

Post-conflict Reconstruction in Angola

by

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Dedication

To my beautiful children, Hannah and Alex. With all my love. Mommy.

Acknowledgements

My sincere appreciation and thanks to my husband Adegoke, for his encouragement. A big thank you to my family and friends for their support. Thank you especially to my sister Angie. A special thank you to the Executive Director at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Dr Adekeye Adebajo, for giving me this opportunity to pursue further studies at UCT and for his interest in my personal and career development. Thank you to the CCR management for the financial contribution the organisation made towards my studies, and to my colleagues at CCR for being positive and supportive. A special thank you to Dawn for her generosity and motivation. To my supervisor, Professor John Akokpari, thank you for your guidance.

Thank you to God Almighty for His faithfulness.

Abstract

This study examined the main strategies adopted by the Angolan government in its post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and the extent to which these efforts have promoted durable peace in the country. The number of post-conflict countries on the continent is increasing, with 16 African countries already in the process of implementing peace agreements signed during the last decade. With research showing that up to 50 percent of post-conflict countries relapse into violent conflict within five to 10 years of signing a peace agreement, implementing practical and effective strategies to prevent a return to conflict becomes imperative. In the light of the limited experience of African countries in post-conflict situations, Angola presented an interesting case study. The oil and diamond rich country, emerging in 2002 from over 40 years of conflict, has been able to develop its own home-grown post-conflict reconstruction strategies. Notable progress in addressing some of its short-term post-conflict reconstruction priorities include, the successful resettlement of an estimated four million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and reintegrating more than half a million refugees and over 100 000 ex-combatants, into Angolan society. Progress in the areas of de-mining, as well as the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, and increased enrolment in primary school education are other significant achievements. It is noteworthy that the Angolan government has, despite a lack of major international funding and overseas development assistance, been able to finance the majority of the expenses required for the country's reconstruction and re-launching of the national economy. Importantly, the government's efforts have had some assistance in the form of oil-backed loans from China. Despite notable progress, such as the country's rapid economic growth, and being ranked 59th among the world's economies, Angola remains one of the most badly governed, corrupt, and unequal societies in the world. Credible improvements in the areas of good governance, socio-economic development, especially basic service delivery, and a more even distribution of the benefits of the country's oil wealth are vital in order to deliver significant peace dividends to the majority of the Angolan population. Making these improvements will be vital, and will influence considerably whether the country's post-conflict reconstruction efforts are ultimately successful.

List of acronyms

ADRP	Angolan Demobilisation and Integration Programme
APM	Anti-personnel mine
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
AUPEC	Aberdeen University Petroleum Economic Consultancy
BNA	Central Bank of Angola
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CED	Executive Commission for Demining
CNIDAH	Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance
CNRSPDD	National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilised and Displaced
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
ECP	Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza (Strategy to Combat Poverty)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMRP	Emergency Multi-sector Recovery Programme
EMS	Environmental Management System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCD	Cabindan Forum for Dialogue
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave

FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GDDS	General Data Dissemination System
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HRCC	Human Rights Coordination Council
IDA	Agricultural Development Institute
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAD	National Demining Institute
INE	National Statistical Institute
LICUS	Low-Income Country Under Stress
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central Africa Republic
MINADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MINARS	Ministry of Assistance and Social Reinsertion
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEDR	Rural Extension and Rural Development Programme
PIP	Public Investment Programme
PMFP	Public Finance Modernisation Programme

PRESILD	Programme of Restructuring the Logistics and Distribution of Essential Products to the Population
PRR	Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction programme
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SIGFE	Sistema Integrado de Gestão Financeira do Estado (Integrated Financial Management Information System)
TB	Tuberculosis
TSS	Transitional Support Strategy
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background and motivation

Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction¹ are very relevant to Africa, with 16 African countries already in the process of implementing peace agreements signed during the last decade. The number of post-conflict countries on the continent is also increasing². With research showing that up to 50 percent of post-conflict countries relapse into violent conflict within five to ten years of signing a peace agreement,³ implementing practical and effective strategies to prevent a return to conflict becomes imperative.⁴

In light of the limited experience of African countries in post-conflict situations, Angola presents an interesting and current case study. The country, emerging from more than 40 years of armed conflict, has the potential to become a success story in post-conflict reconstruction. The Angolan government, faced with the immense and complex task of rebuilding a war ravaged country, has been firmly in control of efforts aimed at post-conflict recovery,⁵ and in only seven years has made some remarkable progress. The main

¹ Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium-and long term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase; however these should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries. NEPAD African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, 2005. Available at <http://www.africanreview.org/docs/conflict/PCR%20Policy%20Framework.pdf>. Accessed on 10 August 2008. Post-conflict reconstruction is also seen as 'a process that involves the achievement of a range of peace milestones'. Viewing post-conflict countries as part of a 'transition continuum' would prevent placing countries in 'boxes' where they are either seen as 'in conflict' or 'at peace'. Graham Brown, Arnim Langer and Frances Stewart, 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working Paper, No 53, London, p4. Available at <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf>; accessed on 21 February 2010.

² Peace Agreements in Africa. Available at <http://www.accord.org.za/our-work/knowledge-production/peace-agreements.html>. Accessed on 10 August 2008.

³ McAskie, C. 2007. The International Peacebuilding Challenge: Can new players and new approaches bring new results. The Lloyd Shaw lecture in Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 22 November 2007, p4. Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Statements/ASG%20Carolyn%20McAskie/Shaw%20final.pdf>. Accessed on 2 November 2009. See also Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Africa, *Conflict Trends*, Volume 3, ACCORD, 2009, p2. http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2009_3.pdf. Accessed on 10 February 2010.

⁴ Some of the conditions which place war-torn countries at continuing risk of relapsing into violent conflict include: weakened state capacity, destroyed physical, human and social capital, distorted economic incentives, widespread poverty and massive unemployment. Some countries also have to cope with criminal networks that plunder their resources, and former warlords who resist relinquishing power. United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Post-conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, piv. Available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-provides-insights-on-post-conflict-economic-recovery.en>. Accessed on 10 February 2010.

⁵ The war destroyed important physical infrastructure, impacted on the macro-economy of the country, and resulted in increased poverty among the majority of the population. Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report,

achievement for the Angolan people must be the sustained peace experienced since the country's 27-year civil war ended with the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement in April 2002.⁶ The absence of violent conflict, a visible peace dividend, is a welcome change for the people of Angola, half of whom had never lived without conflict.⁷

During the first three-and-a-half years of peace, the Angolan government's strategic priorities included: i) the social and productive reintegration of demobilised soldiers and populations displaced during the war; ii) improved delivery of basic social services to people throughout the country; and iii) macro-economic stabilisation. The country also began the monumental task of rebuilding its infrastructure, and promoting social and economic development. In September 2008, Angola's first multi-party elections in 16 years were held.⁸ Some initial key objectives and significant peace milestones have been reached, including the resettlement of an estimated four million internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as the reintegration into Angolan society of almost half a million refugees and about 100 000 ex-combatants. Progress is also being made in the areas of de-mining⁹ and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Other notable achievements are in the areas of education and health.¹⁰ Most celebrated has been the country's incredibly rapid economic growth, which has made it Africa's fastest growing economy and largest oil producer in 2008. The country's macro-economic stability and improved performance in the non-mineral, transport and agricultural sectors are reflected by the high annual growth rates and the lowering of inflation

UNHCR/AU/NEPAD Sub Cluster on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p25 – 30.

⁶ A distinguishing feature of the Luena peace agreement is that it resulted from a military victory by one of the warring parties over the other. This factor is significant, because together with a battle weary population it makes a return to civil war highly unlikely. Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p25 – 30.

⁷ Children under 15 years comprise over half of Angola's population of 13 million, and 20 percent are under the age of five. Jenny Clover, Angola's Children: Bearing the Greatest Cost of War, *African Security Review*, Vol. 11 (3). Available at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/11No3/Clover.html>. Only two percent of the population is 65 years or older. Angolan Government Ministry of Planning, Strategy to Combat Poverty: Social Reinsertion, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and Economic Stabilisation. Available at <http://www.angolaemb.se/Actualidades/Combate%20a%20pobreza.pdf>. Accessed on 10 November 2009.

⁸ Presidential elections are set to take place in 2012. EDC Economics: Angola, Available at http://www.edc.ca/english/docs/gangola_s_e.pdf. Accessed on 2 November 2009.

⁹ United Nations Development Programme. Angola: Millennium Development Goals Report Summary 2005. An estimated seven million mines needs clearing. At least 80 000 people are reported to have lost limbs as a result of landmines during the conflict. Demining is also critical to food stability as 85 percent of the population engages in subsistence agriculture. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: Angola, 16 July 2009, Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6452d514.html>. Accessed on 1 November, 2009.

¹⁰ In 2003, one million children returned to school and more than 29 000 teachers were recruited. Also in 2003, about 5.2 million children were vaccinated against polio, although new cases of the illness have since been reported. United Nations. Angola: Mid-term Review of the Brussels Program of Action – Least Developed Countries, Final Progress Report 2005. Available at <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrls/ldc/MTR/Angola.pdf>. Accessed on 2 February 2010.

recorded since 2000. These changes are seen to provide further opportunities for the government to make far-reaching reforms aimed at sustainable socio-economic development.

The Angolan government has since 2002 financed the majority of the expenses required for the country's reconstruction and re-launching of the national economy. The country's appeal in 2002 for an International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation, after it had already prepared a Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme intended as the basis for discussion at the conference, went unheeded. To date a conference of this nature has not materialised. In 2003, Angola's Minister of External Relations, Dr Joao Bernardo de Miranda, highlighted to the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly the lack of assistance from the international community, contrasting its inaction with the swift response being provided to other African countries in post-conflict situations.¹¹ However, in their defence, donors have pointed out the weakness and inadequate transparency of Government systems for budget management, procurement, accounting and auditing as reasons for their reluctance to provide financial assistance directly to the Government.¹²

Despite the lack of major international funding and limited Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) for its reconstruction programmes, Angola has with the assistance of oil-backed loans from China, amounting to a staggering US\$13.4 billion in 2009, been able to meet a number of the country's reconstruction priorities.¹³ The ties between China and Angola have since been strengthened by a number of developments. In 2006, Angola became China's largest trading partner in Africa, with trade between the two countries reaching US\$12 billion. While in 2007, China overtook the United States as the largest importer of

¹¹ Angola: Statement by H.E. Joao Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola, at the General Debate of the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 26 September, 2003. Available at <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/angoeng030926.htm>. Accessed on 8 March, 2010. During his statement, Minister de Miranda renewed the April 2002 appeal for an International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation. See also United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p1. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/ang_ecorep.2005.pdf, accessed on 8 March 2010; and United Nations, Angola: Mid-term Review of the Brussels Program of Action – Least Developed Countries, Final Progress Report 2005, available at <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrls/ldc/MTR/Angola.pdf>, accessed on 21 February 2010.

¹² Angola: The Post-War Challenges, Country Assessment Report, United Nations System in Angola, Common Country Assessment 2002, p89. Available at <http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/CCA2002.pdf>. Accessed on 4 February 2010.

¹³ Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I. 2009. Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola. Chatham House, London, p3, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14524_r0809_africanoil.pdf. Accessed on 6 February 2010.

Angolan oil¹⁴ and is currently Angola's largest investor. Especially in the area of infrastructure development, China has been involved in both the construction and financing of over 100 projects in the areas of water, energy, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries and public works.¹⁵

Despite some important achievements, and ranking 59th among the world's economies in terms of gross domestic product,¹⁶ Angola remains one of the world's most unequal societies. The country's weak social indicators include a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.381, ranking it 166th (out of 177), and amongst the lowest worldwide.¹⁷ Two-thirds of the population continue to live below the poverty line.¹⁸ Angola has the world's second highest under-five mortality rate. Malaria, a preventable disease, is the major cause of death in the country for both children and adults.¹⁹ The Angolan government does however, outline in its medium-term development plan its priorities for Human Development, including its intention to improve the HDI ranking by 30 places in order to position itself amongst the medium development countries by 2025.²⁰

An explicit emphasis on poverty reduction is however not included in the country's development vision. Instead, the government intends to improve overall living conditions, indirectly - through economic growth and overall modernisation of the country, rather than

¹⁴ Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I. 2009, p42.

¹⁵ Campos, I, Vines, A. 2008. Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership. Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, Prospects for Improving US-China-Africa Cooperation, December 5, 2007, Chatham House, London, p1. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080603_campos_angolachina.pdf. Accessed on 6 February 2010.

¹⁶ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 – 2013, p9. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/UNDAF-AO-2009_2013-En.pdf. Accessed on 8 February 2010.

¹⁷ African Development Bank, 2005. Angola: Results-Based Country Strategy Paper (RBCSP) 2005-2007, pvi. Available at <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADB-BD-WP-2005-73-EN-ANGOLA-RBCSP-2005-2007-FINAL.PDF>. Accessed on 8 February 2010.

¹⁸ Over two thirds of the Angolan population remains poor (living on less than \$1 per day), with one in four Angolans being extremely poor (living on less than \$0.75 per day). Aid Harmonisation and Alignment for Greater Development Effectiveness. Available at <http://www.aidharmonization.org>. Accessed on 31 October 2009.

¹⁹ Angola: The Post-War Challenges, Common Country Assessment, 2002, p91.

²⁰ The government's Human Development Goals are: improving the living conditions of Angolans, eradicating hunger and poverty and promoting adequate levels of education and basic sanitation; promoting national cohesion and the consolidation of democracy; and ensuring sustainable economic development, freedom and fundamental rights. United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola (UNDAF), April 2009, p6-7. Despite the high prevalence of poverty, Angola as a country does not belong to the poor in terms of GDP per capita. The World Bank classifies it as a lower middle income country, and it may soon be among the middle income countries in terms of average GDP per capita. Isaksen, J., Tvedten, J., Ilinga, P. 2006. Experience and Institutional Capacity for Poverty and Income Distribution Analysis in Angola, Chr Michelsen Institute, p3. Available at <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2540-experience-and-institutional-capacity-for-poverty.pdf>. Accessed on 8 February 2010.

directly with poverty reduction as a primary focus.²¹ Analysts have pointed out that the government's strategy has been shaped by the idea of gradualism: investing first in infrastructure that is visible and has tangible results, leaving human development to the second phase of its post-conflict recovery.²²

Angola has the potential to play a significant role in the region and continent.²³ The country's participation in the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central Africa Republic (MICOPAX), under the authority of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)²⁴, is seen as especially relevant to advancing peace and security in neighbouring countries. The country's armed forces are battle-trained and considered as one of the most experienced on the continent.²⁵ The country also intervened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congo-Brazzaville conflicts.

