CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE INTEREST OF REGIONAL PEACE

A CRITICAL REEXAMINATION OF U.S. MEDIATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1981-1989

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Compulsory Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

This dissertation reexamines the negotiation process mediated by the U.S. that occurred between parties representing Angola, Cuba, Namibia, and South Africa during the 1980's. It presents the U.S. policy of constructive engagement ('81- '89) as a contributing factor in the mitigation of regional conflicts in Southern Africa. It reexamines whether the guiding principles of the mediation strategy effectively led to the Cuban withdrawal from Angola and the independence of Namibia. In addition, it looks at how constructive engagement created a regional climate for peace through the mitigation of these interconnected conflicts which significantly contributed to South Africa's transition away from apartheid.

The central question of the dissertation is, did constructive engagement foster a regional climate for peace in Southern Africa, defined by the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the independence of Namibia, and a path towards South African democratization? There are three sub questions: (I) what were constructive engagements techniques and guiding principles? (II) why did the Reagan administration pursue the strategy; and (III) was constructive engagement a successful international conflict mediation strategy? To answer these questions, this dissertation will employ relevant literature to produce general principles of constructive engagement. It will use William Zartman and Saadi Touval's classifications of third-party mediators in international conflict in addition to Vincente Tome's staged model of the negotiation process. In this respect, this dissertation is an interpretative case study.

This dissertation argues that constructive engagement is an effective conflict mediation strategy that made a significant impact on the propensity for peace in Southern Africa on several fronts. It aims is to reconsider the overwhelmingly negative opinion of U.S. intervention in Southern Africa throughout international relations discourse. It produces a piece of literature that explores the positive impact of the mediation strategy of constructive engagement as a driver for Southern African regional peace and subsequently a contributing factor in the end of apartheid.

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To my family, thank you for always supporting my decisions no matter how from home they may take me. To my supervisor Zweli, thank you for your guidance, knowledge, and patience over the past two years. And finally, thank you to my late godmother Carol, who I know has been watching over this journey.

List of Abbreviations

ANC- African National Congress

CAA- Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act

CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy

DDPD- Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

EHFP- Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy

EU- European Union

FNLA- National Liberation Front of Angola

ICJ- International Court of Justice

JCPOA- Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

NP- National Party

NSSM- National Security Memorandum

MENA- Middle East and North Africa

MK- Umkhonto we Sizwe

MPLA- People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

OPO- Ovamboland People's Organization

PAC- Pan African Congress

SADF- South African Defense Force

SWANU- South West Africa National Union

SWAPO- South West Africa People's Organization

UCT- University of Cape Town

UK- United Kingdom

UN- United Nations

UNITA- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNSC- United Nations Security Council

UNSCR- United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNTAG- United Nations Transition Assistance Group

US- United States of America

USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WCG- Western Contact Group

ZPwN- Zero Problems with Neighbours

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Chapter 1: Introduction

> Dr. Chester Crocker, one chief architect of the Reagan Administration's Africa policy, has the problems of a man trying to build a card house while riding a bicycle on a high wire. His motives are widely misunderstood. To pause and explain himself would be disastrous. And, even then, his critics would never believe him.[1]

The African continent experienced several significant institutional changes at the latter end of 20th century. It also goes to say that the continent saw a heightened propensity for violence during this period. In the proceeding decades Southern Africa was plagued by extensive interdependence while lacking regional cooperation. By the turn of the 1980's, there was substantial tension between apartheid South Africa and its neighbors. Namibia was experiencing an increasingly dangerous conflict over the conditions of independence while foreign intervention in Angola became the apartheid governments defense against relinquishing it's illegal control over both the region and its own population. However, with mediation by the United States, all parties involved were able to successfully lessen hostilities and commit to several peace agreements by the end of the decade.

The UN Peacemaker database chronologizes 22 peace agreements from 1978-2013 when controlling for "Africa," specifically "Angola," "South Africa," and "Namibia", in addition to "United States." Of these 22 peace agreements, 9 of them entered into force during the 1980s.[2] This reflects the most significant period for Southern African peacebuilding in the 20th century. This dissertation is particularly interested in the events that occurred during this nine-year period of 1981-'89 of significant regional transformation.

Born out of an interest in the field of international conflict mediation in Sub-Saharan Africa, this dissertation deals with the foreign policy instrument of mediation employed in the American-Southern African context in which the United States pursued a regional strategy dubbed constructive engagement in dealing with the mitigation of several interconnected conflicts in Southern Africa. Specifically, constructive engagement refers to the U.S.' policy of involvement in Angolan, Namibian, and South African affairs during the 1980s and shortly thereafter. Adopted in 1981 by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker, constructive engagement

[1] Nickel, "RDM Article Crocker- The Silent Activist," Telegram, January 31, 1983, National Archives and Records Administration.
[2] UN Peacemaker "UN Peacemaker," accessed May 15, 2021.

defined the relationship between the United States and Southern Africa during President Reagan's administration [1981-‘89]. In the end, the foundational principles of constructive engagement as a concept matured into a regionwide negotiation benchmark for America's mediation strategy used in dealing with South Africa's role in the decade's prolonged conflicts in Angola and Namibia.

1.1: Brief Review of Literature

Constructive engagement is demonized throughout academic literature. The general opinion can be simplified into one statement: the policy of constructive engagement was an expression of Cold War realpolitik that opposed the condemnation of apartheid and effected little change within South Africa. It resulted in the perception of vialed support for the racist regime by the United States where the superpower’s focus on Cold War concerns acted as a detriment to racial equality in South Africa. That is, constructive engagement as a policy overlooked apartheid for South Africa to remain a regional ally, the policy was unable to effect meaningful change within South Africa, culminating in the idea that constructive engagement was a policy that focused on South Africa alone and not the region. While this characterization of the policy throughout the literature is incorrect, few prominent authors stray from this theme.

The concept was originally presented in 1980 by Chester Crocker in an opinion article for the Council on Foreign Relations titled, “South Africa, Strategy for Change,” and explained in further detail in his autobiography, *High Noon in Southern Africa*— published in 1993. Despite the explicit definitions, strategies, ultimate goals, and results of constructive engagement being laid out in the article in addition to Crocker’s first-hand account in his autobiography, scholarly literature that has emerged as a response to the early days of the policy routinely misses the mark.

It has been made overwhelmingly clear that many authors fail to view this instance of third-party mediation as a regional strategy towards Southern Africa, overlooking the main objectives of constructive engagement taken on by the United States. Despite this fact, most of the literature is a critical response to the policy's implementation and various results. Joanne Davies and Alex Thomson are two main critics of the policy throughout the literature. While well researched and convincing, the two authors characterize and portray the policy as objectively self-serving, unsuccessful, and even damaging for the democratization of Southern and South Africa.

However, Christopher Saunders and Henning Melber stray from the conventional account of the strategy, supporting the point that constructive engagement did have an impact on the

democratization of the region. In addition, Geoffrey Berridge stresses that American mediation in the region did result in a comprehensive peace settlement that was achieved rather quickly. This dissertation employs Berridge's point that American mediation in Southern Africa was a diplomatic achievement.

The use of constructive engagement by states other than the U.S. is reviewed to deviate from existing literature and establish common features of the strategy within different regional contexts. The fact of the matter is that there are several instances where nations other than the United States have advanced and applied this mediation strategy regional conflicts. Qatar's approach to its region, Turkey's "Zero Problems with Neighbors" strategy, and the European Union's 'constructive dialogue' with Iran have all employed constructive engagement, whether explicitly or implicitly, in its approaches to dealing with the tumultuous nature of the Middle East in recent decades.

1.2: Research Question(s), Aims, and Significance

The dissertation's research question asks**:** *Did the U.S.'s policy of constructive engagement foster a regional climate for peace in Southern Africa, defined by the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the independence of Namibia, and a path towards South African democratization*? The research question therefore has three sub-questions:

I. What were constructive engagements techniques and guiding principles?
II. Why did the Reagan administration pursue such a strategy?
III. Was constructive engagement a successful international conflict mediation strategy?

This research critically reexamines the U.S.- South African relationship during the 1980s–a period that academics often inaccurately recall with suspicion. Significant shortcomings exist in the literature surrounding U.S. foreign policy in Southern Africa during the Cold War Era. Authors fail to capture the full picture of American intervention in favor of Cold War driven explanations. Through a holistic reexamination of the American mediation method, a clear picture of the significant impact that constructive engagement had on the Southern African region–from ending South Africa's occupation of Namibia, the Angolan Civil War, along with its unmistakable influence on South Africa's democratic transition–emerges**.**

This research aims to critically reexamine constructive engagement as a third-party formulative mediation strategy and investigate if the strategy, despite its criticisms, contributed to a regional climate conducive to peace in Southern Africa. The research also calls into question the U.S.' role as a third-party mediator that facilitated several successful peacebuilding agreements in the region. In addition, this dissertation seeks to potentially establish a link between the New York Accord and Pretoria's transition away from the apartheid state's characteristic domestic and international belligerence.

This dissertation will look at constructive engagement within the context of mediation strategy, compiling a list of basic mediation principles used to show that the strategy was an "overwhelming success" in Southern Africa. In addition, it will support the linkage element that tied together several Southern African conflicts due to the significant impact that that decision had on the end of apartheid to counter the Cold War-focused argument that exists throughout the literature. This work contributes to the academic literature by filling in gaps as it deviates from established opinion and accounts constructive engagement as a successful region-wide conflict mediation strategy.

1.3: Research Design and Methodology

In terms of a specific research methodology, the case study method is the most suitable approach to answering the research questions presented. The case study method applies to one case, whereas the comparative method relatively few, and the statistical method many. Case studies have many benefits. Their focus on single cases allows for an intensive examination even of limited resources, they are general, and they constitute neither the basis for generalizations nor their disproval.[3] According to Lijphart, case studies make an essential contribution to establishing propositions and theory building in political science.[4] Cases may be selected for analysis because of an interest in the case *per se* or because of an interest in theory-building. However, this is not to say that the insights arising from the atheoretical class of case study types cannot significantly contribute to further research related to theory.[5]

[3] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 682-93.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

Lijphart distinguishes between six ideal types of case studies: atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-conforming, theory-infirming, and deviant.[6] As mentioned, the researcher's interest in either the case or interest in theory building determines which ideal case study method is selected for analysis. Lijphart's model breaks the ideal types of case studies into two groups from which they are drawn: either by interest in the case or interest in theory-building. The first two case study types, (1) atheoretical and (2) interpretive, belong to the former while the other four the latter.[7]

Atheoretical case studies are traditional, descriptive single-country or single-case analyses that are neither guided or motivated by theoretical hypotheses.[8] They are data-gathering operations that provide valuable information that can later contribute to theory-building. Interpretative case studies are similarly selected for analysis due to a disinterest in the formulation of general theory and interest in the case itself. They differ from atheoretical case studies because interpretative case studies make explicit use of established theoretical propositions to explain the case while never contributing to empirical generalizations on their own.[9]

On the other hand, hypothesis generating case studies hold great theoretical value.[10] They seek to develop theoretical generalizations where no theory currently exists by formulating and testing a hypothesis among many cases. Similarly, theory-conforming and theory infirming case studies can act as crucial tests of propositions. They seek to analyze cases within a framework of established generalizations where the results can either confirm or infirm the proposition. These case studies hold great theoretical value if results show that one of the variables holds strong significance. Finally, deviant case studies are single case analyses that seek to reveal how cases may deviate from established generalizations. By refining the operational definitions of variables and uncovering additional variables, deviant case studies weaken the original proposition while developing stronger, more modified ones. Like the three ideal types that proceed it, deviant case studies have great theoretical value.[11]

[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

Of Lijpharts ideal types, this dissertation employs an interpretative case study method.[12] According to Shana Ponelis, "the interpretive research paradigm is characterized by the need to understand the world as it is from a subjective point of view."[13] Interpretative case studies are not common in political science and even more rare in international relations, where many researchers are concerned with applying conventional international relations theory to their analysis. Because of this deviation from standard research methodology within the field, this choice requires an explicit definition of the method and justification for use:

> In interpretative case studies, generalizations [are] applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case rather than of improving the generalization in any way. Hence they are studies in "applied science." Since they do not aim to contribute to empirical generalizations, their value in terms of theory building is nil. On the other hand, it is precisely the purpose of empirical theory to make such interpretative case studies possible.[14]

The interpretative case study method is the most appropriate mainly due to interest in the case rather than general theory. Likewise, this dissertation does not deal with any established theory or use it as a guide.[15] Instead, it is interested in constructive engagement as a case itself instead of making propositions grounded in conventionally established international relations or international conflict mediation theory.

While the case study aims to provide a historical background on the conflict and introduce Crocker's guiding principles prior to the 1980's, this research reexamines the negotiation process within a staged framework established by Vincente Tome in the journal article, *Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988,* to answer the research question and sub-questions.[16]

While Tome's research is concerned with the relationship between partiality and the credibility of mediators in the Southern African context, specifically, "how a mediator maintains his credibility when he is perceived as being partial–"[17], it also chronologizes the eight-year

[12] Ibid.
[13] Shana Ponelis, "Using Interpretive Qualitative Case Studies for Exploratory Research in Doctoral Studies: A Case of Information Systems Research in Small and Medium Enterprises," *International Journal of Doctoral* Studies no. 10 (2015): 538.
[14] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 691.
[15] Ibid., 682-93.
[16] Vicente Tome, "Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988," Negotiation Journal 8, no. 3 (July 1992): 273-290.
[17] Ibid.

Angolan-Namibian negotiation process into five distinct phases. The subheadings and corresponding dates that Tome uses are useful in breaking down the negotiation progress into digestible phases that coincide with major events: Phase I: *Linkage Introduction and Namibian Independence (April 1981- July 1982),* Phase II: *Pursuing Linkage (July 19821- March 1985),* Phase III: *Derailment (April 1985- March 1987),* Phase IV: *The Players Return and a New Player Emerges (March 1987- May 1988)*, and finally Phase V*: Double Games and Endgame (May 1988-December 1988).*[18] This phased framework acts as basis for the reexamination of the American exercise of constructive engagement in Southern Africa.

There are several disadvantages of the interpretative case study method. Researcher bias is unavoidable as the framework for analysis is dictated by the researcher's interpretation, guided by subjectivity rather than objectivity. In addition, data collection is time-consuming, analysis challenging and complex, and the emergence of clear patterns within the literature is not guaranteed.[19] Still, interpretative case study method remains the most appropriate research method despite these complexities.

1.4: Sources of Evidence

Case study research typically involves many sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and potentially physical artifacts. Given that this dissertation analyses a historic political process, books, journal articles, speeches, signed peace agreements, interview transcripts, policy memos, newspaper articles, databases and various archives were used. The reference management software, Zotero, was used to assist in organizing and referencing the many source materials.

Virtual research used to facilitate this study. This method was chosen out of constraints but made possible by the rich availability of information already published electronically. It was considering the weaknesses associated with such a method due to time and current events and the inability to conduct in-person research and analysis. Quantitative methods were not used. Instead, this dissertation in favor of qualitative research would provide a holistic understanding of rich, contextual, unstructured, non-numeric data.

[18] Ibid.
[19] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 682-93.

In addition to Chester Crocker's autobiography, Alex Thomson's book was relied on as the basis for a first-hand account of the negotiation process. In terms of primary source records that coincide with Crocker's account, the Padraig O'Malley Archival Collection, the South African Foreign Affairs Archive made available by Wilson Center, The U.S. Department of State National Archives and Records Administration Catalogue/ Freedom of Information Act Virtual Library, the U.N. Peacemaker and Digital Library databases were used. Small contributions of relevant chapters from books housed at the University of Cape Town's (UCT) Special Collections at the Jagger Library were also used. These contributions were made possible by librarians who were able to scan and email these materials up until library's tragic fire in April 2021.

The topic of dissertation was generated out of initial interest in American foreign policy in Southern Africa. Therefore, the author did submit a paper examining this relationship for a Peacebuilding course at the University of Cape Town. Certain sections draw from this previous research, particularly the historical background and one section of the negotiation process. The necessity of including this was due to the constraints regarding access to archives presented at the time of writing. Besides this, all materials were limited to those that have been digitized or available online.

1.5: Chapter Outline

This dissertation is broken up into seven chapters. Going forward, Chapter Two is introduced by a section reviewing the literature surrounding constructive engagement in Southern, or most prominently, South Africa. It provides an overview of prominent publications representative of the general conclusions made throughout the literature regarding the ineffectiveness of constructive engagement as a foreign policy. While exploring relevant literature, this section aims to provide a simple characterization of constructive engagement as per the strategy's creator, Chester Crocker. In doing so, the literature review gradually transitions into a second section that reviews several cases of constructive engagement beyond Southern Africa to make clear that constructive engagement is not unique to the U.S.-South African relationship nor guided by Cold War ideology. By interpreting the literature surrounding the use of similar strategy outside of the U.S.-Southern African context, constructive engagement is established as a widely practiced instrument of foreign policy used by states to resolve international conflict.

Chapter Three discusses three different roles that mediators can assume when involved in mitigating international conflict. Zartmaan and Touval break this down into mediation as communication, mediation as formulation, and mediation as manipulation. There are three sections that correspond with each role, specifying where American mediation in Southern Africa would fall in the triad. The conclusion applies Zartmaan and Touval's definition of a formulative mediator to the U.S.-Southern African context.

