 'we are doing that, we are doing that', I mean I could have done better.

Alright, we are talking now in confidence. While listening to the radio and reading a book suddenly the announcer said 'there is breaking news' and she explained to us what the breaking news was. The captain of the South African Police Services – his wife – the General, Salemi, Salemi, yes – his wife was caught in Sandton pinching in the shop. They caught her as she walked out and they found quite a lot of stuff on her. But it didn't appear in the paper the following day. They continued for hours talking about it on that particular radio station – on Cape Talk. And I was going berserk. I was saying if Amy Kleinhans was caught, and she had to pay, she would have paid up, am I right? But Salemi's wife, it was all hushed up. I think it was wrong.

But you see, there it is who you know.

Let's not bring that in, there is much greater issues. Where the South African Government has a little say about the Palestinian issue. They have got so a little say about the Palestinian issue. Or a lot to say, they want to try to run the Palestinian issue, and they have got a little to say about what is happening in our country. Mbeki wants to say Islam can't do that, Islam can't do that, but what is happening in our townships is more important, but he has to please...

The world.

...the world, to say certain items about this, he has to sacrifice. So the global concept, they must bring it more back to...

Okay.

...that is one thing; the DA tries to bring the issues back home.

Looking at the image of the IFP, why did they fail to convince you to vote for them in 2004?

I don't think they were strong enough.

They are not strong enough?

I think it is a matter of we don't want to bring to South Africa a tribal thing. It is a tribal thing. I am not really prepared to bring in tribalism. In the history of Africa, tribalism is the downfall of Africa. So let's not go back to tribalism.

Okay, you are nodding your head, what do you want to say?

I don't like this guy.

You don't like Buthelezi?

The reason is we are Xhosa, they are Zulu.

Okay _____?

I don't know enough about them.

You don't know enough about them.

I don't know enough about the IFP. I can't even give an opinion about it.

In 1980 I met Chief Buthelezi in Stellenbosch and I found him to be a very nice person.

Okay, _____, your opinion?

The first time I voted for the ANC. The second time I thought the IFP is close to the ANC. That is why I didn't – I don't know this party so well.

Okay, that is fine. _____?

In Natal there are more Zulus. Between the ANC and the IFP it is not a case of politics and ruling the Government, it is more a (*inaudible*) situation, the Zulus are there and the Xhosas are there, it goes back to Dingaan's time when they were going at each other. And this is why the IFP loses a lot of votes.

Okay, that is interesting. Okay, the UDM.

The UDM is the same as the IFP.

Why do you say that?

This guy used to be in the ANC. And he also thought he was going to climb the ladder very quickly, and he thought he could be Nelson Mandela's right hand and unfortunately Nelson had his guys already and he just fell down the ladder. To me the IFP has a stronger political situation that what the UDM has. Even though the UDM comes from Natal, they are not as strong as the IFP.

The same. To me it is all small parties. I always look for a bigger party that really counts. To me they don't really count.

To me this guy is trying to make himself better.

He is trying to make himself better?

Yes. This is a guy that was a general in the Apartheid Government. Then he joined the ANC and then forms his own party. And then I don't really think he has got a foot to stand on. He is a general in the Apartheid Government. He splits from the Apartheid Government, he joins the ANC. Then he forms his own party with a former National Party. I mean honestly!

It doesn't seem to have gotten anywhere. Funny enough, the ACDP seems to have taken on a lot.

Anything on this side before we go to the ID?

I don't know it.

You don't know it, okay, that's fine.

If you take Patricia, she can come far. She stands up for what she believes in. This whole armament deal that is going on in Durban she is the one that started it. She wanted to know what is happening to the money and who is spending it. Who is spending millions and there is a poor man sitting there looking for a job, looking for a house.

So why was she not able to convince you for the ID?

The thing is, she is still small. She doesn't have that big power behind her. She's got the power, but there is no backing up. But I believe in another five or six years she should be able to have a good go.

I do know quite a lot of about Parliamentary procedure. She had no right to be told to remove herself from Parliament. Because in Parliament you are protected.

But now why did the party not convince you in 2004?

The same reason.

Okay, and other people?

She belonged to a very radical party. The PAC. Now if you belong to a radical party and you are a radical person, then my belief is you stick to your radical views. You don't try to use the housewives of Mitchell's Plain to forward a party that forms after that, because that, I believe, is only for personal gain. She formed this party for personal gain. Because if you are really a radical and your heart is really in being a radical and being a member of the PAC, not even being a member of the ANC, and then you move over and try to woo the housewives of Mitchell's Plain, which are the underprivileged people and the people of Guguletu and Bonteheuwel and all that to vote for your party because you are going to be the fairy godmother. That is my opinion about that.

Okay, _____?

When I went to the polls to vote it was like 'which one of the two?'. I like her a lot, she is a woman. The only thing that got me for the DA was that when we were standing in the row there was people discussing the parties and I was quite determined to go and vote for her and I think she stands up and I don't care what anybody says I just feel that she stands up for her rights and if she feels something is wrong she says it. And then when I heard this lot talking and I got in there I just...

One of those last minute decisions?

But I also think at the next election she is not going to be as small, she is going to go past quite a lot of people.

Anything on this side? _____?

I can't really say that much, I was actually betwixt between her and the DA, but ultimately I chose the DA.

Her party was too small by the time we started voting to challenge the big parties.

Okay, this is the last one...

Oh no! This is a hopeless case. To me the NNP is a waste of time. The guy can't make up his mind where he wants to be. He jumps from the one place to the other. That is what I feel about him.

In 1994 the Nationalist Party got somewhere. And they formed with the ANC a Unionist Government. And then they walked out. Pik Botha was so annoyed that to this day he doesn't talk to FW de Klerk. He wanted them to remain with the ANC, to help them along.

Their campaign turned the people to the ANC, because they had the so-called Colored people as coons. They had a coon carnival. They had the coons on the bus playing music. The National Party wanted to use the coons to get votes. And the people realized it.

Okay, I have heard from two that they were between two parties. The rest, did you at any stage consider voting in 2004 for any other party besides the DA?

To me they didn't have the power to rule the country, they were there, but they weren't there.

Anybody else consider?

No, the ironic thing was, I walked into Woolworths at the Garden Center one Saturday afternoon and Mr. van Schalkwyk walked in to buy some stuff on his own, without any bodyguards. And I said to him 'Aren't you Mr. van Schalkwyk?' – This was before the election. And he said yes. He was very nice, but he didn't seem like a leader.

Okay, now campaigning consists of a lot of aspects, we mentioned some of it. If you think specifically of the DA campaign, which aspect of the campaign made you keen to vote for them?

I stay in Southfield now for nine years and I have got a friend that works for the DA. One evening we were sitting and I had this quarrel with my daughter. The next minute my phone rings and it is this guy from the DA, I am trying to think what his name is now, from Plumstead, and he says to me "Hello, Mrs. Hannekom, how are you. You sound very cross!" And I said it is because I don't have time for all this stuff. And he kept on chatting and asked 'what is wrong, can't I help you?' and we chatted a lot and two days later he phoned me again and said 'I just wanted to know if you are feeling better' and I was so embarrassed! But it was a nice feeling that they phoned around.

To me it was that if they got into power the rules that they would have brought in, equality for everybody, schooling, jobs, especially jobs. To me if they could come in they would make a lot of difference.

Okay, let me move onto the next question then. Some people say that campaigns don't really matter in elections...

To me they do.

...because they have already decided who they are going to vote for. Other people say that campaigns are really important because they help you make your choice. How does the group feel?

To me, if you are going to have a party, how are you going to know who to vote for? I mean campaigns are there to tell you what they are about and what they are going to do. If you are not going to campaign, why the elections, you are wasting millions and millions of money.

I also think it is important.

I think campaigns is really important, but what I want to have implemented is follow up on the campaigns, because they never follow up on the campaigns. If they won you don't see posters saying 'thank you, we are going to have a meeting, we are going to celebrate something'. You have to follow on. If you have a good campaign and you win or even if you lose, you can still come together, it is still the opposition. Come together, say, 'fine, we lost, but we still have that amount of thousands'. So those thousands come together in the hall and we discuss where did we go wrong, there is going to be a next election, we are going to win. Things like that, little things. Even if you lost by 50 votes fair and square, we were still trying.

Okay, _____ do you feel campaigns are important?

No.

Why do you say?

I just want to vote.

You just want to vote, you don't want to worry about the campaigns.

...they must regroup. They only regroup after five years. In five years they regroup again, but not yearly.

Why regroup after five years, they lost, so regroup yearly. It is the people that are voting, they must regroup immediately. You can beat anyone if people regroup immediately. And convince people from that time already. Okay, they won the election, they are in power, I have to do that, we have to do certain things, but we are the opposition, we can do certain things. So let's regroup, build the census on the next election.

Okay _____?

I think campaigning is important, because it works subconsciously on your mind. Every time you see posters or something when you are going past, it is going to have some effect on you subconsciously.

And you feel that is important?

Yes.

It is important, yes.

At the same time, the people that one have to be sitting in Parliament. It is very difficult, they also have to go out, as you said.

But we are not going to use that people that is sitting in Parliament, we are going to use...

It is very tough for them to go out and talk to the people.

Okay, thinking of all that we have said and discussed here for this past hour or so, what advice would you give to somebody in charge of a political party, how do you think they can improve their chances in the next election?

Communicate with your voters, hear what problems they have got, and try to see if you can get a solution. You don't always get a solution, but at least try, hear what they say.

Be honest.

That is the biggest policy.

Being honest is not the only policy. What I would say to a person that is in a political party, he can be how honest, but he is not going to run the other branches, he is not going to run the police. Have a hands-on attitude towards the police and all the other little groups that are attached to you. You can be honest, but you have to have a hands-on approach.

I suggest that tomorrow morning you go to the Delphi Center in Sea Point and see the police at the Delphi Center at their tables being helped by the local people living in the Sea Point area.

So the community and the police work together.

That is right.

We have discussed quite a bit here, do you have any comments on anything we have discussed here?

The one thing I feel the ANC are basically shying away from it, and that is the crime rate. These guys walk away, nothing happens...

...When you read the paper you see our justice system is so wrong. There is so much unemployment, why don't they take these people, train them. I mean you get guys who are sitting five, six years, waiting trial in prison and by the time they do get the sentence they sit two years because they already sat six years. So we have an issue with the crime rate and we have to fight it. I mean we've got this 16 day thing now of women and children. What happens now? Does that give them the right to beat up on women and children? We've got to do something about the crime rate.

Any other comments that you want to raise?

Look, the Government is stretched out to its limits. Okay, like I said, they put certain people in positions they shouldn't be in. They have to put people that can really do the job. The Equity Act is not something that you do or don't do, you have to do it, and it is Government legislations. So you are going to get people that are not qualified for the job. I think that is something that they have to review for people that is really qualified.

Okay, well that brings us to the end of the discussion. Thank you very much, all of you for your input.

My name is Gugu; I am working for a research company that collects views from people and take it to those who need it. So in what we do there is nothing wrong and right. When I ask a question everybody must answer freely. What you say through your mouth is your view. Then every one must feel free.

In this study we have been asked by UCT students from Cape Town, They study on communication with the voters, ways of voting, how political parties communicate with voters. Everything we discuss today is confidential and must remain with us, and then there is a form to sign that this will be confidential. Every one must sign. Now we need to know each other as we are here, we must be free. We must tell each other the name what you like most and generally about yourself. I will give you one minute.

I have a great pleasure because I have spoken with my child, now I am happy because we share same family name. She has four children. What she likes is to stay with her children throughout her life. But the problem is beyond her control; hence she stays here in Siyakha.

Even on my side I am happy because I meet my mother Sis' Khanyi whom we share the family name. She told me that she has five children. She likes to use her hands. She loves things that will make her earn income

So you do not know each other before?

No, it is for the first time.

This is _____, she stays here in Siyanda. She told me that she has two children. What she loves is sport like baseball, as well as netball.

This one is _____ she stays here in Siyanda and she tells me that she love to get going and live happy life.

This one next to me is _____, she stays in Ntuzuma, her biggest problem there in Ntuzuma is that she does not have title deeds. Even the previous government tries to [provide] title deeds but still she does not have [one]. Even if she wants to drink water she can't, because there are no water pipes. There are a lot of things she still needs.

The sister next to me tells me that she finished schooling but till to date she is unemployed. Her name is _____.

This one is _____, he says his problem is that there are no jobs and government he rely most on casual jobs. He wants to stay with his family. He likes to drink alcohol to quench his thirst.

His name is _____, he likes parties.

Today we are going to discuss about the elections. Thinking back on the 14th it was a big event, known nationally. I would like to know from the people you spoke with, what is it that they said about this years elections? What were they saying about elections as well as campaigns before the elections?

Most of the people in these years' elections were not happy, because they voted in the past, but there was no development. Most of the youth were not happy.

I also support the sister's [statement] because most youth do not see the importance of voting. This is because in the past elections, they voted but nothing was done, or is done for the youth. So in these years' elections they did not see any reason to vote. They say they will vote but everything will remain the same.

Children like me, we canvassed other people to go and vote but now they have lost hope. Even the promises we heard during the campaigns, we didn't see any improvement. Those who have passed in school are not working; there are no jobs for them. We even beg them hoping that things will be fine. We beg them to change their vote and see what the other one [party] will bring, because you cannot continue voting [for] the one [party] whom is doing nothing. Now, government has promised us houses, but I have five children, the other three have their children but we stay together in the shacks. They build small houses (ikopi). The Apartheid government was better, because even if they do little things, but you still had a place to stay, where you would stay and do better things.

Most people say the past [ANC] government was better under Mandela's [leadership], because he was able to give grants, and schools. This one of Mbeki's has failed in many things because there are no jobs.

