Browsing by Author "Shutte, Augustine"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Open Access
    A critical analysis of the concept 'care' in the practice and discourse of nursing
    (1999) Haegert, Sandy; Shutte, Augustine; Kyriacos, Una
    This research sought to answer the question: " What meanings has the nursing profession given to the concept 'caring'"? This was achieved by means of a three-fold approach: interpretive phenomenology combined with linguistic analysis [Wittgenstein's as interpreted by Bowden], and, a conceptual philosophical framework. Narratives, from registered nurses working in hospices and oncology/haematology units, were obtained and analyzed through juxtaposing them with selected theorists, and each other, to construct 'family resemblances' and 'layers of understanding'. Their meanings, obtained by requesting them to draw on memories of being cared-for or caring, resulted in descriptive understandings of their use of the concept 'care'; and, to a relational ethic enabling the construal of a normative ethic: one allegedly embedded in the practice and experience of these practitioners. The findings show it is not possible to give a simple definition to explain the concept 'caring'. The meanings, contained in the collected narratives, reveal strong 'family resemblances' in their usage of the term, verifying the Wittgensteinian observation: that no single meaning, no singular essence captures every cultural, individualized use of the term. The findings pointed to these 'meanings' being 'private' but not in the sense of being 'false'. Within the research one becomes aware that the term 'care' is not an ethical notion. To be ethical care is dependent upon context and responsible attitudes and actions. The discourses comprise the personal 'passion', an ethical ideal, held by most respondents; but, their ideal was not always the caring they were enabled to give. Institutionalized care whether hospice or not fell below the ideal because of socio-economic constraints and concerns. The original thesis question was from O'Malley: "[W]hether in encounter man himself makes his own meaning or is made by the meaning made of and for him ...". This research led to the assertion that the reality of the practice setting shapes the 'public' meaning of caring these practitioners act upon, but, they shape their own 'private' meanings and implement it on a micro level. It is at the macro-level of care/caring that there should also be concern. Although not true of all respondents, a possible reason for this less-than-ideal-type caring is the possibility that in institutions there are nurses who for some reason(s) fail to 'grow' - to develop in a fully integrated way that includes the freedom to exercise one's spirituality and to become morally caring not merely on a micro [one-to-one] basis but on a macro level [whole unit basis].
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Open Access
    Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism
    (1988) Williamson, Francis Xavier; Shutte, Augustine
    This thesis is an attempt to defend explanatory incompatibilism, the view that mechanistic and intentional explanations of behaviour are incompatible, against various sorts of objections which come in the form of rival compatibilist theories. In the first chapter the author outlines the prima facie case for explanatory incompatibilism. This prima facie case is then bolstered by a discussion of explanation in general, conditions of compatibility for different explanations of the same phenomenon, and then a more rigorous account of mechanistic and intentional explanations which allows for a formal presentation of an argument for their incompatibility. Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss some of the combatibilist theories which have been advanced. Chapter Two involves a discussion of the "Double-Language" version of compatibilism as advocated by Ryle and Melden. This version is rejected for two main reasons: (1) it fails to keep the two sorts of explanation sufficiently apart so as to render them compatible, and (2) it fails to show that intentional explanations are not a species of causal explanation. Chapter Three attempts to deal with the "Instrumentalist" version of compatibilism as advanced by Daniel Dennett. This is rejected because it fails to provide a rich enough account of rational action and it also leads to epiphenomenalism. In Chapter Four the author discusses the "Physicalist" approach to the question of compatibility as advocated by Alvin Goldman and Donald Davidson. But this version of compatibilism is found to be wanting because it also leads to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. Chapter Five, the conclusion, summarises the basic argument and attempts to develop the author's own account of what the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action are. This is found to involveĀ· three main elements: physical indeterminism, intentional intelligibility, and then something like the concept of agent-causation. In the course of this account there is a brief discussion of the problem of other minds and an argument against the desire-belief model of action and its explanation based on its inability to cope with the problem of deviant causal chains. It is concluded that mechanistic and intentional explanations are indeed incompatible and something is said about the broad metaphysical view which is required to accommodate this fact.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Open Access
    Should a priest consult a doctor or does faith in God have to rule out faith in man?
    (2005) Kay, Louise; Shutte, Augustine
    Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-46).