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# The Sudan: Civil War and Peace-Making

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy in Justice and Transformation

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## COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: signature removed Date: 30/05/06

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## Abbreviations & Acronyms

AACC	All African Conference of Churches
AU	African Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNPC	Chinese National Petroleum Company
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EIJ	Egyptian Islamic Jihad
ELI	Egypt-Libya Initiative
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
GNU	Government of National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
HEC	High Executive Council
ICF	Islamic Charter Front
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGADD/IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (since 1997)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPF	IGAD Partnership Forum
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDTFs	Multi-Donor Trust Funds
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NIF	National Islamic Front
NPC	National Petroleum Commission
NRDF	National Reconstruction and Development Fund
NUP	National Unionist Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PC	Popular Congress

PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SAF	Sudan Allied Forces
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SCP	Sudan Communist Party
SDF	Sudan Defense Force
SF	Southern Front
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-United	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army - United
SSLM/ A	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Force
SSIM/A	Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSRDF	Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund
TMC	Transitional Military Council
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAP	Union of Sudan African Parties
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WCC	World Council of Churches

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## **Abstract**

The Sudanese civil war which just ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a conflict over recognition and opportunities between the center and the periphery, the centre being occupied by the elite of the North – Nile valley representing minority percentage of the entire population. It compounded issues of economic and political marginalization where religion, race and ethnicity were politicized and manipulated. The legacy of colonial rule, the independence movement that followed and the inconsistent policies of nation-building thereafter are some of the factors which further shaped the center-periphery dichotomy.

The first civil war (1955 – 1972) came to an end with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. However, violation of the agreement eleven years later, in 1983, led to the breakout of the second civil war (1983 – 2005) which only ended with the signing of the CPA. In addition to these agreements, there were a number of peace initiatives, internal and external, brokered to bring peace in the Sudan.

As both civil wars have their own unique characteristics the agreements were also negotiated and signed under specific nature, conditions and circumstances. This paper will therefore look at the specifics of the Sudanese civil wars and subsequent peace-making processes. The emphasis of the study will be on the Addis Ababa Agreement, signed in 1972 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. The overall objective of the research is to understand the factors and patterns of the Sudanese civil war and subsequent peace negotiation processes.

## Chronology of Major Events

1820 - 1881	Turko-Egyptian rule over the Sudan
1881 - 1889	Mahdiyya rule
1889 - 1956	Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule
1930	Announcement of Southern Policy
1938	Graduates' Congress, led by General Secretary Ismail al-Azhari founded
1943	Ansar and Khatmiyya sects formed
1946	Reversal of Southern Policy of 1930
1947	Juba Conference which for the first time brought Northern and Southern representatives, chiefs, prominent Arabs and British officials together to discuss new Southern Policy
1948	Creation of 93 members Legislative Assembly in Khartoum
1951	Appointment of a 13 member Constitutional Commission
1952	Cairo Conference to discuss the nature of self-government for the Sudan. Representatives of Northern political parties, Britain and Egypt were present, while South was not represented
1953	Self-government act  Sudan's elections result in victory for the National Unionist Party (NUP) under the leadership of Ismail Al-Azhari
1954	Opening of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Sudanese Parliament with Al-Azhari heading NUP government
1955	NUP and Al-Azhari move from union with Egypt towards independence of Sudan  Uprising in the South against Northern rule  Parliament voted unanimously for independence Northern parties and government promised to consider federation as a solution to the Southern problem
1956	Sudan became independent state  Parliamentary appointment of a Constitutional Committee

	<p>43 Northerners and 3 Southerners</p> <p>Rejection of a federal arrangement by Northerners and withdrawal of Southerners from the Committee</p>
1957	Federalism for South abandoned
1958	<p>Military coup by Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud</p> <p>Suspension of provincial constitution and dismissal of Parliament</p> <p>Forced Islamization and Arabization of South Sudan nationals</p>
1963	<p>Formation of the Sudan African National Union (SANU)</p> <p>Launching of the Anya Nya guerrilla movement and declaration of total war against Northern troops in the South</p>
1964	Fall of Gen. Abboud and appointment of Transitional Government led by Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifa
1965	<p>Roundtable Conference on the problem of the Southern Sudan, with representatives of Southern and Northern parties</p> <p>Appointment of 12 man Committee to explore areas of constitutional compromise between North and South</p>
1969	<p>“May Revolution” successful coup led by Col. Jaafar Mohammed el-Nimeiri</p> <p>Declaration of policy of Regional Autonomy for Southern Provinces</p>
1971	<p>Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) formed</p> <p>Secret negotiations begin</p> <p>Visit by delegation of WCC and AACC to explore ways toward reconciliation</p> <p>Abortive coup by SCP</p> <p>Appointment of Abel Alier as Minister of Southern Affairs and Vice President</p> <p>Lagu forms the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)</p> <p>Nimeiri becomes executive president</p> <p>Preliminary talks in Addis between SSLM and GoS</p>

1972	<p>Formal peace talks begin Addis Ababa Agreement signed</p> <p>Ceasefire Ratification of Peace Accord</p>
1973	<p>Sudan's first Permanent Constitution is proclaimed</p> <p>Sudan becomes one-party state</p> <p>Southern autonomy confirmed</p> <p>Abel Alier becomes the president of Southern Regional Assembly</p>
1976	<p>Attempted coup backed by Libya</p>
1978	<p>Oil discovered by Chevron in Bentin in Southern Sudan</p> <p>National reconciliation agreement</p>
	<p>Appearance of SPLM/SPLA</p> <p>Presidential decree dividing south into 3 provinces</p> <p>Presidential decree introducing Islamic law</p> <p>Second Civil War erupts</p>
1985	<p>Nimeiri is deposed by senior army officers who form the Transitional Military Council (TMC) under Lt. Gen. Abd ar Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab</p>
1986	<p>Koka Dam Declaration</p>
1988	<p>DUP negotiates with SPLA to begin a peace process</p>
1989	<p>NIF led military coup overthrew the civilian government and installing a military regime once again. Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) established</p> <p>Bashir forms a government</p>
1991	<p>SPLA splits into Torit and Nasir groups</p> <p>Clashes between the Torit and Nasir groups</p>
1992	<p>National Transition Assembly formed – Bashir announced return to civilian rule</p> <p>Nigeria peace conference - Abuja I to unite Southern rebels</p>

1993	<p>SPLA-United formed</p> <p>Nigeria peace conference - Abuja II</p> <p>Sudan listed as state supporting international terrorism</p> <p>RCC dissolved; Bashir becomes president and Head of State</p>
1994	<p>IGADD talks begin</p> <p>IGAD Declaration of Principles adopted</p>
1995	<p>Opposition conference in Eritrea</p> <p>Attempt to assassinate Egyptian president</p> <p>Asmara Declaration of National Democratic Alliance (NDA)</p>
1996	<p>UN Resolution condemns Sudan for terrorism</p>
1997	<p>New chapter of cooperation - government signs Khartoum Agreement with Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and other rebel groups in the south, leaving SPLM in isolation</p> <p>Government faces military losses and regional isolation and returns to IGAD talks</p> <p>US imposes sweeping economic sanctions on Sudan</p>
1998	<p>New constitution endorsed</p> <p>US cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum</p>
1999	<p>Bashir dissolves National Assembly and declares a state of emergency following power struggle with parliamentary speaker Al-Turabi</p> <p>Sudan begins to export oil</p>
2001	<p>Popular National Congress (PNC) Al-Turabis' group signs MoU with SPLM/A. A day later, Turabi is arrested and placed under house arrest</p> <p>Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative establishes DOP</p>
2002	<p>Key issues on religion and self-determination signed (Machakos Protocol)</p>

2003	<p>Talks resume. Plans also made for a separate symposium dealing with disputed border territories of Southern Blue Nile, Abyei and the Nuba Mountains</p> <p>Security deal signed in Naivasha</p> <p>Government releases Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi</p> <p>SPLM/A-United merges with SPLM/A</p> <p>GoS and SPLM/A negotiators agree in principle on sharing oil revenues</p>
2004	<p>Protocol on wealth sharing is signed in Naivasha</p> <p>Al-Turabi arrested in Khartoum accused of plotting anti-government coup since 2002</p> <p>Protocol on power sharing signed in Naivasha</p> <p>Protocol on the resolution of Abyei conflict</p> <p>Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States</p> <p>Parties pledge in front of the UN Security Council to end conflict by 31 December</p> <p>Implementation Modalities of the Protocols signed</p>
2005	<p>Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed</p> <p>Donors pledge 4.5 billion for development and recovery programs in the South</p> <p>National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) was established</p> <p>GoS and exiled opposition grouping – NDA – sign reconciliation deal allowing NDA into power-sharing administration</p> <p>Government frees al-Turabi</p> <p>Garang sworn in as the first Vice President of the Sudan</p> <p>Abyei Boundary Commission Report released</p> <p>Interim constitution signed</p> <p>John Garang's death in a helicopter accident</p>

	<p>Garang is succeeded by Salva Kiir</p> <p>Government of National Unity (GNU) composed of 14 parties is formed</p> <p>Presidential decree on the Technical Committee to draw the 1956 border between North and South endorsed</p> <p>Interim Assembly of Southern Sudan is inaugurated</p> <p>Autonomous government – Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) is formed in the South. Administration is dominated by former rebels</p> <p>National Petroleum Commission established</p> <p>Judicial Service Commission Act approved</p> <p>Board of Directors of the Central Bank approved</p> <p>Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) established</p> <p>President approved the establishment of the Constitutional Court and members were appointed through a presidential decree</p> <p>Joint Defence Board established</p> <p>Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan signed</p>
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## Introduction

In August 1955, four months prior to independence, conflict broke out in the Sudan. The conflict developed into a long and bloody civil war which lasted for almost forty years. Sudan has existed as an independent state for fifty years and only experienced peace for eleven of those (1972 - 1983). The Sudanese civil war is one of the longest, most devastating and complex conflicts in Africa. The Sudan conflict has taken the form of two separate civil wars – the first from 1955 to 1972 and the second from 1983 to 2005.

The years of conflict have been disastrous in both human and economic terms, with millions displaced and country's economy crippled. The Sudanese civil war has claimed the lives of millions of innocent citizens. Estimates show that the first civil war claimed the lives of about 500,000 people and more than a million Sudanese became refugees.<sup>1</sup> The second civil war claimed up to 2 million lives – from direct violence or war-induced disease and starvation. It internally displaced an additional four million Sudanese, and millions went into exile in neighbouring countries.<sup>2</sup>

In discussions of civil war in Sudan, observers commonly use the terms 'North' and 'South', to indicate regions involved in the conflict. In Sudanese terms, 'North' is used loosely to refer to the eastern, western, central and the northern regions of the country, while the term 'South' is used to describe the Southern region, including the three provinces of Bahr el Ghazel, Equatoria and Upper Nile.<sup>3</sup> [See Appendix 1]. 'North' therefore covers about two-thirds of the land mass and population. As it is common practice, this paper will also use these terms to describe these regions.

The North-South dichotomy is shaped by the legacy of colonial rule, the independence movement that followed, and subsequent nation building processes characterized by inconsistent policies. The conflict in the Sudan is a reflection of socio-economic and political imbalance and inequality created and left by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule. Under colonial rule, development initiatives were focused in the North, particularly

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<sup>1</sup> Hizkias Assefa, "World Council of Churches Mediation and the Sudan Civil War, New Approaches to International Mediation", C.R Mitchell and K. Webb (ed.), *Contributions in Political Science, Number 223*, (New York Westport, Connecticut . London, 1988), 147.

<sup>2</sup> Emery Brusset, "Evaluation of Conflict Prevention Pools: Sudan", *Department for International Development (DFID)*, Evaluation Report EV 647, (Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC and Associated Consultants: March 2004), 1.

<sup>3</sup> Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement." *African Affairs*, 76, 303 (Apr. 1977), 144.

along the River Nile. This policy subjected the rest of the country, including the South, to severe economic and political neglect. The 'Northern elite', who have dominated the political and economic platform since independence, originate from around the River Nile area.

The socio-political structure introduced and left behind by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule created problems of social and regional inequality. Roads, schools and other infrastructure were built mainly along the Nile River where about five percent of the population reside. This area also had better education facilities, infrastructure and was developed economically while the rest of the country was neglected. Development initiatives were also focused in this area, while the rest of the country, particularly the South was severely underdeveloped. With the government based in the North, those included in the activities of the state were the educated elite from Khartoum and its surrounding areas. This situation inevitably led to a centre-periphery relationship that ultimately led to civil war.

The 'North-South' terminology belies the fact that the trend of marginalization was not only limited to Southerners. The 'Black Book', anonymously released in 2000 and which is said to have triggered the recent Darfur conflict, tabulated the imbalances over the division of power since the 1950s.<sup>4</sup> For example, for the period between 1954 and 1964, from the seventy-three ministerial positions at the central government, fifty-eight positions were occupied by members of Northern elite, twelve by Southerners and two from the central region. From 1964 to 1969 Northerners dominated in the government with sixty-seven point nine percent representation. The South had seventeen point three percent, central and western regions six point two percent each and the east two point zero-five percent representation.<sup>5</sup> Thus, inequity, injustice and lack of access to scarce resources was not limited to the South. Nevertheless, both instances of civil war broke out in the South and were led by Southern guerrilla movements.

This mini-thesis will examine the Sudanese civil wars and subsequent peace-making processes. The emphasis of the study will be on two peace agreements namely, the Addis

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<sup>4</sup> "Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace", *International Crises Group*, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing, No. 32, 6 October 2005.

<sup>5</sup> *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*, 2000, [http://www.sudanjem.com/english/books/blackbook\\_part1/20040422\\_bbone.htm](http://www.sudanjem.com/english/books/blackbook_part1/20040422_bbone.htm) [accessed 22 October 2005]

Ababa Agreement, signed in 1972 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. The overall objective of the research is to understand the factors and patterns which influenced the parties in the negotiation processes.

### **Primary Research Question and Methodology**

The central research question of this mini-thesis is the following: What are the factors which influenced the parties to negotiate peace in the Sudan? Furthermore, what were the dynamics which contributed to the success or failure of the implementation of the agreements and the establishment of peace in the Sudan?

Each chapter will address specific issues related to this research question. This approach is applied in order to help the reader understand the core issues involved in the civil war and to demonstrate the complexity of the conflict.

Due to the nature of the thesis (mini-thesis), the research will depend heavily on secondary sources. The research is conducted in the form of a descriptive analysis with the characteristics of the agreements studied separately, rather than as a comparative study of the two agreements.

### **Chapter Outlines**

Chapter one of this thesis will investigate the historical background and also identify the fundamental causes of the conflict. Although discussing the history of the Sudan is not the purpose of this paper, an awareness of the historical context is important in understanding the causes of the conflict, and its complexity and to appreciate the problems involved in the peace initiatives.

Chapter two is devoted to the Addis Ababa Agreement and the conditions in which the agreement was negotiated and implemented. The first civil war (1955 to 1972) fought between the government and the Anya Nya (meaning “snake poison”) lasted for about 17 years. The role of the mediators in the peace process– the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) – is important and should not be overlooked. However, as Dunstan Wai has rightly observed, the most important question is “why did the Sudan government, after a period of bitter conflict in which it had invested considerable resources, change its policy and agree to terminate the war on

terms which throughout the period of fighting it had deemed unacceptable?”<sup>6</sup> This chapter will therefore investigate the factors which brought the parties to the negotiating table.

The Addis Ababa agreement addressed a number of critical issues and succeeded in ending the conflict. However, the agreement fell short of sustaining peace, and conflict erupted again in 1983. It is therefore important to understand at what point the agreement failed and why.

Reflecting on the previous chapter, chapter three examines the developments which emerged in the early 1980's leading to the second civil war. It also identifies the internal, regional and international dynamics around the conflict. While the South was again leading the resistance movement, the overall objectives of those involved, and the nature in which the war was conducted were different. In this regard, the chapter will look at the different factors which led to the next phase of the conflict and the peace-making process that followed. Like the Addis Ababa Agreement, it is crucial to look at the political dynamics of the time and also to understand how the negotiation process as well as the actual peace process was influenced.

Chapter four will focus on the different peace talks which led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The political dynamics, the nature and ideology of the parties and the regional and international dimension to the conflict are all pertinent factors which make the second civil war different from the first. This chapter will examine the salient features of the CPA and try to identify whether it has addressed the root causes of the conflict.

The conclusion will discuss the salient features of peace-making and negotiations in the Sudan. It will also highlight the main arguments of the different chapters and contextualize the findings in relation to the research question and the dynamics of political developments in the Sudan.

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<sup>6</sup> Dunstan. M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan*, (New York, London: African Publishing Company, 1981), 162.

# Chapter 1

## Historical Background to the Sudan Conflict

### *Introduction*

The Sudan conflict is understood and portrayed by scholars in different ways. Dunstan Wai describes it as an Arab-African conflict rooted in Arab versus African nationalism, in which Northerners identify with the Arabs and Southerners with 'Negroid' Africans.<sup>7</sup> Francis Deng and Ann Lesch argue that it is a conflict of 'national identity' with race, religion, culture and ethnicity at the root of the problem.<sup>8</sup> Some say it is a religious war between Muslims and followers of indigenous beliefs or Christians.<sup>9</sup> Parties involved in the conflict have their own analyses of the root cause of the conflict. On the one hand, the government sees it as a Southern problem caused by international interference while rebel groups see it as rooted in ethnicity and religion.<sup>10</sup>

This chapter will assess the root causes of the Sudan conflict. Although the above interpretations all have an element of truth, these factors do not entirely explain the fundamental causes of the civil war in the Sudan. The root causes of the Sudan conflict lie in colonialism and its legacy in Sudanese society. Ethnicity, race, religion and identity were often tools used by the colonial powers to manipulate the political, economic and social balance in the Sudan. The perspective of this chapter will be to show how Wai's, Deng's and Lesch's arguments illuminate some of the causes of the conflict but not necessarily the root cause.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 1

<sup>8</sup> See Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, (Washington DC: the Brookings Institution, 1995) and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, (Oxford: James Currey, 1998).

<sup>9</sup> Country Profile: Sudan, BBC News [Online]. Available: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/820864.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm) [accessed July 11, 2006]. Douglas Johnson in his book "The Root Causes of the Sudan Civil War" and Emeric Rogier in "*No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace*" have also made reference to such description of the war.

<sup>10</sup> See "Conflict Resolution in Sudan: Stakeholder Perspectives" in Korwa G. Adar, et al (eds.), *Sudan Peace Process Challenges and Future Prospects*, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), p. 22 - 57

## *Colonialism and its Legacy*

In explaining the origins of the conflict in the Sudan two distinct approaches are commonly used. The first explanation sees the conflict as a continuation of confrontation between two different cultures – ‘Arab culture’ and ‘African culture’. This explanation sees ‘communal cleavage’ between the two communities as leading to an African-Arab schism which became the fundamental problem that beset the Sudan.<sup>11</sup>

In the context of the Sudan, the term ‘Arab’ does not necessarily mean the Arab race found in the Middle East or North Africa. The ‘Arab’ groups in the Sudan are mixed with ‘African’ races to varying degrees – less so in the central Nile valley than in Darfur or Kordofan.<sup>12</sup> These groups are predominantly found in the North – in Khartoum, Blue Nile, Kordofan and the Northern Provinces.<sup>13</sup>

The population in Northern part of the county is generally identified as ‘Arab’ in terms of “racial” classification and Islam is the dominant religion in the region. However, it is important to note that the Beja tribe in Kassala and the Westerners (i.e. west Africans claiming Sudanese status) in Darfur do not claim to be ‘Arabs,’ even though they identify with Islam. The population of the Southern regions who are mainly Nilotics and Nilo-Hamites, are racially ‘African’ and are predominantly followers of indigenous belief. About five percent of this population, mainly the political elite, practice Christianity.<sup>14</sup> (For clarity on regional and provincial groupings see Appendix 1.)

The second approach explains the conflict as a consequence of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule which created the ‘Northern’ and the ‘Southern’ regions through artificial boundaries.<sup>15</sup> This refers to the British policy of indirect rule through tribal chiefs and to the Closed District Ordinance which separated the two regions, leading to a situation where the North developed socio-economically and politically at the expense of the South.

It is important to note that the term ‘North’ in the literature on Sudan is loosely used and

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<sup>11</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 16.

<sup>12</sup> Emeric Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, Clingendael Security Paper No. 1, August 2005, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> The only group which has not mixed is the Rashaida group who settled in the East in the 1870's

<sup>14</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 19

<sup>15</sup> Douglas Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), xiii

refers to the eastern, western, central and Northern regions which represent about two-thirds of the land mass and the population. The 'South' refers to what is known as the Southern region and includes the three provinces of Bahr el Ghazel, Equatoria and Upper Nile.<sup>16</sup> For the sake of consistency, this paper will also follow such referencing.

The concepts used in both explanations for the conflict include exploitation, cultural and religious assimilation, slave-raiding and economic and social injustice committed against marginalized people. Religion and ethnicity have also been identified as factors in the cause of the conflict.

When Francis Deng talks about the issue of 'national identity' being the root cause of the problem he takes the above concepts into account. Identity, as defined by Deng, is 'a function of how people identify themselves and are identified [by others] in race, ethnicity, culture, language, and religion'.<sup>17</sup> Ethnic identification can be a source of conflict once it is politicized. Deng maintains that the 'context in which one's identity is used as a weapon to oppress includes denial of recognition, exclusion ... marginalization and even the threat of cultural annihilation or physical elimination' as a result of one's identity, could be a source of conflict.<sup>18</sup> Thus, once the concept of identity is manipulated it becomes a source for a power struggle.

Sudan has a population estimated at about forty-one million. The majority (fifty-two percent) of the population claim to be 'African'.<sup>19</sup> However, the dominant culture has been the 'Arab' culture. Over half of the population speaks Arabic as their mother tongue while the rest including the Southern Sudanese, use Arabic, or a pidgin form of it as a *lingua franca*.<sup>20</sup> The religious make-up of the country is thus: Sunni Muslim account for seventy percent of the population (mostly in the North), while twenty-five percent of population, mainly in the South, follow indigenous beliefs and about five percent practice Christianity.<sup>21</sup> Out of the seventy percent Muslim population, fifty-seven percent see

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<sup>16</sup> Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement." *African Affairs*, 76, 303 (Apr. 1977), 144.

