

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

**A Psychological Analysis of Political Violence: A Narrative
Case Study of an Apartheid Policeman.**

Amanda Lucey

LCYAMA001

**A Minor Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Award of the Degree of Masters in Justice and Transformation**

Politics Department

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2006

Declaration:

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited or referenced.

Signature:

Date: 16/06/07

Signed by candidate

Abstract

The topic of this thesis is a psychological perspective on political violence conducted by state-agents. In particular it focuses on one former Security Branch policeman from South Africa, Paul Erasmus. The issue with which this thesis is concerned is how one can understand the motivations and intentions of perpetrators of political violence based on narrative accounts by the perpetrators themselves. Consequently this thesis is interpretive in nature. Previous academic literature on political violence is reviewed and a psychological model developed by Foster, Haupt and de Beer (2005) in *Theatre of Violence* is outlined. An available transcript relating to Paul Erasmus from the Amnesty Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is analysed, as is a structured interview conducted with Erasmus at the time of the TRC by David Goodman (1999). Media representations of Erasmus are also considered. It is argued that these representations are not helpful in understanding the motivations and intentions of this perpetrator. A three-hour interview was therefore conducted with Paul Erasmus by the author and this interview is analysed using applied discourse analysis. The narrative is also examined in relation to the model set out by Foster et al (2005). It is found that Paul Erasmus locates his motivations and intentions in the context of the Cold War and the ideology prevailing amongst the Security Forces in South Africa at the time. He also refers to the downward spiral of events that drew him into the role that he later took on. Blame is often diffused onto colleagues or the victims themselves. It is also found that there is strong support for Foster et al's (2005) model, particularly with reference to the notions of entitlement and masculinity.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Don Foster for his careful supervision and invaluable assistance. Many thanks also to the National Research Foundation and to the Noreen Saunders Bureau, K.W. Johnson and Siri Johnson award schemes at UCT for the financial assistance that made my studies possible. A big thanks goes to my whole family for their support, especially my mother, Sue, and my grandmother, Chloe, for their unwavering love. Most of all I would like to thank my father, Roger, for being an eternal inspiration.

University of Cape Town

Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Who, How and When?	4
1.1 Clarification of Key Concepts	
1.2 Approaches to Studying Perpetrators	
1.3 Brief Context of the Amnesty Process	
1.4 Concluding Remarks	
Chapter 2: Academic Literature	12
2.1 The Banality of Evil	
2.2 Situationism	
2.2.1 Obedience to Authority	
2.2.2 Conformity	
2.3 Dispositional Approaches	
2.3.1 The Authoritarian Personality	
2.3.2 Virulent Ideology	
2.3.3 Needs as the Roots of Evil: The Violence Prone Individual	
2.4 Perspectives of Victim and Perpetrator	
2.4.1 The Magnitude Gap	
2.4.2 Moral Disengagement	
2.5 Narrative Approaches	
2.5.1 Entitlement	
2.5.2 Multiple Subjectivities	
2.5.3 Special Organisations	
2.5.4 Sequences	
2.6 Concluding Remarks	
Chapter 3: Methodology	34
3.1 General Methodology	
3.2 Methodology of the Interview	
3.3 Morals	
3.4 Context of the Interview	
3.5 Features of Discourse	
Chapter 4: Analysis and Reflection	44
4.1 Media Representation	
4.2 Literary Representation	
4.3 The Amnesty Process and Representation	
4.4 General Outline of the Interview	
4.4.1 Non-reasons	
4.4.2 Reasons	
4.4.3 Breaching Scripts and Norms	
4.4.4 Them and Us : Victim-blaming	
4.4.5 Central Role of the Organisation	
4.4.6 Masculinity	
4.4.7 Entitlement	
4.4.8 A New South African Discourse	
4.9 Concluding Remarks	

Conclusion	75
Appendix: Interview Transcript with Paul Erasmus	78
Notes to Chapter 4	103
References	104

University of Cape Town

Introduction

Political violence appears to be growing in both scale and intensity throughout the world. Often, the state allows atrocities to take place, and may even promote them. This was certainly the case in apartheid South Africa. The question is: how do we understand the behaviour of state-agents in South Africa who committed gross violations of human rights at this time? What were their motivations and intentions? How did they become perpetrators of political violence?

A chapter on perpetrators in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report made an initial attempt to answer these questions. Yet one of the critiques of the TRC was the way in which the narrative testimonies of perpetrators were limited as a result of 'quasi-judicial amnesty procedures' (Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005:94). In an attempt to outline the potential causes and complexities involved in political violence, Foster et al (2005) collected nine narratives of perpetrators from different sides of the political divide, including two narratives from police operatives. Interviews collected in the period from 2000-2004 allowed, to the extent possible, these perpetrators to tell their own stories.

There have been other attempts to obtain narratives of perpetrators from South Africa's apartheid days, such as Jacques Pauw's (1997) sensationalist book, *Into the Heart of Darkness*, and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela's more empathetic encounters with Eugene de Kock, in *A Human Being Died that Night*. This Masters Mini-thesis will seek to add to the corpus of knowledge that surrounds political violence using, as a case study, the narrative of Paul Erasmus. Now that perpetrators feel more secure in telling their stories as their amnesties have been granted, and perpetrators have had time to reflect on their actions, it is vital to collect these narratives. There is a common misperception that to understand is to excuse. On the contrary, understanding can be a preventative measure and if the psychological causes of political violence can be understood then strategies can be implemented on a societal level to prevent future violence.

The topic of this Masters Mini-dissertation is a psychological perspective on political violence, with a specific focus on political violence committed by policemen, or state-agents, under the apartheid regime. This thesis will analyse an in-depth interview (conducted by the author of this mini-thesis) with former Security Branch policeman, Paul Erasmus and use this, along with Paul's available amnesty transcripts from the TRC, a previous interview conducted at the time of the TRC by Goodman (1999) and media reports from that time, as a case study. The case study will be used as a means of understanding the intentions and motivations of political violence and the role that these things play in the propensity to commit acts of political violence, as Paul Erasmus sees them. This approach has the benefit of not imposing a prejudiced outside frame of reference. This thesis will also examine the extent to which this case study fits with a recent theoretical model of perpetrators of political violence put forward by Foster et al (2005). The study will consequently be interpretive in nature.

The research questions for this thesis are thus as follows:

- How can we understand Paul Erasmus' intentions and motivations for committing acts of political violence from other sources (the media, amnesty transcripts and an interview with Goodman in 1999) written at the time of the TRC?
- What does Paul Erasmus cite as his intentions and motivations for committing acts of political violence in the current day based on the interview conducted with him?
- Based on Paul Erasmus' narrative, what are the psychological processes that played a role in the propensity to commit these acts?
- Does the narrative fit with Foster et als' (2005) relational model?

The chapter structure will be as follows. Chapter 1 will give a basic introduction to the research topic by clarifying the key concepts (i.e. what we mean by the term 'perpetrator' in relation to political violence) and by outlining various approaches towards the study of these perpetrators. Finally it will give a brief account of the amnesty process in South Africa as it relates to the subject of this thesis, Paul Erasmus. Chapter 2 will then examine what academic understandings of perpetrators

of political violence, in particular state-agents, have thus far contributed to this arena. Explanatory and interpretive accounts will be examined with particular attention paid to studies conducted in South Africa. Foster et al's (2005) model will be detailed in full. Chapter 3 will outline the methodology of the interview and will deal with moral issues that arise from the study of perpetrators in General and the interview process in particular. Chapter 4 will then examine features of discourse and the method of discourse analysis to be used in this mini-thesis. It will look at whether a previous interview with Goodman (1999), Paul's available amnesty transcripts and media representations from the time provide useful clues towards answering the research questions in this thesis. The context of the recent interview will then be detailed and the interview analysed with reference to these research questions. I will then conclude this thesis by answering the research question and relating these answers to previously detailed literature, but particularly that of Foster et al (2005) since this literature forms part of the research questions of this thesis.

Chapter 1

Who, How and When?

1.1 Clarification of Key Concepts

Who exactly is a perpetrator of political violence? The TRC Act stated that perpetrators were people who had committed an act, omission or offense that could be considered a gross violation of human rights, with gross violations of human rights being 'the violation of human rights through (a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered by any person acting with a political motive.' (TRC Report, 1998: V1, Ch4, Para42)

There are many problems with the narrow definition of gross human rights violations, such as the act not covering less severe injustices such as forced removals (Sarkin, 1996), or addressing the systemic injustices of apartheid (Mamdani, 1998). Furthermore, there are problems with the definition of a perpetrator. Foster et al (2005) even prefer to use the term 'protagonist' in their book.

The binary dichotomy of victim and perpetrator has been troublesome, especially for those who committed human rights violations on the side of the oppressed and thus saw their actions as legitimate. The definition given above applies to any perpetrator of human rights violations, yet some argued that human rights violations for the purposes of fighting apartheid could never be equated to those that furthered its end. One example of the resistance that met this definition was the ANC's response to the release of the TRC report (ANC Statements, 30/10/1998). Furthermore, victims may have become perpetrators and vice-versa. With groups retaliating in response to another, violence was often committed in relation to acts already perpetrated. It was the case in South Africa that some participants in the Amnesty Hearings refused to be labeled as a perpetrator. Since this term carries negative connotations, many felt that it

did not aptly describe their position. Whilst this is certainly a valid point for those who committed crimes on the side of the oppressed (yet still debatable depending on the gravity of the crime), South Africa needed to investigate all human rights violations, to the extent possible, for the purposes of maintaining an element of justice through acknowledgement of victims' pain.

The definition, whilst being broad in that it covered those on all sides of the struggle, the term was equally problematic in its constraints. The term perpetrator does not cover wider aspects of political violence, such as those that did not commit atrocities but enabled them (e.g. through supplying information). It was unclear from definition how accidents (such as the bombing of innocent civilians) were to be dealt with. Did that still make one a perpetrator of political violence? The definition also did not extend to acts committed outside the Republic of South Africa. Given this, the SADF discouraged many members from applying for amnesty for acts committed outside its borders (Fullard and Rousseau, 2003:199). Furthermore, applications for amnesty tended to focus on specific incidents rather than general trends. Yet some perpetrators may have not remembered certain incidents. This also detracted from a more complete picture of the violations and motivations for these violations that occurred under apartheid.

For my purposes I restrict my analysis to that of a state agent (as opposed to a non-state agent) who did fall into the TRC's definition of a perpetrator. Political violence in this context thus refers to gross human rights violations committed with a political objective and political affiliation. I use the term perpetrator rather than protagonist since it is my belief that state agents who prolonged apartheid deserve to be labeled with a term that has negative connotations.

1.2 Approaches to Studying Perpetrators

There are four main approaches to understanding political violence. There is firstly that of the media and public representation. This approach has often been extreme in the use of othering discourses, portraying a perpetrator as a monster, a 'sadistic criminal', a psychopath or on the other end of the spectrum minimising their actions. This kind of depiction is not useful, however, camouflaging the real reasons behind

the perpetration of gross human rights violations as we will see later when examining the portrayal of Paul in the *Mail & Guardian* at the time of the TRC.

A second approach is that of theoretical understanding, which draws from laboratory experiments or detailed analysis of perpetrator actions for example. This approach normally follows a positivist line of thought. The problem with laboratory experiments is that these can be hard to Generalise to outside the laboratory - there may be factors in the real world that are untestable in a lab, or an interaction of factors that cannot be separated. Analyses stemming from the actions of perpetrators may also be inaccurate to some extent such as reflecting an author bias, or only offering a limited explanation since words do not always fully express underlying motivation. For example, Browning (1992) has noted, in his analysis of Police Reserve Battalion 101 in Poland at the time of Nazi rule in Germany, that his analysis was limited at points because the information he got was dependent on questions asked by interrogators at the Nuremberg Trials, which were related specifically to certain crimes.

The third approach to the study of perpetrators is the use of stockpiling. Stockpiling gives a statistical, factual account of atrocities; it outlines how often atrocities have occurred and where. Yet such an approach simply gives us numbers, and does not explain why these acts were committed. It masks the part played by structural processes and other actors in the political arena and, in the South African case, reflected only those who applied for amnesty, rather than the true numbers of perpetrators. Indeed, the majority of applications for amnesty in South Africa were from ordinary criminals trying to depict their actions politically related (Fullard & Rousseau (2003:199). It is therefore necessary to combine these facts with a storytelling, or narrative approach, which contrasts with, yet is complementary to, the use of stockpiling (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo, 2002).

A storytelling approach uses narratives from perpetrators to enhance an understanding of behaviours and motivations of perpetrator actions as they see them. Whilst the truth in these accounts is debatable due to the limitations of language, and whilst stories are told the way that the perpetrator in question wishes them to be told (i.e. a 'negotiated version' of reality as described by Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005:274), there is still

information that can be of use in outlining the contributing elements of gross violations of human rights. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some perpetrators may still deny certain atrocities and even if they do acknowledge them their descriptions may be influenced by their own (possibly unconscious) psychological processes of responsibility displacement or diffusion, or a redefinition of themselves. In other words, perpetrators of state-supportive violence may have faulty or selective memories. Furthermore, these studies cannot ever provide an explanation of these actions per se, but only an understanding.

This study will be, on the most part a factual or descriptive study, drawing on storytelling methodologies. I approach this topic from an interpretive/hermeneutical angle. This approach is also ‘concerned with morality, arguing that “‘what is’ and what ‘should be’ are closely intertwined and cannot be artificially split” (Foster et al, 2005: 89). However other approaches will also be considered, as will their usefulness. Firstly the stockpiling approach will be explored in that the statistics from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission relating to Paul will be detailed. Academic literature will be examined and it will be argued that Foster et als’ (2005) model is most appropriate in understanding perpetrators. However other academic literature from the positivist line of thinking is not without merit. Media and literary representation that relate to Paul Erasmus will also be looked at and scrutinised since these representations are not particularly useful, often portraying him in othering discourse.

1.3 Brief Context of the Amnesty Process

A quick background of the amnesty process that occurred in South Africa is necessary to provide the context of how ‘perpetrators’ were dealt with by the TRC and how this affected Paul Erasmus and his self-image as a ‘perpetrator’. I do not wish to go into the history of apartheid in South Africa since this has been greatly detailed elsewhere. However, for a nice analysis of how the ideological heritage of white supremacy was carried throughout apartheid see Steyn (2001).

Amnesty was an element of the negotiated political settlement between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP), and was part of the 1993

interim Constitution. Unlike many countries in Latin America this amnesty was not a blanket amnesty but a conditional amnesty that allowed freedom in exchange for truth. The Amnesty Committee was set up as part of the larger 'victim-centred' TRC. Other parts of the TRC included the Reparations and Rehabilitations Committee and the Committee for Human Rights Violations.

The tension between amnesty and justice means that some have criticised the extent to which the TRC achieved this ideal. Bizos (2003: 30) aptly describes this tension by outlining the choice between 'the silence of perpetrators without justice being done and learning the truth without perfect justice being done.'

A blanket amnesty would have undermined the principles of individual accountability and would have added salt to the wounds of victims by not acknowledging their pain. However by attaching too many conditions to the granting of amnesty the TRC might have provoked a backlash from perpetrators that could have damaged the fragile transition to democracy. Thus a compromise was vital. Furthermore, the Interim Constitution placed an emphasis on reconciliation and national unity. The postamble to the 1993 Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) stated that a foundation would be laid

'to transcend the divisions and strife of the past which Generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is need for understanding but not vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not victimisation.'

Whilst there has been a fair amount of literature covering the TRC, there has not been much analysis of amnesty procedures themselves (Foster, 2006:80). Sarkin (2004) has therefore written a highly critical review of the amnesty hearings based on 2500 amnesty cases, interviews and legislations. As Foster (2006:83) notes, the hugest limitation of the Amnesty Committee is the small number of perpetrators who actually came forward. As a result Sarkin (2004) makes a superb case for prosecution.

The first amnesty hearings were held in April 1996. Perpetrators, as described by the TRC in the previous section, were required to fully disclose any politically motivated crimes committed between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994. Amnesty was granted to those that filled these two criteria along with a third – proportionality, which held that acts had to be proportional to politically stated objectives. The Amnesty Committee originally started with just five members but grew in size as increasing numbers of amnesty applications were received. Amnesty hearings were public and televised in order to give a greater sense of transparency and accountability. Decisions were made by a three-person panel, one of whom was a judge. If amnesty was not granted, prosecution could follow. Unfortunately, the ‘stick’ of prosecution has not been a strong enough threat to the ‘carrot’ of amnesty and very few prosecutions have followed. The apparent lack of threat arguably derives from both a lack of political will and/or lack of resources with which to prosecute individuals (see Sarkin, 2004). A five-volume *TRC report* was completed in 1998 but because the amnesty process was not completed, two more volumes (including the Amnesty Committee’s report) were finished in 2003.

Paul Erasmus was one of 293 state and security personnel that applied for amnesty from a total reported figure of 7 115 applicants from all political affiliations (TRC report, 2003, vol. 6). Of all these applications only 1 674 had met requirements (Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005:13). In total, 229 applicants for amnesty came from the Security Branch Sector that Paul had been part of, and 31 applicants from the South African Defence Force (SADF). 48% of these applications were from lower ranking personnel (Foster et al, 2005:15) like Paul, who started his career as a Warrant Officer.

These statistics however camouflage the real numbers of atrocities that occurred and by whom. They also do not provide an insight as to *why* these atrocities occurred. In 1998 the *TRC report* attempted to address a grave question (Volume 4, chapter 7): “What are the causes, motives and perspectives of those responsible for gross human rights violations?” The TRC report has been criticised for the version of truth it provided. Despite the TRC report (*TRC Report*, Vol. 1:103-134) distinguishing between four notions of truth (factual, personal, social and restorative), these distinctions were often controversial and not at all straightforward. Ignatieff (quoted

by Posel, 2002:167) argues that ‘All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse.’ However given the limited time frame and lack of resources for investigation, it has been argued that

‘the sheer power of the public testimonies of victims and perpetrators, coupled as they were with the drama of catharsis and the rhetoric of forgiveness, created neat, emotionally charged ‘sound bites’ of truth, and seemed to remove the need to penetrate the background or look beyond specific testimony (Posel & Simpson, 2002:8).

Furthermore the ‘quasi-judicial’ nature of the Amnesty Committee meant that it did not allow full examination of the afore-mentioned question through a perpetrator’s eyes. Perpetrators were instructed to answer questions by the panel but often did not elaborate more than they needed to. Because the act had to be politically motivated actions were often framed in the context of anti-Communist thinking rather than in terms of racism, and the procedure did not allow an understanding of why these acts were committed.

Given that the chapter of the *TRC Report* and the statistics mentioned above do not provide an adequate answer to the question of a perpetrators motives and intentions, this research report seeks to address this issue through the eyes of a perpetrator as defined by the TRC.

1.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined the key concepts and approaches and addressed the context of the amnesty process as it applies to Paul Erasmus. It has argued that the TRC was unable to fully look at the motivations and intentions of perpetrators of political violence due in part to the nature of the amnesty hearings. Furthermore, whilst the statistics given by the TRC do provide some information yet these figures often camouflage the reality behind the picture such as who committed what and why. The

Amanda Lucey

next chapter will look at broader academic understandings of political violence that appear in the literature and examine to what extent the academic lens so far provides a useful look at political violence.

University of Cape Town

Chapter 2

Academic Literature

Since the controversial Milgram experiments in the 1960s, a fair amount of research has been conducted on perpetrators of political violence, often arguing that they are ordinary people caught up in a highly influential situation. Originally most of this research has come from a positivist line of thought but more recently there have been a few attempts to obtain narrative accounts by perpetrators themselves. This chapter will examine what research already exists on perpetrators of political violence and to what extent this research can thus far enhance an understanding of the motivations behind political violence. It will finally detail a model put forward by Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005) so that the interview conducted with Paul Erasmus can be analysed in relation to this model.

2.1 The Banality of Evil

The widely used phrase 'the banality of evil' was coined by Hannah Arendt (1977) in her book on the legal trial of Adolf Eichmann, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. For Arendt (1977), Eichmann was nothing more than what he claimed to be: an ambitious bureaucrat, certified by half a dozen psychiatrists as normal. Arendt argues that most Nazis were not criminals or psychopaths (an antisocial personality disorder, defined by the inability to feel guilt) but people from all walks of society, and it is this normality that makes understanding perpetrators all the more challenging.

The notion that many perpetrators are ordinary men has been generally concurred by scholars, Goldhagen (1996) being the most notable exception. Despite Miale & Selzers' (1975) findings that Rorschach data (a test which analyses how subjects responded to inkblots in order to infer psychological characteristics) showed fifteen out of the sixteen Nazi Criminals to be psychopathic to varying degrees, Borofsky & Brand (1980) examined in detail studies concerning the Rorschach records of the Nuremberg War Criminals. They concluded that overall, there seemed to be no significant differences between the psychological functioning of the Nuremberg War Criminals compared to that of other groups used as a control.

Furthering this perspective on banality, others have suggested that modernity itself has great implications for the pervasiveness of violence. In looking at the Holocaust, Bauman (1989) has argued that through division of labour, technical rather than moral responsibility and dehumanisation of people, atrocities became easier to commit. He states (1989:13) that “Modern civilization was not the Holocaust’s sufficient condition; it was, however, most certainly its necessary condition....it was the rational world of modern civilization that made the Holocaust thinkable.” For Bauman, of paramount importance at the time of the Holocaust were the technological advancements and organizational achievements of German society and an elite that were preoccupied with ideology and power.

According to Bauman (1989), modernization spurred on Holocaust in two major ways. Firstly the effects of hierarchical and functional divisions of labour meant that people were distanced from the end result both physically and mentally. In other words, people did not know the full consequences of their actions, but rather focused on their functionality. Another effect was that technical responsibility allowed a substitution of moral responsibility. By concentrating on the task at hand, moral standards became unimportant. Furthermore, the dehumanisation of bureaucratic objects (whereby objects became quantitative statistics, rather than people who had a life value) was also a significant factor at play.

Genocides, such as the case of Rwanda, have been possible without the same level of bureaucratisation and administration suggesting that modernity is not necessary for genocide. Other factors most certainly play a role. Furthermore, whilst bureaucratisation and technology may have aided the Holocaust, Bauman’s thesis cannot account for the root causes of political violence. Nevertheless, analyses of torturers from other parts of the world have also placed an emphasis on the banality of perpetrators of political violence, suggesting this idea is not one that is restricted to the Holocaust (e.g. Haritos-Fatouros, 2003). Others have gone further and in South Africa, Gobodo-Madikizela demonstrated the humanity of Eugene de Kock, a man dubbed ‘Prime Evil’ (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003).

Lifton (1986) extended the normality thesis by suggesting that an extraordinary environment and subculture can activate personality characteristics that would not have manifested themselves in other situations. Lifton (1986) argues that one of the keys to understanding perpetrators is a psychological process called 'doubling' where the self is divided into two separate wholes. This process may allow people to act in a manner that may not concur with their moral values. It is in some ways a kind of psychological survival, allowing an avoidance of guilt by a transfer of conscience to the other self. Lifton (1986) applied the concept of doubling to the Nazi doctors, whom he interviewed, concluding that doctors may generally be more prone to this phenomenon than others. Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo, (2002) add weight to this hypothesis in their analysis of Brazilian torturers, suggesting perpetrators linguistically divided themselves into personal and business sides.

2.2 Situationism

The situationist approach emphasises the powerful influence of a person's environment rather than personal dispositions on an individual's behaviour. Much positivist research has followed in the line of the situationist approach. Nisbett & Ross (1980) have demonstrated that in many instances we tend to attribute behaviour to personal characteristics rather than situational effects, termed the 'fundamental attribution error.' In terms of political atrocity, many people have argued that the importance of situational factors is downplayed when attempting to understand state-supportive political violence. It is to these situational factors that I will now turn.