A desire to change its international image and gain global respectability, has led to strategic engagement with key organisations continentally and globally. In 2007 Angola became a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), taking over the chairmanship of the organisation in January 2009. This has largely been viewed both as a positive step towards economic security and as a means to further its international influence in the oil industry. Significantly, Angola was the first country to be admitted to the

²¹ Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008. Drivers of Change: Angola – Summary of Findings, Department of International Development (Dfid), United Kingdom. Available at ukinangola.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/3647797/english-summary. Accessed on 8 February 2010. Rehabilitating electrical and hydro-electrical infrastructure expanded electricity access to thousands of people; similarly, the rehabilitation of water supply systems has granted thousands more people access to clean water. The rehabilitation of roads, bridges and rail networks will facilitate commercial activities; while rehabilitation of hospitals, health centres, schools and universities will provide access to education and health to communities. Campos, I, and Vines, A., 2008, p18-19; Some of the government's plans for the medium-term include building one million new houses in the country by 2012, and creating 1.3 million jobs during this parliament. Reuters, Angola to Launch Fund to Build One Million Homes for the Poor, 15 April 2009. Available at <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE53E0FR20090415>. Accessed on 10 February 2010.

²² Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009. State-Society Relations in Angola: Peacebuilding, democracy and political participation, Initiative for Peacebuilding, Madrid, p31. Available at <http://www.fride.org>. Accessed on February 12, 2010.

²³ Angola's growing economy has led to its being tipped, remarkably, only three years since the end of the war, as South Africa's biggest rival within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Adebajo, A. Regional rival Angola could yet become SA's best friend, *Business Day*, 19 August 2009. In 2008 Angola overtook Nigeria as the leading sub-Saharan oil producer. It has also become a major oil supplier to South Africa, while South Africa has become a major trading partner, with a number of entrepreneurs and major companies seeking to penetrate the Angolan market. Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009, p16.

²⁴ Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009, p30.

²⁵ By 2001, the Government of Angola had been involved in armed conflicts in all neighbouring states with the exception of Zambia. United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p1. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/ang_ecorep.2005.pdf. Accessed on 8 February 2010.

organisation since 1975. Angola's non-permanent two-year seat on the UN Security Council in 2003 also raised the country's profile on the world scene. Its role in the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), formally launched in August 2006, could serve to extend the country's influence in the area. Angola is also closely involved in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiatives, taking over the presidency of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 2007. The country is expected to play a key role in SADC's regional development plan, specifically in the area of deployment of road links and interconnections in the energy sector.²⁶ In August 2007, Francisco Pereira Furtado, Angola's Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, indicated that Angola's role in the African Standby Force will be considerable, with its soldiers constituting 30 percent of the force – possibly more than South Africa will provide.²⁷ Angola also actively participates in African Union (AU) activities. In July 2004, Angola signed on to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and in 2007 it was elected a member of the AU Peace and Security Council.²⁸ The country has also signed the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2003. In 2007 it was elected for a three-year mandate at the UN Human Rights Council.²⁹

For now, Angola remains listed in international ratings such as Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and will have to increase its efforts at good governance in order to change this perception. In this regard, the government has shown a willingness to increase transparency relating to its oil revenues,³⁰ and has accepted a package from the World Bank that provides technical assistance to improve transparency and reduce off-sheet-budget expenditure.³¹

²⁶ Although Angola is a member of both the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and Energy Pool of Central Africa (PEAC), it currently does not have any interconnections with its neighbours, apart from isolated lines serving several towns on the country's southern border with Namibia. International Energy Agency, 2006. Angola: Towards an Energy Strategy, p19. Available at http://www.ica.org/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1818. Accessed on 8 February 2010.

²⁷ Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008. Drivers of Change: Angola – Summary of Findings, p10.

²⁸ Participating countries in the APRM benchmark good governance with shared African and international norms and standards, through a process that is inclusive and involves a variety of stakeholders. United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p3. See also Magalhaes Ferreria, P., 2009, p8.

²⁹ Magalhaes Ferreria, P., 2009, p19.

³⁰ International Energy Agency, 2006, p16. The government has also published a critical investigation of its oil revenues performed by consulting firm KPMG, identifying most oil revenue flows.

³¹ The Angolan government also organised an international petroleum revenue management conference in May 2006, and has published a report on the future of the oil sector 'Petroleum Outlook'. It has also started applying the principles of the EITI to its own industry. Magalhaes Ferreria, P., 2009, p19.

Angola's post-conflict reconstruction programmes will only be successful if they are implemented in ways that will benefit the majority of the population, and especially if the benefits from its growing economy are distributed more evenly throughout Angolan society. This achievement will certainly gain the international and regional respectability the Angolan government is aspiring to.

1.2. Aim

This study seeks to address two key questions: i) what has been the main strategies adopted by the Angolan government in its post-conflict reconstruction efforts?; and, ii) to what extent does this bode well for promoting durable peace in the country? To answer the questions, the research aims to critically assess the post-conflict reconstruction strategies of the Angolan government, where the 27-year civil war ended in 2002. The merits and flaws of these strategies, how they are being implemented, the difficulties and challenges which accompany them, and whether to date there have been successes, will be assessed.

Specifically, programmes for socio-economic development; good governance; reform of justice and security institutions; efforts at demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration of ex-combatants into society; refugee repatriation; economic recovery, and particularly the rebuilding of financial systems, will serve as some of the key areas that will form the basis for this assessment of Angola's progress towards successful, post-conflict reconstruction.

1.3. Methodology

The research was a literature-based review.

Data were collected by reviewing secondary sources such as books, journals, and papers presented at conferences, UN Secretaries-General reports, as well as reports of UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA); the World Bank; the African

Development Bank; and official government documents such as the Angolan Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

Internet-based research was conducted, especially using the websites of the United Nations, European Union, African Union, NEPAD and major donor organisations.

1.4. Organisation of the study

Chapter One provides a background and motivation for the study.

Chapter Two presents an overview of post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era.

Chapter Three provides an overview of Angola, focusing briefly on its history, civil wars, peace processes, and current political, social, and economic climate.

Chapter Four details the short-, medium-, and long-term development and reconstruction programmes of the Angolan government.

Chapter Five focuses on the implementation of some of the key priority areas of the reconstruction programmes and assesses their progress, challenges and prospects.

Chapter Six provides the conclusion and findings of the research.

Chapter 2. Post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era

2.1. Introduction

Angola is one of a growing number of post-conflict countries in Africa. In 2007 there were only three active conflicts, compared to the 19 conflicts the region witnessed between 1990 and 2000.³² African countries that have signed, and are implementing peace agreements include, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Chad³³, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger³⁴, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery processes in Africa are heavily influenced by external actors and overall global political, security and economic concerns. This chapter considers post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era and its implications for Africa's rising number of post-conflict countries.

2.2. Post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era

Post-conflict stabilisation became a new area of focus for the United Nations (UN) following a sharp increase in intra-state³⁵ conflicts in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War. It became apparent that despite the variety of intervention strategies³⁶ that could be used as critical tools for dealing with violent conflict, the UN lacked a coherent approach for

³² Chad, Sudan and Somalia are currently the only states engaged in active civil wars. Nkurunziza, J. 2008. Civil War and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Geneva: Switzerland, p3. Available at <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge>. Accessed on 10 August 2008. See also Gambari, I. 2006. The UN, NEPAD and the Commission for Africa in Adebajo, A. Scanlon, H. (eds.) *A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations*. Jacana Media: Auckland Park.

³³ The latest peace agreement was signed in August 2007. Overview of key peace agreements in Africa: 1990 – 2007. Available at http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/peaceagreements/PA_overview.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2008.

³⁴ A peace agreement was signed in 1995, however hostilities continue intermittently between the government and other rebel movements. Overview of key peace agreements in Africa: 1990 – 2007, p3.

³⁵ About 13 out of 15 UN peacekeeping operations over the last decade dealt with intra-state conflict.

³⁶ The UN used a variety of intervention strategies, including preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding that became critical tools for dealing with violent conflicts. McAskie, C., 2007, p2

dealing with countries in a post-conflict setting and that a new framework to manage intra-state armed conflicts was needed.³⁷

Unlike traditional methods for dealing with inter-state conflicts, the new types of intra-state conflicts required a simultaneous mix of military and civilian intervention which led to the expansion of the mandate of peacekeeping missions to include an array of activities which fall under the banner of peacebuilding.³⁸ Former Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support, Carolyn McAskie, has noted that at the time of conception there was not yet recognition that peacebuilding as a concept may bring together peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict development.³⁹ She also highlighted that until peacebuilding appeared as an official concept, UN actions were based on a sequential approach toward the transition from war to peace which had characterised inter-state conflicts. The concept has evolved significantly since then, with statebuilding emerging as the central objective of peacebuilding.⁴⁰

Senior UN officials such as Lakhdar Brahimi, Former Special Adviser of the Secretary General of the United Nations, view the establishment of the 2005 UN Peacebuilding Commission, as an important step towards “integrating statebuilding as a central aim of UN interventions in post-conflict situations”,⁴¹ further highlighting the central place of statebuilding in UN approaches to peacebuilding. With its overall aim to help the UN to

³⁷ McAskie, C., 2007. The International Peacebuilding Challenge: Can new players and new approaches bring new results. The Lloyd Shaw lecture in Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 22 November 2007, p2. Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Statements/ASG%20Carolyn%20McAskie/Shaw%20final.pdf>. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

³⁸ The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-1990) was the first such type operation, with a mandate including elections, policing and demilitarization. Other complex peacebuilding operations include Angola (UNAVEM – 1991-1995). Included in their mandates were human rights and elections monitoring; the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, and the promotion of economic liberalization. McAskie, C., 2007.

³⁹ McAskie, C., 2007.

⁴⁰ Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007. Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Post-war Statebuilding, International Peace Academy, New York, p3. Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/JBRN-7PECP5?OpenDocument>. Accessed on 22 February 2010.

⁴¹ Brahimi, L. 2007. State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries, Paper presented at the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in Government, 26 – 29 June 2007, Vienna, Austria. p18, Available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf>. Accessed on 22 February 2010. According to Brahimi, the PBC has been conceived as a mechanism through which resources will be brought together, support sustained and coordination established for peacebuilding operations. He also suggests that the PBC should; i) advocate for a more coherent statebuilding approach that avoids the artificial distinctions often made between peacekeeping, recovery and development activities; ii) ensure sustained attention to statebuilding even after the immediate post-conflict period is over; iii) encourage integration among the UN entities involved in post-conflict contexts; identify gaps in capacity and financing for UN missions; and iv) institutionalise and integrate knowledge and lessons learned in these contexts.

effectively assist countries in their transition from war to peace, the Peacebuilding Commission was an important step in addressing an institutional gap in the UN. The Commission is especially significant to Africa, with all four countries currently on its agenda being African.⁴²

Scholars have also suggested that concerns about failed and fragile states have led to the increased prominence of statebuilding in academic and policy debates, evident in recent publications by the UN and other multilateral organisations such as the European Union, and the OECD. Statements by powerful states such as the United States and Britain also reflect the same concern. With African states frequently described as “weak”, “fragile” or “failing”, it is important that the idea of statebuilding as a central aim of peacebuilding should be further investigated.⁴³

2.3. Conceptual challenges

There are several views on post-conflict reconstruction. One view is that post-conflict reconstruction has become the politically correct or politically ‘sensitive’ way of referring to statebuilding.⁴⁴ Others see post-conflict reconstruction as a ‘huge experiment’, and as ‘unchartered territory’.⁴⁵ The UN’s Lakhdar Brahimi, summed up a predominant view when he stated in 2007, “the business of helping countries make peace and rebuild after conflict is not an exact science”.⁴⁶

⁴² Burundi, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau, are currently on the Commission’s agenda. United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/qanda.shtml>. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

⁴³ OECD. 2008. Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, p7. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf>. Accessed on 21 February 2010. See also Van de Walle, S., Scott, Z. 2009. The Role of Public Services in State-and Nation-building: Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile states, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) Research Paper, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, p3. Available at http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/vdewalle_2009-research-paper.pdf. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

⁴⁴ Rubin, B. 2005. Constructing Sovereignty for Security, *Survival*, Vol. 47. No 4. Winter 2005 p93-106. See also Hamre, J.J., Sullivan, G.R. Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction, in *The Washington Quarterly*, 2002. Vol. 25. No 4. p85 -96. Available at <http://www.twq.com/02autumn/hamre.pdf>. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

⁴⁵ Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007, p1.

⁴⁶ Brahimi, L. 2007, p4.

In much of the recent literature, the concepts peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are often used interchangeably, reflecting the lack of a clear definition for either concept. It is also clear from research available that both concepts are still evolving.⁴⁷

The most well-known and widely used definition of peacebuilding was developed by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his landmark report, the 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding is defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.⁴⁸

A conceptual weakness of this definition is the emphasis placed on “preventing large scale violence or the recurrence of violence immediately after wars or armed conflicts” which some scholars argue it reveals a strong focus on ‘negative peace’ as well as excludes the possibility of preventative measures.⁴⁹ There are other scholars, however, who have pointed out that since 1992, the UN’s peace instruments– prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, are no longer viewed as chronological steps on the conflict management continuum, but are rather seen as interlinked, and interdependent aspects of the same process.⁵⁰

Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are ongoing activities. However, there exists no template for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.⁵¹ This is seen as a critical shortcoming in international peacebuilding systems. Of the few examples available of strategic frameworks for peacebuilding being applied are processes such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) developed by the humanitarian community. The CAP process, however, is seen as being more a resource mobilisation tool than a strategic planning tool.⁵² There are also researchers who regard the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), aimed at aligning the

⁴⁷ de Coning, C. 2010. Clarity, Coherence and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Available at <http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/cepi-cips/eng/documents/deConing.pdf>. Accessed on 8 March 2010.