The other thing is that these children, we saw them in newspapers having passed their matric. There is not even something to make them happy, not all the children are happily giving birth with no reason. They rely on looking for casual jobs. There must be an increases in factories and the children grants must be available, than to stay [unemployed]. Maybe they must be given a chance to study further, to further their ambitions and must be supported.

So you say people were not happy with elections?

Yes

What about campaigns what were they saying about campaigns?

In rural areas where I come from, those who didn't vote in the previous election were just happy, because for them it was for the first time they were casting their votes, then they were excited.

I voted because I had to, but I was not excited.

Since all of us we voted and we voted for the IFP, from 1994, 1999 and now 2004, Lets we think back in 1994, what was the reason for voting IFP?

I liked its slogan.

I voted the IFP because its leader speaks one language; he does not speak this today and tomorrow changes. He stands for the truth. What he said in the past years, is what he is saying today, he does not go off the line. I love IFP because it has humanity (Ubuntu), it respects. I go to church on Sundays and I am respected, but when there is a rally for IFP, I do not go to church if that rally is on Sunday; I go to attend the rally. We are taught of respect at all times. IFP is able to look after its people and the nation. When he speaks, at all times he likes people to be happy and live a [good] life.

I voted the IFP because I love it, and my parents support this party. And the fact that Baba Shenge (Mr. Buthelezi) people like his thinking. When he campaigns, he does not make promises to people, but he does what he can.

I voted IFP because I grew up in a family of the IFP. Also IFP supports our culture and tradition. When we do traditional things, the IFP is involved.

On my side, Baba Shenge is the only person I see, he has a good record for governing people. He speaks one language, he promises a better life to all people.

When Shenge speaks, Baba Shenge has spoken, even if he is in other places he makes no promises, IFP has nothing, it makes no promises but he encourages people to make things for themselves.

In 1994 what excited you in the IFP?

In 1994, we were threatened; I was nearly necklaced with tires by the ANC. The only organization that used to be available was Inkatha. We were threatened but I became strong and I voted the IFP. It was better, in the past I knew nothing about rates, the ANC come with title deeds. I voted for the IFP.

Let's talk about 1999, you voted the IFP because you like IFP slogans or the thinkings of Umtwana kaPhindangene (Mr. Buthelezi)

I voted the IFP, because I used to vote for it, I couldn't just change to other parties. Even at home, I grew in a family that loves the IFP. Our grand parents still tell us about Umtwana ka phindangene, then I decided to vote for the IFP. In 1999, I was in Gauteng and when the elections came I decided to go to where I registered, to vote for the IFP. Even when I was young, doing standard eight, we use to say: "Viva, IFP," but not knowing exactly what is happening.

Beside your family influence, what are your reasons that you vote IFP?

When Buthelezi speaks, he encourages people to work for themselves, to work in the gardens. In rural areas, people believe in rural farming.

I will continue to vote for him, even if I am left alone. I wish he succeeds, so that one day he rules this country. I have seen him, that he is a strong man. The most important thing and the one that attracts me most, is that God is always at the centre of the IFP. It is better if we are lead by someone who knows what is wrong. Only him.

I voted in 1999 because of other leaders who say we must practice abortion. This I do not support, that a person can do what ever they like.

I voted for him because he encourages children to go to school. Now we know there is Mangosuthu Technikon, there are other things named after him, which contributes to development.

I voted for him because he is the only one I can see that can lead the nation. He is a respectable leader. Since he says we will triumph together, we must be united so that we can go forward.

I decided to continue voting for him, because the other government didn't provide us jobs and houses. We still stay in the shacks. Now we have some problems. This is why Umtwana Ka Phindangene, I hope he succeeds.

I voted IFP because at home they supported it and I love its policies.

You have voted this year, why did you vote for the IFP?

What I can say, this year the IFP, the previous government encouraged us with this grant to continue giving birth, the next thing we die because of AIDS, but this government is failing to provide this cure for AIDS and continue asking people to vote, but they can't stick to their

promises. This was the reason I voted for the IFP. Mangosuthu, where ever he goes, he always talks about the HIV/AIDS. He comes out and tells us when his children have died because of Aids. He supports other people.

I voted IFP because I have a wish, that the man you can trust can lead the nation. He speaks at all times about respect and respect among other people. Mr. Buthelezi does not like abortion, he likes children to be responsible, to go back to their culture, this is why I am going to vote for him. I voted for the IFP because it fought against Apartheid. It is not fighting the rights of all people, but for blacks.

All of you have voted IFP because of the reasons you put forward, but now I would like to know whether there is something that can change you to vote other organizations beside the IFP?.

I can vote for other organizations if it will have a major role in the country. May be it can come with the cure of HIV, or reduce crime.

It must provide jobs.

Eliminate poverty.

Eliminate these rates payments.

Firstly, is it possible that you would vote for other organizations like ANC, UDM? If that is possible what is it that they must do?

If the whites can provide food to people, instead of putting them in trucks and dumping it in some places. We can change that.

We can vote for the other organizations, if it will preach the word of respect, culture, provide jobs and every one can live a better life. Because we need respect, good life, and our traditional chiefs are respected.

I won't change to other organizations.

On my side, unless the IFP dies, I can't vote for other organizations.

If it provides job opportunities, I would vote for someone [else].

Jobs and our culture, we respect.

Educate our children.

I can vote for another organization, but I will not, unless it is doing something, because all [parties] say this and that. All this policies we talk of are the IFP policies,

Let's talk about campaigns, we want to know whether prospective votes have already had a stand as which party to vote or they are campaigned. They want to know whether or not campaigns are important? Because they can waste a lot of money but campaigning is not helping at all. What are you views about campaign?

Campaigns are important because it educate, people know why they vote this party, If all the party during campaigning they have money, but one organization come with food and do campaign in different ways while the one with nothing will seem as having nothing at hand.

Others then decide to vote other organization unintentionally because of these things. Campaigns are important so that people can be educated.

Campaigns are useful because you are able to choose which party to vote after the campaign.

You can know before you vote that really you love this organization and its policies, and the feeling of the people that really there are elections.

Even on my side campaigns are important because it encourages people to votes.

Campaigns are important, call meetings and do house to house and encourage the olds and disabled. You show the gestures and appearance of the leaders to be voted.

People have been campaigning, but we do not see any progress. What we see is poverty. Campaigns or no campaigns person knows which party to vote for. They come and say our children will live a better live and get free education but we pay school fees. This start from the campaigns themselves. To me campaigns are not necessary. To me, what is important is that the organization I voted is doing its job to help me and my family.

Campaigns are important, but this year I was annoyed not to see the IFP but in Johannesburg I saw a lot of IFP and the ANC. Others were receiving t-shirts from the ANC and Mr. Mbeki was available then you could see others changing from IFP to ANC.

I agree that campaigns are important; some people become confused when they do not see their organizations. There are also those who are threatening others and others then are afraid to come out. If he can see that his party is still alive then he become happy and continue.

Assume that there is this party, what advise would you give me about how must I do campaigns?

I can say you can campaign but do not criticize.

You can campaign but stand for truth do not say tomorrow we will do this and tomorrow that is not done. Then followers will cry for their time wasted on you.

How will you know that I am telling the truth?

That will be clear, because you have said tomorrow we will do this and tomorrow arrives but nothing is happening.

What must I do if I campaign, so that I get a lot of supporters?

Do things people would recognize even if it's little. You go and tell the government to stop abortion. I think you can get a lot of people.

As youth, we do not have electricity, water and roads, if you come with solution and provide that solution to people.

Councilors are supposed to be the one who do campaigning but they can't because they get wages. They suppose to get wages from us.

Can you advise the leader of the organization as to what he must do to improve in the elections?

There is no other advice beside of assisting the youth. Improve the needs of the youth because

even this organization that is in power was helped by the youth. They used our children in order to go to parliament. If this organization want to win elections it can do that vie the youth.

What are the youth needs?

Job opportunities

Sport need to supported

support the talent

Youth, must be provided with something they have volunteered now they have run out of energy.

They must be employed by the IEC and get something.

They must encourage the youth

If one organization can provide tractors and call people to come and plough, people can stand.

It must bring back culture back and tradition

When a girl is growing there must be expects to tell what a man is and boys be told what is a women.

Provide solution to this grant.

If the other one uses condom, and other receive a grant. Then the other one will stop using condom and he will need a grant and become pregnant.

Now what is needed, if someone is having AIDS he must get a grant not everyone

The reason why we must return back to our culture is that when this boy make my child pregnant he need to cleanse this house and because the ancestors won't be happy.

They must not provide educated people to run the IEC, because now they just bring the teachers who whom we never saw in any rally. They need to give people who are not working.

They must provide cameras in the poling stations so that there can be a proof that everything went well.

Thank you very much for your participation!!!

ANC Voters – 1999 - 2004

Let's start. We can just go around the room and give your names and a favourite pass-time ... something that you enjoy doing. Maybe a hobby or a sport.

My name is _____ and I enjoy golf.

Golf?

Ja, that's it.

My name is _____ and I like to watch sport.

So you were watching the Olympics everyday and going to bed late.

My name is _____ and I enjoy soccer.

Do you play?

No.

My name is _____ and I like playing pool.

My name is _____ and I enjoy watching TV. I watch TV a lot and when I'm in front of the TV I don't want anyone to disturb me. I like watching the BBC. I also like sport.

OK. My name is Cherrel Africa and I also like watching sport. I've got 2 boys and they're very much into basketball but I can't find a place for them to play basketball. They play soccer at school. I've also been watching the Olympics.

OK. The first question I want to ask with regard to the research... The elections on the 14th of April was a very big event, what do people that you speak to say about the election. Just generally, people that you speak to, what do they say about the election?

The people that I've spoken to...I think after the election... the ruling party... the reason why they did that is they want to say... a lot of young people... most people voted for the ANC. They don't want other parties. They just give ANC that boost.

Its like they want to give the ANC a reminder... to show their confidence. For those that voted they gave their vote to the ruling party. Its like people are voting for the ruling party because, ja there's a lack of jobs, but people wanted to give this ruling party a second chance because its like...10 years is not enough to make rapid changes. Rome was not built in a day. So now since this ruling party said... houses, jobs, shelter but now there is still more to do you see. So if they vote for other parties, the other parties are going to start their own things like that so they wanted to give this ruling party a chance to proceed further with this delivery.

Ja... like the ones that I talked to ... I had interesting chats with people that I talk to. Some said that they voted for the ANC er firstly because of the history of the ANC and knowing where the ANC comes from ... the history of the ANC and the role the ANC played you know in South African politics and then they said... their fear is ... the ID... because the other parties are like dogs without teeth... you know... somebody said "I just vote because of my heroes that have passed away fighting for democracy... because of Chris Hani... we are still in the tri-partite alliance...I will vote ANC.

OK.

Erm. Then let me ask you...That's what other people have been saying, moving now to yourselves. Some people are satisfied with government performance, other people are not that satisfied, overall how satisfied are you personally with the governments performance?

I'm satisfied... so far.

So far?

Yes, I can see changes...

Ja.

I can see that everything has changed. Most of the things have changed...I'd say 85% of things have changed.

Even though we can't know what's happening behind closed doors but I can say its transparent...its open for everyone in the country... even though we can't attend each and every one...

To add to that... the very same government... there's still a lot to be done... that I know... to bring hope to the hopeless... you can see a distance and they are on the right path... they are actually aware of the ground to cover... that there's a lot to be done.

Er... they treat people equally... there's no ... how can I put it... there's no differentiation ... discrimination and all that stuff...

I think that another thing that is important... I agree with what is being said... but I think my own misgivings is the slow pace of change on the economic side... some of us have degrees but we are without work... about two years now...I'm saying... even though I'm in agreement with what is being said here... I think the lives of many of us have not been changed... in a lasting sense... haven't changed so much for the better...and yet would say 10 years is not enough...my personal ambitions at this time – I will be supportive of them, but it does concern me. But I agree with everything that was said... our democracy is flourishing...but economically, materially there is a lot that they must do.

And another thing... I would like to emphasize more on the issue of jobs... there's some change that's happening but the ordinary citizen... the ruling party... people are voting continuously for the ruling party so now there is some change but it is very slow. Our emphasis is on the fact that there's no jobs... they can build houses but our emphasis is the jobs. There are people outside...there are no jobs...people are struggling because there are no jobs.

I think...I mean what does come across...when listening here...you get the sense that economic development is a problem...they talk of jobless economic growth which is a problem...the economy is growing jobs is still a big problem.

Ok, the next question...

I just want to highlight one more thing on this issue of jobs and education. When I look at the education system that our government is using...education...funding students more especially at tertiary level... to me its like some structural adjustment kind of ...er... programme... because you give loans to those like poorly students and then after a certain period they complete their studies then you expect them to pay back those loans and when they pay back...it's a huge amount of money that they owe you know...you lend R10 000 and then its tripled or fourpled you know...so in that case you are impoverishing the poor instead of trying to enrich or empower them. I think it could be better if you say that I will give you a loan of maybe R14 000 or so...then you will study and after you've finished studying you will come and work for the institution...that's the way of paying back you know... rather than saying after three years you've finished your degree but then for another three years you don't get a job...the interest is accumulating. When it comes to the issue of houses... I think ...yes I can see the speed of building these small RDP houses but on the other hand I think if government can be able to offer people jobs they can be able to buy and build such kind of houses that they can come out of a shack and build a house. If you give them houses but you don't give them jobs...you give them houses with electricity at the end you expect them to pay for electricity and those things where they can't.

Ok.

Coming to the point of education, I think the government must do a lot in the education of this country. Firstly we know that the majority of the population in this country is blacks. Most blacks when they finish high-school level they don't know what to do with their lives. They finish standard 10/grade 12 and they are blank you know. They go to higher learning institutions and they don't have any idea what they want to do there. They end up being lost and... you know... doing unnecessary courses.

