A neo-institutional analysis of opposition structures in the South African Parliament

Master Thesis

1996

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University of Cape Town

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South Africa's negotiated parliamentary system is a hybrid of political institutions based upon different models of democracy. Theoretically, there are two broad models from which South Africa's system draws its characteristics: consociational democracy, and majoritarian democracy. Both models of democracy bestow certain characteristics on the South African system which affect how opposition politics operate within the system. Concern has been raised about the ability of opposition politics to function in, and contribute to, the operation of the South African Parliament. The many consociational characteristics of the South African system may have created opposition structures which are emaciated of their duties, rights and responsibilities. This concern prompted an investigation into the operation of the opposition structures of the South African Parliament. The basis of the neo-Institutional analysis is the premise that the behaviour of actors within a system (in this case, Members of Parliament within Parliament) is shaped by the rules and structure of that system. As such, the opposition behaviour of parties and individuals in the South African Parliament is shaped by the rules and structure of Parliament. This paper first presents the theoretical considerations of a neo-Institutionalist examination. The theory is explored by examining the literature of rational choice theorists as well as Historical Institutionalists. Secondly, an examination is conducted of the different models of democracy-and the attributes which each contribute to the South African system. Within this section, the concept of opposition is developed. The analysis of the South African Parliamentary institutions of opposition is conducted by examining the two basic documents which proscribe the rules of procedure for the institutions of Parliament: the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Standing Rules of the National Assembly. The theoretical expectations of behaviour are checked against the empirical reality of Parliamentary behaviour. This study examines data collected from the Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) regarding individual and party participation in debate, questions and interpellations, committees, and Cabinet. The data support the contention of the analysis that whether it is by virtue of the consociational nature of Cabinet, or the over-representation of smaller parties in National Assembly debate, opposition politics are an important part of the Parliamentary process in South Africa.
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Includes bibliography.

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