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**Selective Suppression: Relations between Civil Society Organizations and
the State in Zimbabwe**

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of Philosophy in Development Studies Degree**

Supervisor

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Date: 11/01/2021

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my late father Mark Muza Mpani. I am walking through the doors you once prayed for.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.P.P. A	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
A.R.T.U. Z	Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
A. U	African Union
P.O.S. A	Public Order and Security Act
M.D.C	Movement for Democratic Change
M.O.P. A	Maintenance of Peace and Order
S.A.D.C	Southern African Development Community
N.C. A	National Constitution Assembly
N.G. O	Non-Governmental Organization
L.R. F	Legal Resources Foundation
Z.A.N.U. P. F	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
Z.C.T. U	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
Z.F.T. U	Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions

ABSTRACT

This study assessed whether civil society organizations in Zimbabwe that have previously been suppressed by the state, currently experience any change in their relations with the state under the Mnangagwa Presidency. I adopted a case study approach to comparatively assess the experiences of two civil society organizations relations with the state over a two- year period. The two case studies are of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ). Selected media sources, including the organizations' social media (i.e., Facebook, websites, and Twitter) and non-state news media, were used to obtain mainly qualitative data and basic numerical information. Gramsci's theory of hegemony and Foucault's concept of 'panoptic surveillance' informed my analytical framework. The findings show that state suppression is at the core of the relations between state and civil society organizations that are critical of the state in Zimbabwe. The recurring forms of suppression include arrests, detention, assaults, abduction, torture, raids, theft, surveillance, judicial harassment, cyber-attacks/smear campaigns, travel bans, salary cessation and abuse. The findings suggest that ongoing state suppression is worse than during the latter part of Mugabe's Presidency. Selective suppression of targeted civil society organizations that are critical of the state also reflects diminishing democracy in Zimbabwe. This appears to be a general pattern in the region and one possible reason why bodies such as African Union and the Southern African Development Community are reluctant to discipline member states, including Zimbabwe, for human rights violations or state repression of critics.

Key words: civil society, state, suppression, Zimbabwe, ARTUZ, ZCTU

'Let us bury our differences and rebuild a new and prosperous Zimbabwe, a country that is tolerant of divergent views, a country that respects opinion of others' (Meldrum, 2017): President Mnangagwa addressing supporters in a statement issued to the media on the 8th of November 2017

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

In Zimbabwe, relations between the state and civil society organizations that are critical of the state have been strained since the early days of independence. Literature (Tarugarira, 2011; Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014; Moyo, 1992) shows that the post independent government of Zimbabwe led by Robert Mugabe viewed many civil society organizations with suspicion and having ulterior motives. They were caricatured as a residue of white interests clinging to privilege. Notwithstanding this general rhetoric, in the early 1980s the new state under Robert Mugabe and the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), tended to view civil society organizations through a binary lens: either as partners collaborating with the state or enemies of the newly liberated Zimbabwe. For example, in the early 1980s Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had a close working relationship with the state, but the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) was seen to be hostile towards the state. Mugabe and his ruling party saw CCJP as a remnant of white interests and an enemy of the state (Moyo, 1992).

Relations between civil society organizations, including ZCTU, began to deteriorate in the late 1980s and by the late 1990s, with the introduction of Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP), relations became hostile. The emergence of pro-democracy groups such as National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to further hostility and suppression of all civil society organizations that were critical of the state. By then, many civil society organizations were viewed by the state as anti-government and 'regime change' agents whose aim was to destabilise the country (Bulawayo Bureau, 2018).

In Mugabe's era civil society organizations pushed for accountability by state by voicing public displeasure not only about the proposals of a one-party state, but also against corruption and other human rights violations which were being committed by the state

(Tarugarira, 2011). From the late 1990s onwards, during Mugabe's era, civil society organizations such as Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CIZC), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) experienced state suppression. The state during this period introduced restrictive regulations, which included the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA). These laws were designed to curb civil society activism and to curtail civil and political rights (Bhebhe and Mahapa,2014; Kagoro,2010).

The coup d'état - or 'military assisted transition' – on 24 November 2017 by Emmerson Mnangagwa removed Mugabe as President. Mnangagwa was a prominent Mugabe ally for many years and served as the Vice-President until Mugabe dismissed him. He was officially inaugurated as President on 26 August 2018, after ZANU-PF won the 2018 general election. When Mnangagwa became president, he publicly claimed he was ushering in 'a new dispensation' (Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 2018). Chikohomero (2018) posits that Mnangagwa promised 'much more political freedom' and initially showed signals of 'being more open to other actors and voices'. Mnangagwa raised expectations when he promised to 'open Zimbabwe for business', observe human rights and political reforms, which promote internal and external relations and economic development (Chikohomero, 2018).

In his inauguration speeches both in November 2017 and August 2018 Mnangagwa promised radical reforms that he said would foster 're-engagement' (Daily Maverick, 2018). His public relations team and the state media painted him as a reformist who was serious about opening up the democratic space and allowing citizens and organizations to enjoy their democratic rights. The new government proposed a raft of measures to promote the observance of equity and freedom and committed itself to good governance and a movement towards further democratisation, human rights and the rule of law (Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 2018). Reconfiguring state-civil society relations was also part of the promises made (Chikohomero, 2018).

Mnangagwa pledged to replace Mugabe-era legislation that obstructs press freedom and the right to protest and to set up an international inquiry into abuses by state security forces (Kingsley and Jeffrey Moyo, 2019). He promised to cultivate a culture of debate and contestation, and ensure it permeated through the Zimbabwean society.

Many Zimbabweans and stakeholders in the international community questioned the extent to which this ‘new dispensation’ was a genuine break with the past and whether, as the new leader, Mnangagwa had the ability to change the country’s trajectory.

My study was motivated by my interest in testing the extent to which relations between the state and the previously suppressed civil society organizations had changed under the new president. My thesis sought to investigate if organizations that are critical of the state, experience more or less state suppression in Mnangagwa era compared to the Mugabe era. This study used a range of media sources (e.g., online sources, media reports and Twitter feeds), to assess selected civil society organizations current relations with the state from the perspective of civil society. More specifically, this research project adopted a case study approach and focused on two organizations that experienced suppression during the Mugabe era, in order to assess their current relations with the state. These organizations are the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ). These organizations were chosen because they (and their members) have been monitored, curtailed, restricted, and had their human rights violated through harassment over a period of many years. The period under investigation for this research was from November 2017 to February 2020; in other words, the first 2 years under the new President.

I also used this study of state suppression of some civil society organizations as a crude yardstick to assess the levels selected features of democracy in Zimbabwe, including freedom of speech and freedom of association.

The central research question for my study was:

‘What do we learn at the beginning of the Mnangagwa period in Zimbabwe from selected media sources about the current nature of relations between the state and civil society organizations that have historically been subjected to state suppression?’

The thesis is organized into eight chapters and the chapters unfolds as follows:

- Chapter one comprises the study introduction as well as the significance of the study.
- Chapter two presents a description of the organizations under study.
- Chapter three presents civil society and state relations in the region and historically in Zimbabwe under the Mugabe era.
- Chapter four focuses on conceptualizing of the research problem.

- Chapter five is the methodology used in this research.
- Chapter six presents the study findings of this study.
- Chapter seven is the discussion and analysis of study findings.
- Chapter eight is the conclusion of the thesis.

I now turn to a description of the two organizations that are the focus of my thesis.

CHAPTER 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS

2.1 Introductory Note

This chapter seeks to give a synopsis of the organizations included in my study. I focus on their nature: what they do, their goals and the history of their relationships with the state. This will provide insight into what each these organizations do as well as their mission, values, and historical background.

2.2 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)

ZCTU is an umbrella organization that represents most of the labour force in Zimbabwe (Gwisai, 2002). It was formed on February 28, 1981, with the primary objective of reducing industrial disagreement and refining the effect of the government on the union movement (Gwisai, 2002). Its mission since inception has been to encourage, progress and protect the economic, social, and constitutional liberties of employees by securing legal, political, democratic and good governance framework in Zimbabwe (Gwisai, 2002).

2.3 Historical Background

The preliminary leadership of the organization in 1981 was politically aligned to the government led by Robert Mugabe. Subsequently, the ZCTU leadership was accused of corruption and was removed in 1984. This paved the way to a more independent outfit, which took over the reins in 1985. The thrust of this new leadership outfit was to promote, safeguard and push for economic, social, political, democratic, and good governance in Zimbabwe (ZCTU, 2019).

Numerous studies have shown that the organization has been historically suppressed, harassed, and terrorized by the state because of this critical stance (Gwisai, 2002; Kagoro, 2010; Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014; Sachikonye, Raftopoulos and Kanyenze, 2018). The independent leadership which was drawn from other professionally administered unions in 1985 took a radical and vocal stance against the government and this saw the birth of a more confrontational relationship between the state and ZCTU. Sachikonye, Raftopoulos and Kanyenze (2018:263) reiterate that during this period fragile relationship had emerged between the state and the labour movement. (Bhebhe and Mahapa 2014:70) explain: 'The relationship between the government and ZCTU completely broke down when the ZCTU leadership decided to make the trade union

into an autonomous entity, breaking away from its association with ZANU—PF in 1989'. This move ushered in a protracted era of resentment between ZCTU and the Government of Zimbabwe. Raftopoulos and Phimister (1997) reiterate that throughout this time ZCTU pressed hard for accountability and transparency on the part of the state. The unions voiced their discontentment with the state's proposal of a one-party system and corruption scandals, such as the Willow Gate Car Scandal, and endorsed demonstrations by the students at the University of Zimbabwe against state corruption (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 1997).

In addition, since its fall out with the state in the early 1980s, the organization has taken a more autonomous, critical position against the state. The rift between ZCTU and the state under Mugabe was further widened after the introduction of the neoliberal orientated Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991 (ZCTU, 2019). Bhebhe and Mahapa (2014); Gwisai (2002); ZCTU (2019) reiterate that, as hardships arising from the introduction of ESAP and associated austerity measures increased, relations between the state and ZCTU worsened. Good governance in the state deteriorated and the ZCTU increasingly became the torch bearer for alternative governance. The Mugabe regime increasingly resorted to hostile actions to redeem its fading political backing (ZCTU, 2019). Deteriorating governance in state structures in Zimbabwe during that period compelled ZCTU to become an alternative leader in championing good governance (ZCTU, 2019). The relationship soured to the extent that President Mugabe in 1993 refused to attend any Worker's Day celebrations organised by ZCTU (Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014). Robert Mugabe suspected the leaders of ZCTU of having a concealed motive and this heightened tensions between the government and the trade union.

Furthermore, in an effort to affect a fundamental policy shift which is not anti-worker, the ZCTU was instrumental in the establishment of an alternative political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Gwisai, 2002). It should be noted that the top leadership of this political party came from the labour movement. This move was a major turning point in the relationship between state and ZCTU, as this intensified the rift between them. MDC was tasked with championing labour issues and bringing to the fore those issues which the Mugabe government had failed to address. As a result of this, a majority of labour leaders and trade union activists were commissioned with assembling a grassroots movement to embark on a national sensitization crusade to generate support for the new movement (ZCTU, 2019). In response to this move, the

state under Robert Mugabe sought various ways to quell the growing ZCTU influence. For example, government introduced the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) as a contender to weaken ZCTU (ZCTU, 2019). ZCTU (2019) reports that, in April 2001, war veterans at the instigation of Robert Mugabe stormed factories, to apparently resolve labour disagreements. Their involvement in labour issues disrupted normal processes of industrial relations and worsened relations between state and ZCTU. The state interference using war veterans also paved the way for the suppression and harassment of the trade union federation.

Similarly, Robert Mugabe also used the law to suppress and harass the union. The President Powers (Temporary Measures) Act of 1998 was propagated to outlaw strike action and stay-aways. (ZCTU, 2019). NANGO (2013) and Kagoro (2010) reiterate that the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) was also grafted into the Presidential Powers Act of 1998 with the same intention of preventing the union from striking or demonstrating. Over the years, Under Robert Mugabe's rule, ZCTU members became a target of state harassment, while its leadership became victim to incessant surveillance, malicious defamation, arrest, abduction, and torture, over the years. Thus, the ZCTU has a history of harassment and torture by the state, which informed my decision to include it in this study.

2.4 Amalgamated Rural Teachers Association (ARTUZ)

ARTUZ is an organization that started in 2009. It is a self-governing, subject-founded union, and its main focus is on the improvement of the working conditions of rural teachers as well as the right to education for children in the rural areas of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ, 2019). Since 2009, ARTUZ has been constantly pushing for all-encompassing access to quality education, labour fairness and a democratic Zimbabwe. ARTUZ was officially founded on March 12, 2013, in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The launch of the ARTUZ set the wheels in motion for the development and improvement of the working conditions of the rural teachers employed by the state and the citizens' livelihoods in the rural areas of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ, 2019).

2.5 Historical Background

The organization has been historically suppressed by the state because of its fight for labour justice in Zimbabwe. ARTUZ (2019) notes that the idea to form a union to

represent teachers in the rural areas was prompted by the introduction of Mugabe's Action Inducement Scheme, in which teachers were to get 10% of levy paid by pupils (ARTUZ,2019). This scheme profited the already-advantaged urban teacher and sidelined the already-impooverished rural teacher; hence there was need to challenge the government against such a policy. This saw the beginning of a long-drawn-out period of bitterness between ARTUZ and the Government of Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe and his ruling ZANU PF party tried to decimate the union. Multiple forms of suppression were employed by the state in order to try and achieve this. Under Mugabe's rule, the state mistreated the teacher's union in a plethora of ways ranging from judicial harassment, abductions and torture to assaults in a quest for its selfish political interests. As a result of the teacher union's radical stance on labour justice, a number of demonstrations such as the 'pockets out' protest organized by the union, angered the Mugabe regime (ARTUZ, 2019). These prompted the state to activate repressive apparatus to deal with the organization in a more brutal manner.

ARTUZ (2019) postulates that because of the teachers union's dissenting voice, the state under Robert Mugabe further founded and funded an opposing union with a name similar to ARTUZ in order to cause confusion amongst its members and partners. This was done to reduce ARTUZ's membership. The state also infiltrated ARTUZ in order to cause divisions within the organization. The state constantly tried to pressurize and delegitimize ARTUZ through state sanctioned violence and mass media campaigns, which involved tarnishing the reputations of the organization and its leaders (ARTUZ, 2019), which has contributed to the hostile relations between state and the teachers' union.

Furthermore, the government actively repressed the union by forcing rural teachers to go to ZANU PF political gatherings, to donate money to fund ZANU PF political events and donate their domestic property in the form of sofas, tables, kitchen utensils and cutlery (ARTUZ, 2019). For example, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (2017) also notes that the ARTUZ members were in some instances coerced to donate money ranging from \$1 to \$10 to finance ZANU PF activities and rallies. Another example is that schools staffed by ARTUZ members had to make buses available for ZANU PF's rallies. This was the nature of the abusive relationship that the union suffered at the behest of Robert Mugabe. The rights of rural teachers' choices and of freedom of association were violated during Robert Mugabe's era. The union's relations with the state were worsened as union

members were victimized, abused, wrongly accused and even forced to vote as assisted voters yet they were well educated and without any disabilities (Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, 2017). Thus, ARTUZ has a history of suppression by the state and its as members have often been targeted by ZANU PF officials.

CHAPTER 3: CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE RELATIONS IN THE REGION AND HISTORICALLY IN ZIMBABWE DURING THE MUGABE ERA

3.1 Introductory Note

The chapter draws on relevant literature to discuss the nature of civil society-state relations in Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 to the end of the Mugabe era in 2017, and recent patterns of civil society-state relations in the Southern African region. This is valuable in order to help us see the historical patterns of suppression by the state of civil society organizations in Zimbabwe and whether they are similar or different to the general patterns in the region. These regional patterns can help explain the responses of regional intergovernmental structures such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) to suppression in Zimbabwe, a discussion I will further elaborate on later. The regional countries include Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa.

3.2 Civil Society and State Relations in the Region

While there is diversity in relations between civil society and the state in the region, there are some emerging commonalities. Discussion on civil society organizations' working operations and relations with state in post-independent Africa has exhibited at times incompatible relations between the state and civil society (Wondsen, 2009). However, there is a growing negative trend of varying degrees of suppression in the region that is becoming the norm. Vava (2019) reiterates that civil society organizations' work in the region is becoming dangerous as various governments in the region have devised various nefarious strategies to restrict civic space for democratic activity. Subsequently, countries like Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and, to some extent, South Africa have enacted stringent laws to control, curtail and monitor the operations of civil society organizations who have a dissenting voice (Vava, 2019). Forquilha (2019) Twalnegeti (2019), and Vava (2019) reveal that recently there have been growing efforts and a change in tactics by governments in the region in a bid to shrink the available democratic space. As a result, state-civil society relations in the region have been characterised as either strained or antagonistic as the regional governments have followed a similar fashion or pattern of making use of draconian strategies such as violence, naked security service brutality, increased arrests, abductions, surveillance of civic

leaders and activists, and the enactment of draconian laws which restrict civil society organization's working space (Vava, 2019). Countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and South Africa have varying degrees of suppression, but the trend is similar - i.e. increasing suppression over the past 10 years.

In Mozambique, civil society organizations are lawfully recognised in both legal and political discourse. While the legal and policy framework in Mozambique exhibit openness of civic space the reality is that the state has shown an equally increasing trend of restriction and obstruction of civic space (Forquilha, 2019). The restrictions and obstructions have been introduced in a number of ways, which include state agents using their excessive discretionary power in preventing access to information by citizens and civil society organizations. Forquilha (2019:35) reiterates that state institutions in Mozambique 'have been intolerant to any attempts by the media, civil society organizations and social justice activists to investigate and understand the real context of events that significantly impact the lives of citizens'. In addition, civil society/state relations have been marred with conflict in Mozambique as civil society organizations working on critical aspect of governance have suffered from state repressive tactics. Forquilha (2019) notes that these organizations have been victims of state sanctioned intimidation, abductions, seditions and even murder. There is also a growing smear campaign of civil society organizations being conducted by the state in order to discredit and immobilise the organizations. Forquilha (2019) posits that the state has discriminated and labelled civil society organizations who oppose and challenge the state as 'external agents' or 'anti-patrióticas' who are operating in defence of other interests which are not national. Civil society organizations while being an inextricable part of Mozambique's development process, the evidence provided shows a growing trend in state suppression of civil society organization in Mozambique due to increased limitations on their operational space.

Similarly, in Tanzania, relations between state and civil society over the past decade have been characterized by stricter state control as the state has continued unabated to enact stringent laws that curtail civil society operations in the country. Twalnegeti (2019) notes that laws such as Newspapers Act 1976, The National Security Act 1970, Civil Service Act 1989, Public Leadership Code of Ethics 1995, The Cybercrimes Act, 2015 and The Statistics Act, 2015 have been enacted and not repealed by the successive regimes in Tanzania with the sole aim of monitoring and suppressing civil society organizations.

These laws according to Twalnegeti (2019) ‘have adversely affected the rights of civil society organizations and the people to freely express themselves’. In addition, Twalnegeti (2019) argues that the Special Bill Supplement No. 21 Vol. 100 was tabled and grants extreme authority to regulators and registrars of civil society organizations in Tanzania. Twalnegeti (2019;15) argues that ‘the Minister and in all cases the amendment does not define the offense or criteria of de-registration of a civil society organization but has made it the prerogative of the Minister of Community Development, Gender and Children’. This suggests that a growing trend of civil society state suppression in the region as state relations in Tanzania is under intense strain as their efforts to protect and safeguard the democratic space has been met with an iron fist. The state has proved to be highly suspicious towards civil society organizations and therefore it has repeatedly made frantic efforts to thwart and immobilise their activities as argued by Twalnegeti (2019) above.