Since this dissertation seeks to analyze historical events, a chapter that details the Angolan and Namibian conflicts was included to provide critical contextual information on the interlinking conflict's origins. Chapter Four provides this historical background for the analysis of the Southern African case study. Broken down into two, it looks at how previous U.S. administrations dealt with the Angolan Civil War, Namibia's quest for independence, and the apartheid government's involvement. With this historical background established, this chapter outlines U.S. motivations during this period. It provides detail on how the progression of these events set the tone for the Reagan administration's foreign policy goals for the region.

Chapter Five provides further answers to the research questions. Firstly, the chapter introduces Chester Crocker, constructive engagements architect, along with the principles that he presented to resolve the regional conflict. Crocker's early publications are then used to reexamine the U.S.'s role of a formulative mediator in the negotiation process. By using Vincent Tome's framework to explain the negotiation process, the research questions are answered. It is broken down into five distinct phases. The phases go as follows: Phase I: *Linkage Introduction and Namibian Independence (April 1981- July 1982),* Phase II: *Pursuing Linkage (July 19821- March 1985),* Phase III: *Derailment (April 1985- March 1987),* Phase IV: *The Players Return and a New Player Emerges (March 1987- May 1988)*, and finally Phase V*: Double Games and Endgame (May 1988- December 1988).* The chorological narrative presented in this section is used as the evidentiary basis for analysis for the rest of the paper. The second section of Chapter Five discusses the significance of these negotiations on regional peace and the South African democratic transition.

In Chapter Six, Crocker's principles outlined in the previous chapter are reexamined in against the three universal guidelines presented generated by the literature review. Evidence is given to distinguish whether each principle was met and the extent to which Crocker's principles

coincide with principles found throughout the literature. This section is used to further deviate from the idea that constructive engagement was unique to the American-Southern African context.

Finally, Chapter Seven will discuss concluding remarks on the extent to which the research has fulfilled its intended objectives. This dissertation will end with limitations, recommendations for future research, and several considerations regarding American peacebuilding in Southern Africa.

Chapter 2: Literature Review; Resulting Principles

The aim of this chapter is to review the large body of literature surrounding constructive engagement in Southern Africa as well as the Middle East. it will do so by first presenting the general themes regarding American intervention in Southern Africa. It will move on to featuring works by several prominent authors in the field in addition to outlining the foundational principles of constructive engagement by Chester Crocker. A holistic review of the literature surrounding constructive engagement by the United States is important for the objectives of the dissertation, as the research questions stem from a direct challenge to such literature. This section departs further with the inclusion of a review of existing literature surrounding the use of constructive engagement by Turkey, Qatar, and the E.U. towards the Middle East. Three general principles of constructive engagement are then extrapolated from such review, proving that constructive engagement is not unique to the U.S.-South African relationship nor guided by Cold War ideology. These principles will be reexamined in accordance with Crocker's later in the dissertation. By interpreting the literature surrounding the use of similar strategy outside of the U.S.-Southern African context, constructive engagement is established as a widely practiced instrument of foreign policy used by states to resolve international conflict.

2.1: Literature Review; Foundation of Constructive Engagement

The policy of constructive engagement has been the topic of much scholarly debate concerning Cold War politics and its effectiveness in ending apartheid in South Africa. This literature review attempts to deliberate upon the major themes and arguments surrounding constructive engagement in Southern Africa as a response. It contributes to international relations and peacebuilding discourse regarding international conflict mediation strategy, focusing on several critical expansive and detailed publications from prominent scholars such as Chester Crocker, Joanne E. Davies, Alex Thomson, Christopher Saunders, and Geoffrey Berridge.

The general opinion throughout the literature can be simplified into one statement: the policy of constructive engagement was an expression of Cold War realpolitik that opposed the condemnation of apartheid and effected little change within South Africa. It resulted in the perception of vialed support for the racist apartheid regime by the United States and the

perpetuation of the idea that the U.S.'s prioritized it's stance against communism over racial equality. Likewise, the U.S. policy of constructive engagement with South Africa overlooked the crime of apartheid because it was committed by a 'liberal' ally in the region, indirectly benefing from racial inequity. While this characterization of the policy throughout the literature is incorrect, few prominent authors stray from this theme.

It is crucial to outline the policy as its creator intended before diving into the literature to respond to constructive engagement in Southern Africa. If not most important, a significant source for the policy's implicit and explicit goals in South Africa is publications by constructive engagement's creator Chester Crocker. Crocker sought to conceive a political strategy that would maintain U.S. economic ties and exert a positive influence over South Africa to advance regional geostrategic goals in 1980, outlined in the landmark article for the Council on Foreign Relations titled, "South Africa, Strategy for Change."[20] In the publication, Crocker criticizes the American-South African relationship, signaling a need to implement a more coherent foreign policy that challenges the existing order. In his opinion, a controversial public stance against the white-minority government's racial policies would not be practical. Instead, the Afrikaners who governed South Africa should be engaged constructively. This article foreshadows his tenure as the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, where he implemented the strategy of constructive engagement as he conceptualizes it here.[21]

Constructive engagement encompassed "sustained and nimble diplomacy, responsive to the pragmatic instincts of regional leaders."[22] He argues, "a basic U.S. objective should be to foster and support such change, recognizing the need to minimize the damage to our interests in the process, but also recognizing that American interests will suffer inevitably if such change fails to occur."[23] This characterizes a basic definition of his policy, and lays out the ultimate goal of "the emergence in South Africa of a society which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment, or political damage."[24]

Beyond contributing to the scholarly discourse on how America could use mediation as a method to thoughtfully bring an end to white minority rule in the Republic, this publication acts

[20] Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980). 323-351.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 345.
[23] Ibid., 324.
[24] Ibid.

as constructive engagement's introduction into the fields of foreign policy and international relations in the Cold War Era. It establishes a basis for the U.S. the strategy that guided Crocker's leadership. It also creates an opportunity for dialogue for other literature in the field to build off, accept, and challenge. Being such a pivotal publication, it serves as the basis for established knowledge surrounding the strategy.[25]

Crocker publishes his memoir *High Noon in Southern Africa* in 1992 after his tenure as U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Through his first-hand account of the strategy's evolution from only an idea presented in an opinion column to practice to finalized policy, he stresses the need to analyze such policy within a regional context. Crocker asserts that the path towards ending apartheid was created by fostering a regional climate conducive to transformation and accommodation by minimizing conflicts in surrounding states.[26] He is also adamant in challenging his critics and deeming the policy as an overwhelming success by providing details and explanations in a way that only constructive engagements creator can provide. Nevertheless, in the years following the policy's introduction to the literature in 1980, its subsequent implementation in 1981, and finally, the publication of his memoir in 1992, many scholars sought to challenge Crocker's policy.

Joanne Davies critically evaluates the policy in her book titled *Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and the American policy in South Africa, Namibia, and Angola 1901-8,* published in 2007. The publication provides a historical analysis of United States foreign policy towards Southern Africa during the 1980s, of which this literature review aims to contend. Davies comes to her conclusion that constructive engagement was merely an exercise of realpolitik inextricably linked to Cold War imperatives using secondary sources, congressional hearings, interviews, and recently declassified Reagan era documents.[27]

Overall, Davies argues that constructive engagement is another not-so-striking example of how United States foreign policymakers routinely put the economic, resource, and strategic interests ahead of those such as human rights and democracy when constructing the Cold War Era

[25] Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Constructive Engagement with Angolan and Namibian Conflicts," (unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, 2019).
[26] Chester A Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993.
[27] Joanne E. Davies, *Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and the American policy in South Africa, Namibia and Angola 1901-8,* (Oxford: James Currey, 2007).

foreign policy in Southern Africa.[28] Despite significant research and analysis, Davies problematizes the policy without considering its exact definition and intention put forth by Crocker. Throughout her book, Davies routinely flips between contextualizing the policy as one focusing on South Africa alone and addressing Southern Africa's regional security concerns, i.e., as a regional policy that ultimately sought the end of apartheid. When discussing Crocker's goals and intentions, she states:

> American interests were paramount; that synthesis could be created to address these regional and global concerns together; that his policy must be understood as a regional policy. There was a real possibility of gradual, white-led change within South Africa.[29]

The points that she brings up here are entirely correct. Where she is incorrect is in her argument that "the reignited Cold War zeal of the Reagan administration overshadowed each of these issues."[30] According to Davies, American relations with South Africa were defined by the struggle against communism, with the roots of constructive engagement being vengeance for the 1976 U.S. withdrawal from Angola and its failure to assume that Cold War concerns overrode Crocker's stated goal of ending apartheid in South Africa.[31] Besides, she draws little from *High Noon.*

Alex Thomson's review of Davies' book asserts, "Despite this useful summary of the issues at hand, the book adds little to the existing literature on this topic. Similarly, the nuances and detail of Crocker's policy seem to have been lost in the author's attempt to provide bold conclusions about the Reagan administration's failings in this part of the world."[32] Thomson is an academic who has published numerous books and journal articles regarding the diplomatic history of U.S. Cold War relations with apartheid South Africa for over 20 years.

A major publication of Thomson's is *Incomplete Engagement*, which precedes Davies by a decade.[33] The book examines how the United States tackled the South African problem during Reagan's tenure from January 1981 to January 1989. Focusing specifically on the Reagan

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Alex Thomson, "Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and American Policy in South Africa, Namibia and Angola 1981–8" by J. E. Davies Oxford: James Currey, 2007, 246, *The Journal of modern African studies* 47, no. 1 (March 2009): 158.
[33] Alex Thomson, *Incomplete Engagement : U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Republic of South Africa, 1981-1988* Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.

administration's South Africa policy, Thomson can identify the context, outline constructive engagement's approach as it emerged, evaluate its relevance, and finally, assess its performance. Like many, he concludes that the policy failed to realize its objectives.[34]

Thomson chooses to limit this publication's analysis to constructive engagement in South Africa alone. Thus, the administration's Southern African regional mediation strategy is portrayed as an isolated element of U.S. policy in the region within this work.[35] Thomson notes, "The administration's Southern African regional strategy is only addressed when this policy sheds light upon the United States' approach to the internal situation actually within the Republic itself."[36] This discrepancy of characterizing constructive engagement as a U.S. policy towards only South Africa is prominent throughout the literature. Authors either chose to avoid or do not characterize constructive engagement as a regional policy that sought to end several conflicts in Southern Africa and focus, inaccurately, to analyze the policy.

Despite criticism, J. E. Davies continues to communicate her dissatisfaction in an article for the Journal of Southern African Studies titled "Constructive Engagement, Lessons Learned?." She continues to argue that constructive engagement was nothing more than a Cold War-driven policy that had no genuine interest in the liberation of South Africans. Instead, the policy would secure a strategic relationship between the United States and South Africa when it appeared that several communist-backed regional conflicts threatened the future security of 'liberal democracy' in Southern Africa. In doing so, constructive engagement was an extension of the anti-communist Reagan Doctrine in the region. The focus was on fighting against Soviet expansion throughout Africa, in essence, "realpolitik in disguise."[37]

Davies reasserts that anti-communist national interests governed the policy, citing that apartheid was only addressed because it was unavoidable as the American public was aware of it.[38] However, Davies is not considering the significant strides this U.S. policy made in solving the

[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 3.
[37] Joanne E. Davies, "South Africa and Constructive Engagement: Lessons Learned?" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008), 8 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Constructive Engagement with Angolan and Namibian Conflicts."
[38] Ibid., 8-9.

regional conflicts present at the time and how the resulting political climate may have impacted South Africa's political triumphs of the 1990s.[39]

Particularly, Davies fails to consider the effort that Crocker put into the negotiations for Namibian independence and the success that settlement reaped for both the region and South Africa despite having little connection to Cold War aims. As Christopher Saunders says in his critique of Davies, "certainly Crocker had to work within a Washington context that put the Cold War above all else, but the effort he put into the Namibian negotiations over many years was not a mere window-dressing: the evidence is clear that he wanted to use the progression of the Namibian issue to bring about change in South Africa. Members of the South African government certainly believed that that was what he was about."[40] He asserts that "while constructive engagement emboldened Pretoria to launch attacks on neighboring states, for it knew it could get away with such activities, it is impossible to know whether Namibian independence would have come about any earlier had to not been linked by Crocker to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola."[41]

Saunders expands upon this point further in *Conflict Mediation in Decolonization and Namibian Independence* published in 2007 with Henning Melber.[42] The pair strays from Davies in that they recognize the influence that Namibian independence had on the fall of apartheid.[43] Mainly, they argue that Crocker's linkage strategy for the decolonization of Namibia promoted a process of controlled change in South Africa. It reassured South Africa that the international community would be as even-handed to its transition to democracy as they were in response to Namibia.[44] Saunders makes meaningful contributions to the literature by recognizing Namibian independence as a significant link to the end of apartheid.

Similarly, Geoffrey Berridge produced an article titled Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published in 1989, the article focuses on the influence that Crocker's diplomatic procedures had on the settlements in Angola and Namibia.

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[39] Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Constructive Engagement with Angolan and Namibian Conflicts."
[40] Christopher Saunders, "Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and American Policy in South Africa, Namibia and Angola 1981-8, J.E. Davies : Book Review", 2008, 275-276.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Henning Melber and Christopher Saunders, "Conflict Mediation in Decolonisation: Namibia's Transition to Independence," *Africa Spectrum* 42, no. 1 (2007): 73-94.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

Berridge uses information available through the public record to discredit the idea that favorable Cold War circumstances were the leading cause for the New York Accord and similar peacebuilding settlements of the late 1980s. While he does lend some credit to fortunate circumstances, he also stresses that significant barriers remained and that "in the absence of American mediation, either such a comprehensive settlement would have been achieved or that it would have been achieved so quickly."[45] This contribution to the literature at the time of its publication is significant because it regards the mediation by Crocker, under constructive engagement, as an overwhelming diplomatic achievement.

Despite the critical debates that have been presented that outline their perceived iniquities of constructive engagement, with principles that Crocker establishes as "sustained and nimble diplomacy, responsive to the pragmatic instincts of regional leaders,"[46] the strategy has been used across the world. Similarly, one of the main downfalls of the literature surrounding constructive engagement is that it tends to focus on its original region and the time that the U.S. applied the strategy. Not only is it concerned with South Africa during the 1980s, but most of it was also written during or shortly after this time. The literature fails to consider that constructive engagement is also something that extends beyond the frame of South or Southern Africa. Despite constructive engagement's emergence as the U.S. approach towards conflict in Southern Africa during the Cold War, several state actors have employed the mediation strategy beyond the region and this period.

The fact of the matter is that there are several instances where nations other than the United States have advanced and implemented this mediation strategy to formulate the end of regional conflicts. For example, Qatar, Turkey, and the E.U. have all employed constructive engagement, whether explicitly by name or implicitly recognizable by common features, in their approaches to dealing with the tumultuous nature of the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. The following sub-section will deal with the efforts of constructive engagement as mediation by Qatar in the Emirate's approach to its role in the Middle East, in Turkey with the country's 'Zero Problems with Neighbors' strategy, and in the European Union (E.U.) 's 'constructive dialogue' with Iran.

[45] G. R. Berridge, "Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords," *International affairs (London)* 65, no. 3 (July 1, 1989): 468.
[46] Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980). 323-351.

2.2: Review of Constructive Engagement beyond Southern Africa

2.2.1: Qatar's Approach to the Middle East

With its independence from Great Britain on September 3, 1971, Qatar has emerged as an unexpected third-party mediator in its surrounding Middle East and Northern African (MENA) region. For such a small state, Qatar has developed an overwhelming image of itself as a proactively neutral state with the ability to significantly contribute to the mediation of multiple national and international conflicts across the Middle East. Qatari diplomacy has and continues to play a significant role as an active regional actor regarding Arab, Gulf, and Middle East issues.[47] While not explicitly referred to as constructive engagement, Qatar's distinct role within–and its mediation strategy towards– its surrounding region is essentially that. Qatar aims to secure a strategic relationship with its neighbors through communication.[48] The Emirate holds that maintaining open channels of communication is a fundamental principle of Qatari international relations. Besides, their focus on issues rather than personalities and attitude is the "only constructive way to engage in politics in our globalized environment."[49] The main impetus for Qatar's desire is to facilitate and maintain open communication between Middle Eastern disputants to increase both national and regional security. This communication is highly personalized, with key officials in the Qatari establishment investing personal time and energy by acting as principal mediators. Negotiations were not only personal and performed by a small group; they are also local as Doha becomes the primary site for these discussions.[50]

As for a Qatari success story, one can look towards Sudan and Darfur. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad bin 'Abdullah al-Mahmud began to develop close contacts with all domestic, regional, and international parties involved in the Darfur conflict and mediation efforts starting in 2008. These trips and meetings were used as fact-finding missions, where on-the-ground information was gathered to assess the opportunity for and effectiveness of substantive Qatari involvement. Once mediators had developed their credentials through these personal missions, they invited several groups of Sudanese disputants to Doha to begin negations. Since Qatar hosted

[47] Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," *The Middle East Journal* 65, no. 4 (October 15, 2011): 539–556.
[48] Sultan Barakat, "Between Ambition and Achievement," *Brookings Doha Center,* no. 12 (November 2014): 1-58.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy."

representatives from both sides, Doha became the primary location of Darfuri rebels, and the Sudanese government met.[51] The negotiations resulted in the comprehensive peace process outlined in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).[52]

A second triumph for Qatari mediation can be seen in the agreement between Hizballah forces and the Lebanese government in 2008. In Doha, the two sides agreed on a framework that would allow Hizballah seats in government and planned for new parliamentary elections in 2009. The incumbent government will begin to disarm the organization.[53] This event is the most successful of Qatar's significant mediation attempts during the late 2000s. The talks were widely lauded as effective, proven by the aversion to the eruption of civil war.[54] Through strong personal engagement under the umbrella of the Arab League, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaykh Hamad bin Jassim were the individuals able to maintain open lines of communication between factions along with diplomats from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran who "had either stood idly by or had actively pushed Lebanon toward the abyss,"[55] to secure their support for negotiations and the final deal.[56]

Despite mediating no less than six disputes by the end of 2010, Qatar began to shift from patient conflict mediation to confrontation and intervention tactics supporting Arab Spring protestors across the region. For example, in Libya, Qatar pushed for a no-fly zone, supplied troops, supported rebels, and recognized the National Transitional Council as the official government. In Syria, Qatar closed its embassy in Damascus, urged the Arab League to suspend Syria's membership, pushed for military intervention, and supplied massive humanitarian aid to rebel groups. Finally, Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through millions of dollars in funding.[57] However, instead of seeing this as Qatar staying from its preferred conflict resolution method of mediation, this shift towards activism should be seen as a pragmatic response to the ever-changing political landscape of the Arab world.