You know I still believe we are under the so-called Bantu education... it still exists in this country...it was introduced by Verwoed...really at present I'm doing research about Bantu education...I still believe we are still under the same line of Verwoed you know because we are still... most blacks ...they feel that they can't do it...the white person is always more clever than them...and we cannot adventure life...we are always focused on this thing...working, studying, woking.

OK, I...

What I wanted to emphasize is that the education system, it must change to at least introduce more practical subjects at high school.

Ok, on this question, let me just take these last points and then I need to carry on.

They are very crucial points.

Ja.

We need to at least make sure that they pump more money into education or whatever the case may be so that the government can get what they need... they need skilled people...educated people. Our freedom depends on that...therefore they must send down projects...its never too late...that will equip those unfortunate people...projects that will help them to sustain a living.

I agree that... I think the biggest problem facing South Africa is not so much that there's an inability to introduce new projects...I'm sure one has heard of O.B.E and all sorts of things...these are endeavors to change things...I think the problem is money...because it requires a lot of money...a lot of resources...look at the high schools we came from in the townships. Throughout my years at school, there was a building at the school, we were told that it used to be a lab, we never went into it. We study until matric and he or she gets to UCT...so I'm saying things are better but when I look at it the biggest problem is finance...that is facing us...and those who give the government funding they then prescribe what they should do with it. You know your needs. The government may say our biggest need is that we need to finance education so that we can change the system and help people to be self-sustaining but those who...the sponsors and the donors they say we give you this much money...this must go to this thing and that...don't spend so much health...don't spend so much on job creation projects...spend so much on that. I mean this is a developing country...you look at the rest of Africa. Some are worse off but then I'm not saying that to justify the slow pace of delivery...when one looks at it, the biggest problem is funding for all these things.

OK, just to move on. Each and every person in this group voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004. Can you talk about your reasons for voting for the ANC in these elections.

1994 was an exciting period...especially for all blacks...going everywhere...high schools... it was "Viva ANC, Vote ANC".

In the first elections we were obviously all excited. Came the second one... okay we thought...give them a chance... the ANC must win again...but along the way we started to question...some people thought maybe the ANC's not doing well. Most people voted for the sake of the ANC being there...not for other parties because we'd end up in the same way we were before...it was "let it be the ANC". Some people say if there is corruption let it be the ANC which does corruption.

People still have that hatred of what happened in this country and I am one of them.

Ja...and another thing...I agree with him...the ANC has been with us since we grew up...so I'll vote for the ANC and the majority of blacks will vote for them.

We were just excited to vote for the ANC in 1994 but now the only thing is change...we need some change because now we are tertiary level...there's a lot of things happening at tertiary level. We need some funding...its very very important you see...that happened previously...there can be very many projects coming through...we need to get progress whereby we can get a way forward...otherwise...the ANC has done a lot so far but now let us go forward and then at least we can get what we are looking for.

The situation now...there's a question of ...we need some practical...whereby someone can be very confident of themselves so that they can be able to speak out about what it is they are looking for...so we can talk with the ANC and all these parties...what is very important is to form groups so then...I've got my idea and the person next to me has got his own idea and then we can make a good combination of those ideas so we can form something like a group.

For me...you know I was very excited to vote in 1994...particularly for the ANC...looking at the history of the ANC...when it formed it was named ANNC, African National Natives Congress, it was predominantly for blacks. So now seeing the fact that the ANC is committed to other races I feel ANC...I see that as...I am not a racist so then this is the party to vote for, for the rest of my life...because I like that we are a multi-racial country so we must have a multi-racial party. So I am still voting ANC because it is looking out for all Africans and all South Africans.

I think in 1994...I mean...it had a lot to do with the history of the ANC. I think that's what drove most of us – to do away with racism once and for all. We wanted to see change...then in 1999 it has sunk in that we are in power...we felt that we want to give them a chance...we need houses and if you listened earlier on you'll realize that there has been a progression. A lot of things have happened...but there is a problem with the pace of delivery...of this change.

They must go back again and do more with much more vigour and we will criticize if they don't deliver. Besides giving confidence to the ruling party we are saying that we want you to do things...we want your foot soldiers to walk that road and deliver these things. And in 2009 we'll say "How far did we come?" I was listening to my brother saying "I will vote ANC for the rest of my life but we don't know what's going to happen...I mean if you look at other governments...people have been in there more than 20 years and then people get tired...if you look at Zimbabwe, ZANU PF...they can't be in there forever...you can't give them forever to deliver.

Its not like Zimbabwe...Mugabe is like...on some sort of revenge...we in the ANC criticize...

No, let me just finish my point...the point I am making is that...I hope the ruling party...the fact that we are liberated should serve as an advantage for us because if you look at almost all of them... the likes of ...inaudible... he was once a hero...the people of that country said we must vote for him forever and then there came a stage where they became disgruntled...it depends largely on what the ANC does.

I am sure that expectations were too high. I don't know if it was the chain of command but we expected more...we expected projects to be coming from NGOs...it takes time...up to now you get different stories...there are people who do not feel like us...you will get mixed feelings about the situation.

The thing is...I left my job to go back to school...I see if maybe I get education I 'm going to be better but my feeling is that people are leaving the country...if the government can create more jobs.

I have a feeling...if we can have a one-party state but in a democratic form...the ANC. Why I am saying that...I am really excited about what happened recently when our enemy came and died on our hands, the National Party. When the ANC was chopping the National Party into pieces that makes me so excited because the National Party was our enemy and therefore the mechanisms that the African National Congress is using...there are possibilities that these little parties can come to an end...you see that's why we can end up with a one-party state...I still have a hope that we...the ANC ...can root out these rotten potatoes in departments because there are people who are corrupt in the ANC, in government.

I hear two brothers on this side saying I'll vote ANC long-term and I see a head shaking on this side. Can I just ask about that, do others feel the same?

I think there's one ruling party no. There's many parties...provincial...national ...but I think it's a good idea if all of us, most of the people vote ANC...it's the government that I want.

Do you see yourself voting for them long-term?

Ja, I see myself voting for the ANC for the long-term as well because it's the party I would like.

Okay.

Ja, as I said earlier...judging from experience of what has happened in Africa...some of the countries which got a majority...during that people were excited...I mean up until today...even here in South Africa... people...they are starting to question the ANC...you know...from now and in 10 years to come... we don't know what's going to happen.

So would you say you'd vote long-term ANC?

I'll judge, I'll judge...I'll give the ANC a last chance...I would say that...obviously people...the forthcoming elections...if things are still going the way they are...if people really don't see change...I'm going to question them...inaudible.

Let me put it this way...the commitment that I see...I don't want to go into issues of corruption...corruption has always been there even in so-called democracies. On voting ANC long-term...to put it safely, in the foreseeable future I would definitely vote ANC...we have a history that we share...the ANC was at the forefront of the struggle...we are here today...we are able to come to Cape Town without producing a pass... those things...are things that people died for...now I'm not saying that we don't appreciate that but if at some stage we sit back and say that things are moving too slow for our liking we may have to look for alternatives...despotism has grown in parties that have a good history of struggle...most if not all parties have evolved...the fact that we were liberated after all of them should serve as a lesson for all of us...look at Zimbabwe...the example of Kenya...that party had a good record...they took them out of office... the people said no its too much...we can't be blind...we must see change in our lives...we want to see funding, education, we want to see more hospitals, a better life for all. We

gave them an overwhelming majority and we want delivery and I'm saying at some stage... maybe 2014... we may say to them "no, no its too much"

Can you tell me what will happen if the ruling party can deliver up to the expectations of voters and...like...the majority of South Africans can see this ANC is really like delivering...lets say in 2009 and 2014 we find that when the results are coming in other parties are not coming in at all...its only the ruling party which is the ANC and its because of voters who put that party there. So when I was talking about one-party state South Africa might end up in that situation...it won't happen because of that political parties but because of the people's will...you know people can turn the political environment if we have a leader...someone who can come up and make people aware ...inaudible...You can only tell the driver "drive" and "stop". If people can...in the near future...can say this is political party A and party B...let us agree that this elections we give political party A a chance and then we want political party A to do A,B and C and then if its not doing that after a certain number of years we can change.

This reminds me of a discussion about Presidents going to a third term and fourth term. People were asking "what is wrong with that?" There's nothing wrong but when your seat becomes your house...after a while...people got into office, did a good job...but the people got tired and they wanted to hold onto office...we must be careful of those things. But I'm not saying that we must vote out the ANC for the sake of voting them out. I think we must keep the ruling party on its toes if I may use that term.

They don't take a mandate from the grassroots ...they just do what they think is right for the people.

Okay, now I just want to show you some images from the campaigns. Let me pass this around.

Looking at this image of the IFP, was it about the IFP that they were unable to convince you to vote for them in 2004?

I don't know whether I was fortunate or not...because...IFP...I'm chopping IFP. What has happened in Gauteng before the elections most of the guys who were killing people from the hostels...most of them were followers of the IFP and I've experienced this first-hand...in a brutal way...people were killing each other in a senseless and brutal way.

They say a leopard never changes its colours...the thing is...this guy (Mangosuthu Buthelezi) his whole party...his zulu party...they don't accommodate other people, that's why I don't vote for them.

This guy was with the ANC first of all...in the Natal region...I cannot go according this guy.

They are forces that challenged political change...they sounded more like an ethnic political party...they are not encompassing the whole of South Africa.

If you look at the history of the IFP...culturally... it was an organisation that was there for cultural purposes, to say 'us as Zulus, we need to remind ourselves of who we are'...it was an identity kind of thing...I think its difficult to evolve into a political party that would encompass other people...because as a political party you have to encompass all. In 1994 I did see a few posters in the Eastern Cape of the IFP...they were struggling to become an all-encompassing political party. That was their biggest problem and they've not been able to transcend that and...the destructive nature ...just recently people were watching TV...this area Ulundi...it has significance to the King Shaka...it was almost a no-go area for the ANC...the Minister of Defence and Correctional Services had to go there because the IFP did not want the ANC to go canvass...that is part of their destructive nature.

And we find that even long before the 1994 elections, Gatcha was used by the then regime...you see... to kill ANC supporters...this guy...there is nothing good about him.

To me personally there is a need for young politicians to analyse the political songs, when they analyse the political songs it will give a lot of information to know exactly about these heroes. For Mangosuthu my feeling or opinion with him is that he was an informer...he betrayed his people...you know he was like Judas...when I think of the IFP, I just see his face and I think of impimpi.

The next one we are looking at is the DA.

Can I say on the DA...I'm asking myself what was Tony Leon doing in 1993...to me he is like an opportunist...and he is misleading people because one...he is the opposition...he is a person who...like...always criticizes you know...if he criticizes he doesn't come with constructive criticism. For instance, when they were saying to the Minister of Transport...saying that he must resign...he was not coming with an alternative...you must come alternatives. But, I think he's there for people from the white communities.

Ja, Tony Leon was there when the National Party was in power. What did he do to stop the National Party from oppressing black people? Nothing! So when I look at Tony Leon and I ask myself what is he going to do that he never did before...how is he going to create more jobs? He is an opportunist.

I want to say that...he is said to be a custodian of white privilege...that's the first thing. Then these things, more work, less crime...these are issues that are being raised by Civil Society and NGOs and we find that Tony Leon...the opportunist that he is...capitalizing on these things...create more jobs, less crime...50 000 police on the streets...these are the issues...he's playing on the emotions of the people...these are issues that are contagious...you know that if there is massive unemployment the likelihood is that people will resort to crime. These things are so obvious...its just pure opportunism. What he is, is a custodian of white privilege...and he's just going to stay like that. I was listening to the stats...if you look at the voting patterns...Rondebosch, Carlton, Constantia, Sea Point, Muizenberg, Camps Bay...they know that if they vote DA someone is going to fight to preserve their privileges.

Their campaign was "Fight Back". Fight what? What should we fight?

The question that I ask myself is what if we were the same in terms of numbers, would the ANC be the ruling party? I think the reason the ANC is in power is because the majority of people...some of us are not aware of what is happening... they do not have a clue of what is happening in the country especially in rural areas and the townships...I was shocked...there was this guy on TV ...inaudible...so they just vote ANC...they don't actually know what is happening in the country.

Why do you mention that in relation to the DA?

Ja...I was thinking the ANC...okay...is in power and its got this high percentage of voters...I'm thinking this high percentage, is it because people are loyal or...I mean... maybe these other guys...maybe ...they do not have that support, but they are able to come up with changes in the country you know.

That thing about the DA...part of the problem of the DA...white people oppressed us for all these years and now I'm seeing a white man saying "Vote for me, I'm going to bring change". I ask myself, does he think that I'm crazy...that he wants me to believe that he will bring more jobs. That is part of the baggage...the majority of South Africans are blacks and as long as that's the case, white parties are going to suffer. I've noticed...they are the official opposition largely

because white people voted for them...and they are still voting for them...they are privileged. Transformation is taking place in this country...because of that, the ANC is stepping on their toes. So I'm saying that all of these changes are not to the favour of those having privileges, unfortunately.

White people who voted DA, those who did not want to vote ANC, will definitely vote DA so the DA is going to be there as a strong party...a opposition party.

I was amazed to discover that there were whites who were in exile and joined the ranks of the ANC.

I have misgivings about Tony Leon. He seems to be selling or projecting economic interests. I don't know exactly what's his agenda.

Okay, lets move on to the UDM.

This is a problematic subject. The face of the UDM is General Bantu Holomisa, who was a former Homeland Minister and therefore participated in the previous regime and has the experience of protecting a Homeland and now has somehow changed. He joined the ANC and when things did not go his way left and joined a former member of the National Party, Roelf Meyer.

Look at the alliance, a man from a Homeland came to the ANC, left when things were not going his way and then is a bedfellow with one of the architects of apartheid, Roelf Meyer. I look at him and think of all those things and ask myself "What kind of man is this and can I trust my life with him?" The answer is "No!", I just can't do that. It doesn't really matter what he says about 10 years of unemployment. Again, he is using the same tactics as Tony Leon. He is using those issues...relevant issues...the issue of unemployment...we find that these opposition parties will all go for those issues...issues of corruption, the arms deal. People like him do not realize that there is a history that will always follow him. They carry a lot of baggage and I think that baggage is too much.