<sup>17</sup> Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, (Washington DC: the Brookings Institution, 1995), 11.

<sup>18</sup> Deng, *War of Visions*, 11.

<sup>19</sup> CIA: The World Fact Book [Online]. Available: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/su.html> [April 20, 2006].

<sup>20</sup> Muddathir Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 5

<sup>21</sup> CIA: The World Fact Book [Online]. Available: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/su.html> [2006. April 20]

themselves as 'Arab' and forty-three percent as African.. Arabic and Dinka are the two major languages spoken,. There are fourteen other languages, divided into some 100 dialects, half of which are spoken in Southern Sudan.<sup>22</sup>

The identity factor which Deng defines as a source of conflict is linked to differences in race, culture and religion which create differing views concerning the future of the country. According to Deng, such differences lead to a 'War of Vision', where different factions have conflicting ideas on the future of the country. This is also related to Wai's notion of an Arab-African conflict, which he sees as rooted in 'Arabism' versus 'Africanism'.<sup>23</sup>

Issues of national and ethnic identity, politicized by the colonial powers, is not supported as a main cause of the conflict if one takes into account that Sudan is politically and economically dominated by a minority group. This dominant group represents about five point three percent of the population while the majority (about eighty percent) of the population are at the periphery.<sup>24</sup>

### ***The First Period of Colonial Rule (1820-1881)***

When Egypt's ruler, Muhammad Ali invaded *Bilad al-Sudan* (land of the Blacks) – what is more or less present-day Sudan – in 1820 he planned it with three objectives which are related to political, military and economic interests. His political objective was to invade Sudan in order to expand Turko-Egyptian international power in the region.<sup>25</sup> Militarily, Sudan represented a stable supply of strong slaves for Egypt's army, and economically Sudanese gold, ivory and other precious metals would be welcome additions to the Egyptian treasury.<sup>26</sup>

Ali's army first conquered Northern Sudan which was almost completely Islamized and Arabized.<sup>27</sup> The cultural and religious similarities among the populations made it easy for the colonizers to use the peoples of Nubia, Sennar, Kordofan and the Red Sea to

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<sup>22</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, p.1

<sup>23</sup>Wai, *The African-Arab*, 1

<sup>24</sup> According to the Black Book, five point three percent of Sudan's population is represented at seventy-nine point five percent at executive and ministerial posts in Khartoum.

<sup>25</sup> Peter Woodward, *Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable State*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1990), 13.

<sup>26</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 26.

<sup>27</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 7.

collaborate in slave-raids directed at non-Muslims in the hinterlands of the White Nile and the Nuba Mountains. The Turko-Egyptian army broke through the *Sudd* swamps and penetrated into the South of the region, which opened up commercial opportunities for European, Egyptian and Northern Sudanese merchants to trade.<sup>28</sup> The North became a base for carrying out operations to the South. From the hinterlands of the White Nile and the Nuba Mountain alone, about ten thousand slaves were exported to Egypt annually.<sup>29</sup>

By the 1840's slave trade became increasingly profitable, and the Southern Sudanese became the victims of merciless traders who were brutal in their dealings with the local people. By breaking through the *Sudd*, the Turkiyya altered the political and economic *status quo* between the North and the South. As it was forbidden for Muslims enslave other Muslims, slave raids to the non-Muslim South continued on a massive scale.<sup>30</sup> This marked the beginning of the North-South division in the Sudan.

Wai, Deng and Lesch agree that the Sudanese civil war was initiated by factors that go as far back as the first colonial rule. In his book 'The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars' Douglas Johnson also makes reference to colonialism as an historical factor which helped to trigger the civil war.<sup>31</sup> The South was initially unaffected by political events in the North but became a victim once the Turko-Egyptian armies expanded southward.

The first attempt to form a central administration in the Sudan occurred during Turko-Egyptian rule.<sup>32</sup> The territorial unity of the North and South was imposed by conquest and maintained by force. The new administration destroyed the domains of indigenous kingdoms such as Dar Fur and Sennar, and imposed a central authority which ruled from Khartoum.<sup>33</sup> The infrastructural developments introduced during this period encouraged economic growth. These included administrative structures, schools, communications, and security, mainly around Khartoum.<sup>34</sup> However, such limited development strengthened the position of those at the centre (i.e. central riverin Sudan) at the expense of the peripheries.<sup>35</sup> Hence, riverin Sudan became the centre of administration while the

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<sup>28</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 5.

<sup>29</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 14.

<sup>30</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 14.

<sup>31</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, xviii.

<sup>32</sup> Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 26.

<sup>33</sup> Sharif Harir, "Recycling the Past in the Sudan", in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt eds., *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), 23.

<sup>34</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 27.

<sup>35</sup> Harir, *Recycling the Past*, 30.

peripheries, including the South, West and East were economically and politically marginalized. This was only the beginning of the separate development of the regions, which in the long run led to 'structural contradiction' in the Sudan.

The government introduced a new form of taxation, which impoverished some areas of Northern Sudan, and the Northerners slave raiding increased.<sup>36</sup> The Shariqiyya, from north of Khartoum, the Rufa'a of the Blue Nile, and the Baqqara along the White Nile and in the west became involved in official raids with the army and also organized raids of their own.<sup>37</sup> Cattle raiding, plundering of foodstuff and seizing slaves were common practice. As the momentum of the slave trade increased, slaves were used not only in the army, but as agricultural labourers, servants, cooks, blacksmiths and construction workers.

From the Southern perspective, those who invaded the South, including Muslim merchants from the North, Egyptians and European traders were as responsible as the Turko-Egyptian conquerors for destroying the livelihood in the South.<sup>38</sup> Slave-raiding reached its peak in the 1870s and overwhelmed and devastated the Southern societies. Northern slave traders particularly the riverin merchants, including Zubeir Pasha Rahma, who was appointed Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal in 1873, enjoyed the support of central government. Slave-trading was seen by the government as one of the objectives of invading the Sudan in the first place.

The historical processes which separated the North and the South of the country therefore began during the Turko-Egyptian rule. Though Islam came to the Sudan around the seventh century, the effect of Arabization and Islamization was only felt after the Turko-Egyptian rule forced Northerners to participate in the slave raids. Once Khartoum – a riverin city – became the capital city of the Sudan in 1833 a pattern of centre-periphery relations was reinforced, wherein the Centre (riverin Sudan and its immediate surroundings) was politically and economically dominant, while the rest of the country, including the Kassala, Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan and Southern region was marginalised. The political consequence was felt once the economic and political pattern started to develop in a discriminatory way. This was just the beginning of a long-term political situation, in existence by the time Sudan was conquered for the second time, this

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<sup>36</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 5.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 27

time by Anglo-Egyptian joint rule.

### ***Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule 1898 – 1956***

One of the causes of the conflict in Sudan was the British administration's attempt to separate the North and the South through an 'artificial boundary'. The Anglo-Egyptian alliance conquered Sudan after defeating the Mahdist army in 1898.<sup>39</sup> Even though the condominium rule was a system of shared governance between Britain and Egypt, the latter's presence was nominal as it was under British protection.

Britain sought control over the Sudan because, by virtue of its proximity to Egypt and the Suez Canal and as the source of the greater Nile River, Sudan's geopolitical setting made it an important territory both economically and politically. In addition to being an important trading route for both Egypt and Britain, Egypt's welfare depended on the Nile water which runs through the Sudan.<sup>40</sup> During the 'Scramble for Africa' in the 1880s the country was seen as strategically important, and attracted the interest of Belgium and France.<sup>41</sup>

Conquest followed distinctly different patterns in the North and in the South. In the North, the cultural and religious similarity with Egypt made it easier for the Northern Sudanese to accept the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule, whereas in the South, resistance was shown to the colonial rule until 1930's.<sup>42</sup> While the colonial administration invested considerably in the political, economic, social and cultural development of the North, the South remained isolated and underdeveloped.<sup>43</sup> In the North, the government financed social service projects, such as schools and hospitals, throughout the 1930s. In the South, the government had limited objectives - the establishment and maintenance of law and order while defending its own position in the face of tribal unrest.<sup>44</sup>

The pattern of playing-off the centre against the periphery was repeated under the Condominium rule. By consolidating the central administration in Khartoum, as it was the case under the Turko-Egyptian rule, the Governor-General of the Sudan isolated the

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<sup>39</sup> The present boundaries of the Sudan were formed in 1916 once Darfur came under British occupation.

<sup>40</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 24.

<sup>41</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 33.

<sup>42</sup> Abel Alier, "The Southern Sudan Question" in Dunstan M. Wai ed., *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*. (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 13.

<sup>43</sup> Deng, *War of Visions*, 11.

<sup>44</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 37.

administration from the South both in terms of physical distance and its guiding preoccupations.<sup>45</sup> This again left the South and other marginalized areas on the periphery of central governments concern.<sup>46</sup>

In the South and in some areas in the Nuba Mountains there was little assimilation of indigenous structures into the administration. This was mainly due to the lack of organized executive authorities or tribal chiefs.<sup>47</sup> To strengthen its political and material base the administration sought friendly and collaborative tribal chiefs.<sup>48</sup> To establish its authority, the administration exercised indirect rule through what was known as native administration, which delegated administrative functions to the tribal chiefs of the various communities whenever possible.<sup>49</sup> To ensure compliance, the British administration established tribal chief's among those who were in contact with the Northern riverin society and had acquired knowledge of the Arabic language and trade.<sup>50</sup>

In the North, families who held authority under Turko-Egyptian rule were re-instated as part of the government bureaucracy. Key influential Sufi Islamic families like the Khatmiyya who originated with Muhammad Utham al-Mirghani (1793-1853) were given positions in the government.<sup>51</sup> The British also allowed the 'posthumous son of the Mahdi,' Sayyid Abdal-Rahman al-Mahdi, who was also from the Sufi brotherhood, to collect zakat (Islamic tithes) from its followers and to develop profitable pump-irrigated cotton schemes on Aba Island and in the Gezira district.<sup>52</sup> Mahdi followers were mainly from the west. The economic and political power of these families increased under British rule and later became a strong political movement.

Throughout the first phase of the condominium rule, from 1899 to 1919, which PM Holt and MW Daly called the period of 'pacification and consolidation',<sup>53</sup> the policy of the government towards the Southern provinces was largely passive or *laissez-faire*.<sup>54</sup> The

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<sup>45</sup> Johnson, *Root Causes*, 10.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 10-11.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 12.

<sup>48</sup> Yoshiko Kurita, "The Social Bases of Regional Movements in Sudan: 1960s-1980s" in Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds.), *Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, (London: James Currey, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 203.

<sup>49</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 34.

<sup>50</sup> Kurita, *The Social Bases*, 203-204.

<sup>51</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 26.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 29.

<sup>53</sup> PM Holt and MW Daly, *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, Firth edition (England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 101.

<sup>54</sup> Abd-al Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 71.

colonial authorities restricted their role in the area to the maintenance of law and order and the provision of different forms of assistance to Christian missionary societies. However, during the second phase – post Egyptian revolution of the early 1920's – the government became increasingly active and interventionist, especially after the uprising of the White Flag League – a manifestation of Sudanese Nationalism – in 1924 which the British and tribal chiefs, including al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani saw as a damaging to their indirect rule and the established social order.<sup>55</sup>

It was in this spirit that the colonial rule introduced the Closed District Ordinance in the 1920s and regulated the movement of non-native persons in the South.<sup>56</sup> The Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922 made Southern Sudan off limits to all non-African Sudanese and also limited Southerners from travelling to the North. The Southern Policy introduced in 1930 officially barred Northerners from the South and created a social and commercial barrier between the two populations.<sup>57</sup>

The decision to administer the North and South separately reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North. At the same time Christian missionary education of the population was encouraged in the South.<sup>58</sup> The activities of the Christian missionary societies were also sought to help win the confidence and support of Southern inhabitants.<sup>59</sup>

### **The Southern Policy**

Although cultural and religious differences between the Southern and Northern provinces existed, the basic considerations which dictated the government's Southern policy were the colonial interests of the British Empire in the Sudan and in East Africa.<sup>60</sup> Broadly, the British wanted to keep Arab and Islamic influences out of East Africa.<sup>61</sup> The government therefore encouraged the establishment of western institutions, Christianity in particular.<sup>62</sup> Through its separation policy the government "aimed not at creating a non-Islamic culture, but an anti-Islamic one".<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 30.

<sup>56</sup> Johnson, *Root Causes*, 12.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Deng, *War of Visions*, 11.

<sup>59</sup> Abd-al Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 72.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. 71.

<sup>61</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 32.

<sup>62</sup> Dunstan M. Wai, "Pax Britannica and the Southern Sudan: The View from the Theatre." *African Affairs*, 79, 316 (July 1980), 379.

<sup>63</sup> Abdelwahab El-Affendi, 'Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa', *Africa Affairs*, 89, 356 (July 1990), 372.

Having lost America as a source of raw material (cotton) for their textile industry, the British saw Sudan's potential in meeting the demand. The British began developing the Gezira cotton plantation, south of Khartoum, and also established a railway line in the North for transporting cotton from Gezira and manufactured products imported from Britain.<sup>64</sup> The British did not see the South as a source of raw materials or even a market for finished products. Hence, there was no incentive for them to invest in the administrative, educational or economic development of the region.<sup>65</sup>

The alleged reason behind the Southern Policy was to protect the South from the North's religious influence and dominance.<sup>66</sup> However, it would be difficult to defend the way in which this policy was implemented. The prohibition of the Arabic language, the abolition of Arab names, the wholesale accusations against all Northerners for being slave dealers, and the advantage given to Christian missionaries over Muslim preachers made the policy seem discriminatory.<sup>67</sup>

The Southern Policy of the British administration was successful in ending slavery in the South as interaction between the people of the North and the South was discouraged.<sup>68</sup> However, the Southern policy did not strive to bring social and economic progress in the South to match the growth in the North. The policy led to the development of a different political, economic and social trajectory which widened the North-South dichotomy.<sup>69</sup>

The decision to administer the two regions separately reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North, while the introduction of Christian missionary education and the English language further separated the South.<sup>70</sup> This difference opened options that the South would either develop into a separate territorial and political entity or eventually be integrated into what was then British East Africa (namely, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, including Zanzibar). However, these anticipated events never took place and the South was faced with enormous challenge of competing with the Northern region which was

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<sup>64</sup> Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict*. Boulder, (London: Westview Press, 1987), 44.

<sup>65</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 44.

<sup>66</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 31–32.

<sup>67</sup> Alier, *The Southern Sudan*, 15.

<sup>68</sup> M.A. Mohamed Salih, "The Ideology of the Dinka and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement" in Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, eds., *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, (London: James Currey, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 195.

<sup>69</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 31–32.

<sup>70</sup> Deng, *War of Visions*, 11.

relatively advanced and developed. Though Britain revised its policy of separate development in 1946, it neither had the time nor the will to make proper constitutional arrangements on the future of the South.<sup>71</sup>

The realities of post-independence confirmed the difficulty of uniting two regions with very different levels of development. A situation of centre-periphery relations where the former is in full control and the latter is in full subordination was inevitable. The divisive Turko-Egyptian rule and Britain's policy of separate administration led to unequal development in terms of distribution of wealth, administrative role in the government as well as general participation in the economy. These are some of the factors which triggered the conflict in 1955.

### ***Sudanese Nationalist Movement leading to Independence***

Anglo-Egyptian rule set the political milieu of post-independence Sudan. It was during this time that Sudanese nationalism matured, the major political parties formed and preparation for independence began. The rise of the educated 'Northern elite' who were at the forefront of the nationalist movement also began during this time.

### ***Sudanese Nationalism***

The White Flag League, influenced by the Egyptian nationalist movement, began the push for independence in the 1920's. The Graduates' General Congress (GGC), founded by Ismail al-Azhari in 1938, continued the movement for political rights, including the right to self-determination, the right to establish a Sudanese representative body, the establishment of a Higher Education Council, judicial reform and educational and economic upliftment.<sup>72</sup> This small but vocal urban educated class in the North gradually became the 'unofficial' voice representing Northern Sudanese attitudes.<sup>73</sup> There was no similar Southern voice at this point.

Internal tension between unionists and separatists split the Congress. The split also reflected sectarian interests, in which al-Mirghani and the Khatmiyya family tacitly

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<sup>71</sup> Deng, *War of Visions*, 11.

<sup>72</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 30.

<sup>73</sup> Mansour Khalid, *The Government they Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution*, (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990), 43.

supported the Ashiqqa party led by al-Azhari who was pro-unity with Egypt, while the Ansar sect, led by the Mahdi family were for an independent and separate Sudan. This eventually led to the creation of two of the strongest sectarian parties – the National Unionist Party (NUP), later known as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of the al-Mirghani family and the Umma party of the Mahdi family. Internal divisions on the future of Sudan undermined the movement, as the issue of self-determination revolved around who would inherit the instruments of state.<sup>74</sup>

From the GCC also emerged a group known as the ‘Northern elite’. The term ‘Northern elite’ refers to a group of western educated riverin elite, who trace their roots to religious or secular families such as the Ansar and Khatmiyya.<sup>75</sup> These groups of people who represent only about 5.3% of the population have since dominated the socio-economic and political spheres through the Umma party, the DUP and other major parties including the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and the National Islamic Front (NIF).<sup>76</sup>

Other parties also emerged in the 1940s. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) was one of them. The SCP, which emerged from Marxism imported from Egypt introduced new ideologies and also protest strategies such as mass demonstrations, strikes and petitions.<sup>77</sup>

### ***Road to Independence***

Responding to pressure from the North, the British laid plans to merge the Northern and Southern regions.. In 1943, before the Southern Policy was changed, the British created an Advisory Council with the objective of establishing a legislative assembly whose jurisdiction would encompass the entire country.<sup>78</sup> Members of the council however, were only drawn from the Northern region.

The reversal of the Southern Policy in 1946 was followed by a conference which brought together representatives from the North and the South to discuss the future of the Sudan. The Juba Conference held in 1947 was also the first time Southerners were invited to a consultative process dealing with the future of the Sudan. It was therefore, the British administration’s first attempt at safeguarding the future interest of the South in a united Sudan even though it was likely that the region would suffer from the consequence of the

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<sup>74</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 128.

<sup>75</sup> R. S. O’Fahey, “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan.” *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXVI. 3 (1996), 261.

<sup>76</sup> The Black Book

<sup>77</sup> Khalid, *The Government*, 85.

<sup>78</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 34.

previous policy of isolation.<sup>79</sup>

However, Southern representatives at the Juba Conference were hand-picked from among those who were on the administration's payroll, such as tribal chiefs, junior officials or police officers.<sup>80</sup> The central concern of the meeting was the establishment of a Legislative Assembly with Southern representation.<sup>81</sup> The new Southern Policy emphasised unity with the North, while the previous policy was about keeping the two regions separate.

The conference was also about transitional measures to accelerate the political and economic integration of the South at a national level. In other words, Britain was preparing the Southern region for independence. Initially, representatives of the South opposed self-government or the independence of the Sudan.<sup>82</sup> While accepting the principle of the conference, Southerners expressed the need for more time to strengthen their educational and economic systems before uniting with the North. The Southern representatives expressed need for the protection inherent in a federal system, revealed their concerns about the power imbalance that existed between the two regions. At the Juba conference they requested guarantees of progress and the preservation of Southern identity in a united Sudan.<sup>83</sup>

However, lack of consensus from within weakened the Southern position. Civil servants favoured immediate participation in the Legislative Assembly and argued that "the best way in which the Southerners could protect themselves would be to go to Khartoum now to legislate together with the Northerners .... In spite of their backwardness ... Southerners must defend themselves and speak and think for themselves".<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, tribal chiefs insisted that they stick to their original request for more time and not change their position which would be a violation of the mandate given to them by the people.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Francis Deng, 'Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan's Conflict of Identities'; in I. William Zartman ed., "Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars", (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995), 89.

<sup>80</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 49.

<sup>81</sup> Woodward, *Sudan 1898-1989*, 72.

<sup>82</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 133.

<sup>83</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 34.

<sup>84</sup> "Proceedings of the Juba Conference," in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 185-188.

<sup>85</sup> Deng, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda*, 85.

93 seats) of the seats was allocated to the South. In the thirteen members Constitutional Amendment Commission established in 1951 only one representative was from the South and the impact of this was felt when the South lost the vote for a federal system.<sup>85</sup> Southern exclusion from decision making was further evidenced when no Southerners were called to join the delegation that went to Cairo in 1952 and 1953 to decide whether the country should become an independent state or merge with Egypt.<sup>86</sup> Present at the meeting were representatives of the British and Egyptian administrations and the Northern political parties, but that pivotal meeting excluded Southern representation.

The process of Sudanization – handing over of the civil service to Sudanese officials – announced in 1954, appointed only six Southerners to administrative positions out of eight hundred posts - about zero point seven-five percent of the jobs Sudanized.<sup>87</sup> Out of the six appointed the highest post was an Assistant District Commissioner position and no Southerners were appointed as governors, deputy governors or at district commissioner level. This is often justified with reference to the Southerner's lack of seniority, experience and education, as well as the lack of Southerners with fluency in Arabic, which directly favours Northerners.

Self government came to the Sudan very much as a surprise to both the North and the South. Jeppie quotes Daly in saying, '... a target date of 1965 was presumed for independence ...'.<sup>88</sup> However, the outcome of the Second World War as well as the regional and local environment left the British with no choice but to begin preparing Sudan for self rule.

The first parliamentary election held in 1953 brought al-Azhari's National Unionist Party (NUP) into government with fifty-one seats followed by the Umma party with twenty-two seats, while the Southern Party – later renamed the Liberal Party – won nine seats.<sup>89</sup> A self-Governance Statute which called for a referendum on independence or union with Egypt was published the same year. However, in October 1955 the NUP and Umma bypassed the Statute and agreed to move towards independence, speeding the adoption of the transitional constitution, a revised version of the 1953 act, and Sudan became an

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<sup>85</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 43.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. 35.

<sup>87</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 56.