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[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy.”
[54] Sultan Barakat, “Between Ambition and Achievement.”
[55] Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 548
[56] Ibid.
[56] Sultan Barakat, “Between Ambition and Achievement.”

2.2.2: 'Turkey's 'Zero Problems with Neighbors' Strategy

Turkey has become a major actor in the Middle East and the Balkan region in the last few decades. The country's new activism and pivot from past foreign policy fall in line with the rise of the Justice and Development Party and a shift to an export-driven economy.[58] In 2002, the Justice and Development Party's introduced the 'Zero Problems with Neighbours' (ZPwN) policy to position Turkey as a stable hub for Balkan and Middle East regional integration. Nuh Yilmaz argues that the introduction of this post-Second World War policy intentionally absent from Western influence was an effort by Turkey to advance positive bilateral relations that would provide regional stability while advancing Turkish interests.[59] Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carol Migdalovitz affirms this in the characterization of Turkey's role in the region by referring to the strategy as "very active (and) aimed at portraying the country as a regional power and at improving relations with its neighbors."[60] The ZPwN also gave Turkey a mediation role in several regional crises.[61]

Ahmet Davutoglu is objectively the most influential actor in Turkish foreign policy during this period. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic and later Prime Minister, Davutoglu guided Turkish relations with Hamas in Palestine and mediated the Israeli-Syrian peace talks, among other mediation tasks. Being the architect of the policy, Davutoglu is the best resource for knowledge on the strategy. For Davutoglu, the ZPwN approach "aims to eliminate the existing disputes and tension and increase stability in the region by seeking innovative mechanisms and channels to resolve conflicts by encouraging positive deeds and building cross-cultural bridges of dialogue and understanding."[62]

As outlined in a publication by Davutoglu, Turkey uses its posture as an emerging regional power broker to eliminate disputes and tensions to increase stability in the region.[63] The ZPwN policy's key objective extends beyond the local to contribute to peace, strength, and prosperity to the world while developing relations with other states outside its region, preferring engagement

[58] Henri J. Barkey, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *Ceri Strategy Papers,* no. 10 (2011).
[59] Carol Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, August 29, 2008.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Nuh Yilmaz, "Turkey: Goodbye to Zero Problems with Neighbours." *The Regional Struggle For Syria* (2013): 67-73.
[62] Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Foreign Policy, and the E.U. in 2010, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (2009): 12.
[63] Ibid.

with all instead of isolation tactics. Davutoglu credits the positive relationship to four guiding principles: security, dialogue, economic dependence, and cultural harmony, and mutual respect.[64] According to a report outlining Turkish foreign policy on issues alongside U.S. administration and congressional views, the country has been dramatically involved with engagement with several international actors in recent years. Since 2008, it has engaged with Iraq to dismantle the Kurdistan Workers Party, prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state, and help establish stability in the country. Turkey has also been drawn closer to Iran due to national security and economic motivations to protect itself against an Iranian nuclear program conflict while diversifying its energy sources. It has helped facilitate indirect negotiations for an Israeli-Syrian peace process while improving ties with Damascus for some time.

The test of the ZPwN strategy can be made clear when looking at Turkish relations with the Assad regime. According to Yilmaz, Turkey's Syria policy evolved through three phases; firstly, Turkey remained neutral while promoting reform and dialogue between the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. From March until September 2011, Turkey aimed to resolve the Syrian crisis by convincing Assad to implement reforms and outreach measures before the situation escalated quickly. Finally, once it was clear that Assad would not be making meaningful political reforms, Turkey began to focus on regime change. In addition to empowering Syrian opposition elements and hosting Syrian military defectors, the country was a part of a group of 13 states belonging to the international "Friends of Syria" coalition where Turkey advocated for the ouster of Assad due to the failure of previous peaceful methods.[65]

To Turkey, the removal of Assad is consistent with ZPwN principles because the country believed regime change to be the only remaining option for the restoration of regional stability.[66] According to Yilmaz, while the evolution of the policy from one that pressed for democratic reforms to one actively supporting regime change was a gradual and pragmatic transition to "hard-power elements alongside soft power and diplomacy."[67] However, it is generally understood that

[64] Ibid.
[65] Nuh Yilmaz, "Turkey: Goodbye to Zero Problems with Neighbours," *The Regional Struggle for Syria* (2013): 67-73.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.

the ZPwN was replaced with a new Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy (E.H.F.P.) in 2016. Despite this, the E.H.F.P. echoes constructive engagement principles.[68]

Still, Turkey's ambition to "establish peace, stability, and security in the Middle East; to further integrate the Balkans with the Euro-Atlantic community; to bolster democracy and peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia; to contribute to enhanced energy supply and security of Europe; (and) to strengthen security and stability in Afghanistan and South Asia,"[69] are the Republic's only foreign policy goals nor situations where constructive engagement was and continues to be applied. Beyond the Middle East and Balkans, Turkey continues to ambitiously engage with the European Union in hopes of future membership.[70] Davoulgu admitted that while perusing constructive engagement in the immediate region, full integration with the E.U. is Turkey's main foreign policy priority.[71] That sentiment still exists today where Turkey pursues E.U. membership.[72]

2.2.3: European Union's 'Constructive Dialogue'

Sustained European Union engagement with Iran initially began with 'critical dialogue' in the 1990s after the country's war with Iraq and evolved to a 'comprehensive dialogue' after Iranian President Khatami's administration.[73] In response to the development and direction of the Iranian nuclear program, the European Union– notably France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and Germany–has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework and followed a policy of constructive engagement in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the country's nuclear ambitions since 2002.[74] The substantial result of the 12 years of constructive engagement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) born out of the Union's Common Foreign

[68] "Turkey's Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy: A Synopsis," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed October 28, 2020.
[69] Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Foreign Policy and the E.U. in 2010, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (2009): 14.
[70] Nuh Yilmaz, "Turkey: Goodbye to Zero Problems with Neighbours," 72.
[71] Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Foreign Policy, and the E.U. in 2010, 11-17.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Leah McCloskey-Gholikhany, "E.U. Foreign Policy Identity: A Case Study on the E.U.'s Engagement of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *College of Europe E.U. Diplomacy Paper* 6 (2019).
[74] Ioana Constantin-Bercean, "A Nuclear Test For Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate," *On-line journal modeling the new Europe*, no. 28 (2018): 182–205.

and Security Policy (CFSP), is sometimes referred to as the E.U.'s most significant foreign policy success at the time.[75]

Constantin-Berceans' journal article, "A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate," stresses that E.U. leaders have had vastly different foreign policy ambitions in Iran than U.S. President Donald Trump.[76] Also, the E.U.'s commitment to constructive engagement and support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has remained unwavering, unlike the recent shift to an aggressive containment policy adopted by the Trump administration.[77]

Despite its focus on comparing the E.U.'s relationships with Iran with that of the U.S., the article presents the bigger picture on the history of EU-Iran relations, critical components, and each country's goals. Most importantly, Constantin-Bercean outlines three of the main E.U. interests that it has perused with high-level diplomacy in the past being the prevention of a fully nuclear Iran, avoidance of another war in the crisis-ridden Middle East, and to prove the Unions role as a significant global power, along with the introduction of its recent strategic concern of energy security.[78] It affirms European leaders' commitment to a constructive relationship with Iran and the fractured Middle Eastern region when the U.S. is reining back on diplomacy and taking a more confrontational foreign policy approach.[79]

Bernd Kaussler supports Constantin-Bercean's characterization of 2000-2004 engagement with Iran, affirming that the CFSP towards the region is based on "positive and constructive partnerships with governments based on dialogue, support, and encouragement."[80] Further, "this (engagement) should aim to improve mutual understanding and respect, and promote sustainable reform."[81] Kaussler similarly addresses the convergence of U.S. and E.U. policy towards the Middle East by characterizing the U.S. as a volatile, coercive actor. In contrast, the E.U. is a beacon of soft power exercising its ability to persuade rather than compel with force. According to Helga

[75] Leah McCloskey-Gholikhany, “E.U. Foreign Policy Identity: A Case Study on the E.U.'s Engagement of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
[76] Ioana Constantin-Bercean, “A Nuclear Test For Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate.”
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ioana Constantin-Bercean, “A Nuclear Test For Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate.”
[79] Bernd Kaussler, “European Union Constructive Engagement with Iran (2000-2004): An Exercise in Conditional Human Rights Diplomacy.” *Iranian Studies* 41, no. 3 (2008): 269-95. Accessed September 11, 2020.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid., 270.

Maria Schmid, Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and one of the lead negotiators of the Iran nuclear deal:

> It was only the E.U. that was accepted (as the negotiator) because the E.U. was perceived by both sides as a neutral actor, as a moderator, a facilitator. We were bridge builders in the context between Iran and the U.S., which continues to be difficult.[82]

Regarding human rights concerns, Klaussler outlines how many Iranians believe that E.U. security triumphs over their worry. However, he notes that "Europe's human rights dialogue with Iran was an effective strategy based on E.U. soft power. While the impact on the protection and respect for human rights was subject to changes in E.U. foreign policy priorities (...) from a historical perspective, the Comprehensive Dialogue may have well been the first genuine Western initiative (...) which partly succeed in depoliticizing the issue of human rights."[83] The CFSP includes a 'suspension clause' which gives the E.U. the ability to impose aggressive measures such as sanctions if it foresees that a state "lacks a genuine commitment to pursuing change through the dialogue and consultation," once all other options have been exhausted.[84]

While serving as a significant player in the region and only threatening sanctions as a last resort, the bigger picture of E.U. political diplomacy hardly wavered throughout the development of Iran's nuclear program. According to Ioana Constantin-Bercean, "during the 12 years of negotiations with Iran, the E.U.'s role went to several phases: if in 2003 the EU-3 began as a unified and autonomous negotiator and in 2015 it had become a more pragmatic facilitator between Washington and Tehran."[85] Nevertheless, the relationship between Iran and the E.U. remained of utmost importance as engagement focused on promoting multilateralism and diplomatic dialogue. The JCPOA successfully ended negotiations in 2015 and stabilized the volatile Middle Eastern region concerning nuclear power due to this diplomatic triumph.

2.3: Principles Derived from Review of Literature Beyond Southern Africa

Upon reviewing the literature surrounding the use of constructive beyond the American context, and independent from the stated principles guiding American intervention in the region's

[82] Helga Maria Schmid, speaking on "Europe and Iran: Beyond the Nuclear Deal," at Carnegie Europe on May 17, 2017.
[83] Bernd Kaussler, "European Union Constructive Engagement with Iran (2000-2004)," 293.
[84] Ibid., 271.
[85] Ioana Constantin-Bercean, "A Nuclear Test For Diplomacy: Iran and the (New) EU-US Sanctions Debate," 183.

affairs during the 1980s, several general principles that guide this type of third-party mediation are made clear. In all three cases, constructive engagement has been used as a conflict resolution method. Extrapolated from the literature are the following three standard parameters that guided third-party mediation by Qatar, Turkey, and the E.U.:

- A non-confrontational approach.
- A focus on dialogue and negotiations.
- The encouragement of political reform or change.

Therefore, the literature defines the three general principles of constructive engagement in the Middle East as such. The following sections will discuss these points in detail.

2.3.1: Non-Confrontational

Often, states that employ the foreign policy approaches characteristic of constructive engagement take on a non-confrontational approach to their foreign policy. This is particularly true when the target state is accused of committing human rights abuses within their territory. The three states mentioned each had made a calculated decision to utilize 'smart' power in dealing with belligerent target states instead of employing hard power foreign policy tactics.

Joseph Nye distinguishes between soft and hard power concepts, combining them to introduce an effective foreign policy strategy using what he terms 'smart power.'[86] Nye defines soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment."[87] It is based on three resources: a state's culture, political values, and foreign policies that hope to influence a specific perspective through persuasion. In contrast, hard power involves "the ability to use the carrots [the promise of reduced trade barriers, alliances, military protection] and sticks [threats] of economic and military might [implementation of economic sanctions; military intervention] to make others follow your will."[88] Hard forms of political power are often aggressive and confrontational.

Favoring a non-confrontational approach to foreign policy does not mean that states who chose to engage constructively with belligerents avoid expressions of hard power altogether.

[86] Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (2009): 160–63.
[87] Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 94.
[88] Joseph S. Nye, "Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power," *International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 2003.

Instead, hard power is cautioned against and avoided unless necessary. However, it should be said that in all of the cases mentioned, the non-use of military force remained paramount. At the same time, the imposition of economic sanctions was considered and implemented in some cases. This work refers to hard power as economic sanctions exclusively due to this situation. In the case of the E.U., sanctions are considered a last-case scenario after all methods of engagement and mediation with Iran had been exhausted, and the regime made no political change.

While choosing to impose economic sanctions against countries accused of committing human rights abuses carries good intentions, some scholars caution against this instrument of political force and coercion. Sanctions are most often criticized on humanitarian grounds, which is ironic due to their humanitarian intentions. Coercing the target country with the intent of damage or reversing aggressions can negatively impact a nation's economy, inadvertently causing private citizens economic stress and other distress.[89] When ordinary people in the target country become collateral damage to this economic policy, sanctions harm the people they were intended to help. In addition to humanitarian concerns, economic sanctions have several other shortfalls that make them ineffective, such as inadvertently causing political integration while strengthening resolve and defiance in the target country.[90]

That being said, Nye asserts that smart power, the combination of the resources used by and execution of soft and hard power, is decided by an individual's or administration's level of 'contextual intelligence.'[91] Contextual intelligence is an intuitive diagnostic skill that helps policymakers align tactics with objectives to create smart strategies that integrate soft and hard power.[92] It can be argued that constructive engagement predisposition for soft power tactics such as negotiation while considering hard power economic sanctions policies as a last-ditch option exemplifies the use of tactful smart power in a non-confrontational approach to dealing with states who commit human rights abuses.

[89] Michael Mastanduno, "Economic statecraft," In *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases.* edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfeild, and Tim Dunne. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[90] Ibid.
[91] Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," 160–63.
[92] Ibid.

2.3.2: Dialogue and Negotiations

A focus on dialogue and negotiations are tied to the concept of diplomacy. Diplomacy is the established practice of a government influencing the decisions and conduct of foreign governments through dialogue, negotiation, and means short of violence or war.[93] According to Lynne Dryburgh:

> Diplomacy is the art of communication, which necessarily implies that concrete action takes the form of statements, meetings, negotiations, or discussions. As Risse argues, talk is not cheap within the foreign policy arena but is an action in itself, building meaning and understandings between those involved. Therefore, communicative interactions can be considered 'concrete' action within the realms of the foreign policy of the E.U., particularly as these interactions are accompanied by negotiations involving resources and policy instruments.[94]

Scholars have determined that there are five 'Tracks of Diplomacy.'[95] Constructive engagement has employed Track One or Official Diplomacy. This form of diplomacy is generally used as an instrument of foreign policy that establishes and develops contacts between respective governments. It is carried out by diplomats, government officials, and heads of state through mutually recognized intermediaries. Official diplomacy is generally considered a state's primary tool for conflict resolution. It aims to influence power structures within the receiving state through mutually accepted agreements such as cease-fires, peace talks, and treaties.

