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Quality Matters: Electoral Outcomes and Democratic Health in Africa

Ari Paul Greenberg

GRNARI001

A minor dissertation submitted in *partial fulfillment* of the requirements for the award
of the degree of Master of Arts in Democratic Governance

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2009

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: signature removed Date: 12/2/09

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Abstract

In December 2007, Kenyans went to the polls to elect a president, Member of Parliament, and local councillor. As citizens who had most recently voted out one of Africa's longest standing "Big Men," in Daniel Arap Moi, there was an understandable level of excitement and enthusiasm from citizens to exercise their vote once again, as well as from the rest of world which was eager to uphold Kenya as a model of African democracy. Unfortunately as the polls closed five days later; the Kenyan Electoral Commission had been disgraced, the two main political parties were mired in ballot stuffing accusations, and violence had engulfed Nairobi, Kisumu, and the Rift Valley. While the flawed election led to an irreplaceable loss of life and severely damaged the nation's economy and reputation, it is unclear whether this flawed election would diminish Kenya's democratic health and progress towards democratic consolidation. Indeed, recent and compelling social science evidence suggests that flawed elections do not necessarily hinder democratic development in Africa, and thus the greatest indication of Kenya's democratic progress was simply that the election was held.

However, as a witness to Kenya's 2007 election, I feared that Kenya's democratic progress would be severely impeded as people voiced their discontent with elections, voting, political parties, and most importantly, democracy itself. In an attempt to determine if in fact flawed elections have a long-term detrimental impact on democratic health and consolidation I investigate the relationship between the "freeness and fairness," of elections (or electoral quality) and two indicators of democratic health: (1) popular perceptions of democratic supply and (2) popular demand for democracy. "Supply," is measured as popular satisfaction with the way democracy works plus the recognition of living in a democracy. "Demand," is measured as support for democracy plus rejection of three forms of authoritarianism, military rule, one man rule and one party rule. These indicators are aggregate measures taken from responses to Afrobarometer surveys, and have been utilized previously to assess citizen's views of democracy and the prospects for democratic growth and consolidation.

Using three rounds of Afrobarometer surveys I analyze data from 18 countries and 33 elections in Africa between 1996 and 2005, using both elections and countries as the unit of analysis. The empirical results demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between electoral quality and perceived supply of democracy, but no correlation between electoral quality and the current level of demand. In other words electorates tend to see electoral outcomes as the preeminent event in determining how satisfied they are with democracy, but do not directly link the outcome of the most recent election to their support for democracy. Although the level of electoral quality did not directly correlate with the level of demand, further analysis showed that flawed elections on average negatively influence both supply *and* demand. Free and Fair elections, on the other hand, had a much smaller but positive influence on supply and demand. Taken together, there is compelling evidence to suggest that electoral outcomes do shape people's perception and support for democracy. If in fact citizen opinion and support for democracy is critical to democratic consolidation than this research finds that flawed elections can significantly impede democratic growth and retard the consolidation process.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Problem	1
Democratic Consolidation and the Role of Elections in Africa	2
Consolidation through Institutionalization	3
Consolidation by Legitimation	7
Theories of Consolidation in Conflict	11
Chapter 2 Research Design	14
Research Question	14
Hypothesis	15
Definitions	16
Measurement	19
Research Type	21
Cases or Units	21
Number of Units	22
Level of Analysis	22
Method of Comparison	22
Method of Control	25
Chapter 3 A Look at Africa in Terms of Elections, Supply, and Demand	26
Elections in Africa	26
Supply and Demand in Africa	26
Chapter 4 Validity	30
Comparing The Two Popular Perception Scales of Free and Fair	30
Comparing Popular Perceptions of Free and Fair with the Expert Measure of Free and Fair	32
Chapter 5 Does Electoral Quality Matter? Cross Sectional Analysis	36
Electoral Quality and Supply	36
Post Only Test	37

Electoral Quality and Demand-----	38
Post Only Test-----	39
Control Variables -----	40
Chapter 6 Does Electoral Quality Matter?-----	42
A Longitudinal Analysis of Changes in Supply and Demand -----	42
A Natural Experiment-----	42
Comparing Countries -----	45
Chapter 7 Behavioural Effects-----	49
Chapter 8 Conclusions-----	56
Bibliography -----	59

University of Cape Town

**Quality Matters:
Electoral Outcomes and Democratic Health in Africa**

University of Cape Town

Chapter 1 Introduction

Problem

On December 27th 2007 Kenyans went to the polls to vote for a presidential, parliamentary, and local government candidate. Although not as euphoric as the 2002 poll that saw the defeat of long-standing authoritarian leader Daniel Arap Moi and his KANU party, there was still plenty of excitement. Pubs closed and their owners left notes urging their customers to go vote, some even promised free beer with an inked thumb. Some Matatu¹ drivers offered free rides to polling stations and some even refused to take passengers unless their fingers were inked. Lines at polling stations began to form in the pre-dawn hours and by mid morning snaked around city blocks for kilometres on end.² By the end of the day turnout was hovering near 70% of registered voters, and nearly all polling places reported a peaceful and relatively orderly process. However by the evening of December 28th, the opposition candidate Ralia Odinga had an almost insurmountable one million vote lead, and rumours started circling. Indeed more than 75% of the vote had yet to come in from President Kibaki's stronghold of Central Province, and most pre-election polls predicted that he could expect to garner more than 94% of the million plus votes in the region. By the dawn of the New Year (2008) most of these votes were in, President Kibaki was sworn in as President, and the rumours of widespread voter fraud, and tampering by Electoral Commission officials turned out to be all too true. From that moment on violence erupted in contested provinces and Odinga strongholds of Nairobi and Kisumu. High level mediators such as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to US Under-Secretary of State Jendyai Frazer shuttled in to press the two sides to form a coalition government. When things calmed down enough for people to venture into town, everywhere people seemed to utter the same refrain, "I'm never voting again."³

Yet the existing political science literature says *Kenyans will vote again*, and again, in roughly the same numbers as before. According to Steffan Lindberg the quality of the election rarely if ever affects the level of voter participation in a subsequent election in Africa's new multi-party systems. Only by the fourth election is there any significant deviation in voter turnout according to the quality of elections (67% for free and fair, 52% for flawed).⁴ Indeed additional data shows that regardless

1 Mini-buses used as public transportation in Kenya

2 See www.kenyavotes.com for a number of video feeds detailing the Km long lines and interviews with Kenyans on election day

3 As an employee of the National Democratic Institute, I had the opportunity to participate in the electoral process and observe the post election fallout. The observations I discuss herein are entirely my own.

4 Lindberg 2002, 176

of the quality the more elections a country convene the more democratic it becomes.⁵ This data not only runs contrary to my first hand account in Kenya, but it also suggests that the quality of elections has little to do with the health of democracy in Africa

However African voters and international actors, however, continue to place tremendous emphasis on elections, *and* their outcomes. Domestically, elections provide citizens with an opportunity to activate their agency and participate in the democratic process. Due to the low levels of education and general democratic activity, many citizens in new democracies think that elections and only elections are both the basis and the culmination of the democratic process, making voting day the pre-eminent event upon which “democracy “ is judged.

The international community also pays close attention to elections in Africa, and provides substantial funding towards building the capacity of electoral officials, domestic observers, and national organizational ability to guarantee a free and fair poll.⁶ In addition the international community sends hundreds of international observers to audit the voting process and support or challenge the validity of outcomes. In short the level of scrutiny new democracies in Africa face on Election Day is unprecedented. This pattern of international attention, funding, and domestic pressure for a “successful,” election are unlikely to change. Thus it benefits both international and domestic actors to fully understand the consequences of an election with both good and bad outcomes. Lindberg’s conclusions suggests that international resources and domestic attention might be better spent ensuring that elections take place rather than ensuring free and fair outcomes. Yet is the quality of election outcomes as insignificant as the data suggests?

Democratic Consolidation and the Role of Elections in Africa

Africa has experienced two distinct periods of democratic growth or transition. The first was in the late 1960s and early 1970s when colonial powers decided it was no longer worth the cost in goods or violence to continue their oppressive systems.⁷ Following independence most countries moved to establish a government based loosely on socialist or democratic norms. These countries however quickly slid from hopeful newly independent nations to autocratic and ethnically divided still born nation-states. The second phase occurred after the end of the Cold War when both the United States and the Former Soviet Union no longer had an interest in propping up autocratic regimes.⁸ Since the fall of the Berlin wall, nearly every African country has attempted to move in some way

⁵ As measured by the Freedom House’s indices of political rights and civil liberties in Lindberg, 2006

⁶ Elkin, 2002

⁷ Diamond 1999, 3; Huntington 1991, 60

⁸ Hayden and Bratton, 2002

towards a more democratic system. Indeed by 1992 more than half the countries in Africa held “founding,” or “re-founding” elections.⁹

As the number of countries undergoing democratic transitions increased, scholars found an increasingly rich pool of cases to analyze. Most of the initial scholarship focused on why some transitions succeed and some failed, with O’Donnell and Schmitter’s “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” (1986) and Bratton and van de Walle’s “Democratic Experiments in Africa,” (1997) being the most comprehensive of these studies. Scholars also sought to determine if there were certain factors that made a country more “ready,” for democracy than others. However as these new democracies continue to proliferate and their paths towards becoming more established democracies continued to diverge other scholars began to argue that 1) there were no prerequisites and 2) that the prerequisites for transition may be better viewed as indicators of consolidation. “What the literature has considered in the past to be the preconditions for democracy may better be conceived in the future as outcomes of different types of democracy...patterns of greater economic growth...such as “civic” political culture...independent variables in the past might be more fruitfully conceived as dependent variables in the future.”¹⁰ Indeed the literature on democratic consolidation has now outpaced the study of democratic transition. Significant scholarship has been produced to determine both the drivers of consolidation and how to measure its progress. Similar to the scholarship on democratic transitions most consolidation scholarship focuses on independent variables that can be divided into three main groups attitudinal, behavioural, and institutional. Interestingly elections play a significant role in each of these categories.

Consolidation through Institutionalization

Early scholarship contended that political institutions played a minimal role in determining the success and effectiveness of the governing structure or stability of the body politic. Scholars that subscribed to this argument or “systems analysts,” fixed their focus on the inputs and outputs of a political system and largely ignored the function and form of a democratic system, often thinking of it as a ‘black box.’¹¹ In this model, institutions are viewed as a mere by products of a more fundamental phenomenon like class conflict or competition. In other words institutions when created are designed to reduce transaction costs or preserve the position of elites in society, not to alter the nature of political behaviour.¹²

⁹ Lindberg 2006, 52

¹⁰ Karl and Schmitter, 270

¹¹ Easton 1968, Tilly 1978

¹² Atkinson, 843

In the late 1980s however, scholars began to reject this paradigm and attempted to “bring the state back in,” recognizing that institutions were autonomous political forces in their own right.¹³ “Institutions are real, independent entities that are capable of shaping society by redefining individual and group identities.”¹⁴ Scholars began to argue that institutions mattered largely because of the rules, logic, and structure that created a series of incentives and disincentives which influenced how the state developed and its citizens behaved.¹⁵ Indeed some scholars went further in their claim to note that institutions matter because of their direct and significant influence on norms, beliefs, and actions, and most importantly, the ability of institutions to shape outcomes.¹⁶ Thus the emerging consensus was that political democracy and consolidation depended not only on the economic and social conditions but also on the *design* of the political institutions precisely because of the behaviours they facilitate or obstruct.¹⁷ As both citizens and elites become more accustomed to the democratic “rules of the game,” their behaviour would become more liberal and democratic. Larry Diamond describes this process of “political institutionalization” as, “a move towards routinized, recurrent, and predictable patterns of democratic behaviour.”¹⁸

To that end practitioners and scholars of the *institutionalism* school believe that building democratic institutions such as a judiciary, legislature, and a constitution that is imbedded with democratic norms are the key elements for a democratic foundation. Researchers have worked to identify what type of democratic institutions are more likely to lead to rapid and successful consolidation such as the type of state (unitary or federal), electoral system (winner take all or proportional representation), or the nature of the executive (presidential or parliamentary).¹⁹ For example, some scholars believe that parliamentary systems are better placed to resolve cleavages in deeply divided societies because the behaviour they induce is based on compromise and coalition building.²⁰ Other scholars have found that the key determinant for democratic consolidation is not only the type of executive, but its interaction with other key institutions such as party systems and electoral rules. “Different combinations of presidential, electoral, and party systems can have profound effects on

¹³ Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985

¹⁴ March and Olsen, 16

¹⁵ North, 1989; Madison, 1787

¹⁶ Przeworski, 527

¹⁷ March and Olsen, 1989; Lijphart, 1985; Horowitz, 1991; Linz, 1990a and 1991b; Grofman & Lijphart, 1986; Reynolds, 1999; Weaver & Rockman, 1993; Macintyre, 2003; Colomer, 2001; Reynolds, 2002

¹⁸ Diamond, 75

¹⁹ Lijphart, 1985; DiPalma, 1990; Horowitz, 1991a and 199b; Linz, 1991a and 1991b; Reynolds, 1993; Sisk, 1996; Reilly, 2002; Reynolds, 2002; Colomer, 2001; Macintyre, 2003; Norris, 1999; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Bratton & Cho, 2005; Colomer, 2001

²⁰ Linz, Stephan and Skatch

democratic performance...thus the lesson for a new democracy is that the choice of institutions is directly linked to the challenges of democratic consolidation.”²¹

Other scholars have found that development of the executive office and the behaviour of the executive is a key indicator of democratic consolidation. In Africa, Posner and Young found evidence of democratic consolidation in behaviour of executive office holders. Since 1995 more presidents and executive office holders in Africa are leaving by peaceful or constitutional means compared to the 1980s. This suggests elites are increasingly abiding by democratic rules and norms or have institutionalized democratic behaviour. “Across sub-saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are coming to matter much more than they used to, and have displaced violence as the primary source of constraints on executive behaviour.”²²

However, of all the institutions that are deemed critical to democratic consolidation, none has received more attention than elections. “Electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the most basic democratic structure from which much else flows.”²³ Most scholars would agree that although elections are insufficient to ensure and strengthen representative democracy free and fair elections are an essential and minimal condition for consolidation. In their simplicity elections and electoral law embody the idea that formal rules determine political behaviour, or that “formal electoral rules generate important incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political behaviour.”²⁴

To date most scholarship on elections has focused on the endemic problems that elections underscore, namely inadequate levels of voter education ²⁵exacerbating ethnic divisions ²⁶zero sum or winner take all incentives,²⁷ and the differing effects of other electoral rules.²⁸ Other research has found that the quality of the election and even the manner in which an election is held is a key indicator of a government’s capacity for service delivery.²⁹ Elections and voting patterns also provide an opportunity for citizens to validate or reject a government and even a form of regime (as in referendums). Indeed the focus on elections is not without reason. There is hardly another event that does so much to focus international and domestic attention and produces relevant useful data that would otherwise not be available.

