

THE CONCEPT OF THE LIVED WORLD
(AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MERLEAU-PONTY)

ELDON WAIT

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P R E F A C E

(i) UNDERSTANDING THE EXPRESSIONS OF MERLEAU-PONTY

The phenomenological philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, is without doubt an indispensable access to modern European thought, but for the student at least, many of his expressions present intellectual hurdles of an almost unique kind. The power and wealth of his writing ensures that he always 'strikes a cord', but in expounding this philosophy, one finds it difficult to do much more than quote his expressions verbatim.

Generally even commentaries on the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty are liberally sprinkled with his expressions. We are not suggesting that it will ever be possible to separate the meaning of his philosophy from his expressions, but we are suggesting that there is a danger of these expressions becoming detached from their meaning foundation, so that they will tend to be used in an automatic and detached way. It is not so much that Merleau-Ponty's expressions are misunderstood, but rather that there is a tendency to superficialize their meaning through their being used to solve traditional problems. To speak about a 'body-consciousness' or 'being-in-the-world' is not necessarily to avoid a superficial kind of chatting, or to avoid providing merely verbal solutions to real problems.

Merleau-Ponty's expressions are deliberately opaque, and there is no possibility of clarifying them or of reducing them to pure meanings, nevertheless, this does not imply that these expressions must be regarded as the philosophical equivalent of a 'holy mystery', defying all thought. Merleau-Ponty's expressions are not significant in the sense that they can never be grasped in pure thought, but rather in their power to motivate new approaches and new expressions, and to bring about a liberation from restricting metaphysics. But to what extent has this taken place,

to what extent have Merleau-Ponty's expressions become institutionalized and his philosophy become a doctrine, instead of a style of thinking?

There would seem to be at least two general approaches to his philosophy which lead to a petrifying of his expressions and ultimately of his philosophy. His expressions are taken either as having no metaphysical relevance, or as having metaphysical relevance. How, for example are we to understand the statement, 'my body is the fabric into which all objects are woven'?¹ We know that Merleau-Ponty is not a metaphysician, and that this statement could consequently not be a metaphysical statement, but does that imply that Merleau-Ponty is only talking about the way in which the body is experienced, and that the statement must be understood as poetic?

Although Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is not based on any metaphysic, it is not neutral to metaphysics. To understand his expressions as allegoric or poetic is not to avoid misconstruing their meaning in terms of a metaphysic. If we interpret expressions like "my body is the fabric into which all objects are woven" as an allegory, what prevents us from retaining our naïve, objective attitude to the body and the world, and to reduce the whole of phenomenology to an allegorical description of the way in which the body and the world is experienced, so that before we have even started to philosophize, there is already a body of muscles and bones and a brain composed of neurons making the entire enterprise possible, so that the 'lived world' is no more than experience in it's raw form, experience which has not yet been refined by the understanding, but which is still confined within a psycho-physiological subject, and consequently has no quarrel with the world of the everyday attitude.

If on the other hand we recognize that these statements are meta-

physically significant how are we to co-ordinate the statement above, with another Merleau-Ponty makes about the body, "my body is my general power of inhabiting all the environments which the world contains"²?

Here reference is generally made to the reduction. Once we have performed a reduction on the body and revealed the 'lived body', we will supposedly see that these two statements are perfectly compatible.

The 'lived world' is taken as the ultimate meaning of all phenomenological descriptions, a new kind of metaphysic or a Platonic world of 'phenomenological forms' which we can ascend or descend to with the aid of the reduction. Merleau-Ponty's expressions are then said to 'strike a cord' because they are making evident, something which has always been there, but not 'explicitely' recognized.

To understand the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty is neither to appreciate his expressions as allegoric, nor is it to silently comprehend an underlying meaning - a metaphysic of all his expressions, because understanding a philosophy is never some 'internal event', to understand is to philosophize. To explain a philosophy is not to express an understanding or a knowing which was already there, but rather to intend or aim at a meaning through the intersubjective body. Just as we need to actually 'look' with both eyes in order to overcome monocular vision, so we overcome metaphysics, not by the passive acceptance of arguments and solutions, but by the active re-creation of a phenomenology. To understand Merleau-Ponty is thus to extend the speaking body so as to aim at a meaning with him. We understand his philosophy not by grasping what he is speaking about, but by speaking with him.

We extend the speaking body not by overcoming once and for all the natural attitude or any other metaphysic, but by actively transcending metaphysics at every point. To perform the reduction and to philosophize are not two distinct operations. The reduction is never

complete and there is no point of view from which I can survey the 'lived world' precisely because the 'lived world' does not transcend metaphysics, but is the transcending of metaphysics. To understand Merleau-Ponty by speaking with him, does not presuppose the acquisition of a certain speaking body but, it is this acquisition itself.

The task we have set ourselves in this thesis is not to interpret or translate Merleau-Ponty's expressions but rather to re-create his philosophy, avoiding as far as possible the actual expressions he used, not because we find any fault with them but because we wish to re-create the conditions under which they can appear in their original urgency and vitality. We must understand Merleau-Ponty by being present at the birth of his philosophy, to experience the philosophy "from the inside".

Our approach must be distinguished from a purely historical or a psychological one. We do not wish to introduce the thought of Merleau-Ponty by an examination of pre-phenomenological thought, nor do we wish to concern ourselves with his personal development which led to the writing of "The Phenomenology of Perception". Our approach is phenomenological. We wish to understand Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology as itself an intentional movement, as the "coming about" of the structure of intentionality, or as we will refer to it, the coming about of the imperfect unity, or the informal essence. Our discussions of the psychological ego and the transcendental ego are important not only as an historical introduction, but because psychologism and transcendentalism are respectively the noetic and noematic poles of this intentional movement.

(ii) INTRODUCTION TO THE NOTION OF AN IMPERFECT UNITY

Let us take as our example a glass of water. The chemical composition of water i.e. H_2O is not actually a perfect unity of all the appearances of water, but it does tend toward being such a perfect unity and for the present we may take it as being such. While the chemical composition never itself appears, it is the ultimate meaning of all appearances. The chemical composition, H_2O , is not itself wet, or liquid or solid, yet it can account for these manifestations. It is a perfect unity because it accords no special status to any of its manifestations. Neither ice, steam or water are any more revealing with respect to the nature of H_2O . While H_2O can never be seen, touched or even used, it can be understood, i.e. grasped by the intellect.

Water as it is for a thirsty man, or as it is in the everyday non-scientific attitude is not a perfect unity of its manifestations. While it is recognised, that ice, steam and water-as-a-liquid are all appearances of water, water-as-a-liquid is the 'standard appearance'. It is taken as a more revealing manifestation of the true nature of water itself. Although water as a liquid is as much an appearance of water as is ice or steam, it is an appearance which permeates the nature of water itself. While water is never reducible to 'wetness' or 'liquidness' it does not absolutely transcend these qualities. Water then, in the everyday attitude is an IMPERFECT UNITY, for while it is always more than its qualities or appearances, it 'looks back' at one particular appearance as the most revealing or as the standard appearance. Such an imperfect unity cannot be grasped either by the mind or the senses while these are held to be distinct.

Let us note that the imperfect unity can only be for an involved

or interested subject, one for whom there is an important difference between ice and water.

We will attempt to construct a phenomenology of experience on the basis of this imperfect unity, or what we will also refer to as the informal essence or the intentional movement. But to what extent is such a project a self-contradictory one? Are we not saying on the one hand that there is no metaphysics, no perfect unity underlying all experience and on the other, asserting that the fundamental structure of all experience is the imperfect unity?

The imperfect unity is not a metaphysical structure, it is rather the cohering of experience. As we move from our discussion of 'Truth and Error' to 'Ontological Intentionality', to 'Constancy' and finally to 'Intersubjectivity', we experience the emergence of this structure of the imperfect unity. Although it is true that we could re-examine 'Ontological Intentionality' in the light of the enhanced understanding of the imperfect unity, brought about in the exposition of 'Intersubjectivity', this is not because this structure was, in its more developed state, already there, implicit in our original discussion of 'Ontological Intentionality', but because as the noematic pole or the sense of the intentional movement which is this thesis, the structure of the imperfect unity is capable of absorbing into itself all previous noematic poles.

I N T R O D U C T I O N
(T H E F O R M A L E S S E N C E)

(i) THE SPIRIT OF RADICAL AUTONOMY

The Renaissance believed itself to be an absolute break with the spirit of Medieval existence. Classical civilization was taken as it's model and it sought to reproduce this mode of existence in itself, a mode of existence which would be in accordance with the true dignity of man, a mode which could be described as nothing less than "the philosophical". This true dignity of man, conceived in terms of his absolute autonomy, would find it's highest expression in a universal and eternal philosophy, unfettered by myths, beliefs and traditions, based purely on the insights of Reason, a philosophy which would be man's absolute self-consciousness.

The irrefutability of such a philosophy, guaranteed by the undeniable light of pure Reason would be the eternal guarantee of man's salvation. Being a core of irrefutable knowledge it will be the key to his liberation from, and his domination of the world, for the 'philosophical' existence would entail not only an autonomy in thought but also a recreation of the entire surrounding human world. The state, society, the arts and sciences would all be reconstructed in accordance with the principles of Reason. Man would at last be master of his fate.

(ii) THE ULTIMATE RATIONALITY OF ALL BEING, PRESUPPOSED
IN MAN'S ABSOLUTE AUTONOMY

This absolute commitment to the light of Reason, to the power of reflection was in fact a belief in the ultimate rationality of all Being,

for if the light of Reason was an absolute light, if the power of reflection was absolute, man would be able to 'distance' himself from all aspects of Being. Nothing of Being would escape his fully reflective apprehension. Even meaninglessness would be apprehended as meaninglessness and would consequently appear as a certain kind of meaning and irrationality would be rational in it's irrationality.

The ultimate rationality of Being would guarantee an eternal and absolute metaphysics which in turn would bring about an endless realm of indubitable and rationally constructed scientific disciplines, each reflecting an aspect of Being and each being totally absorbed into, or deducible from the absolute metaphysics. Furthermore, not only would the content of this universal body of knowledge be built upon the insights of Reason, and it's various branches rationally interrelated, but the infinite task of research would be ordered by a rationally intelligible methodology which would ensure a rational and ordered progress.³

(iii) THE FAILURE TO ARRIVE AT SUCH AN ETERNAL PHILOSOPHY LEADS TO A LOSS OF FAITH IN REASON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CRISIS IN PHILOSOPHY AND EUROPEAN HUMANITY

But this universal and eternal philosophy has never been achieved. Although there have been many attempts to construct systematic philosophies on pure Reason alone, none of these have been compatible. On the other hand the special sciences have had unqualified success in their theoretical and practical endeavours. Nevertheless, in that they continue to bear within themselves the meaning of their original founding as branches of philosophy, they too are affected by this Crisis.

Although the Crisis does not affect their theoretical and practical achievements, it does shake the foundations of the whole meaning of their truth, which ultimately leads to a Crisis of European Humanity itself. This Crisis of philosophy entails the meaninglessness of European Man.⁴

Because of the repeated failure to arrive at a critically unassailable philosophy the new humanity lost the inspiring belief in this ideal and endeavoured to understand why such an eternal philosophy was impossible. For Hume and Kant philosophy becomes a problem for itself.⁵

Skepticism about the possibility of philosophy, led to a collapse in the belief in Reason. The ancient distinction between *epistēmē* and *doxa* was rejected. For Husserl this is no less than a loss in the faith of European Man himself a surrendering of his true nature. For he held that the true nature of European Man does not lie in the fact that he either is or is not rational, but in the fact that he struggles towards rationality. Can we accept that this faith in Reason, this concept of humanity born of the ancient Greek civilization is no more essential to European humanity than any other commitment of any other civilization?

Husserl accepts that the rationalism of the 18th century philosophers was naïve, but he argues that this is no sufficient reason to reject Reason itself. The Irrationalists in their rational considerations and arguments constitute a powerful testament to the irrefutability of Reason.⁶

Husserl will not give up the belief in Reason, and maintains that the failure to arrive at a rigorous and irrefutable philosophy and its true method have been due to an unnoticed naïveté in the concept

of such a philosophy. By an analysis of the motivation of this concept, by an analysis of Galileo's mathematization of nature, Husserl attempts to show the unexamined premise of all 18th century Rationalism, what we wish to call it's preoccupation with the FORMAL ESSENCE.

(iv) THE RATIONALIST CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY IS MOTIVATED BY GALILEO'S MATHEMATIZED WORLD

Although Euclidean geometry had grown into a purely rational totality, resting on axioms and proceeding according to irrefutable arguments, it remained for the ancients a finite closed system, encompassing only finite tasks. With Galileo however, the idea emerges of an infinite totality of ideal shapes. Any conceivable shape could be shown to be deducible from the axioms. The task of the geometer becomes one of bringing to light an infinite realm of rationality and truth which is already there.⁷

Together with this concept of an infinite rational realm went the substitution of geometric space for real space. Geometry for the ancients was the science of pure forms in an ideal space. Real forms and real space were related to their ideal counterparts only as imperfect replicas. With Galileo we find real space surreptitiously being replaced by ideal space so that geometry becomes the science of real space.

This mathematization of space is extended to the whole of nature. The secondary qualities such as colours, textures and sounds are explained as being due to the effect of objects, conceived purely in terms of shape and motion, on the perceiving subject. The 'real world' being the ultimate cause and explanation of the experienced world absorbs the latter

into itself, rendering it purely subjective an object for introspective psychology.

(v) THROUGH THE PROCESS OF BECOMMING A TECHNIQUE SCIENCE LOSES SIGHT OF IT'S MEANING FOUNDATION

The movement from Arithmetic to Algebra was both important in expanding the possibilities of arithmetical thought and dangerous in it's tendency to result in a forgetting of it's own origins. Algebraic thinking is systematic, a priori and free from all actual numbers, numerical relations and laws. Through analytic or arithmetized geometry algebra in turn affects a liberation from all ideal straight lines, circles, triangles and motions. The spatio-temporal actualities of mathematized nature are now transformed into pure algebraic structures.

If the algebraic system was no more than a system of symbols facilitating calculation of a more general nature, it would not be autonomous. The way in which the symbols would be manipulated would depend upon what they were representing. In it's development algebra became a reflective and autonomous science by evolving it's own laws for the manipulation of it's symbols, laws based purely on syntax. The system becomes no more than a technique allowing one to operate with the symbols with the same clarity and ease as one would operate according to the rules of some game like chess or cards. The original thinking which grounds the entire enterprise, giving meaning to the technical process and it's results is left far behind.⁸ The work of the discovering and defining mathematician is always forgotten. Just as the original activity which led to geometry is forgotten, so the

arithmetization of geometry is forgotten.* The mathematical symbols take on the meaning they have by definition, i.e. the meaning they have as members of the system viz. their formal meaning. By becoming autonomous a science becomes formal, and loses sight of the informal essence.

Husserl is not suggesting that such a process of becoming a technique is illegitimate, on the contrary, he concedes that it is imperative for the progress of science, but he does mean to criticise the unreflective use of such a technization. The superficialization of meaning through technization does not affect the results or the progress of the sciences themselves, but it does affect their meaning and it was for Husserl the fundamental factor which misled the rationalist philosophers.

The world in which these philosophers found themselves had already lost the real foundation of it's meaning, it had been turned into a technological model.

(vi) FORMAL THOUGHT IN A THEORY OF ARITHMETIC

The first kind of formalism against which Husserl reacted was the formalism implicit in Frege's "Foundations of Arithmetic". In this work Frege defines the basic concepts of number in such a way as to render arithmetic absolutely autonomous, so that the truth of all number statements are truths of Reason i.e. deducible from the definitions of the numbers.

* e.g. The real triangle and Pythagoras's insight are no longer needed because the length of a Vector is defined in such a way so as to take account of this proof.

A number, according to Frege, is not ascribed to an object or a group of objects, but rather to the concept of the counted objects. To say that Jupiter has eleven moons, is not to be making a statement about Jupiter's moons but rather about the concept, "Moons of Jupiter". This distinction enables Frege to place Arithmetic entirely in the sphere of the conceptual, breaking all links with the real activity of counting objects.

Frege's definition of the concept of number relies heavily on the theory of equivalence. A certain number 'x' can be ascribed to a concept F and a concept G, only if it is always possible to establish a one to one correlation between the objects included under F, and those included under G. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the extension of a concept is the totality of all objects falling under it, we may define the number which is ascribed to the concept F as being the extension of the concept, "having the same number as the concept F". e.g. If the number eleven is ascribed to the concept "Moons of Jupiter", then the concept of this number (the concept of eleven) is defined as being the infinite totality of concepts, each of whose objects can be uniquely co-ordinated with a moon of Jupiter. The concept of a number absorbs into itself all concepts to which that number is ascribed. There are eleven pens on my desk because the concept "pens on my desk" is included under the concept of eleven, and it is included under the concept eleven because each pen can be uniquely co-ordinated with a moon of Jupiter. The question one immediately wishes to ask is "How did the concept 'Moons of Jupiter' become included under the concept of eleven?" Frege's reply would be that while any of the other infinite number of

concepts falling under the concept eleven could replace the concept "Moons of Jupiter" as the standard, they are all included under the concept eleven by definition.

At no stage is a real counting operation ever presupposed. The truth of a number statement is always a truth of Reason, i.e. the statement is deducible from the definition of the concept of the number involved. There are eleven pens on my desk because the concept 'pens on my desk' is presupposed in the concept of eleven.