I want to agree with this. This guy left the ANC...to me Holomisa is a snake...his own people are leaving him everyday...I would never think of voting for them.

Actually, he's days are numbered. If you look at the trends...he lost the last remaining municipality...I think in Umtata...2 or 3 weeks ago...they lost it.

This guy...the place that he grew up in is a rural place you see...and now it's a one-sided party this one...because he's leading a rural place where he can lead those people... it's also a very very poor place that one...he has done changes in that place and as a leader of that place the only thing he comes with are what the people are looking for...unemployment...that question of unemployment...it's about the poorness of that place.

Okay, the Independent Democrats.

Ms De Lille, she suffered even more than a lot of people and is part of the mass democratic revolution...and part of the PAC...her history is impeccable but then I think she does...to me...show signs of opportunism.

She always capitalizes on being vocal on issues...the whole AIDS debate...the issue of corruption...if you look at these opposition parties, they always raise these issues. These are issues that the ruling party is raising. I mean... these are issues that are discussed in portfolio committees and parliament almost every day. How do we make sure that we decolonise this issue of AIDS? Maybe that's what they can do as opposition parties is to raise these pertinent

issues...but the problem is that before you hear these issues being raised by the ruling party itself...there's a rigorous debate in the ruling party today about all of these issues...the issue of corruption...I mean...the issue of AIDS...you see. The advantage of the ruling party is that you have a divergence of views. That is what is lacking in these smaller parties...then when they raise these issues, you see that but that its issues that's here in the ruling party...that have been tabled...the issues of AIDS and corruption that she raises everyday.

We've been promised this and that...houses...in the campaigns all these parties have been promising things...lets set an example with the present government. I don't know how, but setting an example so that when the next government comes into power, it must respect the masses...because we the people on the ground are the ones that are suffering...I mean...even if this...like UDM can win...if given a chance...maybe, maybe, maybe they can bring changes faster.

This Patricia De Lille, she decided to quit her own party to form another party...so from that point I see no reason to vote for her because she never even made right in her own party.

On that issue of her leaving...part of her logic...the PAC...you hear complaints about the PAC...problems of leadership...Mr Pheko who is said to be one of the worst despots there ever was...I did speak to people in the PAC and some people are disgruntled...you hear these stories that the leadership is dying...I'm saying...that's what pushed De Lille away. But look at the alliances in her party. They worry me. Some of the closest people in her leadership...inaudible...he was a member of the DA...sometime he might have joined the ANC...what worries me is that she works closely with such people.

I think she has yet to find her footing.

Ja, when I look at the ID...yes, the ID came in as an alternative to voters...to followers disappointed by the National Party...they at least see the ID as a shelter and those who don't really support the DA, they will vote ID. When I look at the leader of the ID, Patricia De Lille, yes she is a strong woman and a very promising person but looking at the leadership in her party, its worrying. She can die tomorrow as an individual. I'm wishing the Lord might give her many many years. She might make ordinary citizens view the country in another way...she's a strong woman.

To wrap up, thinking of campaigns, some people say that campaigns don't matter because people make up their minds a long time before the elections, other people say that campaigns are very important because they give information. Do you think they are important or not important?

I think they are important because people tend to forget and they need these things to remind them...besides the promises...I mean if you look at people read those things...these posters...television campaigns, the newspapers, that is why the campaigns cost millions of rands....I think it would be dangerous on the part of any party to just sit back, so the campaigns are valuable.

If you look at some of the posters, "Don't fight blacks", this was how the ANC was saying with a little sarcasm, "fighting what? Is it fighting transformation? And preserve your privileges" These campaigns are saying there's a better product.

Yes, I think the campaigns are important. As my colleague said...like...people tend to forget easily. Not all people forget, but desperate people tend to forget very easily, people who are hungry, poor people. They are the ones who also are putting representatives there. Representatives of parties, when they campaign, they come up with empty promises you see. So...like...if there could be any way, perhaps the IEC could play that role because its playing a role of teaching people how to vote...but to teach people how to make their representatives

accountable and how to vote our MPs out as we voted them in. So, if we see they are not delivering according to our expectations, what can we do as ordinary citizens that voted, how can we take them out before their term comes to an end. So, I think if those kind of workshops can come to people at grassroots that we can bring a lot of changes and make political parties not make empty promises. If you promise something, you must deliver because I voted on that promise...but you cross the floor at the end of the day.

The campaigns must be accompanied by consultation. If they consult, we can keep in touch...there should be meetings...there should be rallies.

Campaigns are a wonderful thing...it tends to remind people and give them hope...that's all I can say.

Are there any comments on anything we've discussed before I close?

I think...its opinion...it could be wise if there could be policies on the ways of campaigning...there mustn't be any political parties that will campaign on issues that they won't be able to fulfill and if you campaign about something and tell people you will be doing this and this and this, there must also be a time-frame for that...you know...whilst they are in that position...what are they doing...even if they don't win, to be in a ruling party position...but as political party A, they promised within 5 years or a number of years, they will be doing this and this and this...people believe in action, that's what they believe in.

I don't know whether the budgets are the same or what...one councilor is doing things for their people but another is not doing anything...no changes, nothing. If there can be changes, it will be better.

I agree with that...the issue of timeframes...what is different this year is the issue of timeframes. The premier of the Eastern Cape said that in a 100 days we want this done...this is what we want. They tell us ...okay...in a 100 days the Minister of Public Works in the Western Cape will have done 1,2,3,4 and 5 in terms of public works programmes that are generated. We want to see change, and change that we can count...this week this has happened...if we can keep our government going in that direction.

And the other issue is the issue of monitoring...we do have good policies and then when it comes to the issue of the implementation of these policies...yes, some of the issues are being implemented...we hear the Minister or DG saying "I delegated this person to do this and this in certain area" but who's...like...doing continuous monitoring? So that what is supposed to be done is really happening. So, I think the culture of monitoring is what the government needs to emphasize or encourage in departments. These policies, are we implementing them and how are we monitoring them?

You know...just on that...I was shocked before the elections, when I learnt that the MEC for housing in the Eastern Cape at that time had records that 500 houses were built but half the houses were not done...were only at foundation level and I was asking myself, "Didn't he have someone to walk there and see that it was not done?"

And that guy that was interviewed on 3rd Degree by Deborah Patta...the guy for 5 years or 7 years, he was given a budget of more than 2.5 million...we must keep them accountable...the officials that we vote in...we must them these questions and raise these issues...it can't be difficult to go see...if someone says I'm going to build 500 houses, I don't think it will take much at the of the 6 months to go see, are these things happening on the ground.

I think the reason is that these people who are there on top don't respect the people...they don't hear the people, that is why they are doing all these corrupt things. If people are there knowing

that they are representing the masses, they will deliver because they have the respect of the people and he knows where he comes from.

I agree with everybody. It is not wise for people who we elected to office to sit in their offices from 8:00am to 4:00pm. They should go out to their constituencies and find out what it is they need...what it is they lack. Sometimes its difficult for us to reach their levels...to go to the Minister of Home Affairs...they won't allow us to go to the man in charge...so they must come down to the constituencies and ask them "What is it that you need?"

I would like to bring in an example of a classroom with students and a lecturer. If you are a lecturer and you are lecturing students, first you give tasks to the students. They must take this course pack and go home and read 10 pages or 3 chapters, then by tomorrow they come back and review what is in these chapters and then you learn from them, are they really reading. Whatever kind of preparation you do as a facilitator or lecturer you will do it according to the students ...that they are reading, that they are understanding, that they are on top of their work. They will make you prepare as a teacher...you know. The same applies to government institutions and citizens at grassroots level...and the role of Civil Society Organisations. If you look at our Civil Society Organisations from the late 90's and 2000 and look at the role of Civil Society Organisations in the late 80's... people now...they are no longer interested in political matters...you know...we can't do away with politics. So what I'm saying is that we young people, we have a huge role to play...we have a huge role to make these people that are leading us...that they are supposed to do things in a certain way and they must hear our footsteps...that we are there...you see.

And another thing, most people that I speak to...they say "I've got my own car, I've got my own house, why do I need the party? I can go wherever I want, I've got my money, I can marry whoever I want" so...

So that culture of collectiveness is no longer existing, people are concerned about their individual needs.

Exactly!

That's why these young ones, they don't care...they focus on work, studying and progressing in life.

The typical example...you ask a person how they differentiate between the ruling party, parliament and the cabinet...what is the role...they will tell you different things...I'm talking about grown-ups who don't really understand what the whole setup is...they just see this building and they think of government and when they think of government they think of the ruling party you see...I think institutions should open up a school of democracy.

Thanks very much for your time guys.

1994 -1999 – ANC Voters that changed to UDM in 2004

She is _____ from Nambonga, she is staying in the 83, she always make herself happy to she like to be happy when he is watching soccer,

And this one is _____, she goes to church, she like music,

Does she go to choir?

No so just assisting others,

And the other said he is _____, he stays at no 52, but what I'm sure of, he likes music, especially choral music, I ask him which group he, he said Nkamboti, and he has recently come back from the choir, .

Now this is _____i, he stays in 147, and she does not like someone who lies, and someone who is not confident, he doesn't like someone who is not confident, from what _____has said, that she did not want someone who is not confident and who would tell lies,

I want all of us to be confident, and everything that we say to be true, some of the people I'm sure they never participated in the market research like this, in a group discussion, now we are here to discuss your views to, here we represent a different number of people here, everything that we say here, there is nothing wrong here, we just want your views truly and honestly, here everything is recorded, and we help this for someone to do analysis after and here we need to sign something of confidentiality so that none can go and disclose that someone has said that and someone has said that. To make this sure, that everything we say here is confidential, so that we wouldn't go to, when we go home, go to the streets and discuss someone has said that and that and that, and here we are going to sign a confidentiality. Here you must take this, that and say, I as who and whom, I agree that I'm going to, I am here freely, I agree that everything that has been discussed here I am going to leave it here. Do we agree on those things? Then we need to sign here, your full name at the top, and your signature at the bottom. And you say I, your name. Does anyone want another paper? Then your full name at the top and a signature at the bottom. Thank you. What we are going to discuss about here, the first one is, in fact, I have different issues, but the first issue is that I'm speaking Xhosa and I want everyone to speak freely in that language that, but even if you use Xhosa, but sometimes you feel that you do not have a specific word for Xhosa, but you just speak freely. In this year 2004, on the 14th of February, there were elections, and it was a very big event. But before there were elections, what were the discussions about the elections?

People, people were bored the don't see any improvement from the previous election, they don't see any progress, there is nothing, no they, now they were not sure, some were saying I'm going, I'm not going, but ultimately they decided to go and vote. Those that decided to vote.

Just before the election, what were they saying to you? How, you mean you didn't discuss with anyone before the election? What were the discussions and talks before the elections?

Some of the people were saying that there is nothing, that has been improved, from 1994, now we vote again, now because I'm not working, and I'm not going to school, some others decided to not and some others decided to go to vote.

But what about you brother?

But my friends were saying that they are not going to the elections, but I decided that I'm going to try and convince some of them, but it is important that they must go and vote and be sure which party they are going to vote, and then they decided to go and cast their vote.

Like before the people were campaigning, the people were campaigning for their parties, but people were complaining saying that, because during the last campaigns, there were a lot that they put in the campaign, but there were no improvement from what they said from the election campaigns.

What about you Dada?

What had happened, people are always crying, some of them are saying there is nothing that has been improved,

Let me come back to this man who is on my left, here, brother were here to discuss and talk about the elections. Everything that we hear in this room, is the talk and, no I'm not going to allow anyone who said he is not going to participate in this discussion.

Why?

No I do not have any response, because the people whom I stay with they never spoke anything about election.

Now I'm free now, because you are saying that the people whom you are staying with are not talking about elections. Okay, here in this room before all of us here, we voted the ANC, why? I voted in the elections, what is it that causes us to vote for the ANC?

But, before there was a lot of frustrations from the people, and after the release of Mandela, then people decided to vote the ANC and support the ANC, because Mandela has stayed a lot, and he suffered a lot for the freedom. Now people decided to participate in election and voted for the ANC.

Was it because of Mandela's release?

The only reason that it was so important on my side, our brothers and our sisters those who died during the liberation they are fighting for the ANC, the second point is, the one serious problem is we suffered a lot during the apartheid regime, and the ANC was the only organisation that was central and vocal, fighting for the liberation of our country.

What about you?

The reason that I decided to vote for the ANC, because even when were in school we were told that the only organisation that is fighting for people's rights is, is the ANC. And the second the ANC, it has worked hard, and now at least now all people are equal and have rights, and they have shown some of the improvement, and that is the reason that I decided to vote for the ANC.

And why did you voted the ANC?

The reason why I voted for the ANC, firstly, we wanted the freedom. The reason that I voted ANC is my aunt died as a member of the ANC, and I was following her cause. The ANC is at home, I followed the cause of that aunt.

And the other one said that the ANC wanted us to be equal.

This issue of voting, I didn't know, it was very exciting, and then I decided to vote for the ANC, then I just participated in such election. It was for the first time, me voting.

But why did you participate and vote for the ANC?

No, I just wanted to vote for the ANC.

The way that we were suppressed by the apartheid regime, and they way that we see all the police vans, and our family members were being arrested and with no Dom Pass, or pass, and our parents, some of them were being arrested, and I was very frustrated, and I was hating an

apartheid government, and what happened, when that time arrived that we must vote for an organisation and then the ANC was the only option.

You voted for the ANC? Is there anything that you want to add more?

On my side I just wanted to add, the ANC, I voted for it, because it was not discriminating anyone, and then it didn't say when I'm in power some of them are going to listen, it said that everyone is going to enjoy the fruits of election. Then I saw that this party, it was the only party that come from this point.