²¹ Norris, 180

²² Posner and Young, 126

²³ Norris 235

²⁴ Norris 239

²⁵ Morison, 2006

²⁶ Green, 2006

²⁷ Sandbrook, 2005

²⁸ Norris, 2004

²⁹ Elkin, 2002

The most salient publication to this study, Lindberg's "Democracy and Elections in Africa," finds a strong correlation between elections and democratic growth.³⁰ After compiling a massive dataset that includes information on 264 elections in Africa since 1989³¹, Lindberg concludes, "the inception of multiparty elections usually initiates liberalization and repeated electoral activities create incentives for political fostering...the expansion and deepening of democratic values."³² By simply looking at the number of elections each country has held, and their associated Freedom House composite scores he shows that countries that hold more elections are indeed considered more "free." Countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, and Botswana that have had 4 or more elections all are listed as "free," with a score of 2 or below on FH composite ranking. Whereas countries such as Mauritania, and Guinea Bissau who have only held one election are listed as partly free with an average score of 4.³³

It is important to recognize that Lindberg concludes that it is the holding of elections that initiates the liberalization and not the other way around. "The inception of multiparty elections usually initiates liberalization and repeated electoral activities create incentives for political actors fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic values...a sequence of elections tends to expand and solidify de facto civil liberties in society."³⁴ In other words by initializing and repeating the electoral process, more people become sensitised to the rules of the game, it opens up political space, and raises expectations.

Furthermore he shows that the effect of increasing liberalization does not depend on the quality of the election, that is whether or not elections are free and fair or flawed. In a subsequent paper he shows quite convincingly that the quality of the election has little impact on voter turnout until the fourth election. Indeed people seem to turn up for each subsequent election regardless of the outcome or the quality of the previous one. By the fourth election however, citizens begin to recognize a flawed election when they see one. "This seems reasonable. If you have participated in more than three flawed elections without any real effect, delusion starts to set in."³⁵

Lindberg's analysis then makes a strong institutional argument in support of the theory that democratic institutions and rules lead to democratic behaviours and thus strengthens consolidation. He also refutes the premise that elections are the result of a deepening of democratic values.

³⁰ Lindberg, 2006

³¹ Lindberg, 2006 compiles data for 232 elections between 1989 and 2003, Lindberg, 2007 adds an additional 34 elections between 2003 and 2006.

³² Lindberg, 2007

³³ Lindberg 2006, 140

³⁴ Lindberg, 2007

³⁵ Lindberg 2007, 16

Furthermore he demonstrates that neither violence nor prior experience with a flawed election deters voters from participating. Thus the simple process of holding elections and the public's participation in them, can lead to democratic consolidation. Lindberg fails however to more closely scrutinize the path dependency of election irregularities. Nor does his analysis take into account the effect of elections and their quality on public support for democracy. Indeed there is likely to be tension between Lindberg's findings that elections spur democratic consolidation regardless of the quality and political studies that argue consolidation is a result of legitimation.

Consolidation by Legitimation

While the scholars described above contend that the development of political institutions is sufficient to confer legitimacy and ensure consolidation another group of scholars believe that institutions are but one necessary condition to ensure democratic consolidation. Indeed this group of scholars believe that a democracy requires democratic institutions *and* democrats. In other words a democracy will not consolidate unless the public believes in and embodies democratic values. "If the democratic model is to develop it will require more than the formal institutions of democracy...it will require a political culture consistent with it (democracy)."³⁶ Almond and Verba were the one of the first of this *culturalist* school that argued that for a democracy to take root in society, certain values and characteristics had to be present. They describe a culture conducive to democracy as a "civic culture" with characteristics of openness, trust and confidence, the capacity to share values with others, and one that was free of fear and anxiety.³⁷ Other scholars looked for the presence of social traits in society to determine the readiness of a country for democracy.³⁸ Some of the traits that scholars think are necessary in a democratic political culture include but are not limited to tolerance, pragmatism, flexibility, trust, willingness to compromise, and civility.³⁹

One of the most well known contemporary studies on political culture is Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* which examines the importance of "social trust," in building and sustaining a democracy. Putnam suggests that participation in community organizations such as bowling clubs, parent teacher associations, and philanthropic groups both instills a set of norms and values on individuals and has a wider effect on the body politic based on the aggregation of interests and building of

³⁶ Almond and Verba, 5

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Almond Verba 1963; Booth Seligson 1994, Gibson Dutch 1992; Diamond 1998; Putnam 1995; Norris 2002

³⁹ Diamond 1999

social trust. He suggests that this can be categorized and measured as social capital, *the* critical component in a democratic political culture.⁴⁰

Other scholars have examined the presence of these democratic traits in emerging democratic societies. For example a comprehensive study of residents in Moscow's Oblast district found support for 11 out of 12 democratic values at or above the level in most consolidated democracies. The one value, however, where Russian's scored lower was tolerance.⁴¹ More importantly however a subsequent study found that residents who expressed their support for democratic values were also likely to participate in defending democracy during the Soviet Putsch of 1995. This suggests that a strong democratic culture will prevent emerging democracies from backsliding.⁴² Indeed other scholars undertook similar studies to look for mass support for similar values in emerging democracies of Latin America and Africa.⁴³

However, critics of this argument contend that measuring democracy in the abstract or as an ideal it is less than meaningful and leads to inaccurate conclusions. Most citizens, regardless of their country will support democracy as an ideal, much as they will support the characteristics of a "democratic culture," such as "trust," "tolerance," or "equality." Although critical of the culturalist argument, this group of scholars agrees that institutions are insufficient for consolidation; yet they believe that for a democracy to consolidate it is more important for citizens in a new democracy to voice a preference for democracy than it is for them to embody democratic ideals. This realist approach avoids abstract and idealistic labels by asking citizens to evaluate regimes as they have personally experienced them.⁴⁴ Indeed for scholars who advocate a realist methodology citizens must prefer the democratic regime to the authoritarian one which in turn will engender legitimacy and support for democracy.

The legitimacy of any political system is determined when political authority is accepted by citizens or subjects. Authoritarian regimes often rely on coercion or force to achieve dominance or diminish resistance but it is often insufficient to achieve acceptance.⁴⁵ In a new democracy, legitimacy or acceptance of the political authority is derived from regime performance. "If procedural commitment forms the principal foundation of regime consolidation, the performance of the regime

⁴⁰ Putnam 1995

⁴¹ Gibson Dutch Tedin 1992

⁴² Gibson 1996, in this study Gibson went back and interviewed the same people to gauge their reaction and participation in the pro democracy protests of 1992 in Russia.

⁴³ Booth and Seligson examined political cultures in Costa Rica and Mexico 1994; Richard Sklar examined political culture in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1996

⁴⁴ Rose and Mischler

⁴⁵ Ciobanu, 2

is a crucial variable affecting the development and internalization of beliefs about legitimacy.”⁴⁶ In other words regimes must continue to perform adequately in the eyes of citizens in order to gain acceptance and engender legitimacy. How exactly regimes do this and which reforms gain the most traction with publics in developing democracies is still very much in question. The debate largely centres on the delivery of economic goods versus the delivery of political goods.

Initially scholars focused heavily on the delivery of economic goods, or “the politics of the belly.” Empirical analysis suggested that citizens in developing countries and emerging democracies would support whatever regime was able to provide the most tangible goods (food, clothing, shelter) the quickest. More importantly failure to provide food or jobs would lead people to support authoritarian alternatives to democracy⁴⁷ Initial studies in post communist states and in Russia immediately following the fall of communism found economic performance to be a critical pillar of regime support.⁴⁸ For example Mishler and Rose advocated a “fear and hope,” model in which support was based heavily on fear of the old regime and hope for improved economic conditions under democracy.⁴⁹ “The strongest relationship between regime support and economic variables is registered by public evaluations of current macroeconomic performance.” Meaning citizens base their support for the regime on improved national economic conditions and opportunities. However in subsequent studies they determined that “economic conditions are but one basis by which citizens evaluate regime performance.”⁵⁰ Rose and Mischler conclude that experiences with past regimes, economic performance and political performance are the three key sub groups that determine regime support.

Building on this work, other scholars found that the delivery of political goods was crucial to encouraging support for the regime, democracy, and subsequent consolidation. In an effort to determine which political good had the greatest influence on support for the regime and support for democracy, scholars studied the effect of personal freedoms, an independent judiciary, elections, and the delivery of other political goods.⁵¹ Of these political goods scholars have found presidential performance to be closely related to regime support and then to support for democracy. “Perceived performance of the national president is a convenient touchstone for many Africans in deciding where they stand on regime-level issues. If they approve and trust the president they project these

⁴⁶ Diamond, 77

⁴⁷ Pzewoski et al. 1995. The book itself was produced to address the fear that the structural adjustment programs proposed by the IMF for new democracies would reduce the regime’s ability to provide economic goods and thus in danger the sustainability of democracy.

⁴⁸ Mischler Rose 1993, Carr Poffenberger Gordon 2000, Gibson Dutch 1995

⁴⁹ Mischler and Rose 1995 575

⁵⁰ Mischler and Rose 91

⁵¹ Huntington, 1967 and 1968; Grindle, 2000; Rose & Shin, 2000; Fukuyama, 2005

positive sentiments onto democracy.”⁵² The belief that the delivery of political goods is of greater importance than economic goods for long term democratic consolidation has continued to attract support as enhancing civil liberties and delivering free and fair elections are seen as relatively easy compared to improving the national economic outlook.

Scholars on both sides of the economic vs political goods debate, however, argued that in developing democracies, support for democracy can be derived from regime support as citizens often equate the regime with larger governance issues. And if support for democracy can be derived from support for the regime, then regime performance is a critical component of democratic consolidation. Indeed scholars have argued that for a democracy to be considered consolidated, citizens must be satisfied with regime and believe that democracy is the best form of government. “Stable democracy requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy...that democracy is the best form of government possible.”⁵³ Larry Diamond strengthened this claim by suggesting that democracies can only be considered consolidated if 2/3 of the public believe in the legitimacy of democracy.

Given the emphasis on citizen support, scholars were searching for valid public opinion data that was consistently collected across countries and across time.⁵⁴ The Afrobarometer, which began surveying 12 African countries in 1999, is a step towards improving the validity of research by improving the credibility and consistency of the data used. Mattes and Bratton use this data set to examine how African’s form attitudes towards democracy. They found it useful to segment citizen attitudes towards democracy between indicators of democratic supply of and indicators of demand for democracy. They measure demand by adding “support for democracy,” and “rejection of authoritarianism,” and they measure supply as “recognition of being in a democracy,” plus “satisfaction with democracy. “ Indeed the segmenting of public opinion is useful as it captures the two strains of consolidation theory described above; that democracies will only consolidate when citizens *demand* democracy *and* are satisfied with the amount of democracy being *supplied* by the regime.⁵⁵ Similarly but not identical to Diamond and Rose Mischler, Bratton and Mattes believe that democracy has a low probability of breaking down where citizens both demand democracy as their preferred form of government and feel that their leaders have internalized democracy’s

⁵² Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi

⁵³ Diamond, 168

⁵⁴ Diamond 1994, 212 Although Diamond’s is the most expansive almost all of the articles discussed here are followed by a brief critique or caveats surrounding the problems with the public opinion data utilized in that particular study

⁵⁵ Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi

“institutional rules.”⁵⁶ These two indicators then should provide insight into the prospects for and progress of consolidation.

After examining the first round of public opinion data in twelve African countries Mattes and Bratton conclude that there is significant evidence to support a “cognitive learning” model of the origins of popular opinion.⁵⁷ Indeed Mattes and Bratton found Africans learn about democracy through direct experience and interactions with associated institutions. Furthermore they make judgements about democracy based on regime performance, specifically whether the regime is able to deliver political goods such as freedom of speech, press, and ensuring free and fair elections.⁵⁸ This finding lends support to Diamond’s “autonomy of the political,” or his belief that citizens’ base their support for democracy on the expansion of political rights and is independent of economic growth.⁵⁹

Elections then may play an even greater role in influencing democratic support at the national level, due to the fact that there are few opportunities outside of elections for citizens to engage democratic institutions.⁶⁰ Furthermore if democratic support is determined by the regimes delivering political goods such as free and fair elections, then in a cognitive learning model the quality of the election should have a disproportionate effect on support for the regime, support for democracy and the prospects for democratic consolidation.