Furthermore, in Zambia, state-civil society relations have been strained as the state has censored civil society organizations in making critical issues known to the public. Broadcasting entities are not allowed to give civil society organizations air play because of their dissenting voices. Mwamba, F (n.d.) asserts that the current state administration under President Lungu is in the process of heavily financing the purchase of software to spy on civil society leaders and organizations. Mwamba notes that the Zambian government recently bought the Pegasus spyware which they will connect on devices of opponents and civic leaders, as the country prepares for 2021 elections. According to Mwamba (n.d.) ‘Pegasus is capable of reading text messages, tracking calls, collecting passwords, tracing the location of the phone, and gathering information from apps. Restrictive laws such as The Public Order Act and the NGO Act of 2009 have been abused by the state in order to crush and repress civil society organizations. Mulobela (2019:37) posits that ‘the continuous selective application of the Public Order Act has led to a lot of violations of human and citizen’s rights. Civil society organizations have been assaulted by state agents several times for protesting against the maladministration of public resources (Mulobela, 2019). This shows evidence of how civil society organizations are being suppressed by the state in Zambia as the state continues to use all surveillance tactics possible in order to curtail them.

In Malawi, civil society-state relations have been hostile and antagonistic. The state has used various nefarious means to suppress and oppose civil society organizations with a

dissenting voice. Civil society organizations' democratic space has been under attack from the state. The state has over the last decade curtailed and diminished civil society organizations' democratic right to access to information in order to strengthen government accountability mechanisms (Mwenda, 2019). The state has made frantic efforts to thwart and continuously subjected civil society organization members to acts of violence, intimidation and assaults. For instance, the petrol bombing of the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation in September 2019 by the suspected paramilitary wing of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and arrest and gagging of Human Rights Defenders such as Timothy Mtambo, Billy Mayaya, Charles Kajoloweka and Gift Trapence from commenting on governance and corruption issues (Mwenda, 2019). On the legal front, the state has made serious attempts to push for a draconian Non-Governmental Organizations Amendment Bill, 2018 whose intention is to control the functioning space of civil society (Mwenda, 2019). These repressive laws have been tabled with the sole aim to regulate and control civil society organizations. It allows the state to legally suppress civil society organizations it judges to be undesirable and to allow others that favour the state or that are apolitical and uncritical to proceed with their work. The bill gives the state the power to suspend or deregister organizations as well as imprison leaders of civil society organizations for a period of seven years if found guilty of breaking the law (Mwenda, 2019). Such repressive tactics being meted out by the state on selective and targeted civil society organizations in Malawi support a growing trend to discriminate between civil society organizations and to primarily suppress in a targeted way those that are deemed a threat to the ruling party.

In neighbouring South Africa, the post-apartheid government and civil society organizations relate to each other in various ways: sometimes as collaborators and at other times as adversaries (De Wet, 2010; SANGONeT, 2013). In the last decade and specifically under the leadership of former President Jacob Zuma, South Africa has increasingly become unstable. The operations of civil society organizations, mostly those who work in the area of advocacy, have and continues to be weakened by the state because of the perilous role they play in raising public awareness about the decay in government (SANGONeT, 2013). Civil society organizations, in particular those who play the social watchdog role, have been branded as enemies of the ruling party, the Africa National Congress (ANC), for being overtly critical of the ANC government; especially its neoliberal policies and development approaches (De Wet, 2010). These organization's

exposure of the shortcomings of the South African state has led to hostility, which has triggered at times a conflictual relationship between them and the state (SANGONeT, 2013). However, there are also friendly relations between the state and some civil society organizations in South Africa, especially ‘apolitical’ welfare agencies that are engaged in service delivery (De Wet, 2010; SANGONeT, 2013). The state believes these organizations are key state partners as they act as ducts for distributing services to the poor and vulnerable, hence cordial relations with these organizations exists. These civil society organizations collaborate with the state and they are viewed by the state as more credible in the eyes of government because they positively affect service delivery operations across the country (SANGONeT, 2013). However, there is a growing trend in South Africa of selectively targeting civil society organizations that are highly critical of the ruling party. This was most prevalent while Zuma was president as organizations such as the Right2Know Campaign were subjected to constant surveillance by state security (Gumede, 2018).

Having considered various countries in the region, the general pattern that is emerging in civil society relations with the state in the region is fairly similar. The countries in the region are increasingly under ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ as alluded to by Vava (2019). It is evident that there has been a growing trend of civil society suppression by the state in the region. Growing trends of antagonism, and suppression characterize and dominate the relations between state and civil society in the region. Civil society organizations in the region, especially those who have a dissenting voice and challenge the state on issues of good governance are increasingly restricted and subjected to various forms of suppression by their governments. There is a growing pattern of repressive laws, threats, misuse of the criminal justice system, abductions, and a climate of fear continue used by governments in the region to silence civil society. Furthermore, the law in all jurisdictions continues to be manipulated by the various ruling parties in the region to control and limit democratic civic space.

I now draw on literature to briefly discuss the history of state-civil society relations from 1980 when Zimbabwe got its independence to 2017 when Robert Mugabe was ousted. This section will outline the major patterns which characterised the relations. For this study, I will focus more on the patterns of civil society-state relations with the state in the 2000s as these dynamics have shaped the current relations. I will start with the general patterns in the earlier period from 1980 to the beginning of 2000s and then focus on 2008-

2013 (sometimes called the period of ‘inclusive government’) and 2014-2017 (post inclusive government).

3.3 State-Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe Under Mugabe: A Historical Perspective

The nature of relations between civil society and state and its structures in Zimbabwe has varied immensely from time to time, in scope, quality and impact. Post-independent Zimbabwe according to Lee (2011) currently boasts of a dynamic civil society which is occupied by a huge, diverse and energetic community extending from resident associations, student groups, churches to trade unions. In post-independent Zimbabwe, civil society organizations have played a critical role in issues of development and democracy. In an unstable political and economic situation that manifests in Zimbabwe, civil society organizations have acted as regulators over the political characters and as safety harbours for many Zimbabweans who are living on the edge of the economic strata (Kagoro, 2010). Since independence, it is without doubt that, civil society organizations have been crucial in standing in the gap formed by the inefficacy of state and its structures to render full services to its citizens (Moyo, 1993).

Against this background, different political context that has emerged in Zimbabwe from 1980 up to present day has also necessitated varied changes in civil society organization’s operations and relations with the state. Wetherell (1998) argues that the operations and relationship between state and civil society habitually hinge on the political context of a country. Over the course of several years in Zimbabwe, civil society-state relations have been shifting. Moyo (1993:4-5) posits that soon after independence, civil society relations with the state and its structures was ‘co-operative’, ‘positive and ‘good’. This was as a result of the fact that government saw civil society organizations, in particular those operating in Mashonaland and Manicaland as partners who were supplementing government efforts. However, in Matabeleland during this time, the situation was totally different. Relations between state and civil society organizations such as Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) were sour as government saw them as ‘unwanted elements’ that were bent on supporting and funding “dissident” behavior in that region which the state sought to crush and consolidate (Moyo, 1993). This view which the state held on CCJP affected the operations of this organization in its area of humanitarian assistance as government always placed its programs under police and

military surveillance (Moyo, 1992). The government was very suspicious about the work of this civil society organization as they saw it as a threat to state power. However, soon after the Unity Accord that was signed between ZANU and ZAPU in 1987, relations between state and civil society organizations such as CCJP normalized (Moyo, 1992).

Furthermore, at the beginning of independence Bhebhe and Mahapa (2014) notes that there was very little or no antagonism between civil society organizations such as labor movement and the state. Organizations such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and government enjoyed cordial relations as the state treated the union as its integral arm tasked with the mandate of articulating government position to the workers (Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014). Raftopoulos (2013) argues that a relationship of similar interests nurtured between state and ZCTU as the two ensured the enactment of laws that protected the labor force and saw the establishment of an agreed minimum wage. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union which formed a fundamental element of civil society momentarily after independence worked hand in glove with the government and enjoyed cordial relations with the state as most of its leaders were Presidential appointments (Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014).

However, leadership renewal that occurred in ZCTU in the early 90s saw the honeymoon period (1987-1990) between the state and civil society organizations including the ZCTU coming to an abrupt end (Raftopoulos, 1997). The trade union leadership which was pro-state lost its grasp to a new leadership arrangement that was anti-state as it was more vocal and critical towards the state particularly when proposals of turning the country into a one party state started to permeate through the country, a suggestion which the state later rescinded (Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014). Additionally, the relations and operations between the state and civil society organizations such as ZCTU entirely broke down when the new anti-state ZCTU leadership chose to transform the labour movement by making itself a self-governing unit breaking ranks and its close relationship with state in 1989 (Tarugarira, 2011). During this period Tarugarira (2011) posits that the organizations hard-pressed for accountability from the state as they voiced public discontentment not only about the suggestions of a one-party state but also against corruption and the Willowgate scandal. According to Bhebhe and Mahapa (2014) it should be noted that the phase of perilous resentment between civil society organizations such as ZCTU and the state of Zimbabwe thrived throughout this period and impelled the state to place measures which affected the organization's operations.

Tarugarira (2011) notes that relations between state and civil society organization organizations were further stressed between 1990-96 when the state stopped its socialist rhetoric and approved neo-liberal policies better known as Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP). The structural adjustment policies championed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank rendered millions jobless and affected the textiles, clothing, engineering, transport and retailing sectors (Tarugarira, 2011). The effects of ESAP triggered a sharp decline in the economy and saw civil society organizations such as ZCTU gaining more admiration. They called for the Public Sector Strike in 1996, which stressed civil society relations with the state. This was evidenced by the then President Mugabe swearing in 1993 would never again to go to any May Day celebrations. His government saw civil society organizations in the form of trade unions as having an ulterior motive, thus further fueling tension between government and civil society (Bhebhe and Mahapa, 2014).

To counter the ZCTU, the state formed the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) early 2000. The state enjoyed mutual relations with ZFTU as it supported government policies on labour issues (Tarugarira, 2011). According to Bhebhe and Mahapa (2014), ZFTU was regarded by other civil society organizations as a counterforce to the mounting star of ZCTU because of its leadership which was virtuously made up of state allies and its operations were further made smooth as it supported government notion of opposing mass stay-aways which they viewed as counter-productive to the economy of the country and the welfare of the masses.

Moreover, in 1997 relations and operations between pro-democracy civil society groups such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) led by Prof Lovemore Madhuku were also unreceptive. This was because of the fact that the state used repressive tools to always disturb the organization's activities which were bent on challenging one-party rule and sought to establish a people driven democratic constitution in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2011). More so, the relations were further made discordant by the repressive nature of the state which saw the police violently stopping an NCA demonstration in Harare in 2004 that called for a new people driven Constitution (Sachikonye, 2011). In addition, Sachikonye (2011) argues that civil society leaders such as NCA's Lovemore Madhuku became targeted by the state and were severely beaten and detained by state security forces in a bid to thwart their activism. The state in response according to NANGO (2013) imposed strict rules for civil society as they labelled them

agents of 'regime change'. NANGO (2013) government in reply to civil society organization's behavior and dissenting voice which did not support state policies, placed restrictive regulations such as The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) enacted in 2002, with subsequent amendments in 2004 and 2005, and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) also enacted in 2002 with amendments in 2003 and 2004. Kagoro (2010) posits that the actual drive behind the enactment of these laws governing civil society organization was the need by government to safeguard the March 2005 parliamentary election victory, while starving it of any opposing domestic or foreign broadcasting on human rights defilements. This response augurs well with Dorman (2001)'s assertion which indicated that the post-independent Zimbabwean state has never hesitated to conjure its legislative powers to paralyze civil society organizations. The regulations according to Bhebhe and Mahapa (2014) negatively affected the operations of civil society and further affected the relationship between state and civil society organizations as the restrictive laws sought to curb civil society activism and to shrink civil and political rights.

From this period up to the 2008 harmonized elections in Zimbabwe civil society-state relations have been frosty as the two have been on each other's neck (Legal Resources Foundation, 2008). In 2008, smooth operations of civil society organizations were also interrupted when the then Minister of the Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare, Nicholas Goche delivered a holdup on all civil society organization's operations specifically those in the field of humanitarian work whom the state accused of breaking the terms of their registration as stipulated in the Private Voluntary Organizations Act (Legal Resources Foundation, 2008). The prohibition according to NANGO (2013) created discord between state and civil society organizations as the latter saw the move as a direct ploy by the state and quasi-government agents to stifle the work of civil society organizations operating in the country. It should be clear that the Private Voluntary Organizations Act gives the responsible Minister in-charge of civil society organizations, the supremacy to suspend or place any if not all members of the executive committees of these organizations and even to assign executors to man the organization (Gutsa and Mandizadza, 2014). It is imperative to therefore note that this Act forms the basis of civil society-state relations in Zimbabwe.

3.4 State – Civil Society Relations During the Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe (2008 -2013)

The March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe did not have a clear winner as both candidates Robert Mugabe (48%) and Morgan Tsvangirai (43%) did not attain the 50% plus one threshold to assume the presidency (Oosterom,2019). This meant the two contenders had to go for a presidential run-off in June 2008. The run-off campaign in 2008 was very violent. A countrywide campaign of violence was unleashed by war veterans, Zanu PF militia and security forces members (NANGO,2013). Kept afloat by the army's support, senior Zanu PF representatives declared that the party would not concede defeat in an election because Zimbabwe had been liberated by the gun and not the ballot (Oosterom,2019). This stance resulted in civil society and state relations being further strained as various groups such as the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) publicly challenged and criticized the process and the election results which they argued was flawed (NANGO, 2013). The reaction of these various civil society organizations prompted and pressured the political players ZANU PF and MDC to enter an inclusive government, marking the end of one-party rule in Zimbabwe that had continued since independence in 1980 (NANGO,2013).

With the dawn of the inclusive government, the anticipation was that the commencement of the inclusive government would usher in a brand-new season in state-civil society relations that would affect more opening up of civil society's space in Zimbabwe (Masunungure, 2009, p. 8). According to Dziva *et al.*, (2013), the initial years of the inclusive government in Zimbabwe to a certain degree marked some fractional reverence of the freedom of association and assembly. The state closely worked with a number of welfare civil society organizations in a bid to address a plethora of socio-economic challenges which were negatively impacting the country. In as much as the political principals of the inclusive government had agreed under Article 12 of the agreement which entailed the safeguarding of freedom of association and assembly, these were however not implemented (Gutsa and Mandizadza,2014).

The inclusive government was marked by plain contestations as a result of the battle for the state, which formed the basis of the politics of the agreement (NANGO, 2013). The revolutionary Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) party was in total control of the corridors of power while the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was permitted a superficial sense of power. This saw the incessant

immobilization of civil society organizations as ZANU-PF continued to maintain a hold of the important ministries, which facilitated the continued incapacitation of “watchdog” type civil society organizations.

According to Raftopoulos (2013) ‘at virtually every step of the execution of the arrangement, strong struggles over its clarification left their fragments on the political topography and intensely entrenched civil society in this hostile environment’. Raftopoulos (2013) additionally, posits those relations between the state and civil society organizations during this time, were repressed mainly due to mutual mistrust and hostility, as civil society was often viewed by other state players as an adjunct of opposition parties and therefore antagonistic to the government. The state accused civil society organizations of being motivated by foreign donor agendas and funding while being faintly connected to the citizens and being highly political (Raftopoulos, 2013).

Gutsa and Mandizadza (2014) argue that civil society organizations and state relations did not transform even in the wake of a new political dispensation birthed by the inclusive government. Evidence shows that the inclusive government did not lead to substantial extension of civil society space in Zimbabwe. This was demonstrated by sustained presence of regulations such as AIPPA and POSA, which had been in presence prior the inclusive government and was seen as confining space for persons and civic society organizations (Gutsa and Mandizadza, 2014). It was clear that although the inclusive government was a significant moment of party politics in Zimbabwe, it however, did not change state-civil society relations.

Gutsa and Mandizadza (2014) argue that the inclusive government was a passing ‘political cease fire’ a ‘marriage of convenience and inconvenience’ orchestrated by political characters of the time, destined to offer a cleansing for pent up, hot-blooded political and economic fevers. Nevertheless, cordial relations between the state and civil society organizations were also witnessed during the inclusive government as many civil society organizations managed to continue with their operations ‘smoothly’ and assisted the state and its structures in creating and coming up with a new home-grown constitution for Zimbabwe (NANGO, 2013). The state and some civil society organizations worked well on development issues; particularly during the 2013 constitution making process where civil society organizations were an integral part in financing and giving technical support to the inclusive government till the process was finished. This process culminated in the birth of the new constitution of Zimbabwe.

3.5 State-Civil Society Relations: Post-Inclusive Government (2014-2017)

The inclusive government came to an end after presidential and parliamentary elections were held “peacefully” on 31st July 2013, but the sword of 2008 was hanging over many heads. Tendi (2013:965) argues that the ZANU PF party made use of memories of past violence to intimidate the electorate to support it. Voter intimidation was employed subtly, and it was less readily discernible to election observers (Tendi,2013:966). The elections witnessed a resounding victory for ZANU-PF giving the party total control of all state structures again (NANGO, 2013). July 31, 2013 was a serious occasion in Zimbabwe. It put an end to the 2009–2013 inclusive government (Masunungure, 2015). The victory surprised many, including those in the civil society space and meant that the Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF party had to form the next government to rule Zimbabwe for the next five years (Masunungure, 2015). The advent of this new government meant that several systems operations and relations had to be altered to fall in line with the ideologies of the ZANU-PF led government under Robert Mugabe (Raftopoulos, 2013). According to Masunungure (2015) the changing of systems also meant that civil society organizations had to operate in a new dispensation that suits the dictates of the ‘new’ government. Raftopoulos (2013) posits that several civil society organizations shocked by the resounding victory of ZANU PF changed their operations techniques and adopted a ‘*wait and see*’ attitude on how to relate with the new administration.

Oosterom (2019) argued that state-civil society relations become highly antagonistic after the inclusive government ended as evidenced with the worsening of an existing trend of state suppression. ZANU-PF was neither under threat from the opposition nor felt no pressure to be held responsible as it was now in total control of state and its structures. This behaviour by ZANU-PF invigorated intrinsically an anti-government spirit and made the state far more vigilant than before about any civic mobilisation (Oosterom, 2019). It is argued by Oosterom (2019) that civil society organization’s gatherings began to be regularly watched and carefully monitored by the state, with some being disrupted by the state’s repressive apparatus, i.e. the police and Central Intelligence Officers.

In addition, the new political context post-inclusive government invoked repressive techniques which further curtailed and strained civil society-state relations. Oosterom (2019) argues that civil society organizations whose scope was on human rights work or civic engagement found that with the new political setup post inclusive government it was now difficult to submit paperwork to Rural District Councils as submission was

followed by a series of interrogations which sought to understand the nature of activities and entailed the submission of the curriculum to be used in trainings, and the facilitators who will be present. This therefore posed a discordant relationship that existed between government and civil society. Oosterom (2019) argues that the state continued to harass civil society leaders and members and also even made efforts to obliterate protests and demonstrations organized by civil society organizations by using intimidation, arbitrary arrest of protest organizers and laws such as AIPPA and POSA (Oosterom, 2019). Civil society organizations did not relent and even participated in the anti-Mugabe coup protests that saw the ousting of Robert Mugabe in November 2017 (Chikohomero, 2018). This further shows how relations between the state and civil society continued to sour.

From the literature reviewed in this section, it is imperative to note that state-civil society organization's relations in Zimbabwe since 1980 can best be described as increasingly hostile – especially for organizations deemed a threat to the ruling party. Antagonism, resentment, and suspicion characterised the relations between state and civil society. The presidency of Robert Mugabe was especially hostile towards civil society organizations which were critical of his administration and the ruling party used all repressive and Machiavellian tactics in a bid to silence and demobilise these organizations. While the above is generally accurate, there were moments of cooperation, however, this cooperation and mutually beneficial engagements did not dominate civil society – state relations during the Mugabe era.

CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUALIZING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

4.1 Introductory Note

The purpose of this chapter is to draw on theory to conceptualize the research problem about current civil society organizations' relations with the state in Zimbabwe. More specifically, the central research question is: '*What do we learn from selected media sources at the beginning of the Mnangagwa Presidency in Zimbabwe about the current nature of relations between the state and civil society organizations that have historically been subjected to state suppression?*'.

I define and unpack the following key concepts referred to in this research question: non-state media sources; civil society organizations, the state, suppression by the state, and civil society relations with the state. In particular, state suppression of civil society in Zimbabwe is conceptualized with the help of Foucault's theoretical notion of 'panoptic surveillance' and Gramsci's theory of hegemonic power.

I start with the concepts social media and non-state news media before discussing the more complex concepts.

4.2 Media Sources: Social Media and Non-State News Media

4.2.1 Social Media

According to Dube (2013), social media is a mode of interacting among people. It is used to create, share and exchange information and ideas in virtual communities. Social media is made up of various individual websites which consist of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc. This study harvested data from Twitter, which is a microblogging website. It allows its users to post messages limited to 280 characters ((Tumasjan et al, 2010). Twitter exchanges information in short bursts. Various personalities and politicians make use of Twitter to churn out their opinions and to read the views of their followers. Twitter activity is very fast and current. It is for these reasons that various organizations, including global news organizations use Twitter. A tweet is a written message on Twitter. Tweets are 140 characters long and the tweets are immediately seen by the user's followers.

Dube (2013) reiterates that the dawn of the internet in the early 1990s altered the way society functions. As a result, it is imperative to note that with the advent of the internet

and social media we learn a lot about society. Consequently, social media has become a valuable source of information for social research.

4.2.2 Non-state News Media

Non-state news media is media used for mass communication that is controlled editorially and financially by non-state actors (David, 1992). In some cases, non-state media may be bankrolled directly or indirectly by the government, however, normally in these situations the state does not have control over the media's editorial work (David, 1992).

4.3 Civil Society and Civil Society Organizations

There has been renewed interest in the concept of civil society in Southern Africa since the 1990s as civil society organizations have played a major role in the fight against state corruption, bad governance and human rights abuse (Gumede, 2018). However, there is no agreement on the definition of the concept of civil society. Civil society is often seen as comprising the space between state structures and individuals or families (Pillay, 1996). This understanding has led those who support a strong civil society to adopt an anti-state perspective, whereby the state and civil society are described as two distinct spheres (De Wet, 2010). However, this does not accurately characterize the history of relations between the state and civil society in Southern African countries, including Zimbabwe. We need a definition that captures a more complex relationship: one that reflects both collegial and antagonistic relations between civil society organizations and the state (De Wet, 2010). For this reason, we adopt a definition inspired by Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci did not make a radical distinction between the state and civil society (Pillay, 1996:340). He argued that the state contributes to the evolution of civil society, but the two must not be conflated (ibid.). This understanding recognises that it is difficult to set clear boundaries between the different spheres of society.

For the purposes of this study, civil society refers to:

the area between the state apparatus and individuals or families [the private sphere]. It includes elements of the economy, such as business associations, but the economic base of society constitutes a separate realm. It excludes the formal political society, which is made up of political parties in parliament, but includes social movements that lobby to change public policy. (Pillay, 1996:341; De Wet 2010:4)

Civil society constitutes a wide range of independent voluntary associations including trade unions, human rights organizations, advocacy groups, professional associations, welfare organizations, religious groups, and community-based organizations.

The above definition of civil society, which links it to other sectors of the broader society, is best represented in Figure 1 by a Venn Diagram of intersecting circles indicating both distinctiveness and overlaps in the different spheres of society. This conceptualization of civil society accommodates the history of civil society organizations in Southern Africa sometimes cooperating with the state and at other times opposing the state.




Figure 1: Civil society and the democratic state (Pillay 1996, 341)

The study also incorporates another conceptual dimension developed by Gramsci, which sees civil society ‘as the arena of creativity where counter-hegemonic forces develop alternatives to the hegemonic ideologies and practices, and from where, under specific conditions, reformist processes can emerge (Katz, 2010).

Putnam (1993) argues that civil society organizations are ‘demand-driven’, and they aid in giving a voice to marginalized communities and people. These organizations are made up of players who are independent from the state but serve both a public and a political function through creating social capital, trust, and raising citizen and community awareness (Putnam, 1993). Furthermore, Putnam (1993) argues that civil society organizations assist in making democracy work through tackling collective action

difficulties in the short term as well as constructing the essential societal circumstances obligatory for continued cooperation over time. Putnam (1993) further reiterates that the working synergies that are created by civil society organizations assist in developing stable societies that support citizens in their demand for better governance of society.

4.4 The State and State Suppression

Gramsci (1971) conceptualized the state as a combination of political society, economic and civil society, but he focuses on political society and civil society. Pertinent to this study is Gramsci's (1971) notion of the state as a structure of superiority used by the ruling class to ascertain their dominance over the ruled. Gramsci (1971) argues that the state is the organized force of society which is represented by law enforcement agencies (e.g. police and military) and the judiciary; 'hegemony protected by the armor of coercion'. These law enforcement agencies are responsible of executing repression on behalf of the state. The relevance of Gramsci's theory of hegemony to this study is discussed further below when we conceptualize civil society relations with the state.

State suppression entails attempts by the state to control its citizenry using force (Christian, 2007). The primary motivate for the use of force by the state is political. It aims restrict the citizens' ability to participate in the political life of their society.

Foucault's notion of 'panoptic surveillance' further elaborates on how the state exercises suppression. According to Foucault, state suppression involves making the population more vulnerable to institutional control (Shumway, 1989). Through the concept of 'panoptic power', the state exercises hegemonic control over the population and makes the populace submissive through surveillance (Sheridan, 2016). It also exposes the nature of the relationship between ordinary people or citizens and the systems of social control and the knowledge/power nexus (Sheridan, 2016). Foucault borrows and further develops the architectural model of Jeremy Bentham's perfect prison, the Panopticon, which allowed the prison authorities a hidden panoramic view of all prisoners in their cells from a location at the centre of the circular structure. Consequently, prisoners experienced a sense of total and continuous surveillance, which controlled their behaviour. In Foucault's panopticon model, it is no longer merely an observation tower in the middle of a spherical prison, but rather in modern society it has been reorganized in a habitual form that allows state security apparatus to track down people's movement and behaviours (Sheridan, 2016). In Foucault's panoptic framework, he describes how

the observer (the state), by continuously watching obtains information about the observed (civil society organizations) and in so doing exercises power and control over the observed (Sociology Group, 2019). Consequently, the more it monitors, the more controlling it becomes.

I draw on Foucault's theory to emphasize the function of state sanctioned surveillance as a device of power by the Zimbabwe state in its relations with civil society and how mass surveillance by the state is habitual in Zimbabwe. This is done through the state's use of overt measures like police presence at civil society organization's meetings and demonstrations, but also more subtle and invasive means such as data checking (email hacking, bank account checks, cell phone call tracking), whereby the state through powerful entities such as the Central Intelligence Organization is able to search through large volumes of data on civil society organization's leaders and members in a bid to harvest evidence on them and employ control over them. The negative impact on human rights and diminishing democracy are discussed later.

4.5 State – Civil Society Relations

State-civil society relations are defined by Department of International Development (2010) as 'interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people'. These relations are premised on issues which include mutual rights and obligations of both the state and society, negotiating how national resources are to be allocated and creating diverse approaches of representation and accountability. Moyo (1993) posits that state and civil society are intertwining parts of the same social reality as they belong to one public sphere (see Figure 1). Ideally, for these relations to thrive they should be anchored in democratic principles and processes. Democracy entails upholding the rule of law, respect for the constitution, maintaining fundamental rights and freedoms (Arko-Cobbah, 2008). Its tenets according to Inter-Parliamentary Union (1998;28-29) include an independent judiciary, respect for the voice of others and dignity of the individual, rights and freedom of expression, association and assembly guaranteed, independent media and professional policing that does not tolerate unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture.

Civil society is vital in consolidating and sustaining democracy (Arko-Cobbah, 2008). Pillay (1996) reiterates that civil society 'should be guardian of the public good and not the state'. This means that civil society endeavors to protect and advocate for policies

and environment that seeks to benefit the people. Likewise, Pillay (1996) notes that for Gramsci freedom and strength of civil society cannot be bargained. For democracy to thrive there is need for the state to avoid muzzling freedom and the vitality of civil society (Pillay, 1996). Arko-Cobbah (2008) reiterates that in a democracy it is not only the prerogative of the state and its institutions to secure a high degree of democratic governance, but civil society organizations play a critical role as social watchdogs.

Collectively civil society organizations play dual roles: being deliverers of services to the people and being social watchdogs - i.e. critically assessing government policies or actions and lobbying for social change (De Wet 2010; Desai, 2002). As social watchdogs, civil society organizations are supposed to check, monitor or block the state from exercising its power to the detriment of the populace (Diamond, 1999; Bunbongkarn, 2004). This role in a functioning democracy can reduce political corruption, which is pervasive in emerging democracies. It can hold the government to be more accountable, transparent, and responsive to the public, which strengthens its legitimacy. In doing so they bring the state closer to the people and make the state aware of the citizens' needs. De Wet (2010) argues that civil society state relations in a democracy are characterised by collaboration and opposition at different times. Collaboration is evident when civil society partners with state in service delivery and opposition manifests when civil society exercises its watchdog role over the state - its public policy priorities and practices (De Wet, 2010). Although De Wet (2010) was specifically writing about South Africa, the dual role of civil society is also historically pertinent in Zimbabwe.

Gramsci's theory of hegemonic power further helps us to conceptualize civil society relations with the state in the context of Zimbabwe's democratisation process.

Marx's superstructure, according to Gramsci (1971), consists of two elements, namely 'political society' (the state sector) and civil society (the private sector). In Gramsci's theory of hegemony, the conflictual relationship between civil society and the state is theoretically conceptualised as hegemony and counter hegemony, involving a tussle for power and control. The idea that civil society inculcates the hope of social change as a 'new' world that is liberated from repression and domination through counter hegemony places these class struggles at the core of any analysis of society. Magure (2009:27) reiterates that the counter hegemonic efforts by civil society are crafted 'towards reversing and negating the dominant elements until they wither away'. Hence, in the

context of Zimbabwe, Gramscian theory explains how civil society is seen as a counter force which is in a struggle with the state intent on challenging and redirecting government according to the needs and desires of the general public - especially the underclasses.

A cross cutting theme in Gramsci's (1971) work is that the ruling class is able to manufacture the 'consent' of the public in order to continue with uneven relations of power that serve ruling class interests (Gramsci, 1971). This 'consent' is concocted through the use of state apparatus; for example: state media, state security forces, public order laws that are crafted with the intention of suppressing dissenting voices (Dodo, 2015). These apparatuses are used by the state to instill state-determined civic morality and governments count on them to preserve supremacy According to Gramsci (1971) civil society is the field in which the fight for domination plays out.; where 'dominant groups create a way of life that the general populace is coerced to unquestioningly accept as legitimate' (Hunt 1990). Civil society provides the counter hegemony, which challenges the ruling party and state hegemony in its quest to create a world free from suppression and state-determined civic morality (Dorman, 2001). Pillay (1996) develops the understanding of counter hegemony when he argues that civil society and state relations are selectively antagonistic. If the state enhances civil and political rights, civil society supports and endorses the state and if the state crushes these rights, civil society comes out in full force to condemn and protect the citizens thus counter hegemony (Pillay, 1996). Pillay (1996) sees civil society as the guardian of public good and not of the state. Similarly, Dorman (2001) and Locke (1988) argue that civil society in a democratic state challenges and protects the individual from arbitrary use of state power especially when the state behaves in undemocratic ways. Dorman (2001) argues that Gramsci's model of relations between civil society and the state is very useful characterizing the complicated and conflictual relationship that has existed between the two sectors in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introductory Note

This chapter discusses the research methodology used in this study. The chapter lays out the research design, methods of data collection which were used for this study and also pronounce the strategies used in analysing the research data. Issues to do with ethics are also enunciated.

5.2 Case Study Research Design

I adopted a case study design with using mainly qualitative methods and a small quantitative component in the analysis. Qualitative research is concerned with opinions, perceptions and attitudes of people (Bryman, 2008). The study consisted of more than a single case and, therefore, I applied the Yin's multiple-case study design drawing on his replication logic. Yin's (2018) multiple-case study design is an empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the 'case') in depth and within its real-world context, particularly when the margins between phenomenon and context may not be obviously apparent. I used a multiple case study design in order to provide a rigorous approach for collecting and analysing data as reiterated by Zach (2006). This design allowed me to explore the phenomenon under investigation with the help of Yin's (2018) replication strategy.

The replication logic is analogous to that used in multiple experiments (Yin, 2018). Through the replication strategy each of the two cases (ZCTU & ARTUZ) were carefully selected so that they either predict similar results (a literal replication) or produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication) as postulated by Yin (2018). The replication strategy allowed me to identify and compare patterns which emerged from the data

In my study I collected data from two case studies in accordance with Yin's (2018) multiple-case study approach. I treated each case as 'whole' study; convergent evidence was sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case. I was then able to compare the emergent patterns in the data from the two cases and assessed the extent of replication. The purpose of using this approach was to build up a model of what these organizations

are experiencing and acknowledge the differences and similarities in their treatment by the new regime under President Mnangagwa.

Another important feature of case study research is the use of multiple data collection methods. Yin (2009:115) notes that the ‘most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation and corroboration’. In doing so, it bolsters the finding or conclusion of the case study and makes it very much substantial and correct.

In this study I will use the following different data collection methods:

- Online newspaper articles and reports
- Data from ARTUZ and ZCTU websites
- All ARTUZ and ZCTU twitter feeds over the period under investigation

5.3 Sample

The research focuses on civil society organizations that have historically experienced suppression in Zimbabwe under the Mugabe regime. The study sample comprised of two civil society organizations, namely the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Association (ARTUZ). The reason I have chosen these two organizations is because they have historically experienced state suppression in Zimbabwe as discussed earlier.

5.4 Data Collection Methods

Data for this study was harvested using multiple sources of data generated within period under investigation (November 2017 to February 2020) (see Appendix A). Yin (2009) reiterates that multiple sources are of importance in case study research as they enable the drawing of data from various sources to capture the case study in its complexity and entirety. Data was collected through document review of online newspaper articles/reports, ARTUZ/ZCTU websites and through twitter feeds of the two organizations. In-depth interviews which have been touted by Yin (2009:106) ‘as one of the most important sources of case study information’ could not be used for this study as interviewing members of these organizations could put their lives at risk and I too could be targeted by the state. I was aware of the complex, volatile and toxic socio-political

environment that exists in Zimbabwe. Interviews would generate information about these organizations and their members that is not already in the public domain and this could be used by the state against them. It would have been irresponsible for me to use this method of data collection.

Documentary review was employed as a tool to obtain relevant data to support and reveal authentic relations of civil society organizations with the state. Bowen (2009) posits that document review is a form of qualitative research in which documents are reviewed and interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessed topic. Bowen (2009) further posits that document review is a systematic procedure of reviewing or evaluating documents that are both printed and electronic (computer-based and internet-transmitted) material. For this study, these documents were analysed while incorporating coding of the content into themes which was similar to how focus group or interview transcripts are analysed (Bowen, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The exercise involved analytical reading and review of the published material which involves online newspapers (state and independent), ZCTU and ARTUZ online newsletters, reports and blueprints found on their websites as well. In addition, online news media, online reports and ZCTU/ARTUZ websites were opted for because these platforms report and keep records on the current nature of relations between state and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe. The sources of these online materials are acknowledged throughout the thesis.

My second data collection method entailed the harvesting of information from the ZCTU and ARTUZ organization's public twitter handles as well as the official Twitter handles of their presidents, Peter Mutasa and Obert Masaraure. From these accounts relevant data was extracted in order to assess the current relations between state and civil society under Mnangagwa's regime using sentimental analysis.

Sentimental analysis is an approach that has developed as a discrete method to study people's opinions in terms of views, attitudes, appraisal and emotions towards entities, events and their attitudes (Liu, 2010; Pang and Lee 2008, as cited in Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan, 2013). The study focused on the mentioned twitter accounts in order to glean the sentiments that were expressed in relation to the central research question and related questions. From the twitter handles of these organizations and those of its leaders, two tasks enunciated by Liu (2010) were performed: (1) retrieving twitter feeds or posts that

were relevant to the research question, and (2) identifying and ranking opinionated posts or feeds from those retrieved. I used Bae and Lee's (2012) approach to assist with the ranking exercise by detecting a polarity in the sentimental analysis. This involved identifying and classing sentiments into a positive and negative binary classification scheme (Kumar and Sebastian, 2012). I used this binary classification to capture the sentiments that best described the current nature of relations between state and civil society organizations that were historically subjected to state suppression. I further classified the data according to the emerging forms of state suppression which included judicial harassment, arrest and detention, symbolic violence, surveillance, abduction, assault, salary cessation, travel ban, suspension, raid/break ins, cyber-attack, smear campaign and defamation.

I now describe the practical steps I took in the process of collecting data from twitter.

I did a manual search of the tweets posted by the two organizations under study and their presidents' accounts. I made use of the 'Advanced Search' feature on Twitter to obtain the timelines of the organizations and that of its leaders and sieved to the latest (as shown in Figure 2) tweets in a bid to obtain all Twitter activity connected to the precise handle. I then focused on opinion expressions both positive and negative that were being conveyed by the civil society organizations and its leaders' online with regards to their current state of relations with the state under Mnangagwa. The study also opted to focus on social media, i.e. Twitter as it is an ideal platform to trace the sentiments of the organizations and their leaders as they reacted to unfolding situations under the new regime. The value of Twitter in this research lies it being a word-of-mouth tool online (Bae and Lee, 2012), which conveys the verbatim the unrestrained views of the author useful for examining the relations between the state and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe. An important advantage of harvesting organizations and their leader's opinions and sentiments using Twitter is that data from Twitter can be traced, observed and accessed in the form of public tweets that can be easily found (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan, 2013). Figure 2 illustrates the advanced search parameters used when harvesting relevant information from Twitter in the data collection stage of the study.




Figure 2: Twitter advanced search parameter used

5.5 Data Analysis

Having gathered the data on each organization or case, I carefully read and re-read the data closely. The purpose of this process was to obtain a preliminary understanding of the matters arising from the data. De Wet and Erasmus (2005) argue that this close reading gives the researcher the ‘spirit of the text’ before fragmenting the text by allocating text segments to different thematic coding categories and it assists in keeping the researcher attentive for unanticipated responses. At this stage what was becoming apparent from the data was that both the organizations were subjected to extreme suppression by the state which was being committed using a wide range of forms and

tactics. After a close reading, I proceeded to systemically and thematically code the data. This process according to Miles and Huberman (1994) comprises designating sticky tags (thematic coding categories) to text passages that comprise references to a specific cluster of information. Coding was also done in order to assist in sorting, handling and interpreting significant sections of the data (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). In light of this, I managed to designate different, unique tags to the data in a bid to categorise the information as is stated by Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014). In doing this, data fragmentation was employed which in turn necessitated data reduction as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). The coding was carried out on the NVivo Version 12 software where all data was subjected to computer assisted coding. Furthermore, coding was done with the central research question constantly in mind. During first level coding (or descriptive coding), I managed to create 22 major categories from the data. The coding was done for the two eras under Mugabe and Mnangagwa. It was apparent from the first level coding that repression or suppression was the predominant/overarching element or theme that was emerging in light with the nature of relations between state and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe.

