



University of Cape Town

The capacity and efficacy of security agencies in combating terrorism in the democratic South Africa

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South African Parliament gutted by fire on 02 January 2022.

Suspect charged with ‘terrorism’.



Source: Daily Nation (2022)

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I limped, crawled and surprisingly reached the finish line!

To the Almighty, Wisdom Conquers!

Firstly, would like to thank my champion coach, Prof Irvin Kinnes, who traversed with me in this research journey. It was difficult, but he was a torch bearer of hope, and his guidance will never be forgotten. Thank you!

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Abstract

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that requires a complex response that involves state capacity and partnership between countries. It poses a threat to global stability because it undermines democratic architecture. Worldwide, terrorism has inflicted significant loss of life, destabilised governments, and created humanitarian crises. In Africa, it presents another dilemma. Countries around the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia, in West Africa, and the Sahel states such as Mali are bedeviled by the existence of groups such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and Boko Haram. South Africa is also facing terrorism challenges. It has been used as a helipad for terrorism financing and a transit point because of its complex financial institutions and its perceived incapacity to deal with this phenomenon.

The aim and objectives of this research were to determine the capacity and efficacy of security agencies in combating terrorism in democratic South Africa. The research further analysed the manifestation of domestic and international terrorism as perceived in South Africa. Furthermore, a comparative overview of counter-terrorism measures from developed and developing countries was evaluated as a flagship for the South African context.

Qualitative research was used in the collection of data. The population was derived from a sample of terrorism and security experts who know the subject matter. Various research tools were developed for collecting data, and these included interviews, questionnaires, recording devices, and document analysis. An interactive qualitative analysis of data was used. The research confirmed that the security agencies are not well-capacitated to combat terrorism in South Africa. However, the research recommended that an integrated, holistic approach is necessary to combat terrorism through collaboration among the various departments of the security agencies.

Acronyms and specification

AML	Anti-Money Laundering
ANC	African National Congress
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASS	Alliance of Sahel States
ASWJ	Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah
AU	African Union
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstand Beweeging
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BMA	Border Management Authority
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CATS	Crime Against the State
CoE	Council of Europe
CTLEF	Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DPCI	Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigations
DSO	Directorate of Special Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FIC	Financial Intelligence Centre
FICA	Financial Intelligence Centre Act
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ID	Independent Directorate
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INTERPOL	International Police
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
JCPS	Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster
JNIM	Jihadist Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali

MK	uMkhonto weSizwe
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NHW	Neighbourhood Watch
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NICOC	National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee
NOCOC	National Operational Co-ordinating Committee
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NPO	Non-Profit Organisations
OAS	Organisation of American States
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
PCLU	Priority Crimes Litigation Unit
PMC	Russian Private Military Company (Wagner Group)
POCDATARA	Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities
POCOC	Provincial Operational Co-ordinating Committee
SA	South Africa
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAMIM	Southern Africa Development Community Mission in Mozambique
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARB	South African Reserve Bank
SSA	State Security Agency
TFRA	Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment
TFNRA	Terrorist Financing National Risk Assessment
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

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CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION

1.1. INTRODUCTION

“Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves, but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you”.

Paul Wilkinson, British Scholar

The quotation above clearly explains that in combating terrorism, successes go unnoticed while failures are heavily remembered. Terrorism in South Africa (SA) has become a growing concern due to socioeconomic disparities, porous borders, links to extremist networks, and vulnerabilities in state capacity. Some of the challenges faced by the security agencies in combating terrorism are a shortage of resources, poor coordination, and insufficient funding, which further weaken the capacity to respond to emerging threats. Terrorism has changed the world ever since the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America (USA). Countries under threat of terrorism have since deployed enormous resources to counter the challenges posed by this phenomenon. Terrorism has always been understood in different ways by different social actors, and it is a manifestation of policy failures.

In this dissertation, I take up this issue of SA security architecture efficacy in combating terrorism, determine how domestic and international terrorism is perceived, and analyse some counter terrorism measures from a developed and developing country. Scholars such as Boshoff *et al* (2001) have outlined the various manifestations of domestic terrorism in South Africa. In the same vein, Azhar Cachalia¹ and Hussein Solomon (2012) have criticised the efficacy and application of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA) 33 of 2004 and advanced their proposed counter-terrorism

¹Cachalia, A. 2010. *Counter-Terrorism and International Cooperation Against Terrorism — An Elusive Goal: a South African Perspective*, *South African Journal on Human Rights*, 26 (3): 510-535.

measures.² South Africa's fight against terror cannot be viewed in isolation from the global war on terror (GWOT) that is initiated by other countries.

Even though there are no significant terrorist attacks in SA, the USA has intermittently, through its Diplomatic Mission to SA, issued terror warnings, especially after threats by the Islamic State (IS) in its intentions to attack Western interests elsewhere, including SA (Kempen 2016:15). The arrest and conviction of the Thulsie twins³ for planning terror attacks against Jewish and American institutions heightened the influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)⁴ in SA (McCain 2022). The bombing of the mosque⁵ in Verulam, Durban, and the July 21 unrest⁶ has left many people questioning the capacity of SA's security agencies' ability to protect the Republic and its citizens. The threats posed by Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other terrorist groups such as Hezbollah were also flagged by an intelligence report commissioned by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) in 1998, outlining their clandestine activities and using SA as a springboard for establishing terror networks (Githing'u 2021).

To explain my theoretical framework, I will draw from the following two theories in exploring the motivation and the rationale behind terrorism. The rational choice and governance theories will form the basis for explaining the propensity for criminal behaviour and terrorism.

²Solomon, H. 2012. *Eight steps to improve counter-terrorism measures in South Africa*. *African Security Review*, 21 (1): 31-41.

³McCain, N. 2022. *Thulsie twins released on parole after serving time for terrorism*. News24. 19 August. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/thulsie-twins-released-on-parole-after-serving-time-for-terrorism-20220819> [Accessed on: 24 August 2023]. *The brothers were charged and convicted of planning attacks on US and Jewish targets in South Africa.*

⁴ *In this research ISIL and ISIS is used interchangeable.*

⁵Fabricius, P. 2018. *Is Islamic terrorism starting to emerge in South Africa?* Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamist-terrorism-starting-to-emerge-in-south-africa> [Accessed on: 06 March 2024].

⁶Davis, R. 2024. *How the reports into the July 2021 unrest let down South Africa*. Available at: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2024-01-30-how-the-reports-into-the-july-2021-unrest-let-south-africa-down/> [Accessed on: 06 April 2024].

1.2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

South Africa has witnessed a fair share of terror attacks since the dawn of democracy in 1994 and beyond. Terrorism in SA evolved during apartheid as state-sponsored violence and transcended into the new dispensation in another form. The African National Congress's (ANC) uMkhonto weSizwe (MK)⁷ were labelled as terrorists when they attacked key institutions of the apartheid government, such as the 1980 Sasol blast.⁸ After 1994, terror attacks were also perpetrated by right-wing white supremacists such as the Boeremag, who were opposed to the transition to democracy. The People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) also operated in Cape Town and were infiltrated by radical Islamists who used terror tactics to attack government institutions such as police stations, magistrates, and their opposition to drug peddlers in the Cape Town metropole.

The South African government, through its security agencies, mounted a coordinated response to deal with this domestic terror.⁹ The security cluster consists of, among others, the South African Police Service (SAPS), South African National Defence Force (SANDF), National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), State Security Agency (SSA), Department of Home Affairs, the Justice Department, Correctional Services, and International Relations. These departments mobilised resources to respond to terrorism in a coordinated manner because urban terrorism became a threat to democracy. The study will seek to answer some of these perceived inconsistencies in the South African security agencies' capacity and responsiveness against terrorism. It has been reported that South Africa has engaged in a cautious response against terrorism, probably as a way of avoiding alarm (Fabricius 2018:3-4).

⁷*Umkhonto weSizwe was the military wing of the African National Congress during the liberation struggle.*

⁸Murphy, C. 1980. *Guerillas hit Oil plants in South Africa*. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/03/querrillas-hit-oil-plants-in-south-africa/e739ff63-e087-4a70-8dc1-192fc1a3da4e/> [Accessed on: 08 October 2023].

⁹*These are dedicated departments and institutions within government that are tasked with providing safety and security and protecting the sovereignty of the Republic and safeguard its territorial integrity.*

1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

South Africa is not an island; it is part of the global village. Events in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique,¹⁰ Somalia and the Sahel affect the domestic affairs of South Africa. Scholars such as Omenma, Nwaogaidu, and Okwueze (2020:165) have also alerted that SA is not immune to terrorism, considering that in 2017, 350 incidents of terror were carried out by suspected Islamic militants in neighbouring Mozambique. Between 15 July – 15 October 2021, the SANDF was deployed in Mozambique as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission dubbed Operation Vikela in Cabo Delgado against Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASWJ) (Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) 2021). This jihadist movement was designated as a terrorist group by the USA because of its ties with ISIL. The implications were that they became an internationally recognised terrorist network.

In 2014 nearly 100 South Africans reportedly joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria and were not monitored upon returning home (Hamilton 2018:14; Cachalia and Schoeman 2017:9). South Africa came into the spotlight in 2016 when it acknowledged publicly that Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) is operating and present in its soil (US Department of State 2022). Several South Africans became victims, and their business interests have been impacted by this group in Mozambique around the Palma region.¹¹ This led to deploying an international counter-insurgency mission, which included bilateral and multilateral missions. South Africa is in a proxy war against terrorism through its combat participation in the South African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).

This has become an albatross around SA's response against terrorism in the SADC region. In 2015, the South African government arrested the Thulsie twins for international terrorism. It became clear that ISIL networks and cells existed in the country, exacerbated by the situation in Mozambique (Jokinen 2020:6-7). South Africa is facing risks from individuals with terror links who might be taking advantage of the democratic dispensation and porous borders to engage in nefarious terrorist activities

¹⁰ *Mozambique is fighting terrorist insurgents associated with ISIS in the Cabo Delgado region who use systematic violence against civilians and infrastructure including killings, kidnappings and beheadings.*

¹¹ Fraioli, P. 2021. *The Islamic insurgency in Mozambique. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.* Vol 27, 22. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13567888.2021.1971435> [Accessed on: 06 April 2024].

(Potgieter 2014:33-35). Furthermore, in 2019, members of a supremacist group named the National Christian Resistance Movement, led by Harry Johannes Knoesen¹², were arrested on terrorism related offences in SA because they were planning attacks on shopping malls, government installations, and human settlements (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

On the 23rd of April 2023, the Sunday Times reported that SA might have been used as a conduit to transfer illicit finance that may have been used to fund terrorist activities in countries such as Somalia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Uganda. The article suggested that between January 2020 and March 2021, more than R6.3 billion in illicit finance may have flowed out of SA without detection from authorities. It has been reported that SA has become a training ground and financial hub.¹³ For terrorism financing. Illicit financial flows transactions initiated by suspected terrorists are one of the reasons SA was grey-listed in 2023. It is also reported that countries such as Kenya, Somalia, Mozambique, and Nigeria are synonymous with terrorism and has a large émigré community in SA which increases the risk of terrorism financing using unregulated and clandestine channels and, in most cases, these illicit financial transactions are anonymous and untraceable (Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) 2022:9).

The lack of action by law enforcement has prompted the country to be grey-listed in February 2023 by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international terrorism financing watchdog (Hyman, Hosken, and Makhetha 2023:1;4). The US-based intelligence and security think tank, Soufan Centre, noted that SA has “emerged as a financial hub for ISIS in Africa” (AFP, 2023). The existence of terrorist cells, porous borders, and the use of SA as a haven for terrorism funding has heightened the need for effective surveillance and monitoring. Due to globalisation, both domestic and international terrorism have a footprint in South Africa. Terrorist activities in other African countries, such as Mozambique, are close to home. Some terrorist cells in South Africa have been accused of funding terrorist activities elsewhere in Africa, such

¹²McCain, N 2022. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/right-wing-leader-harry-knoesen-jailed-for-life-for-plotting-terror-attacks-on-black-people-202> [Accessed on: 06 April 2024].

¹³IntelBrief: South Africa has emerged as a financial hub for ISIS in Africa. Available at: <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-march-21/> [Accessed on: 27/03/2024].

as in Mali, Kenya, and Mozambique. The fact that South Africans have joined extremist groups like ISIS is a testimony that terrorism in SA cannot be ignored.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The researcher asks the following research questions.

- What is the capacity and efficacy of the South African security agencies in combating acts of terrorism?
- How is domestic and international terrorism perceived in South Africa?
- To formulate recommendations based on the research results for the best practice model for the fight against terrorism.

1.4.1. Aims and Objectives

The research aims to determine the capacity and efficacy of the South African security architecture in combating terrorism. To achieve this, the research also analysed some terrorism manifestations in SA and evaluated terrorism strategies implemented by one developed and one developing country. The comparative evaluation from these countries could help SA to learn how other countries implement their terrorism strategies. The objectives of this research were:

- To ascertain the capacity and efficacy of the South African security agencies in combating acts of terrorism.
- To determine how domestic and international terrorism threats are perceived in South Africa.
- To make recommendations based on the research results, the best practice model in the fight against terrorism.

1.5. RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH

Terrorism is not a static subject; it evolves with time. Researching this phenomenon captures the very foundation that terrorism is here and will continue to be elusive because there are no perfect counter terrorism measures in the world. The rationale is also to engage with policies that create legal frameworks and conditions for security structures to respond effectively against terrorism. The findings will result in the

formulation of recommendations that may be of value in terms of scholarly knowledge and policy development. The research is justified considering that the business of terrorism affects all and sundry. This phenomenon has been researched widely; however, it is also important to investigate the phenomenon in the South African context and show whether our security architecture's application against terrorism is sufficient.

Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, and Smyth (2011:125) have indicated that the response to this threat by nations of the world has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars in wars and counter-terrorist operations. Both the global North and the global South suffer the same fate in terms of terrorism, since it is politically motivated and perpetuated by both state and non-state actors to advance a certain agenda (Adigbuo and Forae 2023:31). South Africa is not immune it is also vulnerable to terrorist attacks especially from the vantage point of what is happening in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, and perceived terrorist cells in South Africa. The SANDF is deployed in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado to fight the insurgency. South Africa could become a target of terrorists who may seek reprisals because of its assistance to and involvement in neighbouring Mozambique.

In 1998 and 2002, respectively, Kenya was attacked by terrorists, and researchers have pronounced that this might have happened because of its close ties with the USA, Israeli interests, security incompetence, and porous border with stateless Somalia, which has exposed Kenya to terrorism (Otenyo 2004:76-77). The study will explain the ambiguity created by the South African government in acknowledging terrorism, its pedestrian and cautious pronouncement on terrorism activities in South Africa.

1.6. DEFINITION OF TERMS

1.6.1. Terrorism

Terrorism is derived from Latin word *terrere*, meaning "to frighten" (African Union Commission 2015:14). It is broad and due to its intricate nature, defining it has never been an easy task (Pienaar 2007:10). Many countries have developed their understandings of terrorism, and this has hampered some strategies that can be applied to deter terrorism. Some scholars have also suggested that the elusive nature

of crafting a single definition of terrorism has alluded to its development and has created a conundrum that is unproductive (Young and Findley 2011:414).

Schmid and Jongman (1988:1) have hinted at terrorism as a “method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence”. In SA, the POCDATARA Act 33 of 2004 defines terrorist activity as an act of violence which exposes the public to a dangerous environment, causing harm or death to humans, destruction of property, both public and private, to coerce the government to adopt a particular viewpoint.

In 2005, a United Nations panel defined terrorism as “any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act” (Shinn 2016:17).

Combs (2023:7) developed a more contemporary definition of terrorism and defined it as:

“a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatisation of the most proscribed kind of violence—that which is deliberately perpetrated on civilian noncombatant victims—played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes”.

1.6.2. Security agencies

In SA, it is called the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS).¹⁴ It is a multi-agency government structure that comprises the different departments of the security agencies, such as the Department of Police, Defence, Justice, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Intelligence, Border Management Authority (BMA), Home Affairs, Correctional Services, and International Relations. These departments work together in a multi-pronged approach on issues of state security, sovereignty, peace, and diplomacy in the national interest.

¹⁴DefenceWeb. 2022. SA's safety and security machinery will be restored – Security Cluster. 28 February. Available at: <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sas-safety-and-security-machinery-will-be-restored-security-cluster/> [Accessed on: 29 March 2024].

1.7. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

The chapters are arranged in six different sections. Each chapter has some segments that focus on the study.

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the phenomenon being researched, offering a preview of the research questions and justification for the investigation.

Chapter 2 will examine the existing literature review and explore various typologies of terrorism as presented by different scholars and authors.

Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and data collection instruments used in the study, including a discussion of ethical considerations.

Chapter 4 explores the emergence of terrorism in post-apartheid SA, examining the country's security framework's efficacy in addressing this threat.

Chapter 5 presents comparative case studies of the United States (developed) and Mali (developing), analysing their responses to terrorism and outlining their respective counter-terrorism strategies.

Chapter 6 presents the final discussion, analysis, and conclusion of the study, including recommendations and suggestions for future research.