⁴⁸ Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, New York, p11. Available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>. Accessed on 8 March 2010;

⁴⁹ de Coning, C. 2010.p12

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Paris R., Sisk, T.D. 2007, p1.

⁵² de Coning, C. 2008. The Coherence Dilemma in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems, in *African Journal in Conflict Resolution*, Vol (8) Nr 3. Durban, p98.

overall development strategy of the external actors and the host Government, as one of the most broad and pervasive processes yet developed. However, some of the weaknesses in the PRS process have been highlighted, and include its emphasis on macro-economic and financial issues. The PRS has also not been designed to manage post-conflict transitions in fragile states.⁵³

The creation of the 2005 UN Peacebuilding Commission as a strategy for managing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction has already been mentioned above. At a regional level, the 2005 African Union Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework seeks to contribute to efforts at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa, by amongst others “addressing one of the remaining gaps in the African peace and security architecture, namely the nexus between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding”⁵⁴. The African Union Peace and Security Council protocol of 2002 also makes provision for the Council “to promote peace, security and stability in Africa; to anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and *implement peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction activities* and promote and encourage democratic practises”.⁵⁵ These are important efforts, and the current global and regional strategies and programmes being applied will need time to be refined through practise before they can be meaningfully analysed.⁵⁶

2.4. Post-conflict reconstruction, development and statebuilding

Lakhdar Brahimi, former Special Adviser of the Secretary General of the United Nations stated in 2007 that, “statebuilding is unapologetically seen as the central objective of any peace operation”.⁵⁷ Some of the key activities which should be undertaken in pursuit of this objective would include constitution-making, electoral processes, reintegration and national

⁵³ de Coning, C. 2008, p99.

⁵⁴ NEPAD - African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework, 2005. Available at <http://www.africanreview.org/docs/conflict/PCR%20Policy%20Framework.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Murithi, T. 2006. Towards a symbiotic partnership: The UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Evolving AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework in Adebajo, A., Scanlon, H. (eds.) *Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations*. Jacana Media: Auckland Park.

⁵⁶ De Coning, C. 2008, p100.

⁵⁷ Brahimi, L. 2007, p4. See also Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007,p1.

reconciliation, and implementing the rule of law. He further states that “despite a mandate for global security and many years experience of working on post-conflict reconstruction, the UN is still struggling to develop the necessary concepts and capacities to assist statebuilding in a coherent and effective manner.”⁵⁸ Brahimi advocates a “light footprint approach”⁵⁹ to post-conflict reconstruction.

The view that statebuilding has become a central focus of multidimensional peace operations in war-torn societies is echoed by several scholars, including Paris and Sisk, who further argue that “statebuilding – the construction of legitimate, effective governmental institutions – is a crucial element in any larger effort to create the conditions for a durable peace and human development in countries that are just emerging from war. Without functioning and legitimate state institutions, post-conflict societies are less likely to escape the dual traps of violence and poverty”.⁶⁰

The complementarity between statebuilding and peacebuilding has also been highlighted. Peacebuilding and statebuilding are seen to address overlapping problems. Both processes are geared towards moving societies towards situations which would be conducive to development. Both processes are seen as necessary because weak and fragile states lack key attributes that benefit citizens. In addition, it is argued that both peacebuilding and statebuilding require attention to both sides of the state-society relationship, which it states cannot work if either side is prioritised at the expense of the other. States should have the

⁵⁸ Brahimi, L. 2007.p4; Several organs/departments of the UN also espouse this view as seen in a 2007 UNDESA discussion paper which states that “State- or nation-building is the central objective of every peacebuilding operation and is dependent upon the reconstitution of sustainable governance structures.” The paper further states that post-conflict nation building comprises, at minimum: the rule of law, judicial, constitutional and security sector reform, the establishment of mechanisms of political participation and inclusive policies, the effective provision of basic services and good, fighting corruption, fostering a democratic culture, free and transparent elections, and the promotion of local governance. UNDESA, 2007. Governance Strategies for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development, p9. Available at <http://www.unpan.org/Regions/Global/Library/tabid/103/ModuleID/813/mctl/DocumentDetails/did/28332/language/en-US/Default.aspx>. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

⁵⁹ A light footprint approach is based on patient identification and systematic use of the human and institutional assets that do exist in the country concerned, even in post-conflict environments. The gaps in capacity and the operational inadequacies within the UN system are now reasonably well-known as a result of several reviews and reports. The creation of the peacebuilding commission is an attempt to begin to institutionalise some of these ideas and improve coordination, focus and funding for the work of the United Nations in post-conflict situations. Brahimi, L. 2007,p20.

⁶⁰ Paris R., Sisk, T.D. 2007. p1.

capacity to identify, respond to, and be accountable to, the broader society and its interests and not just the preferences of a narrow elite.⁶¹

There has been increased criticism regarding the growing use of post-conflict countries as experiments for statebuilding. Some view it as a “new form of colonial control over the territory of war-torn states”, while some of the strongest critiques against statebuilding see it as “a form of neo-imperialist or capitalist exploitation of vulnerable societies”. Others have pointed to the mixed record of statebuilding, questioning whether it is worth the effort and resources. The mixed outcomes have also raised doubts about the prospects for peacebuilding and statebuilding, even in relatively favourable settings.⁶²

Many African states in sub-Saharan Africa are described as hybrid political orders. This means that although “many are constitutional liberal democracies that operate according to formal, legally enforceable rules”, they “co-exist with, or are overshadowed by, other competing forms of socio-political orders that have their roots in non-state, indigenous societal structures that rely on a web of social relations and mutual obligations to establish trust and reciprocity”.⁶³ These states are not able to fulfil the three critical functions that the governments of all stable states perform; security, the provision of basic services, and the protection of essential freedoms.⁶⁴

The World Bank has created a low-income country under stress (LICUS) category, and identifies 25 states in this situation, including Angola. The concept has been questioned and criticised however, as being incomplete and not very useful. It is seen as having the deliberate intention of “imposing neo-liberal policies from outside or of exaggerating the danger that weaker states pose for the US and other western countries”. It is also argued that “states are penalised for their weakness without taking into consideration the implications of economic globalisation and the economic models that are being imposed”. Another criticism

⁶¹ OECD, 2008.

⁶² Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007, p4 – p9;

⁶³ OECD, 2008.

⁶⁴ Eizenstat, S., Porter, J., Weinstein, J. Rebuilding Weak States, in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2005, Vol. 84, Number 1, p135-146. See also Hamre, J.J., Sullivan, 2002, G.R. p136.

suggests that the administrative changes being forced on “weak” and “fragile” countries may not necessarily contribute to peace and security for the population as a whole.⁶⁵

Another major criticism against the current international peacebuilding paradigm is that it promotes “liberal internationalism”, and assumes that the best way to consolidate peace is to transform states into stable market democracies as quickly as possible. Critics argue, however, that the limited success of many post-conflict peacebuilding processes is due to the destabilising effects generated by overly fast political and economic liberalisation processes in post-conflict societies that do not meet the necessary pre-conditions.⁶⁶

2.5. Peace milestones

Researchers agree that the concept “post-conflict” is not easy to define. They draw a distinction between international wars (inter-state wars) and intra-state wars, where the end of a conflict is easier to mark, by peace treaty for example. In the case of intra-state wars, conflicts do not end as abruptly.⁶⁷ Highlighting the definitional problems of the concept, and pointing out that low-intensity conflict could continue even after a conflict is supposed to have ended, scholars have suggested that two major events could be used to determine the beginning of a post-conflict period. The first is the immediate period following a landmark victory by either of the warring parties. The second is the date of signature of a comprehensive peace agreement between the warring parties. Researchers also suggest that

⁶⁵ Aguirre, M., Sogge, D. 2006. Crisis of the State and Civil Domains in Africa, FRIDE, Working Paper Number 30.p1, available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/246/crisis-of-the-state-and-civil-domains-in-africa>. Accessed on 22 February 2010.

⁶⁶ Similar arguments which have also been raised is that ‘neo-liberal accumulation strategies’ are not ‘development oriented’, stating further that “privatization, liberalization, public-private partnerships, surveillance-based good governance, a truncated individual rights based discourse and regular elections are all strategies to entrench the power of capital over society and the state”. The promotion of neo-liberal policies for Africa has been described as being the “essence and logic of the new scramble for Africa”; Satgar, V., Global Capitalism and the Neo-Liberalisation of Africa, in *The New Scramble for Africa: Imperialism, Investment and Development in Africa*, edited by Southall, R., Melber, H. University of KwaZulu Natal Press.

⁶⁷ Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working Paper, No 53, London, p4. Available at <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf>. Accessed on 21 February 2010. A recent World Bank report reiterates this by pointing out that drawing a line between conflict and post-conflict is not easy. The apparent closure points to conflict, such as peace agreements or elections, rarely signal the clear beginning of a definable post-conflict reconstruction period. Rather there is a period of transition where peace must still be consolidated and ground laid before sustainable recovery can begin. Even among the countries with identified bank-financed ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ operations, about half are experiencing ongoing conflict. The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction . Available at <http://inweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/F753E43E728A27B38525681700503796?o=pendocument>. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

the end of the post-conflict period generally refers to the end of the 10-year period following the end of a conflict.⁶⁸

Some analysts suggest conceptualising post-conflict as “a process that involves the achievement of a range of peace milestones”. In this way, ‘post-conflict’ countries could be viewed as lying on a transition continuum on which they sometimes move forward and at other times backwards. This would avoid placing such countries in “boxes” where they are either viewed as “in conflict” or “at peace”.⁶⁹

The following are some peace milestones:

Box 1 Peace milestones

- Cessation of hostilities and violence;
- Signing of political/peace agreement;
- Demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration;
- Refugee repatriation;
- Establishing a functioning state;
- Achieving reconciliation and social integration; and,
- Economic recovery.

Source: Brown, G., Langer A., Stewart, F. 2008: A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working Paper No. 53, p4.

⁶⁸ Nkurunziza, J. 2008. Civil War and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Geneva: Switzerland. Available at <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge>. The post-conflict phase can be divided into two sub-phases, the immediate aftermath of armed conflict (1-5 years) and the period after (5-10 years).

⁶⁹ Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working Paper, No 53. London, p4. Available at <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf>. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

Indicators which could be used to assess the progress made towards achieving the peace milestones are listed in the table below:

Table 1 Peace milestones and indicators of progress

Peace milestones	Possible indicators of progress
Cessation of hostilities and violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction in the number of conflict fatalities • Reduction in the number of violent attacks • Time passed since major fighting stopped
Signing of political/peace agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signing of and adherence to ceasefire agreements • Signing and implementation of a comprehensive political agreement which addresses the causes of the conflict • Endorsement of peace/political agreement by all major factions and parties to the conflict
Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No. of weapons handed in • No./proportion of combatants released from military duty and returned to civilian life • No./proportion of combatants released from active duty and returned to barracks • No. of military barracks closed • Successfulness of reinsertion programs for ex-combatants • Reduction in total number of active soldiers/combatants • Spending cuts on military procurements
Refugee repatriation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No./proportion of displaced persons and refugees that have returned home voluntarily • No. of displaced persons and refugees still living involuntarily in refugees centres within a conflict country or abroad
Establishing a functioning state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which impunity and lawlessness has been reduced • The extent to which the rule of law is introduced and maintained • The extent to which corruption has been reduced • Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP
Achieving reconciliation and societal integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of violent incidents between groups • Perceptions of “others” via surveys • Extent of trust (via surveys)
Economic recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic growth recovery • Increased revenue mobilisation • Restoring of economic infrastructure • Increased foreign direct investment

Source: Brown, G., Langer A., Stewart, F. 2008: *A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview*, CRISE Working Paper No. 53, p5.

These peace milestones should be viewed as processes, and the “activities and interventions” aimed at achieving the various milestones, can and should be undertaken even during the “conflict’ phase itself”.⁷⁰

Others have listed as major objectives for post-conflict recovery the provision of conditions to generate economic recovery and growth; generating employment and other economic opportunities, especially for youth; tackling horizontal inequalities, if severe; and managing natural resources and distributing the revenues in a transparent and equitable way. The latter is particularly relevant to countries rich in natural resources.⁷¹

2.6. Special features of post-conflict countries

The United Nations Development Programme has identified some specific challenges of post-conflict development.⁷² A critical step is to tailor post-conflict reconstruction strategies to the specific circumstances of individual post-conflict countries.⁷³

The effects and consequences of war makes the development challenges in a post-conflict country different and more difficult, than those faced by poor developing countries that have not experienced conflict, even though the problems presented in both situations appear similar. The context in which development programmes are implemented also differs between post-conflict countries and poor developing countries unaffected by conflict. UNDP highlights the following criteria that may be more severe in post-conflict countries than in ‘normal’ developing countries.

⁷⁰ Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working Paper, No 53. London, p4. Available at <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf>. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

⁷¹ United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p42. Available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-provides-insights-on-post-conflict-economic-recovery.en>. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

⁷² United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p40.

⁷³ Security, political, institutional and economic factors all contribute to the unique characteristics of individual post-conflict countries. Security factors would include the nature of the conflict and its geographical scope; political factors would involve the nature of the peace settlement, and institutional factors refer to the character and strength of the state, while economic factors involves the level of development and impact of the conflict on economic activity. United Nations Development Programme, 2008.

Box 2 Characteristics of post-conflict countries

- A lack of basic security and corresponding low levels of confidence among economic agents;
- Low fiscal capacity due to administrative weaknesses and lack of political support, reducing the government's revenue and tax base;
- A weak administration and judiciary that is unable to check illegal economic activity;
- A high level of criminal activity, which often surges in post-conflict period, and much predatory behaviour among the elites, especially in resource-rich countries;
- Sudden mass movements of people; and
- Deep macro-economic challenges, often including large budget deficits, high inflation and a high debt burden.