<sup>88</sup> Shamil Jeppie, *Sharia and State in the Sudan: from Late Colonialism to Late Islamism*, (Oxford, Somerville College and OCIS, -----), 9

<sup>89</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 35.

independent state on 1 January 1956.<sup>90</sup>

Southern politicians accepted independence on condition that federal status is granted to the three Southern provinces (Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile). A clause which reads ‘... claims of the Southern Members of Parliament for federal government in the three Southern provinces be given full consideration ...’ was inserted in the Independence Resolution and Southerners supported the motion for independence as well as the Transitional Constitution.<sup>91</sup>

To the surprise of Southerners in the parliament, the newly established National Constitutional Committee, which consisted of 46 members, out of which only 3 were from the South, rejected the provision for federal arrangement. In December 1957 Premier Abd Allah Khalil (1956 – 1958) rejected the possibility of Sudan becoming a federal state.<sup>92</sup> This attitude led the few Southern representatives who joined the government to quit, leaving the central government an opportunity to openly impose its policies on the rest of the nation.

The South’s resistance toward independence came to be justified as the subregion’s economic neglect became obvious. By the end of the condominium period 56% of all investment was concentrated in Khartoum, Kassala and the Northern Province which together had a population of about 2.3 million. In contrast, 17% of investment was in the Darfur and Kordofan provinces, which had a population of 3 million.<sup>93</sup> The socio-economic gap between the centre and periphery continued well into the post-independence period.

Khalil’s failure in settling the issues which emerged out of independence led to a military coup in 1958 led by General Aboud. Once Aboud (1958-64) took over power, he suppressed all political parties and multi-party activities. Aboud refused to accept that there was a Southern constitutional problem, His severe reprisals against dissent affected civilian population. Aboud’s regime forcefully imposed the process of Islamization and Arabization on the.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 215.

<sup>91</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 69–70.

<sup>92</sup> Edgar O’ballance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 15.

<sup>93</sup> Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: An Ambiguous Genocide*, (London: Hurst & Co., 2005), 33.

<sup>94</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 61.

## *Status of Islam and Sharia Law in the Sudan*

Since the first parliamentary election, two of the most contentious issues in the country have been the status of the South and the relation between state and religion. Since independence relations between the government and those at the periphery have been challenged by these two factors. Resistance to religious domination was a source of conflict, not just in the South, but also in other marginalized provinces of Darfur, Kassala, Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Muslims who preferred non-theocratic secular government were also excluded and marginalized from the mainstream of political participation.<sup>95</sup>

As part of indirect rule, the Anglo-Egyptian rule consciously institutionalized Islamic policy in the Sudan.<sup>96</sup> Instituting Sharia meant that the colonial administration had accepted Islam as a religion in the Sudan, even though it did so for strategic reasons. Fear of Mahdist revivals and religious elite who could easily be mobilised against foreign conquest was the primary reason.<sup>97</sup>

Although Islam was implicit in Northern Sudanese nationalist discourse since 1920s, political Islam (*Islamism*) as an ideology was not the focus.<sup>98</sup> It is therefore important to make a distinction between those who practice the religion (Muslims) and Islamists. Sean O'Fahey explains Islamism in the context of Sudan as a local expression of the Islamic rebirth and determination to establish a social and political order based upon God's revelation.<sup>99</sup>

Political movements among the Northern Sudanese as they emerged in the 1930s and 1940s, for example the Umma party or the NUP, were based on ethnic and family allegiance and not on religion.<sup>100</sup> The processes of Islamization and Arabization during Abboud's regime was a means to create national unity and less to do with political ideology. Abboud made Arabic compulsory in schools throughout the country and

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<sup>95</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 128.

<sup>96</sup> O'Fahey, *Islam and Ethnicity*, 260.

<sup>97</sup> Jeppie, *Sharia and State*, 5.

<sup>98</sup> Jeppie, *Sharia and State*, 8.

<sup>99</sup> O'Fahey, *Islam and Ethnicity*, 259.

<sup>100</sup> O'Fahey, *Islam and Ethnicity*, 261.

changed the weekly holiday in the South from Sunday to Friday.<sup>101</sup> By 1964 all Christian schools in the South were closed.

Abboud's aspirations were carried out by incoming governments, including democratically elected governments, transitional authorities and military regimes. All positions in these governments were held by riverin elite, who have a common ambition of establishing an Islamic state. For example, in 1966 Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi expressed his wish to introduce an Islamic constitution in the Sudan and stated this in his maiden speech as Prime Minister "the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival".<sup>102</sup> This was followed by the drafting of the constitution in 1968 which termed Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language.<sup>103</sup> For the second time the South boycotted a Constitution Drafting Committee and for the second time, civilian rule failed to rule the Sudan in unity.<sup>104</sup>

Islamism – an Islamist movement with specific religious and political ideology – did not begin until the birth of the Sudanese wing of *al-Ikhwan al-muslimun* (the Muslim Brotherhood) in 1949, later renamed the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and lately known as the National Islamic Front (NIF) or the National Congress Party (NCP). Even then the ICF did not function as a strong political movement until its revival in 1962 by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, member of the Mahdi family.

As a political group, the concern of the Islamist movement since the 1960s has been to attain an Islamic constitution which ultimately guarantees an Islamic state with specific political, economic and social policies.<sup>105</sup> The advocacy of an Islamic state with Islamic identity became a threat to the legal and political rights of non-Muslims.<sup>106</sup> Such policy introduced a new dimension to Sudanese politics and saw a turning-point in the conflict.

The movement towards political Islam was taken further when Ja'afar Nimeri in 1983 introduced a presidential decree which adopted the Sharia law as a national law. The

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<sup>101</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 39.

<sup>102</sup> Quote from Wai, *African-Arab Conflict*, 117.

<sup>103</sup> A. Lesch, *The Sudan*, 42.

<sup>104</sup> Deng, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda*, 89.

<sup>105</sup> O'Fahey, *Islam and Ethnicity*, 262–263.

<sup>106</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 35.

legacy of Nimeiri's action survived into the period of al-Bashir's government and Sharia became a major political topic tied to the state. Islamic control became stronger when NIF, introduced the 'Sudan Charter' which clearly stated that 'Islamic jurisprudence shall be the general source of law ...'.<sup>107</sup>

### ***The Constitution in the Sudan***

From the time of independence, drafting an agreed upon national constitution in Sudan has been a political challenge. Sudan achieved independence with a temporary constitution which was meant to be replaced by a permanent one. Two of the main constitutional challenges in the country were whether Sudan should be a federal or a unitary state, and whether Sudan should have a secular or an Islamic constitution.<sup>108</sup>

Support for an Islamic constitution has existed since the establishment of the first constitution drafting committee in September 1956. Even though the motion was voted out by 21 to 8 votes, Sharia was specified as a basic source of law and Islam as the official religion of the country.<sup>109</sup> However, the Committee did not come up with a permanent constitution. This was repeated under the second democratic government (1964 – 1969) when the national committee formed to review the constitution could not agree on the two points and Southerners boycotted the Constitution Drafting Committee.<sup>110</sup>

The first permanent constitution of the Sudan was only adopted in April 1973 under Ja'afar Nimeiri's rule. The constitution established the Sudan as a secular state while reinstating Sharia as the source of legislation while making provision for non-Muslims.<sup>111</sup> The Southern Province's Regional Self-Government Act of 1972, which granted the South regional autonomy, was also incorporated into the constitution as an organic law.

Although the permanent constitution addressed both issues – regional autonomy for the South and respect of the rights of non-Muslims, its domestic structure for implementing the constitution was not accommodating. Political participation and political institutions remained limited and controlled. Freedom of speech was limited to existing political

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<sup>107</sup> Jeppie, *Sharia and State*, 15.

<sup>108</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 30.

<sup>109</sup> Jeppie, *Sharia and State*, 14–15.

<sup>110</sup> Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism*, 227.

<sup>111</sup> National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, 1973.

organizations.<sup>112</sup> When the constitution was abrogated in 1985, both constitutional questions remained unanswered. Although the transitional constitution of 1985 guaranteed self-rule to the South, as per the 1973 constitution, it was suspended following the 1989 coup.<sup>113</sup>

The next Constitution was only introduced nine years after the NIF seized power. Hardly twelve months after it was issued was it partially suspended in December 1999 by President al-Bashir. Under the present interim government an Interim National Constitution was ratified in July 2005 and a Constitution of Southern Sudan was signed in December the same year. Though Southern questions have been addressed, as the name suggests, these changes are not yet permanent.

### ***Conclusion***

The Sudan conflict is complex and multi-faceted. While colonialism remains the root cause of the conflict, there are overlapping and complementary factors which explain the conflict in a broader sense. First is the emergence of the Northern or riverin elite as the strongest entity in the Sudan. Economic, social and political status in the Sudan has for a long time been determined and monopolized by this small but influential group. It is misleading to suggest that the issues of national identity and an Afro-Arab schism are the root cause of the conflict. Sudan has national crises which is a consequence of colonialism and subsequence socio-economic and political gap between the centre and periphery. It is therefore wrong to generalize the conflict as one which is between the Northerners and Southerners.

Contributing factors in the conflict remain the status of the South and the relation between religion and the state. The emergence of an Islamist movement with a strong ideological base of Islamization in the 1940s, the attempt, since the 1960's to introduce an Islamic law (Shari'a law) as the state law governing the Sudan, and the expansion of political Islam has hindered the efforts made towards a nationally supported constitution.

The duration of the conflict has also contributed to the complexity of the civil war. At the time of independence, the issue of power-sharing and regional autonomy was at the centre of the conflict. From the mid 1970's the struggle was against Islamization and

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<sup>112</sup> Dunstan M. Wai, "The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimiery" *African Affairs*, 78, 312 (July 1979), 298

<sup>113</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 64.

since the 1980's the struggle for natural resources, particularly oil, has played a huge factor in the civil war. As the conflict unfolded, concealed grievances and concerns from other parts of the country were brought into the arena. These areas included Nuba Mountains, the Southern Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur. Some of the problems are still ongoing and have yet to be solved.

A final contribution to the conflict is the issue of Sudanese identity. As a Member of the Arab League and also due to the role of the riverin elite, Sudan is usually considered an Arab State. Sudan is also systematically classified as part of the Middle-East along with Egypt and other North African countries while its African context is usually given nominal significance and often acknowledged as a geographical setting and nothing more.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> CIA: The World Fact Book [Online]. Available: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/su.html> [April 20, 2006].

## Chapter 2

# The First Civil war and the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan

### *Introduction*

The previous chapter focused on some of the causes of the conflict in the Sudan. These included: constitutional power held by a small elite group; the socio-economic and political gap between the center and periphery, political and economic marginalization of the Southern region and the contentious issue of the relation between state and religion. Now that the root causes have been identified, it is important to see how these factors affected post independence Sudan particularly during the first civil war and the peace-making process that followed.

Chapter two is divided into three parts. The first part will focus on origin of the first civil war, and the political setting at the time. The second part will look at the steps which led to peace including the various factors which influenced the parties to negotiate. Lastly, the peace agreement will be evaluation with respect to its content and its implementation. The last part will also set the background to an understanding of the factors which contributed to the failure of the peace agreement and the resumption of conflict, widely known as the second civil war.

### *Origins of the First Civil War*

The first Sudanese civil war (1955 and 1972) broke out in August 1955 in Torit, East Equatoria when Southern soldiers disobeyed orders to relocate to the North and attacked and killed more than 300 Northern officials and civilians.<sup>115</sup> Following the 1954 election, when the NUP took over power from the British, it rapidly extended its authority in the Southern region. This included the establishment of Northerners in the South as administrators, senior officers in the army and police force, and as teachers and merchants.<sup>116</sup> These steps increased Southern fears of Northern domination.

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<sup>115</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 36.

<sup>116</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 27.

Southern fears of economic marginalization and displacement also intensified once the new management took over the Zande cotton and textile scheme in Yambio district in Equatoria in June 1955.<sup>117</sup> This agricultural scheme, which employed thousands of Southerners, was initiated by the British once the Southern Policy was reversed as a way of addressing the economic imbalances between the North and the South.<sup>118</sup> The new management, established following the Sudanization process, dismissed 300 Southern workers for financial reasons while ignoring the repercussions this would have on the political situation of the country.<sup>119</sup>

General dissatisfaction over the new developments was prevalent mostly in Equatoria, where the economic activity was concentrated and from where most Southern army and police personnel were recruited.<sup>120</sup> Tensions between Northern and Southern soldiers were building up in this area. These armies which were created at the time of the Southern Policy were stationed in their respective regions. However, NUP's decision to station Northern troops in the South and Southern troops in the North created unease and tension amongst Southern soldiers. The situation reached a peak when the Equatoria Corps, who were called to relocate from Torit to Juba and from Malaka to Khartoum, disobeyed the command and attacked Northerners.<sup>121</sup> The government, with the help of the British airlifted about 8000 Northern troops from the South and declared a state of emergency.<sup>122</sup>

What was seen by the government as mutiny was understood as a nationalist uprising in the South, a reaction to long-term economic, social and political injustice committed against the people of Southern Sudan. The incident in Torit was only the beginning of a long civil war which claimed the lives of millions of innocent civilians.

### **Southern Guerrilla Groups**

As Sudan gained independence, the conflict in the South was taking its own shape. Torit mutineers who crossed the border to Ethiopia began an uncoordinated insurgency in rural areas. This group was motivated by injustice, injury and adversity, rather than by political

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<sup>117</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 36.

<sup>118</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 62.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. 63.

<sup>120</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 28.

<sup>121</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 64-65.

<sup>122</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 36.

awakening.<sup>123</sup> The groups' political objective was not clear until the Anya-Nya guerrilla group was formed in 1963. Anya-Nya was a creation of Torit mutineers and the post-independence politically conscious Southern Sudanese administrators and students affected by General Abboud's programs.<sup>124</sup>

During the 17 years of civil war (1955-1972) it is estimated that about half a million people lost their lives and an additional one million have been displaced.<sup>125</sup> Anya-Nya and its political wing – the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) were fighting for Southern people's right to self-determination leading to secession. This demand was not only grounded in the fact that the two regions were separately administered by the British. It was based on two premises: that the people of the south had faced long-term economic, social and political injustices committed by the North and that the two regions differed in terms of religion, language and culture.<sup>126</sup>

When Sudan moved towards independence, the reality of historical and cultural differences became more acute. The Southern Sudanese, since the early days of the Turko-Egyptian rule, developed a strengthening African identity. Economic dominance along with subjugation to Arab traders and slavers led to a general consensus that their territory had a distinctly and exclusively African entity.<sup>127</sup> Consequently, 'South' emerged as a political concept and in opposition to the North which was predominantly identified with Islam and an Arab culture.<sup>128</sup>

The government's assimilation policies pursued throughout the country, including the South aggravated the conflict and turned it into a civil war. The effect of the war on the political situation has also led to a number of coups and counter-coups and popular uprisings that removed both civilian and military regimes in the Sudan. (Appendix 2 lists the different regimes Sudan witnessed in the last 50 years.) However, the change in government did not make a difference to the levels of the people of Sudan, particularly Southerners. As the violence escalated, the differences between the representatives of

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<sup>123</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 18.

<sup>124</sup> Douglas Johnson, "The Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism", in Christopher Clapham ed., *African Guerrillas*, (Oxford : J. Currey Kampala : Fountain Pub. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1998), 55.

<sup>125</sup> Assefa, *World Council of Churches*, 147.

<sup>126</sup> M.T. Ali, O. Matthews, and S.I. Spear, Ali, et al., "Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972-1983) and Angola (1991-1998)" in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds), in *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa*, (London, Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p 283.

<sup>127</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab*, 19.

<sup>128</sup> El-Affendi, *Discovering the South*, 372.

government and the representatives of the Southern people became sharper. While the cycle of war continued the challenge of building a unified sovereign state became more pressing.

### **Preliminary Peace Effort**

The first peace talks were launched in 1965 by Sirr el-Khatim el-Khalifa's transitional civilian government (1964 – 1965) which replaced Abboud's military government. The Round-Table Conference of 1965 was called to "discuss the Southern question with a view to reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the regional interests as well as the national interests of the Sudan".<sup>129</sup> The conference was marked as a historical event in a number of ways, but most importantly due to its achievements in bringing the North and South together again, after the Juba Conference of 1947.

However, unlike the Juba Conference, the Round-table was attended by both parties with more or less equal representation. Parties from the Northern region included Umma, NUP, SCP, ICF and NF (representing professionals) while the Southern region was represented by three groups: the Southern Front (SF) and the two Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) factions – Aggrey Jaden's group known as 'SANU Outside Wing' and William Deng's group, the 'SANU Inside Wing'.<sup>130</sup>

Even though it they were encouraged to see the South with fair representation, the conference was a challenge for the groups with regard to reaching a consensus on the future of the South. When it came to listing grievances and historical discrimination and violence committed against the South all parties spoke with one voice. However, they differed with regard to the solutions they proposed for the Southern problem. The SF believed the problem could only be addressed through self-determination, the SANU Outside Wing proposed separation and SANU Inside Wing insisted on a federal arrangement.<sup>131</sup>

Differences within the Southern political groups made it impossible to reach consensus at the Round-table. The conference therefore adjourned with the appointment of a Twelve

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<sup>129</sup> "Resolutions of the Round-Table Conference on the South, Khartoum, March 16<sup>th</sup>-25<sup>th</sup>, 1965" in *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 207-209

<sup>130</sup> The division within SANU was along location and vision for the future of the South. SANU outside spoke on behalf of those in exile and operated outside of the Sudan while SANU inside operated from within the Sudan.

<sup>131</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*. 32-33.

Man Committee representing groups (from the North and the South) tasked to study and recommend constitutional, administrative and financial relations between the South and the central government.<sup>132</sup> When the committee reconvened, it ruled out separation and centralized unitary government, and instead proposed a scheme of regional autonomy within a united Sudan.<sup>133</sup> It also called for the transfer of some central powers to the regions, the preservation and development of Southern languages, the establishment of regional legislative bodies and a national development committee with regional branches, the adoption of a parliamentary system of government, and the selection of a technical committee to recommend financial arrangements for the proposed system.<sup>134</sup>

Two the major challenges at the Round-Table Conference were issues of trust and the timing of the conference. Neither side trusted the other with regard to entering an agreement.<sup>135</sup> Previous meetings and their outcomes, including the Juba Conference, the 1952, conference in Cairo and the constitutional conference of 1955 were fresh in the minds of Southerners. For Southerners, compromising on the status of the Southern region was comparable to losing their demands. On the other hand, the government was also not comfortable with the South's demand for self-determination, federalism or separation. Rather it proposed a form of regional government with its own parliament, executive, public service commission, development committee and a university.<sup>136</sup> This was the government's strategy to prevent the South's eventual secession.<sup>137</sup>

Secondly, the timing of the conference affected its outcome. As the conference was scheduled at a date close to the national election, the latter took attention away from the issues discussed. For political parties in the North the priority at the time were preparations for the upcoming elections. The Southern problem was of lesser concern in the North than it was in the South.

The Round Table Conference was an important exercise in as far as it attempted to bring the parties together and clarify their positions for discussion. It was also an opportunity to

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<sup>132</sup> Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 2nd ed. (London: Ithaca Press, 1992), 31.

<sup>133</sup> Donald Rothchild and Catherine Hartzell, "The Peace Process in the Sudan, 1971-1972" in *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars end*, Roy Licklider (ed), (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 78.

<sup>134</sup> 'Report of the Twelve-Man Committee' in *The Southern Sudan : The Problem of National Integration*, Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Class, 1973), 211-217.

<sup>135</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 41.

<sup>136</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 101.

<sup>137</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 31.

educate the public on the magnitude of the conflict.<sup>138</sup> However, it failed to produce for Sudan what Deng called “the national instrument required to build it as one nation”.<sup>139</sup> However, even if the recommendations were not implemented at the time, they provided appropriate guidelines for the next peace talks - the Addis Ababa talks held in 1972.

## **Political Dynamics in Post Independence Sudan**

The focus of this chapter will be the second military regime in Sudan, under the leadership of Colonel Ja’afar Nimeiri. During this period the first civil war came to an end with the signing of a peace agreement. The peace lasted eleven years, after which the second civil war began.

The military coup of May 1969 by the Free Officers under the leadership of Major Ja’afar Nimeiri was supported by the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), and the new leaders supported revolutionary change in the Sudan.<sup>140</sup> The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which identified itself as secular and socialist, modelled on the Egyptian-Nasirite revolution, suppressed other political parties, particularly religion-based traditional political groups such as the Umma, NUP and ICF and their leaders.<sup>141</sup>

The leader of the RCC, Nimeiri condemned the policies of his predecessors on a number of issues, including the approach to the Southern problem, the power politics between sectarian groups and the deteriorating economy. He introduced a policy “aimed at safeguarding national independence, consolidating territorial unity and enhancing social and economic change”.<sup>142</sup> However, this was implemented through contradictory domestic and foreign policies which impacted on the country in general.

In the 16 years Nimeiri was in power he shifted his ideological stance at least three times. Not only did this affect Sudan’s domestic policy, it also impacted on the country’s foreign policy. Internally, this led to the frequent reshuffling of cabinet and administering elites at different levels of government. Between 1969 and 1985, 115 Ministers served under Nimeiri’s government in different capacities.<sup>143</sup> Even though the government’s

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<sup>138</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 101.

<sup>139</sup> Deng, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda*, 89.

<sup>140</sup> Khalid, *The Government They Deserve*, 242.

<sup>141</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 45.

<sup>142</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 300.

<sup>143</sup> Black Book

position on international affairs was related to national interest, its shift of alliance from the East to the West to the Arab world reflected the indecisiveness of the government.

Nimeiri's rule can be divided into three periods: (1) the pre-1971 coup period, where he was ideologically attached to the concept of 'pro-Soviet socialism' and 'pro-Arab socialism' with strong ties to the East bloc, particularly the USSR and Eastern Europe, and Egypt and Libya from the Arab world; (2) post 1971 – 1977 where he shifted to a 'pragmatic' pro-Western European orientation<sup>144</sup>; and (3) the post 1978 period of 'Islamic radicalism' and reconciliation with Northern political forces. Domestic policy was also characterized by changing political alliances: 1969 – 1971 with the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), 1972 – 1977 with liberal technocrats from North and South and from 1978 with traditional Northern sectarian groups.

A study of these periods is central to an understanding three important issues related to the first civil war. The first is the dynamics through which the parties came to the negotiation table, secondly, the peace agreement itself and the nature in which it was implemented and thirdly, the causes of the second civil war.

