Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism

 

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Shutte, Augustine en_ZA
dc.contributor.author Williamson, Francis Xavier en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned 2016-02-22T07:13:36Z
dc.date.available 2016-02-22T07:13:36Z
dc.date.issued 1988 en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation Williamson, F. 1988. Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism. University of Cape Town. en_ZA
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153
dc.description Bibliography: pages 136-144. en_ZA
dc.description.abstract This thesis is an attempt to defend explanatory incompatibilism, the view that mechanistic and intentional explanations of behaviour are incompatible, against various sorts of objections which come in the form of rival compatibilist theories. In the first chapter the author outlines the prima facie case for explanatory incompatibilism. This prima facie case is then bolstered by a discussion of explanation in general, conditions of compatibility for different explanations of the same phenomenon, and then a more rigorous account of mechanistic and intentional explanations which allows for a formal presentation of an argument for their incompatibility. Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss some of the combatibilist theories which have been advanced. Chapter Two involves a discussion of the "Double-Language" version of compatibilism as advocated by Ryle and Melden. This version is rejected for two main reasons: (1) it fails to keep the two sorts of explanation sufficiently apart so as to render them compatible, and (2) it fails to show that intentional explanations are not a species of causal explanation. Chapter Three attempts to deal with the "Instrumentalist" version of compatibilism as advanced by Daniel Dennett. This is rejected because it fails to provide a rich enough account of rational action and it also leads to epiphenomenalism. In Chapter Four the author discusses the "Physicalist" approach to the question of compatibility as advocated by Alvin Goldman and Donald Davidson. But this version of compatibilism is found to be wanting because it also leads to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. Chapter Five, the conclusion, summarises the basic argument and attempts to develop the author's own account of what the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action are. This is found to involve· three main elements: physical indeterminism, intentional intelligibility, and then something like the concept of agent-causation. In the course of this account there is a brief discussion of the problem of other minds and an argument against the desire-belief model of action and its explanation based on its inability to cope with the problem of deviant causal chains. It is concluded that mechanistic and intentional explanations are indeed incompatible and something is said about the broad metaphysical view which is required to accommodate this fact. en_ZA
dc.language.iso eng en_ZA
dc.subject.other Mechanism (Philosophy) en_ZA
dc.subject.other Intentionality (Philosophy) en_ZA
dc.subject.other Agent (Philosophy) en_ZA
dc.title Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism en_ZA
dc.type Master Thesis
uct.type.publication Research en_ZA
uct.type.resource Thesis en_ZA
dc.publisher.institution University of Cape Town
dc.publisher.faculty Faculty of Humanities en_ZA
dc.publisher.department Department of Philosophy en_ZA
dc.type.qualificationlevel Masters
dc.type.qualificationname MA en_ZA
uct.type.filetype Text
uct.type.filetype Image
dc.identifier.apacitation Williamson, F. X. (1988). <i>Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Williamson, Francis Xavier. <i>"Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Williamson FX. Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1988 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153 en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Williamson, Francis Xavier AB - This thesis is an attempt to defend explanatory incompatibilism, the view that mechanistic and intentional explanations of behaviour are incompatible, against various sorts of objections which come in the form of rival compatibilist theories. In the first chapter the author outlines the prima facie case for explanatory incompatibilism. This prima facie case is then bolstered by a discussion of explanation in general, conditions of compatibility for different explanations of the same phenomenon, and then a more rigorous account of mechanistic and intentional explanations which allows for a formal presentation of an argument for their incompatibility. Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss some of the combatibilist theories which have been advanced. Chapter Two involves a discussion of the "Double-Language" version of compatibilism as advocated by Ryle and Melden. This version is rejected for two main reasons: (1) it fails to keep the two sorts of explanation sufficiently apart so as to render them compatible, and (2) it fails to show that intentional explanations are not a species of causal explanation. Chapter Three attempts to deal with the "Instrumentalist" version of compatibilism as advanced by Daniel Dennett. This is rejected because it fails to provide a rich enough account of rational action and it also leads to epiphenomenalism. In Chapter Four the author discusses the "Physicalist" approach to the question of compatibility as advocated by Alvin Goldman and Donald Davidson. But this version of compatibilism is found to be wanting because it also leads to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. Chapter Five, the conclusion, summarises the basic argument and attempts to develop the author's own account of what the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action are. This is found to involve· three main elements: physical indeterminism, intentional intelligibility, and then something like the concept of agent-causation. In the course of this account there is a brief discussion of the problem of other minds and an argument against the desire-belief model of action and its explanation based on its inability to cope with the problem of deviant causal chains. It is concluded that mechanistic and intentional explanations are indeed incompatible and something is said about the broad metaphysical view which is required to accommodate this fact. DA - 1988 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 1988 T1 - Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism TI - Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153 ER - en_ZA


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record