Although, in his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', Frege does not concern himself with epistemological problems, we can see how his theory belongs to the broader sphere of 18th century Rationalism. Just as the space of the world, for example, was an infinite rational totality, which was already presupposed in the geometric axioms, so for Frege the infinite groups of objects of the world had already been counted, for the results of this calculation was presupposed in the definitions of numbers. Just as the geometric axioms constituted a perfect unity, in that all conceivable shapes and their characteristics could be deduced from them, so the concept of a number is a perfect unity of all the number statements which refer to this number. The concept of eleven for example absorbs absolutely into itself all statements such as, "There are eleven pens on my desk", "Jupiter has eleven moons", so that these statements are no more than manifestations of the concept eleven. This of course implies that they can only be grasped once the concept of eleven has been grasped.

Without resorting to a theory of innate ideas, however, it is impossible to account for our knowledge of numbers, for the concept of a number can only be acquired once everything has been counted, and besides

requiring the intuition of an infinity of concepts, we require concepts of numbers in order to count in the first place.

For Husserl, the important point was that while things are still being counted, numbers have a meaning which enables us to count but which does not presuppose the results of the counting operation. This is the genuine meaning of numbers, the meaning which numbers have for a subject who is actually calculating. In his 'Philosophy of Arithmetic' Husserl attempts to uncover this genuine meaning of a number.

University of Cape Town

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO

(i) THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC

Unlike Frege, Husserl does not wish to define the concept of number for he believes this to be impossible. Only things which have been logically compounded are for him capable of definition. Although he wishes to describe an actual meaning of number he does not intend these descriptions to be concerned with a personal meaning, but rather to uncover the general structure of any subject's intuition of a number.

Husserl believes that an analysis of the concept of number presupposes an analysis of the concept of plurality. The concept of plurality, he maintains, is abstracted from real totalities or aggregations. While the actual objects of these totalities are irrelevant for this particular abstraction, the factor which renders them all objects of a totality is not. This factor Husserl calls "the collective connection". He maintains that there are two fundamental ways in which objects can be related or included in a totality. In the first instance they can be related by virtue of some intrinsic feature such as colour, size or origin, or they may be parts of some whole or even just spatially or temporally related. On the other hand objects may be related purely by virtue of the psychological act which is directed at them, at the same time. The objects are thus related by the psychological act. This relation is observed by reflecting on that act. Any act of presentation, judgement, feeling or volition which involves more than one object will bring about such a relation. Because it is possible to add objects which are not related in the first sense, Husserl concludes that "collective connection" must be due to the psychological act of presentation, which is

presupposed in every counting operation. The concept of plurality is thus based upon reflection on the act of presentation of a totality.⁹

The concept of "a something" is in turn due to reflection upon the psychical act of presenting a single thing.¹⁰ This concept of "a something" is important because in the abstracting process which gives rise to the concept of plurality, we abstract from the particular nature of the individual objects and we are left with a totality of "somethings". Plurality is thus defined as a "something" and a "something" etc., or as a 'one' and a 'one' etc.

The concept of a "something" and a "something" is called two and the concept of a "something" and a "something" and a "something" is called three etc.

- (ii) THE FAILURE OF "THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC" TO UNCOVER THE GENUINE MEANING OF NUMBER AND THE WEAKNESS OF PSYCHOLOGIST OR EMPIRICIST THEORIES IN GENERAL.

If it is true that all concepts of number or plurality are based on reflection on psychological activity, then we must concede that all number statements do not refer to objects, but rather to the intuition of these objects. To say that Jupiter has eleven moons is not to be saying anything about the moons of Jupiter, but only about the way in which these moons are intuited. While Frege places the whole of Arithmetic in the realm of the conceptual, Husserl places it in the realm of the psychological. While Frege can never explain how a thinking individual can ever grasp the concept of a number, Husserl can never explain how number statements can have objective validity.

The question we can put to Husserl in particular and to Empiricists in general is "Why does the mind intuit objects in a totality when these objects are not intrinsically related? Why does the mind associate images or project images from the past?"

If it is maintained that the mind behaves in this manner because of the way in which it is constructed, not only is all truth but all meaning is rendered impossible, for even if perchance a relevant image is associated or projected, it can never be associated or projected as relevant.

If on the other hand it is maintained that the mind self-consciously aims at the truth or aims at being rational, we will be unable to explain collective connection by referring to the fact that the totality of objects is intuited in one psychical act of presentation, because there would then be a reason for it being intuited in this way..... in which case a reference to the psychical act itself, is irrelevant. The most essential criticism of Husserl's psychologism then, is not that his descriptions are incorrect, but that they are irrelevant to a foundation of Arithmetic. Arithmetical calculations can be carried out by a computer or an adding machine. Yet an exact description of how the circuits and levers function will not provide an understanding of arithmetical concepts or calculations. The adding machine is designed to operate in a certain manner in order to produce the correct answer, i.e. in order to operate in accordance with the definitions of the numbers and functions. In a similar way, any psychological activity which is required to bring about the intuition of a certain number, is determined by the meaning of the number itself, and consequently cannot serve to account for that meaning.

But if the mind self-consciously directs itself toward its goal, if it deliberately intuits totalities as totalities, projects past events into the present, associates relevant images, then surely it has no need to reflect on these activities in order to grasp the essence of a totality, the past or intrinsic relationships. In fact there is no necessity to even perform these activities.

If it is true that events in the present remind us of past events, if the mind self-consciously projects into the present, memories of the past, it must already have recognized the intrinsic relation between these two events, which implies that it is simultaneously in the past and in the present, in which case there is no necessity to project the past event into the present.

When Husserl speaks about abstraction he means that attention is paid to certain features while others are ignored. In abstracting the concept of plurality for instance, he says that abstraction is made from the particular objects while only the collective connection is retained as a conceptual extract. But here again the problem emerges, if I do not know in advance what I am looking for, how am I going to find it and if I happen to stumble across it how am I going to recognize it. Before we can possibly abstract, we need to know what it is that we must abstract, in which case the abstracting activity is superfluous.

Surreptitiously presupposed in every psychologistic theory of association, projection of memories, attention, judgement etc., is another mind which already knows the answers the first mind seeks and which, so to speak, guides it and renders it superfluous.

(iii) THE MIRROR THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Both Frege and Husserl establish a dualism, Frege by confining Arithmetic to the realm of the conceptual, and Husserl by confining Arithmetic to the realm of the psyche. Like all naturalistic epistemologies, Husserl's 'Philosophy of Arithmetic' is formulated against the background of the dualism of a psyche and a world. After all the processes of association, projection and abstraction have been performed there must be someone for whom images are associated, projected or for whom things are abstracted. Here the otherwise materialistic theory is complemented by the addition of a 'psychical substance', or 'thinking substance'. This psychical substance was able to mirror events in the real world and the problem of epistemology was to establish the accuracy or the objective validity of this mirror process.

Ultimately, however the mirror theory or the theory of a psychical substance does not explain anything, for even if the object of knowledge is reconstructed or mirrored in this psychical substance, we would still require another act of awareness to become conscious of this mirrored or reconstructed object. An explanation in accordance with the mirror theory thus does no more than postpone the problem of awareness.

On the other hand it could be asserted that the perceiving subject is the mirror, and that he is no more than this endless stream of images. The subject would then be conscious of images and colours not by surveying them but by actually coinciding with them. But a colour or an image experienced in this way would be like the grey colour that envelops me when I close my eyes, or the black colour I see as I am about to faint. There would be no distance between me and the sensation, it would saturate my entire consciousness. This however would

imply that the sensation could have no meaning for me, that it could not form part of the objective world. The extent to which I am capable of creating a distance between myself and the object or colour of my gaze is the extent to which the object or colour is reducible to some higher unity, or the extent to which it manifests something or means something. The object of perception overcomes its meaninglessness, its irreducibility, its here and now givenness because it does not saturate my consciousness of it, but rather refers consciousness to that which it means.

In an important sense every philosopher who questions the objective validity of knowledge or who questions the existence of a world to which this knowledge refers, contradicts himself, for the point of view from which these questions can be meaningfully asked is already a point of view which transcends the pure immanence of the empirical ego. It is only when empiricism begins to reflect upon itself that it points the way to transcendentalism.

intuitions of consciousness only referred to a transcendent world, and were in no sense intrinsically related to it.

Both Kant and Husserl reject consciousness as a psychic fact, or as an epiphenomenon, or as a mirror which reflects or refers to a world. The knowledge of a transcendental ego does not refer to a world, it is that world itself. The world of the transcendental ego is a world of pure meanings which are not the meanings of some other objects but only the meanings of the transcendental ego.

There is however always a danger of misconstruing such a transcendental ego. A trivial nuance, which avoids solipsism and which distinguishes transcendentalism from both Hume and Descartes, is easily overlooked. If the object of a transcendental ego is the object itself, it either means that the objects are no more than thoughts or products of consciousness, or that the transcendental ego is the world of real objects i.e. either the world is entirely immanent or the transcendental ego is entirely outside itself. The genuine transcendental position is both of these interpretations simultaneously, because the basis of their difference lies only in a naturalist or empiricist understanding of transcendence and immanence. Both Descartes and the empiricists presupposed a certain concept of transcendence which put transcendence outside the world of experience. The real object was taken to transcend the knowing subject entirely so that transcendence was not an element for consciousness. Nothing transcends the transcendental ego, because it is the realm 'within' which objects are either transcendent or immanent. Consequently we will from now on refer to the objects or thoughts of the transcendental ego as object-meanings, indicating thereby that as object they are not immanent

occurrences in some mind, and as meaning that they are not meaningless beings which rely on some perceiving subject to bring about their relatedness to other objects.

The fundamental problem in discussing the transcendental ego is that it is difficult to find terminology which does not have overtones of either of the two naturalistic approaches. We will try to overcome this naturalist approach to transcendence and immanence by presenting the argument from both points of view, wherever this is relevant. In every case it should be born in mind that the genuine transcendental position renders the two approaches identical.

(11) THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS CONSTITUTING THE WORLD OF OBJECT-MEANINGS¹²

Within empiricism a situation is no more than the accumulation of it's elements. e.g. The thief, plus his desire to steal the Crown Jewels, plus the guard at the gate all interact producing the situation 'the-thief's-desire-to-steal-the-jewels-thwarted-by-the-guard'. For the present we may say that in Transcendentalism the situation is reversed. The situation is the primordial unity and each of the elements are no more than abstractions of this situation. For me, the thief, the guard at the gate is no more than that which thwarts my desire. For myself I am no more than that which is thwarted. This of course does not imply that throughout various situations neither I nor the guard will have any fixed identity. Each situation is itself an abstraction of the ultimate situation of all situations, which is my life as a whole. The meaning then, say of the guard, will be the

meaning he has as an element in my life as a whole or as an element in myself as the transcendental ego.* The transcendental ego is thus the fundamental source of all meaning. It constitutes a world of object-meanings purely in terms of itself as the absolute meaning.

(iii) THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Quite obviously the meanings constituted by such an ego will be prejudiced and there could be no hope of an intersubjective agreement, each constituting meanings in terms of his own life. This difficulty is overcome by rendering the transcendental ego self-conscious. No matter how prejudiced a meaning may be, its prejudiced nature is compensated by its being understood as prejudiced.

Being fully self-conscious the transcendental ego is reflectively aware of itself and its activity. By achieving an objective grasp of itself as interested or involved and of the world as consequently prejudiced, the transcendental ego renders itself a disinterested observer with an absolutely disinterested or objective grasp of the world. The ego which is recognized as interested is known as the empirical ego while the world seen by this empirical ego is only a manifestation or an appearance of the world. The empirical ego is

* It is important to note that any situation other than the absolute situation is itself the interaction of objects which are directly abstractions of the absolute situation, or transcendental ego.

only a manifestation or an appearance of the world. The empirical ego is thus the realm of this prejudiced knowing, or the realm of perspectives or manifestations of the world and the extent to which the transcendental ego has an objective grasp of this empirical ego, is the extent to which it is self-conscious and no longer limited to the empirical ego's point of view.

If for instance a transcendental ego constitutes an object standing at an angle of 45° , through its self-consciousness it will recognize that the angle of the object was only 45° in relation to the empirical ego. The absolute self-consciousness of the transcendental ego makes it impossible for it to be orientated, consequently the inclination of 45° is understood by it, as being the law of all possible orientations of empirical ego and object which will result in an appearance to the empirical ego of an inclination of 45° .

The object of the transcendental ego, the object-meaning, is thus the perfect primordial unity of an infinite series of perspectives, while the transcendental ego is itself the perfect unity of an infinite series of empirical egos. Since each object absorbs into itself all its perspectives, the world as a whole absorbs into itself all empirical egos. Consequently the empirical process whereby knowledge comes about can never serve as a meaning foundation of that knowledge since it is already presupposed by the knowing process.

(iv) THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS THE ULTIMATE MEANING OF THE WORLD
OF OBJECT-MEANINGS¹³

The world does not manifest itself as a Heraclitean flux, it shows certain stable structures i.e. it is meaningful. For the

Rationalists however the world was absolutely meaningful. The extent to which the world was seen as being meaningless, or as not regulated in accordance with absolute laws was regarded as the extent to which the point of view was limited, and unable to appreciate the behaviour of the world as a whole. From an absolutely unbiased point of view the world could be seen as absolutely structured in accordance with the norms of meaning. On the one hand, through an observation of the world, it could be established that every object can be measured with respect to say quantity. On the other hand, it could also be noted that it was impossible to conceive of an object which was not measurable in terms of quantity, without abrogating the meaning of that object, i.e. the fact of having a quantity is part of what it means to be an object.

Instead of trying to establish the full meaning of an object in general by means of a process of infinite induction, Kant examines the various possible ways in which we can speak about an object without destroying its sense i.e. he examines the various possible logical statements that can be made concerning objects in general. Besides always being quantifiable Kant finds that objects are also classifiable in terms of quality, number, and that they always stand in relations of cause and effect with other objects etc. These various aspects of an object in general are what Kant calls the categories.

In an attempt to describe the absolute meaningfulness or lawfulness of the world, both Kant and Husserl describe the world in terms of an analogy. The world is said to appear "as if" thought by a consciousness. Every object is regarded as a thought, so that just as it is beyond consciousness to imagine an object without a

quantity or a quality so the world thought by such a consciousness will show the same adherence to the norms of meaning. Just as in consciousness the thought of an object without the thought of it having a quantity or a quality is impossible, so in the world every object will of necessity show a quantity, and a quality.

Before an object can have a quantity or a quality, i.e. before an object can be an object it has to be. Being is the ultimate condition of being anything at all. To say that an object does not manifest Being is to abrogate the meaning of Being. In the same way one cannot be conscious of an object without being conscious, for object-consciousness is a manifestation of consciousness in general. Just as Being is the ultimate meaning of the world, so consciousness is the ultimate meaning of all object-consciousness.

When the world is considered as being thought by a consciousness, this consciousness is known as the transcendental ego and since every object, now regarded as a thought-object, or an object-meaning, or object-consciousness, is an aspect of the transcendental ego, the transcendental ego is the ultimate meaning of this world.

Let us bear in mind the nature of this analogy. To say that an object is constituted or thought by the transcendental ego in terms of the categories is merely to state that objects of necessity manifest certain constant laws. To say that the transcendental ego is conscious of an object-meaning is merely to state that the object exists. To say that the transcendental ego is the ultimate meaning of the world is to state that the world is absolutely rational. But because of this absolute rationality, there are no grounds for distinguishing the analogy from that which it aims at describing i.e. the world is identical

to a pure consciousness.

(v) THE SELF-CONSCIOUS TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
OF THE WORLD

As the law of perspectives the pure object-meaning cannot manifest itself except through it's perspectives. Unless there is a perspective or perspectives, the law of perspectives is nothing. As a law it only becomes itself in the exercising of it's legislating power. Consequently it is only through the empirical ego that the object-meaning, as an object-consciousness becomes self-conscious.

It might seem strange to speak of a self-conscious object or world, but it must be born in mind that objects are, for the Rationalists, absolutely reducible to pure meaning. There is no need of a consciousness to grasp this meaning in order for it to be a meaning, it is a meaning already, and it is for this reason that it is spoken of 'as if' thought by some consciousness, and since a thought would be nothing if it did not actually think itself, so the pure object-meaning, and the world of pure object-meanings becomes self-conscious through the empirical ego,¹⁷

Although the empirical ego is no more than an association of perspectives of the world, because that world is rationally ordered, it will manifest itself in a rationally ordered way and the empirical ego brought about in this way will be a genuine manifestation of the rationality or the meaning of the world i.e. it will be a manifestation of the transcendental ego, so that the self-consciousness of the world, is the self-conscious transcendental ego.

(vi) THE REALM OF "THERE IS" AND "I THINK THAT"
KNOWLEDGE

The perspectives or opinions of the empirical ego fall under the heading of "I think that", while the knowledge of the transcendental ego falls under the heading of "There is". Unlike the knowledge of the empirical ego, the knowledge of the transcendental ego is not the knowledge of a person but rather the world's self-consciousness.

We have also seen however that knowledge only becomes a possibility for a self-conscious transcendental ego, consequently the two forms of knowledge cannot be separated. From our first point of view we can see that since all objective knowledge is subjective or prejudiced knowledge understood as subjective or prejudiced, so every "there is" is in fact an objectively grasped "I think that". From our second point of view we can see that "there is....." can only manifest itself through an "I think that"

(vii) THE REALM OF FACT ABSORBED INTO THE REALM OF MEANING¹⁴

The object of a transcendental ego, the pure law of all perspectives, dictates what perspectives will be correlated with what possibilities of the empirical ego. Nevertheless it does not always dictate the order in which these perspectives will occur. As a ship moves across the sea, there is only one order in which it's various positions can be seen without abrogating the meaning of a moving ship. If on the other hand I am inspecting a house, there would be many possible orders in which I could see the various parts of the house.

Nevertheless, although the particular sequence in which I see the parts of the house is not implied in the meaning of the house, it is implied in the meaning of the world as a whole or in the transcendental ego. The here and now givenness, the facticity of every perspective is overcome. In contrast then to empiricism which made meaning the outcome of a de facto psychological event or in contrast to Descartes who posited a realm of meaning parallel to a realm of fact, transcendentalism renders all facts possible actualizations of meaning.