But this year you have changed, why did you decided to vote for UDM for 2004?

Like on my side, I voted the ANC on the past and they did what they could do, but I could see that the ANC could not finish what they promised. Then I decided to change hoping that this one was going to go straight to where the ANC failed.

There are many parties that you could vote. There are many parties that campaigned for elections, but you have chosen the UDM, why?

In 1994, I was working in Transkei, and then that time then Bantu General Holomisa was the leader of that country, and we were very free. So I voted in 1994 and then voted for the ANC, and Holomisa he was also a member of the ANC, and then in the due course how could, there were many things that I was not happy of, and then I decided to change and look for, because some of that things were promised were not achieved but now we we're suppressed now.

How difficult was it to access jobs?

Like before, you could come to a company and know on the door and you could get a job, but now there are many processes, you have to go to a process of interviews, some of the people could not express themselves freely in the process of interviews. And for instance, someone could make a job or give a job, but he is impossible, for him to express freely in the interview.

But also the houses that the government is doing to people, I cannot even describe.

Why did you decided to chose the UDM from the ANC?

But in Transkei, Holomisa we were free during his time of reign, and then I decided to vote for UDM.

Did you join the UDM because you followed Holomisa?

Yes, because some of the things that he did in Transkei and we were so happy at that time.

On my side, in 2004, I voted for the UDM because, because there was that time that General Holomisa took over from Matanzima, everybody in Transkei was very happy, and there was a time when peoples could get, when they were underpaid they could get a lot of bonus, and it was through funding that Transkei was prospering at that time. So now I decided in 2004, no, what Holomisa was doing in the former Transkei, in that little Transkei he does have the capability to do such thing in this big South Africa, if he can be given a chance. That is why my X goes straight to next to Holomisa.

Now I have to add on what she has just said, when I arrived here in Cape Town, in 1995, when I started to work, the scale of work go down, it was not the same as the one in Transkei, it goes down. The reason why I voted for UDM, I saw many things were not going, Holomisa used be

someone who speak frank and freely, and he was discovered during his time in Umtata, a welcome was freely and now I say, and now I decided to vote for UDM, the General, he is frank.

Do we all change because of this reasons?

No, I think so because, one important thing is someone who is on the forefront must be someone who is confident, if it makes it difficult, he must be frank and confident and be able to pull a lot of support.

on my side I think it is because of him as Holomisa.

And to add more onto that, sometimes you look a person just as a person, and you look him on his face, when he is speaking and you can see the and you can see that he is having the confident, and you can see that when this person, he'll have something, no he was a ruler in the former Transkei, and that is why I'm saying that he must be given a chance and he can be seen, and judging from the things that he did in the past.

Now would be the last one on this?

From what I know in the former Transkei, I never saw him with body guards, he was not as if he was a big person, he was just alone, one man, now you can see these people have a lot of body guards.

But now, this coming question, people are getting information about the political parties from different aspects, or from different sources, where did you get the political information about the UDM?

No, I get the information about the UDM in Guguletu, it was a rally of UDM. I got the information from the rally in Guguletu.

No, I get the information from this rally, these rallies. This information, the rallies, they explain why there is a UDM, what is UDM, and the intention of UDM.

But beside rallies, where else do you get information?

Like on my side I get the information from the people that I am working with these people are the member of UDM, they were explaining what is the UDM, the UDM is like this and this and that, they showed me their aims, explaining the aims and objectives of the UDM, from work.

On my side, sister, I got the information about the UDM from the TV, there was an incident, a very hot incident, an incident from Richmond in Natal, where Mr Nkapete was killed, it was a big debate, it was where I got the information and where Mr Holomisa, where he could do a speech and to that, sensitive speeches, then I can see this person, this guy is standing for what he is saying, he can speak clearly and frank about this party.

In our communities, there are people from the UDM, now they can speak freely about the UDM, just freely on talks and not community meetings. And there was a time when then there was some time when the people of UDM could and General Holomisa could come down and address and you could see to this person that early in the morning and late in the evening, that this person Mr Holomisa is here comforting the family. And then that shows me that Holomisa really is responsible.

No, I got the information from the rallies, I always go to the rallies

When moving from the ANC then going to UDM, wasn't there a time when you could think of another party before you went to the UDM?

No, on my side without thinking the only person, okay the only person that I am in a relation with he is a member of, the ANC members are fighting with themselves there is no unity within the ANC. Now I've decided, if, since they are not united, since there is not unity within or between themselves, some of them are killing each other because now they are rushing for high position, at that time, I decided to join the UDM.

On my side, I, before UDM, I thought of voting for DP, but when I was thinking of DP, now I'll be downplaying all the effort that have been done, I would be going back now if I voted for Democratic Party. So I decided no, I even heard about something about DP on the TV, I could see Tony Leon is a bit of a racist, and then he was asked in the TV about why the ANC where the ANC could not see the coloured in the position, now Tony Leon is still in that believe of the old regime of apartheid. Now I could recall that this person is not, he is not supporting the unity now, before I decided to join the side of UDM.

On my side, I just thought of voting for Azapo, now I wanted to enquire about this Azapo, but I could see that it was just a group who leans when they go to meetings they go into groups, no, I just wanted some time to join this group, now when in that group I saw someone taking a brick and waving it to someone, and saying I'm going to kill, and I'm saying, no, I'm not going to vote for this Azapo, now I have every hope of voting for Azapo goes down, and then it rises up, but otherwise Azapo, I love it and I like it because they are people of Africa, then now I was just cold now about this brick thing, now I decided if someone wanted to kill some other Africans, there is no hope. No I just have thought about the UDM.

Now, here I have some images from different political organisations, specifically when they are campaigning, you can pass it to one another. What is it that you look for from these images that convinced you to vote for or didn't convince you when you look on this image on the ANC? What is it that makes you to convinced that?

Like to me, when I'm going to town, I go on this corner, I go this corner, then I could see this image, this organisation has a lot of people, and you can see that this party has a lot of money. Now I decided no, I must approve of another organisation.

Now on my side, nothing good that I could see from these posters that I could see from the ANC.

Nothing from this poster that I could see, I could just look at this poster and then nothing. It was not directed to me, but to someone else, from this image, the only thing that I could see there are a lot of promises and the promises that were from this image are not being put forward.

There is nothing that I could see here on this poster, I just see, to me it is just meaningless, because on my side, I just voted for ANC once, and then 1999, I didn't vote now I voted in 2004, but the ANC just disappointed me.

Do you believe from suppression and now you want some position, and you can see that the ANC is doing what, is repeating what was being done by the apartheid National Party.

To me this really showS it was nothing.

On my side these images are all over, but they have no meaning. But they are just silent to me. But I decided a month before the election that no man, I know that I'm going to vote for a political organisation they were just wasting their time.

But now we are wasting time, what about you Dada?

No, this image didn't do anything to me, I didn't even bother to look at the images, because I knew that I am going to vote for

What about you sister?

No, I could see this poster, I could see this poster, they were just posting it next to my house, but in just a minute, after they put the poster, a few minutes after that, some children could climb the pole and drop that poster down and you could play, and you could see that even the children could see that there is nothing would come out of the ANC.

Now I'm going to with this image, this image that I'm giving you now, look there, nothing happened, this is Tony Leon.

I don't even want to look at Tony Leon.

Why?

When you could see this image, you could feel that it opened the wounds of apartheid. You could see that, he, the Democratic Alliance want us to go back to the oppression of apartheid.

Okay, now what about you?

No, it is a repeat of what I was saying earlier, but about the Democratic Party, when I listened to that comment of Tony Leon in the TV, you could see that this person, really I could not waste my vote and vote for the Democratic Party, cause they want us to go back

On my side, when I see now when I look at the Democratic Alliance, you could see, now since he was staying in the shack, you could see that now the DA could chase us and ask us for pass.

In general, does the party depend mostly on the leader?

Yes, it depend mostly on the leader. Because the leader is mostly the one who is influential and no one could go without a head.

No, let's talk about you, you people who are involved, do you look at the organisation itself, or the leader?

No, we look also from what they do, exactly what they do, and the leader himself.

I do have another image, you can pass it through to other people. Nothing said to us about we must vote for IFP?

Nothing.

Why don't you want to look, just on the reason, why?

The reason, the problem with this IFP, they are in Kwa Zulu Natal, the IFP wanted to form a coalition, the IFP rejected the coalition with the ANC, then they wanted to form a coalition with, then they joined with the Democratic Party, and then I could see then, no, that this party is not okay, and this put me off from the IFP.

On my side I could say without the political leader the Zulu National itself could not mix to the Xhosa. I don't know from what side that came from, if you are Xhosa and you go to Gauteng, they look as if you are someone who is, who is a skelm, or who is a crook, there is nothing to come out good from a Xhosa person, when what about you as a Xhosa person, when you get under the Zulu's?

Here, the problem here is Gaja, he was working with a Batete, before 94, he had some police protection, this police people, they were fighting against the UDF, they didn't want to see the members of the United Democratic Front, his police guards, Gaja's police guards, were working with the apartheid regime, and I could see that this person was not really, he is the same as Tony Leon, no, I don't like this guy, because when you look at his nation, he like is a nation, the Zulu nation, he would not accept anything that will tamper with that King of the Zulu peoples, he likes the Zulu people, the culture, the tradition of the Zulu, he did not want anything that would destroy the Zulu nation, and the nationality,

But why you didn't vote for IFP?

No the reason is one, he likes only the Zulu's, he is not interested about everyone in South Africa,

What about your vote?

The reason that I didn't vote for the IFP, on my area I never saw anything like this, because I could not vote for anything that I didn't see in my area.

Here in Kwa Zulu Natal, something that happened in the past, now what happened in the past, they look at your hand when you when they saw that your finger was cut through, your culture, now they will kill you because of your culture, because of your cultural, then I decided not to vote for IFP, because they are for the Zulu, and that what they did as a Zulu people to the Xhosa's.

Now here is an ID, independent Democrat, why, what is it that fed you to vote for the Independent Democrats?

The only thing is she is really opportunistic, because, firstly she was in the PAC, she was speaking a lot and then she just, and then she go to the top structures of the PAC, then she decided, and then she just decided to cross the floor, and then you could see, that the only thing that she want is to gain from the politics, financially. And the second problem then they criticise a lot, and she criticise and provides no solution to the problems. She cannot express what must be done, or say what must be done

Now I'm asking to other people?

On my side, I didn't hear anything, her campaigning, I don't want to lie, really, I never saw this lady in Guguletu.

I saw only mostly Costadine, here in parliament, you could wonder where this person get hold of their information. And she is always involved in this political gossip in parliament, but you could really you could see that when she always uses this gossip to put her on the top.

I never saw her to addressing problems, in our areas,

What other reasons that..?

No, this lady she come from the PAC,

Why does she not like to put unity to the PAC?

You always look to opportunity, and really she is not reliable.

And what about you?

No, I have seen her a little, from the ID,

On my side when I analyse, when you analyse the Independent Democrats, you could see, for me, you could see that this person would not be will not be willing to listen to other people's views, because she would be independent, she would not appreciate the support, now you could see even from what she did in the PAC, she spoke a lot from within the PAC, and she was mobilising within the PAC, then she decided to move out.

You know, on your side, what happened, why you didn't vote for her,

No, on my side, I never saw this lady.

We vote organisation only, because we saw them.

Is it important for a leader to be seen in our communities?

Yes, it is very important, because you are a leader and because they are people, and you must work with them.

Don't come only when it is time for election, and then you come. You must always be part and parcel of people's actions.

Let us concentrate on the last image of the NNP? What the NNP feeled, or why you didn't vote for NNP?

What is it, De Klerk?

On my side, the reason why I didn't vote for NNP is, the NNP wants, I was a casual in Sea Point, in a hotel in Sea Point, when I was going to Sea Point, I saw the poster of the NNP, saying.... When I analysed the poster of the NNP, I could see that this poster of the NNP is racist, the majority of the people in the NNP are the white people, and the majority of them did not care much about other on the feeling of the non-white people. Now this party wanted to fulfil the interests of the white people. Now when I see this poster, I decided no, the problem on my side was he said he was going to, there was a rally in Phillippi, but the first time he wanted he said he first go to Lentegour, on the rally in Lentegour. But his speech, really was not convincing, and then he was always on the side of the white people. But no, I did not mind about that, but he didn't go to Phillippi at all, and then he really disappointed me and I said, no, no this leader is not going to stand on his ideas.

Why you didn't vote for ?

No, I decided no, there is no way I can go back to Pharaoh, never saw any change.

What about this (in-audible)?

No, this is just a word, no, it is just a word change otherwise nothing change in content of change, from the New National Party.

Okay, and the other thing that said I must not vote for the NNP, you could go to these rallies, now when he address the people in the rally in Khayelitsha, he addressed the people the African people in Khayelitsha with Afrikaans, and really, you could see this person really, he is not. And he knew exactly the African people are not conversant of Afrikaans, but he was convinced that he must address them with the Afrikaans. Then this person was not good, then he turned me off.

When they put these boards on the poles, it is part and parcel of campaign, it is part and parcel of identifying and showing themselves, now I want you to tell me which other way of, there are many ways of selling, what is it here in the UDM that interested you most from their deal?

On my side, the only thing that I was very interested in from the UDM, is when Holomisa go, will Holomisa go to the rallies that the majority of people there who go to that rally would speak are Xhosa, that he would speak Xhosa and when he goes to any rally of people that speak English, and then he would speak English. And because people cannot understand much of the language, much of they do not understand the language, what is important is that people could get the sense of what he was saying exactly on your true language.

What else interested you in the UDM when they first campaigned?

On my side, when they campaigned the campaigned was very late on my side, because you could see when there was problem, Holomisa he would arrived at exactly the scene of the problem and to comfort the people.

