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Towards A *Pax Africana*: Southern African Development Community's Architecture and Evolving Peacekeeping Efforts, 1996 - 2009

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**A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
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Declaration:

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

Based on library research this thesis examines the contribution of the SADC's peace and security efforts towards enhancing the larger security on the African continent. While it is acknowledged that peace and security involve peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building; the research focused only on the peace and security mechanisms of SADC between 1966 and 2009. A central argument is that the SADC's peace and security system does enhance the evolution of a wider AU peace and security architecture. In furtherance of this argument, the thesis addressed the evolution of SADC from its predecessor the SADCC, the evolution of the African Stand by Force and the role of SADC in this process. In the end the study identified the necessity for certain policy reforms to ensure SADC's better contribution to AU's over all peace and security architecture: i) being donor-driven, SADC should remain the driver of its projects and set its own agenda for projects and strengthen its financial management systems in order to attract international funding; ii) SADC members should commit themselves to implementing its policies and strengthening its National Committees (SNCs); iii) The responsibilities of the SADC secretariat need to be revisited to grant it more executive powers on decision-making for achieving its security agenda; iv) Limited and inadequate staffing hampers SADC's overall security objectives, therefore, the SADC secretariat must be supported with additional capacity in competent programme management, planning, monitoring, finance, procurement and administration; and, v) HIV/Aids remains a challenge for SADC's peacekeepers and a policy should be implemented to cater for peacekeepers by specifying a timeframe and length of period for deployment of military personnel on peacekeeping missions with a moratorium set for much high ranking officials overseeing such missions.

Acronyms

African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)
African National Congress (ANC)
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
African Peace Facility (APF)
African Standby Force (ASF)
African Union (AU)
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)
Arab Magreb Union (AMU)
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
AU planning elements (PLANLEMs)
Civilian Police (CIVPOL)
Command, communication, Control and Coordination (C3)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC)
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DbSA)
Early Response Mechanism (ERM)
East African Community (EAC)
East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM)
Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM)
North Africa Regional Capability (NARC)
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
European Development Fund (EDP)
European Union (EU)
European Union (EU)
Field Training (FTX)
Finance and Investment (TIFI)
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR)

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique/ Mozambique's Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
Front Line States (FLS)
Infrastructure and Services (IS)
Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM)
Inter State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC)
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KPTC)
Lesotho Defence Force (LDF)
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Ministerial Committee (MC)
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
Mutual Defence Pact (MDP)
National Liberation Movements (NLMs)
Nordic Standby High Readiness brigade (SHIRBIRG)
North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)
Planning Element (PLANELM)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)
Regional Economic Community (RECs)
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC)
SADC Brigade Command Post Exercise (CPX)
SADC National Committee (SNC)
SADC National Committees (SNCs)
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC)
SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS)

SADC standby brigade (SADCBRIG)
SADCC Programme of Action (SPA)
Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR)
Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (SHD)
South Africa's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)
South African Defence Forces (SADF)
South African Department of Defence (DOD)
South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO)
Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM)
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO)
Standing Committee of Officials (SATCC)
Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO)
Terms of Reference (TOR)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
United States (US)
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

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1. Chapter One: Introduction

Peace and security is one of the key areas that this thesis focuses on. In the plethora of challenges to peace and security in southern Africa, the thesis addresses peacekeeping as one of those challenges by providing an illustration of SADC's peacekeeping role under its SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The thesis will not address southern Africa's economic situation (regional integration and development has been addressed in chapter two) – however, this is key for the region's stable peace and security architecture. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) created in 1992, with the main aim of achieving economic development and political stability in the sub-region. Earlier, southern Africa was involved in a struggle to shed a colonial history, support liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa. Peace and security issues in southern Africa are now related to, political, economic, and social instability such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and widespread poverty, the painstakingly efforts to create democratic rule, and efforts to maintain political stability and to promote regional integration and development. The SADC treaty of 1992 calls for its member states to promote peace and security, human rights, and democratic governance, and encourages the peaceful settlement of disputes. At its inception, SADC placed more emphasis on the economic stability of the region and less emphasis on peace and security issues. But with instability continuing in Angola and Lesotho and in an effort to rectify this anomaly, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) was launched at a Summit Ministerial meeting in 1996. In 2001, the SADC protocol for the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) was established. The OPDSC was intended to address intra and inter-state conflicts and promote political stability. The other main functions of the OPDSC were to devise appropriate mechanisms to respond to sub-regional conflicts through peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures with flexible and timely responses. Thus far, the record of SADC in managing sub-regional conflicts has been mixed. Military interventions in southern Africa have been plagued with divisions within SADC evident in previous peacekeeping efforts, such as the controversial interventions in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by SADC states, both in 1998. SADC has also been faced with the ongoing challenges of building operational capacity and a strong human resource base and has sought to clarify the relationship between the OPDSC and the Organisation

which is a pre-requisite for establishing an effective security Organ for the southern African region.

International Peacekeeping efforts have, since 1948, evolved into more comprehensive approaches and strategies with varied definitions. Egyptian United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, published a landmark report on addressing peacekeeping in 1992, “*An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*”.¹ This report outlined the complexities of peacekeeping missions and draws on i) “preventive diplomacy” as measures to build confidence, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and demilitarised zones; while ii) “peacemaking” deals with mediation, amelioration through assistance, sanctions, use of military force, and peace-enforcement units; iii) “peacekeeping” involves deployment of troops to separate warring parties; iv) “Post-conflict peacebuilding” includes comprehensive efforts to identify support structures to consolidate peace and provide a sense of confidence and well-being among people; while, v) “Cooperation with regional arrangements and organisations” involves the UN’s conflict management role with regional bodies.² The design of peacekeeping in Africa has changed from previous peacekeeping missions towards a more holistic framework. This framework encapsulates a more nuanced approach to peacekeeping, incorporating a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, peacekeeping operations could include comprehensive efforts to identify support structures to consolidate peace that provide a sense of confidence among people by cooperating with regional bodies and organisations.³ The United Nations, for example, does not have in its Charter of 1945, any specific reference to peacekeeping which is often referred to as “Chapter six and a half”, falling between Chapter six (peaceful settlement of disputes), and Chapter seven (peace enforcement).⁴ The African Union has already deployed past peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2003), Sudan’s Darfur region (2003), and Somalia (2007).⁵ SADC will form one of five sub-regional African Standby Brigades, a force designed to ultimately undertake peacekeeping operations that require observer missions and peacekeeping activities. However, the new thinking

¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), “*An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*” United Nations document A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June, New York, United States.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Musifiky Mwanasali, (2009), “Overheating Chapter VII” in *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press).

⁵ *Ibid.*

about Africa's peace and security architecture is about a multilateral approach by incorporating regional peacekeeping efforts that are comprehensive, systematic, and practical from a sub-regional level to the continental and global levels.

The transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 brought about the creation of other structures within the new body: the AU Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee.⁶ July 2002 heralded the establishment of the Protocol of the African Union's Peace and Security Council at the first ordinary session of the AU in Durban, South Africa, bringing together 53 African heads of state to adopt the protocol of the Peace and Security Council. The main purpose of the PSC is to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts on the continent, while serving as a security institution for early-warning and conflict management in order to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict situations in Africa. Under Article 3 of the PSC, six key areas are stipulated: i) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development; ii) to anticipate and prevent conflicts in circumstances where conflicts have occurred - the Peace and Security Council has the responsibility to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of conflicts; iii) to promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities in order to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence; iv) to coordinate and harmonise continental efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism; v) to develop a common defence policy for the African Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of its Constitutive Act of 2000; and, vi) to promote and encourage democratic practices, "good governance" and the rule of law; to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law and contributing, towards efforts for the prevention of conflicts.⁷ For the Peace and Security Council to function effectively, support will be provided by the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.

⁶ African Union Peace and Security Council. See website address: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/organs/The_Peace_%20and_Security_Council_en.htm.

⁷ African Union (AU) document, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, adopted at the First Ordinary Session of the African Union, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002.

A July 2004 decision emanating from African leaders at the AU Summit meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, brought about the establishment of the African Standby Force.⁸ In June 2008, a further memorandum of understanding between the African Union and sub-regional bodies like SADC was agreed. The 2008 memorandum binds Africa's eight main regional economic communities to the memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security. These include, the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Arab Magreb Union (AMU); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); as well as the two regional mechanisms: the East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) (which goes under the name, the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism, EASBRICOM); and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) (which goes under the name North African Standby Brigade, NASBRIG), which are not managed by a regional economic community.⁹

The thesis focuses exclusively on the Southern African Development Community's architecture and its peacekeeping role in achieving regional integration and security in southern Africa. It is designed to ascertain how best SADC can contribute towards enhancing southern Africa's regional peace and security efforts towards achieving greater security for the African continent. These issues are addressed in the five main chapters. Chapter one, which includes also the introduction, provides a synopsis of SADC's evolving peace and security architecture. Also touched on is the role of peacekeeping efforts of the African Union, and the United Nations, detailing how SADC fits into this peacekeeping framework.

In chapter two, discussed are three key areas of SADC's evolving peace and security architecture and its efforts to promote regional integration and security in the region. In the first area, provided is a contextual background, sketching SADC's predecessors - the creation of the Front Line States (FLS) and its role played in southern Africa's liberation and anti-apartheid struggles

⁸ African Union Standby Force. See website address: <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/asf.htm#>.

⁹ African Union Commission (2008), Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the AU, the RECs, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the regional standby brigades, (Conflict Management Division, CMD, Department of Peace and Security, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), June, accessed at website, www.africa-union.org.

and efforts to create a cohesive region. The second key area addresses the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) of 1980 and the transition made to SADC in 1992. Also provided is an explanation why the transition was made and how this has impacted on regional security. The third key area of the chapter is a discussion of SADC's main peace and security policies and their validity for promoting regional peace and security for the region.

Chapter three examines SADC's peacekeeping role and is guided by three key issues which include: i) a discussion on SADC's peacekeeping role provides an understanding of its main institution that deals with peace and security – the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation of 2001 that was expanded on from the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security of 1996; ii) the second issue in the chapter deals with SADC's peacekeeping activities in southern Africa and elsewhere in Africa; and, iii) this is followed by the third key issue whereby SADC's standby brigade (SADCBRIG), and its role in forming part of Africa's wider brigade, the African Standby Brigade (ASF) is assessed. Also assessed is the SADCBRIG timelines, in particular its readiness in making the 2010 deployment deadline in line with the ASF guidelines. The role of external actors such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are also discussed, in terms of how their support can enhance SADC's peacekeeping missions and the African Standby Force for the benefit of the southern African region and Africa as a whole.

Chapter Four provides an assessment of SADC's security challenges, which addresses seven key areas plaguing SADC's security architecture. These include: I. Complex Scenarios; II. Building Solid Institutions; III. SADC's Military Architecture; IV. Hybrid-Missions: SADC, the AU, and the UN; V. Addressing the Security Resource Challenge; VI. SADC Brigade Readiness: Building the African Standby Force (ASF) Capacity; and, VII. SADC's Peacekeepers: Presenting a Challenge? The chapter deals mainly with identifying challenges that SADC faces in its peacekeeping efforts and its efforts in adopting constructive approaches in complex regional conflict scenarios. It is argued that an effective response to violent conflict requires building effective institutional structures. Further argued, is that effective responses to complex conflict require effective regional institutions. This discussion also identifies the gaps in SADC's Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation structures that could negatively contribute towards achieving sustainable regional peace and security. A discussion on the involvement of

international actors such as funding and peacekeeping missions by the UN and the EU is explored. In recognising that SADC's security architecture for the region has become more intricate and multidimensional, it is necessary to assess the anomalies that exist in SADC's security policies which could hamper regional peace and security. Also discussed is how southern Africa's regional security can be improved by providing an assessment of the SADC Brigade's readiness as part of the ASF for rapid deployment in the region's future conflicts. The chapter ends by noting that enhancing regional peace and security in southern Africa will require a firm commitment of resources such as peacekeeping personnel, funding, and clear timeframes. Finally, the thesis concludes by briefly providing policy recommendations in chapter five, for SADC and its institutions to consider in its future peace and security policies that can directly enhance and positively contribute towards peace, security and political stability in southern Africa.

1.1. Research Question

The thesis focuses exclusively on the Southern African Development Community's architecture and its peacekeeping security role. It is designed to ascertain how best SADC can contribute towards enhancing southern Africa's regional peace and security efforts towards greater security for the African continent and creating a *Pax Africana*.¹⁰ The major research question that is addressed in the proposed thesis is:

Does SADC's architecture have the potential to support southern Africa's regional peace and security agenda?

1.2. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework guided by the main question as outlined in the above tautology. SADC's architecture and its evolving security is discussed, by assessing its peacekeeping role between 1996 and 2009. It is my view that peacekeeping does not only entail deployment of military forces but is a holistic engagement that encompasses other facets, integral to the maintenance of peace, such as deployment of civilian police which is an integral part in the maintenance of peace. Through an analysis of SADC's peacekeeping engagement during the period 1996 to 2009, the thesis aims to show its impact (if any) on southern Africa's overall

¹⁰ A *Pax Africana* is postulated as a triumph of continental jurisdiction, and perhaps of racial sovereignty. *Pax Africana* is borrowed from Ali Mazrui (1967), *Towards a Pax Africana: a Study of Ideology and Ambition* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London), p.211.

regional peace and security. Although the thesis mainly focuses on SADC's architecture and peacekeeping role, it is important to stress that peace and security do not happen in a vacuum, but are related to domestic and external actors and factors. Because of this inter-relatedness, the reality of peace and security determines both in policy and in practice what happens at a sub-regional level, a domestic level, and a continental level.¹¹ Hence, my conceptual framework has mainly focussed on peacekeeping within the SADC region, and in some instances, has only referred to sometimes and occasionally, if and where applicable and when necessary, to the African Union; the United Nations (UN); and the European Union (EU).

1.3. Methodology

The research component of the thesis, is based on library resources, secondary sources, speeches and key role-players. The research is qualitative and has not adopted a quantitative approach.¹² The research undertaken, has been geared towards better understanding the Southern African Development Community's peacekeeping role and contributing towards collective security in Africa. While it is acknowledged that peace and security involves peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; the research has only focused on the peace and security mechanisms of SADC between 1966 and 2009, and assessed how it can support the overall vision of Africa's peace and security efforts. The research has involved a desk-based literature review.

¹¹ See the chapter on regional security in Barry Buzan (1991), *People States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado), (second edition).