Distinct from first level coding is second level coding (or pattern coding), which is a necessary process in producing findings. De Wet and Erasmus (2005:33) argue that second level coding is done by identifying clusters and hierarchies of already coded information generated by the first level thematic coding process. At this stage in the analysis of the data, selected single descriptive coding categories from the first level coding exercise are clustered together to form hierarchies because they are related. It is through second level coding that a deeper level of analysis which necessitates the identification of patterns and relationships in the data was done. In consultation with my supervisor, I progressed from the first level coding to second level coding. This was also done with the central research question in mind. Doing this, I managed to collapse some codes and merged them into slightly broader categories to facilitate analysis. It is imperative to note that at this stage, relevant data was clustered into evolving themes which were organized into units. The coding process, which was done, ultimately yielded groups of data which were relating to similar content and themes. This I did in order to avoid too many overlapping coding categories. I managed to collapse the 22 categories which had been created in first level coding into five broad thematic clusters of codes and classified all the different forms of suppression from these 'broad themes'. These

thematic clusters are as follows; 1) intimidation *which involves persecution, symbolic violence, raids/break in, threats, surveillance*), 2) abduction/torture *involving arrest, enforced disappearance, killings, physical attack, torture and ill-treatment*, 3) judicial harassment *involving all forms where any arm of the judiciary was used to suppress the organizations*, 4) propaganda *comprising of any form of cyber-attack, malicious defamation, and verbal abuse*, 5) other violations *involving any forms of harassment, reprisals, salary cessation, sexual harassment, travel ban*). Eventually, these five preliminary categories became the following eight thematic categories:

- Arrests/Detention/Travel ban
- Assaults
- Abduction and Torture
- Raid/Break in/Theft
- Surveillance
- Judicial Harassment
- Cyber Attack/Defamation/Smear Campaign
- Suspension/Salary Cessation

The study findings were exposed to any opposing deliberations at this stage. Memos for these broad themes on suppression were also created which recorded in detail all my observations about the presence, extent and nature of the suppression in both periods. In addition, I added memo notes included a comparative assessment of Mugabe era versus the Mnangagwa era based on evidence retrieved from the data. Having done the above, I then created a table matrix of columns and rows summarising each era (Mugabe and Mnangagwa) and each form of suppression that emerged from the data (see Appendix B). This matrix made it easier for me to see the overall pattern of relations and suppression between state and civil society organizations that emerged from the findings and to assess each type of suppression and whether or not it is still present or not in Mnangagwa era. Furthermore, with the aid of the matrix table, I also managed to assess the bigger picture as to whether the evidence suggested that suppression had increased or decreased under the Mnangagwa regime.

Finally, the nature of civil society relations with the state was elucidated in the context of the primary data as presented by findings from social and non-state media and buttressed by the theoretical framework of the study.

5.6 Content Analysis

Content analysis was also employed in the analysing of data findings. According to Neuman (2014), it is a practice for analysing data findings which can be confined in print documents or other communication media such as photos, movies, song lyrics, advertisements etc. In conducting content analysis for this study, the first step I did was to identify the types of sources which I was using to analyse as alluded to by Neuman (2014). The sources of material which I used for analysis were online newspaper articles, organizational reports (ZCTU and ARTUZ), online reports and articles, and Twitter feeds. Following Neuman (2014) I then formed a classification for recording precise aspects of the content in the sources. In order to convert observations discovered in various source groups into quantitative data and taking heed of the five emerging themes created in the second level data coding, I then sought to quantify the information using frequency counts of the number of times incidents of suppression were reported in each case study based on the four different sources of data used for the study. I used Neuman's (2014) system of counting how often (frequency rate) each violation or suppression theme is reported in the four different sources used in the period under study. This is helpful in my analysis as it will be able to quantify the number of times a certain violation has been committed during the period under study. For instance, in the source category Twitter feeds, I would count the number of times incidents of assault come up or are reported for each case study (ZCTU and ARTUZ) by that source.

Similarly, I used content analysis to corroborate the findings arrived at by my thematic coding analysis described in the previous section. This was necessitated by the fact that content analysis has quantitative features which were based on frequency counts. The results of the counts were presented in cluster bar graphs to demonstrate frequency and density of occurrences of categories of suppression coded thematically earlier in the analytical process. This was also done to get an impression of the extent and frequency of how often the used sources make references to each violation coded or listed. After counting in each source for each case, I then proceeded to systematically record what I found and analysed the data using cluster graphs for each thematic category and later made an overall cluster graph which had combined frequency counts of violations for both cases. This facilitated a broader and clear understanding of the various themes of political suppression which civil society organizations under study are facing under

Mnangagwa. With content analysis, I was able to map out the emerging trends in these themes of suppression as reflected in the data sources used for this study. Content analysis helped me record more precisely and systematically whether or not there has been a rise or decline in state repression of civil society organizations in the Mnangagwaera and what forms of repression were more prevalent

5.7 Ethics

Ethical issues are proper human or moral conducts expected of a researcher when undertaking a research (Denscombe, 2010). My research used information that is in the public domain. This is information available on social media, which is on worldwide web, Twitter, etc. Additionally, available public domain information in the print media such as newspapers, newsletters and annual reports was also used.

When I embarked on this study, I was aware of the complex and volatile socio-political environment that exists in Zimbabwe, and the resultant personal safety risks of interviewing respondents (as discussed previously). This situation led me to use “raw” (or unanalyzed) information already existing and available in the public domain. Furthermore, neither of the two organizations or their leaders’ Twitter or Facebook handles has privacy settings. This therefore means that their Twitter or Facebook posts are publicly available and are easy to access. This study was done under supervision and conformed to all the ethical standards and requirements of the university.

I now turn to the research findings.

CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS

'We are the army, we are the air force, we are the police, we are everything you can think of.' -: President Mnangagwa addressing supporters at a rally on the 7th of May 2019 (Ncube, 2019)

6.1 Introductory Note

This chapter outlines the main empirical findings from primary data collection for this study. The focus here is on the context and content of the current nature of relations between state and civil society organizations (ZCTU and ARTUZ) that have historically been subjected to state suppression in Zimbabwe and which is found in selected media sources. The sources are not an exhaustive record, but a record based on the available sources and provide a useful nuanced picture of suppression in contemporary Zimbabwe. The chapter focuses on categories of suppression, which are central in shaping and defining the present nature of relations between state and civil society organizations (ZCTU and ARTUZ) in Zimbabwe. I will demonstrate how suppression has been at the core of the relations between state and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe and how repressive tools have been used by the state in its relations with civil society organizations under study.

In presenting the study findings, I draw on Yin's replication logic (discussed earlier) since my study contains more than one case study. The findings presented below deal with each category of suppression. I provide evidence and illustrative quotations from both case studies assisted by cluster bar graphs of frequency counts. I start with the categories where there is evidence from both case studies and progress to those categories of suppression that only apply to one case study. At the end of this chapter with the aid of a cluster bar graph, I will then summarise the findings and show how many times each category of suppression has been mentioned in the data sources over the two-year period under investigation. The list of suppression categories is as follows:

- Arrests/Detention/Travel ban
- Assaults
- Abduction and Torture

- Raid/Break in/Theft
- Surveillance
- Judicial Harassment
- Cyber Attack/Defamation/Smear Campaign
- Suspension/Salary Cessation

6.2 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) Relations with The State Under Mnangagwa

6.2.1 Arrests/ Detention/ Travel ban

Deprivation of freedom, including the freedom of movement, is one of the stratagems most frequently used against human rights defenders across the globe (Frontline Defenders, n.d.). Findings gathered in this study clearly shows that relations between the state and ZCTU are still characterised by conflict and suppression as was the case during Mugabe era. The state still makes use of arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention of ZCTU members and its international visitors in a bid to prevent the organization from carrying out its mandate. The ZCTU (23 January 2019) statement reports that:

‘The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) calls on the government to unconditionally release its Secretary General, Japhet Moyo who was arrested on Monday 21 January 2019, upon his return from China where he had travelled on union business over last week’s stay away which was against government’s action to more than double the price of fuel. The arrest is an act of repression on the trade union and the ZCTU strongly condemn the act of the police as it is contrary to the Constitution of Zimbabwe that gives workers the right to demonstrate peacefully.’ (ZCTU, 23 January 2019)

More so, during the fuel protests which was organised by the ZCTU from the 14th to the 16th of January 2019 which turned violent saw hundreds of ZCTU demonstrators being arrested, unlawfully detained, and tortured by the police. This was reported to be the first worst government crackdown since the ousting of Robert Mugabe. The state heavily descended on ZCTU protestors in a very brutal manner and charged the as the protestors of trying to remove a constitutionally elected government. Mashininga (2019) reports:

‘Hundreds of ZCTU protestors, ordinary citizens including pro-democracy campaigner Evan Mawarire, have been arrested across the country for either inciting people to protest or participating in demonstrations that followed

Mnangagwa's announcement of fuel hikes. ' (Mashinga, 16 January 2019)

In addition, the state continued to suppress, harass and treat the union with suspicion as it went on to institute unlawful prolonged detentions of union leaders of sister organizations who would have visited the country to conduct meetings with their ally the ZCTU. The State implored these repressive tactics to strengthen and safeguard its status quo. Evidence of this unlawful and prolonged detention is reported in *The Zimbabwean*.

'In February this year, Kwasi Adu Amankwah, secretary general of the International Trade Union Confederation's (ITUC) regional body ITUC-Africa was detained for several hours while visiting Zimbabwe on a solidarity mission with the ZCTU . '(The Zimbabwean, 2019)

In addition, in spite of the glimmers of hope ushered in by the removal of Robert Mugabe, the study noted that relations between state and ARTUZ were still tense. The continued use of arbitrary arrest and detention of the teacher's union's leaders and members soured relations between the state and the teacher's union as it painted a picture that suspicious relationship of the past had not ended. Several reports were noted across Zimbabwe were ARTUZ members and leaders were arrested and detained for demanding a decent wage. As reported by *ZimEye*;

'The leader of the Amalgamated Teachers Union of Zimbabwe, Obert Masaraure has been arrested during the 'funeral demo' in Harare where teachers are protesting over their meagre USD38 per month salary. The demo was dubbed #paydayfuneral. Masaraure was together with nine others violently led away by riot police officers in the CBD at midday. '(ZimEye, 2019);

These arbitrary arrests are a stark reminder of Mugabe's days when the union members were also arbitrarily arrested by the state for voicing their concerns. The *United States Department of State* (3 March 2017) reports that:

'The government did not respect the workers' right to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively. In January, ZRP officers beat protesters and arrested three ARTUZ leaders following a demonstration regarding delayed payment of civil servant salaries and annual bonuses. '(United States Department of State, 3 March 2017)

The organizations in particular ZCTU has continued to be a victim of state suppression as it also got more stringent treatment from the state in the form of travel bans. The state denied travel visas for 'friends' of the union who had come to offer solidarity to

the union and its leaders. On this subject, the Solidarity Center reported that:

'An attempted fact-finding visit by a delegation of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in February this year resulted in denial of visas for most of the delegation and the arrest of ITUC-Africa Secretary General Kwasi Adu Amankwah by state security.' (Solidarity Center, 2018)

Equally the organization's leadership also endured travel bans during the Mugabe era. The state used the immigration department to frustrate and harass the union by issuing travel bans to all its visitors. This was all done in a systematic manner. *United States Department of State* annual survey report:

'On the International Day of Action on Zimbabwe on 22 September, against the torture that took place on 12 and 13 September, a four- person labour delegation of the USA AFL-CIO constituency group Coalition of Black Trade Unionists led by AFL-CIO Vice President William Lucy was refused entry into Zimbabwe.' (*United States Department of State*, 2007)

Observation

This thematic category clusters arrests, detention and travel ban into a single category for convenience. They all relate to the restriction of movement. According to my findings these violations have been used to harass the two unions over the period of investigation. Evidence shows that the current state and Mugabe era tactics are similar in degree and manner to repress and terrorize the two unions. An observation also worth noting in this thematic category is that travel bans were systematically used by the two regimes to frustrate and alienate ZCTU. Travel bans were also imposed on visiting sister unions from outside Zimbabwe who would come to convey solidarity messages or to attend meetings with ZCTU. Both regimes, being paranoid, would use this tactic and not allow the sister unions to enter the country and meet ZCTU. Figure 3 indicates the number of arrests/ detentions/travel bans in the period November 2017 - February 2020 that were reported by the two unions in the sources I accessed. Figure 3 indicates a frequency of 46 references for both cases studies over the two-year period. This indicates the pervasiveness of suppression of these unions under the Mnangagwa administration.




Figure 3 – Bar Graph summary of incidents reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.2 Assaults

The assault of ZCTU members and its leadership are another feature of state suppression and intimidation. These assaults have not been hidden under the new dispensation as was during the Mugabe period where the then union leaders, Mr Matombo and Ms Matibenga, were brutally assaulted by state agents as a way of trying to silence their public voicing of the state’s violation of worker rights, especially in 2003. These intimidatory assaults have since resurfaced under the Mnangagwa administration. Evidence of assaults of ZCTU members by the police in the Mnangagwa era were reported in The Zimbabwean newspaper (30 October 2019) where Munashe Chirowamari a trade unionist is quoted saying;

‘We were at the balcony of the ZCTU offices when the police started manhandling the [ZCTU] President [Peter Mutasa]. I thought it would be a good idea for us all to either sit down or follow the president to the police vehicle. ‘That was when one of the police officers dragged me outside and began hitting me with a baton all over my body. He then bundled me into the police vehicle, together with President Mutasa and others, they beat us all the way to the police station, where we spent the night before appearing in court the following day,’ (The Zimbabwean, 30 October 2019)

Further evidence of assault is seen during the January 2019 fuel protest that was called for by the ZCTU. The police and military tried to end the protests and unrest by going into the homes of trade union activists and brutally assaulted them for participating in the fuel hike protests. Burke (18 January 2019) reports:

‘Soldiers and unidentified armed men conducted door-to-door searches in poor areas of cities on Friday, dragging known ZCTU members and “random” residents out of homes to be beaten and often detained, activists said.’ (Burke, 18 January 2019)

Additional evidence of Mnangagwa’s state apparatus using this repressive tool to suppress and intimidate the union is cited in a ZCTU Press Statement;

‘The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is disgusted by the reports that the Zimbabwe Republic Police today beat-up suspended trade union leaders from the energy sector who were attending a hearing at the company premises.’ (ZCTU, 2018);

In a similar vein, frustrated by the ARTUZ’s influence and critical stance on the rights of the teachers, findings reveal that the state under Mugabe resorted to severely assault union members and in some cases leaving them with permanent injuries. NewZimbabwe.com article reports that:

‘Some teachers have lost limbs, some lives and others had to flee the country as the ruling party under Mugabe continued to use violence as a tool of mobilization,’ (NewZimbabwe.com, 2013)

Findings further revealed that the assaults on the ARTUZ and its members continued to be done in Mnangagwa era in an attempt by the regime to inculcate fear in the members. NewsDay article reports that:

‘ARTUZ president Obert Masaraure was abducted from his home and tortured on June 6 by suspected State agents. The assailants, armed with rifles, broke into Masaraure’s home at midnight, confiscated his wife’s phone and force-marched him to the bushes where he was beaten and interrogated. The perpetrators accused Masaraure of encouraging teachers to revolt against government.’ (NewsDay, 2019)

Observation

There is clear evidence of assaults by state security personnel of members of two unions ARTUZ and ZCTU. The nature of the assaults is very similar to those that occurred

during the Mugabe era. The assaults under Mnangagwa administration follow a similar pattern of unjustified, inhumane attacks using excessive force. Carey (2010) argues that if the state perceives that the extent of threat an organization or an individual poses is too much; the state does not hesitate to reply with unadorned measures of repression. The continued use of such callous repressive tactics is evident of the antagonistic relationship that continues to exist between the state and these unions as indicated by the number of references to assault which are captured in Figure 4. From the graph it is clear that 12 references of assaults over the two-year period have been reported by the various sources used in my study.




Figure 4 – Bar Graph summary of incidents of assaults reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.3 Abduction and Torture

Further the use of abduction by the state under President Mnangagwa paints a disturbing picture on the state’s attitude towards ZCTU and ARTUZ. Previously the state under Robert Mugabe had conflictual relation with these unions. Under Mugabe, the unions suffered several abductions as the state sought to intimidate the unions for their role in being a mouthpiece of the workers. Evidence to support this is cited by International Trade Union Confederation report;

‘ITUC has strongly protested to President Mugabe in a letter following the assault and detention of three ZCTU leaders on 17 September. Michael Kandukutu, the ZCTU national Organizer, Tennyson Muchepfa from the National Engineering Workers’

Unions, and Justice Mucheni from the Food Federation were attacked and beaten at around noon on Monday in Harare's Workington industrial area, while distributing information about the peaceful strike planned for 19 and 20 September. They were then abducted. The ZCTU suspects that members of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) were responsible.' (ITUC, 2007)

In addition, ARTUZ members were also abducted under Mugabe because of their critical stance against his government. The *NewsDay* reports;

'Yesterday (Monday), our Mashonaland West provincial chairperson, Cde Munyaradzi Ndawana, was abducted from his workplace at Slaughter Primary School in Makonde. Ndawana was taken to Chinhoyi's NSSA (National Social Security) building, where six members of the infamous spy grouping (Central Intelligence Organization) interrogated and harassed him for five hours and released him after threatening him with unspecified action if he remains a member of our union.' (Newsday, 2019)

Similarly, these abductions have resurfaced under President Mnangagwa, and they have further strained the relationship. Reports of abduction of a ZCTU affiliate member Dr Magombeyi under Mnangagwa regime is stated in ZCTU Press Statement;

'The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is shocked by reports of the abduction of Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors Association (ZHDA) President, Dr. Peter Magombeyi on Saturday, 14 September 2019. The ZCTU is appalled by what appears to be a clear and systematic pattern and upsurge of threats and abductions of civic organization and trade union leaders who voice their concerns against the poor working conditions' (Zimbabwe Today, 2019)

Findings also indicate abduction and torture of ARTUZ members by the state apparatus. On this subject, CITE newsletter reports;

'According to the union, seven cases of abduction were recorded in 2019. Obert Masaraure was abducted twice in Harare, Robson Chere twice in Goromonzi. These abductions were clearly orchestrated by the State given the weapons that were carried by the abductors, some of the victims would end up being dumped in police cells.' (CITE, 2019)

These examples indicate a conflictual relationship as the Mnangagwa government continued to severely abduct ARTUZ and ZCTU members in a bid to silence and intimidate the unions as was the case during the Mugabe era.

Observation

It can be observed that abduction was used by both administrations in order to harass and suppress the unions. The approach used to conduct these abductions are similar in both cases and in both administrations. The *modus operandi* involved using ununiformed men with unmarked vehicles to carry out these abductions. In addition, Figure 5 is evident that the number of times the various sources used for this study have referred to abduction and torture cases mount to 19 cases. Of the 19 cases, Figure 5 indicates that ARTUZ suffered more abductions than ZCTU over the two-year period under review.




Figure 5– Bar Graph summary of incidents of abduction and torture reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.4 Raid/Break-in/Theft

The insistence on the use of pre-Mugabe suppression tactics by the Mnangagwa’s administration is a clear indication of the acrimony that still exists between the state and the two unions. Under the Mugabe administration, findings show that the unions were subjected to raids and break ins which were conducted by the Central Intelligence Office to seize documents, gadgets and files which the state deemed to have information

it could use to incriminate and silence the unions and its leaders. Evidence is reported in the *Green Left Weekly*;

'Already ZCTU members have been arrested, their offices raided and material relating to the stay away confiscated.' (*Green Left Weekly*, 2017) Equally, under Mnangagwa raids and break ins resurfaced further straining the relations and inhibiting all hope of a change in relationship. Findings gathered in this study indicate that the Mnangagwa government has conducted raids and break ins at ZCTU and ARTUZ homes and offices in order to harass and intimidate union leaders from doing their work. In a tweet by ZCTU on July 2019, the organization reported of a break in;

ZCTU (ZctuZimbabwe). *'This is the first time, for all we know, in our history that bullets are delivered at the homes of trade union leaders. This is the new dispensation! We demand the safety of @MutasaPeter and @japhet_moyo.* 17 July 2019, 11:30 a.m. Tweet.