As mentioned previously, after several rounds of negotiations, the European Union emerged as a key actor in the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the Iranian Nuclear Deal. In the case of Turkey, Davutoglu insisted that the Republic's ZPwN policy "advocates for dialogue; all issues and problems should and can be resolved through diplomacy and political interaction."[96] With this political context, Turkey mended its relations with Assad, facilitated nuclear negotiations with Iran and the West, attempted mediation between Israel and Palestine, and engaged in trade throughout the Middle East and North Africa.[97] However, the

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[93] Sally Marks and Chas.W. Freeman, "Diplomacy," In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Encyclopedia Britannica, January 17, 2019.
[94] Dryburgh, Lynne. "The E.U. as a Global Actor? E.U. Policy Towards Iran." *European Security* 17, no. 2–3 (June 1, 2008): 261.
[95] Jeffrey Mapendere, "Track One and Track Two Diplomacy," *Culture of Peace Online Journal* 2, no. 1 (n.d.): 1-16.
[96] Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Foreign Policy, and the E.U. in 2010, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (2009): 13.
[97] Nuh Yilmaz, "Turkey: Goodbye to Zero Problems with Neighbours," *The Regional Struggle for Syria* (2013): 67-73.

diplomatic, non-use-of-force narrative could not underscore Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors indefinitely. Similar to Qatar at the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Turkey's strategy of constructive engagement took on a more security-influenced nature while remaining broadly consistent with its general goals for the region.[98]

2.3.3: Political Change and Reform

Beyond mutually beneficial relations between states, constructive engagement aims to encourage political change at various degrees through various methods. It should be clear that constructive engagement's non-confrontational character is not absolute, despite the overwhelming characterization throughout the literature. Whether through diplomacy, sanctions, or intervention, one can argue that constructive engagement's greatest aim is first to e*ncourage* reform. If this method does not produce the desired results, the objective transforms into domestic political reform or regime change within the target state.

In the instance of Turkey and Syria, Turkey maintained positive relations with the Syrian regime during pro-democracy protests until President Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown on protesters. In a turn of events after attempts at negotiation with the regime, Turkey demanded that al-Assad step-down, assuming the objective of overthrowing the Syrian government. In addition to calling for al-Assad's removal, Turkey began to support the Syrian opposition.

For Qatar in the wake of Arab Spring, diplomatic strategies shifted from mediation to regime change. The Emirate, like Turkey, began to take an interventionist approach in supporting pro-democracy rebels. This is because Qatar leader's were pragmatic in the necessity for shifting strategies. Qatar decided that temporarily shedding its neutral mediator role would best manage instability within the region and prevent this conflict from affecting domestic politics.

To conclude, this chapter sought to review the literature surrounding constructive engagement in and beyond Southern Africa. It has been made overwhelmingly clear that many authors fail to view this instance of third-party mediation as a regional strategy towards Southern Africa, overlooking the main objectives of constructive engagement taken on by the United States. While well researched and convincing, many authors characterize and portray the policy as

[98] Ibid.

objectively self-serving, unsuccessful, and even damaging for the democratization of Southern and South Africa. This dissertation will resolve this issue.

The use of constructive engagement by other states in the post-Cold War era is also reviewed to stray from the opinion throughout the existing literature that inaccurately focuses on the policy's application to Southern Africa to establish common features of the strategy within different regional contexts. The fact of the matter is that there are several instances where nations other than the United States have advanced and applied this mediation strategy regional conflicts. Qatar, Turkey, and the European Union have all employed constructive engagement, whether explicitly or implicitly, in their approaches to dealing with the tumultuous nature of the Middle East. This chapter has also said that according to the discussions within this literature, we can identity three main principles of constructive engagement that can be used to reexamine Crocker's policy later in the dissertation.

The following section will reexamine constructive engagement in Southern Africa as a third-party mediation approach towards crisis-ridden regions. The framework is based on the three principles extrapolated from the literature surrounding constructive engagement by Qatar, Turkey, and the E.U. However, these three cases do not explicitly mention each of the three principles. Instead, they refer to them in some way or another, leaning more strongly to some than others or explaining these concepts through different while broadly consistent explanatory wording. Regardless, it can be safe to assume that these principles are closely intertwined and cannot exist without the other in some capacity due to the nature of constructive engagement as a foreign policy.

Chapter 3: Mediation Strategies

This chapter breaks down the three widely accepted strategies that mediators in international conflict can pursue. While this chapter provides an explanation for why third parties insert themselves into conflict and what they hope to gain from their participation, it also works to establish which mediation style constructive engagement fits into. The cataloging of constructive engagement into one of Zartman and Touval's widely accepted mediation styles is significant in that it locates the policy within the established literature of mediation strategy. It is with the classification as a mediation strategy that constructive engagement is reexamined throughout this dissertation.

As mentioned previously:

> mediation is a form of third-party intervention in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing to its abatement or resolution through negotiations. Like other forms of peacemaking or conflict resolution, it is an intervention acceptable to the adversaries in the conflict who cooperate diplomatically with the intervenor. (...) it is not based on the direct use of force, and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants to win. (...) mediation is concerned with helping the adversaries to communicate, and like conciliation, to emphasize changing the parties' images of and attitudes toward one another.[99]

The mediator, i.e., the third party who intervenes, are usually rational actors who form a reciprocal relationship with disputing parties and have desired objective of conflict termination.[100] The primary roles in international conflict resolution are to suggest ideas for compromise, facilitate negotiations between disputing parties, and assist in bargaining.[101]

Likewise, it is crucial to define mediation strategy. According to Bercovitch and Wells, a mediator's strategy refers to a "broad plan of action designed to indicate which measures may be taken to achieve some objectives in particular situations."[102] The strategies that mediators use to reach their stated goals are dependent upon several personal and contextual factors that make up their unique cultural framework– their conception of the world and likewise the dispute.

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[99] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics," *Journal of social issues* 41, no. 2 (1985): 27–45.
[100] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Wells, "Evaluating Mediation Strategies," Peace and Change 18, no. 1 (1993): 3–25.
[101] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics."
[102] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Wells, "Evaluating Mediation Strategies," 5.

In *International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics*, William Zartman and Saadia Touval go further to establish a typology of three principal roles that mediators can assume as a participant in negotiations to end international conflicts–either communicator, formulator or manipulator–in accomplishing desired peace outcomes and affecting the positions of the parties in conflict.[103] According to Bercovitch and Wells, Zartman and Touval's typology is the most applicable classification of mediation strategies as it "permits reasonably accurate distinctions between types of mediator behavior, (...) and facilitates comparative empirical research on the effectiveness of different kinds of mediation strategies in international disputes."[104] Beardsley et al. further investigate the links between each mediation style and crisis outcomes to confirm their point.[105] The following sections will further break down the characterization of these three roles and their respective levels of effectiveness.

3.1: Mediation as Manipulation

In some situations, mediators become total participants in the negotiation process. Whether pernicious or good-intentioned, third parties who intervene in an overtly-active role are manipulators. According to Zartmann and Touval, mediator as manipulator is a structural role where mediators transform the typical bilateral bargaining structure to insert themselves in negotiations as total participants. In this case, the original actors will attempt to 'cozy up' to the mediator to advance their interests at the expense of their adversary. However, mediators who assume the role of manipulators will remain impartial as mutual stalemates benefit their bargaining power in negotiations. This is because the triangular relationship relies on the full participation of all parties. When neither side can form a successful coalition with the third party, the sides will begin to look towards the mediator to broker a solution for their deadlock.[106]

Behavioral tactics indicative of manipulative mediation is defined by Bercovitch and Wells as follows:

- Change the parties' expectations
- Take responsibility for concessions

[103] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics."
[104] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Wells, "Evaluating Mediation Strategies," 7.
[105] Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes." *The Journal of conflict resolution* 50, no. 1 (2006): 58–86.
[106] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics."

- Make substantive suggestions and proposals
- Make the parties aware of the costs of nonagreement
- Supply and filter information
- Suggest concessions that the parties can make
- Help negotiators undo a commitment
- Reward the parties' concessions
- Help devise a framework for acceptable outcomes
- Change expectations
- Press the parties to show flexibility
- Promise resources or threaten withdrawal
- Offer to verify compliance with the agreement.[107]

According to Beardsley et al., manipulative mediation effectively secures formal agreements and achieves overall crisis abatement.[108] However, it generally has a limited effect on overall tension reduction. Beardsley at al does find that this 'carrot and stick' form of third-party intervention to be necessary to resolve conflicts.[109]

3.2: Mediation as Communication

Another role discussed by Zartman and Touval is mediator as a communicator. In this instance, the mediator will assume a communication role after a breakdown in negotiations occurs, facilitate communication between the actors, and deliver messages, proposals, and concessions.[110] By increasing communication in a crisis, mediators of this category enable actors to reach an agreement representing their varied interests and distribution of capabilities. While remaining facilitatory, this is the only passive role that the mediator can play in the negotiation process out of Zartman and Touval's three categories.[111]

Bercovitch and Wells go further to identify the specific behavioral tactics of communicative mediation:

Communication-Facilitation Strategies

- Make contact with the parties
- Gain the trust and confidence of the parties
- Arrange for interactions between the parties

[107] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Wells, "Evaluating Mediation Strategies," 8-9.
[108] Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," *The Journal of conflict resolution* 50, no. 1 (2006): 58–86.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics."
[111] Ibid.

- Identify issues and interests
- Clarify the situation
- Develop a rapport with the parties
- Supply missing information
- Develop a framework for understanding
- Encourage meaningful communication
- Offer positive evaluations
- Allow the interests of all parties to be discussed.[112]

According to Beardsley et al., facilitative mediation that is practiced with as little intrusion as possible, i.e., communicative mediation, is best able to resolve commitment problems and secure a reduction in postcrisis tensions. In addition, their findings show that more intrusive or coercive roles are not necessary to resolve conflicts.[113]

3.3: Mediation as Formulation

In contrast, mediators as formulators will take on an active formulative role in a stalemated negotiation process once constrained parties cannot produce an amicable solution that meets each of their needs. In this case, a third party may be able to redefine the conflict and formulate its management or resolution in a way that the parties involved were unable to uncover themselves.[114] According to Zartmann and Touval, this action can be a substantive key to the conflict's termination.[115] Like facilitation, formulation is considered 'pure' mediation as mediators act as neutral parties outside of the relationship between conflicting participants in the conflict. Similarly, "they have no preference among solutions (expect for a solution that satisfies the parties), exercise no power (except the power of persuasion to change people's minds), and have no weight (expect the weight of the agreements required to get the parties' attention and confidence.)."[116]

According to Bercovitch and Wells, mediators that employ formulative strategies:

- Choose meetings sites
- Control the pace and formality of meetings
- Control the physical environment
- Establish protocol

[112] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Wells, “Evaluating Mediation Strategies,” 8.
[113] Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes,” The Journal of conflict resolution 50, no. 1 (2006): 58–86.
[114] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics.”
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid., 39.

- Suggest procedures
- Highlight common interests
- Reduce tensions
- Control timing
- Deal with simple issues first
- Structure the agenda
- Keep the parties at the table
- Keep the process focused on the issues.[117]

Formulative mediation may not rank highest out of the three categories in terms of total effectiveness. While Beardsley et al. assert that formulative mediation has a significant impact on postcrisis tension reduction, they find that this style has the most negligible impact out of the three studied partially due to insignificant results in several models.[118] Despite this, they found that the probability of mediation significantly affecting crisis abatement is the second highest out of the three categories studied when formulation is the most necessary form used. Thus, negotiations that involve formulating mediators are more likely to result in crisis abatement than faciliatory or communicatory mediators.[119] The characterization of mediation as formulation is highly important to this dissertation, as constructive engagement involved this mediation style.

In the remainder of the dissertation, the reexamination of American intervention in Southern Africa will be framed in terms of Zartman and Touval's understanding of the different types of third-party mediation strategies and the roles these parties assume. Particularly, standard mediation style identified as mediation as formulation will be used to establish the United States' use of constructive engagement in Southern Africa as an exercise of formulative mediation.[120] To reiterate this classification:

> Mediators (...) perform a more active role. (...) Redefining the issues in a conflict, or finding a formula for its management or resolution, is the substantive key to its termination, and the parties frequently need help not only in finding a key hidden in the morass of bad relations but, more frequently, in inventing a key out of pieces of the conflict itself. In this role, mediators need to add the qualities of creativeness and invention to the communicator's traits of tact and empathy and must seek to discover the parties' real and basic interests, and their component ingredients. [Mediator as formulator is a facilitator role,] necessitated by a breakdown in physical and psychic aspects of communications that

[117] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Wells, "Evaluating Mediation Strategies," 8.
[118] Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," The Journal of conflict resolution 50, no. 1 (2006): 58–86.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Saadi Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics," *Journal of social issues* 41, no. 2 (1985): 27–45.

> prevent the parties from working together to find a solution to their common problem. Mediators in [this role do nothing] to change the nature of the problem or the circumstances of the conflict; at most, they work on perceptions.[121]

By looking at U.S. mediation considering Zartman and Touval's definition of mediation as formulation, the effectiveness and success of constructive engagement will be made abundantly clear. Through the manifestation of the policy's guiding principles, U.S. created the outline for a peace deal for Namibia and Angola that all parties in Southern Africa accepted. Beyond the remarkable feat of producing a signed peace agreement, the tremendous significance of this mediation was that constructive engagement as outlined by Crocker became a resolving formula for conflict in the region and in extension, a contributing factor at the end of apartheid. If the United States' role is understood as a formulative third-party mediator constrained by the principles of constructive engagement, the policy was overwhelmingly successful.

To reiterate, this chapter breaks down the three widely accepted strategies that mediators in international conflict can pursue. It explores Zartman and Touval's justifications for why third parties insert themselves into conflict and what they hope to gain from their participation. The summarization of the three classifications works to establish constructive engagement as an exercise of formulative mediation by Chester Crocker. This chapter is significant in that it locates the policy of constructive engagement within the established literature of mediation strategy, diverging from the common themes of constructive engagement throughout the literature. It is with the classification of a formulative mediation strategy that negotiations to end the interconnected Angolan and Namibian conflict is reexamined throughout this dissertation.

Still, before reevaluating America's formulative meditation strategy with Southern Africa, two things are necessary: the parameters that will define Southern Africa for the focus of this analysis must be established. This dissertation must also provide the historical context of the interrelated conflicts within the region. Therefore, the following section will deal with the Angolan and Namibian conflicts in a Southern African region that, for this dissertation is composed of Angola, Namibia, and South Africa and the several U.S. administrations approached the conflict.

[121] Ibid., 38.

Chapter 4: Historical Background

This chapter provides a historical background on the Angolan and Namibian conflicts. The first section explains the causes for the substantial tension between Angola, Namibia, and South Africa that reached its peak by the 1980's, as well as introduces the conflicts key actors. The second section serves as an account of several U.S. administration's responses up until this point to provide context for the decisions made by Chester Crocker in regard to Namibia's increasingly dangerous conflict over the conditions of independence and the Cuban's internationalist mission in Angola.

4.1: Angolan and Namibian Conflicts[122]

Tensions in Angola during the Post-War era can be traced to the period that followed Portugal's armed forces' seizure of power of the Portuguese government in 1974. The state's colonial might had collapsed, and a mass exodus from the colony of Angola followed shortly after. Civil war broke out, and the economy deteriorated in the wake of traumatic Angolan independence in November 1975, where Portugal was unable to impose order and lead Angola into a transitional government of national unity through democratic elections.[123] Angola was left as a power vacuum that existing rival Angolan liberation groups such as the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were eager to fill.[124]

Before the civil war, the Cuban government initiated an alliance with the Leninist-oriented MPLA. The alliance was solid and produced considerable support. It can be said that nearly 90% of the liberation movement's arms came from the Soviet Union and satellite countries, and MPLA

[122] The following account of the background on the Angolan and Namibian conflicts was taken from a paper that the author had written for the University of Cape Town.
[123] K. K. Virmani, *Angola and the Super Powers* (Delhi: Dept. of African Studies, University of Delhi, 1989,) 30 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Constructive Engagement with Angolan and Namibian Conflicts," (unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, 2019), 9-13.
[124] Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 45 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."

students and military personnel receiving training in Cuba.[125] Over a decade, involvement increased substantially:

> From November 1975, Cuba began airlifting combat troops from Havana to Luanda in a significant escalation that came to be known as "Operation Carlota." The Russians flew huge Anotow-22 transport planes containing arms directly to Luanda and helped fly in thousands of Cuban combat troops to instruct MPLA recruits in the use of and to man sophisticated Soviet weaponry that included T-54 and T-55 tanks.
>
> Thus, using heavy weaponry encircling tactics and the total concentration of a Cuban army that was about 7000 strong by late 1975, (and about 10,000 to 12,00 strong by early 1976) the MPLA eliminated the FNLA as a fighting force by early January 1976.[126]

The MPLA quickly seized power of newly independent Angola, and Cuba aimed to act in defense of territorial integrity and sovereignty alongside the Angolan army. This longstanding support for African liberation movements formed a strong Soviet alliance and allowed for Cuba's fifteen-year military occupation of Angola, beginning in 1975 possible. It was Cuba's intention to "defend the interests of the Angolan people; and they would leave the county as and when they were told that they were not needed."[127] South Africa, weary of communism encroaching further south, responded to the occupation with increased intervention in the country.

