Dignity and the Political Right to Freedom

 

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dc.contributor.author Fagan, Anton
dc.date.accessioned 2018-04-03T11:09:29Z
dc.date.available 2018-04-03T11:09:29Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.citation Fagan, A. (2008). Dignity and the political right to freedom. Acta Juridica: Dignity, freedom and the post-apartheid legal order: the critical jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann, 177-184.
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11427/27742
dc.description.abstract In the case of Ferreira v Levin NO, Justice Laurie Ackermann seemed to make the assumption that the political right to freedom is best explained, and its content therefore best determined, by the fact that all human beings have dignity. That is, he seemed to assume that dignity and the fact that human beings necessarily possess it provide the key to an understanding of the political right to freedom. This is, I think, an assumption made by many. The aim of this essay is to question its validity.
dc.source Acta Juridica
dc.source.uri https://juta.co.za/products/acta-juridica-2016/
dc.title Dignity and the Political Right to Freedom
dc.type Journal Article
dc.date.updated 2016-01-20T09:52:53Z
dc.publisher.institution University of Cape Town
dc.publisher.faculty Faculty of Law en_ZA
dc.publisher.department Department of Public Law en_ZA
uct.type.filetype Text
uct.type.filetype Image


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