Browsing by Author "Vorster, Shaun"

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    Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road from Bali
    (Taylor & Francis, 2007) Winkler, Harald; Vorster, Shaun
    What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame.
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    Mitigating climate change through carbon pricing: An emerging policy debate in South Africa
    (Taylor and Francis, 2011) Vorster, Shaun; Winkler, Harald; Jooste, Meagan
    South Africa is considering how best to contribute its fair share to the global effort to mitigate climate change. The domestic policy debate is characterized by a vibrant engagement involving government, business, labour and civil society. The policy option with greatest potential for reducing emissions is carbon pricing through a carbon tax or emissions’ trading scheme. The welfare and development impacts need to be carefully considered. The broader debate considers economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, welfare impacts, competitiveness impacts, design implications given market concentration, and complexity and transaction costs. This article examines the challenges of pricing carbon given considerations of political economy, such as high unemployment, poverty and lack of access to basic services. The article shows a preference emerging for a carbon tax. A carbon tax does not create equivalent certainty with respect to environmental outcomes, but the tax level can be adjusted to achieve desired emissions reductions. Where the policy priority is price stability a tax is advantageous, providing long-term policy signals to investors, as well as price transparency, fiscal revenue stability, economy-wide coverage of emissions and administrative efficiency. However, three implementation issues need clarity: limiting welfare impacts on poor households; the feasibility of a hybrid model; and integrating carbon pricing with the broader transition to a low-carbon economy.
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    Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries
    (Taylor & Francis, 2009) Winkler, Harald; Vorster, Shaun; Marquard, Andrew
    A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI’s national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between –52% and –69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic –35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.