THE AFRICAN UNION AS A HUMAN SECURITY ACTOR: A STUDY OF THE AU MISSION TO SOMALIA (AMISOM) FROM 2007-2017

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: Signed by candidate **Date:** 12/12/2021

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"…do what your hand finds to do, for God is with you."

1 Samuel 10:7 (NIV)

"Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with all your might…"

Ecclesiastes 9:10 (NIV)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis assesses the effectiveness of the African Union as a pro-human security actor in conflict. It employs a case study approach using the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007-2017 to examine the extent to which the AU has helped, hindered or harmed human security through its interventions. A critical human security lens is used to unpack the organisation's efficacy in anticipating, mitigating and responding to both direct and indirect forms of violence faced by civilians. This study relies primarily on secondary qualitative data sources including policy documents, mission reports and interviews with Somali civilians, government officials and ex-combatants. The data shows that AMISOM experienced mixed results in its ability to proactively account for and respond to the human security needs of Somali citizens. This is due to several factors, including its overreliance on third party forces, inconsistent access to resources to match extensive mandates and the organisation's propensity toward state-centric forms of interventionism. The study finds that in some cases AMISOM was able to evolve and adapt to minimise its own direct contributions to human insecurity over time. However, the AU-led mission remained largely reactive and in some cases enabled, indirect drivers of insecurity facing Somali citizens.

ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
APSA	AU Peace & Security Architecture
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
R2P	Responsibility to protect
PoC	Protection of civilians
CSSDCA	Conference on security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa
CADSP	Common African Defence & Security Policy
PSC	Peace & Security Council
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
ASF	African Standby Force
PSO	Peace Support Operation
AMIB	AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
USC	United Somali Congress
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
SNPC	Somali National Peace Conference
SRRC	Somalia Reconciliation & Restoration Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
IGAD	Inter-governmental Agency on Development
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace & Counter-terrorism
RoE	Rules of Engagement
UNSOA	UN Support Office for AMISOM
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
CONOPS	Concept of Operation
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces
TCC	Troop Contributing Country

SOMA	AMISOM Status of Mission Agreement
CCTARC	Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
SPF	Somalia Police Force
SNA	Somali National Army
NISA	Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Africa remains one of the most conflict-afflicted regions in the world. In recent decades African nations have attempted to take ownership of responses to conflict on the continent; complementing and sometimes replacing the efforts of other international actors. The African Union (AU) serves as a pioneering actor in African politics and governance. Contrary to its forebearer, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU has been viewed as better equipped to deal with the challenges of 21st century peace and security operations. The regional organisation has actively involved itself in a wide range of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in conflict-afflicted member states. The most notable element of the AU Peace & Security Architecture (APSA) is the explicit and ambitious emphasis placed on protecting and promoting a human-centred view of security. The concept of 'human security' has grown in prominence in the international arena since the 1990s. The human security concept has shifted the focus of security practices from its traditional referent, the state, towards the level of individual citizens. This shift has been accompanied by a recognition of the limitation of state-centric approaches to security, which fail to account for the needs of the most vulnerable in conflict-afflicted zones.

Utilising a critical lens this thesis will seek to assess the extent to which the AU has been able to promote human security practices and principles in its response to conflict. It will do so using a case-study methodology to unpack the AUs response to the conflict in Somalia, with particular focus on the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to 2017. The study will employ a conceptual framework developed using contemporary human security literature, to analyse both the practices and corresponding consequences of the AU-led intervention in Somalia. This thesis will argue that while the AU has made some discernible progress, the case of Somalia suggests that AU interventionism continues to fall short of a more comprehensive vision of human security. It will further show that in practice a state-centric logic of peacebuilding still dominates the AU's approaches to security. This, in turn, has not merely prevented the AU from achieving its set human security goals but has also made it complicit in reinforcing structural social and political dynamics that perpetuate ongoing human insecurity.

Chapter 1 of this thesis gives a broad overview of how human security has become embedded both in international and regional governance frameworks. Chapter 2 conducts a review of the most relevant literature to identify trends, areas of consensus and gaps in contributions made by authors on AU interventionism. Chapter 3 develops a conceptual framework, drawing on critical human security literature to outline the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin this study and its methodological approach. Chapter 4 turns towards the Somali case study to provide an overview of the political and social dynamics and actors that have shaped conflict in Somalia, positioning AMISOM within that broader context. Chapter 5 builds on the preceding chapters to present and analyse data on the evolving role and effect that AMISOM had on the drivers and dynamics of human insecurity in the Somali conflict between 2007 to 2017. Chapter 6 further discusses the findings of the study and conclusions that can be drawn about the efficacy of the AU as a human security actor.

1.2. Background:

In the last 60 years African leaders and policymakers have been intensely engaged in identifying and defining the key threats facing the continent. This section will provide a brief overview of how the discourse has evolved at both an international and regional level to incorporate a more human-centric vision of security. The most notable shift in the discourse on security in Africa can be located in the 1980s, when regional security policy began to transition from a doctrine of exclusive non-interference towards an ever-expanding policy of non-indifference. This shift aligns with broader trends in the international peace and security arena in the latter years of the Cold War; characterised by a growing concern for the well-being and rights of citizens in conflict-afflicted regions. Understanding the evolution of Africa's continental security policies is crucial to the rationale and aims of this thesis, as it speaks to the heart of the debate on the AUs actions, intentions and efficacy. This section ultimately sets the point of departure from which this thesis moves to assess the AU as a human security actor, with reference to the case of Somalia.

1.2.1. The International Human Security Turn

The human security discourse emerged during the post-WWII era and continued to develop throughout the Cold War, primarily via the formation of the United Nations and key foreign policy directives of Western states (Zondi, 2017). The concept formed an implicit part of the 1948 *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights* as well as the basic human need approaches of international development programmes in the 1970s (Glasius, 2008). Human security gained further independent currency with

the publication of the 1994 *UNDP Human Development Report*. King & Murray (2001) refer to the UNDP Report as a "unifying event" where the idea of human development and wellbeing was officially brought into the international security policy arena. This marked a milestone in the emergence of people-centred global norms that sought to deepen and widen the parameters of security. The Report identified several interwoven categories of threats that face the health, prosperity and dignity of the human person. The main categories of threats included concerns over economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP, 1994). These categories rested on the broader objectives of human security to achieve *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want* for all peoples. It was argued that while development widens people's variety of choices, human security gives them the ability to choose "safely, freely and to be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today won't be lost tomorrow" (Tadjbakhsh, 2014:3).

Many Western nations proactively internalised human security principles into their foreign policy objectives in the early years of the discourse. Several international norms also emerged as a result of the internationalisation of the human security paradigm. Most notable among these were the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) principle, which both draw on the idea of prioritising the protection of the life and dignity of individuals rather than the state in the context of international interventions (Lotze, 2014). The role of state sovereignty in international peace and security was also scrutinised during this period through initiatives like the Canadian-funded *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* hosted in 2000. The Commission aimed to reach multilateral consensus on the legitimacy of international interventions geared towards humanitarian purposes and for the protection of human life. *The Responsibility to Protect Report*, published by the Commission, clearly established the legitimacy of foreign interventions when the lives of citizens in a state were at risk (Chandler, 2012). The R2P principle was later formally adopted by the UN General Assembly as part of the 2005 World Summit; encouraging member states to protect their citizens from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (United Nations, 2005:30). While not synonymous with human security, the normalisation of the R2P doctrine was an important step towards realising the eventual ideal of protecting citizens from harm caused by their states or other groups. The introduction of R2P also centralised the role of multilateral institutions as actors through which nations should take collective action to protect civilians (MacGinty, 2011).

In 2003 the *UN Commission Report on Human Security* further deepened the human security paradigm; recognising that protection from want and fear alone was not enough, but that it was necessary to actively empowerment citizens to become resilient in the face of latent threats. This further introduced the idea of agency as a key measure of human security i.e., assessing the economic, social, political factors that prohibit or help people make free choices and act upon them (Tanaka, 2015). This conceptual development in human security was closely associated with Sen's development as freedom approach, which views development as an individual's capability to freely choose a course of action to protect themselves against any given threat or vulnerability. The association between security, development and freedom has since become a cornerstone of the post-Cold War international order. Under the leadership of key Western powers, such as the United States, promoting democracy, liberty and human rights became imperatives for the promotion of human security in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Fukuda-Parr, 2012; Tanaka, 2015).

1.2.2. Human Security in African Regionalism

Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, post-colonial Africa experienced the formation and evolution of its own regional governance frameworks. The OAU was established in 1963 to promote coordination and cooperation among African states. For the first decade of its existence, the OAUs primary security concerns revolved around securing newly decolonised states, navigating Cold War-era politics and countering the influence of European settler regimes on the continent. The founding principles of the organisation highlighted a strict adherence to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states, as outlined in the organisation's founding Charter (OAU, 1963). In the late 1970s and early 80s however, discourses on development and human rights gained prominence in Africa, accompanied by a wave of political, economic and social liberalisation under the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions. This challenged African governments to adopt a more human-centred discourse in African regional governance, including in the realm of security (Umozurike, 1983). The 1981 adoption of the *African Charter on Human & People's Rights* by OAU member-states evidenced this shift in priorities. It marked the first substantive continental position to look beyond the well-being of states alone and acknowledge that every African citizen has the "right to liberty and to the security of his [sic] person" (OAU, 1981:6).

In 1990 OAU member states issued the *Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa*, which marked an important turning point in the continent's security priorities. Political leaders and stakeholders recognised that while colonialism had largely been vanquished and the Cold War was waning, issues like human rights and underdevelopment posed greater threats to the long-term stability of the continent. This opened the way for the human security paradigm to gain a stronger foothold in African security policy and discourse (Dersso, 2014). At a grassroots level, the idea of human security also gained increased prominence. In 1991 a coalition of civil society organisations published *The Kampala Document* calling on African leaders to redefine regional security to include securing people's livelihoods and protecting the rights of all citizens. The document and its proponents argued that national and regional security were intrinsically linked to the long-term security of citizens. It further challenged the OAUs policy of non-interference, calling for greater collective action to address ongoing conflicts on the continent, consistent with the R2P and human security paradigms evolving at an international level (Hutchful, 2008). At the same time calls for reform in African regional governance institutions were accompanied by a growing push for African states to take greater responsibility for addressing problems on the continent. This gave rise to the "African Solutions to African Problems" philosophy, reminiscent of the earliest years of the Pan-African and anti-colonial movements of the 20th century (Ani, 2019).

Throughout the 1990s a general appetite for African-led solutions permeated international politics due to both push and pull factors. The push for a regionalised approach to peace and security was informed primarily by Boutros-Ghali's 1992 UN Secretary-General Report on the *Agenda for Peace*, which sought to place more responsibilities on regional institutions and thereby lessen the growing financial and human cost on the UN. The unique historical moment of the post-Cold War era further brought about a period of Western disengagement from Africa as the strategic priorities of the US and its allies shifted towards the post-Soviet states (Kraxberger, 2005). At a regional level pull factors such as the rise of prominent African leaders calling for an "African Renaissance" also helped to solidify the paradigm shift in how problems on the continent were to be addressed (Ani, 2019). Renewed calls for both a more African-led and human-centred approach to African conflict finally converged in the 2000 *Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)* which was directly informed by the human security agenda (Opongo, 2014).

1.2.3. Human Security in the AU Peace & Security Framework

The founding of the AU in 2002 marked the formal inclusion and institutionalisation of human security language and principles into African regional governance frameworks (Tieku, 2007; Hutchful, 2008). The organisation positioned itself as a leading peace and security actor on the continent, committed to upholding regional stability, human rights, rule of law and good governance. This is most evident in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which makes explicit provision for AU-led interventions into member states to "prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" with the support of a 2/3 majority in the AU Assembly (African Union, 2002:7). Weiss (2004) highlights that in its attempts to adopt a more proactive form of interventionism the AU set an even lower intervention criteria than the UN, where the General Assembly did not have the power to authorise interventions; emphasising the AUs ambitious approach to human security. (Weiss, 2004). Williams (2009) notes that the AUs stance on interventionism was heavily informed by the desire among reformers to remedy the shortfalls of previous institutional attempts at addressing peace and security such as the OAU *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* established in 1993. While the *Mechanism* was the first continent-wide attempt at collective action between OAU member states, leaders at the time remained reluctant to endorse outright interventionism, due to the respect for national sovereignty, rather favouring preventative diplomacy. The 1993 *Mechanism* however failed to prevent or address events like the 1994 Rwandan genocide and other subsequent conflicts, leading many to question its efficacy (Berman & Sams, 2000). Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act was thus inserted with the recognition that governments could in some cases pose a significant threat to their own citizens further highlighting the region's commitments to pro-human collective action (Tieku, 2007). Other provisions in the AU Act that reinforced a human security paradigm include Article 3(g) on the promotion of democratic principles and good governance, Article 3(h) which requires members states to commit to upholding the *African Charter on Human and People's Rights*, Article 4(o) which mentions "respect for the sanctity of human life" and Article 4(i) which mentions the right to peace (AU, 2002). AU member states also expressed collective support for upholding R2P principles and human rights as international norms in the 2005 *Ezulwini Consensus* policy document on UN reforms (Lotze, 2014).

In addition to strengthening its policy commitments to human security principles, the AU also created institutional mechanisms through which to apply them, such as the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the leading organ of the broader Peace and Security Architecture (Tieku, 2007). The 2004 *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy*, which led to the formation of

the PSC, explicitly highlighted the need to pursue the "protection of the people's political, cultural, social, economic values and way of life" (African Union, 2004:4). The broad nature of the PSC's mandate encompassed many non-conventional security issues which even the UN Security Council, which the PSC was modelled after, did not include e.g., encouraging and acting to uphold democratic principles and good governance in member states (Williams, 2009). The *Common African Defence & Security Policy* (CADSP), further acknowledged the multidimensionality of security, going beyond military and state security, consistent with the broader view of security in the 1994 UNDP Report. Tieku (2007) highlights that in its earliest years the AUs human security aspirations were more ambitious than most other international organisations at the time. Hutchful (2008) and Moller (2009) both argue that the CADSP, which forms the foundation of AU peace and security policy, remains a unique innovation in African regional governance that aligns with the broader aspirations of human-centric security. They point out that the CADSP, in principle, moves away from strict state-centrism and the militarization of conflict responses. Other institutional innovations included the establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise dedicated to preventive diplomacy and mediation, as well as the AU Peace Fund. These institutional innovations borrowed from many organisations like the UN and EU, while also showing the AUs ability to expand and enhance these frameworks rather than merely imitating them (Babarinde, 2007).