#### ***Period between 1969 – 1971: Relations with the SCP***

Accusing previous governments of mishandling national concerns and perpetuating division in the country, Nimeiri announced a new ideological approach which proclaimed socialism instead of Islamism for the whole country.<sup>145</sup> Through the 9 June 1969 declaration Nimeiri pledged his determination to "arrive at a lasting solution" on the basis of "the right of the Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a United Sudan".<sup>146</sup> Nimeiri also believed that political problems were mainly due to power struggles amongst sectarian leaders and Muslim Brothers leading to political instability and deterioration in the economy.<sup>147</sup> Nimeiri believed that the Southern problem could only be solved through political means and not militarily.

The SCP also believed that 'the cause of the Southern problem was the inequality which existed between the North and South as a result of uneven economic, social and cultural

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<sup>144</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 297.

<sup>145</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 12.

<sup>146</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 46.

<sup>147</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 300.

development.<sup>148</sup> Since the Round-Table Conference, the SCP had been advocating autonomous rule in the South, but under ‘a broad socialist oriented democratic movement’ forming part of the revolutionary structure in the North ....<sup>149</sup>

The SCP’s ideology influenced Nimeiri’s national programs and foreign policy. Between 1969 and 1971 the government’s economic policy was geared towards development programs, including state-led industrialization and the expansion of capital-intensive agricultural schemes.<sup>150</sup> In terms of foreign allies, Nimeiri established relations with the Eastern bloc – Soviet, Eastern Europe and other communist countries including China and Romania.

The relationship between Nimeiri and the SCP soured around the issue of the future of the SCP and their respective visions on the new radical Arab coalition/union with Egypt and Libya.<sup>151</sup> Within the RCC itself, Nimeiri and his pro Arab nationalist group intended to create a one-party system led by the ‘Sudan Socialist Union’ and dissolve the SCP. They believed that the SCP should join the SSU, which would then be the only legitimate party in the Sudan. The SCP insisted on maintaining its independence and acting as a watchdog to the progress of the new regime. It could only fulfil this role the party retained its independence from the regime.<sup>152</sup> Contention between the two affected the implementation of government policies, including those recorded in the June Declaration.<sup>153</sup>

Nimeiri’s vision included a move towards creating an Arab federation with Egypt and Libya. The Tripoli Charter, signed in December 1969 between Nimeiri, Nasser and Ghadaffi, set out the aims and principles of an Arab Federation of Egypt, Libya and the Sudan with envisaged cooperation on defence, foreign policy and economic matters.<sup>154</sup> The SCP saw the union with Egypt and Libya as a threat to Sudan’s domestic policy.<sup>155</sup> Nimeiri’s solution to the Southern problem was also incompatible with the creation of a federation with Egypt and Libya.

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<sup>148</sup> Deng, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda*, 89.

<sup>149</sup> John Howell, “Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*, Vol. 54, No.3, July 1978, 422

<sup>150</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 45.

<sup>151</sup> Woodward, *Sudan 1898 – 1989*, 138-139.

<sup>152</sup> Tim Niblock, *Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898 – 1985* (London: Macmillan, 1987), 250.

<sup>153</sup> Alier, *Too Many Agreements*, 56.

<sup>154</sup> Niblock, *Class and Power*, 247.

<sup>155</sup> Woodward, *Sudan 1898 – 1989*, 139.

The SCP attempted an abortive coup on July 1971. Nimeiri undertook a massive purge to eliminate opposition elements in the military, the party and government administration and replaced them with Arab nationalists.<sup>156</sup> Nimeiri also accused the Soviet Union, the principal supporter of the government, of supporting the coup attempt. Until the time of the attempted coup, Soviet was the principal source of Sudan's economic and military aid. The Soviet Union provided Sudan with over \$150 million in aid after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and it had more than 1 000 Soviet military personnel stationed in Sudan to assist the Sudanese Defence Force (SDF) in the civil war with the South.<sup>157</sup> After the coup, relations with Soviet Union halted but Nimeiri's relations with the eastern bloc did not come to an end. Sudan received aid and loans from Czechoslovakia, Romania and China.<sup>158</sup> Sudan's relation with China was strengthened after the coup.<sup>159</sup>

### ***Period between 1972 – 1977: Nimeiri and the Liberal Technocrats***

Following the attempted coup, Nimeiri dissolved the RCC, assumed leadership of the SSU party and promulgated a new constitution which granted him an executive power as the President of the Republic.<sup>160</sup> In the presidential elections held in September 1971 Nimeiri, the only candidate won with 98.6% of the votes.<sup>161</sup> This was repeated in the April 1977, election where Nimeiri won with 99.1% votes.

Nimeiri's allies now became the liberal technocrats from the North and the South. Members of this group were in general less politically active, and less concerned with transforming the nature of Sudanese society than developing it within the existing framework.<sup>162</sup> Southern Sudanese representative appeared at the centre of Sudanese politics for the first time once the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed.<sup>163</sup>

The technocrats and the Arab nationalists did not make a cohesive team. The technocrats favoured the restoration of diplomatic relations with the US and a negotiated settlement

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<sup>156</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 69.

<sup>157</sup> Korwa G. Adar, "A State under Siege: The Internationalisation of the Sudanese Civil War." *African Security Review*, 7, 1 (1998) [Online], Available: <http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/7No1/Adar.html>, [October 23, 2005].

<sup>158</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 310-311.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. 311.

<sup>160</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 66.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Niblock, *Class and Power*, 265.

<sup>163</sup> Khalid, *The Government they Deserve*, 243.

of the Southern conflict and opposed any move towards Sudan joining the Egypt-Libya federation, while the nationalists held the opposing views.<sup>164</sup> Increasingly, Nimeiri gave his support to the technocrats, leading to heightened interest in establishing relations with the US, pursuing a political solution to the conflict in the South and delaying the Arab Federation.

In 1972 diplomatic relations with the USA were resumed, leading to strengthened relations with Great Britain, West Germany and Western Europe. Subsequently, Sudan became US' strategic ally against Soviet-backed Ethiopia.<sup>165</sup> Meanwhile, Cairo criticized Khartoum's move which Nimeiri was quick to defend as "his right to make decisions in the interest of his country".<sup>166</sup>

Ties with the US led to partnership in development schemes. Chevron, an American oil company, entered the Sudan during the second half of the 1970s to explore oil. The US government was also engaged in funding infrastructure as well as servicing Sudan's national debt in the 1980s.<sup>167</sup> Major development projects as well as rehabilitation and resettlement programs in the South were also financed by the US.<sup>168</sup> Monetary support in terms of aid, for development projects, loans and infrastructure rehabilitation were also channelled to the Sudan from the United Kingdom and West Germany.<sup>169</sup>

The period between 1972 and 1977 changed the future of the Sudan. Mansour Khalid describes it as a period which "realized the most lasting achievement of the regime in constitutional, economic and social fields".<sup>170</sup> It was the period where agreement was reached on the war in the South, Southerners were invited to take part in the national government and a national constitution was promulgated for the first time in the history of post-independence Sudan.

However, the government was far from reconciling with Northern groups, particularly sectarian political parties, including the Umma, DUP and the Muslim Brotherhood. Between 1971 and 1977 Nimeiri survived four attempted coups carried out by Northern

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<sup>164</sup> Niblock, *Class and Power*, 266.

<sup>165</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 57.

<sup>166</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 306.

<sup>167</sup> Johnson, *The Root Cause*, 57.

<sup>168</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 306.

<sup>169</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 307-309.

<sup>170</sup> Khalid, *The Government they Deserve*, 243.

groups – in July 1971 by SCP members, in January 1973 by a retired Brigadier from the North, in September 1975 by paratrooper regiment in the North and in the July 1976 coup, led by Sadiq al-Mahid of the Umma party and backed by Libya.

### ***Post 1977: Period of Northern Reconciliation***

From 1969 to 1977 Nimeiri ruled with the exclusion of Northern political parties from the political stage.<sup>171</sup> His popularity and strong base came from the liberal technocrats and Southerners who benefited from his approach towards the Southern problem. However, as Northern political groups kept threatening the stability of the government, Nimeiri was forced to redefine his strategy. This led to a revisiting of the government's relations vis-à-vis the North, at the expense of existing relations with the technocrats and the Southerners.

To create a new basis for legitimacy Nimeiri called a reconciliation meeting in April 1978 with Northern political parties which concluded with the signing of the National Reconciliation Agreement leading to the restructuring of the SSU. This was followed by a calculated move whereby Sadiq al-Mahid was called back from self-imposed exile and granted amnesty while Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the Muslim Brothers and other 3000 political prisoners were released.<sup>172</sup> The cabinet reshuffle that followed brought members of Umma, DUP and ICF to official positions and Central Committee of the SSU.<sup>173</sup>

Southerners saw the reconciliation process as a threat to two of the central constitutional developments which resulted from the Addis Ababa Agreement. These were the regional autonomy given to the South and the separation of state and religion, which addressed Southerners concern over Sudan moving towards an Islamic state. It is noteworthy that these two issues have been at the centre of political debate since the first parliamentary elections in 1954.

As foreseen, Nimeiri's new alignment undermined these rights that were vital to the Southern people. The new alliance led to the shifting of the 1956 North-South boundaries, the emergence of regionalism – which divided the South into six provinces – and the process of Islamization which followed a presidential decree in September 1983.

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<sup>171</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 52.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 113.

By championing reforms pushed by Northern elite, including Islamic reforms, Nimeiri guaranteed his own political survival for some time.<sup>174</sup>

### **Steps towards a Negotiated Peace Settlement**

In the first two and a half years of coming to power, neither Nimeiri nor his Council of Ministers was ready for any form of dialogue with Anya-Nya or its political wing, the SSLM. However, the attempted coup in 1971 radically transformed the political scene in the Sudan. One of the technocrats appointed as the Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel Alier who also came from the region, initiated a dialogue with the Anya-Nya and SSLM. Getting Nimeiri interested in peace talks was a huge achievement for Alier. In an attempt to bridge the gap between the rebels and the government, without threatening the sovereignty of the latter, Alier presented 11 recommendations which were based on the 9<sup>th</sup> June Declaration and the recommendations of the 1965 Round-table Conference.<sup>175</sup> [A summary of the recommendations is listed in Appendix 3.]

The first important step Alier took when approaching the SSLM was to admit the government's mistake in its policy and dealings towards the South in the past.<sup>176</sup> Such acknowledgement showed the SSLM the government's interest in peace. Even if Nimeiri's move to ally with the centre, after alienating the right then the left was purely political, it did help settle the Southern problem. At the time, building peace with the South also meant having a strong alternative political and military power base which indeed proved valuable in confronting an attempted coup led by al-Mahdi in 1976.<sup>177</sup>

Pre-negotiations began in November 1971 with the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) as mediators. The SSLM called for a cessation of hostilities, including the establishment of new military posts in the war zone; the appointment of an OAU member observer team stationed in Juba; recognition of the SSLM as the sole and only body to represent the South in the talks; and the venue of the first negotiation meeting to be outside Sudan. In return Anya-Nya would order its forces to stop fighting.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Johnson, *The Root Cause*, 56.

<sup>175</sup> Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 65-66.

<sup>176</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 150.

<sup>177</sup> Deng, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda*, 90 – 92.

<sup>178</sup> Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 54-55.

The government proposed negotiations within the framework of a united Sudan while Southern provinces would become regionally autonomous in a newly defined constitutional structure for the Sudan.<sup>179</sup> Even though this was far less than what the South had in mind, which was a federal structure in which it could exercise its autonomy, and thus it accepted the government's proposal of regional autonomy.<sup>180</sup>

In early February 1972 negotiation began in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the auspices of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and with the WCC and AACC as mediators. After two weeks of negotiations, the parties came up with "The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan" signed on 27 February and ratified on 12 March 1972 as the Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces.

The Addis Ababa Agreement ended a civil war which lasted for 17 years and cost the lives of an estimated 500,000 people. While it was the first ever agreement which proved to have the mechanisms to solve the Southern problem, for the eleven years it lasted, this agreement was viewed with mixed feelings within the Sudanese community. For Southerners it brought hope for a better future while Northern traditional and secular groups were against the agreement. External forces, including the major powers, the OAU, African countries, NGO's and the UN on the other hand saw the peace agreement as a unique process which ended a protracted civil war. The difference in perspective towards the agreement, particularly within the Sudan, was obviously not a good sign for the sustainability of peace.

### **The Dynamics of Prospective Conditions for Negotiation**

Without the parties willingness to talk there is no peace to negotiate. Dunstan Wai rightly raises an important question: "why did the Sudan government, after a period of bitter conflict in which it had invested considerable resources, change its policy and agree to terminate the wars on terms which throughout the period of fighting it had deemed unacceptable?"<sup>181</sup> What were the factors which also made SSLM and Anya-Nya agree to negotiate?

There were a number of factors that contributed to the success of the negotiation between the government and the Southern guerrilla group. At first glance, the role of the mediators

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<sup>179</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 153.

<sup>180</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 39.

<sup>181</sup> Dunstan, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 162.

– the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Council of Churches (AACC) – is what is noticeable and should not be overlooked. However, there are a number of ‘mutually reinforcing’ factors which influenced the parties’ decision to move towards peace.

Hizkias Assefa reasons that the identity and characteristics of the participants; the duration of the conflict; the stalemate; interests at stake and the characteristics of the mediators were essential to the success of the mediation.<sup>182</sup> Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell also list the emergence of identifiable bargaining parties, the leader’s determination for a political solution, mutually hurting stalemate, external pressure and the active role of the mediators as the background to the success of the negotiations.<sup>183</sup>

Dunstan Wai’s lists factors which he feels influenced the parties attitude towards peace. These are military stalemate on both sides, limited resources to finance the war on both sides, local pressure for a 9 June 1969 Declaration on the policy of regional autonomy for the South, Numeiri’s change of allegiance, the appointment of Abel Alier and his role in speeding up the implementation of the policy of regional autonomy and political development in the region.<sup>184</sup>

These factors have indeed affected the parties’ behaviour and approach towards the conflict. For the purpose of this paper, however, I will only deal with factors which I believe are significant to this particular research topic.

### **Military Stalemate**

By 1971 both the government and Anya-Nya felt the political, financial and military stalemate.<sup>185</sup> Stalemate defined by Modelski and quoted by Hizkias Assefa, is the condition “in which neither side, given its aims, has the resources to overwhelm the other (absolutely, or without incurring unacceptable losses)”.<sup>186</sup> After 17 years of fighting, the government and Anya-Nya came to realize that one could not defeat the other in total victory. The central government accepted that the Anya-Nya could not be defeated

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<sup>182</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 13-28.

<sup>183</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 68-77.

<sup>184</sup> Dunstan, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 162-166.

<sup>185</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 72.

<sup>186</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 17.

without a prolonged and expensive war and continued military repression.<sup>187</sup> The Anya-Nya and the SSLM also faced the stalemate. Through out the years, Anya-Nya grew from a small unorganized group to a unified army with about 10,000 – 12,000 men.<sup>188</sup> It had popular support and the armed strength to destabilize the South and worry the authorities, but it was not strong enough to defeat the government.

### **Internal and External Political Pressure**

After the abortive coup, Nimeiri changed his domestic and foreign policy. Internally, his new allies were those who believed the solution to the Southern problem should come through political means rather than militarily. At the same time, after the SCP coup, Nimeiri received opposition from traditional parties as well as the left wing. Hence it was important for him to find a new ally who would provide solid support base to keep him in power. After the coup, relations with the Soviet Union, the main arms supplier to Sudan also deteriorated.<sup>189</sup> His new allies, the Western powers, were sympathetic to his call for aid and loans and also supportive of a peaceful settlement of the Southern problem.<sup>190</sup>

The Anya-Nya was under pressure from external supporters to negotiate a settlement with the government. The Anya-Nya was dependent upon external support, especially for ammunition and medical supplies, which if cut off would curtail its activities.<sup>191</sup> In 1971 Nimeiri patched relations with both Ethiopia and Uganda, who were the major supporters of the rebel groups in the South. Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to stop aiding secessionist groups in each other's countries.<sup>192</sup> Following the coup in Uganda, which overthrew Obote and placed Idi Amin in power, Nimeiri signed an agreement with the latter whereby Nimeiri will abandon support for Obote and Amin in return would restrict the Anya-Nya's international access through Uganda.<sup>193</sup>

With Anya Nya's secessionist agenda lacking recognition by African countries including the OAU, which was keen in maintaining the boundaries inherited from colonial rule, the government was in a better position to receive international backing for its cause.

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<sup>187</sup> Howell, *Horn of Africa*, 426.

<sup>188</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 74.

<sup>189</sup> Dunstan, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 163.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Howell, *Horn of Africa*, 426.

<sup>192</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 159.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.160.

## **Economic Pressure**

Sudan is a state with limited resources and capacity within its boundaries.<sup>194</sup> Attempts to strengthen state control of the economy by a series of confiscations, seizures and nationalizations chased foreign investment and local private entrepreneurs away. At the same time, Sudan's instability made it difficult to attract foreign investments and funding from international financial institutions.<sup>195</sup> Even if one or both parties had the resources to continue the conflict, the rising costs of the conflict affected the parties.<sup>196</sup>

## **Leadership Role**

Political leadership and will is required to free a nation from conflict. While Nimeiri and Joseph Lagu, the leader of the SSLM and Commander-in-Chief of the Anya-Nya played prominent roles as leaders of the two parties, Alier as a catalyst to the whole negotiation played an invaluable role. Throughout the process, not only did Alier's role prevent the initiative from collapsing, but it won international support for both sides to the extent of soliciting pledges from funding agencies for humanitarian assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and development.<sup>197</sup>

Despite mixed responses from both sides, Nimeiri and Lagu took bold decisions in unilaterally ratifying the Addis Ababa Agreement, and promulgating the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act.<sup>198</sup> At the time, neither party was certain about the political support from their respective constituencies.<sup>199</sup> Lagu was not only ready to cooperate with Nimeiri, but also willing to accept Nimeiri's non-negotiable principle of Sudan's unity which was less than Southerners were requesting.<sup>200</sup> As Nelson Kasfir said with regard to the establishing peace in the country, "the decisions of Nimeiri and Lagu to fully commit themselves to peace and the patient efforts of Alier ... to establish conditions permitting those commitments were crucial."<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 73.

<sup>195</sup> Dunstan, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 162.

<sup>196</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 18.

<sup>197</sup> Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 54-61.

<sup>198</sup> Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*, 72.

<sup>199</sup> Kasfir, *Southern Sudanese Politics*, 145.

<sup>200</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 72.

<sup>201</sup> Kasfir, *Southern Sudanese Politics*, 145.

## *The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan*

### **The Content of the Agreement**

The two main aspects of the agreement were the division of functions and power and military arrangement. These issues were tackled at the level of sub-committees on political issues and security.<sup>202</sup> Economic aspects of the regional government were not discussed as an independent topic. According to the Addis Ababa Agreement, the Southern Region would become a self-governing unit within the Republic of the Sudan.<sup>203</sup> An 18 month interim administrative body responsible for setting up the administrative arrangements, regional civil service, and the Assembly was also put in place.<sup>204</sup>

The functions and relation of the central and regional government are described in Chapters IV and V of the agreement. While issues like “public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields ...” lie within the jurisdiction of the regional government, national defence, external affairs, currency and coinage, communications, customs and foreign trade, nationality and immigration, educational planning, planning for economic and social development and public audit are under the authority of the central government.<sup>205</sup> The agreement granted political leadership and control to the SSLM in the Southern region. It also gave the South the power to establish its own financial autonomy by raising revenues from local taxation although it would receive additional revenues from the central government.

The sub-committee on security discussed military arrangements, which included a permanent ceasefire and absorption of the Anya Nya guerrilla forces into the national army and other security branches. While the regional government was responsible for internal security in the South, the Southern Command was made to join the national army made up of equal number of Northern and Southern troops. However, the police and prison guards in the South would be entirely recruited from Anya Nya.<sup>206</sup> This meant that

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<sup>202</sup> Initial proposal was to have three sub-committees: political, economic and security. However, due to the size of its delegation, SSLM insisted on having only two sub-committees (political and security).

<sup>203</sup> “The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan” in *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, D.M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p 221-243

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Chapters IV and V of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan

<sup>206</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 49.

out of the estimated 10,000 Anya Nya troops 6000 would be integrated into the national army while the remaining 4000 would join the police force or prison service or be integrated into civilian life.<sup>207</sup> Full integration of Anya Nya into the national army was to be completed within five years.

The agreement also guaranteed amnesty to those involved in mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region since violence broke out in the South in August 1955.<sup>208</sup> A commission on repatriation and resettlement of Southerners from other countries was also established. Although Arabic remained the official language, English was designated the principal language in the South and Southern schools were allowed to teach indigenous languages.<sup>209</sup> Even though the agreement addressed fundamental rights and freedoms, including equality of citizens, personal liberty and freedom of religion and consciousness, it was not explicit on the separation between state and religion.<sup>210</sup>

The agreement was incorporated into the 1973 permanent constitution. As an organic law, the act could only be amended by a three-quarters vote in the national assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds vote in a referendum of the Southern provinces<sup>211</sup>. This was meant to safeguard the Act from arbitrary changes by the central government.

### **Implementation**

Although the domestic and international circumstances were opportune for the success of the peace initiative, there were still differences between the parties, which surfaced after the agreement was signed. Nelson Kasfir argues that “a few scattered violent incidents serve as reminders that civil wars ... cannot be entirely resolved by a single dramatic gesture.” He concludes that the Addis Ababa Agreement “provided novel but untested procedures for the Southern Region ... the development of the new relationship between the North and the South implicit in these rules has not been easy to achieve nor entirely successful”.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 88.

<sup>208</sup> “Protocol on Interim Arrangement of ‘The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan’ in *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*, D.M. Wai (ed.), (London: Frank Class, 1973), 221-243.

<sup>209</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 47

<sup>210</sup> Adar, *A State under Siege*.

<sup>211</sup> *The Addis Ababa Agreement*, 221-243.

<sup>212</sup> Kasfir, *Southern Sudanese Politics*, 143-144.