(viii) THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION¹⁵

There cannot be more than one pure meaning. If there were two pure meanings they would be related at least in the sense that they were both meanings. We say that objects are related by virtue of their meanings. Tables are related to chairs because both are included under the general concept, furniture. Tables and chairs can be regarded as different manifestations, or different ways in which furniture can appear. But the pure object-meaning is itself that which appears and is never the mode of appearing. Consequently there is only one pure meaning, furniture, with two modes of appearing. But of course furniture itself belongs to some higher category and is itself the manifestation of this higher meaning. We could continue this process until we arrive at the most general of all concepts, one which cannot again be included under some higher category, one which is therefore not a manifestation of anything but is itself the pure meaning, that which appears in all appearing. This ultimate concept is the general concept of Being. Consequently all objects are ultimately different modes of the appearing of Being.

Although this example of chairs and tables has enabled us to see the essential inter-relatedness of meaning, neither Kant nor Husserl would accept this type of 'collective noun' absorption. Quite obviously a chair could be a member of a host of other collections without its meaning changing in terms of every collection. Kant shows Descartes' influence in his reduction of the meaning of any object to its spatial configuration. Space then, is the higher meaning which absorbs all spatial objects. All real objects are thus manifestations of the pure meaning space. In the same way time is the highest meaning of all transcendental self-experience i.e. the experience of the empirical ego by the transcendental ego. Since all knowledge is objectively understood knowledge of the empirical ego as the empirical ego, the ultimate meaning of all meaning is time i.e. the transcendental ego is itself temporality.¹⁶

We thus have two points of view. On the one hand the ultimate meaning of the world is pure Being, and conceived in terms of a pure constituting consciousness, it is the pure experience, 'I am'. On the other hand the ultimate meaning of the world is time. The transcendental ego is neither a being, nor is it in time.*

* Within the context of this interpretation of Kant the identification of transcendental subjectivity and temporality takes Kant (and Husserl of 'Cartesian Meditations') beyond the bounds of transcendentalism and suggests a phenomenology of subjectivity. For the present we will refer to the meaning of transcendental subjectivity as pure Being, the 'it is' or the 'I am'.

We have already referred to the object-meaning as the law of perspectives, and we have also noted that all constitution, or all meaning conforms to the categories. Kant refers to such an object meaning as a synthetic unity. The ultimate synthetic unity of all constitution, the ultimate meaning of all meaning is the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception. All synthetic unities are aspects of the synthetic unity of apperception all object meanings are abstractions of the pure meaning "I am".

(ix) NECESSITY, UNIVERSALITY AND THE CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEA

As with all Rationalist philosophers Kant believed that all true knowledge could be stated in terms of clear and distinct ideas and that the universality and necessity of knowledge was guaranteed by the fact that it was reducible to such clear and distinct ideas. For Kant space, for example, is identified with Euclidean geometric space. The axioms or propositions of Euclidean geometry were held to be clear and distinct ideas and any statement in geometry could be proved indubitably i.e. it could be shown to be a universal and necessary truth. By reducing all object-meanings to their spatial configurations Kant ensures the clarity and distinctness of the object-meaning and the universality and necessity of any statement deduced from that meaning.

Psychologistic theories attempt to explain necessity and universality in the world by referring to the laws of the thinking psyche. J.S. Mill for instance bases the laws of logic on what the mind can or cannot do. We have already seen how this position implies subjective relativism. In a similar way the universality and necessity

of knowledge is guaranteed in transcendentalism by the fact that unless objects were constituted in accordance with the categories they would not be objects and would not be an aspect of the world of objects, or the transcendental ego's self-consciousness.¹⁸ Subjective relativism is overcome by the fact that it is the transcendental ego which constitutes the world. Nevertheless the transcendental ego differs from the empirical ego in that it is transparent to itself. This means that the laws of thought must themselves be founded or rendered obvious. The categories as the conditions of meaning are not just the laws according to which I think or according to which I have to think, they are the laws according to which I think when I think in absolute freedom because the categories are themselves abstractions, or deducible from the very idea, of what it means to mean. In other words constitution in accordance with the categories, is constitution in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception.

Both Kant and Husserl accept the indubitability of Descartes' clear and distinct idea, "I think therefore I am". Neither however, attempt to use this idea as a geometric type axiom in the construction of an eternal philosophy. We have seen how for Kant the object-meaning absorbs into itself all the possible ways in which it can be perceived. Similarly Descartes' Cogito is taken as a possible way of demonstrating or of manifesting the fact that 'I am', but the manifestation in no way determines the meaning of what 'I am'. I am not a thinking thing, on the contrary, my thinking (as empirical ego) is merely a possibility of my Being (as a transcendental ego). The 'I think' is absorbed into the 'I am'.

The fact that 'I am' is not only a clear and distinct idea which can never be doubted, it is also by virtue of being the pure experience of the self by the self, the ultimate meaning of all meaning. Since space is a manifestation of this meaning, the axioms of Euclid are clear and distinct ideas, and since space is the ultimate meaning of all objects, all objects are clear and distinct ideas. The absolute intelligibility of the world is implied in the absolute intelligibility of the self by the self.

(x) ABSOLUTE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS : SPONTANEITY AND FREEDOM

We have seen how the empirical ego is absorbed into the transcendental ego i.e. how all consciousness is at the same time a consciousness of being conscious. This absolute self-transparency of transcendental consciousness implies that it cannot be influenced or affected by anything. I can only be influenced by something if I am conscious of being influenced, otherwise the influence cannot even exist, just as every empirical ego intuition presupposed another more fundamental consciousness, which would be conscious of this intuition as an intuition of the empirical ego. But if I am conscious of being influenced I am of course no longer influenced. Consequently the transcendental ego constitutes a world in absolute freedom.

But how are we to understand this absolute freedom, or absolute spontaneity if we insist that all constitution is strictly in accordance with the categories of the Understanding? Within Kantian terminology, if I 'judge' a stone to be heavy, the judgement will be in accordance with the categories, it will be a judgement made by the transcendental

ego and will be in the form "it is" i.e. it will be the constitution of the weight of the stone. If on the other hand I try to estimate the weight by recalling an attempt to lift it, the estimation will be an act of the empirical ego, the estimation made will not itself be in accordance with the categories. The entire estimating act however as an act of the empirical ego, being a process of knowing in the form "I think that" will be constituted in accordance with the categories.¹⁹

The point we feel Kant is making is that the transcendental ego constitutes in absolute freedom. Let us suppose it constitutes an error, or something which is meaningless, because it is absolutely transparent to itself the error will be constituted as error, i.e. it will present itself as an error and will consequently be a truth. Similarly meaninglessness will be constituted as meaningless, i.e. as a certain kind of meaning. The error is only the truth for the empirical ego. Because transcendental consciousness is absolutely self-conscious, it constitutes in accordance with the categories in absolute freedom.

This absolute self-consciousness or self-transparency of consciousness means that it is in immediate contact with itself. Nothing about itself needs to be interpreted or referred to, for all thoughts or meanings are manifestations of the single meaning 'I am'. The entire transcendental ego is a perfect organic unity. There is no necessity for it to take notice of anything or to concentrate on anything. There is no necessity for it to remember the past or anticipate the future, because it is always already there where it wishes to direct it's attention, it is always already in the

past and future. Any theory which attempts to explain consciousness using the analogy of a screen or a beam of light presupposes another consciousness which sees more than the screen or the objects in the light. Not only is it unnecessary for me to direct my attention to an object, as one may shine the torch at the gate, it is also unnecessary for me to bear in mind where my attention is focussed as one would need to know where the screen is if one wished to project objects on to it.

I never need to decide to think or to set my mind in action. In the final analysis the only way in which I can get my mind to concentrate is by actually concentrating. The only way in which I can think rationally is by actually thinking rationally. I do not need to (and in fact cannot) control my thinking process by bearing the laws of logic in mind.

(xi) THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS A PRESUPPOSITIONLESS BACKGROUND
FOR HUSSERL'S DESCRIPTIONS

Through the many changes in his philosophy, Husserl retained his belief that in all knowledge, as in Arithmetic, there are fundamental concepts which cannot be defined and which can only be described. The Crisis of European man, the meaninglessness of his sciences was due to an overlooking of these fundamental concepts. Describing the 'coming about' or origin of these fundamental concepts (or essences) against the background of a psychological ego doomed all meaning and all sciences to subjective relativism. His intention was always to describe meanings as they are for the experiencing subject. Describing

these meanings against a naturalist background i.e. in terms of a psychological ego, gave the meanings a subjectivist content which they did not have for the subject.

Husserl needed an horizon which was itself neutral to the immanent - transcendent opposition, an horizon which would allow him to describe the coming about of objective or subjective knowledge as objective or subjective. He needed a realm which was the coming to self-consciousness of all objective knowing, a matrix of pure meaning, or which is the same thing a pure transcendental ego.

One of the fundamental issues of the "Philosophy of Arithmetic" was that the 'collective connection' or even the very 'being' of an object was due to a reflection on the activity of the ego. We have thus on the one hand the synthesizing or presenting act of the ego and on the other, the meaning of these acts i.e. the collective connection itself or the being of the object itself. Without a transcendental ego as the matrix for these descriptions the entire polarity takes place "in the mind" and "in the present". Once the transcendental ego is taken as the horizon, these synthesizing and presenting acts are no longer seen as de facto occurrences in the world but rather as descriptions of the coming about of the meaning of that world. They are neither the real acts of the psychological ego, nor are they the pure thoughts of the transcendental ego. They refer to or intend the pure thoughts as their meaning or sense i.e. as their NOEMA, and they refer to the psychological act as the here and now actualization of that meaning i.e. they refer to the psychological act as their NOESIS. In other words the informal essence which Husserl at first understood as a real synthesizing and presenting act is now

grasped as an intentional movement with a noetic and noematic pole.

The intentional movement or informal essence is not the product of the noetic pole, in fact it is the coming about of the noetic pole as transcended. On the other hand the informal essence is not absorbed into the formal essence or noematic pole to the extent of becoming a mere manifestation of that formal essence, because as an intentional movement it is the coming about of the noematic pole. The actual process, i.e. the noesis, whereby a number is intuited for example, is relevant to the meaning of that number, not because it is the process whereby that number is thought but because the genuine meaning of that number is the coming about of the psychological process, but as a psychological process. The formal essence on the other hand is relevant to the intentional process or informal essence, not because the intentional process is no more than a manifestation of the formal essence, but because the coming about of the formal essence is the intentional process.

Unlike the formal essence, the intentional process is not a perfect unity of manifestations or psychic acts, one manifestation takes precedence and permeates the entire unity. Although the informal essence transcends being a mere manifestation of the formal essence it does not absolutely transcend being such a manifestation and it is never a pure essence or an abstract law of manifestations. It is always the coming about of such a law, which is at the same time the coming about of the manifestation as a mere manifestation. But this coming about process is never completed and although the informal essence "looks forward" to the formal essence as it's essential meaning, it never ceases to "look back" at the manifestation as it's noesis.

Although examples could be misleading at this stage, we could

attempt to give some intuitive content to our discussion by referring to the perception of a three dimensional object. If for the moment we can overlook the difference between visual and tactile perception, we must consider that by grasping a three dimensional object in both hands we have an encounter with the object which transcends a visual perspective of it and which would require an infinite series of such perspectives to account for it. The informal essence is such a grip on the object, and while it is not itself an abstract law of perspectives, it already indicates the possibility of such a law, it 'looks forward' to such a law.

We must bear in mind however that for Husserl (even the Husserl of "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology") the entire intentional process and the poles it intends are within the realm of the transcendental ego and that the problem still remains of accounting for the constitution of the informal essence. The essential point about such a transcendental phenomenology is that the transcendental ego does not constitute the world and the empirical ego directly. It constitutes a 'lived world' as the realm of intentional processes. It is this 'lived world' which aims at a world and which brings about an empirical ego as transcended, as an aspect of that world. The intentional processes are themselves manifestations of more primordial pure object-meanings which are in turn aspects of a pure transcendental consciousness.²⁰

(xi) THE FORMALISM OF PURE TRANSCENDENTALISM

In much of his published works Husserl seems oblivious of the fact that writing against the background of such a pure transcendental consciousness abrogated the very meaning of the informal essence ... the informal essence he had been trying to uncover in the "Philosophy of Arithmetic" as an answer to the formalism of Frege's "Foundations of Arithmetic". Much of Kant's transcendentalism reminds us of Frege's theory. Both theories for instance guarantee the irrefutability of true statements by rendering the object-meaning (or number-meaning) the perfect unity of all its manifestations. Both philosophers assume an absolutely disinterested subject as the realm of these meanings.

Sometime after (or perhaps even during) the writing of "The Crisis", Husserl began to realize that his failure to arrive at an absolutely pure transcendental ego and a corresponding body of irrefutable knowledge was not due to a misapplication of the reduction, but rather due to the very nature of meaning itself.

THE LIVED WORLD

(i) THE REJECTION OF THE PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

With a pure transcendental ego as the background of all descriptions, meaning will no longer be an occurrence in the psyche or in the present. The investigating philosopher will be able to describe meanings precisely as they present themselves without any metaphysical presuppositions. But would such a background not itself be a metaphysical presupposition? Is it always tautologous to say that everything I experience, presents itself to me? Am I necessarily the matrix of all my experience? Is it not possible that there is much that I know, not because I am the realm of that knowledge coming to self-consciousness, but because I merge with a higher realm of knowing? Could I not have knowledge because I participate in the knowing of a 'we', in which case it would be impossible for me as a meditating philosopher to reflect on this knowledge because it is not for me but for us? Let us take as an example the relation between a detail of a painting and the painting as a whole. The 'drama' of Christ's habit in El Greco's "Agony in the Garden", can never account for itself purely in terms of itself, it is what it is because of the unity i.e. the entire painting, in which it participates. As a reflecting or meditating philosopher I can never account for what I know as a participating or involved subject, nor can I account for the 'we' in which I am involved, for this 'we' essentially transcends me.

To participate in a higher unity is not however to be entirely absorbed into it, it is not to be no more than a mere aspect or

manifestation of this unity, nor is it to be the unity itself. To participate in a unity is to be an imperfect unity, imperfect, because within this unity I am never given to myself as a mere member or element, because as a unity it always points back to me as the access to itself. In the unity with the other I am the imperfect 'we', a 'we' which is still tainted with an 'I' and which consequently only "looks forward" to a perfect unity within which I would be no more than a possible manifestation of the unity.

We may also grasp this imperfect 'we' as the "coming about" of the perfect unity. To the extent to which I can overcome my personal point of view and merge with the other is the extent to which I am the 'we', but I never entirely overcome this personal point of view. I am this never-ending overcoming of the personal point of view.

In answer to Empiricism we may point out that I am not an empirical ego or an in-itself, because the extent to which I recognize myself as such is the extent to which I am no longer the empirical ego. In reply to the Rationalists on the other hand, we may point out that I am not a pure transcendental ego, or a for-itself, because I can never entirely transcend myself as a empirical ego, because my knowledge of the world is not absolute, because I need to philosophize.

(ii) THE SUBJECT ITSELF AN INTENTIONAL MOVEMENT

Ultimately then we may regard the involved subject as an imperfect transcendental ego, or as an intentional movement which only aims at it's noematic pole, the pure transcendental ego as it's meaning and which "looks back" to it's noetic pole, the empirical ego as that

which it is in the process of transcending.

Before we examine the subject as an intentional movement in the light of traditional polarities, we need to emphasize the significance of the noetic and noematic poles. We have said that the intentional movement "looks ahead" or "aims" at the noematic pole as its essential meaning, and that it "looks back" at the noetic pole as that which it transcends. Although these expressions are useful, and we will continue to use them, they must not be misunderstood.

(iii) THE INTENTIONAL PROCESS 'MOTIVATES' THE NOETIC AND NOEMATIC POLES

The intentional process, the process of aiming or looking back neither presupposes nor is presupposed by that which it aims at, or that at which it looks back. An intentional movement is neither a movement between two pre-established poles nor does it constitute the poles. The intentional movement motivates its noetic and noematic poles.

In order to explicate the essential structure of this motivation let us refer to motivation in Fine Art. If we say that Cezanne motivated the entire Cubist movement we do not mean that Cubists like Picasso and Braque were uncreative and that they were merely working out the implications of Cezanne's art. On the contrary, we mean that while it is true that the Cubists drew inspiration from Cezanne's work, it is also true that they in effect re-created the meaning of his work. Without the Cubists, Cezanne's work could hardly bear within it, that significance of being the embryo of Cubism.

The act of motivation is thus a self-transcending act because it is through that which it motivates that it becomes more than what it was before. We must concede then that Cezanne's art has no static or constant identity and that with every development of art as a whole the meaning of his work changes. Nevertheless, these changes are never purely at random. Any particular meaning will never reject that which precedes it, it will only render that meaning a perspective or a 'limited view' of itself. Every movement of transcendence or every intentional movement is the simultaneous coming about of a new and transcendent meaning (noema) and of a meaning as transcended (noesis)

But just as there is no possibility of an absolute meaning of Cezanne's art so there is no possibility of an absolutely subjective point of view of the meaning of his art. The noesis and noema are only the sense of a movement of transcendence known as Cezanne's art.

There is no possibility of a clear and distinct understanding of this relation of motivation or in fact of the whole notion of intentionality. Nevertheless, we can attempt to appropriate motivation and intentionality as a style, or as the coming about of a significance through the examination of a selection of traditional dualisms.