2.2.1 Obedience to Authority

Milgram (1963, 1974) created huge controversy when he conducted experiments that suggested the power of obedience to authority by measuring how far a subject would go before refusing to obey an experimenter's instructions. A 'learner' who happened to be a stooge was strapped to a chair with electrodes at his wrist in another room, whilst the subject became the 'teacher.' The subject was told to shock the learner every time the learner made a mistake with word pairs at increasingly large voltage

levels. On average, around 65% of subjects would proceed to the last shock despite the learner showing immense signs of distress. There were many permutations and variations of the experiment, which I will not go into in this thesis, mainly because they are not all relevant to the topic in question. However, for a detailed review of these experiments and criticisms on methodology and ethics, see Miller (1986) and Blass (2000). It is worth noting that studies conducted all over the world have yielded the same results (Blass, 2000) showing the universality of obedience to authority.

Milgram (1974) likened the laboratory effects of obedience to authority to that of obedience in the Nazi regime, proposing that when people see themselves as carrying out orders and therefore no longer being responsible for their actions, a 'critical shift of viewpoint' has occurred. Moreover Milgram (1974) argues that the power of the experimenter would be less than that of for example, a General in a real life situation. Milgram (1974) also proposes that, as with the pursuit of ideologies in real life political conflict, the subjects believe that they are engaging in a good cause for society, in his experiments this being the pursuit of scientific truth.

Why do we have this need to obey? Milgram explains this from an evolutionary perspective. Social organization is helpful to survival, and through defining our positions in a hierarchy, conflict is minimalised. We therefore have an instinct to obey. An 'agentic shift' occurs when a person no longer sees himself as acting for self-directed reasons, but rather as an agent performing the wishes of another. Gilbert (1981) has proposed that pertinent to Milgram's (1974) experiment is the "foot in the door phenomenon". In other words, once a subject has agreed to a trivial request they are more likely to comply with further requests at a later stage. Why is this? Gilbert (1981) has argued that there is a change in self-perception as a result of initial small-scale behaviour. Compliance is then likely because self-perception has changed to fit with the action. In other words, the subjects get caught up in the precedents they have previously set for themselves before they realise the impact of their actions. This can make it harder to quit the experiment. This indeed may be the case in political situations. Sabini & Silver (1980) have also argued that by denying the moral legitimacy of the step the subject is about to take is to deny the moral legitimacy of the step the subject has just taken, thereby undermining the subject's position. They furthermore apply this idea to Nazi perpetrators.

These experiments have been met with accusations that they cannot be applied to reality. However, Miller (1986) has maintained that the emotional strain experienced by subjects in Milgrams' (1974) experiments demonstrate the realism of the experiments. Obedience to authority may therefore not just be a laboratory phenomenon but something that can be related to the perpetrators of state-supportive atrocities. Yet whilst obedience to authority may be an antecedent condition to inciting state-supportive violence or a factor that maintains it, but not a sufficient factor in itself for a person to commit gross human rights violations (Haritos-Fatouros, 2003).

2.2.2 Conformity

Following from the influences of Milgram (1974) and Solomon Asch (1952), the Stanford Prison Experiment outlined not so much how people comply with demands by an unjust authority but how conformity can play a central role in influencing violent atrocities (Zimbardo, Maslach and Haney, 2000). In an experiment lasting 6 days and nights (originally planned to last two weeks) subjects were randomly divided into mock prisoners and mock guards, with the guards being told to maintain law and order and to use their clubs as symbolic weapons only. Guards were allowed to select their own uniforms from shops, but they had to be identical. There was no General authority, but rather a remote presence. Unlike Milgram's (1974) experiments, however, the set-up of the experiment itself allowed the victims to be degraded (Sabini & Silver, 1980). By the second day, there was a protest against the rules and restraints were imposed on prisoners who tried to individuate themselves by ripping off their prisoner numbers or who made fun of the guards. Over the next few days, the guards increased coercive and aggressive tactics, humiliated and dehumanised the prisoners and only refrained after advice from the research team. Things got so severe that the study was stopped prior to the planned date.

Zimbardo et al (2000) draw several conclusions from this experiment. Firstly, the situational effect is most extreme in novel situations with no previous guidelines to follow and therefore personality variables have little predictive use. Ambiguity of role

boundaries also makes these effects more salient. Through role-playing, private attitudes are altered to fit with the role played (dissonance theory). Zimbardo (2004) expanded this theory claiming that ideology, and the 'foot-in-the-door' phenomenon are necessities that induce changes in behaviour. All these previously mentioned factors, according to Zimbardo (2004) can turn most people into perpetrators of political violence, particularly state-agents.

Browning (1992) outlines the pressure of conformity in a real life situation faced by Reserve Police Battalion 101. His historical examination of a historical incident in Poland showed that only 12 out of 500 men responded to a General's offer to step forward and refuse to take part in the mass murder to come. Why was this number so small? Browning (1992) explains this by the suddenness of the decision and answer, but also by the pressure to conform. Browning (1992) states how uniforms served to give the men the feeling of camaraderie. Some of the soldiers did not want to admit that they were too weak or too cowardly to commit such atrocities.

Why do people conform? There are two reasons suggested by research (Foster et al, 2005). The first of these is ambiguity over information (informational influence) so that a group norm provides information or validation of the person's response and the second is to gain approval from others (normative influence) due to the fact that people want to maintain a positive self-image (Foster, 1991). Sabini & Silver (1980) concur with the relevance of informational influence, drawing on an experiment by Sherif (1935) where the ambiguity of a light movement was greatly affected by others' judgements. They liken this to situations in the Holocaust, where the absence of 'good guards' to emulate meant that there was an absence of group norms in terms of right and wrong and enforced regulations. Thus conformity appears to be a relevant factor in understanding the motives and perspectives of perpetrators involved in state-supportive violence. It cannot, however, explain acts of political violence initiated by individuals in the absence of group support.

2.3 Dispositional Approaches

The situationist view has its merits and may suggest some influences for perpetrators in their propensity towards political violence. However, whilst it is vital to understand the role of the lower status perpetrators, what about the people who gave the orders and were at the top of the hierarchy? Furthermore, situational factors may not explain all behaviours demonstrated by perpetrators of state-supportive political atrocities, such as initiating killings, and individual dispositions may be wrongly neglected (Berkowitz, 1999). The situationist approach to understanding perpetrators produced some notable critics (e.g. Goldhagen, 1996).

Steiner (1980) has outlined the concept of a 'sleeper,' a violence-prone individual whose personal characteristics lie dormant until activated by certain circumstances or events. Steiner (1980), in light of interviews with SS members suggests that there is a self-selection process that operates with state-agents, whereby individuals choose their careers due to enjoyment of military roles, economic reasons, identification with the ideology or the desire to become a soldier. Many also had few alternatives. Katz (1993) has agreed with this perspective going on to describe how many SS officers were notorious for their individual methods of cruelty.

It is therefore worth questioning, given that some people play more of an active role in the perpetration of atrocities, what factors make the decision to harm another possible? Some scholars have attempted to explain violence as a result of aggression. But it has long been refuted that there is a biologically determined force that produces aggressive behaviour (Haritos-Fatouros, 2003).

2.3.1. The Authoritarian Personality

The idea of the authoritarian personality, a potentially fascist individual and someone likely to be involved in political violence, was put forward by Adorno, Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford (1950). Suggesting that people differed in their susceptibility to

antidemocratic propaganda, and therefore their personalities (personalities being a person's readiness for response), Adorno et al (1950) compiled various scales for measuring different kinds of personality. An analysis of these scales produced the F-scale, a measure of Fascism. It was argued that an authoritarian would feel aggression towards out groups as he/she is not able to vent frustration with in groups. Authoritarians are also more prone to obeying orders.

This study was highly influential and much research on the notion of prejudice has followed. However, many studies have been highly critical of Adorno et al's (1950) methodology, such as the study ignoring authoritarians on the Left, and the scale being biased towards responding positively (Staub, 1989). Haritos-Fatouros (2003) has also argued that men showing elements of a pre-Fascist identity were in fact the men who failed to be selected as regular torturers as they did not have enough self-control. Nevertheless, the concept of an authoritarian personality still continues to be debated. In independent research, Dicks (1972) also created an F-scale, finding that the dispositions of German soldiers in his study produced high F-scores. Duckitt (1992: 193-215) provides an extensive review of the literature following from Adorno et al (1950) and furthermore has conducted more methodologically sound research in South Africa in order to ascertain whether individual attributes or social processes play a larger role in the formation of prejudice. Duckitt (1992:246) found that social and individual factors are complementary rather than interactive and that both are equally important in the determination of prejudice.

Whilst there still may be elements of personality which increase the likelihood that someone will be aggressive, and differences in the way people respond to authority (Staub, 1989), it is unlikely that there is a Fascist personality as such. There is often a big difference in the way that people think, and what they actually do. Furthermore, it appears from recent research that both individual dispositions and social factors play a role in creating prejudice.

2.3.2 Virulent Ideology

Goldhagen (1996) has argued that situational perspectives cannot account for a variety of behaviours that were demonstrated in Nazi Germany, such as excessive torture and individually initiated killings. For Goldhagen (1996:106) anti-Semitism “more or less governed the ideational life of civil society” and Nazi perpetrators were wilful actors, who consciously chose to act in a manner complementing pre-existing values and beliefs. Ideology has not only been a predominant factor in Germany. It played a large role in apartheid South Africa (Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005), Rwanda (Staub, 2003) and many other countries engaged in political violence. Yet as a cause in itself in inciting political violence, ideology is necessary but not sufficient and it has been argued that Goldhagen’s theory is oversimplistic and monocausal (Hinton, 1998).

Furthermore, Dicks (1972) has pointed out that it was not only Jews that were subjected to gross violations of human rights but other minority groups as well, suggesting Anti-Semitism was not the sole cause of Nazi abuses. Arendt (1977) has also portrayed Eichmann as someone who was not initially interested in ideology—he had never read *Mein Kampf*, nor did he know the Nazi party ideology when he became a member.

2.3.3 Needs as the Roots of Evil: The Violence Prone Individual

Staub (2003, 1989) has suggested that although there are Genetic predispositions toward aggression, these dispositions shaped by socialization and culture to create actual dispositions. For Staub (1989), the anti-social, violence-prone individual has certain characteristics including an anti-social value orientation, where harming others becomes a value in itself, aggressive behaviours learnt from childhood, an inclination to obey authority as a result of one’s upbringing, a lack of self-awareness, an attitude that morals are inapplicable to outside groups and a shaky self image. As we will see later, it is in fact a positive self-image that has the potential for violence, so Staub

(1989) may not be correct in his thesis. Staub (2003) argues that circumstances are an insufficient explanation of aggression; we need to also consider cultural influences as they may determine how difficult life conditions are fulfilled by reacting to outgroups. Not only this, but Staub also has proposed that aggression can be a habitual way of behaving. Staub (1989) argues that a monolithic culture hinders moral development.

According to Staub (1989) there are a variety of human needs make us more prone to violence if we feel they are threatened. These needs are only a starting point, but do make certain actions more likely. Whilst his approach is General, and relates to all kinds of violence, he does link this to political violence conducted by agents of the State, particularly in Rwanda. The first of these needs is security, and involves feeling free from harm and able to obtain food. It also applies to other things than enable us to survive. The fact that we have 'flight or fight' responses, according to Staub (1989) is evidence for this. The second need is for effectiveness and control, believing that we can lead purposeful lives and achieve what we wish to do. The third need is to have a positive identity, and the fourth to have a positive connection and to belong. The final need is a comprehension of reality, the understanding of which then shapes our interaction with the world. On top of these fundamental needs, Staub (2003, 1989) also argues that we have a need for autonomy or identity, transcendence of the self, and a need for long-term satisfaction. These needs can coexist together and are not hierarchical, but may also be in opposition.

Staub (2003, 1989) argues that difficult life conditions, such as economic and social problems, may mean that these needs are not fulfilled. Individuals may react by blaming an outgroup for their problems, and by agreeing with ideologies that may outline what they desire. By feeling that one's group has been victimised, and by devaluing other groups, political violence may be more likely. Baumeister (1997) has also proposed that violence may originate from a frustration of basic needs, and in this way violence is simply a means to an end.

How can this apply to top-down perpetrators? It can be argued that after World War I, the Germans had undergone a huge recession and were suffering from a negative self-image. They felt threatened by the Jews and decided to take action. In South Africa, the Afrikaners may have also felt threatened by the other. But is this enough to kill?

There is huge poverty all over the world, yet not everyone who has difficult life conditions commits atrocities. Staub (2003) proposes that such actions are much more likely depending on the way an individual was raised. If a child has been brought up suffering from neglect or abusively, they may begin to believe that aggression will fulfil their needs. They are also more likely to interpret another's behaviour as hostile.

Staub's (2003, 1989) theory therefore has considerable weight in contributing to our understanding of the psychological factors influencing political violence, but it can be argued that the theory, whilst linked by Staub (2003) to all forms of violence may really be more applicable to bottom-up theories of political violence than those that are top-down.

2.4 Perspectives of Victim and Perpetrator

2.4.1 The Magnitude Gap

Moving towards a relational approach is the concept of Baumeister's (1997) magnitude gap. Baumeister (1997) states that evil is subjective and that most perpetrators do not see that what they are doing is wrong. He points out that if soldiers were too concerned with morality and human sympathy, it would be too stressful for them to carry out their duties. Indeed, many accounts of perpetrators have outlined how sensitive perpetrators often suffer from many symptoms of stress, including nightmares, anxiety attacks and guilt (Baumeister, 1997, Foster et al, 2005).

Baumeister talks of a 'magnitude gap' where what takes place is of more importance to the victim than the perpetrator. The perpetrator may often have less emotion about their acts, considering it a small thing. Whereas victims see things in black and white, perpetrators see a grey area, bracketed in time. It is in this way that perpetrators may see their acts as almost inconsequential, and may feel less responsibility as a result. The memory of their actions lasts a short while, whilst for the victims the trauma they have experienced may remain an indelible print on their memories.

2.4.2 Moral Disengagement

Moving on from this concept, there appear to be a variety of mechanisms that enable perpetrators of political violence to see their actions as lesser evils. Bandura (1999) argues that through socialization, people learn moral standards that they use as self-regulatory guides to modify their conduct and achieve a sense of self worth. Yet these self-regulating mechanisms need to be activated, and there are a number of ways to ensure that these processes do not come into play. The first of these is moral justification, where people undergo a cognitive reconstruction of the behaviour and see themselves as fighting against the oppressed and protecting themselves. Such justifications have been documented by Huggins et al (2002) in the case of Brazilian torturers.

The second mechanism for moral disengagement is that of euphemistic labelling. Language can 'sanitize' actions and detract from one's sense of responsibility. For example the killing of civilians may be seen as 'collateral damage,' or soldiers 'take someone out' rather than kill them. This kind of language hides the atrocity of the action by changing thought patterns. Baumeister (1997) explains how language can be a smoke screen allowing perpetrators to conceal their guilt. By using passive terms, a perpetrator can avoid responsibility and may find it easier to address the problem.

A third mechanism, according to Bandura (1999) is that of advantageous comparison. Comparing one's behaviour to others (such as state-agents seeing themselves as martyrs compared with the perceived oppression inflicted by others upon them) takes on a utilitarian outlook - that an individual's actions are better than the potential threat of others. Such a mechanism, as with the previous two mentioned, are particularly dangerous as they allow people to feel proud of their actions. This pride is made apparent by Arendt (1977) who makes the point that despite evidence of the Nazi atrocities being published years before the Nuremberg Trials, most of the 'Eichmann Commando' did not feel that they needed to live under an assumed name.

Bandura (1999) also outlines various other mechanisms such as displacement of responsibility by justifications such as “I was only following orders” and diffusion of responsibility through a division of labour, as I have discussed previously. Kelman (1989:16) terms the displacement of following orders as authorization, whereby when violent acts are “explicitly ordered, implicitly encouraged, tacitly approved, or at least permitted by legitimate authorities, people’s readiness to commit or condone them is enhanced.” Kelman (1989) argues that because these acts are authorized there seems to be automatic justification for them.” Kelman also uses the term routinization where people have agreed to an action and reduce their moral qualms by making the action routine, mechanical, and highly programmed. Furthermore, Duntley & Bass (2004) have argued that in order to be free of guilt, people attend to details rather than the broader context - what they refer to as ‘low-level thinking.’

The final act of moral disengagement is that of dehumanisation. By stripping people of their human qualities, people may be seen as sub-human. Even in the laboratory people may devalue others. Milgram (1974) outlined how subjects often devalued the subject when shocking him. “He was so stupid and stubborn he deserved to get shocked” were common comments. In real life we see many examples of outgroups being devalued. Upon questioning Stangle, one of the men who set up the concentration camps, Sereny (1974:101) asked what the point of the humiliation and cruelty was. Stangle’s response confirms this aspect of moral disengagement by answering that it was “To condition those who actually had to carry out the policies. To make it possible for them to do what they did.” He also described seeing the Jews as cargo. In many accounts of Nazi Germany, Jews were portrayed as ‘dirty’, and African colonial discourses often refer to natives as ‘savages’ and so on. All serve to dehumanise victims of political atrocity. An analysis of Captain Paul Grueninger, a chief of police in Nazi Germany who saved refugees, shows the strength of humanization. Rochat & Modigliani (2000) describe how by regularly visiting the Swiss border and meeting refugees face to face, Grueninger may have had too many visual cues to dehumanise victims, and therefore felt great empathy towards them. Moral disengagement thus provides many clues as to how perpetrators of political violence ease their consciences.

In order to understand perpetrators' actions it is useful to understand the different perspectives of victim and perpetrator. This also makes way for a relational approach since this approach considers 'the constellation of relations between persons, groups, ideologies and juxtaposed positionings which eventually emanate in the 'toxic mix' (Foster et al, 2005:66).

2.5 Narrative Approaches

Situational and dispositional accounts have Generally stemmed from positivist interpretations. However, narrative accounts are slowly becoming the predominant way of understanding how people become perpetrators of political violence. Whilst these accounts acknowledge that such methods do not enable an explanation of this violence, they can achieve an understanding. Narrative interviews have been conducted in many countries around the world. Gitta Sereny (1974:9-10) spent 70 hours talking to Franz Stangle, commandant of an extermination camp in Nazi Germany feeling it essential to evaluate his background, childhood and adult motivations '*as he saw them*, rather than as we wished or prejudiced them to be.' Rosenberg (1992) extended this approach to an examination of perpetrators of South America, including Columbia, Peru, and Argentina and by spending time with these people, came to conclusions about how the different contexts in South America contributed to different forms of violence, whether it was political, or merely criminal. Schirmer (1998) interviewed members from the Guatemalan military in order to better understand the transitional process occurring there and the hindrances to democratisation. Yet this research cannot be related to the context of South Africa without difficulty for a variety of reasons. South Africa's history and the whole context leading up to apartheid is different to any other place in the world and these socio-historical situations have led to some actions being considered more legitimate than others and to different organisational factors that may play a role in the propensity towards violence.

It is therefore useful that other research has examined the South African context. A book by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) focussed on her experience of interviewing Eugene de Kock, commanding officer of South Africa's death squads,

and dealt with her personal issues of forgiveness and trauma. Eugene de Kock (1998) has even written his own autobiography, *A Long Night's Damage into Day*, with a foreword by Jeremy Gordin. Gordin (1998, p.302) comes to the conclusion that 'De Kock was a product of the system in which he grew up.' He acknowledges that distinguishing between environmental influence and personal responsibility are complex, but this is as far as he goes. Jacques Pauw (1997) has produced a somewhat sensationalist book titled *Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins*. However, he does not try to analyse these perpetrators of political violence from a psychological perspective.

Of utmost relevance to this project is *Theatre of Violence* by Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005). Their relational approach has several advantages. Whilst placing a larger emphasis on agency than situational models, which are too passive in explanation, political violence is understood as multi-sided and does not seek to explain actions through the dispositions of the perpetrator alone, but rather through the relations between people, groups and ideologies. Ideologies not only place people in specific positions, but also shape the way that both victims and perpetrators see themselves. Feldman (1991:1) has suggested that political violence is 'predicated on self-reflexive, interpretive framings of power which are embedded not only in language but in relational sequences of action.' I will now examine Foster et al's (2005) model in more detail.

2.5.1 Entitlement

Central to Foster et al's (2005) model is the notion of entitlement. Whilst agreeing that perpetrators are ordinary in that they are not psychopaths, Foster et al (2005) argue that people become 'other than ordinary' (p.68) through a feeling of entitlement. Entitlement comes from the belief that one is deserving. It is relational in that it requires of the other respect and acceptance of the person's rights. Yet there is a difference between healthy and exaggerated entitlement. Entitlement becomes exaggerated when people also possess a sense of superiority (demonstrated by an expectance for a right over others' bodies or spatial freedoms) and show very little, or selective empathy towards others (Foster et al, 2005:69). Entitlement is in some way an identity, and further provoked by ideologies. In the narratives analysed by the

authors, entitlement is demonstrated by a sense of frustration and a comparison to others. It may even involve a 'touch of buried shame' (Foster et al, 2005:278). More subtle elements of entitlement include demonstrations of pride and enjoyment in one's work. Foster et al (2005:70) also apply this notion of entitlement to oppressed people as a 'sense of righteous demands for equality' due to inequalities in power, status and resources.

Adding weight to the concept of entitlement are studies conducted by Baumeister (2004, 1997), which demonstrate on the basis of much evidence that, contrary to long-held views, it is not those with low self-esteem that are prone to violence, but rather those with high self-esteem. Egotism and revenge are therefore some of the elements contributing to political violence because one's pride has been threatened. Moreover, empirical research by Kernis, Granneman & Barclay (1989) has suggested that it is in fact the instability of a person's self-esteem that is conducive to violence. Nevertheless, this experiment did not induce anger but only measured anger in General, which may have convoluted the results.

Bushman & Baumeister (1998) take this notion of entitlement further. They investigated the effects of narcissism on aggression where narcissism is 'less a matter of having a firm conviction about one's overall goodness (which is self-esteem in a literal sense) than a matter of being emotionally invested in establishing one's superiority. (p.220)' They found that, rather than self-esteem being a predictor of experimentally induced aggression, narcissists demonstrated aggression towards those who threatened their egos. Aggression was not directed towards those who praised them, showing narcissists' selectivity in aggression. In relation to political violence, this may be similar to Foster et al's (2005) description of entitlement, and moreover, may provide some experimental evidence for the violent effects of conspiracy mentalities, which I will discuss later.

How does entitlement apply to groups? Foster et al (2005) draw on Tajfel's (1981) Social Identity Theory, which posits that superior groups, if unthreatened produce no aggression towards others, but if their status is challenged, they find new

justifications, such as ideology, for increased repression against the outgroup. Foster et al (2005) extend this theory to account for oppressed people too, yet for the purposes of this thesis will the focus remains on state-agents.

2.5.2 Multiple Subjectivities

Foster et al (2005) have proposed that the second core construct of their relational model for explaining political violence is the interlocking of multiple subjectivities. In other words, some aspects of our selves become more salient in certain situations and when certain combinations of different types of identity connect, there is a 'potent mix' (p.70), which makes the probability of violence higher. For example, a policeman may have violent tendencies, which only become apparent when he/she is allowed to use force. If they instead had become a restaurant owner for example these violent tendencies may not become obvious.