The new relationship between the North and the South was tested during the 11 years of the implementation of the agreement. The 'cost of compromise and concession' was challenged not only between the parties but also within their respective constituencies and oppositions on both sides. The first sign of a compromise of Southern autonomy began to show soon after the 18 month transition period. During the Southern Regional Assembly election in 1973 there were concerns over Nimeiri's intervention in the nomination and appointment of Abel Alier as the President to the High Executive Council (HEC) and as the official candidate of the SSU.<sup>213</sup> Nimeiri's interference created reservations on the electoral procedures and questioned the power relation between the central and regional government and the independence of the Southern region.<sup>214</sup> Nimeiri's intervention continued in the 1978, 1980 and 1982 elections. Alier's appointment looked as if it was meant to protect Nimeiri's political investment in the new arrangement rather than a genuine exercise of self-rule.

With regard to the military, the integration of 6,000 Anya Nya guerrillas into the regular army was completed as planned in 5 years.<sup>215</sup> Nevertheless, absorption of the guerrillas, forming a Southern Command of 12,000 – with equal forces from both sides – was the most delicate task of the regime. Many remained in the bush and were not willing to comply with the provisions of the agreement. Even those who complied remained suspicious of the army and wished to remain in their own units. Among those integrated, many were dissatisfied with the low ranks they received and others were disappointed for not being absorbed into the army.<sup>216</sup> The number of Northern troops in the South was not reduced to 6000.<sup>217</sup> Southern troops were not only suspicious of the integration and redeployment of Northern troops in the Southern region, but also the presumed superiority the Northern troops had over the Anya Nya guerrilla troops. Within the integrated army, the Anya Nya soldiers were called 'absorbed' units, while the national troops were referred to as 'old' units.<sup>218</sup>

By the mid 1970s Southerners expressed general disappointment over the level of central expenditure allocated to rebuild the war-devastated infrastructure in the region.<sup>219</sup> The

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<sup>213</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 87.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> Khalid, *The Government they Deserve*, 273.

<sup>216</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 41.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid. 42.

<sup>218</sup> Kasfir, *Southern Sudanese Politics*, 149.

<sup>219</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 87.

Addis Ababa Agreement granted the Southern Region extra sources of revenue from the national budget. Although the reversal of the 1970 nationalization policy and signing of the peace agreement brought the Sudan increasing western aid, both developmental and humanitarian, economic mismanagement on both sides brought serious discontent in the region.<sup>220</sup>

Meanwhile, the almost non-existent infrastructure was burdened with the return of over 1 million refugees. This brought a population increase of 33% more than the South had been coping with when the civil war ended. Its limited tax base made it dependent more on the subsidies from the national treasury and on external assistance.<sup>221</sup> In the budget for 1974-75 the regional government was expecting 88% of its revenue to come from the central government.<sup>222</sup>

Furthermore, Nimeiri's strategy for rapid growth of mechanized agriculture put the country in severe debt. The overflow of development activities – in mid and late 1970s – with the aim of increasing gross domestic output led Sudan into a deep economic crises. Money borrowed with the expectation that it would be repaid out of increased production ended up not being paid. By 1980 Sudan's annual output declined, as did the growth rate of exports to negative five point seven percent. The annual balance of payments deficit rose from thirty point five million Sudanese pounds in 1973-74 to 310.6 million Sudanese pounds in 1981-82. Sudan's external debt by 1978 was standing at three billion dollars, at the beginning of 1982 it increased to \$5.2 billion and by April 1985 it had reached \$9 billion.<sup>223</sup>

## **Failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Beginning of the Second Civil War**

In addition to the growing economic pressure in the country, there were a number of issues which led to the failure of the agreement and led to the second civil war. First, around the mid 1970's Nimeiri's proposal to open a joint Sudan-Egypt project to build a 175-mile canal between Jonglei and Malakal became a major confrontation between Khartoum and the Southern Region, Water being the main asset of the Southern region at

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<sup>220</sup> Wai, *The Sudan: Domestic Politics*, 306-309.

<sup>221</sup> Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict*, 159.

<sup>222</sup> See Kasfir, 152-159 and Khalid, 273-275.

<sup>223</sup> Niblock, *Class and Power*, 283.

the time. The central government argued that the canal was needed to meet planned agro-industrial expansion in the country.<sup>224</sup> However, Southerners feared that the drying effect in the swampy Sudd area would drain pastures, dry up wells, change the climate and generally undermine the pastoral life style.<sup>225</sup> Despite criticism from Southerners and external experts, Nimeiri, with only some hesitation from the HEC, went ahead with the project.<sup>226</sup>

Secondly, the discovery of substantial amount of oil in Bentiu district (a border area between the North and the South) in 1978, Southern Kordofan and Upper Blue Nile in 1979, Unity oilfields in 1980, Adar oilfields in 1981 and Heglig in 1982 created an interesting dimension to the situation in the Sudan.<sup>227</sup> Nimeiri replaced Southern troops stationed in the Bentiu district with Northerners.<sup>228</sup> This was followed by the drafting of a new bill by the Attorney General at the time – Hassan al-Turabi - to redefine the North-South boundary. The discovery of oil led to hope amongst the South that this would create economic opportunities in the area and contribute to the development of the region<sup>229</sup>. However Nimeiri's decision in 1981 and 1982 to locate the refinery in the North and also build a pipeline at Port Sudan on the Red Sea created resentment and rebellion in the Southern region.<sup>230</sup> As the second civil war broke out in 1983, SPLM/A attacked Chevron's oil operations in 1984 and forced it to abandon its USD 800 million investment in the area.<sup>231</sup>

Thirdly, the government unconstitutionally divided the South into three provinces, namely, Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Blue Nile. This act of decentralization was meant to neutralize the role of Southern regional government in economic matters.<sup>232</sup> According to the provisions of the agreement, a referendum or endorsement by the regional government should precede such action. While Southerners wanted to ensure

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<sup>224</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 47.

<sup>225</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 88.

<sup>226</sup> Alier, *Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, 197-200.

<sup>227</sup> Shannon Lee Field, "The Internal and External Contexts of Oil Politics in Sudan: The Role of Actors" in Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospect*, ( Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), p. 68

<sup>228</sup> "God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan." *International Crises Group (ICG)*, Africa Report, 38, (January 2002), 12.

<sup>229</sup> Rothchild and Hartzell, *The Peace Process*, 88.

<sup>230</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 123.

<sup>231</sup> Shannon Lee Field, "The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry", *IGD Occasional Paper*, No. 23, February 2000, 11.

<sup>232</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 53.

their own security, the central government was obsessed with guarantees that the region would not secede, particularly after the discovery of oil.

Most Southerners, including Abel Alier, were against the division and saw it as an intention to divide-and-rule. Alier argued that regionalism would break up the Southern voice and hence lead to division amongst Southern people. On the other hand, Joseph Lagu supported the initiative as an effort of 'decentralization for development'. However, the actual intention behind Lagu's support came from a sense of insecurity. Coming from the Nuer tribe, Lagu and most Nuer's felt marginalized by the systematic monopoly of power and regional institutions by the Dinka ethnic group. This will be discussed in chapter three.

Fourthly, in an attempt to secure legitimacy and support from key Northern political groups Nimeiri introduced the Sharia law – Islamic penal, commercial and tax codes — as a national law in September 1983. By introducing the September decree Nimeiri institutionalize Islam as the state religion and, as Ann Lesch quotes from Carolyn Fluehr-Lobben and made Sharia "the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan."<sup>233</sup> The adoption of Sharia law contradicted the Addis Ababa Agreement which guaranteed religious pluralism in the Sudan.

### ***Conclusion***

There is considerable evidence showing continuity in the Round-Table Conference of March 1965 and the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. The recommendations of the Twelve-Man Committee laid the foundation for the Addis Ababa negotiations. Nimeiri should therefore be commended for reaching a workable compromise and finalizing the peace agreement which previous governments, both military and democratic, failed to do.

Both the Round-Table Conference and the Addis Ababa meeting were initiated by the government. In both occasions the personal commitment of the leadership was crucial. In the case of the Round-table Conference, el-Khalifa's interest and personal commitment in finding a solution to the Southern problem should not be overlooked.

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<sup>233</sup> A. Lesch, *The Sudan*, 55.

Peace prevailed, even if only for eleven years (1972-1983), mainly because of the willingness of the parties to observe the provisions of the Accord. It also failed because parties went against their own commitment and violated the provisions of the agreement they signed. Nimeiri's domestic policy which Ann Lesch labeled as "contradictory policy" is part of the reason for the success as well as failure of the agreement.

The success of the Addis Ababa agreement was that it brought peace for the first time since independence and established the rules for post-war interaction and relations between the parties. Through the creation of a regional self government in the South, it developed a new North-South relation and also managed to get the government to admit its mistakes in relation to its policy towards the South. By creating the regional government in the South, Nimeiri managed to suppress the Southerner's quest for succession.

On the other hand, the agreement raised too much expectation on both sides. The implementation strategies outlined in the agreement did not realistically correspond to the timetable outlined and the economic needs of the population. The sense of physical, economic and political insecurity felt on both sides was an impediment to peace right from the start. This was especially witnessed during the formation of the new joint national army, and in the establishment of political institutions in the Southern Region.

Scholars have different interpretations as to why the government decided to negotiate and furthermore compromise. John Howell argues that Nimeiri's willingness to concede to Southern claims was mainly strategic. He concludes that even if the South succeeded in gaining regional autonomy, it was clear to Nimeiri that the South would be dependent on the North both economically and politically. Therefore, national unity would be enforced indirectly and in the long run, the status-quo would be maintained.<sup>234</sup>

Deng, on the other hand argues that the Khartoum government had a secret plan not revealed during negotiations. This included using the peace agreement to ensure Southern rebels surrendered their arms and then within two or three years, nullifying the agreement and continuing with the revolutionary agenda without a military threat from the South.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Howell, *Horn of Africa*, 425.

<sup>235</sup> Deng, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda*, 93.

Both Howell and Deng's argument do not take into account the cost of the war, which was far greater than that of concessions that were likely to come with a peace agreement. Factors like the military and political stalemate, internal and external pressure for peace, had a significant impact on both sides, particularly the government. Negotiation was the only way out of the costly conflict. However, the agreement failed to address the fundamental factors which contributed to the problem. Political institutions in the country were still run by the elite; the gap between the centre and periphery still persisted, the relation between state and religion was unclear and the Southern question was not permanently resolved. The agreement was therefore weak in providing guarantees on constitutional issues.

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## **Chapter 3**

# **The Second Civil War and the Background Leading to Negotiations**

### ***Introduction***

In the previous chapter the main factors that led to the first civil war were discussed. The dynamics of the internal, regional and international politics and the impact these had on the internal events vis-à-vis the civil war were elaborated on. The Addis Ababa Agreement, its negotiation, its content as well as its implementation and failure were also detailed.

The central aim of the previous chapter was to address specific issues around the agreement and at the same time examine the question of peace-making within the context of the conflict in the Sudan. As concluded in the previous chapter there is a continuation between the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Round-Table Conference which preceded it. However, the Addis Ababa Agreement failed in tackling the fundamental problems which caused the civil war.

This chapter will elaborate on the consequences of the failure of the Peace Agreement. This includes a discussion of the unique developments which emerged in the early 1980's with respect to internal, regional and international dynamics around the conflict. This chapter will discuss the variables which led to the next phase of the conflict and the peace-making process that followed.

### ***Origins of the Second Civil War***

The previous chapter identified four factors which caused the second civil war. These are the government's proposal to build the Jonglei Canal, Nimeiri's attempt to redefine the 1956 North-South boundary, the division of the South into three provinces and the introduction of the Sharia law as the national or state law despite its contentious nature. The grievances these government actions provoked contributed to the birth of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983 in Ethiopia under the leadership of Dr. John Garang.

From the start, the SPLM identified itself as a national movement with the broad political objective of bringing political reform to the Sudan. It identified itself as a social movement for all Sudanese which did not intend to fight exclusively for Southern autonomy, but rather aimed to establish a 'New Sudan' that would reflect the diversity of the population and ensure equal access to economic and political power for all groups.<sup>236</sup> According to the movement's manifesto '...the SPLA/M programme is based on the objective realities of the Sudan and provides a correct solution to the nationality and religious questions within the context of a united Sudan, thereby preventing the country from an otherwise inevitable disintegration ...The New Sudan as a concept, therefore, strives to establish a new cultural order in the country'.<sup>237</sup>

Concurrent with the violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement there was strong opposition to government action throughout the Sudan. Dramatic expansion of rain-fed mechanized farming extending from Darfur to the Blue Nile, involving the alienation of land or rights to the use of land (of Muslims as well as non-Muslims) and the transfer of those rights to merchants and government officials – the Northern elite – from the central Nile Valley had a catastrophic impact on the population.<sup>238</sup> Civil unrest and opposition against the government was growing stronger in the Muslim areas in the North. Furthermore, there were popular protests against price increases and the shortage of commodities including fuel, soap and edible oil.<sup>239</sup> Protest spread to Juba and Wau in the South, Port Sudan in the east, Merowe and Atbara in the North and wad Medani, Kosti, Rufaa, El Manqil and El Huda in Central province.<sup>240</sup> The army, which was also affected by the shortages, supported the strikes and public protest in the streets. While the civil war continued in the South, popular discontent grew in the North, eventually leading to the overthrow of Nimeiri through a bloodless coup d'état in April 1985.

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<sup>236</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 18.

<sup>237</sup> Salih, *The Ideology*, 198.

<sup>238</sup> Douglas Johnson, "The Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism", in Christopher Clapham ed., *African Guerrillas*, (Oxford : J. Currey Kampala : Fountain Pub. Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1998), 57

<sup>239</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 62.

<sup>240</sup> O'ballance, Sudan, 125.

## ***The Third Democratic Period and the Power Struggle amongst the Northern Elite: 1986 – 1989***

The Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by Suwar al-Dhahab (1985– 986) prepared the country for a parliamentary election held in May 1986 which established a coalition government of Umma-DUP with 39% and 24% votes respectively. The NIF, with only 20% of the vote, was not represented in the Council of Ministers. The coalition government, under Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of Umma, was a marriage of convenience rather than a genuine political collaboration. In the three years that followed the cabinet was shuffled 5 times and the coalition changed between Umma/DUP and Umma/NIF.<sup>241</sup>

By 1988 Umma proved to lack clear vision in its domestic decisions and coherence in its foreign policies. For example, during the Umma/DUP coalition foreign policy was contradictory. The Foreign Minister, who was from the DUP tried to improve relations with Egypt, Iraq and the US while Prime Minister al-Mahdi was keen to build relations with Libya, Iran and the USSR. This contradiction sent mixed signals as Iran and Iraq were at war, Libya and Egypt at odds while the US and USSR were fighting a proxy war.<sup>242</sup>

All three parties – the Umma, DUP and NIF supported an Islamic state but differed in their approach and degree to which Sudan should be Islamized. Umma was critical of the September law and called for a modern democratic and sound Islamic society. Al-Mahdi favoured ‘the full citizen, human and religious rights’ of all including non-Muslims.<sup>243</sup> The DUP, on the other hand were against any concessions that undermined a future Islamic state, including regional autonomy or federalism. The DUP believed that the September law should be retained with some revisions. The NIF, which had gained substantial power since 1977 strongly believed that Islam should be the official religion of the state, Arabic the official language and Sharia the source of all laws. NIF wasn’t just committed to an Islamic state but to a particular interpretation of Islamic law

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<sup>241</sup> The first two councils were a coalition between Umma and DUP. At the third council, NIF emerged in the government and Hassan al-Turabi was appointed as the Attorney General and Minister of Justice. At the fourth council DUP was no longer in the coalition, however re-emerged at the fifth council and NIF was not in the coalition.

<sup>242</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 76.

<sup>243</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 79.

including a political system and Islamic doctrine that included the death penalty for apostasy.<sup>244</sup> NIF also supported Nimeiri's policy on the re-division of the South.

Meanwhile, fighting continued in the South and also spread into the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan (including Abyei and Nuba Mountain) and Darfur in the North. During the period (1985-1988) many of the victims of the conflict were civilians, including women and children. It became apparent that al-Mahdi's government was not able to deal with the critical issues which eventually removed Nimeiri from power. Neither did he attend to the issues that emerged thereafter, including the economic injustices, marginalization of populations and the unrest in the North. By 1988 pressure built up in the North for a solution to the Southern problem. Al-Mahdi could not come up with a constitutional solution to address the question of the September law or the Southern problem which continued to be the most contentious issues.

### ***Wake of the National Islamic Front and its Strategy of Nation Building***

Weakness in the al-Mahdi government led to another bloodless coup in June 1989, led by Col. Omar Hassan al-Bashir's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from the military and backed by Hassan al-Turabi's NIF party. The National Salvation Revolutionary, a joint NIF/RCC government led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir, claimed to be neither left-wing nor right-wing, or represent any tribal or ethnic interest.<sup>245</sup> It aimed to build a 'New Sudan' which would be defined by Islam, the Qur'an and Sharia. To al Bashir's government, Sharia applied to everyone in the North, including non-Muslims resident in the region, while they accepted the South's right to choose whether or not to be governed by it.<sup>246</sup>

Members of the RCC included middle rank officers who supported the NIF's desire to establish an Islamic state. Immediately after taking over power the NIF/RCC banned trade unions and political parties, suspended the constitution and declared a State of Emergency. By 1991 the process of establishing an Islamic legal system saw Sharia was embedded in the penal code. Holy war against 'apostates and heathens' began to guide

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<sup>244</sup> Robert O. Collins, "Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan", *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2. (September 1999), pp. 107.

<sup>245</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 165.

<sup>246</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 79.

the administration of all government agencies and the military.<sup>247</sup> This added a whole new dimension to the dynamics of the civil war.

### **Internal political development**

The NIF openly began advocating its ideology of political Islam. Al-Turabi's strategic alliance with Nimeiri during the period of National Reconciliation (1977 and 1984) enabled it to play an influential role in paving the way for Islamists in the government. Al-Turabi, who at the time was appointed as the Chairman of the special committee for the 'return of the laws to compatibility with the Sharia' took the responsibility of harmonizing Sudan's legislature with the Sharia.<sup>248</sup> This led to the adoption of the September Law which endorsed Sharia as a national law. This included the drafting of 7 bills related to the prohibition of alcoholic beverages, gambling, banning of usury, Sharia penalties prescribed for murder, theft and adultery.<sup>249</sup>

NIF sustained its power through series schemes which enabled it to build a strong foundation in the political and economic system. This included control of foreign exchange, monopoly of the economy, controlling civil service and the armed forces and the flow of information to the population.<sup>250</sup> In pursuit of its ultimate objective, the NIF devised a systematic plan to transform the civil service, armed forces and security structures. Once in power, the RCC, influenced by the NIF central committee dismissed 14,000 civil servants, including 128 judges and legal advisors. Despite the heavy fighting in the South, it dismissed close to 1500 army officers in 1993 and replaced them with the so-called Popular Defence Force (PDF), militias indoctrinated by NIF ideology.

By October 1993 the process of restructuring the political system was well underway. The government dissolved the RCC and announced that Sudan's government was no longer a military government but civilian one led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir as the President of the Republic.<sup>251</sup> The cabinet reshuffle that preceded the announcement consolidated the NIF's control over economic and social aspects of the country, as well as national security, with the appointment of NIF and ex-RCC members to key

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<sup>247</sup> Collins, *Africans*, 107.

<sup>248</sup> Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya*, (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), 155.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid. 155-160.

<sup>250</sup> "Sudan: The Islamic Front in Power", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 14, 12 July 1991

<sup>251</sup> "Sudan: Turabi's unconvincing transition", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 34, No. 21, 22 October 1993

positions.<sup>252</sup> The NIF Central Committee, chaired by al-Turabi, advised politicians the way in which NIF preferred the country be run.<sup>253</sup> The diplomatic service and the judiciary were also politicized.<sup>254</sup>

With the introduction of the Islamic banking system in the late 1970's as part of the financial law of the country, NIF gained financial capital and influence out of proportion to its electoral support.<sup>255</sup> By 1989 financial interests in companies under direct or indirect NIF control, both in Sudan and overseas, amounted to about \$800,000 million.<sup>256</sup> NIF's supporters, mainly from the riverin areas, profited from tax exemptions on investments in privatized state corporations, real estate and large-scale mechanized agriculture for export production.<sup>257</sup> The strong economic backing NIF supporters received from the Islamic bank deepened the economic divide between those in the centre and the rest of the population.<sup>258</sup>

By controlling foreign exchange, the government had access to financial resources such as remittances sent by the Sudanese diaspora in the Middle East. Access to such resources made it easy for the NIF to take over currency dealing and build a strong capital base. NIF became not only the most organised and highly motivated political organisation in Sudan but also the wealthiest.<sup>259</sup>

### **Power Relations between the NIF and Northern Groups**

The first presidential and legislative elections since 1986 took place in March 1996. The election was boycotted by opposition parties and al-Bashir, being the only candidate won the presidency with a majority of over 70% of votes cast and al-Turabi was unanimously elected as the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.<sup>260</sup> Two years later, in June 1998, the government adopted an Islamic Constitution which endorsed the supremacy of Islamic law as a source of legislation. A Bill of Rights was adopted and a Constitutional Court established. The NIF renamed itself the National Congress Party (NCP) in the same year.

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<sup>252</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 117.

<sup>253</sup> Colin Legum, *African Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 509.

<sup>254</sup> Collins, *Africans*, 107.

<sup>255</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 80.

<sup>256</sup> Warburg, *Islam*, 212.

<sup>257</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 80.

<sup>258</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 80.

<sup>259</sup> "Sudan: The Islamic Front in Power", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 14, 12 July 1991.

<sup>260</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 188.

Al-Bashir was re-elected in the 2000 election which was again boycotted by opposition parties. Despite transforming itself from a military government to a civilian one, it remained one of the most repressive regimes in Africa.<sup>261</sup> With its Islamist agenda, the government was not only opposed in the South, but also by Northern political groups who were also marginalized. These included the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Umma, DUP, the Communist Party, trade unions and professional associations.<sup>262</sup> Although the constitution guaranteed citizens' right of association including political association, opposition groups at large rejected the NIF's the drafting of a constitution as insufficient and an act to achieve legitimacy and to improve its image as a supporter of democracy at home and abroad.<sup>263</sup> The Khartoum government continued to control civil, military and security structures; restrict independent associations and control education policy.<sup>264</sup> Overall, the government was reluctant to make any changes that would jeopardize its goal.