Indeed, one study that examined the relationship between electoral quality and public opinion found that the quality of an election affects public opinion and has a “legitimizing effect.” Devra Moehler was able to show that on some levels electoral quality influences support for democracy and willingness to defend democratic institutions.⁶¹ Different to this study, however, she focused on the legitimacy gap between winners and losers and not directly on the effect of electoral quality on levels of supply and demand or democratic consolidation. Thus while it is encouraging that she found evidence of a correlation between electoral quality and changes in public opinion, the focus and construction of her study makes it difficult to extrapolate her findings to determine its impact on a more macro level.

Theories of Consolidation in Conflict

In theory, elections are legitimating institutions because they provide citizens with fair procedures for selecting leaders. Research shows that when individuals believe decision-making procedures are

⁵⁶ Mattes, 194

⁵⁷ Later called “active learning” in the AJPS article of 2007

⁵⁸ Ibid, 195

⁵⁹ Diamond 1994, 212

⁶⁰ Analysis of round 1 of the Afrobarometer found that only 1 in 10 citizens firstly associate elections with democracy.

⁶¹ Moehler, 43

fair, they tend to be more satisfied with the leaders overseeing the process and more accepting of the outcomes of the process—even when the outcomes are deemed undesirable.⁶² Due to the prominent role the selection of leaders play in developing democracies, elections play a large role in both consolidation through institutionalization, as well as the consolidation through legitimization.

The consolidation through institutionalization theory suggests that democracy is a function of the institutions that are built. Democratic consolidation then, is the result of citizens and elites engaging with democratic institutions, learning the rules of the game, and adjusting their behaviour to reflect more democratic traits. Lindberg's analysis supported this line of reasoning by finding that the level of consolidation is closely correlated to the number of elections held. In other words as citizens and elites participate in elections they become more accustomed to democratic institutions and rules and respond by both increasing the support for democracy and behaving more democratically. Most importantly Lindberg found it was the process of **holding** elections that enhanced a country's democraticness and was not contingent on the quality of the electoral outcome.

The legitimation approach suggests that institutions are insufficient for democratic consolidation; democracy requires the support of democrats. The idealists believe that democracy will only consolidate when electorates believe in or embody democratic characteristics such as tolerance, pragmatism, and social trust. The realists believe that democracy will consolidate when the citizenry supports and prefers democracy over other authoritarian alternatives to the point that a majority *demand* democracy. As suggested above the process by which democratic regimes build legitimacy is through the delivery of political goods which also builds support for democracy. Mattes and Bratton's analysis supports this line of reasoning by identifying an active learning model where citizens determine their level of support for democracy through their interactions with democratic institutions. It follows then that if these interactions are negative, support for the democratic regime will diminish. Furthermore if these interactions are with institutions that are by nature political such as the judiciary or elections then the impact should be significant. Thus elections, being a political good and one that almost all citizens have experience with in developing democracies, should have a sizeable impact on how citizens shape their attitudes towards democracy, and the prospects for democratic consolidation.

In sum then Lindberg finds that elections as an institution can induce democratic behaviour and achieve higher levels of freedom, regardless of the quality of the electoral outcome. Whereas Mattes and Bratton suggest that the quality of the election *does* matter. They found that citizens

⁶² Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, and Listhaug 2005; Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler, Casper, and Fisher 1989; Tyler 1989

determine both their satisfaction with and support for democracy based on the delivery of political goods, overall performance of the regime, and/or interaction with democratic institutions. Given that elections have the potential to play such a prominent role in both theories of consolidation, it is critical to determine if in fact electoral quality influences public support for democracy and thus has the ability to hinder or facilitate democratic consolidation.

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Chapter 2 Research Design

Research Question

Elections are widely viewed as a singular opportunity to take the temperature or check the progress of democratic development in any country. International opinion places great emphasis on how the election was carried out and whether the results were accepted peacefully. However scholars such as Rustow, Elkin and Lindberg believe elections are important largely because of the democratic behaviours they induce among leaders and citizens. Thus the act of having an election where citizens participate in the voting process is in and of itself *the* positive indication of democratic health.

However other scholars would argue, that democratic progress or “health” is better measured by the opinions citizens have of both the electoral outcome and the overall state of democracy. Mattes and Bratton advocate a methodology that divides public attitudes relevant to democratic health into two components: supply and demand. The central question of this study then seeks to address the tension between these camps by determining, **whether the quality of elections affect citizens overall attitude towards democracy as measured by supply and demand.**

Included in this central question above are separate assessments of the possible negative effects of flawed elections and the possible positive effect of free and fair elections on mass public opinion. For example, do flawed elections adversely affect citizen’s support and demand for democracy? Do citizens give significant weight to elections in determining how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country? Or do citizens recognize that since democracy is more than simply voting once every four or five years, and thus the electoral effect on perceptions of supply is negligible? Answering these questions will also help determine whether there is a relationship between the quality of elections and the *level* of supply and demand; such that countries with poor electoral quality also have low levels of supply and demand?

It is also important to determine whether flawed elections and the opinions they generate act as a deterrent to democratic consolidation, as some scholars suggest. Indeed, Larry Diamond suggests that a democracy will not be consolidated until, 2/3 of a country’s citizens believe in the supremacy or legitimacy of a democratic system. Thus the popular demand for democracy component, which measures both people’s support for democracy as well as their support for different forms of authoritarianism, can be viewed as an important indicator of consolidation.

Therefore I can examine the effect elections have on popular demand for democracy to determine if in fact elections facilitate or impede democratic consolidation.

Citizen behaviours towards government institutions and their level of democratic participation are equally important indicators of democratic health. Indeed, it is important to determine if flawed elections contribute towards popular disengagement from government officials and representatives or make citizens more apathetic and less likely to participate in democratic institutions. Similarly it will be equally important to determine if free and fair elections increase legitimacy, and contact between citizens and government officials or elected representatives.

Hypothesis

I believe that flawed elections reduce the level of perceived supply of democracy and to a lesser extent a free and fair election will increase the level of perceived democratic supply. In other words a flawed election will have a larger impact than a free and fair election. I believe that after holding constant for the delivery of other political goods, the effect of elections on perceived supply of democracy will remain. The data will show that elections make the largest impact on whether or not citizens believe democracy is being supplied compared to other political or economic indicators. Thus I believe that the level of supply will be strongly correlated with the level of electoral quality.

I believe that flawed elections will also reduce the level of democratic demand (albeit to a lesser degree than flawed elections reduced the level of perceived supply of democracy.) Moreover repeated flawed elections will have an increasingly negative impact on demand. In this way electoral outcomes can impact the consolidation process.

Furthermore in most developing democracies in Africa, an election is the seminal opportunity for citizens to exercise their democratic rights or test the democratic credentials of the government. Most citizens have limited access to information about the government or their democratic rights, thus they have little else besides elections to inform their opinions. This theory supports the idea that supply will reflect the impact of a flawed election more so than democratic demand. I believe it takes time for citizens to develop an internal yardstick, and that it takes repeated institutional failure for citizens to begin rejecting democracy and be willing to accept other forms of government. As I once heard from citizen of Northern Uganda following the 2006 election, "I do not know if I want much more of this democracy."⁶³

⁶³ The author conducted interviews with political parties, civil society leaders, and local activists as part of a baseline assessment survey for the National Democratic Institute in 2006

These hypotheses are supported by research that shows that citizens base their opinion on the delivery of “political goods.” As was discussed in the earlier literature review both Diamond, Rose et al., as well as Mattes and Bratton found that citizens base their opinions of democracy on the delivery of political goods or getting the small things right. In other words democratic support or perceived democratic supply is independent of economic growth or pocket book issues such as housing, job opportunities, or the availability of consumer goods. Instead they suggests that perceived democratic supply is most closely associated with freedoms; of choice, of speech, associated political rights, and the fairness of elections. Since a flawed election is stark example of the government’s inability to safe guard citizen’s political rights and ensure the legitimacy of the voting process, then it should reduce both demand for democracy and perceived supply of democracy.

Definitions

The three key variables or concepts in this study are “supply of democracy,” “demand for democracy,” and “electoral quality.”⁶⁴ Both supply and demand are aggregates of a number of responses to survey questions, whereas electoral quality is determined by the response to a single question.

Supply and Demand

The concepts of Supply of Democracy and Demand for Democracy arose out of a need to better understand African’s view democracy. By segmenting African’s views of democracy, scholars and researchers are able gain a more nuanced understanding of how public opinion influences democratic growth and how democratic institutions, actions, or processes influence public opinion. Unlike autocracy or other regime types, in a democracy, public opinion and public sentiment towards the regime and government is critical for consolidation and stability.⁶⁵

The process of consolidation through legitimation suggests that support for the regime and support for democracy is contingent on the delivery of democratic goods such as civil liberties, maintaining law and order, adjudicate equitably, or delivering public services.⁶⁶ The component, perceived supply of democracy, is designed to determine if citizens believe that the political institutions and elites are delivering these democratic goods, and how satisfied they are with democracy in their country.⁶⁷ “(satisfaction) refers to an empirical assessment of the concrete performance of an actual

⁶⁴ In this study I use electoral quality and “free and fair” interchangeably

⁶⁵ Mattes and Bratton, 192

⁶⁶ Fukuyama 2005, Huntington 1968

⁶⁷ Mattes and Bratton 192

regime.”⁶⁸ Indeed regardless of what political commentators, academics, or experts believe about the performance of the regime and adherence to democratic principles; public opinion or judgement of the regime performance is ultimately what matters when measuring consolidation.

Perceived democratic supply then is a measure of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country plus the recognition of being in a democracy. Perceived supply measures (1) the extent of democracy by asking citizens to determine whether ‘the way’ their country is governed is, ‘on the whole,’ ‘a full democracy,’ ‘a democracy with major problems,’ or ‘not a democracy,’ and (2) how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country.⁶⁹ In sum a citizen feels fully supplied with democracy if they both believe that their country is democratic and they are satisfied with the way their country works. A nation of fully supplied democrats would mean that government was performing well and citizens believe their governments behaviour is very much in line with democratic norms and principles.

Similarly through the process of legitimation democracies will consolidate only when elites and an overwhelming portion of citizens view democracy as the only game in town.⁷⁰ Thus citizens must support democracy above all other forms of government, or specifically *demand* that they be governed by a regime that embraces and acts according to democratic norms and principles for democratic consolidation to be successful. For demand Mattes and Bratton denote, “that is necessary for committed democrats to profess a preference for democracy, it is not sufficient...democrats must therefore go beyond paying lip service to democracy; they must reject real world alternatives.”⁷¹ In other words demand for democracy means that citizens would choose democracy even given all other regime alternatives.

Demand then can be measured as support for democracy and rejection of all three forms of authoritarianism (one party rule, one man rule, and military rule). To measure this respondents are asked a battery of questions along an adopted scale developed by Rose Mishler and Haerpfer.⁷² The four questions that determine level of demand are; firstly which of these statements are you most in agreement with; “democracy is preferable to me “It makes no difference to people like me” or “sometimes a non-democratic system is preferable;” plus rejection of three forms of authoritarianism, one party, military and one man rule(dictatorship).

⁶⁸ Bratton Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi

⁶⁹ Mattes and Bratton, 194

⁷⁰ Linz and Stepan, 15

⁷¹ Ibid, 193

⁷² Ibid

Electoral Quality

Any determination of “Free and Fair” or electoral quality must take into account more than the voting process, but also the environment in which the elections take place. A number of different international organizations have developed a set of principles and norms to help election observers and domestic monitoring organizations make this determination.⁷³ These standards include: an atmosphere of respect for human rights and one that is absent of intimidation; the right of self determination and non discrimination; freedom of opinion and expression freedom of association and assembly; respect for individual rights and due process of the law. These standards then must be applied to both the electoral administration and the political competition.

In practice this means that electoral administration must be impartial, and transparent in resolving election disputes. The electoral body must be seen as legitimate and be allowed to carry out its mission without interference. Political contestants must be able to campaign freely, and voters must be free to engage the campaigns openly. In many African elections this means that voters may engage in political discussions, attend political rallies or meetings without fear of retribution or intimidation. The organs of the state and the security apparatus must also be impartial and professional. This includes determining whether government resources are properly utilized, the military is neutral and acting as a professional body, whether the police are acting to maintain order and are protecting voters seeking to exercise their civil and political rights, and the judiciary is conducting itself impartially and effectively. The news media must also be independent and objective, or free to act as conveyors of accurate information and act and as watchdogs over government and the political processes. The voting process must be free of violence, but it also must be transparent and credible. Every citizen should have their vote counted, and the rule of one person one vote must be respected and enforced. Violations in any of these areas compromise the credibility of the election and the legitimacy of the elected.

Although it is unlikely that citizen’s think about each one of these components of the electoral process, the list above is meant to suggest all the area’s that may influence citizen opinion on the question of freeness and fairness. In the Afrobarometer the freeness and fairness of elections, or electoral quality is measured by the response to a single question: “How would you rate the freeness and fairness of the most recent (presidential/parliamentary) election in your country held on (specific date). In some countries “freeness and fairness,” was replaced by “honest or dishonest.”

⁷³ Some organizations include, National Democratic Institute, IFES, the Carter Center, IDEA, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House

Staffan Lindberg however, has developed a system that takes into account each one of the components mentioned above in a systematic process to determine the quality of an election. Indeed, Lindberg's grading system compiles data on 10 different indicators. These ten indicators are separated into three categories or "three qualities;" political participation, competition, and legitimacy.⁷⁴ Lindberg assigns each indicator a numerical score after analyzing information from domestic monitoring organizations, academic sources, and both local and international newspapers. Impressively less than 5% of the 5,568 values entered in the dataset utilize less than three sources.⁷⁵ After compiling this data Lindberg is able to assign each election a numerical score for freeness and fairness.