The most significant processes that interact here are ideology, the construction of identity and the construction of the other. For Foster et al (2005), ideology creates different kinds of domination, principally through language, which shapes a person's view on what is good or bad. Language not only creates an identity, but furthermore modifies the way we see others. Language also enables people to feel that they are not the agents of their crimes (Bandura, 1999) and serves as a bonding factor (Haritos-Fatouros, 2003). The construction of one's identity through ideology can be an active process, allowing people to take up subjectivities that they relate to. However, ideology also allows people to view others in a negative light who might be seen as threats. Nevertheless, in this model described by Foster et al (2005) it is not just any ideology, but a dangerous combination of some ideologies that create the potential for political violence. For example a mix of Christian Nationalism, racism and masculinity may produce a potentially violent male. It is worth noting that this construct of multiple subjectivities can apply to any form of discourse including that of liberation movements. These counter-discourses are, however, not the focus of this paper.

2.5.3 Special Organisations

Some perpetrators do not have a strong ideology so how can their motives and perspectives of political atrocities be accounted for? Special organisations appear to play a role in the perpetration of atrocities, especially those involved in political violence and can explain the more immediate influences on political violence. Foster et al (2005) claim that there are three reasons for this. Firstly, secrecy is highly conducive to political violence, secondly that the people who are highly involved in such organizations are a particular type of person, and thirdly that these organisations promote a climate of secrecy.

Haritos-Fatouros (2003) and Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo (2002) have done extensive studies on Greek and Brazilian torturers and have outlined how these groups of people are split into specialised autonomous groups that keep them split off from the rest of the world. They even begin to produce specialized language forms relating to their activities. Huggins et al (2002) claim that the relationships formed between torturers compelled them to feel that secrets must be heavily guarded, and through being rewarded these men came to feel that they were in unique groups where no one else could appreciate what they were doing. They lived in separate moral universes where victims were blamed for their actions, and the torturers believed they were fighting a just cause, or merely being professional. In other words, these state organizations allowed a more extreme form of moral disengagement.

Not only do certain types of people get involved in secret organizations, but the culture promoted by these organizations can also change the way that people view their actions and how they behave. Ainsworth (1995) has described initiation ceremonies in police training that seek to remove the oversensitive recruit and Huggins et al (2002) have also outlined the way that Brazilian recruits were degraded and dehumanised at initiation ceremonies. They were called 'beasts' by the older policemen and given a number and a war name. This served to bolster the group mentality and desensitise the new recruits. Foster et al's (2005) police narratives all demonstrated pride in connection with an organisation. For example, Foster et al (2005:285) note how state security discourses used the term 'professional' to describe

their work. The narratives also emphasised the legitimating role of these organisations by referring to organisational aims, which they claim shaped their actions.

Masculinity has often been neglected by scholars studying political violence, yet in the majority of reports on political atrocities, acts have mainly been committed by men (Foster et al, 2005; Baumeister, 1997). The studies that do approach the topic of masculinity generally acknowledge that it is a factor however. (An exception is Goldblatt & Meintjes (1998) who claim that women perpetrators are so because society has taught them that cruelty is necessary.) Theweleit (1987) has suggested that it was masculinity that was a major factor in the Freikorps in Germany. Staub (2003) also suggests that, historically, men have tended to be strong, tough and powerful, but life conditions can make it hard to fulfil these roles thus contributing to violence. In South Africa conscription into the army may have been a factor.

The most major analyses of masculinity in relation to political violence are those by Huggins et al (2002) and Haritos-Fatouros (2003). Huggins et al (2002) have argued that notions of Western patriarchy encourage men to dominate some men and all women. The men involved in these Brazilian organisations are taught to require respect, be competitive and degrade others, which makes the threshold for instigating violence lower. Huggins et al (2002) came up with three kinds of masculinity prevalent in the organizations involved in Brazilian torture.

People with a “personalistic masculinity” believe that they are improving society and blame the victims for their actions. They demand respect, are proud of their work and frequently make references to being their own boss. Another kind of masculinity, “bureaucratizing masculinity”, is reflected in people who describe themselves as part of a larger system where their masculinity is linked to the security system and the state. In their minds, the system is responsible for making sure that violence is not excessive, and teamwork is more important than personal attributes. The third type of masculinity is “blended masculinity” where people alternate between showing elements of “personalistic masculinity” when not talking about work and “bureaucratizing masculinity” when discussing tasks required by the organization.

Ainsworth (1995) has put forward the notion that attitudes like toughness and lack of feeling are encouraged by male dominated cultures involved in police organisations, which may promote the likelihood of violence. Foster et al (2005) also have remarked on the emphasis placed on masculinity in the police narratives they collected, such as references to male bonding, patriarchal images and control. It seems therefore, that masculinity is a factor that cannot be ignored when it comes to understanding the motives and perspectives of perpetrators involved in political violence. However, Foster et al (2005) stress that masculinity is not a personality trait in itself, but something that men strive towards, particularly in certain organisations.

2.5.4 Sequences

A final element of Foster et al's (2005) model is the way that events evolve in small steps, in both macro and micro levels. Toch (1996) has argued with reference to police organisations that a person is more likely to use political violence once they have already committed an act of violence. Previously discussed was the notion of the 'foot-in-the-door phenomenon' and many scholars have concurred with this notion when examining perpetrators.

Whatever the processes are that enable the continuation of political violence, it is vital to remember that the time process involved in the sequences of political violence is not linear (Foster et al, 2005) but rather a spiral of events-reactions by the other, such as protests, result in responses to these actions. Foster & Skinner (1990) thus refer to these cycles of revenge as a 'dialogue of violence.' Of particular importance, noted by Foster et al (2005) is how conspiracy mentalities can severely increase the likelihood of violence. A belief that an oppressed group of people is trying to overthrow the government, allows those involved in state-supportive violence to feel particularly justified in their actions. In South Africa, this was especially noticeable. In an interview with one of the main perpetrators working for Koevoet, Alan Cowell (2005) reports that the perpetrator stated "My motivation was that we, the security forces, were REACTING to a communist and a terrorist threat, and not that THEY were reacting to an unfair political dispensation." Again, this ties in with the notion of entitlement.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined the way in which previous academic research has enhanced our understanding of perpetrators. As described above, neither situational nor dispositional accounts are satisfactory in accounting for the factors affecting the propensity towards political violence. Situationist views cannot explain people nearer the top of the hierarchy who actually give the orders. Furthermore this approach is insufficient in explaining certain behaviours such as initiated killings. Dispositional accounts, on the other hand, tend to be too simplistic and neglect any element of situationism.

Some authors have focussed on the perspectives of victim and perpetrator and have shown not only how both perspectives differ, but also how perpetrators can be disengaged from their actions through a variety of mechanisms. This allows them to see their actions as less significant. This makes way for the new relational approach adopted by Foster et al (2005).

A large proportion of this afore-mentioned research comes from a positivist line of thought. Yet narrative approaches are increasingly becoming another way to examine the psychological factors that may affect the propensity towards political violence. These accounts cannot explain political violence, but they can allow a glimpse of understanding as to the intentions and motivations of the perpetrator of political violence. Many of these studies however cannot be related to the South African context, as the socio-historical context can greatly shape behaviours. On the other hand a few narrative accounts have been recorded in South Africa. Of most relevance to this topic is *Theatre of Violence* where Foster et al (2005) have collected several narratives from perpetrators on all sides of the political divide. Through analysis of these accounts these authors created a model that has several advantages over previous accounts. A larger emphasis on agency counters the passivity of situationist accounts, yet the relational emphasis allows a multi-sided understanding of political violence.

Nevertheless, the accounts collected were at the time of the TRC before certain amnesties were granted. There were also only a few accounts, with only two police narratives. By and large, the amnesty process is now over and perpetrators may feel more secure in telling their stories. They may also have had time to reflect on their actions. Therefore this thesis seeks to add to these narrative accounts by providing a case study of an ex-Security Branch policeman whose narrative comes in 2006, many years after the whole TRC process. The next chapter will detail the methodology involved in this case study. The case study will partly be analysed with reference to the model set out by Foster et al (2005).

University of Cape Town

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 General Methodology

As previously mentioned, this mini-thesis approaches the topic from an interpretive/constructionist angle, drawing on several texts. The previous section of this thesis looked at more General understandings of perpetrators as cited in the academic literature. The analysis of this thesis will draw on some of this literature, namely Foster, Haupt & de Beers' (2005) relational approach but it is also necessary to consider specific representations of Paul from various perspectives other than academic understandings.

The first perspective that I will analyse is that of the media. I will look at the way in which Paul has been portrayed and whether his actions have been justified or condoned. Unlike the majority of perpetrators in South Africa, Paul was frequently in the media at the time of the transition and did a series of expos with the Mail and Guardian. All of these texts will be used to examine whether othering discourses were used that allowed the public to distance themselves from Paul's actions or whether Paul's actions were simply shown as acceptable given the context of apartheid.

I will also examine how Paul is portrayed in any other published material. Unfortunately a series made by Max du Preez and containing interviews with Paul has proved to be difficult to get hold of and thus cannot be used in the analysis. I will however be using David Goodman's (1999) book *Fault Lines* that devotes a chapter to Paul based on an interview he conducted with him. I will analyse whether this chapter provides a useful understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions and what purpose the text serves.

Another perspective will use the available transcripts of Paul's amnesty hearings and the details of his amnesty applications. This 'factual' or 'forensic' voice may provide some objective facts concerning Paul but due to the 'quasi-judicial' nature of the amnesty hearings the bulk of information will relate to the facts of one specific

incident, the bombing of the Alexandra Health Clinic, rather than providing a full understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions for committing such an act. Some information may be gleaned however. The bombing of the Alexandra Health Clinic was one of many incidents for which Paul applied for amnesty but is the only incident for which a transcript is readily available.

Most importantly, the final perspective that I will consider is that of Paul in the present day (i.e. the interview that was conducted and the events leading up to the interview). This will be the predominant but not the only focus of my analysis. Critical analysis of these different perspectives will allow a more complex and unbiased examination of the complexities of political violence. I will detail the methodology of the interview and the context of the interview below. I will then detail the methodology of the discourse analysis that will be used in the next chapter.

3.2 Methodology of the Interview

Because the intention of the interview was to gain as open and self-Generated a narrative as possible, ranging from childhood to the present day, a list of questions was devised spanning several General areas. These questions are not necessary, but acted as prompts during the interview towards certain areas, or kept the momentum of the interview going.

These General areas included:

- life history (such as early years, adolescence, career choices, important life events, present day)
- questions steering towards issues of personal and group identity, dynamics of the police force, violent acts and intentions/motivations for this, the role of superiors and the effect of their actions (i.e. psychological functioning)
- the TRC process
- Paul's view of justice, forgiveness and reconciliation.

I got into contact with Paul Erasmus through my father, who was one of Paul's targets in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time of the TRC Paul came forward and through Paul's amnesty applications, my father came to learn of exactly what Paul had been doing.

The two of them have reconciled and met for the first time in a documentary called *Stopping the Music*. Since then they have kept in contact by travelling to Turkey amongst other places to talk about forgiveness. I had never met Paul, but emailed him, explaining who I was and arranged an interview on his farm in Blanco, just outside of George.

The interview lasted just under three hours and was audio-recorded and transcribed. Impressions of Paul and his farm were also recorded in a notebook. I cannot ignore how my identity affects the interviewing process and thus I note that my identity played out in three ways: as a white female South African, as my father's daughter and as a Masters student. The interview was conducted in English.

Concerning the research ethics of the interview, the interview was consensual as was the audio recording. When Paul requested the recording to be stopped, I did so. Paul Erasmus has given me permission to use his real name rather than a pseudonym and should he want a copy of the interview and/or a copy of the thesis this will be provided.

I personally transcribed the interview in a manner most appropriate to the analysis. Pauses in the transcript are denoted by full stops, italics represent a word that has been emphasised and laughing is written in brackets. I will detail the methodology of this discourse analysis in the forthcoming section. For now a quick word is required on morals as an interpretive/hermeneutical approach is 'concerned with morality, arguing that "'what is' and what 'should be' are closely intertwined and cannot be artificially split" (Foster, Haupt & de Beer, 2005: 89).

3.3 Morals

There are two moral dilemmas that arise from this mini-thesis appropriate to the study of perpetrators. Whilst these dilemmas are not easily resolved, they are worth mentioning since they are moral issues that had to be grappled with for the purposes of this study. The first dilemma concerns the study of perpetrators in General whilst the second is specific to the interviewing of perpetrators of political violence.

The study of perpetrators is a contentious one. On the one hand an understanding of the underlying factors that contribute to political violence may help prevent the likelihood that people will commit these acts. The study of perpetrators themselves is the best way to do this. However, as noted by Foster et al (2005:89) such a focus may diminish attention to victims and allow an overly sympathetic reaction towards perpetrators. Many scholars have wrestled with this dilemma (see Browning, 1992: xx). Foster et al (2005:92) somewhat resolve this moral quandary by taking a relational approach. This model goes beyond binaries of victim and perpetrator and argues for both agency and structure hopefully allowing a critical viewpoint to be retained. A multi-perspectival approach also allows different angles to be examined without believing one perspective entirely. This is the approach this thesis takes.

The second moral predicament concerns the interview process and the way in which researchers listen to perpetrator accounts. Critical self-examination by a researcher is necessary since the way in which information is gained is partly dependent on the exchange by interviewer and interviewee. Perpetrator accounts may therefore reflect an interviewer bias. Whilst there is no ethically definitive way of proceeding, it is worth examining the processes that may have played a role in the main interview considered in this thesis.

Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo (2002: 45-62) argue that a perpetrator of political violence is a bearer of secrets. They identify four principal elements involved in the 'secrecy exchange' between interviewer and interviewee that relate to this thesis. The first element relates to initial security measures and the power that the interviewee holds. The demonstration of this power can take a variety of forms. The perpetrator may for example refuse to be interviewed at all, or may pick out other colleagues who they argue can reveal more. Whilst this did not occur with Paul Erasmus, there was a point when he asked for the tape recorder to be turned off and revealed information relating to his present day point of view. Furthermore, initially Paul invited his eighteen year old son, Dylan, to join us and engaged in social chat. It was only when Dylan left the room that darker secrets were revealed.

The second element, espionage, relates to the way in which an interviewer attempts to find a way to exchange something for more information from the perpetrator. Because

money is not an option, other forms of 'symbolic capital' must be found (Huggins et al, 2002: 55). One subtle way that is pointed out is to allow long digressions. Although these digressions seem to be moving away from important information they can, on the contrary, actually reveal a close proximity to the secret. When asked about interrogations for example Paul moved on to talking about the border, thus minimising his actions and creating a more acceptable context. He says 'Personally I could never torture...not a white person you know. I s'pose the border was a different thing again.'

The third element involved in secrecy exchange is entrusted disclosure. Entrusted disclosure is most apparent at the beginning of the interview when ground rules and the contextualisation of the interview are established. Not only does the interviewer attempt to gain a useful background to the perpetrator accounts, but the interviewee also aims to set the terms of the interview. This then allows information to be revealed in a way that maintains the value of these secrets. Secrets are consequently not ever revealed as a whole, metaphors are used, violence is often legitimated and responsibility is denied. This will be apparent in the analysis of the interview.

The final element involved in secrecy exchange is that of post hoc-security where the perpetrator attempts to involve the interviewer in such a way that the perpetrator is able to maintain a positive self-image. The way that information is neutralised can be through blame of higher-up officials or through by placing the interviewer in a 'helper role.' Paul constantly referred to his post-traumatic stress disorder and described reconciliation as a 'fantastic process' because of 'the mere fact that you are sitting in this house' considering the hatred he had for my father.

Despite all the elements involved in secrecy exchange, it is still asserted that useful information was obtained in the interview and that this information can greatly enhance an understanding of the motivations and intentions for political violence.

3.4 Context of the Interview

It is necessary to give a quick context of the narrative obtained in the interview with Paul. Firstly, the interview was conducted in the beginning of 2006. The TRC had officially ended many years prior but there was much talk during that time of the reopening of amnesty cases. Paul himself admitted that he was nervous of the reopening of amnesty cases with the possibility of prosecution. It is perhaps for this reason that Paul never gave full acknowledgment of his wrong-doings. In South Africa at this time the apartheid regime has been unquestionably discredited and placed firmly in the past. For this reason Paul may have been wary of showing strong support or approval of the previous regime.

I met Paul at his farm in Blanco, just outside of George. His son, Dylan, who is currently 18 years old, greeted me as I pulled up. Paul took me into his living room and invited both me and his son to sit down. I wondered whether this was an attempt to gain sympathy from me, to show me that he was an ordinary person, or whether this was an opportunity to boast to his son over things he was proud of. It was clear that Dylan had heard these stories before which left me doubting Paul's remorse. However Dylan soon left us to talk alone.

Paul was wearing a blue-collared shirt, shorts, flip-flops and had a cross around his neck. Apart from the long-hair and earrings Paul did not look out of the ordinary in any way. Pictures on the walls reflected farming achievements and family life. However a shotgun hung on the rack. I noticed a shrine sitting by one of the sofas with a prayer inscribed. It stated 'I expect to pass through life but once. If therefore, there can be any kindness I can allow or any good thing I can do to a fellow human being, let me do it now and do not defer or neglect, as I shall not pass this way again.' I found this somewhat ironic given Paul's history. The interview lasted approximately three hours. I will now detail some defining elements of discourse and describe the way in which the interview was analysed

3.5 Features of Discourse

What do we know about discourse? Parker (1992:5) defines a discourse as a 'system of statements which constructs an object'. He asserts that there are certain features that all discourses contain. For my purposes it is useful to consider some of these features with respect to my analysis. Parker (1992:6) firstly states that discourse works through text. He defines a text as a delimited aspect of meaning in any form that can be interpreted in some way. Thus a text can be anything from a bus ticket to non-verbal behaviour. For my purposes the text I will be analysing contains primarily the transcription of the interview with Paul and events leading up to the interview, though I will also be using an interview conducted by David Goodman, transcripts from his amnesty applications and media representations at the time of the TRC to aid further analysis.

Parker (1992:8-9) asserts that a discourse necessarily contains subjects and objects. It is recognized that 'a discourse makes available a space for particular selves to step in' (p.9) There are many subjects in the text that I will be examining, with Paul being one of them. There are of course other subjects in the text such as Eugene de Kock, his superiors, judges from the TRC and so on. As Paul broaches different topics throughout his narrative many selves become apparent. On the surface there is Paul as a remorseful being reflecting on his past. At other times his narrative becomes framed in extremely masculine institutionalised language, in particular that of police discourse. He uses, for example, phrases such as 'terr' to describe the enemy and it is interesting that although he comes from an English speaking background he often uses Afrikaans slang such as 'babalas' or 'skinner'.ⁱ He uses familial discourse when he talks about his ex-wife and son, religious discourse at a few points in time and also frames his thoughts in a discourse acceptable to the new South Africa. The main object that Paul is consistently referring to throughout the text is his life experience.

Parker (1992:10) also argues that discourse is a coherent system of meanings such that statements are regulated to constitute reality. In my analysis Paul tries to explain how he got embroiled in a violent career path as a consequence of the apartheid system at the time. His discourse moves from being called-up into the police force to

brainwashing propaganda to volunteering to go to the border because everyone else did. He often reflects on his discourse through various devices. He uses denial of his position for example “I’m not saying that I’m a good guy or something like that’ and moves sometimes to extreme agonizing over how he never realized the implications of his actions in terms of morality.

Parker (1992:11) states that a discourse is historically located. This is certainly true for Paul’s discourse, which is situated against the backdrop of the apartheid regime and notions of white supremacy growing out of firstly colonialism and secondly white political domination over the course of the 1990s. However, Paul’s discourse extends past the system that he grew up in to the transition to democracy in which the institution that he worked for became increasingly illegitimate. Parker (1992:12) proposes that discourses also refer to other discourses. Paul’s narrative therefore refers to other historically located discourses, such as Communist discourse, the discourse of liberation movements and the transitional discourse that prevailed in South Africa from 1994 onwards concerning debates which considered whether perpetrators should be prosecuted or punished and their changing status in society.

I now turn to examine Thompson (1984) who provides a useful analytical framework for understanding ideological discourse in particular. However, Larrain (1979:26) shows that not all ideas are ideological, and this is the case in my analysis. On the other hand, much of Paul’s narrative is ideological - in particular that of Afrikaner Nationalist discourse and policing discourse. The major advantage of Thompson’s (1984) approach comes from his keeping alive the link between ideology and critiques of domination. As du Toit (1994:112) points out, ideology originally served to demonstrate the ways in which meaning was mobilized in the interests of the dominant groups by misrepresenting social contradictions. For the purposes of my analysis, this critical conception of ideology is in tune with the notion of ideological discourse as invoked by Paul. Therefore I agree with Thompson (1984:130) that for this thesis ‘to study ideology is to study ways in which meaning serves to sustain relations of domination.’ I do not wish to delve into deeper philosophical notions of how this critical perspective can be applied elsewhere (see du Toit, 1994 for an in-depth analysis on how critical perspectives apply to non-ideological discourse such as liberation movements).

Thompson (1984:132) argues that these relations of domination are ‘sustained by a *mobilization of meaning* which legitimates, dissimulates or reifies an existing state of affairs’ (Thompson’s emphasis). By legitimation he means the way that language serves to show domination as rational, traditional or charismatic. By dissimulation Thompson means the way that relations of domination are hidden so that they seem something they are not. Reification refers to the way in which this state of affairs seems permanent rather than transitory.

Thompson (1984: 127) states that ‘The concept of ideology cannot be considered in isolation, but must be situated within the framework of a General social theory.’ He provides three levels of abstraction relating to action and structure in which ideology can be located and analysed. Whilst I follow Wetherell and Potter (1992:105) in arguing that these stages are ‘entirely intertwined’ and thus cannot be conveniently separated for the purposes of my analysis and furthermore are all interpretive, I do agree that Thompson (1984) provides an identifiable and practical way of focusing on the concept of ideology.

I thus wish to outline these stages briefly for further clarification. The first is that of social analysis and examines the context of action, institutions and structural elements that constrain institutions. At the next level, discursive analysis, the focus is on articulated structure in language, the argumentative structure of language, and syntactic structure. The final stage is interpretation.

Discourse analysis does not have one homogenous fixed method. Whilst the basic concepts and assumptions hold for any analysis, the methodology that must be used depends on the particular topic. For the purposes of this thesis, I draw on methodologies suggested by Thompson (1984), Fairclough (1992, 1989) and Wetherell and Potter (1992). Discourse analysis tries to unravel the taken-for-granted versions of reality and their contributions towards power relations (Foster et al, 2005: 275). The underlying aim of discourse analysis then, given that ideological discourse is the mobilisation of meaning, is to ask ‘for what purpose is this meaning mobilised?’

The framework that I follow is similar to that of Foster et al (2005) and will serve to answer each research question of my thesis accordingly. Since the first question of my thesis relates to how Paul views his intentions and motivations for committing acts of political violence and the context that may have played a role in him becoming a perpetrator of political violence, I first look at the non-reasons that he gives and the reasons. Given his limited acknowledgement of responsibility I then look at devices that allow him to deflect blame, either on to the victims or to other policemen and Generals. I then examine his discourse with respect to the main elements of Foster et al's (2005) model of political violence, namely the role of the organisation, masculinity and finally entitlement. It is worth stating that Paul's narrative does not differ strikingly from this model. Finally, I look at the way that Paul's narrative has elements of the New South African discourse that has emerged. However first I wish to examine other representations of Paul Erasmus from the time of the transition to give a background to this interview and allow an additional critical angle to be examined.