### ***Intra Party Politics and Power Struggle***

#### ***Bashir versus Turabi***

Relations between the NIF and RCC was never one without conflict. When the Islamic legal codes were promulgated in 1991 the NIF anticipated that the Islamic state would replace the military regime. Two years later, al-Turabi openly challenged the RCC to disband in favour of a non-military government dominated by Islamists.<sup>265</sup> Indeed in 1993 the RCC, under pressure from al-Turabi, dissolved and the NIF became the strongest political force in the country. Although al-Bashir remained the Head of State, NIF leaders held key economic and social positions, including in the security apparatus.<sup>266</sup> Disagreement between al-Bashir and al-Turabi became open conflict by the mid 1990s. A power struggle over the ruling National Congress (NC) led to a split, with al-Turabi creating the Popular Congress (PC) in July 2000 in opposition to al-Bashir.

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<sup>261</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 26.

<sup>262</sup> NDA was formed in 1990 to oppose NIF. The alliance consists of Southern-based Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP) and SPLM/A, DUP, Umma, SCP, Sudan Trade Unions Association, Independent National Personalities and the Ba'ath Party, Free Lions, the Legitimate Command and the Sudan Allied Forces and marginalized communities including Darfur's Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) which joined in February 2004.

<sup>263</sup> Warburg, *Islam*, 216.

<sup>264</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 134-147.

<sup>265</sup> Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 509.

<sup>266</sup> Warburg, *Islam*, 213.

Al-Bashir used the old themes of Arab domination in a radical Islam guise while al-Turabi claimed to de-Arabize Islam to the benefit of all population.<sup>267</sup> While al Bashir was concerned with preserving the role of the Arabized elite in Sudan, Al-Turabi's vision was to mobilize a revolution throughout Africa.<sup>268</sup> Al-Turabi's modern Islamist movement was more contemporary and different from the traditional patterns al-Bashir and the traditional sects promoted. It called for the adoption of more 'advanced patterns' in politics, economy and culture than those in socialist, communist and capitalist systems.<sup>269</sup>

This difference caused a split in the movement, with al-Turabi and his followers moving away from the traditional focus of Nile Valley Islamism and its close association with the Arab world.<sup>270</sup> In the process of expanding its grand Islamic objective, al-Turabi mobilized the marginalized non-Arab population in Darfur, promising that Islam could be a route to their enfranchisement – economic, social and political – as citizens of an Islamic state.<sup>271</sup> Despite their strong ideological, personal and tactical differences, Turabi signed an agreement with the SPLA whereby the two pursued the objective of overthrowing al-Bashir.<sup>272</sup> In retaliation the government reacted by banning the PC and detained many of its leaders, including al-Turabi, who was detained in February 2001.

### **Fragmented Opposition Forces**

The dissent amongst the opposition groups made it difficult for forces to unite or have a clear vision of how they should deal with the internal political situation. Differences between Umma and the DUP as well as between secularists and traditional religious groups had the characteristics of inter party politics.<sup>273</sup> Furthermore, division in the South and weakness in the SPLM/A dimmed the prospects of bringing change in the Sudan.

Groups opposed to NIF/RCC in the North included two major Muslim sects – Umma and the DUP - trade unions and the secular professional elite. In the rural areas the strongest

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<sup>267</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 26-27.

<sup>268</sup> Alex de Waal, "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap", *London Review of Books*, Vol.26 No.15, 5 (August 2004), 6.

<sup>269</sup> Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 509.

<sup>270</sup> Alex de Waal, "Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement", *African Affairs*, 104, 415 (Oxford University Press, 2005), 191.

<sup>271</sup> de Waal, *Who are the Darfurians*, 191.

<sup>272</sup> "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crises", *International Crises Group Africa Report*, No. 76, 25 (March 2004), 8.

<sup>273</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 148.

opposition came mainly from the Beja Congress, and the Christian population of the Nuba Mountains.<sup>274</sup> While political parties continued to be prohibited in Sudan, Sudanese opposition groups in exile formed the NDA in May 1990 in Cairo, Egypt. Egypt's interest in Sudan will briefly be discussed in the next chapter. While there were long-term conflicting interests amongst NDA members, they were united by having the NIF as a common enemy and their support for a united Sudan.

The issues of a secular constitution versus an Islamic one and the question over the right of the Southern population to self-determination remained unresolved. Umma and the Communist party claimed to have no objection to the South's right to self-determination, but qualified their stand by setting a timetable for when such a move would be possible. This obviously put their commitment in doubt.<sup>275</sup> The DUP rejected the notion and looked towards the re-establishment of the relationship it forced upon the South in the 1950s – era of 'Arabization and Islamization'.

Beyond their commitment to overthrow the government there was no common understanding on a long-term and sustainable settlement of the war.<sup>276</sup> The alliance was obviously one of convenience rather than one based on principle or belief. Bona Malwal, a prominent Southern scholar, rightly questioned SPLM/A's membership of the NDA. Given the history of the North "...Southerners who in 1990 opted to work within the NDA, chose to set aside their doubts about the sincerity of the Northern political parties within the organization because they believed that these groups were prepared to fundamentally re-examine the relationship between North and South and to work for positive changes. Those hopes have since proved to be naïve because once again the Northern parties have shown themselves to be more interested in regaining political power than in genuinely searching for political solutions to Sudan's problems and conflicts." He goes on suggesting that "... the South needs to pull out of all the alliances with groups in the North" and "concentrate on securing their own unity over the demands for self-determination".<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 510.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 25.

<sup>277</sup> Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-94), 510.

The alliances' lack of unity meant it was not able to seriously challenge the government.<sup>278</sup> Nevertheless, the NDA continued to exist and SPLM/A also continued its alliance with the NDA. Since the early 1990s the SPLA remained the official army of the NDA, supplemented by the Beja Congress from the north-east and the Sudan Allied Forces (SAF), composed of secular Northern politicians and intellectuals.<sup>279</sup> In 1990 the SPLM made its transmitter, based in Addis Ababa, available for NDA's use. Radio SPLA and the sporadic NDA broadcasts were avidly listened to in the South and the North.<sup>280</sup>

### **Internal Division within the South**

Regardless of the North-South problem, hostilities within the Southern groups contributed to the conflict. Division within the South is not unique to the second civil war. The different visions and approaches in addressing the Southern question were clearly visible during the 1947 conference, the 1965 Round-table conference and the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. However, the divisions during the second civil war were not restricted to verbal disagreements, but caused fighting leading to casualties amongst Southerners. This division was triggered by three factors: differences over separation versus unity, power relations in the country and ethnic conflict.

### ***Separation versus Unity***

The SPLM's claim to build a new united Sudan reflected the concerns that existed since independence. For the past 5 decades power was held by the elite at the expense of the majority.<sup>281</sup> As a point of departure, the SPLM manifesto states that 'human beings in any society have equal rights and obligations regardless of race, beliefs, colour, etc. The establishment of the new Sudan cultural order demands a radical restructuring of state power to establish genuine democracy and to follow a path of development that will lead to far-reaching social change.'<sup>282</sup> Unity, secularism and socialism were inseparable objectives of the SPLM/A.<sup>283</sup> This core ideological base earned SPLM/A strong and sustained support in the North as well as from its neighbour Ethiopia.

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<sup>278</sup> Emeric Rogier, p. 25

<sup>279</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 24.

<sup>280</sup> "Sudan: A Regional Setback for the SPLA", *Africa Confidential*, Vol 32, No. 12, 14 June 1991.

<sup>281</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 18.

<sup>282</sup> Salih, *The Ideology*, 198.

<sup>283</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 18.

Beyond ideological interest, there were a number of reasons for the SPLM to adopt the policy of unity, some tactical and others based on political realities. Ideologically, if SPLM advocated separation, it would have contradicted the interest of Ethiopia, which at the time was also fighting against its own separatists.<sup>284</sup> In a broader continental context, separatist movements were still not recognized by African countries and the OAU. In fact, the OAU, since its inception in 1963 supported the retention of territorial boundaries inherited at independence. Gerard Prunier further argues that Garang changed its movement to 'New Sudan' to win larger constituencies and broaden its power base by reassuring marginalized Sudanese; appeasing the Arab league. He also wished to please Washington, and consolidate his standing with the UN and the OAU and other international elements.<sup>285</sup>

However, it was difficult for the SPLM to keep implementing this unitary policy in the face of a continuous reaction in favour of secession. Many of the old Anya Nya veterans were not comfortable with the Addis Ababa Agreement. With the second civil war, they rededicated themselves to the cause of Southern separatism.<sup>286</sup> Some saw calls for unity only as a political tactic, while others wanted guarantees from Northerners before committing fully to a united state.<sup>287</sup>

### ***Power Relations***

Since 1991, tension between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups led to increased violence resulting in the death of up to 5,000 civilians and the displacement of 200,000.<sup>288</sup> The August 1991 attempted coup by top SPLM/A leaders Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. Lam Akol led to a split and the subsequent formation of the SPLA-Mainstream (Torit Group) led by John Garang and the SPLA-United (Nasir Group), led by Riek Machar. Machar and Akol accused Garang of authoritarian rule, and condemned human rights abuses by the army. They disagreed with Garang's ultimate objective of introducing a 'New Sudan'.<sup>289</sup> By 1993, factional fighting led to growing division between the Dinka and the Nuer who were the supporters of Garang and Machar respectively.<sup>290</sup> Even though Machar and Akol fought together against Garang they fell out in February 1994 and Machar sacked

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<sup>284</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 62.

<sup>285</sup> Prunier, *Darfur*, 72.

<sup>286</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 62.

<sup>287</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 19.

<sup>288</sup> Colin Legum, "A Decade of Darkness", *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIII, 1990-92), 504.

<sup>289</sup> "Sudan: A Moment of Truth for the SPLA", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 18, 13 Sept 1991

<sup>290</sup> Colin Legum, "A Decade of Darkness", *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIII, 1990-92), 504.

Akol. Subsequently, Machar dissolved SPLA-United and formed the Southern Sudan Independent Movement/Army (SSIM/A).

The coup revealed concerns over the political vacuum within the SPLM/A hierarchy. The 1991 split not only weakened the movement but also prompted a renewal of the conflict. While Garang's group joined the NDA coalition Khartoum established relations with Machar.<sup>291</sup> By 1997 six splinter groups that emerged out of the SPLM/A signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Government.<sup>292</sup> The signing of the agreement was a blow to Garang, as these groups in total represented more than 70% of its senior field commander's.<sup>293</sup> Despite the split in the movement, the SPLA continued to dominate the movement, with popular support from the Dinka (the largest ethnic group in the South).

Despite reconciliation efforts from within the South, intra-factional fighting continued. The Dinka and Nuer Peace Conference of March 1999 concluded that these conflicts were primarily the outcome of the political and military ambitions of individuals.<sup>294</sup> With efforts from external actors, including the US government, Nigerian mediators and the Carter Centre, Riek joined the SPLM in December 1999 and Lam in September 2003.

### ***Ethnic Division***

In 1978/79 a group identified as Anya Nya II began to operate from the Ethiopian border. This group consisted of ex-Anya Nya fighters who defected following the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The main point of contention at the time was their dissatisfaction with the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the 'Dinkanization' of the civilian administration and the armed forces of Southern Sudan.<sup>295</sup> Abel Alier, Nimeiri's chosen administrator of the South, who was from the Dinka tribe, was accused in this regard.

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<sup>291</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 23.

<sup>292</sup> The groups are: United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) and the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) of Dr. Riek Machar; Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP) of Mr. Samuel Aru Bol; SPLM of Cdr. Karubino Kawanyn Bol; Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) of Dr. Thiopholus Ochang Lot; South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG) of Cdr. Kawac Makwei; SPLM – Bor group of Cdr. Arok Thon Arok

<sup>293</sup> Hassan E. El-Talib, "Sudan Government and the Peace Process" in Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*, ( Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 28-30.

<sup>294</sup> Warburg, *Islam*, 220.

<sup>295</sup> Taban Lo Liyong, "South-South Sudanese Dialogue" in Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*, ( Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 144.

Nimeiri's re-division of the South into three regions (Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile) in the early 1980's was supported by the Equatorians, who feared Dinka domination. Joseph Lagu and the majority of Equatorian's felt regionalism would protect them from domination by the Dinka ethnic group. Meanwhile the Dinka's perceived the re-division as an act of divide-and-rule designed by the regime to weaken the bargaining power of a united South.<sup>296</sup> The conflict between Anya Nya II and SPLM/A, among other issues was also about leadership.

## ***Internationalization of the Conflict***

### ***The oil Factor***

Until 2000 Sudan's economy was heavily dependent on the agriculture sector. Since oil production and export began towards the end of the 1990s, the major source of national income changed to oil. When the government launched the Greater Oil Project in 1997, major oil companies from Canada, Malaysia and China entered into partnership with the Sudan State Oil Company.<sup>297</sup> The development of oilfields gave Khartoum a significant strategic advantage, not only against the South but also in financing the war, fresh revenue for domestic use as well as servicing external debt, which at the time was estimated at USD 20 billion. Once it pursued oil wealth, the Government also cut links with Islamist organizations whose financial assistance was no longer needed.<sup>298</sup>

In 2000, Sudan produced a trade surplus of USD 440 million in contrast to the average annual deficit during the past decade of USD 640 million.<sup>299</sup> The annual gross domestic product growth which averaged at three point six percent in the 1990s climbed to five point seven percent by the first half of 2001.<sup>300</sup> By 2004 Sudan had an excess of one billion barrels of oil reserves and by 2005, its daily production capacity reached about 500,000 barrels, which was worth about USD one billion per year in revenue.

Even though the government claims that oil revenues are used in non-military spending, information from Khartoum frequently suggested otherwise. For instance, in 1999 Turabi openly admitted that the government would buy tanks with oil profits and in mid-2000 Bashir declared that Sudan would celebrate the eleventh anniversary of the coup by

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<sup>296</sup> Salih, *The Ideology*, 195.

<sup>297</sup> Field, *The Internal*, 70.

<sup>298</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 27.

<sup>299</sup> Field, *The Internal*, 70.

<sup>300</sup> ICG, *God, Oil and Country*, 103.

manufacturing “tanks and heavy equipment”.<sup>301</sup> As Rogier cites from the Human Rights Watch report of November 2003, sixty percent of USD 580 million received from oil revenue in 2001 was spent in weapons purchase<sup>302</sup> with about USD one million per day being spent on war costs.<sup>303</sup>

To protect the oil fields and defend oil operations easily, the government has implemented strategies to clear the land surrounding the oilfields. One of them involved forcefully displacing non-Arab communities surrounding the oilfields and replacing them with Arab communities.<sup>304</sup>

The expansion of oil development also contributed to the internationalization of the Sudan conflict. It is estimated that Sudan possesses about 1% of global oil reserves.<sup>305</sup> It's major partners in the second half of the 1990s were Talisman of Canada, Petronas of Malaysia and the National Petroleum Company of China. After Chevron sold its oil interests in the Sudan in 1992, the US declared Sudan a country sponsoring terrorism.<sup>306</sup> In 1997 the US prohibited by law its citizens from doing business with the Sudanese government. Meanwhile, as the momentum towards oil production increased, European firms like Austria's OMV Aktiengesellschaft, Sweden's Lundin Oil, Qatar's Gulf Petroleum and Russia's Slavneft started doing business with the Sudan. Other oil service countries were France, UK, Italy, Netherlands and Germany.

China has the largest proportion of development projects with the Sudanese government. The relation between the two countries is one of mutual understanding – where China is in need of securing a long-term source of oil while Sudan needs the external credit, investment and market for its oil.<sup>307</sup> The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) is the largest oil co-operative project in the world and the largest oilfield construction project China has undertaken overseas.<sup>308</sup>

With the help of China, the Government of Sudan is planning to increase its daily production from 50,000 barrels per day to 90,000 barrels per day. Furthermore, China

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<sup>301</sup> Ibid. 102.

<sup>302</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 27.

<sup>303</sup> Field, *The Civil War*, 8.

<sup>304</sup> Field, *The Internal*, 74.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid. 70.

<sup>306</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 162.

<sup>307</sup> Field, *The Civil War*, 19.

<sup>308</sup> Field, *The Internal*, 71.

and the Sudanese Government have initiated development and infrastructure projects involving construction of dams, hydroelectric power stations, textile mills and agricultural schemes in total worth about USD 20 Billion.<sup>309</sup> Bilateral trade by 2005 reached about USD 2.521 billion, an increase of thirty-one percent since 2003.<sup>310</sup> According to studies, China also buys between 60-70 per cent of Sudan's exports.<sup>311</sup> While Malaysia provides bridging loans to the IMF on behalf of Sudan China, as Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, blocks the UN from imposing sanctions against the Sudan.<sup>312</sup>

### ***Regional Political Dynamics***

Instability in the Sudan directly or indirectly affects countries that share international boundaries with it. Gerard Prunier describes the relationship between these countries and the Sudan as 'an undeclared regional war'.<sup>313</sup> For example, Egypt is not only concerned about the Islamic fundamentalist groups supported by the Sudanese Government, but also about the Nile waters that flow through Sudan. Eritrea and Sudan share an ethnic group along their border and have been supporting the rebel groups in each other's countries. Ethiopia has had an uneasy relationship with the Sudanese government since the 1970s. The area between Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda is an international cattle-raiding area, a source of regional conflict. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) of Northern Uganda operates from Southern Sudan, while Central African Republic and Chad are havens for SPLM members from the South and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) members from the west. Libya is a sanctuary for Sudanese exiles.<sup>314</sup> Of these countries, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda play a more direct and influential role in the North/South conflict.

The 1989 military coup did not improve the situation in the Sudan.<sup>315</sup> The regionalization of the second civil war was largely due to the Islamist government's subversion policy and resulted in the Sudanese crises being transformed from a national problem to a

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid. 72.

<sup>310</sup> Daniel T. M. Large, "Sudan-China Relations: A Historical Perspective on 'China's Outpost in Africa'", *7<sup>th</sup> International Sudan Studies Conference*, (Bergen, Norway, 6-8 April 2006), 8, CD-ROM.

<sup>311</sup> Large cites a study by Chris Tomlinson, "Experts: Illegal ivory trade taking off in Africa, China the main importer", *AP*, 14 March 2005.

<sup>312</sup> Field, *The Internal*, 72.

<sup>313</sup> Rogier quotes Gerard Prunier "Sudan's Regional War" *Le Monde diplomatique*, February 1997.

<sup>314</sup> Lo Liyong, *South-South*, 141.

<sup>315</sup> Peter Anyang' Nyong, "Crises and Conflict in the Upper Nile Valley" in *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (ed.), (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), 103.

regional and international problem.<sup>316</sup> One of the major concerns in the region was the expansion of political Islam in the Sudan. In the eyes of its neighbours and Arab countries, as well as in the opinion of the international community the NIF government harbours radical Islamic groups and their leadership, including Osama bin Laden (1991-1996) as well as Al-Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Abu Nidal, and Gamaat al Islamiyya.<sup>317</sup> Fellow Arab League members are threatened by Sudan's support for Islamists and rebel groups in their respective countries.<sup>318</sup>

With the regionalization of the conflict, a relationship developed between the Sudan, the SPLM/A and neighbouring countries. In the 1990s countries supporting the SPLM/A were Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, while Egypt, Chad and Libya were allies of the Government of Sudan, although the relationship fluctuated from time to time .

Eritrea and Sudan backed each other's rebel movements and opposition groups. While Asmara hosted and supported the NDA, Khartoum armed the Eritrean Islamic Jihad group. When the NDA-SPLA attacked the Eritrea-Sudan border Eritrea assisted in allowing fighters across its border into eastern Sudan.<sup>319</sup> In 1994 Asmara and Khartoum reached diplomatic deadlock on issues around the border conflict.

Uganda blamed Sudan for supporting the notorious Lords Resistance Army (LRA) since 1986, which has been accused of human rights violations in the country including the abduction of children from Northern Uganda. Yoweri Museveni, since coming to power in 1986, supplied the SPLA with logistic and military support. Museveni knew Garang from 1967/68 when they both attended the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

With the change of ruler in Ethiopia in May 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) expelled the SPLM/A and closed down its headquarters in Addis Ababa. Along with its base, the SPLM/A lost its supply routes and radio station. Suddenly, 400,000 Southern Sudanese refugees were exposed to the double threat of starvation and Sudanese air force bombing.<sup>320</sup> Mengistu supported the SPLM from its

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<sup>316</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 30.

<sup>317</sup> Abebe Zegeye, "Future Perspectives and Conclusion" in Korwa Adar and etal (ed), *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 159.

<sup>318</sup> "Sudan: Turabi's unconvincing transition", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 34, No. 21, 22 October 1993

<sup>319</sup> <sup>319</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 31.

<sup>320</sup> "Sudan: A Regional Setback for the SPLA", *Africa Confidential*, Vol 32, No. 12, 14 June 1991

inception, and the different regimes in the Sudan were performing the same role with regard to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the EPRDF's core organization.

Once the NIF began supporting factions in Ethiopia from 1992, the EPRDF embarked on a policy of cooperation with the NDA. The relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan reached its lowest point in June 1995 when NIF aided Egyptian militants who tried to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during his visit to Addis Ababa to attend an OAU Summit. This affected Sudan's relations with both Ethiopia and Egypt. In April 1996 the UN sanctioned Sudan for failing to extradite the terrorists.<sup>321</sup>

Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda supported the SPLA militarily and logistically. Due to its conflicting relations with all three countries, the Government of Sudan faced regional isolation during the mid 1990s. By 1995 all three countries stepped up their military assistance to the SPLM/A to the extent of sending forces into Sudan. In 1996, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda received over USD 20 million worth of arms from the US on behalf of SPLM.<sup>322</sup> Even Egypt, a supporter of Sudan since the colonial times, has cautiously switched sides in favour of the SPLA. Egypt's fluctuating support is mainly in fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

Egypt was fighting its own internal war against Islamist groups. By the late 1980's Sudan was actively supporting various Islamic groups in Egypt whose activities were destabilizing Hosni Mubarak's government. Sudan only stopped supporting these groups when Egypt mobilized its troops along the Egyptian-Sudanese border. In June 1995 tension between the NIF and Egypt reached a peak when Egyptian terrorists, assisted by Sudanese intelligence service attempted to assassinate President Mubarak during his trip to Addis Ababa for an OAU Summit.