In addition, the state also continued to conduct raids and break ins at ARTUZ members workstations and homes as well as was the case during the Mugabe era. Newsday reports that:

'ARTUZ president Obert Masaraure was abducted from his home and tortured on June 6 by suspected State agents. The assailants, armed with rifles, broke into Masaraure's home at midnight, confiscated his wife's phone and force-marched him to the bushes where he was beaten and interrogated. The perpetrators accused Masaraure of encouraging teachers to revolt against government.' (*NewsDay*, 2019)

Observation

The state continues to execute raids and break ins as was happening during Mugabe era. It has become habitual that state security agents orchestrate these raids. Evidence from both cases under both administrations indicate how these raids and break ins have been instrumental in fueling the state's action to continue to terrorize and harass the unions in order to intimidate them. From Figure 6 below they are 5 references to raid/break-in and theft from the sources used. Of the five reported for this study, four have been carried out on ARTUZ and ZCTU experienced one.




Figure 6– Bar Graph summary of incidents of Raid/Break ins and theft reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.5 Surveillance

Marx (2007) notes that surveillance is found in a plethora of spaces and in classic arenas such as military surveillance and police surveillance. Study findings reveal those relations between state and the two unions ZCTU and ARTUZ is laced with suspicion. Findings exposes lack of mutual trust and respect between them. Continued use of surveillance by the Mnangagwa government is a chilling reminder of the uncomfortable relations that have always existed between state and civil society under Robert Mugabe. Both unions were always under physical surveillance conducted through the military, police and the Central Intelligence Organization. Evidence to substantiate state surveillance of ZCTU under Mugabe is reported by *IOL News*;

‘Last month police forced their way into the ZCTU’s meeting where it was going to discuss the possibility of a national stay-away in protest state suppression of the labour movement following Mugabe’s victory in flawed presidential elections on March 9-11.’ (IOL News, 2002)

And for ARTUZ, *United States Department of State Report*;

‘On February 23, the Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) reported security officials routinely visited rural schools ahead of visits by senior ZANU-PF officials to ensure that teachers delivered the ‘correct lessons’ to students. ARTUZ representatives stated these actions created significant stress on teachers and negatively affected their performance in classrooms’ (United States Department of State, 2017)

Similarly, under Mnangagwa there is continued state surveillance of ARTUZ and ZCTU organizations’ activities. This surveillance has resurfaced in the wake of the criticism levelled against Mugabe towards his treatment of these unions. Evidence of the state conducting surveillance on ARTUZ is captured in *Nehanda Radio Newsletter* which reports that:

‘ARTUZ told the Daily News on Sunday this week that there has been a heavy presence of military personnel especially in high density suburbs who make impromptu visits at public schools.’ (Nehanda Radio, 2019)

Further evidence of Mnangagwa government ’s continued use of surveillance of ZCTU is reported by *NewZimbabwe.com* For example:

‘IF U CONTINUE DRIVING THAT PRADO ADQ 2851 CARRYING THAT BEAUTIFUL DAUGHTER OF YOURS TO XOOL. AND U CONTINUE TO MAKE STUPID DECISIONS AT THE EXECUTIVE AND GC MEETINGS. WE WILL GANG RAPE KAMWANA KAKO (your child). WE HAVE ALL DETAILS AND MOVEMENTS.’ (NewZimbabwe.com, 2019)

Strong inference is made against the state that it was behind this act of surveillance as the meeting was intended on planning the union’s action plan against government’s unfair labour practices and a deteriorating economy. Furthermore, it is the state’s prerogative to protect its citizens and the failure by the state to address this led to such an inference.

Observation

The state under Mnangagwa continues to send chilling warnings to ZCTU and ARTUZ leaders through surveillance even after ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ which saw the ouster of Robert Mugabe. The new administration under Emmerson Mnangagwa has continued to make use of Mugabe’s tactic of surveillance as a tool to monitor the activities, bank

accounts of unions, and daily routines of leaders of ZCTU and ARTUZ. Evidence suggests that both Mugabe and Mnangagwa used surveillance to repress the unions, and both made use of state security agents to conduct these surveillance operations. In the period under study the number of times surveillance comes out from the different sources used in the two cases is 8 as illustrated in Figure 7 below. This clearly shows that surveillance is still part and parcel of the Mnangagwa’s administration.




Figure 7– Bar Graph summary of incidents of surveillance reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.6 Symbolic Violence and Threats

Symbolic violence and threats have marred relations between state and unions (ZCTU and ARTUZ) during Mugabe era. This came in the form of the state deploying armed police and military personnel to places where the unions intended to strike. Verbal threats came from Mugabe who would publicly condone police beatings and brutality of anyone who would have dared to protest his administration. Evidence of such is substantiated by *Zimbabwe News Online* which reports;

'They mobilised the riot police, armed them with teargas and ordered them to make sure people did not gather at Africa Unity Square, the intended meeting place for the demonstration.' (Zimbabwe News Online,1997)

And Human Rights Watch reports that President Robert Mugabe, addressing delegates at the Zimbabwe embassy in Cairo, Egypt, on the arrest, torture and mistreatment of 15 trade union activists in Zimbabwe declared;

'We cannot have a situation where people decide to sit in places not allowed and when police remove them, they say no. We can't have that. That is a revolt to the system. Some are crying that they were beaten. Yes, you will be thoroughly beaten. When the police say move you move. If you don't move, you invite the police to use force.' (Human Rights Watch, 2016)

For ARTUZ symbolic violence was in the form of deployment of state security agents to target teacher's union members. *NewsDay* reports that:

'ARTUZ is angered by the barbaric tactics being employed by the State in a desperate bid to silence our bold union,' he said. 'The State has deployed security agents across the country to harass our leadership, threatening them with unspecified action' (*NewsDay*, n.d.)

In the same way the 'new dispensation' under Mnangagwa has insisted on using intimidation to harass, suppress the organizations for standing for the right of workers. Study findings reveal that after the January 14, 2018, protests organized by the ZCTU, the state activated its repressive apparatus and instituted symbolic violence against the unions. ZCTU press statement reports that:

'The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is demanding thorough and unfettered investigations into the death threats on its leaders, President Peter Mutasa and Secretary-General, Japhet Moyo after letters that had bullets were delivered at their homes and offices on Tuesday 16 July 2019. Although the writers of the letters claimed that they were doing so to protect their businesses, it is clear that these letters were not written by business people, but some security agents who are used to beating up, torture and even killing of innocent civilians going about their business.' (ZCTU, 2019)

Furthermore, the new dispensation also made use of threats as a strategy to silence and instill fear in the ZCTU leaders and members. On August 1, 2018, soon after the July 30 elections state security agents threatened the organization by shooting live ammunition into their Headquarters. The shooting was to act as a macabre warning to the ZCTU leadership who had started to claim that the election results had been rigged. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (16, November 2018) reports;

'...just a few days after the 30 July elections, the army fired live ammunition at the ZCTU headquarters in central Harare, shattering windowpanes and injuring a staff member.' (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 16 November 2018)

Likewise, the similar strategies have been used against the ARTUZ by the Mnangagwa regime. *Nehanda Radio's* newsletter substantiates this claim by reporting that:

'Armed soldiers are now a familiar sight at public schools throughout the country in the wake of an on-going strike by teachers, resulting in parents, guardians and learners living in fear.' (Nehanda Radio, 2019)

Observation

From the evidence symbolic violence is being conducted through protest policing and deployment of heavily armed police by the state at both ARTUZ and ZCTU workplaces and homes. Figure 8 indicates references to symbolic violence and threats, which have been reported from the various sources used for the study. These developments speak of continued use of suppression by the state to try and inculcate fear in the unions.




Figure 8– Bar Graph summary of incidents of symbolic violence and threats reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.7 Judicial Harassment

Goldstein (2001) posits that the state can institute suppression using the legal or judicial system or procedures. Under Mugabe judicial harassment was used in various forms in order to harass and frustrate efforts of both ZCTU and ARTUZ. Study findings indicate that under Mugabe judicial harassment was witnessed through banning of ZCTU demonstrations. *United States Department of State Report* reports:

‘In September police twice banned all demonstrations in the Harare Central Police District in response to social movement protests, which included ZCTU members.’ (United States Department of State, 2017)

And also, through refusing to allow arrested ZCTU members to talk to their lawyers as permitted by the law. Human Rights Watch notes that:

‘Lawyers representing the ZCTU told Human Rights Watch that they were initially denied access to their clients and that police refused to provide the injured unionists with medical assistance. After almost 24 hours in custody the unionists were eventually taken to Parirenyatwa hospital in Harare after lawyers obtained a court order that police allow access to medical treatment’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006)

This kind of judicial harassment by the state was also used against ARTUZ under Mugabe. ARTUZ members were arrested by the state police and endured unlawful remand and bail denial. This is verified by a report in *Nehanda Radio*'s newsletter:

'ARTUZ President Obert Masaraure is appearing in a Murehwa court tomorrow, facing charges of convening a gathering without notifying the regulating authority under POSA. The Investigating Officer is arguing that he cannot be granted bail on the basis that he has other pending court cases. The state is proposing the accused be remanded until 15 September and bail be denied.' (*Nehanda Radio*, 2016)

However, after the military assisted coup which saw a change in government in November of 2017, the new government promised to break away from the past and open the democratic space (Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 2018). On the contrary, findings reveal that just after the controversial July 31st, 2018, elections Mnangagwa regime continued with Mugabe's legacy of disregarding the enjoyment of important freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution. He continued to use the judicial system to oppress The ZCTU and ARTUZ. The organizations continued to have their demonstrations unfairly banned by either the police using the AIPPA and POSA laws or through a court order. Evidence to substantiate this is reported in *The Equal Times*:

'Authorities used a recent cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe to justify banning the ZCTU demonstration; however other gatherings, such as sports and Zanu-PF party events, have taken place unhindered.' (*The Equal Times*, 2018)

Aside from demonstration bans, strict bail conditions were imposed on arrested ZCTU members in a bid to curtail their movement. Evidence is reported in the ZCTU Submission Report to UN Rapporteur which notes that:

'President Mr Peter Mutasa [of the ZCTU] were arrested on 21 and 26 January [2019] respectively over the January 14 to 16 protests over worsening economic conditions. They were jailed for two weeks only to gain their freedom through a court order coupled with strict bail conditions that included reporting to police daily and twice a week for Mr Mutasa. The conditions have now been varied to once a month after surrendering title deeds of ZCTU property and personal property for Mr Mutasa as surety.' (ZCTU, 2019)

The organization also continued to suffer through deliberate failure by the courts to give arrested union leaders trial dates. President Peter Mutasa in a tweet on his official Twitter page notes that:

Mutasa, Peter (@MutasaPeter) *'Justice Delayed is Justice Denied. 11 Court appearances before 7 Prosecutors and 6 Magistrates. Still no date of trial & all applications for refusal of further remand are dismissed. Repressed but not Depressed.'* 2 October 2019, 6:27 p.m. Tweet.

ARTUZ has also not been spared from this type of judicial harassment under Mnangagwa. Trial dates and bail hearings were continuously and deliberately delayed. *Zimbabwe Morning Post Newsletter* (November 22, 2019) reports that:

'MAGISTRATE Victoria Mashamba on Thursday dismissed activist Obert Masaraure's application for charges against him to be dropped. The defence made the request for the case to be dismissed, saying the State had has no case, adding it had taken long for the trial date to be given. Masaraure's case has taken 11 months while the State said it was still carrying out investigations.' (*Zimbabwe Morning Post*, 2019)

This behaviour by the judicial system in Zimbabwe reinforces Franz Neuman's (1936) position, which argues that the legal system is nothing more than an avenue or tool used by repressive regimes to terrorize its people.

Observation

The state manipulated the judicial system in order to repress the unions. Similar judicial harassment tactics such as delays in trial, stringent bail conditions have been used by the Mnangagwa regime in order to terrorise and repress ARTUZ and ZCTU as illustrated in Figure 9 below. In Figure 9 it is clear that judicial harassment has resurfaced under Mnangagwa regime. The graph shows 28 references of judicial harassment from the various sources used for the study of both cases. In both cases the findings show that the legal system is compromised, captured and it is supporting repression.




Figure 9– Bar Graph summary of incidents of judicial harassment reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.8 Cyber Attack/Defamation/Smear Campaign

It was also established during the study that the Mnangagwa administration made use of smear campaigns/defamation and cyber-attacks to discredit and tarnish these organizations. The use of such repressive tactics was reminiscent of the period under Mugabe where the regime unabatedly used these tactics to also harass and terrorize ZCTU and ARTUZ for their role as the mouthpiece of the workers. Under Mugabe, the unions were broadcasted as anti-regime agents, Western sponsored outfits bent on destabilising the country. These reports were corroborated by Reuters news articles which for example reported that:

‘Mugabe, battling a crumbling economy and resurgent opposition, has accused the ZCTU of being a Western stooge, sponsored to oust him for seizing white-owned commercial farms. His ministers have called on workers to ignore the boycott, warning the unions against inciting violence’ (Reuters, 2007)

Also, under Mnangagwa similar repressive tactics have been a recurring theme. In the 2019 ZCTU Submission Report to UN Rapporteur it is mentioned that:

'ZCTU also suffered media violence instigated by the government's newspaper 'The Herald'. It published a propaganda story on 4 February 2019 on its front page titled 'Fresh MDC-A, ZCTU plot Exposed' claiming that ZCTU and its research institute, the LEDRIZ are being used by the Movement for Democratic Change, an opposition party 'to train youths in violence and destabilisation tactics to render the country ungovernable and effect regime change'. The article simply means ZCTU is a terrorist organization and so written to cause alarm and despondency to readers to hate ZCTU. ZCTU raised its concern with the publishers of the Herald to retract the allegation but was ignored.' (ZCTU, 2019)

ARTUZ was also at the receiving end of such treatment and accused of being 'regime change' agents who are bent on advancing a political agenda under the guise of standing for teacher's rights. *Vantu News* reported that:

'Primary and Secondary Education Minister, Paul Mavima have professed that Teachers' unions such as ARTUZ, that are claiming incapacitation and inability to go to work on behalf of their members, are now pursuing a political agenda to destabilise the education sector.' (*Vantu News*, 2019)

The state under Mnangagwa further conducted a cyber-attack on the unions. Social media accounts of union leaders were tampered with while they were in incarceration, an illegal internet blackout was also instituted by the state to undermine planned protests planned by the two organizations. ZCTU Submission Report to UN Rapporteur observed:

'During the protest period, the government denied us the right to information as it disconnected internet services and social media access in an attempt to hide the atrocities perpetrated against the protestors by security forces that followed people into their homes and brutalised them and some women were reportedly raped' (ZCTU, 2019)

ZCTU President Peter Mutasa also had his email tampered with while he was incarcerated. In a tweet on his official account, he wrote;

Peter, Mutasa (@MutasaPeter) *'Even my email was also tempered with on 29 January while I was in prison. Please be careful with any correspondence from my usual email until this is sorted.'* 6 February 2019, 9:22 p.m. Tweet.

Observation

There is evidence that both regimes used propaganda to character assassinate and to tarnish the unions and their leaders. Negative depiction of the unions using state media was repeatedly employed by the two administrations in order to denigrate them. It is worth noting that in both cases the state has referred to both ZCTU and ARTUZ as 'regime change' agents of western countries; a narrative which both regimes continuously peddled to sabotage and discredit the work of the unions. Evidence shown in Figure 10 indicates the frequency of incidents of smear campaigns/defamation/cyber-attacks under Mnangagwa. The graph shows that there was a total of 20 documented incidents of cyber-attacks, defamation, or smear campaigns over the two-year period across all the sources used in this study.




Figure 10– Bar Graph summary of incidents of smear campaign/defamation/cyber-attack reported in the sources used in this study

6.2.9 Suspension and Salary Cessation

Under Mnangagwa there were suspensions of union leaders from key national boards without due process being followed. As a way to silence the critical voice of the union and to curtail its influence the Mnangagwa government resorted to suspending and removing ZCTU from the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) board. This is a board that administers and oversees the pensions authority to avoid abuse of pensions

fund. The state insisted on playing a big role in the appointment of this board in a bid to coverup its looting of the pensioners' fund. Evidence shows that the Mnangagwa state insisted on suspending ZCTU from the board because of its radical stance in challenging government abuse of the fund. The Zimbabwe Independent noted that:

'Last month, Minister Mupfumira removed ZCTU official Peter Mutasa from the social security agency accusing him of working against the social security agency and leaking confidential information. However, the ZCTU has challenged Mupfumira's decision and is pushing for the reinstatement of the union's secretary-general.' (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2017)

The ZCTU on their official Twitter page also reported that:

ZCTU (@ZctuZimbabwe) *'The current Minister @SekaiNzenza must come clean why she has been refusing to reappoint our President @MutasaPeter on @nssazw board. This starts with Board appointments on political lines.'* 27 July 2019, 7:26 a.m. Tweet.

This repressive tactic was also used during Mugabe's era as the union was also removed from the same National Board because it campaigned for the rights of the workers and for challenging state abuse of public funds. NewZimbabwe.com article reports that:

'The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) has written to President, Robert Mugabe over the dismissal of ZCTU President, Peter Mutasa, from the National Social Security Authority board.' (NewZimbabwe.com, 2017)

There were also notable reports on the dynamics of hostility and tension in the relationship between the state and ARTUZ. In the first instance, findings reveal that the government, through the public service commission, managed to repress and abuse the union because of its dissenting voice by employing salary cessation to the union leaders and its members. ARTUZ reported:

'The government has instructed the cessation of salaries for 31 of our members without following laid down procedure. The affected members were never given the right to respond before the sentences were delivered. Teachers would only learn of their fate on pay day' (ARTUZ, 2019)

Observation

Salary cessation and suspension were systematically used by the Mnangagwa regime to suppress the two unions. Figure 11 shows 41 references to incidents of suspension and/or salary cessation in the various sources used for this study. In both the Mugabe and Mnangagwa regimes' findings indicate that ZCTU has been suspended from the NSSA board for its critical voice in challenging state abuse of pensioners' funds. None of the suspensions followed due process. From the findings it is also clear that the Mnangagwa government viewed the ARTUZ as a threat because of their critical stance against government policies. Government in response has resorted to using salary cessation and abuse to control and intimidate the union. Government invoked salary cessation as a way of frustrating the union members and to silence them from challenging government policy. Under the Mnangagwa Presidency salary cessation has also been used as retribution to ARTUZ members and leaders for not siding with the government. The state cannot conduct salary cessation on ZCTU as it does not have direct access to the salaries of the office bearers of the organization as in the case of ARTUZ. With ARTUZ, members are state employees and as a result the state has the power to suspend or terminate their salaries for unfounded reasons. In ARTUZ's case there is no evidence from my sources of state suspending it from national boards or instituting travel bans on members of the organization. ARTUZ seems to have been spared of this form of suppression by the state.



Figure 11- Bar Graph summary of incidents of suspension and salary cessation reported in the sources used in this study

6.3 Summary of Violations

Suppression of selected civil society organizations that was evident in Mugabe era is still observable during the early years of the Mnangagwa presidency, which was dubbed a ‘New Dispensation’. The various forms of suppression perpetrated against these unions by the state appears to have worsened under Mnangagwa. Frequency counts of these various forms of suppression indicate that for six out of nine categories the teacher’s union ARTUZ has experienced more incidents of suppression than labour union ZCTU. The exceptions are judicial harassment and smear campaigns where ZCTU has a high frequency count. This difference in the frequency of suppression is because ARTUZ is not fully independent as government is able to track down and target its employees who are members of the union. As a result, the government can harass them by direct means such as salary cessation, a violation which the state cannot exercise over ZCTU, an independent organization. Furthermore, ARTUZ conducted more numerous industrial actions during the two-year period than ZCTU, giving the state more frequently an excuse to target ARTUZ with acts of suppression.