What interested me in the UDM, is when my home girl died, in Nyanga, who was very caring, the UDM was very caring, and I just decided when the times of casting a vote, now I'm going to vote for UDM.

What is it that interested you?

Holomisa could see that the UDM has gained a lot of membership, and then I was following the numbers, because they could see the work, the work that he did, and because he worked very hard in the...

And when we speak of the UDM, who do we see?

No, we see Holomisa when you talk of the UDM.

What about other people that are sub structures of what he does?

It is not that we don't see other leaders within the UDM, but the only person that we see is the General only.

And when he speak Xhosa, he speaks Xhosa, not mixed, but then he is honest, but the ANC, is not honest, and you could see that really.
Holomisa is honest.

On my side, there is nothing that can change me to another party. UDM is the only answer.

If there is something that makes me unhappy, I can participate, I can participate in on the leadership of the UDM and influence, so that we can unify and get to make the organisation more viable.

Because of course, we run away from the ANC, then we join the UDM, but we have to stick to this, stick to them.

Here in the UDM, as members of the UDM, is there anyway when you can sit and discuss?

No, there are channels that you must follow, also in the UDM, you go in a specific channel and you go, if you see you are from this level, this first level, you are not happy on the grass roots level, then the original level and then you go to provincial level and from provincial you go to national. And then you can see from that side. No, we are summarising.

Now my question is some of the people say that campaign is not really important, because people have already made up their mind before the election? But others say the campaigns are very important, because voters have to choose who to vote for? What about you?

Campaigns are very important or not?

No, I must say that campaigns are very important

Why?

Because, since they are campaigning, now they strengthen your ideas and then they strengthen and make sure of your voting and emphasize their elections.

On the side campaigns are solidifying your views, and your thoughts about voting for that party.

On my side, when you campaign, other people do not know about any party, and like ID, they don't know about Independent Democracy, now when you campaign, some of the people didn't even never participated in any elections, now the campaign will help

Now, on my side, campaigns are very important,

Is it important, campaigns are very important for the leader contesting the election or the voters?

No, campaigns are very important, it is important for the leader and it is important for the elections that they can pull a lot of support from the voters,

Some of the people are not politically aware and some of the them are aware, campaigns are very important for those that are not aware, but if someone is politically aware, then elections are not important?

Now if I know politics, I read newspapers and watch TV, if I know what is going to happen, now for someone who is not politically aware, the campaigns are very important.

What about you?

On my side, I can say the campaigns is very important because they solidify and strengthen the fact that I am in UDM. Now I do have every right to in and listen to anyone like ANC so that I become clear about what is happening, whether to show that I am staying in the right or going in the right direction. The campaigns are very important.

What about you brother?

Well on my side and my views, it is very important, sometime we see, we see a leader and then you cannot see only the party, you must also get the leaders of the party to come it is very important for the leader of the party to come to the people just like this one.

We only see the paper on this one, he never go to, she never go to our area to campaign, but it is

important for them to come to our area

And now, what reason some say that campaigns are not important, and some say that campaigns are important?

Now you know the KTC in Guguletu, before the elections, before the elections, you could see Mantu Shabalala going to our hospitals, coming to campaign, what is it that she was doing when people were crying, there is no need for any elections.

Now you contradict yourself.

No, I said for special campaigns, for those who do not know about politics, but for me, I'm politically aware, I know, I know these people, the campaigns are important, to the one that is being campaigned.

For the one who is going to vote, and now they're in-between, there are those that are not sure, the one who campaigned a lot is the one who would at least get a lot of people, during the campaign, therefore campaigns are important,

So on my side, campaigns are really important, as the campaigns is important only to also to those who campaign, and those who are going to vote.

As a prospective voter, is it important to be campaigned?

Not as important as you see this person, not only do you go and vote, we only see this person on the ballot paper. It is important that you see this person during the process of campaigning, some of the people are not so, they are in between, so the process of campaigning, the leader who is going to get a lot of people specifically those who are not who are not sure, campaigns are really important. No I'm finishing now.

From what we've discussed, lets, if a person is, if a person can be given a chance to head a political party, what is it that we can do to improve, let me put it in this way, what can you do in order to be a real leader?

No, go to the people, stay with them, ask them, talk to them,

Where are you going to get them?

Lets be open what must I do really, you go to the street, the street canvassing, or the board, or the leader in the rural areas and you ask them that you wanted to see the people and that you wanted to talk to them. And you sit with them, and you discuss maybe, with the comet of that area, it must give you that particular date and you ask them, and you don't tell them, what you want, that you need this and that and that and ask from them, what is it that you want? And you must know your people, and you must go down, really, you must be a good listener, and you must listen from exactly from what the people are saying, advise them, and then encourage them, you must advise them, then you can be a good leader from there.

What about your brother?

On my side,

No, I'm just going to add.

Your first line is to enquire and do research what is it that the people need. And you know, do this thing called door to door campaign, because you can see on this grant issue and this social

grant project where we are going to each and every household and see them and ask them whether they do receive the grant, or not, and we are assisting them with the application forms. This is another way of assisting people.

Now I'm going to repeat this, the committee and the sub committee's and then there's where you go to the people because a door to door campaign is really expensive and too much.

From all of you three people who have just spoken, you say you must go to the people, what else?

No, you must tell them, you must tell them why that particular thing could not be done in that particular way this one is going to be done in this way or that way. And don't show them think that you are big or big headed, and at the end of the day you don't follow your promises. They are approachable also.

What about you? What is important ?

I'm going to repeat, when you first introduce yourself to the people, and then tell them these things are going to happen, and you must show them these things are going to happen if you work hand in hand with them.

University of Cape Town

Appendix 7: Media Tenor Methodology Notes²⁹³

The content analysis data-set had two levels of analysis: articles and statements. An article was defined as an independent graphical unit with separate headlines. On television and radio every new story was considered a new unit. One article could have numerous statements. A 'statement' was defined by Media Tenor as a unit of analysis that contains a subject, an issue, a rating, and a source.

The main SABC news broadcasts (Afrikaans news, English news, Nguni News, Sotho news) as well as e-tv news were included in the data-set. Newspapers included were: The Star, Beeld, Sowetan, Mail & Guardian, Pretoria News, Business Day, Citizen, Cape Argus, Cape Times, Die Burger, Independent on Saturday, This Day, Natal Witness, Daily News, Isolezwe, Ilanga, The Mercury, The Sunday Times, Rapport, Sunday World, Sunday Independent, City Press, Finance Week, Financial Mail, Daily Sun, Sunday Sun, Sake, Sake Rapport and Business Report. Radio news from Jacaranda, Radio Sonder Grense, SA FM, East Coast Radio, Ukhozi, Motsweding, Thobela, Radio 702 and Metro FM were collected by the Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR) and were also coded and captured into the data-set.

In print media, all articles in the political, news, editorial, opinion as well as the business section were included in the data-set. Excluded were letters to the editor, 'advertorials' and other sections of the newspaper clearly indicated as of non-editorial content. On TV, all news reports were coded including sport and weather but excluding the re-broadcast of 'highlights' after advertisement breaks.

Each article/report and statement was coded and captured into a data-set using the following coding categories developed by Media Tenor:

1. Name of publication/medium, e.g. The Star, Beeld, SABC 1;
2. Date when publication was printed;
3. The month where it was reported on;
4. The week when the articles appeared.

²⁹³ This section is based on Schreiner's (2004) how-to guide developed for Media Tenor.

5. The page number of the article;
6. The article number on the page, from top left to right to bottom;
7. The section where the article was found, such as news front, news, business, business front and others;
8. The type of article/report (op-ed,interview, etc);
9. The origin or the article/report e.g. an agency report or from the journalist of the medium;
10. Main individual issue. The main issue is the individual issue that receives the greatest coverage in the article (number of lines);
11. Area of focus. This could be national (South Africa) or provincial (Western Cape) or local (Cape Town) or even international;
12. Main individual protagonist. The main protagonist is either a person or an organisation or an entity that the article/reports focus on the most;
13. The explicit rating of the article, according to majority statements;
14. The implicit rating of the article, according to majority statements;
15. The overall rating, combining explicit and implicit at equal weight;
16. Group of media, e.g. dailies, weeklies, provincial, radio, television etc;
17. Areas of coverage grouped according to provinces;
18. The individual newsmaker on a statement level;
19. the individual source making the statement;
20. Topic i.e. the individual issue of the statement;
21. Whether the topic was a policy or non-policy issue.

Media Tenor argued that the bias or tendency contained in the presentation by a journalist, protagonist or his partners as well as independent sources can be expressed:

- explicitly, by using terms of clearly positive or negative judgement (for instance ‘good’, ‘promising’, ‘ominous’, ‘disappointing’.), or
- implicitly, if the presented content is embedded in a positive or negative context.

They therefore use a combination of two separate ratings i.e. explicit and implicit which is then combined to establish the overall ‘rating’ of a subject or issue.

Explicit	Positive	Rather positive	ambivalent	rather negative	negative	neutral
Implicit	Positive	Rather positive	ambivalent	rather negative	negative	neutral
Overall	Positive	Rather positive	ambivalent	rather negative	negative	neutral

Appendix 8: Coding Frame for Recode of Media Tenor Issues

ORIGINAL CODE	NEW CODE
1 = Ethical values	15 = Other
2 = Democracy/state	3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
3 = Justice in general	3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
4 = Human Rights	3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
5 = Responsibility of individual	15 = Other
6 = Political/civic culture	3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
7 = Economy and welfare	6 = Economy
8 = Domestic and external security = other	15 = Other
9 = Anti-American ideology = other	15 = Other
10 = Coalitions and co-operations	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
11 = Political parties: Tendency/Competence	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
12 = Political parties: Internal affairs	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
13 = Elections, voting	1 = Elections and Voting
14 = European Union	15 = Other
15 = Suitability to govern	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
16 = Parliamentary work	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
17 = Public appearance	2 = Public Appearance
18 = Politicians: Relations to party	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
19 = Politicians: Leadership qualities	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
20 = Politicians: Personal characteristics	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
21 = Party politics other	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
22 = Domestic security	15 = Other
23 = Politically motivated crime	5 = Crime
24 = Non political crime	5 = Crime
25 = Official: Position within organisation	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
26 = Official: Leadership qualities	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
27 = Official: Personal characteristics	4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern
28 = Constitution	3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
29 = Justice system	3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
30 = Minorities, immigration	15 = Other
31 = Black Economic Empowerment	6 = Economy
32 = Elections	1 = Elections and Voting
33 = Domestic politics	15 = Other
34 = Foreign policy	15 = Other
35 = Defence policy	15 = Other

36 = Developmental aid	15 = Other
37 = International politics	15 = Other
38 = Warfare	15 = Other
39 = America's position in world	15 = Other
40 = International trade	15 = Other
41 = Public budget, debt	6 = Economy
42 = Revenue, tax policy	6 = Economy
43 = Economic policy	6 = Economy
44 = Mining	15 = Other
45 = Employment policy	7 = Unemployment
46 = Agriculture	13 = Agriculture
47 = Economic situation	6 = Economy
48 = Labour costs	15 = Other
49 = Situation within global economy	6 = Economy
50 = Competitiveness	6 = Economy
51 = Situation of companies overall	6 = Economy
52 = Business climate	6 = Economy
53 = Consumer protection	6 = Economy
54 = Market position	6 = Economy
55 = Regulations	6 = Economy
56 = Procurement of capital	6 = Economy
57 = Mergers, co-operations	6 = Economy
58 = Executives, management	6 = Economy
59 = Personality of management	6 = Economy
60 = Personnel	15 = Other
61 = Research and development	15 = Other
62 = Production process, productivity	6 = Economy
63 = Products, marketing	6 = Economy
64 = Public appearance company	15 = Other
65 = Image	15 = Other
66 = IT	15 = Other
67 = History	15 = Other
68 = Strikes	15 = Other
69 = Business associations, appearance	15 = Other
70 = Trade unions	15 = Other
71 = Economy other	6 = Economy
72 = Media, media policy	15 = Other
73 = NGO's	15 = Other
74 = Welfare/Social policy	14 = Welfare and Social Policy
75 = Social services	14 = Welfare and Social Policy
76 = Pension policies	14 = Welfare and Social Policy
77 = Health system	8 = Health
78 = Aids: causes	9 = HIV and AIDS
79 = Aids: prevention	9 = HIV and AIDS
80 = Aids: treatment	9 = HIV and AIDS
81 = Aids: opportunistic infections	9 = HIV and AIDS
82 = Aids: social/political effects	9 = HIV and AIDS
83 = Aids: economic effects	9 = HIV and AIDS
84 = Aids: other issues	9 = HIV and AIDS
85 = Females/family/homosexuality	15 = Other
86 = Education	10 = Education
87 = Culture	15 = Other
88 = Housing	11 = Housing

89 = Social policies	14 = Welfare and Social Policy
90 = Religion	15 = Other
91 = Environment	15 = Other
92 = Energy	15 = Other
93 = Transport	12 = Transport
94 = Technology, research, science	15 = Other
95 = Germany	15 = Other
96 = Soccer	15 = Other
99 = Rugby	15 = Other
114 = Athletics	15 = Other
116 = Tennis	15 = Other
118 = Golf	15 = Other
119 = Water sports	15 = Other
121 = Sport in general	15 = Other
125 = Sport, other	15 = Other
126 = Public opinions	15 = Other
127 = Accidents	15 = Other
128 = Other topics	15 = Other

University of Cape Town

Appendix 9: Media Monitoring Project Methodology Notes²⁹⁴

The monitoring was conducted by first language speakers who underwent training from MMP. The monitoring was sent to the MMP office on a daily basis, where it was checked and then captured into MMP's specially designed election database. In total, 6080 items were monitored from 24 March 2004 up to and including 24 April 2004.