(iv) CONSCIOUSNESS - SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

We have already indicated the interdependence of the self-consciousness of the transcendental ego and the rationality of the world. From our first point of view the world is rational because the constituting consciousness is self-reflective and any prejudiced meanings would be constituted as prejudiced meanings. From our

second point of view the rationality of the world guarantees that the empirical ego as the realm of manifestations of the world, will be absolutely explicable in terms of that world i.e. will be absolutely absorbed into that world, which means that the world as a transcendental consciousness is a self-consciousness.

Firstly, since the involved subject is neither the empirical ego nor the transcendental ego, it neither experiences itself by being itself, nor does it know itself by transcending itself. As an intentional movement the involved subject 'lives through' it's empirical ego i.e. it is only a coming about of a consciousness of the empirical ego. Consequently it neither constitutes a world in complete ignorance of itself nor does it constitute in full self-consciousness, so that the world is neither absolutely irrational nor absolutely rational. The world is an intentional movement which only aims at absolute rationality and looks back at absolute irrationality.

From our second point of view the world is not absolutely rational. There is much in the world which has no explanation or meaning, which is ultimately irreducible, which cannot be absorbed into some higher unity, so that the experience of this world by coinciding with it, is not absolutely distinguishable from a knowledge of the world. The transcendental ego does not absolutely transcend the empirical ego and is consequently not absolutely self-conscious. I am neither the self-experience of the world, the world's experience of itself because it is itself, nor am I the world's self-consciousness. I am the GRIP of the world on itself. I am the coming about of the self-consciousness of the world i.e. I am an intentional movement

which aims at absolute self-consciousness.

But here again we must bear in mind the significance of this "aiming at" and "looking back at" i.e. we must bear in mind the fact that the noetic and noematic poles are motivated by the intentional movement, the process of knowing or meaning. The empirical ego is not already there, as if for some external observer, waiting for the transcendental ego to become conscious of it in its quest for self-consciousness. Similarly the meaninglessness of the world is not like some meaning which is only hidden and which will in time be uncovered, both empirical ego and meaninglessness of the world are motivated by the transcending movement of the subject as an intentionality.

(v) KNOWING THAT IT IS - KNOWING WHAT IT IS
(MEANINGLESSNESS - MEANINGFULNESS)

We have already seen that since the empirical ego experiences its object only by co-inciding with it, by actually becoming the perspective which is not yet recognized as a perspective i.e. by actually becoming the collection of sense data, it cannot know what the object of its experience is, it can only know that it is. Because the transcendental ego is always capable of transcending its object by classifying the object under a higher unity, it can always recognize this object as a manifestation of the higher unity i.e. it always knows what the object is.

For an involved subject facticity, irreducibility or meaninglessness and meaningfulness are not mutually exclusive. Objects are not completely absorbed into higher unities, they cohere without losing

their facticity. In fact they are this cohering. Just as there could be no 'we' unless it was saturated by an 'I', so there could be no meaning without facticity. For an involved subject the world is thus neither absolutely meaningful nor absolutely meaningless, it is an intentional movement which aims at meaning and which looks back at facticity. Meaningfulness and meaninglessness must not be regarded as mutually exclusive, they are poles motivated by a single movement.

(vi) TRUTH - ERROR (THE RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE HORIZON)

We have seen in Kantian philosophy that the meaning of an object depends upon the meaning of the higher unity of which it is no more than a mere manifestation, in other words an object is what it is by virtue of its horizon. The transcendental ego is always the absolute horizon and all relative horizons are for Kant no more than mere collections of absolute object-meanings, and are only for the empirical ego.

For an involved subject it is true that some horizons partially absorb other horizons and that within the context of the transcending horizon, the transcended horizon takes on the significance of being subjective. But this does not imply that there is an absolute horizon, it merely points to the nature of the coming about of truth.

As an intentional movement the involved subject is an horizon for all its intentional processes. Just as the present is neither the future nor the past, so the subject is neither an absolute nor a relative horizon. Nevertheless, it is not neutral to absolute and

relative, it looks forward to the absolute as it's meaning and back to the relative as that which it transcends, in fact it is this looking forward and looking back.

As an horizon, the subject does not absolutely transcend any other horizon, consequently the transcended horizons still permeate the transcending horizon, just as the past still permeates the present. The truth only absolutely transcends error for the transcendental ego. For the involved subject truth is the overcoming or transcending of error, it is what it is by virtue of the error it transcends.

We have seen that there is no absolute horizon, and no absolute truth, that every all embracing view becomes a limited view, that every horizon is relative with respect to some other horizon which for it is absolute. But this is not the same as saying that all truth is relative. To say that all truths are relative is similar to saying that all futures are pasts. It is possible to take up such a point of view only by abrogating the whole meaning of future and past. Although all pasts have at some stage been futures, they are pasts precisely because there is still a future. Once we say that all truths are relative we disengage ourselves from the process of knowing to such an extent that relative and absolute no longer have any genuine meaning. The involved subject is itself neither in truth nor in error, it is an intentional movement aiming at truth, an intentional movement which motivates truth and error as the poles of the transcending movement known as existence. Truth and error is the whole theme of the coming about of knowledge, yet the coming about is not yet knowledge and hence neither in truth nor in error.

(vii) TRUTH AND ERROR, THE NOEMA AND NOESIS OF AN INTENTIONALITY
OF VERIFICATION.

Since the noematic pole is never given, truth is never for an involved subject, it is only aimed at. In general it is the activity of verification which aims at the truth, which has as its essential meaning, the truth. Consequently there is truth only for as long as there is verification. We must not misconstrue the nature of verification. It is not the testing of a preconceived truth, a testing which has nothing to do with the meaning of that truth.

The ability to demonstrate the inadequacy of a certain theory is the ability to aim at a transcendent theory. The process of verification is at one and the same time the coming about of truth and the coming about of error as error. The verification of Einsteinian theory for example will always take place in that realm of experimentation which shows up the inadequacy of pre-Einsteinian theory.

At what point does a theory cease to come about as truth and begin to come about as error? When does an evidently verifying synthesis become an evidently nullifying synthesis? The 'overall' intentional movement towards truth does not absolutely absorb the individual intentionalities so that we cannot say that ultimately all intentional movements intend the same noema, nor is the overall intentional movement towards truth no more than a mere collection of intentionalities, so that we cannot say that the noesis of one intentionality is the noema of the previous intentionality. The various intentionalities at any one moment and throughout time

participate in the overall movement towards truth which is the involved subject.

Through a sequence in time the various intentionalities relating to say Cezanne's art, all participate in one intentional movement which motivates a constant noema and noesis. Each particular intentionality aims, at it's particular moment, at the most significant manifestation of Cezanne's art. (We will return to this problem of temporal synthesis in our discussion of constancy)

(viii) THE BODY AS THE NOETIC POLE

In "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" Husserl persists in speaking against the background of a pure transcendental consciousness. Nevertheless, he begins to refer to the noetic pole as the body instead of the empirical ego. This is not the body as a physiological unity in space, but a body as a system of associated sensory fields. While the background of all intentional movements remains a transcendental ego, there would be no real significance in such a change. It is our conviction however that Husserl was beginning to understand intentionality not as the structure of a pure meaning i.e. not as if the entire intentional movement was constituted by a transcendental ego, but as if the transcendental ego was itself only aimed at, so that we would have to take as our starting point, the intentional process itself i.e. something which is neither the empirical ego nor the transcendental ego, something whose 'parts' are neither merely associated nor absolutely absorbed into a perfect unity. The 'lived body' was identified as this intentional process. Without losing their facticity, the various sensory fields merge into the imperfect unity of the body. This imperfect unity motivates as it's noetic pole, the 'empirical body'

as a system of associated sensations and as its noema the transcendental ego i.e. the realm of pure meanings.

Unlike the transcendental ego, the lived body is not a consciousness of the empirical body, it is only a 'lived through' experience of that body. It experiences the body neither by merely co-inciding with it, nor does it transcend the body entirely, it is a grip on the body, and as such the lived body is known as the body image.

From our second point of view the 'lived world' is the intentional movement which aims at the world of pure meanings or the transcendental ego, and looks back at the 'empirical body' as a realm of associated sense data. The lived world is thus neither the blind self-experience of the world, nor the full self-consciousness of the world. It is the grip of the world on itself. Just as the lived body never absolutely escapes from the empirical body so the lived world never escapes from the empirical body. Both are permeated by this facticity.

Once we have accepted that the transcendental ego is not the horizon of the intentional processes, these processes must be grasped as being permeated by the facticity of the body. While the intentional process is never an actual empirical event nor is it a Kantian type synthesis. Intentionality must be understood as ontological.

(ix) THE PROBLEM OF DESCRIBING SUCH A 'LIVED BODY' OR 'LIVED WORLD'

In our discussion of the transcendental ego we attempted to overcome the naturalist attitude to transcendence and immanence by

approaching the transcendental ego from two points of view. From the first point of view we considered the transcendental ego as that which constitutes the world in terms of itself, so that objects of the world were no more than abstractions of transcendental consciousness. Furthermore we also noted that because the transcendental ego was absolutely self-conscious, the objects of the world would be constituted in terms of pure meaning and not in terms of an interested or involved empirical ego. Transcendental consciousness of the world is in fact the objective grasp of this empirical ego as the realm of involved or interested knowledge. For the empirical ego, there is colour, emotion, sound etc., but for the transcendental ego there is only the meaning of that colour, emotion or sound, i.e. there is only the pure object-meaning as the absolute explanation of it's various manifestations.

We have noted that the lived body is not a consciousness of the empirical body, it is only a 'lived through' experience of that body, or a grip on the body, consequently the world which corresponds to this lived body is not a realm of object-meanings which absolutely transcend their colour, their usefulness etc, nor is the lived world just a realm of appearances. Corresponding to the lived body, such a world is neither explicable in terms of pure sensation nor in terms of pure meaning. We must attempt to understand the lived world through an understanding of the lived body.

From our second point of view we attempted to grasp the transcendental ego as the ultimate meaning of the world. We saw that these meanings could not be for themselves, could not think themselves, unless they could manifest themselves in some way. For example, unless it could appear, unless it could be red or brown, here or there,

'bookness' would be nothing. Unless the transcendental ego could manifest itself through an empirical ego, it could not be for itself, i.e. it could not be. Unless my thoughts were grounded in an experience of the senses they could not exist.

The lived world is neither the realm of appearances, nor is it that which merely manifests itself through the appearances (i.e. it is not the realm of pure meanings), it is neither a realm which experiences itself merely by co-inciding with itself (i.e. it is not the realm of sense data) nor is it the world of pure self-conscious meanings it is the grip of the world on itself. Being neither the realm of sense data, nor the realm of pure meanings, the lived world is ultimately, not the empirical body nor the pure transcendental consciousness but the lived body.²¹ We must endeavour to understand the lived body through an understanding of the lived world.

We are thus again faced with the dilemma which the natural attitude to transcendence brings about. Is the lived world entirely immanent, is it the self-experience of the lived body or is the lived body entirely outside itself, is it the grip of the world on itself?

ONTOLOGICAL INTENTIONALITY

(I)

TO UNDERSTAND THE LIVED WORLD THROUGH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIVED BODY²²

As I am only a grip on the body, it is not given to me as an external thing. I am not in front of my body, I live through it, I experience it's coming about from the 'inside'. I experience the activities of the body neither as real or actual events, nor on the other hand do I experience them as the transcendental ego experiences the synthetic activity of the imagination. I experience the body as a cohesion of elements into an imperfect unity, a cohesion which does not overcome the irreducibility of these elements, a cohesion which does not render the elements to be no more than manifestations of the unity.

Similarly the world does not come about as a collection of distinct objects external to each other and placed in an undifferentiated system of places i.e. placed in a geometric space. I do not confront the world I am involved in it. I live through it's coming about from the inside. The coming about of the world is neither a real empirical event nor is it a coming about with respect to pure meaning, it is rather the cohesion of sensuous entities which does not cancel out their here and now facticity.

(i) THE PARTIAL TRANSCENDENCE OF SENSATION

We noted in our discussion of Kant's transcendental ego, that all consciousness was at the same time a consciousness of being conscious.

This second order consciousness was the guarantee or the result of the act of knowing, without which there could be no consciousness at all.

It follows that there can be no knowledge for an empirical body which does not at least transcend itself to the extent of feeling itself.

Unless my hand was sensitive to itself how could it be sensitive to anything else?

Similarly the lived world could not even be coloured or textured unless there was something which was coloured or textured.

As an intentional movement I differ from the empirical body as a system of associated sensations, in that while I am never a consciousness of that body, I am that which aims at such a consciousness through being a grip on that body. Similarly, while a lived object does not entirely absorb its appearances, it is an intentional movement which aims at a pure object-meaning which does.

(ii) THE IMPERFECT UNITY 'LOOKS BACK' AT IT'S NOESIS

The various sensory fields merge into an imperfect unity, the lived body. Although this body transcends being a system of associated sensory fields it does not entirely transcend the sensory realm and remains 'tainted' with sensuousness. The various sensory fields participate in the lived body so that while each sensory field is immediately translated into every other, it is not purely fortuitous that for reflective consciousness, an actual sense experience presents itself as say visual rather than tactile or auditory. There is always a certain irreducibility about the actual sense experience, so that the other experiences are there only as

potential. By analogy we may note that while it is always possible to translate a sentence from one language into another, such a translation is never perfect. While every sentence aims at a meaning which transcends its actual manifestation and which could appear in any other language, this aiming is never fulfilled, so that the meaning remains tainted by the actual form of its manifestation and to this extent, is untranslatable. Similarly, although any object always presents itself as intersensory i.e. as something which precedes what is seen, felt, or heard, it always presents itself as say seen and only potentially as touched, or heard.

(iii) THE LIVED BODY AND LIVED WORLD AS INTENTIONAL MOVEMENTS :
NOT AS THE DISINTERESTED HORIZON OF INTENTIONALITIES

As the field of sensory fields, the lived body looks back to actual sense experience as its noesis and forward to pure consciousness as its noema. It is itself a form of experience which precedes both pure sensuousness and pure meaning. Through the lived body the various sensory fields express both their reducibility and their irreducibility. The body is thus the space within which the various sensory fields can take up their 'places' with respect to the significance of the whole, without being totally absorbed into that whole. But we must not misunderstand this notion of a 'bodily space'. The lived body is itself an intentional movement, it is not a realm of disinterested or objective experience. The various sensory fields take up their positions not in terms of a geometrically given structure, vision is not 'near the top of my body', tactile sensation does not occur out 'there in front of me, at the ends of my arms', as it would

for a reflective consciousness. At every moment the various parts of my body merge into the imperfect unity of a bodily attitude of intention, or purpose.

In order to explicate this synthesis of the body let us use the example of operating a record player. I am carefully lifting the needle from a record, my forefinger gently supports the weight of the playing arm, my back is bent, my knees are slightly bent and my left hand gives support to my bent back by a firm grip just above the left knee. The position of my body and the position of my limbs, are not given to me against a geometric background. I know where my limbs are because I know what I am doing.²³ In order to lift the needle I do not have to bend my back and knees, grasp my left knee and raise my right arm, I only have to lift the needle, everything else follows as implicit in that activity, so that it can be said that I lift the needle with my whole body. It is as if at this moment, the tip of my forefinger is the underlying significance of my whole body, as if the weight of the playing arm on my forefinger absorbs into itself the curvature of my back, the angle of my bent knees etc.

Not only is my body space structured at every moment in terms of a bodily purpose but every moment partially absorbs into itself all previous moments, and already anticipates those to follow, so that the lived body is also the coming about of a unity through time. We noticed in our discussion of the transcendental ego that it was not necessary for me to keep track of my train of thoughts so that I would know the meaning of what I was thinking about. There is no necessity to keep taking a 'bird's eye view' in order to see just what I am really thinking about. The synthesis of every meaning is at the same

time the synthesis of the synthetic unity of apperception, the absolute horizon of all meaning so that every 'view' is at the same time a 'birds eye view'. Consciousness of any object is at the same time a recognition of its eternal significance. No matter how complicated a series of exercises may be, there is never any necessity for me to remember what movements I have made in order to infer where my limbs are at any particular moment.²⁴ There is no starting position in terms of which I can understand all other positions. At any particular moment I am never in a fixed and completed position. I know where my limbs are because I know what position I am moving towards (noema) and from which position I am moving (noesis). I am the same body because the position I move towards absorbs into itself all previous positions, it is the absolute in terms of which all other positions are grasped.²⁵

Although the various sensory fields partially merge into the unity of a purpose directed at the world i.e. an intentional movement, no purpose is isolated, all are partially absorbed into the general movement of my existence as a whole.

On the other hand, the lived world also presents itself as structured in accordance with a purpose. While lifting the needle off the record, the head of the playing arm becomes a kind of symbol of the whole world. It absorbs into itself the turntable, the amplifier, the bookcase and ultimately the whole world. The head of the playing arm takes on the significance of being some sort of 'concrete synthetic' unity of apperception, the ultimate object of the world. The surrounding object and the surrounding world exist only as possible manifestations of a setting, of which the head of the

playing arm is the most revealing perspective.

As with the lived body the synthesis of the world is at any moment incomplete. The world as a significance is always coming about. The head of the playing arm is not a static object, it is itself an intentional movement, a participant in this coming about of world-meaning.

But what could we possibly mean by the synthesis of the world, or even a 'concrete synthetic unity of apperception'? We do not mean that real objects merge together like tributaries merge into a river, nor do we mean that objects merge into each other in terms of what they mean. A world of objects can be absorbed into a setting in the same way that an infinite series of perspectives of an object merge into the imperfect unity of one object. Just as an object is not reducible to a series of perspectives, so a situation is not reducible to any number of objects, and just as we can only perceive an object through a perspective, so we can only perceive a situation through an object or a group of objects. As a change in perspective always accompanies a change in my spatial location, so a change in my orientation towards the world brings about a change in the objects through which a situation manifests itself.