In the bigger picture, while the broad patterns in the forms of suppression of these civil society organizations by the Mnangagwa regime are similar across these to case studies, the frequency of suppression in these categories sometimes differs. Figure 12 shows this clearly.




Figure 12– Bar Graph summary of incidents of the frequency counts of violations reported in the sources used in this study

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

7.1 **Introductory Note**

This chapter discusses the key findings of the study in response to the central research question: ‘*What do we learn at the beginning of the Mnangagwa period in Zimbabwe from selected media sources about the current nature of relations between the state and civil society organizations that have historically been subjected to state suppression?*’. To address this question, there are four major sections that I will focus on. The first section is technical, and it comments on the extent of the replication of patterns of suppression across the two case studies. The second section discusses key findings about civil society suppression by the state in relation to relevant literature. The third section reflects on how the findings reveal diminishing levels of democracy in Zimbabwe. The fourth, and final section, discusses whether the patterns that emerge in this study of civil society relations with the state in Zimbabwe are similar or different to those in the region.

7.2 **Replication of Suppression Patterns**

Yin (2018) argues that in multiple case study designs the pattern of replication across the cases serves to support the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, where there is replication, there is an emerging pattern. From the study, it is clear that the case studies have their differences, but there is clear evidence of replication from the data. In broad terms there are similar patterns of suppression across the two cases. Replication is evident in the types of suppression tactics used by the state against the two unions and in the *modus operandi* used in enforcing these tactics. These tactics are enforced with the sole aim of monitoring and incapacitating the two organizations, which are regarded as enemies of the state. Similar repressive methods (see Figure 12) - including assault, arrest or detention, abduction, torture, cyber-attacks, defamation or smear campaigns, suspension or salary cessation, judicial harassment, symbolic violence, raids, and surveillance - are repeatedly used by the Mnangagwa regime and reported by both case studies.

The intensity of some methods of suppression varies across the two cases. This difference should be noted, but it does not substantially detract from the overall pattern of replication. One example of varying intensity or frequency across the cases is that there

were more reports of abduction or torture of ARTUZ members than ZCTU members. This probably was because ARTUZ conducted numerous industrial actions during the two-year period under investigation as compared to ZCTU hence it gave the government reason to act against them. The other reason for the difference in frequency is that ARTUZ's members as employees of the state are not fully independent of government and they can be easily traced and targeted with, for example, salary cessation which the state cannot commit against ZCTU and its members because they are independent of government. Replication is in the type of suppression experienced and not necessarily in the frequency of reported incidents.

Notwithstanding the differences mentioned above, the patterns of replication across the two cases begins to establish a general pattern of what is happening in civil society in Zimbabwe.

7.3 Civil Society Suppression by State

State-civil society relations have remained conflictual with certain forms of suppression or violations being dominant. The levels of hostility and suspicion that were visible in the Mugabe era are still evident under the Mnangagwa era, which according to Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (2018), was marketed as the 'New Dispensation' during its inception. My findings suggest a pattern of worsening suppression of targeted civil society organizations under Mnangagwa. They also show that the politics of suppression, violence, rancour and acrimony that had been characteristic of the Mugabe era in the state's relations with these civil society organizations has grown and become a feature of the new administration under Mnangagwa. The state continues to perceive civil society organizations that are critical of state as its adversaries. My findings show that across the case studies the dominant forms of suppression are similar. These forms of suppression have continued to be used by the state to consolidate its Gramscian hegemony.

The broader pattern of civil society suppression by the state is also seen in how the state, under Mnangagwa, manipulates the military and uses it to suppress civil society organizations in Zimbabwe. Dorman (2001) posits those repressive states, if faced with a threat to their power, quickly activate the repressive apparatus to protect the interests of the powerful. Similarly, my findings show that the Mnangagwa administration has, over a period of two years, worked to reinforce a Gramscian hegemonic hold over civil society organizations (ZCTU and ARTUZ). Mnangagwa

administration has entrenched Gramscian hegemony by scaling up the role of security forces and police in the abuse of civil society leaders and citizens who are critical of the state. Security forces and the police have been used in torturing, abducting, arresting and assaulting members of civil society organizations (see section 6.2.2; 6.2.3 and 6.2.7). My findings show that the state is prepared and eager to use security agents to suppress civil society. This view is corroborated with literature by Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019), which reiterates that the state, under Mnangagwa, also uses security forces to thwart all forms of dissent through intimidation. Repressive activities of state agencies, such as the security forces and police, are evidence of the state entrenching hegemony and attempting to dissuade or silence all expressions of political criticism of the ruling party by civil society organizations (Lichbach, 1987).

In addition, civil society suppression by the state is also evidenced by the way the military and security officials are being made to participate in institutions and processes that directly or indirectly serve the interests of the Mnangagwa regime. Della Porta (1995, 1996), Della Porta & Reiter (1998a) and Wisler & Kriesi (1998) reiterate that state security apparatus in any repressive state is characteristically cast as agents functioning at the command of their political leaders. The response of state structures, including the police and the army, on civil society organizations that are being selectively targeted by the state paints a picture of heavy state suppression. The police, army and courts have brazenly displayed a lack of objectivity and professionalism in their engagement with state targeted civil society organizations such as ZCTU and ARTUZ (see sections 6.2.2; 6.4;6.2.7). These examples of state's heavy-handedness in dealing with the unarmed unions reinforce Gramsci's (1971) argument that certain structures in society play a momentous role in the consolidation of state hegemonic control. The disregard of civil society's rights by the state structures, especially the police and the army, illustrate the suppression that these targeted civil society organizations are operating under in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019) confirms the evidence of civil society suppression by the state, which is being committed by politicised law enforcement agencies who continue to violate civic leaders' rights and unashamedly remain complicit in human rights violations.

My findings show that there is substantial evidence in the two case studies of a growing pattern of suppression of civil society organizations that are being selectively targeted by the state using judicial harassment. Under Mnangagwa, the state is suppressing civil

society by manipulating and capturing the judicial system. The judicial system has repeatedly become a tool with which the new administration uses to suppress ARTUZ and ZCTU's counter-hegemonic efforts. My findings show that the law and the judicial arm has been repetitively used in cases involving ARTUZ and ZCTU in order to harass and prevent them from carrying out their mandate of standing up for the rights of their respective constituencies against the Mnangagwa regime. Other judicial harassment tactics such as delays in trial, stringent bail conditions also demonstrate the lack of independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe and its manipulation by the state to repress ARTUZ and ZCTU (see section 6.2.7). This form of suppression was well established during the Mugabe era, but it appears to be getting worse and diminishing democratic space. This form of suppression is also confirmed by Zhou (2019) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019) who reiterate that civil society suppression by the Mnangagwa state is also tolerated by the judicial system. Civil society organizations, in particular those that are critical of the state, are being suppressed by Mnangagwa through state's abuse of judicial pronouncements (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, 2019). This pattern is perpetuated each time the state ignores judicial pronouncements and continues its suppression of civil society organizations.

A conflictual relationship has historically existed between the state and civil society organizations that were critical of the state under Mugabe. ZCTU and ARTUZ continue to be subjected to state surveillance. Foucault's (Shumway, 1989) notion of 'panoptic surveillance' employed in this study is useful in depicting how the state has continued to suppress and silence civil society in Zimbabwe under the new dispensation. Civil society organizations in Zimbabwe have been continuously suppressed by the state through surveillance. Mnangagwa has managed to suppress civil society organizations through a coordinated and systematic state surveillance of selected civil society organizations (including ZCTU and ARTUZ). The state has used various overt and covert means of surveillance to suppress and consolidate its hegemony over ZCTU and ARTUZ (see section 6.2.5). The Mnangagwa presidency has perpetuated civil society suppression through mass surveillance which seeks to control, violate and make civil society docile as the state sees it as a threat to its hegemony. This view corresponds with Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019) and Zhou (2019) who also note that the broader pattern of suppression of civil society organizations still remains intact under Mnangagwa as surveillance continues to be used as a form of restricting and controlling

civil society as the state is still suspicious of civil society organizations as was the case under Mugabe era.

Despite the glimmers of hope in terms of civil society relations with the state, my findings indicate that the broader challenge of civil society suppression by the state remains and is abundantly evident (see Figure 12). The state continues to have a negative attitude towards civil society those that are critical of the state. Suppression of these organizations has been through intimidation, harassment, surveillance, break ins, abductions and torture, salary cessation and suspension. Zhou (2019) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019) cite evidence of similar forms of suppression of targeted civil organizations by the state to thwart all forms of dissent and protest and consolidate the Mnangagwa state hegemony.

I now move on to look at the diminishing levels of democracy which is a consequence of civil society suppression by the state.

7.4 Diminishing Levels of Democracy

Earlier, I mentioned how relations between the state and civil society serve as a barometer for assessing democracy. Relevant tenets of democracy, according to Inter-Parliamentary Union (1998;28-29), include:

‘an independent judiciary, respect for the voice of others, recognising the dignity of the individual, rights and freedom of expression, association and assembly is guaranteed, existence of independent media and police and does not tolerate unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture.’

Democracy, according to Arko-Cobbah (2008), entails upholding of rule of law, respect for the constitution, maintaining fundamental rights and freedoms.

In this section, I am not going to look at all features of democracy, but I am only going to comment on threats to democracy posed by ongoing state suppression under Mnangagwa administration. These threats to democracy relate to freedom of speech, association, assembly and individual dignity.

Democracy and good governance were some of the radical promises upon which the new state of Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa were to be founded as enunciated in his inauguration speech (Meldrum, 2017). Citizens hoped Mnangagwa and his government

would subject themselves to the tenets of democracy and rule of law espoused earlier and envisioned the new state as having the moral right to do so. However, the current nature of relations between the state and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe paints a clear picture of a diminishing democracy. A diminishing democracy entails lack of rule of law, lack of respect for the constitution and lack of respect of fundamental rights and freedom.

Democracy continues to be under siege in Zimbabwe. My findings depict Mnangagwa's administration as an authoritarian state evidenced by state sanctioned abductions, assaults, detentions, judicial harassments, and torture, meted against civil society leaders by the state (see section 6.2.2 and 6.3). Kagoro (2010) understands that dictatorship state politics need certain pre-conditions for their existence. He argues that for them to exist 'coercive arms of state must be efficient, loyal and ruthless', 'civic authorities and institutions such as the courts and the civil service must be complicit with the government's aims', 'civic, economic and political spaces in society must be closed up', 'information must be controlled by the political elite, who use the private and public media as mouthpieces' and 'tight controls must be maintained over the operation of all social movements, NGOs and organized groups in civil society'. Taking note of Kagoro's (2010) understanding, it is clear from my findings that all these dictatorial signs and conditions are present in Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa. Evidence of these conditions paints a country that is now under authoritarian rule and whose democracy is under severe threat.

In Zimbabwe democratic features such as upholding of rule of law, respect for the constitution, maintaining fundamental rights and freedoms espoused by Arko-Cobbah (2008) have been muzzled. Under Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe is now a ruthless hegemonic state. Democracy is curtailed in several ways up to the point where the state does not hesitate to make use of nefarious methods to perpetuate and advance hegemonic control over civil society (see section 6.2.6). The violent and brutal response by the police and military to the ZCTU January 2019 protests and August 2018 elections shooting of the ZCTU headquarters is evidence of how hostile and vindictive the Mnangagwa regime is to anyone or anything that he considers to be in opposition to his goal (see section 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 6.2.6 and 6.2.7). These incidents which were reported to be among a list of the worst government forms of suppression since the ousting of Robert Mugabe. Carey (2010) argues that when an autocratic government is threatened by internal dissenting voices of civil society, it is projected to exploit the use of vicious and repressive force to fortify and safeguard its status quo. My findings from the study give credibility to this

assertion as they indicate how the state has found it difficult to do away with the use of coercion and repression in a bid to protect its hegemony. This has been done using both the police and the military elements by the state. Protests by the two unions ARTUZ and ZCTU have been brutally crushed by armed police and soldiers (ZimEye, 2019; ZCTU, 2019). The state has prohibited all methods of democratic protest and discourse. The unions believe the state and its other

arms have become illicit elements that are against democracy and the rule of law as they are preventing them from exercising their constitutional rights. It is quite evident that there has been an acute restriction of democratic space by the government, and this has led to diminishing of democracy.

According to my findings, the state readily uses security forces to silence civil society's dissenting voices. Evidence is seen in (section 6.2.2) where police were deployed to go and conduct a door-to-door operation in high density suburbs beating and assaulting people for participating in the ZCTU fuel hike price strike in January 2019. The same security forces were used also to shoot live ammunition at the headquarters of ZCTU days after the 30 July 2018 elections as a warning to the organization for voicing their concerns on the elections which they claimed to have been rigged (see section 6.2.6). The frequency of the police's torture of union leaders and union members (see section 6.2.3) has also increased. This is a typical sign of coercive and repressive tactics used by the state to protect its hegemony. Dorman (2001) postulates that the state has overtime used heavy-handed tactics to maintain their relations of power in society. These repressive techniques used by the state are intended to avert, regulate, or prevent the unions from conducting collective action (Earl, 2011). This is corroborated in my study with evidence of the police violently attacking and repressing the unions (see section 6.2.2). Since assuming office there is clear evidence of Mnangagwa having taken numerous steps to further destroy relations between the state and the civil society and consolidating of power through loyal and ruthless coercive elements. Such behaviour by the state has undermined the country's democracy. Scholars such as Zhou (2019) and Vava (2019) also confirm that democracy under Mnangagwa is under threat the state has adopted the use coercion and repression as a stratagem to deal with the dissenting and protesting voices of civil society organizations, such as ARTUZ and ZCTU, which are critical of the state.

Furthermore, the pattern of diminishing democracy is being witnessed in both case studies as different forms of suppression indicate how democracy has weakened in Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa. The study's findings reveal structural hegemony in the organization of state media institutions by the Mnangagwa administration that has impacted on the unions. The state media houses have been used to demonize the unions (see section 6.2.8). For instance, state media houses such as *The Herald* newspaper (4 February 2019) continued to paint a picture of the two unions' activities as terrorist and anti-government institutions who are bent on fostering 'regime change' in the country. This pattern speaks of a state whose democracy is in jeopardy. It is a true reflection of a weakening democracy as the state under Mnangagwa continued to make sure civil society organizations are silenced through smear campaigns and lack of access to genuine channels of expression, information and right to information. Chikwanda (2019), Zhou (2019) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019) support this view that freedom of information and speech as hallmarks of democracy are waning in Zimbabwe. They argue that under Mnangagwa the reform agenda has been thrown off track as the state has crushed civic space through thwarting competition, generating a culture of fear through silencing other views, spreading falsehoods of opponents and closure of alternative voices perceived to be anti-state.

A weakening independent judiciary under Mnangagwa shows how democracy has shrunk in Zimbabwe. The level of democracy of any country is framed around actions and behaviour of its courts/judiciary system (Vava, 2019). According to my findings, the judicial system has proved beyond reasonable doubt that it has become hostage to Mnangagwa as it is being used undemocratically to control and enforce compliance with civil society groups. The judicial harassment carried out against ZCTU and ARTUZ organizations (see section 6.2.7) through the captured judicial system is meant to deliberately disregard judicial dictates that obstruct the state and its structures from maltreating civil society organizations and their members. Judicial harassment of civil society organizations frames a narrative about the governance architecture of the state, which is undemocratic and portrays a shrinking democracy. The state's abuse of the judiciary system reinforces the Gramscian analysis of a hegemonic state protected by the breastplate of legal coercion. Gramsci's theory is useful in accurately reflecting what we have found in Zimbabwe. This behaviour by the judicial system in Zimbabwe shows how democracy has been weakened. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (2019) and Chikwanda (2019) similarly argue that the judiciary system in Zimbabwe under

Mnangagwa has been captured by the state, weakened, and co-opted resulting in democracy diminishing.

Foucault's notion of the 'panoptic surveillance' helps me explain aptly what is going on in civil society-state relations in Zimbabwe; in particular the diminishing levels of democracy. Foucault's panoptic surveillance provides an analytical lens to expose how the state monitors and controls civil society organizations in Zimbabwe (Sheridan, 2016). The state under Mnangagwa has confirmed Foucault's traditional model of monitoring and surveillance. The Zimbabwe state is turning surveillance into a form of a culture that allows state security apparatus to unconstitutionally track the leaders of civil society organizations' movements and behaviours using different surveillance techniques (see section 6.2.5). These examples bear a resemblance to authoritarian practices at work. They reveal how the state, is continuously monitoring and conducting surveillance to try and harvest information about the ones being observed (e.g., ZCTU and ARTUZ) to gain and maintain power over them as opined by Magure (2009). The physical surveillance and electronic surveillance machinations being deployed by the state on civil society organizations explained by Foucault's surveillance framework (Sheridan, 2016), which speaks of making people vulnerable to institutional control and undermines the tenets of democracy about free movement. Vava (2019) also notes that democracy is under intense attack and is diminishing in Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa as the government's suspicion of civil society has grown. This Vava (2019) says, has prompted the state to conduct physical surveillance of civil society organizations' activities and through infiltrating the organization's membership and leadership to keep track of what they are planning. This state-sanctioned surveillance under Mnangagwa is yet another undemocratic device of power used by the state to safeguard hegemony. It speaks of the decline of democracy as it curtails freedom of movement, assembly, and association.

7.5 Extent to which patterns that emerge in the study of Zimbabwe are similar or different in the region

In the previous two sections, I have looked at civil society suppression by the state and diminishing levels of democracy and evidence thereof. The key features of diminishing levels of democracy discussed above are lack of rule of law, lack of respect of the constitution, lack of fundamental rights and freedom. Furthermore, my study has found that the key features of civil society suppression by the state are judicial harassment, torture, abductions, smear campaign, unlawful arrest and detention and unlawful surveillance. Considering what has been discussed above in relation to diminishing levels

of democracy in Zimbabwe, it is important to note that the patterns of diminishing levels of democracy exhibited in Zimbabwe seem to be replicated in varying degrees in the region.

There is some evidence that the above-mentioned patterns are also developing elsewhere in the region. In most countries in the region, evidence shows that the democratic space is shrinking, dissent has been criminalised and basic human rights are under threat in various regional states (Chikwanda, 2019). The harsh treatment of civil society organizations that are critical of the state suggests a growing trend of civil society suppression by the state in the region. According to Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2019) state-civil society relations in the region is under intense strain as civil society organizations that are critical of the state's efforts to protect and safeguard the democratic space has been met with harsh and brutal responses by government agencies. Similar repressive tactics that are being meted out by the state in Zimbabwe on selective and targeted civil society organizations are also being replicated in other countries in the region. Repressive techniques and patterns of ruthlessness which have been displayed in Zimbabwe against civil society organization are also being carried out against civil society organizations in other states in the region. A number of governments in the region are encroaching on civic space and civil liberties through the enactment of draconian laws that seek to curtail the operating space of civil society organizations (Chikwanda, 2019). In countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya and Swaziland civil society suppression by the state has been so rife as the state in all instances has taken the lead in outlawing human rights and development work in these countries (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019; Vava, 2019). In much the same way as in Zimbabwe, governments in the region are implementing both direct and indirect controls of civil society organizations that are critical of the state.

Likewise, state-civil society relations in other countries in the region mirror what is happening in Zimbabwe (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019). Chikwanda (2019) describes civil society organizations being targeted by governments in the region and their leadership or members being subjected to physical attacks, deportation, detention, imprisonment, torture and even execution (Chikwanda, 2019). For instance, in Malawi (Mwenda, 2019) reports that the state has been violating human rights and subjecting civil society organizations and its leaders to grueling state harassment. Mwenda (2019) posits that civil society organizations such as the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR) which is one of the leading human rights and governance institution in Malawi

was petrol bombed in September 2019 by unknown assailants suspected to be Cadets, the paramilitary wing of the former ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). These acts of banditry and arson are all full proof of a similar trend and pattern of state suppression, harassment and intimidation of civil society organizations leaders which has gripped the region.