1.8. SUMMARY

Chapter One presented the orientation and introduction to the phenomenon of terrorism. The chapter encompassed the background of the topic and the problem statement. The rationale for conducting the research is explained. The research aims, objectives, and research questions were highlighted. The next chapter focuses on the literature review on terrorism and discusses two schools of thought on the manifestation of this phenomenon.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON TERRORISM

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of a literature review is to identify patterns, gaps, and debates to contribute new insights about a subject under study. Warren and Karner (2015:256) further evince that literature review is done to educate the researcher about the various debates, key theories, and broader trends that other colleagues have explored. In SA, terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but post-1994 urban terrorism.¹⁵ It was threatening to destabilise the democratic fabric of the South African government. This chapter critically examines the efficacy of the South African security agencies in counter terrorism operations and gaps identified in their terrorism efforts.

2.2. TERRORISM AND THE EFFICACY OF THE SECURITY AGENCIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The effectiveness of the South African agencies in combating terrorism dates to the years of apartheid. During those years of apartheid, terrorism was used by state actors to punish political rivals and dissent. After 1994, the transition to democracy ushered in a new ethos based on constitutionalism and fundamental human rights. Post 1994 SA saw new forms of urban terrorism emerge through the formation of groups such as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), and the Boeremag, whose members were variously accused and charged with urban terror. South Africa's geopolitical context and its links to transnational terrorist networks in the form of terrorism financing have heightened its counter terrorism strategy. South Africa relies on several security agencies that play a pivotal role in preventing and responding to acts of terrorism.

2.2.1. South African Police Service

The SAPS Act 68 of 1995 established the SAPS. It derives its mandate from section 205(3) of the Constitution 1996, which is to prevent, combat, and investigate crime. Though the SAPS operates within the confines of the law, it has been criticised for displaying a lacklustre attitude towards crime and its failure to deal with internal strife

¹⁵ *It is localised and violent in nature, occurs in urban settings against government infrastructure and involves bombings and creates insecurity in cities. Unlike terrorism which is broader and occurs in numerous settings and involves internecine violence against civilians, government or military installations.*

that hinders its capacity to respond effectively to potential threats. It has been suggested that the policing deficit was a result of corruption, poor intelligence, lack of accountability, and inefficiency (Burger 2015). However, Benson (2008:6) insists that though corruption in the police may constitute a perception, it is fairly extensive and varied in nature.

2.2.2. South African National Defence Force

Chapter 11 of the Constitution makes provision for the defence force as one 'single defence force' which, according to section 200(2), is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people under the Constitution. The defence force has been facing a decline since the 1998 defence procurement package. Some of the reasons for the decline were a result of budget cuts, brain drain, strategic constraints, and lack of rejuvenation. The defence's military assistance has been severely curtailed. The military has, from time immemorial, been deployed to do policing work during the July 21 unrest, border control, and in the same vein, deployed on peacekeeping missions outside the Republic, such as in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This has significantly overstretched the military. At one stage, the then Minister of Defence lamented that the military's readiness was becoming "unsustainable" (ADF 2024).

2.2.3. State Security Agency

The SSA is tasked with gathering domestic and foreign intelligence. This is one organisation that is beset with political interference, abuse of resources, and often lacks public trust and integrity. Its oversight mechanism lacks transparency. Masiapato *et al* (2020:140-141) observed that fragmentation, lack of coordination, and collaboration hamper the SSA from delivering an effective intelligence gathering. The High-Level Review Panel Report (2018:3) unveiled a plethora of failures by the SSA and suggested a paradigm shift where domestic and foreign intelligence structures should be separated. However, this was criticised by Lotter (2024:951), who observed that overcentralisation led to the inept response by intelligence during the July 2021 unrest when they could not combat organised crime.

2.2.4. Challenges and emerging threats

A cocktail of all these challenges and limitations within the security agencies has downgraded their ability to swiftly and effectively deal with terrorism efforts. The security agencies' limitation in engaging in sustained counter terrorism operations is compounded by the shortage of skilled personnel in intelligence gathering and a lack of cooperation, which has hindered some strides on counter terrorism. The July 2021 unrest led to a significant shift in law enforcement's approach, as it was revealed that the country's security architecture remains inadequate in ensuring safety for all. Since the democratic transition, the system has been stagnant, further weakened by poor coordination among security agencies (Africa 2011:27). The July 2021 unrest further exposed the security architecture's systematic lack of coordination, failure to detect, and lack of capacity to deal with the unrest.¹⁶ South Africa's geopolitical proximity to conflict-prone areas like Mozambique (with the rise of insurgency in Cabo Delgado) poses a growing security concern.

2.3. HOW DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS PERCEIVED IN SOUTH AFRICA

There has been a suggestion that ISIS networks and cells remain an existential threat to SA.¹⁷ However, indications are that there is a presence of ISIL cells that process clandestine money transfers to fund terrorism in the Sahel, Kenya, Somalia, the UK, and other countries and use SA as its transit springboard. At the level of international standards, SA still lacks an overarching anti-illicit trade framework that can effectively combat money laundering and terrorism financing (Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade 2023:6-7). Concerns have been raised that hundreds of South African citizens who have joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria may pose a threat, potentially recruiting others and targeting government and Western institutions (Chelin and Buchanan-Clarke 2018-24). Both domestic and international terrorism poses a threat to SA because the security architecture has diminished and compromised due to maladministration, corruption and was further decimated by the realm of state capture

¹⁶SAHRC. 2024. *July's People: The national investigative hearing report into the July 2021 Unrest in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal.* Available at: https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/JULY%20UNREST%20REPORT%20FINAL_29%20JAN%202024.pdf [Accessed on: 29 March 2024].

¹⁷U.S. Department of State. 2019. *Country Reports on Terrorism.* Available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/south-africa/> [Accessed on: 03 June 2024].

during the Jacob Zuma presidency (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2024:6). On the 23rd of July 2024 the US sanctioned two ISIS associates operating from SA, Abubakar Swellah and Zayd Gangat accused of money laundering, terrorism financing, extortion, kidnap for ransom and cross border transactions (US Department of the Treasury 2024).

Hussein Solomon, a senior researcher from the University of the Free State, has indicated that the existence of IS cells in SA presents a threat to SA since it is part of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), which heightens the risk considering that South African security services are inept (Gruzd 2024). South Africa has portrayed an image that is free from domestic terrorism, albeit persistent allegations of the existence of militant training camps and South Africans' participation in the Islamic State (Githing'u 2021). Miller (2019:63) proposed that the contrast between domestic and international terrorism has become obscure, and failure to understand this dichotomy may lead to a maladjusted response. Mills (2004:161-162) has also suggested that weak governments and unsecured borders often provide a haven for terrorists, enabling the growth of both domestic and international terrorism.

2.4. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Terrorism in SA, while not as prevalent as in some other regions, is influenced by a range of interrelated social, political, and economic factors. In South Africa, issues of poverty, a growing youth population, unemployment, socioeconomic inequality, and bad governance are some factors that contribute to dissent and unrest. Shinn (2016:18) has postulated that in sub-Saharan Africa, poverty remains to be seen as one of the cardinal factors that creates a conducive environment to acts of terrorism, especially among the youth who see no future because of political and economic marginalisation. Youth which are dissatisfied with the status quo find it ready to be radicalised and recruited into the fold of terrorist organisations (Moten 2010:47). Pigou and Opperman (2021:5-6) traces the genesis of terrorism to a divergence of views including ethnicity, unequal access to state resources, peripheral economic participation, illicit economy, and prevalence of underdevelopment. Botha (2007:4-5) concurs with those domestic conditions such as closed political systems, failed states, ethnic marginalisation, conflict over natural resources, religion, and economic factors

such as poverty and unemployment fuel terrorism. South Africa's porous borders make it vulnerable to the movement of foreign terrorists and transnational criminal networks.

The assumption that the nexus between poverty and terrorism stimulates terror is far from the truth; it is anecdotal and therefore no clear-cut link exists between the two dimensions, and it can be claimed that such a link remains subtle (Gottlieb 2014:50;62). This was further amplified by the proposition that there is a weak and indirect link between poverty and terrorism. The author further explained that terrorists do not come from poor backgrounds; they are better off and educated than their peers (Bobbitt 2008:398). Greg Mills, Director of the Brenthurst Foundation South Africa, dampened the nexus between poverty and terrorism; he lamented that poverty alone does not give rise to terrorism, as Africans have endured poverty for decades (Mills 2004:160).

2.5. DEVELOPMENTS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM RESEARCH IN SOUTH AFRICA

There is a growing recognition that SA is vulnerable, particularly concerning terrorist financing and the security agencies' readiness. In 2024, SA released a terrorist financing risk assessment report focusing on NPOs. The report identified risks within NPOs that could be exploited by IS, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and domestic right-wing extremists to raise and move funds for terrorist activities (TFRA 2024:52). The operationalisation of the POCDATARA Amendment Act 23 of 2022 and General Laws (Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Financing) Amendment Act 22 of 2023 strengthened SA's system of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and addressed measures against foreign terrorist fighters (Department of National Treasury 2023).

The integrity of the South African borders has been in the spotlight of the SSA. Dentlinger (2024) has highlighted that the Minister in the Presidency responsible for the SSA, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, said international terrorists have entered the country using SA travel documents and exploiting the asylum process and subsequently using SA as a logistical hub for terrorist organisations, posing a reputational risk for the country. Thekiso's (2024) doctoral research found that widespread corruption, ineffective institutions, and poor communication have contributed to diminished public trust and confidence in the government's ability to address and prevent terrorism in South Africa effectively.

2.6. OLD AND NEW TERRORISM

In the South African context, the rise of new terrorism was witnessed around the nineties when PAGAD, a vigilante organisation, was infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists. Though SA is a secular state, it found itself facing challenges of domestic terrorism ostensibly inspired by religion, ideologies and ethnic identity. Since the 9/11 attack in the USA there has been momentous belief that due to the violent nature of terrorists, researchers have also classified terrorism into two mutually inclusive terms between “old terrorism” and “new terrorism” The notion of contemporary terrorism propels that religious fundamentalism is the cardinal authoritative goal for terrorist adventures while old terrorism is dubbed secular further compounding the criticism that religious terrorism dated back more than a thousand years (Gottlieb 2014:9-10).

2.7. GAPS IN EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

In the South African experience, the study of terrorism is underdeveloped when compared to a growing body of knowledge globally. Though the phenomenon is not new in SA, there is a growing need to explore further the capacity of security architecture in terms of capacity and effectiveness in combating terrorism. South Africa has been described as a gateway to Africa and its rich financial hub, together with its richest square mile in Africa.¹⁸Sandton has attracted both good and those with nefarious intent. This has potentially exposed SA and attracted terrorist groups such as ISIL, both foreign and domestic, who facilitated money laundering from the region (Kempen and Botha 2022:25). I will then seek to make input to terrorism architectures, government responses in general and state inaction in particular. Via this framing, I will redirect attention to the overlooked issue of state capacity on terror financing and provide critical insights and understanding into SA’s unique successes or failures of counter terrorism efforts.

¹⁸Available at: <https://joburg.co.za/makes-wealthiest-square-mile-africa-tick/> [Accessed on: 28 March 2024].

2.8. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The phenomenon of terrorism can be explained from a theoretical perspective. Two theories of crime that stood out in the analysis of this phenomenon are discussed below.

2.8.1. *The rational choice theory*

Derek Cornish and Ronald Clarke's rational choice theory explains that those who engage in criminality derive pleasure and incentives from it. Cornish and Clarke (2014:1-4) assume that criminals make decisions and choices about engaging in crime, albeit rudimentary such calculations, an element of rationality is displayed and is present. These theorists further explained that the would-be criminals participate in a sequence of decisions and select a target which is vulnerable, accessible, absence of policing, and where there is a low level of proximal risks. Terrorists are rational, intelligent, and calculative because, in most cases, when they attack, they are not easily detected, and their operations are covert. The conceptualisation of the 9/11 attacks was carried out by an intelligence organisation that displayed a hallmark of a terrorist entity with a rational capability, which could measure cost and benefit analysis (Ilardi 2009:172). Terrorists turn to commit their acts to measure the state's capability to respond and to elevate their symbolic existence.

2.8.2. *Governance theory*


Burris, Drahos, and Shearing (2005:31-39) postulate that good governance is not simply the domain of central government; it should cascade to lower levels of local and regional authorities to efficiently provide services to their inhabitants. Governance theory explains how local authorities or law enforcement agencies fail to maintain public order in their area of jurisdiction. The exploitation of poor countries by the powerful nodes and state actors undermines good governance and subsequently creates a dissatisfied citizenry. Because of prejudice individuals may engage in terror as a response to an oppressive system of government which alienates the majority poor who may be encouraged to be deviant as a protestation against vagabondage (Arrigo and Bersot 2014:23). In Mali the Fulani's discontent with the central

government failure to address jihadists, militias and ethnic conflicts fuelled rebellion in the Northern regions (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2022:18;44).

2.9. CLASSIFICATION OF TERRORISM

The classification of terrorism below indicates different typologies, though not exhaustive. The classification of terrorism into various schisms has not only problematised this phenomenon, but it has also made it a very complex subject to follow. It has also created a quandary on how countries best deal with this phenomenon.

Figure 2.1: Basic Classification of Terrorism



Source: Schmid & Jongman (1988:48)

Schmid and Jongman (1988) managed to identify political, criminal, and pathological terrorism as the major yardsticks cascading to other kinds of terrorism depending on the objectives of the perpetrators of terror. Political terrorism is subcategorised into vigilante and state terrorism, which is engineered by organisations or individuals who do not conform to conventional rules but take the law into their own hands, and state

terror is supported and sponsored by the state, respectively. The objective of a political terrorist is to achieve political leverage. Insurgent terrorism is another subset of terrorism where perpetrators stage an insurrection against the state, and in many instances, it is a low-intensity uprising involving a limited number of rebels (Wilkinson 2006:8). In SA the ANC's MK mounted a rebellion against the apartheid regime.

Social revolutionary terrorism can be understood from the purview of the social conditions of the environment. Revolutionary terrorists can be hailed as revolutionaries who are saviours in their country, while others may term them anarchists. Fidel Castro was idolised in Cuba, a symbol of resistance against the United States embargo. Social revolutionaries include left-wing activities, constituting riots, arson, and attacks with explosives, propaganda, and include right-wing coordinated activities in the form of radicalisation and spread of Islamisation (Europol 2017:43-45). Separatist terrorism refers to dissidents who carry out their attacks violently using explosive devices like improvised explosive devices (IEDs), incendiary devices, and arson (Europol 2017:39). Examples of these terrorists are Joseph Kony's Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the Kurds in Turkey. Single Issue terrorism is the least violent and operates within the boundaries of law and is organised by pressure groups or activists who coalesce around issues of the environment, animal, or land rights (Europol 2017:48). However, there is contestation on classifying pressure groups like Earthlife Africa or Greenpeace International as terrorist organisations because of their good intentions. Further categories of terrorism are also explained below.

2.9.1. Domestic terrorism

Boshoff, Botha, and Schönreich (2007:15) have explained that domestic terrorism applies to violence and terror that is restricted within the borders of a country but excludes targets outside the borders. Terrorists are not static, they will always travel between states for safety, financing opportunities, and logistics. Democratic countries should strive to protect their territories at their ports of entry through security enhancement and democratic institutions.

2.9.2. Transnational terrorism

Anderson (1998:282) describes transnational terrorism as transcending national borders and is perpetuated by individuals with foreign ties, often motivated by political

or ideological objectives against international targets and government authority. South Africa is not an island; it is part of the global economy; hence, it will not be immune to the threat of terrorism in other countries. There is also a view that an open economy does contribute to transnational terrorism due to globalisation and mobility across the borders of countries. Transnational terrorism is not government-sanctioned and can involve nationals from more than one country, and migration has also become a new threat in the contemporary world. Terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS operate across different countries.

2.9.3. International terrorism

International terrorism involves foreign nationals crossing national borders and attacking targets and victims merely because of their connection to a foreign country which they deem an enemy (Boshoff *et al*, 2001:28-29). The USA and the Israeli governments, and other European countries have labelled Hamas as a terrorist organisation¹⁹ even though Israel is an occupying force in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The protracted fight between Israel and Hamas culminated in the events on October 7, 2023.²⁰ Hamas crossed the border into Israel, attacked civilians and killed more than a thousand, and held others hostage. The Israeli government mustered a response, and more than 41,000 Palestinians were killed and over 96,000 injured, still counting²¹. Groups like Hamas, Ansarallah (also known as Houthis), and Al-Qaeda are considered quintessential cases of international terrorism.

2.9.4. State-sponsored terrorism

States that are involved in state-sponsored terrorism use surrogates to attack their targets. This type of terrorism is used as a form of hegemony to destabilise international peace. During the apartheid years, the South African security police pursued some freedom fighters involved in political activity and attacked them both within and outside the borders of South Africa. The political opponents were detained

¹⁹Gradstein, L. 2024. *Explainer: How Hamas ended up on US list of terrorist groups*. 07 February. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/explainer-how-hamas-ended-up-on-us-list-of-terrorist-groups/7478227.html> [Accessed on: 30 March 2024].

²⁰Rozdilsky, J.L. 2024. *Gaza war: The displaced survivors of the Oct. 7 attack remain in need of support*. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-the-displaced-survivors-of-the-oct-7-attack-remain-in-need-of-support-224557> [Accessed on: 30 March 2024].