Additionally, South Africa and its Defense Force [SADF] sought to intervene in the conflict supporting Joseph Savimbi's UNITA.[128] The SADF trained UNITA rebels as a classic guerilla army in the country's southwestern territory in a combined effort to put pressure on the MPLA regime and the South West African Peoples Organization [SWAPO] in neighboring Namibia.[129] This insurgency could help prevent any further communist expansion, especially in Namibia's northern districts where SWAPO's ethnic heartland lay. According to Crocker, "before long, Angola became the centerpiece for the SADF's anti-SWAPO strategy in the Namibian bush war–-."[130]

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[125] K. K. Virmani, *Angola and the Super Powers* 26 (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[126] Ibid., 37.
[127] Ibid., xiv. (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 45 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[128] Ibid.
[129] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 57. (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 45 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[130] Ibid.

Ultimately, "these events profoundly changed both the Angolan and Namibian conflicts. The Angolan civil war became part of a regional war in which the South Africans, as well as the Cubans and Soviets, were central players. The SADF came to view Angola as the forward defense zone and strategic buffer for Namibia."[131] It is crucial to outline the Namibian conflict in further detail.

South African aggression in Namibia can be traced back to the early 20th century. In 1914, South Africa launched an attack on its neighbor with the goal of territorial acquisition. In 1915, the territory, no longer a German colony, was occupied by 400,000 South African troops before becoming administered by the Union government under a class C mandate by the League of Nations.[132] After World War II, a considerable effort was made by Pretoria to incorporate the territory into its union, ignoring the will of the United Nations. This colonial paternalism and refusal to accept the right of the U.N. system to oversee its administration in Namibia extended until it was determined that Namibia was under the direct responsibility of the U.N. through the termination of the League's original mandate in 1966.[133]

South African occupation of the colony was contested internationally and domestically. When the International Court of Justice refused to act on the South West African issue when first brought to them six years prior in 1960 by Ethiopia and Liberia, understanding the Namibian issue as political conflict and thus outside its legal jurisdiction, black consciousness in Namibia spread. In response, the SWAPO declared that they had "no other alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation."[134] SWAPO was one of the many black opposition groups in the territory, joined by Ovamboland Peoples Organization [OPO] and the South West Africa National Union [SWANU]. Confrontations between these groups and their illegal administrator resulted in South Africa taking many members of the liberation struggle as political prisoners.[135]

When asked again in 1970, the ICJ ruled "the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under the obligation to withdraw its administration from

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[131] Ibid., 56-57.
[132] Geisa Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibian Independence: the Limitations of the United Nations* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018). 34-35. (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 45 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[133] Ibid., 35-59.
[134] *To be Born a Nation, The Liberation Struggle for Namibia*, Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia (London: Zed Press, 1981), 177 (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 45 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[135] Geisa Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibian Independence,* 56-57 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."

Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory."[136] In response, South Africa attempted to put forth a series of policies that would placate Western criticism and arranged for elections in 1976. However, this settlement was delayed after the Zimbabwean election, where Robert Mugabe's ZANU party was victorious. South Africans, fearing communist win, assumed that SWAPO would have the same success in Namibia and refused to relinquish control.

The UNSC responded by passing resolution 385, reaffirming U.N. responsibility for the administration of Namibia. Additionally, the body expressed "(*concern* with) South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia," along with "(*grave concern* in regards to) South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,"[137] with an emphasis on condemning South Africa's militarism and extension of apartheid policies into the territory. It also called for the release of political prisoners.[138] This would not be the end of resolutions surrounding the Namibian issue.

Through a joint diplomatic effort, the Western Contact Group [WCG], composed of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada, and West Germany, established a basic mandate for Namibia's independence. The WCG began negotiations with this aim and, in 1978, presented the Settlement Proposal per UNSCR 385, calling for free and fair elections to the U.N. Security Council. According to the letter, the Secretary-General must appoint a Special Representative to oversee all measures, who will be at the heart of the decision-making process and establishing the United Nations Transition Assistance Group [UNTAG] and a timeline for the mission.[139]

After prolonged negotiations, the United Nations Security Council resolution 435 was passed in 1978, reaffirming the body's legal responsibility to outline Namibia's transition to independence.[140] After correspondence between the Government of South Africa and the President of SWAPO, the UN Security Council voted 12 votes to none, with abstentions from Czechoslovakia and the USSR, in favor of adopting the resolution that called for a ceasefire and

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[136] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971,* 16 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[137] United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/RES/385, 30 January 1976 and and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[138] Ibid.
[139] United Nations, *Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa,* (20 July, 1988) and and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."
[140] United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/RES/435, 29 September 1978 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."

would lead to the "withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976),"[141] to oversee the free and fair elections and South Africa's withdrawal. Despite this, South Africa would not withdraw from the territory for ten years.

4.2: Responses of American Administrations

Before the 1980s, the U.S.-South African relationship was defined by U.S. trade, investment, and strategic interests. Throughout the Apartheid Era, South Africa was an important trade partner to the United States, providing the country with access to mineral resources vital to U.S. industries in addition to a strategic location for naval bases and missile tracking stations that provided access to much of the African continent during the Cold War era.

Increased U.S. attention towards South Africa coincides with an increasingly hostile apartheid state, marking a complicated relationship between South Africa and the United States under President John F. Kennedy. In contrast to Pretoria's evolution towards greater racial segregation during the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States of America also reached its peak. President Kennedy's domestic political agenda stood at odds with Pretoria's domestic belligerence, and cooperation with the apartheid regime would cause considerable damage to his position of racial integration. Similarly, good relations with South Africa would also compromise Kennedy's strategic alignment with existing emerging Third World states when the expansion of communism was seen as a legitimate security threat during this period.[142] The rationale is that if the Third World saw the United States as an ally, they would be less likely to turn towards communist states for assistance and significantly reduce the opportunity for Third World communist expansion. To win respect and support of these nonaligned states, the U.S. would need to share the Third World position and voice its opposition to apartheid South Africa.[143]

These external and internal pressures lead the Kennedy administration to harden the U.S. stance towards Pretoria.[144] Public rhetoric became harsh, frequently referring to Pretoria's

[141] Ibid.
[142] Alex Thomson, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994 : Conflict of Interests*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

domestic policies and international actions, particularly regarding South Africa's encroachment into then South West Africa, as repugnant. In addition, the administration began to establish links with black opposition leaders such as A.N.C. president Chief Albert Luthuli and Patrick Duncan of the Pan African Congress (PAC). To top it off, the U.S. embassy and consulate buildings in South Africa began to hold multiracial receptions that would have illegal under apartheid law if not technically hosted on U.S. territory.[145]

While these tactics were significant irritants to U.S.-South African relations, the most significant confrontation deployed by the Kennedy administration would be the 1963 arms embargo that prevented U.S. citizens from selling military equipment to South Africa.[146] While Washington wanted to maintain the position that avoided assisting in the enforcement of apartheid, it also sought to benefit from strategic and economic cooperation with Pretoria, effectively a 'dual strategy of 'divided cooperation,' stating, "Our policy problem is how best to influence South Africa's internal policies in a constructive direction maintaining correct and mutually advantageous relations. (...) Our basic approach, therefore, is to distinguish between non-cooperation in matters directly or indirectly related to South Africa's apartheid policy, and cooperation in other important fields [such as intelligence gathering, access to missile tracking stations, etc.]."[147] In addition, the administration cautioned against the imposition of any additional sanctions that would further isolate the Republic and decrease the opportunity for American influence:

> In objecting to additional sanctions, the Kennedy administration advanced four central arguments: the belief that negotiation remained the best way forward to eradicate apartheid, its view that an economic embargo simply would not work, the idea that black South Africans would be the individuals most disadvantaged by any punitive measures, and the general principle that it would be tactically incorrect to isolate a government while, at the same time, seeking to influence it.[148]

The way to influence Pretoria to abandon apartheid would be by strengthening "those elements of the white minority that desired to bring out a constructive evolution toward racial harmony and eventual equality," argued Ambassador Satterthwaite, advocating instead that "continued judicious pressure and discreet attempts to persuade and convince government officials

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[145] Ibid.
[146] U.N. Security Council, *Security Council resolution 181 (1963) [Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa]*, 7 August 1963, S/RES/181 (1963).
[147] Alex Thomson, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1991: Conflict of Interests*. 39.
[148] Ibid.

and other influential people that significant change must be made."[149] This thin line between confrontation, cooperation, and condemnation by the U.S. would continue beyond Kennedy's, throughout apartheid's lifespan.

Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, largely continued with the same core premises for his administration's South Africa policy. However, Johnson strayed from Kennedy in his commitment to addressing human rights at the expense of U.S. trade, investment, security, and strategic interests, brought about by particular concern over South Africa's actions in Namibia which can be traced back to the early 20th century.[150] In the meantime, the administration issued the National Security Action Memorandum 295 in 1964, with the immediate priority being South West Africa.[151]

In 1968, Johnson's National Policy Paper outlined four critical objectives for the government's dealings with South Africa being "continue(d) pressures to move towards racial equality and majority rule; continue to avoid conspicuous association as would result in U.S. identification with repressive racial policy; where not inconsistent with the forgoing, continue contacts and relationships of material benefit to the United States (e.g. in the field of trade, scientific and technical exchange, routine naval visits, tracking stations, etc.); and encourage wider exposure of South Africans to the outside world through cultural contacts and exchanges." [152] However, the policy paper argued against "intensified pressures on, or by closer association with, the white minority regimes of the area."[153] President Nixon and Ford's administration felt differently about the ladder.

Nixon's and Ford's Southern African strategy tilted towards embracing white rule in the region. This is due to the 1969 National Security Council Report 39 that presented U.S. objectives and five policy options for dealing with Southern Africa.[154] U.S. objectives included the desires to:

> –Improve the U.S. standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue. To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and risk of U.S. involvement. To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and gain political influence with black

[149] Ibid., 39.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid., 61.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.

> governments and liberation movements. To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of white regimes. To protect economic, scientific, and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production.[155]

According to Thomson, the study put forth recommendations that "rang(ed) from greater cooperation with the white regimes [Option one] through to a complete withdrawal from the region [Option five]."[156] Option two proposed a closer association white regime, black liberation movements, and independent African countries in the region, based on the premise that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."[157] With this option, the U.S. hoped to promote communication and negotiation between the groups to help influence peaceful change while protecting its material interests in the region. On the other hand, Option three advocated for the "codification and extension of present policy" of public opposition to minority rule while pursuing strategic and economic cooperation with the region's white regimes implemented by President Johnson.[158] Option four advocated for the alignment with independent black African states based on the premise that the U.S. could not influence change within the region's white regimes and should focus on protecting the country's standing on race issues.[159] In the end, Nixon's administration did not adopt any of the options presented in NSSM39 as such, instead focusing on a strategy of 'Communication' that would encourage Pretoria towards piecemeal reforms without the threat of retaliation or punitive sanctions.[160]

Despite the plan never being thoughtfully implemented, Nixon's NSSM39 option two assumptions that the 'whites are here to stay in Southern Africa was proven incorrect in 1974-75 when Portugal's colonial might had collapsed after the colonial power's armed forces seized control of the government in Lisbon and a mass exodus of European settlers from the Angolan colony followed shortly after.

Unlike the previous administrations mentioned, President Jimmy Carter's human rights-based Southern Africa policy confronted Pretoria greatly.[161] Attention from the Carter administration was needed at this time, as despite small to medium concessions on apartheid, the

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[155] Ibid., 67.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid., 69.
[158] Ibid., 68.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Alex Thomson, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994 : Conflict of Interests.*

Republic was becoming even more insistent on the independent homelands program. In addition, the Soweto uprising in 1976 drew the attention of the West and proved that South Africa's black majority population was prepared to oppose white minority rule.[162] Unable to shake the image of the uprising, Carter's Presidential Directions sought to "promote the progressive transformation of South African society," while meetings with South African officials perused a policy of 'delinking' the conflicts in the region.[163] The United States would not be making concessions in Namibia, South Africa, or Rhodesia in exchange for cooperation elsewhere in the region.[164]

While there was no blueprint for change in South Africa, full political participation remained the end goal, and the U.S. was not prepared to outwardly favor any model of post-apartheid governance presented by the National Party. Instead, the U.S. made several human rights-focused demands stating:

> South Africa must:
> (a) Take timely steps to eliminate the policy and practice of apartheid and grant all elements of the population equal rights including a full and free voice in their destiny. (b) Terminate all systems and plans under whatever name which forcibly separate elements of the population on the basis of race, whether within a unitary state or in the form of separate political units. (c) Bring its illegal occupation of Namibia to a speedy conclusion. (d) Facilitate the holding in Namibia on a territory-wide basis of free elections under the aegis of the U.N. and refrain from any steps inconsistent therewith. (e) Comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions on the questions of Namibia and Rhodesia.[165]

Carter routinely threatened Pretoria with the use of sanctions if it did not suspend its police offensives against the country's black majority. In November 1977, the administration lent support to an immediate U.N. arms embargo against the Republic after the repression of the black consciousness movement and the death of Steve Biko. Loopholes within previous sanction bills were also closed within the coming years, putting an end to any 'back-door U.S. assistance.[166]

Despite the Carter Administration's condemnation of apartheid and confrontations with the Republic, no significant progress was made in influencing South Africa to eradicate the policy of apartheid in favor of genuine political change based on the will of the country's black majority. However, significant progress was made within the Southern African region despite the apartheid

[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid., 91.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid., 95.
[166] Ibid.

stalemate.[167] Under Carter, the U.S. adopted an equally strong stance on the independence of Namibia as it did against apartheid. Calling for free and fair elections, the Carter administration denounced South Africa's attempts to define Namibian independence within the context of an internal settlement that excluded the will of Namibian liberation movements in favor of the territory's white minority.[168]

Looking back on each administrations strategic motivations, objectives, and strategy towards the region, one can see many similarities. Despite varying rhetoric and policies, Kennedy's 'divided cooperation,' Johnson's continuation, Nixon and Ford's 'cooperation,' and Carter's aggressive pro-majority rule strategy in dealing with the mitigation of conflict in Southern Africa were all pursued with a common end goal: a comprehensive peace agreement for regional political reform that favored U.S. interests. However, despite its invariability and various attempts by the United States and the United Nations through various dispute resolution bodies over several decades, this goal was not materialized as South Africa was not interested in strategies for change put forth. The objective of a compressive peace agreement does not begin to be materialized until a new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who has his sights set on redefining the American relationship with Southern Africa is confirmed in 1981.

[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid.

Chapter 5: Constructive Engagement in Southern Africa 1981-1989

The aim of this chapter is to provide information on the Southern African case study on several fronts. The chapter will break down the case study into two sections. The first section deals with Chester Crocker. It begins with Chester A. Crocker's personal background and transitions into an account of his opinion on the then-current situation with Southern Africa and into a discussion of the mediation principles he outlined as a result. The second section of this chapter deals with the negotiation process. It is broken down into a framework of five distinct phases according to Vincente Tome. The chapter will provide a background of evidence for the critical reexamination of the policy.

5.1: Crocker's Principles

Born in New York City in 1941, Dr. Chester A. Crocker was educated in history at Ohio State University as an undergraduate and later received his Master's in '65 and Ph.D. in '69 from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where his Ph.D. focused on the decolonization of the French and British empires.[169] His first stint with the American public service was during the Nixon-Kissinger administration from 1969-'72, from which he left for a career at Georgetown University. Crocker returned to government in the early 1980s when presidential candidate George Herbert Walker Bush recruited him as a foreign policy advisor and President Ronald Reagan in 1981 for a position at the State Department.[170]

In an interview, Crocker recalled that "[President Reagan] had written me several handwritten notes on op-eds that I'd written, saying 'I like this line of thinking.' So the president was aware of the name and he realized that I'd said some things that were critical about the way the Carter policies had played out, so the president liked that kind of thing–" in regards to how he got the job as the Assistant Secretary of African Affairs for the administration.[171] As one would expect, Crocker's tenure is characterized by a focus on Southern Africa. Despite his research

[169] Chester A. Crocker, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, June 5, 2006, Interview.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid., 60.

history in decolonization, the New York Times attributes his interest in the region to Crocker's marriage to Saone Baron, the daughter of a prominent lawyer from Zimbabwe.[172] Regardless, Crocker would be the man tasked with solving the crisis's Southern Africa that others before him were unable to do. As he said, "–this was the overwhelming question for the Africanist community. We all knew South Africa was not acceptable in its current form, but how do you go from here to there and what is there, anyway? What is the endpoint?"[173] Crocker set out to answer these questions.

