



An Assessment of Ghana-China Relations (2000-2020): Benefits and Challenges to Ghana

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

Master of Social Science: International Relations

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2020

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DECLARATION

I, Theresa Ayerigah, hereby declare that, this thesis is my own work towards the degree of Master of Social Science in International Relations, at the University of Cape Town (UCT), under the supervision of Associate Professor John Akokpari. I further declare that I have read the research ethics guidelines of the university and that this thesis is my own effort, conducted under the necessary conditions of the Department of Political Studies and that all chapters and quotes have not been presented in part or whole for any other degree. I thereby accept any responsibility for any shortfall and acknowledge the right and consent of all participants.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the memory of my late father: Mr. Peter Ayerigah, whose drive for education remain my hallmark, and the consistency of my mum: Mrs. Janet Ateni Ayerigah, to whom I owe the woman I am today. You have been my first role model and constant reminder of resilience and effort. To my younger sister, Victoria Mina Ayerigah - you are capable of anything.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the almighty God, through whose providence this work was completed. I am also grateful to my family for their consistency and prayers throughout my life.

My sincere gratitude to my funders: The MasterCard Foundation Scholars Program (MCF) for their financial and emotional support.

A special thank you to my supervisor, Professor John Akokpari, who remained a father throughout my journey at UCT. You have subconsciously taught me so many lessons in academia that will stay with me for life.

I am grateful to the family I made in South Africa and the consistency of friends back home, especially my Lecturers and colleagues from Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST). I truly appreciate this community.

To any other person who subconsciously contributed to this success. Here is to more: "I am because we are." I appreciate you all and thanks for being part of this journey.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AGA	AngloGold Ashanti
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ATL	Akosombo Textiles Limited
AU	African Union
CDB	China Development Bank
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPR	Economic Recovery Program
EU	European Union
FDA	Food and Drug Authority
FDIs	Foreign Direct Investments
FOCAC	Forum on China Africa Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTP	General Trade Policy
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MoUs	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
SA	South Africa
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SSC	South - South Cooperation
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TPR	Trade Policy Review

UN	United Nations
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Abstract

Chinese relations with African countries have increased significantly during the last two decades. In recent times, a large number of Chinese nationals have temporarily relocated to parts of the continent to engage in trade, mining and other businesses. The limited to no approach on Sino-African relations has created mixed feelings among Africans and especially scholars. A wide range of academic publications on Sino-African relations in recent times have especially focused on the impact of China on African economies. However, there is scant research on Ghana's partnership with China. The purpose of this study was to examine the challenges and opportunities of Ghana-China relations through the lenses of realism and liberalism as theoretical frameworks. The study adopted a qualitative approach. Data was collected through interviews with purposively selected respondents, along with field observations, archival reviews and relevant literature. The aim was to examine the impact of Chinese relations on Ghana, in the areas of development, governance, trade, aid and investment. A total of 35 respondents participated in the study. These included academics, market women, members of civil society and traditional leaders. The study found that some of the perceptions of ordinary Ghanaians about China were inaccurate and misplaced. However, the study revealed the tension that exists between local communities and Chinese investors. At the governmental level, it was found that the economic and trade relations between Ghana and China have become stronger. However, it was noted that, consistent with China's realist foreign policy orientation, and in spite of China's growing trade, aid and investment in Ghana, Beijing has on the whole enjoyed more benefits than Accra in the relations between the two countries.

Key words: Partnership, Trade, Development Assistance, Investment, Benefits and Growth.

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1. Background Statement

The origins of China-Ghana relations date back to the mid-twentieth century, after both countries attained independence – Ghana from Britain and China from Japanese imperialism. By the 1940s, Chinese immigrants, mostly from Hong Kong, had started arriving in Ghana as independent business traders and distributors (Sarpong, 2015). The initial stage of the bilateral relations between Ghana and China was purely diplomatic and had little economic/commercial effects. Ghana officially established diplomatic ties with China in 1960. In that year, Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, helped to lobby for the re-instatement of China as a member of the United Nations (UN). Again, in 1962 Ghana supported China during the Sino-Indian War (Sarpong, 2015). Relations between Ghana and China grew subsequently as they established embassies in each other's countries. However, the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 saw a decline in relations. The military government of the National Liberation Council (NLC), which succeeded Nkrumah, turned to the West. This led to the abandoning of most Chinese projects in Ghana. Eventually, the relations between the two countries were restored in 1972, with the emergence of a new pro-east government under General Kutu Acheampong. Since then, Ghana has maintained strong economic and diplomatic relations with China (Sarpong, 2015).

Modern day relations between Ghana and China were created to enhance partnership and mutual assistance with the objective of improving livelihoods in these two states. While China seeks resources, markets and influence, trade, investment and development assistance lie at the heart of Ghana's intentions. Chinese activity is argued to be suspicious. There is a growing concern that Ghana among other African countries have become a centre of struggle between the great powers, with increased competition from Beijing. In Ghana, China is gaining acceptance in mining, land acquisition, markets share and infrastructural development – all of which are promoted by Accra's free market policy approach and quest to achieve

technological advancement and innovation (Sakyi, 2011). Beijing is the second leading investor in Ghana after India accounting for about 247 projects from 1994 to 2006: 34% in manufacturing and 19% constituting the trading sector (GIPC, 2005). China has increased its investment share in industries such as retail, commerce and manufacturing (Tsikata, et al., 2008). China also provides much-needed development assistance as a way of promoting social, economic and political development in Ghana (Idun-Arkhurst, 2008).

Despite the euphoria about Chinese relations with Ghana, there are grave concerns about Beijing's influence and the influx of Chinese investors on Ghana's economy, governance and the environment. While some support these relations, others have condemned them, explaining that China's actions do not resonate with Accra's plan for development, which include human, social and capital growth.

1.2. Definition of Concepts

Trade - The import and export of goods and services as a basic concept in commercial relations thrives because of Ghana's open market policy, enabled by the country's adjustment from unilateral trade reforms to economic and social advancement priorities. Subsequently, Beijing has emerged as the second largest importer from Ghana, after the United States (Sakyi, 2011). Trade between both countries is supported by export and import, with a high influx of private and public Chinese enterprise. The thesis looked at how the principles of trade and economic relations play out in this partnership.

Investment - An investment is an asset with increased value in appreciation (generating value over time), with a hope that the item will pay off more than its original worth (Chen, 2020). Chinese investment is linked to infrastructural development in Ghana. In this study, growth was assessed based on Chinese investments in Ghana.

Development Assistance within the context of the study refers to Chinese aid towards the promotion of social, economic, and political development in Ghana (Idun-Arkhurst, 2008). The thesis examined how trade, investment and development assistance support the objectives of Ghana-China relations.

Furthermore, economic development, environmental sustainability and good governance are key concepts which informed the hypothesis and theoretical perspectives which guided this study. It is worth noting that good governance goes hand-in-hand with economic development and environmental sustainability, which in turn have a direct impact on trade and infrastructural growth (Park, 2015). The concept of governance relates to how relations with China promote or undermine Ghana's democracy, while environmental and economic development trace the extent to which Chinese activities promote industrialization and protect bioreserve in Ghana.

1.3. Statement of problem

China's presence in, and its various assistance programs to, Ghana have inspired debate on the overall impact of Beijing's economic activities on Ghana. There are two schools of thought on this. One argues that China is a philanthropist, dedicated to assisting developing countries in Africa, including Ghana, to overcome some of their developmental challenges. For this view, therefore, China is a saviour. The second view, however, holds that, China's engagement with Ghana produces negative consequences for the latter. Specifically, China exploits Ghana, siphons its resources and does little to promote good governance and genuine development in the country. For this view, China is a curse and not a blessing for Ghana. This thesis revisited the debate on the impact of Chinese presence on Ghana, with a particular focus on the areas of trade, investment, Chinese ODA to Ghana and governance. The study also distinguished between the position/perceptions of the political elite and the opinions/views of ordinary people in the country.

1.4. Research Questions

In contributing to the debate on the impact of China-Ghana relations, the main research question which informed the study is, *Has Ghana benefited from its relations with China?*

In addressing this question, the following auxiliary questions guided the research:

1. What are the objectives of Ghana in its relations with China?
2. What are the positive effects of China-Ghana relation on the latter?

3. What are the negative effects of China-Ghana relation on the latter?
4. Can Ghana turn the negative impact of Chinese operations to its advantage?

1.5. Research Objectives

The main objectives of the study were:

1. To examine Ghana's objectives for orchestrating relations with China
2. To critically assess the positive effects of China-Ghana relations.
3. To highlight the negative impact of Ghana's relations with China.
4. To recommend ways in which Ghana can turn the negatives of its relations with China to its advantage.

1.6. Significance of Study

The emergence of China in contemporary global politics, and especially in Africa, has attracted a lot of academic inquiry and debates. There are many conceptions and misconceptions about China's relations with African states. There have also been various debates about the impact of China on Africa. This study is significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it helps confirm or refute some of the conceptions about China in Africa. Secondly, it focuses on Ghana and explored the impact of Chinese capital on Ghana's development. Further, the study contributes to debates on the impact of China on Ghana's economy and development in general. The study also reflects the difference between the operations of the Chinese government and private Chinese investors in Ghana. Most writers do not distinguish between public and private Chinese capital. Finally, the study adds on to literature on China in Africa. It is expected that the study will become a document of reference to Ghanaian policy makers, non-governmental organisations and students of international relations, especially those who are interested in China-Ghana relations.

1.7. Methodology

This section details various sources used in the study; i.e, it includes mechanisms that were deployed to collect, manage and analyse relevant data. The qualitative data collected by the researcher was studied through content analysis. Even though, content analysis present

different interpretations in texts, it presented the researcher with the right analytical tools in examining patterns in perceptions, behaviour and societal trends. The study relied on primary and secondary data. Primary data was obtained through archival records and interviews with respondents in Ghana. These respondents were selected using purposive sampling. A total of thirty-two individuals were interviewed. The sample included academics, students, and ordinary citizens. These primary sources were complimented by the researchers own observation of development in Ghana-China relations. The secondary data were obtained from books, journal articles, and various government reports on Chinese investments, mining trade and development assistance.

1.8. Limitations

The thesis is centred on relations between China and Ghana, with much emphasis on the impact it has on Ghana. It is not concerned with examining the effect of these relations on China. In addition, there is a general concern with some information being considered as classified, which in effect compromised the researcher's ability to access some crucial information from some participants. As such, the study did not benefit from the best and most original data, and this is a common research challenge. Scant academic research on Ghana's relations with China also limited the researcher's access to multiple relevant sources. Ultimately, the study adds on to the said scant research, thus contributing to necessary knowledge production on the topic.

1.9. Scope of the Study

The study focused on the period between 2000 and 2020. The year 2000 was selected because that was when China began active economic engagements with Ghana. It also the period when China's contemporary influence in Africa began. The year 1961 marked the inception of bilateral relations between Ghana and China. The extent of Chinese trade and investment since 2000 has increased greatly with about US\$4.4 million worth of Chinese projects being registered in Ghana. From the year 2000, Ghana saw an increased economic pragmatism (economic expansion through trade, aid, investment and mutual economic assistance) from China (Yiagadeesen , 2010). Again, between 2000 and 2010, Ghana witnessed a remarkable

financial breakthrough after the rebasing of its yearly nationwide account (Sarpong, 2015). This period strategically informed development in Ghana following the country's commercial relations with China. The 20 year-period scope of the start is deemed necessary as it would highlight growth in terms of Ghana's development following its relations with China. The year 2020 was also selected in order to get the relevant data and literature on the topic.

1.10. Central argument

It has been established that both Ghana and China seek to gain from their bilateral 'relationship'. However, through a dollar diplomacy, China advocates for agreements that support its expansionist approach to international economic relations. While there has been notable infrastructural development in Ghana, Chinese contributions towards social development and the negative effects of this 'tie-in' present Ghana with more challenges than gains which reflects on its vulnerable population.

1.11. Synopsis of Chapters

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter one introduced the topic by focusing on the background statement, definition of concepts, statement of problem, research questions, objectives, significance, methodology, limitations, scope of study, central argument and synopsis of chapters. Chapter two looks at the theoretical framework of China-Ghana relations, using liberalism and realism as key concepts to explain the objective of Chinese assistance to Ghana. Chapter three outlines arguments and counterarguments on China's presence in Africa. Chapter four traces Ghana-China relations from 2000-2020, focusing on trade, investment, development assistance and governance. Chapter five examines the negative impact of China's relations with Ghana. Here, the thesis highlights these effects by examining areas of development such as governance, economic growth and improved livelihoods. Chapter six, sums up the findings and provides relevant recommendations and conclusions.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

Globalization and development offer complex understandings on aid and financial assistance. Oftentimes, theories disagree on the actions, perceptions and behaviour of states when conducting negotiations with other states. However, it aids the interpretation of state centrality in the study of international relations (Katagiri, 2018). Historically, two main schools of thought have provided a descriptive theory of foreign affairs, explaining the motives behind Chinese capital assistance to Ghana. Realism and liberalism will be used in examining Ghana-China relations. These two theories provide two contrasting views on the dynamics of this relations in global politics (Burchill, et al., 2013).

Chapter two highlights key concepts relevant to the study of China's relations with Ghana. Even though some of the ideas may overlap, they distinguish between the social and political life of states (Kenny & Festenstein, 2005). The chapter provides explanations of China's realist foreign policy actions and how they are also intertwined with liberalism. Both explanations will be contrasted for critical inquiry. To understand relations between states, there is a need to examine their interests as a way of understanding their foreign policy. Interests are key to the assimilation of global politics. According to Morgenthau's concept of international relations, national interest should be the central concept of international relations theory (Algozaibi, 1965). Accordingly, these theories will act as a link to the debate on China-Africa relations by providing a conceptual framework for this analysis, which contributes to the fact that, global politics take priority over any analysis when providing theoretical explanations to International relations (Algozaibi, 1965).

2.2. Realism

Statism, survival and self-help represent the key assumptions of realism. Essentially, statism explains that states are the sovereign and dominant actors in the international sphere even though non-state actors exist. Survival looks at the anarchical nature of the international

realm which present state's with competition and the need to take responsibility for their survival (threat, insecurities and danger) (Baylis & Smith , 2001). Self-help demonstrates that trust is the basis for survival and security in the international community. However, the absence of this assurance in global politics compels states to act in order to ensure their own stability and progress (Baylis & Smith , 2001).

Realists argue that the underlying motives behind China's relations with Ghana are purely exploitative. Beijing is said to only target oil resources that feed its manufacturing industry. Realists believe Chinese capital in Ghana is not driven by a genuine desire to help the latter out of its economic predicament, but rather to promote its own national interests. Morgenthau addresses the issue of false political morality, which has become a norm of the modern world thus emphasizing the various approaches supporting the necessary evil of politics (Nobel, 1995). Realism contends that power and survival inform the forces of inherent behavioural traits, which depict struggles in the realm of international politics. These struggles contrast ethical and legal reasoning found in political realities (Cozette, 2008). "This is why politics is in essence a never-ending struggle for power. As power is defined as a relationship whereby man always try to impose their will upon and dominate others. The political actor always considers others as means rather than ends" (Cozette, 2008). This explains the immoral political actions of states, which Morgenthau argues to be an inevitable and perennial fact to bilateral relations. In modern relations, states rely on diplomacy as an essential mechanism to promote their national interests in the sphere of international politics. Realism looks into contemporary relations and even though rationale vary depending on state behaviour, realist perspectives inform foreign policy analysis through the study of the national interests of states. In modern times, Morgenthau argues that not only do states control others through their economic and political actions, but also through cultural imposition, something he terms as 'National Universalism' where nations pursue the imposition of their doctrines and creeds on other nations (Nobel, 1995). An example is the cultural exchange program introduced by China, whereby the curriculum includes not only the Chinese language but also the promotion of other Chinese cultural activities including festivals in Ghana. The conflict between Communism and democracy is reflected in Chinese relations with Africa. Realism provides insight to the debates on Communism and Democracy as competition for dominating the world (Nobel, 1995). Realism defines China's focus on

relations with Ghana and other African states as acts of self-help, representing how states in the global political economy are naturally individualistic in their quest to survive. Contrary to liberalism, the ideas of cooperation is not ideal in the realist world (Akokpari, 2016).

Individual states are realistic in their actions and the absence of a central authority makes it difficult for states to commit to any moral or ethical obligation. Morality in the international system is as a result of power and never the theory of justice. That is to say, morality has no dominance in coercing states in the international environment (Adigbuo, 2007). China continues to promote its national interests in Ghana, using political and economic strategies driven by Beijing's foreign policy. It has been possible for China to thrive in a rather weakened environment due to Accra's liberal approach towards market regulation. Realists contend that every foreign policy thrives on self-interest, material interest, and the self-maximization of security and power, as well as self-preservation. As such, continually gaining power should be a social-economic and political imperative of a state (Baylis & Smith, 2001).