²¹Anadolu Agency. 2024. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/gaza-death-toll-nears-41-700-as-israeli-attacks-kill-51-more-palestinians/3349355> [Accessed on: 04 October 2024].

indefinitely under the Terrorism Act of 1967,²² and this law was used as a vehicle of terror against opponents of the undemocratic state. State-sponsored terrorism is amplified by clandestine support and measures provided by the state, and such assistance includes training, planning, financing, communication, intelligence, haven, and diplomatic cover (Collins 2014:134). The West has pointed fingers at countries that are believed to be sponsors of terrorism, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. In 2002, the Bush Administration in the USA coined the metaphor "Axis of Evil," which identifies Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as chief sponsors of terrorism (Heradstveit and Bonham 2007:422).

2.9.5. Lone-wolf terrorism

Hamm (2013)²³ advances that "Lone wolf" terrorism is the term used to describe someone who acts alone in a terrorist attack without the help or encouragement of a government or a terrorist organisation. Individuals can be driven into terrorism without being influenced or radicalised by the main pathways and affiliation to a terrorist group. The planning, execution, and targeting of their victims in the terror attack is the work of a secluded individual who may have been triggered by personal grievances or episodes of a troubled soul. It has also been demonstrated that "lone wolf" terrorists are solitary individuals who engage and legitimise their terror activities based on ideology on which tactical methodology, planning and implementation of their deed is pursued without direct order or command (Spaaij 2015:45). The activities by a lone wolf terrorist, Anders Behring Breivik on July 11, 2011, in Norway claimed 77 lives in two separate terrorist attacks (Berntzen and Sandberg 2014:759). On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Oklahoma City building, which left 168 people dead and hundreds injured (Gumbel 2015).

2.9.6. Vigilante terrorism

This is understood by the distinction between conformity and non-conformity to an established social order. When there is a breakdown of law and order, individuals engage in illegitimate conduct outside the boundaries of conventional rules of

²²Available at: <https://www.aamarchives.org/campaigns/political-prisoners.html> [Accessed on: 31 March 2024].

²³Hamm, M. 2013. Available at: <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/lone-wolf-terrorism-america> [Accessed on: 31 March 2024].

engagement. The sociopolitical order of the State is undermined, and “justice” is dispensed by angered crowds against “criminal” elements summarily expressed as “taking the law into one’s own hands” (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974:542). Vigilante terrorism is spontaneous and motivated by the desire for revenge and just deserts against those suspected of committing a crime. Victims of vigilantism are not brought before the mainstream legal system; the vigilantes, who are non-state actors, become the judge, jury, and executioner. The victim is punished unilaterally without following due process. In SA, one of the prominent vigilante groups was PAGAD²⁴.

2.10. CONFLUENCE BETWEEN ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Africa Organised Crime Index (2023:16) defines organised crime as “illegal activities conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption, or related activities to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit and these activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally”. South Africa is considered one of the murder capitals of the world, ranked the world’s third highest in murder rate behind only Jamaica and Honduras (Hill 2023). In the third quarter of the 2023/24 year (October to December 2023), an average of 84 people were murdered every day in South Africa (Ngcobo 2024). The symbiotic relationship between organised crime and terrorism in SA is characterised by the rampant kidnapping for ransom and extortion, the same tactics which IS supporters use to raise funds (TFNRA 2024:6).

Organised crime²⁵ and terrorism in SA seem to be classified and lumped as part of general violent crime. It is also stated that there is a thin line between organised crime and terrorism because they coexist and go together in that they exhibit common tactics such as obtaining funding, and illicit activities (Ras and Els 2023:1). Additionally, Ewi (2023:1-2) advances that organised crime was the spark that ignited the 9/11 attacks and without organised crime 9/11 would not have occurred. That is why the South African government has been criticised for its vacillating response to terrorism preparedness and alerts issued specifically by the USA. In 2016, the South African

²⁴PAGAD was formed in the nineties in the Cape Flats as an organisation that coalesce against gangsters and drugs, however it became a vigilante when it was infiltrated by radical Islamic fundamentalists.

²⁵Enact. Available at: <https://enactafrica.org/research/explainers/the-nexus-between-organised-crime-and-terrorism> [Accessed on: 03 April 2024].

government was criticised for downplaying terror warnings issued by the USA, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia, which left South Africa's capabilities and efficacy in responding to terrorism questionable.²⁶ In February 2023 global financial crime watchdog, FATF, grey-listed SA due to failure to address money laundering and terrorist financing through organised crime.²⁷

2.11. SUMMARY

In this chapter, the various propositions about terrorism were explained. Many authors have come up with opposing views and analyses on terrorism. Different typologies of terrorism were identified, albeit the fact that terrorism has multitudes of branches that cannot be fully exhaustive. Two selected theories were proposed that supported the pertinent circumstances of a terrorist. Theories alone do not fully explain the causes of criminal behaviour, they have limitations. The issue of terrorism funding, the nexus between organised crime and terrorism, was also ventilated. In the next chapter, the research methodology and the different phases of the research will be outlined.

²⁶Burke, J. 2016. South Africa rejects UK warnings of terrorist attack. *The Guardian*. 06 June. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/south-africa-rejects-uk-warning-of-terrorist-attack> [Accessed on: 03 June 2024].

²⁷The Conversation. 2023. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-been-grey-listed-for-not-stopping-money-laundering-and-terrorism-funding-what-it-mean> [Accessed on: 03 March 2024].

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Research will not be complete when the methods used to gather information are not reliable. In this chapter, the research design, the sampling method, data collection, and analysis will be justified. Considerations of ethics and the means to guarantee trustworthiness will be explained. In a nutshell, research methodology clarifies why certain methods of data collection are applicable for the specific study. Hagan (2011:21) postulated that research methodology involves the collection and analysis of accurate data to answer a research question.

3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

Lanier and Briggs (2014:37) stress that research design is the 'blueprint' that directs how the research will be conducted, guided by the research questions. The most notable are qualitative and quantitative methods. Withrow (2014:298) cited that qualitative research is an expansive research method that seeks to produce a detailed understanding of human action with meaning and motivation. De Vos *et al* (2011:63-65) opine that quantitative research is the study of variables that are measured by numbers or statistical analysis. This study followed a qualitative paradigm.

3.3. POPULATION

Ahmad *et al* (2023:20) advances that population refers to the complete set of individuals or items that possess a shared characteristic and are the main subject of investigation. A population in research is a whole group of elements, individuals, or objects that are the subject of study. These elements should at least fit the criteria relevant to conclude the study. In this research, the population was experts and practitioners drawn from a diverse group who have the know-how of terrorism and the capacity of security agencies in combating this phenomenon in SA. The population for this specific study was difficult to recruit, since the topic can compromise national security. In some cases, participants withdraw without giving reasons at the last minute.


3.4. SAMPLE

A sample is a smaller aggregate or number of individuals that is selected from a population for actual study. De Vos *et al* (2011:223-224) posits that a sample includes elements of the population considered in the study or measurable variables drawn from a population. It represents a smaller group that will make generalisations about the entire population. The reliability of the research results somewhat depends on the accuracy of the sample size. The sample size for this research was pegged at interviewing 15 participants, but with challenges of access and time, only 10 were interviewed. The other five participants played along and pulled out at the last minute after I had already scheduled interviews with them. The topic of terrorism is not easy to speak about for those who are at the coalface of preventing and combating terrorism. The world they inhabit is a secret world, and lives are dependent on secrecy.

Getting interviews with such actors is difficult. With the number of participants interviewed, data saturation was nonetheless achieved. The population was deliberately selected without randomisation. It was based on their rich knowledge of the topic. Some of these practitioners are well known through their work, which is published in books, journals, and commentary. They were contacted personally and made aware of the aims and purpose of the research. After their informed consent, an arrangement was made to conduct the interviews according to the time agreed upon at the setting determined by the participants. These were participants who possessed rich knowledge about the research topic and its research questions.

Composition of the included individuals, both male and female, who are experts in the field of terrorism. Figure 3.1. below illustrates participant demographics in terms of gender, professionalism, level of education, and their experience. The sample was balanced since all participants were educated professionals with experience as practitioners in security. In the main, all the 10 participants had some form of tertiary qualification and with university degree. The only concern in the sample was gender; only two women, as compared to eight men, were interviewed. This did not augur well, especially when you want to garner a balanced view from the participants.

Figure 3.1: Sample demographics



3.4.1. Justification for sample size

The research objectives were specific to the sample size, considering the sensitivity of the research topic. Governments and experts in this field do not want to be seen to be divulging information that can be misconstrued as a security risk to the country. The resources at my disposal, accessibility, and time constraints meant that it became a battle to reach the required population. In the same sample, 10 participants did not significantly alter the saturation point. Some of the participants in the sample were previously involved in formulating and advising government agencies in terrorism policy, and others were doing consulting work in the terrorism sphere. The research was of a complex nature that required human interaction to understand certain nuances about the phenomenon under study. Those nuances and perspectives are not static and cannot be understood from a numerical point of view, but through the richness of data derived from the participants' experiences. This was augmented by the fact that the sample was composed of participants who knew the subject under investigation.

3.5. SAMPLING

De Vos *et al* (2011:228-231) classify sampling into two, namely probability sampling “based on randomisation” and non-probability sampling “without randomisation”. However, Withrow (2014:160) defines sampling as a scientific technique that allows the researcher to select a sample from a population to gain knowledge from that population. In this study, the sample size was known. Hence, it is based on selecting the population with certain subject matter characteristics. Participants were drawn from terrorism experts and practitioners, government officials, Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), and Members of Parliament (MPs). All of whom know the subject matter. It is anticipated that this sampling, which is being conducted, will allow credible inferences since this was a targeted population with specific knowledge about the investigation.

The desired sample size was 15 participants, but with challenges of access and time, only 10 were interviewed. The other five participants played along and pulled out at the last minute after I had already scheduled interviews with them. The topic of terrorism is not easy to speak about for those who are at the coalface of preventing and combating terrorism. Getting interviews with such actors is difficult. With the number of participants interviewed, data saturation was achieved. The population was deliberately selected without randomisation. It was based on their rich knowledge of the topic. Some of these practitioners are well known through their work, which is published in books and journals, and commentary. They were contacted personally and made aware of the aims and purpose of the research. After their informed consent, an arrangement was made to conduct the interviews according to the time agreed at the setting determined by the participants. The following non-probability sampling methods were used.

3.5.1. *Snowball sampling*²⁸

De Vos *et al* (2011:393) states that snowball sampling is when the researcher selects a participant who knows the research phenomenon and then refers to other

²⁸*Snowball and key informant sampling are the recruitment of participants through other participants and referrals from those that had participated in the study. The number of potential participants will then grow exponentially until the desired sample is reached. It is a useful tool to access those participants that are difficult to access.*

participants who can be included in the study. The covert nature of policing terrorism in SA entailed that I relied on the trust and referrals suggested by other participants. Snowball sampling was suitable for this purpose as it involved getting participants dependent on networks from the initial participants.

3.5.2. Key informant sampling

Participants were selected using key informants, and this was expanded through a cascading approach, which improved recruitment. This kind of sampling relies on identifying those participants who possess the most characteristics of the phenomenon investigated. In this case, experts or practitioners in the field of terrorism were identified, and then they played a greater role in recruiting other participants.

3.6. SOURCES OF DATA

Primary sources of information were collected through questionnaires directly from participants. One-on-one interviews were also conducted with the participants. Researching such a phenomenon will not be enough without consulting other secondary sources of information, either in the form of documents, books, journals, or the internet. Internet data that is peer-reviewed was used, such as literature, journals, and so forth. Other reliable sources of information from the internet are websites from government institutional databases and Google Scholar. Credible authors and data, academic databases were reliable sources of information. All the scholars quoted were referenced.

3.7. DATA COLLECTION

Data collection entails the gathering of data or information about a subject that is under investigation. Data collection methods can either be quantitative or qualitative. Simister and James (2020:1) indicate that quantitative data is expressed in numbers while qualitative data is expressed as words. According to De Vos *et al* (2011:206; 347), quantitative research comprises measurement tools such as indices compared to qualitative research, which employs unstructured and semi-structured interviews.²⁹

²⁹*Unstructured interviews are free and unguided whilst semi-structured interviews are guided, and questions predetermined.*

In this study, data were collected to answer research questions on terrorism. Since this is qualitative research, the following data collection tools were used.

3.8. DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

Various instruments were used to gather data for this research. Before the interviews could be conducted, the participants were introduced to the study's reasons and purpose. They were also inducted into the data collection instruments, and their interviews were recorded using a dictaphone. The data collection instruments are:

3.8.1. *Semi-structured interviews*

Longhurst (2016:143) affirms that a semi-structured interview is a verbal interchange of information between the interviewer and interviewee following a predetermined set of questions. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview schedule because it is flexible and was conducted face-to-face with the participants at a site agreed upon and fit for purpose. Seeing each other face to face also bolsters trust and research integrity. The duration of the interviews took 45 – 60 minutes per participant. Since the participants were spread across the country, the use of MS Teams was considered for those participants who could not avail themselves of face-to-face interviews. Both online and face-to-face interviews were recorded with permission from the participants. The recorded interviews were transcribed and placed in a database for analysis. This type of interview gave the participants freedom to express their ideas and express themselves freely and decide their course without deviation from the subject matter (Denscombe 2007:176).

3.8.2. *Qualitative questionnaire*

Due to time constraints and other logistical challenges, qualitative questionnaires were also used to complement the study in case participants were not keen on face-to-face interviews. Some participants are comfortable with questionnaires because they can answer the questions on their own time without being pressured by the interviewer. The questionnaire consisted of open-ended questions, the same as those on the semi-structured interview schedule. Questionnaires were in Word format so that participants could check their answers online and email them back to me for integrity. This is to prevent misunderstanding and was a way to check and verify that what they said is


confirmed. The questionnaire was emailed to the participant's domain address. Participants indicated their details in the questionnaire so it could show that it was them, not somebody else, who completed it. The use of both online and face-to-face interviews was complementary, adding a holistic view and ensuring a detailed understanding of the participant's belief about the topic under study (De Vos *et al*, 2011:351).

3.9. DATA ANALYSIS

According to Cuesta and Kumar (2016:7), data analysis is a process where raw data is converted into meaningful, actionable information that can be evaluated to understand the problem and its practical solutions. The data was cleaned, and all errors and inconsistencies were set aside. This is important because data analysis will seek to clarify some correlation in the data and make its interpretation compatible with the phenomenon under investigation. Qualitative data analysis is the classification and interpretation of linguistic material to make sense of the data, which is not explicitly meaningful or clear (Mezmir 2020:15). The following method of data analysis was used:

3.9.1. Interactive Qualitative Analysis (IQA)

Figure 3.2: Components of Interactive Qualitative Analysis (IQA).



Source: Miles, Huberman & Saldaña (2014:14)

Figure 3.2 is a hybrid data analysis model that follows three successive episodes, which are not complex, but humanistic in nature, which refine data to make it usable by others (Miles *et al*, 2014:14). The three episodes were followed to analyse the data in this research.

First Episode: Data Condensation

Data was simplified, evaluated, and coded to infer and draw summaries which made it possible to select relevant themes that were condensed into meaningful abstracts which answers the research questions (Miles *et al* 2014:12). The data was also transcribed from audio recordings to word documents to discard and include the data that is deemed useful and relevant to the study.

Second Episode: Data Display

The second robust episode was used to assemble and organise the data so that it can be accessible, enhance iterative viewpoint using extended text and coherently simplify the bulk of the field notes (Miles *et al*, 2014:13).

Third Episode: Drawing and Verifying Conclusions

The third and last stream identified patterns and explanations by thorough verification from the corpus of the field notes to derive meaning and data causality (Miles *et al*, 2014:13). From this model, above the data collected is sifted through three streams shuttling within data condensation, data display and then concluding interactively and systematically. In these circumstances, IQA was suitable for the qualitative data analysis because the data was summarised and verified to conclude a cyclical pattern. This made it possible to analyse the data and answer the research questions.

3.10. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

De Vos *et al* (2011:129) suggest that ethical issues arise between researchers and society when data that is gathered becomes harmful to that environment. Ethics in research forms part of the core moral virtues that must be exercised to augment the integrity of the research. In the same vein, ethics is indispensable because it accommodates the rights and dignity of participants, and the researcher should adhere to the principles of honesty and integrity (Denscombe 2007:141). During every phase

in research, ethics looms large when data is collected (Creswell 2013:56; 174). The Belmont report proposed three cardinal ethical principles for the protection of human participants, namely, respect for persons, beneficence, and justice (Bachman and Schutt 2011:56). Some of the ethical concerns which were dealt with in this research are:

3.10.1. Permission

Permission to conduct the research was approved by the University of Cape Town. An ethical clearance certificate was issued by the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Public Law (**Appendix A**). This was always shared with all the participants so that they could rest assured that their participation was justifiably above board, protected in law, and ethically acceptable.

3.10.2. Privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality

De Vos *et al* (2011:119) explain that privacy implies an element of personal secrecy, while confidentiality indicates concealing information to protect the integrity of that information. Access to the data was minimised by a role-based access control, which gave access only to those who are permitted to use it. Transmission of data was encrypted with an encryption key. Identification of participants was concealed or anonymised by pseudonyms. Field notes were kept in a secured, locked cabinet. Digital notes were also stored in a password-protected storage file. The data was treated with integrity, and confidentiality was guaranteed to the participants. The researcher and supervisor have access to the data. After completion of the research, the data may be archived, stored in locked cabinets, or disposed of ethically under institutional guidelines.