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Post-conflict economic recovery: enabling local ingenuity, p40-41 Available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-provides-insights-on-post-conflict-economic-recovery.en>.

2.7. Post-conflict reconstruction challenges

Each country emerging from conflict has a unique set of circumstances, and country-specific post-conflict reconstruction strategies should be developed to meet the needs of individual countries.⁷⁴ However, there are some issues which are common to all, including the critical key challenges in post-conflict environments listed below:

- Legitimacy trust and authority of the state;
- Political will for transparency and accountability;
- Rule of law;

⁷⁴ UNDESA, 2007. Governance Strategies for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development, p4.

- Social capital and social cohesion;
- Reconciliation;
- Economic reconstruction and service delivery structures;
- Security and cross border movements;
- Decentralisation.

Some of the other challenges that are specific to post-conflict countries include the following:

Box 3 Challenges for post-conflict countries

- Generalised insecurity and armed violence;
- High risk of armed conflict recurring;
- Unexploded ordinance;
- Armed groups contesting the legitimacy of the new government;
- Wide-spread inter-group violence;
- Massive destruction of infrastructure and institutions;
- War (or warlord) economies;
- Severe scarcity in human capacity (massive population displacement; IDPs, refugees, diasporas);
- Collapsed labour markets; and
- Militarised international intervention.

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Post-conflict economic recovery: enabling local ingenuity, p40-41 Available at <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-provides-insights-on-post-conflict-economic-recovery.en>.

Research has shown that low-income countries and countries with significant natural resources, face particular challenges in relation to post-conflict economic recovery. Low-income countries have to deal with a tendency toward aid dependency due to the fact that it is generally difficult to generate adequate savings and therefore easier to depend on foreign flows of income for reconstruction and development. Private sources of funding are also more difficult to attract in these environments. On the other hand, although middle income post-conflict countries are also dependent on aid, it is mostly for the short term, as possibilities of renewed inflows of private capital tend to be greater, making it easier to escape from aid dependency. Another major obstacle to successful recovery is the scarcity of human resources, making the recovery of service delivery difficult as well as leading to a weak bureaucratic capacity.⁷⁵

The financial needs of countries with significant natural resources are much smaller than that of low-income countries. The major threat they face, however, for a recurrence of conflict, is if there is a presence of high horizontal inequalities. The macro-economic policies of these countries are also affected by ‘Dutch disease’, making it difficult to diversify the economy, and generally undermining the growth of non-oil sectors. These countries need special policies to help manage resources that could assist with making them developmentally effective and inclusive, as well as to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict.⁷⁶

Scholars have also suggested that post-conflict societies face two major challenges – economic recovery and risk reduction⁷⁷. A study focusing on these areas have concluded that “both the post-conflict government and external actors should give priority to reducing the risk of conflict”. Statistical results of the study found that economic development does not necessarily reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict. The study also found that there was no systematic influence of elections on the reduction of war risk. They therefore suggest that

⁷⁵ Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008, p7-9.

⁷⁶ Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008, p12.

⁷⁷ Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Soderbom, M. 2006, “Post-conflict Risks”, Centre for the Study of African Economics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, London. Available at <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2006-12text.pdf>. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

elections should be promoted as “intrinsically desirable, rather than as mechanisms for increasing the durability of the post-conflict peace”.⁷⁸

2.8. Conclusion

There are no quick-fix solutions to the complex realities faced by a growing number of African states emerging from protracted conflicts. The sharp decline in conflicts across Africa has coincided with the continent experiencing for the first time in 30 years economic growth in tandem with the rest of the world, and recording its highest economic growth rate for this decade in 2007 at 6.7%.⁷⁹ In 2007, Angola and Sudan, previously the sites of Africa’s longest running civil wars, featured among the 10 largest economies in Africa.⁸⁰

Given the increased global momentum towards statebuilding, it is also imperative for the region to develop a unified, co-ordinated and coherent African approach and perspective to post-conflict processes taking place on the continent. However, whether post-conflict reconstruction is seen as a vehicle to promote statebuilding or not, the fact remains that it is necessary in post-conflict societies to build effective systems and institutions of government.

African states should endeavour to perform the essential functions of a state and government, most importantly focusing on the provision of basic services to their citizens. The improved economic performance of individual states, such as that of Angola and Sudan cited above, and the contribution this makes to improved economic performance for the region, will only then be a real cause for celebration.

⁷⁸ Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Soderbom, M. 2006, p2.

⁷⁹ The World Bank, 2008. Africa’s Development Indicators 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_11_07_africa_dev.pdf. Accessed on 8 March 2010. Average growth in the Sub-Saharan economies was 5.4% in 2005 and 2006. See also Reuters, 2007. IMF sees post-war states as priority in Africa. Available at <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L14872796.htm>. Accessed on 8 March 2010.

⁸⁰ Africa’s 10 largest economies in 2007. Available at <http://www.clickafrique.com/Magazine/ST014/CP0000002788.aspx>. Accessed on 10 March 2010.

Chapter 3. Angola: An overview

3.1. Introduction

Angola's⁸¹ recent past will impact greatly how its future unfolds. The country's history has been shaped by its experience as a Portuguese colony, the politics of the Cold War, and more than four decades of armed conflict. In 1975, the country gained its independence from Portugal, after a 14-year long liberation struggle. A 27-year long civil war followed, and culminated in the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement in April 2002.

This chapter will provide a brief overview of Angola's independence struggle as well as its civil war, and the legacy left by the country's armed conflict of more than 40 years.

3.2. The road to independence

Two massacres in the Uige and Malange provinces in 1961 provided the catalyst for Angola's first war, the War for Independence. It also gave rise to Angola's three liberation movements: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)⁸²; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)⁸³; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)⁸⁴, which formed in response to colonial repression, racial

⁸¹ Modern Angola derives its name from the Kingdom of Ndongo, ruled by the Ngola (king). The Portuguese gradually took control of the coastal strip throughout the 16th century by a series of treaties and wars and the territory became known as Angola in 1574. Angola is on the west coast of Africa, bordering Namibia, Zambia, the Democratic Republic Of Congo, and Republic Of Congo. Its population is nearly 14 million, of whom the largest ethnic group is Ovimbundu. Other ethnic groups are Kimbundu, Bakongo, Mestiqo (mix – European/African); European, and others. The official language is Portuguese, and Umbundu, Kimbundu and Kikongo are widely spoken. Christianity is the main religion. Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London.

⁸² The MPLA was formed in the late 1950s from smaller resistance movements operating in Luanda. Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London.

⁸³ The FNLA was formed in 1962, under the leadership of Holden Roberto. Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London.

⁸⁴ UNITA was founded by Jonas Savimbi in 1966. Previously Savimbi was the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile (GRAE) formed in 1962 by the FNLA. Savimbi then built up his own constituency in the centre and south of the country. His supporters came mainly from the largest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu. Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London.

policies and other discriminatory practices.⁸⁵ The liberation movements not only fought the colonisers, but also engaged in a bitter power struggle among themselves for international recognition and national legitimacy. In addition to adopting different ideologies, each organisation was dominant in different parts of the country, and had an ethnically-based support base. Conditions of tolerance, openness and debate were also absent within the structures of the liberation movements.⁸⁶

Fought mainly with guerrilla tactics, the independence struggle lasted until 1974. Commentators suggest that the armed movements did not pose any real threat to the colonial state, and that it was really a change in the national political arena in Portugal that brought the colonial period to an end. The Alvor Agreement⁸⁷ signed by all three parties in Portugal paved the way for independence on 11 November 1975. The Agreement made provision for a power-sharing transitional government, comprising the MPLA, UNITA and FLNA, a new constitution and elections.⁸⁸

On 11 November 1975, excluding both UNITA and the FNLA from government and the city of Luanda, the MPLA declared Angola's independence and installed Agostinho Neto as its first President. A socialist one-party regime was established. Brazil was the first country to recognise the new government, followed in 1976 by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), Portugal, and more than 80 countries which officially recognised the new Angolan government. Following President Neto's death by natural causes in 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos, at the time the Minister of Planning, became president.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, UNHCR/AU/NEPAD Sub Cluster on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p15

⁸⁶ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p16.

⁸⁷ The Alvor Accords - the agreement between the MPLA, UNITA, FNLA, and the Government of Portugal, signed on 15 January 1975, in Alvor, Portugal. Key texts and Agreements, In From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London, p68.

⁸⁸ Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London, p13.

⁸⁹ Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, p10. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, March 2008, p16.

The country's long civil war started almost immediately after independence, with the collapse of the Alvor Agreement.⁹⁰

3.3. Angola's civil wars

The power struggle between Angola's different elites is generally viewed as having been the driving force behind the country's protracted war. With support from their international backers, each of the liberation movements wanted to be in control of the country. The MPLA, with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuban troops, was able to gain the upper hand over UNITA and the FNLA, and had extended its control over all 18 provinces by April 1976. South African troops supported UNITA, and Angola's neighbour, Zaire, backed the FNLA. Between 1976 to 1989, during the country's 'second war', Cold War politics were evident in the struggle between the MPLA, which had a Marxist-Leninist orientation and enjoyed support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and UNITA, whose support came mainly from the West, and South Africa.⁹¹ UNITA was dominant in the interior of Angola and its rural areas, while the MPLA was mainly based in the cities.⁹²

A change in military tactics by the end of the 1980's, involved targeting civilians. UNITA subsequently lost most of its Western supporters as a result of its vicious attacks on civilians, which claimed the lives of between 100 000 and 300 000 people. The US, however, continued its support to UNITA until the end of the Cold War in 1989. The battle for Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 presents a defining moment in Angola's second war. With the assistance of Cuban troops, the MPLA was able to push back South African and UNITA forces after a long battle. Conceding that there seemed to be no prospect for a military solution to the security of their northern border, South Africa started to explore political alternatives. A troika of Portugal, the United States and the Soviet Union, managed the peace initiatives which followed, and this resulted in the Bicesse Accords of May 1991. The defeat of the South Africans at Cuito Caunavale also led to an agreement between Angola, South Africa

⁹⁰ Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004.p13.

⁹¹ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p17.

⁹² Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, p15.

and Cuba that provided for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia.⁹³

The peace accord was followed by the country's first general elections in 1992, held under the auspices of the UN. UNITA's Savimbi expected to win, and when the results turned out in favour of the MPLA, he rejected the voting results and returned to war. The 1994 Lusaka Protocol brought an end to the war, creating a four year break from open hostilities, before the 'third war' broke out in December 1998. Only with the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, was the door to peace re-opened, and with the signing of the Luena Memorandum in April 2002, four decades of war finally ended.⁹⁴

3.4. Peace processes

Attempts at ending Angola's conflict are evident in the three peace accords produced between 1989 and 2002. All three peace processes failed however. The extensive involvement of the international community in the creation of first two accords, and its minimal involvement with the third accord, the Luena Agreement, has been pointed out as one of the reasons for the failure of the first two accords and the success of the last attempt.⁹⁵ Key features of the peace accords are briefly described below.

3.4.1 *The Bicesse Accords*

The MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Accords in May 1991. The Accords prohibited both sides from purchasing weapons. The US and the Soviet Union also had to end their military support to the parties. Under the Accord, the MPLA was authorised to continue as the government until the country's first general election, set for September 1992, was held. The UN's peacekeeping mission, UNAVEM II, was responsible for: i) overseeing the

⁹³ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p17. See also Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, p15. Several protocols and agreements were signed by South Africa, Cuba and Angola, including the New York principles of 20 July 1988; the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988; the Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December 1988; and the Bilateral and Tripartite Agreements both signed on 22 December 1988. Key texts and Agreements, in *From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15*, London, p68.

⁹⁴ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p15.

⁹⁵ Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, p15.

demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers; ii) reform of the police services; and iii) assisting with preparations for the elections. However, due to the lack of adequate resources, as well as a weak mandate, UNAVEM II, a central component of the peace arrangements, could not successfully fulfil its mission.

Given that the minimum political and military conditions for conducting elections were not in place, the realistic action would have been to postpone the elections. The US, however, expected that UNITA would win the elections, and therefore, no real effort was made to amend any of the provisions contained in the Accords. With UNITA's defeat in the election, and its rejection of the election result, the MPLA won significant support among local communities. However, it was not until UNITA's rejection of the Abidjan Protocol (in mid-1993), that the US recognised the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, paving the way for UN sanctions against UNITA.⁹⁶

3.4.2 Lusaka Protocol of 1994

Realising a reversal of fortunes, UNITA called for new peace talks in October 1993. The UN representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, supported by the Troika, led peace negotiations in November 1993.⁹⁷ Savimbi, suffering several military setbacks, and under increasing international pressure, signed the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. Similar to the Bicesse Accords, no allowance was provided for other stakeholders to contribute to discussions relating to the Lusaka Protocol. Key elements of the Protocol were blatantly defied by both UNITA and the Angolan Government. One of the key breaches of the Protocol was UNITA's refusal to disarm. At the end of December 1998, the Angolan government declared its 'war of peace'.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Meijer, M., Birmingham, D. 2004.p19-20; See also "Angola" in *Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa* (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 17-18. Available at <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ang1991bicesse.htm>. Accessed on 8 March 2010.

⁹⁷ Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004.p19-20.

⁹⁸ Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004.p22,

3.4.3 *The Luena Peace Agreement*

Jonas Savimbi's assassination on 22 February 2002 by Angolan government military forces created the space for re-engaging in peace talks. Following his death, a ceasefire was announced on 2 March 2002, followed by the Angolan government declaration on 13 March 2002 of an end to all its military operations against UNITA, and a peace plan. Included in the peace plan were calls for the resolution of outstanding military issues in accordance with the Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol, UNITA's demilitarization and reintegration into political life, and an amnesty for all crimes committed in the framework of the armed conflict. It also pledged to work with all of society, especially the churches, political parties and civil society groups.⁹⁹

On 4 April 2002, the Luena Memorandum marked the end of four decades of war and the ultimate defeat of UNITA. In October 2002, UNITA declared itself fully disarmed and a democratic political party and UN sanctions against it were lifted.

3.5. **Cabinda**

Commentators suggest that peace in Angola remains incomplete without the resolution of the ongoing conflict in Cabinda. Accounting for 60 percent of Angola's oil production, the prospects for the Angolan government granting autonomy to the region is unlikely.