Again, realist asserts that obtaining a morally high ground is deceit and a tool used by states to promote and advance their national interest. Hence, realist believe nations in their conduct enforce foreign policies that ameliorate the global stature of their state (Norwich, 2017). "If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are a motivational desire like states and do not robustly represent reality". State action does not reflect its moral discourses (Bex-Priestley, 2018). On the relationship between ethics and politics, China is known to promote its economic and political interests in other countries, regardless of the effects it has on humanity. These dynamics are not only present in China-Africa relations but even in Sino-Russian relations and in Beijing's relations with neighbouring Asian countries like Taiwan and North Korea. This highlights the aggressive encroachment of China's realist political approach in International relations. China continues to promote its economic and capital assistance to African countries that have high records of human rights violations and corruption, pursuing their economic, material interest and natural resources policy benefit in Africa, seen in countries like Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Beijing is not so much concerned with making Africa conform to political ideologies such as democracy and human right. Morgenthau explains that individuals in their quest for power will only be satisfied when others became objection to their dominations (Algozaibi, 1965). In this sense, realists

contend that states in the international sphere strive for power by dominating others; power therefore becomes an immediate goal in the political environment (Algozaibi, 1965).

A breakdown of Morgenthau's six fundamental principles of realism discussed in the first chapter of *Politics among Nations* by Hans Morgenthau (1948), highlights key areas such as the laws of politics, the concept of interest, concept of power, absence of universal moralism or ethics, nations as political actors and the autonomy of politics, vis-a-vis other spheres of human action (Algozaibi, 1965). Smith contends that realism provided the explanation and opinions necessary for ending the big power struggle during the cold war (Smith, 2000). In recent times, China has asserted its dominance in world politics through economic and political tendencies, driven by Beijing's agenda to increase military might as a global hegemon. China adopts practical terms with immoral tendencies such as cheating and flouting regulations (trade and environmental) to increase its chance of survival and maximum gains (Katagiri, 2018). Realist foreign policy approaches such as Beijing's focus on coercing resources and ruthlessly exploiting other actors in the international sphere, and this is done through the advancement of various bilateral agreements (Moravesik, 2010).

2.3. Limitation of realism as a theoretical paradigm

Critiques have argued that moral judgement, emotional appeal, a finite goal and ground for action are essential for any effective political thinking and its exclusion makes realism a weapon of its own attack (Carr, 2016). Accordingly, the debate on realism introduces the clash between facts, generalisation and reality. These critiques contend that the mere actions of giving meaning through reasoning on moral grounds makes facts in realism questionable. The rational outline that interest is of essence in politics and forever changing give specification but fails to provide description and classification which makes the theory on realism ethically unacceptable and difficult to evaluate (Peterson, 2018).

Critiques therefore argue that theoretical and empirical study cannot provide adequate evaluation for the national power of nations and Morgenthau's advocacy that no nation should depend on morality as a guide to making policy is argued to be unrealistic. Morality,

they argue play an important role in policymaking and implementation. Hence, in international reality no nation can adopt violence as a means of securing its national interest (Hoffmann, 1981).

In his book 'Politics among Nations' Morgenthau accounts that the struggle for power is the ultimate driving force in International relations. Critiques contend that, this does not account fully for the behaviour of state and the concept of reducing modern politics to a story of contest makes his logic limited. They therefore explain that these partial explanations offer complex meaning to relations among nations and does not resonate with international reality (Peterson, 2018).

Again, the discussion on state as the sole actors in global politics and the little-to-no importance on non-state actors indicate that realism is not being fully representative of all issues in International relations. For instance the rise of trans-national actors and nonstate actors introduce a nonmilitary form of power which in the lenses of realism debunk the fundamentals of the nature of man, society and politics (Carr, 2016). Hence, realism is critiqued for the continuous increased of non-state actors which again shift attention on state interaction to other entities. An inference here indicates that Ghana-China relations is influenced by high percentage of corporate and individual actors. Nevertheless, Scholars have argued that realism 'concerns itself with power politics in a decentralised system' and this remain important (Peterson, 2018).

Further, the idea that realism explains relations as a struggle for power, promote some level of conflict as it ignores values in the international system. This to a high degree could promote isolationism rather than cooperation. Stanley Hoffmann contends that if political thinking remain in the six principle listed by Morgenthau then realism fails to provide adequate guidelines for neither analysis non evaluation because conservative state behaviour as argued by Robert W. Tucher, remain constant despite nuclear weapons, economic dependence and military might (Hoffmann, 1981). The theory on realism is criticized for building on expansionism by arguing that diplomacy and trade have come to replace force and war (Hoffmann, 1981). This assertion may be in reference to a historical phase of the world wars. However, events following the post- cold war era presents a paradigm shift in relations and

cooperation which realism fails to account for. Deducing from Hobbes and Machiavelli, Morgenthau 's realism is dangerous and fails to promote international peace and harmony. Many critics have held that Morgenthau's assertion depicts every relation as a political action since the ultimate goal is to control minds and action (Hoffmann, 1981).

2.4. Liberalism

Liberalism as an emerged version of idealism at the initial stage emanated to espouse ideas of freedom, free market approaches and self-restraint. Liberals approach to theorizing international relations contend that the condition of global politics is globalization; interdependence and cooperation among states as well as distribution of social and state preferences (Norwich, 2017). These systems are developed to leverage global approaches in generating global markets revenue. Liberals believe that the international system creates opportunities for cooperation and conflict. They argue that there are many opportunities in the international system that benefit everyone, and this becomes possible when states work together (Norwich, 2017).

Historically and contemporarily, states are embedded in domestic and transnational societies that promote social, cultural and economic incentives through interaction. These policies are either harmful or beneficial to some domestic groups. Capitalists and liberals argue that man is naturally depraved, and the existence of interdependence promotes competition that will cause strife, as the powerful will savour more than the weak (Gbemisola & Bjorn, 2006). In the context that individuals drive their preference through state institutions. State preference becomes a driving force for state behaviour in world politics. Liberalism can be explained in various ways "What matters most is what states want, not how they get it. Ends are more important than means." (Moravesik, 2010).

The two main basic assumptions of the liberal theory are anarchy and rationality. To a large extent, both assumptions are linked to earlier mentioned realist contentions. Anarchy explains the need for self-help in the absence of a central government (legitimate authority) (Moravesik, 2010). Rationality on the other hand expresses that nations promote policies that provide benefits by avoiding cost in their relations. In this sense, actors in the

international environment “seek to deploy the most cost-effective means to achieve whatever their ends may be” (Moravesik, 2010). Liberalism shares this rationality with realism and its assumption of anarchy with all international relations theories. Liberals, contrary to realists do not contend that states pursue an idle goal regardless of what other states do. However, they argue that each state aspires to achieve its preference under constraints imposed by the clash of interests in the global politics (Moravesik, 2010).

Liberalism thrives on the importance of integration, moral equality of every individual and universal human rights (Norwich, 2017). They argue that there is anarchy in the international realm. However, this can be transformed into cooperation, which promotes bilateral and multilateral trade among states. It can be argued that China is a liberal state that promotes cooperation with Ghana through trade, investment and development assistance. Liberal states often use social, political and economic power in realizing their national objectives (Norwich, 2017).

Again, liberals share common ideas with realists on individualism, democracy, liberty, equality and rationality. They share the same social and moral rationale which is absent in Ghana-China relations. This political explanation can be traced to the social and philosophical context that argues that imbalances in unearned privilege will provide illegitimate advantage for some groups over others (Wright & Eatwell, 1993). Philosophers like Martin Luther (1483-1546), Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1632-1704), and Adam Smith (1776) are among many who were behind the ideas of liberalism (Ball & Dagger, 2006). In recent times, markets, democracy, and justice dominate the material and moral priorities of liberals. However, their ethical values are accessed through political arrangements which is central to individual freedom (Kenny & Festenstein, 2005).

2.5. Limitation of Liberalism as a theoretical paradigm

The word liberal is explained as being free from limited prejudice and open to new ideas and reforms (Kedourie, 1989). Liberalism looks at equality, liberty and tolerance by promoting economic and environmental activities that enhance the freedom of all in the international environment (Glaser, 2018). For this reason liberals depend on individuals and nations to

regulate their own activities ethically through cooperation. Critiques have contended on the fundamentals of liberalism as the basis for its weakness. (Azam, 2014).

Walzer (1990), explained that liberals are free to choose but have no criteria governing their choices except their wayward interest and understanding which lacks cohesion. It re-emphasize equal respect and rights on the individual's ability to self-restraint, control and to self-realization which places the importance of peace and equal distribution on choice and self-determination. This lies exclusively within the individual responsibility. This critiques contend make justice distinct and a moral ideal (Campbell, 1988) in (Azam, 2014). Accordingly, the justification on the theory of justice lies in how minorities are treated in society, something liberalism cannot account for, this makes critiques question community in liberalism and the reality of presentation in real life (Walzer , 1990).

For instance, many critique have argued on the equal distribution of state resources on the terms of right to ownership and right of liberty and property. Even though individual's are entitled to self- ownership, Liberals like Marshall, argue that 'equality requires that individuals receive an equitable share of social resources' (Azam, 2014). Equal distribution should ensure that everybody counts as one and not more than one, giving no individual more than others (Azam, 2014). Hence the critique that liberalism is based on claims of false certainty on morality as a matter of individual opinion (Gutmann, 1985). The claims that justice is absolute and universal and individuals are unable to know themselves well enough to share common ends due to personal identity embedded in social given ends makes the foundation of Liberalism flawed (Gutmann, 1985).

Contemporary, the world continue to struggle with justice, comfort and peace. Liberals have failed to channel individual freedom to the fundamental importance of community. They devalue community as a basic and essential ingredient in providing good life for all (Buchanan, 1989).

2.6. Interpretation of Hypothesis and Theory

Liberals contend that China, with regards to international morality, finds it ethical as a fast-growing economy, to assist Ghana with capital for economic and infrastructural development (Akokpari, 2016). Realists opines that Chinese activities in Ghana are exploitative and selfish. It is argued in this study, that realism provides a better interpretation of the rationale behind Chinese capital assistance in Ghana (Nobel, 1995). This explains the contrast that,

The ancient politics employed war to get what they wanted, where modern politics now see and are able to exploit the advantages of peaceful economic exchange in pursuit of the same goal. Cheap and less hazardous than war, trade will tend to displace it as the principal mode of international relations. (Kenny & Festenstein, 2005).

Further, Private commercial interest has become the focus of intervention and economic exchange. States are more inclined to nationalism than internationalism and for this reason actuate their national origin and aspirations for supranational powers (Algozaibi, 1965). China's trade and investment is tailored towards countries or regions that support the latter's national agenda. The asymmetrical relations between Ghana and China give the latter a higher level of influence over the former. Morgenthau therefore argues that national interest is the sole factor that propels countries to engage in international politics. Thus, it is self-need that drives states in the relation building (Algozaibi, 1965). Some scholars have posed the question; *Is China a friend or a foe to Africa/Ghana?* The final answer to this question will be determined after addressing the benefits and cost to Ghana of its relations with Beijing.

Chapter three

Arguments and Counterarguments on China's Presence in Africa

3.1. Introduction

Sino-African relations can be traced through the historical, political, economic, and social connections between China and Africa. China's intense relations with the continent emerged following Beijing's economic revolution which saw the increased presence of China on most global markets. The relations under study which took off in the 21st century have become popular in contemporary debates. The debate on China-Africa relations is driven by the increasing presence of Chinese immigrants, projects and businesses in Africa. Following the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) discussions, reports, projects, commentaries, policy briefings and publications reflect current and topical debates by media reporters and researchers alike, on the effects of Sino-Africa relations. They look mostly at the mandate, goals and policies of FOCAC. The chapter will assess Chinese policies in relation to their focus on Africa. It will evaluate the challenges and benefits of Sino-Africa relations by examining the role and influence of the Chinese.

3.2 Historical Evolution of Sino-African Relations

Earlier contact between China and Africa is unknown. However, according to historians, modern relations date back centuries and traverse the imperial past of these two regions and how that shape relationship of today (NewAfrican, 2015). In 1955 the Bandung Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, mobilized leaders of Asian and African States. Following this, Egypt became the first African country to establish ties with China in 1956, and by the climax of 1970, 44 out of the 50 independent African countries had established relations with China. Today Swaziland (now eSwatini) is the only African country maintaining ties with Taiwan (NewAfrican, 2015). Chinese earlier involvement with the continent was purely diplomatic with focus on building ideological solidarity. This relationship which began with little infrastructural and economic relevance is now dominated by capital assistance (Akopari, 2016).

Currently, China supports independent African countries through political ties, and cooperation in the areas of economics trade, education and culture. This is underpinned by trade, investment and development assistance which form part of Beijing's developmental policy to introduce seed support to underdeveloped countries. Today, statistical inference reflects the increased participation of African countries in forming bilateral alliances with China. However, Chinese policy demands that African countries counter recognize and reject Taiwan in any global events such as the UN (NewAfrican, 2015).

China's growing largesse in the context of growth in Africa reshaped debates, which are now premised on claims of neo-colonialism and neo-liberal approaches to development. This among many researchers and academics, highlights the scramble for resources on the continent, owing to Africa's rich geographical endowment. Debates on China-Africa relation argue from two viewpoints. The realist approach foresees China as promoting its national interest to becoming a world economy, and the liberal approach argues that China is fulfilling its obligation in the global space which is regulated by interdependence and cooperating with other nations. Both contentions justify Beijing's insistence that Sino-Africa relations provide multilateral solutions to the challenges of the global south. Different arguments on whether the relations are mutually beneficial or pose challenges to development on the continent, are widely debated in African, the Western media and academic platforms (Mlambo, et al., 2016).

This chapter then is about conceptualizing the discourse on China-Africa relations to understand whether China desires to exploit Africa's natural resources which has contributed to deindustrialization, poverty and underdevelopment or whether Beijing creates avenues for economic growth through its investment and aid support (Mlambo, et al., 2016).

3.3. Political

Sino-African relations take the form of negotiations and policy-making. Today, bilateralism and multilateralism offer an important tool for cooperation, and through diplomacy, provide the most effective tool for managing relations, either local, regional or international. With the intensification of foreign relations and the end of diplomatic isolation, there has been an

increase in international actors. More recently, individual to individual relations have been established via businesses in both regions, which speaks volumes to the fact that actors in Sino-African relations are not limited to state officials (Ross Anthony: Grimm & Kim, 2014). Communication has therefore been established as an effective tool in successful cooperation and benefitting. Scholars argue that there is lack of effective communication in Sino-African relations. This has led to Beijing breaching laws on the continent, as companies do not always understand local legislation (Watchers, 2016). Others contend that China peripheries Africa by dominating in negotiations, silencing the continent's political voice through Beijing's foreign policy. On the contrary, some scholars reason that China gives Africa a voice which represents actors in the global South, i.e. Africa, Asia and the Pacific (Ross Anthony: Grimm & Kim, 2014).

Chinese political interest in Africa is supported by multilateral forums such as FOCAC, which also play a role in resource diplomacy. This has been the basis for strengthening relations between the two regions. FOCAC provides platforms for talks and the main regional settings for collective dialogue between China-African countries. This body serves as an indicator in assessing the success and challenges between the two sides looking at Chinese environmental footprint in Africa. Which is exemplified by the "Belt and Road Initiative", where Beijing has shown policy support for Africa on regional groupings and international voting blocs. The intensification of political ties, cooperation, congress and parliamentary exchange of public official leaders is established to announce the strategic importance of African-Chinese future interests. (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020).

According to some scholars, it will be wrong to highlight and conceptualize China as the sole decision-making actor, as all African governments contribute to negotiations that impact their respective countries. China cannot be held accountable for dominating and should not be held liable for local developmental agenda on the continent. Governments in Africa should be blamed for not scaling up in their political ties. Accordingly, they argue that some governments in Africa have formed good partnerships with China. An example is Ethiopia, whereby the government has fostered technological and manufacturing partnerships with China through projects like the *Huajian shoe factory*, which is a leading exporter. Thus, one can conclude that actors on both ends are promoting the success of the factory. The sceptics

assert that there is still an asymmetrical relationship, hence China will continue to benefit at the expense of Ethiopia (Watchers, 2016).

The general principles and objectives of Ghana-China relations is built on equality, sincerity, solidarity, mutual benefits and common development. These are the guiding principles for cooperation and exchange. China is accused of flouting all these principles by not acting in line with environmental challenges, and not condoning fake and hazardous products promoted by Chinese corporations. Some scholars debunk this and argue that China's history of foreign invasion makes these principles the centre for their foreign policy, which is attractive to African countries who have had similar past through colonial rule and continue to suffer under global capitalism. On the contrary, it is argued that "non-intervention and no strings attached" are a political strategy of Chinese economic dominance in Africa. This enables China to continue its economic relations with individual countries led by authoritarian regimes thus robbing the continent of stability and development. These countries, scholars argue are contended as failed nationhood which thrive on gross misrule empowered under Chinese non-intervention strategy (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020).