3.10.3. Voluntary and Informed Consent

The participants were notified that their participation was voluntary. A written consent form was given to participants in advance to sign before the commencement of interviews (**Appendix B**). Participants were informed that since their participation was voluntary, they could stop and leave the interview at any time they wished. No participant was pressured into partaking in the research because the consent form was made available to them to assent (Yeboah 2008:151).

3.10.4. Harm and risks

There was no harm experienced even though participants were privy to sensitive information. As explained before, participants were not named for publication. According to Bachman and Schutt (2011:56), the principle of beneficence explains the idea that the research should minimise possible harm and maximise benefits. The cooperation that was embedded in this research with participants was beneficial to the study.

3.11. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Reliability and validity of any research are no doubt the bedrock to ensure the results are sound and accurate. A research project that has followed the right processes and phases from beginning to end encompasses the hallmark of credibility and authenticity. This research aimed to achieve this by using both face-to-face interviews and qualitative questionnaires to bolster rigour and authenticity. Credibility is achieved when the measuring instruments are accurate and dependable. Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument performs the task it is meant to do correctly and truthfully (De Vos *et al*, 2011:173). Reliability entails that an instrument will obtain consistent and identical outcomes when it measures the same thing at different times (De Vos *et al*, 2011:177). Since the study is qualitative, the trustworthiness of the data was determined by four key factors, namely credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (De Vos *et al*, 2011:419-421; Kumar, 2014:219).

3.11.1. Credibility/authenticity

Kumar (2014:219) has established that the results of qualitative research are as authentic as the participants' beliefs and perspectives because of their knowledge of the phenomenon. The participants were individuals who were knowledgeable about the subject of study. The fact that this is qualitative research is indicative that the instruments used to secure the data were plausible and credible. Using more than one data collection method reinforced credibility. The research was conducted from a neutral perspective without bias or predetermined perceptions about the phenomenon. It is only the participants' views and beliefs that matter.

4.11.2. Transferability

Kumar (2014:219) advances that transferability is the extent to which the findings of qualitative research can be applied to different settings. To strengthen transferability in the study, a composite data collection strategy was used. Though it is difficult sometimes to generalise the findings, this was achieved by corroborating the results of a similar kind.

3.11.3. Dependability

This explains whether the results or findings of the research will be replicated if performed elsewhere, despite the changing conditions (De Vos *et al*, 2011:420-421). The different phases in the conducting of the research were recorded and tracked. The logic is to follow a sequence of conducting research, leaving trails and documents that would allow others to replicate (Kumar 2014:219). The dependability in this research was strengthened by keeping all the data transcripts, recordings, and notes within the department of criminology for archiving. The supervisor, the ethics committee, and the researcher have access to the data.

3.11.4. Conformability

Confirmability captivates the principles of objectivity (De Vos *et al*, 2011:421). However, in Fox and Bayat (2007:110), conformity supersedes objectivity in the research process. This illustrates a holistic explanation of whether the research passed the test of time and that other researchers can confirm its findings. Above all, the data collection strategy deployed in this research was systematically recorded and continuously audited throughout the entire research process to mitigate any bias from the researcher's viewpoint. The data that was collected was detached from the researcher's inherent convictions. If the research is dependable, it can also easily be confirmed.

3.12. LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Limitations are understood to be difficulties and setbacks that a researcher encounters during a study (Mohajana 2013:42). I would like to acknowledge some of the outliers as limitations. There is always a possibility of a lack of cooperation and bias because

of subjectivity. The sampling method used was not random; participants were carefully selected according to their knowledge of the study. This could have negatively impacted the objectivity that could have been solicited had the sample size been larger. The interviews were conducted under strict deadlines, time, and budgetary constraints. This hindered a more inclusive process, inadvertently excluding other potential participants. The target was 15 participants, however, 10 were interviewed. Four of the participants cited time constraints and other commitments. The other participant was not reachable anymore over the phone and could not respond to my emails. This may have whittled down findings, albeit reaching data saturation. Qualitative data is enormous, and to do an analysis requires some software and expertise that is costly.

Additionally, with the recording of the interviews, there were some apprehensions from some participants who objected to recordings, which may have adversely affected the full corpus of the data. To mitigate some of the risks due to apprehensions and objections by participants, the following strategies were introduced:

- They will remain anonymous, responses kept confidential, and pseudonyms will be used.
- They were given a sense of control by allowing them to freely decline answering certain questions.
- Field notes backed up the data.

Due to the guarded nature and intelligence-driven policing on terrorism, some participants were unwilling to divulge information that may be perceived as compromising state security. Documents do not provide sufficient data to answer a research question because of biased selectivity and deliberate alignment to certain organisational agendas (Bowen 2009:31-32). Information accessed from the internet should be peer reviewed to avoid distortion and inaccuracy. Recruiting participants had its dynamics, such as the criteria for participants, building trust, accessibility, and ethical considerations. This would leverage a trusted intermediary that will align with the goals of the research. Moreover, snowball sampling brought bias since the sample was selected by non-random sampling. This had a negative impact when seeking to generalise the findings from the sample to the entire population. These are some of the limitations that were traversed in this study.

3.13. SUMMARY

The research methodology is the engine that drives the research process because it is central to the formulation of the results of the study. In this chapter, the methodology was explained, including the research design, sampling method, data collection instruments, analysis of data, and some of the ethical considerations that are pertinent to this research. The next chapter addresses the manifestation of terrorism in SA and the kinetic response of the security architecture.

CHAPTER 4: MANIFESTATION OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA AND PREVENTION MEASURES

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The decapitation and prevention of terrorism in SA lies squarely on the effectiveness of the security architecture. Despite the wanton destruction of property and loss of life during the July 2021 unrest, the government still mulled and pondered what charges would be brought against perpetrators of this violence and unrest. There is no doubt that SA regards terrorism as one of its cardinal concerns; however, its perceived mixed message and pedestrian response have caused a lot of hysteria among citizens and the international community. During the early years of transition from apartheid, SA was faced with a wave of urban terrorism ostensibly perpetrated by PAGAD and the Boeremag. Although the security architecture appeared to respond in a coordinated manner to threats from PAGAD and the Boeremag, addressing challenges related to international terrorism and terror financing remains a significant issue for SA.

4.2. CHAMELEON STEPS: AMBIGUITY IN THE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Terrorism existed in SA since the apartheid years and transcended into the new democratic dispensation. This was expected considering the internecine violence that preceded the transition years. The national intelligence community has known that some groups or individuals were linked to ISIS and Al-Qaeda, who had clandestine networks operating in SA. However, SA has played chameleon steps or has reacted passively when responding to threats of terrorism in the republic. Such uncertainty does not absolve SA from its commitment and cooperation with regional and international instruments in the prevention of terrorism. The involvement of SA in the fight against terrorists in Mozambique is testimony that it should not be complacent, since terrorists can avenge their attacks on South Africa.

Therefore, SA faces a difficult choice, they are damned if they intervene in Mozambique and damned if it does not since opting out will only strengthen the terrorists in that region which poses a risk to South Africa (Fabricius 2020:3). South Africa has always maintained that it is not at risk of any attack from terrorist activity, oblivious of the fact that there is evidence that it is used as a hub and helipad for terrorism financing. The mixed messaging about the threat of terrorism in SA has caused anxiety among citizens about whether the security architecture can respond

effectively against terrorism. On the other hand, the government acknowledges the existence of terrorist cells in the country and, in the same vein, denounces countries that provide terror alerts as alarmist. When the US government issued a terrorist threat alert to the South African government, the President, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, denounced them for jumping the gun.³⁰ The NATJOINTS³¹ further voiced their displeasure at the spread of false messages about possible terrorist attacks in South Africa (South African Government 2022).

4.3. THE GROWTH OF EXTREMISM AND VIGILANTISM

Since 1994, SA has faced a myriad of challenges during the years of transition. By 1996, South Africa's first threat assessment on Islamic extremism driven by Qibla was flagged by the National Intelligence Assessment, which advanced that there was an anti-state movement to destabilise and engage in violence (Shaw 2023:161). Some of these challenges were inherited from the ruins of the apartheid edifice. The country was faced with economic, social, and political problems. Crime was rampant, and the government was under severe pressure to deal with these challenges. Far right extremism rose based on Afrikaner nationalism, a belief on creating an independent state motivated by their common culture, language, and creed such as the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (AWB) (Cachalia and Schoeman 2017:4). The communities felt that the government was not doing enough in their fight against social ills and crime. Communities around Cape Town started to create their structures, which resulted in the formation of community shields like PAGAD.

4.3.1. Genesis of Pagad and the Boeremag

The genesis and neutralisation of PAGAD is captured by Dixon and Johns (2001:49-50) when they explained that between 1996-1999 PAGAD developed from being a 'popular movement' to 'vigilante group' and 'vigilante group' to 'urban terrorists' and subsequently from 'urban terrorist' to an empty shell today. It was formed in the Cape Town Metropole on November 1, 1995, by a predominantly neighbourhood watch

³⁰Khoza, A. 2022. Ramaphosa slams US for "panic-driven" Sandton terror alert. TimesLive. 27 October. Available at: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2022-10-27-ramaphosa-slams-us-for-panic-driven-sandton-terror-alert/> [Accessed on: 15 April 2024].

³¹The National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) comprises of different government departments led by State Security Agency (SSA), South African Police Service (SAPS) and South African Defence Force (SANDF) meets regularly to assess the safety and security of the country.

(NHW), Muslim community, and the Qibla Movement.³² They aimed to curb crime and clamp down on gangsters and drug traffickers. It had some organisational structure that coordinated its activities. However, it was not long before their modus operandi caught the ire of the security architecture when it became clear that they were becoming a vigilante organisation. They (PAGAD) gradually became belligerent and militaristic in their operations. Their prominence heightened after July 1996 when they stormed a suspected drug house at Salt River and killed the Hard Livings co-leader Rashaad Staggie (Gottschalk 2005:5).

The Boeremag were the right-wing Afrikaner nationalists who, after 1994, felt marginalised in the new democratic government. They launched a series of bombings to destabilise and intended to overthrow a democratic state. They planned to create chaos, attack government infrastructure and military institutions under the terrorism doctrine and engineer a coup d'état that would ultimately allow them to establish their own South African Boer Republic (Schonteich and Boshoff 2003:70-75).


4.3.1.1. Modus operandi by PAGAD

During 1996-2000, PAGAD mounted sustained attacks on various institutions around Cape Town, such as police stations, businesses, places of recreation, and homes of gangsters and drug dealers. It became clear with the security architecture that the metamorphosis of PAGAD has created a vigilante organisation that does not respect law and order. Their attacks against individuals and state institutions became brazen. In 1999, the USA maintained that PAGAD and Qibla movement probably had ties with extremist groups in the Middle East, and as such, it classified them as terrorist organisations.³³ The violence perpetrated by PAGAD was a classic example of domestic or urban terrorism. The state responded by instituting special operations because PAGAD's activities posed a threat to the new democratic dispensation (Dixon and Johns 2001:50).

³²*Iran Press News Agency. 2024. A Revolutionary Legacy: Yusuf Patel on Qibla Movement and International Quds Day. Available at: <https://iranpress.com/a-revolutionary-legacy--yusuf-patel-on-qibla-movement-and-international-quds-day> [Accessed on: 09 April 2024].*

³³*Own Correspondent. 1999. US brands Pagad 'terrorists'. Mail and Guardian. 5 May: Available at: <https://mq.co.za/article/1999-05-05-us-brands-pagad-terrorist/> [Accessed on: 09 April 2024].*

Figure 4.1: PAGAD's violent modus operandi, 1996 - 2000



Source: Boshoff, Botha & Schönsteich (2001:53)

Figure 4.1 shows the intensity of the bombings and shootings that were carried out by PAGAD during that period. During the middle of 1998, PAGAD, through its military wing, G-Force, also targeted academics and clerics who were critical of their activities. PAGAD's bombings and shootings during 1996-2000 were marked with anti-American and Israeli sentiments, which were militant and indiscriminate in nature Boshoff *et al* (2001:53-55).

- 1996-2000 were years of the campaign against drug dealers using covert operations.
- 1998 saw an increase in the campaign against drug dealers, illegal taverns. State security institutions were threatened and attacked, such as police stations and businesses.
- 1999-2000 witnessed a shift in the approach of PAGAD as it conducted its violent tactics. It targeted restaurants and places of entertainment.

Table 4.1: Significant terrorist-related events in South Africa from 1994 - 2002

Year	City	Site	Number injured	Number dead
1994	Johannesburg	Airport	16	0
1994	Germiston	Taxi rank	40	10
1994	Johannesburg	City centre	100	9
1994	Pretoria	Pub	29	2
1996-2000	Cape Town	Justice Department, tourist areas	120	5
2002	Gauteng Townships		15	1

Source: McFarlane (2003:136)

Table 4.1. shows that just before the elections, there was widespread violence between 1994 and 2002 with more than 400 bombs and explosions because of internecine gang wars and vigilantism in the Cape Town area, which was blamed on PAGAD and its surrogates (MacFarlane 2003:136).

Gang violence grew exponentially after the democratic transition in the Cape Flats, creating problems for policing because they were organised and violent (Kinnes 2017:82). Some of the terrorist acts that were perpetrated by PAGAD during 1999 - 2000 is registered below by (Boshoff *et al* 2001:55-57).

- On the 1st of January 1999, V & A Waterfront shopping and entertainment complex was bombed.
- On the 8th of January 1999, Kentucky Fried Chicken in Athlone was bombed.
- During January 1999, Woodstock and Athlone Police stations and the Wynberg magistrate court were also attacked.
- On 28 November 1999, a popular tourist place in Camps Bay was bombed, injuring 48 people.
- On 29 August 2000, a bomb exploded near the USA Consulate in Cape Town, injuring seven people.

4.3.1.2. Modus operandi by the Boeremag


The Boeremag was a far-right Afrikaner movement that was opposed to South Africa's transition to democracy. Theirs was inspired by a secessionist movement that demanded the restoration of a Boer republic. Besides, SA was undergoing transformation, and the Afrikaner secessionist agenda was viewed as anti-democratic, and they were not willing to embrace the new dispensation. Just after 1994, the Boeremag orchestrated some incidents that exhibit an outlook of vestiges of domestic terrorism. Schönreich and Boshoff (2003:54-61) revealed that this group engaged in the following bombing crusade:

- In 1996, two bombs exploded at a shopping centre in Worcester (Western Cape Province), killing four people and injuring 60.
- During the same time, another explosion occurred in Rustenburg (Northwest Province) at a Mosque.
- In 1997, this group attempted to steal military hardware from Pomfret military base in the Northern Cape.
- Further, in 1998, they broke into the Tempe military base and stole significant amounts of military equipment and weapons.
- In 2002, they were implicated in planning to plant bombs in Parliament and in preparing to engage in eco-terrorism against Gauteng infrastructure in the townships of Atteridgeville, Soshanguve, and Laudium.
- On 30 October 2002, Soweto was rocked by eight bomb blasts, damaging the railway infrastructure, killing one person in the adjacent informal settlement.

4.4. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Figure 4.2. below is a testimony that international and domestic terrorism has a footprint in South Africa. It has been suggested that SA has a history of perennial failures in dealing with terrorist financing activities within its borders, exacerbated by lawlessness and corruption (Solomon 2022).

Figure 4.2: Transactional nature of violent extremism



Source: Cachalia & Schoeman (2017:7)

The tributaries of the transnational nature of terrorism can be associated with diminished state capacity, porous borders, corruption in government institutions, and poor intelligence gathering which made it easier for international terrorist to use SA as a transit hub and haven for terrorist activities such as illicit financing, cells and hiding (Cachalia and Schoeman 2017:4-6). South Africa has failed to heed seriously warnings from other foreign countries such as the USA, UK, and Australia about the existence and threats of terrorism in the country. Mozambique is just one porous border away, and the involvement of the SANDF in the fight against terrorism there has raised the threat, albeit SA's non-interventionist foreign policy (Hamilton, Bax and Sayed 2018:3).

During the early years of democracy, the security architecture was facing challenges on two fronts: the existence of vigilante groups such as PAGAD, the Boeremag (White right-wingers), and the existence of extremists who were using SA as a hub and respite for terrorist funding. Terrorism in SA does not only manifest itself based on home-

grown terror. Some incidents resembled an element of international terrorism. The challenges of border control and immigration in SA came under the spotlight when several incidents of terrorism happened beyond the borders of the Republic, with individuals allegedly in possession of South African passports. The integrity of the South African passports came under the microscope when several suspected terrorists were held with South African passports. Samantha Lewthwaite is under Interpol watch and dubbed “the White Widow.” she obtained a South African passport fraudulently and has been linked to al-Shabab and the attacks on the Westgate Mall, Nairobi in 2013 (De Wet and Tolsi 2013).

Botha (2014), Cachalia and Schoeman (2017) noted several cases where individuals suspected of terrorism used South African passports.