Chapter 4

Analysis and Reflection

4.1 Media Representation:

In *Theatre of Violence* Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005:33) describe how the time period of 1960-1990 was 'largely characterized by silences regarding "those responsible" for violence' and attribute this partly to media restrictions and distorted information given by the government and security forces. The period from 1990 onwards at first suggested a promising start of many investigations into finding those responsible for the violence. It was hoped that the TRC would unveil many hidden truths. However these investigations often did not amount to anything substantial. These authors suggest that by and large perpetrators were largely unknown in the media (Foster et al, 2005:44). When this was not the case, either 'othering' discourses were used that portrayed perpetrators of political violence as few and far between and as sadistic monsters or a discourse was used that justified the actions of these perpetrators. This allows the reader to distance oneself from examining the possibility that we could all potentially be perpetrators of political violence.

What did the media say about Paul Erasmus at the time of the transition and throughout the TRC process? The majority of newspapers around this time are silent about Paul. However the *Mail & Guardian* that produced a series of expos resulting from interviews with Paul in 1995. Later articles related primarily to Stratcom.ⁱⁱ The reports often suggest that cover-ups within the Security Branch at the time were ongoing and that Paul was the one of the few to voluntarily disclose information and come forward. The reason why Paul may have been prepared to talk publicly may have had something to do with the fact that Paul had already 'spilled the beans' at the Goldstone Commission a few years prior, even though this commission had been too short of hard evidence to make any damning conclusions.

How is Paul portrayed in the *Mail & Guardian*? The first thing to be noted from these reports is that the reasons given for committing these acts of political violence are often unstated. Paul is not portrayed as a bloodthirsty psychopath, but rather on the

contrary his actions are often justified in terms of his opposition to Communism. In an article titled 'Front Company is still in business' the aim of an undercover Stratcom company is given as 'countering the revolutionary threat' (*Mail & Guardian*, 23/06/1995). In an excerpt from Paul's book that was published by the *Mail & Guardian* on 07/07/1995 (the book itself remains to be published) Paul describes my father as someone who at the time he believed was "just another 'red' who had to be stopped."

On the other hand, despite the silence over reasons for committing acts of political violence Paul is portrayed with a strong sense of agency in all of these articles, both in terms of his acts of violence and in terms of coming forward with information. Relating to this latter sense of agency we are told that 'A draft document for Lamont was given to the *Mail & Guardian* by Erasmus' for example (*Mail & Guardian*, 23/06/1995). This passive use of the verb suggests the voluntaristic nature of the information disclosed by Paul. Later the article also describes how Paul disputed the claims of other intelligence operatives that Stratcom had been disbanded. These sentences suggest implicitly that Paul is telling the truth whereas other colleagues were lying and puts Paul in a position of power. This point is emphasized particularly in an article dealing with Frank Chikane.ⁱⁱⁱ The article details how Chikane had stated "As you know, I am one of those few South Africans who are prepared to forgive those who are responsible for hideous acts, but this must go with the willingness to voluntarily disclose the said acts as well as an indication of remorse on the part of the perpetrators...Failure to do so should open (them) to prosecution and punishment" (*Mail & Guardian*, 30/06/1995). Paul called Chikane to ask for forgiveness two days later even though he had not been the person to plant the poison. He had nevertheless been part of scouting operations that led to this. We are told that Erasmus knows who that man is but would not disclose this information preferring him to come forward voluntarily. This then demonstrates how Paul is in a powerful position by being the bearer of secrets.

In the same article the *Mail & Guardian* (published 30/06/1995) quotes Chikane as saying "I hope there are more people who will join him for the sake of the country. We are all prisoners and victims." Thus Paul is also portrayed as a victim of circumstance, a rational ordinary man caught up in the system at the time who is

deserving of forgiveness. He is also described as having ‘made peace’ with Chikane again suggesting a strong sense of agency. This active voice implies that Paul is responsible for making the peace and detracts from the way that he destroyed the peace to begin with. The portrayal of Paul as an ordinary professional man is bolstered by a quotation by F.W. De Klerk published in an article from the same day (30/06/1995) stating “we are likely to see a great many more ‘revelations’ of the kind that figures like Paul Erasmus had made...”

Over the course of time the *Mail & Guardian* describes Paul in a more sceptical manner. This may have something to do with the change of author, but also with growing scepticism over the TRC process. On 14/08/1998 Paul is described as coming forward in an amnesty application with a name for a fake news agency set up by Stratcom. Yet we are told that the name ‘rang few bells with journalists, suggesting it was singularly ineffective as a means of intelligence gathering or disinformation.’ Furthermore, Raymond Louw (described as a ‘prominent’ journalist) is quoted as saying “I think [the former security branch] are now trying to create the impression they ran a massive disinformation campaign.” This discourse undermines Paul’s credibility and his effectiveness.

Overall, media representation does not provide a useful understanding of Paul’s actions. Whilst he is not portrayed as a sadistic monster, thus giving the impression that he is an ordinary person (concurring with the Milgram (1974) experiments) the nature of the articles is such that Paul’s actions are almost condoned.

4.2 Literary Representation

If media representations do not provide a useful understanding of the causes of political violence, what can we learn from the representation of Paul in David Goodman’s book *Fault Lines*? Goodman’s (1999) book is a somewhat journalistic look at reconciliation in South Africa. It focuses on Paul and one of his victims, Frank Chikane and examines their journeys towards reconciliation in the new South Africa at the time of the transition. Paul was involved in targeting Chikane who was, at the

time, the leader of the South African Council of Churches. However Paul claims that he was not directly involved in Chikanes attempted poisoning.

The chapter in the book devoted to Paul confirms many of the background details surrounding Paul's life that were obtained in the interview by the author of this thesis. These will be outlined later. We learn, for example, that Paul joined the police force in Potchefstroom so that he would be able to still see his girlfriend at the time. Furthermore, the book also gives descriptions of Paul's victims and specific dates of important events in Paul's life. Nevertheless, the chapter in the book relating to Paul is highly stereotypical. Goodman (1999: 106) states that 'To hear Paul Erasmus tell it, he's an innocent bystander while bad things have happened around him.' Goodman (1999) takes a different view. He describes Paul's voluntarism, such as with going to the border where 'he jumped at the chance to go.' Goodman (1999) portrays Paul as a sadistic psychopath, rather than an ordinary person. Whether the portrayal of Paul as a monster is in order to make the story of reconciliation with Chikane all the more incredible or whether this is simply Goodman's style is debatable. The end result is that an intricate understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions is not achieved.

Hook (2003:6) finds in his study of students' assignments on the Norwood killer that there are three consistent tendencies that relate to the production of stereotypes. These stereotypes are readily apparent in Goodman's study. Of direct relevance are sensationalisation (the use of macabre details to 'de-normalise' the narrative) and sentimentality (where over-stated descriptive terms are used to create a stereotypical response).

With regards to sensationalisation there are many instances of gruesome details being given that portray Paul as a monster and therefore allow the reader to distance oneself from the fact that perpetrators are more often than not somewhat ordinary. Unnecessary details are included that make Paul's actions seem all the more extraordinary. For example, Goodman (1999:98) describes an incident of torture in Namibia saying

'In a sudden and swift motion, Paul Erasmus thrust the hot brand into her face. She let out a blood-curdling shriek, her son's sobs could be heard in the distance. The sickening smell of burning flesh hung limply in the night air.'

In describing the first time Paul killed someone, Goodman (1999: 94) describes how Paul's friends insisted they pose for photos. We are told that Paul 'grinned manically, like a trophy hunter gloating over his prize kill. He was flush with the excitement of the hunt.' Perhaps most shocking is the description of electric shocks for the purpose of torture (Goodman, 1999: 100).

'Suddenly a searing hot flash of electricity ripped through Rosavita's body. She bit down so hard on her tongue that the end fell off. Blood spurted from her mouth. Erasmus roared with laughter.'

These details do not bring us any closer to an understanding of Paul's motivations and intentions. They simply make Paul seem an aberration from the norm. In a similar vein, Goodman's writing also shows many instances of sentimentality. He states for example (1999:78)

'But there was something unsettling about him. Maybe it was his Fu Manchu mustache that dropped in a permanent scowl. Or maybe it was that penetrating gaze, like the stare of a predatory animal, that always made you feel like you were being sized up for the kill.'

The Security Branch are described as 'the James Bonds of the South African Police' who 'had an unsettling cocksure air, like lawmen from the Wild West who answered to no-one' (Goodman, 1999: 89). Whilst this may indeed be true, the style of the text is such that it is unclear what facts are embellished and what are true. It seems that the text is written through Paul's eyes and yet some of the descriptions seem unlikely to have come from Paul himself. One instance of this is when Goodman writes 'Erasmus felt the veins tighten at the insolence of this kaffir.' Since people often wish to portray themselves in a positive image, it is unlikely that Paul would have used this word and it appears that its usage is simply to shock. This makes the accuracy of the text debatable.

Goodman's (1999) portrayal of Paul is therefore also not particularly useful in understanding the causes of political violence. Whilst it confirms details and events from the present day interview it once again gives a stereotypical image of Paul that detracts from our understanding of his motivations and intentions for committing acts

of political violence. One useful description in the chapter however sums up the way that Paul portrays himself in the new South Africa. Goodman (1999: 107) says 'Erasmus's half-hearted confessions are typical of many former security police operatives. They are at once eager to enhance their image by saying that they were key players, but keen to distance themselves from the worst atrocities. They find themselves in a curious bind: their only cachet is their notoriety, which could form the basis of their post-apartheid careers...But if he didn't do anything bad, no one (such as foreign journalists or publishers) is interested in him.'

Furthermore, some ideological statements can help to confirm the potent mix of multiple subjectivities analysed later on in relation to the present day interview, but these statements are only useful when Paul's direct speech is given in Goodman's (1999) text. His Christian Nationalism, combined with anti-Communist thinking is demonstrated for example when Paul states that a Communist was 'anti-Christian and therefore satanic' (Goodman, 1999: 104). Paul also admits to being racist by stating that his father had 'a depth of feeling for the blacks which rubbed off on his other children. But definitely not on his youngest son' (Goodman, 1999: 80). As will be seen later, Paul in the present day hides his racist sentiment under anti-Communist mentality.

4.3 The Amnesty Process and Representation

Given that the media and literary representations of Paul are not entirely useful; in understanding Paul's motivations and intentions, to what extent does the available amnesty transcript concerning Paul provide some light on the situation? Unfortunately the only obtainable transcript regarding Paul's amnesty applications refers to the bombing of Alexandra Health Clinic. Paul applied for many other incidents but none of these transcripts are available. In the available transcript it is not clear who else is implicated. The transcript instead is restricted to Paul's testimony and that of the witnesses. Paul is also careful not to implicate others. The jargon is typical of the amnesty hearings from the TRC; the format is framed in a 'Question and Answer' style, using semi-legal terminology. The transcript is also concerned with minor technical details. For example Paul's lawyer, Mr. Van Zyl addresses the Chairperson saying

‘As it pleases you Madam Chair. It's clearly a typing error and he said now it should be January 1975. That is all that I wish to amend and I think he can confirm it, Madam Chair.’

This focus on incidents and facts is exemplified by Judge de Jager's question:

‘Mr Erasmus, the question was: "What did you do?" Listen to the question. What did you invent to harass them? What did you yourself, we don't want at this stage to hear about other people, you might be asked about that afterwards or even later in the hearing, but please listen to the question and try to stick to and answer, in answering that question.’

As can be seen from the outset the transcript does not allow much revelation of Paul's motivations and intentions. Most of the transcript is concerned with the details of particular incidents i.e. Paul did X on this particular day. It is only at the beginning of the transcript that a few reasons are divulged by Paul. Paul describes his thinking as typical of many policemen where ‘because as a Christian, we were, as a Christian at that time, it was our duty to fight Communism. Communism was at the root of this evil that was going to rip our country to pieces.’ By appealing to religious discourse Paul attempts to place his actions in morally legitimate terms and justify any actions taken. He is silent on the issue of racism however.

Nevertheless, as is shown in analysis of the interview later, Paul's discourse also suggests an element of excitement and masculinity. Paul says

‘it was something to which I could commit myself, this crusade against godless, satanic communism, as we were taught, and then I would be something of a James Bond type of character and lead this exciting life dealing with very important issues.’

There is also some element of pride and superiority, couched in policing discourse, that is demonstrated when Paul states

‘you had a license to break the law on a scale which we knew if we performed the most outrageous things and we certainly worked hard to outdo each other, we became very inventive. I certainly flourished in this environment, I suppose because I’ve always tried to be a lateral thinker, I was innovative, I developed in my own right and I have admitted it before in these forums, I developed new techniques of harassment and more bizarre ways, which in some ways were more effective than some of my colleagues or Commanding Officers could ever have dreamed of.’

Paul therefore claims superiority over not only his colleagues but also those in charge of him. He uses words with positive connotations such as ‘innovative’ and ‘flourished’ that implicitly portray him in a positive light, and by using words such as ‘effective’ Paul also seeks to define himself as a professional. This also minimises his actions by using a distancing device.

Paul often places the blame on others stating that he was simply following orders. For example when questioned by his lawyer ‘So you fell into line with this total indoctrination that took place?’ he replies

‘Absolutely. I not only fell into line with it, it was almost a staggering concept that here as a member of the police, you had very much a licence to break the law on a scale which we knew if we performed the most outrageous things and we certainly worked very hard to outdo each other, we became very inventive.’

He also blames his actions on stress and says ‘With the benefit of hindsight, looking back, I think it impaired my judgement in many, many situations which affect me to this day, most definitely.’

Due to the quasi-legal nature of the hearing and the fact that there is only one amnesty transcript there is limited usefulness in analysing Paul’s amnesty representation as a means of understanding his actions. As described in the first chapter, the Amnesty Committee hearings were framed in a “factual” quasi-judicial layout that focused on incidents rather than motivations. Nevertheless, there are a few paragraphs that begin to demonstrate Paul’s motivations and intentions. As will be seen later, elements of masculinity, pride and superiority all follow the model set out by Foster et al (2005).

4.4 General Outline of the Interview

Throughout the narrative questions were as open-ended as possible and infrequent as possible to elicit as much information as possible from Paul's perspective. Paul's style is often informal, using my name often throughout the interview and making jokes. This is presumably to build a feeling of solidarity and to show himself as a likeable person. It is worth questioning who he believes the intended audience to be - presumably academics and my father - this may affect the way he wished to be portrayed. Paul's narrative begins in a fairly chronological fashion, starting with when he received his call-up papers in 1975. He does not speak much of his childhood or schooling other than to describe his mother and father. He does however frequently compare himself to his father who he claims was a pilot and also suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Paul says of his father 'But I never started to understand him until I started to understand myself.' This comparison then extends to Paul stating 'before the war he was a loving, decent, sensitive guy.' This use of three positive adjectives alludes to the fact that Paul may believe that he also shares these attributes. Paul also claims that his father wrote some of the legislation governing the old Pass Laws. It is not clear in what capacity this was, nor is it clear which of the two jobs his dad did or when he did them.

The questions throughout the interview were somewhat open-ended starting with 'Where did it all begin?' and it appears that Paul does not find much relevance from his childhood in how he ended up where he did. He describes his life after leaving school as that of a typical white male that was not sure what he wanted to do with his life. He says, for example 'I came out of Police College on the 3rd of December '75 and then I thought I would stick it out until the end of the following year.' This is somewhat at odds from what can be seen in the TRC transcript of the bombing of the Alexandra Health Clinic where Paul places a larger emphasis on his desire to practice art: 'My idea of what I wanted to do with my life, apart from compulsory conscription, was that I wanted to practice art.' The turning point in Paul's life (this time in accord with the TRC transcript), came on June 16th 1975 the day of the Soweto riots as 'it was the first sort of dead people I have really seen, a real trauma. But I think that's what made me decide to stay, you know, in the cops.'^{iv} We know

from his narrative and other interviews (Goodman, 1999) that he joined the Security Branch in January 1977 and went on Intelligence courses the year after. In 1981 he volunteered to go to the border, even though 'the border was an entirely voluntary thing'. For Paul, the border greatly affected his outlook and he states that 'I took a knock, I think everybody did. Just the scale and the propensity and the horror.' He found it hard to adjust to ordinary life when he returned but met his wife, Linda, in 1982 and married in 1983.

Paul started officially working for Stratcom at the end of the 1980s although he had previously been involved in some of their operations, such as designing posters. Until this time Paul had remained as part of the Security Branch. Paul does not speak much of his time at Stratcom apart from hinting at the pride with which he undertook his operations. I propose that this silence over activities at Stratcom is because in Paul's words 'Proof in the pudding is that all those years up until the TRC never one arrest or conviction of any third force.' It may be that he does not want to implicate himself and others should these cases reopen. In this way Paul retains power over the interview by being the bearer of secrets.

Paul suffered increasingly from post-traumatic stress (according to his statements) in the early 1990s but feared leaving the Security Branch because he knew too much. Another concern was that he needed to pay his son Dylan's (who has cerebral palsy) medical bills. It is common knowledge that Paul was one of the first to go to the Goldstone Commission in 1994. According to Paul he applied for amnesty for 527 incidents at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and got amnesty for all except 22. However, the TRC report on its website suggests this is more in the region of 86.

According to Paul, the TRC failed in the case of Eugene de Kock and P.W. Botha.^v Paul says 'justice might have been better served if they charged Botha.' Nevertheless, he believes that 'to not have had a TRC would have prolonged the hatred.' Paul is positive about the future of South Africa. He currently grows the African potato to make beauty products.

In some ways Paul's narrative starts off like a planned autobiography, almost like an adventure novel (which is maybe because he is currently writing his autobiography).

As the narrative progresses, it becomes less chronological and begins to jump back and forth in time. There is very little mention of violence throughout the narrative, and when the issue of violence arises Paul often begins to refer to the psychological problems that he began to face in the police force. This may be a way of avoiding blame for his actions, as he was not psychologically fit to make decisions. The fact that I am a female may have also contributed to the lack of graphic detail surrounding his actions and indeed in his interview with Goodman (1999) these details are more apparent. It may also be that over time Paul perceives this language to be less and less appropriate.

Paul is also quick to state that it was impossible to go for counselling within the Security Branch. He says that 'I literally went under a false name because I wasn't coping' to further emphasize the point that he did not have much of a choice in trying to sort out his problems and had to continue in his job. Despite the latter part of the narrative being less sequenced, there are a number of themes that keep recurring other than his psychological problems. Paul makes frequent references to his intelligence and commendations in the police force, presumably to make himself seem reasonable and make his actions seem more justified in that he did not make rash or stupid decisions. He often speaks with pride about Eugene de Kock and I believe that Thompson (1984: 136) is correct in stating that in narratives 'Stories are told which glorify those in power and seek to justify the status quo'. Whilst Eugene was not in power he was in charge of Vlakplaas and for Paul, Eugene might be the closest person higher up the ladder.

According to Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005:277), narratives are often demarcated along lines of power, gender and racialisation. With respect to racialisation Paul's narrative, being that of a white state-security agent, unsurprisingly shows a normal schooling process and a call-up to the police, as was then customary. Little mention is made concerning black oppression or hardship, and Paul for the most part neglects his privileged status other than the concept of sheltered employment for many people working for the police. His narrative is often gendered and masculine; this will be analysed in more detail later. Along the power axis Paul's narrative shows a similar sense of continuity demonstrated by the security personnel in *Theatre of Violence* (2005). After leaving school he got his call-up papers and went to Pretoria 'which was

just down the road' and enabled him to carry on his relationship with his new girlfriend at the time. After the police he then volunteered to go to the border. He states 'I threatened to resign if they didn't let me go.'

Paul never fully acknowledges his wrongdoing. His discourse is intertwined with excuses and justifications, never fully accepting responsibility for his actions. Even when describing how his wife typed his amnesty application and how she stated she 'didn't know that she was married to a monster' Paul then goes on to say 'look, it even horrified me because these things were over a scale of 18 years and all of a sudden...' His attempt to distance himself through the passage of time is some form of justification. Paul however does at some point argue that 'I never said and will say "Don't blame me, I was simply following orders"' thus showing partial acknowledgement.

4.4.1 Non-reasons

Paul's narrative often outlines what he was not involved with and reflects on the way in which events unfolded and spiralled into something else other than what he originally intended. This is one of the elements of Foster, Haupt & de Beer's (2005) relational model, where people are drawn in and having crossed one line are able to cross many more. Despite Paul's father writing 'many of the legislation governing, you know, the old Pass Laws' Paul maintains that he and his siblings were not 'politicised as kids.'^{vi} He did not know what he wanted to do with his life and states 'Well I *certainly* didn't think that I would end up where I was.' The emphasis on the word 'certainly' is an example of strong affinity modality. This strong affinity with *not* knowing serves to distance himself away from the possibility of choice in his life. This is bolstered by his argument that there was 'no money to go to varsity. A career in the police offered an opportunity for him to do something other than office work. He states 'I didn't want to sit behind a desk' and adds 'you know...office work and just being stuck in an environment.' The word 'stuck' has a negative connotation which then allows police work to be seen in a positive light. A few paragraphs later Paul says 'But I still had no idea what I wanted to do with my life. But anyway, I stuck it out with a view to leaving at the end of the year.' The repetition of the word

‘stuck’ once again adds to the notion of Paul’s career not being one of choice in any situation, but something that he got caught up in unintentionally. This is a way of diffusing blame.

Ironically, despite the policies of apartheid Paul insists that racism did not play a central role in his thinking saying ‘we were never brought up as racists. That is honest to god.’ He later adds further justification to this by stating that ‘What the government did was a classic thing, everybody that was an enemy of the state was compartmentalized into this one thing, Communism.’ However at the end of his narrative Paul concedes that ‘People believe and react in ways that they have been conditioned to. I mean I would probably never have a black girlfriend, I might, but why?’

Paul also deflects responsibility with ignorance as an explanation. ‘None of us really realized the things that were going on you know, all that was going on.’ He often refers to the “need-to-know principle.” Paul also says ‘I never saw myself as a hero. I just didn’t have a choice.’ These two sentences are contradictory and confusing. The implication is that if Paul did have a choice then he would have been a hero. In this way his actions are legitimized through suggesting that either he didn’t have a choice or that if he did he would have been doing something good and moral.

4.4.2 Reasons

What actual reasons are then possible to find according to Paul? These reasons were somewhat more ambiguous. ‘We saw it in a different way, if you didn’t get them to speak out you were costing someone their life, um or you were costing lives because if you didn’t get them to talk you wouldn’t know who else to go and arrest or shoot or kill or whatever.’ Yet the hesitation followed by repetition hints that Paul is not so convinced of this himself. When referring to violence, Paul often used distancing devices such as a shift to the passive voice and the use of collective pronouns. When talking about the first time he interrogated someone Paul states ‘No, no I was bored. We had shock machines and that was it. Um, just, ja, that’s the way it worked.’ This

language minimizes the actual content of what he did. He also used euphemisms such as 'Well I took a guy out' meaning that he killed him.

Paul describes his turning point to be that of the Soweto riots. He says 'But then of course there was Wednesday June the 16th which I think changed my life and changed everybody's' lives. This whole country changed.' This threefold repetition emphasizes the impact of the Soweto riots and by showing the impact on every person there is an implicit suggestion that Paul had no choice but to get involved. It also diffuses the responsibility to extend to everyone. He also describes his lack of enjoyment at the whole event but only in material rather than moral terms stating 'No winter clothing, I mean it was freezing cold, no bloody food and we sat in a parade with hundreds and hundreds of policemen'. Further to this he describes how some men still had the price tag hanging on their rifles, perhaps as an attempt to show the lack of aggression on the part of the police. This is contrasted with the opposing side. He says 'we had no inkling what trouble was coming.' This use of the word 'trouble' seems a bit odd to describe the Soweto riots. It undermines the morality of the stand taken and places the behaviour in the same category as a child or a criminal. This then serves to sustain relations of domination.