The increased use of surveillance by the state to monitor civil society critics is one pattern of suppression, which is also being witnessed in the region. This type of state surveillance diminishes democratic space. Vava (2019) and Chikwanda (2019) note that while in other countries the difference state surveillance is only in the form of how it is done, overall a clear similar pattern is evident as majority of states in the region have embraced the use of overt measures of surveillance of selected targeted civil society organizations and their members. For instance, in Zambia, the use of Pegasus spyware tracking software for surveillance of people or organizations critical of the state has reached extreme levels (Chikwanda, 2019; Mulobela, 2019). Similarly, in South Africa academic researchers at the University of Johannesburg led by Professor Alexander were spooked by the state for their role in investigating the police's killing of innocent mine workers in the infamous Marikana Massacre in 2012 (Evans, 2014). It is reported by Evans (2014) that the researchers were repeatedly followed by people they suspected were state security agents and had their laptops stolen under suspicious circumstances. The researchers' drop box account which contained crucial audio recordings of interviews they had conducted with protesters was tampered with (Evans, 2014). In addition, The Right2Know Campaign in South Africa has also complained of state monitoring and harassment as its activists and leaders were under surveillance by South Africa's intelligence agencies during Jacob Zuma's presidency (Mybroadband;2015). Clearly, state surveillance of civil society exists in most countries in region, and it is also evident that governments' attempts to control civil society are done in targeted ways. Certain civil society organizations are targeted, in particular those that are critical of the state, and others are ignored because they are not regarded as a threat by the ruling party. This is being done to maintain a firm control and check on civil society organizations.

The above examples begin to reveal something of an emerging pattern of the current nature and state of democracy in the region. In addition, the examples also reveal a growing level and disturbing regularity with which governments in the region are stifling democratic governance, human rights violation, and suppression of people's democratic rights using physical force and other political chicanery. This pattern speaks of

democracy in jeopardy and of a civil society that is subjected to suppression as a result of Machiavellian politics that has been permitted to flourish in the region.

The region pattern of state suppression of voices critical of ruling parties helps to explain the responses of regional intergovernmental structures such Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) to suppression in Zimbabwe. The responses of these two international bodies to what is happening in Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa's Presidency have been contrary to these bodies' constitutional mandates. The mandates of these bodies encourage the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, encourages popular participation and good governance and above all, champion promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments (Declaration of SADC Treaty, 1992); (Constitutive Act of the AU; 2000). However, SADC and the AU both seem to be very reluctant to discipline member states, such as Zimbabwe, who repeatedly behave in violation of these human rights principles.

While the mandate of these bodies is clear, it is quite disappointing to note that what is happening in Zimbabwe is a representation of what is happening in the region and explains to some extent why SADC and AU has not been firm in confronting Mnangagwa when it comes to human rights abuses. These bodies have not been exercising their mandate because it is a general pattern among member states. Countries in the SADC region do not occupy the moral high ground and therefore are unable to callout Zimbabwe on human rights abuses and diminishing democracy. They seem to believe the old adage: 'Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones'. The consistency in the pattern of what is happening in Zimbabwe and the region cannot be ignored. The nature of civil society's relations with the state in Zimbabwe is indeed a representation of what is transpiring in the region.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

The study sought to assess whether civil society organizations that have previously been suppressed by the state currently experience any change in their relations with the state under Mnangagwa's Presidency from November 2017 to February 2020. The study primarily examined state suppression of civil society organizations, but it also considered the extent to which the state under Mnangagwa is democratic in its relations with civil society organizations compared to the Mugabe era. The relevant features of democracy include freedom of speech, association, assembly and individual dignity.

The study was qualitative in nature with a small quantitative component. Selected media sources, including organization's social media sites and non-state news media, were used to gather qualitative data and some numerical information. A limitation of this study was that the study could not use face-to-face physical interviews due to state surveillance and the safety of the interviewer and interviewees. Hence the study opted for online information using selected media sources and non-state news media.

The study adopted Yin's case study approach to comparatively assess the experiences of two civil society organizations, namely ZCTU and ARTUZ. The small study sample was used as this was necessary for in-depth work, which in essence is the nature of case study research. Despite the small study sample, the study provided important insights about the current nature of relations between the state and civil society organizations that are critical of the Zimbabwe state. Working with two organizations in a comparative way allowed me to see the similarities and differences in the data and the extent to which patterns emerged in the data.

Gramsci's theory of hegemony and Foucault's concept of 'panoptic surveillance' informed the study's analytical framework and shed light on how suppression has been at the core of the relations between state and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe. The study also showed how repressive strategies and apparatus have been used by the state in its relations with civil society organizations leading to diminishing levels of democracy in Zimbabwe. It also provided a clear picture and understanding of the forms of suppression that are being perpetrated against civil society organizations who are critical of the government in Zimbabwe and the extent to which patterns of suppression in the study of Zimbabwe are also evident in the region.

There is clear evidence from the study that under Mnangagwa's presidency there is more of the same types of suppression, which characterised the Mugabe regime. This pattern describes relations between the state and civil society organizations that are critical of the state; it does not seem to characterise relations between the state and 'apolitical' welfare type organizations.

Relations between state and civil society in Zimbabwe are generally characterised by conflict (and control). This conflict emanates from a superfluity of reasons such as political polarisation, strict state control, lack of political will etc. My research found numerous forms of suppression of civil society organization that are critical of the Mnangagwa administration. These include: arrests or detention, assaults, abduction and/or torture, raids/break-ins/theft, surveillance, judiciary harassment, cyber-attacks, defamation or smear campaigns, travel bans, salary cessation and abuse. The study findings show that the politics of violence, suppression and hostility that characterised state-civil society relations in the Mugabe era now describes the Mnangagwa administration's relations with civil society organizations that are critical of the ruling party. At the core of state-civil society relations in Zimbabwe lies the hegemonic control and surveillance; both of which are the antithesis of democracy.

My research found that the case studies (ZCTU and ARTUZ) experience similar kinds of state suppression, but there is some variation in the frequency or intensity of the incidents of different types of suppression. These differences do not detract from the shared pattern of suppression. This suggests an emerging pattern of suppression of civil society organizations that are critical of the state/ruling party in Zimbabwe.

The findings also reveal diminishing levels of democracy in Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa with respect to freedom of speech, association, assembly and individual dignity. A pattern that literature suggests is a growing trend in the region.

The two case studies, ZCTU and ARTUZ, have endured extreme state suppression and demonstrated that they have survived over the years as they have continued to campaign for human rights and defend the principles of democracy. It is clear that while the state seeks to silence these organizations, there is a need for civil society organizations to strengthen their position in relations with the state. Civil society organizations need to relentlessly draw attention to their plight by lobbying the AU and SADC, or perhaps the

United Nations, so that they can put pressure on the Mnangagwa's government to uphold democratic principles.

This study points the way for further research. The research could be scaled up to make it a regional study of civil society organizations relations with the state. To get more detail and information pertaining the matter, further research may incorporate interviews. Interviewing leaders of civil society organizations and heads of state institutions such as police, military, judicial service commission and intelligence department would provide or allow for a more nuanced analysis for further research. Further research is needed on a wider range of civil society organizations in Zimbabwe, including both 'watchdog' organizations that are critical of government and 'apolitical' welfare type organizations that collaborate with the state, to comparatively assess their relations with the state.

It is critically necessary to note that the research shows how information that is in the public domain must be reworked to draw attention to not only atrocities but also the systematic way in which suppression plays itself out in the real world and in relation to real organization and real people. The research is critical as it highlights the human rights component but also the importance of using multiple sources to draw attention to patterns in historical events by using social media. The research is important as it shows the value of using social media to draw attention to the way people and organizations experience state suppression.

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ZctuZimbabwe. 2019. [Twitter]. 27 July. Available: <https://twitter.com/ZctuZimbabwe/status/1154986466633814016?s=20>

Appendix A: List of Data Sources used

Data Source	Data Type	Date	Link
Human Rights Watch	Human Rights Watch Report	01/11/2006	https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/11/01/you-will-be-thoroughly-beaten/brutal-suppression-dissent-zimbabwe
Bulawayo24 News	Online newspaper article	8/3/2011	https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-local-byo-1864.html
New Zimbabwe News	Online newspaper article	1/11/2013	https://www.newzimbabwe.com/rural-teachers-drag-mugabe-to-the-human-commission-over-violence/
NewZimbabwe Vision	Online newspaper article	4/1/2016	http://newzimbabwevision.com/rural-teachers-association-for-zimbabwe-rtuz-press-statement/
Nehanda Radio	Online newspaper article	09/03/2017	https://nehandaradio.com/2017/03/08/ang-ry-teachers-fresh-strike-threat/
Zimbabwe Independent	Online newspaper article	16/6/2017	https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/06/16/zctu-drags-minister-court/
ZW NEWS	Online newspaper article	29/7/2017	https://zwnews.com/we-will-use-live-bullets-again-terror-gang-warns-zctu/
Newsday	Online newspaper article	12/10/2017	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/mugabe-targets-teacher-union-leaders/
Zimbabwe News Online	Online news article	12/10/2017	http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/zmno_121097.html
Pindula News	Online newspaper article	26/10/2017	https://news.pindula.co.zw/2017/10/26/civil-servants-forced-bankroll-zanu-pfs-8-million-special-congress/
Newsday	Online newspaper article	23/11/2017	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/teachers-demo-today/

Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Press Statement	04/04/2018	http://zctu.co.zw/press-statement/police-beats-union-leaders
SABC News	Online news article	11/10/2018	https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/zimbabwe-congress-of-trade-unions-members-arrested/
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre	Online article	16/11/2018	https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/peter-mutasa-zimbabwe-congress-of-trade-unions-zctu/
Equal Times	Online newspaper article	19/11/2018	https://www.equaltimes.org/arrest-of-zctu-leaders-highlights#.XuovvkUzbIU
My Zimbabwe News	Online News article	19/12/2018	https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/37540-latest-police-ambush-and-arrest-marching-rural-teachers-again.html
Zimeye.net	Online newspaper article	16/01/2019	https://www.zimeye.net/2019/01/16/artuz-leader-robson-chere-arrested/
Mail and Guardian	Online newspaper article	16/01/2019	https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-16-five-dead-dozens-injured-as-protests-prompt-brutal-crackdown-in-zimbabwe/
The Guardian	Online newspaper article	18/01/2019	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/18/zimbabwe-activists-protests-crackdown-spectre-of-mugabe-era
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Press Statement	27/1/2019	http://zctu.co.zw/press-statement/zctu-demands-japhet-moyo%E2%80%99s-unconditional-release
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Press Statement	5/2/2019	http://zctu.co.zw/press-statement/zctu-will-not-be-deterred-government-clampdown
@MutasaPeter	Twitter	06/02/2019	https://twitter.com/MutasaPeter/status/1093228372338135040?s=20
Nehanda Radio	Online newspaper article	10/02/2019	https://nehandaradio.com/2019/02/10/soldiers-flood-schools-in-zimbabwe/

Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Publication	17/2/2019	http://zctu.co.zw/publication/zctu-submission-un-special-rapporteur-rights-freedom-peaceful-assembly-and-association
Solidarity Peace Trust	Online Article	20/02/2019	http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/report-files/Resurgent-Authoritarianism-The-Politics-of-the-January-2019-Violence-in-Zimbabwe.pdf
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Press Statement	6/3/2019	http://zctu.co.zw/press-statement/government-clamp-down-civic-society-leaders-and-members-parliament-0
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Press Statement	14/3/2019	http://zctu.co.zw/press-statement/subject-zctu-appalled-interrogation-satucc-delegation-state-agents
Bulawayo24.com	Online newspaper article	05/06/2019	https://bulawayo24.com/news/national/163705
Newsday	Online newspaper article	6/6/2019	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/06/zctu-govt-come-face-to-face/
Nehanda Radio	Online newspaper article	6/6/2019	https://nehandaradio.com/2019/06/06/kidnap-torture-of-rural-teachers-union-leader-obert-masaraure-unjust-unacceptable-eu/
Newsday newspaper article	Online newspaper article	07/06/2019	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/06/abduction-dents-eu-zim-talks/
Kubata.net	Online newspaper article	8/6/2019	https://nehandaradio.com/2019/06/08/mnangagwa-government-makes-bizarre-claim-that-trade-unionist-tortured-himself/
Kubatana.net	Online newspaper article	25/6/2019	http://kubatana.net/2019/06/25/false-start-in-mawarire-mutasa-subversion-trial-as-masaraure-endures-third-night-in-prison/
NewsdzeZimbabwe	Online newspaper article	26/6/2019	https://spiked.co.zw/Court-Ends-Obert-Masaraures-Malicious-Incarceration-Dismisses-Mutasa-And-Mawaires-Challenge-Of-Delay-Of-Subversion-Trial/#Respond
Frontline Defenders	Organization's Online Statement	4/7/2019	https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/judicial-harassment-artuz-human-rights-defenders
Sky News	Online news media	5/7/2019	https://news.sky.com/story/emmerson-mnangagwa-promised-a-zimbabwe-you-want-but-has-failed-to-deliver-11752072
My Zimbabwe News	Online newspaper article	10/07/2019	https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/48585-latest-zctu-stay-away-dates-revealed-in-leaked-documents-see-dates.html

Newsday newspaper article	Online newspaper article	15/07/2019	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/07/abductions-intimidation-spike-in-zimbabwe-zpp/
@ZctuZimbabwe	Twitter	17/07/19	https://twitter.com/ZctuZimbabwe/status/1151423841656328193?s=20
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union	ZCTU Online Press Statement	18/7/2019	http://zctu.co.zw/press-statement/zctu-demands-thorough-investigations-deaths-threats-its-leaders
@ZctuZimbabwe	Twitter	26/07/2019	https://twitter.com/ZctuZimbabwe/status/1154986466633814016?s=20
Zimeye.net	Online newspaper article	23/08/2019	https://www.zimeye.net/2019/08/23/breaking-obert-masaraure-arrested-at-funeral/
The New York Times	Online newspaper article	2/9/2019	https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/world/africa/internet-shutdown-economy.html
@MutasaPeter	Twitter	02/10/19	https://twitter.com/MutasaPeter/status/1179432722986614784?s=20
Bulawayo24 News	Online newspaper article	11/10/2019	https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-national-byo-172418.html
New Zimbabwe	Online newspaper article	14/10/2019	https://www.newzimbabwe.com/threat-to-gang-rape-zctu-bosss-daughter/
@ARTUZ_teachers	Twitter	14/10/2019	https://twitter.com/ARTUZ_teachers/status/1183848219123617800?s=20
The Zimbabwean	Online newspaper article	31/10/2019	https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2019/10/in-zimbabwe-trade-unionists-human-rights-activists-and-opposition-politicians-are-under-siege/
ZimMorning Post newspaper article	Online newspaper article	22/11/2019	https://zimmorningpost.com/activist-masaraure-application-dismissed/
JellyPages.com	Online newspaper article	5/12/2019	https://www.jellypages.com/world/Everyday-a-new-cruelty-h96187.html
Gambakwe Media	Online newspaper article	6/12/2019	https://gambakwe.com/2019/11/06/ed-mnangagwa-is-scared-of-being-removed-in-november-like-mugabe-but-thats-not-our-fight-obert-masaraure/
CITE newspaper	Online newspaper article	17/12/2019	https://www.cite.org.zw/2019-a-bad-year-for-teachers-artuz/

Kubatana.net	Online newspaper article	26/1/2020	http://kubatana.net/2020/01/26/midlands-schools-targeting-artuz-members/
Amalgamated Rural Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ)	ARTUZ Online Annual Report	05/01/2020	http://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Teaching-Under-the-new-dispensation.pdf
Kubatana.net	Online newspaper article	11/01/2020	http://kubatana.net/2020/01/11/artuz-national-2020-congress-resolutions/
Kubatana.net	Online newspaper article	2/2/2020	http://kubatana.net/2020/02/02/artuz-members-unsanctioned-salary-stoppages-worrisome/

Appendix B: Suppression Matrix Table

Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) Suppression/Mnangagwa/Mugabe

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
Torture/ill-treatment	Arrest and detention and torture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State invoked arbitrary arrest on union leaders for calling for strike and demos, Arrest was also done on ZCTU invited international guests • Prolonged detentions were also invoked on union leaders, and it even went further to detention of sister organizations at the airport who had visited to support the organization • Interrogation and torture were part and parcel of the arrests done by the state to the union leaders (Arrest of Mutasa, Arrest of SATUCC delegation, Arrest of Japhet Moyo, Arrest of ITUC president) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbitrary arrest and prolonged detentions also done by Mugabe (case of thirty-four trade unionists arrested in Harare, Arrest of Secretary General Wellington Chibebe President Lovemore Matombo and Vice President Lucia Matibenga) • Torture was heavily used by the state under Mugabe 13 September 2006 Arrests and torture (147 members of ZCTU were tortured for participating in a protest demanding better lives)- The day is now being commemorated annually by ZCTU • Detention also implored (Japhet Moyo detained at airport in September 2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From the two administrations Arrest, detention and torture are tactics which have been used by Mugabe and Mnangagwa to suppress ZCTU. The modus operandi used to institute all these tactics have been the same and with the same degree and intensity. The regimes have persistently used torture with Mugabe being more severe for example the 13th of September 2006 torture of ZCTU members is now commemorated by the union as a reminder.