- January 2003, Ihsan Garnaoui, a Tunisian Al-Qaeda was held in Germany with a South African passport. He was accused of hatching a plan to bomb American and Jewish institutions.
- November 2003 Ibrahim Tantoush, a Libyan national, was deported to SA after his arrest in Indonesia with a fake South African passport.
- July 2005 Haroon Rashid Aswat, a UK citizen, was arrested in Zambia with a South African passport. His cellphone was linked to suicide bombers responsible for the 7/7 bombings in London. He was also wanted in the US for terrorist activities in Oregon.
- In 2006, Mohammed Gulzar was one of the suspects on trial for plotting to blow up flights between America, Britain, and Canada. He used a pseudonym when he entered Britain using a fake South African passport.
- August 2006 Rashid Rauf, the mastermind of the transatlantic plot, was also arrested in Pakistan with a fake South African passport.

Box 4.1. Events related to international extremist groups in South Africa, 1999 - 2016

- October 1999 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed is arrested in Cape Town for his role in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Mlambo & Masuku 2022:6).
- September 2004 Zubair Ismail and Feroz Ganchi arrested in Pakistan in an al-Qaeda safe house with senior al-Qaeda commander Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani.


- July 2008 Samantha Lewthwaite³⁴ “White Widow” reportedly enters SA.
- In October 2010, Henry Okah was arrested in Johannesburg for planning bombings in Abuja, Nigeria.
- In March 2015, a dozen South Africans were deported from Turkey for attempting to join ISIS.
- In April 2015, a 15-year-old girl was taken off a flight in Cape Town en route to Syria to join ISIS.
- July 2016 Ibrahim and Fatima Patel, and Brandon and Tony Thulsie are arrested on suspicion of planning terrorist activity.
- In July 2016, two suspects linked to ISIS travelling from Turkey were detained in Turkey and South Africa.

Source: Cachalia & Schoeman (2017:5)

Organised crime and corrupt government officials have enabled individuals with dubious character with links to terrorism to easily obtain South African passports for their nefarious activities (Botha 2014). In March 2022, more than 26 people, including foreign nationals, were arrested for issuing fraudulent passports at the Home Affairs in Krugersdorp (US Department of State 2022).

³⁴Addley, E & Hirsch, A. 2013. “White widow”: Interpol arrest warrant issued for Samantha Lewthwaite. *The Guardian*. 26 September. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/interpol-arrest-warrant-samantha-lewthwaite-white-widow> [Accessed on: 16 April 2024].

Figure 4.3: Flow of terrorism financing in South Africa



Source: Hosken, Hayman & Makhetha (2022)

Figure 4.3. above illustrates the problem SA is facing in addressing the flow of illicit money, the complex nature of terrorism financing, both on the domestic and international front. There are ISIS cells inside SA that transfer illicit funds and gold, which is subsequently used to fuel the Mozambican insurgency. Some of these funds have supposedly sponsored the attack on Kenya’s Westlands Office Park in 2019, killing 22 people, including a South African, Luke Potter (Hosken *et al*, 2022). The South African security architecture seems to be failing to detect the movement of such funds, especially if transferred from informal businesses like spaza shops through applications like Mama Money.³⁵

³⁵ *Mama Money is an international money transfer instrument that enables money to be transferred online across the borders.*

This is exacerbated by the poor regulation of the transfer of money through third-party payment providers (TPPPs) by an émigré community from Kenya, Somalia, and the DRC, which exposes SA to threats of terror financing (Hosken *et al*, 2022). Despite evidence of radicalisation by South Africans participating in terrorism activities through training and financing, it has been debated whether the response from security apparatus has been adequate if not ambiguous, garbled, and ineffective (Solomon 2013:3). The June 2024 Report on Terrorist Financing National Risk Assessment (TFNRA) elevated SA at a higher risk of terror financing from IS affiliates and its supporters.³⁶

4.5. POETIC JUSTICE: THE FIGHT BACK AGAINST PAGAD

The security architecture has a mammoth task in protecting the citizenry and responding effectively to the challenges of terrorism. There are mixed feelings about its efficacy despite SA already participating in the fight against terrorism in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Whether this can be translated into efficiency in SA is difficult to answer, considering the erratic successes in prosecuting terrorism suspects. The State's response to vigilante groups like PAGAD, far-right nationalists, extremists, and individuals engaging in terrorist activities was multi-pronged, decisive, and somewhat coordinated. The fightback operations were launched with various degrees of success. The National Operational Co-ordinating Committee (NOCOC), a joint response from SAPS and SANDF, spearheaded the fight against urban terrorism. The response was initiated into different notable operations.

4.5.1. Operation Recoil

This first step was launched on 23 October 1997 by NOCOC as a multi-disciplinary response with the Provincial Operational Co-ordinating Committee (POCOC) to counter the growing violence involving gangs, drug trafficking, and insecurity in the Western Cape. It encompassed intelligence gathering, visible policing and investigations (Boshoff *et al*, 2001:70; Dixon and Johns, 2001:15).

³⁶ *South African National Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Report of June 2024 assess the risk of terror financing in SA.*

4.5.2. Operation Saladin

This was availed on 12 January 1998 as a paradigm shift from Operation Recoil because the intensity of violence and murders had degenerated. Terrorists could be intercepted and apprehended before attacking their targets. This was achieved through intelligence-driven operations such as early detection, monitoring, and interception (Boshoff *et al*, 2001:74).

4.5.3. Operation Good Hope

As urban terrorism intensified, the security architecture also revised its rules of engagement with PAGAD. Operation Good Hope was set up in January 1999 and culminated in an increase in the deployment of more than a thousand police officers. This deployment excluded local police from Cape Town and dealt with terrorism, organised crime, intelligence gathering, and high-density policing against gangs, civil conflict, and taxi violence (Boshoff *et al*, 2001:76-79).

4.5.4. Operation Crackdown

From April 2000, the State initiated a surgical operation known as Operation Crackdown. This was originally meant to deal with gang violence. This operation identified the vulnerable segments or target areas through an integrated policing mechanism backed by enhanced communication technology, intelligence, organised crime, and investigative approach with crime prevention strategies (Boshoff *et al*, 2001:80-81). Operation Crackdown achieved some successes and PAGAD was dealt a crippling blow, and its footprint began to disappear in the Western Cape.

4.5.5. Operation Lancer

Operation Lancer³⁷ was launched days immediately after the 9/11 attacks against the USA. This could have been motivated by taking precautions to protect citizens and the USA's interest in South Africa. There were minimal PAGAD incidents during this period, and the operation was spread into the rest of the country to prevent crime.

³⁷*Operation Lancer was a judicious driven operation by the security architecture to institute a tactical policing master plan aiming at achieving successful prosecutions backed by intelligence to reduce urban terrorism. It played a significant role in prosecuting most of the Pagad members.*

Most of the PAGAD members were already dislodged by the multi-disciplinary police operations.

4.6. THE FIGHT BACK AGAINST BOEREMAG

The Boeremag was composed of Afrikaner right-wingers who were conservative and hesitated in embracing the new democratic dispensation. They felt that the new democratic SA from 1994 did not address their yearning for Afrikaner nationalism based on their Calvinist posture, religion, and language. According to Schönreich and Boshoff (2003:85), the farm attacks after 1994 rallied the Afrikaners, who accused the government of neglect because they purport to be victims of an ethnic massacre. Their dissatisfaction with the democratic government prompted them to engage in domestic terrorism against government infrastructure. The Boeremag was an insignificant group, and the security architecture did not consider them a threat. Around 2002, they seem to have fallen through the cracks and mounted a bombing and sabotage campaign against democratic South Africa. The security architecture reacted and launched Operation Zealot.

4.6.1. Operation Zealot

This was coordinated from the SAPS national head office in cooperation with structures from NICOC. A team of specialist investigators from SAPS was mustered, and it constituted the following:

- Crime Intelligence, which included Crimes Against the State (CATS) that investigated crimes against the state and the Boeremag's clandestine activities.
- Serious and Violent Crimes comprised of CATS and detective units to investigate crimes and terrorism committed by the Boeremag.
- Operational Response Services were involved in Intervention Units encompassing the Public Order Policing and National Task Force to mitigate the high-risk operations. High intensity intelligence gathering and coordination between the security architecture paid off when more than 23 Boeremag members were arrested (Schönreich and Boshoff 2003:77).

4.7. LEGISLATIVE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FRAMEWORK IN COMBATING TERRORISM

Before 1994, the apartheid government had terrorism legislation that had specific intent. The regime was fighting monumental resistance from liberation movements such as the ANC's MK, Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and others. The apartheid government classified these liberation movements as terrorists. Legislation such as the Terrorism Act, 1967, and the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (renamed Internal Security Act in 1976) was punitive and specifically used to punish political opponents of the regime. Post 1994, the democratic government was faced with a mammoth task of transformation, be it economic, social, and political, exacerbated by the vestiges of colonialism and the apartheid architecture.

Moreover, the transitional government has inherited widespread social ills and fragmentation. The government came under pressure when it could not arrest the challenges of crime, poverty, and unemployment. Communities became agitated and formed neighbourhood watches and community protection units to deal with crime. Organisations like PAGAD, the Boeremag were born and slowly became vigilante and right-wing organisations, respectively. The democratic government was compelled to respond; however, without enabling legislation to prosecute cases of terrorism, their effort became hollow. Legislations were introduced in congruence with the constitution that empowered the government to address the elusive phenomenon of both domestic and international terrorism. In October 1998, the South African Law Reform Commission was tasked with the mandate of reviewing all the security laws that were deemed regressive.

4.7.1. The Terrorism Policy, 1998

The official Anti-Terrorism Policy was approved in 1998 by the government. According to Solomon (2013:46), it is proposed that the South African government shall be committed to:

- Condemn all acts of terror;
- Take all lawful measures to prevent acts of terror and bring to justice those who are involved in acts of terror;
- Undertake to protect foreign citizens from acts of terror in South Africa;

- In the event of an act of terror in a foreign country and involving a South African citizen, co-operate with the host government to resolve the matter;
- Do not make concessions that would encourage extortion by terrorists;
- Not allow its territory to be used as a haven to plan, direct, or support acts of terror;
- Support and cooperate with the international community in their efforts to prevent and combat acts of terror;
- Use all appropriate measures to combat terrorism; and
- Support its citizens who are victims of terrorism.

This was a rational and encouraging approach by SA because the policy laid the foundation for the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law as enshrined in the constitution (Schönteich 2000:40).

4.7.2. The Draft Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2000

This was a contentious Bill because civil society and labour unions opposed it, citing gross violation of human rights if it were implemented in its current form. Those who criticised it contend that it was not in sync with the Bill of Rights as enshrined in the Constitution, 108 of 1996. Even the South African Law Commission and the Human Rights Commission voiced their dissatisfaction about the Bill, citing its draconian nature, especially the detention clause, which gives the security architecture wide powers to detain suspects for 14 days without trial. The security cluster was at pains to justify some of the clauses, albeit their support of the Bill. Their support was based on the notion that SA was facing challenges of terrorist activities, and in some instances, it was becoming a sanctuary and respite for international terrorism.

Boshoff *et al* (2001:129) have suggested that the Bill was amenable to abuse and could be used as a blunt instrument to punish political opponents as in the past. It reverses the gains in a democratic society, and it may also have unintended consequences against the citizenry. South Africa was under pressure from the international community to be seen to be doing something, considering that it was just after the terrorist bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the USA. In 2004, Charles Nqakula, former Minister of Safety and Security, in defence of the Bill, explained that:

“We go around making promises to co-operate with everyone, but as our law stands, we cannot deal with terrorism”.

However, the Bill was not passed because it needed to be amended for it to pass constitutional muster. In 2004, it was temporarily shelved so that it could be aligned with the Constitution.

4.7.3. Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 (POCDATARA)

The Department of Police is the custodian and is the enforcer of the POCDATARA Act. This law stemmed from the numerous policies and draft legislation on terrorism to formulate comprehensive terrorism legislation that conforms with the constitution and is acceptable to all and sundry. The Bill was crafted in a way that it does not only become a deterrent against terrorism but also complies with international instruments to counter terrorism (Solomon 2013:46). The government was meticulous because it could not afford to disregard the basic tenets of fundamental human rights and the supremacy of the Constitution when drafting this legislation. The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, simply summarised this in his keynote address to the plenary of the UN International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security.³⁸

“...that human rights and the rule of law must always be respected. As I see it, terrorism is in itself a direct attack on human rights and the rule of law. If we sacrifice them in our response, we will be handing victory to the terrorists”.

This Act ushered in a new regime in the fight against terrorism, It broke new ground because it amended some of the old apartheid Bills, such as the Internal Security Act, and aligned them with the democratic principles that embody human rights. This legislation is a buffer to protect SA and its citizens against domestic and international terrorism. The legislation also outlaws individuals from participating in terrorist activities both domestically and in foreign countries. Above all, it proposes stiffer penalties for those who were convicted of terrorism, and the court’s jurisdiction can

³⁸Annan, K. 2005. Keynote address to the closing Plenary of the UN International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, Spain. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2005-03-10/kofi-annan%E2%80%99s-keynote-address-closing-plenary-international> [Accessed on: 21 April 2024].

also preside over cases committed outside the republic. This Act was criticised in that terrorism is described and not defined in the POCDATARA Act.


4.7.4. Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998

This Act was in place to introduce measures to combat organised crimes, money laundering, criminal gangs, and to prosecute any entities that are involved in terrorism and other related activities. It also facilitates the seizure of assets of any entity that is involved in terrorism. It imposes severe penalties, and an accused convicted under this Act could face a maximum fine of one million rand or life imprisonment.

4.7.5. Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA)

Njotini (2015:528) has reported that the FICA was promulgated to respond to the scourge of terrorism. The FICA complements the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998. The Act reinforces a banking sector regime that is responsible, responsive, and receptive to regulatory frameworks and risk assessments in the financial sector. Montesh and Ngantweni (2009:133) suggested that the Act empowered security agencies to share information with counterparts from other countries regarding money laundering and terrorist activities. Financial institutions are obliged to detect and report unlawful transactions that may be used for terrorist financing to the FIC, which is responsible for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. The FIC is a member of the FATF.

Figure 4.4: FIC suspicious transaction report 2002 - 2012



Source: Goga (2014:69)

Figure 4.4. The above illustrates SA's terrorism concerns and use of a robust mechanism, 'follow the money' approaches to detect illicit financial flows in ten years (Goga 2014:69). As a result of the new trend in terrorism financing, SA has witnessed a rampant increase in suspicious transactions. Through the FIC, such transactions that are deemed suspicious get tracked and recorded. This is a testimony that SA's anti-money laundering (AML) mechanisms are making progress in mitigating terrorism financing.

4.7.5.1. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The FATF was formed in 1989 as a global financial watchdog by the G7 countries to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.³⁹ Its mandate is to *"lead a decisive, co-ordinated and effective global action to counter the threats of the abuse of the financial system by criminals and terrorists, and it can respond to these threats that all countries face"*. Countries are required to implement financial reforms that are impervious and able to address the illicit finance and terrorism funding. During February 2023, SA was grey-listed; it is still struggling to get off the grey list due to

³⁹FATF30. 2019. *30Years 1989/2019: Financial Action Task Force 30 Years*. Available at: <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/Fatf-30.html> [Accessed on: 21 April 2024].

failure to address some of the concerns flagged by FATF about money laundering and terrorism financing (Fabricius 2024:1).

Notably, SA is a financial hub, is vulnerable, and exposed to terrorism funding largely because of its geographic and economic standing, which facilitates transit in illicit goods and services for groups such as ISIL in the form of cash, cross-border remittances, banks, and virtual assets.⁴⁰ The South African Reserve Bank of South Africa (SARB) is central in the supervision of the FIC Act so that banks and other financial institutions can comply and implement financial reforms that mitigate illicit financial flows and money laundering.

Table 4.2: Request to FIC for Terrorism Related Intelligence from 2014 - 2019

Year Ending March 31	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total	Average
SAPS: DPCI-CATS	4	30	101	4	18	157	314	52
SAPS: DPCI- PCMC⁴¹	-	1	-	-	1	2	4	1
SAPS CI	-	3	5	22	22	52	104	17
SSA	2	-	6	-	2	10	20	3
NPA: AFU⁴²	1	1	-	-	-	2	4	1
Total	7	35	112	26	43	223	446	74

Source: FATF (2021)

Table 4.2. depicts how the FIC responds to requests from the various units of law enforcement on activities related to terrorism financing enquiries. The DPCI-CATS investigate terrorism and terrorism financing, and they have made significant requests for financial surveillance from FIC (FATF 2012:88).

⁴⁰FATF. 2021. *Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures-South Africa. Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report*, FATF, Paris. Available at: <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-south-africa-2021.html> [Accessed on: 21 April 2024].

⁴¹The Priority Crime Management Centre (PCMC) is one of the capabilities within the DPCI established for identifying those priority crimes outlook and respond accordingly through investigations.

⁴²National Prosecuting Authority. 2024. *Asset Forfeiture Unit: Making crime unprofitable*. Available at: <https://www.npa.gov.za/asset-forfeiture-unit> [Accessed on 16 May 2024]. The AFU seize assets identified as proceeds of crime.