For television, the headline news bulletins were monitored on SABC1, 2, 3 and on e-tv, as well as at least one current affairs programme per day. For radio, two bulletins were monitored each day, one in the morning and one in the late afternoon, as well as at least one current affairs programme per day. The monitoring times varied from station to station. The following media were monitored:

Media Monitored by MMP	
Beeld	Radio Grahamstown
Bush Radio	Radio Pretoria
Business Day	Radio Teemaneng Stereo
Cape Times	RSG
Citizen	SABC 1
City Press	SABC 2
Daily News	SABC 3
Daily Sun	SAFM
Die Burger	Saturday Star
EP Herald	Sunday Independent
e-tv	Sowetan
Ilanga	Sowetan Sunday World
Independent on Saturday & Sunday Tribune	Sunday Sun
Isolezwe	Sunday Times
Kaya FM	The Star
Mail & Guardian	This Day
Motsweding FM	Ukhozi FM
Naweek Beeld & Rapport	Umhlobo Wenene FM
OFM	Weekend Argus
Radio 702	Weekend Post
Radio Algoa	Y-FM

Bias was understood as “a result of the language utilised, the deliberate omission of a counter view to that initially put forward, and/or the overall presentation of the item in the context of the newspaper or broadcast media news bulletin”.

²⁹⁴ This section is based on Media Monitoring Project, 2004.

Appendix 10: South African Advertising Research Foundation Methodology Notes²⁹⁵

I used SAARF AMPS® which is the SAARF All Media and Products Survey. It is a single source survey, i.e. information on media usage, product consumption and demographics are collected from the same respondent. It is an in-home face to face personal interview. The SAARF AMPS® sample is 12 500 adults (16 years and older) and the survey was conducted from end January to beginning June. The SAARF AMPS® sample was designed by using multi-stage area stratified systematic sampling, pre-stratified by population group (Coloured, Indians and whites form one stratum and black another), province, community size, gender and age.

I also used the SAARF Radio Audience Measurement Survey (SAARF RAMS®) which uses the same respondents used for SAARF AMPS®. The SAARF RAMS® Diary is left with the respondent at the end of the SAARF AMPS® interview and collected a week later. Respondents are expected to record, for every station listened to, quarter hour by quarter hour, for seven consecutive days, their listening. Respondents are also requested to, at the end of the reporting period, to indicate the three most preferred stations (in order of preference). A new procedure called 'flooding' was introduced in 2004, where all household members, in addition to the one selected for SAARF AMPS are requested to keep a SAARF RAMS® Diary, this doubled the(SAARF RAMS®) sample.

Additionally, I used the television viewing information provided by SAARF AMPS®, the SAARF TAMS Panel provides television viewing information, minute by minute, using so-called 'peplemeters'. It is semi-automatic electronic equipment that is connected to households' television equipment. It records television set events automatically, while viewer are logging in and out by using a remote control unit.

²⁹⁵ This section is based on material from the South African Advertising Research Foundation website, see SAARF 2004d.

Appendix 11: Nielsen Media Research Methodology Notes²⁹⁶

With regard to radio, Nielsen Media Research receives all radio data electronically from the respective media owners. The received data consists of the following: flighting code, date of Ad, start and end time, duration of ad, standard rate card rates, agency code and name, manufacturer code and name, product code and name.

This data are loaded onto their system and run through a coding file to obtain the radio advertising figures. Similarly Nielsen Media Research receives television log sheets with the following information: flighting code, start and end time, duration of ad, brand description and standard rate card rates. This data are loaded onto their system and run through a coding file to obtain television advertising figures. Print figures are calculated by AC Nielsen based on the size of the advertisement and the cost of advertising space charged by the publication. They include daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, community newspapers (country and free sheets), consumer Magazines, trade magazines and business and technical magazines. Direct mail includes the distribution of addressed and un-addressed mail or samples directly to the home. Direct mail advertising figures are based on data provided by the media owners. Outdoor advertising figures advertising figures are based on the standard rate card cost supplied by the outdoor company and includes billboards, walls and murals, sports stadium /promotional, on premise/store signage, commuter promotions, transit media (trains, taxis, etc), electronic and retail/street furniture.

²⁹⁶ This section was compiled from notes of Nielsen Media Research, 2004.

Appendix 12: Nielsen Media Advertising Expenditure Figures

Table 49: ANC Outdoor Media Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-Apr 04
BILLBOARDS	3,264,098	3,553,534	2,476,642	228,832	9,523,106
COMMUTER PROMOTION	0	59,540	0	0	59,540
MOVING MEDIA	1,003,250	1,042,250	482,600	206,560	2,734,660
RETAIL	0	0	41,291	0	41,291
Total	4,267,348	4,655,324	3,000,533	435,392	12,358,597

Table 50: ANC Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-Apr 04
ALPHA FM	0	0	6,014	3,195	9,209
ALX FM	0	0	13,096	6,962	20,058
TLANTIS FM	0	0	5,264	2,792	8,056
BOTLOKWA FM	0	0	6,756	3,593	10,349
BUSH FM	0	0	11,944	6,332	18,276
GRAHAMSTOWN FM	0	0	5,631	3,001	8,632
KHANYA FM	0	0	5,631	3,001	8,632
LETHLABILE FM	0	0	6,431	3,441	9,872
MAFISA FM	0	0	8,301	4,451	12,752
MARITZBURG FM	0	0	14,271	7,585	21,856
MOHODI FM	0	0	6,756	3,593	10,349
MOSUPATSELA FM	0	0	6,395	3,399	9,794
RADIO MAPUT	0	0	6,756	3,593	10,349
RADIO MORETELE	0	0	7,490	4,012	11,502
RADIO VALLEY	0	0	0	2,080	2,080
SETSOTO FM	0	0	5,905	3,139	9,044
SOSHANGUVE FM	0	0	7,705	4,095	11,800
TAKALANI FM	0	0	5,631	3,001	8,632
TYGERBERG FM	0	0	0	5,530	5,530
UNITRA FM	0	0	5,230	3,001	8,231
VAALTAR FM	0	0	6,431	3,441	9,872
VCR STEREO	0	0	3,522	4,854	8,376
VUKANI FM	0	0	5,631	3,001	8,632
ZIBONELE FM	0	0	11,707	6,274	17,981
P4 CAPE FM	0	0	3,796	3,411	7,207
P4 KZN FM	0	0	26,823	315	27,138
CAPE TALK	0	0	67,384	54,512	121,896
RADIO 702	0	0	100,758	86,614	187,372
EAST COAST RADIO	0	0	92,280	98,220	190,500
KAYA FM	0	41,900	296,465	129,535	467,900
KFM 94 5	0	67,035	476,475	269,250	812,760
CISKEI	0	5,103	32,172	12,354	49,629
GOOD HOPE FM	0	0	0	103,734	103,734
IKWEKWEZI FM	0	15,030	85,320	33,345	133,695
LESEDI FM	0	68,316	396,170	151,752	616,238
LIGWALAGWALA FM	0	15,678	94,188	36,675	146,541
LOTUS FM	0	19,773	132,706	110,253	262,732

METRO FM	0	97,923	581,756	269,074	948,753
MOTSWEDING FM	5,520	42,645	249,254	97,397	394,816
MUNGHANA LONENE FM	0	17,254	103,706	44,475	165,435
PHALAPHALA FM	0	10,187	61,417	28,353	99,957
SAFM	0	0	70,662	57,252	127,914
THOBELA FM	0	46,296	258,778	97,923	402,997
UKHOZI FM	0	104,511	665,831	308,649	1,078,991
UMHLOBO WENENE FM	0	70,302	392,510	219,959	682,771
Total	5,520	621,953	4,350,949	2,310,418	7,288,840

Table 51: ANC Advertising Expenditure, Print Media (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
BEELD (MON-FRI)	54,665	0	54,665	245,533	354,863
BURGER (MON-FRI)	48,235	0	96,470	195,008	339,713
BURGER (EASTERN CAPE)	14,933	0	29,866	67,789	112,588
CAPE ARGUS	39,015	0	39,015	195,075	273,105
CITY PRESS	78,840	0	78,840	191,160	348,840
DAILY DISPATCH	29,845	4,504	22,981	48,128	105,458
DAILY NEWS	33,394	0	74,307	160,038	267,739
DAILY SUN	35,798	0	51,826	84,835	172,459
D.F. ADVERTISER	16,351	2,212	37,722	38,825	95,110
EASTERN PROVINCE HERALD	20,903	0	41,806	63,174	125,883
INDEPENDENT ON SATURDAY	0	0	7,541	0	7,541
ILANGA	27,135	0	54,270	73,537	154,942
ISOLEZWE	12,536	0	25,072	25,072	62,680
MAIL & GUARDIAN	21,840	0	43,680	0	65,520
MERCURY	28,166	0	56,854	73,234	158,254
NATAL WITNESS	8,013	0	0	17,258	25,271
POST	0	0	14,054	25,852	39,906
RAPPORT	137,160	0	274,320	346,680	758,160
SATURDAY DISPATCH	0	0	2,203	0	2,203
SATURDAY WEEKEND ARGUS	41,753	0	83,506	66,803	192,062
SOUTH COAST HERALD	0	1,413	0	12,715	14,128
SOWETAN	33,033	0	78,239	176,455	287,727
STAR	68,278	0	136,556	341,383	546,217
SUNDAY SUN	15,288	0	30,576	37,401	83,265
SUNDAY TIMES	178,200	23,715	457,584	488,076	1,147,575
SUNDAY TRIBUNE	50,593	0	101,186	148,591	300,370
SUNDAY TRIBUNE HERALD	0	0	0	94,254	94,254
SUNDAY WORLD	23,751	0	47,502	47,502	118,755
THIS DAY	43,200	0	86,400	178,200	307,800
VOLKSBLAD	20,878	0	41,756	51,337	113,971
WEEKEND POST	23,544	0	47,088	66,393	137,025
OTHER*	410,207	5,946	126,056	509,129	1,051,338
TOTAL	1515554	37790	2241941	4069437	7,864,722

*Other includes most community newspapers

Table 52: DA Outdoor Media and Direct Mail Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 -

April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-Apr 04
Direct Mail-UNADDRESSED	7,589	0	41,262	23,371	72,222
Outdoor-BILLBOARDS	0	137,350	62,350	0	199,700
TOTAL	7,589	137,350	103,612	23,371	271,922

Table 53: DA Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-Apr 04
CCFM	0	0	0	9,707	9,707
EAST RAND FM	0	0	0	6,377	6,377
GOODNEWS FM	0	0	0	5,295	5,295
HIGHWAY FM	0	0	0	10,276	10,276
NAMAKWALAND FM	0	0	0	4,005	4,005
RADIO KABOESNA	0	0	0	4,088	4,088
RIVERSIDE FM	0	0	0	4,683	4,683
TEEMANENG FM	0	0	0	4,045	4,045
TYGERBERG FM	0	0	0	10,221	10,221
WEST RAND STEREO	0	0	0	4,129	4,129
P4 CAPE FM	0	0	4,992	7,716	12,708
CAPE TALK	0	0	168,922	56,655	225,577
HIGHVELD 94 7	0	184,432	321,975	124,730	631,137
RADIO 702	0	76,254	127,110	51,581	254,945
EAST COAST RADIO	0	142,800	270,528	126,432	539,760
JACARANDA 94 2FM	0	330,750	486,744	281,235	1,098,729
KAYA FM	0	75,900	0	0	75,900
KFM 94 5	0	125,700	300,258	161,415	587,373
5FM	0	94,500	110,430	67,422	272,352
GOOD HOPE FM	0	103,638	212,196	141,696	457,530
IKWEKWEZI FM	0	21,114	37,140	17,153	75,407
LESEDI FM	0	137,824	147,517	93,051	378,392
LIGWALAGWALA FM	0	26,910	45,783	21,753	94,446
LOTUS FM	0	30,780	35,910	21,852	88,542
METRO FM	0	159,030	200,130	142,950	502,110
MOTSWEDING FM	0	70,646	92,876	55,417	218,939
MUNGHANA LONENE FM	0	28,760	39,588	26,951	95,299
PHALAPHALA FM	0	17,353	29,120	15,176	61,649
RSG	0	154,704	302,082	189,936	646,722
SAFM	0	61,860	110,286	50,778	222,924
THOBELA FM	0	99,089	131,654	79,396	310,139
UKHOZI FM	0	279,959	495,276	204,038	979,273
ALGOA	0	32,500	28,470	13,230	74,200
OFM	0	29,600	40,020	9,472	79,092
TOTAL		R	R	R	R
		2,284,10	3,739,007	2,022,861.0	8,045,971.0
	0	3.00	.00	0	0