¹² Quantitative research is based on observations that are converted into discrete units that can be compared to other units by using statistical analysis. Emphasis is being placed on the statistical part of the research examination as *the* most essential part of quantitative research. Quantitative research is thus based on a positivist position. In 1830 Auguste Comte first coined the word positivism, which for him was synonymous with science or with positive or observable facts, based on measurable variables and provable propositions. Positivism is thus based on explanation, prediction and proof. In, "Science, Faith and Society", Polanyi, M., 1946:21-42, purports that in research, personal judgments, intuitiveness and sensitivity plays a vital role in the world of the scientist itself. Qualitative research examines people's words and actions in narrative or descriptive ways more closely representing the situation as experienced by the participants that is being researched. Qualitative research is based on a phenomenological position. Phenomenology is to understand the meaning events have for individuals, where the person is viewed as having no existence apart from the world and similarly the world has no existence apart from the person. In summary, the debate in research should not be based on the correctness of qualitative versus quantitative theories, but should rather be all encompassing. Questions that need to be addressed in research should be ontology, epistemology, logic, and teleology. Ontological assumptions concern questions about the nature of reality; what is the nature of reality? Epistemological assumptions concern the origins of knowledge; what is the relationship between the knower and the known? and, what role do values play and contribute? Logic deals with principles of demonstration or verification. In the logic of inquiry, are casual linkages between bits of information possible? What is the possibility of generalisations? Teleological questions constitutes what does research contribute to knowledge? What is the purpose of research? The answer to these questions makes up the postulates of the research paradigm and by paradigm I refer to a set of overarching and interconnected assumptions about the nature of reality. Assumptions cannot be proved, hence it is stipulated, these stipulations are called postulates which form a paradigm.

2. Chapter Two: Regional Integration and Security in Southern Africa

2.1. Southern Africa's History: A Contextual Background

Southern Africa's peace and security architecture has evolved over a long period with a history marked by intense inter and intra-state conflicts. The independence gained by seven southern African states from the 1960s represented was the beginning and an opportunity for southern Africa to unite. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) joined in 1998 and Madagascar who joined SADC as a candidate member in 2004 and was formally admitted in 2005,¹³ were the first two states that gained independence in 1960.¹⁴ This momentum was increased with other states gaining independence: Tanganyika, 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963 which together formed Tanzania in 1964; Malawi and Zambia both in 1964; and Botswana and Lesotho in 1966.¹⁵ Even though southern Africa states gained independence from colonialism, the destabilisation tactics of South Africa particularly in the 1980s, remained the core security problem in the region.¹⁶

Between 1970 and 1974, the Frontline States (FLS) were created by a handful of five states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) - formed to support the National Liberation Movements (NLMs): South Africa's African National Congress (ANC); Namibia's South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO); Angola's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) Mozambique's Liberation Front (FRELIMO); and Zimbabwe's two NLMs – the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Zimbabwe's NLMs also tried to unite, but failed.¹⁷ The origins of the FLS stem from the FLS' founders and leaders: Tanzania's Julius Nyerere; Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda; and Botswana's Seretse Khama with the main goal to create political cohesion and a stronger security regime to support the region's NLMs, gain political freedom from colonial rule, and overthrow white minority rule.¹⁸ The FLS initiative was expanded on, and in 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, was created by nine states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania,

¹³ Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, (2006), *The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects* (Institute for Global Dialogue, IGD: Midrand, South Africa) p. 134.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Frank Khachina Matanga, (2002), "Towards an Understanding of the Foreign Policy-Making Process of a New State: The Case of Namibia" in, Korwa Gombe Adar, and Rok Ajulu, *Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, US).

¹⁷ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁸ Khabele, and Kebapetse Lotshwao, (2009), "*Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects*" (University of Botswana) 18 December, p.5. Also see, Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p. 53.

Zambia, and Zimbabwe).¹⁹ The FLS became SADCC and evolved into SADC which was said to be a western creation.²⁰ SADC being the creation of the West had not been widely discussed in political circles. It is considered counterproductive and politically incorrect for western government officials to openly acknowledge that SADCC was the creation of the West for fear of the organisation being labelled an imperialist western puppet who wants to control southern Africa.²¹ However, a strong view exists that SADCC was designed by the West to have SADCC make the transformation from regional cooperation to market integration.²² The international community's involvement in Africa since time immemorial has always been based on the premise of what it can get out of the region and Africa as a whole. This notion strongly centres on the principles of supply, demand, resources, and power. The involvement of the West in SADCC's creation has never been for the sake of peace and security and it would be naïve to think otherwise. International donor support for southern Africa has been huge. External actors and international donors have provided 90 percent of SADCC's budget though sometimes ambiguous roles were played. For example, between 1980 and 1986, the US government indicated that it did not see the southern African region developing without apartheid South Africa's participation due to its strong economy.²³ Hence, support received from countries from the West simultaneously provided funding for SADCC's projects and several western governments continued supporting the apartheid regime.²⁴

Other differing views on the origins and the formation of SADCC, suggest that the FLS was a political response rejecting South Africa's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) invitation.²⁵ Other scholars²⁶ like, Daniel Ndlela note that the initial design of SADC took place in Brussels, created by a Briton, David Anderson, Managing Director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC).

¹⁹ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp. 53-54.

²⁰ Paul-Henri Bischoff, (2002), "How Far, Where To? Regionalism, the Southern African Development Community and Decision-Making into the Millennium" in, Korwa Gombe Adar, and Rok Ajulu, *Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, US) pp. 288-289. Also see, Margaret C. Lee, (2003), *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, (University of Cape Town Press: Cape Town, South Africa), p.49. Also see, Abillah H. Omari, and Paulino Macaringue, (2007), "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective" in, Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani, Abillah Omari, *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Wits University Press: Johannesburg, South Africa), pp. 50-51.

²¹ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.49.

²² *Ibid.*, p.48.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp. 60-61.

²⁶ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, pp. 48-49.

“Upon Anderson’s retirement from Brussels, he sold the idea to the southern African ambassadors in London, notably to the Tanzanian Ambassador. Hence the first mission to Africa and the creation of SADC started from London and not from any southern African capital. Anderson in the company of an African diplomat first travelled to Dar es Salaam and met with the influential Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere who gladly accepted the idea. With the wise counsel of Nyerere, the mission proceeded to Gaborone to brief the late President Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama. This idea fitted in well for these leaders who were grappling with a South African apartheid regime and fierce military on their doorstep and its bullying tactics. Hence, even after the establishment of SADCC, the first executive secretary – a Zimbabwean national, Arthur Blummeris, was retired from Brussels where he was Zimbabwe’s ambassador to come and lead the new organisation. At the SADCC secretariat in Gaborone, British officials, including Anderson maintained the secretariat.”²⁷

SADCC’s secretariat was initially staffed by British nationals, and had only two Africans: the first executive secretary, Zimbabwean Arthur Blummeris and his personal secretary. In 1984, the SADCC staff structure changed with the death of Blummeris, the Britons were replaced by Africans from the southern African region and brought under the second executive secretary’s leadership, Zimbabwe’s Simba Makoni.²⁸ Other interpretations of the formation of SADCC suggests that Mozambique came up with the idea at a meeting in June 1979 held for FLS officials and international cooperating partners to incorporate Zimbabwe into the southern African region. Other dominant views suggest that the FLS was founded on the basis of the ineffectiveness of the Mulungushi Club (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zaire), in particular the autocratic regime led by Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko.²⁹

The political, military and economic muscle of South Africa was set to overpower the southern African region, to gain control, destabilise the region, and to wage war with Angola,

²⁷ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, pp. 48-49. Also see, Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p.61.

²⁸ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, pp. 48-49.

²⁹ Omari, and Macaringue, “Southern African Security in Historical Perspective”, pp. 50-51.

Mozambique, and Namibia (then South West Africa).³⁰ Determined to remain the region's political and economic hegemon, South Africa invited Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) to be part of its grouping of a Constellation of Southern African States that included the fictitious independent states of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.³¹ The struggle for southern Africa continued to loosen the stronghold of South Africa's apartheid regime.³² In 1980, southern Africa's independent states declined South Africa's invitation to join CONSAS.³³ Zimbabwe having gained independence in 1980 emerged as southern Africa's most important player in a bid to reduce dependence of member states on South Africa and to isolate the apartheid regime from the international community.³⁴ Zimbabwe had the largest economy in the southern African region after South Africa. As an important player in southern Africa it fought against colonialism, white supremacy, and supported the liberation movements in neighbouring Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa. Zimbabwe was viewed as both the leader of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference and the Front Line States.³⁵ In 1974 the military coup d'etat that was staged and deposed the regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal came as a shower of blessing, forcing the new regime in Lisbon after its April 1974, coup to promote positive changes in Angola and Mozambique.³⁶ For southern Africa, this was a turning point in its history that allowed for major changes and events to occur, with Angola and Mozambique gaining their independence in 1975.³⁷ Despite the successful independence gained by both Angola and Mozambique, South Africa continued destabilising the region. During the 1970s and into the 1980s, South Africa was determined to fight the Marxist governments in Angola, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which resulted in the South African Defence Forces (SADF) illegally occupying southern Angola.³⁸ External actors played a pivotal role which was both productive and counterproductive dictating how southern Africa's peace and security architecture would evolve. Cuban president, Fidel Castro assisted Angola's struggle with the

³⁰ Omari, and Macaringue, "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective", pp. 50-51.

³¹ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p. 45.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

³³ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, pp. 44-45.

³⁴ Korwa G. Adar, Rok Ajulu, and Moses O. Onyango, (2002), "Post-Cold War Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy-Making Process" in, Korwa G. Adar and Rok Ajulu (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, Hampshire, England), pp.264-265.

³⁵ *Ibid.* Also see, Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.45.

³⁶ Omari, and Macaringue "Southern African Security in Historical Perspective", pp. 50-51. Also see, Assis Malaquias, (2002), "Dysfunctional Foreign Policy: Angola's Unsuccessful Quest for Security since Independence" in, Korwa G. Adar and Rok Ajulu (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa*, (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, Hampshire, England) p.20.

³⁷ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.45. Also see, Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p.54.

³⁸ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.45. Also see, Malaquias, *Dysfunctional Foreign Policy*, pp.13 – 31.

deployment of 50,000 troops.³⁹ In an attempt to prevent a Marxist MPLA government controlling the entire country, South Africa on the other hand was supported by the US-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to have victory.⁴⁰

Peace and security remained elusive for the southern African region. South Africa progressively continued its policy of regional destabilisation. Pretoria fought the Marxist government in Mozambique, strongly supporting the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), against the Mozambique Liberation Front until a ceasefire agreement was reached and the first democratic elections were held in Mozambique in 1994. South Africa continued a 20-year war in Namibia against the South West Africa People's Organisation, which ended in 1989 with Namibia eventually gaining independence in 1990.⁴¹ The costs of the war staged by South Africa through its policy of regional destabilisation in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia, led to an estimated US\$60.5 billion of damages between 1980 and 1988 and resulted in one million deaths and the displacement of millions of people.⁴² The political unrest that engulfed South Africa, between 1984 and 1986 and the intense battle fought by its neighbouring states to gain the support of the international community to apply economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa were the ultimate turning point for southern Africa. The economic sanctions imposed, and the unrest and violence that engulfed South Africa was too costly. The mounting pressure on the apartheid regime led to it eventually abandoning its policy of regional destabilisation.⁴³

2.2. From SADCC to SADC: Towards a Development Community

The further expansion of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference into the Southern African Development Community provided a multilateral platform for member states to achieve greater political and economic stability and regional security. SADCC, created in 1980 and its formal establishment in July 1981⁴⁴, was initially a governmental partnership to strengthen economic development in the region, and to minimise dependence on apartheid South

³⁹ Malaquias, *Dysfunctional Foreign Policy*, pp.19 – 31.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.46. Also see, Frank Khachina Matanga, (2002), "Towards an Understanding of the Foreign Policy-Making Process of a New State, pp.149-151.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.* Also see, Garth le Pere, and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (2002), "Facing the New Millennium: South Africa's Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World", in, Korwa Gombe Adar and Rok Ajulu (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, Hampshire, England), pp.173-174.

⁴⁴ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p. 59.

Africa.⁴⁵ The entire creation of SADCC was a difficult process and it became an international organisation through a long and arduous journey. External actors such as western donors were an important component for SADCC: they funded 90 percent of its budget and had enormous influence over the southern African region. This is evident when the US was backing South Africa's invasion of southern Angola in 1975 while simultaneously funding SADCC and supporting the apartheid regime during the same period.⁴⁶ SADCC's member states had always envisaged South Africa as eventually being part of its organisation. Bearing this in mind, both the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had observer status at SADCC's annual Summit and annual Consultative Conferences.⁴⁷ SADCC was the only regional economic community (RECs) in Africa that rejected the European Union's (EU) market integration model and advocated aggressively for a regional cooperation and development model.⁴⁸

Since SADCC was already in 1976 a concept developed in Brussels, the fundamental change that occurred transforming SADCC's 1980 Memorandum of Understanding and adopting its 1992 SADC Treaty appears to have been inevitable for the southern African region. It became a product largely controlled by western governments and international donors that oversaw over 80 percent of the organisation's funding. The origin and creation of SADCC is vitally important since it suggests whether the Organisation has been able to develop African ownership of its numerous policies. SADCC members have been relying heavily on the support of external actors by way of funding. This was evident during the post-Cold War era (1974 – 1989) when southern African states received US aid of \$53.7 million (1975-79); \$154.4 million (1980-84).⁴⁹ The 1974 coup d'état in Lisbon that brought about changes in Angola and Mozambique raised concerns for the US, perceiving that the new communist movements and self-proclaimed Marxist regime in Angola and Mozambique would filter through into the region into Namibia and into South Africa. Hence, the US increased its aid from \$5.3 million in 1975 – 1979 to \$209 million in 1985 – 1989.⁵⁰ Other global events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a further increase in aid by the US, playing a supportive role to promote countries who were transcending

⁴⁵ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p. 59. Also see, John Ravenhill (1985), "The Future of Regionalism in Africa" in, Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, *The Future of Regionalism in Africa* (Macmillan Publishers Ltd : London).

⁴⁶ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.47.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴⁸ Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p.47.

⁴⁹ Peter J. Schraeder, (2002), in, Korwa Gombe Adar and Rok Ajulu (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, Hampshire, England) pp.332-333.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 333-334.

into democratic regimes such as Malawi: \$58.4 million; Zambia: \$41.7 million; and assisting with the resolution of civil wars in Angola: \$29.4 million and Mozambique: \$102 million.⁵¹ Post-1994, South Africa received an annual amount of aid from the US of \$112 million for the period 1995 – 1996 that made it the largest America aid recipient in southern Africa.⁵² Also, between 1989 and 1994, South Africa received \$75.3 million annual funding from the US to work with the African National Congress regime towards a multiracial democratic society.⁵³ More recently, in November 2008, SADC's Double Troika and the European Union (EU) Troika met in Brussels, Belgium, to mark fourteen years of the EU-SADC Dialogue under the Berlin initiative providing a package of €116 million for reinforcement of the SADC secretariat and 85 percent for regional economic integration for the Infrastructure Trust Fund, and other areas such as, the Water and Energy Facilities, the Development Cooperation Instrument, and the European Investment Bank Interventions for the southern African region.⁵⁴ The Brussels meeting furthermore acknowledged funds in support of African security of €440 million since 2004 and allocated an additional €300 million for the period 2008 to 2010 towards the EU Partnership of Peace and Security and in operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These pledges and regional packages were made against an unambiguous tag attached that have not come without a price - aid for trade for European Union's (EU) member states and other donors.⁵⁵ The structure of the SADC Declaration states that foreign assistance is of vital importance, hence donors have a critical say in the business of SADC.⁵⁶

In April 1980, the leaders of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe met in Lusaka, Zambia, to adopt the "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation" declaration as a first step to the formation of SADCC established in 1981.⁵⁷ The SADCC declaration established in Lusaka was an important policy instrument for the nine southern African states to rigorously promote their national and regional policies in order to gain political and economic liberation and independence from apartheid South Africa.⁵⁸ In July 1981, the SADCC structure was ratified at a summit of Heads of State meeting, adopting the

⁵¹ Peter J. Schraeder, (2002), in, Korwa Gombe Adar and Rok Ajulu (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, Hampshire, England) pp.332-333.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Bischoff, How Far, Where To? p. 288.

