Why Depression Feels Bad

Abstract

We believe that conscious mental phenomena (such as feelings) are not epiphenomenal to the workings of the brain. Feelings evolved for good biological reasons; they make specific, concrete contributions to brain functioning. Notwithstanding all the philosophical complexities, therefore, the non-conscious/conscious interactions that are the focus of this book are, in our view, causal interactions. To marginalize consciousness in relation to what is ultimately a dualistic scientific understanding of how the brain works is likely to lead us badly astray. We illustrate this view by trying to address the question: why does depression feel bad?

This is the postscript of a book chapter. The final version has been published in: "New Horizons in the Neuroscience of Consciousness" by Prof. Dr. Elaine K. Perry et al. (2010). Published by John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia.