An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency

 

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dc.contributor.advisor Roeleveld, Jennifer en_ZA
dc.contributor.author Russell, Bruce en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned 2014-10-17T10:13:00Z
dc.date.available 2014-10-17T10:13:00Z
dc.date.issued 2014 en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation Russell, B. 2014. An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency. University of Cape Town. en_ZA
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8568
dc.description Includes bibliographical references. en_ZA
dc.description.abstract Investor interest in the untapped growth offered by the African continent is increasing dramatically. The South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business Licence regimes, offer the most expansive double tax treaty networks of all African holding company regimes. Therefore, both of these regimes are attractive to international investors wanting to establish a gateway into Africa. Governments have identified the need to share ownership information in respect of corporations so as to curb base erosion and profit shifting and to prevent fiscal losses arising from unintended deliberate abuse of double tax treaty benefits. This dissertation examines whether Africa's two favourable holding company regimes, the South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business Licence, have characteristics and installed measures to ensure the fiscal transparency so desired by the international community at large. The examination commences with a review of features within the Mauritian and South African holding company regimes which perpetuate the concealment of the identities of the owners of these holding companies. Without measures in place to overcome these anonymity features, the Headquarter Company and Global Business Licence corporation regimes would undoubtedly undermine fiscal transparency. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the legal and administrative measures in place to overcome these roadblocks to fiscal transparency. This examination established that sufficient measures are in place to facilitate the recording and maintenance of ownership information for headquarter companies and global business licence corporations. en_ZA
dc.language.iso eng en_ZA
dc.title An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency en_ZA
dc.type Master Thesis
uct.type.publication Research en_ZA
uct.type.resource Thesis en_ZA
dc.publisher.institution University of Cape Town
dc.publisher.faculty Faculty of Commerce en_ZA
dc.publisher.department Department of Finance and Tax en_ZA
dc.type.qualificationlevel Masters
dc.type.qualificationname MCom en_ZA
uct.type.filetype Text
uct.type.filetype Image
dc.identifier.apacitation Russell, B. (2014). <i>An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Department of Finance and Tax. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8568 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Russell, Bruce. <i>"An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Department of Finance and Tax, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8568 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Russell B. An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Department of Finance and Tax, 2014 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8568 en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Russell, Bruce AB - Investor interest in the untapped growth offered by the African continent is increasing dramatically. The South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business Licence regimes, offer the most expansive double tax treaty networks of all African holding company regimes. Therefore, both of these regimes are attractive to international investors wanting to establish a gateway into Africa. Governments have identified the need to share ownership information in respect of corporations so as to curb base erosion and profit shifting and to prevent fiscal losses arising from unintended deliberate abuse of double tax treaty benefits. This dissertation examines whether Africa's two favourable holding company regimes, the South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business Licence, have characteristics and installed measures to ensure the fiscal transparency so desired by the international community at large. The examination commences with a review of features within the Mauritian and South African holding company regimes which perpetuate the concealment of the identities of the owners of these holding companies. Without measures in place to overcome these anonymity features, the Headquarter Company and Global Business Licence corporation regimes would undoubtedly undermine fiscal transparency. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the legal and administrative measures in place to overcome these roadblocks to fiscal transparency. This examination established that sufficient measures are in place to facilitate the recording and maintenance of ownership information for headquarter companies and global business licence corporations. DA - 2014 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 2014 T1 - An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency TI - An investigation into whether the South African and Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may undermine fiscal transparency UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/8568 ER - en_ZA


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