⁵⁴ Council of the European Union (2008), Communiqué.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Bischoff, How Far, Where To? p. 288.

⁵⁷ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p.59.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

SADCC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and providing members with an institutional framework. The headquarters was set up in Gaborone where it is still located. The SADCC Summit of Heads of State and government oversaw policy-making and met on an annual basis.⁵⁹ The SADCC Council consisted of ministers tasked to oversee the economic affairs of the region. Sectoral Commissions comprising of the Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR); the Standing Committee of Officials (SATCC); and the secretariat were the other structures that completed SADCC.⁶⁰

The problems that faced the southern African region have always been related to regional security, linked to issues of poverty and economic strife. Political and economic stability was of vital importance hence regional integration was to be SADCC's response to oppose the wrath of South Africa. Key to the regional integration efforts of SADCC was the adoption of the SADCC Programme of Action (SPA), seen as an important vehicle to promote and obtain regional cooperation. The SPA was the means to achieve the participation and involvement of all SADCC members. Member states were tasked to oversee sub-sector and sectoral activities, at both national and regional levels.⁶¹ While sectoral activities were very important towards SADCC's efforts in fostering security for the region through political and economic stability, external actors have been influential in SADCC's ultimate success or its dismal failure. The sectoral activity was coordinated at the respective national levels through their respective national ministries.⁶²

The decentralised approach adopted by the SPA became problematic for the region and the integration process of projects was negatively affected. The problems that faced the decentralisation approach adopted by SADCC member states varied: donor preference for sectoral activities and funding allocated to projects that donors thought more important; lack of funding for sectoral activities that were equally important for the region; levels of competence varied among SADCC member states and some states were more competent and effective in

⁵⁹ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, *Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*.

⁶⁰ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp.61-63.

⁶¹ SADCC's Sectoral Activities and Responsibilities overseen by its member states: Angola - Energy; Botswana – Agriculture research, Livestock production, and Animal disease control; Lesotho – Environment and land management, and Water; Malawi – Inland fisheries, Forestry, and Wildlife; Mauritius – Tourism; Mozambique – Culture, information and sports, and Transport and Communications; Namibia – Marine fisheries and resources, and Legal sector; Swaziland – Human resources development; Tanzania – Industry and Trade; Zambia – Employment and labour, and Mining; Zimbabwe – Crop sector, and Food, agriculture and natural resources; and later South Africa joined in 1994 – Finance and investment, and Health. See the typology provided by, Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p. 51.

⁶² Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*. Also see, Matlosa, and Lotshwao, "*Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*."

executing sector responsibilities; lobbying for sectoral funding occurred in advance with member states seeking donor support unilaterally, and proper procedures were not always followed. Therefore, the procedures of the Annual Consultative Conference held with its international cooperating partners became a dress rehearsal for discussions on donor support. Sectoral project activities became more national, and SADCC's regional focus became less important and was neglected by member states. The decentralisation approach adopted clearly did not work. For example, funding from the US during the 1980s for SADCC's regional transport and communications sector overseen by Mozambique was limited, because Mozambique was leading a Marxist government. The realities of the Cold War filtered through into the region. The breakthrough for the southern African region was reached in 1988, when a life-line was thrown by external actors: France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the former European Economic Community (EEC) provided military assistance against South Africa's destabilising military aggression in the region.⁶³ During the 1990s, South Africa became a strategic partner for the west particularly when it became a member of the southern African region. The US made more serious efforts to support the region's transport and communications sector in the 1990s and secured funding through supporting South Africa initiatives.⁶⁴

SADCC soon realised that financing of its decentralised approach of its sector coordinating units was difficult to manage and more difficult to coordinate through its secretariat. This led to new strategies being adopted from 1985.⁶⁵ This new strategy focused less on the coordination of project activities and more on coordinating activities through a more robust regional focus on sector policies and strategies. But the new coordination and development of sectoral regional activities also failed. In the early 1990s, SADC placed a moratorium on the creation of new sectors as well as adding additional projects to the SPA. In mid 1993, the SPA had 464 projects which required funding of \$9 billion with only 22 percent of these projects found to be truly regional. By the late 1990s there were 19 sectors and the SPA had 380 projects. Although the main goal was to retain regional projects with adequate funding, only 49 percent of funds were secured. Similarly, members failed to provide resources for the adequate functioning of the SADCC secretariat. The lack of allocating sufficient resources and insufficient staffing of the

⁶³ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p.67.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p. 64.

secretariat made it difficult for SADCC, and later also for SADC, to fulfil its role adequately. Member states were generally unhappy with the role that the secretariat played, particularly the inadequate staffing structure. By 1996 the secretariat had 10 professional staff and 20 administration staff which increased in 2001 to 384 staff members comprising of both 194 professionals and 190 support staff. Member states felt that the secretariat was grossly incompetent and the in-fighting within the Secretariat led to the public firing at a SADC Summit of its independent-minded executive secretary, Namibia's Kaire Mbuende in 1999. A substantive executive secretary, Mauritius's Prega Ramsamy was only appointed in 2001.

SADCC's evolving security architecture took on a difficult journey. Defence and security issues were initially a sub-structure under the FLS. The Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the security leg of the FLS formed in 1976, was operating with no formal charter or institutional framework. Zimbabwe held the chair of the FLS and played an integral role in the ISDSC. During the struggle in Angola after 1975, the FLS played a key role in the region's security architecture, especially in the battle over the Angolan town, Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 against South Africa's military. The FLS and later SADCC fought the struggle mainly against South Africa's regional destabilisation policy and its proxy wars. Key to the struggle was to secure and protect the transport infrastructure of the Beira, Lobito, Maputo, and Nacala railway lines frequently attacked by South Africa. SADCC was determined to loosen the stronghold of South Africa on the region's transport systems. This determination led to SADCC members uniting to establish a consortium of private and public companies that included Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia's transport corridor infrastructure. In addition, Zimbabwe provided military support to secure the Limpopo corridor that linked South Africa, Swaziland, Zaire (now DRC), Zambia and Zimbabwe to Maputo; and, SADCC received financial support from Botswana.⁶⁶ With the major wars and battles being fought during the 1970s to late 1980s, made the coordination of SADCC's regional activities cumbersome and almost impossible.

Initially when the FLS was disbanded and replaced by SADCC and then subsequently by SADC, the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee was retained. Southern Africa's security architecture was formally designed with the idea of fighting colonialism, racism, and the proxy

⁶⁶ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp. 68-69.

wars staged by neighbouring South Africa. SADCC's key hegemonic player between 1975 and 1990 was Zimbabwe, seen as the economic giant. With the "new kid on the bloc" - South Africa - joining the southern African states, SADC had new battles to fight. These battles did not encompass a political agenda of racism and colonialism but was instead a battle over a clash of personalities,⁶⁷ evident in Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and South Africa's Nelson Mandela. Robert Mugabe was not only the longest serving head of state in the southern African region, but was also the Chairperson when it joined the FLS which later became SADCC until 1992, and acquired significant regional status. After decades of draconian leadership displayed by apartheid South Africa, the democratic changes from 1990 under F.W. de Klerk, finally allowed for its inclusion in the SADC community. Being a key SADC member, the South African government, has since its first democratic election of 1994, incorporated regional integration into its policies. This is seen as *the* building bloc to harness good ties with its neighbours, in particular, in the security field.⁶⁸ With South Africa having eventually transformed from a devastating apartheid past, and allowed into the circle of the southern African region's fold, it became chairperson of SADC in 1996. This was a major bone of contention and a clash of personalities pursued between Mugabe and Mandela dividing the region and leaving member states to choose between South Africa (Mandela) advocating for an Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) integrated approach into SADC and reporting to the Summit, versus Zimbabwe (Mugabe) who strongly opposed the South African idea and felt that the Organ should be autonomous and have its own Summit.⁶⁹

SADC's security architecture was further challenged by Zimbabwe when it sent troops to the DRC with Angola and Namibia and signed its own Mutual Defence Pact with all three states.⁷⁰ In June 1996, at a SADC summit meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was established.⁷¹ The establishment of the OPDS showed a commitment by SADC to regional security, but not sufficiently. The June 1996 Summit outlined that the OPDS "shall operate at the Summit level, and function independently from other SADC

⁶⁷ Chris Alden, and Garth le Pere, (2003), "South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – from Reconciliation to Revival?" (International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): Oxford University Press, New York), Adelphi Paper 362, pp. 58-59.

⁶⁸ Khabele Matlosa (2007), "South Africa and regional security in Southern Africa" in, Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.) *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press: Scottsville, South Africa). Also see, David Simon (1998), "Shedding the past, shaping the future" in, David Simon (ed.) *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region* (James Currey Ltd : Oxford).

⁶⁹ Alden, and le Pere, *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy*, p.39.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.40.

⁷¹ See SADC website address: <http://www.sadc.int/opds>.

structures; operate at Ministerial and Technical levels. The Chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and Troika basis. The ISDSC shall be retained and be one of the structures of the Organ.” Three years later, in August 1999, at a Heads of State meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, SADC foreign and defence ministers came together to develop the sub-region’s collective security system.⁷² However, the mandate and activities assigned to the OPDS also became problematic, and were seen as taking on a broader state security agenda.⁷³ In an attempt to deepen cooperation and trust among SADC member states, two bodies were established: the Inter State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) of sub-regional foreign ministers; and an Inter State Defence and Security Committee retained from the FLS, comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security.⁷⁴ At a Summit meeting in Maputo in 1999, Zimbabwe was criticised for acting on behalf of the region without a clear mandate.

Though SADC was created as an international organisation, in reality it was pushing ideals personified by its “heavy weights”, Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe. Even though South Africa was transforming its apartheid government, Mugabe remained wary of South Africa’s new political transformation. Mandela had strong concerns over human rights and democracy issues in Zimbabwe. All of these issues filtered into SADC’s security architecture and only changed once Thabo Mbeki took over the South African presidency from Mandela in 1999, advocating and adopting an approach of “quiet diplomacy”.⁷⁵ Overall, member states felt that security needs to be part of the overall SADC agenda. The option for an independent Association of Southern African States (ASAS) was called for but shot down and the calls for an OPDSC won the debate. During 1996 the further delay of the institutionalisation of the OPDSC was mainly due to the Angola crisis; the Lesotho governance crisis; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) civil war.⁷⁶

⁷² See the chapter on, “The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: The rise and fall of a security model?” in Naison Ngoma (2005) *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community* (Institute for Security Studies, ISS) Pretoria.

⁷³ Ngoma, *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa*.

⁷⁴ See the chapter on, Ngoma, “The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: The rise and fall of a security model?”.

⁷⁵ Korwa G. Adar, Rok Ajulu, and Moses O. Onyango, (2002), “Post-Cold War Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy-Making Process” in, Korwa Gombe Adar and Rok Ajulu (eds.), *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa* (Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, Hampshire, England) pp.264-265.

⁷⁶ Omari, and Macaringue, (2007), “Southern African Security in Historical Perspective”, pp.51-59.

2.3. SADC's Restructuring Process: From Rhetoric to Implementation

In 2000, at an Annual SADC Consultative Conference held in Ezulwini, Swaziland, the meeting highlighted that of the 378 SADC sectoral activities totalling US\$7.7 billion, the organisation effectively secured 50 percent of the budget through funding.⁷⁷ SADC's member states have generally been successful in securing funding to benefit the region, however the funding secured for regional sectoral activities were unevenly spent, with member states servicing national activities more than regional activities. Member states felt that they owned the process, and felt that part of SADC's overall aims to secure the region and states' sovereignty was enhanced through a decentralised SADC Programme of Action. However, due to some states pursuing more national interests than others, coupled with varying degrees of efficiency, restructuring of the SPA was imminent. The activities of the defence and security committee in comparison to the foreign affairs committee were still lopsided, with the defence and security committee seen to be more effective.⁷⁸ SADC experienced many difficulties in the operationalisation of the OPDS mandate. The objectives of SADC are stipulated in its founding treaty of 1992. These objectives define the economic and political values of the institution and include the promotion of defence and security. As a regional economic community, SADC is able to legally take on security functions. Hence, in August 2001 at a summit of heads of state in Blantyre, Malawi, the OPDS was restructured through the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, providing SADC members with an institutional framework to coordinate policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence, and security. SADC's principal instrument for dealing with security is its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The security architecture had already been drawn up by SADC at a 1996 Summit but only came into force in August 2001. The Organ operates at the level of heads of state, through a troika, that in turn reports to the SADC Summit of heads of state. Assisting the Organ is the ministerial committee comprising ministers responsible for defense, policing, and intelligence for SADC member states. The ministerial committee makes key decisions, and reports to the troika. The Organ's operational activities are carried out by the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee, and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee. SADC experienced many difficulties in implementing its new aims and objectives. There were doubts as to whether the Organisation's security architecture would be

⁷⁷ See the discussion on SADC's Sectoral Activities in, Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa* p.50. Also see, Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*.

⁷⁸ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp.224-225.

able to promote regional peace and security effectively.⁷⁹ Further concerns raised an unclear work programme and lack of focus that did not link to SADC's overall objectives. In 2001 SADC's current organisational structure still appeared inadequate with lack of resources and staffing. In addition the political tensions and divisions that emerged between Zimbabwe and South Africa threatened the possible immobilisation of the Organisation's security work. The 2001 Summit recommended improvements and changes to SADC's institutional framework in order for it to execute its original 1992 mandate. The SADC OPDSC was put firmly under the control of SADC and a small secretariat of the Organ was established at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.

A further SADC extraordinary meeting in January 2002, in Blantyre, mandated the Organ on Politics and Defence Cooperation to provide guidelines for its Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. By 2004, the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) was created by SADC focusing on four main areas: political; defence; state security; and public security sectors.⁸⁰ Also approved, were the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the development of SIPO, establishing a Task Force comprising the Troika of members with a one-year rotating chair to coordinate SADC's security policy.⁸¹ With the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ being the driving force behind the region's security, it is important that member states work together to build effective security architecture in southern Africa. SIPO provides a five-year strategic and activity guideline for implementing the OPDS Protocol. It covers a range of objectives and activities. SIPO has also developed additional policy documents such as the Mutual Defence Pact that was signed at the August 2003 SADC Summit. SIPO still has to operationalise and develop an implementation apparatus and business plan to engage with its politics, defence and security area effectively. SIPO has a broad understanding of security through its governance and democratisation issues as well as its defence and security issues but, with divergent opinions and approaches. Hence, some member states in the region places more emphasis on state security issues while others place more emphasis on human security.⁸²

⁷⁹ Bischoff, *How Far, Where To?*, pp.295-299.

Also see, Elling N. Tjønneland, Jan Isaksen, and Garth le Pere, "SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies: Options for Norwegian Support" Report of the Norwegian Embassy (Harare).

⁸⁰ See SADC website address: <http://www.sadc.int/opds>. Also see, Adebajo (2008), "Southern Africa's Fledgling Security Architecture" in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Tim Murithi (eds.) *The African Union and its Institutions* (Jacana Media) Auckland Park, South Africa.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Tjønneland, Isaksen, and le Pere, (2005), "SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies: Options for Norwegian Support", p.21.

The 21 sectoral committees and commissions responsible for SADC's planning and implementation member-state activities were shut down and revamped into four clusters in 2001.⁸³ The four clusters are the directorates for Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI); Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR); Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (SHD); and Infrastructure and Services (IS). Three separate units were also established on HIV/AIDS, Statistics, and Gender. SADC's institutional reforms envisaged a more efficient secretariat which aimed to provide for stronger leadership, ensure that its programmes are more regionally focused, and narrow the gap between rhetoric and implementation. A further three units were also established in the office of SADC's Executive Secretary for: policy and strategic planning; resource mobilisation; and legal affairs. The new directorates' focus on regional integration, mobilisation of financial resources, policy development, and providing assistance to member states. SADC member states each established a SADC National Committee (SNC) overseeing national coordination and implementation.⁸⁴ By 2005, SADC continued to experience challenges with little achievements in its restructuring and institutional regional integration agenda. The secretariat was also widely seen to be inefficient and had staffing problems, management constraints, and incapacity issues. By the end of 2004, the secretariat managed to appoint the heads of its four directorates and staffing for each directorate was beefed up to ten per cluster. The most basic administrative resources such as adequate access to email and communications have been a continuous problem at the secretariat.⁸⁵ The mandate of the secretariat is mainly administrative with no political decision-making powers. A gap between the relationship of the secretariat and member states remains a challenge. In addition, the administrative unit of the Organ also established at the secretariat has been staffed by less than ten staff since 2003.⁸⁶ An additional secondment was made from South Africa to the Organ's Chair in 2005. The Organ has been expanded into a fifth directorate, headed by a chief director with three sub-divisions on politics and diplomacy; defence, security and strategic analysis; and an early warning and situation room. The Organ has an entirely separate governing structure with its own Troika reporting to the SADC Summit. Below the level of the Organ Troika is the Ministerial committee comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public and state security from each member state. Persistent problems still exist with the relations between the Organ and

⁸³ Tjønneland, Isaksen, and le Pere, "SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies: Options for Norwegian Support", pp. 8-9.

⁸⁴ Bischoff, (2002), "How Far, Where To?", pp.295-299.

⁸⁵ Tjønneland, Isaksen, and le Pere, "SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies: Options for Norwegian Support", p.10.

⁸⁶ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, *Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*, p.13.

the secretariat. This remains a major challenge with both the Organ and the Secretariat sharing the same support staff, but having entirely different governing structures.⁸⁷

SADC operates on the basis of a consensus and its key governing institutions for its social and economic areas are the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), the Council of Ministers, the Troika (past, current and incoming Chairs of SADC) and the Summit. The ICM still lacks the ability to provide direction on programmes and activities for the various sectors and similarly lacks the ability to provide strong policies and a coherent flow of information between government departments at the national level.⁸⁸ The Council of Ministers on the other hand, appears to spend too much of their time on administrative detail and seems to lack overall leadership.⁸⁹ The Troika system has also failed to provide strong political leadership between the meetings of the ICM and the Council of Ministers. To narrow this gap between rhetoric and implementation, SADC established a Committee of Ambassadors in February 2005 in Gaborone, Botswana.⁹⁰ The functioning of the OPDSC is defined by SIPO, which sets out a detailed programme of activities for its key political, defense, public security (policing) and state security objectives.⁹¹

It is crucial that SADC creates a balance how it views security. SADC's security architecture has evolved over three decades and its present rhetoric needs to be tied down into operations. Integrated systems that deal with security are of critical importance. SADC's security architecture should not only focus on military and policing issues, but also promote common values for its member states. Such values and ideals should promote democracy, human rights, safe and secure societies, and the establishment of early warning systems throughout the region. SADC made good progress at its 2001 Summit decision to centralise the coordination and implementation of its programmes in order to strengthen its secretariat. But this is not enough. At a consultative conference in Windhoek, Namibia in 2006 and at a further consultative meeting in April 2008, in Port Louis, Mauritius, SADC's role was re-examined. These two conferences sought to address SADC's capacity and its performance against the commitments made at its 1992 Windhoek

⁸⁷ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, *Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*.

⁸⁸ Tjønneland, Isaksen, and le Pere, *SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies*.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, p.226.

⁹¹ SADC, *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*, accessed at, Website address: <http://www.sadc.int/>.

Declaration. The findings were that: SADC's secretariat remained weak, lacked human and financial management capacity, and was not able to facilitate strategy development and policy harmonisation within the region.⁹² At a SADC Summit in Maseru, Lesotho, in August 2006, two important decisions were made: One, to establish a task force on regional economic integration; and, second to strengthen the role of the secretariat, and to review the role of the Integrated Committee of Ministers. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers instructed the secretariat to participate in an evaluation of all its staffing positions with an attempt to realign the secretariat's organisational structure to SADC's priorities. To this end, the job evaluation was undertaken by an auditing firm, KPMG. In addition to KPMG's evaluation was the European Union's support for a similar evaluation undertaken by the Ernst and Young auditing firm which undertook an institutional assessment of the secretariat that focused on operational policies and procedures. Germany financed a similar evaluation through GTZ and inWent focusing on SADC's capacity needs. The evaluations adopted were critical and stressed the need to address capacity constraints of the organisation.⁹³

The February 2008 SADC Council of Ministers meeting proposed a number of changes to the organogram of the secretariat. The main purpose for the meeting was to clarify the lines of authority and to improve the coordinating activities of the secretariat's senior management. Hence, the vacant post of chief director was to be eliminated and replaced with two deputy executive secretaries.⁹⁴ The deputy executive secretary for regional integration is responsible for and oversees regional integration within all the technical directorates: Trade Industry, Finance and Investment; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services; Health, Labour and Skills Development; and Policy, Planning and Resource Mobilisation. In addition, the deputy executive secretary for regional integration provides direction to the secretariat by recommending regional policies, and by providing strategic impetus and coordination with other RECs.⁹⁵ The role of the deputy executive secretary for finance and administration oversees two directorates and is responsible for the Human Resources and Administration; and Budget and Finance clusters. The OPDSC has its reporting line through its Organ directorate directly to the

⁹² Elling N. Tjønneland, (2009), "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", in, Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda and Farai Zizhou (eds.), *Furthering Southern African Integration: Proceedings of the 2008 FOPRISA Annual Conference* (Lightbooks a division of Lentswe la Lesedi: Gaborone, Botswana) p.19.

⁹³ Tjønneland, "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008, p.19.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.22-23.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

executive secretariat.⁹⁶ SADC has since its inception struggled with a capacity gap hence the August 2008 Mauritius conference calls for strengthening SADC in a proposed Capacity Development Framework. The assumption is that should the secretariat embrace the priorities of the Framework that encompasses both the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2001, and the Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO) of 2004, the priorities must include functions such as: i) a think tank to guide members on the implementation of SADC's common agenda; ii) a principal regional coordinator of policies, strategies and programmes for regional integration; iii) a provider of support services to the technical directorates and convening annual consultative conferences for SADC's decision-making structures; and, iv) a professional programme manager to facilitate, implement and systematically prioritise programmes and provide a business plan and budget. In addition, the SADC Capacity Development Framework includes ten intervention areas⁹⁷ intended to strengthen the SADC secretariat's capacities and calls for a Bridging Facility through which donor funding can be channelled. The SADC Capacity Development Framework was endorsed by the SADC's Council of Ministers in August 2008. Funding has always been the key stumbling block for SADC activities, and Germany's KfW has already stepped in to provide interim support and funding for the new Framework until such time that South Africa's Development Bank of Southern Africa (DbSA) is able to take over the funding task.

The SADC OPDSC has also been fully integrated into the SADC secretariat as one of its technical directorates. The OPDSC still reports directly to the executive secretary. The elevated role afforded to the OPDSC has its origins from its successor, the Inter State Defence and Security Committee and the Front Line States. The debate since 1992 to 1996 centred on how to bring on board the FLS and ISDSC within the new SADC and may divert SADC's main focus from economic development and integration. The functions and role of the SADC executive secretary cannot be over stressed. The executive secretary has a critical role to play in the current political challenges that faces the southern African region. Political unrests evident with the ousting of president Ravalomanana in in Madagascar in March 2009 by former Antananarivo

⁹⁶ TjØnneland, "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008, p.19.

⁹⁷ Ibid. The SADC Capacity Development Framework lists ten intervention areas these are: leadership skills development and review of management processes; policy and strategy development; programme management; implementation of secretariat performance management and appraisal system; internalization of the secretariat vision, mission and values; human resource development; development of administrative management competencies; financial management development; accounting and procurement of services; and implementation of the SADC/ICP partnership framework.

mayor, Andry Rajoelina; the reported attempt on Lesotho prime minister's life; the volatile situation in Malawi; Swaziland; and the ongoing violence in the DRC. Such conflicts in the region require strong leadership and executive power that is able to work alongside the chair of the Organ to successfully manage emerging violence and political turmoil in the region.⁹⁸ The role of the SADC executive secretary does not have sufficient power to provide strategic leadership at regional level. The current SADC executive secretary, Mozambique's Dr. Tomaz Salomão has made remarkable efforts to bring about stability in the region, but SADC still has to clearly devise the role and functions of the executive secretary to give it more clout and better synergy with the Organ chair. However, the current deputy executive secretaries in charge of the economic and administration agendas respectively may be able to free up the SADC executive secretary to perform more political functions and focus on the stability of the region.

⁹⁸ Jorge Cardoso, (2009), "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community: Institutional and Operational Frameworks" in, Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda and Farai Zizhou (eds.), *Furthering Southern African Integration: Proceedings of the 2008 FOPRISA Annual Conference* (Lightbooks a division of Lentswe la Lesedi: Gaborone, Botswana) p.114. Also see, Matlosa, and Lotshwao, *Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*.

3. Chapter Three: SADC's Peacekeeping Role

This chapter examines three key issues. First, it provides an assessment of how the role of SADC's peacekeeping evolved in the southern African region and elsewhere in Africa. Second, it assesses the SADC Brigade as one of the regional brigades and its readiness for the 2010 deployment timeline and how this will fit into the overall ASF structure. Thirdly, the importance of external actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union is discussed in support of SADC's peacekeeping support missions, and how the African Standby Force can benefit overall from such external actors.

3.1. Politics Defence and Security Cooperation

Since the establishment of SADC's OPDSC in 1996, the Organ's mandate has been to oversee conflict prevention, establish a regional peacekeeping force, coordinate foreign and security policy of member states; strengthen democracy and human rights; and establish a mutual defence pact. The basic structure of the OPDSC comprises: the chairperson and the office of the chairperson; the troika; the Ministerial Committee (MC); the Inter State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Together the MC, ISDSC, and the ISPDC are the SADC Organ's ministerial committees.⁹⁹ The Organ was also brought under the authority of the SADC Summit and chairmanship and became rotational from being solely chaired by one country: Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁰ The Organ has its own Troika system consisting of three heads of state (the chairperson, Mozambique; Swaziland; and Zambia).¹⁰¹ In 1996 the Organ was established as a semi-independent institution headed by the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, but remained ineffectual due to political tensions in the region and the uneasy relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa.¹⁰² The Organ was set up with its own regional structures and mechanisms for decision-making, a small permanent secretariat, and an administrative unit is based at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.¹⁰³

The SADC Troika system - sometimes referred to as the Double Troika - has an incumbent chairperson, an incoming chairperson who also serves as the deputy chairperson for one year and

⁹⁹ See "SADC's Main Institutions and Office-Bearers" in, Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*, pp. 217-225.

¹⁰⁰ Omari, and Macaringue, *Southern African Security in Historical Perspective*, p54.

¹⁰¹ Summit of the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was held in Maseru, Kingdom of Lesotho, from 21 to 22 February 2010, accessed on website address: <http://www.sadc.int/>.

¹⁰² Alden, and le Pere, *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – from Reconciliation to Revival?*, pp. 58-59.

¹⁰³ Ibid. Also see, Ngoma, *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa*, pp.150-154.

immediate or previous chairperson who can take quick decisions on behalf of SADC that are not taken at SADC's regular policy meetings. The Summit of Heads of State and Government Summit meet annually; while the Council of Ministers meets biannually. These meetings transpire in February to approve SADC annual budgets and also in August, to prepare the Summit agenda. Provision is also made for extraordinary Summit and Council meetings if and when the need arises. The Troika is also applicable at the level of the Standing Committee of Senior Officials comprising the permanent or principal secretaries accounting for government offices, and ministries. These rules of engagement also apply to the Troika of the OPDSC. The chairperson of the Organ does not hold the chair of the Summit simultaneously. The Organ is coordinated at the level of Summit on a Troika basis and reports to the Chairperson of SADC. The functioning of the Organ is defined by the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of 2001, with a detailed programme of activities against key political, defense, public security sector (policing), and state security objectives. With the Organ operating at the level of heads of state through a Troika, it reports to the SADC Summit. How this works in practice, is through the ministerial committee which in turn reports to the Troika and makes the key decisions. The ministerial committee consists of ministers of defense, policing, and intelligence from SADC's 15 member states. The Organ's operational work is carried out through the two committees of senior officials: the ISPDC; and the ISDSC. The main responsibility of the Organ is security cooperation for member-states based on principles of common and collective security and mutual defense, and provides a framework for operationalising the SADC Brigade. The Protocol for the OPDSC empowers the Organ to deal with both inter-state and intra-state conflict such as civil wars, military coups, or gross human rights violations. In August 2003, the Mutual Defence Pact was signed committing member states to develop both individual and collective defence capabilities and to cooperate on defense training, research and intelligence issues.¹⁰⁴

3.2. Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: Dilemmas and Prospects

Past peacekeeping efforts by SADC in southern Africa occurred in an ad hoc manner determined by the willingness and capability of its member states to undertake peacekeeping operations within the region. SADC in general has had very little peacekeeping experiences. Most of SADC's peacekeeping engagements have been conducted through hybrid-African Union (AU)

¹⁰⁴ Ngoma, *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa*, pp.147-150.

and UN missions. A controversial military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, allowed for the formation of a Mutual Defence Pact between Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁵ SADC has also seen mixed results in South Africa and Botswana's direct military intervention in Lesotho in 1998, side-stepping SADC, without a clear mandate.¹⁰⁶ The attack on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) undoubtedly left a bitter taste in the region; the attack resulted in the killing of 58¹⁰⁷ members of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and approximately 47 civilians. Such unilateral interventions undertaken by some of SADC's member states should be more multilateral and better planned in the future. Egyptian UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, published a landmark report on peacekeeping in 1992, "*An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*".¹⁰⁸ This report outlined the complexities of peacekeeping missions and draws on i) "preventive diplomacy" as measures to build confidence, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment, and demilitarised zones; while ii) "peacemaking" deals with mediation, amelioration through assistance, sanctions, use of military force, and peace-enforcement units; iii) "peacekeeping" involves deployment of troops to separate warring parties; iv) "Post-conflict peacebuilding" includes comprehensive efforts to identify support structures to consolidate peace and provide a sense of confidence and well-being among people; and, v) "Cooperation with regional arrangements and organisations".¹⁰⁹ The design of peacekeeping in Africa has changed from previous peacekeeping missions towards a more holistic framework. This framework encapsulates a more nuanced approach to peacekeeping, incorporating a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping operations.

3.3. SADC Brigade: Towards A Viable African Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) to be set up by 2010 entails strengthening the capacity of sub-regional brigades for peace support operations, enhancing the capacity of national defence forces, and training of civilian police for peace support missions. The AU provides a roadmap for its five brigades and Planning Element (PLANELM) – a framework guided by operationalising six scenarios and missions. Scenarios 1 to 4 is aimed at deployment required within 30 days from an

¹⁰⁵ See Ngoma "The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: The rise and fall of a security model?"

¹⁰⁶ Khabele Matlosa (2007) "Regional Security in Southern Africa".

¹⁰⁷ See Vale "Ordering Southern Africa".

¹⁰⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "*An Agenda for Peace*".

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

AU mandate resolution further outlined in: scenario 1- AU/regional military advice to a political mission; scenario 2- AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission; scenario 3- stand-alone AU/regional observer mission; and, scenario 4– AU/regional peacekeeping force for peacemaking and preventive deployment missions. Scenario 5 involves an AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, whereby the African Standby Force is required to deploy within 30 - 90 days; Scenario 6 – in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly, it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days. Furthermore it was envisaged that as a first phase, scenarios one and two would be complete by June 2005; and phase two by June 2010. The AU at this stage would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for scenario four, that involves AU/regional peacekeeping forces.¹¹⁰

Already in the late 1990s based on a recommendation of the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the ISDSC decided to have a 5000 to 6000 brigade size as a standing regional peacekeeping force for deployment on peace and humanitarian missions (but not for peace enforcement), but the restructuring of SADC and the AU overtook events.¹¹¹ Over the years, has peacekeeping in Africa become more and more complex and moved beyond conflicts between states to wars within states. Peacekeeping has evolved into a multidimensional operation that calls for operations that are able to assess the political, social and economic dimensions of both inter and intra-state conflicts. Such operations involve the promotion of dialogue to restore and maintain the rule of law and human rights by protecting civilians. In August 2007, the SADC Brigade was launched in Lusaka, Zambia.¹¹² The concept and design of security in southern Africa includes a wider concept of human security in its policy documents. The 2007 SADC Summit launched the SADC Brigade as a regional and multidimensional peace support operation. The Protocol on OPDSC states that security should be approached through peaceful cooperation,

¹¹⁰ African Union (AU) document, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, adopted at the First Ordinary Session of the African Union, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002. Also see, Jakkie Cilliers, (2008), "*The African Standby Force: An update on progress*", (Institute for Security Studies, ISS: South Africa), Paper 160, March.

¹¹¹ Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community*. 298.

¹¹² SADC Brigade Launch, accessed at website address, <http://www.sadc.int/archives/read/news/1100>. Also see, Cardoso, "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community" pp.109-116.

enhance mutual security, and manage humanitarian disaster.¹¹³ Southern Africa's collective security arrangement was put into place by its Mutual Defence Pact of 2004. This is a collective defence arrangement for its members from external aggression that is guided by the 2001 SIPO policy framework for security cooperation in the region.¹¹⁴ By August 2008, eight SADC member-states signed the Mutual Defence Pact policy: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa.¹¹⁵ The establishment of the SADC Brigade along with the other four standby brigades of the African Standby Force will perform observations and monitoring missions, peace support missions, and interventions for peace to restore regional security. The SADC Brigade will also serve as a preventive deployment mechanism in order to prevent conflicts from escalating. Besides peacekeeping, other duties would entail post-conflict reconstruction such as disarmament, demobilisation of militia or ex-combatants, and providing humanitarian assistance to countries' civilians in war-ravaged areas.

A major goal of the African Standby Force is to never allow another catastrophic situation as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in which 800,000 people were killed. Hence, it is accepted that the SADC Brigade will be part and parcel of a peacekeeping process and would deploy peacekeeping missions on the continent that not only seeks the restoration of peace, but also involves processes of peacebuilding and preventive action. It is now also expected that the AU will deploy first followed by a United Nation multidimensional peace support operation.¹¹⁶ Hence, at an early stage, given this scenario, the ASF will seem to create conditions on the ground that could lead to a comprehensive peace agreement.¹¹⁷ The SADC Standby Force, as one of the five standby brigades of the ASF, will perform observation and monitoring missions; peace support missions; interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of member states; preventive deployment; peacebuilding; as well as post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation and providing humanitarian assistance in conflict areas. African governments are already seeing an increasing responsibility in peacekeeping operations on the continent.¹¹⁸ The ASF structures and operationalisation frameworks are being established and SADCBRIG will manage complex

¹¹³ SADC OPDSC, website address: <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/157>.

¹¹⁴ Cardoso, "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community", pp.109-116.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ African Union (AU) document, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, adopted at the First Ordinary Session of the African Union, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002. Also see, Cilliers, "*The African Standby Force: An update on progress*".

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p.7.

¹¹⁸ Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, "*Security and Development in Southern Africa*" 8-10 June 2008, Vol.27.

peacekeeping missions. Extensive¹¹⁹ training has been conducted since January 2000 by the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM)¹²⁰ network closely collaborating with: civil society groups and military officers in security institutions in eight SADC member states: South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. Training has already been provided to more than 1000 senior officials, military officers, and civil society leaders. Peacekeeping entails a holistic design in keeping with SADC's security policies. Peacekeeping has evolved from the traditional peacekeeping approach where generally a military force is deployed to manage conflict between two belligerent forces to a more multidimensional peacekeeping and support operation which involves multidisciplinary mandates and multidimensional structures that include civilian police units and the military. The military is generally tasked to ensure stability and security and the police oversee reinstating a reliable law enforcement system. SADC, like the other four African Standby Brigades, will have special battalions and units with forces on standby. Civilian professionals will be overseeing the missions' administration in terms of the political, economic, and development aspects of the SADC Brigade. These professionals will be required to create and maintain a peace support operations database and will need to receive the requisite professional skills and expertise to apply to peace support operations.¹²¹ Resources such as peacekeeping personnel, funding and timeframes are critical aspects to ensure a successful operation.

3.4. Operationalising the SADC Brigade

SADC's Planning Element (PLANELM) was established at its Gaborone secretariat in 2005 as a tool of the OPDSC and takes guidance from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Committee of Police Chiefs. Therefore, SADC thought it appropriate to have its logistics base in Botswana. SADC's PLANELM will not be included in the deployed force, and SADC member states will each ensure that the pledged forces are available and have a level of training as outlined by, and comparable to, the regional peacekeeping training centre in Harare, Zimbabwe. SADC will not set up a permanent brigade headquarters. This will only be put in place when the brigade is to be deployed.¹²² The ASF is relying heavily on the regional hegemon,

¹¹⁹ Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) training report, accessed at website address: <http://sadsem.org/Portuguese/images/SADSEM%20AR.pdf>. Also see, Adebajo, "The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU".

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Cilliers, "The African Standby Force: An update on progress".

¹²² Thomas Mandrup (2010), "South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force", (Royal Danish Defence College), accessed at website address, www.jstor.org, pp. 1-21.

South Africa in SADCBRIG, and (Nigeria in ECOBRIG) to support the areas of logistics and to compensate for weak members with lesser infrastructure. In support of co-member states, the South African National Defence Force has pledged a parachute battalion, engineering capability, sanitation, a field hospital, patrol boats, signal capacity, drivers, naval support vessel and air transport to fill the resource and capacity gaps that other SADC members may lack.¹²³

Civilian Police (CIVPOL) has become an important element for peacekeeping operations. The ASF protocol has provided a number of - 240 police officers for peacekeeping missions. According to Motumi, (deputy director-general: chief defence policy and planning in the secretariat of the South African department of defence)¹²⁴ the coordination of activities of CIVPOL in peacekeeping operations has expanded since the 1990s. In acknowledging the important role of CIVPOL in peacekeeping operations, synergy between the military and police staff have expanded towards greater cooperation. For example, South Africa has already, in 2004, committed CIVPOL units to exercises such as Blue Crane and Blue Hungwe.¹²⁵ Armed conflicts, civil wars, and armed rebellions, are some of the major problems threatening stability in the southern African region and throughout Africa. Such threats require a rapid response from well-trained military and civilian police officials. Approaches to peacekeeping must have well synchronised military operational procedures in order to achieve impact. SADC is hopeful that the southern African region will have the desired military interventions envisaged.

In February 2009, in Angola's northern Bengo province, Cabo Ledo, SADC Brigade completed its first exercise, overseen by the Head of Peace Mission, Mathendele Moses Dlamini who headed the SADC Dolphin Phase I Mapex military exercise and also was the planning phase.¹²⁶ In April 2009, the SADC Standby Brigade held its second phase of the SADC Brigade Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Maputo, Mozambique, codenamed: Exercise Golfinho.¹²⁷ The exercise conducted in Mozambique was a preparatory exercise for military, police, and civilian decision-makers with command, communication, control and coordination techniques (C3). A follow up

¹²³ Thomas Mandrup (2010), "South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force", (Royal Danish Defence College), accessed at website address, www.jstor.org, p.19.

¹²⁴ Tsepe Motumi, (2004), "Logistical and Capacity Considerations Surrounding a Standby Force" in, Shannon Field, (ed.), *Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*, (Institute for Global Dialogue, IGD: Johannesburg, South Africa), pp.251-261.

¹²⁵ Ibid. Also see, Oosthuizen, *The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects* (Institute for Global Dialogue: Midrand, South Africa) pp. 297-298.

¹²⁶ See SADC website address: <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/488>

¹²⁷ SADC Brigade Command Post Exercise (Exercise Golfinho Phase II), (Institute of Telecommunication of Mozambique, Maputo, 24 April 2009), accessed on SADC website, <http://www.sadc.int/index/save/page/488>).

exercise was held in September 2009 for final field training (FTX) in South Africa in a fictitious country, Lohatla, created for training SADC's 8200-strong brigade.¹²⁸ According to Article 13 of the African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol of 2002, the regional brigades need to test the brigades' capability to handle conflict situations in line with the United Nations peacekeeping framework.¹²⁹

Of critical importance to any peacekeeping mission is logistics and capacity which are often neglected.¹³⁰ Conceptualising logistics in a military setting involves aspects such as - design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance; evacuation and disposition of material; movement, evacuation and hospitalisation of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and acquisition and or, furnishing services.¹³¹ In essence the inappropriate conduct of considering military operations without proper logistic and capacity support can make or break a peacekeeping intervention. Other important facets for peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of civilian police, and humanitarian agencies. CIVPOL as an integral component of peacekeeping operations were first deployed during the UN's first peacekeeping mission in the DRC (Congo) during the 1960s to accompany local police, monitor police behavior and serve as a support unit. Hence, during the 1990s CIVPOL played various important roles and became integrated in various missions, for example in Namibia, Haiti, Cambodia, Eastern Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique and Somalia.¹³² SADC's first peacekeeping exercise that took place in 1997, in Zimbabwe, codenamed, Exercise Blue Hungwe, deployed elements of CIVPOL to the peacekeeping exercise. In 1999, SADC staged a second military peacekeeping exercise in South Africa, codenamed, Exercise Blue Crane into which CIVPOL was also incorporated. The lessons that emanated from these exercises highlighted the importance of CIVPOL and the need for more structured coordination between the military and CIVPOL for successful peacekeeping missions.¹³³ Besides aspects of logistics, also important is the varying expertise of military expertise among SADC member states and its contributing forces. Peacekeeping operations will carry no weight without

¹²⁸ SADC Brigade Command Post Exercise (Exercise Golfinho Phase II), (Institute of Telecommunication of Mozambique, Maputo, 24 April 2009), accessed on SADC website, <http://www.sadc.int/index/save/page488>).

¹²⁹ African Union (AU), (2002), "Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union" document. Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Durban, 9 July, p.14.

¹³⁰ Motumi, "Logistical and Capacity Considerations Surrounding a Standby Force", pp.251-261.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

a clear understanding of what SADC's peacekeeping entails, is composed of, and is expected to do. This can only occur with a clear understanding and adequate training. Hence, SADC's Organ directorate has two credible subsidiarity organisations to support peacekeeping operations. The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO) both based in Harare.¹³⁴ The RPTC was previously shut down after the government of Denmark withdrew funding due to Zimbabwe's political unrests in 2001. It was revived and funding is being pursued.¹³⁵ SADC and the RPTC have been addressing the RPTC's training programme of the SADC BRIG for the African Standby Force. RPTC will be addressing training capacity needs for multidimensional peace support missions. The focus of the training will be provided to both police and civilian components. RPTC's training will be aligned with Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation¹³⁶ to ensure proper cohesion. SARPCCO is to be responsible for providing technical expertise for police agencies in the region and also act as the regional office of Interpol. More importantly, SARPCCO has been assisting SADC to implement its protocol on small arms.¹³⁷

3.5. The Principles of Interoperability- Towards Rapid Deployment Capability

The importance of adequate logistics in peace missions is also provided in Article 9(c) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact: "joint research, development and production under license or otherwise of military equipment including weapons and munitions, facilitation of the supply of, or procurement of defence equipment and services among defence-related industries, defence research establishments and their respective armed forces."¹³⁸ Peacekeeping is complex: the lack of resources and infrastructure in areas where deployments need to take place and timely transporting infrastructure and resources to such areas are important and can affect the mobility of military forces in terms of supply. The unnecessary delay in providing logistical support can

¹³⁴ Tjønneland, "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008, p.29.

¹³⁵ Ibid, p.29.