The struggle for the independence of Cabinda stretches over 30 years, with the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) in 1974, and its rejection of the Alvor Accords that included Cabinda as part of Angolan territory at independence. Since 1975, FLEC has been spearheading the campaign for an independent Cabinda, using guerrilla tactics, selective attacks against government targets, and even kidnapping foreigners to focus media attention on their cause. In 2003 fighting between the FLEC separatists and the Government of Angola intensified. However, a peace agreement was signed in August 2006,

⁹⁹ Griffiths, A. 2004. The end of the war: The Luena Memorandum of Understanding, in, *From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord*, Issue 15, London, p24.

between the Angolan government and the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD), to bring about an end to the armed conflict.¹⁰⁰

3.6. Legacy of the war: Angola today

Angola's wars have left a tragic legacy. Forty years of armed conflict have cost the lives of more than 1.5 million people, about 12 percent of the population. Almost one-third of the population were internally displaced, and about 450 000 thousand people became refugees in neighbouring countries. Zambia and the DRC hosted the largest number of Angolan refugees. Angola is now the most mined country in sub-Saharan Africa and among the highest worldwide, with the number of landmines estimated to be between six and eight million. One in 415 people in Angola has been injured as a result of landmines, with an estimated 800 000 people having lost a limb due to land mine injury. In addition, the proliferation of landmines is also impacting on the resettlement of and reintegration of refugee communities into Angolan society, as well as on agricultural production due to inaccessible areas and roads.¹⁰¹

The damage to physical infrastructure has also been severe. Soldiers from both sides targeted communication and transport facilities such as airports, seaports, roads and railways, bridges and telecommunications. Power supplies were also affected because of attacks on hydro-electric plants. Houses, schools and hospitals were destroyed. In addition, due to the war, the existing infrastructure was neglected, with government spending geared towards the war effort and neglecting expenditure on areas such as infrastructure.¹⁰²

Tragically, the war also deepened poverty among the population. About 68 percent of the Angolan population live below the poverty line, and 28 percent live in extreme poverty. Angola's war efforts were mainly funded by oil-backed loans, and this has further increased the country's national debt level. By 2004, Angola's external debt was estimated at US\$9.4

¹⁰⁰ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p21. See also Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, p15.

¹⁰¹ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p25.

¹⁰² Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p28.

billion. Exports in commodities such as coffee also declined from significant levels before the war. The fishing industry, also a major export commodity, was also affected, with earlier exports of 600 000 tons declining to only 30 000 tons during the war.¹⁰³

Angola's children have suffered the most. A recent study, found that 10 percent of the country's children have fought in the war, 85 percent have seen dead bodies, 84 percent suffered from malnutrition with nearly half of under five-year olds malnourished. One third of Angolan children between the ages of 5 to 14 are working.¹⁰⁴ Three in five people do not have access to safe water and sanitation. About one in four Angolan children die before their fifth birthday, with 90 percent dying because of malaria, diarrhoea or respiratory tract infections.¹⁰⁵

Angola does not have a democratic government. Although it is structured along the lines of a conventional democracy, political power remains concentrated in the hands of the President. The executive branch of the government consists of the President (head of state and government), the Prime Minister, and a Council of Ministers. The central government administers the country through 18 provinces. The MPLA is the dominant party in parliament with 129 seats, followed by UNITA with 70, the Party for Social Renewals with 6, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) with 5. A few smaller political parties are also represented.¹⁰⁶

3.7. Conclusion

The Luena Peace Agreement of 2002 provided an opportunity for Angola to redress some of the legacies left by its colonisers, anti-colonial struggle, and civil war. Included in the Angolan government's agenda for creating a new Angola, is changing the country's mostly

¹⁰³ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p28-30.

¹⁰⁴ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p27 – 31.

¹⁰⁵ World Bank, 2006. Angola: Country Economic Memorandum – Oil, Broad-based Growth, and Equity; piii. Available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/10/24/000090341_20061024104820/Rendered/PDF/35362.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

¹⁰⁶ Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008. Drivers of Change – Angola: Final Report, London, p11.

Available at mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/Drivers-of-Change-Angola.doc. Accessed on 12 March 2010, p4 and p30.

negative image, from being one of the world's most corrupt and poorly governed states, as well as one of the world's most unequal societies, to one of a nation that is respected by its neighbours and the global community.¹⁰⁷ This goal will only be achieved by addressing the country's poor governance record, overcoming institutional weaknesses, creating better socio-economic conditions, and most importantly, improving the lives of Angola's poor by a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth to benefit the entire population.

¹⁰⁷ Sogge, D. 2009. Angola 'Failed yet Successful', FRIDE Working Paper, Madrid, p1. Available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/599/angola-failed-yet-successful>. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

Chapter 4. Angola's post-conflict development and reconstruction strategies

4.1. Introduction

In its quest to attain long-term peace, security and development, Angola will have to address an infinite range of post-conflict challenges. The Angolan government, as the main driver of post-conflict reconstruction in the country, has developed its own home-grown post-conflict strategies and frameworks to advance the country's post-conflict recovery process.

This chapter will focus on some of the key programmes that have been developed. These programmes aim to address the challenges identified by the government and include those related to: i) peace, justice, democracy, social stability, national unity and cohesion, and internal security; ii) elimination of hunger and extreme poverty, employment, economic growth and fair distribution of national income; iii) sustainable long-term development, human development and well being for all Angolans and harmonious development of the territory; iv) good and transparent governance; v) Angola a country with a future, respected by neighbours, by partners, by the entire international community, and increasingly integrated into the world economy.¹⁰⁸

4.2. Angola's post-conflict reconstruction strategies

4.2.1 The International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation

One of the first steps the Angolan government took immediately following the Luena Peace Agreement of April 2002, was to call for an International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation, seeking in this way assistance from the international community to support

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola, UNDAF, Angola: 2009-2013, April 2009, p6. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/UNDAF-AO-2009_2013-En.pdf. Accessed on 10 February 2010.

the country in meeting its most immediate and pressing post-war demands.¹⁰⁹ By the end of 2002 the Government had prepared its Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction programme (PRR) and intended to make it a base document for discussion at the International Donor Conference. The PRR priority phase features a list of vital projects, (see Table 2), to rebuild the country's infrastructure and extend state administration throughout Angola. The donor conference has, however, to date not materialised.¹¹⁰

4.2.2 *The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)/New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Report*

In July 2003, the Government launched the Angola 2003 MDG/NEPAD Report. The document provides a baseline of indicators against which progress will be measured until 2015. A 2005 MDG Report was also prepared.¹¹¹ Both documents provide important indicators relating to Angola's progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals¹¹², highlighting key policies and programmes that have been adopted, as well as some of the remaining challenges.

4.2.3 *The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*

One of the main national policy frameworks developed by the Government for the immediate post-conflict period was its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Initially the government had prepared two Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Both were not approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or received any endorsement from donors. The government then moved on to develop a full PRSP which received clearance by

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p1. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/ang_corep.2005.pdf. Accessed on 10 February 2010.

¹¹⁰ Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008, p11.

¹¹¹ Angola: Millennium Development Goals – Report Summary 2005. Available at <http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/MDGANG2005-eng.pdf>. Accessed on 10 September 2009.

¹¹² The eight millennium goals are 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) develop a global partnership for development. Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Available at <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/summ.htm>. Accessed on 10 September 2009.

the Angolan Council of Ministers in January 2004. Thereafter, the government started the implementation of its PRSP in the absence of donor support.¹¹³

The final version of the Government's PRSP, also known as the *Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza (ECP)*, or Strategy to Combat Poverty, was released in January 2004 and covers the period 2004 to 2006. The ECP, PRR and MDG documents are linked and provide a joint means by which the government would pursue both its immediate post-conflict recovery and medium-term growth. For example, the expenses of PRR projects that relate to poverty reduction would be taken up by the ECP.

Also, the government's Public Investment Programme (PIP) would on an annual basis provide funding for those items that were to be carried by the State budget. Ten sectors were listed for priority action and support in the PRR, with the total ECP cost estimated at US\$3.17 billion over five years.¹¹⁴ The three-year emergency rehabilitation plans prepared by the country's provinces, as well as the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) reports, also informed the final PRSP.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ In 2005, the donor community provided an estimated €287 million in aid to Angola. In the same year, public expenditure by the Angolan government amounted to an estimated €8.16 billion (or US\$ 10.159 billion). Comparing these figures shows donor aid is about 3.5% of the Angolan public expenditure budget. The figures for donor aid have not improved in recent years, in fact they have shown a decline. Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008. Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008 – 2013, Annex 1a: Key Macro-economic Indicators, p8. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_ao_csp10_en.pdf. Accessed on 8 February 2010.

¹¹⁴ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p8-9.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Table 2 PRR priority phase - list of vital projects

Activity	Cost (in US Dollars)
Resettlement-Social Reinsertion, including support for return of four million internally displaced persons (IDPs); 450 000 refugees; demobilisation and reinsertion of ex-soldiers and families	350 million
De-mining. The programme mentions 4, 750 000 landmines, 26 000 kms of roads infested with mines	285 million
Food security and rural development	70 million
HIV/AIDS	71 million
Education – with a focus on primary universal education	450 million
Health – programmes seek rapid access to basic health services	158 million
Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure; new housing schemes	1, 038 million
Employment and professional training	45 million
Governance: extend access to justice to all areas of the territory – Public Administration reform – decentralisation – modernise the management of the PIP – support to the statistics system, new set of accounts	325 million
Economic management: overhaul the financial system and extend financial services to rural areas and small business – modernise the public finance system	60 million

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2005. *Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War*, p8-9, Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/ang_ecorep.2005.pdf.

The PRSP identifies ten priority areas of intervention: i) social integration; ii) security and civil protection; iii) food security and rural development; iv) HIV/AIDS; v) education; vi) health; vii) basic infrastructure; viii) employment and vocational training; ix) good governance; and x) macro-economic management.¹¹⁶

Through the PRSP, the Government intends to:

- Support the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons, refugees and demobilized soldiers to their areas of origin, or preferred locations, where they can integrate themselves into the community in a sustainable manner;

¹¹⁶ See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p24.

- Guarantee basic physical security through demining, disarmament and the upholding of law and order throughout the country;
- Minimise food insecurity and re-launch the rural economy as a key aspect to sustainable development;
- Control the spread of HIV/AIDS and minimise the problems of those families living with AIDS;
- Provide universal access to quality primary education that is gender sensitive whilst reducing illiteracy and creating the conditions for the protection of youth with special needs;
- Improve the health situation of the population by increasing access to primary health care and focus on the control and spread of HIV/AIDS;
- Rehabilitate and expand basic infrastructures for economic, social and human development;
- Value national human resources, protect workers' rights, promote access to employment opportunities and enhance the labour market;
- Consolidate the rule of law through improvements to the administration and the management of resources whilst promoting transparency in the development of national documents;
- Create an enabling environment for stable macro-economic growth that allows a steady development of the markets ensuring the reduction of poverty.¹¹⁷

4.2.4 *Medium-term strategy*

Having made progress with some of its key short-term and emergency priorities such as maintaining macro-economic stability, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and rebuilding vital physical infrastructure, the government in its medium-term

¹¹⁷ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2005 – 2008, p7-8.

development plan, is able to prioritise more specific measures for addressing the country's human development needs. During the transition¹¹⁸ period the Angolan government will focus on: i) promoting sustainable human development; ii) improving socio-economic conditions; iii) promoting governance and rule of law; iv) creating economic stability for poverty reduction and sustainable long-term development; and v) working towards sustainable use of environmental resources.¹¹⁹

The Government's specific plans for promoting sustainable human development include improving its Human Development Index (HDI) ranking by 30 points in order for the country to join the level of medium development countries by 2025. It also aims to reduce poverty by up to 75 percent, the infant mortality rate by 90 percent, its under-five mortality rate by 85 percent¹²⁰, its maternal mortality rate by up to 95 percent, increase life expectancy by at least 10 to 12 years, and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.¹²¹

Promoting governance and rule of law will be achieved by improving governance efficiency and by reducing its ranking in corruption indices, such as that of Transparency International and the World Bank. Improving access to justice and promoting human rights are also planned.¹²²

Creating economic stability is a key factor influencing the government's ability to ensure poverty reduction and sustainable long-term development. The government intends among other to support private sector development, entrepreneurship and capacity development, reform the planning and macro-economic management systems, and improve national

¹¹⁸ The African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) distinguish three phases within a post-conflict reconstruction and development process, namely: the emergency (short-term); transition (medium-term); and development (long-term) phases. Report on the Elaboration of a Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, Available at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2007/july/PCRD/Report%20on%20Post%20conflict%20reconstruction.pdf>. Accessed on 10 March 2010.

¹¹⁹ United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola, UNDAF Angola: 2009-2013, April 2009, p6

¹²⁰ About 195 000 children die every year before the age of five. Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008. Annex 15: Children and Development, p65. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_ao_csp10_en.pdf. Accessed on 2 March 2010.

¹²¹ United Nations, DP/DCP/AGO/2, 2008. Draft country programme for Angola (2009-2013), p2. Available at www.undp.org/execbrd/word/DPDCPAGO2.doc. Accessed on 21 February 2010.

¹²² United Nations, DP/DCP/AGO/2, 2008, p3.

statistics.¹²³ Plans for achieving the sustainable use of its environmental resources include developing an environmental impact assessment (EIA), as well as an environmental management system (EMS).¹²⁴

Ongoing challenges during the transition period include maintaining internal security, unity and national cohesion. Creating a respectable image for the government within the region, and at a global level, are also part of the Angolan government's agenda.¹²⁵

4.2.5 *Long-term plans*

In addition to the above frameworks, the Government is preparing, in collaboration with the country's main political parties and civil society, its long-term strategy, known also as *Vision 2025*. This strategy outlines the broad reforms which need to be implemented in Angola over the next two decades. These include large-scale reforms (generally macro-economic), sector reforms, and a new innovation called "matrix reforms"¹²⁶. Indicators and targets for the various reforms have been set up to 2025.¹²⁷

Some of its more specific strategies and development plans in the important areas of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration; health; education; financial management; decentralisation; macro-economic challenges; and governance are discussed in more detail below.