As mentioned previously, Chester Crocker's Foreign Affairs article, *Strategy for Change,* questions the role that the U.S. can play in the prevention of mass revolutionary violence in the name of multiracial democracy in South Africa and criticizes the policies of previous U.S. administrations.[174] It is incredibly significant because the article serves as constructive engagement's introduction to the literature, but it also outlines the strategy's goals and recommendations. While the article primarily focuses on the U.S.-South African relationship and South Africa's domestic politics, there is significant attention placed on the entire region.[175]

Crocker says:

> U.S. officials correctly insist that the timetable and the blueprint for change in South Africa are not for outsiders to impose. However, without Western engagement in the region as a whole, it will not be possible to assure that South Africans are permitted to build their future. The American stance must be firmly supportive of a regional climate conducive to compromise and accommodation in the face of concerted attempts to discredit evolutionary change and to exploit the inevitable ambiguity and periodic 'incidents' that will accompany political liberalization.[176]

With most of the region's governments in pragmatic hands, Crocker believed the time for change within South Africa had come. In effect, pressure for change should be a central principle for American policy, along with a clear emphasis on active communication–making American intervention an effective coercive influence within the region. To be effective in spearheading this initiative, "Washington will need a sustained and nimble diplomacy, responsive to the pragmatic instincts of regional leaders"[177] that engages with leaders across all racial and ideological lines due

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[172] Neil Lewis, "Washington Talk: Working Profile; Chester Crocker: Inside, Making Policy on Africa" *The New York Times*, June 9, 1987.
[173] Chester A. Crocker, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project.
[174] Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1980), 323-351.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid., 345.
[177] Ibid.

to the invariability of American interests in Southern Africa. This diplomacy can be simplified into four main principles that should guide constructive American engagement with Southern Africa. Crocker delineates these principles as open lines of communication with political leaders, public encouragement and support for positive political achievements, pressure for change through public and diplomatic channels, and the avoidance of punishment options in the form of sanctions or military intervention.[178]

From the start, open lines of communication should be the benchmark of the South African-American relationship. the American government must be willing to meet publicly and communicate with South African political leaders. Communication "in the sense of actually transmitting ideas and signals about change is not"[179] is an essential diplomatic tool that must be put to use. Furthermore, communication with parties should not be dictated or limited by the leader's ideology or race. Communication should extend across all racial and ideological lines to meet American interests.[180]

Secondly, the American government should publicly encourage and support South Africa's positive advancements and achievements to be taken seriously by the country's leaders. Crocker asserts that bias against South Africa's post-war society dominated by apartheid has led to a "casualness and condescension"[181] that Western observers possess when endorsing, or more accurately disvaluing, significant steps towards political change within the country. In addition, an America that is empathic and sympathetic to the concerns of all local actors, both to blacks who exist within the racist system and regarding the political dilemma of the Afrikaans population has created for themselves. This would provide significant American leverage in support of evolutionary political change.[182]

Thirdly, pressure for change should define the tone of American interaction with South Africa. Mainly, pressure in public and diplomatic channels should be used to signal American disapproval of the policy while "strengthening the hand of official modernizers and other agents

[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid., 350.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid., 351.
[182] Ibid.

of change."[183] By empowering National Party modernizers to act upon their desire to implement political change, South African society will benefit.[184]

Finally, the American government must take a firm stance against the introduction of military force and refuse trade or investment sanctions against South Africa. The government should act in favor of collaboration and mutual respect instead of aggression. The option of punishment, mainly if the U.S. were to support mandatory U.N. sanctions against the apartheid regime, should be avoided. According to Crocker, these sanctions cause irreversible damage, as they erode rather than strengthen the possibility for future influence and flexibility. Just because change is coming more slowly than the Western preference does not mean governments should act hastily in applying "pinprick measures and minor wrist-slapping proposals"[185] that offer temporary relief while underscoring the prospects of American futility in the region.[186]

In an article co-authored by Crocker published in 1981 titled, "A U.S. Policy for the '80's," Crocker says, "in our approach to the stability and development of Southern Africa, we in the West are well advised to be as pragmatic as the politically diverse states of the region (...) have shown themselves to be. This means that, where possible, we should try to build on and strengthen linkages between them on the conditions they are prepared to accept."[187]

Nevertheless:

> An important role of official U.S. policy is to lay down guidelines, help create a climate supportive of constructive engagement by other Western governments and encourage our diverse and pluralistic society to engage with, not turn away from, a changing South Africa. (...) Washington (...) has a significant role to play.[188]

With the guidelines presented in these articles, there is no surprise that Chester Crocker was nominated by Ronald Reagan as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs for his administration and confirmed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in early 1981.[189] He

[183] Ibid.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Chester Crocker, Mario Greznes, and Robert Henderson, "A U.S. Policy for the '80s," *Africa Report* 26, no. 1 (January 1, 1981): 8.
[188] Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," 350.
[189] "PN134-3 - Nomination of Chester A. Crocker for Department of State, 97th Congress (1981-1982)," *Congress.gov*, Library of Congress, 17 March 1981.

entered duty on June 9, 1981.[190] Crocker set out to advocate his strategy shortly after with the mitigation of conflict in Southern Africa being of utmost importance to American foreign policy.

On August 29, 1981, Crocker presented several of the Reagan administration's foreign affairs goals in an address to the American Legion in Honolulu, Hawaii.[191] This presentation is significant because not only does it take place slightly under three months after Crocker is assumed the position as the incoming Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, but it makes the administration's foreign policy position precisely clear. He repeats Secretary of State Haig, saying, "We will be constant in the pursuit of U.S. interests, the United States will be reliable as a force for peace and stability, [and] there will be balance in our approach to individual issues and orchestration of policy in general."[192] In regard to what the administration has set forth as its objectives in Africa:

> America seeks to promote peace and regional security in Africa, and to deny opportunities to all those who seek contrary objectives, We will support proven friends and be known as a reliable partner, in Africa as elsewhere, We support open market opportunities, across key resources and expanding African and American economies. The U.S. actively supports regional security and peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. We seek to expand and assist that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress, and which have working democratic institutions. The U.S. will do its share in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in supporting basic human liberties, in keeping with both American principles and American interests.[193]

Crocker also affirms that the Reagan administration's Africa policy sees the resolution to conflicts occurring in Southern Africa as a high priority. For several months, they were able to "[define] a new regional strategy, responsive to our national security, economic, commercial, and political interests"[194], seemingly influenced by the ideas presented in Crocker's *Foreign Affairs* article.

Crocker reiterates the general objectives guiding America's Africa policy throughout his tenure in a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa on September 16, 1981. Born out of several primary considerations, "we have formulated a strategy designed to address the major challenges and opportunities facing us in the region, a strategy responsive to our global and regional interests and to the aspirations of the peoples of Africa," he

[190] "Chester A. Crocker - People - Department History - Office of the Historian," accessed March 26, 2021.
[191] "Chester Crocker on American Policies in Southern Africa," *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, 1981.
[192] Ibid., 6.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid., 7-8.

says, referring to constructive engagement.[195] Firstly, Southern Africa is vital to Western economic and strategic interests. Secondly, the U.S. must play a significant role in fostering regional security by mitigating the current conflicts and encouraging their negotiated solutions. Finally, while the region is substantially interdependent, there is no political basis for regional cooperation due to South Africa's policy of apartheid.[196] Serious, sustained diplomacy is the only answer and a negotiated settlement, led by the United States and agreed upon by all parties. These attributes of constructive engagement remained strong during Crocker's involvement in the Angolan and Namibian negotiations. The following section will describe the negotiations in detail.

5.2: Negotiation Process and Phases

This section details the the Angolan/Namibian negotiation process and emphasizes the Chester Crocker's role as a formulative mediator employed by Angola, Cuba, Namibia, and South Africa that created a successful solution to the regions interconnected conflicts. It borrows the staged framework that Vincente Tome presents in his journal article, *Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988*. This framework was selected due to its ability to characterize distinct historical events by the role they played in the overall negotiation process. In addition, Tome's framework simplifies these events into succinct yet descriptive headlines that could stand alone and still produce a basic understanding of the complex process. However, these phases still provide a guideline for how each month and year of the negotiation process can be analyzed within specific time parameters.

Likewise, Tome breaks down the eight-year Angolan and Namibian negotiation process into five distinct phases that will be employed in throughout this section: Phase I: *Linkage Introduction and Namibian Independence (April 1921- July 1982*), Phase II: *Pursuing Linkage (July 1982- March 1985),* Phase III: *Derailment (April 1985- March 1987),* Phase IV: *The Players Return and a New Player Emerges (March 1987- May 1988), and* Phase V: *Double Games and Endgame (May 1988- December 1988).*[197] The following reexamination of this historic negotiation process will be sectioned off by the categories that Tome presented.

[195] "Chester Crocker on American Policies in Southern Africa," 1.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Vicente Tome, "Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988," Negotiation Journal 8, no. 3 (July 1992): 273-290.

5.2.1: Phase I: *Linkage Introduction and Namibian Independence (April 1981- July 1982*)

The independence of Namibia was one of the U.S.'s principal foreign policy goals up until the turn of the decade. Yet, to Crocker, the close empirical relationship between the conflicts in Namibia and Angola was unmistakable. "It is hard to see how the future peace and independence of Namibia could be assured if there continued to be a Cuban troop presence in Angola and the threat or actuality of continued violence across borders. (...) If progress could be made on Cuban troop withdrawal, it would unquestionably aid in the process of achieving Namibian independence," Crocker writes in 1981.[198] Despite no organic linkage between Angola and the Namibia negotiations had been made up until that point, there was a clear need to include this precondition into the negotiation process to speed up the progress on the issues.[199]

By 1981, Crocker sought to implement a new settlement formula. By redefining the regional conflicts in Angola and Namibia, Crocker brought new ideas to the negotiations that had previously reached a stalemate after eight years of disagreements. When describing his new approach, he argues that the Cuban troop withdrawal had to be implemented in parallel with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435. Crocker argued that these conflicts simply could not be separated from one another due to the premise that the prospects for negotiated transformation within states were directly affected by the security climate between them.[200] Ultimately, a decision was made in April 1981 to expand the agenda of UNSCR 435/78 and define a new Angolan and Namibian settlement formula. This included stipulating South African decolonization of Namibia as outlined in the resolution and leveraging this against a scheduled Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.[201] This would secure the framework for a successful a negotiated settlement.

Based on the belief that America could not push South Africa to relinquish its control over Namibia purely by force, the linkage formula would entice Pretoria towards negotiations by tying Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to Namibia's independence. The South African government had deadlocked the negotiations in the past, maintaining the position that the Republic was concerned that the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola would hinder the efficacy of

[198] Ibid.
[199] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[200] Ibid., 67
[201] Ibid.

Namibian independence and concern over continued subversion and attacks from liberation movements against South Africa through Namibia.[202]

Approval from all parties involved was necessary. Unable to assume that South Africa was interested in the redefined settlement, Crocker set out for an unambiguous statement from Pretoria agreeing to negotiate. The acceptance of the linkage formula was critical for several reasons. Firstly, it would give the United States leverage over a U.S.-defined negotiation framework for the region. Secondly, it would provide an incentive to the South African's to actively participate and support the agreement instead of blocking the negotiation process. Finally, the framework would advance the U.S. foreign policy goal of removing Cuban troops from the region.[203]

Crocker and Haig developed a three-phase negotiating plan that would be implemented once South Africa was committed:

> in phase one, to last three to four months, The Contact Group would undertake to obtain agreement between South Africa and the Front Line States on constitutional principles (...); phase two would commence once phase one had been completed and would serve to refine the complex UNTAG arrangements; phase three should begin (after these Namibia issues were resolves, hopefully around March 1982) with Pretoria's providing a 'date certain' for the start of implementation of Resolution 435 (sometime before the end of 1982). The United States would use this to obtain from the Angolans a specific commitment to a schedule for Cuban withdrawal 'coordinated' with UNTAG's arrival and the S.A.D.F.'s departure from Namibia. The Cubans would leave Angola, and Namibia would become independent in phase three.[204]

Phase one negotiations were to focus on Namibian constitutional principles that would offer protection to minority rights. The second phase would deal with the technical issues that would arise during the Namibian election, ceasefire agreements, withdrawal of foreign troops, and election supervision. Finally, U.N. Resolution 435 would be implemented in the third phase, while the United States engages in bilateral talks with Angola regarding Cuban troop withdrawal. The first variable of linkage, South Africa's acceptance, commitment to, and the early stages of implementing the modified U.N. plan for Namibian independence, would come shortly after.[205]

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[202] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[203] Vicente Tome, "Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988."
[204] Ibid., 101-102.
[205] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*

5.2.2: Phase II: *Pursuing Linkage (July 1982- March 1985)*

In July 1982, South Africa and SWAPO agreed to a set of constitutional principles for an independent Namibia.[206] This development signifies South Africa's acceptance of the modified U.N. plan and its subsequent implementation. However, neither party could agree on the preconditions of Namibian independence. South Africa began to push for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola as a precondition for its departure from the territory. Angola countered that it would only remove Cuban troops after South African troops withdrew from Namibia as instructed by Resolution 435.[207]

The context for further negotiations ripened after South Africa's military campaign Operation Askari into southern Angola commenced in pursuit of SWAPO forces began in December 1983.[208] During this campaign, South African troops were able to push SWAPO forces north of the Namibian-Angolan border. At this point, Crocker urged the Angolans and South Africans to meet and re-negotiate disengagement proposals.[209] By February 1984, a disengagement agreement mediated by Crocker was reached by Angola and South Africa.[210]

The 1984 Lusaka Accords declared a ceasefire between the two countries and called for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola in addition to a joint commission of all three parties to oversee the implementation of the agreement.[211] By November, Angola agreed to remove all Cuban troops in southern Angola within three years and presented several conditionalities for South Africa. In return for their commitment to Cuban troop withdrawal, Angolans insisted that South African troops must also withdrawal from Angola, South Africa must end its aggression against Angola, cease all aid to anti-communist UNITA, and agree to the implementation of Resolution 435.[212] The Lusaka Accord marks Angola's *de facto* acceptance of the linkage, demonstrating that the Angolans agreed that with the help of U.S. mediators, linking the conflicts

[206] United Nations Security Council, *Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia,* S/15297, (July 12, 1982).
[207] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[208] Vicente Tome, "Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988."
[209] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[210] Lusaka Accord, Agreement between the Governments of Angola and South Africa, Feburary 12, 1984, Lusaka, Zambia.
[211] Lusaka Conference between M.P.C., SWAPO and Administrator-General, May 11 - 13, 1984.
[212] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*

was the only way to entice South Africans to the negotiations and restrain the regional superpower's aggression.

With Angola and South Africa's acceptance, the issue turned to the timing between the withdrawals and their partiality. The U.S. shared South Africa's total Cuban troop withdrawal goal, while Angola only sought to withdrawal troops stationed in the southern region of the country and retain those to the north. South Africa responded to Angola's proposal with a demand to remove all Cuban troops in the country within twelve weeks. In mid-March 1985, Crocker made a compromise proposal that offered a two-year timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal where a small Cuban defensive presence could remain around important northern cities.[213] To Crocker, it seemed like massive progress was being made on the negotiation front during this period.[214] However, the treaty would not last.

5.2.3: Phase III: *Derailment (April 1985- March 1987)*

Hostilities escalated during mid-1985 when the Lusaka Accord was *de facto* annulled due to repeated violations and criticism among the signatories. Specifically, the Angolan, American, and South African talks came to an impasse in April after South Africa announced Namibia that ran counter to the commitment it made in July 1982 to the modified plan for the territory's independence. By mid-April, South Africa attempted to settle the Namibian issue unilaterally by establishing a transition government in the territory. Then, in May, South African troops began attempting to sabotage Angolan oil facilities.

However, the blame for the treaty's failure does not rest only on South Africa. Angola was taken aback by the July decision by U.S. Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment that prohibited U.S. aid to UNITA. Nevertheless, negotiations continued. When South Africa abandoned its twelve-week Cuban withdrawal demands and agreed to Crocker's two-year compromise proposal by November 1985, Angolan officials then pressed South Africa for a date-specific for implementation of Resolution 435. Angola offered a new schedule for Cuban withdrawal as a concession. When South Africa offered August 1, 1986, as the start date for the implementation of Resolution 435, Angola rejected the proposal. It suspended negotiations as it was made clear

[213] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[214] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*

that the U.S. had initiated covert military assistance to UNITA. with the repeal of the Clark Amendment. In addition, the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in August 1986 added significant strain to the U.S.-South African relationship.

While the Lusaka Accord failed, this period of the derailment remains significant in the grand scheme of U.S. mediation in the conflict. According to Crocker, as short-lived as it was, the Accords created progress for main negotiations, as Luanda and Pretoria initiated their first Cuban withdrawal proposals and informally accepted U.S.'s role as mediator.[215] While no significant progress was made for a short period after implementing the CAAA. in August 1986, significant breakthroughs were made in March of the following year in the form of early tripartite negotiations.

5.2.4: Phase IV: *The Players Return and a New Player Emerges (March 1987- May 1988)*

The Angolans were ready to talk in March 1987. The resumption of negotiations occurred in conjunction with Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba, insisting on a seat at the table. Given that he was the leader of the country where these highly contested troops were deployed, the development seemed fair. However, Castro did not consult with the Angolans to signal that he was serious about seeking an exit from the country before reaching out to the U.S. in the spring of 1987.

Following a series of seemingly unproductive discussions, the U.S. and Angola relaunched negotiations in July of 1987 in Angola.[216] American officials were shocked when Angola's leader, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, responded to these discussions with a commitment to constructive action and willingness to begin multilateral negotiations. During these meetings, Dos Santos reported that "Angola would soon propose the parties the framework for an overall settlement, to be signed by Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and SWAPO under the aegis of the (UNSC)."[217] This would begin a series of 25 meetings regarding the Angola/Namibia negotiations in which the United States was involved from 1987 through 1988.[218]

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[215] Ibid., 198.
[216] Ibid., 344-45.
[217] Ibid., 352.
[218] "Documents on Peace in Southwestern Africa and Transition for Namibian Independence," *International Legal Materials* 28, no. 4 (1989): 944-1017.