¹³⁶ According to, Oosthuizen, (*The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, its Policies and Prospects*, p.222; SARPCCO was established in 1995 at a meeting of southern African police chiefs who met under the auspices of the earlier ISDSC. It continued the work of the Front Line States police chiefs forum. SARPCCO's members are the police chiefs of all SADC member states except the DRC and Madagascar. SARPCCO being recognised by the earlier ISDSC and the OPDS continues to be the main regional anti-crime cooperation body. SARPCCO has also close links with INTERPOL.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ "SADC 2002. Although the pact had been approved by SADC's ministers of foreign affairs and defence, not all heads of state or government adopted it, this was referred back to member states for further discussion. They did so because they believed that it would have major implications for their states which had not been properly assessed. Also see, Motumi, "Logistical and Capacity Considerations Surrounding a Standby Force" p. 255. Also see, Cardoso, "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community", pp.109-116.

escalate violent conflict. Equally important, is the need for specialised equipment coupled with command, control and communication and de-mining in certain areas of deployment.¹³⁹ Other factors that need to be filtered in and provided for are: air cargo handling teams, logistical load teams, forklift equipment, military police contingent, water purifications systems, airfield crash rescue and fire-fighting teams, trucks and trailers.¹⁴⁰ Problems of interoperability can determine the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission. It is imperative that a standby force must have a single and a unified command, and a single doctrine. All equipment used in a given peacekeeping mission must be interoperable and compatible. For example, a 2000 status report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) revealed that the failure of former eastern bloc countries joining the European regional security system was due to a lack of harmonisation of defence policies, and military integration of personnel and systems, coupled with out-dated equipment versus NATO's hi-tech equipment and infrastructure.¹⁴¹

Whether a division of labour for the five regional brigades of the African Standby Force will enhance the maintenance of peace and security for Africa is an important question and this may relate to concerns of interoperability for ASF. Already evident and in existence is a wealth of experiences in west Africa's five ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire. The main brigade (ECOBRIIG) of the ECOWAS standby force with 5000 soldiers, is ready for deployment within 90 days. In addition the ECOWAS standby force has a high readiness component of 2773 soldiers at 30 days readiness. ECOWAS has already in place a task force chief of staff, a task force headquarters, and an operational planning element, and has identified three centres of training excellence: the National Defence College in Abuja; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KPTC), Accra; and the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye in Bamako, Mali.¹⁴² A division of labour among the region's five brigades can enhance SADCBRIG's operational plan towards the ultimate African Standby Force for the continent. One of SADC's members, South Africa, committed to providing logistical elements as it did to the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 1999.¹⁴³ The ASF concept of rapid

¹³⁹ Motumi, "Logistical and Capacity Considerations Surrounding a Standby Force", p. 256.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.257.

¹⁴¹ Motumi, "Logistical and Capacity Considerations Surrounding a Standby Force", p.257.

¹⁴² Cilliers, "The African Standby Force: An update on progress".

¹⁴³ Cardoso, "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community", p. 116.

deployment capability (RDC) within 14 days, in cases such as genocide, still needs to be finalised. Cost implications for a rapid deployment capability, is estimated at US\$300 million per year.¹⁴⁴ In southern Africa, the core RDC will be done by Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe on a rotational basis. These plans designed in the ASF and its regional brigades require adequate funding. Previous AU and SADC peacekeeping missions have highlighted that sustained interventions require sustained resources and funding.¹⁴⁵ The United Nations Charter, under Chapter VIII, allows for cooperation between regional bodies and the UN. The operational plan of the AU Standby Force and how SADC BRIG as one of the brigades effectively work in joint peacekeeping missions, will require more planning.

Africa's five regions have conducted various training activities and joint exercises. However, the main issue for the ASF must be to facilitate the interoperability of all forces. Interoperability is one of the major challenges that face regional brigades based on the various and differing standards for operational procedures, equipment, and training backgrounds.¹⁴⁶ The official language for missions at the regional and continental levels needs to be addressed to ensure effective command and control of missions.¹⁴⁷ The AU is currently in the process of conducting a continental training exercise, codenamed, Exercise AMANI, to assess the operational readiness of the ASF's various brigades. This exercise will be conducted with the support of the EU's Euro RECAMP programme.¹⁴⁸ Euro RECAMP is an EU Council (ESDP) project that was taken over from France to reinforce the capacities of African armies with regard to prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and will run from 2008 to 2010. Since the African Union's peace facility is created from the European Development Fund (EDF), Euro RECAMP can only provide support to sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of South Africa. It will not finance hard-core military costs, such as salaries of troops, uniforms, and arms, but will support peace support operations, capacity building, conflict prevention, mediation and some aspects of post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ Cardoso, "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community". pp. 10-11.

¹⁴⁵ Centre for Conflict Resolution, "Security and Development in Southern Africa".

¹⁴⁶ Solomon A. Dersso, (2009), "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture", (Institute For Security Studies, ISS: South Africa), ISS Paper 209, January, p.13.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Swedish Defence Research Agency, (2008) "UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa", (Defence Analysis: Stockholm, Sweden), November, pp. 50-51.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 50-51. Between 2004 and 2007, the African Peace Facility encompassed €384 million of which more than €300 million went to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The remaining funds have been used for support to 30 positions in the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), liaison officers for regional organisations in Addis Ababa, administration and financial management of regional organisations

The African Union has already deployed past peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan's Darfur regions (2003-2007), and Somalia (since 2007). The experience of these AU missions deployed, confronted the difficulty of sustaining peacekeeping missions in the field, when faced with financial and logistical weaknesses.¹⁵⁰ The UN High-Level Panel of 2004¹⁵¹ clearly outlined the increase in the deployment of UN peacekeepers with 60,000 peacekeepers deployed in 16 missions. Hence, for peacekeeping to be effective, the UN High-level Panel of 2004,¹⁵² called for promotion of collective security. Such collective security entails the availability of peacekeepers; prompt and effective responses to current challenges facing peacekeeping missions; and making use of regional and sub-regional based peacekeeping missions. Further robust calls were made in the 2004 report of the UN High-level Panel to ensure that post-conflict peacebuilding processes are sufficiently resourced.¹⁵³ A standing fund of \$250 million was suggested to finance expenditures and to focus on the areas of post-conflict reconstruction, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. A UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in December 2005. The Southern African Standby Brigade, being part of the African Standby Force, is designed to ultimately undertake peacekeeping operations that require observer missions and peacebuilding activities. The ASF structure is based on the model of the Nordic Standby High Readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG). The ASF will, however, be taking on much larger peacekeeping tasks.¹⁵⁴ The African Union will have to act swiftly and implement all the aspects of its memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between itself, the RECs and RMs.

3.6. External Actors

Finally, the involvement in peacekeeping in southern Africa of the international community, such as the UN is important given the expensive nature of peacekeeping. In 2003, the EU established the Africa Peace Facility which had made €300 million available for peacekeeping and related capacity building by 2006.¹⁵⁵ By March 2007, the EU had contributed a further €400 million for

and staff for the PLANELM's in the regional brigades of the ASF. See European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Newsletter 2007, Africa-EU, No. 5, p.21.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004 "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility" United Nations.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Mandrup, "South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force", p. 18. SHIRBRIG was declared operational on 1 January 2000, and has thus far been deployed in UN missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 and in Sudan in 2005. The brigade was closed down in June 2009.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p.12

Darfur and the US \$350 million for the same mission. The EU at present provides about €104 million directly to SADC for ongoing projects.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, SADC's Secretariat and Directorates' technical capacity through the EU 10th European Development Fund for development cooperation with SADC will provide €135 million for the period 2008 to 2013.¹⁵⁷ The artificial timeframe set by the AU to have all five brigades operational by 2010 appears to have been set based on the 2008 to 2010 deadline given by Brussels under the EU-Africa strategy in order not to lose out on the €300 million that had already been secured.¹⁵⁸ On 3 February 2010, the pressure taps were turned on by the European Commission in its meeting with the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to ensure that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is on track and funding criteria adhered to.¹⁵⁹ The European Commission at the February 2010 meeting addressed the main objectives of the first set of measures to be funded from the second African Peace Facility (APF), 10th European Development Fund (EDP) which provides increased financial resources for the period 2008 to 2010 of the APF of €300 million. The following decisions emanated from the meeting:¹⁶⁰ a) continuation of ongoing activities that have been provided for under the African Peace Facility capacity building programmes of the 9th European Development Fund in line with re-allocations; b) inclusion of new activities, including support to establish and strengthen the AU liaison offices for the RECs and RMs, enhancing mediation capacity within the AU, RECS and RMs; greater support to the AU Peace and Security Council and similar structures of the RECs and RMs as well as the African Standby Force; c) the continuation of the €6 million capacity building programmes through the joint salary scheme to commence in July 2010; while early deliverables need to be agreed upon at the Nairobi workshop between 8 and 12 February 2010 regarding the African Peace Facility support to training centres to be finalised under the second APF funding at the end of February 2010; d) the 1st APF funds will continue and be measured against programme effectiveness; e) and the expiry date for re-allocation of funds of €7,5 million and €20 million is set for June 2010; f) the APF early response mechanism (ERM) which became operational in 4 November 2009 was financed at €3 million from the total contribution agreement of €15; g) the EU will conduct an evaluation and

¹⁵⁶ Sebastian Krapohl, and Johannes Muntshick, (2009), "Two Logics of Regionalism: The Importance of Interdependence and External Support For Regional Integration in Southern Africa" in, Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda and Farai Zizhou (eds.), *Furthering Southern African Integration: Proceedings of the 2008 FOPRISA Annual Conference* (Lightbooks a division of Lentswe la Lesedi: Gaborone, Botswana) pp.11-12.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. Also see, Council of the European Union (2008), Communiqué.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ African Union and European Union, (2010) "6th Meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee of the African Peace Facility" (Addis Ababa: Ethiopia), Joint Communiqué, 3 February, accessed on website address: www.africa-union.org/.

¹⁶⁰ Council of the European Union (2008), Communiqué, p.7.

assessment of the entire African Peace Security Architecture's components and policies in order to address and assess conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post conflict phases by mid-March 2010; h) to expand AU representative offices in Brussels, New York and Cairo and set up EU Liaison offices in the RECs and RMs before the end of 2010; and finally, i) to assess the EU contributions made to the AU's Year of Peace and Security at the next EU-Africa Summit in November 2010.¹⁶¹

In concluding this chapter it is important to note that the EU's big agenda has made no mention of future funding support for the ASF and its brigades beyond the current deadlines. SADC will have to make use of these time frames and get all its ducks in a row to ensure a more effective peacekeeping system in southern Africa. This chapter assessed how SADC's peacekeeping evolved in the southern African region and elsewhere in Africa. Peacekeeping in the southern African context will not only entail monitoring ceasefires and maintaining a peaceful environment, but peacekeeping that is expected to help pave the way for reconstruction and sustainable development in the region. Also assessed, was the SADC Brigade as one of the regional brigades, and its readiness for the 2010 deployment timeline and how this will fit into the overall ASF structure. The civilian component is an important aspect in addressing issues such as human rights, maintaining good governance and the rule of law. All these components all add up to the critical success of peace missions and similarly to tackle the recurrence of violence. The importance of external actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union was discussed, in support of SADC's peacekeeping support missions, and how the African Standby Force can benefit overall from such external actors. In the DRC in particular, SADC is already assisting with UN peacekeeping operations and the UN is more and more relying heavily on the partnerships with regional and sub-regional organisations to effectively assist in peacekeeping efforts.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ African Union and European Union, (2010) "6th Meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee of the African Peace Facility, pp. 1-3.

¹⁶² Christina Human, (2009), "Civilian participation in UN peacekeeping: one South African's perspective" in, *Pax Africana*, Vol.5, No.2, July, pp.16-17.

4. Chapter Four: SADC's Security Challenges

This chapter discusses the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) security challenges and identifies seven key areas that need to be addressed and these are: i. Complex Scenarios; ii. Building Solid Institutions; iii. SADC's Military Architecture; iv. Hybrid-Missions: SADC, the AU, and the UN; v. Addressing the Security Resource Challenge; vi. SADC Brigade Readiness: Building the African Standby Force (ASF) Capacity; and vii. SADC's Peacekeepers: Presenting a Challenge?

The chapter thus addresses the challenges that SADC faces in peacekeeping efforts between warring states or parties and examines how to approach complex regional conflicts. It argues that an effective response to violent conflict requires building effective institutional structures. The gaps identified in SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) structures that negatively contribute towards sustainable regional peace and security is also discussed. The involvement of international actors such as funding and peacekeeping missions of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) is also explored. Recognising that SADC's security architecture for the region has become more intricate and multidimensional - the chapter also assesses the anomalies that exist in SADC's security policies that can hamper regional peace and security. The SADC Brigade readiness of the ASF for rapid deployment in the region's conflict areas is further assessed. Resources such as peacekeeping personnel, funding, and timeframes are the final critical aspects for enhancing regional peace and security, which is interrogated in this chapter.

4.1. Complex Scenarios

Southern Africa states are developing states, plagued by weak governance structures such as parliamentary and electoral systems; inadequate security and justice systems; public administrations that are either absent or dysfunctional; and a deadening poverty evident in post-election conflicts in countries such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and recently Madagascar.¹⁶³ These are key ingredients that lead to conflicts that can spiral into violence that inevitably lead to the collapse of states and lawlessness. Africa overall is still confronted with corrupt governance structures that leads to governments not adequately delivering on, or at times not at all on the

¹⁶³ Adebayo Adedeji, (1999), "Comprehending African conflicts" in, Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance* (Zed Books: London).

most basic social services for its citizens. The reality of conflict in Africa has many dimensions and is at most conflict over scarce resources as well as exploitation of natural resources among different groups and regions which has as its root causes a historical dimension of ethnic dominance, manipulation and violence evident in such countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Resource-based conflicts have many dimensions and actors. Such actors include: government military groups, rebels, insurgents, private militias, warlords, mercenaries, private security companies, and multinational corporations (MNCs).¹⁶⁴ These actors often accumulate wealth by gaining direct and indirect access to resource-rich areas such as the DRC's diamonds, cobalt, oil, zinc, copper, and gold; and, Sudan's oil. Furthermore, such conflicts where armed militia groups are involved, using civilians as a tool of war and the most vulnerable groups of society are often targeted such as the rape of women and recruitment of children,¹⁶⁵ as soldiers.¹⁶⁶

4.2. Building Solid Institutions

An effective response to violent conflict requires effective institutional structures. The SADC secretariat is seen as, the “engine room” of the Organisation where everything should come together. The roles and responsibilities of the secretariat cannot be too over emphasised. The Mauritius conference of August 2008 made considerable progress for the SADC secretariat with the approval of the SADC Capacity Development Framework. This may not be enough for achieving the desired outcome of an effective SADC secretariat. For the secretariat to move from the “engine room” to becoming the driver, SADC may need to add more weight to the roles, responsibilities, and decision-making power of the secretariat in order to achieve positive results in its security architecture. The SADC Council of Ministers is viewed as a very important structure of the Organisation with major powers invested in it. The Council coordinates the work of the Organ and its structures and reports to the Organ chairperson.¹⁶⁷ Instead of adopting a multidisciplinary approach to the issue of defence, politics, and security, and empowering a committee of foreign ministers to manage SADC's affairs, the SADC treaty of 1992 authorised

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. Also see, Lederach, J., (1994), *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (United Nations University Press: Tokyo).

¹⁶⁵ Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), focussed on by the International Crisis Group. Accessed at website address: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5897&l=1>.

¹⁶⁶ In Africa on the whole there is an alarming number of 100,000 children being forced into rebel movements and militia groups to form part of rebel movements and their gendarmerie. See statistics provided by, Child Soldiers Organisation at, website address: <http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/some-facts>.

¹⁶⁷ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, *Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*.

the ministers of economic planning and finance to form the Council of Ministers. This has not worked sufficiently ever since, and the region's key concerns of politics, defence, and security, have been compromised. The functions of the Inter State, Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) also face several challenges in executing SADC's administrative role with its incoherent systems.¹⁶⁸ The Organ Directorate having to oversee four sectors: political and diplomatic affairs, defence, security and the regional peacekeeping training centre has a staff complement of 20 people. Its staff capacity is inadequate, hampering the Organ Directorate's ability to function effectively.¹⁶⁹ The Organ Directorate services the SADC Organ Troika and its network committees, and primarily services the ISDSC. SADC's governing structures often task the Organ directorate with a mandate beyond its budget and its staffing capacity, with the Organ having a minimal developed business plan and budget in comparison to other SADC directorates. The Organ's responsibilities have been overwhelming: overseeing peace and security preparations for a standby force; addressing SADC's mediation efforts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC; dealing with anti-corruption, politics and governance issues and deployment of election observer missions in member countries; developing a mediation framework study and a study on training initiatives for peace support missions; and overseeing two subsidiarity organisations based in Harare – the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SAPRCCO), and the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC).¹⁷⁰ SADC will have to address urgently the Organ's staffing and financial capacity in order to ensure that the region's political and security agenda is realised.

4.3. SADC's Military Architecture

The SADC BRIG is an important component for southern Africa's stability and was developed at a very important point in the history of the region. Southern Africa is still vastly poor with elites still pushing the political agendas in countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola and the DRC. Southern Africa's conflicts have their root causes in deprivation of the most basic needs such as food, shelter, safety, and belonging. It is inevitable that such conflicts will spiral into violent conflict seen recently been played out through intra-state conflicts that spilled over into the DRC's borders. The extensive training for SADC's police and military personnel may present a

¹⁶⁸ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, *Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*, p.13.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Tjønne, "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", pp.21-32.

challenge and some militaries have staged coups to overthrow states, evident in the recent cases in SADC member states - Lesotho and Madagascar.¹⁷¹

The Protocol for the OPDSC is extensive and far-reaching which allows the Organ to deal with both inter-state and intra-state conflicts such as gross human rights violations, civil wars, and military coups, among other violent communal conflicts. The Mutual Defence Pact of 2004, for the OPDSC of 2001 is also loosely designed and does not articulate in practice how it will be applied to an intervention, as well as its relationship with the SADC Brigade. In turn the synergy between the SADC Brigade, the African Union's Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) must also be clearly defined in terms of how peacekeeping is going to be undertaken in a given peacekeeping support operation. SADC should start defining how to intervene by making use of the UN's DPKO and could do this with the current DRC conflict at its doorstep. South Africa's role should be more influential by using its economic muscle and contributing more economically as well as with its strong military (South Africa has 1400 troops with the UN mission in the DRC). The role of the United Nations is critical in terms of support and capacity. The UN intervention in Angola in 1992 failed dismally and hence the UN may need to work more closely with SADC in future. The African Union has played an important role in the region in resolving southern African conflicts by providing an authorising role in SADC interventions, and has previously worked alongside the United Nations in peacekeeping operations. For example, in 2003, the AU established a framework for deployment of a peacekeeping mission in Burundi: the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). This mission was led by South Africa's military, with support from Mozambique and Ethiopia, and taken over by the United Nations in 2004.

In June 2003, former South African president, Thabo Mbeki announced in parliament that South Africa's peacekeeping effort in the DRC was costing R819.6 million over a twelve-month period.¹⁷² Also in 2003, South Africa's military involvement in Africa's "First World War" in the Great Lakes, deployed 1 600 soldiers in Burundi and costs were estimated at R783 million.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ SADC Summit Troika of the OPDSC Communiqué document, Maseru, Kingdom of Lesotho, 22 February 2010. Accessed at, website address: <http://www.sadc.int/opds>.

¹⁷² Christopher Landsberg, (2004), *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition*, (Jacana Media: Johannesburg, South Africa), pp.159-171.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

With SADC looking to South Africa to secure and carry the burden of the region's peacekeeping agenda this may not be that feasible in future. The costs of peacekeeping missions are overwhelming and not to be underestimated. It costs the United Nations US\$100 million (R1 billion) a month to maintain a brigade size of 1000 military personnel during a peacekeeping mission.¹⁷⁴ The funds that South Africa used in the DRC peacekeeping operation was only repaid by the United Nations several years after the original expenditure occurred.¹⁷⁵ South Africa may not be in a viable position to do this. Deployment of a military component within 14 days (scenario six of the ASF PLANELM – presents a challenge for SADCBRIG given the maintenance costs envisaged to have a deployment contingent ready for rapid deployment – the ASF policies may want to incorporate into its policies that scenario six is done on a rotational basis within SADC and its other regional brigades.¹⁷⁶

4.4. Hybrid-Missions: SADC, the AU, and the UN

The recommendations of a report of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's High-level Panel on "Threats, Challenges and Change" of 2004¹⁷⁷, highlighted that effective peacekeeping requires collective security. Such collective security entails the availability of peacekeepers; prompt and effective responses to challenges facing peacekeeping missions; and making use of regional and sub-regional based peacekeeping missions that are sufficiently resourced.¹⁷⁸ Collective security has been evident in peacekeeping missions in Africa such as those of the United Nations. Of the 63 UN peacekeeping missions deployed, between 1948 and 2009, 27 were conducted in Africa and four in southern Africa. Presently, of the 17 UN peacekeeping missions deployed globally, 7 are in Africa.¹⁷⁹ Since the United Nations is deploying peacekeepers to address Africa's conflicts, the new thinking around peacekeeping structures for the African Union may be either viewed as a duplication of the UN's role, or taking away its responsibility. However, the complexities of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa particularly after the brutality of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, which left 800,000 people dead, has raised grave concerns over the ability of the world's most powerful security body and questioned its ability to deal with

¹⁷⁴ Alden, and le Pere, "South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – from Reconciliation to Revival?" p.34.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Dersso, "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture", p.8.

¹⁷⁷ 2004 "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" United Nations.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ See complete list of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations past and current website address: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf>. Also see, Adekeye Adebajo (2006), "A Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform" in, Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds.) *A Dialogue of the Deaf*.

complex peacekeeping missions.¹⁸⁰ This resulted in a search for “best practices” for UN peacekeeping interventions, led by Kofi Annan during his period in office, from 1997 to 2006. Annan seconded former Algerian foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, to lead a Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A comprehensive review of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations was undertaken followed by the submission of a report in August 2000, known as the Brahimi report, which recommended an increase in the size of DPKO and improvement in the UN’s deployment capacities.¹⁸¹

Since, the AU’s peacekeeping management capability is in the developing stages, it may only be able to deploy small missions and resort to adhoc management capability as seen in the current struggling African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Past peacekeeping engagements such as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (2003-2007) also raised serious challenges.¹⁸² Clear command and control structures at strategic, operational and tactical levels and provision of requisite military and technical capabilities are needed. SADC and the ASF need an integrated and interoperable command, control, communication, and information system infrastructure to link deployed units with mission headquarters and with AU planning elements (PLANLEMs) and regions.¹⁸³ The issue of interoperability is important and much of this could be alleviated through structured and coherent training. To have an overall ASF ready for deployment with critical elements place requires adequate training and overcoming language barriers between contingents. The SADC BRIG has made some progress in working towards Scenario 6. However, much more still needs to be done in order to standardise ASF within and across regional brigades. Training must address the interoperability of brigades from different regions. Different SADC member states have 15 different brigades with different standards for operational procedures, approaches, equipment, traditions and backgrounds in training. Furthermore, the remaining ASF’s 38 states within the four other brigades will face challenges as well. A key challenge remains with not only sourcing the funding but developing an appropriate financial administrative system and framework to ensure efficiency and transparency. The SADC Secretariat has created a Bridging

¹⁸⁰ See, Henry Anyidoho, (2006), “A Tale of Two Tragedies: Rwanda and Darfur” in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds.) *A Dialogue of the Deaf*.

¹⁸¹ Lakhdar Brahimi (2000), “*Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*” United Nations document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August, New York, United States.

¹⁸² Dersso, “*The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*”, p.13. Also see, Motumi, “*Logistical and Capacity Considerations Surrounding a Standby Force*” pp.251-261.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

facility through which donor funding can be channelled. At the continental level, the AU has to ensure that funding for ASF missions are timeously funded and effectively administered.

4.4.1. Who will Keep the Peace?

For Africa, there will always be a peace to be kept, but the key question that should instead be addressed is - who will keep the peace? - who will intervene in emergency situations in Africa's conflict prone states?¹⁸⁴ A UN 2008¹⁸⁵ peacekeeping operations document highlights key lessons to be adhered to if peacekeeping operations are to succeed. This document raises an important question: Whether there is a peace to keep?¹⁸⁶ The 2008 document notes that a UN peacekeeping operation can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process. Furthermore, it notes that a UN peacekeeping operation deployed in the absence of such a commitment runs the risk of paralysis and under a worst case scenario, being drawn into a conflict, and possibly losing its impartiality. According to the AU Policy Framework, the ASF should hand over mandates and responsibilities to the UN.¹⁸⁷ This could pose a security challenge since a reluctance to approve a stronger United Nations peacekeeping operation in Rwanda in 1994 by its Security Council has posed serious handicaps to Africa's overall regional security. For example between 1945 and 1990, the UN Security Council passed 193 vetoes of peacekeeping initiatives.¹⁸⁸ The nature of conflicts in Africa has been prone to violent clashes that often require a timely response.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁴ African Union Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and The Military Staff Committee, (2003), (Document adopted by the Their Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff, 15-16 May, Addis Ababa). Exp/ASF-MS/2 (I), p.25. See the section on: "(f) UN Consultations with TCCs. In order to take advantage of this provision, the Meeting recommends that one or more ASF operational brigades should be organised in accordance with UN standards to be fielded in UN peacekeeping operations along the lines of SHIRBRIG...."

¹⁸⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (2008), "*Principles and Guidelines*" indicates that: "This document reflects the multi-dimensional nature of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations.... It override the national military doctrines of individual Member States participating in these operations and it does not address any military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), which remain the prerogative of individual Member States. It is nonetheless, intended to support civilian, police and military personnel who are training and preparing to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) to United Nations peacekeeping operations may wish to draw on this document in developing their respective doctrines, training and pre-deployment programmes. This document provides a clearer understanding of the major principles guiding the conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Key partners include TCCs, PCCs, regional and other inter-governmental organisations, The document supports a vision of a system of interlocking capabilities in which the roles and responsibilities and comparative advantages of the various partners are clearly defined." Accessed at website address: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping>, pp.9-10.

¹⁸⁶ Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (2008), "*Principles and Guidelines*" Accessed at website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping>, p.49.

¹⁸⁷ African Union Policy Framework, p.25.

¹⁸⁸ Adekeye Adebajo,(ed.), 2009, in, *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (KwaZulu-Natal Press: Scottsville, South Africa), p.66.

¹⁸⁹ Dersso, "*The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*", p.2.

4.4.2. Multidimensional Peacekeeping: A Deficit?

A major challenge for regional brigades is to address the peacekeeping gap of the UN launching interventions timely in Africa's conflicts. The new UN policy clearly outlines that a United Nations peacekeeping operation can only deploy a peacekeeping operation with the commitment of parties on the ground to genuinely resolve the conflicts through a political process.¹⁹⁰ The UN will not intervene in the case where there is no peace to keep such as in Somalia, irrespective of continued violence, loss of human lives, and displacement of people.¹⁹¹ While the authorising of a UN peacekeeping operation requires nine votes (and no vetoes from the five permanent members – the US, Russia, China, Britain, and France) from the Security Council's 15 members, divisions within the Security Council are likely to send mixed messages to parties in conflict. This could undermine the legitimacy of missions in the eyes of the parties and may make room for "spoilers" at both local and regional levels.¹⁹² The reverse could impact positively on the peace process on the ground and greatly enhance a peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, missions approved by the UN Security Council take a minimum of six months before being deployed on the ground.¹⁹³ The responsibility of the ASF to affect a timely response to conflict interventions thus rests in its hands.

4.5. Addressing the Security Resource Challenge

Funding and resources are the bedrock for successful peacekeeping interventions and SADC should draw lessons from other peacekeeping engagements.¹⁹⁴ For example, experiences by the African Union's peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Sudan's Darfur regions and Somalia between 2003 and 2009, have exposed the difficulty of sustaining peacekeeping interventions when faced with financial and logistical weaknesses.¹⁹⁵ The Southern African Standby Brigade, being part of the African Standby Force, is designed to ultimately undertake peacekeeping operations that require observer missions, and sustained interventions will require sustained resources and funding.¹⁹⁶ The United Nations Charter, under Chapter VIII, allows for cooperation between

¹⁹⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (2008), p.49.

¹⁹¹ Dersso, "*The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*", p.16.

¹⁹² Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (2008), p.50.

¹⁹³ Dersso, "*The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*", p.16.

¹⁹⁴ Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), *Ending Africa's Wars: progressing to Peace* (Aldershot, Hampshire and Burlington, Ashgate).

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Report, "Security and Development in Southern Africa".

regional bodies and the UN. Stemming from the December 2007 Lisbon summit with Africa¹⁹⁷, the European Union has articulated as one of its projected plans, a clear plan of action in support of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) defined in the African Union's PSC. In 2004, the EU provided €250 million, and a further €300 million in 2006 towards the AU's peace and security architecture.¹⁹⁸ These funds are aimed at benefiting the AU Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force. One of SADC's member states, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, gained EU support for UN peacekeeping efforts in 2003 and 2007/2008.¹⁹⁹ Given the expensive nature of peacekeeping, it would be important for SADC to tap into such resources through the UN and the EU. SADC should make use of such structures in order to improve peacekeeping and enhance the capacities of member states with lesser military expertise. At both regional and continental levels, progress has been made for securing funding initiatives. These resources have been successfully secured through the European Development Fund for SADC's peace and security architecture. A thematic group is also being constructed to provide a business plan and budget for the Organ's regional projects in the politics, defence and security areas.²⁰⁰ At continental level, the African Union has expanded its international cooperating partners to include India. The April 2008 New Delhi Declaration as well as the Africa-India Framework for Cooperation, have been adopted. The Framework outlines commitments by India to the AU and Africa's post-conflict reconstruction; enhancing the civilian component of peacekeeping operations; policing; human trafficking; disaster management; and, humanitarian intervention. Thus far there has been limited capacity in the area of peacebuilding at the regional level. However, it is envisaged that this will change in the near future.²⁰¹

4.6. SADC Brigade Readiness: Building the African Standby Force Capacity

The ASF and its five regional brigades are critical for ensuring the protection of ordinary civilians especially, women and children, in violent conflict areas. They cannot easily dispose of this role, nor relinquish it and rely too heavily on the UN. It is most likely that ASF will have

¹⁹⁷ The Joint EU-Africa Strategy was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007. During the second Summit between heads of state and government from the EU and Africa. The first summit was held in Cairo in 2000. <http://europafrica.net/2007/05/20/libson-summit/>.

¹⁹⁸ This section has made considerable use of the Centre for Conflict Resolution reports: "Eurafrrique? Africa and Europe in A New Century" 31 October and 1 November, 2007 Vol.26, and "Security and Development in Southern Africa" 8 – 10 June, 2008 Vol.27.

¹⁹⁹ EU Website Address: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2428_en.htm

²⁰⁰ TjØnneland, "SADC Restructuring, Pioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", pp.21-32.

²⁰¹ Dersso, "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture".