¹²³ United Nations, DP/DCP/AGO/2, 2008, p3.

¹²⁴ Water resources are a major asset of the country. Angola's internal renewable water resources are estimated at 140 km³/yr, and are a major contributor to international river basins (Zambezi, Okavango, Cunene). Marine water resources and fisheries account for 2 to 3% of GDP. Forests cover 43% of the country area, and over 5000 plant species have been recorded. See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p20.

¹²⁵ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 – 2013, p7.

¹²⁶ Matrix reforms is a new innovation that attempts to look at key issues such as poverty, hunger and human capital as a mix of policies that need to be undertaken under different ministries. Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p25.

¹²⁷ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p9. See also Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008,p25. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_ao_csp10_en.pdf.

4.3. Select strategies and development plans for key priority areas

4.3.1 *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*

Angola's DDR process was carried out mainly by the Angolan government. Provisions in the Luena Peace Agreement guided the DDR process and included: disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNITA military forces; integration into the FAA of UNITA military personnel; integration into the National Police, demobilisation and extinction of the UNITA military forces; and social and vocational reintegration of demobilised ex-UNITA military forces. A Joint Military Commission and Technical Committee were given the responsibility to coordinate and implement the provisions.¹²⁸

The Angolan government had in January 2001 already adopted a domestic law, the Norms for the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Populations¹²⁹, and in 2002 its implementing regulation. The law defined a number of pre-conditions necessary for resettlement of demobilised soldiers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returning refugees.¹³⁰

The governments Peace Plan, launched in March 2002, also provided a framework for DDR to take place, including the preparation of an Emergency Programme to support the DDR and general reintegration processes. It also announced its Programme to Overcome the Crisis, especially focusing on the establishment of a Public Investment Programme, especially aimed at facilitating the rapid reconstruction of the country.¹³¹ In 2006, the government supported by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), officially launched the Sustainable Reintegration Initiative, aimed at addressing key development gaps in the eight main districts of refugee return. Detailed assessments were compiled in each district to

¹²⁸ Key texts and Agreements, in *From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord*, Issue 15, London, p73-74.

¹²⁹ The government adopted in January 2001 a domestic law, the Norms for the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Populations, and the implementing regulation in 2002. In doing so, Angola became the first country in the world to incorporate the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic law, and extended the application of those principals to the treatment of returning refugees. Human Rights Watch. *Coming Home: Return and Reintegration in Angola*, Vol. (17) 2, March 2005, p9. Available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/03/16/coming-home-0?print>. Accessed on 10 March 2010.

¹³⁰ The five provinces most affected were Luanda, Benguela, Lunda Norte, Huambo, and Kwanza Sul, receiving a combined total of 2.5 million displaced people. Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, p xv.

¹³¹ Key texts and Agreements, in *From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord*, Issue 15, London, p73-74.

highlight major gaps in social services, transport infrastructure and economic opportunities, and to identify key development priorities in line with existing national and provincial plans.¹³²

4.3.2 De-mining

The Council of Ministers approved in 2006, a Mine Action Plan for the period 2006 to 2011. Other initiatives by the government in the area of de-mining include: the establishment of the CNIDAH - the national authority for mine action; and the establishment of INAD - which is responsible among other for de-mining operations and managing the national mine action training centre. An Executive Commission for Demining (CED) was also established in 2005.¹³³

De-mining has been adopted as a critical priority area, considering the dependence of about 85 percent of the population on subsistence agriculture to sustain their livelihoods. Due to the importance of de-mining for socio-economic development, the government aims to reduce the number of injuries and deaths caused by landmines, and to fast-track land mine clearance in order to make contaminated land available for productive use.

4.3.3 Health

4.3.3.1 Reducing infant/child mortality

To address Angola's dire health situation, the Ministry of Health developed among other a Strategic Plan for the Accelerated Reduction of Infant and Mother Mortality in Angola (2004-2008), a National Strategic Plan for Reproductive Health (2002-2006), and a Vaccination Programme (2005-2006). Two critical areas will be addressed by these programmes: reducing by 2015, the infant mortality rate to 104 per 1000 births, and the maternal mortality rate from 1400 to 350. Strategies include an extensive immunization

¹³² Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p69.

¹³³ Angolan Government, 2002. Mine Action in Angola: Strategic Plan 2006-2011, p14-16. Available at http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-Angola-2006-2011.pdf. Accessed on 1 March 2010.

campaign targeting pre-natal and neo-natal tetanus, as well as vaccination campaigns to control, and ultimately eradicate diseases such as measles, polio and yellow fever. Lack of adequate and quality nutrition is one of the major causes of infant mortality. Intensive campaigns highlighting the importance of preventing a deficiency of vitamins and iodine have been created to address this.¹³⁴ Other specific aims include, improving access to primary health care; building the capacity of health workers, especially in the paediatric and maternity units; and developing and implementing a monitoring system for drug resistant, predictable and potentially epidemic diseases.¹³⁵

4.3.3.2 *HIV/AIDS*

The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Angola is not as extensive compared to other African countries.¹³⁶ However, to control and avoid the spread of the disease, a National Commission Against HIV/AIDS and Epidemics was created by law in 2003. A law on HIV/AIDS was approved in 2004, and specific regulations relating to HIV/AIDS have also been promulgated. In 2005, the National Institute for AIDS was created. National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plans were drawn up for the periods 2001 to 2002, and 2003 to 2008 respectively.¹³⁷ In addition, other programmes are being implemented, such as strengthening the government's information, education and communication strategy; transmission prevention; diagnosis support; availability of medication for treatment; and strengthening of the epidemic monitoring system.¹³⁸

4.3.3.3 *Malaria/tuberculosis (TB) and other diseases*

Malaria is the major cause of death in Angola for both children and adults. The government aims to reduce the occurrence of malaria in the country from three million cases to 900 000 during the medium-term period, and the related high death toll associated with the disease.

¹³⁴ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p35.

¹³⁵ Angola MDG 2005 Report, p16-17.

¹³⁶ HIV/AIDS prevalence was estimated at 2.4% in 2004. USAID: Angola – HIV/AIDS and Health Profile. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/Countries/africa/angola_profile.pdf. Accessed on 10 March 2010.

¹³⁷ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p56.

¹³⁸ See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, 2008, p15.

As part of its strategy to achieve this, the government has adopted a Roll Back Malaria Campaign that promotes increased access to primary care and the reinforcement of preventive actions, diagnosis and treatment of cases.¹³⁹ A TB Strategic Plan (2003 -2007) has also been developed.¹⁴⁰ Other widespread diseases which the government has to contend with include cholera¹⁴¹, a resurgence of polio in 2005, and Marburg, a new hemorrhagic disease.¹⁴²

4.3.4 Education

Some of the main challenges identified within the education sector are: enrolment disparities; lack of physical infrastructure; lack of teachers and learning materials; and disparities in education expenditure among provinces.¹⁴³

Efforts to improve the education sector are being guided by Angola's Education Sector Strategy and National Plan of Action. During the interim phase of transition, activities such as the reconstruction and rehabilitation of schools and classrooms, providing teaching materials, and upgrading of teacher qualification constituted the essential elements of donor assistance.¹⁴⁴

4.3.5 Financial management

4.3.5.1 The Public Finance Modernisation Programme (PMFP)

In an attempt to modernise its public finance system (PMFP)¹⁴⁵, the government in 2002 launched a five year programme aimed at improving institutional capacity within the Ministry of Finance, to ensure effectiveness of its internal processes, and to accelerate reporting on

¹³⁹ Angola MDG 2005 Report, p21. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p36.

¹⁴⁰ Angola MDG 2005 Report, p22.

¹⁴¹ Between February 2006 to May 2006, an outbreak of cholera killed over one thousand people. Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p55.

¹⁴² Angola MDG 2005 Report, p23. See also Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p19.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations Development Programme, Country Programme Action Plan for Angola: 2009 – 2013, p3

¹⁴⁵ The PMFP is an important as it advances good governance and accountability; in particular, the Asset Management component will deal with the reform of the Public Procurement System, a key function in assessing transparency in the use of public resources. Another outcome of the PMFP will be a better expenditure tracking system for monitoring devolution of resources to agreed priorities. See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p17.

financial performance. The programme includes three projects: i) streamlining functions and enacting new regulatory frameworks; ii) installing a new technological platform for data processing and transmission; and iii) training the staff, individually and on procedures. Technical committees have been formed within the Ministry of Finance to spearhead and monitor progress. Participation in these processes extends to the relevant ministries and to institutions such as the Central Bank of Angola (BNA), and the state-owned national oil company, Sonangol.¹⁴⁶

To date one of the major achievements of the PMFP has been the implementation of a plan to introduce an integrated financial management information system (SIGFE).¹⁴⁷

4.3.5.2 Statistical information

The National Statistical Institute (INE) has adopted a five-year action plan aimed at streamlining the country's statistical system. The five-year plan is receiving support from Norway and the World Bank. Projects which were set to start in 2006, include, a population census sponsored by UNFPA, an agricultural census sponsored by FAO, and a demographic and health survey sponsored by USAID. In February 2004 Angola joined the IMF-sponsored General Data Dissemination System (GDDS), a project aimed at improving statistical systems.¹⁴⁸

4.3.6 Governance

4.3.6.1 Decentralisation

Decentralisation is another priority area for the Angolan Government. Measures to implement decentralisation have included the creation of a Directorate for Municipal Affairs in the Ministry of Territorial Administration, and provisions are also outlined in the New

¹⁴⁶ See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p17. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_ao_csp10_en.pdf. Accessed on 3 March 2010.

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p9.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p9.

Constitution adopted in January 2010. In 2001, the government had also approved a National Plan for Decentralisation and Deconcentration. Since then the decentralisation process empowering the municipalities for local decision making and service delivery has been underway.¹⁴⁹

More recently, the Decree 2/07 was approved, making provision for selected municipalities to become increasingly responsible for their budgets. Decree 2/07 reinforces the status of the provincial and municipal governments as deconcentrated units of the State. A Programme for Improvement of Municipal Management was created in 2007. It is envisaged that municipal administrations will in future become autonomous, holding executive and legislative powers.¹⁵⁰

4.3.6.2 *Public administration*

The rehabilitation of the Angolan state is a key determinant to whether long-term stability will be achieved. During the last four decades of war, there has been virtually no investment in the development of State administration at the national, provincial or municipal levels. Administrative capacity has been described as minimal at best. Given its key role in socio-economic development, the Angolan government has undertaken to promote an efficient, transparent, accountable, and professional public administration system. The need to rebuild effective State administration is essential for several reasons, including the expectation that the government should become more involved in the delivery of basic services, and that poor governance and weak administrative capacity makes the country an unattractive destination for investment, especially outside the natural resources sector.¹⁵¹

4.3.6.3 *Transparency*

Angola is perceived to be one of the most poorly governed countries in the world, according to indicators compiled by the World Bank Institute. However, the government has yet to

¹⁴⁹ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p38.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

develop a clear strategy to tackle issues of governance. Transparency and accountability in the management of public resources remain low. Neither the Ministry of Finance nor the Central Bank is able to perform their oversight roles, especially because some public resources are channelled through the office of the President and are not subject to their scrutiny or record keeping.¹⁵²

Despite these difficulties, some progress has been made in the following areas: auditing oil companies - cost and fiscal audits of all oil companies, including Sonangol, are conducted by internationally qualified auditors; and management of oil revenues - the government has created a separate account at the Central Bank to deposit some oil revenues as precautionary savings. In April 2006, the government signed a contract with Aberdeen University Petroleum Economic Consultancy (AUPEC) to implement an oil revenue forecasting model, as recommended by IDA. Other measures to improve governance and transparency have included: publishing oil company payments; posting data on oil company payments on the website of the Ministry of Finance; and oil tax administration – the government updated and simplified rules governing oil taxation in 2004.¹⁵³

4.3.7 Economy

4.3.7.1 Macro-economic stability

Angola is on a sustained path to economic reform. In 2003, it adopted a Stabilisation Programme, which contributed to lowering the inflation rate. The country faces three main macro-economic challenges: i) managing its oil wealth before oil production begins to decline to ensure long-term fiscal and debt sustainability; ii) improving its economic competitiveness; and iii) developing its non-oil/non-extractive economy. It will have to

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008.

diversify its economy and develop a more vibrant non-oil private sector, essential for long-term growth and a sound business environment, if it wishes to maintain high growth rates.¹⁵⁴

The Angolan government is not dependent on donor funding or financial assistance from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. In March 2007, the government decided not to enter into a programme with the IMF, believing that this step was unnecessary given the country's current strong macro-economic performance and increasing foreign exchange reserves. Many in the government also have a preference for home-grown policies, and a gradualist approach to economic development, believing that advice given by the IMF and others to African countries in the 1990s was flawed.¹⁵⁵

As part of its debt management, Angola repaid its principal arrears (US \$2.3 billion) to the Paris Club creditors in early 2007.¹⁵⁶

4.4. Role of external actors

4.4.1 *African Development Bank*

Two Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) were prepared for 2002 - 2004, and 2005 - 2007, and covered rural and social sectors. The first one emphasised rehabilitation and health infrastructure, demobilisation and social integration activities, while the second one was designed to tackle poverty reduction in rural areas and create a conducive environment for private sector development. Both CSPs were aligned with priority sectors identified in the Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) which set out a total of ten: i) social reintegration; ii) security and human care; iii) food security and rural development; iv)

¹⁵⁴ United Nations Development Programme, Country Programme Action Plan for Angola: 2009 – 2013, p1-2. Available at <http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/UNDAF-AO-2009-En.pdf>. Accessed on 10 February 2010.

¹⁵⁵ Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008, p42.

¹⁵⁶ World Bank, International Development Association, Interim Strategy Note for Angola, April 26, 2007, p4. Available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/05/04/000310607_20070504092646/Rendered/PDF/39394main.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

HIV/AIDS; v) education; vi) health; vii) basic infrastructure; viii) employment and vocational training; ix) governance; and x) macro-economic management.¹⁵⁷

4.4.2 European Commission

The European Commission and Angolan Government jointly developed a Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme covering the period 2008 to 2013. Financial assistance of €228 million was made available by the Commission for implementing the activities relating to the programme. The key focus areas of the joint programme are: governance and support to economic and institutional reform; human and social development; and promoting rural development, agriculture and food security. Through these key targeted areas, the Commission hopes to contribute to the sustainable development of the country.¹⁵⁸

4.4.3 The World Bank

The Bank's programmes in Angola include an Emergency Multi-sector Recovery Programme (EMRP2) which focuses on upgrading infrastructure, supporting rehabilitation or construction of feeder roads, trunk roads (including bridges), electricity services, rural water supply, and water supply in the provincial capital, and urban infrastructure. The Bank also developed a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the period 2003 to 2004 for Angola. The TSS focused on economic and sector work in respect of transparency and governance issues.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ African Development Bank, 2008. Angola: Country Strategy Paper Update. Available at <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ADB-BD-IF-2008-159-EN-ANGOLA-CSP-UPDATE-VERSION-FX.PDF>. Accessed on 10 August 2009.

¹⁵⁸ The EU's assistance is guided by its framework known as "Link between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The strategy proposes short-, medium-, and long-term interventions to contribute to the following objectives: furtherance of the 2002 peace process, national reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy including the creation of conditions for free and fair elections; good governance and development of civil society; poverty alleviation through a gradual concentration of EU's aid on food security and social sectors. Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p4-5.

¹⁵⁹ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p91.

4.4.4 United Nations

The UNDAF (2009 - 2013) is built around the following six of the Government's national priorities, as outlined in its draft National Medium-Term (2009-2013) Development Plan:

- Promote the unity, national cohesion and consolidation of democracy and national institutions;
- Guarantee a sound and sustainable economic development, with macro-economic stability, transformation and diversification of economic structures;
- Promote human development and social well being;
- Stimulate the private sector development and support national entrepreneurship;
- Promote an equitable development of the national territory; and
- Strengthen the national competitive insertion in the international trade context.¹⁶⁰

The UN support strategy during this phase will be concentrated on: i) improving the living conditions of Angolans by eradicating hunger, poverty and promoting adequate levels of education and sanitation; ii) promoting national cohesion and the consolidation of democracy; and iii) ensuring sustainable economic development, freedom and fundamental rights.¹⁶¹

4.4.5 Bilateral donors

The US, Norway, Portugal and Japan are the biggest bilateral funders of development programmes in Angola. Japan has been providing assistance in various areas including food, food production, repatriation and reintegration of refugees, and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, as part of its efforts to ensure that the people of Angola receive peace

¹⁶⁰ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 – 2013, p8.

¹⁶¹ United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 – 2013, p8.

dividends. In 2005, the government of Japan, along with the UN, extended assistance totalling more than US\$1 million to support primary education, school feeding programmes, and raising HIV/AIDS awareness. Portugal focuses its support in the areas of education and technical support, while the US has focussed on rural development.¹⁶²

4.5. Conclusion

The Angolan government has developed its own home-grown post-conflict reconstruction and development strategies. This is an important step as solutions to the vast challenges the country face cannot be imposed by external actors. With research showing that it could cost between US\$1.5 billion and US\$15 billion per year to fund post-conflict recovery activities, and considering that the average post-conflict period is at the minimum five years long, the need for international assistance and co-operation is clear.¹⁶³ Angola should not have to carry the burden of its post-conflict recovery process alone, even if it has the financial means to implement most of its recovery programmes.

¹⁶² Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009, p25.

¹⁶³ Gueli, R. 2007. South Africa: new strategies for helping to mend the African fabric. *Business Day*, 3 September 2007, Johannesburg.

Chapter 5. Rebuilding Angola

5.1. Introduction

This chapter assesses the implementation of Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes. The progress that has been made, as well as the challenges of implementation will be highlighted and the prospects for success considered. Noting that Angola's post-conflict challenges are interrelated, and due to the scope of the challenges presented in Angola's post-conflict environment, this section of the study will only examine some of the key challenges and priority areas identified by the Angolan government.¹⁶⁴

5.2. Progress, challenges and prospects

Post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term process. In the first seven years of its post-conflict period, Angola was able to implement a comprehensive DDR process, as well as make some headway with de-mining. Some of its most notable progress has been made in infrastructure development and education. The Angolan government was also able to sustain economic growth and stabilise the country's macro-economy. Transparency in governance, especially relating to financial management, and socio-economic development are some of the areas that have proved to be more complex and challenging. These will be considered in more detail below.

¹⁶⁴ Angola's PRSP, one of the base documents for its reconstruction process, identifies ten priority areas of intervention: i) social integration; ii) security and civil protection; iii) food security and rural development; iv) HIV/AIDS; v) education; vi) health; vii) basic infrastructure; viii) employment and vocational training; ix) good governance; and x) macro-economic management. See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p24.

5.2.1 *Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)*¹⁶⁵

The Angolan government has implemented a comprehensive DDR programme since 2002. Guided by the Angolan Demobilisation and Integration Programme (ADRP)¹⁶⁶, and using mainly its own resources for the disarmament and demobilisation of UNITA troops, the government was able to reintegrate an estimated 450 000 people in their areas of origin. The challenges of implementing a DDR programme in addition to the challenge of returning and reintegrating almost four million displaced persons was a monumental task. The limited or lack of access to large parts of the country due to landmines, as well as thousands of people in temporary resettlement sites, added to the challenge of managing the DDR process.¹⁶⁷

The government's 2001 Norms on Resettlement and Return defined a number of pre-conditions necessary for resettlement¹⁶⁸, but as a result of the magnitude of people returning, the return and resettlement of the displaced frequently took place despite the lack of suitable conditions prescribed.

The government, in June 2002, established the National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilised and Displaced (CNRSPDD) to plan and manage the DDR process. The co-ordination and implementation of the process, was however, the task of the Joint Military Commission and a Technical Committee.¹⁶⁹ A three year programme, Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of Ex-UNITA Combatants, makes provision for training, education, creating small income generating activities, rehabilitation of roads, social infrastructure, and energy sources, and the creation of jobs in the public and private sectors, as well as support for the resettlement and community development of the rural population.¹⁷⁰ By February 2003, emergency

¹⁶⁵ Demobilisation and reintegration consists of four phases: the assembly of quartering troops; the demobilisation and discharge of troops; the initial reinsertion of ex-combatants into civilian life; and long-term re-integration, OCHA's role in co-ordinating demobilisation and reintegration efforts. Available at http://reliefweb.int/OCHA_OL/pub/angola/summary.html. Accessed on 16 February 2010.

¹⁶⁶ The ADRP is partly funded by donors. Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p14.

¹⁶⁷ Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007. From Soldiers to Citizens, The Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of UNITA ex-combatants, ISS Monograph Series, No 130, March 2007, pix-xi.

¹⁶⁸ The five provinces most affected were Luanda, Benguela, Lunda Norte, Huambo, and Kwanza Sul, receiving a combined total of 2.5 million displaced people. Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, I. 2007, p xv.

¹⁶⁹ Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, pxiv.

¹⁷⁰ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p47.

reinsertion support¹⁷¹ had been given to a total of 71 434 former combatants. Records from February 2004, indicate the registration of approximately 98 252 post-Luena ex-combatants at the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reinsertion (MINARS). A Programme for the Operationalisation of a Social Reinsertion Support Strategy prepared by MINARS provided for the distribution of resettlement kits, and an emergency reinsertion subsidy. Food assistance, the provision of clothing and domestic utensils, kits, agricultural inputs, and addressing other emergency needs were also part of the programme.¹⁷²

The disarmament and demobilisation process is considered to have been relatively successful. This is especially significant as the process took place in the absence of, and without the assistance of an international peacekeeping force. No provision for formal third party monitoring was included in the Luena Agreement, although the Troika (Portugal, Russia and the United States), as well as the United Nations were invited as observers.¹⁷³ The reintegration process is still hampered by some difficulties. However, ongoing efforts are made to assist in the areas where such challenges are being reported.

The government has also turned its attention to combating the problem of small arms and light weapons, which poses a major security threat for Angola. In 2003, an estimated three to four million small arms and light weapons remained in the hands of civilians throughout the country. In March 2003, the government established a National Commission for the Disarmament of the Civilian Population, under the Public Order branch of the National Command of Police. Since then a national strategy for weapons collection has been designed as well as a programme of action to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Equivalent to five months salary. Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, p xv.

¹⁷² Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, p xv. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p47.

¹⁷³ Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C 2007, March 2007, pxiii.

¹⁷⁴ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p48.

5.2.2 *De-mining*

Considered one of the most mined countries in Africa and globally, Angola has approximately six to eight million mines spread across the country. The Angolan government has since 2002 provided about US\$ 3 million annually for de-mining operations. The funds are managed by the National Demining Institute (INAD) and the Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH). Since 2006, the government has also committed additional funds to resource, equip and train manual and mechanical de-mining brigades in the Angolan Armed Forces and INAD.¹⁷⁵ The CNIDAH reported in 2003, that land totalling 3 525 197m² had been cleared, 14 762 anti-personnel mines (APMs), 1 045 anti-vehicle mines, and 71 596 unexploded ordinances (UXOs) were destroyed.¹⁷⁶

Mine action is one area in which cooperation between the Angolan government and foreign partners has yielded encouraging results. Seven international NGOs: HALO Trust, Norwegian People's Aid, DanchurchAid, INTERSOS, Mines Advisory Group, Menschen gegen Minen (People Against Landmines), and Santa Barbara Foundation, are involved in mine clearance.¹⁷⁷ In 2003, local and international NGOs provided mine education to 806 319 individuals through 8077 events. In addition to foreign support, the government announced its decision to earmark US\$16 million annually in the budget for mine action, for activities to be implemented by its own de-mining brigades.¹⁷⁸

The National Institute for Professional Training of the Ministry of Labour, and the National Institute for Support of Disabled People of the Ministry of Social Affairs, work with national and international NGOs, to support mine-survivors with vocational training and micro-credit

¹⁷⁵ Angolan Government, 2002. Mine Action in Angola: Strategic Plan 2006-2011, p14-16. Available at http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-Angola-2006-2011.pdf. Accessed on 1 March 2010.

¹⁷⁶ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p50. See also Angola: On trail – a faster more reliable way to clear mined roads. Refworld, 2009. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country>. Accessed on 6 March 2010.

¹⁷⁷ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p50.

¹⁷⁸ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p54. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p51.

programmes. Seventeen countries have contributed to mine-action programmes in Angola, totalling US\$21.9 million.¹⁷⁹

5.2.3 Infrastructure development

The Angolan government has concentrated most of its post-conflict reconstruction spending on the rehabilitation, rebuilding and development of physical infrastructure, especially its transport and energy sectors.

5.2.3.1 Transport

A priority for the Angolan government was developing improved and safe transport networks. Here, the government has focused on the rehabilitation of rural roads and bridges destroyed in the war and those decayed from the lack of maintenance. The Angolan government has estimated that it will cost approximately US\$4 billion to repair part of the disused and damaged rail networks and to rebuild the rest. According to the Ministry of Transport feasibility study, it will take 11 years to get the network fully operational. The first phase, after which some major train networks will be able to function, will cost an estimated US\$300 million.¹⁸⁰

The project ANGO FERRO 2000 is valued at US\$4.158 billion for the rehabilitation and construction of about 3,100 kms of roads, 8 000 km long, 36 bridges, rehabilitation and construction of 29 stations and posts (CFB), 70 new stations and 150 new way-side stations. Also planned is an increase in connection points of the railway with 16 national and six

¹⁷⁹ Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p52.

¹⁸⁰ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p63. See also AfDB/OECD 2008. African Economic Outlook, Available at: <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/30727878-EN-ANGOLA-AEO2008.PDF>. Accessed on 10 March 2010.

international road traffic connections. The Angolan integrated railway network will provide port infrastructure for SADC member countries that do not have access to the sea.¹⁸¹

In 2004, the government began work on several vital bridges, including: the bridge over the Kwanza River that links south of Luanda to the south and the centre of the country; the bridge over the Cavaco River linking Lobito and Benguela; the bridge over the Zenza River in Kuanza Norte province linking the Ngonguembo Municipality to the provincial capital Ndalatando, and the bridge over the Lui River which links Malange to Luena.¹⁸²

Chinese investment has played an important role in infrastructure development. Financial support pledged by China for the reconstruction of Angola stands at nearly US\$7 billion. China's aid consists of two credit lines of US\$2 billion from China's Eximbank and an additional US\$2 billion from China International Fund. The latter credit line has gone to projects relating to the Luanda International Airport, the Caminhos de Ferro de Luanda railway project, drainage systems in the capital, studies on the new city to be built close to Luanda, and improvements to the Luanda-Lobito, Malanje-Saurimo, Saurimo-Dondo, and Saurimo-Luena highways. More recent estimates of China's loans to Angola indicate amounts of between US\$13.4 billion and US\$19.6 billion.¹⁸³

5.2.3.2 *Construction sector*

Due to an increase in infrastructure development and residential housing projects, the construction sector continues to expand, especially in Luanda and Benguela. New projects include the construction of a new town in the Benguela Baia Azul municipality, the Benguela Blue Ocean project. Several oil companies are building skyscraper office buildings, several major residential projects are in the pipeline, and 39 hotels are to be built over the next five

¹⁸¹ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p26.

¹⁸² United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p63.

¹⁸³ Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I. 2009. Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola. Chatham House, London, p3. Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14524_r0809_africanoil.pdf. Accessed on 6 February 2010.

years. For the African Nations Cup held in January 2010, new international football stadiums were also built.¹⁸⁴

The government plans to spend US\$50 billion on providing new homes for Angolans by 2012. A government housing project estimated at US \$100 million will provide 2 448 housing units (flats and houses) to civil servants, with repayment for the houses guaranteed through salary deductions.¹⁸⁵ The lack of adequate housing remains, however, a huge challenge in both the urban and rural areas.