Another contention is that Chinese bilateral relations with individual African countries undermine the aims of FOCAC. This is because China does not deal directly with African countries (through the AU) as an integrated regional body, but rather competes against the continent's weak integration into the global economy. Thus, Chinese solidarity with African states is questionable. Others argue that local circumstances influence Chinese trade with the continent – that is, influence by factors in individual African countries. Therefore, Beijing does not challenge regional integration, but rather specializes in creating projects that work in Africa. For instance, the Gaza-Hubei Friendship Farm (grain production) and Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Mozambique and Nigeria respectively were created specifically for each region (Watchers, 2016). This is a neo-liberal principle which promotes privatization and reforms policies such as price control and deregulation (Mlambo, et al., 2016). In support of the above, analysts argue that China provides support for the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) by providing funds and resources for projects and also contributing to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Beijing is said to have invited the AU Commissioner as an official member of FOCAC. Hence, while China develops routine

strategic dialogue with African countries independently, it is also committed to regional integration in the continent (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020).

Trade remains the fundamental element in both bilateral and multilateral relations. Scholars argue that wealth is protected through trade. A fact which explains that trading partners are less combative than non-trading nations (Polachek, 1997). Again, they contend that China competes against individual African countries in the quest for the status of global hegemon. This, they describe as the backdrop of Chinese bilateral relations. In the absence of coercion, Beijing adopts the strategy of containment, through which China embarks on economic, political and social policies in Africa (Katagiri, 2018). According to Nobel (1995), Morgenthau in support of this discussion argued that actors in the world of opposing interest transgress, hence competition and struggle is motivated by selfishness; a background of what realism looks into in contemporary international relations. The concept of political morality according to Morgenthau's analysis has undergone transformation in recent times and this rationality may vary depending on state behaviour.

In addition, the effects of Chinese engagement on domestic politics in Africa has created a conflict of interest between governments and citizens on the continent. While others argue that China adopts the divide and conquer approach by giving political leaders the opportunity to exercise authoritative lifestyles, Beijing's approach to this assertion will vary depending on the context (Watchers, 2016). Such arguments hold that, China's engagement is exclusively beneficial to the African elite (Bourgeoisie) and not for civil society, even though Beijing engages with other actors in Africa (Giles & Lampert, 2013).

It is again argued that China aims to extend its geo-political influence as the preeminent power in Asia. As a realist choice, Africa offers pragmatic promises for the expansion of China's global presence and influence than India, a historical rivalry to China. This is tied to its investment motivations in Africa which will ensure that China holds a considerable political alliance by controlling essential economic elements such as telecommunication, utilities sector in these countries. This explains how China embarks on a realist approach to development by promoting its national interest through political alliances on the continent (Maverick, 2018).

Symmetry promotes efficiency which ensures that nations are equalized in terms of cooperation, allocation and benefit (McGinty , 2007). Full cooperation results in positive global net benefits. That is, when nations share the same autonomy there is an equal share benefit of distribution (McGinty , 2007). The power dynamics in Sino-Afro relation explain Morgenthau's contention on sacred mission, that moderation of modern politics has given way for 'nationalistic universalism' and the conflict between democracy and communism present another argument in Sino-African relations (Nobel, 1995). The lack of transparency, authoritarianism, and human rights abuses are strategic weaknesses used by Beijing to promote relations with conflict ridden states like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and Zimbabwe. This strategy threatens accountability in Africa in support of Beijing Communism. For instance, reports on state expenditure do not reflect China's foreign aid statistics in the continent due to the absence of accountability. On a visit to Angola, Senegal and Ethiopian, then US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo warned African countries to be "wary of authoritarian regimes with empty promises" following Beijing infrastructural projects in Africa (South China, 2006).

3.4. Commercial

Africa has been part of the world economy and continues to retain its position as the centre for natural resources; exporting cotton, coffee and other minerals to Europe, America and Asia, in return for imported machinery, pharmaceutical product and consumable goods which compete unfairly (to China's advantage) with domestic industrial production in Africa (Mshombu, 2000). Through trade, investment, development aid and businesses, Chinese commercial relations provide a contrasting standpoint on growth and sustainability which critics argue have long-term economic consequences. Trade is characterised by principles of import and export. It remains the earliest form of contact between the North and the South and the basis of slavery and colonialism. Capitalist assistance is a means of compensating the continent and aiding its growth through infrastructure and human development. This characterizes the basis of Sino-African synergy through trade, investment and development assistance. It is argued that China offers a good opportunity to the African states as the West has failed to promote development in Africa through the World Bank and International

Monetary Fund (IMF). Again, China is appraised to have emerged following the decline of overseas investment and development assistance in the continent. For this reason, China offers the continent a different source of capital assistance (Akokpari, 2016).

3.4.1. Trade

In Africa, China trades leading partners include South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Angola, Egypt and Sudan. As a state centred on market economy principles, Chinese systemic economic reforms have contributed massively to trade in Africa. There has been an increase in Sino-African trade with a growth of US\$10.5 billion to US\$107 billion from 2000-2008 respectively. From 2018-2019 trade growth increased from US\$ 185 billion to US\$ 192 billion (Trade, 2020). The disparity in export and import data with regards to this relation makes China's interest questionable. Imports from the continent consist mostly of extractive minerals while exports are dominated by Chinese manufactured products and electricals.

China's imports from Africa are mainly oil and natural gas (62%), metalliferous ores (17%), wood products, cotton and precious stones. China's exports to Africa are mostly manufactured goods such as machineries (10%), textiles and clothing (4%), and transport equipment (4%) (China-Africa, 2009).

Trade with Africa has contributed hugely to Chinese economic growth. Largely, the European Union (EU), United States (US) and China account for 70% of Africa's trade. In 2009 trade benefits under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) declined in comparison to that of 2008. China-Africa trade also declined amounting to US\$ 37.1 billion in 2009. This is however significant to Chinese economy which is a unique composition of import from Africa; comprising oil and natural gas, metal, agricultural raw materials which are strategic to Beijing's economy (China-Africa, 2009).

Owing to the US-China trade war, Beijing continues to intensify trade with Africa. Companies from China are active in sectors such as agriculture, energy, manufacturing, fishing and telecommunication. These are the major industries for import and export. The intensification of trade over the past two decades brings into this debate another dimension. Critics argue

that China is the biggest trading partner in Africa but rarely a balanced trade. Africa's large economies such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, Angola and Ghana struggle amidst US-China trade war. For instance, in 2018, Check Africa conducted a survey in Kenya and indicated that trade is skewed in favour of China, with US\$96.88 million worth of exports and US\$3.79 billion value. It is therefore important for African states to grow their economies and find a market outlet in China for their manufactured goods (African, 2018).

Further, trade takes the form of bilateral framework with the opening of markets and promotion of Chinese-state-own companies all happening at the government-to-government level. Some scholars argue that China continues to breach contracts of operation and promotes an unhealthy competition in Africa (Sarpong, 2015). These are the main allegations levelled against China by the US, in line with promoting unfair practices, threatening punitive tariffs and stealing innovation as identified by former US President Donald Trump. For instance, the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2004 lifted tariff restrictions on Chinese imports which has affected products and markets such as the nascent African textile industry. Not only has the continent seen competition of Chinese produced clothing but also the undercut of locals' manufactured goods, job losses and the crashing of local businesses (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020). As argued, this is just one aspect of the broad trade issues in China-Africa relations. Trade is argued to have aroused mixed feelings; as economic cooperation increases, so does competition; as trade expands so do disputes (Mshombu, 2000).

The influx of Chinese imports has raised concerns in Africa. Among this is the strain of Chinese presence and engagement in various businesses. Chinese wholesale and retail enterprises, with extensive supply chains, are in direct competition and they undercut/crush local businesses on the continent. Moeletsi Mbeki described China as "both a tantalizing opportunity and a terrifying threat" (Mshombu, 2000). Despite the benefit of Chinese products in Africa, which include, providing individuals with a variety of products for customer's satisfaction, it offers China an opportunity to take advantage over Africa's large market, while opening a small portion of its markets to Africa. Trade with China allows Beijing to take advantage of economies of scale. Economies of scale are achieved when the average cost of production decreases as production increases. Some countries have small markets

which makes it difficult to access the global market in order to take advantage of economies of scale. Thus, trade is an important tool for economic growth. Although economic growth does not guarantee development, it is certainly a prerequisite for it (Mshombu, 2000).

Hence, trade promotes the integration of the continent into the global economy. Some anti-globalization activists contend that Africa is exploited by trade due to its inability to compete. In their view, trade is complimentary to both partners and promotes increased production based on the comparative advantage of the trading partners (Mshombu, 2000). However, classical comparative advantage explains that countries under free trade produce more and consume less of the product of which they have a comparative advantage (Richradson & Zhang , 2001).

Africa's trade with China from 2000 to 2008 increased by 1,000 percent which is due to the unexplored markets and natural resources in the continent providing opportunities for explorers. For instance, in 2013 Japan announced that it would challenge China in Africa, while the US recognized that it had lost dominance in Africa to China (Mlambo, et al., 2016). Trade therefore provides the legal framework for competition between the old and new powers.

While through trade reforms, China increased its per capital income with growth affecting wages and production, Africa continues to adopt economic reforms that will shape development on the continent due to factors associated with unhealthy competition. Chinese trade is therefore a catalyst for economic stagnation in Africa. The theory of realism therefore explains how economic stagnation results in contraction in Africa.

3.4.2. Investment

China recently announced further investments in Africa, with billions of loans on energy and infrastructural development being made available. This has raised questions about the 'debt trap' and 'neo-colonialism', which are both promoted by China's Development Bank and China Eximbank. The effects of the trap are a major source of anxiety on the African continent. At the centre of this there are debates surrounding the motive behind Chinese investment in Africa (Gbemisola & Bjorn, 2006). Does this investment promote a pragmatic root to growth

and improved livelihood in Africa? Many have argued that this is part of Beijing's *'going out'* plan which inspires Chinese companies to invest globally. An investment which is more risky than offers made by other countries in the global economy (Donnelly, 2018).

Critics argue that Chinese energy production and consumption since reforms in 1978 has grown rapidly and is associated with coal, oil, natural gas and renewable energy. China accounted for US\$ 3billion to US\$8.8 billion, between 2016 and 2018, in energy and infrastructure projects in Africa. Mining and oil remain key drivers of Chinese capital assistance in Africa. The continent supplies 90% platinum, 75% coltan, 35% uranium, two-thirds manganese and 50% gold, constituting the entire world's supply. In return for the aforementioned, benefits for the African states include infrastructure development in telecommunication, roads, rail and port construction and expansions, transportation, highways and power plant. US\$60 billion financial assistance was announced at the seventh annual FOCAC meeting in 2018 and Chinese investment ever since has been increasing steadily (Maverick, 2018). Some scholars contend that these motivations stems from the desire of Beijing to secure a solid base of raw materials and finding emerging markets in Africa to enhance China's global influence and its rapid growing economy (Maverick, 2018).

Accordingly, this belt and road project is strategically constructed to connect China to the rest of the world, linking to a *'China-centre trading network'* (Donnelly, 2018). China would continue to promote investment in oil extraction and import, with Chinese national interest and aspirations taking shape of every negotiation. Most African countries receive a variety of *'oil-backed credit lines with little conditions in exchange for natural resources'* (Giles & Lampert, 2013).

Further, others contend that these investment activities are part of the ongoing trade negotiations and political deliberation between China and the US on market control. China's rapid growth due to exploitative relations with Africa motivate the need for continued economic expansion to sustain the increased need for natural resources and new markets, all of which are available in resource-rich Africa. Focus on mining, oil and markets on the continent is a logical strategy for China in strengthening its economy for time to come. "Mining investment account for nearly one-third of China's total foreign direct investment

(FDI) in African nations” (Maverick, 2018). Critics argue that most of the oil and natural resources are largely in the domain of western companies hence Chinese influence in that sector Africa is minimal. The EU and the US outweigh China in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) , hence Beijing struggles to catch up, thus creating a huge gap and opportunities for areas of aid assistance. Conditions of global economic recession which led to the curtailing of investments by western companies also widened the gap for the strategic entry of China into Africa, thus, giving Beijing an opportunity to target its trade policy at oil and natural resources from the continent (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020).

Such investments come with no ‘strings attached’, cutting off bloated bureaucracies, democracy, improved human rights, buckling down corruption and opening of markets to foreign competition and opportunity perceived to help African leaders do away with post-colonial dependency (Donnelly, 2018). For instance, the South African government received R33 billion from the China Development Bank (CDB) in support of Eskom against the power challenges in South Africa. Something argued to be post-colonial economic exploitation bound by Western leaders. It is argued that China envisions to use the ‘debt trap diplomacy’ to strategically take assets of nations that are unable to repay their debts as issues emerge following Zesco state electricity company of Zambia. According to Donnelly (2018):

Sri Lanka reportedly ceded the port of Hambantota to China after it could not repay its loans for the development of the project. Other countries such as Djibouti are confronting similar dilemma as debt to China far outstrips the country’s ability to pay.

Due to this distress, countries are cancelling loans with China. More recently Pakistan and Malaysia announced the cancelling of US\$20-billion rail project. Many of these Chinese deals are argued not to be sustainable (Donnelly, 2018). In contrast, Africa has seen an increase in Chinese investment.

3.4.3. Development aid

China continues to double its commitment to support Africa, pushing its ‘belt and road initiative’ as a way of strengthening ties with Africa. Chinese financial assistance on the

continent as of 2018 stood at US\$2.4 billion, which explains that development assistance is an important instrument used by China in pursuit Beijing's interests. While the EU, the IMF, and other international financial institutions link development aid to fostering good governance, political transparency and human rights in Africa, capital assistance from China comes with no strings attached, rooted in its principle of non-intervention. China's international reputation remains questionable following its involvement with corrupt and abusive regimes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. However, Chinese interests in Africa are much deeper than this principle as Beijing continues to influence domestic politics in the continent. Its policy of non-intervention in Africa is gradually becoming difficult to sustain. For example, prior to the toppling of the Sudanese government in 2020, China provided support for the Sudanese government amidst the complexity of the Darfur crisis and again threatened it's to stop investment in Zambia should Michael Stata (the opposition leader) be elected due his pro-Taiwan campaign. This is due to some opposition parties condemning China's increasing presence in Africa as 'exploitative neo-colonialist'.

Again, critics argue that China's ties with Africa promote tension on the continent, among its Asian rivalries such as India and Japan. For instance, China competes against India in Mauritius, an island that enjoys traditional ties with India. As Clarke (2018) argues, Mauritius had to be diplomatic in its relations with the two countries: *'With a population of just 1.3 million, Mauritius relies on India for security, but needs China's help for its ambition to become the Singapore of Africa, a financial and business gateway for overseas investors in the continent'*.

According to experts, China's 'one belt, one road' is an expanded version of the silk road initiative which is intended to integrate physical roads and sea routes through South Asia, Africa, Middle East and Italy (Venice) as opposed to its initial integration of Europe and Asia. *"The One Belt, One Road covers about 65% of the world's population, one-third of the world's GDP and a quarter of the world's goods and services trade"*. Critics hold that Chinese need for export and surplus domestic capacity provides a need for external opportunities, hence such infrastructural development may fail to address and deliver the needs of the partner countries. These expected infrastructure needs are alternative to China (Kodongo, 2018).

Again, China tends to write off loans owed by many African countries and provides grants “soft loans” with little or no conditions. However, some observers argue that many African countries who benefit from China’s debt relief soon get back into the debt trap. Hence, Chinese aid is seen as a catalyst to African underdevelopment (Sarpong, 2015). For instance, despite Chinese aid and debt cancellation, Ghana has not been able to stay out of debt and critics argue this might be a replicate of Accra’s international position on the list of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) despite interventions and US investments in the country (Sarpong, 2015).

More importantly, the issues on labour and employment prove that Chinese enterprise, industrial and contractive ventures promote job creation in Africa. Critics argue that labour is cheap in Africa; a strategy that enable foreign companies to thrive using locals in reaching the wider markets. For instance, in Nigeria, Chinese Telecommunication company, *Golden Telecoms* since 1990 consistently recruits a high percentage of local staff, and this has enabled the company to relaunch careers in the wider corporate sector (Giles & Lampert, 2013). Again, they argue that project and infrastructure development are financed, constructed and operated by China. Hence, China does not promote skills development, neither does it promote job creation in Africa. Most Chinese infrastructure constructions are solely beneficial to China. There is lack of sustainability on untapped potential in technology, telecommunication, transportation and security development in Africans (Aidoo, 2019). Many Chinese projects are executed by Chinese immigrants with materials imported from China.