He scores, "the freedom and fairness of an election in four ordinal categories: "No, not at all" when elections were wholly unfair and obviously a charade orchestrated by the incumbent regime, "No, irregularities affected outcome" when the elections had a legal and practical potential to be free and fair but there were numerous flaws and serious frauds that affected the result; "Yes, somewhat" when there were deficiencies either unintended or organized but they did impact the outcome of the election; and "Yes, entirely" when elections were free and fair although there might have been human errors and logistical restrictions on operations. When distinguishing between flawed electoral processes and essentially acceptable ones in binominal fashion, the first two categories are collapsed into flawed while the later two were grouped as "free and fair."⁷⁶

Measurement

At the individual level the Afrobarometer categorized the responses to supply and demand on a 4 point scale, I then recoded them on a 5 point scale with responses that could be considered "more democratic" on the upper end and less democratic answers were on the low end of the scale with "don't know" or ambivalent responses occupying the middle. I recoded the responses to a five points scale to better differentiate democratic responses, un-democratic responses, and indifference or ambivalence. In most cases recoded responses of 4 and 3 were considered democratic responses, whereas 1 and 0 were considered less democratic responses. Two was often a middle ground expressing ambivalence, unfamiliarity, or a response that was slightly less than supportive of democracy.

⁷⁴ The 10 indicators by quality are: Political Participation; 1) voter turnout 2) opposition participation 3) autocratic guard gone. Competition 4) winner's share of votes 5) largest party's share of seats 6) second party's share of seats 7) turnover of power. Legitimacy 8) loser's acceptance of results 9) peaceful 10) electoral regime survival.

⁷⁵ Lindberg 2006 45-47

⁷⁶ Lindberg 2006, 37

The responses gauging free and fairness were also coded on a four point scale to match the Expert scale. On the scale the higher the number the greater the respondent thought the level of free and fair was in the most recent election. On both scales “4” indicates an election that was completely free and fair, “3” indicates an election that somewhat free and fair, “2” indicates an election that was somewhat flawed and “1” indicates an election that completely flawed or not free.

Responses that were classified as “refused” to answer, “didn’t understand,” or “didn’t know” were all recoded to the median point or to the response that expresses indifference. In most cases, such as all questions that are aggregated for supply and demand, this was a “2.”⁷⁷ Although each of these three types of responses (don’t know, didn’t understand, don’t know) are different it is difficult to make assumptions about the “true intention,” of the respondent and flush out the differences in meaning between “don’t know,” and “refused.” This is especially true for a dataset that spans 18 countries. For example someone in Zimbabwe who refuses to answer might do so out of fear for repercussions, whereas in a more open and tolerant society like Botswana the motivation could simply be confusion. For the majority of the data the combination of these responses rarely exceeds 3.5% , and thus the recoding of the responses has a negligible effect on the aggregate indicators. The instances that the responses for these three categories exceed 10%, will be discussed in greater detail in the data analysis. Missing data which makes up less than 1% in nearly all responses was left as missing.⁷⁸

Following the recoding each country receives a composite mean score for supply and demand for each round of Afrobarometer surveys. Each country also receives a composite “free and fair” mean score based on the most recent election held in that country.

In addition to the graduated scale I also created a binomial version of responses to each question such that democratic responses are coded “1” and everything else is coded a “0.” (This includes non-democratic responses, ambivalent responses, refused answers, and responses which express don’t know.) Missing data is left as missing. In most cases the scores of 4 and 3 are recoded a 1 and all other responses are coded a 0. Using this scale the country score is not a mean, but the percent

⁷⁷ In the rare case where the response expressing indifference or ambivalence was a “1” on the original scale, each of the three categories “don’t know,” “refused to answer,” and “don’t understand” were also recoded to a “1” These cases are almost always ones that ask for “the number of times you did X.” In these cases “many times” was a 4, “sometimes” was a 3, “once,” was a two, and “never” was a zero. For these the mid-point or the point between participating and not participating was a “1.” See appendix for specific questions.

⁷⁸ This methodology was used by Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi in their research. For a complete discussion on their reason see page 398 Appendix C

of respondents that answered in support of democracy or a “1” in each question. This “absolute percent” score then can be thought of as the percent of “committed democrats.”⁷⁹

The absolute percent scale is useful in that it provides an easily understandable way to determine the significance of results. For example if demand for democracy in Lesotho falls from 2.9 to 2.4 on the average mean scale it is not readily apparent that drop is unless compared to say other countries on the same scale. However a drop from 60% to 52% on the absolute percent scale can be understood and utilized easily by almost anyone.

Research Type

I will use both a Cross Sectional and Longitudinal approach to measure the effect of flawed elections on support for democracy at a macro level. The Cross Sectional approach examines public opinion in 18 countries in two distinct time periods: July 1999-January 2001 and March 2005-February 2006. The goal is to examine whether elections that were held immediately before one of the two rounds of surveys, influence public opinion. The longitudinal approach examines whether elections cause a change in public opinion from July 1999 through February 2006. The longitudinal approach uses both elections and countries as unit of analysis, and examines their effect at the macro-level *over time*; whereas the cross sectional approach only utilizes elections as the unit of analysis.

Cases or Units

I will examine all elections that take place within the range of the three rounds of Afro Barometer survey, from 1996 to 2005. Thus for elections held prior to 1999 or that were captured in the first round of survey data, this study examines elections in 12 countries. For elections after 1999 this study looks at elections in 18 countries.

I will examine each of the 16 countries for which there are at least two rounds of Afro Barometer data.⁸⁰ I will measure changes in supply and demand over the 2 or 3 rounds of AB data. I will also separate the 16 countries into 2 groups, those that have held at least one flawed election and those that have had only free and fair elections than flawed over the survey period.

⁷⁹ For a complete list of recoded responses see “Table 1.0 Recodes”

⁸⁰ These countries are South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Uganda, Zambia

Number of Units

Although nearly 260 elections took place in Africa between 1989 and 2007, this analysis will focus on the approximately 33 elections whose effects were captured by the Afro Barometer. Discrepancies may stem from the lack of uniformity of time frame between the election and survey administration. Most elections however (21) occurred within 1.5 years of an AB survey.

At the country level I will focus on each country (16) that has been surveyed at least two times, and have carried out a minimum of one election.

Level of Analysis

My focus is on the aggregate level of perceived supply of democracy and demand for democracy for both the cross sectional and longitudinal approaches. I do not differentiate between individual winners or losers, level of education, gender, or other demographics. I am justified in doing this because most indicators of consolidation by public opinion are focused on the overall level of national support demonstrated by the masses.⁸¹

Method of Comparison

Firstly in order to determine the validity of the AB data, free and fair as a mean score (FF mean) will be compared to free and fair as an absolute percent score (FF absolute percent). The goal is determine whether both scales are telling similar stories and to determine if there advantages or disadvantages to using either scale. Second both of these scales will be compared to the Expert scores (FF expert). A correlation between the Expert Score and the FF mean or FF absolute percent suggests that people are indeed paying attention to the election and citizens across the 18 countries examined in this study are able to tell a free and fair election from a flawed one.

Once the validity of the mass perception indicators has been established, this study will then seek to examine cross sectional data to assess the relationship between the quality of an election and the levels of supply and demand on a macro or national level. The data set includes 29 elections in 18 different countries. The mean score and the absolute percent score for electoral quality, supply, and demand are derived from responses in Rounds 1 and 3 of the Afrobarometer. In order to

⁸¹ Certain scholars, for lack of more comprehensive data, have looked at small population segments in an effort to determine macro level trends in public opinion and support or readiness for democracy. (Gibson and Dutch at residents of Russia's Moscow Oblast in 1992 for example) By utilizing Afro Barometer Data I can directly examine a diverse cross section of individuals to obtain a better measure of "national," opinion. Furthermore Diamond suggests that 2/3 of the population must believe in the legitimacy of democracy to ensure consolidation. He, nor other scholars, ever suggested that consolidation requires lower levels of support from different sects of population such as 1/3 of all college educated people. To examine small segments of the population would open this analysis to discussion of elite based consolidation, which while making a good study, is outside the scope of this paper.

determine the effect of electoral quality (X) on supply and demand (Y), I will test for co-variation. This means that where X is lower than the average, Y should be lower than the average, or vice versa. I may also find that when X is high, Y is low (or the inverse). To demonstrate co-variation I utilized the Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient, a statistical tool commonly used to measure the strength of correlation between two quantitative variables.⁸² Correlation coefficients range from -1.00 to +1.00. A coefficient of -1.00 indicates that there is a perfect negative linear relationship between the variables, +1.00 demonstrates a perfect positive relationship. If Pearson's is 0 then there is no correlation between the quantitative variables.⁸³ In order to ensure that my findings were not the result of random measurement error, I utilized a threshold of statistical significance of $p \leq .1$ due to the low number of cases. Co-variance will be assessed on both the mean score scale as well as the absolute percent scale.

Where appropriate, regression analysis will also be applied to assess the amount of variance in aggregate supply and demand that can be explained by the variance in freeness and fairness of an election. A regression analysis will allow us to determine with greater predictive accuracy what the level of supply or demand might be in country Y based on the quality of the most recent election. Due to the small N, I will take into account the standard error of the estimate. The standard error will help in determining the ranges of supply and demand based on a specific level of electoral quality.⁸⁴

The second part of the cross-sectional analysis requires an independent t test to determine if the means of supply and demand for flawed elections and free and fair elections differ to a statistically significant degree. This methodology divides the cases between flawed elections and free and fair elections using the FF expert scale. The FF expert scale is utilized because it is ordinal not ratio level data, and it allows me to include four additional elections for which there are no data for the popular perception indicators. The null hypothesis for this study is that there is no difference between the level of supply or demand between the free and fair group and the flawed group. Once again I utilize a threshold of $p \leq .1$ due to the low number of cases (33). Furthermore by only examining the level of supply or demand or resulting "status" of supply and demand following an election I employing "post-only" methodology. Since the elections are sufficiently randomized across almost any measure, the cases (elections) will be initially comparable on the dependent

⁸² Kranzler, 96

⁸³ Ibid, 99

⁸⁴ Ibid, 113

variable- comparable enough to satisfy conventional statistical tests used to evaluate the results. In cases like these, “the only justification for pre-testing is tradition.”⁸⁵

This study will also examine the effect of flawed elections over time using both elections and countries as the unit of analysis. This examination hopes to determine whether countries that had at least one flawed election share similarities as a group and if there are marked differences between these countries and those that have held only free and fair elections. To do this, I will examine changes in supply and demand in the 16 countries for which there are at least two rounds of Afrobarometer data. These countries will then be split into those that have held at least one flawed election as indicated by any of the three scales. The countries that have held at least one flawed election over the course of the 3 rounds of AB survey’s include, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria, Malawi, Mali, and Lesotho. The period of examination remains 1996 to 2005.

Lastly this study will examine the relationship between electoral quality and *the change* in supply and demand. In order to do this I will examine the 15 elections that have Afrobarometer data both before and after the election. However this section also utilizes 13 dyads for which there are two rounds of Afrobarometer data but no election occurred in the intervening period. This set up lends itself readily to a natural experiment, by designating the “no election” dyads as the control group.⁸⁶ In any experimental design subjects are pre-tested in terms of the dependent variable (supply or demand), exposed to a stimulus representing the independent variable (elections), and then remeasured or post tested in terms of the dependent variable.⁸⁷ The natural experiment divides the electorates in three groups, those that had experienced flawed elections, free and fair elections, and no election. The principle method for determining if the means of these three groups differ will be a one way ANOVA test for independent samples. A one way ANOVA tests for statistical significance of the differences among the means of two or more groups.⁸⁸ It examines the amount of differences between the means of the groups, compared with the amount of difference among the individual scores in each group.⁸⁹

Thus to determine validity, a correlation test will be performed between FF mean, FF absolute percent, and the FF Lindberg. To determine the covariance between electoral quality and the level of supply and demand, I will utilize the Pearsons product moment coefficient, and a t test of

⁸⁵ Babbie and Mouton, 221

⁸⁶ Babbie and Mouton 224

⁸⁷ Babbie and Mouton, 209

⁸⁸ This is similar to the independent T test discussed earlier. While a t test can only examine the difference in mean between 2 groups, ANOVA and can test the difference between 2 or more groups

⁸⁹ Kranzler, 164

independent sample means. Similarly to assess causality changes of supply and demand will be examined per country. The goal is to determine if there are similar characteristics between those countries that have held flawed elections and distinct from those countries that have held free and fair elections. Finally this study will also utilize experimental design to determine if electoral quality causes a reduction or increase in the level of supply and demand. This natural experiment uses the dyads with no election as a control group. A one way ANOVA test will help determine if the difference in means is significant. If electoral quality does have a causal relationship with changes in supply and demand then this paper will discuss the implications for democratic consolidation.

Method of Control

In determining the effect of flawed elections on democratic health as measured by levels of perceived supply and demand it is important to control for other variables that might also sway people's perception of democracy and how it works in their country. Most prominently Larry Diamond argues that people's perception of how democracy works or supply is influenced largely by the delivery of political goods. Equally important Mattes and Bratton prove that political goods such as rights, liberties, judicial systems, free press have a much greater impact on perceived supply compared to economic growth or improvement of economic conditions. Thus to determine if elections really do have a strong impact on supply or demand this study I will control for other political goods such as performance of the president or corruption as well as the delivery of economic goods or measures of the perception of national economic conditions.