5.2.3.3 *Power/energy sector*

Electricity

The total amount of power projects being built across Angola until 2012 is estimated at more than US\$2.5 billion. Only about 20 percent of the Angolan population has access to electricity. Electricity supply to urban areas is the government's immediate focus, and the rehabilitation of power systems has resulted in improvements within many urban areas.¹⁸⁶ Producing such highly visible results in the area of electricity provision forms part of the government's strategy of creating confidence in its rebuilding efforts amongst the population.

Improvements include the following:

- The cities of Luanda and Malanje benefited from the Capanda hydroelectric dam in the northern province of Malanje after it was completed in 2004;
- Towns in the Benguela province have had their electricity restored. A public lighting project is underway in Benguela to light four municipalities;

¹⁸⁴ African Economic Outlook, 2008. Angola. AfDB/OECD 2008, p126. See also United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p18.

¹⁸⁵ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p26.

¹⁸⁶ Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I., 2009. Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola. Chatham House, London, p3. Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14524_r0809_africanoil.pdf. Accessed on 6 February 2010. In Luanda electricity access has already reached new 60 000 households.

- Sourimo, the capital of Luanda Sul Province, improved its electricity supply; and
- The districts of Muconda and Dala, and Cocolo villages restored their lights, and many other villages are in the process of getting their lights restored.¹⁸⁷

Chinese investment, via a credit line of US\$5 billion, has also propelled the growth of electricity generation with expected growth set at 42 percent for the 2007 to 2008 period.

Future developments include:

- The Apanda-N'dalantando powerline;
- A new power line from the Cambambe Dam to Luanda;
- A series of electricity distribution and transformation centres;
- A power line from Quifangondo to Caxito; and
- A 70 million project to electrify Luanda's urban areas.¹⁸⁸

Biofuels

Angola could become one of the most important producers of biofuels in Africa. The country's national oil company, Sonangol, a Brazilian company, Odebrecht, and the Angolan firm, Damer, recently signed an agreement to set up a new biofuel company, Biocom. The deal involves a US\$200 million investment in a 30 000 hectare sugarcane plantation, which will produce enough fuel annually to fire a 140 MW power plant. This biofuel project will be located in one of the three industrial clusters created by the government.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p62.

¹⁸⁸ United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p63.

¹⁸⁹ African Economic Outlook, 2008. Angola. AfDB/OECD 2008, p125. These three clusters are Futila (in Cabinda), Viana (Luanda) and Catumbela (Benguela). The Viana cluster is the biggest and the most advanced, with 119 contracts signed in a number of agricultural and industrial sectors.

5.2.4 *Agriculture*

The Rural Extension Programme and the Rural Development Programme (PEDR) were approved by the Counsel of Ministers on 12 June 2005. A budget of US\$205 million has been set aside to implement the PEDR programmes across seven provinces over a five-year period. Some of the programme components include: seed distribution, staff training, and equipment for 111 Agricultural Development Stations (EDAs). The PEDR is intended as a framework for all agricultural interventions in rural areas and works through intense and formal cooperation with all potential partners in the field. With the return of displaced people and the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, which was almost completely destroyed by the war, the agricultural sector is gradually recovering.

Agriculture is a priority sector for public investment, particularly in irrigation, owing to its importance in employment creation and poverty reduction. An agreement was signed in late 2007 between Angola and the International Fund for Agricultural Development to provide a credit line of US \$45 million to 200 000 farmers to strengthen agricultural production and investment.¹⁹⁰

Two-thirds of the population depend on agriculture for food, income and employment. Women provide most of the agricultural labour force. State budget allocations for the agricultural sector are low, despite the fact that agriculture has been identified as a priority sector of the poverty reduction strategy.¹⁹¹ The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) bears government's responsibility for promoting the development of crops, livestock, and forestry.¹⁹²

There is not yet a clear rural development policy framework and the government is in the process of re-examining and clarifying its goals in the agricultural sector via an Action Plan for the Agriculture Sector (2001-2010) and an Action Plan for the Agricultural Development

¹⁹⁰ Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008. Annex 12: Analysis of Past and Present Cooperation of the European Commission in the Field of Rural Development and Food Security in Angola, p46.

¹⁹¹ International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2005. Republic of Angola: Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, p3. Available at <http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/85/e/EB-2005-85-R-12.pdf>. Accessed on 1 March 2010.

¹⁹² International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2005, p4.

Institute (IDA) for the period 2002 to 2005. Aims related to improving the sector include: i) increasing food security; ii) reducing rural poverty; iii) raising crop production; iv) promoting livestock production; v) developing the forestry sector; vi) reactivating rural trade; vii) modernising the animal health research system; viii) rehabilitating irrigation systems; ix) rehabilitating rural infrastructure; and x) supporting human resource training and skills.¹⁹³

5.2.5 *Trading/SADC*

Although Angola is a member of SADC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), its major trading partners are outside Africa. Portugal continues to be the largest source of imports and an important destination for exports. Trade with Brazil has also increased dramatically, with imports rising four-fold between 2003 and 2006. Angola has become the fourth-largest African export market for Brazil. Imports from South Africa increased by 37 percent from mid-2006 to mid-2007. In November 2007, Angola and South Africa signed two cooperation agreements in the oil and tourism sectors, as well as a declaration of intention on eliminating visa requirements.

In 2002 and 2003 Angola participated in several meetings of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), the cooperative created to promote a power pool through the expansion of interconnections between member states.¹⁹⁴ An example of regional cooperation is the country's involvement in the Lobito Corridor Development Project. The project will enable the Capanda 520 MW hydroelectric power station to be better utilized, as it will supply power not only to the national grid but also to the regional network. The project will also make it possible for the country to be interconnected to the regional network and for ENE to become an operative member of the SAPP.¹⁹⁵ The Angolan government sees SADC as the market

¹⁹³ International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2005, p4.

¹⁹⁴ SADC has adopted its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) to be implemented within 15 years, for building effective and efficient infrastructure that will serve as a support suitable for the supply of cheap energy, development of tourism, transportation, communication, and meteorology and integrated management of water resources. Angola can link its own national plans to RISDPs plans. United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p27.

¹⁹⁵ The western corridor project involves the electric power companies of Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The main undertakings will be: construction of a 3500 MW hydropower station at Inga, Congo; construction of a transmission line interconnecting the five countries; and a telecommunications component using optical fibre ground wires to facilitate operation and improve the reliability of power systems. United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004, Defusing the Remnants of War, p27.

that it never had, and aims to position itself advantageously within the region to exploit this potential. It sees SADC as an entry point to diversify Angola's oil-based economy, as SADC's demand is high for certain products, such as petrochemicals.¹⁹⁶

5.2.6 *Economic management*

The Angolan government has implemented major economic reforms since 2002 to increase transparency. These include: i) the unification of the budget; ii) the establishment of a single treasury account at the National Bank of Angola (BNA); iii) the publication of an oil diagnostic study; iv) the release of oil revenue data on the website of the Ministry of Finance; v) the conduct of external audits of the 2003 financial statements of the BNA and Sonangol; and vi) the compilation of comprehensive data on external debt.¹⁹⁷

Customs reform introduced by the government in March 2001 resulted in a rise in customs receipts from US\$215 million in 2000 to US\$1 billion in 2005.¹⁹⁸

5.2.7 *Other initiatives*

Several government initiatives have taken off, including the 2007 Programme of Restructuring the Logistics and Distribution of Essential Products to the Population (PRESILD). The programme consists of the construction of 10 000 retail sales outlets, 163 municipal markets, 31 "Nosso Super" supermarkets, and eight distribution centres. This initiative is expected to reduce food prices, enlarge the market for locally produced food products, and help to create 200 000 jobs by 2012.¹⁹⁹

An important feature of the budget legislation for 2008 is the pilot decentralisation of budget execution. Sixty-eight of Angola's 167 municipalities have been designated as "fiscal units", and each will be allocated US\$300 000, which will subsequently be scaled up to US\$1

¹⁹⁶ See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p24.

¹⁹⁷ See Republic of Angola – European Community, 2008, p18.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid..

¹⁹⁹ African Economic Outlook, 2008. Angola. AfDB/OECD 2008, p127.

million. This reform, which reduces the dependence of local administration on provincial governments, aims to raise the execution rate of capital projects and to accelerate and improve delivery of basic services.

Angola held its first General Assembly of the Human Rights Coordination Council (HRCC) in February 2007. The meeting was attended by representatives of the National Assembly, the Ombudsman and the Ministry of Justice.

5.3. Conclusion

Angola has achieved remarkable progress in some areas such as DDR and de-mining, and is making progress in infrastructure development. The challenges remain mostly in the areas of socio-economic development and governance, especially with regard to transparency and the use of the country's oil wealth and public resources. However, the government and its people have proved to be resilient and determined to overcome the remaining obstacles to the country's development.

Chapter 6. Findings and conclusion

6.1. Introduction

Since the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement on 4 April 2002, the Angolan people have experienced a sustained peace, and most analysts agree that a return to civil war in Angola is unlikely. The country has achieved several peace milestones over the short-term (emergency) post-conflict phase. However, there are still huge challenges ahead as the country enters its post-conflict medium- and long-term transition and development phases.

6.2. Findings

The Angolan government has been able to develop its own home-grown post-conflict reconstruction strategies. These strategies include plans that cover the government's short-, medium- and long term goals for the reconstruction of the country. The country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is of particular significance as it is this strategy that has been used and implemented by the government since 2004 – this despite the PRSP not receiving approval from the IMF or any endorsement by international donors. The government has also, in partnership with UN agencies such as the UNDP, embarked on projects that relate specifically toward the attainment of the MDG targets by 2015. However, it is unlikely that the Angola will meet most of these targets by 2015, with the exception possibly of MDG goal two, which relates to universal primary education.

Some of the short-term emergency goals that have been achieved include a successful programme in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration and refugee repatriation; the resettlement of more than four million internally displaced persons; and reintegrating into Angolan society more than half a million refugees and over 100 000 ex-combatants. The country has also achieved its goal of macro-economic stabilisation, and since 2002, Angola is the fastest growing economy in Africa. Another strategic priority for the Angolan government has been to improve basic social services to people throughout the country.

Although much has been done to start the process, not much progress has been made with basic service delivery, and the slow movement towards any significant achievement with improvements in this area is a key criticism that has been levelled against the government. During the short-term post-conflict phase, the Angolan government has been carrying the major burden and cost of financing its post-conflict reconstruction programmes. It has, with oil-backed loans from China, been able to sustain some momentum with implementing reconstruction programmes, especially in infrastructure development. Major investments in infrastructure development are still needed, but in the long term such investments will have significant benefits. For example, improvements in Angola's roads, bridges, railways and ports will play a key role in enhancing its regional trade and growth. Better infrastructure will also encourage increased investment in different sectors of the Angolan economy.

Angola's medium-term goals prioritise measures to address the country's human development needs. Although Angola is ranked 59th amongst the world's economies, it has one of world's lowest ranking human development indicators. The Angolan government's ambitious intention is to improve this ranking by 30 points, moving Angola onto the level of medium development countries by 2025. With the country's oil and diamond wealth however, and if it is applied effectively to benefit the majority of the population, it would be possible for the country to achieve a higher HDI ranking.

A focus on promoting governance and rule of law is also included in the government's medium term plans. Progress in these areas is also slow. In its programme for 2009, the Angolan government has highlighted its intention to recruit as well as train clerks, bailiffs, judges and magistrates amongst others to fill positions in the justice sector. If implemented, this would provide an important indicator by which progress in the area of justice can be monitored.

In the area of governance, profound reforms will be required in order to change the perception of Angola as one of the world's most corrupt governments. Efforts have been made to improve transparency, and decentralisation, and de-concentration programmes are being implemented. Importantly, the government held its second legislative elections in

September 2008. A new constitution was adopted in January 2010, and Presidential elections will take place in 2012.

Post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term process. The devastation caused by over 40 years of armed conflict cannot unfortunately be wiped out in eight or 10 years. The country's long-term plan, also known as Vision 2025, will be implemented over the next two decades, and includes large-scale reforms and specific sector reforms for which targets and indicators have been set.

Thus far, the Angolan government has succeeded in making some progress with its post-conflict reconstruction, despite the obstacles associated with the enormous task of rebuilding a war-ravaged country.

Some of the important challenges that remain include strengthening weak state and public institutions, improving the functioning of the state, and achieving broad reconciliation and social integration among Angolans. Although the government has received assistance from multilateral organisations such as the UN and the World Bank, as well as from bilateral donors, the government's overall relationship with donors and other Western partners in the area of post-conflict reconstruction remains weak. Given that almost US\$5 billion is required annually in order to sustain the momentum of its reconstruction programmes, building this relationship will be vital.

Angola's human capital is the most important resource to ensure a prosperous future for the country. The government's development strategies should therefore ensure that it has an impact on the youth, currently making up 50 percent of the country's population, so that they can become the driving force of national development.

Thus far the Angolan government's post-conflict reconstruction programmes have produced some peace dividends for the Angolan people. However, the country still has a long way to go in order to achieve all its goals and objectives. The long-term process of implementing recovery programmes is underway, and perhaps only in 2025, a clearer picture will emerge as

to whether its strategies and development processes have been successful or whether it has failed to yield further peace dividends.

6.3. Conclusion

In its Peace Plan, announced on 13 March 2002, following the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement, the Angolan government appealed to the country as follows:

“The government urges all Angolans to unite, so that we may together turn an important page in our history. This is a time for reconciliation, mutual forgiveness and unity. Let us bid a final farewell to arms and war and dedicate ourselves fraternally to the reconstruction of a prosperous and modern Angola, capable of guaranteeing the physical, material and spiritual well-being of all its citizens and of occupying its rightful place in the concert of nations.”²⁰⁰

A new history is indeed being written for Angola, this time, we all hope, it will be a less tragic one.

Angola has the potential to play a leading role in the region and continent. It has proved with its involvement in regional organs such as SADC, ECCAS, and initiatives of the AU, that it has the capacity to become a key driving force for regional development and change. With several other African countries developing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction programmes, positive change in Angola could lead the way for others to deliver significant peace dividends to people who have suffered the effects of war, and in so doing, prevent the return to conflicts which have for so long prevented Africa from realising its full potential for development.

²⁰⁰ Key texts and agreements, in *From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process*, Accord, Issue 15, London, p79.

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