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis now turns to examine the relevant literature on AU interventionism; highlighting the shape, scope and evolution of the AUs regionalised responses to conflict and insecurity in the 21st century. This chapter seeks to position the arguments made in this thesis within the broader discourse on interventionism and its effects on human security. This review begins by critically unpacking the successes and limitations of attempts to operationalise the AUs peace and security architecture in recent decades. It further draws on the literature to define the liberal form of interventionism that has dominated international peace and security; linking this to what authors have argued about the AUs style of intervention. Finally, several relevant critiques against the state-centric nature of AU interventionism are considered. This literature review forms the foundation of the research design and case study analysis that follow in later chapters.

2.1. Operationalising the AU Peace & Security Architecture

Several authors in the literature have made noteworthy contributions in studying the operationalisations of the AUs approach to peace and security. This research has helped to develop clarity on persistent conceptual, logistical, political and practical opportunities and challenges faced by the organisation over the years. In its first two decades, the organisation authorised the deployment of more than 70 000 peacekeepers in up to a dozen AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSO) across the region (Williams, 2021). This is consistent with the "African solutions to African problems" philosophy that emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s and reflects the organisation's overall ambitions. The AUs first intervention missions, namely the Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) served as inflexion and reflection points where the successes and shortcomings of the organisation were most clearly manifested. In reflecting on the organisation's achievements Williams (2009) praises the AU PSC as an institutional innovation due to its ability to channel collective action among African states by way of consensus. He further notes the power of the AU organ to sanction member states that violate the common principles of the organisation as a tool of peace and security, evidenced in cases like Togo, Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar (Williams, 2009). Yet, despite this, authors highlight the continued challenges that face AU interventionism.

2.1.1. Challenges to AU Peace and Security

At a practical level, several challenges still prevent the AU from effectively deploying and maintaining peace operations. Williams (2009, 2011) identifies financial constraints and a lack of capacity to track and respond to conflicts in a characteristically unstable region as a key hindrance to the organisation's efficacy (Williams 2009, 2011). As a result, the organisation has often been slow to respond to evolving conflicts, only becoming involved when there is no longer any tangible peace or security to uphold. Ultimately this has forced the AU to adopt what Murithi (2012:105) refers to as a "fire brigade approach" to peace and security. In his analysis of the AUs APSA, Kuwali (2018:55) supports this conclusion and argues that the AU has often defaulted to "ad hoc, short term military interventions" that lack due consideration for the political realities and root causes of conflict. This comes at the expense of scarce organisational resources while delivering limited peace dividends for ordinary citizens (Kuwali, 2018). Another weakness highlighted by authors is the tendency for AU-led missions to embrace ambitious and expansive mandates during the early phases of deployment. This often occurs at the behest of other international actors. The AU takes upon itself the role of a stabilizing actor that clears the way for later international interventions. As a result, AU interventions have little long-term impact in establishing sustainable peace and security due to the myriad of tasks that fall under its mantle (Williams, 2009; Badmus, 2015). At an institutional level, Tieku (2007) notes the persistence of old state-centric mentalities among elites in the AU framework, reflected in documents like the 2005 *AU Non-Aggression and Defence Pact*. He adds that the *Pact*, while framed as being complementary to the pro-human security CADSP, leaves room for human security to be interpreted in its most minimalist and apolitical forms. In turn, priority is given to fighting insurgencies rather than addressing grievances on the ground that drive conflict. These observations in the literature point to continued ambiguities and contradictions that still exist within AU security policy and practice.

2.1.2. Lessons from AMIB to AMIS

Turning to the literature on prior AU-led interventions in Burundi and Sudan highlights further interesting observations about the AU as an actor in conflict. One conclusion which emerges is that the organisation's limitations go beyond immediate technical obstacles such as a lack of resources or capacity, and stretches to a deeper state-centricism that permeates AU peace and security. This is highlighted by several authors in their research on AMIB and AMIS. AMIB was deployed to Burundi from 2003 to 2004, making it the first PSO to operate under the newly formed AU. The literature on AMIB highlights both successes and failures in the mission's operation and outcomes. Murithi (2008)

identifies AMIB as a symbol of the AUs turning point towards a more active stance in peace and security. Williams (2009) further notes that AMIB made a greater contribution to securing a ceasefire in Burundi than any prior African-led mediation attempt since 1993, showing the value of better regional coordination under the leadership of the AU. The arrival of AMIB forces also contributed to a significant reduction in politically motivated attacks across the country, which has led authors like Badmus (2017) to conclude that there would have been far more violence were it not for the AU-led deployment. The mission was also able to achieve its objective of stabilising the situation on the ground to an extent that allowed for further UN deployment of troops and humanitarian aid (Badmus, 2017).

However, the mission had several shortcomings, which prompt scholars to warn against overromanticizing the AUs initial victories. First, the mission was plagued by underfunding and tensions between member states, which limited its overall effectiveness (Williams, 2009). Second, despite showing commitment to the R2P principle outlined in AU policy documents, Lotze (2014) nevertheless argues that the mission failed to fulfil human security commitments because PoC was not explicitly included into the mission mandate. While PoC provisions were later added to the mission's rules of engagement, allowing for use of force to aid civilians in imminent danger, there was no clear directive or clarity on how and by whom these provisions were to be implemented (Lotze, 2014). Furthermore, AU forces were faced with a dilemma in that some acts of violence against civilians were being carried out by government forces. This led many to question the role of the AU in preventing and addressing human insecurity in Burundi (Badmus, 2017).

AMIS marked the organisation's second official PSO and the first to be deployed under the post-2004 Peace and Security Architecture. Initially reluctant to accept UN intervention in Darfur, the Sudanese government invited the AU to deploy forces to monitor the country's 2004 cease-fire agreement. Murithi (2012) notes that just like in the case of AMIB, AMIS initially faced significant challenges in ending widespread violence against civilians due to the absence of a more refined PoC mandate. The mission later evolved to cover a vast array of tasks including securing the environment for humanitarian aid, as well as protecting civilians and refugees (Williams, 2009). Yet even under a more ambitious and better-staffed mandate, the mission faced resistance from the host government in Sudan. This took place both at a PSC level where Sudanese leaders attempted to influence AU decision-making and on the ground in physically restricting the movements and activities of AU troops. Williams (2009) points out that aside from outstripping the capacity of the mission, the expanded AMIS mandate to protect civilians was unable to effectively navigate the resistance the mission faced from the government. Civilians were to be protected from "imminent threats", yet it was not clear if

this was merely permitted on an ad hoc basis or if AU forces were required to proactively seek to protect civilians. The mandate explicitly stated that the "protection of civilian populations is [first and foremost] the responsibility of the Sudanese government", yet many of the attacks on civilians were being carried out by government forces (Williams, 2006:176). It was only much later in the mission in 2006 that the AU PSC formally released a communique calling on the Sudanese government to desist violations against civilians, encouraging a broad interpretation of PoC (Hussein, 2012). Williams (2009) argues that these contradictions and delays, which allowed for the suffering and deaths of many Sudanese civilians, showed the persistent lack of political will among elites to internalise pro-human security norms.

The issue of governments and regimes restricting effective interventions is consistent in the literature and shows that the issue of mission effectiveness goes beyond material restraints. Tieku (2007) and Badmus (2015) both highlight that the AU faces continuous challenges in its peace operations from governments that fear being held accountable for their own role in promoting human insecurity. These leaders often seek to portray external interventions as a ploy for Western interference, even when carried out by regional actors like the AU. Hence intervention missions are subject to an array of conditionalities set by the host government, which regional organisations like the AU are forced to comply with (Tieku, 2007; Badmus, 2015). In the case of Sudan, the AU did not openly address this contradiction for fear of disrupting the ongoing peace talks between rebels and the Al-Bashir administration. Esmenjaud (2014) points to the case of AMIS as an example where the fledgling AU Peace and Security Architecture failed to prioritise the protection of individual civilians over the security of the ruling regime, showcasing the state-centric bias in the African security discourse (Esmenjaud, 2014).

The case of AMIS further highlighted the AUs tendency to favour elite bargains in peace and security practices; where the state is viewed and legitimised as the preferred "partner for peace", at the expense of recognising its role as a potential perpetrator of violence (Esmenjaud, 2014:120). Williams (2021) argues that the AUs proclivity towards elite bargaining has had counterproductive effects on African-led interventions. In the case of Sudan, rebel forces accused the AU of siding with the government during the Darfur Peace Agreement process, given that those who refused to sign the agreement were excluded from talks. AU member states also resisted any punitive action against the Sudanese leadership for its role in committing war crimes in Darfur, in spite of the organisation's professed commitments to human security and rights. This has contributed to the politicisation of mandates and an overall failure of the AU to help build workable political settlements through its interventions

(Williams, 2021). In recent years there has thus been a growing consensus among critical scholars that the AUs main deficiency as a peace and security actor is not merely due to a lack of capacity or resources. Rather the implicit assumptions that shape and inform how the organisation positions itself and its priorities in relation to states, combatants and civilians on the ground has significantly impacted its efficacy.

2.2. Liberal Interventionism and its discontents

A second set of authors in the literature critique AU interventionism by highlighting its association with Western forms of responding to conflict. This critique gained increased prevalence in the post-9/11 era under the broader critical literature on liberal interventionism. Zambakari (2016) and MacGinty (2011) identify the key assumptions that underpin liberal interventionism as 1) that the achievement of liberal forms of peace and security is morally desirable and universally applicable, 2) that liberal peace and security can only be achieved within the context of strong, democratic and sovereign states and 3) that liberal peace and security are intrinsically linked to the promotion of liberal values, norms and societies. Moe & Geis (2020) argue that the ideological primacy of international liberalism, which arose from the end of the Cold War, was militarised by the events of 9/11 and the global "War on Terror". This revived a normative dualism, characteristic of Western foreign policy during the peak of the Cold War in the 1950s and 60s. The R2P norms evolving at the time under the leadership of countries like the United States were thus increasingly aligned with the objectives of protecting and promoting the life and liberty of civilians, by eliminating the illiberal "other" through military intervention. MacGinty (2011) further notes that another manifestation of the liberal interventionist turn of the post-9/11 era was the securitization of the state. Unlike during the Cold War, the enemy was no longer an identifiable state, but rather a collection of sub-national Islamist groups and ideologies flourishing in unstable and ungoverned territories. Duffield (2006) adds that the reification of state-building as the primary form of peacebuilding in liberal interventionism was driven by the perception that weak states created the conditions for terrorist groups to flourish, and therefore posed an immediate threat to international security and norms. To remedy this problem Western actors employed what is referred to in the literature as a stabilisation logic. Collinson et al. (2010:281) define stabilisation as a "combination of military, political, development and humanitarian resources…to mitigate perceived security threats posed by weak and fragile states". This includes securing the state's territorial sovereignty, constructing institutions that mirror liberal societies and eliminating alternative sites of legitimacy that may challenge the process of state formation.

Yet several authors highlight the inherent pitfalls of liberal interventionism. Graubarts (2013) uses the example of the 2011 US-led invasion of Libya to show how powerful nations embrace a duality in their peace and security operations, merging the normative weight of R2P, with a more rationalised pragmatism (Grauberts, 2013). In doing so these nations attempt to claim both the implied legitimacy to act under the guise of human security norms, as well as the freedom to pursue their unique national objectives with relative impunity. The result is what Chafer, Cummings and van der Velde (2020) refer to as a process of 'norm stretching', whereby international norms, such as human rights, rule of law and protection of civilians, are reshaped by the behaviour and actions of the intervening actors that claim to uphold them (Chafer, Cummings & van der Velde, 2020). However other authors have gone further in their critique, setting aside the explicit violations of norms and highlighting the flawed ontological assumptions that drive and shape liberal interventionism, even when actors remain faithful to its precepts. MacGinty (2011) critiques the liberal paradigm interventionism becomes a technical, apolitical and problem-solving exercise rather than a comprehensive political process that considers the social, cultural and economic drivers of violence, extremism and conflict. Botha (2008) argues that the focus of western actors has been misplaced under the global War on Terror, viewing manifestations of Islamist radicalisation in some regions as a consequence of the internationalisation of Islamist ideology, while neglecting the domestic grievances and factors that contribute to this phenomenon. Gilmore (2011:29) further argues that the dualistic, enemy versus friend, narratives inherent in liberal interventionism is inadequate in the context of intra-state conflicts where the "motives for participation in violence vary considerably…influenced by a variety of ideologies, local politics, economic and personal agendas". Yet western actors have often neglected these considerations, driven by the "imminent threat" narrative of the War on Terror and the push to eliminate the illiberal other (Newman, 2011).

2.3. Liberal Interventionism in African Peacebuilding

Authors in the literature have also extended the critique of liberal interventionism to the AUs responses to conflict, highlighting similarities that reflect a deeper problem in the organisation's approach to peace and security. Botha (2008) notes that African leaders have often adopted the same mentalities and strategies as their western counterparts concerning counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. MacGinty (2011) identifies the cause of this mimicry within the "complex chain of delegation and cooperation" that characterises the contemporary international order and which gives undue influence to Western elites. Franke & Esmenjaud (2008) and Mahmood & Ani (2017) also problematise the role of Western nations as prime financiers of African peace and security, which allows for the perpetuation

of neo-colonial power dynamics between Western and African actors. The AUs overreliance on external donor funding by Western nations has hampered the effectiveness of the AUs institutional innovations as tools of African agency, transforming them into an extension of international liberal interventionism (Franke and Esmenjaud, 2008; Mahmood & Ani, 2017). These factors have contributed to the implicit normalisation of peace and security practices preferred by Western nations at the expense of authentically localised solutions.

2.1.1. State-building as peacebuilding

Opongo (2014) highlights that AU peacebuilding has often followed a liberal blueprint characterised by the same state-centrism and elite bargains that appear in the interventions of western nations. Rather than promoting sustainable nation-building and restoring the social contract that underpins the legitimacy of the state, state-building itself becomes a technocratic objective in AU-led missions (Opongo, 2014). The state-building approach to peacebuilding has been criticised in the literature for several reasons, including its failure to account for the intra-state and regionalised nature of security threats in Africa (Holsti, 1995; Gleditsch et. al., 2002). As well as its propensity towards Eurocentric visions of statehood that has contributed to the rise to the "failed states" narratives in the global south (Fisher, 2018). However, critical authors also highlight the incompatibility of conventional state-building approaches with the socio-political dynamics in African societies. State-building in Africa has usually suffered from a lack of regard for the diverse social identities in African societies, which flare up in light of a perceived zero-sum game for power in the formation of centralised national governments (Opongo, 2014).

