Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings

 

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dc.contributor.advisor Shutte, M F N en_ZA
dc.contributor.author Giddy, J P en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned 2015-07-14T08:39:57Z
dc.date.available 2015-07-14T08:39:57Z
dc.date.issued 1994 en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation Giddy, J. 1994. Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings. University of Cape Town. en_ZA
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414
dc.description Bibliography: p. 175-179. en_ZA
dc.description.abstract It is argued in this thesis that much modem and contemporary moral philosophy has been subjectivist, and that this is largely due to the theory of knowledge that has accompanied the increasing dominance of modem science in the determination of our thought-patterns. The expansion of standards of rational enquiry beyond the confines of empiricism, in the way that B.Lonergan has done, is a necessary part of any adequate contemporary restatement of ethical naturalism. Two different approaches to the Aristotelian tradition in ethics are discussed: in the one judgments of value are based on a particular human psychology; in the other they are related to the standards of excellence associated with social roles. Two contemporary writers - P. Simpson and A. Macintyre respectively - are taken as representative of these approaches. Neither account, it is argued, is fully successful: the metaphysical psychology of Simpson fails to take into account variations in social and cultural contexts; while the communitarianism of Macintyre remains to some extent unjustified. The basis for a more adequate defence of ethical naturalism is given in Lonergan's account of the normative structure of human self-determination. Two further writers are used to develop this argument. H.Meynell argues that morality is largely a matter of promoting the happiness not just of oneself and one's group, but of people in general, and that this can be objectively specified. R. Johann contends that there is a further necessary condition for moral goodness, viz. the commitment to the realisation of personal community. This is justified, I argue by way of conclusion, because human persons are radically dependent on a certain kind of influence of other persons for the development of their capacity for self- determination. en_ZA
dc.language.iso eng en_ZA
dc.subject.other Philosophy en_ZA
dc.title Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings en_ZA
dc.type Doctoral Thesis
uct.type.publication Research en_ZA
uct.type.resource Thesis en_ZA
dc.publisher.institution University of Cape Town
dc.publisher.faculty Faculty of Humanities en_ZA
dc.publisher.department Department of Philosophy en_ZA
dc.type.qualificationlevel Doctoral
dc.type.qualificationname PhD en_ZA
uct.type.filetype Text
uct.type.filetype Image
dc.identifier.apacitation Giddy, J. P. (1994). <i>Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings</i>. (Thesis). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Giddy, J P. <i>"Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings."</i> Thesis., University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Giddy JP. Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings. [Thesis]. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Humanities ,Department of Philosophy, 1994 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414 en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Thesis / Dissertation AU - Giddy, J P AB - It is argued in this thesis that much modem and contemporary moral philosophy has been subjectivist, and that this is largely due to the theory of knowledge that has accompanied the increasing dominance of modem science in the determination of our thought-patterns. The expansion of standards of rational enquiry beyond the confines of empiricism, in the way that B.Lonergan has done, is a necessary part of any adequate contemporary restatement of ethical naturalism. Two different approaches to the Aristotelian tradition in ethics are discussed: in the one judgments of value are based on a particular human psychology; in the other they are related to the standards of excellence associated with social roles. Two contemporary writers - P. Simpson and A. Macintyre respectively - are taken as representative of these approaches. Neither account, it is argued, is fully successful: the metaphysical psychology of Simpson fails to take into account variations in social and cultural contexts; while the communitarianism of Macintyre remains to some extent unjustified. The basis for a more adequate defence of ethical naturalism is given in Lonergan's account of the normative structure of human self-determination. Two further writers are used to develop this argument. H.Meynell argues that morality is largely a matter of promoting the happiness not just of oneself and one's group, but of people in general, and that this can be objectively specified. R. Johann contends that there is a further necessary condition for moral goodness, viz. the commitment to the realisation of personal community. This is justified, I argue by way of conclusion, because human persons are radically dependent on a certain kind of influence of other persons for the development of their capacity for self- determination. DA - 1994 DB - OpenUCT DP - University of Cape Town LK - https://open.uct.ac.za PB - University of Cape Town PY - 1994 T1 - Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings TI - Ethics and human nature : a reconsideration of ethical naturalism in contemporary thomist writings UR - http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13414 ER - en_ZA


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