A Neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness

Abstract

A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness revolves around the distinction between the subject and objects of consciousness. In contrast to the mainstream of cognitive science, neuropsychoanalysis prioritises the subject. The subject of consciousness is the indispensable page upon which its objects are inscribed. This has implications for our conception of the mental. The subjective being of consciousness is not registered in the classical exteroceptive modalities; it is not a cognitive representation, not a memory trace. Cognitive representations are ‘mental solids,’ embedded within subjective consciousness, and their tangible and visible (etc.) properties are projected onto reality. It is important to recognise that mental solids (e.g. the body-as-object) are no more real than the subjective being they are represented in (the body-as-subject). Moreover, pure subjectivity is not without content or quality. This aspect of consciousness is conventionally described quantitatively as the level of consciousness, ‘wakefulness’. But it feels like something to be awake. The primary modality of this aspect of consciousness is affect. Some implications of this frame of reference are discussed here, in broad brush strokes. This is an electronic version of an article published as Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 173-185. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219635214400032, © World Scientific Publishing Company, http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/jin.