This realm of co-ordinated pairs of bodily orientations on the one hand and manifestations of a situation on the other, is what we will call 'lived' or 'intentional' space. Let us note that 'lived space', like its counterpart bodily space is an intentional movement which looks back at geometric space as its noesis and forward to absolute rationalist absorption as its noema.

We have seen that an object is an imperfect unity, that although

it is not itself a perspective, it is permeated by the perspective which manifests it. Similarly a situation does not entirely transcend its objects and that although it is not itself an object it is permeated through its entirety by the object which manifests it, consequently this object will not concentrate itself into one spot, but will extend itself throughout the entire situation.²⁶

University of Cape Town

(II)

TO UNDERSTAND THE LIVED BODY THROUGH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIVED WORLD

(i) THE GRIP OF THE WORLD ON ITSELF IS A GRIP ON THE BODY

Within the realm of transcendentalism objects present themselves as being coloured, textured, as having sounds etc., in other words the world sees, feels and hears itself. Nevertheless, there is always something which is coloured textured or which sounds. This something is the pure object-meaning which is itself neither coloured nor textured nor sounding, but only 'meaning'. Unlike red or smooth the object-meaning does not exist by merely co-inciding with itself, it is a consciousness of itself, it means or thinks itself. The world's seeing, feeling and hearing itself is the seeing, feeling and hearing empirical bodies respectively. This system of associated sensory bodies we will term the empirical body. The world's thinking or meaning itself is the transcendental ego. Since the pure object-meaning is the ultimate explanation of it's colour, texture or sound, the self-consciousness of the world is the ultimate explanation of it's seeing, hearing and feeling itself i.e. the transcendental ego absorbs into itself the empirical body .

For the present let us regard the objects of the lived world as coloured, textured, sounding etc. These objects are however not perfect unities which absorb all their qualities absolutely. On the other hand nor are these objects restricted to being no more than an association of qualities, for then there would be nothing which is coloured, textured or which sounds. In other words these colours,

textures and sounds have to refer to something or mean something other than themselves. Unless the world is at least sensitive to it's own feeling how could it feel at all. Unless seeing and feeling were at least a partial consciousness of seeing and feeling, seeing and feeling would immediately fall away into nothing, for red and smooth would have no explanation, i.e. they would not be the 'red' and 'smooth' of anything. The 'lived object' is thus more than a mere association of sense qualities and yet it is nothing without them, it is their imperfect unity. We must grasp the lived object as an intentional movement which only partially transcends itself as an association of sense qualities and which only aims at being a pure meaning. It is an intentional movement which motivates as it's noesis and noema, an association of sense qualities, and a pure object-meaning respectively. The lived world as the grip of the world on itself, is thus an experience of itself, which is prior to seeing, touching and hearing itself on the one hand, and being conscious of itself on the other.

The lived body is not just an association of sensory fields, for unless seeing and feeling were at least a partial consciousness of seeing and feeling, there would be no one who sees or who feels, which means that seeing and feeling would immediately fall away into nothing. Unless the lived body like the lived object was an intersensory field, it could not be the realm of intersensory fields. We must understand the lived body as an intentional movement, which is the coming about of the empirical body as a system of associated sensory fields, and of the transcendental ego as a pure consciousness. Sense-experience, like pure consciousness is never

given, it is always only coming about.

(ii) THE GRIP AS A CONCRETE IMPERFECT UNITY OF APPERCEPTION²⁷

The lived world presents itself as if constituted by some concrete, imperfect unity of apperception. Such a unity differs from the perfect Kantian unity in that it is the explanation of the internal relatedness not of pure meanings but of concrete, (but lived through) objects, a relatedness which never absolutely escapes from the here and now facticity of that which it relates. For example, the meaning of an abstract painting is always something other than the here and now line, colour, and texture which actually appear on the canvas. The pure meaning aimed at through the painting, the perfect unity of the lines, colour and textures, is always coming about. It is this coming about of meaning which only partially transcends its elements, i.e. as a unity it remains tainted by the elements, so that a painting may be said to have a textural or a colour-meaning. On the noetic side, the colour or texture as a pure quality is also only coming about and we may refer to this coming about as the meaning-colour, or the meaning-texture. As with the painting the meaning of the lived world is always a concrete meaning, and the lived objects are always meaning-objects.

In the same way, the lived body is only the coming about of a significance, an existential project which never escapes from the empirical body, from a certain opacity or meaninglessness, or what we may call bodiliness. We must understand this bodiliness as the facticity of the world (or, of course vice versa). Just as the lived body is an intersensory realm which is itself still tainted by

sensuousness, so it is a realm of intersensory functions, or lived objects, which does not escape from the opacity of these functions i.e. which does not escape from bodiliness.

(iii) THE GRIP AS AN INTENTIONAL MOVEMENT

Because the lived world is not synthesized in accordance with a pure synthetic unity of apperception, it's various parts are not absorbed into the pure meaning 'it is' or 'I am'. The significance of the lived world is always only coming about, it is a cohering of it's parts, not their unity. Consequently the significance of the lived world is always a 'can be' or an 'intends to be' rather than an 'it is'.

Unlike the transcendental ego the lived body is not a pure 'I am' but is always an aiming at or an 'I intend to be'.

Let us note that this 'can be' or 'intends to be' is a lived through probability, it is not a consciousness or a knowledge of probability for then again it would be something, namely a possibility. The lived world (and the lived body) is ambiguous, and it's ambiguity is genuine for it does not present itself as ambiguous. An object or a situation can be ambiguous if I do not know whether it is a or b, but it is no longer ambiguous when I recognize it as being ambiguous, as being that which is neither a nor b, as being the possibility of a or b. For now it is no longer a question of not knowing what it is. I know precisely what it is, it is ambiguous. John's character is confusing only as long as I do not recognize him as being confusing, for once I have done so, he will only be confusing

if he ceases to be confusing. The lived world or the lived body is not a reflective awareness of this intention to be, but only a lived through experience of itself as this probability or possibility of being.

(iv) TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE

The lived world is an intentional movement which motivates as it's noetic pole, a world which is absolutely immanent and as it's noematic pole a world which is absolutely transcendent. It is thus the coming about of an immanent world and at the same time a transcendent world. The world comes about as immanent by becoming a mere perspective, by becoming a subjective opinion. Consequently the world comes about as immanent, by becoming the empirical body. Similarly, the world comes about as transcendent, as transcending any subjective or empirical point of view, by becoming the pure transcendental ego as the realm of absolutely objective meanings. The lived world itself, is thus neither immanent nor transcendent. It is the aiming at the transcendent and the 'looking back' at the immanent, in short it is the very movement of transcendence.

Every factor or 'part' of the lived world will be a movement of intentionality whose noesis will form part of the empirical body and whose noema will be absorbed into the realm of pure meanings. The coming about of a perspective of an object as a perspective is at the same time the coming about of the empirical body as occupying a certain position with respect to the object. On the other hand, this coming about of the perspective as a perspective, is the coming about of the pure object meaning and of the transcendental consciousness

but is in fact the coming about of a place or position, so that a movement is always ahead of itself, always beyond where it is at any moment, so the lived world or lived body is always more than what it is.

(III)

(i) LIVED EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO 'IN MY BODY' OR 'IN THE WORLD'

The physiological concomitants of emotion are well recognized. Anger is said to be felt as a warm sensation in various parts of the body. Fear is said to be experienced as "fog in the throat", excitement is supposed to cause "butterflies" in the stomach, sadness, a kind of sour feeling down either side of the body or a tightness across the chest. Even the experience of colours is said to affect the body.²⁹ Red and yellow produce "the experience of being torn away, of a movement away from the centre" while blue and green bring about "repose and concentration".³⁰ Disgust or nausea are said to refer to general sensations in the stomach. Tall buildings or confined places are said to bring about claustrophobia.

On the other hand the body's response to objects or events in the world is not limited to the production of 'feelings', important objects in my visual field are said to attract my attention, are said to bring about a focussing of the eyes at the required distance. In ethics we are said to strive for what presents itself to us as the Good, in religion we are said to worship the One Who is for us God. As philosophers we are said to strive for the truth.

If in our explanation we move from the apprehension of a pure

essence to the response of our bodies or ourselves to this pure essence, if we move from the apprehension of the pure meaning of a tragic event, or of a confined space, or of the distance of an object, or of the Good, of God, or the truth, to the response, or reaction of our bodies to this apprehended significance, in other words if we move in our explanation from the apprehended essence, to the sour feelings in the throat, to the claustrophobia or on the other hand to the activity of focussing, or being moral, or worshipping or philosophizing ——— we overlook the fundamental feature of these phenomena. The extent to which I am capable of grasping the pure significance of the tragic event, or of the confined space is also the extent to which my body no longer responds. The extent to which I recognize the importance of an object is the extent to which my attention is already there. The extent to which the object takes up a specific distance from me is the extent to which I already have focussed onto it, and the extent to which I recognize the truth is the extent to which I no longer need to philosophize.

The physiological concomitants of emotion or more generally the behaviour of an involved subject cannot be explained on the basis of a response of the body to an intellectually grasped significance. On the other hand we have already seen in our criticism of psychologism that we cannot explain the significance as a reflection on the behaviour of the body. The behaviour of the body and the significance occur together, they are the noesis and noema of an intentional movement.³¹

Before being experienced as a feeling or an event in the empirical body, 'sourness' emerges as the 'substance' of a tragic

event. The 'tightness across my chest', the 'burning in my throat' are there in the situation, permeating the singers, their operatic expressions and the modulation of their voices. My 'throat' and 'chest' are not a throat and chest as they are for the physiologist, they are the very fabric of this tragedy, they are extended through the situation, as the perspective of an object permeates the entire object.³²

Moral behaviour, the act of worship, the act of philosophizing, before being real empirical events, are the very coming about of the Good, of God and the truth.

(ii) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MOTIVATE AND CREATE

We have stressed that the noema and noesis exist only as poles motivated by an intentional movement. In what way does 'motivate' differ from 'create'? If the colour, the tragedy, the confinement of a space, the distance or importance of an object, the Good, God and the truth are not 'already there' but exist only as motivated poles of the intentional movement which is ultimately the involved subject himself, how does such an intentional movement differ from creation? Could I not bring about the presence of red or blue merely by taking up the required bodily behaviour? Could I not bring about the existence of God merely by going through the procedures of an act of worship? This problem involves the relationship between me as a personal free thinking consciousness and the lived body and will be dealt with in our discussion of language. Nevertheless, we must at this stage attempt to consolidate the

distinction between our position and Idealism.

At the end of our discussion of the transcendental ego we came across the problem of how the transcendental ego could constitute in absolute freedom, if it constituted in accordance with the categories of the understanding. We saw that since all constituting activity was self-conscious, everything constituted was either pure meaning, or part of a situation, which when taken as a whole, was itself reducible to pure meaning. It is the empirical ego which apparently constitutes an absurdity. The transcendental ego however constitutes both the situation and the empirical ego, and understands the absurdity as a perfectly reasonable response of the empirical ego.

We differ from Kant in that we do not accept fixed categories, because as an intentional movement, the coming about of meaning is at the same time the coming about of the meaning of meaning. The lived body or lived world as the horizon is itself an intentional movement, consequently the horizon against which all meaning appears i.e. the condition of meaningfulness is a self-transcending movement. Furthermore, the involved subject, unlike the transcendental ego, only aims at absolute self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it remains true, that taking up the required bodily attitude or behaviour will not be the noesis of say the colour red, or of the existence of God, it will be the noesis of an intentionality which aims at the significance of the theory. There is a more primordial intentional movement which precedes this emulated one, an intentional movement which motivates as it's noesis "the conscious taking up of a bodily attitude, or kind of behaviour" and as it's noema, the significance of this theory.

(iii) THE SELF TRANSCENDENCE OF THE 'LIVED BODY' OR 'LIVED WORLD'
AS THE HORIZON OF ALL INTENTIONALITIES

As the imperfect unity transcends itself through that which it motivates, so the lived body transcends itself through the intentionalities it motivates. Every experience I have or every truth I discover serves as a stepping stone for the discovery of higher or more all-embracing truths or experiences. Through every experience the lived body transcends itself becoming an ever more profound horizon. The man who in his youth found certain works of art boring or even irritating now begins to enjoy those works, not because he has acquired in the meantime a wealth of information or the ability to "know what to look for", but because the horizon against which the painting appears, i.e. the conditions of meaningfulness or beauty have changed. The lived body has extended itself or absorbed into itself, let us say the Cubist attitude towards colour and beauty, so that the cubistic elements of the painting will be able to appear as beautiful.³³

But the self-transcendence of the body not only enables me to appreciate things, I can use tools, play musical instruments and drive a car, not because I have with me a hoard of information on how to manipulate these things, but because they have become part of the horizon of all intentional processes i.e. they have merged into the lived body. I may also appropriate a foreign language or even a philosophy, in each case I extend the power of my body, and the horizons of my world.

The most important feature of this power of absorbing is

not that the body is capable of taking up ever new points of view,
but that each new point of view encompasses within itself the previous
point of view i.e. the body is a movement of self-transcendence.

Reason, we have seen, is only the pole or the sense of such a movement.

University of Cape Town

L I V E D R E A S O N
T H E P H E N O M E N O N O F C O N S T A N C Y

(i) INTRODUCTION

Within transcendental theory the object is defined as being the perfect unity, or the law of it's various manifestations. White for example is the law of the infinite possible appearances of white under different lighting. Each appearance is of course no more than an appearance of this pure essence, so that although the empirical ego may experience the various appearances, for the transcendental ego there is always only one 'white'. The constancy of the colour for the transcendental ego will be absolute. For the empirical ego on the other hand, since it is only presented with the appearances, there will be no constancy at all, any identity of the colour will be merely subjective association.

We have mentioned that for the involved subject, the perspective of the object permeates the entire object. How can we account for the identity of the object through various perspectives?

When we begin to speak about an object with an identity we already presuppose the speaking or more generally the 'meaning' intention. We have thus far referred to the lived object as an intentional movement which aims at the pure essence. We must now realize that such a description is an over-simplification. As we will see later, only the speaking or meaning intention aims at the pure essence.

The speaking intention brings about as it's noetic pole a silent world or a silent body and as it's noematic pole the world of pure

essences. The silent world does not precede the speaking intention, it comes about with the speaking intention. The speaking intention is the coming about of the identity of the object. Prior to the speaking intention, the object neither has an identity, nor does it lack an identity (i.e. it is not an association of manifestations) the question of identity has not yet arisen. We must not confuse the silent world, the noetic pole of the speaking intention with the world which precedes this speaking intention.

The lived world or the lived body is this realm which precedes and which motivates the meaning or speaking intention. We need to uncover a form of identity which precedes the speaking intention, i.e. we must uncover 'lived Reason' or constancy.

The meaning of a painting can be seen either in the light of its texture, colour or line in which case the meaning arrived at would be the textural, the colour or the linear meaning. Although in the textural meaning, colour is not excluded it is not as important as the texture. For a transcendental ego, no perspective can have any higher status than another because the object-meaning absolutely transcends its perspectives. As an intentional movement however, the involved subject is a purpose in the world. For the thirsty man water in a glass is the STANDARD appearance of water, it is the most revealing perspective. Ice and water vapour are essentially only derived from water-as-a-liquid.

In spite of the fact that the standard perspective is not always explicitly presented, the object is the same object, the meaning aimed at through any other perspective is always the meaning aimed at through the standard perspective. This phenomenon which

'preserves the identity' of the object through its various manifestations, is known as constancy.

(ii) COLOUR CONSTANCY

Because an object does not entirely transcend its appearances, unless its colour maintained a certain constancy throughout changes in types of illumination, the object could have no identity. Colour constancy is thus an aspect of the constancy of objects and ultimately of the world, i.e. colour constancy is an aspect of Reason. For an involved ego one perspective of the object is the standard appearance, the most revealing, or telling encounter with the object, consequently one colour becomes the standard of a host of possible colours. Colour constancy is achieved, when this standard colour is maintained through variations in illumination.

Colour constancy, like all aspects of Reason, is however never absolutely maintained or brought about, it is always only 'aimed at'.

I have been reading with an electric lamp for some time. The curtains of my room are firmly closed, and my lamp casts a white circle on the opposite wall. The moment the curtains are opened and the sun shines into the room, the light of my lamp takes on a yellow colour and casts a pale yellow circle onto the otherwise white wall. This yellow colour however is in some strange way unreal, it is not the sort of yellow I could ever find on a colour chart.³⁴ At no point do I ever believe this circle on the wall to be yellow in the same way that the rest of the wall is white. This yellow circle is for me a white wall seen under yellow light. It is

yellow, not as yellow but as a perspective of white. For an empiricist, one for whom the whole is no more than an accumulation of parts, for whom white is the collective name for a host of various colours, there could be no difference between this yellow on the wall and the yellow of a colour chart. Through experience and memory I will be able to predict that the yellow patch will disappear once the lamp is switched off, but this prediction owes nothing to the colour I see. For the transcendentalist on the other hand, one for whom the parts are absolutely absorbed into the whole it would be impossible for me to distinguish between this yellow and the white it manifests. The constancy of the white of the wall would be absolute.

For the involved subject this yellow circle cast on the wall by the reading lamp is 'unreal' because it is an intentional movement which only looks back at real yellow and which only aims at white. It is thus itself neither yellow nor white. It is the coming about of the wall as white and of the yellow as a perspective of white, the appearance of white in the light of an electric lamp.

We have often stressed that both noetic and noematic poles do not precede the intentional movement, but are in fact motivated by it. The intentional movement is not the 'understanding' of the noetic pole. It is not as if I first of all perceive the real yellow and then take account of the effect of the reading lamp and in this way infer, that the colour must be white. Before it was possible for me to take account of the effect of the lamp i.e. before the curtains were opened, the circle on the wall was white and not yellow!