Paul cites ideology as an integral part of his thinking. 'I was an ideologue I suppose, I believed wholly and solely.' He often describes the training he went through and the effect it had on his thinking. Paul says 'I suppose we were propagandised a lot.' Paul is also quick to defend this position. He refers to the notes that he made on interrogation (one of the things that he was trained in) and says 'And there is no doubt firstly that these notes are genuine, I mean they can be subject to testing' as if to emphasise how strongly they manipulated his thinking. Perhaps Paul's insistence on the genuineness of these notes is related to the incidents which occurred at the time of the Goldstone Commission. Paul came forward with information which was then refuted by many of the Generals serving above him. Nevertheless, Paul's attention to the truth or falsity of his statements detracts from examination of the extent to which the actual content of these notes had a psychological effect on those that studied it. The underlying premise is that because these notes are true there is proof that people acted according to what they were taught. It is also interesting that none of this training is described as racist.

‘I mean I hated communism more than anything. But I never saw things in a black and white type of stuff. That to me was part and parcel of the whole thing, that the poor masses of black, oppressed masses of the country were being used as cannon fodder by the Commies. The whole thing was a cold war thing.’

Paul’s use of the words ‘poor’ and ‘oppressed’ in this instance serve to reinforce his argument by showing that he was (and is) rational and evenhanded towards other races. The metaphor of cannon fodder for the black masses dehumanizes them and also diminishes their importance. It legitimates his discourse by hinting that the police knew what was best for the masses.

Paul often refers to the way in which the real problem was that of white people fighting against the regime. He states

‘I was on the so-called white desk and that sort of gave me more hatred for people like your dad because why couldn’t they see the light? I mean these people were left-wingers or communists or whatever.’

The low affinity demonstrated by the use of the words ‘sort of’ suggest that Paul is not convinced by his argument. He also puts left-wingers and communists and ‘whatever’ into the same category which implicitly puts forward the idea that any person fighting against the regime fell into the same category. Because communism is now refuted, by placing left-wingers in the same category Paul is also refuting the legitimacy of left-wing discourse in the present day. Paul describes working on white suspects, white organizations and churches as ‘a big thorn in the backside.’ This metaphor sustains relations of domination by giving the image that these people were a big irritation but nonetheless nothing that could not be removed.

Thus the majority of Paul’s reasoning is justified by the context of the Cold War and consequently war is frequently embedded in his discourse. Sometimes Paul actually says as much. At other times however he says things like ‘we were fighting a losing battle hey. I mean, we had minor victories’ which implicitly make these suggestions.

4.4.3 Breaching scripts or norms

As noted by Foster et al (2005:281), narratives often set up implied norms which are then used to demonstrate the agency of the individual ‘in the form of dissent against the script/norm.’ According to these authors, this serves two purposes. It firstly puts the narrator in a positive light and secondly enables the normative group to be the one that can be blamed, rather than the narrator. This device can be commonly noted in Paul’s narrative. He criticizes others for the killing of David Webster and poisoning of Frank Chikane saying

‘I just didn’t want to, none of us, well a lot of the guys that *I* knew, but for myself I didn’t want blood on my hands again.^{vii} Once again, different things. This guy with an AK-47 there with a limpet mine I would have shot and gone home quite happily, you know, and enjoyed the rest of my life. But yirrah, not an academic like David Webster, Frank Chikane....’

The implicit suggestion is that there were a few ‘bad eggs’ that targeted these kinds of people but that Paul was rational and able to differentiate between what was a legitimate killing and what was not. This then justifies his actions. Yet when denying all knowledge of Neil Agget’s interrogation Paul concedes that he has still got photos of him hanging.^{viii} This implicitly suggests approval of the actions of others and a lack of respect for human life, and therefore contradicts his other statements.

From the beginning of his narrative Paul sets himself up against others. Regarding Paul’s friends from school, he mentions that ‘they went to work in banks, stand for six days taking peoples’ money and I thought ‘god I am not cut out for this.’ This is a way of putting down the job choices of his friends and makes a career in the police appear more attractive and acceptable.

Again putting himself in a positive light, Paul states ‘I followed Gene incidentally, I never took bribes. One of the cops that never did but anyway, I am proud of it. Everybody was taking them.’^{ix} This is an attempt to legitimate his discourse, to show Paul as a reasonable person who did his job properly. He also says ‘I think I was more committed. For a lot of them it was just another job.’ Even regarding his amnesty

application Paul argues ‘I don’t know what makes me different from the others but the abuse didn’t catch me like it caught a lot of the other guys.’

Paul describes the Security Branch as a

‘cut above the rest of your normal uniformed police.’ Stating how the police force only required a standard six he says ‘there were some fantastic people, some trashy types as well, you know, low-lives...um...it was sheltered employment. The intellectual side just fell out the window. I saw that from day one - I was regarded as, um, a bloody Engelsman, groot bek, smart ideas, too big for my boots.’

In this way it is made to appear that Paul was capable of making intelligent and rational choices. Furthermore, it suggests that extreme immoral acts by the police were committed by these individuals rather than Paul. This may also aid in making his story more plausible.

Paul doesn’t only shift the blame towards colleagues; he also deflects responsibility upwards at his bosses and at politicians. When he was working at Stratcom Paul describes his boss as ‘so totally stupid. You know, I went berserk, he was a bodybuilder.’ This is compared to Paul’s achievement in getting propaganda material into John Major’s hands.^x This sets up Paul as seeming intelligent and implicitly suggests that faults arose not from himself, but from others higher up in the chain.

Paul also makes an interesting analogy that allows him to diffuse responsibility for apartheid across the population as a whole. He talks of a book by Lord Russell of Liverpool (1954) called the ‘Scourge of the Swastika’ (although Paul calls uses the term ‘purge’ rather than ‘Scourge’) stating ‘And what Lord Russell attacked was the question of accountability of the German people as a whole.’ He says a few sentences later ‘The sheer immensity and the scope of the way that people were disappearing and the camps, it gets bigger, bigger and bigger.’ In this way he is suggesting that it was not only those working for the State that were responsible for the atrocities that occurred during apartheid but that bystanders played a role as well. This then allows Paul to somewhat reject his responsibility.

4.4.4 Them and us: Victim-blaming

Breaching scripts allows the blame to be placed sideways on colleagues and upwards to politicians. Victim-blaming on the other hand places blame downwards on victims by comparing the actions of both parties. Paul often phrases his actions in a passive voice whilst describing the victims of his actions in active terms. He says, for example 'he was shot through the thigh to describe a 'terr' they had caught.' When describing the first time he killed someone he says 'the bugger made a run for it' as if it was the man's fault for wanting to run away. The reaction by the man's family is described in dehumanized terms as Paul states that they 'don't...didn't react like a human reacted. It was just all these kids and you know that sort of typical Ovambo black kraal type of stuff, looking at us in horror but there was no sign of emotion.' He states about two sentences later again that 'it was just like, they aren't human, they aren't like us. You know, it's like a cultural thing, you know.'^{xi} This reifies the power relations of white domination in the way described by Thompson (1984). In this paragraph Paul alternates between the past and present tense. This implies that Paul still believes that these people don't react like humans and reifies power relations by presenting things as a permanent state of affairs.

This dehumanization of victims frequently happens throughout the text. At one point Paul describes how he did not know who his bullets were hitting in the Soweto Riots. He says he shot 'everything that breathed, moved, barked, walked.' Is this to imply that the rioters were like dogs?

Paul uses an extreme case example to shift the blame onto his former enemies when he mentions that 'But let me tell you - they were savages as well; I saw things that SWAPO did that were even *more* horrendous. I mean, I suppose that's the nature of war.'^{xii} The authoritative tone taken up by saying 'let me tell you' suggests that what is said is the absolute and final truth and suggests that any other judgment would be ignorant. Furthermore, there are two functions gained by setting up the enemy in a more horrific light than Paul and his colleagues and then adding that this is the nature of war. Firstly, it makes Paul appear understanding and sympathetic. What it also provides is a form of justification for committing the acts that he did i.e. that his acts were also committed in the context of war. Paul goes further to assert that

‘Personally, I could never torture, not a white person you know, I s’pose you see the border was a different thing again. There was a kind of savagery that was different to locally. Ag, I would balk at the idea of torturing to a point where I killed them.’

This narrative form of war talk is an attempt to legitimate the power relations held at the time by appealing to rational grounds i.e. that of a just war.

On the day of the Soweto riots, Paul recounts how the mineworkers ‘started to, you know, come in arms as well. Not so much on the side of the comrades, they were trying to, some of them, stop it in sorts, settle this thing, you know, it was just butchery.’ The metaphor of a butcher is significant. It suggests that life was worth nothing more than an animal's, a piece of meat. By suggesting that the mineworkers were not on the side of the comrades the implicit proposition is that the Soweto riots were not rational, and neither were they justified. This dissimulation is an attempt to conceal police interests at the time.

4.4.5 Central Role of the Organisation

An integral part of Paul’s reasoning for his actions lies within the context of his organization. His actions are often legitimized by the organization and the job he was required to do. When Paul describes the growing realization that the government was about to change, he tells of the pep talks that were given to himself and his colleagues where they were told ‘there will always be an intelligence system and we will work under his new government because first and foremost we are cops and our oath of loyalty. Ja, at the end of the day they left us canned for what they then did.’ Put this way Paul was, to some extent just doing his job, and cannot be placed in the same category as the decision makers. By talking about the oath of loyalty, a deeper analysis might suggest that Paul is reifying the legitimacy of the police force and his previous commitment to the police. While Paul states that following orders is not an excuse, he then describes how refusal to follow orders meant that ‘some people got sidelined into an office job’ which for Paul is something that he really did not want to

do. If unhappy with an order, Paul recounts the next course of action. 'Afterwards they must submit in writing why they are unhappy and they have got to give them to (listen to this) the person that gave them that order before they give it to a person of higher authority.' When describing the action of his superiors and the issue of permanent removals from society he says 'I mean who the hell were we to question anyway?' to emphasise that the organization was legitimate and that to question it would have been wrong.

Often linked to these organizational dynamics is an element of pride attached to the organization. The Security Branch was 'like this brotherhood' that was 'certainly a cut above the rest of your normal uniformed police.' Whilst higher up officials and certain other members may have gone above the call of duty, Paul puts himself in a professional light. He says 'I was pretty committed hey, I mean I was. I was a bloody good cop.' This repetition highlights his point further and also divides his organizational purpose from his political one. As proof of these statements Paul mentions how he 'got nine commendations as a security cop which is some sort of record, I did a job well.'

It is interesting to note that Paul relates his stress problems to his pride over how hard he worked. He links this to the stress problems still felt in the police today. This serves to demonstrate that it is the job itself that creates this mindset. By comparing the past police service with the new one Paul is legitimating the old police force. He is also putting himself above the rest of his colleagues to allow blame to be placed sideways. Paul says about his colleagues 'Most of them weren't affected. They came to work at eight o' clock in the morning and bugged off at four o' clock.' He then adds 'one of the problems, and we hear this in the police today, is that the more you do, the more shit you do, the less time you've got for yourself.'

Yet the central role of the organization has also led to anger given that many of Paul's superiors did not go through the TRC process or in any way take responsibility for his actions. He uses Eugene de Kock as an example.

'But no, no. I still carry that hatred today - mention Botha's name...um, and all the Generals, I mean where the fuck? I don't think, I don't condone Gene as an

example, he was just the fall guy. I think if the TRC and the justice system failed dismally it was certainly in his case, you know. Someone's got to take account for that.' He even says 'Who could have foreseen anything but chaos' when he describes how Eugene was given 'An almost blank cheque, a staff of sixteen, a farm and vehicles and everything like that and carries on Koevoet inside the country.'^{xiii}

4.4.6 Masculinity

On closer analysis Paul's narrative shows strong elements of masculinity. His language is couched in masculine terms such as giving images of his promotions and commendations, as mentioned above. Male bonding is frequently referred to, such as the war songs they sang at the pub in Ovamboland. There is an emphasis on camaraderie, particularly during his time on the border. He describes sitting under the trees 'everyone with babalases of course' praying. The mention of a prayer brings in religious discourse that seems to add a religious tone to this 'brotherhood'. Paul volunteered to go to the border and laughs as he says 'I wanted to go to the border so badly I threatened to resign if they didn't let me go! Simply because half the guys that I had worked with had all been up there. You hadn't sort of, you weren't accepted totally unless you had gone to the border.' Again there is this notion of male bonding that also feeds into a sense of superiority. Paul states that 'Once you had been to the border it was like you had your final sort of like colours' giving further imagery of these ideas. However, this masculinity only becomes prevalent at certain times. At other times other identities become more salient. 'It was that macho thing, but you know, I mean when you're on your own at night and you close your eyes...'

Paul goes as far as to describe the relationship he had with some others as affectionate: 'Well they used my info, it was this affectionate thing whereas guys in a higher rank than me were treated like 'Good *morning* Captain, or Colonel or something like that.'

Paul tells war stories of himself, but also of others. Paul describes how he wanted to make an ornament out of a skull and bones but tones this imagery down by saying 'Only years later Amanda it sort of dawned on me just how depraved and

desensitized...I don't know the right words for something like that, but it was unbelievable.' The informal use of my name is an attempt to build solidarity and the fact that Paul does know the right words suggests a framing of his old stories in a new discourse, concealing the real intention behind this statement. It seems as though Paul's narrative is torn between trying to make himself appear like an ordinary intelligent guy, with emotions and regrets over his past actions whilst at the same time being incredibly proud of what he did. This is emphasized when he depicts his partner at the Security Branch, Nani, as 'a true hero' despite committing atrocious acts such as bombings.

Paul's narrative is laced with hierarchical imagery and the men that he looked up to. He says of Eugene de Kock 'He was probably one of the best policemen that ever walked the...uniformed policemen in this country, beyond corruption, absolutely fearless, I mean that man never had a scared hair on his head, he was extremely, extremely intelligent.' This image became one that Paul aspired to. 'He was a pretty tough guy so secretly the word was out - we need guys like de Kock, you know, no fear.' It is evident that Paul holds Eugene in high regard. He does not question the morality of de Kock's actions, and only describes de Kock in terms of performing what his job required of him. When he tells of a particular story he describes how 'He'd knocked the hell out of this whole lot, gangsters, wanted criminals and I don't know what' in a shebeen. Paul focuses on those committing illegal crimes but is unspecific as to who 'this whole lot' actually entailed. Again there is a silence over racism and the fact that everybody is lumped together in one category again is a means of sustaining power relations. It is almost as if any people in a shebeen are all criminal types. This may also be an attempt to create a new South African discourse that reflects on his actions as that of a policeman doing his job, rather than someone doing something morally illegitimate. It is surprising, nevertheless to see such respect for a man who in South Africa has been called 'Prime Evil.' Paul says 'de Kock was just amazing, his reputation preceded him.' To show himself as someone who was well-read and prepared to consider other points of view, Paul says of de Kock 'I read Marx, Lenin but de Kock was like that and I think he valued that in me. I certainly appreciated it in him.'

The hierarchical imagery that Paul uses to describe others that he worked with show conflicting elements of pride and shame at the same time. Even when Paul describes Ferdi Barnard as someone who he was scared of and someone who was 'a hectic person' he also describes him as 'fearsome, awesome guy' who out of boredom would 'knock the hell out of the bar.'^{xiv} Paul describes the people that he thinks were 'in the category of disturbed people that wanted to carry on' as 'real all-time action heroes.' This has a positive connotation. He talks of Ferdi saying 'Ja, a guy like him was capable of killing somebody, definitely, I mean he was earmarked for it, done it before, he had the right persona, the right physical attributes.' Thus there is a contradiction by Paul evaluating Ferdi negatively whilst using positive words such as 'right'.

There is little reference to women throughout the narrative, furthering this notion of masculinity. Even when he does mention his ex wife, Linda, Paul is the dominant one.

'I had been awake for three solid days and I came home and she smelt alcohol on my breath and we had a fight that night, I nearly killed her. When I came to my senses, I was on top of her and I had this gun pressed against her.'

Foster et al (2005:287) found that there were two different types of masculinity that became prevalent in the narratives they collected. These included a 'military-bureaucratic' form which places an emphasis on the organisational structures, hierarchy, discipline and rules and an 'action man' form of masculinity which is more linked to notions of excitement and fighting. Paul shows elements of both. The military-bureaucratic form of masculinity is demonstrated as mentioned above in the context of obeying orders. However, the 'action man' type of masculinity is perhaps more prevalent, especially when Paul refers to his experiences on the border. Paul even mentions the word gung-ho: 'It was half past eight in the morning, we were already drinking. We had this slapgat attitude that was gung ho.' A few sentences later again Paul repeats himself, strengthening this notion 'it was very much like, ja, like a gung-ho type.'^{xv} Showing little evidence of emotion, but rather laughing about his experiences, Paul describes how 'One bugger got drunk and jumped into a pool and got eaten by a crocodile.' All these ideas link back to a strongly salient masculine identity.

4.4.7 Entitlement

How does entitlement apply to this narrative? Exaggerated entitlement consists of a sense of superiority which may manifest itself in the assumption of right of access to another's body or spatial freedom, and inattention to others' reactions according to Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005: 69) With the notion of entitlement comes the idea of the intertwining of multiple subjectivities, that is when some identities become more salient in certain situations. Ideology can create certain identities both for the person and of the other (Foster et al, 2005: 71). In other words, not only does a certain identity become more salient for the perpetrator, but it also sets up an identity of 'the other' as the enemy. It is a certain mix of ideologies that create exaggerated entitlement.

In the case of Paul there are several ideologies that appear to have created this potent mix. Despite his denials of racism, there are many racist assumptions that Paul makes throughout his narrative such as 'I mean, I would probably never have a black girlfriend, I might, but why? It was the way we were brought up.' Paul also demonstrates elements of Christian Nationalism, although he claims to have never discussed religion with his partner, Nani. Paul says of Nani 'But he said to me the one day "You know Paul, through all of that we never talked about Christianity."' Yet on the day of the interview he wore a cross around his neck and talked of how he often attended Church. As previously described, Goodman's (1999) description of Paul and Paul's own testimony to the Amnesty Committee also demonstrate elements of this religiousness. These ideologies, combined with an anti-Communist ideology and masculinity, may have led to Paul's sense of entitlement.

Paul's sense of superiority is prevalent throughout the narrative, as an intelligent guy who knew what he was doing. 'I always regarded myself as being intellectually superior.' The idea of exaggerated entitlement becomes prevalent later in Paul's narrative in several instances. He says, of his return to South Africa after the border 'I wanted to take out the traffic cop, which was hysterical, the guy was whimpering, I

had a gun like this, I said to him “How dare you come and try and take...” This exaggerated superiority is also often reflected in the choice of phrase ‘license to kill’. The phrase is applied to Paul himself and Eugene de Kock. By comparing himself to James Bond, Paul depicts himself in a positive light and as someone doing the best for his country. It suggests that he is one of the best and that he was able to judge what action was appropriate for the circumstances.

As Foster et al (2005:288) note, the idea of exaggerated entitlement becomes evident through a sense of frustration. Paul even says his job was ‘a lot of excitement. A lot of frustration as well.’ Entitlement that has become exaggerated also includes an element of shame. Being English speaking, Paul ‘always had this hang-up about speaking Afrikaans’ and victimization at his police college may have led to a need to prove himself.

‘Having a matric with distinctions like I had was quite amazing....not that it ever helped me because that actually worked against me because I couldn’t pass information exams in the police. There was a secret promotion system if you weren’t the right type, that you didn’t belong to the right organization, or you had the wrong family connections. Uh, things counted against you type of stuff.’

It is evident from this paragraph that Paul felt a kind of shame for being English-speaking which he then tried to make up for in other ways. This shame is also apparent at a later stage in the narrative. The first time Paul killed someone the others teased him saying ‘if you find yourself a terr, don’t kill old men’ and this ‘worried him’. As Paul looked up to de Kock, he may have tried to bury this shame by acting in a similar fashion.

Foster et al (2005:289) add two more elements that make entitlement more likely to occur. The first of these is if one acts in a familiar territory. Certainly at the border, Paul felt so at home that when he returned he ‘couldn’t adjust at all, and I think it was about three days; I walked into his office, I said “I’m going back to Koevoet permanently.”’ The second element that makes entitlement more likely is the notion of power, and Paul demonstrates this when he says ‘You literally had license to kill.’ These characteristics are coupled together when he says ‘I got home and I walked into

this - from that totally lawless society.’ The notion of a lawless society not only serves to legitimate Paul’s actions on the border but also gives the apartheid regime legitimacy by contrasting it with Ovamboland.

The above-mentioned characteristics are the more obvious workings of entitlement, but there are other less obvious pointers as well according to Foster et al (2005: 289). Pride can demonstrate entitlement, and Paul’s pride for himself and his work comes across very strongly. Paul is extremely proud that he got into the Security Branch ‘which was almost impossible’ and even more so about Stratcom. ‘There was only this little handful that became the Stratcom component.’ Within his work, Paul is proud of his achievements. He states ‘Lots of things that I was the architect of were pretty well thought out, effective, ja, I was making a name for myself.’ Paul mentions how he learnt to forge cheques, something that was not required in his job, and even is proud of this. ‘Everybody thought this was fucking amazing, you know, it’s the type of shit you read about in books.’ Again entitlement, as it is a relational concept, is further demonstrated by his comparison with others. He gladly acknowledges the actions that he alone did. ‘But the one thing I am proud of, I never pushed the blame down.’

Another more subtle element of entitlement is that of enjoyment in one’s work. Paul says that ‘being in the Security Branch was I suppose if anything never boring.’ He also attributes his being one of the first people at Stratcom to his artistic side. He states ‘yirrah, I was one of the first people that got involved in Stratcom, um, simply because I always had this love of art.’ The sentence is almost contradictory because of the emphasis and pride he places on being one of the first people at Stratcom whilst nevertheless putting this ‘simply’ down to having a love of art. This disguises the immoral side of Stratcom activities whilst still demonstrating enjoyment.

As mentioned previously, a part of the workings of entitlement comes from the intertwining of multiple subjectivities and previous analysis showed how organizational and masculine elements became more prevalent in certain situations. Ideology also plays a role, however. Anti-communist thinking is most apparent in Paul’s narrative, and the training he went through in police college seems to have made strengthened this ideology. Paul describes his Crime and Ethnology textbook as

states how 'Now if you've got a Standard Six education and you knew fuck-all about life and here is a fact, told to you like that, obviously, you know...that is the way that policemen were trained' to justify how people thought.' Paul finds it surprising that as a person who did not know what he wanted to do with his life 'seven, six years after that I was shooting people at the border and going to celebrate it afterwards by drinking.'

As entitlement is not fixed, but can be 'changed and reconfigured' Foster et al (2005:291) argue that entitlement acts as a defense mechanism, and when the feeling of entitlement goes then a person is exposed to a flooding of negative emotions. This may be why Paul increasingly suffered from post-traumatic stress and was hospitalized after his amnesty applications.

4.4.8 A New South African discourse

Much of Paul's narrative is framed in a discourse that appears more acceptable in South Africa at the present time. It is worth pointing out that initially Paul says that he is from an English background and only when was asked if both parents were English does he describe his dad as Afrikaans and 'more conservative'. This may be because he feels that in the new South Africa people look more kindly upon white people of an English background as there is a perception that these people are less responsible than those of an Afrikaans background. He portrays his family as being fairly liberal, especially his mother who was also a 'joller.'^{xvi} Paul also describes colleagues as 'more conservative' to portray his family in a more positive light.

