An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law

 

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dc.contributor.advisor Kelly, Luke en_ZA
dc.contributor.author Ramalohlanye, Zandile en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned 2014-11-05T03:53:49Z
dc.date.available 2014-11-05T03:53:49Z
dc.date.issued 2013 en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation Ramalohlanye, Z. 2013. An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law. University of Cape Town. en_ZA
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157
dc.description Includes bibliographical references en_ZA
dc.description.abstract Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation. The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and class actions as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a pragmatic solution for cartelisation. en_ZA
dc.language.iso eng en_ZA
dc.title An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law en_ZA
dc.type Master Thesis
uct.type.publication Research en_ZA
uct.type.resource Thesis en_ZA
dc.publisher.institution University of Cape Town
dc.publisher.faculty Faculty of Law en_ZA
dc.publisher.department Department of Commercial Law en_ZA
dc.type.qualificationlevel Masters
dc.type.qualificationname LLM en_ZA
uct.type.filetype Text
uct.type.filetype Image
dc.identifier.apacitation Ramalohlanye, Z. (2013). <i>An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Law ,Department of Commercial Law. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Ramalohlanye, Zandile. <i>"An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Law ,Department of Commercial Law, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Ramalohlanye Z. An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Law ,Department of Commercial Law, 2013 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157 en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Ramalohlanye, Zandile AB - Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 which will be inserted into the Competition Act 89 of 1998, will hold directors/executives criminally liable for infringing s4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. Section 4(1)(b) specifically prohibits firms from engaging in price-fixing, collusive tendering, market allocation which are regarded as egregious forms of activity. The underlying justification for the cartel offence is the protection of consumer welfare and on the other hand to address the under-deterrent nature of monetary administrative penalties in the fight against cartels. In its current form, s73A has several weaknesses which will negatively impact competition enforcement; particularly the leniency policy which is the Commission’s most effective weapon against cartelisation. The emergence of follow-on damages litigation as a legal remedy and class actions as a procedural mechanism in the bread class action, have paved the way for private competition enforcement as a more effective deterrent. The lack of a statutory regulatory framework compelled the courts to develop the common law regarding follow-on damages litigation and class actions. Although the exercise has highlighted the challenges associated with the lack of judicial guidance in developing directives, it has indicated that private competition enforcement is a pragmatic solution for cartelisation. DA - 2013 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2013 T1 - An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law TI - An assessment of the suitability of the criminal cartel offence in South African competition law UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/9157 ER - en_ZA


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