However, this is peculiar to different African countries. For instance, contrary to Ghana, China only commit to skills in construction that is lacking in South Africa when undertaking investment projects which is done through South Africa’s legislation on Chinese expatriate (Donnelly, 2018).

Scholars argue that strong legislation in South Africa makes it difficult for the Chinese to export skills which are already present in the country. On the other hand, China is able to import skills and materials that are present in Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia due to their weak legislation on Chinese expatriate and materials (Watchers, 2016). The Chinese technology and

infrastructure development paradigm is a deviation from the neoclassical trade theory which focuses on equal technology and mobility. “I think there is a lot of untapped potential in technology transfer” (Watchers, 2016).

Undoubtedly, China has built much-needed transport infrastructure that can increase Africa’s connectivity with the rest of the world, which in turn can contribute to a higher level of integration into the world economy and play a significant role in the free trade agreement proposed by the AU. Chinese construction companies not only produced new ports, extended and modernized airports, and major railroads, but also new tarmac roads linking major regional hubs, including the various townships with proper connection to large cities. Again, China promotes development in air, rail, road and sea transport to enhance trade, resource acquisitions, labour and military cooperation to the continent. The contribution of Yuan in this regard is greatly recognized (South China, 2006). Critics argue that China does not promote clean technology and renewable energy looking at the quality of technological product on the Africa market and that these construction only serve Chinese interest, a colonial practice of the west which is still relevant in the China-Africa relations (China-Africa, 2009).

3.4.4. Businesses

Although a major percentage of Sino-African relations depend on mainstream politicians from both regions, it is important to note the people-to-people relations as the majority of these enterprises fuel relations between China and Africa. Sino-African relations takes place at the provincial, municipal and private levels (Watchers, 2016). Researchers have argued that Chinese actions in Africa are often presented as ‘single actor’ behaviour, but it is important to note the role of several Chinese companies which often complicate the mission of the Chinese government. These can be singled out as firms carrying out their individual business agenda (Donnelly, 2018). These, according to analysts often challenge the Chinese government, which often lacks practical control in coordinating them (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020).

China foresees Africa as another opportunity to launch its emerging market investments through individual businesses. This provides growth opportunities by allowing them to work with states, to promote individual trade relations in both regions. Both, African governments and citizens take steps in reaching out to China in securing trade opportunities. In many cases, Chinese locals stipulate that they were exposed to the market in West Africa as a result of individual traders seeking products in China. This has been promoted on a personal business journey by African locals. For instance, from the mid-1990s, many Africans travelled to Guangzhou (China) to buy consumer goods from China. It is argued that traders in Africa (Ghana and Nigeria) rather than Chinese traders are responsible for massive influx of low-quality Chinese goods, giving them a better understanding of the African markets (Giles & Lampert, 2013). This resulted in the spring of many wholesale and retail enterprise from China sapping local supply chains, taking market share and squeezing the profit margin in Africa (Chinapolicyinfocus, 2020).

Many individual Chinese traders are establishing shops in Africa, targeting low-income households with cheap and hazardous made in China goods, thus taking advantage of vulnerable demographic groups in Africa. Against these debates is the protest of locals in Africa against Chinese businesses. Many of these protests continue despite government support and intervention. Trade unions, members of civil society and some private organisations continue to blame government for weak regulations against Chinese enterprise in their industry (Sha, 2019). Much of the public outcry and appeals to the state have failed to attract any government responses thus increasing the frustration levels of the anti-Chinese activists. Some Ghanaian and Nigerian actors have taken direct action to regulate the activities of the Chinese and on occasion have attracted some degree of support from elements of the state. Such action has in some cases produced tangible effects, disrupting and/or constraining Chinese enterprise and forcing Chinese actors to adapt their strategies and activities. All of this is especially evident in the responses to Chinese traders and their importation of 'cheap' consumer goods, which has been one of the most contentious issues related to the Chinese's presence in both Ghana and Nigeria (Sha, 2019).

Critics contend that even though there is confusion on Sino-African relations, regarding whether they are driven locally or through mainstream politicians, the beneficiaries are often

business and political elites. Some of these political elite double-up as private entrepreneurs conducting business with China, providing protection and self interest in terms of promoting Chinese enterprise in Africa. This explains the inequality of benefits with regards to Chinese engagement in Africa. These politics and tensions continue to influence locals and mainstream politicians alike (Sha, 2019).

3.5. Geo-Strategic

Braden et.al (1999) explain how geography and economics have an impact on politics and international relations. The nature of modern-day politics promotes comprehensive analysis of theory and practice in the model of understanding geopolitical landscape. Here we focus on the sustainability of Chinese influence in Africa looking at military strategy, economic concerns, environmentalism and multiculturalism.

3.5.1. Military Strategy

The United States remain the military hegemon globally, but is steadily losing its economic and political influence to emerging powers like China. At present, the debate on traditional territorial rivalry or the global conflict, looks at the strategies adopted by these emerging systems in overseas dominance. This will form the basis of the debate and how that will shape China-Africa relations (Gardner, 2014).

This assertion holds further that Chinese economic engagement with Africa is fuelled by Beijing's insatiable appetite for power. In the era of globalisation, industrial and technological advancement dominates and attests to a country's position in the global economy. China replaced Japan as the second largest economy due to these indicators. China's increase in military power against Japan is supported by significant legal and security strategy. Even though Japan has no offensive plan against its neighbours in Asia, China is driven to deepen its influence through a combination of structural realism and liberalism oriented strategies against Japan-US military threat (Katagiri, 2018).

Again, China's aggressive emergence is also explained in line with the rise of power in Asia, against Russia and North Korea and most recently Japan. Even though this relates to nuclear

power politics, China also commands significant global economic and political influence. This explains the rapid and sudden strategy of China in Africa, not only to exploit resources for its economy but to win political influence as part of Beijing's global agenda (Katagiri, 2018).

China plays a significant role in Africa's Conflict resolution efforts and Peacebuilding by supporting the AU with capital and resources. The complexity of conflict on the continent brings the different actors into contestation. "China's projects were conceived, first of all, on the basis of perceived political economic and social commonalities within the Global South, which comprised nations from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and formed an area of geopolitical marginality, lying beyond continental Europe that Mao himself described in militaristic terms as 'a single united front'." (Roskam, 2015).

3.5.2. Economic Concerns

The end of the cold war and the waning West created a perfect entry of China into Africa. The marginalization of Africa by the West led to China emerging as a new development partner. This new era has been called "Beijing's Consensus" - a euphemism used to describe China's wrestle against the West. China saw a strategic entry into Africa, as capital assistance from the West was directed towards the affected countries in Eastern Europe many of which struggle with economic growth (Stremlau, 1900).

Some scholars maintain that China's strategies in Africa are those of mutual respect and benefit. They contend that Beijing introduced Africa to political and economic gravity through investment and aid support, establishing balanced relations, as noted by Wang (2009). Hence, China's presence in Africa, offers alternative funds for infrastructure development, where early donors, particularly the West, devote little assistance (Mlambo, et al., 2016). With regards to Africa's relations with foreign donors, China managed to replace the West by redefining the advancement of political and economic growth in Africa (Aidoo, 2019).

One other debate is the issue of China fighting against the middle-income trap by raising income levels. China shifting from a middle-income economy to an upper income one, supported by its market-based economy, lifted over 850 lives from poverty with a 10% GDP.

However, China's chances of moving Ghana to a high-income country is slim. Beijing has adopted Glawse's three factors that contribute to growth (human capital, export structure and productivity) by promoting good educational policy and reforms and building its human capital through a creative and innovative strategy. In terms of exports, Beijing is strategically involved in more sophisticated products to improve economic performance and generates higher growth rates. China trade in manufacturing goods and services through its innovative and technology production with focus on its strategy to becoming a high-income country (Sha, 2019).

From its market reforms in 1978, China has grown to the status of 'world's second-largest share of global GDP after the US, with a growth of 10% GDP per year, which is unique in history, considering the timely intervals (Sha, 2019). It is also argued that China's emergence is a counter-revolution to western imperialism, as a way of ensuring the economic betterment of the global south - a challenge to the status quo. China provides a '*case of accommodation rather than suppression*'. However, the effects of China's strategy are the same. The politics of international relations make it difficult for Africa to rise above these colonial and post-colonial politics (Nobel, 1995). On the other hand, the demand for these commodities has re-established a source for valuable resources and outlet for a market. These are what other voices believe to have promoted an Africa deep-rooted in colonialism, as a supplier of abundant raw materials and a market for cheap manufactured goods from abroad. A relationship not different from earliest times (Sarpong, 2015).

3.5.3. Environmentalism and Multiculturalism

It is often said that there is an increase in Chinese migration over the years. Some are specifically on the continent on a State-owned Enterprise (SOE) basis, while others include private businesses. Migrants are either legal or illegal. They operate as retailers, traders, labourers or construction/project workers. Despite the allegations levied against these immigrants, some observers contend that there is lack of social responsibility on the part of Africans. The inadequate sustainable mechanism in terms of policy framework and implementation provides opportunities for Chinese immigrants to be complicit in what the African environment condones. If there are no concrete regulations against environmental

degradation, companies are more likely to operate unsustainably. Again, the corruption in Africa provides fertile grounds for the Chinese to engage in corrupt practices (Watchers, 2016).

Scholars argue that Chinese sourcing of natural resources in Africa does not only add to the conflict and tension on the continent, but also contributes to pollution. As Beijing outpaces as a net importer of oil, coal and natural gas, its reliance on foreign sources has sparked concern about the impact on security, considering the fact that China has surpassed the US as the largest contributor to the emission of greenhouse gas in the world accounting to about 28.5% of emissions in 2018. (CSIS, 2018). The importance of fossil fuel to the Chinese economy, with coal leading net imports, continues to promote serious environmental degradation. Chinese mining operations in Africa often disregard safety measures and their technology has contributed to environmental degradation, water pollution, fatal accidents, wasted natural resources and the deteriorating conservative environmental protection (China-Africa, 2009). The redirection of Chinese investment to the continent is notable in extractive industries such as oil and gas. These, together with Chinese mining operations in Africa, often result in conflict of interest and tensions, as well as the emergence of an anti-Chinese movement, boarding resentment against Chinese migrants and businesses (Sarpong, 2015).

Further, one area of multiculturalism is the Confucius Institutes that have been established in many African countries, which serve to promote the learning of Chinese languages and culture. This resonates with Morgenthau's definition of nationalistic universalism - the imposition of doctrines and creed by other nations. Morgenthau posited that the current struggle in the international system is 'the struggle for the minds of men (Nobel, 1995). Today's global politics, contrary to the traditional ones, makes it difficult to use military force as a way of imposing ideologies on people. This has led to the adaptation of strategic measures, which include capital assistance and investment, with the aim of winning the minds of the less developed counties. Which explains that, China follows the successes of European countries like UK, France and Spain in promoting their national languages (Nobel, 1995).

3.6. Conclusion

China's return to Africa has been phenomenal, it offers both opportunities and challenges to the continent. The greatest impact is reflected by how China, in light of the global economic crisis, which affects GDP and exports, rationally and strategically rose to maintain its status by stimulating the domestic economy through a go out policy. Today, China boasts of massive economic development and fast growth in energy production and consumption. China follows a realist approach towards its own development. It is argued that China's actions towards Africa are not guided by any moral conduct, hence any benefit which emerge from this relationship is driven by coincidental tendencies and nothing intentional. This overrides China's objective in Africa; which is basically securing resources, dominating the African economy and increasing Beijing's political dominance in the international arena.

The rise of China and the decline of the Western order reveal how Beijing offers a high percentage of trade and development assistance in the global South. Skeptics contend that the World Bank, IMF and other western lenders continue to exceed China's Exim bank in terms of lending and debt cancellation. "China's share of Africa's debt is significant, but it is not the largest. Beijing is not a major contributor to high risk of capital distress, something Cobus Van Staden argues is always left out of the debate on Sino-African relations" (Donnelly, 2018). Considering the fact that most African countries lack effective monitoring and evaluating systems, the impact of China on the continent is contestable and introduces challenges that are inspired by Beijing's go-out ambitions. Chinese capital assistance and trade in Africa is a curse rather than a blessing.

Chapter Four

Challenges and Opportunities of Ghana-China Relations: A Review of Ghana's opportunities from 2000-2020.

4.1. Introduction

Ghana is an open country which has good relations with almost every state in the world. The country sees itself as a sovereign beacon of democracy. Ghana is rich in land and culture and has a population of about 31, 072, 950 million, with 7,343 per capita income and a landscape of about 238, 523km² (Worldmeter, 2019). The country is divided into 16 regions under 216 local districts, with a presidential representative supporting a unitary constitutional democracy of the fourth (4th) Republic. Through the 1992 constitution, Ghana has achieved significant economic prosperity given the country's involvement in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with strategic partners such as the WB, UN, IMF and EU. The system of government allows for the integration of customary and British common law, with an elected head of state and traditional leaders playing key roles in governance. The open market policy sustained by the country's free market environment promotes trade liberalisation and through mining and oil exploration, Ghana attracts foreign investors. Among these are South Africa, United Kingdom, France and China. China has emerged as the highest investor in Ghana and through trade and diplomacy enjoys strong relations with Accra.

Chinese experiences cut across everywhere in Ghana – from governance institutions into the economy. Ghana-China relations take the form of individual to individual, business to business and state to state relations. These are grouped as either formal or informal. Formal constitutes partnership between the state and some corporate bodies, while the informal relations reflect the movement of individuals for business, leisure, education, et cetera. This chapter will look at state, business and individual level relations. The chapter will begin by discussing the historical cooperation between these regions using indicators such as trade, development assistance and investment to conclude on the hypothesis.

4.2. South-South Cooperation

South-South cooperation emerged following the Afro-Asian conference in 1955, leading to the establishment of the Special Units for South-South cooperation (SSC), formerly the Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC), as instituted by the UN in 1968. This new form of cooperation was to shape common goals by “turning mutual interest into creative partnership” (UNDP, 2004). One such strategy is Ghana-China relations. In the context of this cooperation, collaborative innovative learning models and cost-efficient solutions were established in aiding developmental challenges of the global south, beyond its historic role as aid benefactor towards socio-economic issues like poverty, education, conflict and peacebuilding/peace-making (post-conflict reconstruction) (Task, 2011). Ghana-China relations are linked to Beijing relations with the African continent, a partnership which seeks to use dialogue and financial cooperation in exchange for knowledge and skills promoted under programs and projects, solving peculiar problems to countries in the global south (SouthCentre, 2009). Under the principle of South-South Cooperation, respect, equality, mutual benefit, non-conditionality and complementarity to North-South cooperation were considered as key to economic development (Chaturvedi & Mendiratta, 2015).

The struggle of emerging economies such as Ghana and China in a competitive global setting is highly visible (Anquandah, et al., 2014). The aftermath of the Second World War made it difficult for any powerful country to survive alone due to a massive increase of interdependence in the global economy. Partnerships then provided multiple alliance opportunities for countries to work together in achieving a common goal. Following this “cooperation is no longer a choice but a clear imperative”, especially with countries with the same development crisis (Annan, 2009). Hence, trade, investment and technological transfer become essential to bilateral and multilateral engagement (SouthCentre, 2009).

4.3. Ghana-China Cooperation from 1961-2012

In 1960 a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ began between Ghana and China through a ratification of a letter sent by Mr. Liu Shao-Chi to Kwame Nkrumah - Chairman of the People’s Republic of

China and the president of Ghana respectively. The period between 1961-1975 is described as the exchange of letters between the two heads of state, with little economic contact. With this friendship, it was stated that Ghana and China would develop each other, enjoying prosperity and 'accepted peace' ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269). The period also witnessed an imperial disruption of China-Africa relations, under which the Hsinhua News Agency condemned as propagandist tendencies used by the West (US) against Sino-African relations. The earlier letter sought to discourage Ghana, using examples such as Zambia, Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, as cases of Chinese imperial attempt in Africa. Despite Haung Hua's letter, sent in 1975 condemning this allegation against China, Ghana-China relations were deeply affected, thus leading to limited intercourse. This period coincided with the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah and the rise and rule of Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. In response to Ghana, China explains that the letter meant to confuse 'immature minds' of socialist countries in Africa in order to poison Sino-Afro relations using the term 'psychological warfare' ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269).

From 1975-2000, constructive efforts were made towards restoring China-Ghana relations. The period 1980-2000's was characterised by the rule of military junta and democratic rule in Ghana. The then military leader (1979-1992) and later democratic leader (1992-2001), Jerry John Rawlings, played a crucial role in consolidating Ghana-China relations. This marked the onset of Ghana's 4th Republic which consolidated new and pragmatic Ghana-China relations. This has been supported by continued visits, physical developments and diplomatic talks, strengthening bilateral meetings. The era from 1990 began with a major "economic recovery programme" targeted at revamping development in tourism and industry, with the aim of alleviating poverty through jobs and adequate income. This was to be based on Ghana's mineral worth and cocoa production. The cultural and natural heritage of Ghana's resources became a catalyst to its developmental agenda (Anquandah, et al., 2014). Moreover, financial institutions and donor countries such as the IMF, the WB, European Union and China became part of Ghana's partnership in this regard. From 2000-2020, Ghana has witnessed increased Chinese presence in the country. The period was kicked-off by the Sino-hydro power construction in Ghana, under the rule of John Evans Fifi Atta Mills (2009-2012). His state visit to China in September 2010 led to Ghana's first commercial oil production under the Sino-

hydro project. This was part of the over US\$86 billion loans in Africa under the initiatives of the Chinese government from 2000 (Podcasts, 2016).