Khadiagala (2021) argues that AU missions have been characterised and measured according to a victor's peace, as conceived by Richmond (2008), where military approaches often make up the bulk of the response to conflict in AU peacebuilding in an attempt to eliminate a perceived enemy and extend the state's territorial control. The deficiencies of militarised state-building relate to the fact that African states in many cases remain a remnant of colonialism which, even in its post-colonial form, did not evolve to protect the interests and livelihoods of citizens and often govern diverse and divided societies (Hutchful, 2008). Adebanwi (2017) draws on the seminal distinction that Ekeh (1975) makes in his analysis of the primordial versus the civic public in African post-colonial societies to critique the liberal vision of state-building. He argues that in many cases in the African context the socially unembedded state serves particularistic communal or personal interests rather than the interest of any imagined polity writ large. On the other hand, many sub-groups within society retain allegiances to

their own clans, communities and ethnic groups as part of a primordial public, rather than viewing themselves as having a normative duty to the centralised state. This is contrary to the assumptions of liberal interventionism, that those who are intervened upon are neutral agents without particularistic allegiances that shape how they define themselves and interpret the behaviour and intentions of other actors both domestic and international (Adebanwi, 2017). MacGinty (2011) argues that ontological primacy given to the strong modern state as the preferred channel through which peace and security should be achieved ultimately fails to attain well-intentioned ideals to protect civilians from the ongoing ravages of war and conflict. The ideological dominance of liberal interventionism has led international actors to push for the establishment of liberal political, social and economic institutions within conflict-afflicted societies as a means of upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Yet Hutchful (2008:66) notes the paradoxical relationship that exists between the citizen and their state in Africa, involving both a "primordial bond and a source of fundamental conflict". Newman (2013) adds that the idea that state-building and peacebuilding are mutually dependent neglects to appreciate the inherently violent and coercive nature of state-building itself, which externally imposes centralised regulatory control over territories and peoples inevitably aggravating social divisions and tensions. If these tensions cannot be properly managed the outcome of state building will be intensified cycles of violence.

Zondi (2017) adds to the critique of state-building in Africa by arguing that conflicts in the region are often a manifestation of historical experiences of structural violence that trace back to the artificial imposition of alien forms of governance onto the continent's people. These artificial impositions have served to reinforce the division between clans, groups and various competing elites. There is thus a need to move away from approaches that seek "peace within coloniality" i.e., merely silencing the guns but preserving structures, states and societies rooted in violence (Zondi, 2017:109). In alignment with this Hagmann (2016) argues that the stabilisation logic employed by liberal actors runs the risk of becoming reminiscent of colonial-era social and political engineering, by seeking to set up central regimes while eliminating strategic competitors and alternative sites of political legitimacy (Hagmann, 2016). Zaum (2012) accurately captures the dilemma between state-building and peacebuilding in liberal interventionism by pointing out that while the former calls for the neutrality of international actors as mediators, the latter requires intervening actors to actively define other actors in the conflict as explicitly friend or foe based on their relation to the centrally constructed state. In divided societies, such characterisations are inherently flawed, and missions premised on such logic are bound to neglect the social and cultural nuances required to restore peace and security.

2.1.2. The state as a spoiler

MacGinty (2011) argues that liberal actors often underestimate the agency of those populations and political actors which are intervened upon. They assume that their ideas and norms will be absorbed into societies and systems in a gradual yet consistent manner. However, in reality, those who are intervened upon often behave proactively in light of external interventions, according to their own interests. The liberal assumption that signs of political liberalisation e.g., a secular state, regular elections etc. necessarily imply the emergence of popular consensus and support for the state-building project is therefore flawed (Richmond, 2007). Hutchful (2008) further points out that the emergence of a state does not always translate into security for individuals/communities within that state in Africa. On the contrary, some African states have been major perpetrators of violence and atrocity against their own citizens. Furthermore, even states that have not actively committed violence against their citizens have still been accused of neglect and impotence, which has severe consequences for the citizens who are left without basic provisions and protection (Hutchful, 2008). Call & Cousens (2008) note that the flawed assumption of liberal interventionism that the state should be the preferred "partner of peace" has opened avenues for domestic elites to use external interventions to secure power. This is done by eliminating threats and opposition to their regimes at the expense of meaningful reconciliation and justice (Call & Cousens, 2008). This can in turn shape the outcomes of a mission on the ground in ways that were not intended by intervenors.

Hagmann (2016:6) refers to this as the problem of "extraversion", whereby local and national actors employ an array of tactics to influence, shape and use the presence of external intervening actors to further their own aims. The problem of extraversion breaks down the distinction between local versus international actors, between the agency of those who intervene versus those who are intervened upon. In this regard no actor is neutral, and mission outcomes are shaped by the way that actors, both local and international, choose to interact, perceive and respond to each other (MacGinty, 2011). This brings the weakness of state-centric approaches to peace and security to the fore, as state-building projects do not sufficiently account for the negative consequences that come from empowering and legitimising self-interested actors in the process (Hagman, 2016). A consequence of extraversion is the hybridisation of externally-led military and state-building interventions. A hybridised mission is one where the outcomes are shaped, not merely by the actions and intentions of the intervening actor, but by an amalgamation of the actions and reactions of all the various stakeholders. In the context of state-building external interventions have allowed host states to use the presence of international actors towards their own aims.

MacGinty (2011) argues that the failure of liberal intervening actors to account for extraversion and hybridity has often resulted in unsustainable security situations that relapse or worsen when external forces withdraw. Williams (2009) argues that the failure to recognise and address the power imbalances created by internationally-led interventions and state-building weakens the legitimacy and perceived neutrality of external actors like the AU (Williams, 2009). Richmond & Mitchell (2012) concludes that ignoring the effects of hybridisation and extraversion in state-building has resulted in the construction of empty shell states that are unable to operate successfully on their own to meet the security needs of the population. Glasius (2008:48) thus argues for the need to move beyond the "technocratic emphasis on building [state] institutions" towards restoring the capacity and local faith in the instruments of law and justice. Richmond (2018) further adds that the bias towards state-building in the global South has made intervening actors blind to the underlying realities that underpin conflict and insecurity. States established and supported by external intervention thus remain weak, sustained only through an elite bargain between regimes and international actors, often at the expense of a meaningful social contract that includes social justice, historical justice and distributive justice (Richmond, 2018). Externally constructed states, therefore, remain hollow and illegitimate in the eyes of locals with little capacity to deliver the tangible dividends of peace on the ground (Newman, 2011).

2.1.3. The View from Below

Some critical security scholars note that the main weakness of the international approaches to peace and security is the failure to authentically engage with citizens at a grassroots level. Some authors seek to remedy the problem of state-centrism by emphasising the need to return to indigenous and traditional practices that promote peace, security and reconciliation among communities, in line with what Conteh-Morgan (2005) refers to as peace from below. The *Gacaca* courts used in Rwanda as a tool for justice and reconciliation after the 1994 Genocide is used as one such example. Localised forms of peacebuilding are viewed as more appropriate to dealing with the lack of reconciliation and justice associated with conflicts in Africa (Ani, 2019). MacGinty (2011) however correctly notes that traditional social and cultural approaches are not inherently unproblematic and still reflect many uneven power relations e.g., between women and men, elders and youth, communal elites and community members. However, what the local turn highlights is the deficiency of assumptions of internationally-led, macro-level and militarised approaches to security, arguing rather for the need to reconstruct the socio-political relations between citizen and state (Richmond, 2010). While the state is noted as an important agent for security it is viewed as only one actor among many, with its own perceptions, interests and agency to respond to, help or hinder the objectives of interventions (Newman, 2010). Hydan (2015) highlights that conflicts in Africa often find their roots in perceptions of justice

or injustice at a local level, between various groups in society, thus calling for a more authentic engagement with non-state actors. External interventions seeking to uphold peace and security therefore cannot be void of consideration for local context and views but must link to local concerns (Hayden, 2015).

2.4. Conclusion

Several key points can be identified in the literature covered in this chapter that proves relevant to the aims of this thesis. First, there has been a rising consensus among scholars of the AU that the deficiencies of the organisation's approach to peace and security go beyond material limitations. As shown in the case of AMIB and AMIS the state-centric nature of AU interventions have often been detrimental to the success and human security impact of its missions. Furthermore, a significant part of the literature has outlined the persistent pitfalls of liberal interventionism and its relevance to the perpetuation of state-centric peacebuilding contrary to the human-centric security aspirations of the organisation. Failure to address these pitfalls can impact both the direct human security of civilians and the overall success of missions. Assessing the AU as a human security actor, therefore, requires clear engagement with these shortcomings and the way they shape, prevent or perpetuate the human security conditions of civilians on the ground. The limitations of the AU as a peace and security actor thus goes much deeper than a lack of resources and capacity. Rather the literature suggests that an underlying liberal interventionist pathology has characterised AU-led interventions and had severe implications for the organisation's ability to carry out a coherent human security mandate. While material factors undoubtedly shape the extent to which the AU can carry out a given mandate, they do not inherently shape the nature and priorities of that mandate.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter aims to present the research design of this thesis. It first provides an overview of the key research problem and associated research questions that will be explored through the study of the AUs intervention in Somalia. It will further highlight the significance of this research and position it within the broader debate on the AU as a human security actor. A clear conceptual framework will then be developed, within which the AU as an actor in Somalia can be studied from a human security perspective. The aims of the conceptual framework are informed by what Richmond (2007) refers to as the search for emancipatory forms of human security. This critical framework will directly inform the methodological and analytical approaches of this thesis in the sections thereafter.

3.1. Research Problem

A preliminary overview of the literature presented in this thesis shows that human security has not always been a discernible outcome of AU-led security practices; often becoming a secondary concern or being neglected altogether. In some cases, AU interventionism has even served to worsen the overall security situation of civilians. The apparent disparity between the AUs intentions, as stated in its policies, and the real-world consequences of its actions warrant a more critical assessment of the organisation's responses to conflict on the continent. The remainder of this thesis seeks to uncover the extent to which the AU has succeeded in implementing an effective and consistent vision of human security in its response to conflict, using the specific case study of the AU Mission to Somalia (AIMSOM). The focus of this study will be on the period from 2007, when AMISOM was first deployed, to 2017 when it was first announced that AMISOM would be downscaling its operations with the intention of withdrawing from Somalia. The central research question that this study will attempt to answer is how AMISOM has affected the human security situation in Somalia. This question will be sub-divided into several parts namely:

- How has the AMISOMs mandate from 2007-2017 measured and defined the success of the mission?
- In what ways has AMISOM explicitly attempted to account, limit and address human insecurity through its practices?
- How AMISOMs presence and relationship to key actors in the Somali conflict impacted social and political drivers of human insecurity in the country?

3.2. Significance of the Research

The research conducted in this study of AMISOM is significant for several reasons. First, regional organisations have become central players in reshaping the contemporary international peace and security arena. However, as Soderbaum (2015) argues, the study of regional organisations has been plagued by a Eurocentric bias in the amount of academic attention afforded to studying non-European regional organisations. This paper, therefore, seeks to add to the literature on African regional governance, particularly in the context of peace and security. Second, the AU has positioned itself as a self-professed guardian of peace and security on the continent. However, in studying cases like the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Williams (2009) noted, nearly a decade ago, that the AU was an "embryonic international institution". AMISOM has since William's assessment afforded the organisation new opportunity to adapt and sharpen its responses to conflict, learning from previous operations. This case, therefore, offers new data to further assess whether the AU has grown beyond its "embryonic" stages in peace and security. Third, Akokpari (2007) notes that sources of insecurity in Africa cannot be ascribed to internal dynamics alone, but are influenced by international structures and practices. This research applies this rationale to the case of the AU in Somalia, to uncover how international structures and practices have helped or harmed internal insecurity in the country. The legitimacy of the AU as a security actor must be measured based on the practical effectiveness of its strategies and approaches, especially at a micro-level. The critical assessment of AMISOM in this thesis, therefore, holds the potential to highlight shortcomings and assumptions that inform AU peace and security operations and hamper the organisation's effectiveness. As already shown in the literature review of this thesis the challenges facing the AU goes far beyond capacity and resource constraints and includes the organisation's worsening crisis of legitimacy as a peace actor in the region. Finding pathways toward making the AU more effective holds great value for embracing a true "African solutions for African problems" philosophy. Finally, this research aims to highlight the continued relevance and urgency of the evolving human security paradigm in the study of regional governance in Africa. Using a human security lens in this research on the AU is significant due to the prevalence of state-centric bias that still dominates the field of international relations and African politics more broadly (Christie, 2010).

3.3. Conceptual Framework

A clear conceptual framework is necessary to adequately assess the AU as a human security actor. The human security concept has been praised as a breakthrough in security studies. Its initial proponents viewed it as a radical alternative to state-centric security that deepened and widened the discourse in international relations (Bellamy & McDonald, 2002). In the case of Africa where the vast majority of conflicts are intra-state, authors such as Duffield (2006) highlights that shifting the focus of security beyond the state and toward the individual i.e., human security, is a natural progression when the relevance of national borders in determining where and how conflict occurs falls away. The human security discourse has stretched the concept of security both horizontally, beyond military solutions and responses, and vertically to consider the relevance of other local, regional and international actors (Hutchful, 2008). However, the need for a clear conceptual framework is shown in the fact that human security is not monolithic and any study seeking to employ the discourse should remain cognizant of the existence of many different visions of human security. Akokpari (2007) makes the observation that the human security discourse has, since its early years, splintered into several diverging schools of thought, with competing views on the scope, focus and nature of the concept. This section will define and critique mainstream versions of human security. It will then proceed to outline the tenants of the critical human security framework which inform the methodology of this thesis.

3.3.1. Mainstream Human Security

The dominant conceptions of human security have been the broader developmental approach and the narrower human rights approach. The developmentalist approach to human security seeks a holistic understanding of security as a by-product of sustainable development. This approach is consistent with the multifaceted nature of human security outlined in the 1994 UNDP report. The narrower approach to human security, consistent with human rights discourses and the R2P doctrine, focuses mainly on direct and intentional harm and violence carried out against individuals and communities. The human security as human rights approach has gained mainstream acceptance in Western liberal security frameworks such as the European Union Security doctrine (Fukuda-Parr, 2012). However, both "mainstream" visions of human security have been scrutinized. Critics of the developmental approach to human security point to issues of conceptual vagueness with the laundry list of development needs that it seeks to defend the human referent against (see 2005; Chandler, 2008; Owen, 2008). Other critiques include a lack of analytical precision (see Paris, 2001; Busumtwi-Sam, 2008; Owen 2008), issues associated with the securitisation of development under a broader interpretation (see Bellamy & McDonald, 2002; Henk, 2005; Hutchful, 2008; McCormack, 2008; Christie, 2010) and the inability of the developmental approach to address the full scope of human development needs in lights of

limited resources (see Paris, 2001; MacFalane & Kong, 2003; Hutchful, 2008; Owen, 2008). On the other hand, the narrower human rights approach has been praised by its proponents for overcoming the weaknesses of broader developmental interpretation, yet it nonetheless faces its own set of criticisms. Richmond (2007: 459) argues that in the post-9/11 international order the conflation of the human rights and human security discourses has robbed the latter of its radical potential, transforming it into a "validating concept" for Western interventionism. This has reduced human security to a "technology used by international actors to individuate, group and act upon Southern populations" (Duffield, 2006:13).