We have seen that before being a visible spectacle colour, like everything else emerges as an orientation or a behaviour of the lived body or lived world, it emerges as a "motor physiognomy". We have also seen how this lived body transcends itself and how consequently a motor physiognomy changes or transcends itself in terms of its motivated poles. As the horizon transcends itself, so do the objects seen against it. Since the lived body aims at the transcendental ego all colours will aim at what they are when seen under perfectly white light, a light which in no way affects the colours i.e. the colours will aim at their standard appearance.

As the curtains were opened the body aimed at this new horizon and immediately the colour of the light of the lamp was yellow, not because it was yellow from the start, but because within the transcending horizon it appears as yellow. The coming about of the noesis as noesis is the coming about of the noema. The coming about of the yellow circle cast on the wall as the effect of the lamp does not enable us to 'infer' the actual colour of the wall, it is that colour i.e. it is white.

We must bear in mind that the lived body is itself an intentional movement, and that it only aims at the transcendent horizon and always looks back at the transcended horizon. In other words neither the light of the lamp nor sunlight are absolute givens, they are merely the poles of the intentional movement known as the lived body or lived world.

A confusion might emerge here however, a confusion which will also be possible in all the other analyses of constancy. We have

stressed that the lived world is a realm of intentionalities, nevertheless, there are situations where there is only one light source. Under these circumstances a colour will take up its standard appearance. Would this not imply that it is no longer an intentional movement but an absolute quality? No situation is ever static. For an involved subject time itself is a movement of transcendence, every situation and consequently every colour participates in the coming about of the meaning of my life or of the world. It might be difficult to appreciate the fact that the green of the grass and the blue of the sky are not absolute givens, but intentional movements, precisely because we are so much inclined to explain any differences we might be aware of or any indeterminism of the colour, as being due to the way in which we happen to feel that day. In the perception of works of art however, it is not uncommon to find that the sudden appreciation of a painting brings with it the strange feeling that the colours themselves have changed

(iii) SIZE CONSTANCY

As with colours, objects have a certain standard or ideal appearance. Although there might be an infinite number of distances at which I can view the object, one distance becomes the standard. Under normal conditions this distance will be great enough so that I am presented with as much of the object as possible, and it will be small enough so that I am presented with as distinct a perspective as possible. In short, the standard perspective is the most fruitful, the one which can account for all other perspectives, the one which

enables us to have the most 'telling' grip on the object.

Size constancy is made possible by the fact that size is partially absorbed into a significance, into the object-meaning, so that irrespective of the distance from me, the object will always take up its 'standard size'. As with colour however, size constancy is only aimed at, and we must endeavour to grasp size as an intentional movement.

A large object A is placed some distance away while a smaller object B is placed closer to me so that both objects produce the same size image on the retina. As long as my view remains monocular and protracted (with the aid of screens) so that I am unable to see anything other than the two objects, they will appear to be identical in size. The moment I remove the screens and focus on to the object with both eyes, the object A, will be seen as being larger but further away. Both objects are seen as having the size they would have had, had they been seen from the standard distance. Nevertheless, there is something 'unreal' about the size of object A, something that makes me qualify the statement, "A is larger" by adding "but further away". Here again the Empiricist would deny that the removal of the screens affected what was seen. The only difference lies in what can now be predicted about the behaviour of this object with respect to its size. For the Idealist on the other hand constancy is perfect and the object retains its size irrespective of its distance from the observer.

With respect to its size the object A is an intentional movement which motivates as its noesis, the object having the size it would appear to have, if its distance from me was not "taken into account" i.e. if the distance from me was taken as standard. On the

other hand the noema of this intentional movement is the object with the size it would have, had it been seen from the standard distance i.e. had the distance from me been "taken into account".

As with colour however there is no possibility of a real process of "taking account", since the actual size and the distance of the object can never be grasped in isolation. The coming about of the uncorrected size as uncorrected is the coming about of the correct size. Noesis and noema are mutually dependent, both are poles of an intentional movement.³⁵

As with all objects, size is aimed at through a bodily orientation or through a certain 'motor physiognomy'. Increasing the distance between the observer and the object is analogous to changing the source of illumination. The 'motor physiognomy' which is the emergence of a certain size, remains constant, but the body itself as that which enacts this motor physiognomy has changed. The object appears as having it's standard size, but far away. Here again, since the body only aims at the transcendent horizon, the standard size is only aimed at.

It is not true to say that the standard size is only aimed at because the object is actually situated at a distance. The object is at a distance because it's size is only aimed at. We need to understand distance in terms of this 'aiming at' of objects. Unlike the transcendental ego which is it's world, the involved subject only aims at his world. One aspect of this aimed at quality of objects, comes about as the phenomenon of distance.

(iv) PERSPECTIVE CONSTANCY

Let us suppose I am confronted by a completely unfamiliar object, and that seen from my first position it appears to be supported by two legs. As I move around the object however, as I see it from different points of view I learn progressively that it is in fact supported by four legs. The side of the object which reveals to me that the object has four legs is the most fruitful or revealing side of the object, it is the standard point of view. This standard point of view partially transcends the other points of view because it can explain how they are possible while the reverse does not hold.

There is a constancy of perspective because no matter which point of view I now take up, the object will always be the one with four legs i.e. it will be the object seen through the standard perspective. If for instance I return to my original position, the position from which I originally saw the object supported by two legs, I will continue to see an object supported by four. But here again constancy is not perfect and I will neither see four legs as I did from the standard point of view nor will I see two as I did from the original point of view. If I say that the object is supported by four legs, I always have to qualify this by saying "But two are hidden". We need to grasp this perspective as intentional, as a movement which motivates as it's noesis, the original perspective, when the object was seen as having two legs, and which motivates as it's noema, the standard perspective.

Prior to being grasped as the movement of an empirical body through various spatial positions, the exploratory movement through which the object revealed more and more of itself, or rather through which the object transcended itself, must be seen as the self-

transcendence of the lived body.³⁶ At no point however does the lived body absolutely transcend the localized empirical body, and at no point do I grasp the object in a way which is completely independent of the 'here' and 'now' perspective. The standard perspective presents itself as only aimed at, as if seen through a layer of space. We must attempt to grasp the meaning of being in space as this aimed at quality of the standard perspective.³⁷

(v) CONSTANCY OF ORIENTATION

Of all the possible ways in which an object can be orientated, one orientation is taken as standard and referred to as 'upright'. An object appears in the standard orientation, or is upright, when it is at it's most manipulatable or fruitful orientation. Let us note, here again, that the object is not at it's most manipulatable, because it is upright, on the contrary 'upright' is the very meaning of being in the most manipulatable orientation.³⁸

Strictly speaking, for the empiricist we should be unable to recognize the world if it were inverted, while for the transcendentalist there can be no upsidedown, or upright of the world, these terms being restricted to relationships between objects and between objects and the empirical ego.³⁹

As an involved subject I recognize the inverted object and the fact that it is inverted. I see the object as if upright but inverted i.e. I see the object through a layer of orientational space. Here again the lived body is not restricted to the orientation of the empirical body, nevertheless, it never quite escapes from the

empirical body and only aims at the standard orientation. This aspect of being in space which allows objects to be inverted, upright, or slanting without destroying the identity of the object i.e. this orientational aspect of space must be grasped as the aimed at quality of the standard orientation.

(vi) THE PERCEPTION OF DEPTH

In the perception of depth, thickness or the third dimension, the standard perspective I have of the object is revealed to me by gripping the object in both hands, or by encompassing it in some way with my body. Through an intentional movement of the lived body, an intentional movement which motivates as it's noesis the actual movement of my eyes in focussing on to an object or in bringing about binocular vision, the lived body transcends itself and I am capable of aiming at a grip of even very distant and very large objects.

(vii) MEMORY AND ANTICIPATION

Memories, imaginations, anticipations, dreams and hallucinations are important phenomena in that they are both like and unlike perception. Having rejected the empiricist concept of consciousness as an immanent realm of psychic occurrences, we can no longer explain these other forms of consciousness as purely 'mental occurrences'; occurrences which take place 'in the mind' and not 'in the world'.

The lived body is an intentional movement which looks back at the empirical body enclosed within the present moment, and it looks forward or aims at the transcendental ego which is a-temporal,

transcending time entirely. While the empirical body perceives, remembers or anticipates, the transcendental ego absorbs these various forms of experience into pure consciousness. Here again, for the involved subject we may speak about a standard perspective on consciousness. This standard perspective is 'perception'. On the other hand we can also refer to the standard perspective, or access to a-temporality as being the present moment. Just as the distant object was seen as having its standard size, but seen "through a layer of space", so to remember or to anticipate is to perceive but through a layer of time. Past and future events are not just present in my mind, they are present in the world, but I can only reach them through a layer of time.⁴⁰ Just as we must not grasp space as an infinite series of 'here places', but rather as the aimed at quality of the world, so we must not grasp time as an infinite series of 'now moments', but as that which enables the past and the future to occur in the present, but only as aimed at.⁴¹

The time of the involved subject is neither the present of the empirical body nor the a-temporality of the transcendental ego. The time of the involved subject is the intentional movement which looks back at the present as the most fruitful perspective and aims at a-temporality. (a point of view from which past, present and future will be seen as having equal status) Consequently there is no actual present just as there is no actual a-temporality, both are merely poles of the intentional movement known as time.³⁷

In a similar way the involved subject is neither confined within the realm of perception, nor does he entirely transcend perception and become a pure consciousness, from which point of view perception,

anticipation and recollection are all equal manifestations of consciousness. The involved subject is an intentional movement, an imperfect unity, a consciousness which is permeated by perception.

Neither the present nor perception are given as absolute states within which the involved subject can find itself, both the present and perception, as noetic poles are always only coming about.

(viii) HALLUCINATIONS, DREAMS AND IMAGINATIONS

The worlds of hallucinations, dreams and imaginations are not confined to the immanence of the mind. They are, like the perceived world, an access to the world of pure meanings. The perceived world however, is the standard perspective on this world of pure meanings. We must define the perceived world, as opposed to the dreamt, hallucinated or imagined worlds, as that world which affords me as an involved subject, the most fruitful grip on the world of pure meanings. The lived world is not a perfect unity of the dreamt, hallucinated or perceived worlds, it is an intentional movement which looks back at the perceived world as its noesis, and which aims at the world of pure meaning as its noema. At so stage am I the pure consciousness for whom the hallucinated, dreamt and perceived worlds are all equally legitimate perspectives of the world of pure meaning. On the other hand, at no stage am I ever confined to the perceived world.

The dream, the hallucination and the imagined, aim at being perception. In the dream, the hallucination, or in the imagination I perceive the world, I learn about myself and about the world, but

always through some layer, as if my perception changed key, as a piece of music changes key from C to B^b.⁴² In my dream I perceive objects near and far, I experience flying up and down, but at no stage are these objects and directions identical to their counterparts in the perceived world. The Freudian theory of dreams, maintains that these objects and spatial directions and movements merely 'symbolize' unconscious drives. Such theories belong to the realm of formal thought because they attempt to understand dreams from a completely uninvolved point of view. For the dreamer himself his dreamt objects do not 'represent' otherwise hidden drives, they precede the distinction between object and significance.⁴³ The dream is not confusing or meaningless for the dreamer, it only becomes so, and requires interpretation when the objects of the dream are identified with the objects of the perceived world. In ordinary perception, I see distant objects as being their standard size, not because I am given the retinal image size from which I can infer, or interpret the correct size by taking into account it's distance from me. The object retains it's size irrespective of it's distance from me because the lived body as the horizon of it's appearing is capable of transcending it's empirical limitations. Similarly the dream is meaningful to the dreamer, not through any intellectual interpretation of symbols, but because the lived body is not confined to the world of perception.⁴⁴

The 'interpretation' of dreams is thus somewhat akin to an interpretation of the perceived world in terms of sense data.

The world of the involved subject is neither confined to the perceived world, nor is it ever a world where perception, hallucination, dreaming and imagination are of equal significance, it is an intentional

movement which motivates these two realms as it's noetic and noematic poles respectively. Just as the empirical ego can only appear as an empirical ego for an ego which already transcends it, so the realm of dreams or the perceived world can only appear as a realm of dreams or as the perceived world for a subject which is not confined to either. The lived world is however only the coming about of the dreamt world as dreamt, and the perceived world as perceived.⁴⁵

(ix) REASON WITHOUT ABSOLUTE ABSORPTION:

Our discussion of various forms of constancy could continue ad infinitum. Just as we found a constancy in the perception of colour, so we can find a constancy in the perception of weight, sounds, temperatures, tactile data⁴⁶, movement⁴⁷ etc. In every case we find that the 'lived identity' of the object and ultimately of the world is maintained without the absolute transcending of the sensuous. The world is meaningful not in spite of it's essential facticity or irreducibility, but because of it. Reason is not the ultimate unity of all appearing, but the noema of the intentional movement of the world. It is because the sensuousness of the world is never entirely transcended; because I never entirely escape from being an empirical body, that the constancy of the world is maintained through a layer.

In an important sense, scientific and metaphysical systems are developments of this 'layer'. Newtonian physics for example, reduces all appearances to geometric spatial dimensions i.e. to a meaning which looks back at the experience of volume as the most revealing perspective. Kant reduces all objects to a meaning which looks back

at their appearances when spoken about in logical statements.

But let us not misunderstand this sense of a layer, scientific and metaphysical systems are not the taking up of a point of view which is already there a standard perspective is only the standard perspective for as long as it is the noema of the other perspectives. As with the essence of the object, the standard perspective is motivated by a certain intentionality. We must thus attempt to understand metaphysical and scientific systems as motivated by certain existential projects.⁴⁸

University of Cape Town

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

(i) 'I' AS THE ACCESS TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY

The transcendental ego transcends the empirical ego and is the self-consciousness of an absolutely objective world, consequently it is an absolute intersubjectivity. We have already described the transcendental ego as an absolutely self-conscious empirical ego, but absolute self-consciousness is absolute transcendence, so that although the empirical ego for the 'other' is not the empirical ego for me, we are both the identical transcendental ego. Although the perspective the 'other' has of an object is never the perspective I have of it, because the pure essence absolutely transcends any perspective, in our understanding of this essence we are identical. For an involved subject, such an absolute intersubjectivity is only the noema of the intentional movement which is, the subject itself. On the other hand the isolated empirical body, which is only externally related (i.e. in terms of causality) to the 'other', is only the noesis of this intentional movement. Because I do not absolutely transcend the noetic pole, within the heart of all intersubjectivity is the subject, all for-us is tainted by a for-us-for-me. In that I do partially transcend the noetic pole, the empirical body only exists for the intersubjectivity, every for-me, is a for-me-for-us.

The relationship between 'my' empirical body and the intersubjectivity is like the relationship between the standard perspective and the object. I am the most fruitful perspective or access to the intersubjectivity because I permeate it. The 'other' is a less revealing

perspective on intersubjectivity, and aims at intersubjectivity by aiming at being me. In fact the other is this aiming at being me which looks back at itself as another, or the other empirical body, just as the yellow of my lamp was neither a real yellow nor the real white which it meant, but rather an intentional movement which looked back at the 'actual' perspective and forward to the standard. Just as I perceive the inverted object as if upright but inverted, as if through a layer of orientational space, so I experience the other, as if myself but always through a certain layer.

(ii) THE OTHER ALREADY PRESUPPOSED IN THE 'LIVED BODY' OR 'LIVED WORLD' AND CONSEQUENTLY PRESUPPOSED IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE THING

We have indicated that all objects before revealing themselves as responses of the empirical body on the one hand, and objects in the world on the other, are experienced as a behaviour or orientation of the lived body or lived world, a 'motor physiognomy' which is in fact the lived object, an intentional movement which motivates the empirical body response and the object as it's noesis and noema respectively. Consequently it can be said that all experience is primordially self-experience. We have just suggested that the experience of the other can be understood as an experience of the self, but through a layer. How does such an experience differ from the experience of a thing? What is the difference between a person and a body?

Although the imperfect unity looks back at one manifestation of itself as the most fruitful or revealing, it is not itself that

manifestation precisely because it is still the underlying meaning or explanation of the other manifestations. The imperfect unity partially transcends the standard perspective only because there are other perspectives which merge into it. Although my empirical body is the most fruitful perspective on 'lived intersubjectivity, or on the coming about of the transcendental ego, I as this imperfect unity, as this aiming at the transcendental ego, would be no more than an empirical body without the other. I transcend my empirical body, I aim at the transcendental ego, I am the intentional movement called the lived world precisely because there are other empirical bodies, other systems of associated sensory fields which merge with mine and make possible a lived body. The other is thus for me the very condition of the emergence of anything at all.⁴⁹ I experience the other, not as a system of circles, spheres and colours, but as the coming about of an empirical body as an empirical body ——— but a coming about which unlike the coming about of my own empirical body, is experienced through a layer. I experience the other, as I experience myself, as an intentional movement which looks back at an empirical body and which aims at the same transcendental ego I aim at.

The other will never be me, not because it will require an infinite amount of time for each of us to transcend entirely our empirical bodies, but because the pole we aim at is not a state of being which is even theoretically actualizable, it is merely the sense or direction of a movement of transcendence which is 'lived intersubjectivity.'

I do not have to infer, from watching the man in the street below me struggle against the wind, what it must be like, because at this

moment I am in a strange way that man. I am his bent back, not as I am a bent stick, but as the back of a man for whom there is this terrible wind, for whom there is not much further to go, etc. The other and his world is not a closed system into which I can only 'imagine' myself. Just as it is through the other that I transcend myself as an empirical body so it is through the world of the other that my world transcends being a realm of associated sense qualities, and aims at the world of pure meanings.