According to Crocker, shortly after the meeting Fidel Castro "proposed that Cuba should join the U.S.-MPLA talks in an unofficial message to American officials. Cuba was prepared to work the United States and the Angolans to get a solution (that would ultimately align with Cuban internationalist interests)."[219] Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos visited Cuba later that month. During his visit he expressed the MPLA's desire to modify the Lusaka Accords and begin negotiations that would incorporate its close ally.[220] Cuba joined the Angolan and Namibian negotiations as acknowledged participants in the following year. All parties agreed to the Crocker's linkage principle that tied the independence of Namibian to total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola shortly after.[221]

In August, Angola presented a proposal to withdraw all 20,000 Cuban troops in increments of 5,000 from southern Angola over two years, provided that South Africa "(1) meet all the conditions that had been stated int the Plataforma; (2) that the United States terminate its assistance program to U.N.I.T.A.; and (3) that the Cubans be permitted to participate directly in the talks."[222] This goal did not take long to materialize.

5.2.5: Phase V: *Double Games and Endgame (May 1988- December 1988)*

In the context of meetings between regional leaders mediated by American officials for months, in addition to South Africa's decision to meet with Cubans and Angolans, Crocker convened the three parties met in London on May 2, 1998 to begin trilateral peace talks between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa.[223] This would be the first of 13 publicly acknowledged four-way meetings between the three parties, with mediation by the U.S., before peace agreements were signed.[224]

Several peace settlements came from these meetings. Firstly, the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-Western Africa between Angola, Namibia, Cuba, and South Africa

[219] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa,* 355 and and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 14-15.
[220] Ibid., 353.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Vicente Tome, "Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988," 280.
[223] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 390-392 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[224] Ibid.

established principles for a comprehensive regional peace settlement per UNSCR 435 of 1978.[225] Also referred to as the New York Principles, the agreement signed on July 20, 1988, the principles would be a formula used to end the conflicts in Angola and Namibia and lead South Africa towards the end of apartheid.[226] In addition, the settlement included the formal recognition by all parties of the U.S.'s role of the third-party mediator.[227]

With the mediation of Crocker, the Protocol of Geneva was signed on July 5, 1988. The agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa called for a ceasefire of hostilities and established a time frame for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and Namibia, recognizing the U.N. observing the protocol's implementation. Additionally, it planned a target date for a tripartite agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa for later that year.[228]

On December 13, 1988 the Brazzaville Protocol was signed by delegations representing Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. Assisted by Crocker's mediation, the signatories expressed their commitment to the previous agreements, reaffirming that each condition is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.[229] Also, it announced the intention of all parties to meet nearly two weeks later to sign a tripartite agreement and a second bilateral agreement between Cuba and Angola, as committing to the phased withdrawal of troops from Angola. In response to the Brazzaville Protocol, and consequently the later accords, Crocker exclaims:

> As this protracted negotiation nears a successful conclusion, it is worth noting the ingredients that have made success possible. First, our role has been welcomed by our partners in Africa and by our friends and allies around the world. My country does not have blueprints for the solution of every problem or a mandate to play such a role. But we are prepared to involve ourselves in the search for constructive solutions when such a role is welcomed and appropriate. Second, we have been realists. We have recognized that lasting solutions can only be based on concrete historical realities of a given situation. Just as man cannot eat slogans, neither can statesman solve problems with rhetorical clichés and abstract formulas. Third, we have tried to chart a clear course and stick with it. This is an approach may sometimes fall short of shifting fashions and popular hopes for instant

[225] United Nations, *Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa,* (July 20, 1988) and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[226] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[227] United Nations, *Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa* and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[228] United Nations Security Council, *Protocol of Geneva,* S/20566 (April 4 1989) and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[229] United Nations General Assembly, *Protocol of Brazzaville*, A/43/964, (December 13, 1998) and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.

> results. But over time, this is the approach that gives confidence and predictability to key decision-makers. It is an approach that works.[230]

Moreover, on December 22, 1988, representatives from Angola, Cuba, and the United States signed the Tripartite Accords granting independence for Namibia conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.[231] Ten years after the UNSCR 435 of 1978, the South African government began to surrender control of Namibia. Additionally, Angola and Namibia signed their own accord outlining a timetable for Cuban withdrawal over 27 months starting in April 1989, accepting "that conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory and the successful completion of their internationalist mission."[232] As reported by the *New York Times*:

> The accords (…) mark successful conclusion a long and difficult mediation effort by the United States, with Soviet support, and hold out the promise of an end to decades of conflict in southwestern Africa.
> The accords also mark the end of a decade-long effort by the United Nations to persuade South Africa to give up control over Namibia (…). But South Africa yielded only in return for a firm commitment from Cuba to withdraw all its forces from Angola by July 1, 1991.[233]

The Cubans completed their withdrawal from Namibia on May 24, 1991, five weeks ahead of schedule established in the settlement.[234] The accord fulfilled Crocker's primary goal of getting Pretoria to agree to the 1978 UN Resolution 435, consequently removing South Africans from Namibia.

To reiterate, this chapter provides holistic information on the Southern African case study on several fronts. It broke down the case study into two sections. It begins with Chester A. Crocker's personal background and transitions into an account of his opinion on the then-current situation with Southern Africa and into a discussion of the mediation principles he outlined as a

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[230] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 507 and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[231] United Nations General Assembly, *Agreement among the Peoples Republic of Angola, the Republic of South Africa,* A/43/989 (December 27 1988) and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[232] United Nations Security Council, *Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola for the Conclusions of the internationalist Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent*, S/20345, (December 22, 1998).
[233] Paul Lewis, "Angola and Namibia Accords Signed," *New York Times*, December 23, 1998, and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.
[234] Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* and Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa," 15-17.

result. The second section of this chapter dealt with the negotiation process. It is broken down into a framework of five distinct phases according to Vincente Tome. The chapter is significant in that it provides a background of evidence for the critical reexamination of the policy that occurs in the following chapter.

Chapter 6: Evaluating Success

6.1: Results

Chester Crocker, acting as the WCG main negotiator and later solely representing the United States, successfully mediated lengthy negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, leading to bilateral and trilateral agreements between the parties involved in the regional conflict. According to Crocker, "[the U.S. was] the broker between two sides (containing three governments); [where the U.S.] was not a party."[235] These efforts lead to Namibian's independence from South Africa and the repatriation of Cuban troops from Angola.

Constructive engagement was a success on several fronts, particularly in securing regional peace and its subsequent contribution to the end of apartheid. According to Crocker, recent history suggests several operational and strategic guidelines about the implementation of peace settlements. One of the fundamental elements that must be kept in mind is the relative definition of success. Specifically, the definition of success for a peace settlement must be controlled. That is, excessive expectations should be avoided. Further:

> In some circumstances, success can legitimately be defined as the avoidance of major setbacks or disasters. In others, success may mean a marginal improvement in stabilizing, containing, and checking the human price and territorial spread of a volatile struggle. Finally, success may entail constructing building blocks for a settlement or even obtaining full implementation, complete with resolving the underlying issues. The short answer to the question of what connotes success is . . . it depends. Nevertheless, the important point is that those who decide to intervene have an obligation to develop their own definition of success and to keep it firmly in mind so as to not become part of the problem and make things worse.[236]

6.1.1: Regional Peace

The effectiveness and success of constructive engagement is abundantly clear as the U.S. created the outline for a peace deal for Namibia and Angola that all parties in Southern Africa accepted. Beyond the remarkable feat of producing a signed peace agreement, the tremendous significance of this mediation was that constructive engagement as outlined by Crocker became a

[235] Ibid., 395.
[236] Chester A Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, “Making Peace Settlements Work.” *Foreign Policy*. no. 104 (1996): 54.

resolving formula for conflict in the region. If the American role is understood as a formula for international conflict mediation applied by a third party, constrained by the common principles of constructive engagement, it was overwhelmingly successful.

As mentioned, constructive engagement was propelled from an idea into a regional mediation strategy aimed at creating a Southern African political climate free from foreign occupation and influence. The strategies used to achieve this goal were rooted in historical context and operated within the realities of Southern African regional politics.[237] Constructive engagement main goal was the simultaneous freedom for Namibia and Angola from influence and foreign military presence. This is why Crocker found that "the proper course was to recognize publicly the legitimacy of UNITA's struggle and maintain pressure for Cuban withdrawal, while also pursuing an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia, making adjustments to the U.N. plan if necessary,"[238] would be the resolving formula for conflict in the region.

For years the South African government defended the policy of apartheid as the region's last defense against the spread of communism. The fact of the matter remains that the governing National Party perceived that the regional security environment, particularly regarding the Cuban involvement with its close neighbors, put Pretoria at significant risk and consequently affected the Union's regional belligerence. Constructive engagement's linkage of the Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence successfully calmed the present regional security environment.[239]

Particularly, the impact of the New York Principles, Geneva Protocol, Brazzaville Protocol, the Bilateral Agreement, and most significantly the Tripartite Agreement all of 1988 cannot be overlooked regarding the transformative decade that immediately followed. These negotiated peace agreements provided a set of essential indispensable principles to establish the basis for peace in Southern Africa, outlined a path towards the end of hostilities in the region, terminated Cuba's internationalist mission in Angola, and culminated in the universal acceptance of UNSCR 435/ 78, finally set Namibia on a path towards independence.

In addition, Crocker believed that with the Angolan and Namibian conflicts managed, South Africa would be more likely to end apartheid.[240] He reaffirms this in his historical account of his time as Assistant Secretary of African Affairs. In his autobiography he states:

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[237] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*.
[238] Ibid., 64.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Alexis Leslie, "American-Lead Peacebuilding in Southern Africa."

> –There would be ample time to turn attention to completing the struggle against apartheid. It would be more likely to succeed when the rest of Africa was free and the South African government could not use neighboring lands–like Namibia–as a launching pad for strikes against African neighbors.[241]

Moreover, constructive engagement's end goal of multidimensional, consent-based peacebuilding in Southern Africa culminated in the implementation of these comprehensive negotiated peace agreements. the New York Principles, Geneva Protocol, Brazzaville Protocol, the Bilateral Agreement, and the Tripartite Agreement ended the conflict in Angola and Namibia, produced durable regional peace, and ignited institutional transformation within South Africa. While South Africa relinquished control over Namibia in 1990 and the Angolan civil war continued until peace agreements in 2002, the Cuban internationalist mission in Angola ceased to exist and a path to the negotiated end of apartheid came because of the 1988 negotiations. The accords made possible through Crocker's settlement formula were a significant turning point for the region. With concern lifted away South African aggression abroad, the path towards the democratization could begin to be facilitated within the country.

6.1.2: Contribution to the end of Apartheid

While several significant domestic and international influences led to South Africa's democratic transition, the contribution that the agreements of 1988 had on the end of apartheid should not be overlooked. There are several ways that the agreements of late 1980 have affected South Africa's democratic transition; however, this section will focus on events that led to the termination of the MK's armed struggle and the significance of Namibian independence.

The agreements of the late 1980's addressed the inviolability of borders, self-determination, independence, equality, peace, development, and social progress. They also included specific provisions that would prohibit foreign troops from operating within each signatory's borders. For example, the New York Principles signed on July 20, 1988, includes the principle that all parties must accept "the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states."[242] This commitment is reaffirmed

[241] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 75.
[242] United Nations, *Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa (New York Principles),* (20 July, 1988).

in the Brazzaville Protocol.[243] In addition, the third provision of the Tripartite Agreement signed by the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa relates directly to Namibian independence, while the fifth and sixth provisions apply to all signatories.[244]

The fifth provision of the Tripartite Agreement describes the responsibility of all parties to defend against outside interference in their territories in the same manner that will apply to Namibia, stating, "the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression or violence, against the territorial integrity of any state in southwestern Africa." The sixth provision follows, "all Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa."[245]

This provision that each signatory will bear the responsibility of prohibiting their territory from being used as a base for foreign troops is incredibly significant in the decision by the ANC. and MK. to suspend the armed struggle, as the regional situation greatly affected the MK's operations and infiltration capacity. Angola had become the site for virtually all the MK's general training, with several different camps spread across the country. During this time the ANC begins to rethink its foreign bases. By 1986 the ANC's National Executive Committee passes a resolution to repatriate MK soldiers. Operation Vula outlines a plan to return exiled ANC leaders to South Africa and begins the process of winding down the organization's operations outside of the country.[246]

Moreover, the settlement formula for Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal inadvertently produced devastating effects militarily for the organization. Under the condition of removing foreign troops from Angola, i.e., Cuba, the MK could no longer operate from its underground bases. In addition, Angola could no longer offer any military support to the organization. Therefore, progress on negotiations for Namibian independence would require the MK to operate from bases even further from the South African border in Uganda and Tanzania. Realizing this critical weakness, ANC leaders began considering a negotiated settlement that

[243] United Nations General Assembly, *Protocol of Brazzaville*, A/43/964, (13 December, 1998).
[244] United Nations General Assembly, *Agreement among the Peoples Republic of Angola, the Republic of Angola, and the Republic of South Africa (Tripartite Agreement),* A/43/989 (27 December 1988).
[245] Ibid.
[246] Truth Commission Special Report, "African National Congress-The Late 1980s: Operation Vula and Negotiations," accessed March 17, 2021.

would end the underground element of armed struggle, and in January of 1989, Oliver Tambo announced the MK's departure from Angola and willingness to help facilitate the 1989 Accords.[247]

Operation Vula was a top-secret operation which was initiated in 1986. Its main task was to establish and strengthen the senior and middle-level leadership of the ANC and MK within South Africa. Conceptualized by late ANC president Oliver Tambo, its aim was to create a national underground political and military leadership structure inside South Africa. At the time when Operation Vula was initiated, negotiations over Namibia's independence were nearing completion. The agreements reached would present MK with more serious problems in terms of planning and relocating M.K. even further from South Africa, thus making the execution of the armed struggle more difficult. As part of negotiation terms for Namibian independence, MK was forced to relocate and withdraw from Angola, where much of its training was being conducted.[248] Thus, the decision to build up the MK's presence in South Africa directly responded to Namibia's negotiated settlement.

After half a year of struggles, while moving MK troops from Angola and transiting through several countries to each South Africa, the Harare Declaration adopted on August 21, 1989 helped the ANC imitate conditions for the negotiations to end apartheid. At the summit, the Organization of African Unity accepted the ANC's peace proposal that the MK would consider terminating the armed struggle in favor of a mutually bunding ceasefire if the South African government established favorable conditions for negotiations. The ANC demanded that Pretoria ended the state of emergency, released political prisoners, lifted the ban on political organizations, and withdrew the military presence in townships as preconditions for negotiations. However, the ANC made it clear that the armed struggle would not be abandoned until an agreement on a new constitution for a united, democratic, and non-racial South Africa was reached.[249]

Besides contributing to the dissolution of the MK's foreign presence, the peace agreements set out a successful path for Namibia's total political independence from South Africa. The significance impact that this event had on the region, particularly South Africa's democratic

[247] Thula Simpson, "Toyi-Toyi-Ing to Freedom: The Endgame in the A.N.C.'s Armed Struggle, 1989-1990," *Journal of southern African studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 507–521.

[248] Tsepe Motumi, "Umkhonto We Sizwe -Structure, Training and Force Levels (1984 to 1994)," (African Defense Review, 1994), O'Malley Archives.

[249] Thula Simpson, "Toyi-Toyi-Ing to Freedom: The Endgame in the A.N.C.'s Armed Struggle, 1989-1990."

transition cannot be overlooked. In remarks by Secretary Shultz after December 22, 1988, "The regional settlement concluded here today represents a momentous turning point in the history of Southern Africa. With the independence of Namibia, Africa's last colonial question will have been resolved. As the guns gall silent across the borders of south-western Africa, the world will look to the national of that vast region to turn to resolution of their pressing internal problems through peaceful means.-"[250] Schultz was not unique in his predictions.

Chester Crocker believed that if white South Africa could see a successful transition of power in Namibia, which would be predicated by the withdrawal of foreign troops from the conflict, they could be less anxious about the perceived effects of abandoning white rule in their own country. Pik Botha had similar remarks when looking back on 1988:

> [if] you could get the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, you would remove 50 000+ heavily armed troops with their equipment, (...) I could then at that stage foresee a totally new development in South Africa. Because if you could remove that tension created by that fear, I said to myself it would be easier to persuade the whites of this country to accept greater changes.[251]

Similarly,

> So with that (...) suddenly we've become a lot more optimistic that a solution can be found here. (...) (I am) Very optimistic that the government is going to talk to the ANC in the next year. They are going to sit down and they're going to start talking. They're going to unban the ANC in South Africa in the next year. (...) There are clear signs that the spadework has been done, very similar spadework to South West Africa. (...) And these Nationalists have learned a tremendous amount from Namibia. We owe Chester Crocker (...) an enormous amount and if only because he knows how to handle the Afrikaner. If only some voices overseas could see how they played carefully with the Afrikaner and they got him to a settlement without him losing face, with him being able to come up and boast, which is his character.[252]

In line with Botha's recollection of his expectations, F.W. de Klerk unbanned the ANC and other prohibited political parties during the opening of Parliament on February 2, 1990.[253] Nelson Mandela was released from prison on February 11, and a series of yearlong negations between the

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[250] "Documents on Peace in Southwestern Africa and Transition for Namibian Independence," *International Legal Materials* 28, no. 4 (1989): 944-1017, accessed March 16, 2021.