Table 54: DA Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-Apr 04
ATHLONE NEWS	0	11,073	2,028	2,028	15,129
BEELD MON-FRI	0	38,034	0	0	38,034
BURGER MF	0	33,743	0	67,857	101,600
BURGER OOS KAAP	0	13,454	0	0	13,454
CAPE ARGUS MF	0	40,012	25,359	0	65,371
CAPE TIMES MF	0	0	0	26,972	26,972
CITIZEN MF	0	33,579	0	0	33,579
CONSTANTIABERG BULL	0	0	2,352	4,704	7,056
DAILY DISPATCH MF	0	220	0	0	220
DAILY DISPATCH WE	0	0	257	0	257
DAILY NEWS MF	0	34,246	14,470	20,184	68,900
DIAMOND FLDS ADV MF	3,024	7,548	0	1,659	12,231
DISTRICT MAIL	0	0	0	944	944
EIKESTAD NUUS	0	1,435	4,162	2,870	8,467
FALSEBAY ECHO	0	7,032	0	0	7,032
GEMSBOK UPINGTON	0	0	3,281	0	3,281
GEORGE HERALD	0	0	0	7,232	7,232
GRAAF REINET ADVERT	0	0	0	531	531
GROCOTTS MAIL	0	0	154	0	154
HEIDELBERG NIGEL HERAU	0	0	0	242	242
HERMANUS TIMES	0	0	293	1,131	1,424
HIGHVELD HERALD	0	0	1,257	0	1,257
KLERKSDORP RECORD	0	0	199	0	199
LADYSMITH GAZETTE	1,860	0	0	0	1,860
LETABA HERALD	7,702	0	0	10,902	18,604
MAIL&GUARDIAN	0	0	492	0	492
MALUTI	0	0	0	927	927
METRO BURGER EAST	0	0	674	0	674
METRO BURGER WEST	0	0	615	0	615
MIDLAND NEWS	0	0	290	290	580
MOSELBAY ADVERTISER	1,100	0	0	0	1,100
NATAL WITNESS MF	0	16,025	470	3,962	20,457
NATAL WITNESS WE	0	7,044	0	3,082	10,126
NEWCASTLE ADVERTISER	453	0	0	0	453
NOORDKAAP	0	0	0	1,334	1,334
NORTHERN NATAL COURIER	288	0	0	0	288
PLAINSMAN	0	12,864	0	0	12,864
POST	6,246	18,946	18,946	9,369	53,507
PRETORIA NEWS MF	0	8,902	13,467	0	22,369
RANDBURG SUN	0	0	0	799	799
RAPPORT MAIN BODY	0	105,924	0	105,924	211,848
RECORDER VOLKSRUST	0	0	0	3,128	3,128
ROSEBANK&KILLARNEY GA	0	0	0	1,166	1,166
RUSTENBURG HERALD FRI	0	0	974	0	974
SOUTH COAST HERALD	2,402	0	1,484	1,920	5,806
SOUTHERN MAIL	0	10,308	0	0	10,308
SOUTHERN SUB TATLER	0	0	2,396	4,792	7,188

STANDERTON ADVERTISER	0	0	0	1,045	1,045
STAR MF	0	69,642	34,518	0	104,160
STELLALANDER VRYBURG	599	0	1,410	0	2,009
SUNDAY TIMES M B	0	143,871	0	143,871	287,742
TYGERBURGER BELLVILLE	0	0	588	0	588
TYGERBURGER DURBANVIL	0	0	512	0	512
TYGERBURGER KUIBRAK	0	0	525	2,450	2,975
TYGERBURGER KUS	0	0	537	0	537
TYGERBURGER PAROW	0	0	788	0	788
U D NEWS	779	0	0	710	1,489
VAALWEEKBLAD THUFRI	0	0	2,374	0	2,374
VOLKSBLAD MF	0	15,119	0	0	15,119
VRYSTAAT BETHLEHEM	0	0	0	123	123
WESLANDER	319	0	957	11,528	12,804
WORCESTER STANDARD	0	0	2,538	0	2,538
ZOUTPANSBERGER	0	0	0	2,718	2,718
BURGER MF	0	0	0	9,888	9,888
HERMANUS TIMES	0	0	410	0	410
LADYSMITH GAZETTE	0	1,860	0	0	1,860
TYGERBURGER GOODWOO	0	0	588	0	588
VOLKSBLAD MF	0	0	7,753	0	7,753
WORCESTER STANDARD	0	0	0	2,833	2,833
Total	24,772	630,881	147,118	459,115	1,261,886

Table 55: IFP Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

IFP	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
BEELD	0	0	0	38,034	38,034
ILANGA	0	0	0	92,804	92,804
LADYSMITH GAZETTE	7,254	7,254	0	0	14,508
RAPPORT	0	0	0	103,208	103,208
SOUTH COAST HERALD	0	0	0	4,710	4,710
VOLKSBLAD	0	0	0	15,119	15,119
ZULULAND OBSERVER	0	0	0	1,419	1,419
TOTAL	7,254	7,254	0	255,294	269,802

Table 56: IFP Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
P4 CAPE FM	0	0	4,320	3,780	8,100
P4 KZN FM	0	0	2,800	2,450	5,250
EAST COAST RADIO	0	0	0	57,810	57,810
5FM	0	0	7,980	18,780	26,760
GOOD HOPE FM	0	0	6,840	0	6,840
LESEDI FM	0	0	0	17,118	17,118
LIGWALAGWALA FM	0	0	432	3,078	3,510
LOTUS FM	0	0	39,255	58,410	97,665
METRO FM	0	0	112,065	236,836	348,901

MOTSWEDING FM	0	0	3,020	7,227	10,247
MUNGHANA LONENE FM	0	0	1,131	2,301	3,432
PHALAPHALA FM	0	0	2,259	2,258	4,517
RADIO 2000	0	0	6,000	6,000	12,000
RSG	0	0	0	34,896	34,896
SAFM	0	0	2,160	9,480	11,640
UKHOZI FM	0	0	231,681	269,100	500,781
UMHLOBO WENENE FM	0	0	77,688	131,508	209,196
TOTAL	0	0	497,631	861,032	1,358,663

Table 57: UDM Outdoor Media Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
BILLBOARDS	0	695,400	712,900	395,950	1,804,250
MOVING MEDIA	0	0	11,250	20,625	31,875
TOTAL	0	695,400	724,150	416,575	1,836,125

Table 58: UDM Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
BUSINESS DAY SURVEY	0	73,884	0	0	73,884
CITY PRESS	0	112,320	0	0	112,320
DAILY DISPATCH MF	0	36,164	0	0	36,164
DAILY NEWS MF	0	0	4,452	0	4,452
EASTERN PROV HERALD	0	38,043	0	0	38,043
INDEP ON SATURDAY	0	0	4,465	0	4,465
MAIL&GUARDIAN	0	107,256	68,880	34,440	210,576
POST	0	0	3,123	0	3,123
SOWETAN	0	66,066	0	0	66,066
SUNDAY TIMES	0	284,580	0	0	284,580
THIS DAY	0	108,000	0	0	108,000
TOTAL	0	826,313	80,920	34,440	941,673

Table 59: UDM Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
GOOD HOPE FM	0	0	23,610	16,770	40,380
IKWEKWEZI FM	0	0	5,400	4,440	9,840
LESEDI FM	0	0	32,430	29,280	61,710
LIGWALAGWALA FM	0	0	6,570	6,030	12,600
LOTUS FM	0	0	9,060	5,700	14,760
METRO FM	0	0	61,500	56,250	117,750
MOTSWEDING FM	0	0	18,570	14,040	32,610
MUNGHANA LONENE FM	0	0	7,290	4,830	12,120
PHALAPHALA FM	0	0	4,860	3,210	8,070
SAFM	0	0	20,400	13,260	33,660
THOBELA FM	0	0	19,770	12,120	31,890
UKHOZI FM	0	0	67,530	60,600	128,130

UMHLOBO WENENE FM	0	0	31,530	26,230	57,760
TOTAL	0	0	308,520	252,760	561,280

Table 60: ID Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
ATHLONE NEWS	0	0	317	0	317
BEDFORDVIEW EDENVALE	0	0	646	0	646
CAPE ARGUS	0	9,710	0	0	9,710
CAPE TIMES	5,789	3,952	0	13,758	23,499
DAILY SUN	0	0	1,993	5,979	7,972
DIAMOND FLDS ADV	0	0	0	389	389
EIKESTAD NUUS	0	0	0	205	205
GEORGE HERALD	0	0	2,034	0	2,034
GERMISTON CITY NEWS	0	0	575	0	575
JOBURG EAST EXPRESS	0	0	360	0	360
KAAPSE SON	0	0	0	6,650	6,650
KEMPTON EXPRESS	0	0	726	0	726
MALUTI	0	0	0	1,436	1,436
PLAINSMAN	0	0	331	0	331
REPRESENTATIVE	0	0	807	0	807
STELLALANDER VRYBURG	0	0	1,340	0	1,340
SUNDAY TIMES EX NATAL	0	0	1,800	1,200	3,000
SUNDAY TIMES METRR	0	0	3,060	2,040	5,100
TEMBISAN	0	0	416	0	416
TYGERBURGER BELLVILLE	0	0	622	0	622
TYGERBURGER GOODWOO	0	0	590	0	590
TYGERBURGER KUIBRAK	0	0	637	0	637
VUKANI	0	0	364	0	364
WORCESTER STANDARD	0	0	0	217	217
TOTAL	5,789	13,662	16,618	31,874	67,943

Table 61: ID Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
ALX FM	0	0	0	2,986	2,986
BUSH FM	0	0	0	3,183	3,183
CCFM	0	0	0	2,577	2,577
EAST RAND FM	0	0	0	2,100	2,100
HIGHWAY FM	0	0	0	2,212	2,212
RADIO RAU	0	0	0	1,742	1,742
RADIO TUKS	0	0	0	1,921	1,921
RIPPEL FM	0	0	0	4,206	4,206
SOSHANGUVE FM	0	0	0	2,194	2,194
TODAY FM	0	0	0	3,311	3,311
TYGERBERG FM	0	0	0	4,117	4,117
UCT FM	0	0	0	1,424	1,424
VOC FM	0	0	0	2,744	2,744
ZIBONELE FM	0	0	0	3,450	3,450

YFM	0	0	0	6,552	6,552
CAPE TALK	0	0	0	14,343	14,343
RADIO 702	0	0	0	21,172	21,172
EAST COAST RADIO	0	0	30,840	22,230	53,070
5FM	0	0	0	102,516	102,516
METRO FM	0	0	0	121,208	121,208
RSG	0	0	13,980	28,770	42,750
SAFM	0	0	24,840	38,628	63,468
TOTAL	0	0	69,660	393,586	463,246

Table 62: NNP Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
APPLE EXPRESS	0	0	10,415	0	10,415
BEELD (Mon -Fri)	12,537	22,288	33,434	9,751	78,010
Print-N&BEELD (Week-end)	2,786	5,572	1,393	1,393	11,144
BONUS NORTH WESTERN	0	0	0	12,977	12,977
BURGER	3,955	75,274	161,053	183,670	423,952
BURGER OOS K SAK	0	7,784	17,010	0	24,794
BURGER OOS KAAP	2,358	15,856	31,568	11,676	61,458
BURGER OOS KAAP WE	629	0	0	0	629
BURGER WE	1,483	2,472	25,956	11,124	41,035
CAPE ARGUS MF	0	0	9,710	18,958	28,668
DIAMOND FLDS ADV MF	0	1,382	2,212	0	3,594
DISTRICT MAIL	0	0	4,026	4,026	8,052
EIKESTAD NUUS	0	0	2,358	2,460	4,818
ESCOURT&MIDLAND NEWS	0	0	0	1,094	1,094
GEMSBOK UPINGTON	410	0	0	1,169	1,579
HELDERPOS	0	486	1,949	5,811	8,246
HERMANUS TIMES	0	0	0	702	702
HIGHWAY MAIL	0	0	0	4,100	4,100
KAAPSE SON	500	5,100	5,600	1,400	12,600
KROONNUUS	0	0	1,188	0	1,188
LADYSMITH GAZETTE	11,160	0	0	0	11,160
LOWVELDER FRIDAY	0	0	0	7,326	7,326
MAIL MAFIKENG	0	0	0	1,955	1,955
MALUTI	0	0	0	2,873	2,873
MIDDELBURG OBSERVER	0	0	2,742	3,199	5,941
NATAL WITNESS (Mon -Fri)	0	0	0	8,218	8,218
NATAL WITNESS (Week-end)	0	0	0	3,522	3,522
NOORDKAAP	0	0	0	3,134	3,134
NOORDWESTER TVL	0	2,051	0	0	2,051
NORTHERN NATAL COURIER	0	0	0	1,296	1,296
ONS STAD	0	0	0	6,550	6,550
OUTSHOORN COURANT	0	0	0	976	976
PLAINSMAN	0	0	3,958	3,958	7,916
POST	0	0	0	3,123	3,123
POTCHEFSTROOM HERALD	0	0	0	2,449	2,449
PRETORIA RECORD CENTRAL	0	0	0	1,283	1,283

PRETORIA RECORD CENTU	0	0	0	2,544	2,544
PRETORIA RECORD EAST	0	0	0	2,544	2,544
PRETORIA RECORD MAMELODI	0	0	0	1,255	1,255
PRETORIA RECORD MOOT	0	0	0	1,755	1,755
PRETORIA RECORD NORTH	0	0	0	1,535	1,535
PRETORIA RECORD WEST	0	0	0	1,105	1,105
RAPPORT	3,880	0	0	0	3,880
RIDGE TIMES	0	0	0	2,965	2,965
RUSTENBURG HERALD	0	0	0	11,864	11,864
SAT WEEKEND ARGUS	0	0	10,392	10,392	20,784
SOUTH COAST HERALD	848	0	0	0	848
SOUTH COAST SUN	0	0	0	1,044	1,044
U D NEWS	0	0	8,078	0	8,078
VAALWEEKBLAD	0	0	2,374	0	2,374
VOLKSBLAD (Mon- Fri)	3,588	10,780	15,985	11,020	41,373
VOLKSBLAD (Week-end)	1,050	1,868	1,984	443	5,345
VOLKSBLAD SAKE	0	496	0	0	496
WITBANK NEWS	0	0	0	1,940	1,940
WORCESTER STANDARD	0	0	0	978	978
ZULULAND OBSERVER	0	0	0	2,660	2,660
TOTAL	45,184	151,409	353,385	374,217	924,195

Table 63: NNP Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004)

	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Jan-April 2004
HIGHVELD 94 7	0	0	108,859	59,906	168,765
EAST COAST RADIO	0	0	162,600	96,930	259,530
JACARANDA 94 2FM	0	0	159,780	113,000	272,780
KFM 94 5	0	23,815	276,420	148,305	448,540
5FM	0	0	46,104	21,030	67,134
GOOD HOPE FM	0	0	76,731	30,150	106,881
LOTUS FM	0	0	31,710	14,460	46,170
RSG	0	0	110,310	105,450	215,760
SAFM	0	0	58,947	43,350	102,297
ALGOA	0	0	29,067	1,028	30,095
OFM	0	0	35,940	4,634	40,574
TOTAL	0	23,815	1,096,468	638,243	1,758,526