In the 6th decade of Ghana-China relations, partnership and objectives have been broadened, with more diverse and complex multi-dimensional activities, structured and diversified to include social, economic and political programmes. The emphasis given to governance, the media, local traditions, conflicts, businesses, culture and the environment; increasingly, emphasis the open to no approach of how staggering the forensic and visual friendship exponentially impact Ghana's growth. Today, China's level of influence is felt everywhere in Ghana and this persists under the umbrella of friendship, trade, aid, and investment.

4.3. Ghana-China Diplomatic Relations

A treaty of friendship was consolidated in the five principles of mutual respect, sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference, following earliest formal contact between Ghana and China. In respect to these principles, China asserted to equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269). These treaties were promoted by the fundamental interest that individuals in both countries are prioritized and represented. The treaty remains in force for ten years subject to renewal and until or termination by either party ((PRAAD), MFA 4/125). It is supported through trade and investment deals where both governments agreed to promote and strengthen the principles of equality and mutual benefit connected to the overall context which govern the south-south cooperation principle ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269).

Conventionally, established prices, conditions and quantity of exports and imports were to be discussed by the body concerned. However, the inconsistency and complex nature of trade between these two countries provides a unique form of engagement which is entirely different from the state-led diplomacy. While the state level diplomacy maintains the historical level of engagement and guiding principles of this relationship, the business and individual level allow a complex interaction on trade ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269). The historical ties between these two countries are on a positive approach complemented with an increased number of exchange and contacts between individuals at all levels (Boteng, 2020).

Ghana-China relations are about influence. They provide ways in which China seeks to dominate Ghana. The relations should be underpinned by the principles of positive sum game. Thus, it must award mutual benefits for both sides, yet it does not create the trajectory to equal trade and investment benefits.

Under the framework of FOCAC, fruitful achievements have been made towards Ghana's growth over the years, in the areas of trade, infrastructural investments, job creation, education and technological exchange. Bilateral engagement looks at trade and barter deals. China compensates Ghana with loans and developmental assistance in exchange for access to mineral resources. This is termed "Sinohydro deal", an ongoing barter deal which aimed at "leveraging a fraction of Ghana's bauxite to undertake a massive overhaul of her infrastructural, industrial and agriculture base." In the bilateral talks, it was stated that Sinosure (China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation) has approved the first phase of Sinohydro facility (Ghanaweb, 2019). This form of cooperation which is supported by mutual benefit and growth should lead to an estimated 300 million Yaun grants and a debt write off of 250 million Yuan to Ghana (Ghanaweb, 2019).

Previously, there has been an approved US\$2 billion masters project in support of hospitals, industrial parks, construction works, and the extension of electricity to rural communities. The Sinohydro deal will see to it that the Tamale interchange projects, include additional roads and steel bridges, as well as the construction of the eastern corridor road (Ghanaweb, 2019).

However, Ghana has recently seen a shift in Chinese diplomacy, where negotiation involves engagement with traditional leaders and other prominent people in the country through courtesy visits which reinforce diplomatic talks at the state level. For instance, Shi Ting Wang, the Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, continues to embark on courtesy visits to some influential traditional leaders and elites in Ghana. Mention is made of Otumfour Nana Osei Tutu II; Asantehene, Mohammed Adjei Sowah; Metropolitan Chief Executive of Accra, Shirley Ayorkor Botchway; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Barbara Oteng Gyasi; Deputy Minister of lands and Natural resources, Dr. Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng; Minister for Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation among others. All these visits reinforce the

bilateral talks on economic and social development and trends in China's negotiations strategy in Ghana, which lie exclusively with the state (Ghana-China, 2019).

4.4. Ghana-China Trade Partnership

The economy of Ghana is diverse with trade (export and import) contributing immensely to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Ghana exports gold, timber, bauxite, diamond and magnesium while cocoa provide a similar share to the country's GDP. Foreign capital accounts, high per capita income and high inflows from agriculture and industrial minerals also contribute significantly to the economy. According to the World Trade Organisation(WTO), agriculture products contribute the highest percentage to Ghana's per capital income (Sharma, 2012). With a mixed economy, the country trades with South Africa, United States, the European Union, China and some of its neighbours.

Ghana's trade with China increased due to increased demand for Chinese products. Prior to bilateral talks, individual trade had been established through businesses from the 1940's. Trade between these two regions was mostly facilitated through bilateral talks and agreements signed for the export to China, of tobacco leaves, maize and groundnut oil, from as early as 1961. Exports also included cocoa beans (8,000 tons), palm kernel (5,000 ton), palm oil (5,000), copra (15,000), Industrial diamond (500,00) inter alia ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269). Currently Ghana is China's 7th largest trading partner in Africa, and as of 2018 the volume of trade stood at US\$7.3 billion contrary to US\$6.67 billion in 2017. This has been broadened to include heavy equipment such as automobiles, in addition to minerals and industrial product (Simbao, 2012).

The nature of Chinese business in Ghana re-emphasizes debates surrounding Chinese businesses in Africa confined in fashion, consumer products and technology (Norbrook, 2016). Over the last few years, more Chinese migrants have flooded to Ghana to engage in numerous businesses. Some fashion retail shops in Makola are owned by Chinese migrants which contradicts the trade policy that wholesale/retail industries should solely be sectors for locals to operate in. In reviewing 20 footwear retail shops in Makola, about 15 of these shops

were owned and managed by Chinese (Makola,2019). In Tudu, another business center in Accra, most small scale enterprises are owned by locals but managed by the Chinese. Stocks and products are mainly from China. These Chinese sometimes double as business partners to these locals. This has aroused mixed feelings amongst locals who accuse migrants of taking away job opportunities. The challenge with this accusation is the collapse of the textile industry in Ghana due to the increased availability of cheaper imported Chinese materials. Contrary to Ghana, Nigeria banned the importation of Chinese clothing in order to protect its local textile industry, which has led to limited infiltration of inferior textiles (Simbao, 2012).

Ghana on the other hand imports more Chinese clothing. This began with Agyekum Kuffo's administration (president of Ghana from 2001-2009), giving tender for the manufacturing of the national textiles in celebration of Ghana's 50th anniversary to China in 2007. The excuse given was that Ghana does not have the labour skills and capacity to produce materials in large quantities. This has led to an increase of low-quality Chinese textiles which are sold at a reasonable price compared to better quality versions. Despite the price difference, many market women favour the textiles imported from the US compared to China (Makola,2019). They argued that textiles produced in Ghana from the 19th century can sustain a lifetime, while these Chinese materials wear off quickly. In addition to this, is the inflow of inferior quality fashion and beauty products. Examples are body shops, foreign clothing, hair textiles, kitchenware, accessories, et cetera. Nowhere in Makola and Tudu will you find a shop without Chinese products which are in high demand.

It is estimated that trade between China and Africa has exploded from US\$10 billion to more than US\$100 billion in the last decade (Corben 2012). In the case of Ghana, imports from China stood at US\$1.9 Billion in 2019. Chinese projects and construction work account for US\$1,670 of the total deficit in goods such as electricals, iron and steel, machinery, plastic, aluminum, furniture, and rubber. The value of electricals stood at US\$186.88M, machinery US\$4342.49M, while vehicles accounted for US\$180.20M. These account for state level trade which basically means China imports all these materials in support of loans offered to Ghana. While imports continue to increase, exports are limited to mineral resources (Economics, 2020). Current trade exchange is supported by Ghana-China trade agreements established in 1961 in relation to the export of machinery, appliances, instrumentals, chemicals (pigment,

paints, zinc oxide etc), pharmaceuticals and medical apparatus, textiles, foodstuffs (sugar, tea, cigarette, tinned goods, beverages etc.), stationery and educational supplies, sportswear among others, from China. On the other hand, Ghana exports to China are limited to natural resources such as raw cocoa beans, groundnut, palm kernel, copra, cotton, hides and skins, diamonds inter alia ((PRAAD), MFA 4/125). This explains why while Ghana exports minerals and raw produce to China, Beijing exports manufactured goods to Accra as per agreement.

There is no doubt that economic relations with China are on the rise. However, the accompanying imbalances and competition challenge Accra's pursuance of economic growth, in favor of citizens. The current monopoly of Chinese businesses in Ghana and the collapse of some industrial markets continues to affect the economy due to low internal production, financial shocks, external trade and governmental overspending, which are often subsidized by debt cancellation (Anaman, 2016). For instance, "external debt in Ghana increased to US\$22 900 million in the first quarter of 2020 from US\$20 300 million in the fourth quarter of 2019" (Economics, 2020). In 2019, Chinese imports accounted for US\$1.89 billion, while exports amounted to US\$2.8 billion. This volume favours the import of Chinese goods and export of minerals from Ghana (TrendEconomy, 2020). Ghana's main trading partners in 2019 were the United Kingdom, Netherlands, South Africa and Burkina Faso (Economics, 2020).

That notwithstanding, trade with China has led to the increase of businesses in Ghana, which is attracting more Chinese investors into the economy. Mention is made of Chinese business such as Caitex Group Company, Sunda (Gh) Estates Company Ltd. Greenhouse International Development (Gh) Ltd, Chinese Acupuncture Clinic, Sunon Asogli Power (Gh) Ltd, China International Water & Electric Corporation, Tsingtao Hotel & Restaurant, China State Hualong Construction (Gh) Ltd, Chint International(Gh) Co. Ltd, Happytours Travel Service Ltd, Beijing Clinic , Cable Gold TV, Jiahua Agriuc & Trading Com Ltd, Alstonia Investment Ltd, Akosombo Textiles Ltd, Grand Rice Food Company Ghana Ltd, King-Tech Ltd, Sinobridge Ghana Ltd. However, the dominant question is, *How many Ghanaian businesses operate in China?*

4.5. Chinese Businesses in Ghana

The 20th century, ushered a lot of Chinese merchants into start-up businesses in Ghana. Which has increasingly claimed the market share of business opportunities in Ghana. This has affected local social actors who depend on enterprise as their only source of livelihood. While many Ghanaians air their grievances and protest against Chinese business activities in Ghana, these constitute a very small number of disgruntled locals – most are thought to appreciate opportunities offered by Chinese nationals. The dynamics of these interactions have promoted a complex stereotype. However, such businesses contribute to national growth through payment of taxes. Most of these businesses are found in the capital of Ghana and sometimes they work with state corporate bodies. Examples are Sunda (Gh) Estates Company Ltd., Ghana Associations of Chinese Societies & Ghana Chinese Chamber of Commerce Caitex Group Company, Greenhouse International Development (Gh) Ltd., Akosombo Textiles Ltd., Beijing Clinic Chinese Acupuncture Clinic, Happy tours Travel Service Ltd., China International Water & Electric Corporation, Tsingtao Hotel & Restaurant, et cetera. These businesses provide jobs and contribute to tax revenue in Ghana. However, China receives a high percentage of such revenue.

Also, these businesses are controlled by individuals, which makes it difficult to measure revenue and calculate profit ratio. This has made it much more difficult for Ghana to tax such businesses based on income net. The influence of locals and the malpractices in this area have contributed to tension, especially amongst locals and Chinese migrants in wholesale and retail sectors. Also, many local traders complain that Chinese migrants are able to secure stores in Mokola and Tudu, while locals struggle to afford such spaces due to their lack of huge capital. In the entertainment industry, there are reports about the use of arms by migrants in clubs and casinos. This has increased the increasing tension amongst locals and Chinese migrants.

4.6. Chinese Investment in Ghana

Chinese infrastructural investment in Ghana is termed as the 'barter deal' where goods or services are exchanged through the support of agreements on economic and technical cooperation. A critical analysis of the period from 1961 to 2019 reflects Chinese foreign policy towards Ghana as a barter deal. For instance, the National theatre was built for Ghana's support at the United Nation in reinstating China. Atta Mills, President of Ghana from 2009-2012, facilitated the opening of the Otubo gas plant and received Sino-hydro loans for Sino-Tech building, a gas plant installed to aid the issue of 'fuel' negatively destroying oil wells. This marked the first oil processing facility to be built in Ghana. This gas plant was constructed in exchange for mineral deposits in Ghana, and current investment deals are structured in this way. Mention is made of the Bui dam, the eastern corridor road, schools, hospitals, clinics, et cetera, which operates with the high importation of building materials from China. Chinese trade, investment and development assistance go hand in hand. Most respondents argue that Chinese investment has not led to any significant local economic development even though there has been some level of infrastructural development in Ghana. While others foresee this to be a mutual benefit, most respondents shared the following sentiments:

"I believe it is meant to provide a cost-effective alternative to development in our country."

"It is a joke where China's GDP is far higher than Ghana and Chinese Multilateral companies make more money than the entire yearly investment and aid budget for Ghana. There are no equal relations between Ghana and China."

The contrasting views on Chinese investment informs criticism from the public and other international investors. On one hand, there is a general consensus within the public and international community, accusing China of its neo-liberal approach to development. On the other hand, the state supports and celebrates Chinese investment in Ghana. The most significant of all the developmental projects in Ghana is the 695km eastern corridor road (N2) which outstretches from Tema through to Volta, Northern region, and ends at Upper east Kulungugu (Wadda-Senghore, n.d.). Further, the Atewa forest mine and the construction of the Bui dam are current sites of debate in the continuing discourse on Ghana-China relations.

Even though Chinese infrastructural investment in Ghana is greater than the World Bank assisted projects, environmental activists and opposition governments have organized a number of proposals and protests questioning the sustainability of this investment deals (Smith, 2019).

Further, Chinese development projects in Ghana come with technology and personnel, which contradicts the notion of Ghanaians constituting a 'major' percentage of workers. Major in this sentence means that, Ghanaians may account for a high number of workers than the Chinese in these projects. However, such skilled positions are strictly reserved for migrants even though such labour is abundant in Ghana. Contrary, locals are assigned to unskilled positions which earn them little income compared to migrant co-workers. Hypothesis from this practice indicates that loans are given to boost the Ghanaian economy which will improve livelihoods through jobs and other opportunities. However, reality depicts that China continues to extract minerals, create job opportunities for Beijing's unemployed and ex-prisoners by deploying migrants while avoiding tax in Ghana. These dynamics provide lucrative benefits to China while Ghana is left with debt to settle and limited benefits from such deals. According to a respondent:

Chinese infrastructural projects in Ghana are usually manned by Chinese nationals although the government of Ghana is expected to pay back the loans it acquired for such projects from Chinese Banks and organizations. This inherently denies young Ghanaians the opportunity to be gainfully employed. This is reminiscent of China's foreign policy in Africa. In future, the Chinese will leave the country and there will be limited minerals and debt to settle

This assertion stems from the current reality of Chinese businesses in Ghana and occurrences of neighbouring Asian countries notwithstanding the politics of China-Zambia relations. Citizens in Ghana contend that Ghana is stepping into this predicament. However, efforts such as the construction of the Bui Dam on the Black Rivers has contributed to power capacity of the Akosombo and the Kpong dam with additional 400MW. This provides multi- purpose abilities to generate electricity and water supply, thus enabling Ghana to export power to neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin.

4.7. Community and Social Development

Better quality growth remains the fundamental goal of the solidarity between Ghana and China. This entails assurance of access to food, housing, water supply, peace and security, clothing, education, sanitation, healthcare and employment, aimed at improving livelihoods in both countries ((PRAAD), MFA 4/125). This reemphasizes the macro approach to growth which ensures that development is reflected in people's livelihoods and the quality of their environments. Development must be participatory and can only be sustainable when benefits are shared equitably. To some extent Chinese development assistance promotes social and community development in Ghana.

Through Chinese businesses, Ghana has seen growth in education, employment, health and infrastructure development. Chinese imports have enabled many people to satisfy their survival needs; this group constitutes the vulnerable and individuals with inadequate educational or professional qualifications. For instance, Mokola and Madina markets exhibit Ghanaian traders trading in Chinese consumables, electricals and fashionable goods. Businesses such as China mall (Spintex & Asokwa), Fortress Ghana warehouse, Tip Top restaurant, Palace Chinese restaurant, Han Court Chinese restaurant, et cetera, provide jobs for locals. They provide alternative source of livelihoods through job creation. This also expands into sectors such as Chinese construction sites and gold mines. Some Ghanaian traders commend the positive effects of such opportunities, which often provide alternative huge benefits compared to farming, drivers, labourers, ICT tutors, among others.