4.7.6. Law Enforcement and the Criminal Justice System

The SAPS and the NPA play an important role in the enforcement of laws and prosecuting those who find themselves at odds with the law, including terrorism suspects. Section 205(3) of the Constitution provides that SAPS is responsible for preventing, combating, and investigating crime to protect the inhabitants of the Republic and enforce the law (South Africa 1996:105). There are various specialised units within the law enforcement agencies that all play a role in this.

- The Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigations (DPCI), known as the Hawks, focuses on those complex priority crimes, organised crime, as well as financial crimes. The unit responsible for combating terrorism is the CATS, which also focuses on financial and organised crimes.
- The National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 established the NPA, which prosecutes cases on behalf of the State. One of the important units here is the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU), which is assigned to prosecute terrorist offences under the POCDATARA Act, including terrorism financing.
- The Border Management Authority was established because of the Border Management Authority Act 2 of 2020. It is a recent authority in the South African security cluster responsible for border control and law enforcement at SA's ports of entry to prevent illegal border movements. It has successfully intercepted and prevented more than 281,000 illegal immigrants since its initial deployment (Defenceweb 2024). More than seven departments initially managed border management and security without a single controlling department, which heightened corruption and hampered service delivery due to competing priorities.⁴³ When fully operational, the BMA will play a pivotal role in tackling border security challenges in SA and its neighbours and reduce cross-border criminality and illegal crossings (BMA 2022).

4.8. GLOBAL FORA AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

South Africa is a member of international fora such as the UN, Interpol, Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), SADC, AU, and the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

⁴³BMA. 2023. *BMA Fact Sheet*. Available at: https://www.bma.gov.za/?page_id=13667 [Accessed on: 22 April 2024].

Globalisation and cooperation play a key role in the prevention of terrorism. All these blocs cooperate and share intelligence in the fight against terrorism. South Africa cooperates holistically with these regional and international forums in various ways in combating terrorism.

- South Africa is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, an apolitical multilateral platform whose overarching mission is to mobilise resources worldwide among states to prevent, combat, and prosecute terrorist acts and diminish their activities.⁴⁴ It contributes to the international architecture for addressing terrorism and providing valuable tools and expertise in the support of the UN efforts to fight terrorism.⁴⁵
- The 1999 AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism is an integrated harmonised strategy for the prevention and combating of terrorism through cooperation between member states to forestall terrorism.
- The UN Office on Drugs and Crime is an entity within the UN that is responsible for coordinating and giving technical assistance to member states and capacitating them in crafting legal instruments that will effectively prevent terrorism in line with the UN Charter.
- The SADC Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre is a partnership between SADC member states to nurture and mobilise a prompt response against terrorism. The SADC Military Mission (SAMIM), which was deployed on 15 July 2021 to fight terrorism in Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, is a typical example of this partnership (Amani Africa 2024).
- The 2020 BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy aims to strengthen ties among member states and contribute to global efforts of preventing and combating the threat of terrorism.⁴⁶


⁴⁴GCTF. 2024. Available at: <https://www.thegctf.org/> [Accessed on: 22 April 2024]

⁴⁵GCTF. 2024. Available at: <https://www.thegctf.org/Who-we-are/Background-and-Mission> [Accessed on: 22 April 2024].

⁴⁶BRICS. 2020. *Brics Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. Available at: <https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BRICS-Counter-terrorism-Strategy-2020.pdf> [Accessed on: 22 April 2024].

4.9. HOLISTIC APPROACH: GOVERNANCE LEVEL

Figure 4.5: Priority actions by governance level



Source: Hamilton et al (2018:4)

Figure 4.5. illustrates that different levels of governance play a pivotal role in the prevention of terrorism. A holistic approach in concert with a strong response at all levels fosters awareness and a cohesive multi-pronged approach against terrorism. Cooperation from international and down to the local level enhances collaborative

capacity building to realise and prevent the causes of terrorism at an early stage. In most cases, terrorism thrives because most countries, including SA, have been sluggish in developing a coordinated and unified response (Hamilton *et al*, 2018:3)

4.10. EFFICACY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AGAINST TERRORISM

Notably, SA has witnessed a mixed bag as far as terrorism is concerned. In the early years of democracy, PAGAD and the far-right extremists nearly derailed the democratic project. The security architecture was fighting crime on two fronts: terrorism and vigilantism. However, the government made inroads and managed to cripple PAGAD and the Boeremag. Most of the proteges of these organisations were arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. Albeit the demise of these organisations, SA lately is faced with the challenges of extremism and radicalisation, with the purported existence of terrorist cells and financing.⁴⁷ Arrests were made, but whether the security architecture can step up and sustain convictions remains to be seen.

4.10.1. Success of the security architecture

The following were some of the successes that were mounted against terrorism. The neutralisation of PAGAD and the Boeremag was a result of a concerted effort by the security architecture that instituted a multi-disciplinary approach to mitigate the protagonists' terrorism crusade. The emergence of the erstwhile Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), known as the Scorpions, in 2001 added an impetus point in the fight against urban terrorism.⁴⁸ Their success was bolstered when they managed to get some convictions against members of PAGAD and the Boeremag. Unfortunately, in 2009, the DSO was disbanded in what many believe was a politically charged decision. Terrorism financing remains a complex challenge to deal with, probably due to a lack of skilled law enforcement agencies specialising in financial crimes.

⁴⁷Hosken, G., Hayman, A. & Makhetha, T. 2022. SA's IS crisis: How R6bn got from spaza shops to African terrorists. TimesLive. 08 May. Available at: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times-daily/news/2022-05-08-sas-is-crisis-how-r6bn-got-from-spaza-shops-to-african-terrorists/#:~:text=The%20Hawks%20> [Accessed on: 05 June 2024].

⁴⁸Schrieber S. 2023. Zondo says disbanding the Scorpions was the "worst decision ever". Business Day. 9 November. Available at: <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2023-11-09-zondo-says-disbanding-scorpions-was-the-worst-decision-ever/> [Accessed on: 22 April 2024].

- In November 1999, the State scored its first victory by successfully prosecuting PAGAD member Dawood Osman when he was sentenced to 32 years for murder (Dixon and Johns 2001:17).
- In 2000, a series of PAGAD trials were conducted; Ronald Johnson was sentenced to 12 years for murder, Mansour Leggett was convicted of 11 murders and 7 attempted murders, Mogamat Isaacs got 25 years for murder, and Ebrahim Jeneker got three life sentences for three murders (Gottschalk 2005:9).
- The Boeremag trial has been the longest and expensive trial in the history of SA, totalling R36 million in legal fees.⁴⁹ After the Boeremag were arrested in November 2002, they were finally found guilty of terrorism and high treason after a marathon trial that lasted for 10 years in the North Gauteng High Court and were subsequently sentenced on the 29th of October 2013. The Boeremag leaders Tom Vorster was sentenced to 25 years while Mike du Toit, Dirk Hanekom, and Dr Lets Pretorius received 30 years imprisonment. The rest of the group received sentences ranging from five to 20 years' imprisonment.⁵⁰

Box 4.2. Success on International Terrorism Financing: Henry Okah

South Africa has been under pressure from the West, which regarded it as a less credible partner in the fight against terrorism. On October 2010 Henry Okah a terror suspect, and leader of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was arrested in connection with the bombings in Warri and Abuja that killed 12 and injuring 53 others (FATF 2021:86). The world was watching whether SA could deal with terror suspects away from their home soil. The complex trial was a test case in the efficacy of the security architecture and its ability to respond appropriately to international terrorism (Ewi 2010:1). To South Africa's credit on January 21, 2013, Okah was convicted on 13 counts of terrorism and received 24 years in prison, the first to be prosecuted under the POCDATARA Act of 2004 (Country Reports on Terrorism 2012:35). The trial was led by the PCLU of the NPA. It was a clear demonstration of South Africa's resolve in the global fight against terrorism (Fai 2013).

⁴⁹Venter, Z. 2013. *Bill for Boeremag trial hits R36m*. IOL. 28 October. Available at: <https://www.iol.co.za/news/bill-for-boeremag-trial-hits-r36m-1598256> [Accessed on: 22 April 2024].

⁵⁰SAHO. 2023. *Boeremag Treason Trial Timeline*. Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/boeremag-treason-trial-timeline> [Accessed on: 22 April 2024].

- Similarly, the other case that resembled international terrorism was the arrest of the Thulsie twins in 2016 Johannesburg, for conspiring with IS.⁵¹ The State's case against them was that they intended to carry out terror attacks against the USA, UK, Russia, France, foreign embassies, and Israeli interests in South Africa. In January 2022, the brothers were convicted and sentenced to 11 and 8 years, respectively. They were indicted under the POCDATARA Act, including terrorism funding (FATF 2021:87).

4.10.2. Failures

Despite the security architecture's successes, it also suffered judicial losses. There were cases against PAGAD members and extremist individuals where the State could not sustain the charges.

- In August 1996, PAGAD's Nadthmie Edries and accomplices were acquitted on sedition charges (Dixon and Johns 2001:13).
- The case against PAGAD member Ozeer Booley, accused of the murder of Hard Livings co-leader, Rashaad Staggie, was a spectacular failure due to police infighting and poor communication.⁵²
- A series of failed prosecutions between 1998 -1999 continued partly because of divisions within the police and intimidation of witnesses (Dixon and Johns 2001:19).
- In October 2000, the Mhatey brothers were acquitted due to poor police investigative work (Dixon and Johns 2001:22).
- On the 11th of May 2018, the Shia Mosque in Durban, Verulam was attacked, reminiscent of an ISIS-inspired attack (Fataar 2019:87). The Hawks arrested 12 men for the deadly attack and charged them with terrorism, murder, and other related crimes. The case was struck off the roll when the state could not proceed because of undue delays (Pillay 2020).

⁵¹Simelane, B. & Fabricius, P. 2022. *Thulsie twins convicted on terror charges after plea bargain*. *Daily Maverick*. 7 February. Available at: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-07-thulsie-twins-convicted-on-terror-charges-after-plea-bargain/> [Accessed on: 23 April 2024].

⁵²Duffy, A. 1998. *Cape police split over Staggie investigation*. *Mail and Guardian*. 9 April. Available at: <https://mg.co.za/article/1998-04-09-cape-police-split-over-staggie-investigation/> [Accessed on: 24 April 2024].

4.10.3. The Difficult Road Ahead

Nonetheless, the State has arrested the plotters and instigators of the July 2021 Uprisings. Despite the ambiguity and uncertainty, the State charged 65 of the arrested individuals with terrorism, sedition, public violence, and conspiracy to murder.⁵³ The burning warehouse below is in figure 4.6. It is one of the many destroyed buildings that has compelled the State to add charges of terrorism to the instigators. It is yet to be determined whether the State will be able to ‘cross the Rubicon’ and sustain the charges under the Terrorism Act and related prescripts. Subsequently, the seat of SA’s democracy, the Parliament Building, was set on fire at the beginning of 2022, and Zandile Mafe was charged with arson, housebreaking, and terrorism but was declared unfit to stand trial.⁵⁴

Figure 4.6: Burning warehouse during violence and looting in Durban, July 2021 Uprisings



Source: Ngwenya (2022)⁵⁵

⁵³Hlangu, L. 2023. July 21 riots instigators to be charged under Terrorism Act. Sowetan Live. 12 May. Available at: <https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2023-05-12-july-2021-riots-instigators-to-be-charged-under-terrorism-act/> [Accessed on: 30 March 2024].

⁵⁴Imray, G. 2023. Man accused of terrorism over fire at South African Parliament says he ‘burned it intentionally’. APNews. 13 July. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/south-africa-court-parliament-fire-96bed1f8dd21f569b730787c20ecb4dd> [Accessed on: 07 June 2024].

⁵⁵Ngwenya, A. 2022. NPA in KZN seek to add charge of terrorism to July Unrest instigators. SABC NEWS. 30 November. Available at: <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/npa-in-kzn-seeks-to-add-charge-of-terrorism-to-2021-july-unrest-instigators/> [Accessed on: 12 May 2024].

After the contentious Anti-Terrorism Bill was introduced, the government initiated the POCDATARA Act, a pragmatic Act that has seen some isolated success in the prosecution of individuals involved in terrorist activities. The POCDATARA Act was further amended in 2022 to align it with the international instruments and address issues of foreign travel, terrorism training, and publications with unlawful terrorism content. The General Laws Amendment Act 23 of 2022 also amended the FICA to include anti-money laundering and combating terrorism financing.

Operation Prosper continues to maintain law and order to bring normalcy to the country.⁵⁶ On the other hand, Operation Shanela also exists, and in one year since its inception has seen more than 500,000 suspects apprehended on various crimes across the country.⁵⁷ Overall, SA is facing remarkable challenges in addressing some of the deficiencies in the enforcement of financial and terrorism financing, as raised by FATF. Nevertheless, the two events of the July 21 unrest and the burning of the Parliament of SA exposed the security architecture's incapacibilities in their response to terrorism.

4.11. SUMMARY

This chapter dealt with the manifestation of both domestic and international terrorism in SA. The rise of PAGAD and the emergence of the Boeremag were highlighted. Some transactional footprints were indicative that SA is also facing a rise in extremism. The response from the security architecture in dealing with this phenomenon was a mixed bag of both a success and a failure. In the next chapter, a synopsis of the terrorism measures by developed and developing countries will be accentuated.

⁵⁶Operation Prosper came into existence as an operational response to the July 21 Unrest. The SANDF is co-opted to support the SAPS as they maintain law and order.

⁵⁷Motsoere, G. 2024. Over 500 000 suspects arrested since Operation Shanela's inception. EWN. 07 April. Operation Shanela was ushered in May 2023 to clamp down on crime in high-density areas within South Africa. Available at: <https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/04/07/over-500-000-suspects-arrested-since-operation-shanelas-inception> [Accessed on: 21 May 2024].

CHAPTER 5: TERRORISM RESPONSE BY A DEVELOPED & DEVELOPING COUNTRY

5.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, some counterterrorism measures will be discussed, referring to case studies of the USA and Mali. This chapter is important because these countries have proven terrorism policies that SA can emulate in its strategy in combating terrorism. South Africa can learn a great deal if it coordinates with other regional partners that can aid its terrorism efforts. Developed countries like the USA have, since the 9/11 attacks, made some robust changes in their response to terrorism. Just like any other country, the USA faces challenges of both domestic and international terrorism. Some developing countries, despite their economic challenges, have put the agenda on terrorism to the pinnacle. The Sahel countries, including Mali, are faced with a rise in extremism because of jihadist movements, al-Qaeda, and ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) activities in the region. The inclusion of this chapter in the research is to explain terrorism from the perspective of how other countries are responding to this phenomenon. South Africa can learn a great deal from these countries, albeit with disparities in resources. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, described the Sahel as a “microcosm of cascading global risk converging in one region.”⁵⁸

5.2. COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES BY A DEVELOPED COUNTRY

The strategic objective of developed countries like the USA is to build cooperation blocks with other countries around the world to increase the capacity to counter terrorism. Even the rich countries cannot succeed in the fight against terrorism alone.

5.3. THE CASE OF THE USA

“Terrorists try to operate in the shadows. They try to hide. But we’re going to shine the light of justice on them”.

Former President of the USA, George W. Bush (2001)

The USA is among the world’s most influential and advanced nations. Many countries have learnt a lot from the USA on how to respond to the challenges of terrorism. During

⁵⁸Joshi, M. 2023. *Where is Sahel region exactly and what’s the trouble there.* WIONEWS. 01 August. Available at: <https://www.wionews.com/world/explained-where-is-sahel-region-exactly-and-whats-the-trouble-there-621348> [Accessed on: 01 May 2024].

the George W. Bush Administration, the phrase “Axis of Evil” was personified to depict Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as bastions and supporters of terrorism. The USA counter-terrorism measures were militarised, and perceived terrorists were pursued aggressively through intelligence, greater deterrence, and stiffer punishment (Solomon 2013:10). Immediately after 9/11, the USA embarked on an extensive campaign of retribution against countries perceived to be harbouring and sponsors of terrorism.

5.3.1. The spark: 9/11 terrorist attacks

The USA was awakened on September 11, 2001, by the bombing of the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon. This was initiated by the jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda networks, which was led by the erstwhile Osama Bin Laden. They hijacked aeroplanes and diverted them to their targets. This was the most devastating terrorist attack on US soil, both in human and economic cost. More than 3000 people perished in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This was the watershed moment for the world and the USA specifically. In the USA, this was the spark that changed the world in the fight against terrorism. The security architecture in the USA had to embark on a robust response.⁵⁹ The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was America’s war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq in pursuit of Al-Qaeda. Whether this was a successful crusade against the spread of terrorism around the world remains unanswered.

5.3.2. The rise of domestic terrorism in the USA


Coalitions and partnerships that the USA has created on a global scale have somewhat disrupted terrorism capabilities, including their modus operandi and clandestine financing. However, the USA is experiencing a new trend of terrorism. There has been a significant rise in domestic terrorism in the USA because of far-right and far-left extremism, radicalisation, and political polarisation.⁶⁰ There has been a

⁵⁹Huiskes, K. 2024. *Timeline: The September 11 terrorist attacks*. UVA, Miller Centre. Available at: <https://millercenter.org/remembering-september-11/september-11-terrorist-attacks> [Accessed on: 02 May 2024].