To describe the experience of an object purely in terms of sense data, i.e. to describe the object as if experienced from the 'outside', is always to be dishonest, for it is only to the extent that sense qualities mean or refer to something which they manifest, it is only to the extent to which sense qualities are more than what they are, that I am capable of transcending them and becoming aware of them as sense qualities. Ultimately it is only the transcendental ego, for whom the world is absolutely meaningful, who would be able to describe the world in terms of sense data. Similarly, to experience the body of the other as a system of bones, muscles and skin is also dishonest, for the 'other', being presupposed in the transcendence of my own empirical body, is presupposed in my experience of anything at all. It is only to the extent that the other is not an object, to the extent to which the other is an other, that I transcend my empirical body and become conscious of objects.

(iii) THE POSSIBILITY OF RELATIVISING THE SELF

It may be argued that there is an element of conceit or subjectivism in a theory which renders the self and it's world the

standard perspective. Are there not situations in which I recognize that others may be far more enlightened about a certain topic than myself? Such self-relativisations are never entirely honest. If I can recognize my own knowledge as limited, it is because I am beginning to be conscious of my knowing, as the knowing of my empirical body. In order to transcend myself in this respect, I must at least be in anticipation of that which I do not know.

(iv) SPEAKING AS ONTOLOGICAL INTENTIONALITY

We have stressed that the noematic pole of all intentionalities is the realm of pure absolute meaning, at the same time however, our actual analyses have shown only colours, standard shapes, sizes etc. as noema. Furthermore, we have also stressed that these standard shapes, sizes and colours are themselves intentional movements. It would seem that in every case there is a higher intentionality which brings about an object which transcends even the standard perspective, an object which is not only seen from all points of view in space and time, but in all possible situations, and seen by all possible subjects. This is the object brought about by the speaking intention.⁵⁰ Once I have said, "That is a hat", I have brought about an object which will not change if, I open the curtains, change my spatial position etc. The object motivated, transcends even the standard perspective, in fact it is the abstract law of all possible perspectives. We can say that the 'word' or more generally the expressive gesture is the most fruitful perspective of the realm of pure meanings and that the lived body aims at the transcendental ego by becoming an 'expressive body'.

We have already seen how the lived object reveals itself as a motor physiognomy, an orientation of the lived world or lived body which motivates an event of the empirical body and the object as it's noesis and noema. We must now grasp the speaking word as such a motor physiognomy. The speaking word is neither a real empirical event which represents the meaning, nor the meaning itself. It is an intentional process which belongs to that realm which precedes the split between the empirical body and the world i.e. it is a motor physiognomy of the lived body or lived world.⁵¹

Just as the standard perspective partially absorbs into itself all previous perspectives, so the word absorbs into itself the standard perspective. Just as I can partially 'deduce' from the standard perspective what the other perspectives will be like, so I can be said to be able to 'deduce' from the word the possible ways in which the object can appear. In a very important sense all speaking intentions are like magic incantations. They are not merely forms of expression which leave the world intact, they bring about a higher reality.

(v) THE CONSTITUTION OF A SPEAKING EMPIRICAL BODY

If it is true that the speaking intention brings about the meaning of the world and of it's objects, if it is true that this meaning is not 'already there', what prevents me from creating a world ex nihilo? How are we to explain the possibility of telling a lie or just pronouncing a nonsensical string of words? In our discussion of the difference between motivation and creation in ontological intentionality, we explained why I cannot bring about the presence of a colour or of the

truth simply by taking up the required bodily attitude. Here we see this problem emerging on the level of the ontological intentionality of speaking.

If I said, "That is an apple" while pointing at a pear, I would not be miraculously turning a pear into an apple. As Kant would put it, my 'judgement' would not be in the form 'It is

.....' but rather 'I say that

.....' i.e. the noema of my intentional process is not the meaning pear or apple, but rather the meaning, "I am falsely calling a pear an apple". The 'I' which calls the pear an apple is no longer myself, it is the empirical body. The essential point is not whether I am telling a lie or telling the truth, but the noema at which I aim when I am speaking. If in some philosophic discussion it was demonstrated that calling a table a table in no way affected the object or the world, we would have another example of where the table itself was not the pole we were directed towards, but rather the philosophical point being made. If in darkness I stumble against something with square sharp corners, something which I at first take to be a side-board, but as I run my hands over it's flat top, I realize "this is a table", the word 'table' would be motivated to such an extent that it would be as if the world had spoken. The meaning would be in the form 'it is

.....' and not 'I said that

.....' *

(vi) UNDERSTANDING THE OTHER

Before emerging as an object in the world, or as an effect on his empirical body, the object for the other emerges as a motor physiognomy of the lived body which my lived body is in the process

* This distinction is however never absolute, see our discussion of Opacity and transparency of language. p. 101

of absorbing into itself. I experience the world and the empirical body of the other, from the inside, but, as we have seen always through a layer, only as aimed at. The intentional process of speaking is no exception. When the other speaks I understand what he says because it is in a strange way I who speak. I hear the other with my own voice. I am not merely given the product of his speaking activity i.e. the sound, I live through the activity itself.

There is no realm of meaning which precedes his speaking, which I have to infer from the speaking process, just as there is no realm of meaning which precedes my own speaking. Speaking is the bringing about of meaning, not the codification of meaning. Like all forms of intentionality, speaking can be compared to transcendental constitution. The transcendental ego does not entertain some idea about what it wishes to constitute, for this idea would be the constitution itself. Just as there can be no meaning of meaning, so there can be nothing which precedes the word, of which the word is a manifestation.

Before I can understand the other he needs to speak, not because speaking is a way of communicating a meaning, but because unless he speaks, there is no meaning to be communicated, neither for him nor for me.

To 'think to oneself', to tell a lie, or merely to speak nonsense is still to bring about an intersubjective meaning, a meaning however, which we intend the other to misunderstand. As we have seen in the example of calling a pear an apple, the lie, the 'thinking to oneself' or the 'speaking nonsense' bring about a meaning of the form, "I say or I give the impression that". In the case of 'thinking to oneself' for example, I bring about the meaning, "I

give the impression that I am not struck by his bad accent, his effrontery etc., or that I am actually interested in something else." A person 'deep in thought' is not 'in a world of his own', a world within the immanence of consciousness. Generally such a person is carrying on an imaginary dialogue of some or other sort, and as we have seen imagination does not take place 'in the mind'. I cannot say that I have absolutely no idea what the other person is thinking about, not because I can make an inference from the way in which he is sitting or from the expression on his face, nor is it because I am in some way telepathic, but simply because the imaginary world, as the perceived world, is a perspective of the same world which I aim at. I do not understand the other's imagined dialogue as I understand his speech, because he is not speaking to me, because the layer through which I experience the coming about of his meaning obliterates all but the very general structure of this coming about, just as objects at large distances show only their very general features. The thickness of the layer through which I experience the coming about of meaning of the other, increases the indistinct quality or the ambiguity of this meaning, and so increases the probability of my misunderstanding the other.

(vii) MISUNDERSTANDING THE OTHER

We have indicated that there is no pure realm of meaning which precedes the actual speaking, a realm which the other would have to infer. To speak is the direct bringing about of meaning. Nevertheless, this does not imply that it is impossible for me to misunderstand the

other. Let us take as our example the extreme case where the other speaks a language I do not understand. It would be wrong to say that his speaking is for me totally meaningless. I could find it frightening, hilarious or perhaps even mystical, but it can never be nothing for me because it is the producing of sound by a speaking body which tends towards being my body, not as a speaking body, but as a body merely producing sounds, perhaps in the way avant-garde composers use the human voice. It is always possible for me to assert that there is more to the other's speaking than what there is for me, just as it is possible to maintain that one's own knowledge on a certain topic is limited, but as we have seen such self-relativizations are never quite honest.

One learns to understand or speak a foreign language, not by learning to translate from the foreign language into one's own, but rather by absorbing into one's own body the "German or French speaking body". Just as the yellow of my lamp came about as I opened the curtains, just as the distant object became its standard size when I removed the screens so the speaking of the other miraculously takes on a new meaning once my body has extended itself to this new horizon. I understand, not through a mental activity of translation but by the acquisition of a new horizon.

(viii) LANGUAGE NOT A CONVENTION

We have seen that the speaking intention, like transcendental constitution does not presuppose a pure meaning which it will supposedly manifest or communicate. We now need to supplement this idea by

pointing out that as the transcendental ego does not precede its constituting activity but is in fact this constitution itself, i.e. it is the realm of pure meaning, so the speaking subject does not precede his speaking activity, he is himself this coming about of meaning. Just as there is no 'mind' entertaining ideas which need to be expressed so there is no mind, looking for the right word. I do not need to look for the right word or observe the laws of language, not because the process of speaking has become automatic, or a habit, but because language permeates me entirely. Just as the transcendental ego constitutes in accordance with the categories of the understanding without 'bearing them in mind', so I speak a language not by envisaging or silently hearing the word or grammatical structure I wish to use, but because there is no distance between me and the language. It is as natural or immediate for me to shout in anger or blush in embarrassment as it is to call a table a table.⁵²

Language permeates me not as a restriction of the possibilities of what I may mean, but as with the categories of the understanding, by being the very possibility of meaning.

(ix) SPEAKING AS A SELF TRANSCENDING PROCESS, THE COMING ABOUT OF THE MEANING OF MEANING

Speaking differs from transcendental constitution in a very important sense. The transcendental ego does not aim at the world, it constitutes it in accordance with a set of static categories which are the absolute conditions of meaning. Everything constituted appears against the absolute horizon of the transcendental ego. We have

pointed out that the intentional process transcends itself through the poles which it motivates. The speaking subject, as the horizon of all meaning, as the condition of meaningfulness, transcends itself through the speaking process. When I speak I do not constitute a world in terms of the norms of meaning, I bring about those very norms. There is no fixed set of norms of meaningfulness, there is no absolute background against which I speak. Language is not a set of conventions which happen to change from time to time, it is a movement of transcendence and the norms of meaningfulness are the noematic pole of this movement. I am forever combining and using words in new ways not because I am always thinking of something that has never been expressed in the language before, but because to mean is to transcend.

(x) THE OPACITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF LANGUAGE ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE

Within transcendental theory the empirical ego can shout in anguish or joy, can write a poem of love or paint a picture. Neither the shout, the poem or the picture are reducible to clear and distinct ideas, or to pure meaning. Nevertheless, these forms of expression can be understood by the transcendental ego as reactions of an empirical ego. Although the poem itself is not reducible to pure meaning, it is reducible to pure meaning when it is seen as the response of a psychological subject, of a subject determined by 'love' i.e. the poem is reducible to pure meaning through a psychological explanation.

If on the other hand I use words like 'abstraction, transcendence,

universal or Being', there is no psychological explanation why I use them, or why I said what I said, just as there is no reason why the transcendental ego constitutes a world, it constitutes a world simply because it is the realm of meaning. For as long as I speak in terms of abstract Rationalist terminology, why I said what I said, is explained by or absorbed into what I said. The words I use are said to be transparent because my speaking act is contained in the meaning of what I say. What I say is pure meaning, and there is no possibility of understanding my speaking by grasping the situation within which I speak, because the situation is the situation of all situations, the absolute horizon of all meaning, the transcendental ego. If what I say accounts absolutely for the fact that I speak, I must be the transcendental ego, for then there would be no possibility of relativising what I say by understanding it within the horizon of my speaking, since the latter is already absorbed into the former.

For as long as I remain within the realm of clear and distinct ideas, of abstract rationalist terminology, I express no more than what I actually mean to express. What I have to say neither indicates that I am English or German, nor that I belong to the 19th century. My point of view, being absolutely objective, expresses nothing about myself. I am the pure transcendental consciousness, the self-consciousness of the world. All other terminology carries within itself some or other implicit metaphysics or philosophy of life, and consequently must be understood as the words of a situated and responding empirical ego.

As a speaking involved subject the language I use is neither absolutely opaque nor absolutely transparent, i.e. what I say neither

absolutely accounts for the fact that I speak nor does it presuppose being understood as the speaking of an empirical body. Absolute opacity and transparency are merely the noesis and noema of the speaking intention. The meaning I aim at when I speak is a pure meaning i.e. I do not intend it as the meaning of an involved situated subject, for this would amount to a self-relativization (which we have seen is never entirely honest.) Nevertheless, no sooner have I spoken, than I find that I have said more than I intended, I have 'given myself away'. My speaking is no longer the coming to self-consciousness of objective knowledge but rather that of a psychological subject manipulated by his environment. My mode of expression is no longer 'obvious', and although I can never experience my own speaking as totally meaningless, I find that explanations given in the past tend towards being merely verbal solutions.

At any particular moment, my speaking intention aims at a meaning, which is not dependent on or influenced by language, in fact the speaking activity is the coming about of myself as a pure consciousness and the coming about of the dispensability of language. As the noematic pole of the speaking intention, the realm of pure meaning, the realm which entirely transcends language, is not like some Platonic world of pure Ideas, which for practical reasons I am unable to reach; pure consciousness is not some state of existence which I intend to actualize as the Eastern meditator intends to be God, it is rather the 'sense' or 'direction' of a movement of transcendence which we call speaking. The pure essence is beyond our reach, not because it would require an infinite task to explicate it, but because it is the style of our reaching. The intentional process of speaking brings about meaning

or aims at meaning not because it creates meaning ex nihilo, nor because it uncovers a meaning which is already there, but because it is a self-transcending movement.

Similarly we must not regard meaninglessness or opacity as some admixture in all meaning which for practical purposes is impossible to overcome, an admixture which only a transcendental ego could understand in psychological terms. Opacity and transparency, meaninglessness and meaningfulness, must not be opposed as mutually exclusive, they are the poles of a single movement of transcendence, they are it's whence and whither respectively.

(xi) THE IDEA OF AN ETERNAL AND UNIVERSAL PHILOSOPHY

We have seen that reflective thought is unable to grasp the 'essence' of temporality because it attempts to disengage itself from the temporal process and to view time as an infinite series of 'now moments' spread out before it. For the same reason reflective thought is unable to grasp the nature of philosophy. Philosophy does not absorb into one single unity all meaningful questions, because these questions are motivated or made possible by philosophy, and because it transcends itself through them. There is in philosophy no rationally ordered progress, no phenomenological 'method' which can be ceaselessly re-applied. The phenomenological reduction, the intentional analysis are themselves the noesis of the philosophic process, they neither precede nor are they preceded by the phenomenological description, they arise simultaneously with it, as it's other side.

There can never be an absolute and eternal philosophy providing

an absolute meaning foundation for the various sciences and for existence as a whole, not because of the limitations of Reason, nor because such a philosophy would require an infinite research, but because philosophy is the speaking word, and as such, it is the sense or direction of the intentional movement known as the philosophic existence.

University of Cape Town

FOOTNOTES

1. Phenomenology of Perception p.235 "My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'"

2. Ibid. p.311 "Taking up our abode in a certain setting of colour, with the transposition it entails, is a bodily operation and I cannot affect it otherwise than by entering into the new atmosphere, because my body is my general power of inhabiting all environments which the world contains, the key to all those transpositions and equivalences which keep it constant."

See also p.100 "Bodily space can be distinguished from external space and envelop its parts instead of spreading them out, because it is the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the performance, the background of somnolence or reserve of vague power against which the gesture and its aim stand out, the zone of not being in front of which precise beings, figures and points can come to light".

3. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology p.10 "In light of this we can understand the energy which animated all scientific undertakings, even the merely factual sciences of the lower level; in the eighteenth century (which called itself the philosophical century) it filled ever widening circles with enthusiasm for philosophy and for the special sciences as its branches, Hence the ardent desire for learning, the zeal for a philosophical reform of education and of all humanity's social and political forms

of existence, which makes that much abused age of Enlightenment so admirable. We possess an undying testimony to this spirit in the glorious "Hymn to Joy" of Schiller and Beethoven. It is only with painful feelings that we can understand this hymn today. A greater contrast with our present situation is unthinkable"

4. Ibid. p.12 "This is a crisis which does not encroach upon the theoretical and practical successes of the special sciences; yet it shakes to the foundations the whole meaning of their truth. This is not just a matter of a special form of culture — "science" or "philosophy" as one among others belonging to European mankind. For the primal establishment of the new philosophy is, according to what was said earlier, the primal establishment of modern European humanity itself - humanity which seeks to renew itself radically, as against the foregoing medieval and ancient age, precisely and only through it's new philosophy. Thus the crisis of philosophy implies the crisis of all modern sciences as members of the philosophical universe: at first a latent, then a more and more prominent crisis of European humanity itself in respect to the total meaninglessness of it's cultural life, it's total 'Existenz'?"

5. Ibid. p.11 "There begins a long period extending from Hume and Kant to our own time, of passionate struggle for a clear, reflective understanding of the true reasons for this centuries-old failure; it was a struggle of course, only on the part of the few called the chosen ones; the mass of others quickly found and still find formulas with which to console themselves and their readers".

6. Ibid. p.16 "We are now certain that the Rationalism of the eighteenth century, the manner in which it sought to secure the roots of European humanity, was naïve. But in giving up this naïve and (if carefully thought through) even absurd rationalism, is it necessary to sacrifice the genuine sense of rationalism? And what of the serious clarification of that naïvete, of that absurdity? And what of the rationality of that irrationalism which is so much vaunted and expected of us? Does it not have to convince us, if we are expected to listen to it, with rational considerations and reasons? Is it's irrationality not finally rather a narrow-minded and bad rationality, worse than that of the old rationalism? Is it not rather the rationality of a 'lazy reason' which evades the struggle to clarify the ultimate data and the goals and directions which they alone can rationally and truthfully prescribe?"

7. Ibid. p.22 "To ideal space belongs, for us, a universal, systematically coherent a priori, an infinite, and yet in spite of it's infinity - self-enclosed, coherent systematic theory which proceeding from axiomatic concepts and propositions, permits the deductively univocal construction of any conceivable shape which can be drawn in space. What 'exists' ideally in geometric space is univocally decided, in all it's determinations, in advance. Our apodictic thinking, proceeding stepwise to infinity, through concepts, propositions, inferences, proofs, only 'discovers' what is already there, what in itself already exists in truth".