	Enforced Disappearance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State crackdown of Union leaders after the shutdown forced ZCTU leaders to into temporary disappearance as they feared for their lives. January 2019 fuel price hike protests that forced Mutasa to disappear. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No evidence of enforced disappearance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Of the two administrations only Mnangagwa pulled out this tactic in order to repress the ZCTU. Mugabe era did not make use of this tactic
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Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Killings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State killed ZCTU member during their protest policing of the union's demos (ZCTU member killed during a demo) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No evidence of killings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mnangagwa's era witnessed his repression of ZCTU escalating further to killings of the union's members. Mugabe's era no killing of union member was witnessed.
	Physical Attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State agents while carrying their arrests on union leaders and during protest policing, they would physically attack the union and its leaders. Assaults were so brutal and heavy, and they would use different objects such as baton sticks (Attack on ZCTU members attending a hearing, shutdown protests attacks, Attacks during Mutasa arrest) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The state also physically attacked the union as a way to suppress it. (Matibenga and Matombo case at Matapi police station in 2003) Brutality accompanied these attacks and left others half dead. Mugabe (case of thirty-four trade unionists arrested in Harare, Arrest of Secretary General Wellington Chibebe President Lovemore Matombo and Vice President Lucia Matibenga) September 2006 Arrests accompanied with attacks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both administrations made use of brutal force in attacking the union members and its leaders. Evidence provided show inhumane treatment and beating of union leaders which in most cases left them half dead and with serious and some with permanent injuries. All this attack in both administrations instituted by heavily armed state security agents.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Abduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> uniformed members of the Zimbabwe National Army and the Zimbabwe Republic Police instigated systematic torture and abduction of union members and leaders thru visiting their homes at night. Abduction was coupled with assault and interrogation by ununiformed members of the intelligence team (abduction on union's members in different fields such as Dr Magombeyi, abductions during the shutdown) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The state also made use of abduction using state security agents to carry out this task (Abduction of Matombo's brother and security guard abducted) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From the evidence, both Mugabe and Mnangagwa also harassed and violated the rights of the union using abduction. The method used to abduct union leaders was the same i.e., ununiformed police with unregistered number plates used to abduct these officials. In both eras assault was part and parcel of the abduction process
Intimidation	Raid/break in/theft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State agents break inside union leader's homes and left behind bullets (Break in at Mutasa and Moyo's homes) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mugabe 'regime also repressed the unions using break ins (Break in at ZCTU offices in January 2006 and took computer discs and files) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It was carried out in both administrations with the intention of seizing documents, gadgets and files which the state deemed too might have the information which they wanted to incriminate the union and its leaders

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical surveillance by state agents of union leaders' activities. State would even follow union leaders at airports to see whom they are receiving and for what purpose (ITUC delegation case) Physical surveillance at their homes and marking the union leader's moto vehicle registration number and fact finding about their family (Japhet Moyo and Mutasa bullet case) Placing curfews and armed police in areas the union would want to conduct their meetings (Mutare curfew where ZCTU wanted to conduct a meeting) 	<p>Physical surveillance was conducted by the state through the use of the military and the police (a case where police forced itself in a ZCTU meeting to get to hear what is being planned, Police milling around Africa unity square where ZCTU demo was to take place, Manning of major roads in Harare on the eve of demonstration)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offices of ZCTU and homes also placed under surveillance by Mugabe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both leaders made use of surveillance to repress the unions. Physical surveillance was commonly used by the two leaders as they used the state security agents to carry out this. Surveillance was done both at union leader's homes and at their offices.
	Symbolic violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delivering letters with bullets at union leader's houses (Mutasa and Moyo's case) State security agents sent to protest police demos of the union (January shutdown) 	<p>State deployed armed right to all protests planned by the union (Police sent to man ZCTU strike)</p> <p>-Riot police sent to mill around the venue of protests at Africa Unity square</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It was another tactic used by the state to threaten and instill fear in the union members and leaders. Repressive state apparatus such as the army and the police were used in both administrations to conduct this type of violence.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State agents made death threats to union leaders if they continue to protest against the government (Mutasa and Moyo case) • Rape threats to union leaders that they would gang rape their daughters if they continue with their work (Moyo's Daughter threatened with rape) • Threats to kill and harm union leader's family were also made by state security agents (Text message sent to Moyo and Mutasa before AGM) • The state also used text messages as a way of attacking and threatening ZCTU leaders. (Mutasa and Moyo messages they received before their AGM) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mugabe would made verbal threats against the union (Mugabe's Egypt address threatening beating of ZCTU) • Mugabe state security Minister also made verbal threats to the union (Mutasa threatening to Crush ZCTU) • Zanu PF threats to the ZCTU for organizing work rallies (the case of Mr Kandukutu vs Zanu PF officials in Mash West) • Mugabe 2003 to the ZCTU (Mugabe added his own threat to ZCTU: 'Be warned: we have armed men and women who can pull the trigger.') • Advanced motion in Parliament to get the union be removed (Leo Mugabe's motion to get ZCTU removed accusing it of no longer advancing workers' rights) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State's animosity of ZCTU was also seen in the threats the two admin have issued against it. In both eras this tactic has been used with the leaders of the two-administration leading the front in issuing these threats to the union. Threats varied as in some case it was rape, death, or verbal

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
Judicial Harassment	Judicial Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • police banning ZCTU demos and (police using cholera outbreak to ban demo) • Police ignoring court orders which would have allowed ZCTU to conduct demos, • postponing of trial of ZCTU members (Mutasa, Moyo case) • strict bail conditions for ZCTU members to curtail movement of leaders of the union, (Mutasa and Moyo bail) • Courts choosing not to give trial dates for arrested ZCTU members, (Mutasa and Moyo case) • magistrates refusing to try ZCTU members (Mutasa and Moyo case) • Legal instruments to suppress the activities of the union (enactment of MOPA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • police banning ZCTU demos (September 2006 ZCTU demo banned) • Denied access to meet their lawyers (Arrest of Union leaders in September 2006 and police denying them to see their lawyers) • Police ignoring court orders which would have allowed ZCTU to conduct demos (Mugabe telling ZCTU via radio that they would defy court order) • Placing draconian legal instruments to repress the activities of ZCTU (enactment of POSA and LRAA) • Postponement of trial repeatedly (postponement of ZCTU activists in September 2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In both administrations the justice delivery system has been strongly used to suppress ZCTU. In Both cases it is vehemently clear the system is compromised and captured in favour of the leaders of the two administrations. Similar judicial tactics have been used by the two administrations to persecute and violate the right of the union and its leaders.
Other Violations	Suspension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unjustified suspension of ZCTU president for the Social security Agency by the state without following laid out procedure (Mutasa case of being suspended on NSSA board) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dismissed ZCTU from NSSA board (Mutasa dismissed by Mugabe on NSSA board) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both administrations used this tactic to silence and symphony the influence of the union in the NSSA board

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Travel ban	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The state denied travel visas for friends of the union who had come to solidarity to the union and its leaders. (ITUC delegation denied visa) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Visiting international Trade unionists refused entry into the country (deportation of two Dutch trade unionist who had visited ZCTU, Mrs Alice G Siame from Norway trade union refused entry in the country to meet ZCTU) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An observation worth noting is that this tactic was used by the two regimes to demobilise and frustrate the union. All ban was done on visiting sister unions who would have come to convey solidarity with ZCTU. But both regimes being paranoid would use this tactic to not allow the sister unions in the country
	Formation of Splinter Unions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Made continued use of splinter union to counter and weaken ZCTU (Still recognised ZFTU as a real workers union) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formed splinter unions to counter and demobilise ZCTU (Formation of ZFTU by Mugabe) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both regimes made use of the same splinter union to confuse and demobilise the union
Propaganda	Cyber attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State intelligence tampered with union leaders' emails, social media accounts (Mutasa email and social media accounts tempered with) State imposed internet blackout in order to demobilise the union's planned demos. (January 2019 internet shutdown) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No evidence of cyber attack 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mnangagwa's government went further and started to use more sophisticated way of repression such as cyber-attack. This was to clone accounts of Union leaders to retrieve information. However, with Mugabe this tactic was never used.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Defamation/ Smear Campaign	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> took the form of the state using the state media papers to attack and concoct lies about the organization and labelling it a terrorist organization whose intention is to work with the opposition to topple the government. <p>(4 February 2019 Herald article which defamed ZCTU as working with opposition to remove the gvt, January 2019 strike made them be accused of trying to subvert a gvt)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The state in trying to fight and silence and demobilize the union they defamed it of being a puppet organization (Mugabe defamed it of being an organization working with the whites to overthrow his gvt, defamed to be western stooges) Was defamed for violating foreign currency regulations (June 2006 ZCTU accused of flouting foreign exchange regulations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Observation made is that both regimes used this tactic to character assassinate and dent the union and its leaders. State media in both eras was used to conduct this campaign against the union. it is worth noting that in both cases there is a similar reference to ZCTU as a regime change agent of western countries. A lie which both regimes continuously used to sabotage the work of the union.

Suppression Matrix Table Continuation

Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) Suppression M nangagwa Mugabe

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	M nangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
Intimidation	Raid/break in/theft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illegal break ins and raid done at ARTUZ leaders houses and office by state agents • State agents raided union leader’s cars, houses, offices and confiscated their cell phones, laptop and documents illegally. • Evidence Obert Masaraure, (ARTUZ President) house raided late at night by state security agents, offices in Harare a break in was done by suspected CIO • Obert Masaraure car was raided and laptop and phone stolen by suspected state agents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No evidence of raid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From the two administrations what can be observed is that M nangagwa used this tactic on this union to try and silence the union and suppress it. There is no evidence to show that Mugabe also used this tactic on ARTUZ.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical surveillance conducted by the military and police • Impromptu visits by state security agents to conduct Census taking was conducted at schools by the state • Evidence=Secret police attending ARTUZ meeting in Greystone Park, • Police and armed soldiers milling around schools during ARTUZ strike in January 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surveillance conducted both telephonically and physically by state agents at schools and communities residing ARTUZ members. Surveillance involved interrogation on the union's activities • Evidence=state security agents calling ARTUZ members quizzing him about membership, planned activities, names of leaders etc • Routine visits by Zanu pf officials at schools to check and monitor activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both Mugabe and Mnangagwa used surveillance to repress ARTUZ. In both administrations the state made use of state security agents to conduct this surveillance. Surveillance was done both at the workstations and homes of ARTUZ leaders.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Symbolic Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployment of armed police and soldiers to mill around communities and schools of ARTUZ members • Protest policing-evidenced by the heavily armed police at demonstrations called by ARTUZ • Evidence= Police and armed soldiers milling around schools during ARTUZ strike in January • Heavy police presence during the Caravan strike and Coffin strike done by ARTUZ at the Ministry of Finance Offices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heavily armed state agents were deployed to quash demonstrations by ARTUZ and also to mill in areas and workstations of its members in order to intimidate them • Evidence= state agents deployed to various ARTUZ members in the wake of the planned pockets out demonstrations • Zanu Pf officials and police routinely visited rural teachers to monitor the activities done by teachers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A common tactic employed by both regimes to inculcate fear in the ARTUZ. Deployment of heavily armed police in ARTUZ workstations and homes was part of symbolic violence the two regimes used to harass the union. From the evidence it is also clear that the two states used protest policing as one of the methods to institute symbolic violence.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These came in verbal threats (with unspecified action) issued by Ministers to the Union • Physical threats in the form of militarising workplaces and communities of ARTUZ members, interrogation, symbolic violence • Evidence =Minister of Defence threatened to unleash militia on union leaders • Minister of Education threatened to take unspecified action on other members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical threats were issued to ARTUZ members by government in a way of sending armed state agents into schools. The agents would routinely visit these schools to incite fear • Verbal threats would also be issued to ARTUZ by police during the period they would be detained by the state. • Evidence= State deployed security agents in rural schools to threaten teachers • State security agents threatening ARTUZ ember Ndawana with unspecified action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observations made clearly highlight that both administrations under Mugabe and Mnangagwa made use of threats to harass and intimidate the union. In Both instances threat camein the form of verbal, physical and those in the top offices issued these threats to the union.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
Judicial Harassment	Judicial Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delaying trial dates, (Masaraure trial delayed for 11 months) • magistrates refusing to try union leaders, (Masaraure case and his entire union) • state witnesses in cases involving union members deliberately deciding not to attend trial (Masaraure case) • police refusing to file reported cases of harassment made by union leaders (Mr Ndawana case) • stringent bail conditions (Masaraure bail conditions) • arbitrary arrests. (ARTUZ leaders' incessant arrests) • Repressive law (Replaced one the Draconian law POSA with MOPA to suppress planned demos) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enactment repressive law to suppress union activities (signed POSA into law which it used to arrest and charge Union members for protesting.) • Arrested ARTUZ not allowed to speak to their lawyers (ARTUZ pockets out protests) • Bail hearing cases for union leaders were always postponed in a bid to frustrate and harass the union. (Mehluli Dube Case) • Charge sheets for union leaders were changed at every turn by investigating officer's willy nilly. (Mehluli Dube's Case) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is evident from the two administrations that the state manipulated the judicial system to repress the union. In both instances the state legal instruments have been enacted by the state to legalise their suppression over the union. Similar judicial harassment tactics such as delay in trial, stringent bail conditions were also used by the two regimes.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
Other Violations	Reprisals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The reprisals came in the inform of union-based discrimination which involved union members being chased out of the workstations home, (2 evictions of ARTUZ members from school residence and 1 157 union-based discrimination,) • stigmatised by state affiliated community leaders and members (Chanda’s Case) • salary freeze, (31 ARTUZ members salary cessation) • denied leave days. (Hurungwe ARTUZ member’s case) • Forced transfers to schools that are very remote and in a dilapidated state (ARTUZ Secretary General’s case) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was also conducted and it came in the form gvt choosing to pay ARTUZ members’ salaries late (ARTUZ court case with the gvt on their unjustified 13th Cheque payment delay) • Arrested ARTUZ not allowed to speak to their lawyers (ARTUZ pockets out protests) • Bail hearing cases for union leaders were always postponed in a bid to frustrate and harass the union. (Mehluli Dube Case) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It can be noted from the evidence provided that the two administrations also made use of reprisals as a form of repression. Mnangagwa’s administration mostly used this technic than Mugabe as he went even further in instituting this tactic. For Mugabe it was only uses in bail conditions while for Mnangagwa it went further to stigmatisation, denying leave days and forced transfers
	Salary Cessation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State through the Public Service Commission Freezes salaries of ARTUZ union leaders without following proper legal channels and as a result of terrorizing them for their work (Robson Chere, Masaraure and 31 other ARTUZ members) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Salary payment delays (decision to pay rural teachers their 13th cheque late) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observations made clearly show that this tactic was used by both administrations to repress the union. However, for Mnangagwa it was so inhumane in the sense that it would go for so many months while the state withhold the union members their salaries

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Abuse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministers negatively name calling union leaders and its members as hot headed for demanding a living wage. (Minister Mavhima calling ARTUZ members hot headed) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abused teachers and forced them to attend Mugabe rallies to boost numbers (ARTUZ VS Minister Dokora case) Compelled to donate money for these rallies. Freedom to choose was not an option (ARTUZ VS ZANU PF CASE) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In both administrations the two- administrations practiced abuse. For Mnangagwa it was verbal abuse while for Mugabe it further escalated into abuse of being forced to attend and donate for his functions.
Propaganda	Cyber attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Illegal internet shutdown was also instituted by Mnangagwa in order to cut communication of the union leaders and its members during their planned demonstrations. (January 2019 internet shutdown) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No evidence of Cyber attack 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence shows that Mugabe did not use this repressive tactic, but Mnangagwa use it in a more sophisticated and illegal way of shutting down the internet.
	Smear Campaign	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> involved government cooking up charges for union leaders and its members and accusing union leaders of politicking all in the interest of frustrating the efforts of the union. (ARTUZ called regime change agents) Accused union of working in the interest of the opposition party (Minister Mavhima's case of accusing them of politicking) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARTUZ labelled a terrorist organization by Mugabe (Mugabe's case of labelling them as a terrorist organization for their protests) Charges against its members were cooked by the state (ARTUZ accused of inciting public violence during their demos) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It was used by both administrations with the same intention of trying to portray the union as a political outfit and a terrorist organization. Negative depiction of the union using state media was heavily used by the two administrations to denigrate them.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
Torture/ill-treatment	Arrest/detention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arbitrary Arrest of union leaders and members for protesting (Caravan demo, shutdown and coffin demo) illegal detention of ARTUZ leaders and members by state agents (Detention would pave way for interrogation on union business, activities, members and financiers etc (Ndawana and Masaraure case) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arbitrary arrest of ARTUZ by state agents for conducting demos and protests (Pockets out demos) The illegal arrests and prolonged detentions did not follow the law and however they were accompanied by inhumane treatment (Delayed salary and bonus protests arrests) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It can be observed that as evidence of suppression in the two regimes arrest, torture, detention have been used to harass the union. Evidence shows that in both regimes all these tactics have been used with the same degree by the state to repress the union. It is however clear that frequent illegal arrests were made, and prolonged detentions were also instigated in order to quiz the union leaders and its members.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Enforced Disappearance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> state security agents enforce disappearance of the ARTUZ leader. They arrested him during a protests and disappeared with him to an undisclosed location. (Godfrey Chanda’s missing case) enforced disappearance was also incited in when during the January 2018 Shutdown were the state went on a hunt down of ARTUZ leaders forcing some of them to quickly be motivated disappear for fear of their lives. (Obert Masaraure disappearance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rural teachers who feared government torture during elections time ran away for good into disappearance for fear of Mugabe ‘s violent mobilization tactic (ARTUZ case vs Mugabe which they filed at the Human rights Commission) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The evidence provided clearly shows that both regimes enforced disappearance with the sole intention of demobilising the union and to suppress it. state security agents implemented this strategy.
	Killings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No evidence of a killed ARTUZ member under this Administration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ARTUZ had some of its members killed by Mugabe during is violent election mobilization process for their defiance to not to be recruited in his party (Mugabe vs ARTUZ case at the Human rights commission) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Observations made show that under Mnangagwa there are no killings involved but Mugabe escalated his repression of this outfit by further killing the members in his mobilization approach.

Parent Cluster	Child Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe	Observation
	Physical attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTUZ members suffered heavy physical attack from armed security agents • Beatings were cruel, Inhuman and degrading to the extent that its leader at one point was stripped naked and beaten (Attacks during funeral demo, abduction of Masaraure, January shutdown, Attack on ARTUZ Lawyer, Robson Chere and Tryson case) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARTUZ members were attacked by state agents badly leading to some losing limbs, (Mugabe vs ARTUZ case at Human Rights Commission) • ARTUZ members were also physically attacked by police during their salary protests by baton sticks and guns (Pockets out protests) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In both regimes this technique is evident, and the two leaders use the state security agents to heavily attack the union members. Evidence provided shows the use of intense force which is inhuman and degrading. The beating in both cases were so severe and very harmful
	Abduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The abductions were clearly orchestrated and systematically implemented by the state given the tactics and the arms used to abduct ARTUZ union leaders. • Abduction conducted at night in front of family members and involved heavy beating and interrogation of members. The abductions consisted of heavy torture on union leaders and interrogation in a bid to milk information on the union's planned activities. • Unidentified man with unidentified vehicles carried out this task. (Masaraure abduction, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abductions were carried out systematically on Union Leaders. The state abducted these members and quizzed them for union information • Ununiformed men conducted these operations and in a clandestine manner • Abducted union leader taken to a secret location where he 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observation made on this cluster highlights that abduction was used by the two administrations to harass and suppress the union. The approach used to implement these abductions are similar. All this done with the main purpose of silencing the union.

		Ndawana abduction, Chanda abduction cases)	would be harassed. (ARTUZ MashWest Chairman abduction, Ndawana's abduction)	
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Suppression Matrix Table Continuation

Overall General Summary

Suppression Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe
Intimidation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The state under Mnangagwa made use of this tactic as a way to suppress both ZCTU and ARTUZ. • Different forms of intimidation such as raids, break ins, surveillance, symbolic violence and threats have been used interchangeably or simultaneously with his administration to suppress the unions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mugabe on the other hand also mad use of this tactic to suppress the two unions for their critical stance against his administration • His administration used similar methods of intimidation as used under Mnangagwa such as raids, surveillance, symbolic violence and threats to harass, victimize and terrorize the unions. All these tactics were instituted by his administration.
Propaganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propaganda as a tool of repression was very much used by Mnangagwa to suppress the two unions. Forms of Propaganda such as smear campaigns/defamation and cyber-attack were also used to harass and negatively portray the unions. Of great importance is the use of state media to do this. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suppression is also evident in Mugabe’s regime as he used propaganda also as a tool of suppressing the two unions. • Defamation, smear campaign was also used by Mugabe as tools of oppression. Unions were persistently accused of working for the white and regime change agenda and this was a narrative Mugabe constantly used as justification to crush these unions.
Judicial Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The legal system and other judicial arms of the state was consistently used by Mnangagwa to suppress the unions. The legal system was used to justify Mnangagwa’s heinous actions against the unions. He also removed a repressive legal instrument POSA and replaced it with another repressive law MOPA in a bid to curtail Union activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was also one of Mugabe’s repressive tactic which he used to terrorize ZCTU and ARTUZ. Repressive legal instruments such as POSA and AIPPA were instituted to curb and terrorize Union activities and its leaders. Other judicial arms such as police, magistrates and prosecutors to muzzle unions. LRRA was also placed into law to suppress these unions.

Suppression Cluster	Mnangagwa	Mugabe
Torture/ill-treatment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On this cluster it is evident that repression is present in Mnangagwa's administration. Various tactics which fall under this cluster such as arrest, abduction, detention, torture, enforced disappearance, Physical attack and killings were also used by his administration to harass and terrorize the two unions. At every given stage these tools have been used by Mnangagwa to demobilise these unions because of their critical stance on his government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It was one of the other tactics that Mugabe used to suppress these unions. Mugabe suppressed the unions and making use of arrests, detentions, torture, and physical attack to intimidate the union members. There is no evidence of the Mugabe administration undertaking enforced disappearance or assassinating union members. He relied on severe torture to harass these unions.
Other violations (Travel ban, cyber-attack etc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Other violations such as travel ban, cyber-attack, use of splinter unions were also used to harass the unions by Mnangagwa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mugabe also used other violations such as formation of splinter unions, travel ban, suspensions in order to curtail union activities