⁶⁰Doxsee, C., Jones, S.G, Thompson, J, Halstead, K. & Hwang, G. 2022. *Pushed to extremes: Domestic terrorism amid polarization and protest*. Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Brief. Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/pushed-extremes-domestic-terrorism-amid-polarization-and-protest> [Accessed on: 02 May 2024].

new norm in the USA where most of the domestic terrorism happens when public demonstrations are a target. This competing scenario creates a dilemma within the security architecture on how to police this trend.

Figure 5.1: Domestic terrorism in the USA 2014 - 2019



Source: *Global Terrorism Database (2014-2020)*⁶¹

Figure 5.1. demonstrates a synopsis of domestic terrorism in the USA between 2014 and 2019. However, it indicates a disturbing trend of exponential growth of home-grown terrorism. The USA to date faces an increase in right-wing terrorism perpetrated by lone wolf offenders who have access to weapons and attack soft targets (Combs 2023:18-19).

5.3.3. The US Expansion of the Terrorism Prevention Architecture

The USA adopted a multi-pronged approach against terrorism. In 2003, after the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was created. This department is the engine that propels the various agencies and mobilises the enterprise that oversees

⁶¹*Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 2014-2020. United States of America. Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2014&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2020&end_mon [Accessed on: 20 April 2024].*

the threats and responses against terrorism. Some of the USA's innovative terrorism prevention strategies are explained below. In March 2019 the USA through its Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Daesh launched a series of military operations in Iraq and Syria which led to the destruction of the “caliphate” (Country Reports on Terrorism 2019:2). After 9/11 the then President of the USA, George W. Bush signed critical legislation that bolstered the fight against terrorism and security which includes the following.⁶²

5.3.3.1. The USA Patriot Act of 2001

This eminent legislation empowered the Department of Justice to launch extensive investigations, arrest, prosecute, and convict individuals who are involved in terrorism. This Act is meant to calibrate law enforcement in the United States to mitigate international money laundering and terrorism financing. It scrutinised foreign financial institutions that are exposed to criminal abuse by terrorists. It further prevents the use of the United States' financial system for nefarious activities related to terrorism and money laundering.⁶³

5.3.3.2. Homeland Security Act of 2002

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 and has an overarching role in the protection of the USA against terrorism. Through its Counter Terrorism Bureau and Terrorism Screening Centre the United States can share intelligence on terrorism with its foreign partners (U.S. Department of State 2022:6). Various other departments were assimilated into forming this gigantic enterprise that will be able to secure the homeland's land, sea, and air space against threats of terrorism. In 2005, it developed a six-point plan that empowered the DHS to respond effectively to the threats of terrorism.⁶⁴

⁶²The White House. 2003. *Securing the homeland*. Available at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/progress/securing.html> [Accessed on: 05 May 2024].

⁶³United States Government. *Financial Crimes Enforcement Network*. Available at: <https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/usa-patriot-act> [Accessed on: 04 October 2024].

⁶⁴Department of Homeland Security. 2022. *Department Six-point Agenda*. Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/department-six-point-agenda> [Accessed on: 05 May 2024].

5.3.3.3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI was transformed and streamlined to expand on its mandate and include the prevention of terrorism in the main. The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) are seasoned agencies within the FBI who are highly skilled and able to trace, collect and share intelligence with other agencies to prevent any form of terrorism threat (Mayer 2016:3). The Department of State's Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum (CTLEF) focuses on information sharing and coordination to counter violent extremism (U.S. Department of State 2022:3).

5.3.3.4. National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, 2021

This national strategy "provides an overarching approach to address today's manifestation of the domestic terrorism threat as well as the evolving forms that the threat may take in the years ahead" (The White House 2021:6). The National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism is composed of four strategic pillars that are guiding principles in the prevention of domestic terrorism as listed below (The White House 2021:15; 19; 23; 27).

- Embrace and exchange information on domestic terrorism.
- Discourage violent actions and recruitment for domestic terrorism.
- Disrupt and prevent domestic terrorism.
- Confront underlying contributors to domestic terrorism.

5.3.3.5. Counterterrorism measures through Partnership

The USA has realised that resources alone cannot stop the activities of terrorists. Forging relationships and partnerships to disrupt the activities of terrorists requires multilateralism and cooperation from other countries. The USA is also part of a broader coalition with other multilateral organisations that have terrorism prevention initiatives like the UN, cooperation with the EU, and the Organisation of American States (OAS). The Council of Europe (CoE) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are also part of the coalition to defeat ISIS.

This not only mobilises resources against terrorism but also engenders a coordinated and comprehensive response in degrading terrorists' cells around the world. Such multilaterals further act as a unified bloc with the capacity to prevent terrorism globally.

- The GCTF was formed in September 2011 as an international terrorism architecture that has built an extensive network among members to cooperate and strengthen their security strategies to combat terrorism (Country Reports on Terrorism 2019:214).
- The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) is a century-old organisation. Since this is a global police organisation, members share databases, communication systems, and intelligence about terror suspects and transnational crime (Country Reports on Terrorism 2019:217).
- The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS was formed in 2014 and boasts 87 members who are committed to degrading and defeating ISIS, disrupting its financing and economic activities, and dismantling its propaganda.⁶⁵

5.4. THE CASE OF MALI AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: TERRORIST EPICENTER

The Sahel, including Mali, has been described as the epicenter of terrorism and has become a theater for global geopolitical competition from Russia, the West, and its former colonial power, the French (Global Terrorism Index 2023:3-5). It was part of the G5 Sahel founded in 2014, a developmental and security pact between Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, up until its withdrawal in June 2022 just after the coup.⁶⁶ Its internal political challenges were exacerbated by the coup in May 2021, creating a void that the terrorists' organisations are exploiting due to a lack of effective governmental control (Reliefweb 2015:34).

Mali's complicated relationship with France, Russia, and the United States created a tumultuous situation that the transitional government is facing. The porous borders and the terrain have become a battle ground for ISIS Sahel and some jihadists who cross the tri-borders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger without detection. Terrorist groups seek respite and use Mali as a launching pad for terrorist activities across the region. The transitional government's relationship with the West has left Mali vulnerable because France and its protégé, the EU, withdrew their resources. During December 2021, the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company (PMC), has

⁶⁵The Global Coalition. 2024. *87 Partners: United in enduring Daesh's enduring defeat*. Available at: <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/> [Accessed on: 05 May 2024].

⁶⁶United Nations News. 2022. *Mali's withdrawal from G5 Sahel, Joint Force 'a setback' for the region*. May 2022. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118582> [Accessed on: 03 May 2024].

since replaced the void left by France, but their success against the jihadists is subject to speculation.⁶⁷

Table 5.1: Fatal terrorist attacks in Mali during 2022


Country	Date	Province	Deaths	Description
Mali	19/06/22	Mopti Region	110	Several villages were attacked by jihadists.
	07/08/22	Gao Region	42	Jihadists killed 42 soldiers and wounded 22.
	09/09/22	Gao Region	30	The Islamic State (IS) killed almost 30 civilians.
	05/12/22	Gao Region	70	Jihadist Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) killed an unconfirmed number of civilians associated with the Islamic State (IS).
	07/12/22	Gao Region	100	JNIM fighters were attacked by IS.

Source: Global Terrorism Index (2023:10-11)

Table 5.1. above indicates the intensity of terrorist attacks in Mali during 2022. Between June and December 2022, there were more than 350 casualties due to terrorist attacks in the Mopti and Gao regions, respectively. This illustrates that the transitional government's counterterrorism strategy is maladjusted as it faces escalating attacks in the region. The Malian army is ill-equipped and poorly trained to repel the jihadists, especially in the northern region. The death of Chadian president Idriss Déby in 2020 on the battlefield worsened the situation since he was viewed as a buffer against jihadist advances in Mali.

⁶⁷Giustozzi, A. 2024. *A mixed picture: How Mali views the Wagner Group*. RUSI. 27 March. Available at: <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mixed-picture-how-mali-views-wagner-group> [Accessed on: 12 May 2024].

Figure 5.2: Terror deaths in Mali, 2012 – 2022



Source: Global Terrorism Index (2023:66)

The period between 2012 - 2022, as shown in Figure 5.2, is a testimony to the escalating terror attacks in Mali. There are multi-faceted reasons why this trend continues to bedevil this country. Among the reasons is poor governance, corruption, and Mali is ranked at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI), which feeds well for terrorists to mobilise against the government and win sympathisers (Global Terrorism Index 2023:66).

5.4.1. Mali: Operational Response Against Terrorism

Mali must foster cooperation with other countries if they are to envisage success in the fight against terrorism. Due to sanctions and other challenges after the coup in 2021, Mali is struggling to push back terrorists from its shores. The UN, the French, and some funding from the EU have been assisting the government of Mali in the fight against terrorism. With the recent turmoil created by the withdrawal of the French forces and the end of the deployment in 2023 of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), terrorist attacks are not abating.

5.4.1.1. Operation Barkhane

It began in August 2014 as an incremental force from Operation Serval.⁶⁸ This was led by the French in cooperation with the Malian forces to degrade the spread of extremists' groups such as the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the northern Mali (Reliefweb 2015:34). Following the May 2021 coup this marked the death knell of Operation Barkhane when relations between Mali and the French soured when the junta accused France of not fulfilling their promise.⁶⁹ Operation Barkhane was protracted and became one of the most expensive operations in the history of French involvement in the Sahel after eight years in Mali.⁷⁰ Figure 5.3. below shows the withdrawal of the French troops, marking the end of Operation Barkhane in February 2022.

Figure 5.3: Withdrawal of French Troops and End of Operation Barkhane



Source: Doxsee, Thompson & Harris (2022)⁷¹

⁶⁸ This was a French military operation to degrade and eliminate jihadists in Mali.

⁶⁹ King, I. 2023. *How France failed Mali: the end of Operation Barkhane*. Harvard International Review (HIR) Available at: <https://hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane/#:~:text=Macron's%20announcement%20explicitly%20named%20the,its%20pro> [Accessed on: 04 May 2024].

⁷⁰ Forson, P.V. 2021. *Sahel: Emmanuel Macron announces the eminent end of Operation Barkhane*. Le Point. 11 Nov. Available at: https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/sahel-emmanuel-macron-acte-la-fin-prochaine-de-l-operation-barkhane-11-06-2021-2430495_3826.php?ref=hir.harvard.edu [Accessed on: 04 May 2024].

⁷¹ Doxsee, C., Thompson, J. & Harris, M. 2022. *The end of Operation Barkhane and the future of counterterrorism in Mali*. CSIS. Available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/end-operation-barkhane-and-future-counterterrorism-mali> [Accessed on: 05 May 2024].

5.4.1.2. Operation Seno

It was launched in 2015 and was the brainchild of the Malian army, with the presence of MINUSMA in the northern region of Mopti. This operation managed to offer a reprieve by pushing back some Islamic militants.

5.4.1.3. Operation Gabi

It was launched in 2016 between the Malian, Burkina, and French forces. The operation could not successfully mitigate the threats from terrorists as some of the extremists simply withdrew and went underground.⁷²

5.4.2. Partnership and Legislative Response against Terrorism

Above all, the operational response alone could not succeed without improving the domestic legislation and prosecuting those involved in terrorism. The kinetic response should be complemented by a legislative framework that will mitigate terrorism.

5.4.2.1. The Malian Penal Code of 2013

This was passed to mitigate terrorism and organised crime. It plays a pivotal role in the prosecution of terrorists (Reliefweb 2015:35).

5.4.2.2. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

Mali is part of this multifaceted organisation established in 2005, funded by the US to mobilise resources and capacity in areas of military and law enforcement to prevent terrorism through collaboration, border security, investigation, and sharing intelligence on terrorism financing (Reliefweb 2015:12).

5.4.2.3. US Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance Program

The USA Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance Program has helped Mali work closely with the UN and European Union in terms of capacity building, counterterrorism training, border security and policing reform, and effectiveness (Reliefweb 2015:35).

⁷²International Crisis Group. 2016. *Central Mali: An uprising in the making?* Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making> [Accessed on: 03 May 2024].

Mali is also a member of FATF and the Inter-Governmental Action Group in West Africa, whose organs are responsible for preventing financing of terrorism and money laundering (Reliefweb 2015:36).

5.4.2.4. International and Regional Cooperation

Mali is a member of various organisations that subscribe to the prevention of terrorism in a multilateral landscape, such as the regional bloc Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). In January 2024, Mali gave ECOWAS its intention to withdraw from the bloc, accusing it of being under the influence of foreign powers, its insistence on imposing sanctions, and its failure to support it against terrorism.⁷³ The military junta did not help the situation since their USA and French relationship became untenable, Mali was suspended from the AU, and further withdrew its membership from the G5 Sahel (U.S. Department of State 2022:30).

Furthermore, Mali is also a member of the UN, AU, and the GCTF. The EU military training mission in Mali played an integral role in training Malian forces and members of the G5 Sahel to deter terrorism. After 11 years, the EU has announced that it will not extend its mandate beyond 18 May 2024 after its strategic review and deterioration in its relationship with the military junta.⁷⁴ These organisations have comprehensive terrorism policies that are essential in the prevention of terrorism. Mali's cooperation with these organisations substantially mitigates the risk of terrorism in the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have since forged a military pact called Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) to protect their territorial integrity.⁷⁵

5.5. SUMMARY

In this chapter, terrorism response measures by developed and developing countries were discussed. The USA's terrorism pushback was explained, considering its global partnership with other countries. In the developing sphere, Mali, as another case study in the African Continent, was a good example of a country that is bedeviled by the

⁷³Allegrozzi, I. 2024. *Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger quit regional bloc*. Human Rights Watch (HRW) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/02/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-quit-regional-bloc> [Accessed on: 04 May 2024].

⁷⁴CNBCAfrica. 2024. *EU to close Mali military training mission*. Reuters. 8 May. Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/wire/633747/> [Accessed on: 10 May 2024].

⁷⁵ASS was created as an alternative against ECOWAS which was accused being influenced by foreign nations.

challenges of terrorism. The inclusion of this chapter in the research is to explain terrorism from the perspective of how other countries are responding to this phenomenon. South Africa has a choice; it is compelled to cooperate with other countries in the fight against terrorism globally. The following chapter will present the findings, analysis, and recommendations as the results of the research are concluded.

CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION


6.1. INTRODUCTION

This last chapter will encompass some findings and recommendations that would have solved the puzzle of the research questions. Consequently, data collected from the participants to answer some research questions will suffice in this chapter. Since this was qualitative research and data were recorded, it was then transcribed and analysed. This was done to recognise themes that were in sync with the aims and objectives of the research. After engagement with the data collected from participants, findings and recommendations were formulated.

6.2. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The graph below represents the overall opinions of the 10 participants on the efficacy of security architecture in combating terrorism.

Figure 6:1. Opinion scale by participants on the efficacy of security agencies in South Africa



Participants in this research were anonymised hence they are represented by P1 to P10. On the interview schedule and questionnaire, I have asked all the participants to measure their opinion using a Likert scale between 1 to 5 on how capacitated and efficient the South African security agencies are in combating terrorism. The number

between 1 and 5 represented the participant's sentiments, with 1 representing strongly inefficient, 2 representing inefficient, 3 representing not convinced (neutral), 4 representing efficient, and 5 representing strongly efficient. The chart above indicates the following trends:

- Three participants rated the security architecture as strongly inefficient.
- Three participants rated the security architecture as inefficient.
- Three participants were not convinced whether the security architecture is efficient or not.
- One participant rated the security architecture as efficient
- Out of the 10 participants, only one rated the security architecture as efficient. The data shows that SA's security architecture is not doing well as perceived by the sentiments from participants.

6.2.1. Findings on Research Questions

- **What is the capacity and efficacy of the South African security agencies in combating acts of terrorism?**

The participants were asked about the primary theme on the efficacy of the security agencies. Answers from participants were almost in concert and similar.

Interviewer: Are the security agencies effective in combating terrorism?

P1: You mean combating terrorism in SA?

Interviewer: Yes.

P1: Our security agencies are far from effective. SA has a confused policy in terms of response to terrorism.

P2: Not at all, they (security departments) will be found wanting with this leadership and lack of coordination.

P3: They are not effective unless there is political will and less political interference. ISIS footprints exist in SA, and security agencies know this.

P4: You mean police, they cannot do it, they cannot deal with crime, so how will they manage terrorism?

P5: In fact, the security agencies in our country are fragmented, so which unit will respond to terrorism? There is a veil of ambiguity in SA's terrorism architecture.....so this is a failure of leadership and politics in these agencies is crippling them.

P6: SA's security agencies are ready and capacitated to deal with terrorism. The only problem may be coordination and mobilisation. However, in terms of resources, the security agencies are well-equipped to deal with terror.

P10: Regrettably, the security agencies will not be effective in this regard; this can be attributed to a lack of capacity, skills shortages, poor leadership, and competition among agencies is not helping. The intelligence structures have been hollowed out. Do you know that SA has been grey-listed because it cannot address terror financing, and worse, there is speculation that ISIS cells exist in SA.

P7, 8, and 9 in their answers simply indicated that they are not sure, and as such, they were not able to determine whether South African agencies are capable of combating terrorism. As P9 commented:

"Time will tell whether security agencies are capable and effective, only if there is a significant attack in SA by terrorists like what happened in that mall in Kenya, you know i mean it's not a wish list however SA should always be alert especially with emerging threats on terror funding and its involvement in Cabo Delgado".