A distinctly minimalist version of human security associated with international liberal interventionism is also outlined in the literature. In the minimalist version direct violence carried out against individuals and communities by organised and often illiberal perpetrators is prioritised, and military intervention becomes legitimised to eliminate the perceived threat (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006). Scholars note that rather than moving beyond the state-centric approach to peace and security, minimalist human security has contributed to the securitisation of state-building. Chandler (2012) notes that interventions conducted in the name of human security, under the broader mantle of human rights, can conversely become a cover for reinforcing old state-centric norms of security in the post-9/11 era. As a result of this, R2P interventionism has evolved into "coercive post hoc intervention", with little focus on agency and empowerment of civilians more in line with the original intentions of the human security paradigm (Chandler, 2012:215). Richmond (2010) argues that the R2P doctrine that arose in the 1990s has become an emergency lever for Western nations to respond to perceived threats abroad. He goes on to conclude that this trend is part of an "imperious IR" which has not dealt sufficiently with the paradoxes and tensions that arise from the ontological primacy ascribed to the state (Richmond, 2010:669).

A minimalist vision of human security is further based on positivistic assumptions about human insecurity and violence, neglecting to consider institutional and systemic forms of violence (Chandler, 2008). The failure to acknowledge this has limited the ability of internationally-led peace and security efforts to promote human security and in some cases invertedly leads to worsened human insecurity by not addressing the structural causes thereof (Christie, 2010). The depoliticization of the human security concept, by transforming it into a problem-solving policy tool has side-lined due consideration for the role of power dynamics between the people and the state, as well as the impact that foreign actors have on local political and social structures and dynamics. The narrowing of the human security concept has thus been viewed as a retreat from the emancipatory aims of the 1990s. In reality, the

concept interpreted in its minimalist form becomes closely associated with the pitfalls of international liberal interventionism already discussed in the literature review of this thesis.

3.3.2. Critical Human Security Approach

Hutchful (2008) challenges the dominance of the minimalist interpretation of human security, by highlighting the transitory nature of security. Rather than being a straightforward concept, the definition of security is socially constructed and embedded in the values of a society, the social needs it prioritises, and the legitimate responsibilities and powers given to political actors to achieve it. Thinking about security therefore inherently implies considering the power relations that allow some to define who is protected, in what way and from what/whom. Alternative approaches to human security such as Feminist and Marxist perspectives apply such an analysis of power relations by problematising the exclusion of different social groups, classes, genders etc. from the security discourse. These approaches share a common appreciation for the inherent role of power in the social construction of security and fall more broadly within the field of critical security studies. Newman (2010) argues that to carry out a critical assessment using the lens of human security, as this thesis aims to do, one must uncover the "sources of insecurity, the nature of the institutions which provide security and the interests they serve" (Newman, 2010:81).

In contrast to the minimalist vision, such an assessment is based on an emancipatory vision of human security. Richmond (2007) defines an emancipatory vision of human security as one that seeks to identify and dismantle the structures and processes of domination that exist in society. This approach further draws on Galtung's theory of direct and indirect violence, which highlights that violence can manifest in both visible, direct and invisible, indirect forms. Indirect forms of violence include structural insecurity, which relates to "unjust, repressive and exploitative economic, social and political systems" that are upheld by unequal power relations between actors (Galtung, 1969:178). The epistemological assumptions of an emancipatory vision of human security, Tadjbakhsh (2009) highlights, must be measured from the viewpoint of those who are intervened upon. How these domestic actors view and judge the ability of the state and intervening actors to deliver justice, services and freedoms (Tadjbakhsh, 2009). In contrast to the positivistic assumptions of the minimalist vision of human security, those who are intervened upon, whether states, citizens or combatants are viewed as active and subjective agents capable of self-transformation; able to respond to interventions in non-linear ways (Richmond, 2011; Chandler, 2012) Coteh-Morgan (2005:76) therefore argues that "the first task of peacebuilding should be to eliminate the mindset that compelled people to distrust their socio-political environment". A critical assessment that employs an emancipatory vision of human

security seeks to overcomes the deficiencies of "problem-solving" approaches inherent in mainstream liberal discourses, by refocusing the debate on the underlying structural and societal causes of human insecurity (Newman, 2010). An assessment of the effectiveness and effects of interventions by international organisations from a human security perspective must therefore seek to examine "how global norms of peacebuilding influence domestic politics" and how this, in turn, empowers and disempowers certain actors on the ground (Coteh-Morgan, 2005:74). This requires research to address key questions about what underlying structures of power influence the outcomes of peace interventions, what historical constructions give shape to these structures and ultimately how these structures shape and are shaped by internationally-led peacebuilding (Coteh-Morgan, 2005). An emancipatory interpretation of human security opens the way for the possible conclusion that external intervenors can worsen dynamics that drive human insecurity, despite the best intentions (Newman, 2011).

3.4. Methodology

The research for this thesis consists exclusively of desk research and a case study approach, focusing on the AU intervention in Somalia from 2007-2017. Relying on a single case study allows for a more in-depth analysis of the consequences of AU intervention given the limited available space of this thesis. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from this single case study can identify congruence or divergence with the trends already highlighted by other authors in the literature. This study will rely primarily on qualitative data sources in the form of secondary interview data, publications and official government/AU documents. Martin & Kostovicova (2014) argue that methodological approaches to human security research should maintain a balanced consideration for the subjective perceptions of locals who are intervened upon, as well as the observable actions of outsiders who intervene. This aids in avoiding the pitfalls of either methodological individualism or methodological nationalism. In line with the conceptual framework developed in the previous section, the methodological approach in this study is consistent with moving beyond positivistic assumptions about the state of human security in the case of Somalia. The actions of the AU in Somalia are not assessed based not merely on the mission's ability to remove direct threats e.g., insurgent combatants, but also based on the effect of AMSIOMs practices and presence on the security of the most vulnerable people on the ground. To this end the study seeks to uncover both macro-level trends of violence and micro-level perceptions of those being affected by the intervention.

3.5. Research Limitations

The limitations of the study are that it relies purely on secondary sources from the literature such as reports and secondary interview data, which can sometimes be limited and fail to provide an accurate picture of everything happening on the ground. However, the sources used still provide some valuable insights into the behaviour and perceptions of various actors. A second limitation is that Somalia remains a volatile environment making consistent fieldwork in over the decade period under consideration difficult. There are thus some periods for which information and data are scarce. The research also could not include primary interviews with AU and PSC officials or staff given limited available financial resources, the time dedicated to the completion of this study and travel restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the study also does not employ quantitative data sources; however, this is not viewed as a major obstacle to the aims of the research given the methodological assumptions outlined in the previous section.

CHAPTER 4: CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

4.1. Actors and drivers in the Somali conflict

To study the human security impact of AMISOM it is important to understand the context in which the mission was deployed. A deeper analysis of the relationship between the AU mission and other domestic actors calls for a brief overview of the shifting dynamics in Somalia itself. This section will seek to unravel the interlinking web of actors and events in Somalia in order to provide a more nuanced picture of the conflict and a deeper analysis of the AUs behaviours in particular.

4.1.1. Clans, Warlords and Imams

Somalia is a clan-based society and the politicisation of clan identity has been foundational to conflict and tension in the East African nation. Ethnically, Somalia has five major clan groups, the Darood, Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir and Digil-Mirfle. Among these clans the Darood and Hawiye are the largest. The Darood reside primarily in the northern Puntland region and across the ethnically Somali Ogaden province of Ethiopia. The Hawiye have historically settled across south-central Somalia, including in and around the capital Mogadishu (Menkhaus, 2018).



(Source: CIA, 2002)

Despite being a diverse society, Somalis are connected across clan lines by a common language, a customary clan legal system known as *Xeer* and the Islamic religion. Pre-colonial inter-clan conflicts in Somalia revolved around land and grazing disputes. These were primarily resolved through mediations led by clan leaders guided by *Xeer,* while civil matters were regulated by traditional Islamic leaders and *Sharia Law* (Clapham, 2017). In post-independence Somalia clan politics played an increasingly important role in shaping the trajectory of the nation. In 1976 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, under the coup d'etat leader Major General Mohamed Barre, transformed Somalia into a one-party state with a strict policy of anti-tribalism and pan-Somali nationalism (Menkhaus, 2007).

However, the Barre regime grew increasingly repressive towards the 1980s following a failed war against neighbouring Ethiopia and rising discontent from various clan-based constituencies. The regime increasingly relied on its own clan allegiances with the Darood, while targeting clan-groups that had begun to mobilise politically against the state such as the Isaaq and Hawiye. The Barre regime further reconstructed the country's administrative regions in a way that gave greater influence to some clans in local politics, while breaking up other clan constituencies across multiple regions and districts. These actions reinforced and politicised clan-based power dynamics in Somalia in ways that continue to shape conflict in the country to this day (Ingiriis, 2016). Clan grievances and increased state violence against civilians eventually contributed to the formation of the United Somali Congress (USC), consisting of mainly Hawiye militia, that succeeded in overthrowing the Barre regime in January 1991. In the wake of the overthrow of the regime, divisions arose between USC leaders which prevented the formation of a new Somali state. Opposing groups claimed control over parts of Mogadishu, leading to the splintering and proliferation of several smaller armed groups that had been part of the USC (Menkhaus, 2007). The rise of self-styled warlord militias led to renewed violence in the capital and many urban centres in Somalia. This coupled with a general loss of public services and famine culminated in an estimated 300 000 deaths in just the first few months after the collapse of the Somali state (Baadiyow, 2018).

While Somalia was without a recognised central government throughout the 1990's it was not without governance (Menkhaus, 2007). At the grassroots level a mosaic of traditional clan militias, warlords and Islamic leaders competed and cooperated with one another for control over Somalia's territories and peoples. The country experienced a localisation of politics and security, facilitated by the rise and fall of various economic, military and social elites (Menkhaus, 2007). This created a mixture of security experiences for ordinary Somalis. International interventions aimed at alleviating the suffering of Somali's and stabilising the country further directly contributed to the evolution of clan politics in

post-Barre Somalia. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was deployed in April 1992 with the initial mandate of protecting and facilitating the flow and distribution of humanitarian resources. During this time UNOSOM also attempted to set up local clan councils that could channel external aid and restore local governance structures (De Waal, 2020). However, efforts to revive local governance institutions under UNOSOM often had the unintended consequence of stirring animosity between clans and communities who viewed the process of state formation as a zero-sum game (De Waal, 2020).

De Waal (2020) notes that this initial period of failed internationally-led stabilisation had lasting effects on political dynamics in Somalia, in ways that were still felt even up to the time of AMISOMs deployment. Clan leaders became political figures vying for positions in newly formed, externally-constructed governance structures, which often led to increased violence between rival clan groups (De Waal, 2020). Vinci (2006) notes that within the chaos of the post-Barre years, the emergence of warlords provided civilians with a semblance of stability and security in exchange for taxation and compliance. This was particularly appealing to business owners, who could continue to operate undisturbed by the chaos of state collapse under the protection of warlord militias. Without regulations on transit networks, ports and telecommunications many business owners became increasingly wealthy, making the Somali business class a notable power broker (Menkhaus, 2018). In an attempt to secure their assets and trade routes business elites also financed the expansion of local warlord militias (Vinci, 2006; Hagmann, 2016). However, warlord rule was not entirely unproblematic, nor was it consistent in the absence of a set code of law or conduct. Warlord militias in Mogadishu and other urban centres often carried out genocidal rape, widespread abuse and extortion against civilians and traders (Menkhaus, 2007).

In parallel to the matrix of warlords, clans and international forces that covered the Somali urban landscape, Islamic leaders and institutions also played an increasingly important role in the stateless Somali society. Islam provided both a common identity and a well-established legal system that most Somalis associated with and respected. As a result, Islamic courts served as an important source of socio-moral authority and justice for communities (Vinci, 2006). The administration of Sharia Law in matters of property disputes, contracts and civil matters provided civilians and businesses in major cities with a degree of certainty and security. Islamic elites were further consolidated as a major actor in Somalia following the creation of the national Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 1994. This allowed the courts a greater degree of coordination and institutional resilience across the country (Vinci, 2006). The courts expressed strong criticism against clannism, allowing it to reach beyond historical divisions among Somalis (Ahmad, 2009). The ICU also formed militias of its own that could carry out the

enforcement of court verdicts, making it a prominent actor that challenged the military dominance of warlords. The ICU grew increasingly influential as a political actor, carrying the favour of both business elites and local populations (Menkhaus, 2007; Williams, 2009). The ICU, which started in Mogadishu, spread to many major cities throughout the 1990s bringing a level of order and predictability that had not been experienced since 1991.

4.1.2. Transitional Federal Government

Between 1995 and 2001, Somalia experienced a period of *no peace, no war*, characterised by an overall decline in the scope and duration of violent conflict. This was facilitated both by the withdrawal of international forces and the consolidation of the Islamic elite's growing influence in Somalia (Hagmann, 2016). However, local elites, particularly the business class and international Somali diaspora played a key role in reviving the push for a centralised administration from within Somalia towards the turn of the century (Hagmann, 2016). This, coupled with a growing desire by Somalia's neighbouring states to stabilise the country, led to the 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) hosted in Atra, Djibouti. The SNPC signified the most extensive and inclusive attempt at state formation since the Somali Civil War, including civil, religious, clan and business leaders. The outcome of negotiations led to the formation of the ambitious, yet short-lived Transitional National Government (TNG), supported by the Hawiye of Mogadishu and ICU elites. However, the US-backed Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) criticised the TNG for favouring Islamist groups (Elliot & Holzer, 2009). As negotiations continued between 2002-2003 Somalia experienced a spike in large scale violence, showing once again the violent consequences of power struggles on the ground (Menkhaus, 2018). Following several IGAD-endorsed reconciliation meetings, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in 2004. Hawiye and ICU leaders in Mogadishu rejected the TFG and viewed it as a puppet regime backed by the USA and neighbouring Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2018).

Contrary to the broad-based TNG, the TFG was constructed on a clan-based system of representation known as the *4.5 formula*, which weakened the role and influence of anti-clan actors like the Islamic courts. Menkhaus (2018) highlights that the clan-based approach was adopted in an attempt to avoid the zero-sum seat-banking that haunted previous state-building initiatives and to achieve a workable government. The outcome was the establishment of a 275 seat-parliament based on the *4.5 formula* with selected elites representing each group respectively (Menkhaus, 2018). The agreement that led to the formation of the new government also stipulated that a Darood president would always be deputised by a Hawiye Vice-President, while a Digle-Mirfle representative would become Speaker

of the House. Contrary to the TNG, the TFG also adopted a federal system of government, giving clan-based constituencies greater autonomy and self-control over their regions. These features outlined the intentionally designed clan-based nature of the new Somali state. However, at a community level, the ICU maintained significant influence and control, posing a direct challenge to the success and long-term legitimacy of the fledgling TFG government (Samatar, 2007).