Paul's defense of his thinking is in terms of Communism, as has been mentioned above. Because Communism has by and large failed across the world, by emphasizing the struggle against Communism rather than racism (which is still considered unacceptable in the world today) Paul makes his actions seem more rational. Paul says 'The commies were going to rape the women and turn the Churches into bloody squats, that type of stuff, so ja, I think in that sense, I still say that we weren't politicized, I didn't come from any more than an average white South African family.' The religious reference attempts to legitimate these fears in moral terms. The

way that Paul sets his family as not politicized but portrays these assumptions as facts by the use of the word 'were' is also an attempt to make this seem like common sense and sets up his image as an ordinary man in the context of South Africa. Wetherell and Potter (1992:185) argue that people tend to portray the past as characteristic of history. By placing things firmly in the past it is assumed that things have improved and therefore the status quo is justified. Thus by making reference to the 'usual' way of thinking that has since changed, Paul is able to portray himself as a reasonable person in the New South Africa.

There is a huge silence on the issue of racism and Paul makes references to black friends throughout the text. He describes 'a Xhosa buddy who was a black Namibian South West cop behind us, wonderful guy, god but he was bloodthirsty.' Paul makes sure that he mentions the man's race to portray himself as a non-racist yet quickly defines the man as bloodthirsty. This shows an attempt to seem unbiased but also to portray this man in a more negative light than Paul himself.

The most notable aspect in which Paul's narrative can be seen as being framed in a more acceptable discourse is with regards to the TRC. Paul says 'I knew it was coming and in a bizarre way I possibly helped father the TRC. With Goldstone those cases were crapped out. They drew up a report which was an agreement by de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, and you've got to read that. It's horrendous. And I quote him: "Reading through Erasmus's casebooks is a depressing..."' The sense of superiority that is prevalent throughout Paul's narrative is still apparent, even in the context of the present day. It is impossible that Paul could ever be described as one of the fathers of the TRC and yet Paul suggests that his involvement actually instigated what followed in South Africa. This discourse legitimates his actions and sustains power relations by suggesting that he knew the best way forward for South Africa at the time of the transition. It suggests that Paul is a rational person and that everything he previously did was in the context of what was going on in South Africa at the time.

Even so, Paul still undermines the TRC process, portraying it as ridiculous and legally incompetent. He states that he got amnesty except for 22 incidents

‘which freaked me out because the non-amnesty thing was for being part of the surveillance system. I mean I was a year old when that all came out, the postal interceptions and telephones. And now it’s only recently I sort of got to why this phenomena happened, I mean how the hell can they ever hold me responsible for that? Simply the TRC didn’t have the legal weight to give me amnesty on those things. But there is another little sting in that as well that if those cases are ever opened again I would certainly be charged or used as a state-witness against the people that might have been responsible. The one thing was I stole flowerpots and they didn’t give me amnesty because they found out it was for personal gain, you know, it was ridi...I thought it was pretty (laugh)...flowerpots!’

The TRC mandate was to deal only with politically motivated crimes and the decision not to grant amnesty for stealing flowerpots is therefore totally justified. By placing the emphasis on the nature of the crime rather than the mandate of the TRC Paul is diminishing the validity of the TRC. He even gloats that ‘Proof in the pudding is that in all those years up until the TRC, never one arrest or conviction of any third force.’

Paul also undermines the essence of the struggle against apartheid stating

‘...the country won its freedom, but at what cost? It’s all... you know the last forty years of history in this country has been a senseless waste. I take it from my life sort of, where I saw things....I took an oath that this guy, my son, will never carry a gun. I mean guns, we live on a farm but...but with great circumstances. But to put on a uniform, never. I dunno, you know I watched those planes fly into the towers and I had a rethink on that, I dunno, it’s the old question of violence and non-violence, the old just and unjust war theory.’

Firstly Paul suggests that the cost of freedom does not outweigh the benefits of apartheid. This again legitimates his actions under the old regime by portraying this regime in a positive light. By saying that he took his life from where he saw things Paul is placing in actions in the context of the previous regime and legitimating his actions further. By comparing the struggle to terrorism Paul is implying that liberation movements are similar to terrorist movements. He justifies his past actions in terms of the current ‘acceptable’ status quo and links his actions to age-old moral debates. This

insinuates that there was a moral element behind his actions and therefore allows him to evade responsibility.

Paul remains optimistic about the future. He says 'We all fought for this bloody old place so let's make a go of it. I'm very positive. I had to rebuild my life, I was on drugs, I was hospitalized 14 times for stress, I'm not complaining there, I mean I'm here running a business, providing employment for people.' Paul attempts to show himself as rational and now inclusive towards all by saying 'we all fought' yet by mentioning that he provides employment Paul is still portraying himself as superior and thus sustaining relations of domination.

4.9 Concluding remarks:

So what do we know from this analysis? As is described in Foster, Haupt & de Beer's (2005) model, Paul describes his life as one where he got slowly sucked in to a series of events. As Foster et al (2005:78) point out a special case of dialogical spiraling is a conspiracy mentality. This occurs when a threatened group blames a minority group, suggesting that they wish to overthrow the social order. This is certainly apparent in Paul's narrative with regards to Communism. The reasons Paul gives for his actions are often linked to this notion and are placed in the context of the Cold War. Despite Paul's insistence on the importance of following orders throughout the TRC amnesty hearings, in the present day interview he says 'I never ever said and will say "Don't blame me, I was simply following orders"'. However, Paul is inconsistent on this issue and at other times claims that he acted on the basis of instructions. There may be some support therefore for Milgram's (1974) notion of obedience to authority, yet other factors are also at work throughout Paul's narrative and there is a stronger sense of agency than situationist perspectives allow.

Nevertheless, Paul often diffuses blame. He either shifts the blame onto his colleagues and to superiors or down towards victims. At best he gives partial acknowledgement of his immoral acts. Whilst trying to portray himself as reasonable, Paul nevertheless frequently slips into masculine language that demonstrates a sense of pride and a strong loyalty to the organization. Most importantly however, there is a sense of agency throughout the narrative that implies entitlement, often shown through

superiority. Entitlement is brought about through various ideologies and organizational factors and this is clear in Paul's narrative - the intersection of Christian-Nationalism, police discourse and masculinity all create a dangerous mix that leads to a sense of entitlement.

There is therefore strong support for Foster, Haupt & de Beer's (2005) model of entitlement and Paul's narrative does not differ in any major way. The strong element of masculinity also concurs with the conceptions of masculinity described by Huggins et al (2002). It is sad to note that whilst Paul tries to frame his narrative in a now more socially acceptable discourse in South Africa, he still undermines the current regime and legitimates the apartheid regime and therefore still attempts to maintain relations of domination.

University of Cape Town

Conclusion

This thesis has been a psychological analysis of political violence. It has focussed predominantly on the narrative account of an (ex) state agent, Paul Erasmus. This thesis began by introducing the topic and reflecting the need for further research ten years after the TRC. Key concepts were clarified and the research questions were defined as follows. The first question was general and concerned how someone becomes a perpetrator of political violence. The remaining questions were specific to Paul Erasmus and asked how one can understand Paul's motivations and intentions for committing acts of political violence based on sources written at the time of the TRC and then based on the present day interview from his point of view. Further questions asked what psychological processes played a role in the propensity to commit acts of political violence and how these processes fitted in with the relational model set out by Foster, Haupt & de Beer (2005).

In order to begin answering the above research questions, Chapter 1 clarified key concepts and outlined the problems of varying approaches to studying perpetrators. It then described the amnesty process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, claiming that the statistics and forensic truth provided by the TRC are inadequate for understanding Paul's motivations and intentions. Chapter 2 examined previous academic understandings of political violence. It argued that neither situational nor dispositional accounts could produce an adequate account of how someone becomes a perpetrator of political violence. It then went on to outline Foster et als' (2005) relational model arguing that this approach can best provide an understanding of political violence in South Africa but that more research was needed. Chapter 3 therefore detailed the way in which this research was to be carried out. Chapter 4 first analysed the extent to which media representation concerning Paul provided an understanding of his motivations and intentions for committing acts of violence. An interview conducted with David Goodman (1999) was examined, as were the obtainable transcripts relating to Paul from the TRC. It was argued that these sources did not provide a useful understanding for a variety of reasons-the interview with Goodman was somewhat sensationalist, the media legitimated his actions and the amnesty transcript was specific to certain incidents and too legalistic.

Based on the interview the thesis then looked at Paul's reasons and non-reasons (i.e. the reasons that Paul cannot be blamed) for committing acts of political violence. Agreeing with Arendt (1977) to some extent, Paul came across as an ordinary, reasonable person who claimed to have been drawn into processes that were hard to get out of, rather like the 'foot-in-the-door' phenomenon and also akin to Foster et al's (2005) claim of sequential spiralling. The ideological effects of anti-Communist thinking and the context of the Cold War were emphasised by Paul. Throughout the narrative blame was often deflected by blaming victims and colleagues.

The narrative was not strikingly different from the relational model set out by Foster et al (2005). The same key themes were apparent, such as the undeniable role that the organisation, the Security Branch, played. Masculinity was also a large element of the narrative, relating most to Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardos' (2002) conception of blended masculinity. There was also strong support for the notion of entitlement. Sadly, Paul never took full responsibility for his actions. Blame was often deflected and his actions often legitimated through his discourse.

This thesis has therefore contributed to the corpus of knowledge surrounding political violence. Whilst this case study cannot be generalised, it does strongly support Foster et al's (2005) relational model and has provided an insight into the workings of a state agent. Future research should collect more of these narratives in order to provide a further understanding. This thesis has focussed on a policeman whose story is fairly well known. It would consequently be interesting to examine narratives from 'lesser known' policemen. Furthermore it would be fascinating to see how narratives from perpetrators higher up the chain of command describe their experiences, particularly in relation to Foster et al's (2005) model of entitlement.

Despite Paul never taking full responsibility for his actions (in that he continues to diffuse blame onto others and excuses his behaviour in different ways), Erasmus has taken more responsibility than most. He spoke out as early as the Golstone Commission and has also made attempts at reconciliation. At such a point in South Africa's history it is sad that other perpetrators have not even done this. Forgiveness

Amanda Lucey

by victims can only come once perpetrators have told the truth and show their remorse.

University of Cape Town

Appendix: Interview Transcript with Paul Erasmus

Paul: Ag, I don't know, where did it all start? Well, I certainly didn't that I would end up where I was, but anyway.... Normal South African upbringing, we had to go to the army or the police, no money to go to varsity.... (sigh)... and (sigh) God, I got my call-up papers, like everybody, navy, navy, navy, navy and everybody tried to pull strings. My brother was lucky to get into the air force and in six months he got out of it. He never got called up for a camp or something like that.... Ja, matriculated in '74, my call-up was Potchefstroom, god forbid, (inaudible).... But a friend of mine joined the police force and the big thing then was I had a girlfriend and when I found out about this he said "nah, you're crazy, go to Potch for 18 months and go to the cops in Pretoria which is just down the road" (I grew up in Jo'burg) and that's when it all started.

Amanda: So you grew up in Jo'burg, in...

Paul: Bedfordview

Amanda: In Bedfordview, ok...

Paul: English background

Amanda: English background-both your parents?

Paul: No, my dad worked for the government, he was I suppose more conservative. My father, in fact, wrote a lot of the, many of the legislation governing you know the old Pass laws. My mum was pretty liberal but I mean we weren't politicized as kids, I had older friends that went to Wits in 19... .was it 1973 there was a street uprising at Wits.... I used to hear all the skinner from them and there was all these jokes of John Vorster looking in the toilets, I mean kids looking into the toilets, and saying 'excuse me, is that the Prime minister...' (laughs) But I mean, I never took any of it seriously-we were very much sheltered.

Amanda: And what were your parents like, did you get on well with them?

Paul: Had a difficult relationship with my dad, um, my mum was amazing, she was a real, a joler I suppose, you know very liberated, encouraged us to read, get into arts and stuff like that. My father didn't want any of it (inaudible) was a straight down the road, finish school, go work for the government, get a bursary, study, go to university, whatever,

Amanda: Yeah,

Paul: They always wanted me to be my dad also wanted me to be a lawyer because I had a pretty good school and my mum was against it-she wanted me to do art, everything was art, become an artist.

Amanda: And you? Did you want to become an artist?

Paul: Jesus, I don't know. I didn't want to sit behind a desk. Of course going to the police just hammered that point home. Most of my friends went to the army. (inaudible) And they all went to work, most of them go to varsity-that was the way life worked, they went to work in banks, stand for six days taking people's money and I thought 'god I am not cut out for this.' You know office work and just being stuck in an environment. I just always had this wanderlust and I think there the police was a vehicle where I could sort of...because you were never office bound. So ja, I went to the bloody police college in 1975 and I came out and I was going to leave straight away and then they started changing the laws. Coz at, when I joined the police you only had to do a year. They said in some sort of

emergency or if the situation warrants they can call you back at any time, and when I came out of police college in 75 (ja, the police riots were in 76) they changed it again. They said you can either do 18 months, either a years service the uniformed branch in Cleveland or if you left now you had to come back in five years and do a three month camp

But I still had no idea what I wanted to do with my life. But anyway, I stuck it out there with a view to leaving at the end of the year, that had made my mind up.

Amanda: How did you find it when you first started?

Paul: It was a lot of excitement. Um, a lot of frustration as well. I mean being English speaking at that point, I couldn't speak-I could read and write Afrikaans, so I always had this hang-up about speaking Afrikaans. It was a very Afrikaans world, I mean when I was at a police station there was only two English speaking guys, and the rest of the guys were really conservative, I mean real philistines you know? And then of course police college was totally anti-English, I think 1700 cops and only about 120-150 English-speaking guys. So they were pretty much victimized a lot. But it was all, you know, everybody took it in their stride. I came out of Police College on the 3rd December 75 and then I thought I would stick it out until the end of the following year and I wouldn't have to do these camps. But then of course there was Wednesday June 16, which I think, changed my life and changed everybody's lives. This whole country changed. And I got up and went to work, and I mean there was no work in those years, Amanda (laughs), my job was a... I had a motorbike with a radio on the back, and a helmet, I'd get about, I used to serve what they called 'Processed pieces'. I had to ride around the area, and serve warrants of arrest on people, parking tickets or serve summons, you know, this type of General...and the whole job, I mean, the police force then was worse then what it is now. Nobody worked, I mean everybody was ducking and diving, everybody had sideline interests so I used to get up, I worked office hours, I would go to Cleveland police station in the morning (laughing), with my coffee, get my little heap of work that would take me some days half an hour. Some days I had nothing. So I used to go home, take off my uniform (hearty laugh) and lie at the swimming pool, go visit my girlfriend, and then at about the middle of the day I would show my face, you know, go back there sit, the guys used to play poker, some of them drank and four o'clock we would knock off. And Wednesday June 16 was no exception, none of us had the faintest, we had no inkling what trouble was coming. Got up in the morning, I had no work that day. I went to see an old girlfriend of mine from standard six and I was sitting drinking coffee with her and the radio was on in the background, in the kitchen in fact, and at about half past nine, nine o'clock, it was early, she still had her night gown, or whatever, she came through, she said to me "Paul, there's bloody shit going on in Soweto." I said 'You're kidding' and I still didn't worry about it, I just sat there. Remember what was going on in Soweto? And I don't know, I must have got back to the police station at about 10 o'clock, jus, I couldn't believe it. The guys were standing... parade; it was like Police College again. Everybody was...I didn't even carry a gun, I wore a soft belt. They were dishing out rifles and we were basically told, you know, there was trouble. Anyway, they divided half the guys up, half in Soweto, the other they were on standby at the police station, they drove us and then at five o'clock they took us to John Vorster Square. No winter clothing, I mean it was freezing cold, no bloody food (laugh) and we sat in the parade with hundreds and hundreds of policemen. They gave us bags, as much ammunition as what

we could shove in your pockets, and those old tunics that we used to wear and our rifles. Still laugh at guys who went into Soweto with their tickets (hearty laugh), it's hysterical, you know, just bought it from the shop and the price ticket hanging on his rifle. Anyway, then I was in Soweto for... it was June the 16th... about two days and then trouble started in ...and the area that I was in had hospitals. The mineworkers started to, you know, come up in arms as well. Not so much on the side of the comrades, they were trying to, some of them, stop it in sorts, you know, settle this thing, you know, it was just butchery. I think that's what made, maybe made...it was the first sort of dead people I have really seen, a real trauma. But I think that's what made me decide to stay, you know, in the cops. Although not in the uniformed guards. This friend of mine that had got me into it, his dad engineered that he got me into the Security Branch, which was almost impossible, it was like this brotherhood you know, so ja, started in the Security Branch in January 77

Amanda: And was there training when you went in there?

Paul: Ja, I think the following year, 78 I went to a six week Intelligence (contradiction in terms) laugh training course in Pretoria-back to the police college and that course was pretty hectic. Um, ag, I don't know I could keep you busy for hours, and tell you most of it, the whole spectrum of...in fact all my notes still exist, handwritten and radio that they gave us. It's quite fascinating and I have incorporated a lot of it into my book, um. The course leader was probably one of the top Broederbonders in this country, a brigadier, Hilston... I mean this guy made Terreblanche look like a left-winger; he would rave and rant about Communism, threats and so on. Now his background was, I mean, he was a pro-Nazi; there was a really strong Nazi element in the police. This emerged later of course when the AWB, you know, started to interfere. Half of the AWB was in the SAP. So, ja that was the training that we had and then for the next....

Amanda: Do you think that you...how did you find the training?

Paul: It was fascinating

Amanda: Did it affect you?

Paul: I suppose we were propogandised a lot, I mean when you left that course you wanted to have one thing in mind, to get out there and anyone that was an enemy of the state, that was a.... we were taught things and those notes exist to this day, like interrogation, I think the lectures on interrogation was two days. And There is no doubt firstly that those notes are genuine, I mean they can be subject to testing, I've kept them and a very interesting thing emerged there was, the guy that gave this side was one of the Security Branches top interrogators, a senior guy. In my notebooks you can see it actually highlighted was (Afrikaans...) 'You had to reduce the person that you were interrogating to a point where you controlled his life' and sleep deprivation, another interesting thing, sleep deprivation played a very big part in it. Anyway, I'm digressing there but years later all this was surface, all the deaths in detention, and sleep deprivation the effects of it, so ja.

Amanda: And the people at the time, was that better for you when you went into the security branch?

Paul: Well certainly a cut above the rest of your normal uniformed police. You must remember in those days you only needed a standard six to get into the police. Half of the officers only had standard six.

Um, there was a lot of, there were some fantastic people, there were a lot of trashy types as well, you know, lowlives. Um, it was sheltered employment; the intellectual side fell out the window. I saw that

from day 1, I was regarded as, um a 'bloody Engelsman, groot bek, smart ideas, too big for my boots. Having a matric with distinctions like I had was quite amazing (pride), not that it ever helped me because that actually worked against me because I couldn't pass information exams in the police. There was a secret promotion system if you weren't the right type, that you didn't belong to the right organization, or you had the wrong family connections. Uh, things counted against you, type of stuff. And in fact that's still the case in the police today, with the whole thing about post-traumatic stress and these murders and stuff. We saw that talk was it last night or the night before...

Amanda: Not sure

Paul: Last night. If a guy feels like he needs counseling or he has a stress problem or something like that in those years if you opened your mouth it went on your record and it counted against you. But *least* of all going to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist because immediately you were blacklisted, immediately. The only recourse that anybody ever had was to the Dominic and there were no English speaking Dominic in the police force any way so nobody ever bothered. But I mean I developed a stress problem, ja, jumping ahead, um ja for the next 16 years of the Security Branch at John Vorster Square. But ja in 1981 I volunteered to go to the border, I was... Ovamboland was EuGene de Kock and that mob.

Amanda: Ok, and what made you...did you just want to get out...

Paul: Yis, I wanted to go to the border so badly (laughing) I threatened to resign if they didn't let me go! Simply because half of the guys that I had worked with had all been up there. You hadn't sort of, you weren't accepted totally unless you had gone to the border, so ja, the police force, the border was an entirely voluntary thing, right through the police and the security branch. And ja, I took a knock, I think everybody did. Just the scale and the propensity and the horror, even having been in the Security Branch before that. Life just meant nothing, absolutely nothing, it was worthless. Often the guys that had been in the Security Branch used to get up every morning...when we were in town for example, every morning we started the day off with a prayer. We'd have coffee, the whole staff would sit on this veranda under the bloody makalane palms, everybody with babalases of course but I was there about probably two weeks and um it took hours to get anything done, that was typical, the guys had to prepare the vehicles, and we were sent out on patrols, all this type of stuff. There was this box of rubbish that the guys had brought in or whatever, and I looked in this box out of boredom and here was a skeleton, I mean there was a human body in this box, and I took this thing out and I said...I actually wanted to bring it back to make an ornament out of it, with the skull and a couple of the bones. And you know, only many years later Amanda, it sort of dawned on me just how depraved and desensitized...I don't know the right words for something like that, but it was unbelievable. And this guy once said to me "Ag it's ou kak, the guys picked it up in the veld. It's probably a ter that was shot you know" (Nervous laugh) Steal it a later stage and bring it home with me, post it out or what ever, which I didn't do.

Amanda: So did they tell you to...what kind of things did they tell you to do?

Paul: Our job there, we were on the intelligence gathering side of things once again. We had a fighting unit, it was Koevoet, it was part of the Security Branch, effective, the very name Koevoet, comes from, it was the official codename, secret codenames operation K, unconventional fighting was a part of the

Security Branch, so it's members came from the Security Branch or from other areas where they had proved themselves-like de Kock's background which was amazing. He was probably one of the best policemen that ever walked the, uniformed policemen in this country, beyond corruption, absolutely fearless, I mean that man never had a scared hair on his head; he was extremely, extremely intelligent. He started his career with Basson at Boxford Police Station amongst all the Lebanese and all the cops there were taking bribes and arrives this bugger with his thick glasses from Police college in Pretoria and they posted him out in vans and I mean the East Rand then was controlled by all these Lebanese gangs and gambling and brothels and shebeens and this type of stuff. De Kock got stuck in and he knocked the hell out of these guys and eventually his own colleagues set him up on the circico (inaudible) They went to this house the one night (Dylan knows) and took this old guy in the van or whatever, there was this hell of a fight in the shebeen, there was a lot of dangerous guys involved, many on the run and his commander then said 'EuGene go sort it out' knowing that he probably wouldn't come out there alive. The story goes so old de Kock went in there, (small laugh) this guy sat he lit a cigarette and thought we will wait for half an hour and then call for back-up. And he heard this hell of a gunshots and windows breaking and the next de Kock started to drag the guys one by one. He'd knocked the hell out of this whole lot, gangsters, wanted criminals and I don't know what, he dragged them all out, his uniform was torn like a... glasses broken, threw the guys in the back of the van. So with a reputation like that he started to get noticed and the rest as they say is history because fuck he joined the police just before I did. He was a pretty tough guy so secretly the word was out-we need guys like de Kock, you know, no fear. So what did they do, South Africa secretly, well openly but also secretly on another front, fighting then in Rhodesia, they send de Kock up-well he volunteered but he made his name in the Rhodesian war and also looked at the Scouts, this unconventional fighting group so when the other cops came back they said to me... 'Learn what you can' and hence Koevoet
Amanda: But you were in Intelligence gathering?