A mere analysis of the responses from the participants, one would deduce that the main theme is incapacity and inefficiency. The research found that the security departments in SA work in silos and some structures serve at the behest of politics. Some authors, such as Solomon (2011), Pigou & Opperman (2021), have suggested that the security departments are hollowed out and devoid of intelligence capacity. High-Level Review Panel on the SSA (2018:82) revealed that the intelligence community was ineffective and received inferior training. The work of the DPCI, FIC, and Independent Directorate (ID) of the NPA is hampered by a shortage of qualified staff, which impedes its efficacy. On the other hand, SAPS faces skill deficit and policing shortfalls, incapable of dealing with organised and financial crimes (Merten 2023).

▪ **How is domestic and international terrorism perceived in South Africa?**

Interviewer: How do you perceive domestic and international terrorism in SA?

P1: SA, as compared to other countries, is not as affected by both domestic and international terrorism as one might expect. Democracy is thriving here, but terror financing is a problem.

Interviewer: I mean, does it somehow exist here, or does it pose some challenges in SA?

P2: Globalisation, democracy, and illegal immigration bring another dimension, and it is perceived that because of porous borders, terrorists and illicit financial flows easily cross the border. BMA is still under-capacitated to deal with cross-border crimes and illegal immigration.

P3: Do you know that PAGAD AND Boeremag were a form of domestic threat, and recently ISIS and other extremists are purported to have cells in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. Remember, ISIS is an international terror group, and there are individuals here in SA who joined ISIS as far as Syria and Iraq. We should be worried.

"It's a scary staff considering that these people are South Africans and are now radicalised."

"However, look, PAGAD and the Boeremag were dealt with successfully, but now a new form of terrorism is emerging, and it's terror financing."

P4: If SA does not address inconsistent policy on terror and review some legislation that deals with terrorism, I am afraid combating this phenomenon will be a pipe dream. SA is greylisted because of international terror financing.

P5: Domestic terrorism is not only perceived, remember the Thulsie twins, Verulum mosque attack, and other pockets of attacks. The SANDF is fighting ISIS in Mozambique, exposing SA to revenge attacks. You cannot just rule that out, Mozambique is just a border away, isn't it?

P6: There is very, I mean limited existence of both domestic and international terrorism here. In fact, the security agencies here are not threatened by this perception because let me tell you, it remains a perception. Look, PAGAD, Henry Okah, and Thulsie twins were prosecuted here.

P7: Domestic and international terrorism raises alarm; that may exist, but they do not pose any threat to SA. So, SA is democratic and non-aligned, so terrorism is far-fetched unless otherwise.

P9: We have terrorism legislation that can prosecute both domestic and international terrorism. It's a matter of capacitating the criminal justice system together with security agencies.

P10: There is no doubt that domestic and international terrorism is getting attention from the government, but SA can still do better on the policy implementation. SA is not an island; terrorism is an international phenomenon.

The participants have alluded to the successful prosecution of PAGAD, Henry Okah, and the Boeremag members as a positive development to build a better terrorism prevention strategy. During 2016, SA for the first time acknowledged the existence and threat posed by ISIS cells in the Republic (U.S. Department of State 2020). Githing'u (2021) advanced that the existence of ISIS cells and participation of South Africans who travelled abroad in Syria and Iraq to join ISIS indicates how international terrorism affects SA.

Cross-border crime and e-money transactions have exacerbated the flow of illicit finances, which fund terror activities across the globe. Participants agree that SA is failing to disrupt terrorism financing because the security architecture cannot successfully trace such transactions due to a lack of skills to prosecute financial crimes.

Similarly, Hoffman (1993) confirmed that radicalisation and religious ideology have influenced South Africans to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Fabricius (2020) has indicated that SA is compelled to intervene in Mozambique to fight ISIS, ostensibly driving SA into international terrorism.

Democratic euphoria seems to have overshadowed the need to maintain and protect the border when a decision was made to downsize law enforcement at the borders. Participants suggested that the sordid reality of the SANDF's involvement in the fight against insurgents in Mozambique is a precursor for SA to build and strengthen a preemptive strategy mechanism against terrorism. The BMA still falls short of protecting the vulnerable section of the borderline due to staff shortages and budgetary constraints. The research has confirmed that the South African security agencies are incapable of combating terrorism due to institutional dysfunction.

6.2.2. Theoretical position

Considering the rational choice theory, PAGAD, the Boeremag, and other terror suspects were not just amateur career criminals. PAGAD had an organisational structure which could engage in overt activities undetected from a position of intelligence (Boshoff *et al*, 2001:48-51). They manufactured Molotov cocktails and pipe bombs and conducted their activities with precision and in a clandestine manner. This is indicative of the fact that their criminal activities were conducted with rationality. They further employed intelligence-driven attacks with a high degree of calculus on the choice of victims or targets and were aware of the state's inability to respond effectively. Ansell and Torfing (2022) expressed that governance should be collaborative, focusing on the exchange of knowledge and resources, improving policy and innovation to benefit society.

There is a notion that when the central government fails to guide policy effectively, governance collapses. It was PAGAD and the Boeremag that exploited the transition,

which was bedeviled by poor policing, infighting, shambolic integration, and knee-jerk reaction from the security architecture, which compromised governance on different levels of state control. Urban terrorism became widespread to the degree that PAGAD and the Boeremag became an existential threat to the democratic state. The new democratic order could not fulfil all the aspirations of a society that believed problems of crime and other social ills could be addressed. Governance theory highlights not only the importance of institutional structures, accountability, and inter-agency coordination, but also for a more inclusive and transparent decision-making process to effectively combat terrorism financing. State institutions systematically undergo reform and face governance dilemmas.

6.3. ANALYTICAL STANDPOINT

The security architecture in SA is bedeviled by historical problems since the demise of apartheid. During the advent of democracy in 1994, various security clusters were compelled to embrace a new dispensation based on democratic policing and human rights. The process of unifying the different law enforcement agencies became problematic because of resistance from those who believed their dominance was whittled away. When SA was faced with urban terrorism and the rise of extremism in the early nineties, the security architecture could not swiftly deal with this challenge effectively. This could have been a result of inadequate terrorism legislation and state incapacity. The POCDATARA Act has been criticised for being inconsistent and not in sync with modern terrorism fighting, and further review is necessary.

The lack of inter-agency cooperation between security agencies results in bureaucratic sloppiness and a maladjusted response against terrorism. This eventually perpetuates the lack of communication and collaboration among the security departments. The research has also uncovered that some of the security departments are still under the behest of political influence, making prosecuting terrorism a guided secret. Terrorism in SA is on the back burner because of other pressing priorities such as the economy, crime, unemployment, and poverty. The government is facing social challenges that are seemingly a greater concern to the citizenry than terrorism. Corruption within the security departments has eroded efforts to curb terrorism, which has enabled illicit activities to thrive. Due to the incapacity of the security departments to monitor illicit

financial flows, SA is struggling to cope with cyber and terrorism financing used by international terrorists.

SA has not experienced any major terrorist attack; it is under no pressure and is oblivious to prioritising a counter terrorism strategy. South Africa's global cooperation efforts with other terrorism interlocutors are lagging, which is negatively impacting its capacity building and support against terrorism. It is facing challenges of an émigré community; porous borders and its advanced financial systems make it impossible to monitor the movement of people and goods efficiently. This is exploited by terrorists who smuggle weapons, engage in money laundering, and fund terrorism elsewhere in Africa, as ISIS has gained some foothold in South Africa. Furthermore, SA's involvement in the fight against terrorism in Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, has been condemned as asserting prestige and motivated by the pursuit of economic interest (Makanda 2023:65).

Above all, institutions such as the NPA and Crime Intelligence have, from time immemorial, been hollowed out because of political interference and patronage. Poor intelligence gathering and weak collaboration with international partners have been exacerbated by a lack of specialised training and expertise in counter terrorism. This has implied that SA's security architecture lacks practical and real-time experience in the fight against terrorism. The research has uncovered a need for dialogue on whether SA recognises terrorism as a potential threat. Similarly, SA should communicate perceptions, whether true or not, that its pragmatic stance on non-alignment has harmed its terrorism strategy, especially responses against networks like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. South Africa's unclear stance on terrorism, coupled with the reported presence of terror networks and its delayed implementation of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, has weakened its credibility in recognizing and addressing the threat of terrorism (Solomon 2011:2).

6.4. RECOMMENDATIONS: BEST PRACTICE MODEL FOR TERRORISM

The South African government should address the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequality holistically to sever the culture of violence as witnessed during the July 2021 Uprisings. Some scholars, such as Shinn (2016), have argued that there is an interconnection between poverty and terrorism, even though this link is disputed by other scholars as Bobbitt (2008), who alleges that there are terrorists

who are not from poor backgrounds but are better off and educated. Concisely, fighting poverty and creating wealth may dent the chances of youth and those marginalised being recruited and radicalised by extremists.

South Africa should have a strategy that can respond to the threats of terrorism efficiently without organs of State jostling against each other. This could be enhanced by defining roles and inculcating a culture of cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies. Figure 6.1. below is a conceptualisation on how security architecture should cooperate and work in concert through a nerve center that will collaborate on terrorism strategies as envisaged for the different stakeholders.

Figure 6.1: Proposed Model: The Integrated Multi-Agency Response Teams (IMART)



Source: Author's Conceptualisation of SA's Terrorism Prevention Strategy

The Integrated Multi-Agency Response Teams are different from the Fusion Centre.⁷⁶ This will act as a safety net driven by a multi-pronged approach and may intercept threats from terrorism through collaboration. The strategy should be composed of the various departments of the security architecture and coordinated by the Terrorism Council. All the departmental units are mobilised from the Council in a multi-disciplinary approach. That is why during the terror alerts and the July 2021 unrest in SA, the security architecture's delayed response because of a lack of clear command.

The IMART at least has a command structure that can improve the efficacy of the security architecture in its response to terrorism. Each department has units which has a well-defined role in the exercise of its functions. This will eliminate infighting, duplication of duties, and lack of cooperation within the security architecture. This conceptual framework represents the best practice model in the fight against terrorism. Sandy Africa in her 2011 report on the Transformation of the Security Sector has indicated that there was no coordination of the security cluster since the dawn of democracy in 1994 (Africa 2011:26). Consequently, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) report on July 2021 unrest has highlighted the depth of poor coordination between the security architecture when both Ministers of State Security and Police differed publicly on the existence of intelligence estimates about the July Unrest (SAHRC 2024:161-167).

South Africa should continuously build the capabilities of the security architecture to bolster intelligence gathering, border management, and, above all, strengthen the laws that regulate financial illicit flows. South Africa is battling to exit the dirty money list by the FATF because it is failing to address terrorism financing. The NPA should appoint skilled personnel with experience in financial crimes, organised crime, and terrorism. Awareness campaigns and research should also be conducted within the security cluster so that they can understand and respond better to the phenomenon of terrorism.

Terrorism cannot be fought and won without the cooperation of other countries and international organisations. South Africa has been criticised by the West for reacting slowly to the threats posed by terrorism. It is agreed that SA had not experienced a

⁷⁶ *The Fusion Centre is led by Anti-Corruption Task team (ACTT) a collaborative effort by the security cluster to combat fraud and corruption in SA.*

significant terror attack, however, it should cooperate with multilateral bodies without diminishing the level of threat given by other stakeholders. The USA was accused of being alarmist when it offered terror alerts in the country; the 2022 terror alert in the Sandton area was rejected as such by South Africa (Khoza 2022).

The government should strive to improve its communication on terrorism strategies to the citizenry without expropriating responsibility to other countries. It is incumbent upon SA to assure citizens that their safety will not be compromised and allay those fears and anxieties about terrorism. South Africa is a member of the BRICS and other eminent multilateral organisations like the UN. Naivety about its foreign policy and vagueness about its terrorism messaging may damage SA's standing in the international fora. It is imperative to develop a clear terrorism policy framework that acknowledges the threats imposed by terrorists in South Africa.

Equally, SA should also review terrorism legislation, which has been criticised to be inadequate in addressing terrorism, especially in the areas of terrorism financing. For instance, terrorism is not defined in the POCDATARA Act but is only described, focusing only on intent but not action, which highlights a conundrum when prosecuting complex terrorism cases. The budgets of the security architecture, especially of the SANDF, are regressing. The government should revise this stance and start reviewing such budget cuts so that the SANDF and other security institutions can realise their mandate of protecting the sovereignty of SA without constraints. Above all, a fall back to military interventions breeds a narrow understanding of terrorism.

6.5. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, LITERATURE, AND POLICY

The research contributes to the body of knowledge, literature, and policy on counterterrorism in South Africa. The research contributes to knowledge because the current assumption that security agencies are ineffective has proven to be true after investigation. This research has identified some structural gaps within the security agencies that are structural that undermine national security. It also reflected some knowledge on the manifestation, trends, and some underlying strategic weaknesses around terrorism efforts in SA. Law enforcement that is fractured breeds power dynamics and jurisdictional feuds, which hamper effective terrorism measures that are faced by countries globally. Some of these inefficiencies were due to poor training, lack of skills, and corruption, which hindered effective terrorism efforts.

The research supports existing literature and probably provides a foundation for future investigations to enrich academic literature on SA's terrorism efforts. In the future, some scholars can build upon it as a reference as they investigate this phenomenon further. Chapter five is a comparative study that encourages researchers to compare South Africa's terrorism strategies with other countries in Africa and globally. This can identify which policies could be adopted as a benchmarking exercise and direction for reforms. It can also reveal both strengths and weaknesses, identifying where certain countries perform well and where they fall short, thereby uncovering opportunities for improvement. If countries learn from one another how to solve a problem, this can inspire innovation, and researchers and governments can assess how similar policies perform under different conditions.

The recommendations suggested can inform policy decisions and practical interventions to address terrorism in South Africa. It can also contribute to policy that is evidence-based and grounded in research findings. It can also influence national discourse on matters of security and help align policies that are contemporary in the fight against terrorism. This can be an awareness document that will encourage topical issues to be elevated and bring about issues that demand political intervention, which are tailored to SA's specific context.

6.6. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

There are opportunities for further research that can also add value and policy development on terrorism in SA. Here are several opportunities for further research:

- Explore the nexus between terrorism and organised crime in SA.
- Examine the emerging risks of terrorism financing and cyberterrorism in SA.
- Investigate the root causes and pathways to radicalisation in SA and the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs.
- Analysis of the balance between counter terrorism efforts and respect for civil liberties under South African law.

6.7. CONCLUSION

The research examined the capacity and efficacy of the South African security agencies in combating terrorism. The cardinal research questions were on how effective the South African security agencies are in responding to acts of terrorism. Furthermore, to ascertain how the manifestation of domestic and international terrorism is perceived in SA. Above all, recommendations were proposed which speak to the best practice model for preventing terrorism.

To answer the research questions, a qualitative research paradigm was implemented. The data collection instruments were a semi-structured interview schedule, a qualitative questionnaire, and document analysis. Interviews were conducted, despite some setbacks, this was acknowledged. After data analysis, themes emerged, which made it possible to develop some findings about the research. In conclusion, South Africa should be a dependable ally in the fight against terrorism. Terrorism is a real threat; no country should downplay this phenomenon.

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APPENDIX A

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE



2024/04/03

LAW/00546/2023

RE: Research Ethics Committee Project Approval Letter

Dear Oliver Ndou,

Your application for ethics review of your project titled

The capacity and efficacy of security agencies in combating terrorism in the democratic South Africa

has been reviewed and evaluated by the

Law Research Ethics Committee.

You may proceed with your research project titled:

The capacity and efficacy of security agencies in combating terrorism in the democratic South Africa

Please note that should:

- (i) any serious or adverse effects to participants occur and/or,
- (ii) aspect(s) of your current project change and/or
- (iii) any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project occur then you should immediately report this to the approving REC. You may be required to submit an amendment to this application, in order to determine whether the changed aspects increase the ethical risks of your project.

Based on the information supplied your application has been successful and is approved.

Please note the following additional conditions associated with this approval:

- (i)

Regards,

Law Research Ethics Committee.

APPENDIX B

CONSENT FORM

I hereby grant permission to Oliver Ndou from the Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town, to use information and interviews that I have provided for research purposes.

I have been informed of the purpose of the research and I understand that:

- ❖ My participation is voluntary and I am under no obligation to take part in this research project;
- ❖ I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the research at any stage;
- ❖ My identity will not be revealed in the project outcomes if I so choose;
- ❖ The contents of my information are purely for the purposes of scholarly enterprise and should not be used for any other purpose without my permission;
- ❖ I will not receive a payment for participating;
- ❖ I will be treated with respect and my privacy and dignity will be protected;
- ❖ The interview should take no more than one hour of my time.

I have read and understood the information sheet and the statements above.

Signed at _____ on this day ____ of _____ 2024

Participant name and signature

Interviewer

Oliver Ndou:

*If you have **concerns about the research, its risks and benefits or about your rights as a research participant in this study**, you may contact the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Ms Lamize Viljoen, at 021 650 3080 or at lamize.viljoen@uct.ac.za. Alternatively, you may write to the Law Faculty Research Ethics Committee Administrator, Room 6.28 Kramer Law Building, Law Faculty, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701.*


APPENDIX C

TURNITIN REPORT

The capacity and efficacy of security agencies in combating terrorism in the democratic South Africa

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ORIGINALITY REPORT



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