Through skills building and training, China contributes to human development in Ghana. China offers educational scholarships to students and aspires to support the establishment of vocational and technical institutes for the development of skills in Ghanaians. Institutions such as Yees Africa (Accra, GH), Sunda International, CL Technical service Limited and CL Technical service Limited are among many skills development programs initiated by China. Currently there are about eight Chinese teaching sites and 4 featured programs in Ghana. Notable institutions also include the Confucius institute, University Basic school, Chinese Section, Christ Union Academy, Al-Rayan International School, Blessed Home Academy, Novel Community Academy, Immigration at Kotoka International Airport, Sunon Asogli Power

(Ghana) Ltd, Huawei (Ghana) Company, Custom at Kotoka Airport, Narh-Bita college, Ga- East Kwabenya basic School, with programs from primary schools all the way to tertiary.

In addition, there are Chinese driven programmes for students to study in China, for instance a summer camp with Zhejiang University of Technology and governmental officials; this comprises more than 40 Ghanaian high officials. These officials are part of the 10,000 Africans trained by Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in agriculture, technology and policy development. However, it is important to note that training in knowledge and skills transfer is assessed based on how it fits into Ghana's political and diplomatic ambitions and its emancipated development (Coke & Alemu, 2016). A total number of 3543 students are registered and trained every year in both Ghanaian institutes/companies and Chinese firms in Accra. More alarming is the rate at which Chinese culture is promoted along these educational programs in Ghana. Over the past six years an estimated number of 20000 students are trained in Chinese language and culture.

The Confucius Institute at the University of Ghana, established in May 2014 and inaugurated by Professor Ebenezer Oduro Owusu, Vice-Chancellor, University of Ghana and H.E Madam Sun Baohong, marked the first Chinese institute in the country to support the development of 'Global Model Confucius'. The institute has 18 teachers, 6 Chinese and 12 local volunteer teachers. This speaks to the fact that, to some extent Chinese projects in Ghana provide employment to locals. The institute has had programs such as the 2019 Art exhibition of Silk Road Languages of Art with visits from Rebecca Akufo-Addo (current first lady of Ghana) gracing the occasion. This means Chinese educational programmes have both, local and governmental support. China, through its educational programs has created its own concept of teaching in Ghana. In addition to teaching, it also facilitates access to scholarships to study in China. This concept of teaching by promoting Traditional Chinese Culture includes skills in using Chinese calligraphy, songs, dance, and art to promote education in Ghana.

Again, China aims to go digital with education and business in Ghana. Cooperating with Star Times, China promotes programs on Television (TV) and online. Most of the programs last for 6 to 20 minutes and they help people to learn Chinese culture and language; with the aim that many Ghanaians should learn Chinese beyond time and space limits. For instance, "Chinese

for Business People” is a series of TV programs initiated by Net2 TV on Mondays- Fridays at 4.55pm on Saturday at 5.55pm and Sundays at 2pm (Net2tv, 2020). Ghana has seen massive infrastructural development through Chinese aid and development assistance. Mention is made of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, water and electricity supply projects; Bui dam, police station, large market and even in the entertainment industry (bars, casino, clubs etc). There has also been construction of offices in departments such as the Ghana high court, Ministry of foreign affairs and the Ministry of defence. More recently, Ghana received from 100 vehicles from China to boost the mobility of its police service.

The main objective of these developments is to bring about growth, through access to equal opportunities for all, which includes balanced regional development. Chinese social and community development initiatives are mostly directed to the capital with little improvement on livelihood struggles and dysfunctional policy at the regionals.

4.8. Conclusion

In conclusion, China’s go-out policy explains the drive for commercial and strategic investment in Ghana. This has allowed developmental projects in Ghana even though the environmental abuse is horrific where we see the unfair distribution of gains at local economy. Ghana-China relations, whether political, commercial or social, have both, negative and positive effects on Ghana. The next chapter looks at how this has impacted Ghana’s economy inferring from the general growth supply. However, such inconsistency bribery, mismanagement, et cetera in Ghana, remain toxic to the effectiveness of such benefits

Chapter Five

Negative Impact of Ghana-China Relations.

5.1. Introduction

It is hardly surprising that China-African relations have emerged as part of today's great global debates. Reverse arguments contend that China provides mutual support to Ghana in terms of trade, foreign investment and aid, which marginally incur losses than it eclipses benefits to the country. The chapter looks at the unrealistic position of political elites with laid-back assumptions and concerns of locals who constitute the majority in the Ghanaian society. Many citizens have argued that the government is ignorant about the impact of Chinese relations, looking at Beijing's continuous investment deals in the country (INPANO001, 2019). The asymmetric relations between Ghana and China have more of a negative impact on the former than the latter. This manifests in three ways: economic, political and socio-economic.

5.2. Economic Impact

In the realm of trade and economic relations, poverty is still prevalent in Ghana, despite trade in minerals such as cocoa, gold, crude oil and natural gas, which contribute immensely to the country's economic growth. Trade relations with China in terms of imports and exports have led to the retrenchment of locals, especially in retail, wholesale and farming sectors, thus disrupting sources of livelihood (Trade, 2020). Even though Chinese businesses create jobs for the youth who constitute 9.6 percent of the unemployed, these workers receive low wages and sometimes experience abuse and trauma. The study found out that most employees in the mining sector are often underpaid with as low as \$3 per day (Wassa Gold Mine, 2020). It was also suggested by The International Trade Union Confederation's Hong Kong Liaison Officer (IHLO) that Chinese Companies' wage is among the lowest in many African countries (Xiaoyang, 2016). More often than not, Chinese mining operations encourage school dropouts and child labour. While conducting the study, many employees of Chinese businesses were traumatized to even contribute to the interview and many consented for information

to be receptive. There are cases of some people being retrenched after voicing their grievance on the lack of respect for employees in such firms.

Ghana's unemployment rate for the 15-24 age range stood at 4.33% of the total labour force in 2019 (The World Bank, 2019). The country's unemployed labor force is relatively average compared to other regions in Sub-Saharan Africa as there has been some improvement over the years. A distribution of the population constitutes: 4.8 percent in agriculture, 10.5 in industry and 2.8 in service sector. Inflation decreased from 19.2 to 9.5 in 2016 and 2019 respectively (Plecher , 2020). Inflation and fiscal challenges have led to the closing of domestically owned universal banks, further adding to the unemployment statistics in the economy (The World Bank, 2019). Again, Ghana's debt crisis is growing, amidst Chinese investment and aid with a 30% deficit of government revenue in external debt payment due to debt increases (Johnes,2016). Political elites struggled to resolve the 2015 crisis on governmental debt. In projections up to 2024, Plecher (2020), argues that national debt stood at 59.29% in 2018, 63.76% in 2019 and will amount to 63.46% at the end of 2020 . These figures are subject to change due to the current global pandemic (the Corona crisis) which may influence worse economic conditions compared to initial IMF projections.

Ghana has lost a huge source of revenue due to gold being smuggled to China. "In 2016 alone, an estimated \$2.3billion worth of gold left the shores of Ghana through galamsey. The illicit trade avoids taxation and the prevalence of foreign actors account that profits flow out of the country." (Bird & Burrows, 2017). This is due to weaknesses in institutions that regulate licensing, buying and selling, without any guarantees on how these commodities were legally mined. This means that even licensed brokers buy and sell gold irrespective of its origin (Bird & Burrows, 2017).

Again, Ghana is a fast-growing economy that is attractive to foreign businesses. Despite many foreign imports from the US and Europe, Chinese imports are often considered fake and cheap. These products are often of low quality and they tend to have health implications. Often, anything fake in Ghana is associated with the slang "China". In Ga, a local Ghanaian dialect, there is a popular opinion that Chinese 'nibi n3 et33', which means any product from China does not last long. Despite such criticism, Chinese businesses have taken over local

markets, competing with local goods and small-scale businesses, in addition to infiltrating local markets with fake goods. In an interview, two market women complained bitterly about imported fish and tomato paste.

“When you think of Chinese relations in Ghana, the first thing that comes to mind is fake products and the pollution of our environment. I took one fish out from the box only to realize it was impregnated with cotton wool” (INPANO015, 2020).

“Most of the tomato paste from China has about 20% tomato juice and you can imagine the implications of these products on customers and consumers. I have to sell because market demand is high.” (INPANO016, 2020).

Evidence indicates that businesses and individual activities surrounding Ghana-China relations contribute to the infiltration of harmful and hazardous products into Ghana ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269). Individual businesses such as mini shops, shopping malls, hotels, warehouse, restaurant, clubs, casino, mines, et cetera.

Again, the high inflow of Chinese African print in Ghana disrupts locally made Ghanaian print and subsequently pushed some traders out of business. The collapse of textile factories and cotton production in Ghana is also attributed to the influx. Even though, Printex Limited and Tex Styles Ghana Limited; formally the Ghana Textiles Printing Company Limited (GTP) have sustained this interruption. Many workers were laid off; the textiles industry which employed 30,000 workers in the 1990s now employ over just 3, 000 workers (Yeebo, 2015). This inflow is attributed to counterfeit Chinese print smuggled through neighbouring border; Togo. These counterfeit textiles is argued to constitute 60% of all textiles sold in Ghana (Yeebo,2015). ((PRAAD), Sc/BAA/269)Some of these textiles are fake, making it difficult for traders and customers to differentiate as they are counterfeits of original Ghanaian textiles. However, because they are affordable to customers, they sell quickly. These products attract vulnerable populations in Ghana and resources feed into multilateral Chinese firms, boosting that economy. Ghana has not seen any significant growth in its economy (Yeebo,2015).

Ghana supports a conducive trading and working environment for all foreign migrants, supported through labour laws which condemn discrimination based on the grounds of sex, race, religion, social or economic concern. This has led to an influx of Chinese immigrants. For instance, in 2019, Ghana immigration services estimated 10 500 as the number of Chinese migrants in the country (Boteng, 2020).

5.3. Political Impact

Ghana-China relations amplify the country's presence on the global stage, despite the fact that it continues to promote Ghana's dependence on external partners for its development. This challenges 'the Ghana beyond aid agenda' and the quest for Ghana to become self-sufficient and sovereign will always be undermined by such relations. Ghana's courtesy support to China on global issues can affect the country's NLM positions and also position Ghana as a slave to China. Domestically, Chinese relations intensify Ghana's struggle with illicit practices, especially through the involvement of public officials and individuals in bribery and intensifying the culture of corruption in Ghana (INPANO027,2020).

Ghana struggles with corruption due to greed, political manipulation, weak mass participation and policy implementation, leading to lack of accountability and transparency. Corruption in Ghana is complex and conspicuous, and normalisation has sternly affected growth. Akokpari (2004), argues that such practices pose challenges to a country's developmental goals. *"Corruption is shown to be socially embedded in 'logics' of negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity, predatory authority and redistributive accumulation"* (Sarden, 1999). For this reason, many western donors indulge Ghana with a set of good governance procedures to follow, a principle absent in Chinese relations. Through agreements like the Cotonou Partnership Agreements, the EU has reduced the level of corruption in Ghana (Gokcekus & Suzuki, 2013). Again, Ghana under the WB and IMF structural adjustments policies, made progress in its industrial capacity, thus improving the country's socio-economic growth (Anaman, 2016).

China has faced criticism relating to the question of interest, and the dominance of its soft power strategy in Ghana. For instance, in 2019 a prize was presented at the African Ranger Award Ceremony to encourage military individuals in Ghana who safeguard wild animals by

Ma Yun, a Chinese business philanthropist (Boteng, 2020). This is in contrast to the approach used by most Chinese marine companies in Ghana, which focus on catching large amounts of fish. Through actions such as bribery, nepotism and patronage, Chinese migrants are able to thrive in the absence of accountability, effective corruption control, poor regulatory spaces where the rule of law is undermined, inter alia (Anaman, 2016). The study finds that there is little to no accountability by Chinese businesses or investors in Ghana (Johes,2016). Most Ghanaian citizens blame state officials for being corrupt in supporting China's illicit conduct in the country. All 33 participants in the study shared similar opinions on this. A resident at the Wassa echoed his grievance: *"I think most challenges with Chinese relations has to do with the bribery and corruption of Ghanaian officials. Chinese can pay their way out of every situation"*. This has indeed affected communication and engagement in Ghana as tensions emanate from such allegations.

In today's Ghana, there is a conflict of ideas amongst the Ghanaian elite and the average citizen. While the elite hail China for the tremendous developmental projects in the country, citizens complain bitterly of its negative effects. In (Ghanaiantimes, 2019), former President Jerry John Rawlings argued that politics has been monetised and this continued to affect the quality of democracy and developments in Ghana. In this sense, Ghanaian elites are criticised of romanticizing Chinese developments for their political interest and campaign policies. Again, there has been growing concern about Chinese influence in Customary and religious legislation and activities in Ghana. Recently, Ghana condemned their engagement in local religious and cultural activities. Specifically, a Chinese man engaging in pastoral duties in Kumasi and the installment of Chinese migrants as *nkosuahehen* (Development chief) in the Kwahu Abetifi of Ghana. According to Bob-Miller (2009), the position is given to individuals noted to have contributed to development within the Ashanti community which includes hundreds of Westerners and African Americans. However, this case generated several mixed feelings in the country and the international community. In an interview, one resident from the district complained about the bias and fairness of the selection process and accused the Chief of having ulterior motives. Accordingly, they voiced that the chief doubles as a business partner with the Chinese man hence the objection to this selection. (Maya, 2020). The importance of traditional history and cultural heritage remains an important aspect of the modern Ghanaian society. The public work directly with these traditional and provincial

leaders in developmental projects thus making the issue of Chinese involvement very important (Anquandah, et al., 2014).

Also, threats towards the criminal justice administration by Chinese business power brokers, who often threaten to remove investments and business deals when foreign culprits are made to face the law, undermine the local justice system (INPANO034, 2020). They also undermine compliance with National Migration Policy, the Investment Promotion Act, regulations safeguarding the retail businesses and other restriction on migrants. Ghana often experiences the interference of these powerful Chinese firms, of which the final course of action in respect to Ghana is using its own resources to strengthen immigration policies and enforcing stability through repatriation, deployments of civil personnel, detention and prosecution (INPANO026, 2020). In challenging Ghana's legal prosecution of some Chinese migrant, the administration receives petitions from power brokers in the Ghanaian economy who either have political ties. An example is the Ross Wood crisis (Ross Wood is a natural resources in Ghana that plays an important role in Ghana's export sector) which led to the prosecuted's repatriation with no fine after being accused of breaking environmental and trade laws (INPANO033, 2020). Often, many Chinese illegal corporates are either ignored after prosecution or they repatriated back to China and these actions continue with difference faces of Chinese migrants. According to a respondent:

Some of these Chinese migrants engage in illegal activities and when they are caught they are let go as a result of alliances with influential people. Chinese mining companies engaging in galamsey; these law breakers do not even make it to prosecution, they are repatriated back to China and we continue to see a cycle of which the Chinese feed into this weakness. Every year new immigrants replace the repatriated Chinese in these activities. This among other illicit behaviors negatively affect governance in Ghana.

Further, China has a bad reputation when it comes to the violation of laws in Ghana, compared to, say, South Africa (Cheru, 2010). Ghana has more cases of corporate Chinese violation because of weak state mechanisms and lack of enforcement of rules. For instance, depending on local conditions, Chinese investors tend to behave poorly under weak rule regulation and "where there are higher standards, Chinese companies behave significantly

better, thus challenging the prevailing negative narrative about Chinese companies disregard of corporate social responsibility” (Podcast, 2016). In Ghana, Chinese firms engage in illicit practices in the areas of trade, construction, mining and fishing. For example, a fishing firm such as the Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956 was arrested for a second time for violating the fisheries laws such as catching undersized fish and the use of illegal nets causing destruction of fish habitats. (Maritime , 2020). Such firms are also responsible for illegal fishing in Ghana, exploiting links with neighbouring countries such as CoteD’Ivoire, the main export destination for Ghana’s fishing industry (Godfrey, 2020). Ghana’s mining and construction industries lack safeguard policies. In the case of the Bui dam safeguarding the source was not within the responsibility of Sinohydro (Kirchherr, et al., 2016).

Civil corruption hinders ethical policies and encourages the spread of bribe culture in both, the immigration and police departments. For instance, many civilians engage in the sale of narcotics to these Chinese migrants which has led to trafficking and increased crime, especially in mining communities, as some locals have begun using this medium to secure arms (Oteng-Yeboah, 2019). Embezzled narcotics contribute to illicit financial flows in Ghana’s military department.