4.1.3. The Rise of Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab has been the main antagonist in the Somali conflict and AMISOMs primary military opponent since 2007. The rise of the Islamist group can be traced to tensions between the ICU and other national, regional and international actors starting during the time that the TFG was formed. The first TFG president elected by the Somali parliament, Abdullahi Yusuf, was a notable critic of the Islamic courts. The rise and prominence of the ICU in several parts of the country raised concerns for regional and international actors due to its apparent sympathies for extremist Islamist ideologies and groups. The United States also accused the Somalian Islamic courts of harbouring Al-Qaida linked terrorists following the 9/11 attacks and feared that the country would become a base of operations for terror groups (Elliot & Holzer, 2009). In response the US supported the formation of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism (ARPCT), a coalition of Somali warlord militias, to fight the court militias on the ground (Menkhaus, 2007). Fighting erupted in Mogadishu in early 2006 and led to a series of decisive victories by the ICU against the ARPCT coalition. The ARPCT forces were driven out of the capital, and subsequently from many other parts of south-central Somalia, thereby expanding the territory directly controlled by the ICU (Menkhaus, 2007). Desperate to secure its position the TFG requested military intervention from its regional ally, Ethiopia, in December 2006.

Within weeks from deployment Ethiopian forces defeated the ICU militias in Mogadishu and helped the TFG establish and extend its territorial control in the capital (Samatar, 2007). However, the Ethiopian intervention did not eliminate the ICU entirely and instead, the nature of the conflict changed in a way that inadvertently increased insecurity in the country and the region. The fall of the ICU revealed and aggravated the dormant ideological divisions within the organisation allowing radicals within the movement further justification for their 'jihad' against the TFG, Ethiopia and other Western powers (Menkhaus, 2007; Samatar, 2007; Elliot & Holzer, 2009). While the ICU had up to that point consisted of both moderates and radicals, tensions between the two factions were kept at bay by the broad-based ideological nature of the organisation. Yet, Elliot & Holzer (2009) point out, that in the aftermath of both the US-backed offensive by the ARPCT and the Ethiopian invasion that followed,

the moderate leadership of the ICU gradually lost its influence over the organisation to the more radical elements within its ranks (Elliot & Holzer, 2009). Islamist militia groups fled to the countryside, changing the nature of fighting in Somalia from open urban-centred warfare, as had taken place against the ICU, to asymmetric warfare, with Islamist militias using guerrilla tactics to attack Ethiopian and TFG positions (Menkhaus, 2007). Al-Shabaab became the primary insurgency group that emerged from the weakening of the ICU. The group experienced an initial growth in its membership under a pan-Somali and Islamic liberation banner against Ethiopian occupation. It succeeded in regaining territorial control over south-central Somalia, formerly held by the ICU (Elliot & Holzer, 2009).

4.2. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Badmus (2015) notes that AMISOM can generally be understood in 3 phases; namely the initial deployment from 2007-2011 which faced significant challenges, a period of rapid expansion from 2011-2014, subsequently followed by a slowed advance and consolidation period which began in 2015 and the ultimate aim of embarking on an exit strategy by the end of the decade. In order to uncover the impact that the mission had on human security these phases are further unpacked to understand the actors, circumstances and motivations that contributed to the evolution of AMISOMs role in Somalia.

4.2.1. Initial Deployment (2007-2011)

In January 2007, AU forces were authorised to deploy to Somalia, under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission was initially given a 6-month mandate to prepare and stabilise the country to an extent that would make UN deployment viable (Albrecht & Haenlein, 2016). The initial 2007 mandate of the mission included:

1. Facilitate dialogue & reconciliation between all stakeholders.
2. Protection for TFG officials and institutions
3. Assisting in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme
4. Disarmament and stabilization efforts
5. Monitoring the security situation in areas of operation
6. Facilitating humanitarian aid flows
7. Protecting AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defence

(African Union, 2007)

From the onset, the mission faced several challenges. Prime among these was limited capacity and resources. With only 1600 personnel being deployed by Uganda to join AMISOM the mission was largely restricted in its operations around key areas of Mogadishu. International financial support for the mission was also sparse at first. By 2008 the mission was only able to cover around 5% of the $622 million estimated budget necessary to operate at full capacity (Omorogbe, 2011). Troop numbers later increased in 2009 to 3500 uniformed personnel following additional reinforcements from Uganda and Burundi (Lotze & Williams, 2016). These deployments were however insufficient to meet the need on the ground or to advance beyond the war-torn capital.

In its initial phases, AMISOM was intended to focus on supporting and securing the TFGs position in and around Mogadishu. To achieve this AMISOM focused the majority of its resources on systematically retaking areas of the capital city from Al-Shabaab fighters. Hence, the mission soon evolved into a war-fighting operation involving TFG, AMISOM and Al-Shabaab (Lotze & Williams, 2016). During this first phase, AMISOM had both achievements and shortcomings. The deployment of AMISOM facilitated the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces by 2009. This was regarded as an overall positive outcome as Ethiopia's unilateral intervention lacked local and international legitimacy. By 2011 Al-Shabaab forces were driven out of Mogadishu, signalling a further major achievement for the mission. This allowed the TFG administration to establish itself securely in the capital, which was viewed as a necessary precondition for the final formation of a fully functioning Somali central government. The operation of the Somali government was regarded as necessary for restoring basic public services and security that would improve the lives of ordinary Somali citizens. However, the mission continued to suffer from severe attacks by Al-Shabaab along its supply routes and around the outer districts of Mogadishu. AMISOM remained unable to take an offensive stance against Al-Shabaab beyond the capital during this period, leaving the mission with limited impact on peace and security in broader south-central Somalia.

The TFG also had limited capacity to maintain public law and order on its own, necessitating AMISOM to bear the brunt of this role (Lotze & Williams, 2016). The mission initially accounted for PoC, even though it was not explicitly mandated to do so at the time. The AMISOM 2007 Rules of Engagement (RoE) outlined that "use of force beyond self-defence is permitted to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (Williams, 2017). This shows the intention of the mission planners to improve the security situation of civilians in regards to the most immediate threats. However, in reality, AMISOM initially played a limited role in proactively protecting civilians

due to the chaotic nature of fighting in Mogadishu. The mission was also not given a mission-wide PoC mandate until much later, leaving the matter open to circumstantial interpretation of the RoE by forces and commanders on the ground (Williams, 2017).

4.2.2. The Surge to Stabilise (2011-2014)

By late 2011 the fortunes of AMISOM improved significantly, aided by renewed support from both the region and the international community. Additional troop deployments increased the mission's size to nearly 12 000 personnel, allowing for a more effective division of labour to carry out its various assigned tasks. Between 2009 to 2014 the UN provided the mission with over $1.5 million in material support, facilitated by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) (Albrecht & Haenlein, 2016). Contributions by other major donor countries also increased significantly during this time, such as the monthly commitments from the EU, which grew from €700 000 in 2007 to over €20 million by 2014 (Mahmood & Ani, 2017). This enhanced AMISOMs capacity, allowing the mission to extend its impact. However, the push to advance beyond Mogadishu was ultimately facilitated by unilateral interventions from Kenyan and Ethiopian national forces. Following Al-Shabaab terror attacks in its own cities, the Kenyan government quickly moved to consult the TFG on authorising a Kenyan-led intervention. In October 2011 operation *Linda Nchi* (Protect the Nation) was deployed and within 7 months Kenyan forces had taken key urban centres from Al-Shabaab, including the major port city of Kismayo and the southwestern regional capital Baidao. In the wake of the successful Kenyan intervention IGAD also requested Ethiopia to re-enter Somalia later that year. These unilateral interventions contributed significantly towards weakening Al-Shabaab's presence in urban strongholds and marked an offensive turn in the fight against the Islamist insurgency. Kenyan and Ethiopian forces later rehatted to officially join AMISOM in 2012 and 2013/14 respectively, pressured by increasing financial constraints and a perceived lack of legitimacy associated with ongoing unilateral interventions in Somalia (Williams, 2017).

In February 2012 AMISOM also received a new and expanded mandate. This new mandate called for a more proactive and combative stance aimed against Al-Shabaab.

> *"AMISOM shall be authorised to take all necessary measures as appropriate in those sectors in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective*

and legitimate governance across Somalia." (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2036, 2012)

This new mandate intended to degrade and eliminate the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. This shift came at a time when preparations were being made for the 2012 Somali elections that would mark the end of the TFGs transitional period and the formation of a new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). In September 2012 the Somali parliament elected Hassan Sheikh as president of the FGS. In line with this development, AMISOM priorities shifted towards expanding the territorial control of the new Somali government across the country. By November 2013 AMISOM troops numbered more than 22 000, making it the largest mission in the AUs history up to that time (Williams, 2017). The first mission-wide PoC mandate was also introduced in 2013, formally including it into the key objectives of the mission and further aligning with the growing multidimensionality of a more emboldened AMISOM (Willaims, 2017). The development and inclusion of PoC principles was further informed by the AUs *Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in Peace Support Operations*, which was tabled and adopted by the organisation in 2010. The *Guidelines* sought to expand conceptually and practically the AUs approach to PoC by adopting a tiered understanding of the threats facing civilians. These included 1) protection as part of the political process to "a state emerging from conflict can establish lasting and sustainable peace", 2) protecting civilians from physical harm, 3) mainstreaming the protection of human rights and 4) the establishment of a protective environment (African Union, 2010:9).

The AMISOM Concept of Operation (CONOPS) was also updated in January 2014 to reflect the perceived reality and intended outcomes that African and international leaders envisioned on the ground. The strategic objectives of the mission were clearly defined as 1) neutralize Al-Shabaab, restoring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Somali state, 2) develop the capacity of Somali security forces, 3) restoration of governance in recovered territories and 4) facilitate 2016 Somali elections (Lotze & Williams, 2016). The inclusion of points 3 and 4 highlighted the increasingly political nature of AMISOM and its desire to further embrace multidimensionality. Lotze & Williams (2016) highlight that the transformations AMISOM experienced from 2012-2014 were intended to move the situation in Somalia towards the desired end-state where the Somali government forces would be equipped to take over a stabilised country. The mission adopted a clear-hold-build strategy, where it pushed against Al-Shabaab on several fronts making the way for local governance and services to be restored in newly reclaimed territories (Lotze & Williams, 2016). The first major joint offensive by AMISOM under the new mandate, *Operation Eagle*, was launched in March 2014. The mission rapidly captured dozens of strategically significant towns that formed part of Al-Shabaab

supply routes. In August that same year *Operation Indian Ocean* further pushed the frontline into Al-Shabaab controlled territories, allowing AMISOM forces to take control of up to 80% of south-central territories controlled by the group (African Union, 2014). These advances also benefitted from Al-Shabaab's own internal leadership disputes that began in mid-2013 and made the group increasingly disorganised during this period (Williams, 2014).



(Source: African Union, 2014)

4.2.3. The Stalemate (2015-2017)

The rapid push to recapture territories across south-central Somalia was hailed as a victory for AMISOM. However, Lotze & Williams (2016) point out that the increased existential threat facing Al-Shabaab led to significant changes in the group's tactics and operations. Due to the loss of major urban strongholds, the majority of Al-Shabaab's activities took place via its networks among villages and communities in the countryside. Direct urban warfare once again gave way to more indirect, and often more violent, tactics such as the use of sleeper cells, assassinations, attacks on civilians and suicide bombings. As the group withdrew from cities and towns they blended with local populations, making their movements more difficult to track. The asymmetric and protracted nature of the conflict with Al-Shabaab became a significant challenge to the continued advance of AMISOM. Al-Shabaab continued to ambush AMISOM and government camps, raid supply routes and destroy key infrastructure, diminishing the effectiveness of the operation in taking and securing new territories from the group (Lotze & Williams, 2016). This also prevented AMISOM from achieving its objective of restoring local structures of leadership, law and order, by stretching the capacity of the mission beyond its limit. After nearly 3 years of aggressive expansion, the mission's progress slowed from 2015 onwards and fell short of eliminating Al-Shabaab entirely. Instead, AMISOM adopted a hold-and-defend strategy to maintain relative stability in the areas of Somalia already captured under *Operation Ocean Build* (Lotze & Williams, 2016).

In 2015/6 the CONOP of the mission was amended again to reflect the new reality on the ground. It set out to prioritise 1) continued offensives against Al-Shabaab strongholds, 2) creating an enabling environment for political processes to proceed at a local and national level, and 3) initiating wider and more inclusive peacebuilding and reconciliation programmes among ordinary Somalis (Lotze & Williams, 2016). In 2016 AMISOM was given a new mandate which expanded the political nature of AMISOM even further, mentioning the need to focus on strengthening local governance institutions and conducting more hearts-and-minds activities with civilians. The mission also played a key role in securing the 2016 presidential election by the Somali parliament, which still operated according to the 4.5 Formula, allowing for further consolidation of the new government (Lotze & Williams, 2016). By 2017 AMISOM had made notable achievements in reducing the direct military threat posed by Al-Shabaab, however, it had not reduced the group's capabilities to a negligible level nor removed the possibility of resurgence. In its own 2017 *Report on the 10-year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference*, the AU reflected closely on the mission's shortcomings. The report highlighted that the mission had not lived up to its multidimensional mandate and vision of security, instead remaining military heavy. It also did not give sufficient attention to governance institutions and the formation of a workable political settlement. Finally, the report noted that support for AMISOM among Somali civilians was dwindling, reflecting a general crisis of legitimacy that had haunted the mission since its deployment a decade prior (African Union, 2017). By 2016 survey data shows that civilian approval of AMISOM had decreased from 64%, during the initial years of the mission to 28% nearly a decade later (Williams et al., 2018).

4.3. Conclusion

From the start of the Somali crisis towards the time of AMISOMs deployment, the role of international actors in Somalia evolved from distinctly peace-making and peacekeeping to active counterinsurgency. The Islamist insurgency group, Al-Shabaab, became the primary opponent of the government and other international forces. The group was not viewed as a legitimate actor that could be negotiated with; hence there was no peace process for the AU to protect or preserve as had been the case in it missions to Burundi and Sudan. For these reasons the posture with which the AU entered Somalia significantly differed from its prior missions. The actions and behaviour of various actors in the Somali conflict continued to shape and be shaped by AMISOM, with varying consequences for the security of civilians.