Paul: Ja, which was the one army, we were an Intelligence and a fighting unit and Koevoet itself, they would take the so called Spoor and you know, run the guys down and kill them, klar. If any of them were caught alive you would do the interrogations and that was my job, so ja, quite hectic.

Amanda: Hmm. What was it like when you first had to do it? Was that the first time you ever had to interrogate someone or..?

Paul: Yirrah, No, no I was bored. We had shock machines and that was it. Um, just, ja, that's the way it worked. I was with EuGene and then the one day when, at a what do you call it, firefight scene and one of the ters was caught alive, and I mean there was no argument, he was shot through the thigh, some guys took a rifle, a bayonet and pushed it through the wound, pegged him to the ground and made him speak, and I mean I watched that guy die, so that was it, you know he didn't speak. We saw it in a different way, if you didn't get them to speak you were costing somebody their life, um, or you were costing lives because if you didn't get them to talk you wouldn't know who else to go and arrest or shoot or kill or whatever. And that would be the guys putting reprimands down or torturing or whatever. But let me tell you they were savages as well; I saw things that SWAPO did that were even more horrendous. I mean, that's I suppose the nature of war.

Amanda: And I suppose it's hard to know...in that situation you get quite a lot of leeway as well I suppose

Paul: Ja, well I took a guy out, an old guy, I searched his kraal not far from oshakati, I mean he wasn't an active, we all knew that, he'd been lying in his cell...(inaudible) just clear the cell. What happened was, whoever it was had found (they had searched his kraal) and they had found a bottle of (another irony in this little story) Danish antibiotics, Danish penicillin, which was carried by SWAPO, and on the strength of that and that alone, tossed him in the cell-he was a grandfather, in fact. The guy probably in his fifties and we took him out, put a bag over him, handcuffed him and chucked him in the vehicle and drove out this, myself, a white guy and a black guy, and the bugger made a run for it and I shot him there and then. You know (gasp) big excitement, first person for (inaudible) you know, got back to the base and there was my boss standing, you know, he saw the two bullets that had hit him nearly took his arm right off his body. He came out and he said to me 'Ag, yirrah, now it's more paperwork-what happened?' So I said, he said "man, bury the oke, go and dump him." That afternoon preparing statements, (laugh) even up there the law had a Teutonic thoroughness. It was after all, a death in detention, and this cop, detective came in and said to me "What happened?" So I told him, we'd already revised the story just in case and he said Nee, it's alright, I'll organise everything, like filled in the dockets, speak to the magistrate, you know...war.

Amanda: And was that the first time you shot someone?

Paul: I had shot someone before but not dead, in 76 I mean who knows whose bullets hit who, you shot everything that breathed, moved, barked, walked.

Amanda: And was it a bit of a shock to you or do you think you had already become so desensitized by that point?

Paul: Do you know, I have never got over that hey, never, I don't know, you know it's just...I suppose I went through this (clears throat) whole moral thing, afterwards. I think it was a shock. It was a shock in that I knew it was me that did it. The second thing was I was in charge, um. The third thing was this was half past eight in the morning, we were already drinking. We had this slapgat attitude, that was gung ho. So we broken all the rules, the guy should never have been allowed to run to get him shot. No the whole thing was just wrong, you know, to be in that madness of it, I think. I hawk to think about how much alcohol we would go through each night. I mean that was just how life worked. So wherever we went everybody drank everyday, the whole day. For the regular cops and us I mean it was just a pretty poor show. In fact the same thing happened in Rhodesia in the SAP's record there, it was 38 cops who killed in Rhodesia and I think probably 90% in alcohol related incidents, guys shooting each other. One bugger got drunk and jumped into a pool and got eaten by a crocodile, you know, this type of stuff. So it was very muck like, ja, like a gung-ho type (ag)

Amanda: Yeah, do you think the alcohol impaired your judgement or do you think that it just made you not really care that much?

Paul: It *did* impair my judgement; I mean we never allowed things like that to happen. But I made it, a hell of a...I misjudged the situation entirely just by virtue of the guy's age (clears throat) I mean it never even entered my mine he would run away. And when we stopped at this place, we weren't at the kraal-that was another thing where I think I was on good ground. As he ran, I don't speak the language

but we had a Xhosa buddy who was a black Namibian South West cop behind us, wonderful guy, god, but he was bloodthirsty, the suspects shouted 'Umba, umba, umba, umba' and I mean our training was we all hit the deck because I thought it was an ambush I mean, ja, we opened fire without question.

Point is it shouldn't have happened. We shouldn't have stopped at that place, we weren't at his kraal, you got to work through interpreters, you know, it's a lack of communication, but ja, a lot of guilt, I mean he wasn't a terrorist you know. I wouldn't have had the same feeling if the guy had a gun in his hand. (Pause) But it worried me. In fact that night at the pub a lot of the guys had a go at me, they said 'You're shooting innocent people you know' (hearty laugh)

Amanda: Oh really?

Paul:if you find you find yourself a ter don't kill old men!

Amanda: I wouldn't have expected that reaction.

Paul: Ja, life was cheap.

Amanda: So did they feel that there were certain standards?

Paul: It was more a joke than anything.

Amanda: Oh ok.

Paul: Ja, to watch the guys after you had been into contact, everybody went into a state of, I don't know, I don't know enough about psychology, but I don't think you are normal after.....

(inaudible) In fact it never even came in for policemen, it came in for agents, the agents were psychometrically tested and right at the end of my career when I started to become crap with my commanders they turned the heat on me, they actually tried to kill me as well. My story started long ago. Not like some people would allege I am this turncoat, and the other one that I heard was that I was spying for the ANC from 1977 but right at the end of my career in fact, the last year that I left, I was taken from Mossel Bay, my last station with a total, almost total nervous breakdown, I was escorted, I was taken to Cape Town and I had to see the in-house police psychologist and fill in his monkey puzzles or whatever. And they rigged it, and the idea was then coz I was a threat to certain people they wanted to kick me out of the security branch coz I found out about a lot of corruption. I followed Gene incidentally, I never took bribes. One of the cops that never did (laugh) but anyway, I am proud of it. Everybody was taking them. You saw it from day one, the whole police force, it was rotten. I don't know if it's improved and I don't think so, just from our own experiences here in George, you know, free drinks here, cigarettes there, going up the scale to like serious corruption, coz either way, why? We were so badly paid, treated like shit, um, ill led, understaffed, the rest of it.

Amanda: But I mean there must have been something that motivated you to stay?

Paul: Well, I was pretty committed hey, I mean I was. I was a bloody good cop. I never took, like I said, I never took bribes. I got nine commendations as a security cop, which is some sort of record, um, I did a job well. There was a lot of us, dedicated people in the Security Branch, like Nani. My partner died now a couple of years ago, it was terrible. He was unlike me never treated, never went to hospital, he was a bomb disposal expert, in my eyes a true hero. I mean this guy was decent all the way down the line. And so much so that at the end with all this madness, he was given instruction as a policeman to throw hand grenade into Jo'burg radio controls thing, de Klerk and the media propaganda stuff against the ANC, and this snapped him, it finished Nani off hey. Nervous breakdown-19 years service

and seven months-he just walked in the one day and said 'That's it, cheers' So ja, there was never an outlet, I mean, I went secretly in 1988. I had, I literally went under a false name simply because I wasn't coping. I mean this little oke was a year old, he had massive medical problems (clears throat), it was doctor after doctor and I worked those years an 18-hour day everyday, day or night. And it didn't matter, you didn't get more money for it, they relied on loyalty and our loyalty was abused. But anyway, I went to see a psychiatrist in George, and he said to me, on a lighter note, he said to me 'My boy, you sit and complain about your feet when your shoes are the problem' and he said to me 'resign.' But go where? I needed the medical aid.

Amanda: So when did you meet Dylan's mum, a long time ago?

Paul: Hmm, 1983. Well met her in 82, married in 83 and... ja. Went through a lot... together. She didn't know all of this but it was a bizarre lifestyle, I couldn't exactly tell her... 'honey what did you do at the office today?' 'No, busy planning to blow up this building in Jo'burg (laugh). You know it's bizarre.

Amanda: Did she ever ask you...

Paul: Uh, she knew quite a lot of things; obviously you don't know everything, not the whole picture. In fact my marriage went when she typed my amnesty application because then it all came down to, um, that was the last nail in the coffin. I mean there it was now like in a condensed version and I got divorced shortly afterwards. That was, um, well she said afterwards she didn't know that she was married to a monster (pause) I mean look it even horrified me because these things were over a scale of 18 years and all of a sudden...

Amanda: ...to put it into that condensed form

Paul: God, 527 incidents. It reads like Marquis de Sade

Amanda: Wow, 527 incidents...that's a lot.

Paul (laughing): I dubiously hold the South African record for amnesty applications. It's horrendous hey?

Amanda: But then obviously none of that was from Namibia?

Paul: No, I did apply for amnesty for just that one incident. But I referred to it broadly. I didn't know at the time because (laugh) one of the guys my story came out quite quickly and I got into this slugging match with de Klerk and Botha, you know drove past his house this morning. I didn't know, I just went into that whole amnesty thing with 'I've got to be as honest as hell because it's only chance of getting out of there. *And* the second thing is Amanda, I kept all my casebooks. And the third thing was, I don't know what makes me different from the others but the abuse didn't catch me like it caught a lot of the other guys, uh, a lot of the Koevoet guys they couldn't even get a sensible statement out of them they were so bugged from drugs or booze, or Ferdi with cocaine. Even de Kock was totally off his head, he was way out of it-an intelligent guy with his background, you know the wheels had come off everywhere. But you know, I had sat down, I think I hadn't touched a drink for two years, I had my case-books to rely on and I suppose a good memory so I could document stuff that many people had forgotten about.

Amanda: Or that higher up officials had chosen to forget about?

Paul: Ja, and then I also didn't fit with other guys 'Let's keep quiet about this, nobody else knows about this.' I was totally isolated, no contact, I went under a witness protection programme. So, Anyway, it served me well at the end because I did get amnesty barring on 22 incidents, which freaked me out because the non-amnesty thing was for being part of the surveillance system. I mean I was a year old when that all came out, the postal interceptions and telephones. I mean it's only now recently I sort of got to why this phenomena happened, I mean how the hell can they ever hold me responsible for that? Simply, the TRC didn't have the legal weight to give me amnesty on those things. But there is another little sting in that as well that if those cases are ever opened again I would certainly either be charged or used as a state-witness against the people that might have been responsible. And then some of them just bizarre. The one thing was I stole flowerpots and they didn't give me amnesty because they found out it was for personal gain, you know it was ridi...I thought it was pretty (laugh)...flowerpots

Amanda: I wouldn't mind going back to... if you don't mind,

Paul: Not at all

Amanda: you were telling me about Namibia, how long were you there for?

Paul: I think about nine months

Amanda: And then you came back and what happened when you came back?

Paul: Jesus, I arrived back to chaos. You know what they did, Amanda, they gave me seven days leave to recover in. I got home and I walked into this- from that totally lawless society, I walked into. I was still with my parents, it was two years before I got married and I thought what the hell am I doing back in Jo'burg? I went out that night, I hadn't bathed I think in two days and was wearing the same uniform and I went to the pub in Yeoville and I started...two things happened, I got caught speeding, I wanted to take out the traffic cop, which was hysterical (laughing) the guy was whimpering, I had a gun like this, I said to him 'How dare you come and try and take...' Then I ended up in a hell of a bar fight. I don't know, it took me a long time to recover from that. About, I think it was a Friday or whatever, anyway, I had this official week's leave, seven days, I went back to work on the Monday, Tuesday. My boss said to me "what are you doing?" Jesus, and I moped around, moped around, I couldn't get back, I couldn't adjust at all and I think it was about three days I walked into his office, I said 'I'm going back to Koevoet permanently.' Jesus, And those ous sat there moaning. He said to me 'Nah, stay here, you just need a break, why don't you take leave. But I mean I needed somebody to, I suppose I needed support.

Amanda: And was it a big change? Did you come back with a lot of people or where you suddenly surrounded by men who had never been to the border?

Paul: Uh, a lot of that and then getting back to this humdrum existence, I mean from all that excitement to lesser excitement. Because I mean being in the Security Branch was I suppose if anything, never boring, um, most of the time I was my own boss or in charge of things. (pause) total freedom of movement, um once again the best of everything, secrets, fun. That I applied for amnesty, well I didn't take bribes but I used government money unashamedly like there was no tomorrow, we all did. Long pause...Ja, that was hectic.

Amanda: Did you find when you got back there was more guidance, they told you more what you could or couldn't do, or was it pretty much the same?

Paul: Um, ja, I think it was (pause, sigh) Once you've been to the border it was like you had your final sort of like colours, (Jy's mos'n ouman nou, die krens...???) Blah di blah di blah. I remember once telling my boss that I had shot a guy and he said to me 'What are you feeling bad about?' You know, that was the attitude, there was nobody to really talk to. I didn't have the sort of... my dad went through the war and he had post-traumatic stress as well. I only realized that way after his death; I mean he was up north as they used to say those years, three years. He was a pilot. And he hated us, my brother and I ever even questioning about what happened. But I never started to understand him until I started to understand myself. You know my dad had obviously, because he came back a different person. That I only know from his writings, when he met my mum six years before the war he was a loving, decent, sensitive guy. I never knew my father like that. But that thing...I traced the family history because when he died I got everything from the love letter-the whole lots and it's amazing.

Amanda: Was he quite strict with you when you were growing up?

Paul (laugh, clears throat): Jesus, ja. Old man just looked at you boy, froze or you got a clout, one of the two, but I mean there was no explanations or whatever. He had a very quick temper. Thank god never drank, my dad. That would have been awful. If my father had ever been a drinker, I think we would have gone through hell and it was only later years he mellowed out. I mean I came back from the war thinking... I wanted to speak to my dad and say 'I've also been to like what you went through but it was this closed book and I couldn't get on with him at all. I think when I got back I hated my father, I don't know why? It was just my angst.

Amanda: And your mum?

Paul: My own mother died two years before that, it was my step-mom. But when I got back, I mean I went totally off the tracks, I mean (laugh) drove into the bedroom two o'clock in the morning. My fathers fast asleep. Pissed as a coot. (Huge laugh) I mean I just went absolutely crazy until I met Dylan's mom, she sort of calmed me down I suppose. (Laugh) Marriage.

Amanda: It would be nice to think that women do that, but they don't all the time... (both laugh).

Amanda: so you said you had one brother?

Paul: Ja one brother and a sister, both older.

Amanda: And what do they do? Did your paths diverge at an early age?

Paul: My brother's 8 years older than me, he was always a bully, we sort of get on but don't get on, you know, all these years, just very different people. He did his national service and that was it. My sister I have always been close to. She got married...

(phone rings)

Amanda: I was just thinking when you came back from Namibia do you think ideology was a huge factor or did politics play a role? Were you trained to think in that way?

Paul: Ja, I think so. Definitely. You know Amanda, later years I started to realize, a lot of the guys that were more conservative than me, we all knew the writing was on the wall, you know, um but as much as there were some of us that realised, a broad sort of mass, believed, followed the cause till the end of days. Being I suppose put in the Security Branch, and a *cut* above them, Stratcom, our boss who then

became the Head of Intelligence told us in 1988 'In 10 years time this country's...we had a meeting the one night, there were a lot of Generals there, the writing was already on the wall, I mean what do you say? Ja, I was an ideologue I suppose, I believed wholly and solely.

Amanda: But that was less so from your parents than from your...

Paul: You know the big thing was they got us to summarise this whole concept in a nutshell was communism. Because the one thing we were never brought up as racists. That is honest to god. You know that I have been asked that question so many times before like why did you do it? You look at my history in the Security Branch, I was on the so-called white desk and that sort of gave me more hatred for people like your dad because why couldn't see the light? I mean these people were left wingers or communists or whatever. But I mean what the government did was a classic thing, everybody that was an enemy of the state was compartmentalized into this one thing, communism. From Helen Suzman, the liberals, the progressives, you name it. These were the enemies of the state and the fact that they were white people was seen in a worse thing than a poor black or coloured person or whatever. These were the people

That had an education and that they could go along with the communist ideology...I mean I hated communism, (sigh) more than anything. But I never saw things in a black and white type of stuff. That to me was part and parcel of the whole thing, that the poor masses of black, oppressed masses of the country were being used as cannon fodder by the Commies. The whole thing was a cold war thing. And you know what I've done, just to digress, in my book I try to analyse this in depth, I mean, just the way we were educated in primary school. I remember our Standard 4 teacher who became headmaster, Derek Hull drawing on the black board and telling us about the Israeli war, 1967, about this whole global thing, my parents talking about it. It was cold war stuff. You know the Cape Sea route was this big thing, of course, and that picked up in this country the whole bastion, the Commies were going to rape the women and turn the Churches into bloody squats, that type of stuff, so ja, I think in that sense, I still say we weren't politicized, I didn't come from any more than an average white South African family. My grandmother was this old (inaudible) liberal, you know she used to sit and snipe at us, but that was party politics you know, the NATTE and the SAPP. She was an old United party person to her death in 93, my dad was I don't know, probably a Nat. They used to sit and fight about party politics but I mean that was, ja, I suppose the cold war.

Amanda: But, the way you thought about it then, was it that at all costs you had to do what you had to do or were you ever told there were things that you couldn't do, or was it just you could do anything you want to do?

Paul: You know Amanda, this whole thing of the third force, which I was very involved in, well I started in the Security Branch first, not even two weeks my boss came to me, this colonel and he sat, closed the door, gave me a pep talk. And he said to me 'There's more than just a war here, these people, and you can't fight them through the cause.' And he said 'and you'll see, everything was the jong manne worked in this big group of young guys, most of us were junior ranks, sergeants or constables. He said 'these guys (now, he was testing me, actually, you know in retrospect) he said you know officially we worked office hours, he said and they go out at night, he said, you must put pressure on them, he said. And I say just white staff, racially divided, of blank personnel, just worked with white

suspects, same for Indians, same for coloureds, same for blacks. Then you had a terrorist tracing unit later type, that's how the whole security branch was divided up so I worked on just white suspects, white organizations and churches, a big thorn in the backside. But I think I couldn't have been in the Sap more than a month, I went out to the first 'Nachterlucke escapade (nightly escapade) and sprayed these slogans on what was his name? Oh, anyway this house and cover his car with paint and ag make headlines the next day in the paper, which was fantastic. You know, I couldn't believe it, we were the cops, the cream of crop, famous, notorious, whatever. It was the Security Branch. You literally had license to kill and that type of stuff grew and grew and grew. Started off, in my experience it was paint bombs. Then it was petrol bombs and then eventually it heating up houses. And eventually, not eventually, it became official government policy. All the Stratcom operations. I mean you've got to see what was going on. Um, one of the security courses, ag, Stratcom courses I went on eventually, um the course leader actually talked about assassination as one of the alternative...you know, they said it from a podium. There was no two ways about it. Proof in the pudding is that in all those years up until TRC never one arrest or conviction of any third force (inaudible)

Amanda: So when did you start at Stratcom?

Paul: yirrah, I was one of the first people that got involved in Stratcom, um simply because I always had this love of art because my job to round about 1984 I started designing posters and doing artwork and posters appearing overnight across the country and so on. And they wanted to, I'd just got married. In fact, I came back from honeymoon and I sat did these drawings. They wanted to transfer me to Pretoria, the first official Stratcom unit-Stratcom prior to that was being practiced by the Army and National Intelligence and it's because of my ex that I didn't go. I just said look I'm prepared to do the artwork and that. So for the next couple of years informally I was involved, as was most of the security branch. I mean to stick up those bloody millions of posters. That was still a Mickey mouse type of stuff but towards the end of the 80s I was formally inducted into Stratcom and was there until the end of Stratcom (inaudible) And I mean it was at that time that Khotso House, COSATU House, Khanye college (inaudible) were all part of Stratcom, the so-called secret war.

Amanda: So how did you just how effective you were being at the time?

Paul: We were fighting a losing battle, hey. I mean we had minor victories. I think after the second state of emergency, Amanda most of us were too scared to say, but most of us realized (inaudible) I can show you I got passports made, documents in my name and Linda's name just in case. And the whole time the state's response yirrah endless meetings like you cant believe, pep talks, 'don't you know even if the worst happens we will always be, especially after Nelson, uh, there will always be an intelligence system and we will work under his new government because first and foremost we are cops and our oath of loyalty. Ja, at the end of the day they left us canned for what they then did.

Amanda: Did you feel disappointed with the way things turned out? I know certainly in de Kock's book he talks about his disappointment with de Klerk.

Paul: Ja, because I actually wanted to shoot de Klerk, came very close to it. Not because of anything else but I never saw him as a traitor who had sold the country down the river but the Nats certainly sold out people. But no, no, I still carry that hatred today-mention Botha's name, um, and all the Generals, I mean where the fuck? I don't think, I don't condone using Gene as an example, he was just the fall

Amanda Lucey

guy. I think if the TRC and the justice system failed dismally it was certainly in his case (inaudible) you know, someone's got to take account for that. I think if you look at the whole thing in its entirety, I mean look at Gene's story, when they took him out of Koevoet and they started Vlakplaas that guy was not normal. Who could have foreseen anything apart from chaos-a guy like that after four, five years in Ovamboland almost uninterrupted with a license to kill that created mayhem on a scale I couldn't have even foreseen. But bringing him back to South Africa, an almost blank cheque, a staff of *sixteen*, a farm and vehicles and everything like that and carries on Koevoet inside the country, that's all that happened. And I think getting back to the point that I want to make
(tape ends, states that Eugene alone cannot be blamed)

Paul: So ja, things, none of us really realized the things that were going on, you know all that was going on. In fact there were guys in the Security branch who never knew bloody anything that was going on. I mean, we went out at night, the whole thing was...when we did all these little jobs the only people that knew about it was those that had to know or had a need to know about it, you know, the 'need to know principle.' What happened at the end of all this was the guys that sanctioned all of this came out with these denials, permanent removal from society. I mean, bullshit! They knew damn well, they can wash it away with semantics or whatever, but they were clever enough to use phraseology where if they ever had to stand and it had to be accounted for like my ex-boss, General Johan Coetzee, he sat in front of the TRC with this Afrikaans dictionary about the term 'permanent removal from society.' And when I saw his submission on that I felt absolutely sick. Although when I first heard that word, Amanda, I suspected as much but I wasn't sure. And I mean who the hell were we to question it anyway? I really believed at that time that they were up to something but not killing people, I thought once again in that sort of thing that, um, under emergency regulations they had set-up some sort of conc... like Guantanamo Bay, I suppose, you know, that was the picture that I formulated. Tony asked me how I would have felt if they had come like happened that fateful day a guy coming into my office and saying 'we are drawing up a list of people we would now like to kill, assassinate, um, I don't think I would have gone along with it. I'm not saying I'm a good guy or something like that but it maybe took me a couple of years after that shooting incident in Ovamboland to understand...I just didn't want to, none of us, well a lot of the guys that I knew, but for myself, I didn't want blood on my hands again. Once again, different things, this guy with an AK-47 there with a limpet mine I would have shot to pieces and gone home *quite* happily, you know and enjoyed the rest of my life. But yirrah, not an academic like David Webster, Frank Chikane...so

Amanda: So when you had to interrogate people, for example, did you think to yourself that you had to go as far as you could but you didn't want to actually kill them, you didn't want blood on your hands, so to go to the limit to get the information was required, how did you think about that?