5.4. Chinese Involvement in Small-Scale Gold Mining

Small scale gold mining, also known as (A.K.A) ‘galamsey’ has been known to Ghana for centuries prior to contact with China. Mining in Ghana is huge and mostly identified in the south, central and western regions, with some discoveries in the North, where extraction takes place at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, supported by extractive activities through traditional and industrial methods. Traditional mining involves the use of simple tools such as pans, shovels, pickaxes, chisels and hammer. However, industrial mining emerged following the gold rush in the 19th century. There are so many large-scale mining companies and quiet a number of small-scale mining groups in Ghana. Registered small-scale mining groups amount to about 300, with 90 mines support companies. However, the introduction of huge and sophisticated machines in mining is attributed to the arrival of foreign mine groups and companies (Rashotte, 2019).

The mining industry in Ghana has seen a massive expansion since 2004 through production, investment and annual output, which led to a rapid increase in illegal mining. This has influenced Chinese mass migration, polluted indigenous communities and displaced many livelihoods in rural Ghana (Hilson, 2004). Illegal small-scale mining has long proliferated across Ghana - Africa's second and the world's tenth largest gold exporter. But recent foreign investment, coupled with industrialization has significantly exacerbated its negative effects. An increased number of people, including thousands from China, have been drawn into the sector. A recent claim suggests that there are now 200,000 people engaged in galamsey, while other sources suggest nearly 3 million rely on it for their livelihoods (Bird & Burrows, 2017). This increased number in galamsey is associated with Chinese investment in Ghana, especially in gold mining which has not only led to the use of heavy machinery in extraction but has contributed to environmental degradation (Bird & Burrows, 2017).

Historically, small scale gold mining was condoned among locals in Ghana who mined on their individual properties by using hand-operated tools in digging small pits. This was done with no chemical interference. However, the influx of Chinese gold seekers in Ghana has expanded these activities through the use of sophisticated machinery, tools and chemicals (Bird & Burrows, 2017). *"In the span of only a few years, Ghana has attracted an estimated 50,000 'gold seekers' from China"* (Bird & Burrows, 2017). Illegal mining is mostly done in remote areas such as Offin South, Obusi, Mandarin, Wassa West, Telensi, and there are high chances that most of galamsey hubs are yet to be identified. Some respondents explained that Chinese gold mining in Ghana is supported by the same institution. In an interview, locals noted that in most Chinese mines convicts are replaced even before they leave the country. He explains that during his years of working with five (5) different mine firms, recruitment, practice and payment is same: *"same lordship in all these mining companies"*. This gives Chinese a better opportunity to operate in all these mine areas. According to Bird (2017), "the Chinese working community is believed to be highly organised and hierarchical, with one kingpin allegedly employing over 300 Chinese migrant workers together with a number of Ghanaians which makes it difficult for regulating galamsey in Ghana".

Since 1955, Ghana has adopted and implemented laws and policies to aid the effective regulation of the mining industry (Arkorful, et al., 2018) through policies such as

Environmental Assessment Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency and the Minerals Commission, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. Countries like South Africa, the United States and Europe are able to operate in Ghana. However, mainstream gold mining encountered challenges with effective implementation of these regulations (Arkorful, et al., 2018) and up until 2018, mining in the gold sector was not regulated. Mining companies like Gold Fields Limited, AngloGold Ashanti Ltd; formerly Obuasi Gold mine, Newmont Mining Corporation, Golden Star Resources Ltd were the dominant group with legal mining rights, coupled with small scale mining reserved for locals. The Mineral and Mining law provides guidance through applicable policies and the introduction of diamond rejuvenated mining regulation with Mineral Acts like the Additional Profile Tax Law (PNDCL 122,1985; The Precious Marketing Corporation Law (PNDCL 219;1989) contributing to some form of mine regulation in Ghana (Arkorful, et al., 2018).

Ghana mines gold, magnesium, bauxite, aluminium and other precious metals, with gold being the most popular, as it is ranked as the second gold rich country after South Africa. Mining communities have seen massive influx of Chinese migrants. In most mining communities in Ghana, Chinese migrants engage in illegal mining involving heavy mining equipment where such areas are already under another foreign mining company like Obuasi; AngloGold Ashanti (AGA). As a result of the rich nature of soil in Ghana, it is difficult to even quantify the number of Chinese in local communities. Chinese migrants are found in areas such as Wassa, Obuasi, Akyem, Drakwa Offin, Talensi, Mandine, Darkwa Offin, Akim kwaben. In some regions, these migrants have integrated into local communities and sometimes conduct their activities without official authorization, on individual properties such as farms (INPANO022, 2020).

Illegal gold mining interferes with security and environmental protection and such social consequences lead to the loss of a huge percentage of resource revenues. Under the 5th president of the 4th Republic, Government has adopted pragmatic actions under 'operation vanguard' in ending galamsey, despite failed attempts by the previous administration. According to the mines minister Fuseini, *"The Chinese were just plundering the resources. So what we have done is take action to stop the plunder and ensure that the resource needs of this country are not any way depleted in ways that breaks resource revenue*

of the state." The New Patriotic Party (NPP) government under Akuffo Addo Darkwa saw to the deployment of 400 Ghana military personnel to Ashanti, Eastern and Western region (Awiah, 2017). Although, mineral exports constituted a percentage of Ghana's exports, with gold constituting about 85% percentage of minerals, its deficit sometimes exceeds benefits. Governmental deficits are allocated to conflict management, military deployment, and repatriation; "4 500 Chinese national have been repatriated relating to illegal mining" (Hirsch, 2013).

Mine pollution coupled with land degradation, erosion, and the disruption of wildlife and forest reserves are among the many effects of galamsey in Ghana. Even though legal mining is sustainable for Ghana, critics contend that the Chinese have no regard for their own environment and will not cease to pollute and infiltrate the Ghanaian society with such harmful practices and challenges such as weak regulation, bribery, ignorance and greed. In so doing they rip communities of mining benefits, leading to poverty, poison waterways and soil erosion, as well as long term health hazards. For instance, large mining companies such as the Ashanti Gold mines practice to some extent, safety and sustainable mining practices. In areas such as Wassa Minfi district, conflict and tension arose as locals became defensive in an effort to protect their environment. A resident echoed:

We know how much there is pollution of rivers, lakes and so they say they are looking into the matter but the civil society in Ghana continue to receive such benefits from these Chinese and fail to help even when people are killed. We lost an entire cocoa farm and my little brother to this failed system

This complexity of mining, coupled with such experiences and public perceptions, continues to intensify tensions and has become difficult to control. Citizens blame the government for the Chinese's illicit behaviour, while some individuals are condemned for indulging in corrupt practices with the Chinese. Section 83(a) of the Mineral and Mining Act 703 gives consent to small-scale mining by locals and forbids the involvement of foreigners. Small scale mining activities are supposed to be reserved for locals and indigenous Ghanaians. However, the complexities of small-scale mining and land issues in Ghana have made it even more comfortable for the Chinese to operate in these communities.

In Akim kwaben (Atewa district), the connection of Chinese with Chiefs and locals is scaling down to children through bribery, loose political and traditional system (INPANO01,2019).

In a small village called "Atuna" in Jaman South of the Brong Ahafo district. Tension existed between the Chief and the queen mother on Chinese mining their community. While locals support the queen mother against mining their community, the chief was in support of Chinese mining and according to a resident; 'those Chinese got the permission to mine our lands from Chiefs. It is not their fault, we let them.

Prior to the influx of Chinese migrants in Ghana, mining was mostly done on areas that are not easy to cultivate, like marshy or swamp areas. However, in Akim Kwaben; Chinese miners continue to degrade cocoa farms. Such small-scale Chinese mines also work with legal mining company in conducting these activities. For instance, some small-scale mining groups indulge legal mining companies such as Extra Gold (Atewa) with permits, to undertake illicit mining activities. At the time of the research, Extra Gold was the only legal company with mining rights in Atewa (INPANO009,2019). However, the politics of these mining companies makes it difficult for government to measure and address small scale mining, something Chinese are feeding into. While many Chinese embark on mining individually, others work with big corporations in China. According to an ex-mine worker, *"One is unable to trace the difference between corporate and individual migrants operations"*.

Some locals in remote areas contend that the Chinese create job opportunities in mining communities. However, the researcher observed that only a chunk of such jobs were left to locals who take menial jobs which exclude mine layout design, operating drilling machines, monitoring and extraction. Most of these locals represent the breadwinners in their families and the issue of poverty has encouraged many youths to enter into mining, and some learners even drop out of school to make money in this way. Mining has contributed to an upsurge of sex work and robbery in mining communities. This is worsened by the lack of infrastructure such as school, good roads, hospitals, portable water and markets in these areas. Nimons, for instance, has been undertaking a lot of developmental projects in the Ahafo-Twenyas area. To what extent are these Chinese involved in community activities contributing to

development at the local level? Benefits are only seen in the capital despite the effects it has on mining communities.

In the Talensi district for instance, there has not been any development in the area even though Chinese mining company 'SWAZI' has been conducting mining work in the area. Rather we hear about abuse and assault of local people who try to retaliate. (INPANO021, 2021).

The case of Ghana is not different from many in the sub region. According to Vijay (2012), mining is a neo-liberal development practice promoted by multinational corporations (MNCs) leading to a capitalist society. Galamsey and issues around mining have destroyed many sources of livelihood and the cost of fighting illegal mining is huge. More important is the tension between the state and the public. The mortgage of mining communities has recently attracted a lot of protest from locals. These activities and issues surrounding Chinese small scale gold mining led to a protest by A Rocha, a Ghanaian environmental protection group against the government to reverse the commercial bauxite mining plans of Atewa forest landscape (Oteng-Yeboah, 2019).

Atewa forest remains the most resourced landscape in Ghana. It is one of the evergreen forest reserves left in the country after years of pollution destroyed most forests (Smith, 2019). The Water Resources Commission and other forestry specialists have also expressed concern about the long term impact on the ecosystem (Smith, 2019). Campaigns such 'bauxite for development; barter deal' and 'Ghana's pact with China for bauxite mining threatens to ravage a biodiverse forest' has intensified protest against government promoted through reports from key media houses in Ghana; MyJoy news, Starr FM, Atinka FM inter alia with campaigns on long term sustainability of the Atewa forest landscape which serves as an ecological habitat and a mother to many lakes and rivers in the surrounding community; Densu, Birim and Ayensu which derive their major source from Atewa (Bird & Burrows, 2017). Numerous petitions have led to government being sued over bauxite mining and such issues remain unresolved. These growing clamours have also affected efforts to end galamsey. That notwithstanding, the government is applauded for its pragmatic steps to ending galamsey with the hashtag #StopGalamseyNow#. Previous administrations have been criticized for being reluctant due to China's heavy investment in the country (Bird & Burrows, 2017).

Again, the absence of responsive behavior from Chinese governmental and corporate officials with some issues of threat on this bilateral relationship, and their interference with media reports continue to challenge Ghana's fight against galamsey and other malpractices in the country. The three-week ultimatum issued in April 2017, meanwhile led to over 500 excavators and 1,000 dredging machines being removed from illegal mining sites. This policy was also accompanied by an intense advocacy and engagement program aimed at educating miners about the harmful effects of galamsey (Bird & Burrows, 2017). Finally, there are indications that legal enforcement against galamsey is on the rise too. Ghana's Chief Justice recently designated 14 courts to hear illegal mining-related cases in a bid to expedite them (Bird & Burrows, 2017). The issues of galamsey remain relevant in Ghana's contemporary debates.

Again, it appears that the Chinese were not putting measures in place to ensure the safety of the water bodies and other environmental resources. Chinese mining has led to the destruction of farmlands which has led to further influx of locals in Accra, seeking jobs. These locals represent community subsistence farmers whose farmlands have been destroyed by chemicals. This challenge may lead to cramped living conditions in the capital such as the issue of 'kayayae' (Head porter) in the capital. The use of chemicals like mercury, cyanide, and solvents is toxic to the human immune system and causes health deficiencies such as hepatitis B, kidney failure and even brain and heart diseases (Arkorful, et al., 2018). Many people who live in mining communities have health conditions because their only sources of water are being polluted. Most of these villages do not have adequate health facilities or the basic social infrastructure like taps, medical dispensaries, inter alia. These toxic substances can penetrate deep into the land and impact the lives of communities. Diseases such as asthma and pneumonia are among other common respiratory disorders related to mine workers. However, the pollution of water bodies and the deep penetration of mercury and cyanide into the soil has left many with cancer, sinuses and brain infections. However, prior to these high levels pollution, life spans in remote Ghana exceeded the urban rate, but now regional and district clinics and hospitals experience traffic due to the unhealthy practices in their communities. These people are economically disadvantaged; they are the most susceptible to the negative effects of Ghana-China relations. Fertile lands are left muddy while toxic

substances have negatively impacted on many rural lives or left others struggling with expensive medication

5.5. Socio-economic Impact

Ghana faces massive challenges of loose revenue, rising crime, environmental pollution and the effect of hazardous waste. These are promoted through high Chinese influx in trade and artisanal mining which expose locals to fake consumable products and the release of chemical waste in mining leading to poisoning.

Additionally, illicit Chinese behavior and language barriers create dissatisfaction among locals. Chinese migrants are immoral and tend to exhibit behaviors that contradict the Ghanaian culture and tradition (INPANO01, 2019). Ghana is a developing African country which strives on modernity and tradition. Religion and superstition play an important role in community developments, especially in rural Ghana. Locals must respect and conform to such belief systems. This is something Chinese migrants struggle to conform to in mining communities. Even Accra has some traditional practices that are carried out during festivals such as the *homowo* which include a curfew and a ban on any music or noise. These are customs and practices that are embedded in the Ghanaian society. The Chinese often disregard the Ghanaian cultural practices and heritage by refraining from killing some animals. A resident complained that *“these migrants do not have morals or respect for anything. Whatever makes them comfortable, they engage; all they do is make money”*.

Due to a weak national policy on migration, Ghana needs to strengthen efforts to curb the influx of Chinese migrants and associated challenges. Chinese migrants contribute to the migration problem in Ghana. The movement of persons between Ghana and China has led to mass population in Accra (Podcast, 2016) . Currently, Ghana is facing immigration problems not only from Nigerian nationals as promoted through the free movement of person under the ECOWAS treaty but the increase in Chinese nationals in the country as well. The immigration Act, 2000, (Act 573) of the 1992 constitution of Ghana lays provisions for the “admission, residence, employment and removal of foreign nationals.” While it has become conducive for illegal Chinese migrants to stay in Ghana, China embarks on regular immigration

checks on African migrants who have overstayed their visas. Such strict enforcement is effective, especially in the Chocolate city (Guangzhou), which is home to with an estimated 10-20 000 African migrants (Podcast, 2016).

Even though Ghana is experiencing rapid growth in mining, agriculture, innovation in technology and petroleum, the crisis of Chinese relations has negative effects on the country. There is an increased rate in social crises such as poverty, crime, single parenting, sex work and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). This reflects Senegal's experience with the Shanghai beauties. The increase in prostitution and single parenting in rural Ghana is alarming. Despite these challenges, China continues to strike aid and infrastructural deals with the country to secure access to strategic resources for its economic consumptions (Ball & Dagger, 2006).

5.6. Public Perceptions

Perceptions on Chinese role and interest in Africa follows the intensification of local and global concerns. In Ghana public opinion and that of the elites often contrast when it comes to the benefits of Chinese developments in the country. The public often paints a tainted image, whereas the elites praise Chinese investment and interests in Ghana (Plecher , 2020). This contrast often leads to public campaigns and protests in some local communities. Inclusivity and public cooperation are the main indicators of public participation, which should be reflected in democratic decision making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects (Yadav, 1980). The lack of accountability and transparency on the part of the Ghanaian government and its officials has created a gap in public involvement, on Chinese activities in the country. Widespread apathy is promoted through such misinformation, pioneered by the public. Perceptions about Chinese relations vary depending on interests, but one thing commonly accepted is that anything of low quality is definitely from China. The media also sets an alarmist tone about Chinese colonial interests in Ghana, which is driving Ghana to a debt build-up. Social media has become a platform for making jokes out of the Ghana-China crisis. These provoking comments arouse fear and spitefulness among locals on migrants.

The Chinese are described as racist, dirty and remorseless in their actions and they tend to indulge individuals and institutions in corrupt practices (INPANO028, 2020). Some respondents also explained that the Chinese pose a security threat because they are armed with sophisticated weapons used in clubs, casino and mines, especially on individuals who challenge Chinese supremacists.

According to some locals, roads constructed by the Chinese tend to wear off quickly due to the use of cheap materials. Chinese constructed footbridges especially from Atomic to Adenta are criticized for being a useless waste of resources. Compared to Tetteh Quashie Roundabout-Accra. It takes twice the time to complete the cycle of the footbridge at Assemblies, Adenta-Madina road. According to popular opinion, the government is believed to be the only stakeholder benefiting from Chinese relations in cash and/or kind (INPANO025, 2020). Many blame the government for Chinese exploitation of resources and even agree that elites betray Ghana for their campaign policies and parochial needs. Ghana is believed to be an extension of China soon to be colonized. Many hold the view that Ghana benefits nothing from its relations based on how aid is given; the conduct of trade and businesses; deployment of building and construction materials; the exploitation of minerals and the failed effects of loans to enhance sustainable growth in Ghana, all of which make Chinese relations and interests in Ghana questionable.