Chapter 3 A Look at Africa in Terms of Elections, Supply, and Demand

Elections in Africa

As discussed above, for an election to be considered free and fair the voting process must be credible and transparent, *and* the election environment must allow for competition, and be devoid of fear or intimidation. Unfortunately a number of elections in Africa have not met this very high bar. This was especially true for elections held in the early 1990s. Researchers found that less than half of the elections carried out before 1994 were free and fair, the frequency of elections was declining, and that participation of political parties as well as competition between them was poor and getting worse.⁹⁰ When elections were flawed or electoral disputes arose, electoral commissions were rarely effective in resolving them, and violence often resulted.

However examining African elections over the entire period of this study and earlier (1989-2005), we find that nearly 60% of elections were judged to be free and fair.⁹¹ On average elections in Africa have voter participation higher than 60% of the national population. Competition within free and fair elections is healthy with opposition parties participating in 90% of them. Furthermore, between 1999 and 2003, 30% of elections led to turnover. Unfortunately there is still violence associated with most electoral periods. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the violence is becoming more isolated and on smaller scales with fewer victims.⁹² Studies show that these trends in competition and participation are indeed stabilizing, suggesting that earlier pessimism surrounding elections in Africa, can be attributed to low number of data points and early democratic growing pains.⁹³

Supply and Demand in Africa

Although a number of countries in Africa only transitioned to electoral democracy less than 15 years ago, citizens of Africa are surprisingly supportive of democracy in the abstract but less willing to reject other forms of governance. As discussed previously demand for democracy is measured by both support democracy and rejection of three forms of authoritarianism. The first round of Afrobarometer surveys (1999-2001) examined 12 countries in Africa and found widespread popular support with 70% of respondents agreeing that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Of these twelve countries Lesotho was the clear outlier with only 40% of the respondents supporting democracy over any other form of government. However it is not simply

⁹⁰ Bratton and Van de Wall 1997, 223

⁹¹ Lindberg 2006, 56

⁹² Lindberg 2006, 67

⁹³ Lindberg 2006 70

enough to want democracy in the abstract, citizens must view democracy as *the only game in town* and thus must also reject alternative forms. Afrobarometer surveys have examined the rejection of at least three alternative forms of rule; one man or dictatorship, one party, and military rule. In the twelve Round 1 countries 80% of respondents also rejected military and one man (dictatorship) rule. There is slightly more tolerance for one party rule (69% rejection) but not by much. A key point here is that more than 40% of respondents did not reject one of the three forms of non-democratic rule. In other words a significant number of Africans were willing to tolerate one of three forms of non-democratic government.⁹⁴ This reduces the overall demand component, or the percent of committed democrats to 44.6%.

Absolute Percent Demand			
	1999-2001	2003-2004	2005-2006
	AB Round 1	AB Round 2	AB Round 3
Benin			42.15%
Botswana	58.01%	42.08%	51.50%
Cape Vert		37.38%	42.04%
Ghana	56.09%	37.08%	57.23%
Kenya		58.80%	56.81%
Lesotho	16.40%	30.17%	36.09%
Madagascar			24.00%
Malawi	47.85%	38.75%	22.33%
Mali	41.12%	36.24%	38.99%
Mozambique		19.00%	18.11%
Namibia	26.12%	19.01%	19.00%
Nigeria	64.59%	39.25%	44.10%
Senegal		42.98%	52.00%
South Africa	29.14%	32.75%	36.75%
Tanzania	50.81%	40.07%	19.55%
Uganda	35.50%	34.50%	33.00%
Zambia	59.10%	49.60%	55.12%
Zimbabwe	50.00%	27.80%	52.58%
AVERAGE	44.56%	36.59%	38.78%
Original 12 AVG	44.56%	35.61%	38.85%

Following the publication of these results some critics felt these same conclusions could not be extrapolated across other countries in Africa due to a bias towards Southern Africa and English speaking countries. To make the results more inclusive and repeatable round 3 of the Afro barometer survey included 5 additional non English speaking countries⁹⁵ only one of which is part of mainland southern Africa. However in regards to the demand component in round 3 we find decrease demand for democracy both amongst the original twelve countries and the 18 countries in aggregate. More importantly however there is a small but significant decrease in the percent of committed democrats

from 44.6% to 38.8%. Although support for democracy as an abstract remained constant, rejection of both one man rule and military rule decreased by slightly more than 5%. Namibia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Malawi are the four countries with committed democrats below 25%, whereas Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe remain the few countries where committed democrats are the majority.

⁹⁴ Bratton Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 75-81

⁹⁵ Madagascar, Benin, Senegal, Mozambique, Cape Verde (Kenya is the sixth new country)

Unlike demand, however it is not surprising that perceived supply of democracy in most African countries is significantly lower given that most countries have regimes and elites that may not be familiar with the mechanisms of democracy or service delivery. From Round 1 of the Afrobarometer survey 59% of the respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Only two of the original twelve countries had less than 50% of respondents note they were satisfied with the way democracy works; Lesotho and Zimbabwe. On the other hand South Africa and Malawi had the highest percent of respondents who voiced their dissatisfaction with democracy.

Absolute Percent Supply			
	1999-2001	2003-2004	2005-2006
	AB Round 1	AB Round 2	AB Round 3
Benin			41.74%
Botswana	42.83%	46.12%	53.92%
Cape Vert		20.43%	36.70%
Ghana	43.46%	35.50%	64.00%
Kenya		65.97%	39.91%
Lesotho	21.33%	36.12%	31.52%
Madagascar			23.56%
Malawi	28.56%	26.83%	14.75%
Mali	19.00%	49.58%	45.66%
Mozambique		41.14%	47.83%
Namibia	24.85%	50.38%	61.25%
Nigeria	15.57%	19.48%	14.77%
Senegal		45.07%	46.83%
South Africa	21.59%	30.79%	53.04%
Tanzania	15.65%	50.04%	35.20%
Uganda	19.82%	44.21%	41.63%
Zambia	20.20%	36.14%	20.50%
Zimbabwe	5.00%	27.17%	10.11%
AVERAGE	23.16%	39.06%	37.94%
Original 12 AVG	23.16%	37.70%	37.20%

Critics have suggested that the question to determine satisfaction with democracy is ambiguous, as it is unclear if the respondents are referring to the political regime, a set of institutions, or a group of policy makers. To mitigate these concerns the measure of supply also includes recognition of being in a democracy. Thus although 59% of respondents indicated they were satisfied with democracy in round 1, only 20% of respondents felt they were fully supplied with democracy. In round 1 Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Mali all had levels of supply below 20%, whereas Botswana and Ghana were above 40%. No country scored above 50%.⁹⁶ Without doing very much heavy lifting it would certainly not

be hard to make a case that Zimbabwe and Nigeria were and remain two of the most poorly managed countries in Africa whereas Ghana and Botswana are routinely thought of as two of Africa's best managed countries.

Round 3 Afrobarometer data includes the six additional countries discussed earlier for demand in addition to the 12 original countries. By 2004 levels of supply had improved dramatically across Africa on average. In round 3 nearly 38% of respondents felt satisfactory supplied. Zimbabwe and

⁹⁶ Ibid 82-83

Nigeria continue to hold the dubious honour of lowest number of respondents satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, whereas Ghana, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa all had a majority of respondents feel fully supplied with democracy. Both Mali and South Africa showed the greatest improvement in percent of respondents who felt fully supplied.

In sum then supply and demand for democracy have gone in opposite directions with time. In most countries demand has remained relatively stable with a small but significant overall drop across Africa. Supply, however, has shown a much greater improvement, although on average most Africans still do not feel adequately supplied with democracy. It is especially interesting to note the cases of particular countries. Zimbabwe and Nigeria for example show the lowest levels of supply but some of the highest levels of demand. Whereas countries such as Ghana and Botswana show high and improving levels of both supply and demand. It is equally interesting to note countries like Mali which had relatively stable levels of demand over all three rounds but one of the largest increases in percent of respondents who felt adequately supplied with democracy.


Similar to supply, elections in Africa have on average improved in terms of free and fairness as measured by the composite index score designed by Lindberg. Participation by both voters and opposition parties is relatively high when compared to earlier elections in Africa and certainly in other parts of the world. Frequency of elections has not declined but it does fluctuate from year to year, which emphasizes the importance of examining electoral trends with a long lens. This study hopes to determine if there is a correlation between these electoral trends and the trends in supply and demand.

Chapter 4 Validity


Before examining the relationship between electoral quality and perceived supply of, and demand for democracy we need to determine the validity of the electoral quality scale as measured by popular perception.⁹⁷ The goal of this section is to determine if people are in effect paying attention to the quality of the election and its outcome; do they “know what they are talking about.” To establish validity, the popular perceived free and fairness mean and absolute percent scores will first be compared to each other and then to the expert four point scale, taken from Lindberg’s analysis.

Comparing The Two Popular Perception Scales of Free and Fair

Initially it is important to establish that both the FF mean and the FF absolute percent are strongly correlated and “telling a similar story.” Furthermore it is equally important to determine for which cases or elections the scales seem to be in disagreement and why. This will help to determine the validity of each scale and give their scores greater meaning. Correlation analysis indicates that there is a strong correlation between the FF mean or mean score assigned by citizens and the FF absolute percent or percent of people who thought the election was largely free and fair. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient is near perfect at **.982** and is significant at the .1 level.



Graph 4.1 Electoral Quality



Graph 4.2 Electoral Quality with line of best fit

In graph 5.1 the additional two lines of division at $x = 3$ and $y = .5$ line are an effort to divide the cases between free and fair versus flawed on both axes. Initially it makes sense to divide the cases between those with FF mean above and below 3, based on the fact that people who gave responses

⁹⁷ The data points for each country come from round 1 and round 3 of Afrobarometer surveys. For the most part round 1 surveys were completed between 1999 and 2001, capturing elections between 1996-2001. Round 3 was conducted between 2003 and 2005 and captures election from 2002 to 2005. Each of the three variables, (electoral quality, supply, and demand) has been measured on graduated five point scale with a resulting mean score; and on a binary scale with a resulting absolute percent score.

above 3 considered the election more or less free and fair where as those that gave responses of 2 or less, considered the election more or less flawed. Similarly by dividing elections between those that received more than 50% and those that received less, I am suggesting that for an election to be considered free and fair at the national level at least a majority of people must think it was. Thus all elections should be either in quadrant 2 or 4, as most of them are. However there are a few elections that are in quadrant 1 namely Lesotho 1998, Ghana 1996, Mali 1997, Malawi 1999. Interestingly Lesotho 1998, Malawi 1999, and Ghana 1996 are subsequent elections following flawed elections, suggesting that there may be lingering effects of flawed elections on electoral expectations. The presence of Mali 1997 in quadrant 1, however, might be the residual effect of a split in the quality of the two polls that were held roughly 3 weeks apart, with the parliamentary poll being fair(er) than the presidential poll. Since the survey was administered more than 3 years after the election some citizens might remember the elections as a single period, instead of separate elections, which creates the discrepancy.

Thus although the correlation between the absolute percent and graduated scale over the 29 elections remains strong, the presence of a handful of discrepancies is equally revealing. The data here suggests that if and when an election can be deemed free and fair on one of the scales but deemed flawed on the other it is likely to be a direct result of a previous flawed election, suggesting that a flawed election still effects electoral expectations in the subsequent election cycle. However this does not mean that all subsequent elections after a failed election will produce discrepancies between the free and fair and flawed. Furthermore, based on presence of outliers with a mean score between 2.5 and 3, it could be argued that the mean score that is equivalent to the 50% cut off on the FF absolute percent scale should be closer to 2.5 than 3. Indeed a majority of citizens might still have believed that the election was free and fair (equivalent to responses of 3 and 4) yet the presence of enough people who respond with "don't know," (equivalent to a score of 2) pulls the aggregate score down.

Despite these select cases the significant correlation between the FF absolute percent score and the FF mean score tell us that each scale is equally valid as a predictor of free and fair in relation to each other. Discrepancies between the absolute percent score and the mean score indicates that for some elections where the FF mean was less than 3 a majority of citizens still believed it was free and fair. These outlying elections that exhibit this discrepancy can be determined by the quadrant they are in as well as the distance away from the line of best fit. Furthermore nearly all of these elections are subsequent elections following a flawed election. This suggests that flawed elections have an impact on people's overall perception of electoral quality that continues to influence their opinions

in the following election cycle. Given that some elections appear as free and fair on the mean scale but flawed on the absolute percent scale and vice versa it may be informative to use both scales throughout the rest of the analysis. This is especially true given the low “N” or number of flawed elections, which allows one election to have a sizeable effect on the overall mean and correlation.

Comparing Popular Perceptions of Free and Fair with the Expert Measure of Free and Fair


Yet this analysis only validates the accuracy of the mean score and the absolute percent score in relation to each other. Although important, it may be more helpful to determine if in fact people are paying attention to the election by comparing both scales to a scale derived and assigned by a team of experts. As discussed previously, Lindberg has created an expert score to assign each of these elections a free and fairness score ranging from 1 to 4 with 3 and 4 being scores of a free and fair election whereas 1 and 2 convey a flawed election. As discussed in Chapter 2 these scores are based on numerous reports from various sources divided into ten different indicators. If there is a correlation between the mass opinion on the aggregate level and the expert opinion we can conclude that citizens are paying attention to electoral outcomes and can tell the difference between a free and fair and a flawed election just as well as any academic or electoral expert.