[251] Pik Botha, interview by Padraig O'Malley, O'Malley Archives, August 24, 1992.
[252] Ibid.
[253] F. W. de Klerk, "F. W. de Klerk's Speech at the Opening of Parliament," O'Malley Archives, February 2, 1990.

NP, ANC, and a wide variety of political parties began shortly after, culminating in the end of the apartheid system on April 27, 1994.[254]

This is not to say that other domestic factors primarily but not limited to decades of South African resistance, had little impact on the end of apartheid. However, it would be unwise to discount how a multitude of international, regional, and domestic factors contributed to the democratization of South Africa. As described, the effects of the 1988 peace agreements had a profound effect on the region in more ways than one, proving the effectiveness of the American mediation strategy.

6.2: Reevaluating Constructive Engagement

This section seeks to apply the primary characteristics of constructive engagement as interpreted outside of the Southern African context to Crocker's desired outline, and finally to the actual negotiation process. A critical reevaluation of U.S. constructive engagement with Southern Africa within the guidelines established in the literature review will clarify several points. Mainly, American constructive engagement with Southern Africa is like Qatar, Turkey, and the European Union's methods for resolving conflict in the Middle East. This section will attempt to support this claim by comparing the two sets of principles, then provide evidence of how Crocker applied each to the Southern African regional conflict.

To reiterate Crocker's principles, the strategy of constructive engagement was founded on four basic guidelines that include: *open lines of communication with political leaders*, *public encouragement and support for positive political achievements*, *pressure for change through both public and diplomatic channels*, and the *avoidance of punishment in the form of sanctions or military intervention*.[255] When mentioning these principles, '(C.C.)' will be used to distinguish Crocker's ideas. Chapter three's guidelines establish three similar principles. These principles characterize constructive engagement beyond this dissertations Southern African case study as a: *non-confrontational approach to human rights abuses*, *prioritization of diplomatic negotiations and open dialogue*, and *encouragement for political change*. When mentioning these three

[254] "1994," The O'Malley Archives, accessed June 6, 2021.

[255] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 144.

principles going forward, '(A.L.)' will be used to distinguish between Crocker's ideas and the guidelines established in the literature review.

Firstly, one can assume that that *open lines of communication with political leaders* (C.C.) equate to *the prioritization of diplomatic negotiations and open dialogue* (A.L.). This can be condensed into one principle: open, impartial communication. This is the ultimate basis for Crocker's mediation strategy. He asserts that:

> 'sustained and nimble diplomacy' would work to resolve regional conflicts and reduce violence. We could do this in several ways: by standing up for the very concept of negotiated evolutionary change; by actively strengthening our relationships with leaders throughout the region without regard to race or ideology; by competing regionally for influence with the Soviets and Cubans and contesting the principle of external, Communist military intervention; and by working for a secure and prosperous region.[256]

Open communication was not reserved for parties who were protagonists in the conflict, as interactions with South African antagonists are necessary. In the same way that George Shultz met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo to discuss repression by the South African government and the end of apartheid or representatives from Angola, Crocker routinely met with South African leaders.[257] With constructive engagement, Crocker maintained that the U.S. was in a unique position where he could work with all players involved in Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, in-discriminant of their ideology or other moral positions:

> we cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side or another in these disputes. Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties (...) and to pursue our growing interests throughout the region. Only if we engage constructively in Southern Africa as a whole can we play our proper role in the search of negotiated solutions, peaceful change, and expanding economic progress.[258]

Similarly:

> This Administration has no intention of permitting our hand to be forced to choose between South Africa and its neighbors. That course will only ensure our ultimate isolation or irrelevance in the issues at hand. Our task, together with out key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties–something we in the West are uniquely able to do.[259]

[256] Ibid., 76.
[257] David K. Shipler, "Shultz Meets with Leader of Rebels in South Africa," *The New York Times*, January 29, 1987.
[258] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 79.
[259] "Chester Crocker on American Policies in Southern Africa," *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, 1981, 2.

Moreover, the *avoidance of punishment in the form of sanctions or military intervention* (C.C.) and *non-confrontation* (A.L.) in favor of such communication refer to the same concept of avoiding hard power. However, this position should not be interpreted as passivity. For Crocker, the passive policy would avoid dealing with South Africa altogether, "I think it's pretty obvious that we decided that it was not in our interest to have a passive policy, to seek to walk away from Southern Africa. Nor was it going to be very fruitful to simply seek to continue a process on Namibia specifically, which has already, in our view, ran out of gas," he says.[260]

Furthermore, During America's decades of repeated condemnation of apartheid, Crocker and several other administrations before Reagan's did everything to avoid sanctioning South Africa and deploying troops to the Southern tip of the African continent. However, it is clear that South Africa understood that the U.S.'s position could change. According to R. F. Botha:

> of course, the Americans have their interests at heart, but the Reagan Administration's understanding of those interests is presently easier for us to live with than the previous administrations. They have also made an effort to be more restrained in their public statements on South Africa and seem willing to remove minor irritants and improve relations. In short, our experience is that the Americans are not at present trying to make trouble for us. We realize, of course, that if there is no progress on South West Africa, this may change.[261]

This quote also ties directly into the second principle, *pressure for change through both public and diplomatic channels* (C.C.) and the *encouragement for political change* (A.L.). These are similar enough to be combined into one principle: the goal of political change. The most explicit realization of this concept is Crocker's role in mediating the negotiations for the independence of Namibia. The liberation of South Africa's de facto colony had been a topic of international concern for decades. The U.S. was at the front of the Namibian negotiation process due to the territory's unique historical and legal situation, where South Africa was acting outside its jurisdiction as the de facto administrator. Only was this long conflict successfully resolved through Crocker's linkage formula and organization of international supervised election.[262]

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[260] Wireless File Interview with Assistant Secretary Crocker, National Archives and Records Administration, February 26, 1982, 2.
[261] "Letter from South African Foreign Minister R. F. Botha on Relations with the Reagan Administration," August 18, 1981, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/33/3, vol. 77, U.S.A.
[262] Henning Melber and Christopher Saunders, "Conflict Mediation in Decolonisation: Namibia's Transition to Independence," 73.

On the other hand, constructive engagement also sought to bring about the regional climate conducive to South Africa's transition to democracy. Once one element of Crocker's settlement formula came into being, political progress would snowball throughout the region. The idea here was that if Angola were void of foreign influence, South Africa's justification for its encroachment into Namibia would become invalid. This would lead to Namibia's independence. If Namibian independence went off well, it would quell the fears of the governing NP and provide South Africa reasonable expectations for an equally successful democratic transition for its own country. Similarly, Crocker hoped that engaging with Pretoria would become a positive influence that would encourage a process of evolutionary political change.[263]

The glaring difference between the principles of constructive engagement that Crocker presented clearly in his *Strategy for Change* article and guidelines established through a review of the literature surrounding instances of the strategy outside of Southern Africa in Chapter three is Crocker's insistence on *encouragement and support for positive political progress* (C.C.).[264] However, this does not mean that Crocker's fourth principle strays from the novel guideline. In fact, Crocker's principles fall completely in line with those presented, and should be seen as an extension as such. Nevertheless, Crocker asserts that mediators must celebrate and encourage any positive advancements while avoiding being condescending when piecemeal change occurs, regardless of the significance of the development in the grand scheme.[265] Similarly, each side must be treated by the mediator with empathy and sympathy, as both have legitimate concerns:

> [constructive engagement means] that you are not interested primarily in the way you look or the way you feel but in the results that you have on the situation on the ground. South Africa is an important country and where we have many important interests. (...) We're seeking to actually have an effect on events and decisions. To do so in a way that works in the diplomatic arena means that one has to operate with some degree and sensitivity in relation to the government of a sovereign country.[266]

In addition, Crocker stresses the need for 'flexibility during the peace process:

> mediators must be flexible. (...) Whatever the validity of general propositions on conflict advanced in the academic and policy literature, the actual dynamics of conflict differ markedly from situation to situation as a result of historical developments and diverse personalities, social relations, cultural perspectives, and material conditions. Since few of

[263] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa.*
[264] Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change."
[265] Ibid.
[266] Wireless File Interview with Assistant Secretary Crocker, National Archives and Records Administration, February 26, 1982.

these factors are immutable, and because conflict is an open system, its thrust and contours change over time.[267]

Moreover, in *High Noon*- Crocker asserts that each intra-state and regional conflict "has its own structure and should be approached with appreciation of its uniqueness."[268] Pragmatic responses to circumstances that plague protagonists along with the evolution of the conflict are necessary, as mediators cannot expect success when they cut and paste mechanic and formulaic methods for conflict resolution across vastly different regional political contexts without significant adaptation. Sufficient conflict resolution requires mediators to formulate solutions on an empirical, case by case basis.[269] Crocker did not enter the state department with a full-blown policy as such. "A policy cannot just be imposed on a complete basis or an ideological basis," he wrote.[270] Instead, decisions must be made when the problem arises.

Thus, Crocker was correct in ignoring outside pressures that condemned the Reagan administration's relationship with Pretoria, along with the natural evolution of constructive engagement from an abstract idea to a foreign policy that strayed from its original characterization in the "*Strategy for Change"* article. In the article, Crocker cautioned against applying punitive measures such as economic sanctions against the Republic unless necessary, given the propensity to negatively impact the countries black majority. Sanctions, to Crocker, would harm the very people they were meant to help and drive the country into a further state of conflict.[271]

Similarly, Reagan did not oppose sanctions on principle. The administration supported their implementation as a last resort. However, by the mid-1980s, U.S. Congress and the American public grew tired of this principle, and limited sanctions were applied to South Africa. This development should be seen as a pragmatic response to the evolution of the conflict, not as a failure of constructive engagement.

Constructive engagement was a realistic mediation strategy that would assure the U.S. credibility as a regional partner while mitigating South Africa's domestic and regional

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[267] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 204.
[268] Ibid.

[269] Laurie Nathan, "A Case of Undue Pressure- International Mediation in African Civil Wars," November 1998, 1-15.

[270] Neil A. Lewis, "Washington Talk: Working Profile; Chester Crocker: Inside, Making Policy On Africa," *The New York Times*, June 9, 1987.
[271] Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change."

belligerence.[272] Similarly, the key was to define the relationship and sequence between U.S. goals and to understand the means available to achieve them.[273] Due to South Africa's position within the conflict and the region, South African consensus is the key to a Namibian settlement. As a result, America had to formulate a settlement proposal that addressed South Africa's regional concerns that would be accepted by other African states and take into proper account the U.N. role in the Namibian issue.

[272] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*.
[273] Ibid.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This research critically reexamines the U.S.- South African relationship during the 1980's Academics often inaccurately recall this period with suspicion. Significant shortcomings exist in the literature surrounding U.S. foreign policy in Southern Africa during the Cold War Era. Authors fail to capture the full picture of American intervention in favor of Cold War driven explanations. Through a holistic reexamination of the American mediation method, a clear picture of the significant impact that constructive engagement had on the Southern African region–from ending South Africa's occupation of Namibia, the Angolan Civil War, along with its unmistakable influence on South Africa's democratic transition emerges**.**

The research calls into question the U.S.' role as a third-party mediator that facilitated several successful peacebuilding agreements in the region. In addition, this dissertation establishes a link between the New York Accord and Pretoria's transition away from the characteristic domestic and international belligerence of the apartheid state and towards multi-racial democracy.

This research aimed to critically reexamine constructive engagement as a third-party formulative mediation strategy and investigate if the strategy, despite its criticisms, contributed to a regional climate conducive to peace in Southern Africa. To fulfill this aim, constructive engagement was looked at within the context of a mediation strategy aimed at the creation of peace in the region by establishing a framework of basic mediation principles that characterized the policy, lending credibility to the sentiment that the strategy was an 'overwhelming success in Southern Africa. Based on the conclusions of this research, this objective was met.

This dissertation attempts to answer several questions. The research question asked**:** *Did constructive engagement foster a regional climate for peace in Southern Africa, defined by the resolution of the Angolan War, the independence of Namibia, and a path towards South African democratization*? There are three sub-questions:

I. *What were constructive engagements techniques and guiding principles?*
II. *Why did the Reagan administration pursue such a strategy?*
III. *Was constructive engagement a successful international conflict mediation strategy?*

The main research question, *Did constructive engagement foster a regional climate for peace in Southern Africa, defined by the resolution of the Angolan War, the independence of*

Namibia, and a path towards South African democratization?, is addressed throughout the dissertation. Constructive engagement's creation of a climate for peace in the region is made evident by the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola beginning in 1989, Namibia's independence in 1990, and South Africa's abandonment of apartheid in 1994. Likewise, Crocker, through constructive engagement, helped mediate the lasting peace agreements of 1988.

The first sub-question*, What are constructive engagements techniques and guiding principles?,* is addressed in Chapters Two and Five. From the research on the use of constructive engagement by Qatar, Turkey, and the EU, three principles emerge. The parameters of a non-confrontational approach, a focus on dialogue and negotiations, and the encouragement of political reform or change guided third-party characterized this exercise of mediation by these three states in several Middle Eastern conflicts. In addition, Chapter Five breaks down Crocker's principles and thought process. In Chapter Six the principles are compared, and common principles emerge: open, impartial communication, avoidance of hard power, goal of political change, and encouragement for positive progress.

Due to previous research and understanding of the topic, this analysis was expected. However, it was not anticipated that the guidelines established in Chapter Two would be nearly identical to Crocker's principles outlined in Chapter Five. As described in Chapter Two, Qatar, Turkey, and the EU's research took place in the early stages wholly and before independently from research surrounding Crocker and his principles. While expected to be similar, it was surprising to find so many matches to the characterization of the strategy in several different contexts despite the unfavorable opinion of U.S. constructive engagement in Southern Africa throughout academic literature.

Not only did this research allow for the emergence of guidelines for constructive engagement outside of Crocker's original conception, but it has also proven that the decision to use constructive engagement's guiding principles, whether intentionally, similarly defined, or referred to in whole or in part, as an international dispute resolution method was not unique to the U.S.'s relationship with Southern Africa during the 1980s.

Despite an abundance of academic literature stating the contrary, constructive engagement was not an isolated policy blip in the Reagan administration's dealings with Southern Africa. Previous U.S. administrations had similar motivations, goals, and procedures for dealing with apartheid South Africa's domestic and international belligerence regarding Angola and Namibia.

Despite its emergence out of this specific context, several other states have chosen to employ dispute resolution techniques like constructive engagement in their foreign policies, lending credibility to Crocker's principles and mediation strategy for dealing with troubled states. Chapters Two, Five and Six address why the Reagan administration perused such a policy.

Finally, it can be concluded that *constructive engagement was a successful international conflict mediation strategy*. This point is made clear in Chapter Four and Five, where Chapter Four establishes how previous administrations were unsuccessful in mitigating South Africa's belligerence. Only a strategy responsive to the U.S.' global and regional interest in Southern Africa that also took into account the aspirations of the peoples of Africa would succeed in creating a regional climate, i.e., the termination of the interconnected conflicts in Angola and Namibia would be able to entice South Africa way from its domestic policy of apartheid.

This work makes a significant contribution to academic literature, filling in gaps as it deviates from established opinion and accounts constructive engagement as a successful region-wide conflict mediation strategy. it reexamines the U.S.- South African relationship during a period [1981-‘89] that academics often look back on with suspicion. This dissertation reiterates the significant impact that constructive engagement had on the end of apartheid in South Africa that resulted from positive effects that the mediation strategy had on Angola and Namibia.

Based on these conclusions, academics and other students should reconsider the narrative surrounding constructive engagement throughout the literature and attempt to put forth pieces of work that more thoroughly communicate a holistic view of the policy. While the choice to support or condemn a policy is an individual's choice to make, opinions and claims based on assumptions should be avoided. The tone academic literature surrounding constructive engagement in Southern Africa is hardly objective. Due to a general, and valid, disdain for the Reagan administration, opinion sways to the negative while background research does not paint a complete picture of the correct context, characterization, or policy objectives. Once one has a comprehensive understanding of constructive engagement, it becomes clear that its principles were adhered to and goals realized. The policy was an overwhelming success based on these parameters. Current academic literature fails to reflect this point.

Finally, it must be noted that there was a significant challenge that presented itself throughout writing this dissertation. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic taking place at the time of writing, access to print materials and physical archive materials has been severely limited. While

this topic is still entirely accommodating to the restraints of virtual research, challenges have still presented themselves. For example, much primary source material by the U.S. government from the period in question has not yet been published online. That being said, despite the researcher's belief that the review of literature that this dissertation is based upon is entirely comprehensive despite this fact, this topic deserves to be researched further, and this dissertation should serve as a steppingstone towards the ultimate goal of a comprehensive reexamination of U.S. mediation in Southern Africa.

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