Again, it is believed that the presence of the Chinese has intensified conflict and tension in Ghana (Sarpong, 2015). Beijing does not have respect for Africans and tends to put up a diplomatic face which does not support its real intentions. Chinese developmental projects in Ghana are a scam, often attractive in disguise

There is no explicit local policy on Ghana-Chinese relations, an internal weakness which critics note as the key reason for China's freedom to undermine locals, their culture and resources. This, coupled with corruption and political dynamism has provided breeding ground for illicit practices by Chinese immigrants, despite pragmatic anti-corruption policies in Ghana (Taylor, 2020). It is more difficult to even trace negotiations of an individual-to-individual nature. Nevertheless, the strong nature of the informal Ghanaian economy limits these relations to

the absence of legal documentation and constitutional support. China has been accused of neo-colonization, an approach that allows Beijing to position itself as global superpower. This indeed disrupts governance and Chinese diplomacy in Ghana (Taylor, 2020).

5.7. Positives Impact of Ghana-China Relations

Notwithstanding, it is fair to recognize some of the positive contributions of China's relations with Ghana. This includes 60 years (1960-2020) of cooperation and strong diplomatic relations . Chinese infrastructural development and aid support allows Ghana to secure loans with limited conditions, something that would have taken years to obtain from the global financial system. Such infrastructural and development assistance has led to improved human and physical development in Ghana . More recently, China committed to sending Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Ghana during the Corona crisis. In April 2020, Rebecca Akufo-Addo, wife of the Ghanaian president, received a set of masks and thermometers as assistance from the Chinese government in fighting the covid-19 pandemic (Huaxia, 2020). A second batch of medical supplies was provided in September 2020 (GGTN News, 2020)

Chapter Six

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

6.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the main results of the paper and then concludes with recommendations. From the findings, it was established that China is a foe rather than a friend to Ghana. Ghana-China relations which are supposedly driven by mutual support and benefits have seen a massive dominance of China over the years, which is visible in the uncertainties and the asymmetrical power dynamics seen in the three levels of interaction. Whether engagement takes place at the state, business or individual levels, benefits are not reciprocal. From the state level, the interactions and agreements between Ghana and China are neither partnership nor a relation. Here our focus was on agreements and the level of diplomacy established by these regions towards a common goal. What level of control does Ghana have in this relationship and how does the politics of power play out in promoting the foreign policy of Ghana, specifically with regards to trade? The individual and business level analysis is more of a relation. Individuals in these two regions seeks opportunities and conduct actions in the absence of any state influence. These relations have given individuals autonomy which is driven by equal gains.

6.2. Summary of Findings

I discussed how through trade Chinese imports have led to the influx of inferior products which does not only have implications on health but contributes to poor waste management in Ghana. The research findings indicate that exports are limited to specific minerals and resources, while imports are unlimited, with increased Chinese manufactured goods in Ghana. Today, local markets are flooded with multiple products ranging from automobiles, consumable, fashion, décor and building materials.

Again, there is a little boost on primary industrial exports in terms of agri-business (farming, fishing). South Africa, Europe and the US remain as Ghana's key trading partners in terms of

export destinations, while China remains Accra's strongest import base, promoted by trade liberalisation which has led to the crippling of the Ghanaian local economy due to influx, unhealthy competition and the comparative advantage of Chinese products. The price difference and large-scale production among many has led to the collapse of many local industries like textiles, expanding the unemployment rate in Ghana while such industries are directed to Beijing; creating job opportunities for China.

Further, China's relations with Ghana have led to law violations and increased bribe culture. Chinese engagement entirely lacks ethical compliance. This study explored how Chinese corporations and individual businesses delude Ghanaians by engaging in fraudulent acts. These include making counterfeit textiles, automobiles and machines, hair extensions, footwear and other consumable products. Again, we looked at how institutions, public officials and individuals are influenced by corrupt practices of gift taking or bribery. Both, national demographic statistics and the embassy of China cannot account for the total number of Chinese in Ghana, or their residence status and businesses as a result of corruption and the ill-equipped immigration mechanism in Ghana. There is a high level of extraction, smuggling of minerals and pollution of the environment in Ghana.

Chinese investments promote illegal mining in Ghana. Most Chinese traders come for the sake of mining and later shift to trade. Chinese mining promotes pollution and degradation, leading to chaos and tension in mining communities. There is also a manifestation of crime and robbery in these communities.

Findings indicate that the lack of monitoring and evaluation of these legal mining companies by the government breeds practices of Chinese small-scale mining in the country. These companies either conduct their activities under recognized mining companies or under the authority of traditional leaders, and the sensitivity of land issues in Ghana provides another opportunity for Chinese miners in this regard. This complexity makes it easier for migrants to employ unlawful practices in mining. From our findings, Chinese miners were found in small villages in the Ashanti, eastern and upper west regions. That notwithstanding, mine resources help feed revenue and the Ghanaian workforce.

Even though, Ghana has witnessed many infrastructural developments in industries such as education, entertainment, transport, technological and health, owing to loans and aid from the Chinese government and corporate businesses, such developments do not transcend to improve livelihoods for the majority of the population. There has been physical development in Ghana, aided by China, but this does not lead to social development in the country.

Chinese investment has led to increased communication and little time spent on travels. An example is Fufusu-Swala road in the Savana region of Ghana and the Kojokrom-Eshiem railway project. On project assessment, Chinese contractors complete project faster compared to locals. On cost and quality, Chinese labour is expensive and these projects are not long lasting. On the evaluation of knowledge and skills assessment, there is a continuous transfer of knowledge and skills in technology and technical skills from China to Ghana in this era of industrial revolution. China supports Ghana in capacity building by providing scholarships and other sponsored programs to students and state officials in the areas of communication, agriculture, energy, fisheries and ministry. On the individual and business level, we see improvements in a variety of sectors, which include trading, leisure and entertainment.

Chinese loans are more flexible which presents Ghana with alternative development partners and introduces aid policies that allow Ghana to advance its own approach to development with limited conditions.

Despite the effort by Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo to establish a Consulate in Guangzhou Province to cater for the welfare of Ghanaians in China, several reports have outlined the difficulties faced by African migrants, in assimilating into Chinese societies (Podcast, 2016). This is argued in line with Chinese racism which contrasts the treatment of migrants in Ghana. The current issues on Chinese racism make it difficult to comprehend the mutual respect and solidarity which supposedly emanate from their relations. Our findings indicate that respect is experienced at the national levels between governments. However, locals experienced racism in tendencies such as abuse, bias and maltreatment in Chinese firms. Again, Chinese attacks on blacks during the Corona pandemic in 2020 re-echoed the level of disrespect levied against blacks and how the Chinese conceive Africans. By exposing African migrants in

Guangzhou to bullying and forced testing. China has confirmed among many allegations of racism and xenophobia. Beijing cannot claim to respect Africa and expose Africans to such ills. Such supremacism exposes the vulnerabilities of Africans and in the words of Nana Addo Dankwa; ‘the respect of black people everywhere is embedded in respect of the African continent’.

It can be deduced from the study that Ghana, like any other Africa country, is becoming an extension of China. A comparison of Ghanaian migrants in China and Chinese migrants in Accra explains the disparities in treatment by locals in either context. While many Ghanaian migrants embark on educational, vocational and technical training or businesses trips to China, Accra is inundated with Chinese workers or businesses. Chinese investment deals continue to prioritize workers and materials from China even when such services are available in Ghana. It has been established that China takes advantage of weak African countries which do not have strong policies to protect local populations. The activities of Chinese migrants in Ghana and that of South Africa is supported in this evaluation. China embarks on bribery and corruption which does not only stay at the state level but is also spearheaded by corporate and individual businesses; currently involving traditional and local leaders and even children who are vulnerable due to the dynamics of poverty in rural Ghana. This explains that China presents Ghana with challenges that retard growth and development in the country.

6.3. Recommendations

6.3.1. Education and Research

It is recommended that research and public education through which Ghana can develop an agency of influence be undertaken in Ghana. This will be promoted by investing in statistical data through crowd sourcing to adopt empirical methods in solving challenges of Chinese development in Ghana. Government must fund the collection of data and support experiments that develop testable predictions and approachable solutions to sustainable Ghana-China relations.

In order to bridge the gap in terms of lack of understanding between the media, the state and the public, there is a need to support large media institutions in Ghana by providing them with basic resources for an improved communication mechanism. Clearly, there is a need to reduce such pressure on the media houses in Ghana and to establish media institutions in the absence of any interference. Public education must be prioritized with authentic news under the support of good media houses.

6.3.2. Performance

Ghana must develop its own developmental mechanism that focuses on social sustainability rather than the western notion of environmental and economic development. Ghana can borrow from China and embark on creating such industries in Beijing that would give it an advantage over of the market in China. Such opportunities will provide employment for deploying Ghanaian to work in China.

6.3.3. Diplomatic Advocacy

Ghana must adopt a pragmatic national diplomacy, which include involving traditional leaders as agents of change in policy and implementation. This will ensure that local leaders are abreast with issues on Ghana-China 'relations' and will not be victims of corruption through such visits initiated by the Chinese embassy in Ghana.

6.3.4. Policy Change and Implementation

Ghana struggles with effective policy implementation which contributes to challenges with immigration, mining and the control of its markets. The limited to no policy frameworks and laws on migration have led to weak management of internal and international migrants. The solution lies in the problem itself; a need to exercise a high level of pragmatism the collection of census and immigration data. Ghana must work with demographic data to prevent the overpopulation of Chinese migrants as is it is with the case of Nigerians in the country.

The monitoring of migrants' activities is key to easing challenges in mining communities. Such controls on immigration policy should be introduced by Nana Addo's government by tightening visa requirements for Chinese travelling to Ghana. These should be extended into

a specific policy that deals strictly with China in terms of customs, influx and environmental regulations.

There is a need for nationalization of the mining industry in Ghana. The state must prioritize this by taking steps to create a body responsible for buying minerals in Ghana. This body will provide such services supported through legal strategies to curb the issue of smuggling and the loose of revenue through illicit mine trade. The long-term goal will be to create a collective body representative of Ghana mines on the global market, supported through comprehensive and pragmatic policies. This will give value to Ghana's products. Ghana must also provide licenses for the sale of minerals like gold, diamond and bauxite. This will require dealers to present proof on how to trace the origin regarding such minerals.

Effective supervision and monitoring by state actors and agencies such as random sampling and testing of Chinese products in the market and the banning on any unhealthy item found in the market even when such brands had previous license to trade. Loose immigration and border leakages must be eradicated by strengthening the borders and making sure each imported item is checked, securitizing persons and consumable goods.

Existing policy frameworks in Ghana need to be amended. There is a need for an international business policy framework to be developed to directly control Chinese businesses in Ghana under labour laws and the International Business Act of the 1992 constitution of Ghana. Efforts such as the revision of the 1994 population policy should be prioritized in this regard. A very important incentive that should be created by the Ghanaian governing is to motivate Chinese recruitment of highly skilled employees in Ghana, for national development purposes, while promoting bilateral and multilateral agreements that foster good work ethics in Ghana, such as monitoring mechanisms for foreign businesses, which will aid in curbing the Chinese's continuous violation of citizens.

6.3.5. Behavioural Change

There is need for a high level of patriotism in Ghana. The state must work together with the public in fighting greed, bribery and corruption linked to Chinese businesses. Again, such

infrastructural benefit must be tailored to rural communities to enhance spatial distribution of benefits and prevent urban-migration in the country.

6.3.6. Strengthening and empowering both internal and external mechanism

The public and corporates should be empowered through resources in audit, control of oversight and policy development. The public must provide such revenue to aid debt financing and adopt a shareholder or sole proprietorship financing of minor infrastructural development.

There is an idiom which implies that “Whoever gives you food determines what you eat, how you eat and how much to eat” Ghana must be empowered beyond aid and loans. There is a need to debunk the idea that Ghana thrives on loans. A starting point will be to initiate projects which enable foreign donors like China to co-sponsor infrastructure developmental projects in the country. The Ghanaian government can build sub-technological institutions to guard up the skills of its citizens to fit industry and economic demand in support of Nana Addo’s ‘Ghana beyond aid’ agenda. This can be done by investing in production and manufacturing through technological and market reforms where the one-district-one-factory can be transformed to target different production peculiar to Africa. Ghana can become the hub for Africa.

Ghana must exercise greater control of its internal market by working through its porous border and immigration and aiding locals with resources to support made in Ghana products.

Again, sectors of the Ghanaian economy which have been disrupted or collapsed due to foreign competition must be resourced and revamped. This includes the textile industry, manufacturing of local soaps, food and other consumable goods. The Ghanaian government must promote such local initiatives through sectors such as technical, vocational, technological and industries. Since about 50% of the Ghanaian economy thrives on entrepreneurship, the government can do better in these private sectors, by providing such support and innovative mechanism.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

Trade, investment and aid are at the heart of Ghana's relations with China. China seeks resources, markets and influence in Ghana. From the study, Chinese investment and development assistance is a cover up for its true intentions to conquer and control. Like the realist, China advocates for its own benefits and this impact appears to be more negative than positive, just by looking at the social sustainability of Ghana from 2000-2020, not disputing the fact that some opportunities are created for commercial and infrastructural development.

Again, Covid-19 has introduced new challenges which have necessitated shifts in business and market approaches. It is therefore important to adopt reforms that are directed towards this shift in the global economy with emphasis on how Ghana can sustain itself.

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Interview Schedule

DATE	INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT NUMBER (INPANO)	PROFESSION	LOCATION
17/12/19	INPANO001	Resident	Akyem-Ahafo
19/12/19	INPANO002	Mine worker	Akyem-Newmont Mining Corporation
26/12/19	INPANO003	Staff	Confucius Institute at the University of Ghana
28/12/19	INPANO004	Staff	Confucius Institute at the University of Ghana
29/12/19	INPANO005	Student	University of Ghana -Legon
30/12/19	INPANO006	Student	University of Ghana -Legon
01/01/20	INPANO007	Trader	Korle Bu, close to Makola market
01/01/20	INPANO008	Trader	Korle Bu
03/01/20	INPANO009	Lecturer	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology- Kumasi
03/01/20	INPANO010	Lecturer	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology - Kumasi
03/01/20	INPANO011	Student	Kwame University of Science and Technology-Kumasi
04/01/20	INPANO012	Resident	Obuasi
04/01/20	INPANO013	Resident	Obuasi
04/01/20	INPANO014	Mine worker	AngloGold Ashanti-Obuasi
14/01/20	INPANO015	Business woman	Accra Market- Makola
14/01/20	INPANO016	Business Woman	Accra Market- Makola
17/01/20	INPANO017	Mine worker	Ateiku-Wassa
17/01/20	INPANO018	Mine Worker	Ateiku- Wassa

17/01/20	INPANO019	Resident and a Mine worker	Wassa Gold Mine - Eastern
19/01/20	INPANO020	Worker	Talensi Small Scale
19/01/20	INPANO021	Resident	Talensi Nabdem District
19/01/20	INPANO022	Resident	Taleni Nabdam District
21/01/20	INPANO023	Importer/ Businessman	Accra Market-Tudu
21/01/20	INPANO024	Togolese Importer	Accra Market- Tudu
21/01/20	INPANO025	Trader	Accra Market -Tudu
22/01/20	INPANO026	Student and Researcher	Accra
22/01/20	INPANO027	Researcher	Accra
22/01/20	INPANO028	Student -University of Ghana	Accra
22/01/20	INPANO029	Student -University of Ghana	Accra
24/01/20	INPANO030	Resident	Atuna-Jaman
24/01/20	INPANO031	Resident	Atuna-Jaman
24/01/20	INPANO032	Resident	Atuna-Jaman
24/01/20	INPANO033	Resident	Atuna- Jaman
25/02/20	INPANO034	Staff	Accra -Ministry of Information
25/01/20	INPANO035	Staff	Accra -Ministry of Information

Appendix: Interview Questions



UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
IYUNIVESITHI YASEKAPA • UNIVERSITEIT VAN KAAPSTAD

Faculty of Humanities
Department of Political Studies

Interview schedule for key informants

1. What are your thoughts on Ghana-China relations?
2. What is your understanding of Chinese development projects in Ghana?
3. What do you think are the positive effects of Ghana's partnership with China?
4. What are your sentiments regarding the benefit of ongoing mining and construction activities that are conducted by Chinese in your area?
5. What do you think are the negative effects of Ghana's partnership with China?
6. What are your sentiments regarding the challenges of ongoing mining and construction activities that are undertaken by Chinese in your area?
7. In what ways do you think Ghana can address the challenges posed by Chinese activities in the country?

Thank you for your time and contributions to the study.