CHAPTER 5: THE AU AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOMALIA

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, AMISOM played a key role in shaping the direction and outcomes of conflict in Somalia. The mission paved the way for the formation of a central government in the country after more than a decade and made significant gains in the fight against Al-Shabaab. This chapter now turns to focus on the human security impact of the mission between 2007-2017. In line with the conceptual framework developed in this thesis, human security is approached as a multidimensional concept, with the individual person and their community viewed as the primary referent facing both direct and indirect sources of insecurity. These sources of insecurity are further perpetuated by physical, institutional and structural drivers. The aim of this chapter will be to present qualitative evidence that sheds light on how AMISOM has mitigated, neglected and/or exacerbated sources of insecurity for ordinary Somalians. This data forms the basis for the final analysis of the African Union as a security actor in this thesis, with specific reference to the case of Somalia.

5.1. Direct Violence

Direct and physical violence remains one of the most imminent security threats facing individuals in conflict-afflicted regions. The biggest source of insecurity to civilians in Somalia has been the ongoing fighting between various local, regional and international actors. During periods of intense fighting in Somalia, civilian casualties and fatalities increased dramatically and proportionally. Evidence shows that the period from 2007-2017 was more violent than any other period in post-independence Somalia, surpassing even the violence of the post-Barre years. AMISOMs role and response to physical violence against civilians does show some nuance. It continued to evolve over time, reflecting the mission's successes and failures in addressing civilian insecurity (Willaims et. al. 2018).

5.1.1. Violence by Third Party Forces

Clashes between pro-government and ICU forces emerged in 2006 displacing up to a million Somalis attempting to escape violence and fighting. This diminished their access to their sources of livelihood and exposed them to a range of threats. The period immediately prior to and during AMISOMs deployment, was also the most fatal for civilians, with an estimated 6000 non-combatant civilians being killed in 2007 alone. These deaths correlate with the period where fighting in Mogadishu and other urban centres was most severe (Amnesty International, 2008). Understanding where, how and why civilians died sheds greater light on the key sources of insecurity facing Somalis. The first major source of insecurity relates to the behaviour of third-party forces a.k.a. Troop Contributing Country

(TCC) forces. Intervening forces played a major role in shaping the Somali conflict in both positive and negative ways for civilians. During AMISOMs initial years of deployment, the mission relied heavily on the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) to aid its fight in taking back Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab and warlords. This was linked to the mission's own limitations in terms of capacity and resources as outlined in the previous chapter. However, while it was assumed that intervening forces would improve the security situation of citizens, evidence about the behaviour of Third-Party Forces indicates otherwise. In reality, AMISOM entered Somalia at a time when physical violence against civilians by intervening forces was already commonplace.

Interviews conducted with Somali refugees highlight repeated cases of intentional and severe violence carried out against civilians by ENDF troops in and around Mogadishu and other urban centres. Interviewees reported instances of throat-slitting, indiscriminate sniper and rocket fire, rape, torture and extortion as being among the forms of violence experienced by civilians (Amnesty International, 2008). Contrary to the mainstream narrative which portrayed Islamist groups as the main source of civilian insecurity, residents reported a mixture of perpetrators carrying out violence.

> *It started with the Islamists, then the Ethiopians came to Mogadishu. I left my house two months ago, before that the Ethiopians occupied my house. My family died in the first fighting in an artillery bombardment. After that, one day it was al-Shabab, the next it was the Ethiopians, who decided to stay. My own neighbours were attacked by the resistance, who blew up a military vehicle. In response the Ethiopians cordoned off the area. Then we found people cold bloodedly killed—shot in the forehead.* (Civilian Interview by Amnesty International, 2008)

> *One insurgent fired a shoulder borne rocket, after that everyone was at risk. If [Ethiopian soldiers] see a beard, they say this is an insurgent, or if they see a young boy. This attack happened when I was asleep. When I woke up, I found that the zone was closed, and the Ethiopians had come. When I came out of my house, I saw all the people running, so I ran. After the Ethiopians left, we came back. We started to look at what had happened there. I have seen the bodies of the slaughtered people, including the son of my brother.* (Civilian Interview by Amnesty International, 2008)

Interviews show that the motivations behind the heavy-handed tactics employed by the ENDF was both to root out ICU supporters and as a warning against civilians who might support anti-TFG groups. In the wake of widespread violence, it was hoped that AMISOM, guided by the norms and principles

of the AU, would have a net positive effect on civilian security. In some regards, the arrival of AMISOM was accompanied by a marked improvement in the security situation over time, because it eventually facilitated the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. By 2009 the majority of ENDF troops had left Somalia. However, during the 2-year period between 2007-2009 Ethiopian forces took on the brunt of military operations in Somalia and were continuously accused of abuses and on-site killings in their skirmishes with Islamist fighters (Williams, 2017). Due to its dependency on Ethiopian support, AMISOM was unable to address violence carried out by Ethiopian or TFG forces. The material restrictions that plagued AMISOM in its initial years made it increasingly difficult to carry out the wide range of tasks assigned to the mission (Williams, 2017). Failing to address the issue of violence against civilians further played an indirect role in exacerbating the conflict, further increasing levels of violent insurgency. Crouch (2018) highlights in interviews with civilians that some community and clan leaders grew increasingly sympathetic to Al-Shabaab in the years after AMISOMs deployment, due to their frustration with the violence perpetrated by Ethiopian and TFG forces. In turn, these leaders allowed Al-Shabaab to recruit youth from their clan groups to fight what they perceived as a common enemy (Crouch, 2018). By the time that Ethiopian forces withdrew AMISOM had already become associated with ENDF violence; being viewed at best as a complacent bystander to foreign-led acts of violence and at worst an active supporter of foreign occupation in the minds of many Somalis.

The issue of physical violence against civilians was also not entirely absent during periods where AMISOM served as the sole intervening actor in Somalia. Reports again resurfaced during and after the surge period of the mission (2011-2014) when Ethiopian and Kenyan troops entered Somalia and eventually rehatted under the AMISOM mandate. In 2015 AMISOM soldiers were accused of killing 24 civilians after opening fire on a football field during a public match. In its defence, AMISOM officials claimed that the civilians had been caught in the cross-fire between AMISOM and Al-Shabaab fighters (Mohamed, 2015). Ethiopian forces operating under AMISOM were also accused of killing 14 civilians in 2016 after opening fire on a crowd outside a religious gathering (Hagmann & Seid, 2018). These cases show that while AMISOM managed to reduce instances of violence against civilians directly carried out by intervening forces after Ethiopia's initial withdrawal, it did not manage to eliminate the problem. Hagmann & Seid (2018) note that one consistent flaw in AMISOMs approach to military-civil relations was the impunity that protected deployed troops from serious judicial prosecution within the local legal system. According to Article 54 of the AMISOM Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) soldiers may only be tried by their respective national governments if the evidence against them is presented. TCCs however were slow to take action in acknowledging and prosecuting the misconduct of their soldiers. AMISOM leaders were also been reluctant to pursue

reforms to the SOMA for fear of losing the support of TCCs or harming troop morale (Hagmann & Seid, 2018). Williams (2018) notes that AMISOM control over national troops on the ground also remained a challenge as TCCs continued to redirect operations according to their own military and security objectives. Commanders further used their influence to stifle investigations into misconduct or violence by their own national troops (Williams, 2018). AMISOM, therefore, found itself in a dilemma between its reliance on regional troops and its ability to adhere to the human security aspirations of the AU.

5.1.2. Indirect Bombardment & Civilian Casualties

Another major contributor to physical harm faced by civilians was as a direct result of AMISOMs own combat tactics. As the mission grew and gradually occupied Mogadishu between 2007-2011 it relied increasingly on artillery bombardments to retaliate against Al-Shabaab positions in the areas surrounding the city. These bombardments were often done in an untargeted and indiscriminate manner to disperse and diminish Al-Shabaab hold-outs. In the years following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, civilian casualties and fatalities remained relatively high in Mogadishu, where AMISOM was based. The number of civilian deaths ranged from 1739 in 2009, 2200 in 2010 to 1400 in 2011 (CIVIC, 2011). A large portion of these deaths were as a consequence of indiscriminate artillery fire. The effects of bombardments on civilian areas had several devastating consequences including the loss of life and limb and the destruction of property like homes and businesses. It further fuelled civilian resentment against AMISOM forces. Interview evidence collected by CIVIC shows both the devastation caused by indiscriminate bombardment and the ways that Al-Shabaab used AMISOMs indiscriminate firing tactics to increase civilian fatalities.

> *Al-Shabaab had been attempting to defend the area against a push by Burundian AMISOM troops. Several al-Shabaab fighters entered my house around 2am. They were dressed in black and had their faces covered. When I refused to join them, they took all my belongings and went outside. They were shooting artillery shells from outside my house but they did not allow me to leave. They said, "You will be killed very soon. Do not leave the house." They killed two of my neighbours when they tried to escape. Then a Burundian shell came and hit us. It destroyed my house and damaged three others. I survived with my wife and my child but my father, two brothers and a cousin were killed.* (Civilian Interview by CIVIC, 2011)

Interviews conducted by Crouch (2018) with community elders also shows that the death of civilians from AMISOM bombardments served as a motivating factor for why some communities sympathised with and tolerated Al-Shabaab's occupation, viewing AMISOM as an ally of Ethiopian forces with little regard for the security of locals (Crouch, 2018). This shows that AMISOMs tactics were well-known and criticised as a serious security threat by civilians on the ground.

The AU however did seek to realign its activities in Somalia with human security principles over time. In 2011, following the retreat of Al-Shabaab forces from Mogadishu, the AU moved to develop a more refined Indirect Fire Policy in response to the growing issue of civilian casualties at the hands of AMISOM forces. The policy adopted a more proactive "Avoid, Attribute, Amend" approach aimed at mitigating fatalities. To "Avoid", AMISOM created no-fire zones to reduce casualties and fatalities around civilian concentrated areas like "hospitals, residential areas, markets, religious places and camps for internally displaced persons" (Muhammedally, 2016:240). The mission also adopted policies discouraging the use of certain heavy weaponry, utilizing better early warning mechanisms and reviewing authorisation procedures (Willaims, 2013). This evidences a level of reflectiveness among AMISOM officials about the strategic and moral considerations of its overall impact on the general population, further highlighted in comments made by one AMISOM commander:

> *Winning the support of the people is the guiding principle for the planning and conduct of all our operations. Minimizing civilian harm must be a guiding principle for the planning and conduct of all our operations, and further is a humanitarian imperative on which we all agree.* (Muhammedally, 2016)

In order to further enhance the mission's ability to "Attribute" civilian casualties and fatalities AMISOM established a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) in 2012, which became fully operational in 2015. The CCTARC was geared towards investigating and providing accurate and timely data on civilian casualties that could be used to assess appropriate compensation (Rupesinghe, 2019). Several sources indicate that AMISOMs role in civilian fatalities and casualties caused by indirect bombardments reduced significantly after 2015 (Muhammedally, 2016; Willaims et al., 2018). While this might be in part attributed to an overall reduction in fighting, there were also instances in which civilians who did suffer from bombardments were compensated. Through the CCTARC, AMISOM sought to "Amend" in instances where fatalities did occur through apologies or with monetary payments. This was viewed as a fundamentally important component of the new policy as the idea of "blood money" was in line with Somali traditional and cultural practices that require adequate compensation in cases of murder or accidental death (Muhammedally, 2016).

However, despite its attempts to account for civilian casualties, Rupesinghe (2019) notes that the CCTARC still lacked adequate resources and staffing to carry out its functions properly. Furthermore, instances where TCCs blocked or hindered AMISOMs inquiries into cases of civilian casualties or fatalities remained prevalent. This was exacerbated by the mission's decentralised chain of command which further hindered the flow of information or follow up investigations regarding troop misconduct (Rupesinghe, 2019).

5.1.3. Violence Under Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab has been portrayed as the main antagonist in the Somali conflict. However, as shown thus far the group was not the only source of violence against civilians during periods of intense fighting in Somalia. Yet the group has consistently been responsible for up to a third of all violent incidents in Somalia carried out against both combatants and non-combatants (Menkhaus, 2018). Al-Shabaab's aggressive tactics enhanced its role in increasing the insecurity of civilians, including through public beheadings, mutilations and bombings. However, data suggests that the level of threat that Al-Shabaab posed directly to civilians correlated with several circumstantial factors, namely 1) the group's own perceived existential security, 2) whether it was operating within securely held territories or on the frontline and 3) changes in the behaviour and strategies of intervening forces like AMISOM. Data shows that violence against civilians by Al-Shabaab specifically increased after AMISOM troops began pushing the frontline in order to eliminate Al-Shabaab under its extended 2012 mandate. ACLED (2015) data shows that the recorded incidents of violent attacks on civilians per month increased by an average of 8% between 2012-2014. This period of increased civilian insecurity corresponds with AMISOMs surge period when the "clear-hold-build" strategy was adopted and the mission became more ambitious in its endeavours to extend the territorial control of the TFG. Violence against civilians carried out by Al-Shabaab also occurred more frequently outside of the capital city on the borderline of Al-Shabaab-held and government-held territories, correlating with areas where AMISOM was gaining new territory (ACLED, 2015). This paints an insightful picture of the way that Al-Shabaab's behaviour and attitude towards civilians was shaped directly by the advance of AMISOM forces.

In explaining the causal mechanism between AMISOMs advance and the increased threat that Al-Shabaab posed to civilians, Crouch (2018) makes an insightful observation that the "degrade & destroy" posture of AMISOM unintentionally fuelled a "pathology of violence" in Somalia. This manifested in

a vicious cycle where violence carried out by Al-Shabaab grew proportional to the violence employed by the state and its allies in its surge to recapture south-central Somalia. Ingiriis (2018) supports this interpretation and argues that the emergence of Al-Shabaab itself should be viewed as a consequence of foreign-led interventionism, and as a response to internationally-led state-building. Interviews conducted by Crouch (2018), with civilians in areas formerly occupied by Al-Shabaab, suggest that the group remained relatively lenient and peaceful towards civilians it perceived as compliant to its rule and in areas where its dominance was uncontested. However, as AMISOM forces advanced to enforce the national control of the TFG government the group grew increasingly suspicious of civilians, often carrying out targeted killings against community members suspected of being pro-government spies (Crouch, 2018). Al-Shabaab violence against communities after 2012 also correlated with those villages and clans that showed a propensity for switching sides. These attacks can therefore also be characterised as a form of "punishment", to warn other communities against doing the same. Al-Shabaab directly prohibited clan leaders in its areas of control from participating in the 2016 political selection process, leaving those communities that complied with this directive in peace while taking retaliatory action against those that did not comply (Crouch, 2018).