Free and Fair Expert		Free and Fair Mean	Free and Fair Absolute Percent
Irregularities Affect Outcome 2	Mean	2.32	39%
	N	5	5
	STD	0.4	15%
Somewhat Fair 3	Mean	3.08	71%
	N	20	20
	STD	0.22	9%
Completely Free 4	Mean	3.27	81%
	N	3	3
	STD	0.1	5%


Table 4.1 Mean Scores of Popular Perception Index within Expert Scores

A comparison of the expert scores to both the FF mean and FF absolute percent is best displayed by a box and whisker or simple scatter plot. The strength of the correlation will be demonstrated by Pearson’s correlation coefficient. In both graphs 4.3 and 4.4 the box plot and simple scatter plot show a well defined and separate range of Free and Fair mean scores for those elections that were scored 2, 3, and 4 on the expert scale. Indeed the mean score of free and fair for elections that were

flawed or “irregularities affected outcome” on the Expert scale is equivalent to 2.32 with a standard deviation of .40 whereas the mean score for elections that were coded as “yes somewhat (fair)” on the Expert scale is FF mean 3.08 with a standard deviation of .22. Since a score of 4 is the highest an election can receive from an individual the mean FF score is slightly below a 4 at 3.27 (see table 4.1).





h 4.3 Simple Scatter Plot FF mean and FF expert



Graph 4.4 Box Plot FF mean and FF expert

Grap

Similarly in graphs 4.5 and 4.6 the box plot and simple scatter also show a clear defined range of FF absolute percent scores for those elections that were coded slightly flawed or “irregularities affected outcome,” on the Expert scale and those that were coded mostly fair or “yes somewhat.” The absolute percent scores however display a greater range and variance than the mean scores. The average percent of people who believe the election was free and fair when the experts believed “irregularities had affected outcome” is 39% with a standard deviation of 15.3% whereas the average percent of people who believed it was free and fair when the experts believed it was a “somewhat” free and fair is nearly 71% with a standard deviation of 8.9%. These absolute percent scores give more grounded meaning to the Expert scores. For every election that the experts deem as flawed (2), roughly 1/3 of the population thinks it was mostly free and fair. For every election that the experts deem as “mostly free and fair” (3), roughly two thirds of the population thinks it was mostly free and fair as well.



Graph 4.5 FF Simple Scatter plot FF Absolute Percent FF Expert

Graph 4.6 Box Plot FF Absolute Percent and FF Expert

Zambia 1996 is the only clear outlier when comparing both the FF mean and FF absolute percent scores to the Expert scores. Zambia 1996 is likely an outlier due to the “controversy” surrounding the exclusion of former president Ken Kaunda. Indeed at the time many international monitoring organizations and electoral experts were outraged when the Zambian electoral commission did not allow former president Ken Kaunda to participate. These same organizations however, noted that the polling of the actual election was mostly transparent and peaceful. Average Zambian citizens however, felt the overall election was largely free and fair in spite of President Kaunda’s exclusion largely because they felt his presence was unlikely to affect the outcome.⁹⁸

	FF Expert	FF Mean	FF Absolute Percent
FF Expert	1	0.763*	0.775*
FF Mean	0.763*	1	0.982*
FF Absolute Percent	0.775*	0.982*	1

*Correlation significant at .1 level

N =29 for all correlations

Measures of Association		
	Eta	Eta Squared
FF absolute percent * FF Expert	.833	.694
FF mean * FF Expert	.808	.652

Table 4.2 Correlation Analysis between the 3 scales

Despite the presence of Zambia 1996 both the absolute percent scores and the mean scores display a strong correlation with the Expert scores (see table 4.1). The strength of association between the

⁹⁸ Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi, 2005

expert score and popular perception scales is further validated by the eta squared value of .808 FF mean to .833 FF absolute percent (table 4.2). This analysis suggests that people *do* pay attention to electoral quality and that they are by and large as accurate in their assessments of electoral quality as “experts.” If the expert score is the standard bearer for quality of elections then it seems that both the mean score and the absolute percent are equally useful indicators to compare with supply and demand based on the strength of Pearson’s *r* and eta. Thus given the relative equivalency all three scales will continue to be utilized throughout the study to determine the relationship between electoral quality and public attitudes towards democracy.

University of Cape Town

Initial analysis shows that there is a strong and significant correlation between electoral quality and perceived supply of democracy. Graph 5.1 supports the hypothesis and shows countries with flawed elections having low levels of perceived supply; flawed elections in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia are all on the lower end of the spectrum. The correlation between electoral quality and supply on the absolute scale, however, is somewhat weaker. From figure 5.2 it appears that there is a group of elections that are distorting the relationship between perceived supply and electoral quality. This group that has high levels of electoral quality but low levels of supply includes cases from Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. A common characteristic between these countries is the timing of the transition to democracy in the early 1990s meaning that these data points only represent their first or second election.

Scale	Pearson's	R ²
Mean	0.785	0.616
Absolute Percent	0.581	0.338
Absolute w/out First Elections	0.699	0.487

*All significant at the $p \leq .1$ level

Table 5.1 Correlation Analysis of Electoral Quality and Supply

However, if we remove all of the first elections the standard error decreases while the strength and significance of the regression coefficients improve (see table 5.1). Thus, as seen by the group of cases below the norm in figure 2.2, first elections on average do not correlate well with the rest of the cases. This could be due to the fact that first elections often “announce” the arrival of a new democratic regime and thus citizens have almost no information or experience to judge both the level of democratic supply or a basis to judge the free and fairness of election. As time goes on, however, citizens can use their experience with previous elections and participation in democratic activities to make more informed judgements.

Post Only Test

As discussed in the methodology, a post only examination of supply of and demand for democracy following an election can help determine if publics adjust their view of democracy after participating in a free and fair or flawed election. To determine if the level of supply at the national level is different amongst publics who have participated in a flawed election versus those that have

participated in a free and fair one I use the FF expert binary classification as my break point as it is an ordinal scale and allows me to bring in 4 additional elections.⁹⁹

		N	Mean	STD	Significance
Free and Fair Mean	Flawed	7	1.91	0.45	0.033
	Free & Fair	26	2.63	0.22	
Free and Fair Absolute Percent	Flawed	7	16.16%	7.48%	0.019
	Free & Fair	26	35.21%	14.54%	

Table 5.2 Independent T Test of Supply


An independent t test reveals that there is a significant difference between how supplied electorates feel after a flawed elections or a free and fair election. Indeed the t test provides further evidence that how supplied citizens feel with democracy is closely linked to the quality of the election they most recently participated in. Or in other words, at the national level electoral outcomes produce different and distinct levels of supply. Furthermore the difference in the means of supply between those associated with flawed elections and those associated with free and fair elections was shown to be significant when using FF expert as the break point in either the FF mean or FF absolute percent scale. This evidence supports the correlation analysis which indicated that there is a relationship between electoral quality and level of supply.

Electoral Quality and Demand


Having found a strong relationship between electoral quality and supply, I will apply similar methodology to determine if electoral quality influences the level of democratic demand. As previously discussed democratic demand is determined by the level of support for democracy and rejection of three different forms of authoritarianism (one party, military, and dictatorship). I hypothesized that flawed elections would be associated with low levels of demand and free and fair would be associated with higher levels of demand, and this would be especially true for countries that have held more than 1 flawed election. This sub section will test this relationship through correlation analysis, and using post only methodology. Similar to supply the goal is to determine if there is a relationship and the extent of the relationship between the quality of an election and how fervently citizens demand democracy.

⁹⁹ Further analysis using a FF mean break point of 2.68 and a FF absolute percent break point of 45% shows that the scales rarely produce different results. Tables to this effect can be found in the appendix. As seen in Chapter 3 correlation analysis between FF mean and FF expert revealed that flawed elections had a FF mean of 2.3 with a standard deviation of .38. Thus by making the break point at 2.68 instead of 3 the accuracy of dividing free and fair elections from flawed elections increases. Similar methodology was applied in reducing the break point of FF absolute from .5 to .45.

Unlike supply, however, we find no significant cross sectional relationship exists between the quality of the election and public demand for democracy with correlation analysis revealing a Pearson's r of $-.102$ on the FF mean scale. A negative r implies that the more free and fair an election is the less people demand or support democracy. This is the inverse of what I hypothesized. Examining the relationship between FF absolute percent and demand absolute percent reveals a similar story. The correlation is both weak and insignificant with Pearson's correlation coefficient being $-.058$. Indeed, as seen in the graphs below, less than 5% of the variance in demand being explained by the variance in electoral quality.



Graph 5.4 Electoral Quality and Demand (Mean)



Graph 5.5 Electoral Quality and Demand (Absolute %)

Scale	Pearson's	R ²
Mean	-0.102	0.01
Absolute Percent	-0.058	0.003

None are significant at the $p \leq .1$ level

Table 5.3 Correlation Analysis Electoral Quality and Demand

Post Only Test

I also examined the relationship between electoral quality and demand by using post only methodology to determine if there is a significant difference in demand for democracy amongst electorates that experienced a flawed election and those that experienced a free and fair election. Identical to the supply I utilize an independent t test, with FF expert as the break point to make this determination. Neither the FF absolute percent nor the FF mean scale reveals a significant difference at the $p \leq .1$ level. Thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in

demand for democracy between electorates that have experienced a flawed election and those that experienced a free and fair election.

		N	Mean	STD	Significance
Free and Fair Mean	Flawed	7	3.12	0.31	0.941
	Free & Fair	26	2.99	0.29	
Free and Fair Absolute Percent	Flawed	7	44.30%	14.20%	0.902
	Free & Fair	26	40.78%	13.39%	

Using FF expert as the break point
Table 5.4 Independent T test Demand

Control Variables

The relationship between supply and electoral quality then is well established; however how significant is electoral quality in relation to other variables that influence supply? Based on literature cited in Chapter 1 the delivery of political goods not economic goods should have the greatest impact on satisfaction with and support for democracy. Of those political goods, performance of the president, and civil liberties were shown to have the strongest influence on support for democracy.¹⁰⁰ Further studies on regime performance and the delivery of political goods have found that the presence or perception of high levels of corruption can deteriorate satisfaction with democracy regardless of the presence of certain civil liberties.¹⁰¹ The delivery of economic goods or economic performance was also show to have an effect on satisfaction with democracy although to a lesser degree than other political goods. Thus I use presidential performance, economic performance, and corruption as control variables to determine the strength of the relationship between electoral quality and perceived supply of and demand for democracy.

Examining the co-variance between these three variables and supply I found that each control variable is significantly correlated with supply at almost the same level as electoral quality. Indeed performance of the president and economic performance have just as strong a relationship with perceived democratic supply; all three have a person's correlation coefficient near .800. Utilizing correlation analysis to test the relationship between electoral quality and supply while controlling for these three variables individually I find that the relationship remains but is diminished. From

¹⁰⁰ Afrobarometer working paper 36 further investigated the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and the delivery of political goods, specifically performance of the president and performance of parliament.

¹⁰¹ Afrobarometer working papers 46, 43, and 33 investigated public opinions of corruption in Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania respectively.

table 5.5 it is apparent that holding constant for performance of the president has the largest impact as it reduces the strength of the relationship between electoral quality and supply from .785 to .485. Whereas holding constant for economic performance and corruption individually, has a smaller impact reducing the relationship between electoral quality and supply to .643 and .654 respectively. This suggests that presidential performance and electoral quality seem to influence the perceived level of supply in similar ways as it does not diminish the direct relationship entirely.

	Free and Fair	Performance of President	Economic Performance	Corruption
Direct Correlation With Supply	0.785*	0.788*	0.795*	0.491*
Supply and FF Controlling For	X	0.485*	0.643*	0.654*
Controlling for other 3	0.447*	0.212	0.670*	-0.159

*Significant at the $p \leq .1$ level

Table 5.5 Correlation Analysis of Supply with Control Variables

I also examined the relationship between freeness and fairness and supply when holding constant for the three control variables combined. When doing so I found that the Pearson's coefficient was .447 which is near the strength it was when only holding constant for performance of the president. This corroborates the fact that presidential performance and electoral quality have a near similar effect on perceived levels of democratic supply.

Unlike the relationship between electoral quality and supply, the relationship between demand and electoral quality is almost non-existent. Similar to supply, however, earlier studies showed that presidential performance and corruption were two political goods that had the potential to influence support for democracy. Furthermore while economic goods weren't as dominant a number of studies found evidence that macro economic outlook, as an economic good, was influential in determining support for the regime and thus support for the democracy.

After examining the co-variance between demand for democracy and the three control variables, I found that only the relationship between performance of the president and demand for democracy was significant. A Pearson's r of $-.37$ can be interpreted as the worse a president is performing the more citizens demand democracy. Similarly when re-examining the relationship between demand for democracy and electoral quality but holding constant for performance of the president I find that

that a significant relationship emerges. A positive correlation ($r = .356$) suggest that the relationship between presidential performance and electoral quality obscures the relationship between electoral quality and demand. Indeed further research might show that in countries with poor presidential performance the relationship between electoral quality and demand is strong and significant.

	Free and Fair	Performance of President	Economic Performance	Corruption
Direct Correlation Demand And	-0.102	-0.37*	-0.289	-0.208
Demand and FF Controlling For	X	0.356*	0.083	0.039
Controlling for other 3	0.249	.712*	0.18	-0.085

*Significant at the $p \leq .1$ level

Table 5.6 Correlation Analysis of Demand with Control Variables

However when controlling for presidential performance, economic performance, and corruption at the same time, I find that there is no relationship between demand and electoral quality. Although Pearson's r is .249 it is not significant at the $p \leq .1$ level.