Despite the tension between Egypt and Sudan, the two countries signed an integration agreement in January 2004. The pact, if implemented, will allow millions of Egyptians to move, live, work and possess property in any part of Sudan. The implementation of this agreement may lead to an exodus of Egyptians into South Sudan.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 188.

<sup>322</sup> "Sudan: Arms Against a Sea of Troubles", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 37, No. 23, 15 November 1996.

<sup>323</sup> John G. Nyuot Yoh, "The Politics of Alliances Among Sudanese Stakeholders in the Post-War Sudan" in Korwa Adar, John Yoh and Eddie Maloka (ed.) *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 98.

As a result of its dependency on the Nile Water, Egypt has been opposed to any changes in the status quo.<sup>324</sup> Egypt's interest in Sudan was not necessarily the threat of Southern secession leading to it losing control over access to the White Nile, but the perceived negative impact of having an additional riparian country claiming rights over the Nile. Egypt has long viewed the prospects of South Sudan's secession as a security threat to the 1929 and 1952 agreements. It was also concerned about the consequences of South Sudan allying with Uganda on the use of water and the future impact this may have on other riparian countries' claims over the right to use the water.

### ***US Policy on the Sudan***

US-Sudanese relations go back as far as Nimeiri's time and the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. However, since the 1989 coup, US Policy on the Sudan has changed to less cordial, especially since August 1991 – the first Gulf War – when Sudan supported Iraq and was therefore regarded as a pariah by the US and other Western countries.<sup>325</sup> In August 1993 the US listed Sudan as the 7<sup>th</sup> state sponsoring international terrorism. The Government of Sudan accused the US of targeting Sudan because of its Islamic orientation, for siding with Iraq during the Gulf War and for also having friendly relations with Iran.<sup>326</sup>

By the late 1990s the US increased economic and political pressure on the Sudanese government to change its policies. As bulwark against Sudan's support for Islamic groups, the Clinton Administration began supporting Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda and through them the SPLM. Deteriorating relations were evidenced by the bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam in 1998, where Sudan was accused of supporting terrorist groups suspected of instigating the bombing; and the US bombing of the El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Company in August 1999, justified by claims that it was a chemical weapons-making facility owned by Osama Bin Laden.

The September 11 2001 bombing of the World Trade Centre in the US, and the US global policy on the fight against terrorism influenced the US' policy towards Sudan under the

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<sup>324</sup> Francis A. Kornegay, "Regional and International Implications of the Sudanese Peace Agreement" in Korwa Adar, John Yoh and Eddie Maloka (ed.) *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 64.

<sup>325</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 169.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.* 179.

Bush Administration. Furthermore, pressure from key constituencies in the US – human rights activists, Christian activists, the African-American anti-slavery lobby, the oil lobby groups, the Congressional Black Caucus – kept Sudan high on the US foreign policy agenda.<sup>327</sup>

In 2001, three days before the September 11 incident, President Bush appointed Senator John Danforth as his Special envoy to the Sudan. As a member of the IGAD Partnership Forum (IPF) established to guide the IGAD Peace Initiative, the US along with the UK and Norway, played an active role in the IGAD Peace process leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Although the process was initiated in 1993 it only made substantial progress once the US and other IPF members got actively involved in the process.

### ***Conclusion***

The second civil war was about the conflicting visions of the NIF and SPLM relating to the New Sudan. NIF's thinking was based on political Islam and its vision was to build a new Sudan defined by Islam and the Sharia, as interpreted by the NIF. The SPLM on the other hand introduced a secularist opposition and wanted to build a state that embraced the diversity of the Sudanese society and advocated respect for the ethnic, religious and cultural differences of the population. Hence the concept of 'Sudaness' was contested by these groups. For the NIF 'Sudaness' was linked to 'Arabic' and 'Islamic' political identity, while SPLM identified 'Sudaness' with cultural diversity.

The North of Sudan was more united under Islam, while in the South, tribal and ethnic bonds were more important than identification with being a Southerner. As Prof. Y. F. Hasan has concluded, "the great achievement of Islam and the Arabic culture in Northern Sudan has been the creating of a feeling of cohesion among the heterogeneous inhabitants".<sup>328</sup> In the South, communities were fragmented along religious, racial, language and cultural lines. This was evident in the early 1990s when the SPLM faced internal division, leading to a split into factions. The Southern groups were united only by

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<sup>327</sup> "The Sudan – IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward", *African Security Analysis Program*, Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at <http://www.issafrika.org/pubs/papers/86/Paper86.htm> [accessed on 20 October 2005].

<sup>328</sup> R. K. Badal, "The Rise and Fall of Separatism in South Sudan", *African Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 301, (October 1976), 465.

having the North as a common enemy and even that was easily manipulated and used by the government for their strategy of divide-and-rule.

In a country where thirty percent of the population are non-Muslim and almost seventy percent are 'non-Arabs' it is difficult to build a nation based on religious solidarity, as the Northern elite sought to do since independence. One of the reasons behind such consistent policy of Islamizing the South is the sectarian nature of Northern political parties – from the Umma to the DUP to the NIF and later the NCP.

The ideology of Islamism which spread during the second civil war also led to systematic marginalization of non-Muslims and non-Arabs in the North. Hence the gradually spread of the conflict into the North – southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Nuba Mountain – to eastern and western Sudan. The civil war therefore was no longer about the South and its demand for secession but a broader Sudanese issue.

The discovery of oil along the North-South border brought another dimension to the conflict. The control of national oil reserves became a prominent concern among the political players. Not only did the government's policy towards oil exploration fuel the conflict, it also introduced an international dimension to the conflict, with external actors becoming interested in Sudan and supporting parties in the conflict.

The change in the global environment was also a factor in the second civil war. The NCP's ideology of political Islam became a threat to regional and international security. In a regional context, the NCP government had diplomatic confrontation with Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. The US and its war on terror placed Sudan in the international spotlight. These developments saw the conflict in Sudan change from being an internal conflict to one with a regional dimension with countries like the US and China having an interest in the outcome.

## Chapter 4

# IGAD Peace Talks leading to the Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

### *Introduction*

The background to the second civil war was discussed in chapter three. This chapter will focus on the different peace talks in the country, leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The political dynamics, the nature and ideology of the parties and the regional and international dimension to the conflict are all factors which make the second civil war different from the first civil war. In addition, as the war continued, the factors affecting the conflict also changed.

The peace-making process required the involvement of external actors to get the parties to come to the negotiation table. This chapter will examine the dynamics that led to the signing of the CPA, the factors that pushed the parties to reach a negotiated peace settlement. This chapter will also explore the content of the CPA in relation to the original causes of the civil war. The CPA has brought peace in the Sudan, but has it really addressed the fundamental concerns of the people of the Sudan?

### *Peace Talks and Initiatives*

#### **Internal Initiative**

The Sudanese civil war has seen an abundance of negotiations for peace, which the ICG called 'the traffic-jam of peace initiatives'.<sup>329</sup> Efforts to end the second civil war began as early as March 1986. The Koka Dam Conference organized by a group of professionals and trade unions and attended by the SPLM, Umma, and various secular and regional parties saw the formation of an alliance of fourteen political parties who pledged to work out a formula to end the conflict and build a politically stable society.<sup>330</sup> The final declaration adopted called for a constitutional convention 'to discuss the Basic Problems of Sudan and not the so-called problem of Southern Sudan'.<sup>331</sup> The meeting also agreed to revoke the September law and reinstate the 1956 constitution as an interim constitution

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<sup>329</sup> ICG, *Oil, God and Country*, 153.

<sup>330</sup> Nyong, *Crises and Conflict*, 105-106.

<sup>331</sup> Suggested topics for discussion at the convention included the questions of nationality, religion, culture, basic human rights, the system of the rule of law, development and uneven development, natural resources and security arrangements.

with an amendment to incorporate regional government as adopted in the Addis Ababa Agreement.<sup>332</sup> Despite the positive efforts of the Koka Dam Declaration, the agreements lacked government and DUP input, and were therefore not likely to end the conflict.

John Garang and Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani of the DUP signed the DUP-SPLM Accord in November 1988. The DUP constrained by the Umma-NIF alliance, held series of talks with SPLM between 1987 and 1988 that resulted in the DUP-SPLM Accord. The Accord confirmed the need to end military pacts that limited national sovereignty and to host a constitutional conference.<sup>333</sup> As the SPLM declared a ceasefire, the national military issued al-Mahdi with and ultimatum insisting that he take serious measures to make peace.<sup>334</sup> Al-Mahid was forced to form a new coalition with the DUP, while the NIF refused to accept the terms and left the coalition. The new Council of Ministers proceeded with legal procedures to cancel defence agreements with Egypt. However, before parliament could annul the September law, and shortly before al-Mahdi was scheduled to meet Garang, the RCC staged a pre-emptive coup.<sup>335</sup>

In 1991, two major developments impacted on the conflict in the Sudan. Mengistu's fall led to EPRDF/RCC negotiations, which placed Khartoum in a much better position than the SPLM who lost their support base and primary military and logistic supplier. Secondly, the split in the SPLM between the Troit faction and Nasir faction weakened the movement. Internal division not only diminished the SPLM/A's strength and unity, it allowed Khartoum to play them against each other, which lead to inter-factional fighting. The Troit and Nasir faction were only the beginning of the further split of the SPLM into six factions. While these developments severely affected Garang's movement, Khartoum won military victories, as well as gaining political strength by striking deals with the different SPLM factions in Frankfurt in 1992, Nairobi in 1993 and Khartoum in 1996 and 1997.

Despite the fact that the 1989 coup put an end to internal peace-making efforts, it opened the way for external involvement throughout the 1990s. Peace attempts were facilitated by President Jimmy Carter (1989, 1995 and 1997) and President Ibrahim Babangida (Abuja I and Abuja II in 1992 and 1993 respectively) The IGAD Regional Initiative

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<sup>332</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 72.

<sup>333</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 105.

<sup>334</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 84.

<sup>335</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 84-85.

(between 1993-94 and 1997) and the Egypt-Libya Initiative (ELI) of 1999-2001 also attempted to end the conflict. These multiple initiatives have contributed to the eventual comprehensive peace settlement.

### **Abuja I and II**

The Abuja talks laid down essential principles relating to the establishment of peace that assisted in shaping future peace talks. At the beginning of the talks, the SPLM was represented by the two factions (Troit and Nasir supporters) and this weakened the rebels' negotiating position. In the meantime it allowed the government to gain the upper hand during the talks and take a firm stance on the issue of the Sharia law and the continuation of Islam as the state religion, as well as the use of Arabic as the official language of the country.<sup>336</sup> These issues, in addition to the question of self-determination were the stumbling blocks to the Abuja peace process. The SPLM/A demanded a confederation, while the government reiterated its determination to exercise Sharia law.<sup>337</sup> Hence, Abuja failed to break-through the constitutional questions to establish peace.

The achievements of the Abuja talks, however, were that they committed the parties to work towards an interim arrangement, ensure decentralization of power and equitable sharing of national wealth.<sup>338</sup> The talk established an environment in which the parties agreed to continue negotiating on issues like the continuation of ceasefire, the issue of state and religion, commitment to the unity of Sudan, defining the relationship between the centre and state powers, the establishment of a ceasefire commission, the establishment of a National Revenue Allocation Commission, the adoption of security measures in the South during the interim stage and the status of the judiciary.<sup>339</sup> There were also suggestions of a constitutional conference.<sup>340</sup> Most of all, the Abuja talks succeeded in merging the two SPLM/A factions into a single delegation and focusing them on a common goal.<sup>341</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 38.

<sup>337</sup> Francis Deng and Mohamed I Khalil, *Sudan's Civil War: The Peace Process Before and Since Machakos*, (Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 4.

<sup>338</sup> Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*. (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 27.

<sup>339</sup> <sup>339</sup> Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka eds., *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*. (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 27-28.

<sup>340</sup> Colin Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record*, (Vol. XXIV, 1992-1994), 517.

<sup>341</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 38.

## ***IGAD Initiatives***

Once Abuja failed, in June 1993, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD, the predecessor of today's IGAD), a sub-regional organization founded by Djibouti, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, launched a peace initiative in September 1993. In pursuit of regional security, peace and stability and within the framework of regional cooperation, the IGAD frontline states, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda led the initiative with a clear interest in containing the civil war in the Sudan as well as stopping the spread of Islamists, which Khartoum had begun exporting to its neighbours since 1992.

IGAD's peace-making initiative also fitted well with the post-cold war dynamics of building regional and international security through encouraging regionalism and regional organizations.<sup>342</sup> This mechanism was also supported by the UN and major donor countries. IGAD's role in this regard was further strengthened with the establishment of the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF), a partnership between IGAD and major western donors, including the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands.

IGAD established a Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan and initiated dialogue between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in March 1994. Mindful of previous peace talks in Addis Ababa in August 1989, Nairobi in December 1989, Frankfurt in January 1992, Abuja I in May/July 1992, Abuja II in April/May 1993 and Nairobi in May 1993, IGAD introduced a draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) to the parties. The frontline states, with the interest of countering the NIF's policy in the region, circulated their own proposal for peace rather than helping the parties work out the terms of their compromise.<sup>343</sup>

The Declaration of Principles centred on two main issues, namely the right to self-determination for the South and other disadvantaged areas, and a transitional period within which permanent arrangements were to be finalised.<sup>344</sup> Picking up from the Abuja talks, the DOP also outlined an interim system of governance, sharing of wealth and resources and security arrangements as concerns to be addressed during negotiations.

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<sup>342</sup> Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits for Regional Peacemaking?", *African Affairs*, Vol. 100, (2001), 583.

<sup>343</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 40.

<sup>344</sup> Adar, *A State under Siege*.

While giving unity a priority, the DOP presented the South with the right to self-determination. Maintaining unity was conditional on the principles of establishing the political, legal, economic and social framework of the Country.<sup>345</sup> This included the full recognition and accommodation of diversity, political and social equality for all, the establishment of a secular and democratic state and the appropriate and fair sharing of wealth.

While SPLM/A accepted the draft DOP, the Government rejected the notion of separating state from religion as well as the principle of self determination. Khartoum informed IGAD that Sudan's unity was non-negotiable and secularism unacceptable.<sup>346</sup> The deadlock worsened with the deteriorating bilateral relations between Sudan and the frontline states, starting with the border tension with Eritrea in 1994 followed by diplomatic tension with Uganda and Ethiopia in 1995. The IGAD talks which began as an effort to end the civil war shifted the situation to all-out confrontation, with Khartoum rejecting the DOP and continuing to destabilize its neighbours.<sup>347</sup>

Despite its failure, the IGAD peace-making effort gained strong political and material support through the IPF. Furthermore, IGAD solicited official recognition from the IPF members and the UN as the sole initiative in the Sudan peace process.

### ***Between and After the IGAD Talks***

Once the IGAD talks stalled, SPLM strengthened ties with NDA partners while the Government struck a deal with Southern factions. Through the opposition conference organized in June 1995 in Asmara, the SPLM established relations with NDA members, including the DUP, Umma and the Communist Party. The Asmara Declaration proposed Sudan as a pluralist country where religion would be separate from the state; it suggested a referendum on secession be held in the South and that the political system should be based on democracy and religious pluralism.<sup>348</sup> In this way it addressed the elitist centred political structures. The declaration recorded the sectarian parties' approval of the Declaration of Principles put forward by IGAD.<sup>349</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> "Declaration of Principles", *IGAD(D), Peace Initiative*, 20 July 1994, Nairobi, Kenya, [http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan\\_konflikt/peacepros/igad/igad\\_dop.html](http://www.sudansupport.no/sudan_konflikt/peacepros/igad/igad_dop.html) (accessed 28 April 2006)

<sup>346</sup> El-Affendi, *The Impasse*, 586.

<sup>347</sup> Lesch, *The Sudan*, 185.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid. 194-97.

<sup>349</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 25.

The government signed the Peace Charter and the Khartoum Peace Agreements with SPLM factions in 1996 and 1997 respectively. The documents signed declared the unity of the Sudan and at the same time provided for a referendum for Southerners 'to express their aspirations, by allowing them to retain the right of special legislation with regards to the implementation of Sharia law'.<sup>350</sup> The Khartoum agreement included self-determination for the South, the suspension of Sharia and amnesty for members of the six SPLM factions.

At this stage, it is important to note that some of the contents of the Peace Charter and the Khartoum Peace Agreements were more or less similar to the issues the on which government had repeatedly refused to make concessions. Ironically, given the content of these two agreements, the SPLM rejected the documents while African countries supported it. In the eyes of external actors, these agreements appeared to guarantee religious freedom and non-discrimination and allowed special status to the South during an interim-period leading to self-determination.<sup>351</sup> What the agreements lacked was the presence of the Torit faction of the SPLM.

In the region, Sudan's relations with its neighbours were deteriorating. The military involvement of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda in the Sudanese conflict took the conflict to another level. All three countries increased their military assistance to SPLM/A, in line with the US increase in military support, to a point of sending forces into the Sudan. SPLM/A's victories in the field, alone with internal political and ideological division within the NCP (Bashir versus Turabi) and regional isolation gave the Government no other option but to return to negotiations and accept the DOP as it was.

However, the peace process was curtailed once Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war against each other in 1998 and Uganda shifted its attention to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As the talks continued Government of Sudan, negotiating under pressure, returned to business as usual. An impasse was reached central issues like the duration of the interim period, institutional arrangements, the areas where the referendum should be held and the separation of state and religion.<sup>352</sup> Even though IGAD continued the talks until October 2000 the lack of a regional coalition destroyed the prospects for peace.

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<sup>350</sup> O'ballance, *Sudan*, 189.

<sup>351</sup> El-Affendi, *The Impasse*, 588.

<sup>352</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 42.

### *Egypt-Libya Initiative*

Once the IGAD peace process reached a stalemate, Egypt and Libya, both driven by national interest, initiated the Egypt-Libya Initiative (ELI) in 1999. Since the 1970s Sudan, Egypt and Libya had ambitions to form a broader Arab coalition in the region. Even if the ambitious plan did not go beyond paper, the latter two continued to want Sudan to remain within the Arab fold.<sup>353</sup>

While Egypt's interest in Sudan is in protecting the status quo of the Nile water agreements, the Egyptian government was concerned about the spread of Islamist ideology, which Sudan was promoting in the region. Therefore, Egypt's opposition to restructuring Sudan does not reflect support for the government in Khartoum, but comes rather from national interest.

The ELI initiative was seen as a reflection of an Arab view on the peace process.<sup>354</sup> Egypt and Libya were concerned about the lack of Northern opposition participating in the IGAD talks.<sup>355</sup> Both countries promoted their own interests which were linked to the prevention of a democratic system, which would end the NIF's power.<sup>356</sup> Their goal in general was to reconcile the North and somehow draw some of the Northern opposition members into the NIF.<sup>357</sup>

The ELI initiative did not address the central issues – the question of self-determination for the South and the relationship between state and religion. It therefore lacked support from the SPLM/A and Southerners in general while Khartoum endorsed it. The SPLM also sought to see the initiative linked to the IGAD process, which it saw as the first peace initiative to correctly diagnose the causes of the war.<sup>358</sup> ELI was also accepted by the NDA leadership, despite the SPLM/A's reservations.<sup>359</sup>

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<sup>353</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 176.

<sup>354</sup> See Emeric Rogier, *No More Hills*, 42-43.

<sup>355</sup> "The Sudan – IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward", *African Security Analysis Program*, Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at <http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/papers/86/Paper86.htm> [accessed 20 October 2005].

<sup>356</sup> "Sudan: Delusions of Peace", *Africa Confidential*, Vo. 42, No. 16, 10 (August 2001).

<sup>357</sup> ICG, *God, Oil and Country*, 160.

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>359</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 176.

In reply to the Egypt-Libya initiative al-Bashir - once his coalition with al-Turabi collapsed – ‘did a Nimeiri’ as Johnson described it and called for Northern reconciliation in 2000.<sup>360</sup> He recalled both Nimeiri and al-Mahdi from exile. Once al-Mahdi returned to Sudan from exile, Bashir invited al-Mirghani to join in the negotiations of his government with NDA leaders. However, Al-Mahdi’s return to Khartoum divided the NDA.

### ***Revival of the IGAD Talks***

By late 2001, ELI was nowhere close to bringing the parties to an agreement. The failure of ELI led to a broader appreciation and acknowledgement of what the IGAD talks had accomplished in introducing a DOP that addressed fundamental questions like the issue of self-determination and the relation between state and religion. IGAD negotiations also established a workable relationship with the belligerents and exhibited an institutional focus and international legitimacy.<sup>361</sup> Nevertheless, it became apparent that the IGAD process would not reach anywhere without external strengthening which could only come through international pressure.

The US’ continued to show strong interest in the Sudan following its war on terror after September 11. Furthermore, as Sudan increased its oil production and its potential for contributing to the international oil industry was evident, international interest in Sudan’s internal politics increased. These factors led to further international commitment to revive and reinstate the IGAD peace talks.

Internally, once al-Bashir and Garang realized that they had failed to win the war and that only a political solution was possible to settle the conflict, they looked to IGAD’s DOP to end the stalemate. It was in this climate that the IGAD talks were taken further, leading to the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002, followed by the Agreements on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period in September 2003, and an agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period in January 2004. An agreement on Power Sharing followed in May 2004, the Resolution of Conflict in

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<sup>360</sup> Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 141.

<sup>361</sup> The Sudan – IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward, *African Security Analysis Program*, Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at <http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/papers/86/Paper86.htm> [accessed 20 October 2005].

Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States in May 2004, and the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area in May 2004.

In December 2004, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the last protocols on the Permanent Ceasefire Arrangement and the Agreement on the Modalities of Implementation for the Agreements/Protocols - in 2002 and 2004. Finally the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) containing the the rest of the agreements/protocols, was signed in January 2005. By signing these agreements and protocols parties committed themselves to a new start.