This indicates a clear shift in Al-Shabaab's behaviour in response to AMISOMs advance stemming from its own growing insecurity. While this shows that security under Al-Shabaab remained a moving target for civilians, it nonetheless evidences an underlying logic behind violent attacks. It also shows that civilians did enjoy a level of security under Al-Shabaab rule in certain circumstances, contrary to the blank characterisation of the group as an irrational source of violence. This logic however was not factored into AMISOMs advance strategy. While AMISOM, empowered by the integration of Ethiopian and Kenyan forces, was able to reclaim large portions of territory from Al-Shabaab they did not always hold or protect these areas. The inability and/or failure to hold and protect villages often led to severe reprisal attacks by Al-Shabaab once AMISOM moved on. Villages that were reclaimed by AMISOM and then lost, often suffered more violence when Al-Shabaab returned. Hence there are also recorded instances of civilians fleeing from AMISOM or cheering Al-Shabaab fighters when they re-entered the village (Crouch, 2018). This highlights the complex security situation that many civilians in Somalia were forced to navigate, contrary to dichotomous narratives about areas being "liberated" from the Islamist group. It further gives evidence that AMISOMs presence alone did not always make civilians safer.

5.2. Indirect Violence

Regarding Uganda's involvement in AMISOM, the Ugandan Foreign Minister, Sam Kuteesa once said "Uganda [like Somalia] was once a failed state that needed its neighbours' help" (Fisher, 2018). This comment gives insight into the purpose of AMISOMs deployment into Somalia. Fisher (2018) highlights that the regional and international perpetuation of the Somali 'failed state' narrative in diplomacy and policy circles played a pivotal role in how AMISOM was conceived. Since its deployment, one of the mission's primary tasks has been to secure and facilitate the consolidation of a new and functioning Somali national government. The reconstruction of the Somali state structure has been viewed as a central prerequisite for the restoration of sustainable peace, stability and security in the country. This process has consisted of securing the establishment of effective governance institutions as well as training, supporting and capacitating the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF); which consists of three main branches namely the Somalia Police Force (SPF), Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somalia National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). However contrary to the state-building as peacebuilding narrative supported by international policymakers, the securitisation of the state under AMISOMs guardianship had several implications for human security in Somalia.

5.2.1. Militarised state building

In the Somali context, the process of state-building became an inherently militarized activity under what Hagmann (2016) refers to as a stabilization logic. AMISOMs intervention played a direct role in enabling the establishment and expansion of the Somali central government through military means. Prior to 2012, the mission focused on protecting TFG officials and state-building processes. Once its mandate was expanded in 2012 AMISOM became an active military force seeking to extend the territorial control of the newly formed government across the entire country at any cost and primarily through the use of force. The evolution of AMISOM in this manner showed the preferential relationship that the mission had towards the TFG/FGS. This relationship was inherently built upon the desire to address the 'failed state' question in Somalia. Yet this approach contributed to a dichotomous understanding of the dynamics of conflict in Somalia, where those who opposed the internationally-backed state-building project to any degree were deemed inherent enemies of the country's long-term progress. These actors thus became opponents to eliminate, instead of legitimate stakeholders to engage with (Hagmann, 2016). As the main military actor in the country AMISOM became an instrument of internationally-funded state-building, with several consequences for human

security (Fisher, 2018). Through its support of the FSG, AMISOM neglected to address several underlying drivers of violence perpetuated and exacerbated by the state-building process itself.

Contrary to internationally sanctioned narratives on the importance of state-building in Somalia, the TFG/FGS suffered from a crisis of legitimacy since its inception. The central state was perceived by many citizens as a project geared towards the interests of foreign and domestic elites, rather than towards a more comprehensive strategy to restore peace and security for ordinary Somalis. Many on the ground viewed the TFG/FSG as a foreign-backed regime and regarded the 4.5 Formula it was founded on as an exclusionary system, devoid of democratic character. The clan-based process of selection used to appoint members of parliament and select the president since 2004, resulted in an "empty shell" state which lacked embeddedness in Somali society (Lemay-Hebert, 2011). Fisher (2018) attributes this phenomenon to the "military-first statehood approach" favoured and advocated for by key AMISOM TCCs like Ethiopia and Uganda; who drew inspiration from their own histories of guerrilla liberation movements (Fisher, 2018). The militarized response to state-building, in turn, had severe consequences for the perpetuation and escalation of violence in Somalia's political arena. In line with this observation Ingiriis (2020) highlights an increasing trend of authoritarianism and state suppression under the internationally-backed Somali government. This growing repression was indirectly enabled by the presence and support of AMISOM which afforded the government a level of protection it otherwise would not have enjoyed.

A prime example of state repression includes the Somali government's use and misuse of NISA which was formed under the Yusuf regime in 2007. The organisation serves as the Somali state's primary paramilitary intelligence agency and many of its senior staff at the time were members of the former Barre dictatorship (Ingiriis, 2020). Interviews conducted by Ingiriss (2020) with high-level officials in the Somali government show evidence of post-2004 administrations using the state's security apparatus to suppress pro-democracy sentiments to abolish the country's 4.5 Formula approach of government by selection. President Mohamoud's administration (2012-2017) showed direct signs of antagonism towards those who critiqued the Somali central government, portraying these figures as a second threat to national security after Al-Shabaab (Ingiriis, 2020). However contrary to the government-sanctioned narrative, pro-democracy calls arose in light of the FSGs failure to bring about the reforms that were promised under the 2013 Somali Compact, which promised fully open and democratic elections to be held by 2016. However, by 2016 the FSG failed to transition from indirect selection to direct free and fair elections due to the government's continued lack of capacity to project its authority across Somalia and Al-Shabaab's control over large portions of the Somali countryside.

Interviews conducted by Ali (2018) also suggest that the FSGs aggressive stance against even moderate Islamist groups alienated many Islamic elites from mainstream politics; leaving these underrepresented in the contemporary Somali political landscape, despite the wide support that Islamic elites enjoy among the general population. This has led authors such as Menkhaus (2018:24) to refer to the Somali government as a "mediated state" with little grassroots legitimacy; sustained only by an unstable, internationally-funded elite bargain.

Political freedoms in Somalia more broadly also remained low or even worsened from 2006 onward. Freedom House data shows that Somalia has performed much poorer in political rights indexes over the last decade, even when compared to other unstable and conflict-afflicted nations in Africa during the same period such as Mali (Williams et. al., 2018). Press freedom grew increasingly narrow, with television staff and journalists being detained and tried on accusations of being aligned with Al-Shabaab or as being sympathisers of Islamist radicals. Based on interview evidence collected from communities in Somalia, Ingiriis (2020:266) highlights the "Shabaabization of detained civilians" as a growing trend in the Somali political landscape after 2012 when the new post-transition government was officially consolidated. This also correlated with the time that AMISOMs surge to retake south-central Somalia was at its height. In interviews conducted by Ingiriis (2020) civilians further report instances of extortion by state security forces, where youth could be kidnapped under suspicion of being members of Al-Shabaab and families held to ransom for their release (Ingiriis, 2020). Contrary to the triumphalism associated with AMISOMs role in enabling the establishment of a centralised state in Somalia, the evidence presented shows that this has had little or even worsening effects on the security of civilians. The violence faced by civilians from an undemocratic and repressive state should be viewed as an indirect threat to the long-term security of individuals and communities, enabled by the militarised intervention of AMISOM.

In response to these political threats to civilian security, AMISOM has shown some reflectiveness, primarily through its Civilian Component, which was relocated to Mogadishu in 2011 and expanded in 2014 to include several targeted clusters (Williams et. al., 2018). Support from UNSOA for the component also grew during this period, primarily through means of additional personnel that could be deployed to areas retaken during AMISOMs surge. One of the key tasks of the Civilian Component included "facilitating efforts aimed at overall development and the re-establishment of governance structures, rule of law institutions and the restoration of both physical and social infrastructure in Somalia" (African Union, 2021). The different clusters of the Civilian Component fall under the themes of Political Processes, Stabilisation and Early Recovery; Protection, Human Rights and Gender;

Security Sector Reform; and Mission Support (Williams et. al., 2018). This reflected the desired multidimensionality of AMISOM and its desire to comprehensively address the security needs of civilians on the ground. However, Akpasom (2016) notes that the AMISOM civilian component remained marginal in its impact up until 2014, and thereafter lacked the funding and technical support to carry out a comprehensive strategy across the vast expanse of south-central Somalia. Furthermore, the Civilian Component alone has not been able to adequately account for the indirect violence inherent in the militarised approach to the state-building process as highlighted in this section. In its own assessment of its mission in Somalia the AU in its 2017 *Report on the 10-year AMISOM Lessons Learned* AU officials noted that "AMISOM representatives were excluded from governance mechanisms in Somalia because it was seen as a military mission." (African Union, 2017:11). This further shows the extent to which the organisation's approach to peace and security lacked the necessary consideration for the underlying factors driving the insecurity of civilians in the Somali context.

5.2.2. Quality of Governance

An absence of effective governance has been an ongoing and indirect security threat to many Somalis. Local governance serves as a key indicator of public service delivery and the ability of a centralised authority to maintain law and order. However, several pieces of evidence highlight that the Somali state, which AMISOM has protected and helped to expand, has failed in delivering quality governance to its people. This has been contrasted by some authors to Al-Shabaab's governance capabilities as a way of dismantling simplistic narratives about who does in fact provide civilians with the most security. Evidence suggests that despite the dichotomy of legitimate versus illegitimate security actors in the Somali conflict Al-Shabaab has at times provided more security to civilians than the FSG or AMISOM. In line with this argument authors like Harding (2016) compare Al-Shabaab to groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan who have sought to bring their own forms of governance, albeit illiberal, to an anarchic nation in the context of foreign-led state-building. The failure to recognise the governance capabilities of Al-Shabaab reflects a broader miscalculation in the logic behind AMISOMs behaviour, which has neglected to consider the importance of governance over military victory. Interviews conducted by Ingiriis (2018) with civilian focus groups in several Somali cities highlights that while ordinary Somalis support a strong government, they are more likely to measure its success based on its ability to provide basic services rather than on its ideological or political stance.

Clapham (2017) further notes that from the perspective of ordinary Somalis the issue of access to public goods plays the most important role in which actors they regard as legitimate. If the state fails to provide such goods the "[civilians] have to seek these goods through the instrumentality of alternative social networks e.g., bribery, clans, religion etc.", including networks like those of Al-Shabaab (Clapham, 2017:144). This stands in contrast to narratives that seek to portray some actors, like the TFG/FSG, as having an inherent ontological legitimacy. On the contrary, the ability to govern and bring order to the lives of civilians should be viewed as more important. In this regard, evidence suggests that Al-Shabaab provided civilians with a semblance of stable governance and security in their day-to-day lives in areas that were firmly under the group's control. Interviews conducted with Al-Shabaab defectors show that the group functions internally "like a state system capable of delivering primary security in its territories" (Ingiriis, 2018:515). The features of Al-Shabaab governance includes organised systems of taxation, a functioning judiciary based on Sharia law and centralised political structures that deal with different socio-economic matters. Interviews conducted with business owners by Crouch (2018) also shows that Al-Shabaab has been able to administer and secure ports and major trade routes more efficiently than government forces, despite the support the latter receives from AMISOM. This has ensured that people's sources of livelihoods and businesses continued to function relatively undisturbed in areas where Al-Shabaab rule was uncontested.

Furthermore, taxes (*zakat*) levied in Al-Shabaab controlled areas were often administered in a more consistent fashion, in contrast to local government entities which were accused of inconsistency and corruption. Interview evidence suggests that Al-Shabaab also issued receipts for taxes and levies to keep records of payments and eliminate instances of corruption, further showing administrative and governance capability (Crouch, 2018). In comparison, the Somali government suffered from high levels of corruption limiting its capacity and effectiveness. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Somali government has been perceived as one of the most corrupt nations in the world since 2006 (Williams et. al. 2018). Another major governance factor that influenced civilian livelihoods included ease of mobility. Bakonyi (2018) argues that reduced mobility of people and goods can often be associated with increased economic and social vulnerability, as civilians lose access to their sources of livelihood e.g., pastures for farmers and markets for traders. In this regard interview evidence shows that civilians felt more secure with roadblocks in Al-Shabaab controlled areas due to their consistency, security and greater ease of movement (Bakonyi, 2018). However, this was less true in areas where Al-Shabaab was actively fighting AMISOM and government forces for control. In contrast, interviews show evidence of inconsistencies, extortion and corruption as common features of government-held roadblocks and ports in areas liberated by AMISOM. These gaps in capacity and quality of governance

reflect the Somali government's inability to extend its governance capabilities beyond key urban centres (Ingiriis, 2018). In combination, the evidence presents a picture whereby governance has not been a priority for the AMISOM-backed FSG. This has in turn, harmed the impact of state-building efforts on the day-to-day security of civilians while also enabling Al-Shabaab to gain support.

5.2.3. Clan Conflicts

Menkhaus (2018) highlights that in the last 25 years 35-40% of violence faced by civilians in Somalia has been due to conflict between clans and sub-clans. Along with state repression and a lack of good governance, clan-based violence thus poses a third major indirect source of insecurity for Somali civilians, and one AMISOM has directly contributed to. The drivers behind clan conflict have included land disputes, politically motivated violence, identity politics and general predatory behaviour in the absence of an overarching authority to administer a monopoly on violence (Menkhaus, 2018). However, clan conflict has also been spurred on in response to the behaviours and decisions of external intervening actors and by the larger project of state-building in Somalia. The actions that AMISOM has taken have also had a negative impact on the clan relations in Somalia. While training militias in the Lower Shabelle region AMISOM provided resources to clans to fight Al-Shabaab, which in turn shaped the behaviour and perceptions of other clans in response. Before 2017 AMISOM trained members of the Habar Gidir, a subgroup of the Hawiye to fight Al-Shabaab in the region. However, after 2017 AMISOM began training members of the Biyomaal, a subgroup of the Dir clan and a historical rival of the Habar Gidir. This shift in AMISOMs training strategy directly contributed to the Habar Gidir clan leaders shifting their allegiance to Al-Shabaab, further reflecting the complex nature of clan relations (UN Accountability Project, 2018; Hagmann & Seid, 2018; Mushtaq, 2018).

Clan politics thus became a systemic enabler for Al-Shabaab and the violence associated with the group, as clans who felt politically and economically excluded showed greater willingness to allow their community's youth to fight for Al-Shabaab (Crouch, 2018). Smaller and weaker clan groups from the Digil-Mirifle and also various ethnically Bantu communities became a source of recruitment for Al-Shabaab. These groups were categorically the most vulnerable to looting and discrimination as minorities in the country (Clapham, 2017). An example of this can be found in the attacks by militia from the Abgaal, a subgroup of the Hawiye and one of the largest in Somalia, against ethnically Bantu agriculturalists who were disposed of their land after the 1991 uprising. The ethnic Bantu communities in Somalia also suffered disproportionately during famines of 1991-92 and 2011-12 due to their inability to leverage political influence in the Somali political system to gain access to aid and protect

their livelihoods (UN Accountability Project, 2018). The role of clan politics in shaping who is protected, by whom and from what is therefore still a significant determinant of security for ordinary civilians. While AMISOM provided some security to these minority groups through its role in establishing and protecting internal displacement camps, this alone has not been enough to alleviate the underlying drivers of conflict that perpetuate insecurity.

