Browsing by Subject "Nuclear Engineering"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    Eskom's employees perception on nuclear power in accordance with the IRP 2010 Nuclear Energy Plan
    (2017) Chutri, Mithun; Gaunt, C Trevor
    The future role of nuclear power in global sustainable development, and particularly in the development of industrialising countries is contentious; the debate is often highly emotive. The Republic of South Africa's (RSA) progress towards its largest nuclear procurement program is taking place in the midst of changes within the African National Congress (ANC) ruling party, an increase in global demand for uranium and growing energy needs within South Africa. Major nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl or Fukushima have set nuclear power plant security on top of the public agenda. The internalisation of governance through the creation of responsible eco-citizenship is a primary technique to screen perceived risk, which works through the course of public participation. Participation however, must include those that drive the objectives within the nuclear context. Eskom's Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (KNPS) has a workforce of more than 2000 employees. In 2016, the Department of Energy (DOE) had decided that Africa's leading power utility will be the owner operator and procurer of the planned 9.6 Gigawatts (GW) (e) nuclear fleet that is set out in the IRP2010 report. The perceptual impact of this workforce that keeps the country's economic lifeblood moving is often understated, which was the focus of this study. This study had a distinct focus on what Eskom employee's perceptions are with respect to the IRP2010 nuclear new build program. It was limited to the Western Cape Province and included views from divisions that may be involved in the realisation of the nuclear project. It is unique in its context, as very little has been documented on employee perception within RSA's nuclear industry. It is comparative to a public perception survey, which had a distinct focus on nuclear risk. The public's greatest concerns were noted to be corruption, project mismanagement, excessive cost and lack of trust in stakeholders. The outcome of this study discovered similarities with the public perception survey, however here within nuclear safety and compliance to business best practice were greater significant factors. Most respondents had sufficient knowledge and support for RSA's nuclear plans set out in the IRP reports. Dimensions of how perception was created were voted as being heavily dependent on the leadership within the organisation. With this in mind, Eskom employees have indicated that they are more likely to influence the public if they have their leadership's support, and have gone as far as selecting nuclear power over renewable energy to drive towards the country's commitment towards low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. So while there may be shades of perceptual similarities between the public and Eskom employees, fundamentally this study revealed that these two bodies do not have the same perception on nuclear power. The study revealed that if Eskom employee's nuclear perception is disregarded and mismanaged, it may delay the realisation of the nuclear new build program in line with IRP 2010 timelines. This is mainly due to the concern of adherence to good corporate governance by Eskom's leadership.
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    Legal consideratios in developing and implementing the 2018 draft intergrated resources plan (IRP): a case study of the nuclear sector
    (2019) Kenny, Fadeelah; Glazewski, Jan
    The 2018 Draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) published by the Department of Energy (DoE) of South Africa informs the government’s electricity demand projections until 2050. They are published under the authority of the Electricity Regulation Act (ERA) of 2006. The Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity of 2009 stems from the ERA. The draft IRP must, however, be seen in the context of previous IRPs, and policy considerations outlined in Chapter 2. The draft IRP 2018 sets out to estimate the generating capacity requirements and allocates how much of each energy technology will be commissioned during the projection window. The rollout of the nuclear component of the IRP has had many challenges since the first original IRP was published in 2010. Apart from varied policy jockeying regarding the various energy sectors in South Africa (SA), court cases and other factors, allegations of corruption and maladministration have caused major delays in the envisaged nuclear rollout. This dissertation identifies the legal measures that Eskom as the licence holder and various government entities need to comply with to successfully roll out the nuclear component of the draft IRP 2018. It will describe the applicable legislation, processes and illustrative court cases. In so doing the work will provide guidance on the steps to follow to ensure that the nuclear rollout complies with the legal and policy framework of SA and gets delivered successfully and efficiently. The latest draft IRP 2018 which was published for public comments in the Government Gazette dramatically revises the forecast for SA’s energy demand downwards from a projection of 525 Terawatt hours (TWh) of power in 2050 to 430 TWh for the most optimistic ‘high’ scenario. This revision is the main reason the new IRP no longer calls for massive new coal plants and has relegated nuclear to specific scenarios instead of the ‘base case’. The carbon budget (IRP6) and carbon budget plus market-linked gas price (IRP7) scenarios commission nuclear capacity of 4200 megawatts (MW) and 5600 MW respectively for the period 2031-2040. IRP 6 and 7 have 6 per cent (6.3GW) and 7 per cent (7.35 GW) nuclear of 105 Gigawatt (GW) of installed capacity respectively, up from the 3 per cent (1830 MW) of Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant (Koeberg NPP). For the period 2041 – 2050, IRPs 6 and 7 have 6 per cent (7.56 GW) and 8 per cent (10.08 GW) nuclear of 126 GW of installed capacity respectively. The dissertation identifies the legal requirements and issues and makes recommendations on the steps to be followed to enable a legally sound nuclear rollout for SA.
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    A regulatory assessment of the Build-Own-Operate model for New Nuclear Build in South Africa
    (2017) Essa, Fagmie; Oaker, Bradley
    Governments pursue New Nuclear Build (NNB) projects for different strategic reasons. Many countries are not able to devise a funding model for the excessive costs of a NNB project nor do they have the local skills to construct, operate and maintain a NPP. South Africa's Integrated Resource Plan 2016 indicates that the base case scenario includes a target date of 2037 for the first unit of a NNB programme. This date moves to 2026 when the carbon budget is included in the forecast. The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) has limited experience in licensing NNB programs as the country's only other commercially operating nuclear power plant was completed in 1984. The Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model is being promoted by Russia as an option to finance, design, supply most of the equipment for, construct and operate, a NPP. The first of this model is being executed at Akkuyu in Turkey. South Africa and specifically the NNR will face many challenges should it pursue the Build-Own- Operate model for its New Nuclear Build programme, given this model's novel and complex demands. This study has concluded that the Nuclear Energy Policy does not support an entity other than Eskom (the South African electricity utility) from owning and operating any new NPP in South Africa. The NNR does not presently have the resources to be able to service a NBB program but should be able to adapt to the increased demands of a NNB programme. The minister responsible for the promotion of nuclear energy also provides oversight of the NNR. This conflict of interest does not appear to have affected NNR decisions thus far; however, a NNB programme will exert undue pressure on all stakeholders which could change the relationship between the NNR and its minister. The National Nuclear Regulator Act (NNRA) needs to be enhanced to change this reporting structure while also enhancing the independence of the NNR. Should the Hinkley Point C model be followed in South Africa, the appointment of a design authority within the licensee which effectively creates an additional layer of verification should warrant strong consideration for the South African NNB model. The Akkuyu BOO model challenges the principles of the Intelligent Customer concept. Should the Akkuyu BOO model be followed, the NNR would require the licensee to show that independent verification is in place. Roles and responsibilities should be clearly described and understood by all stakeholders. The onus remains with the licensee to prove Intelligent Customer capability.