Chapter 6 Does Electoral Quality Matter? A Longitudinal Analysis of Changes in Supply and Demand

A Natural Experiment

The goal of this section is to establish a causal relationship between elections and supply of and demand for democracy by examining the change in supply and demand over election and non election periods. Unlike the last chapter which examined cross sectional data and utilized primarily a post-only methodology, this chapter examines the independent variables (supply and demand) both before and after the election, or pre and post-testing. Within the data set there are 15 pairs or dyads of Afrobarometer data points with an intervening election and 13 pairs of data points with no intervening election. This lends itself to a natural experiment where the pairs of data points with no intervening election serve as a control group. I hypothesized that both perceived supply of and

demand for democracy would decrease after a flawed election, increase during a free and fair election and reflect a smaller change in a period of time where no election occurred. To test this hypothesis I use a one way ANOVA test, that similar to the t test, will test for a statistically significant difference between the three groups of free and fair, flawed and no election.

Table 6.1 shows the change in supply for each of the three categories, free and fair, flawed, and no election. Substantively the means in this table are very near to what we expected. Pairs of country surveys with no intervening election reflect almost no change in the perceived level of supply (-.02), flawed elections, however, lead to an average drop in supply of .25 points whereas a free and fair election increases the level of supply by an average of .20. A key difference however, between the mean scale and the absolute percent scale is that a flawed election leads to an increase by 6% whereas a free and fair election leads to an increase by 16% in perceived supply of democracy. On further examination, these results imply that a free and fair election almost always leads to an increase in the number of people who feel supplied with democracy whereas a flawed election might just as likely lead to an increase in the number of people who feel supplied with democracy as a decrease. On the other hand given the fact that each country data point is the result of at least 1200 surveys the standard error is +/- 3% thus it is easier to conclude that there is a significant difference between the two means.

		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Supply Mean	Free and Fair	0.205	0.226	10	0.162
	None	-0.022	0.259	13	
	Flawed	-0.254	0.802	5	

		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Supply Absolute Percent*	Free and Fair	15.87%	15.06%	10	0.175
	None	-0.86%	15.27%	13	
	Flawed	6.84%	25.50%	5	

* All significant at the $p \leq .1$ level

Table 6.1 Change in Supply after a free and fair, flawed, or no election

Examining changes in democratic demand in a similar fashion I find that the means (Table 6.2) do in fact partially support this hypothesis; flawed elections do produce an average dip in demand (-.18) but free and fair elections produce on average almost no change (.003) and non election periods

reflect an average decrease in demand of $-.037$. This might speak to the fact that people expect an election to be free and fair when making their assessment of their support for democracy, thus having a free and fair election only meets expectation and does not greatly influence their demand for democracy.

		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Demand Mean	Free and Fair	0.003	0.134	10	0.1
	None	-0.037	0.159	13	
	Flawed	-0.177	0.371	5	

		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Demand Absolute Percent	Free and Fair	1.92%	19.90%	10	0.08
	None	-1.64%	16.54%	13	
	Flawed	-14.00%	26.28%	5	

Table 6.2 Change in Demand after a free and fair, flawed, or no election

The low level of significance for both the average change in mean and the average change in absolute percent can be attributed to the low number of data points, which allows one country or one election to have a disproportionate affect on the standard deviation and thus the significance in the difference of the means. For example, examining the change in the mean score of demand for the flawed elections, we notice that four out of the five all show a decrease of $.1$ or more, on the scale from 0 to 4, except for Zimbabwe 2005 which shows an *increase* of $.40$. If both Zimbabwe elections are removed from the dataset, then the difference in means for the change in demand between free and fair and flawed becomes significant at the $.1$ level. More importantly the absolute percent falls to -24% and the mean score falls to $-.341$ for flawed elections.


It is also important to keep in mind that the low number of data points is the result of using national level data or aggregate indicators. Indeed each national level supply and demand data point is representative of more than 1,000 individual responses, while the macro level data set only has 18 data points; the micro level data set has more than 20,000 data points. Testing at the micro-level for a difference in means between changes in supply and demand following free and fair, flawed elections, and non-election periods reveals nearly identical means as the national level data set but at a much higher significance level but weaker association. At the individual level a flawed election still results in a decrease in supply mean of $.25$ whereas a flawed election also results in a decrease in demand mean by $.23$. At the national level supply decreased $.25$ and demand by $.18$. However the difference in the means for both supply and demand are significant at the $.1$ level for individual responses.

This analysis of how the change in supply and demand is influenced by both the presence of elections and their quality adds to the evidence that supports elements of the original hypothesis. Indeed the link between electoral quality and supply once again proves to be the most resilient relationship as demonstrated by the significance and order of magnitude difference between change in the supply mean scores following a flawed or free and fair election. Demand does decrease after flawed elections (4 out of 5 times), and slightly increases after free and fair elections. However, the relationship between free and fairness and demand proves to be more fickle than supply. The low number of data points contributes greatly to the low level of significance for all of the ANOVA tests and difference of means. Yet, the directional change of supply and demand after free and fair or flawed election supports the overall hypothesis. Furthermore the fact that the smallest change typically occurred during periods of non-election supports the hypothesis that elections impact the health of democracy on the most rudimentary of scales.


Comparing Countries

Although the evidence presented above is significant the single largest drawback is the low number of data points, particularly for flawed elections. The small N of country level dyads, allows outliers to have a disproportionate effects on the mean and the level of significance. As was seen above all of the flawed elections led to significant decrease of demand by .25 to .45 on the graduated scale of 0 to 4, however, Zimbabwe's .45 increase in demand following the disastrous presidential election of 2005 had a disproportionate influence on the mean and the significance. Furthermore each country has its own particular history, and political system as well as other intricacies that may have yet to be determined effects. Thus it might be more appropriate to look at changes in supply and demand within each country, which allows us to hold country specific factors constant.

Examining all the countries change in supply on a single graph does little to help us understand the effects of flawed elections, instead it is better to divide the countries between those that have held at least one flawed elections and those that have held free and fair. I divided the countries using a loose definition of a flawed election, to include any country that held a flawed election even if that election was prior to the first round of AB data, or wasn't specifically captured by AB dataset. This allowed me to include both Lesotho and Mali who held flawed elections in 1998 and 1997 respectively. As you can see from graphs 6.1 and 6.2 there is a clear difference between the two groups. By the third round all the countries that have held only free and fair elections have levels of supply above 2.4 whereas all the countries with at least one flawed elections have levels of supply below 2.4 with the exception of Mali.



Graph 6.1 Change in Supply for Countries that have held one or more flawed elections




Graph 6.2 Changes in Supply for Countries with all Free and Fair Elections

Furthermore all the countries in figure 6.2 show a net increase in supply with the exception of Kenya whereas all of the countries in 6.1 show a net decrease in supply, again with the exception of Mali. Mali and Lesotho are also informative in the sense that they do not fit well in either group, as they are the only two countries to have a single flawed election prior to the first round of AB data. (Other countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe also held flawed election immediately prior to the first round of AB survey, however they also had subsequent flawed elections) The subsequent elections in both countries were both Free and Fair which rightly explains why they show an increase in levels of supply and their marked difference from the rest of the countries that have held flawed elections and continued to have them. Although this data also suggests that flawed elections may influence supply beyond a single election cycle, countries such as Mali and Kenya demonstrate that no country is necessarily beholden to its electoral history. These two exceptions suggest that citizens can


adjust their support for and satisfaction with democracy following a free and fair election even if the previous one was flawed or vice versa.

Within the countries that have a decreasing level of supply, Zimbabwe as always, is a unique case. It shows the most dramatic changes in supply although it has only held flawed elections. This could be the result of the timing of the survey in March 2003. According to Chikwana, Sithole, and Bratton this was also the time that Jonathan Moyo took over the media or propaganda arm of the Zimbabwean government. Furthermore Chikwana and Sithole contend in their 2004 paper, the increase in supply or (satisfaction with democracy) can be attributed largely to those that read and listened exclusively to government media. Those who didn't read or listen to government media continued to feel dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in their country.¹⁰² This helps to explain Zimbabwe's discontinuity from the rest of the countries that had flawed election.



Graph 6.3 Changes in Demand for Countries that have held one or more Flawed Elections

¹⁰² Afrobarometer Working paper 36



Graph 6.4 Changes in Demand for Countries with only Free and Fair Elections

Graphs 6.3 and 6.4 show changes in demand over the three rounds of AB data and are once again split between the countries that held free and fair elections and countries that have held flawed elections. The difference between the two graphs is not as stark as the difference between graphs 5.1 and 5.2, however they are informative. Unlike the graphs showing changes in supply which showed a clear division both above and below 2.4, there is no clear dividing line for demand. In fact a number of countries that have held flawed elections still have higher levels of demand than countries that have held only free and fair elections. For example Nigeria and Zambia both have demand levels above 3 despite seriously flawed elections whereas Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa have demand levels below three despite holding only free and fair elections. The countries in graph 6.3 show significant changes in demand whereas one of the most notable characteristics of the graph 6.4 is how marginal the changes are. Indeed, with the exception of Tanzania and Namibia, most of the countries in graph 6.4 have slopes that are nearly parallel to the x axis. In Tanzania, arguably the most dominant and long standing one party dominant state, decrease in demand is likely due to an increase in satisfaction with the way the country works. Indeed the data shows that the more Tanzania improved at establishing civil liberties the more people were willing to tolerate the current state of affairs or a defacto one party state.

Mali and Lesotho are once again outliers within the countries that have had flawed elections as both show increasing levels of demand whereas the others (except for Zimbabwe) all show declining levels of demand. As previously discussed this is likely skewed due to the increasing effectiveness of the government's disinformation campaign.

By examining the country as a unit of analysis instead of an election a different set of patterns emerge. In terms of supply those countries that have held flawed elections all showed a net decrease and all fall below 2.4 (except Mali). Whereas those that have held all free and fair elections showed a net increase achieving levels above 2.4 by the 3rd round of the AB survey. Mali and Lesotho are unique in the dataset as they are the only country which had a flawed election captured by the first round of AB survey and went on to have only free and fair elections. As such their lines are almost parallel as they increase significantly from rounds 1 to rounds 2 and then level off. Most of the countries that have only free and fair elections show the largest increase between rounds 2 and rounds 3. In terms of demand, countries with flawed elections share similar characteristics amongst themselves as do countries that have held only free and fair. There is however no unique break point (such as 2.4 for supply), as the level of demand does not seem to depend on free and fair or flawed elections. Instead it is the change in levels of demand that differentiate countries with flawed elections and those with free and fair elections. Indeed the greatest changes in demand take place in countries that have held multiple flawed elections such as Nigeria and Malawi. Most of the countries that have held free and fair elections show relatively little change in demand with the exception of Tanzania and Namibia. Both Tanzania and Namibia are countries with dominant one party system with only very localized political opposition (Zanzibar and Windhoek).

Chapter 7 Behavioural Effects

Although I have demonstrated that flawed elections negatively influence perceived levels of supply and demand for democracy, do these changes in perception, also lead to changes in behaviour? For example do electorates who become increasingly dissatisfied with democracy, as seen by declining levels of supply and/or demand, become less likely to participate in “democratic activities?” Beyond the fact that flawed elections might sway some electorates to reduce their support for democracy or entertain ideas of authoritarian regimes, if these same publics are still reaching out to government officials, attending demonstrations, or obeying the police then there is less reason to believe that flawed elections reduce democratic health. This section aims to determine if flawed elections or declining levels of supply and demand lead to a decline in participation or a change in behaviour. To investigate these questions, I examined three variables, 1) how often people attend demonstrations, 2) how often people contact the government and 3) whether or not they believe that the police have the right to make everyone obey the law. A mean score was taken for each of the three variables.

To investigate the relationship between flawed elections, supply of and demand for democracy and behaviour of electorates I utilize the same type of statistical tests as was used to investigate the

relationship between electoral quality, supply, and demand. Firstly I use cross sectional data and correlation analysis (Pearson’s correlation coefficient) to determine if the levels of participation are related to the level of electoral quality, supply or demand. Second I examine the change in behaviour and the change in supply and demand by setting up a natural experiment between publics that experienced no election, a flawed election and a free and fair election. To make this determination I utilize a one way ANOVA test to find a statistical difference between the means of these three groups.

Table 7.1 (below) shows the correlation between the 3 behavioural variables, electoral quality, supply, and demand, whereas table 7.2 (below) shows the correlation between the change in supply and demand and the change in the 3 behavioural variables. The difference between these two tables is slight but important. Table 7.1 examines if cases with high levels of supply or demand also have high levels of participation. In other words are publics with high levels of perceived supply more likely to attend a higher number of demonstrations than publics in countries with low supply. Table 7.2 examines if declining levels of supply and demand also leads to declining participation. For example if supply falls, does the number of demonstrations attended by the average citizen also drop? In table 7.1 the only significant correlation is between demand for democracy and attend demonstration with a Pearson’s r of $-.323$. This relationship, however, differs from the original hypothesis as it suggests the less electorates demand democracy the more demonstrations they will attend. From table 7.2 we find that the only significant correlation is between the change in demand and change in number of times people contact a government official. In other words as people lessen their support for democracy they also reduce the number of times they contact government officials. This relationship is also fairly strong as the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is $.572$.

Table 7.3a and 7.3b shows the difference in means of the change in the three behavioural variables over the three categorical dyads of no election, flawed election, and free and fair election. Although none of the means are different at a significant level, directionally, the means do support the hypothesis that a flawed election leads to a decrease in engagement between citizen and government and a decrease in the legitimacy of the police to force citizens to obey the law.

Absolute Percent Scale		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Attend Demonstration	Free and Fair	-1.98%	4.00%	8	0.295
	None	-2.58%	4.00%	11	
	Flawed	-5.38%	6.38%	5	
		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Obey the Law	Free and	0.42%	5.76%	5	0.352

	Fair				
	None	-2.62%	7.03%	9	
	Flawed	-6.65%	2.19%	2	
		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Contact Government Official	Free and Fair	1.16%	4.10%	5	0.325
	None	-2.56%	7.00%	9	
	Flawed	-4.50%	-4.50%	1	

Table 7.3a Natural Experiment on the Absolute Percent Scale

Mean		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Attend Demonstration	Free and Fair	0.095	0.133	8	0.089
	None	0.088	0.2	11	
	Flawed	0.038	0.307	5	
		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Obey the Law	Free and Fair	0.044	0.136	5	0.124
	None	-0.073	0.239	9	
	Flawed	-0.275	0.205	2	
		Mean	STD	N	ETA
Contact Government Official	Free and Fair	0.038	0.113	5	0.106
	None	-0.078	0.21	9	
	Flawed	-0.12		1	

Table 7.3b Natural Experiment on the Mean Scale

Similar to earlier analysis the lack of significance in the difference of means can be largely attributed to the lack of data points, however the problem with the three behavioural variables is even more acute. Indeed the question to assess how often a respondent contacted a government official was not asked in round 1 of the AB survey, and furthermore it was not asked in specific countries such as Zimbabwe and Uganda. This reduces the number of data points from 29 to 15 for the “contact a government official” variable. Furthermore only one of the 15 dyads captures a flawed election damaging the significance of the difference in means test. Similarly there are only 16 dyads for the variable “Obey Police,” and of those 16 only two capture a flawed election. For these two variables then the low number of elections in general and flawed elections in particular, make it challenging to draw any definitive conclusions on how electoral quality, supply, or demand influence behaviour.

The attend demonstration variable, however, has 24 data points, which is nearly as many as was used to determine changes in supply and demand at a significant level in Chapters 5 and 6.

Examining Table 7.3a, flawed elections lead to a 6% decrease in the number of people who had attended any demonstration. Yet even a free and fair or flawed election produce a drop in the

number of people attending demonstrations, albeit not as large. Indeed the difference between publics that experienced a flawed election and those that experienced a free and fair in the number of people who attended demonstrations is small and marginal on the absolute percent scale. Further confusing the issue is that the mean scale seems to suggest that for every election *more* people are attending demonstrations regardless of the quality. If we examine the data on a country by country basis on the mean scale we see that number of protests or demonstrations attended by the average citizen increases from round 1 to round 3 for every country except Zimbabwe regardless of the electoral quality (table 7.4). This may lend support to Lindberg's argument that participating in democratic activities builds democratic attitudes and thus moving towards institutionalized behaviour.¹⁰³ However the fact that the both the absolute and mean scale reflect marginal changes (and in different directions) it is unlikely that electoral quality influences electorates in attending demonstrations, given this particular data set.

¹⁰³ Diamond also described the process of consolidation as "repeatable routinized...patterns of behaviour"

Attend Demonstration			
Country	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Benin			0.97
Botswana	0.54	0.74	0.84
Cape Vert		0.75	0.85
Ghana	0.23	0.29	0.44
Kenya		0.71	0.70
Lesotho	0.37	0.36	0.52
Madagascar			0.56
Malawi	0.42	0.55	0.81
Mali	0.21	0.48	0.45
Mozambique			1.01
Namibia	0.83	0.67	0.87
Nigeria	0.19	0.61	0.66
Senegal			0.87
South Africa	0.94	0.79	0.93
Tanzania	0.35	0.93	0.78
Uganda			0.60
Zambia	0.47	0.52	0.61
Zimbabwe	0.99	0.68	0.47

Table 7.4 Attend Demonstrations by country on the Mean Scale

Indeed this data set has some incongruencies which might help explain the findings discussed above. The first challenge with this is data set is in regards to time. In some countries the survey asked the number of protests or demonstrations attended “in the last **year**,” whereas in other countries (Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria in Round 1) it asked “in the last **five years**.” The change in the amount of time given for one to “count,” their demonstration activity causes even more problems because the surveys were taken at varying lengths of time following each election. The time between election and survey administration is highly variable from country to country and from round to round ranging from 4.5 years to 3 months. If in fact there are more opportunities to participate in demonstrations immediately before and after an election, then the difference in time between survey and election becomes a significant complicating factor.

Second, survey respondents have been known to overestimate their participation. For the survey conducted in Mozambique in 2005, 6 months after the 2004 election, a higher percentage of people responded that they had voted in the most recent election than the actual percent of people who voted when compared to the national population.¹⁰⁴ Thus the proclivity of respondents to “overestimate” their level of participation, and the varying lengths of time between election and survey as well as the varying lengths of time proposed in the actual question, once again make it challenging to draw any definitive conclusions for the “attend demonstration” variable.

¹⁰⁴ AB working paper 91

		Free and Fair Mean	Demand For	Supply of	Demonstrations Attended	Contact Government	Obey_Police
Free and Fair Mean	Pearson Correlation	1.000	-.102	.785**	.127	.174	.309
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.598	.000	.520	.519	.227
	N	29.000	29	29	28	16	17
Demand for	Pearson Correlation	-.102	1.000	-.150	-.323	-.070	-.151
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.598		.404	.082	.798	.514
	N	29	33.000	33	30	16	21
Supply of	Pearson Correlation	.785**	-.150	1.000	-.055	.140	.294
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.404		.774	.604	.196
	N	29	33	33.000	30	16	21
Demonstrations Attended	Pearson Correlation	.127	-.323	-.055	1.000	-.074	-.350
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.520	.082	.774		.784	.141
	N	28	30	30	30.000	16	19
Contact Government	Pearson Correlation	.174	-.070	.140	-.074	1.000	.484
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.519	.798	.604	.784		.058
	N	16	16	16	16	16.000	16
Obey Police	Pearson Correlation	.309	-.151	.294	-.350	.484	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.227	.514	.196	.141	.058	
	N	17	21	21	19	16	21.000

Table 7.1 Correlation with Behaviour Variables on the Mean Scale

		Free and Fair Mean	Demand For	Supply of	Demonstrations Attended	Contact Government	Obey_Police
Free and Fair Mean	Pearson Correlation	1.000	-.102	.785**	.127	.174	.309
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.598	.000	.520	.519	.227
	N	29.000	29	29	28	16	17
Demand for	Pearson Correlation	-.102	1.000	-.150	-.323	-.070	-.151
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.598		.404	.082	.798	.514
	N	29	33.000	33	30	16	21
Supply of	Pearson Correlation	.785**	-.150	1.000	-.055	.140	.294
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.404		.774	.604	.196
	N	29	33	33.000	30	16	21
Demonstrations Attended	Pearson Correlation	.127	-.323	-.055	1.000	-.074	-.350
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.520	.082	.774		.784	.141
	N	28	30	30	30.000	16	19
Contact Government	Pearson Correlation	.174	-.070	.140	-.074	1.000	.484
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.519	.798	.604	.784		.058
	N	16	16	16	16	16.000	16
Obey Police	Pearson Correlation	.309	-.151	.294	-.350	.484	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.227	.514	.196	.141	.058	
	N	17	21	21	19	16	21.000

		Supply	Demand	Attend Demonstration	Obey Law	Contact Gov't Official
Supply	Pearson Correlation	1.000	-.032	-.171	.380	.144
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.871	.425	.147	.609
	N	28.000	28	24	16	15
Demand	Pearson					

Chapter 8 Conclusions

Based on the data analysis above there is enough evidence to conclude that elections and the quality of their outcomes impact democratic health as measured by perceptions of democratic supply and democratic demand. In order to prove this, this study first validated the FF mean and FF absolute percent scale by comparing them to each other and to FF Expert scale. There was a strong and significant correlation between FF mean and FF absolute percent, however the five or six cases that were considered outliers and found in quadrant 1 were equally informative. These elections were all subsequent elections following a flawed election, meaning that electoral outcomes had the ability to influence opinions even into the next election cycle. This further validates the “active learning” model that suggests citizens base their opinions on their interactions with democratic institutions.¹⁰⁵ The FF mean and FF absolute percent also correlated with FF Expert on a four point scale. The strength of the correlation and the value of eta squared being above .5 suggests that citizens do pay attention to elections and are equally capable of determining free and fairness as any other electoral independent expert.

Second this study showed that there was a strong and significant relationship between electoral quality and perceived supply of democracy. Although the relationship between free and fairness and supply was significant on the absolute percent scale, the strength and significance of the correlation improved when “first” elections were removed from the dataset. Indeed many of the countries that transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s had low supply levels but high levels of free and fairness following the first election and were a significant distance away from the mean. By the second election (or in the case of South Africa the third election) these countries were much closer to the line of best fit. The reason for this discrepancy could be that citizens in these countries may have been unsure what to base their opinions of democracy on. After going through a full election cycle it appears that electorates begin to equate supply of democracy with free and fair elections. Unlike supply, the relationship between electoral quality and demand however, was weak and insignificant. Indeed after examining FF mean and Demand mean as well as FF absolute percent and Demand absolute percent, it is possible to conclude that there is no direct relationship between the level of freeness and fairness and the level of democratic demand.

Thirdly this study sought to determine causality by examining the change in levels of supply and demand where elections and then countries was the unit of analysis. When elections were the unit of analysis this study showed that level of supply increased after free and fair elections, decreased

¹⁰⁵ Mattes and Bratton, 2006

after flawed elections and barely changed during periods of no elections. Similarly demand decreased after flawed elections, but also decreased during periods of non-election, and barely changed during free and fair elections. Although directionally and proportionally this data validated the hypothesis, the difference between the average change in supply and demand after free and fair, flawed, and no election was only significant at the .1 level on the Supply Absolute Percent Scale. This is largely due to the low number of data points and the disproportionate effect one election can have on the mean, standard deviation, and thus the significance. This was shown by removing both of the Zimbabwe elections from the dataset for change in demand. When Zimbabwe was removed the difference between the mean of flawed elections and the mean of free and fair became significant at the .1 level. The low number of data points also made it difficult to conclude that it takes at least two flawed elections to produce a significant decrease in demand.

The directional and proportional changes were reaffirmed when using countries as a unit of analysis. The countries were split between those that had flawed elections and those that only free and fair. By the third round of the AB survey all of the countries that had flawed elections had supply levels below 2.4 (with the exception of Mali) whereas all those that had only free and fair elections had levels of supply greater than 2.4. Although the graphs that show change in demand per country do not have as clear a dividing point, there are characteristic that separates the free and fair from the flawed. The main characteristic being that countries with only free and fair elections show very little change from round to round, whereas those with flawed elections show more than a .2 change from round to round and mostly in the negative direction. This is especially true for countries with multiple flawed elections.

Indeed as demonstrated by using both elections and countries as unit of analysis to assess the causal effect of flawed elections on supply and demand, elections seem much more capable of alienating democrats or reducing democratic health than of building democrats or improving democratic health. The fact that flawed elections have the ability to do more negative damage than free and fair elections can do positive good has implications for democratic consolidation in Africa. As discussed previously the demand component evaluates how consolidated a democracy is based on beliefs that democracy is the only legitimate form of government. Larry Diamond suggests that a democracy should only be considered consolidated if more than 2/3 of the population believe that democracy is the only legitimate form of government, which is also what the Demand component hopes to capture. Although no country in this study has achieved a Demand absolute percent score of 66%, the countries that are closest; Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, have also consistently had free and fair elections. Other countries such as Zambia and Nigeria, may have a higher proportion of

committed democrats than other countries who have only had free and fair elections, but both of these countries lost nearly 20% of committed democrats following flawed elections. Thus free and fair elections alone do not seem to have the ability to achieve the Diamond threshold of consolidation, yet flawed elections are shown to reduce demand significantly and thus undermine or retard the consolidation process.

Examining the effect of flawed elections on levels of participation in democratic activities was somewhat less fruitful. Although it is possible that elections influence the behaviour of the electorate on some level, both the lack of data and the inconsistency of the data analyzed here made it difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. However, the strong and significant correlation between the change in demand for democracy and the change in number of people who contacted a government official is both encouraging and suggests that future studies with the benefit of more data may be able to draw similar conclusions regarding the impact of flawed elections.

Indeed as more data becomes available and the Afro barometer completes the fourth round of surveys I expect to find the strength of the correlation between electoral quality and supply of and demand for democracy to improve. The recent flawed elections in Kenya, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and a seemingly questionable but credible poll in Ghana has the potential to nearly double the number of dyads that capture a flawed election. Although a boon for this analysis, the elections in the past few years suggests that electoral quality is once again declining in Africa, after a period of relative improvement. If in fact this analysis holds up upon the inclusion of additional data, the declining quality of elections in Africa has significant consequences on support for democratic consolidation on the continent. It behoves other interested scholars to continue to investigate the effect of elections on democratic consolidation, and explore other avenues suggested here; such as the effect of early or 1st elections against later or 4th elections. This analysis also lends empirical evidence to what election observers and electoral organizations have been saying all along, electoral quality matters. Now these organizations, together with African citizens, must find a way to make electoral outcomes, better.

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
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
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
Appendix II: Graphs Chapters 4-5




Graph 4.1 Electoral Quality




Graph 4.2 Electoral Quality with Line of Best Fit




Graph 4.3 Simple Scatter Plot of FF Mean and FF Expert




Graph 4.4 Box Plot of FF mean and FF Expert




Graph 4.5 Simple Scatter Plot of FF Abs Percent and FF Expert




Graph 4.6 Box Plot of Abs Percent and FF Expert




Graph 5.1 Electoral Quality and Supply on the Mean Scale




Graph 5.2 Electoral Quality and Supply on the Absolute Percent Scale



Graph 5.3 Electoral Quality and Supply without 1st Elections



Graph 5.4 Electoral Quality and Demand on the Mean Scale



Graph 5.5 Electoral Quality and Demand on the Absolute Percent Scale