Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios

 

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dc.contributor.advisor Ross, Don en_ZA
dc.contributor.author Wolf, Guy Daniel en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned 2014-10-18T05:57:18Z
dc.date.available 2014-10-18T05:57:18Z
dc.date.issued 2003 en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation Wolf, G. 2003. Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios. University of Cape Town. en_ZA
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8594
dc.description Bibliography: leaves 178-180. en_ZA
dc.description.abstract This thesis contributes to the literature in industrial organization economics on strategic behavior with respect to innovation. In particular, it seeks to extend the applicability of conclusions drawn from a Nash Equilibrium framework in response to the criticisms of Sutton (1991, 1998) through the use of sensitivity analysis. In addition, the focus of the investigation is the link between innovation and persistence of monopoly. The work of Gilbert & Newbery (1982) is used as a foundation for building a new analytical framework for application to innovation games in the traditional 'incumbent-entrant' scenario, but in the absence of the usual restrictive patenting assumption. The analysis of this framework is achieved by justifying an axiomatic definition of the pay-offs to players in various games and then using a computer software program to generate the Nash Equilibrium solution for many hundreds of scenarios. The sensitivity of the N.E. solution to changes in model parameters can then be ascertained. The general conclusion drawn from this approach is that the findings of much of the literature hold only under certain highly restrictive conditions. The investigation shows that barriers to entry are of far more relevance to the identity of the innovator than the characteristics of competition in the market once entry is achieved. It is also demonstrated that the incumbent is more likely to innovate first in an industry that demonstrates a systematically high level of growth. Scenarios of particular unintended risk to social welfare through regulatory attempts at stimulating competition are also identified. en_ZA
dc.language.iso eng en_ZA
dc.subject.other Economics en_ZA
dc.title Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios en_ZA
dc.type Doctoral Thesis
uct.type.publication Research en_ZA
uct.type.resource Thesis en_ZA
dc.publisher.institution University of Cape Town
dc.publisher.faculty Faculty of Commerce en_ZA
dc.publisher.department School of Economics en_ZA
dc.type.qualificationlevel Doctoral
dc.type.qualificationname PhD en_ZA
uct.type.filetype Text
uct.type.filetype Image
dc.identifier.apacitation Wolf, G. D. (2003). <i>Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,School of Economics. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8594 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Wolf, Guy Daniel. <i>"Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,School of Economics, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8594 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Wolf GD. Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,School of Economics, 2003 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8594 en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Wolf, Guy Daniel AB - This thesis contributes to the literature in industrial organization economics on strategic behavior with respect to innovation. In particular, it seeks to extend the applicability of conclusions drawn from a Nash Equilibrium framework in response to the criticisms of Sutton (1991, 1998) through the use of sensitivity analysis. In addition, the focus of the investigation is the link between innovation and persistence of monopoly. The work of Gilbert & Newbery (1982) is used as a foundation for building a new analytical framework for application to innovation games in the traditional 'incumbent-entrant' scenario, but in the absence of the usual restrictive patenting assumption. The analysis of this framework is achieved by justifying an axiomatic definition of the pay-offs to players in various games and then using a computer software program to generate the Nash Equilibrium solution for many hundreds of scenarios. The sensitivity of the N.E. solution to changes in model parameters can then be ascertained. The general conclusion drawn from this approach is that the findings of much of the literature hold only under certain highly restrictive conditions. The investigation shows that barriers to entry are of far more relevance to the identity of the innovator than the characteristics of competition in the market once entry is achieved. It is also demonstrated that the incumbent is more likely to innovate first in an industry that demonstrates a systematically high level of growth. Scenarios of particular unintended risk to social welfare through regulatory attempts at stimulating competition are also identified. DA - 2003 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2003 T1 - Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios TI - Techniques for general modelling of innovation strategies in entrant-incumbent scenarios UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8594 ER - en_ZA


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