40 000-strong²⁰² peacekeepers by 2010. However, the ASF may not have a force available to be deployed immediately for Scenario Six interventions. SADC and Africa overall, are moving in the right direction and displaying the desire and political will to establish a standing force. A key security challenge facing SADC is to move beyond ordinary peacekeeping and to beef up its peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Conflict management, negotiating peace agreements, and mediation strategies are all key facets that could be a cost-saving mechanism, and SADC should more actively enhance such structures. There are instances where countries relapses back into war and back into conflict such as the DRC. SADC should find effective ways and strategies to involve the UN to assist in addressing the root causes of conflict and deal with their triggers effectively. It should also call on external donors and the international community to assist in post-conflict reconstruction such as humanitarian assistance, refugees, revitalising repatriation, political, economic and social structures, and most importantly disarmament, demobilisation, disintegration, and reintegration of ex-combatants and militia groups back into local communities. Africa's regions have already conducted various training activities. NARC is the newest brigade and has had no planned training exercises. The AU is in the process of implementing continental training for all its five brigades to check brigade readiness, by March 2010.²⁰³

A former force commander, General Martin Luther Agwai for the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur has stressed the relevance and critical importance of sufficient resources for peacekeeping. For example, the minimum requirement for combat helicopters, are between 12 and 18, and no country was able to supply the UN/AU-Darfur mission with these resources. Hence, in September 2007, the attack on the UN/AU hybrid peacekeepers in Darfur, cost the lives of 10 peacekeepers because of the considerable time that was taken to move the injured (eight hours). This can be avoided in future if the appropriate resources are in place.²⁰⁴ Overall peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU and RECs have had serious difficulties in Burundi, the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia.²⁰⁵ Timely responses to conflicts in these areas were made. However, constraints of mandates were due to a

²⁰² Dersso, "The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture". Also see Johan Potgieter, (2009), "Peacekeeping forces for peace support operations in Africa" 4 August. Accessed at website address; <http://www.apsta-africa.org/news/article040809.php>.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Dersso, *The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*, p.14.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

lack of military capabilities, insufficient resources, and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, manage, deploy and liquidate operations.²⁰⁶ To deal with the problem of military capabilities, at both continental and regional levels will require logistics depots to be established. The AU has also developed a logistics concept paper in this regard, but, this has not been implemented as yet due to lack of locations for the six logistical depots due to political reasons and has yet to be implemented.²⁰⁷ SADC's South Africa National Defence Force has been tasked to develop a road and rail strategic lift concept, and the Algerian National Defence Force has been requested to develop the air and sea lift capabilities for NARC Brigade. However, the AU and its RECs still need to address acquisition of resources and mechanisms for operationalising these initiatives.

4.7. SADC's Peacekeepers: Presenting a Challenge?

Nowhere in the ASF policy frameworks for the establishment of the African standby force and the military staff committee as well as the memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the AU, RECs and RMs, is HIV/AIDS mentioned. This is quite alarming, because if there are limited brigade forces, who is going to keep the peace? SADC's Bridging Funding Facility should address this challenge and implement sound policies, with practical solutions that are realistic while still addressing the human rights of peacekeepers. Currently, the guiding numbers for ASF peacekeeping operations for regional brigades range between 5000 and 3500 troops; 500 military observers for standby duty; and 240 police officers. It may be more beneficial for the ASF to raise its numbers for police officers from 240 to 1000, in order to maintain an effective peacekeeping force mission. SADC needs to take this into account and it is simply not enough to say that field officers refuse to be tested. The length of time that forces are deployed on peacekeeping mission should also be reconsidered. It may be worth looking at a policy that provides a specific timeframe and length of period for deployment of military personnel. A moratorium could be set, for much high-ranking officials who are overseeing peacekeeping missions. South Africa is the largest troop contributing force for the SADC Brigade. However the major problem facing SADC centres on the extent of HIV/AIDS in SANDF (estimated at 23 percent),²⁰⁸ and how this will affect southern Africa's security

²⁰⁶ Dersso, *The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture*, p.14.

Also see United Nations Security Council report (2009), "Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN", September.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ "The Military Sector and HIV/AIDS" in, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Robin Pharoah (eds.) (2008), *HIV/AIDS and Society in South Africa* (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press: Scottsville, South Africa). Also see, Lindy Heinecken, (2008), "The Potential Impact of HIV/AIDS on the South African Armed Forces: Some Evidence from Outside and Within", accessed on website address: www.jstor.org.

challenges of contributing towards the ASF and to peace and security for the region. In 2006, the South African Department of Defence (DOD) reported that during 2006 of the 34,810 members tested for HIV/AIDS, 30 percent tested positive,²⁰⁹ and in some SADC countries estimates are as high as between 40 to 60 percent.²¹⁰

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²⁰⁹ Lindy Heineken, (2008), *"The Potential Impact of HIV/AIDS on the South African Armed Forces: Some Evidence from Outside and Within"*, accessed on website address: www.jstor.org, p.66.

²¹⁰ See CCR reports: "HIV/AIDS and Human Security" Vol. 6, September 2005; "HIV/AIDS and Militaries in Southern Africa" Vol. 10, February 2006; "Aids and Society in South Africa" Vol.11, March 2006; and "HIV/AIDS and Human Security in South Africa", Vol. 12, June 2006. accessed at CCR Website address: www.ccr.org.za.

5. Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations

Since the post-Cold War period, has the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) identity changed dramatically and peace and security in the sub-region has involved more intra-state violence that spills across borders threatening wider regional stability. This warrants initiatives such as the African Standby Force (ASF) to deal with peace and security in a holistic manner. South Africa joining SADC in post 1994 has also changed the face of peace and security issues in the region. South Africa's transition gave hope to the southern African region, ending destabilisation by apartheid South Africa, and a post-apartheid regime cooperating peacefully with states in southern Africa.

SADC's continuity has always been ensured by a supportive donor community. In 1995, European Union foreign officials and SADC met in Berlin, Germany, to discuss and promote closer trade and political, regional and economic relations.²¹¹ This was a very different gathering that took place to the Berlin Conference, 100 years earlier, staged also in Berlin – the famous conference of 1884 -1885, - under the supervision of Germany's "Iron Chancellor", Otto von Bismarck, when the rules were set for Africa's territories to be effectively carved up by Europe's imperialist powers: Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Germany.²¹² Post-conflict reconstruction is expensive, and SADC must try to rely on the UN and other external donors. SADC also needs to find ways to ensure that it remains the driver of its projects and sets the agenda for its policies. Similarly, it must ensure that it is not dictated to by its international cooperating partners too extensively.

SADC's Mauritius Conference of 2008 also proposed the implementation of a Bridging Fund Facility for short to medium-term projects that started in the 2008 and 2009 financial year. The Bridging Fund Facility will address the needs of the Secretariat, other SADC Treaty-established Institutions - SADC Tribunal, SADC subsidiary institutions such as the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Development Finance Resource Centre.²¹³ At a later stage the Bridging Fund Facility will also fund member states and SADC-supported institutions mandated

²¹¹ See, Peter Vale, (2003), "Ordering Southern Africa" in, *Security and Politics in South Africa* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, London) p. 122.

²¹² Adekeye Adebajo (2007), "The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities" in, John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Tim Murithi (eds.) *The African Union and its Institutions*, p.131.

²¹³ TjØnneland, "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", pp.21-32.

to implement the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) priority areas linked to National Committees, SADC National Contact Points and respective sector ministries.²¹⁴ A special Project Preparation Facility and Fund will also be set up and funded by South Africa's Development Bank of Southern Africa. The purpose for the Project Preparation Facility and Fund is to assist SADC member states, in an intermediary capacity, to develop projects, up to the point that it is of a "bankable stage".²¹⁵ The EU commissioned institutional assessment of SADC and strongly recommended that SADC bring its financial management up to international standards.²¹⁶ This is vital. SADC has to address the EU's concerns and strengthen its financial management.

SADC further, needs to achieve its regional security needs and recruit adequate staff within its structures. The cooperation of SADC member states is of critical importance for this to be realised. SADC's National Committees (SNCs) were established according to its Treaty of 1992, to coordinate programmes and policies for its government, civil society organisations and the private sector. The SNCs are mandated to ensure that SADC programmes are implemented at a national level. The reporting line for state directed SNCs are to the SADC secretariat. This poses a problem for the Secretariat, since the SNCs are state-directed at national levels and therefore accountability becomes a challenge. The Secretariat's lack of power and authority cannot hold SNCs accountable. Furthermore, the SNCs do not exist in all SADC member states and those that do exist are largely dysfunctional, lack technical capacity, and have ineffective coordinating mechanisms and inadequate resources.²¹⁷ This will affect SADC's ability to implement the desired security at regional level and has the potential to create a gap in its security architecture. Matlosa, and Lotshwao have argued that: "In part as a result of the paralysis of SNCs and the inherent weaknesses of the Secretariat in Gaborone, SADC lacks visibility at national level of its member states. It is not well known by ordinary people of the region. Thus, its relevance for the promotion of democratic governance, peace, security and political stability is not easily appreciated by the people of southern Africa besides the political elites. Even among the

²¹⁴ TjØnneland, "SADC Restructuring, Pioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", pp.21-32.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, "*Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*", p.14. Also see, TjØnneland, "SADC Restructuring, Pioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008".

enlightened political elites, it is the ruling groups that tend to have more confidence in SADC's efforts in promoting democratic governance."²¹⁸

Often, the political elites in SADC member states, who happen to belong to opposition parties have raised concerns that the regional economic community is purely a club of ruling parties whose main pre-occupation is to provide political solidarity to each other and who are not inclined to criticise each other in cases where authoritarian tendencies threaten democratic governance, constitutionalism and human rights.²¹⁹ This was evident in 1998 when Zimbabwe experienced massive political and economic crises with land invasions sanctioned by the Robert Mugabe government termed as "fast track" land restitution, and resulting in the eviction of farm workers and largely white farm owners.²²⁰ These actions exacerbated poverty, unemployment, and escalated inflation rates, coupled with disputed presidential elections in 2002.²²¹ Former South African presidents, Mbeki and Mandela opted to engage Zimbabwe through quite diplomacy tactics although Zimbabwean activists called for stronger action to be taken against Mugabe progress was very slow.²²² In May 2000 Mandela spoke out in favour of Mugabe and in defence of the quiet diplomacy approach adopted by South Africa stating that this was the best mechanism to use in a violent political dispute over white land ownership in Zimbabwe.²²³ According to Chris Landsberg, he quotes Mandela stating that: "It is no use standing on hilltops and shouting about such a highly sensitive matter. An approach through diplomatic channels without much publicity, is more likely to bring about a positive result.... I would personally support president Mbeki when he says we have diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe. Everything should be done through diplomatic channels."²²⁴ Such stances adopted by some of SADC leaders may not be advantageous for SADC's citizens. SADC's approach to intervene in Zimbabwe's security challenges was quite casual amidst 5 million Zimbabweans estimated to be suffering from food shortages, and in some cases starvation, with Zimbabwe's inflation projected at 619,5 percent in 2001.²²⁵ By 2001, huge food shortages were reported in Zimbabwe's rural parts such as Matabeleland and Masvingo. Zimbabwe's GDP per capita was US\$471 in 2000 and was

²¹⁸ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, "Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa", p.14. Also see, Tjønnealand, "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008"..

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Landsberg, *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation*, p. 173.

²²¹ Ibid, p.174.

²²² Ibid, p. 173.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid, p. 174.

²²⁵ Ibid.

steadily declining. Payments not made on foreign debt of US\$4 billion, and debt servicing was behind US\$690 million behind by June 2001, with inflation at 100 percent also in June 2001.²²⁶ SADC's response to the crisis in Zimbabwe has revealed the divisions within the Organisation, reflecting divergent political views and values. Hence SADC member states must not diverge from its policies and adhere to what they have committed to.²²⁷

Problems facing SADC today are from SADC Summit level, down to the operational level, and have since its inception continually afflicted its peace and security structure. At the SADC Summit level,²²⁸ comprising of all heads of state and governments of SADC's 15 members have entrusted all policy direction to this body to be the ultimate decision-making body and oversees the organisation's functions by adopting protocols, declarations, conventions, and legal instruments.²²⁹ The SADC Summit elects its own Security Troika on an annual basis and currently in these roles are: DRC (Chair), Zambia, and Namibia.²³⁰ The executive secretary, (currently Mozambican, Tomaz Salomão), is appointed by the SADC Summit. Creation of new structures within SADC, and acceptance of new member states are made at the Summit level. The Organ and the executive secretary have no decision-making powers. All decisions concerning democracy and governance rest entirely with the Summit.²³¹ These decisions are agreed on a consensus basis - whether it is the correct decision or not, and this can lead to problems. In the past in the old SADCC with less membership, (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) the consensus model sufficed. With the additional six member states, it may not be effective for the current SADC. Tackling SADC institutional reform may not be the answer to the desired outcome and it may be that the regional organisation addresses the crucial problems pertaining to decision making and state sovereignty.

The OPDSC Troika system and the role of the chair is an important responsibility. Angola's chairing of the Organ from August 2007 to August 2008 was questioned in terms of its unwillingness to deal with the Zimbabwe and DRC conflict situations, and failed to host any

²²⁶ Landsberg, *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation*, p. 174.

²²⁷ Tjønnealand "SADC Restructuring, Prioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", p.31.

²²⁸ Matlosa, and Lotshwao "Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa", pp.10-11.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão and Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration, Eng. João Samuel Caholo.

²³¹ Matlosa, and Lotshwao "Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa", pp.10-11

high-level SADC meetings by the Troika or full Summit to discuss these matters; especially before, during, and after the election events of March and June 2008. Angola also failed to attend the AU Summit in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt in July 2008.²³² SADC has to address its institutional capacity at the level of the OPDSC secretariat which has currently only 20 people to oversee different fields such as politics, military and police.²³³ This limited and inadequate staffing will hamper SADC's overall security objectives. The abolishment of the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) of August 2007 that replaced six ministerial clusters led to additional responsibilities for the secretariat. The 2008 SADC meeting in Mauritius has provided more support for the secretariat through the capacity building framework, and it is hoped that this will enhance its ability to deliver on its mandate more effectively. The Secretariat must also be supported with additional capacity and competences in programme management, planning, monitoring, finance, procurement, and administration.²³⁴ This may not be enough, and SADC may need to revisit the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat and address how it can be reformed at policy level so that it has more executive powers on decision-making for achieving its security agenda.

The political will and commitment displayed by SADC's 15 member states in the security field remains a challenge for the Organisation. SADC and its institutions have developed over time, and it has been an important Organisation for the region. SADC's policies however, require streamlining on an ongoing basis to meet global trends, demands and developments, and establish an effective standby force. SADC is not the means to an end, but only a vehicle that coordinates the region's "Shared Future" - towards peace, security, and political stability and to achieve socio-economic development. The extent to which SADC achieves its shared future will be determined by the extent to which its member states commit themselves to the implementation of its policies.

²³² Cardoso, "Peace and Security Operations in the Southern African Development Community", p.120.

²³³ Matlosa, and Lotshwao, "*Political Integration and Democratisation in Southern Africa*", pp.12-13.

²³⁴ TjØnneland, "SADC Restructuring, Pioritisation and Donors, 2006 – 2008", pp.22-25.

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