For civilians increased fighting between clans can become a severe source of insecurity due to the cycle of killings and revenge killings that follow. The ability of actors to deal effectively with the nuances of clan conflict to restore security has influenced how those actors are perceived by local Somali communities. In its initial years, Al-Shabaab held a strong anti-clanism ideology and used its coercive force to maintain compliance from clan elites (Crouch, 2018; Toros & Harley, 2018). Crouch's (2018) interviews show evidence that group employed expert negotiators and advisers to help settle disputes between clan communities, thereby reducing inter-clan conflict in the regions under the group's control. This directly contributed to the peaceful mediation of several long-standing inter-clan feuds in different parts of south-central Somalia. Al-Shabaab has also at various points in time employed the use of mobile courts to settle commercial and civil disputes between communities and individuals to avoid inter-clan rivalries, even near regions controlled by the government. Some interview evidence suggests that Somalis showed greater willingness to take cases to the Al-Shabaab courts, even travelling to regions controlled by the group, due to the perceived ineptitude and corruption of state-run courts (Ali, 2018). However, after pro-government forces recaptured the region these clan animosities flared up again, leading to renewed violence. The re-emergence of clan disputes and conflict took place amidst the absence of any adequate local administration with the capacity of will to pursue reconciliation. Furthermore, the reinstatement of local governance structures also led many communities to feel that they were excluded from service delivery due to the interest of their clan not being represented in newly formed political structures (Crouch, 2018). This further supports the emphasis placed on recognising the importance of perceived justice as key to ultimate reconciliation and the mitigation of ongoing violence.

Interview evidence collected by Crouch & Ali (2018) shows that at least some Somalis in territories taken back by AMISOM exhibited a sense of nostalgia for the time that their territory was ruled by Al-Shabaab. This was due to the group's ability to practically implement stability, law and order, albeit through illiberal forms of governance. The inability of pro-government forces such as AMISOM to account for the nuances of clan politics and its effects on the insecurity of Somalis has further harmed

the mission's effectiveness. The majority of respondents interviewed by Crouch & Ali (2018) viewed AMISOMs military approach to Al-Shabaab as necessary but not sufficient, and as a detriment to Somalia's peace and security in the long run. Most viewed a political solution to the underlying social tensions in Somali society and politics as the only viable way forward for restoring security and stability to the lives of civilians (Crouch & Ali, 2018). Based on the evidence presented it can be seen that AMISOM has not only failed to navigate inter-clan politics and violence effectively but has by its presence at times worsened these political dynamics and the violence associated therewith.t.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The main research question that this thesis has aimed to address is whether the AU has succeeded in promoting human security through its intervention in the case of Somalia, and broader lessons that can be drawn from this case study. The preceding chapters have outlined case study evidence and secondary qualitative data that provides insight into answering the abovementioned question. This section will briefly discuss the key findings of the study, linking these back to the literature and conceptual framework developed in earlier chapters for assessing the AU as a human security actor. It will further seek to make recommendations on areas of study that can be pursued.

6.1. Summary of Key Findings

How has the AMISOMs mandate from 2007-2017 measured and defined the success of the mission?

Since the inception of AMISOM, the mission's primary objectives have been to protect the Somali state-building process as a means of restoring peace and security to the conflict-afflicted nation. Its successes have been closely associated with helping to consolidate the TFG in Mogadishu, expanding the government's control over the geographical territory of Somalia and eliminating the state's main opponent, Al-Shabaab. The mission however transformed over time, and while its initial state-centric purpose remained central to its objectives, AMISOM gradually embraced a more multidimensional approach to peace and security. It did this by adopting a mission-wide PoC in 2013 once the mission had gained both a more solidified foothold in Somalia and become better capacitated. This reflected a broader desire to incorporate and align the mission with the human security principles and policies adopted by the AU. However, despite these pro-human security adjustments, the majority of the mission's resources and strategic capabilities were directed towards eliminating Al-Shabaab. Likewise, the mission's behaviour was impacted by changes in its advances of losses against the group, rather than by principled actions to prioritise the protection of civilians. This became most evident during the surge period (2011-2014) when massive advances in AMISOMs push to regain territories taken by Al-Shabaab also exposed the deficiencies in the mission's considerations for the social and political threats facing civilians. Furthermore, even though AMISOM had played a key part in protecting and supporting the central government from a military perspective, the AU nonetheless failed to position itself effectively within the broader political settlement and process, rather deferring to other international entities to take on this role within the first 10 years of its deployment. This shows that the way AMISOMs success was measured did not fully align with the security needs of the Somali people.

In what ways has AMISOM explicitly attempted to account, limit and address human insecurity through its practices?

While initially being limited to combat in scope and focus, AMISOM showed reflectiveness in its ability to reassess its actions according to developments on the ground. The mission was deployed into a chaotic environment where rampant human insecurity was already commonplace as most civilians navigated threats posed by warlord militias, a loss of law and order as well as the heavy-handedness of Ethiopian and government forces. While resource and capacity constraints once again limited AMISOMs impact on human security within the first years of deployment, it nevertheless created the conditions that allowed ENDF forces to withdraw, thereby making it the sole African intervening actor. Once it was more established the mission turned to reflect more deeply on the impact of its behaviour on civilians and took precautionary measures to reduce its role in human insecurity, as evidenced by the adoption of the "Avoid, Attribute, Amend" Indirect Fire Policy and the establishment of the CCTARC between 2011 to 2015. The mission also reprioritised its largely neglected Civilian Component during this time, showing its desire to embrace a more multidimensional vision of security. Yet despite these innovations, the operationalisation of these various mechanisms was not fully realised, due in part to issues of command-and-control and a lack of political will among contributing member states to internalise the PoC principles of the AU. These abovementioned findings thus suggest that AMISOMs main deficiencies stemmed from issues at an institutional level in the way that the AU approaches peace and security in general. In short, the organisation's reliance on ad hoc troop-contributing countries remains problematic for the human security impact for AU-led missions, one that the AU has not sufficiently addressed.

How AMISOMs presence and relationship to key actors in the Somali conflict impacted social and political drivers of human insecurity in the country?

Based on the evidence and analysis presented in this study it can be concluded that one of the primary weaknesses of AMISOM has been its inability to identify and account for its role in shaping the outcome of the conflict through its relationship with key domestic actors. These relationships have playing contributed to the perpetuation of "pathologies of violence" as highlighted in the literature, with severe consequences for the security and well-being of civilians. The first relationship that this study highlighted was between AMISOM and its primary opponent in the conflict, Al-Shabaab. Evidence has been presented to suggest that contrary to simplistic and dichotomous narratives that have been employed to justify an aggressive position in eliminating Al-Shabaab, the group's existence is linked to political dynamics that pre-date AMISOMs arrival in the country. The antagonism between

the TFG and its allies, and the ICU and its allies which started in the early 2000s should be viewed as part of understanding the rise and persistence of Al-Shabaab. The group should be viewed as a reactionary phenomenon in light of the political marginalisation of Islamic elites in Somalia, at the behest of foreign interests. As such the intervention by AMISOM failed to recognise its own role in further embracing the "war on terror" narrative and posture that initially spawned the rise of Al-Shabaab. The mission's increasingly aggressive stance against the group further caused shifts in Al-Shabaab's own behaviour in ways that ultimately proved most detrimental to the security of civilians in both TFG/FSG-held and newly liberated territories. Unlike in AU-led missions prior to AMISOM, like those in Sudan and Burundi, the case of Al-Shabaab's insurgency was treated differently. Ever since the time of the ICUs defeat Islamist elites were not recognised as stakeholders to engage or seek peace with but rather as an illegitimate opponent to eliminate.

The way AMISOM positioned itself in relation to Al-Shabaab was further informed by the mission's relationship to the TFG/FGS state. This relationship closely reflects the problem of elite bargains and extraversion highlighted in the literature. The TFG/FGS was given implicit legitimacy and power by virtue of the support it received from AMISOM. This was despite the fact that, as has been shown in this study, the TFG/FGS lacked local popular legitimacy in many parts of south-central Somalia as well as the capacity or governance capability to unilaterally expert its authority beyond a select number of urban centres. This had several implications for the human security of civilians, exposing them to primarily indirect forms of violence, as conceived in Galtung's theory of peace. These indirect forms of violence manifest at an institutional level and include threats posed by an increasingly repressive Somalian state as well as the inability of the central state to provide local governance, law and order in recaptured territories. In these cases, AMISOM's militarised approach to state-building and emphasis on expanding the reach of an ill-equipped and ill-capacitated government failed to account for the implications this would have on the lives of civilians that come under the rule of such a regime. The AUs lack of consideration for the importance of a workable political settlement in ensuing long-term security for ordinary Somalis shows the organisation's proclivity for short-term solutions and conveys that its approach remains embryonic in this regard.

Finally, this study has presented the central role that clan politics played at both a local and national level in the political dynamics driving conflict in Somalia. In this regard, evidence suggests the AU has not reflected critically on how AMISOM positioned itself in relation to the clan-based society. Again, the repressive consequences of the clan-based 4.5 Formula, which AMISOM played a key role

in enabling during the 2012 and 2016 selection processes, further calls into question the efficacy of the state that AMISOMs ongoing protection helped to build. While the "government by election" approach was deemed necessary by national, regional and international elites, it has also created a situation in which the FSG has no incentive to engage in pro-democratic reforms, weaponizing narratives around the threat of Al-Shabaab to delay these. The clan-based nature of the 4.5 Formula has also further politicised the issue of clan identity, making its persistence a threat to peace and security in Somalia, where clan conflict has been a major driver of human insecurity. In addition, AMISOM remained uncritical of the ways in which the mission's relationship with clans on the ground influenced the behaviour of these actors in reactive ways. This further highlights issues of extraversion and hybridity as mentioned in the literature and an overall lack of engagement with stakeholders on the ground. As a result, AMISOM contributed to fuelling clan animosities by creating a perceived zero-sum dynamic in the eyes of clan elites. By supporting some clans over others, in the hope of fighting Al-Shabaab, the narrow focus of the mission did not reflect on the nuances of how such support might be perceived by local actors. This has driven some clans to support Al-Shabaab, withhold support for the mission or even behave in a retaliatory manner, increasing the threat posed to civilians by cycles of inter-clan violence.

6.2. Recommendations

The findings highlighted above show that the AU through AMISOM has shaped the Somali conflict in both positive and negative ways. The mission's alignment with the human security aspirations of the AU in Somalia between 2007-2017 was not consistent. The following recommendations can be made to address the challenges highlighted in this study:

Deconstructing the war on terror narrative – The AU must think critically about its approach to radical Islamist insurgency, not only in the case of Somalia but in other parts of the continent where the problem persists. It is crucial to recognise the social, cultural and historical factors that drive the emergence and perpetuation of these groups and allow them to pose such a threat to civilians. This requires further engagement with the growing literature that exists on the issue. The degrade-and-destroy policy, which has been exhibited in the case of AMISOM, ultimately has little impact in addressing the root causes of violence, and can at times have negative consequences due to dualistic narratives about the "illegitimate other" and the perpetuation of pathologies of violence.

Partners of Peace – The propensity to view states as the preferred partner for peace, without recognition of the multiplicity of competing sites of authority or the potentially problematic nature of state-centrism can harm the prospects of long-term peace and security. There is a need to engage in a more inclusive political dialogue, not only with national elites but with all stakeholders, as shown in the case of Somali society. This includes including business, civil society, clans and moderates among the Islamic elites that are open to negotiation. This must be done with the aim of overcoming exclusionary political systems such as the 4.5 Formula Somali government and moving towards workable political settlements that prioritise citizens.

Good governance – In order to embody a more comprehensive and multidimensional approach to security, which can benefit civilians most of all, local governance must be prioritised. The AU must do more to employ its institutional mechanisms to ensure inclusive governance processes in areas where fighting has ended. This requires that mission's like AMISOM have a much more well-equipped and funded Civilian Component that can assess and advise on issues of local governance, human rights etc. on the ground. This also requires a more systematic way of engaging with various social groups within conflict such as clans, to better manage expectations and behaviour in response to interventions.

Justice & Reconciliation – As argued in the literature, perceptions of justice or injustice play a key role in the process of reconciliation necessary to address the root socio-cultural divisions that drive conflict and endanger human security. The study of Somalia in this thesis has supported this point, showing the need to address divisions between clan groups, ideological groups and between the state and citizens. In order to be more effective in this regard, the AU must integrate issues of social, economic and cultural justice more deeply into its interventions and response to conflict. This can be done by continuing to push for the practical implementation of innovations like the AU Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) in AU-led or AU-supported interventions.

Promoting an independent APSA – The AU must seek to make progress towards further strengthening its institutional innovations like the African Standby Force and other similar configurations that exist at the level of the Regional Economic Communities. This will allow for a more proactive response to conflict. This will further reduce to organisation's dependency on inconsistent third-party force contributions while allowing for better training, monitoring and accountability for troop deployments in line with the human security aspirations of the organisation.

6.3. Conclusion

The AU has been an increasingly prominent actor in peace and security on the African continent. Since 2002 the organisation has attempted to develop its own approaches to conflict and interventionism. This thesis has attempted to shed light on the efficacy of some of these efforts by looking at the case of the AU-led intervention to Somalia, with a specific focus on the human security implications of the mission. As mentioned in the literature the AU in many ways remains an organisation-in-the-making. It has played a key role in creating several ambitious policies and declarations, geared towards the promotion of a more human-centred vision of peace and security. Furthermore, the organisation has also endeavoured to create the institutional framework in which these policies could be effectively implemented and has demonstrated its willingness to use these when necessary. The study of the case of Somalia in this thesis has highlighted both successes and shortcomings in the AUs responses. Much of what has been outlined aligns with the critical literature on AU interventionism. The study has shown that while the AUs presence in Somalia did have several noticeable benefits to the security situation for civilians, it was not able to fully and consistently live up to the human security principles and practices outlined in the organisation's policy framework. In addition to this AIMSOM has become a participant in the conflict in Somalia, rather than being a neutral arbiter of peace and security as envisioned by liberal interventionism. This has in some cases shaped AMISOMs role in the conflict in ways that are contrary to the well-being and security of civilians. In conclusion, the AU remains a promising, yet thus far underdeveloped, human security actor in conflict. If the organisation hopes to have a long-term impact in addressing the threats that face the citizens of the continent living in conflict areas it will need to renew its commitments to principled and proactive action. It will furthermore need to afford ontological and practical priority to the security of persons above that of states.

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