Are the current Zambian constitutional provisions sufficient in preventing abuse of power by the executive organ of government?

Master Thesis

2015

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University of Cape Town

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This paper discusses reasons why democratic governance cannot be attained by the Zambian government without deliberate commitment to the maintenance of values and principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law. Zambia prides itself to be a democratic and peaceful country. However, accountability, openness and responsiveness to the needs of citizens has been a challenge despite this great record, which has come as a result of free, fair and peaceful elections recorded consecutively since Zambia became a multi-party democracy. The partial fusion of the Executive and Legislative organs of government ably qualified by provisions of the current Constitution, makes it difficult to hold government accountable by the governed. Consequently, presidential appointment of Cabinet Ministers from Parliament equally weakens legislative ability of checking and balancing powers of the Executive. Moreover, appointment of judges by the President is another factor that punches holes in judicial independence and injures the last line of defence. It is as such imperative that the colossal presidential powers are reduced to allow a flourishing democratic society. In the view that the current Constitution does not have adequate provisions to prevent abuse of power by the Executive; this thesis has made recommendations for the Constitution to be amended to provide effective ways of balancing power between the three arms of government. This will inevitably create an environment of mutual accountability in government and construct a platform where the electorate could question irregular administrative actions.
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