### ***The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its Content***

The Machakos Protocol is the foundation for the rest of the protocols, including the CPA. The protocol reaffirmed unity as a priority, while granting the South the right to self-determination through a referendum on secession, which will be held after an interim period of six years. It also dealt with core issues such as the transition period, state and religion and the structures of government. The principles and procedures to guide the transition/interim period of six years were also set out and the structure of the transitional government lay down.<sup>362</sup>

The issue of separating religion from state was the most difficult to deal with. Islamic doctrine, which the NCP was committed to as a pillar for building Sudanese society, had been rejected by both the SPLM/A and other liberation movements before it. It was a major breakthrough to get the Government of Sudan to accept the principles of freedom of worship, non-discrimination on the basis of religion, observance of religious public holidays and observance of religious laws confined to the personal or family realm. While the text respects the exercise of Sharia law in the North it guarantees the South the right to exercise a secular system.<sup>363</sup>

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides for the formulation of a new constitution, and power-sharing through a federal system with a government of national unity in Khartoum. The SPLM/A would be represented in the new cabinet and also establish a separate administration for the South. General elections will be held in the third year of the six-year transition period. This was purposely done to allow the state to create the

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<sup>362</sup> "Machakos Protocol Protocol" Machakos, Kenya, 20 July 2002.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

conditions in which Southerners could be persuaded to voluntarily remain part of a united Sudan.<sup>364</sup>

The North and South were to have their own autonomous regional governments, and the SPLM/A would have to share, not only the civil administration, but also the security forces with the government in both regions.<sup>365</sup> According to the Protocol on Power-sharing, the Government of National Unity (GNU) comprised of the National Congress Party (NCP), the SPLM and other opposition groups from the North and South will be established. The seats of the National Executive would be allocated according to a quota system where the NCP gets fifty-two percent representation, the SPLM/A twenty-eight percent, other Northern political forces fourteen percent and Southern political forces six percent. This also applies to representation in the National Assembly.

A fifty-fifty wealth-sharing arrangement – a mechanism for equitable distribution of revenues – was presented in the agreement. Ownership of land and national resources, management and utilization of oil revenues and non-oil revenues, fiscal and financial allocation, access and utilization of reconstruction and development funding as well as financing for the transition are addressed in the Protocol. The formula for sharing oil resources is based on a fifty-fifty split of oil exploited in the South between the National Government and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). Two percent of revenue would go to oil producing states in proportion to their output. The National Petroleum Commission (NPC) created in October 2005, would formulate policies with regard to the management and development of the oil sector, and negotiate and approve contracts for exploration.

A dual banking system, with two separate currencies and two separate systems would operate during the interim period. Southern Sudan will apply a conventional banking system while an Islamic banking system will function in rest of the country. A new currency will also be issued.<sup>366</sup> Civil and religious liberties and representation in the national government and the parliament were also guaranteed.

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<sup>364</sup> Douglas Johnson, "Comprehensive Sudan peace agreement: Playing for Time", *A Parliamentary Brief*, (2005), available at [http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf\\_reports/2005/nieuws/Februari/20050200CPAJohnson.doc](http://www.ecosonline.org/back/pdf_reports/2005/nieuws/Februari/20050200CPAJohnson.doc) [accessed 8 October 2005].

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills*, 132.

The Security Arrangement is one of the most complex but crucial component of the CPA. The Protocol on the Security Arrangement signed in September 2003 and the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement concluded December 2004 will preside over the security structure during the interim period. According to the arrangement, the two armies will remain separate but considered as Sudan's National Armed Forces and will be deployed along the 1956 North/South border. The details of the CPA make it clear that the armies will be disengaged, separated, encamped and redeployed. In addition, a Joint/Integrated Unit of 39,000 soldiers – composed of the SAF and SPLA – will be established and deployed in Southern Sudan (24,000 soldiers), the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile (6,000 soldiers each) and Khartoum (3,000 soldiers).<sup>367</sup> With the assistance of the international community, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants will take place from all sides, including the militias.

The CPA also laid out provisions for three of the disputed areas: Abyei, Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountain) and Blue Nile. In reference to the 1956 border, these areas fell under the jurisdiction of the Northern administration. However, due to the systematic marginalization and discrimination, the people of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, joined the SPLM struggle from the mid 1980s.<sup>368</sup> The provisions for the area state that the people of Abyei would have a referendum simultaneously with the people of the South and vote either to remain in the North or become part of the South.

### ***Challenges in Implementing the CPA***

The CPA resulted from a bilateral process which focused on the SPLM/A representing the South and the NCP, representing the Government of Sudan, representing the entire North (including the east, west, centre and north). This view sidelined other groups such as the NDA and the Umma Party, the PC, DUP, NDA, the Communist Party, civil society groups, trade unions and professional organizations. Despite their repeated request for observer status it was not until the final stages of negotiations that the participants and observers (IGAD and the observer states, namely the US, UK, Italy and Norway, and the UN and AU) became aware that the support of the Sudanese public was crucial to the success of peace-making.<sup>369</sup> Even when the parties eventually decided to bring on board

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<sup>367</sup> Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Naivasha, Kenya, 25 September 2003.

<sup>368</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 113.

<sup>369</sup> The Sudan – IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way forward, *African Security Analysis Program*, Occasional Paper 86, (March 2004) available at <http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/papers/86/Paper86.htm> [accessed 20 October 2005].

non-governmental groups and leading opposition parties, they did not accept the direct participation of these groups in the peace process.<sup>370</sup>

The IGAD initiative deliberately focused on the North-South dimension of the conflict and ignored the rest of the Sudan. The CPA therefore lacked nationwide consultation that would have made it genuinely comprehensive.<sup>371</sup> As the Human Rights Watch report on the process states, “CPA’s exclusion of other parties, most prominently the southern-based political parties and southern ethnic militias backed by Khartoum, the Darfur rebels, the eastern Beja Congress ..., as well as the multiplicity of other political parties at home and in exile, made it much less than its “comprehensive” title promised”.<sup>372</sup> The word comprehensive in the CPA should therefore be understood within the context of the North-South conflict and not confused with the unrest in the rest of the country, including Darfur in the west and the struggle of the Beja people in the east even if it has been presented as a model for other future peace initiative.

The CPA was meant to address the core concerns which triggered the ‘North-South’ conflict in 1955. These are political dominance by the Northern elite, the socio-economic and political gap between the centre and periphery, the constitutional question over the relation between state and religion, and the status of the Southern region. The agreement is therefore designed to tackle these concerns and at the same time guarantee positive change in the Sudan.

In attempting to deal with the fundamental causes of the conflict, the CPA handed the North to the NIF and the South to the SPLM. Its strategy for peace focused on three critical areas: power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements. These would be tackled through the structures put in place including the more than 50 national bodies and commissions. However, the arrangements for peace resulted in the elite from the North and the South once again dominating political platforms in their respective regions.

The CPA provisions for an interim period of six years, an interim constitution (adopted in July 2005) and the establishment of a National Government of Coalition with proportional representation and its provision for fifty-fifty wealth-sharing makes it

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<sup>370</sup> Ibid.

<sup>371</sup> Rogier, *No More Hills Ahead*, 106.

<sup>372</sup> “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan”, *Human Rights Watch*, No. 1, (March 2006), 5.

different from the Addis Ababa Agreement. However these provisions lose their force if they are not participatory and include marginalized groups throughout the country. The dominant role of the NCP and the SPLM does not seem encouraging. Nevertheless, parties committed to respect the agreement and implement it in accordance with the prescribed modalities.

The SPLM has begun transforming itself from a rebel movement to a government, a political party and a professional army.<sup>373</sup> The SPLM is not only faced with the challenges of setting up a workable system but also with enormous expectations from the general population – both in the North and South. In the South, expectations are related to “peace dividends” promising a better life for the population through service delivery, in the form of health care, education and infrastructure.<sup>374</sup> The expectations of the rest of the population, including those in the Centre, North and SPLM constituencies, in the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile, are related to a vision of “A New Sudan” that the SPLM aimed for during the 21 year civil war. There is fear that war could resume if people feel they are not directly benefiting from peace. An immediate example at the moment is the conflict in Darfur and in the East.

The bulk of the agreement was directly negotiated between the then first Vice-President, Ali Osman Taha and the SPLM Chairman, Dr. John Garang, aided by a small group of trusted supporters. The success of this approach was dependent on the personal relationship between the two and their joint commitment to finding a way to implement the agreement. Garang’s death in a helicopter accident in July 2005 removed a key figure in the peace process.<sup>375</sup>

In the 18 months of the implementation of the CPA, there have been signs of discontent and frustration among the participants. Power politics in the South is fragile and can impact on the reconstruction work of the Government of Sudan. In the transition from a liberation movement to a political party tasked with the running of a government bureaucracy, the SPLM faces difficulties. Factors such as inflexible leadership, ethnic division and power struggles are elements common to any transition. Since the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan, there have been allegations that it is not ethnically

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<sup>373</sup> Ibid, p 18.

<sup>374</sup> “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”, *International Crises Group*, Africa Report No 106, (31 March 2006), 8.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid. 3.

representative and that it is dominated by the Dinka. Internal splits within the SPLM between the unionists and the separatist, and between Garang's camp and Kiir's camp are also a threat to peace. The difference between these two camps surfaced after the death of Garang, when Kiir took over the leadership of the SPLM.

### ***Conclusion***

The CPA has come a long way. It is a development of different initiatives which began as early as 1986. Its progress seems to signal that this is a well thought out and coherent peace-making process. However, implementing the CPA will need goodwill and commitment on all sides, and the CPA may not have the commitment of all parties. Symptoms of the government's lack of commitment to embrace genuine power sharing and the SPLM's lack of capacity to meet the challenges of peace-making in post-conflict Sudan are visible. International observers, including the International Crises Group (ICG) are warning that the government's lack of will, and the SPLM's lack of capacity could hamper the implementation of the agreement, including preventing elections which would ultimately allow Southern self-determination through a referendum in 2011.

The problems of mistrust among the participants, and their internal divisions and limited resources coupled with the high expectations of the population, are in evidence at the moment. The South is already experiencing a capacity and resource shortage in trying to establish the basic structures of governance. Such problems could lead to delays in implementation of the peace agreement which could then lead to frustration and dissatisfaction among interest groups in the country.

The CPA created a new form of governance whereby the Sudan would function as one country with two armies, two governments, two banking systems, two constitutions and two administrations. The real challenge in this regard is to make such a complex system work while ensuring that national unity is secured. The CPA did not clearly address one of the fundamental causes of the conflict – centralized power controlled by the elite. With the current structure power is mainly divided between the NCP and the SPLM, the rest remain marginalized. By addressing the issues of democracy and political plurality the CPA could have ensured a more stable system.

The regional dimension of the conflict has played an important role in the second civil war. What makes the CPA different from the Addis Ababa Agreement is that there is

more regional and international interest and engagement in the CPA than there was during the negotiations for the Addis Ababa Agreement.

One of the constraints to pursuing genuine peace during the IGAD peace talks was the bilateral conflict between IGAD frontline states, tasked with leading the peace talks, and the Sudanese representatives. The CPA is an external initiative while the Addis Ababa Agreement was initiated internally and mediated by a third party. As Gerard Prunier stated: “Naivasha [the IGAD peace talks] began to turn into a strange theatre when the actors appeared driven to compromise more by American pressure than by an inner conviction that peace should actually be negotiated.”<sup>376</sup>

As Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance and Special Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan has rightly stated, “There has been no shortage of peace processes in Sudan in the past. What has been lacking is the will to sustain those efforts. To prevent a repeat of past failures such as the 1972 Addis Ababa accords, we need a strategic approach that focuses on key challenges.”<sup>377</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> Prunier, *Darfur*, 89.

<sup>377</sup> Andrew Natsios, “Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan”, *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Summer/Fall 2005.

## Conclusion

In the fifty years that the Sudan existed as an independent state, it has been governed and ruled by nine different governments (three civilian, three military and three transitional) and under five constitutions. Every authority that seized power in the Sudan promised a better future but none have lived up to their promises.

The Sudanese civil war lasted for almost forty years. In addition to the legacy of colonial rule, three of the causes of the conflict are the emergence of the Northern or riverine elite at the centre of political power and the failure to of successive constitutions to address the relation between state and religion and answers the Southern question. Furthermore, by virtue of the duration of the war, it has been difficult to restrict the root causes of the conflict to only these factors. With the politicization and manipulation of Sudan's diversity – racial, religious, ethnic and cultural – factors related to the conflict have expanded beyond the initial causes of the war. Political exclusion of groups and ideological warfare have significantly contributed to the complexity of the war, while unequal access to natural resources, particularly oil, has led to further complications, especially during the second civil war.

Although both wars were led by Southern movements, the complex nature of the conflict has made it difficult to compare the characteristics of the civil wars. Neither the motives nor the issues at stake were the same. For instance, while the Anya-Nya fought for the secession of the South, SPLM mobilized support in the name of creating a 'New Sudan', which draws on the participation of other marginalized groups.

Although the civil war began in the South, the struggle for change, representation and participation in the distribution of power and wealth were issues not confined to this region. There have been grievances in Darfur, the eastern region, the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile. This proves that the Sudanese problem is one beyond the North-South conflict. Rather, it is a conflict between the center and periphery, Khartoum versus the rest of the country.

When examining the peace-making process in the Sudan, one can not ignore the importance of understanding the factors which led the parties to negotiate. Factors such

as internal political turmoil, an economic crisis, increases in military expenditure as well as regional and international pressure have all contributed to peace-making efforts in the Sudan. Even though both wars were provoked by the government's failure to honour its commitment to Southern autonomy, each war and subsequent peace-making process has specific characteristics in relation to the nature in which peace was negotiated.

Negotiations to stop the first civil war were initiated internally. The major factors which triggered the peace talks were the cost of the war, and the role and contribution of certain individuals. At the time, the cost of war was far greater than that of concessions that were likely to come with a peace agreement. Military and political stalemate could only lead to escalating costs for the government, and negotiation was the only way out. At the same time, personal commitment and the leadership roles played by Abel Alier, Joseph Lagu and Jafar Nimeiri can not be ignored.

Unlike the Addis Ababa talks, the IGAD peace process, was initiated and concluded through external pressure. Interest from other countries including the US, Britain, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, forced the GOS and SPLM to negotiate. The onset of Sudan's oil-exporting capacity since the 1990's brought international interest and engagement in the peace process. Another dimension to international involvement was the Islamist ideology Khartoum was exporting to its neighbours. This became a threat to regional and international security and "the war on terror" were also a critical factor in ending the second civil war. As NCP faced diplomatic confrontation, chances of it ignoring the international pressure diminished.

The two peace agreements addressed the fundamental questions which causes the conflict differently. While the Addis Ababa Agreement addressed the relationship between the two regions it did not explicitly deal with the status of religion vis-à-vis the state. Even though the adoption of the concept of Southern autonomy gave the South relative independence in its domestic affairs and paved the way for future dealings, it was not long before it became apparent that the South was still economically and politically under Khartoum. Furthermore, the Addis Ababa Agreement did not have a mechanism which guaranteed its protection and sustainability, resulting its failure eleven years later.

Though it is too early to speculate on the success or failure of the CPA, there are obvious problems which could be discussed. Through the Machakos Protocol and the Agreements

on Wealth-Sharing and Power-Sharing the CPA addressed many national concerns. However, plans for the implementation of the protocols remain complex and vague. The Protocol on Power-Sharing contradicts itself by stating that “Cabinet posts and portfolios in all clusters, including the National Sovereignty Ministries, shall be shared equitably and qualitatively by the **two parties** [emphasis by author].” Such arrangement shows the lack of awareness of the diversity of interests in the country.. Provisions of such nature clearly imply that matters of the entire country will be dealt with by the GNU which consists of a NCP/SPLM majority with eighty percent representation. Hence the question of political and economic marginalization is still not tackled.

The fact that the CPA kept other parties outside the process makes the peace process fragile. Major political groups such as the NDA, PC, Umma, the Communist Party, DUP, UDSF, USAP and the Trade Unions and some professions such as lawyers and doctors have all been excluded from the process. These exclusions make the agreement seem an exclusive deal between the SPLM and NCP and question the comprehensiveness of the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement”. Most recent evidence of a partial peace deal is the unrest in the east and the ongoing conflict in Darfur which cost the lives of up to 400,000 people in only three years.

In summary, it is worthwhile to conclude by identifying five important characteristics which were prevalent in both peace processes and their implementation. These features are also observed in previous failed initiatives. Firstly, the challenge of reaching a common understanding on the root causes of the problem was a major obstacle. It is evident that the causes of the civil war were understood differently by the parties to the conflict, and by observers. It would be ambitious to expect a workable peace agreement when there is still disagreement on the root cause of the conflict. Lack of a common understanding on the causes of the conflict may lead to difference in perceptions, visions and ideas on solutions to the problem.

Secondly, parties entered into the agreement largely owing to external and internal pressure. Internal political and economic instability was a main reason which led to the signing of both agreements. External political environment and economic dynamics, including a change in allies, economic dependency and pressure of isolation were some of the reasons which pushed the actors to negotiate. The continuance and sustainability of peace depends on the party’s mutual accountability and sense of responsibility towards

their constituencies. In the Sudanese peace process, there is a gap in the representation and participation of civil society and interest groups. Implementing the CPA is a challenge without the broader participation and contribution of the Sudanese people.

Thirdly, if agreements are to last, 'institutionalization' of the peace process becomes crucial. Samuel Huntington introduces institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability".<sup>378</sup> In other words, once agreements are concluded, the crucial challenge will be their continuity in the face of time and regime changes. Thus, without incorporating an agreement into national policy it would be difficult to guarantee its sustainability. Nimeiri ratified the Addis Ababa Agreement as an organic law and incorporated it into the national constitution, but the contents of the agreement were not fully internalized.

Fourthly, peace agreements driven by personalities will remain fragile once these personalities are no longer in power. The Addis Ababa Agreement could not have happened without the goodwill of Nimeiri, Alier and Lagu. Similarly, the CPA would not have been accomplished if it was not for Taha and Garang who directly negotiated the bulk of the agreement. These individuals have played a significant role in sustaining the peace processes. As Nelson Kasfir said, the success of the agreement would only be measured by its acceptance by the constituencies the parties represent.<sup>379</sup> The commitment negotiators bring to a process can be lost in their absence. A case in point is the uncertainty the current peace agreement faces after the death of Garang.

Lastly, both the Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA were concluded in the form of a bilateral process which narrowly focused on Southern representatives and the demands of government. Such a narrow focus has sidelined other marginalized groups who are still victims of Khartoum's negligence. The strategy of undertaking peace talks at a bilateral level has left the broader national problem unresolved. The agreement therefore lacks the nationwide dimension that would make it genuinely able to solve the Sudanese problem. As Santino Aher arop bol, a Sudanese refugee, rightly observed, what Sudan needs is not a plan for ending wars, but one for solving them.<sup>380</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> Samuel Huntington, *Political Orders in Changing Societies*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 8-24.

<sup>379</sup> Kasfir, *Southern Sudanese*, 144 - 148

<sup>380</sup> "Using the Past to Build the Future: The lost boys" Santino Aher Arop Bol, <http://www.kushworld.org/lostboyspage1.html> , [accessed 15 August 2006].

# Appendix 1

## Provinces in the Sudan

1956 – 1983 (8 provinces)

Northern Region	Southern Region
Northern Province Kassala Province Kordofan Province Darfur Province Blue Nile Province	Bahr el-Ghazal Equatoria Upper Nile

1983 – 1994 (18 provinces)

Northern Region	Southern Region
Upper Blue Nile Blue Nile Kassala Khartoum Southern Kordofan Northern Kordofan Southern Darfur Northern Darfur White Nile Northern Nile Red Sea	Eastern Equatoria Western Equatoria Bahr el-Ghazal Upper Nile Lakes Jonglei

1994 – Present (26 Provinces)

Northern Region	Southern Region
Upper Blue Nile Blue Nile Kassala Khartoum Southern Kordofan Northern Kordofan Western Kordofan Southern Darfur Northern Darfur White Nile Northern Nile Red Sea Sennar Gedaref El Gezira	Eastern Equatoria Western Equatoria Bahr el-Jabal Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Western Bahr el-Ghazal Warrab Unity Upper Nile Lakes Jonglei

## Appendix 2

### Government in the Sudan: 1956 – 2006

No.	Year	Leader	Type of Government
1.	1956 – 1958	PM. Abd Allah Khalil	1 <sup>st</sup> Democratic Period
2.	1958 – 1964	Major General Ibrahim Abbud	Military Government
3.	1964 – 1965	Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa	Transitional Civilian Government
4.	1965 – 1969	Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi	2 <sup>nd</sup> Democratic Period
5.	1969 – 1985	Colonel Ja'far Nimeri	Military Government
6.	1985 – 1986	Lieutenant General Abdar Rahman Siwar ad-Dhahab	Interim Government
7.	1986 – 1989	Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi	3 <sup>rd</sup> Democratic Period
8.	1989 – 2005	General Omar Hassan al-Bashir	Military Government
9.	2005 - Present	General Omar Hassan al-Bashir	Interim Government

## Appendix 3

Extract from the book “Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured” by Abel Alier, 1992 (p. 64-66)

Abel Alier presented Numeiri with policy recommendation based on 9<sup>th</sup> June Declaration and previous deliberations on the subject, most importantly the 1965 Round-table Conference. From these documents emerged eleven points which guided discussions with Anya-Nya. These are:

1. Government was asked to reaffirm its determination to abide by 9<sup>th</sup> June Declaration.
2. Amnesty law would be extended to Southerners previously or currently involved in acts and omissions contrary to the laws of the country.
3. Citizens in the South would be responsible for local affairs in regional administration, local government the police and prison forces.
4. Central government would be committed to the principle of guaranteeing citizens their political and socio-economic rights.
5. Whatever is agreed upon in respect of internal self-government in the South, would be embodied in the country's constitution.
6. Exclusive jurisdiction of the central government would include External Affairs, National defence, Economic and Educational Planning, Communication and Telecommunication, currency and coinage, Nationality and Immigration.

Alier justifies this as ‘essential to define areas of sovereignty which the Southern region would not claim and which would not be negotiable in the process of dialogue.

7. Returnees including those fighting against the government and politicians in exile would be entitled to participate fully and unconditionally in political, economic and social work at central and regional government levels.
8. Returnees will be resettled in their original homes, and agricultural and other projects of an economic nature will be provided for the socio-economic welfare of the Southern Sudan.

9. General rehabilitation of those displaced as a result of rebellion will be guaranteed.
10. The government calls upon all citizens to abandon all acts of violence and blood-shed and work for fruitful socio-economic development to fight poverty, ignorance and disease.
11. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the Constitution Committee have gone through these points and are fully in agreement with them.

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