8. Ibid. p.46 "One operates with letters and signs for connections and relations (+, x, =, etc.), according to rules of the game for arranging them together in a way essentially not different, in fact, from a game of cards or chess. Here the original thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the correct results, is excluded".

9. Philosophy of Arithmetic. p.79 "an aggregate arises in so far as a unitary interest and in and with it a unitary observation makes different contents stand out and embraces them. The collective connection can therefore only be apprehended through reflection on the mental act, through which the aggregate comes into being".

10. Ibid. p.86 "The concept of 'something' can naturally not be attained by any thinkable comparison of the content of objects whether physical or mental It obviously owes its genesis to reflection on the psychic act of presentation, as whose content, every definite object is given".

11. Cartesian Meditations. p.24 "Unfortunately these prejudices were at work when Descartes introduced the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans, a separate human 'mens sive animus' and the point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality - in short the change by virtue of which Descartes became the father of transcendental realism, an absurd position, though its absurdity cannot be made apparent at this point Consequently he stands on the

threshold of the greatest of all discoveries - in a certain manner, has already made it - yet he does not grasp its proper sense, the sense namely of transcendental subjectivism, and so he does not pass through the gateway that leads to genuine transcendental philosophy".

12. Ibid. p.26 "The objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that even can exist for me - this world with all it's objects, I said, derives it's whole sense and it's existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental ego, the ego who comes to the fore only with the transcendental-phenomenological epoche'".

13. Ibid. p.25 "Consequently for me, the meditating Ego who, standing and remaining in the attitude of epoche', posits exclusively himself as the acceptance - basis of all Objective acceptances and bases"

14. Ms B 1 5 1x. p.27 - 28 "I conceive of the world as it has meaning for me purely as thus having meaning for me;"

15. Critique of Pure Reason. p.155 B135 "I am conscious of the self as indetical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. This amounts to saying, that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations - to be entitled the original

synthetic unity of apperception - under which all representations that are given to me must stand, but under which they have also first to be brought by means of a synthesis".

16. Cartesian Meditations. p.42 "Synthesis, however, does not occur just in every particular conscious process, nor does it connect one particular conscious process with another only occasionally. On the contrary, as we said beforehand, the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically. Conscious life is therefore an all-embracing 'cogito', synthetically comprising all particular conscious processes that ever become prominent, and having its all-embracing cogitatum, founded at different levels on the manifold particular cogitata The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other synthesis of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time".

17. Critique of Pure Reason. p.169 B.159 "Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me, I require besides the thought of an object in general (in the category) an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so for knowledge of myself I require besides the thought of myself an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought".

18. Ibid. p.155 B.136 "In so far as the manifold representations of intuition are given us, they are subject to the former of these two principles (i.e. the formal conditions of Space and Time); in so far as they must allow of being combined in one consciousness they are

subject to the latter (i.e. the original synthetic unity of apperception) For without such combination nothing can be thought or known since the given representations would not have in common the act of the apperception 'I think', and so could not be apprehended together in one self-consciousness."

19. Ibid. p.159 B.142 "I do not here (in the judgement, 'bodies are heavy') assert that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, in so far as knowledge can be acquired by means of these representations - principles which are all derived from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, that is, a relation which is objectively valid, and so can be adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations that would have only subjective validity - as when they are connected according to laws of associations. In the latter case all that I could say would be, 'If I support a weight, I feel an impression of weight;' I could not say 'It, the body is heavy'. Thus to say 'The body is heavy,' is not merely to state that the two representations have always been cojoined in my perception, however often that perception be repeated; what we are asserting is that they are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be".

20. Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. p.186 "Accordingly, as against the first application of the epoche,

a second is required, or rather a conscious re-shaping of the epoche through a reduction to the absolute ego as the ultimately unique centre of function in all constitution".

21. The Primacy of Perception. p.181 "The world no longer stands before him through representation, rather it is the painter to whom the things of the world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming to itself of the visible".

22. Phenomenology of Perception. p.206 "Every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external perception. If, then, as we have seen to be the case, the body is not a transparent object and is not presented to us in virtue of the law of its constitution, as the circle is to the geometer, if it is an expressive unity which we can learn to know only by actively taking it up, this structure will be passed on to the sensible world. The theory of a body image is implicitly, a theory of perception".

23. Ibid. p.103 "A patient, asked to point to some part of his body, his nose for example, can only manage to do so if he is allowed to take hold of it. If the patient is set the task of interrupting the movement before its completion, or if he is allowed to touch his nose only with a wooden ruler, the action becomes impossible. It must therefore be concluded that 'grasping' or 'touching', even for the body, is different from 'pointing'."

24. Ibid. p.139 "If my hand traces a complicated path through the air, I do not need, in order to know it's final position, to add together all movements made in the same direction and subtract those made in the opposite direction. 'Every identifiable change reaches consciousness already loaded with its relations to what has preceded it, as on a taximeter the distance is given already converted into shillings and pence".

25. Ibid. p.100 "The word 'here' applied to my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other positions or to external co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates, the anchoring of the active body in an object, the situation of the body in the face of it's tasks".

26. Primacy of Perception. p.182 "I cannot say that the water itself - the aqueous power, the sirupy and shimmering element is in space; all this is not some-where else either, but it is not in the pool. It inhabits it, it materializes itself there, yet it is not contained there, and if I raise my eyes toward the screen of cypresses where the web of reflections is playing, I cannot gainsay the fact that the water visits it too, or at least sends into, upon it its active and living essence. This internal animation, this radiation of the visible is what the painter seeks under the name of depth, of space, of colour".

27. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics. p.62 "The 'Flesh' as an 'Element' of Being. Merleau-Ponty turns to the Greek notion of 'element' to make clear what he means by the term 'flesh'. The oldest Greek philosophers looked for the element which would constitute

and penetrate all things. Convinced of the fundamental unity of Being, they tried to explain this unity with the help of the element. The element is conceived by them as a general thing, viz., as a reality which is not a particular being next to other particular beings, but which is yet the essence of all. The element is neither a particular spatio-temporal being nor an abstract idea of our mind; yet it is similar to both because it has the generality of the idea and the reality of spatio-temporal beings. It is a kind of embodied principle which gives a style of Being to everything in which it is present. The element is not a particular appearing thing, but it appears in all appearing reality. It is the general style of Being participated in by all particular beings. It appears everywhere and in everything, and yet it does not itself appear, since it is not a particular being. The element explains the interior unity of different beings. But the plurality is possible only within a fundamental unity. It would make no sense to speak of plurality if the many things did not belong together. We always presuppose this fundamental unity but usually do not make a problem of it. Metaphysicians traditionally say that all things belong together since they all participate in Being. Merleau-Ponty gives a more material name to the worldly unity of all beings, speaking, therefore, of the 'element'."

"The 'flesh' is an 'element of Being The 'flesh' is not a fact or a collection of facts. Yet it coheres with the 'here' and 'now'. We sense here the reason why Merleau-Ponty avoids abstract metaphysical terms; his Being is corporeal worldly. The 'element' the 'flesh', is not a concrete thing appearing 'here' and 'now',

but it makes possible every appearance which is 'here' and 'now'. It inaugurates the fundamental realm of the 'here' and of the 'now'. It is not a particular fact, but it makes the appearance of facts possible. He calls the 'flesh' a 'facticity' i.e. that which makes possible all facts. The element is not a particular meaning, but it makes meaning possible since it concentrates all partial facts around their source".

28. Phenomenology of Perception. p.377 "What I discover and recognize through the cogito is not psychological immanence, the inherence of all phenomena in 'private states of consciousness', the blind contact of sensation with itself. It is not even transcendental immanence, the belonging of all phenomena to a constituting consciousness, the possession of clear thought by itself. It is the deep seated momentum of transcendence which is my very being, the simultaneous contact with my own being, and with the world's being".

29. Ibid. p.209 "It has long been known that sensations have a 'motor accompaniment' that stimuli set in motion 'incipient movements' which are associated with the sensation of quality and create a halo round it, and that the 'perceptual side' and the 'motor side' of behaviour are in communication with each other. But it is usual to procede as if this relation left unaffected the terms between which it stands".

30. Ibid. p.210 "Green is commonly regarded as a 'restful' colour. 'It encloses me within myself and brings a peaceful state'

says one patient. It 'makes no demands on us and does not enjoin us to do anything' says Kandinsky. Blue seems to 'yield to our gaze' says Goethe. On the other hand he adds, red 'invades the eye'. Red has a rending and yellow a 'stinging' effect" says one of Goldstein's patients. Generally speaking we have on the one hand with red and yellow, 'an experience of being torn away, of a movement away from the centre'; on the other hand, with blue and green, that of repose and concentration".

31. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics. p.50 "The affinity between our look and the things makes one think of Leibniz' 'pre-established harmony'. It is as if our look knows the things before knowing them; it adapts itself to them in order to see them, and it does so in a dominating way. The movements of our look do not cause chaos, but bring forward a visible world. We cannot say whether our look or the visible things dominate the visual field what is this remarkable visual prepossession of the visible world? How can we question the visible world in the way this world requires questioning? How is such an 'inspired exegesis' possible?"

32. Phenomenology of Perception. p.211 "When we say that red increases the compass of our reactions, we must not be understood as having in mind two distinct facts, a sensation of redness and motor reactions - we must be understood as meaning that red, by its texture as followed and adhered to by my gaze, is already the amplification of our motor being. The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting which is affected

or changed by it, it is a power which is born into, and simultaneously with a certain existential environment, or is synchronized with it".

33. Ibid. p.393 "Van Gogh's paintings have their place in me for all time, a step is taken from which I cannot retreat, and, even though I retain no clear recollection of the pictures which I have seen, my whole subsequent aesthetic experience will be that of someone who has become acquainted with the painting of Van Gogh, exactly as a middle class man turned workman always remains even in his manner of being a workman, a middle-class-man-turned-workman, or as an act confers a certain quality upon us for ever, even though we may afterwards repudiate it and change our beliefs. Existence always carries forward its past, whether it be by accepting or disclaiming it. We are, as Proust declared, perched on a pyramid of past life, and if we do not see this, it is because we are obsessed by objective thought"

34. Ibid. p.225 "I am sitting in my room, and I look at the sheets of white paper lying about on the table, some in the light shed through the window, others in the shadow. If I do not analyse my perception but content myself with the spectacle as a whole, I shall say that all the sheets of paper look equally white. However some of them are in the shadow of the wall I notice that the sheets over which the shadow is thrown were at no time identical with the sheets lying in the light, nor yet were they objectively different from them. The whiteness of the shaded paper does not lend itself to precise classification within the black-white range".

35. Ibid. p.259 "It follows that the phenomenon of 'apparent

size' and the phenomenon of distance are two phases of a comprehensive organization of the field, that the first stands to the second neither in the relation of sign to meaning, nor in that of cause to effect, but that, like the motivating factor to the motivated act, they communicate through their significance. Apparent size as experienced, instead of being the sign or indication of a depth invisible in itself, is nothing but a way of expressing our vision of depth".

36. Ibid. p.204 "I do not need to take an objective view of my own movement, or take it into account, in order to reconstitute the true form of the object behind its appearance; the account is already taken, and already the new appearance has compounded itself with the 'lived through' movement and presented itself as an appearance of a cube".

37. Ibid. p.139 "We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time."

38. Ibid. p.249 "What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place' defined by its task and situation".

39. Ibid. p.252 "For a thinking subject a face seen 'the right way up' and the same face seen 'upside down' are indistinguishable. For the subject of perception the face seen 'upside down' is unrecognizable. If someone is lying on a bed, and I look at him

from the head of the bed, the face is for a moment normal. It is true that the features are in a way disarranged, and I have some difficulty in realizing that the smile is a smile, but I feel that I could, if I wanted, walk round the bed, and I seem to see through the eyes of a spectator standing at the foot of the bed. If the spectacle is protracted, it suddenly changes its appearance; the face takes on an utterly unnatural aspect, its expressions become terrifying, and the eyelashes and eyebrows assume an air of materiality such as I have never seen in them."

40. Ibid. p.364 "Our individual past for example, cannot be given to us either on the one hand by the actual survival of states of consciousness or paths traced in the brain, or the other by a consciousness of the past which constitutes it and immediately arrives at it; in either case we should lack any sense of the past, for the past, would strictly speaking be present. If anything of the past is to exist for us it can be only in an ambiguous presence, anterior to any express evocation, like a field upon which we have an opening. It must exist for us even though we may not be thinking of it and all our recollections must have their substance in and be drawn from this opaque mass. Similarly, if the world were to me merely a collection of things, and the thing merely a collection of properties, I should have no certainties but merely probabilities, no unchallengeable reality but merely conditional truths. If the past and the world exist, they must be theoretically immanent - they can be only what I see behind and around me - and factually transcendent - they exist in my life before appearing as objects of explicit acts".

41. Ibid. p.333 "I cannot conceive the world as a sum of things, nor time as a sum of instantaneous present moments, since each thing can offer itself in it's full determinacy only if other things recede into the vagueness of the remote distance, and each present can take on its reality only by excluding the simultaneous presence of earlier and later presents, and since thus a sum of things or of presents makes nonsense".

42. Ibid. p.340 "I perceive a world covered with swellings It is as if my perception suddenly changed key to become perception in intumescence, as one plays a piece of music in C or B flat Just then my whole perception was transformed and, for an instant, I perceived a rubber bulb. Does that mean that I saw nothing else? No, but I had the feeling of being transferred to a setting such that I could perceive in no other way". (Sartre)

43. Ibid. p.284 "When we speak of an elevated or a low morality, we are not extending to the mental a relationship, the full significance of which is to be found only in the physical world, we are making use of 'a direction of significance which so to speak runs through the various regional spheres and receives a particular significance (spatial, auditory, spiritual, mental, etc.) in each one. The phantasms of dreaming, of mythology, the favourite images of each man or indeed poetic imagery, are not linked to their meaning by a relation of sign to significance, like the one existing between a telephone number and the name of the subscriber; they really contain their meaning which is not a notional meaning, but a direction of our existence.

When I dream that I am flying or falling, the whole significance of the dream is contained in the flight or the fall, as long as I do not reduce them to their physical appearance in the waking world, and so long as I take them with their existential implications. The bird which hovers, falls and becomes a handful of ash, does not hover and fall in physical space; it rises and falls with the existential tide running through it, or again it is the pulse of my existence, its systole and diastole".

44. Ibid. p.339 "Depersonalization and disturbance of the body image are immediately translated into an external phantasm, because it is one and the same thing for us to perceive our body and to perceive our situation in a certain physical and human setting, for our body is nothing but that situation in so far as it is realized and actualized".

45. Ibid. p.343 "We succeed, therefore, in accounting for hallucinatory deception only by removing apodictic certainty from perception and full self-possession from perceptual consciousness."

46. Ibid. p.313 "The phenomenon of constancy is a general one. It has been found possible to speak of a constancy of sounds, temperatures weights, and indeed data which are in the strict sense tactile, a constancy itself mediated by certain structures, certain modes of appearance of phenomena in each of these sensory fields".

47. Ibid. p.278 "When I transfer my gaze from one object to another I am unaware of my eye as an object, as a globe set in an

orbit, of its movement or state of rest in objective space, or of what these throw upon the retina. The figures for the alleged calculation are not given to me. The immobility of the thing is not inferred from the act of looking, it is strictly simultaneous with it, and the two phenomena envelop each other, what we have is not two terms of an algebraic expression, but two 'moments' in an organization which embraces them both" i.e. we are an intentional movement motivating a noesis and noema respectively.

48. Ibid. p.286 "Like space, causality, before being a relation between objects, is based on my relation to things. The 'short-circuits' of delirious causality, no less than the long causal chains of methodic thought, express ways of existing".
 "That is why one can say with Scheler (Idealismus - Realismus p.298) that Newton's space translates the emptiness of the heart".

49. Ibid. p.352 "Between my consciousness and my body as I experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the system. The possibility of another person's being self-evident is owed to the fact that I am not transparent for myself and that my subjectivity draws it's body in it's wake".

50. Ibid. p.181 "In the first place speech is not the sign of thought, if by this we understand a phenomenon which heralds another as smoke betrays fire. Speech and thought would admit of this external

relation only if they were both thematically given, whereas in fact they are interwoven, the sense being held within the word, and the word being the external existence of the sense. Nor can we concede as is commonly done that speech is a mere means of fixation, nor yet that it is the envelope and clothing of thought. Why should it be easier to recall words or phrases than thoughts if the alleged verbal images need to be reconstructed on every occasion? And why should thought seek to duplicate itself or clothe itself in a succession of utterances, if the latter do not carry and contain within themselves their own meaning? Words cannot be 'strongholds of thought, nor can thought seek expression, unless words are in themselves a comprehensible text, and unless speech possesses a power of significance entirely its own. The word and speech must somehow cease to be a way of designating things or thoughts, and become the presence of that thought in the phenomenal world, and moreover, not its clothing but its token or its body".

51. Ibid. p.235 "The word 'hard' produces a sort of stiffening of the back and neck, and only in a secondary way does it project itself into the visual or auditory field and assume the appearance of a sign or a word. Before becoming a symbol of a concept it is first of all an event which grips my body, and this grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it has reference Words have a physiognomy because we adopt towards them, as towards each person, a certain form of behaviour which makes its complete appearance the moment each word is given".

52. Ibid. p.189 "It is no more natural, and no less conventional,

to shout in anger or to kiss in love than to call a table a 'table'. Feelings and passionate conduct are invented like words. Even those which like paternity, seem to be part and parcel of the human make up are in reality institutions. It is impossible to superimpose on man a lower layer of behaviour which one chooses to call natural, followed by a manufactured cultural or spiritual world. Everything is both manufactured and natural in man

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