Paul: Personally, I could never torture, not a white person you know, I 'spose you see the border was a different thing again. There was like a *savagery* that was different to locally. Ag, I would balk at the idea of torturing to a point where I killed them, um. I was involved in the death of Neil Aggett, I was involved in the investigation. And I only heard, all those years later, I didn't know that right up until quite recently....to the best of my knowledge viewed Neil's interrogation as house-friendly. A hand was never laid on him. And I have actually got photos of him, or had (inaudible) ...hanging from the

cell...killed himself, but I mean. Now you've got to define a line between driven to doing it or he was left no alternative than to kill himself or somebody walking in with a gun and shooting him. (sigh and pause) No. I couldn't have done that, I couldn't have done that. I think, to maybe just quantify that we had a million opportunities to (reverk) people. I mean, horrible. My partner's told me this, died now a couple of months ago, Nani and I would go out and shotgun somebody's house and their cars and we would make damn certain they were not there. I don't think, I can honestly say, as close as what I was to him, it was an unspoken about thing between us. He didn't want to do it and I didn't want to do it. Um once again, these were the suspects, they were involved in underground politics, they weren't carrying limpet mines or whatever. It was a *tacit* support that they were giving. I would have felt differently if they, my boss said to me 'There's a ter with a container who was sitting in a boat, got a limpet mine in the back, I mean sure enough, a different thing. So I think ja, given the circumstances.

Amanda: Do you think that there was a shift in your thinking when you came back from Namibia?

Paul: Secretly ja. I started to suffer from insomnia when I came back from Ovamboland and nightmares, terrible. I mean I was pretty much disturbed, took me years to get past that thing. And um, you know I played these like mind games. This guy was a grandfather you know, think of my grandfather and how I loved him. (Pause) You know after that shooting thing, he was diving into the kraal. That was another thing that freaked me out, Amanda, was they don't...didn't react like a human reacted. It was just all these kids and you know that sort of typical Ovambo black kraal type of stuff, looking at us was like horror but there was no sign of emotion. And when we picked this guy up and we tossed him in the back of this vehicle, it had like this buckle on the back, arming the gun on the side, these women came out that were crying, ululating, hysterical, everything like that, I mean it was probably his daughters. But they packed thorn brushes over where the blood was lying. You know that it was just like 'They aren't human, they aren't like us. You know it's like, obviously it's a cultural thing, you know. So ja, I racked my brains one way or the other, um, I don't know, I just couldn't kill somebody.

(Long pause)

Ja but you know after all this was over, this friend of mine that died I mean we sat hundreds of hours (inaudible)...He never had the benefit of a maybe cathartic process that I went through, but it killed him eventually. His wife now says openly, Nani carrying that, still living in the past....

But he said to me the one day "You know Paul, through all of that we never talked about Christianity' or something like that. I mean he became very religious the last few years. He said to me 'I mean I am horrified at what we were actually involved in and how those bastards misled us because....' (sigh) what I can say to you from my side, up until I started in the Security Branch, I never ever believed that the police force of this country could be involved in shit like we were involved in. But it's almost like we got sucked into this whole thing, you know and that it got worse and worse and worse. I mean, I left school, I had vague ideas about getting some sort of job where I could be creative. You know, no fixed ideas. Seven years, six years after that I was shooting people at the border and going to celebrate it afterwards by drinking. I don't know.

Amanda: When you say that you celebrated afterwards, was that part of being in a group and just the macho appearance that you had to portray? How did you really feel, or was it that there was so much excitement?

Paul: It was that macho thing, but you know, I mean you're on your own at night and you close your eyes, I remember that, that night. It was like any other night with one exception. You know I had killed somebody. And I suppose maybe my face or my demeanor gave it away, I was like quite deep in thought and here was old Piks, you know, this hectic guy saying "all, fok, let's have another one." All singing our war song, war songs. But I remember getting into bed that night, Jesus, I had crossed this divide (pause)... I read accounts, I had always been into military history, those guys that dropped the atomic bomb, the bomber, you know this guy went and imagined, you know...so I was aware of that type of stuff, you know, that phenomenon, like, but you sort of accepted the responsibility, got to deal with it, you know-where do you go now, do you do it again? You know, I said at one point, you know, I think for a lot of guys once you've done it once, or been in a fire-fight once and shot people, I felt that was the line up there. It got easier and easier, like Eugene de Kock. I mean he was absolutely ruthless, but he wasn't like that when he first, the type of guy in the uniformed branch. From what I know, I didn't know him at that time, but the guys that worked with him or whatever, he was a no nonsense guy sure enough but not a natural born killer, you know, um. I suppose now we are getting into another debate, you know, what came first: is one born to this or is it things that make you become like this...I don't believe that he was born to this...circumstances, but um, I don't know, it's a timeless debate, I don't think anyone has really got the answer.

Amanda: I don't think so.

Paul: it's just war shit. You know my own father flew an aeroplane and at some point pushed a button and a bomb fell out of the bottom of it, people to pieces. I mean. Fuck, it's hectic but anyway.

Amanda: But going back to this macho idea, did it make you feel better about things?

Paul: Oh absolutely, it's a group identity.

Amanda: So did the feeling of community help?

Paul: Absolutely. Absolutely.

Amanda: Do you think you had to be that way to get places, you had to show a certain persona?

Paul: You know that was a big thing in the police force but it was a major thing in the Security Branch. You had wheels within wheels. The so-called naughty boys were C-sectioned at various times, known under different names, Vlakplaas... these were the guys, once you made a name for yourself, and a lot of us, like me, aspired to this-you were capable of carrying out the dirty little things, breaking into somebody's house, cutting the break cables of the car, this type of stuff, you know, were like favoured and I think in a lot of cases guys were promoted and given extra, you were treated by the big guys who knew all of this. Like going to head office, I mean I had this reputation for...(inaudible) Paul, you know, but this is from a Colonel or Brigadier or something. Well they used my info, it was this affectionate thing whereas guys who had been in a higher rank than me were treated like 'Good morning, *Captain*, or Colonel' or something like this. And it was just this little core, you know that, Jacques Pauw eventually referred to-I called it the 'Heart of the Whore' and he used that publicly, but anyway, that was what it was like. There was only this little handful, that, that became the Stratcom

component, um, it was almost like we were trustees of the big shots you know, myself, Nani Beyers, the guys on the out section. We were the guys-they didn't just at the morning coffee table say to a staff of two hundred and something people 'Minister says we must blow COTSA House up, looking for volunteers.' It didn't work like that, you know, we were told what was going to happen on one-on-one conversations, started to plan the thing and eventually the job was done.

Amanda: Do you think within groups, you sort of get compelled to do things; you almost don't have to think about it.

Paul: Ja, that's right, group identity. I do have a pretty good analogy once, I read the history of the Hell's Angels, the bikers' background. It was this thing of showing class, you gave what 400 tough guys motorbikes or whatever and they first, the Hell's angels started with everyone trying to outdo the other one by doing something spectacularly, not necessarily...something spectacular, something innovative. Which I always was, quite entrepreneurial. Lot of the things that I was the architect of were pretty well thought out, effective, ja, I was making a name for myself. Like standing up above the crowd. I mean this forging letters and cheques business, I became so bloody good at it, that that's actually where I got this one commendation from. Everybody thought this was fucking amazing, you know, it's the type of shit you read about in books.

Amanda: And how did that make you feel?

Paul: In my case as well there were these problems of this promotion- that's another whole story on it's own but I was given certain merits for performance secretly, I mean I ended up at the end of my career getting a salary that people that outranked me right to the top... I was getting a hell of a salary. Then they brought in this merit thing so in that way I supposedly was, I was rewarded in that sense, although I didn't do it for that particular reason. I would say that was the added bonus. And then just to have elements of notoriety as well (inaudible) Invariably, word spread, you know, one of the guys would come and say 'Aren't you the oke that did this?' 'Oh ja, you know.'

Amanda: So you don't think that there was ever anything that could have gone above the call of duty? I mean you were actually rewarded for going further than what you were ordered.

Paul: Yes, you were rewarded. I think you had...to simplify it, you made a name for yourself, uh, I think Koevoet...just...the people of Koevoet....look it was encouraged all the way down the line.

Amanda: And the excitement....

Paul: Ja, people would go, they didn't talk about it. De Kock was just amazing (inaudible) his reputation preceded him, (inaudible)

Amanda: Did people ever have to cover up for, especially higher up?

Paul: They covered up

Amanda: If you came to them with a problem how would they react?

Paul: They covered it up. Once again, what I said to you earlier, there was never an arrest or conviction, questions asked in Parliament about the so-called third force. Not one of those cases ever went to court...that I know of anyway.

Amanda: Up to the point when things started changing, how had you seen the struggle from other sides of the divide-as a communist mentality?

Paul: Ja, um, I started to get about 1987,88, Dylan's birth, a lot of problems, I started to actually suffer from depression, I wanted to get out the year of Dylan's birth 87, I really wanted to start a business, I just couldn't take it anymore. It was this frustration because there was a lot of areas where...you know I think Botha's Rubicon speech had a lot to do with it as well. Because even in Intelligence there was a lot of things about the realisation that certain changes had to come about, because you know...we were outnumbered, outgunned, the sheer weight of the problem facing us that's when I started to become probably maybe more despondent, more depressed this transience... I mean my days in Stratcom I had, I *had* to still be locked into Military service, the system, the command structures. The guy that was the actual the head of Stratcom in Jo'burg, Amanda, this guy was so totally stupid. You know, I went berserk, he was a bodybuilder. I went into his office the one day having pulled off, for this I got a huge commendation, I started getting propaganda materials in John Major's hands and he didn't know who John Major was! And I went and he said 'No, Wie is die fokken ou?' I said 'He's the fucken Prime Minister of fucking England' and I grabbed stuff on his desk and I went berserk, like. You know when I calmed down he came to me and he said "go away for a day or two, working too hard." I mean, it was just something that books were written about, John le Carre or something like that. Now that could have been built on, there was so much potential. (Long pause) Ja, anyway, getting back to it, I wanted out, um there was like nowhere to go. Another little insidious, or invidious side came into it around about that time when things started getting hectic. And it was that you couldn't leave because you knew too much. Not that I was ever threatened, but I mean at times I threw my toys out of my cot, like when Dylan was born. I was drunk everyday. It was the life. On top of that, Amanda, I was working like an 18-hour day, running all these bloody operations. I had I think the second most informers or agents that I was running of the Security Branch, there was endless crap, these people had to be supported the whole time. They were seeing the writing on the wall faster than what we were. Shit was going on, people were dying. The one thing Stanza (?) I didn't honest to god didn't know till the one officer that I mentioned came to me the one day and she was involved in this organisation and they were going on about this, the whole of this fear. And she said to me 'You guys killed him.' Jesus I gave her a *slap*, I said 'I'm not a murderer.' And I truly believed it. That only came out in the TRC, that Stanza was murdered by, in fact killed by one of my colleagues. Beat the guy to death, tossed his body down the mineshaft. I don't even know the circumstances. So it was like being in this pressure cooker you know and I genuinely wanted to get out, but I mean I would have had to start, I would have had to start my life again. We had lost our house, my medical aid was the most important thing, and Dylan's mom wanted me out. She was starting to...I had a wonderful marriage, the cracks were starting to appear then. I came home the one day, to give you an example, I had been awake for three solid days and I came home and she smelt alcohol on my breath and we had a fight that night, I nearly killed her. When I came to my senses, I was on top of her and I pressed this gun against her. I mean, it was hectic.

Amanda: Do you think that there were some of your colleagues that were less affected?

Paul: Most of them weren't affected. They came to work at eight o'clock in the morning and buggered off at four o'clock, type of attitude. A lot of them. I mean the Security Branch in Jo'burg was a huge body of people (pause) But I think one of the problems, and we hear this today in the police, is that the more you do, the more shit you do, the less time you have got for yourself because you cannot confine

police work in an 8-4 job. I mean with everything with informers and then these Stratcom things that started to happen, break-ins and that type of thing, I was just never around, I mean, how far would you carry on with it? Started to develop, like I told you, I went to see a psychologist, not that he said.. He said 'Tell me what you do' I mean I couldn't tell him.

Amanda: So did you even talk to him about what you...

Paul: Uh uh, Like I said I worked too hard (inaudible) And even on the strength of that, if he had known what I did it probably would have killed him, and I would have been breaking the Official secrets act.

Amanda: Was that something you were worried about?

Paul: *And*, in the Security Branch, never mind the police force, you never went, if anyone ever heard that you had gone for counselling, psychiatric help, you were regarded as a threat. I tell you, any menial job that was done by the Security Branch, the security clearances of people in sensitive areas, all of them were done by the security branch. You know, Amanda applies for this job at the old Atomic Energy Board, regarded as a key...(inaudible) There five hundred and something so called National key points, SASOL....various areas of not necessarily government but private enterprise. One of the questions on that security questionnaire, a form you had to fill in "Have you ever had psychiatric help, if so provide details." A person was given a negative clearance and only when the client was done on like, if that client was of importance they had to go back to them and say what was the nature of this, who was the Doctor, you know, see if the person was in any way, you know the system regarded it as a fact, you know, you couldn't trust them.

Amanda: And do you think for that reason some people got into positions whilst not having, you know, almost...from what you say, you came from a normal mindset, but do you think there were others who did not have a normal psychological make-up.

Paul: There was, there were people, I mean, I talk for myself that I was terrified of. I wasn't scared of Gene with his imperial temper, personality....

(tape ends)

They had to go to Police College for a whole year and influenced like I was, four and a half months training. And then propaganda side, on the police forces side, there was a subject called 'Criminology and Ethnology.' And it was compulsory, I've got that book. You've got to see it, it's unbelievable. Generation after Generation of policemen turned out with that garbage-you wonder where racial hatred and all these preconceptions, things that we all grew up with came from. But this, that famous book, um, eventually somebody got hold of a copy and gave it to Helen Suzman and all the guys in Parliament and they pulled it. And as usual I've managed to (inaudible). Or maybe somewhere along the line I thought 'Jesus, one day this will come in handy.' I've got one of the only ones, I think that exists, that old Criminology and ethnology book. It is unbelievable, it's Victorian, taken from the old English police force, and then of course with all the racial shit as well, I'll just give you an example that comes to mind, um... 'Why are Indians in South Africa involved in politics?' And then the answer is 'The Indians and Pakistanis in South Africa are forming the frontline groups involved in politics. They want to topple the Nationalist government so that they can open the doors to the excess population for India and Pakistan to come live in our country.' Now if you've got a standard six

education and you knew fuck-all about life and here is a fact, told to you like that, obviously, you know...that is the way that all policemen were trained.

Amanda: Obviously it played a large role for most people, but do you think that there were some people perhaps that maybe didn't even need the ideology. I was just wondering about what you said earlier, that there was no screening, so do you think that for some people perhaps and I wouldn't even want to begin trying to give examples, but that it was a good opportunity almost or would that be in fair?

Paul: I think that might be a bit unfair. You see there was times when phenomena like that happened, was where real all-time action heroes joined the police force, they wanted to get into Koevoet or something like that, and after the fall of Rhodesia you had that phenomena, in fact my job was to screen a lot of these guys, because everyone of them arrived in South Africa, they were all Selous scouts, the bullshit was just unbelievable, the whole thing...and a lot of them wanted to get into police or military structures, South Africa was simply a good place for this to help you. And a lot of them did, um, you know I think, quite a lot of them, certainly some of the guys that I've met were totally bushwhacked, you know they'd been fighting the bloody war for ages, but I think, ja, they were probably more into that category of disturbed people that wanted to carry on.

Amanda: But for the large majority?

Paul: Blindies to the national party, Afrikaners in this country was just, I suppose another thing of sheltered employment. Like the railways used to uplift the volk of the Boer war, that sort of thing.

Amanda: You mentioned Jacques Pauw, and I don't think explicitly he differentiates, but he speaks about Ferdi for example, and what were your thoughts on that?

Paul: Jesus, a hectic person. There's another guy that I was scared of. I think everybody was. His reputation preceded him, as well. I don't know if you've seen in Jacques book, he was never in the security branch he was a drug squad cop.

Amanda: Which is ironic considering...

Paul: Ja, where he ended up. (?) told me that he had a 2000 rand a day habit of coke.

Amanda: Gosh

Paul: With that huge body, taking cocaine like... you know and with that temper. But his story I think started with, he was charged (inaudible) He laid outside one of the clubs in Hillbrow and he was convicted and then got off, and then somebody obviously made some enquiries, it was once again wheels within deals, his little section started...only Vlakplaas was an extension of C-1, that's where the physically huge guys, calla Botha, Bonner, that so called-C-1, it's changed names, fell under (?)

Ja, a guy like him was capable of killing somebody, definitely, I mean he was earmarked for it, done it before, he had the right persona, the right physical attributes. I mean Ferdi's big thing in the police force, he never, long before he was absorbed into the Intelligence structures, was that he would go to bars and for the hell of it, you know out of sheer boredom, take on the whole place, knock the hell out of the bar, he was that sort of guy. Fearsome, awesome guy, um...ja, he would be another one I'd say, I don't have a shadow of a doubt, in fact, I've heard stories that even de Kock was scared of him. And then I heard converse stories once again, compliments of Dr Pretorius. He said that Ferdi said that the only people he was scared of was Eugene de Kock.

Amanda: Oh really?

Paul: Ja, so. The fact that Eugene didn't like him, I think possible Eugene being a pretty bright guy...

Amanda: But you were never scared of Eugene...?

Paul: I wasn't scared of him in the sense that he liked me, um, we spoke a lot and in Ovamboland I remember sitting with him drinking the one night, in fact we got him out of a fight, he nearly thrown right out of the police force. He saw in me somebody that did very well, a goody guy. And also somebody that didn't just sit in the police force, I mean I went out on my own volition, I read Marx, Lenin, but de Kock was like that and I think he valued that in me. I certainly appreciated it in him, he wasn't like my boss who didn't know that John Major was the Prime Minister. But I knew the boundaries. I was with him in a in a fight type situation and you played by his rules and that was it, if you got in the way he would probably kill you. And it wasn't that he had a temper, he was just more he was just different- a no-nonsense guy. Ferdi I think was just, he'd take pleasure I think out of, like being destructive. I can honestly say that I didn't see that in Eugene. Um, different people. What was the name of that journalist who came to see me about Eugene de Kock? Whose father was killed? Um, Turner, Rick Turners daughter. You know this neighbourhood that they hung out in, Prime Evil sticks in my claw (?) as well. He was just, in a military sense one of the finest soldiers in this country, um. He certainly had better qualities than the desk or office police that led from the front which anyone who respects anybody for military, and I would certainly respect him. Never a guy that sat down at a desk like, and said 'Amanda, you go do this and come tell me afterwards what happened.' I think that's actually the thing that made him so much of a legend, you know a brave man, it's terrible.

Amanda: Although now they are thinking of pardoning him?

Paul: I worked very hard for that. I really did. I went, in fact tried to start something, a support group, Eugene de Kock group, and every time I made a statement (inaudible)

Amanda: Because he can be seen as a scapegoat, because we try to appease everyone by saying that everything falls down to him, but it's more complex than that?

Paul: Can I tell you something and I am going to ask you to switch your tape off?

(Tape switched off, and then on resumption)

Amanda: What did you think of all your bosses?

Paul: Most of them I treated with contempt, a lot of them, Stratcom, that guy was a joke (laugh). Um, I hate to say this but I always regarded myself as being intellectually superior to many of, of...I knew more about what I was doing and the subject than...um...and more about life than a lot of these guys, it was just, I think I was more committed. For a lot of them it was just another job.

Amanda: With regards to the TRC, when everything started happening, what did you think about that?

Paul: Well I knew it was coming and in a bizarre way I possibly helped father the TRC! With Goldstone, those cases were crapped out. They drew up that report which was an agreement by de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, and you got to read that. It's horrendous. And I quote him: 'Reading through Erasmus's casebooks is a depressing...' he says, a 'shocking, depressing whatever. Page after page of documented violence. (inaudible)

Um, look they had to do something after the Goldstone era.

Amanda Lucey

Amanda: A lot of people resented the whole TRC process but you came forward even before that, so for you...?

Paul: I had misgiving about it because I thought that, I didn't think much about it, like before the Generals came together in Pretoria planning... how they could apportion blame, and that kind of thing but at the outset I think it was the only way to go. And I think what they achieved, one can throw criticisms as a lot of people have done... I think that if they failed in any area society's sense of justice might have better been served if they had charged Botha, not just dragging him in front of the court here, you know threat or whatever. Um, to not have had a TRC would have prolonged the hatred. It was a way of exposing, excising, I spose.

Amanda: Do you think that you began to understand more what the other side of the struggle was about as that all came out?

Paul: Definitely. I mean I went to a lot of the hearing and gave evidence and um, I got discredited a lot along the way for a lot of it which spose I understand why. I don't hold anybody against what they said about me, I never saw myself as a hero. I just didn't have a choice. But the one thing I am proud of, I never ever pushed the blame down, I never ever spoke about anybody that was lower than me, but I wasn't a General. (Laugh) Ja, I think a lot of the guys sold short on them, like Johann Coetzee. To sit in front of that hearing and say (coz we had all agreed he was probably the most educated policemen) he sat there and he said no he had used the term permanent removal from society and it was misinterpreted by the people out there. In other words these fucking idiots weren't capable of determining.... And that you know he was never...and that was where the TRC fell short.

Amanda: What did you think about the people underneath you?

Paul: Well they were carrying out the orders as much as I was carrying out the orders from above. There was no ways I was ever going to sit in any forum and say...you know, I felt I was talking to the hard timers of the country (?). I dragged a lot of people into these things like de Kock and a lot of them, a great friend of mine, he (?) by looking at my surveillance. I'd love to see him, just to clear the air. And I heard, Amanda, about six months ago, you can't even mention my name. He goes into things like, I'm a traitor, I nearly got him jailed. I never mentioned him in any forum whatsoever, even when I cut deals, well not deals. I spoke to Judge Goldstone, I said 'Judge, I am not going to sit here and say, these are the guys, I gave them orders. They arrived eventually, I mean in droves from the security branch to make a statement a certain quality and then they were done. The last couple of years, psychometric testing or whatever, I had a staff of I think 26, male or female that got dragged along on some of these things, that were involved in these operations, they were just ... (inaudible)

Amanda: What do you think you would have done if they hadn't followed orders?

Paul: There *was* some cases like that. . There were some people that got sidelined into an office job, they were replaced and nothing ever happened, somebody kept an eye on them.

Amanda: If we think of the Nuremberg Trials where it was not good enough to say that you were following orders, what do you think about that? Do you think that it does play a role? Do you think that it diminishes your responsibility?

Paul: Jesus, this is a very interesting topic. But it's even hard to give an answer. I read everything I possibly could about the Nuremberg trials. This big debate goes into the police force section of the

Police Act which says 'All members are to carry out an order, by your superior. If you were a constable that superior was to be decided full stop. If they are unhappy with the orders that are carried out they have the right to unquestionable privacy. *Afterwards* they must submit in writing why they are unhappy and they have got to give them to (listen to this) the person that gave them that order *before* they give to a person of higher authority. So that's it, ja, I'm not going to hide behind it, there's this famous test case of South African law-the State versus Arlo. Arlo was under investigation, having already shot black (?), looking for the famous serial killer in Pretoria and he saw the constable who's got a gun driving to this place, black guy sees the police van so he runs away so what does Arlo go and do, he says to the cops (shakes head), the constable carries on, shoots him, the two get charged with murder. Constable defends himself on the fact that he given an order by a superior, under that Police act. That became a very famous case. *That* piece of legislation stayed on the books right up until they rebuked the police act and all that crap that came out of it. I don't think personally that that it a grounds of justification, which it was. In South African criminal law there were seven grounds for justification, one of them was acting on the border. What the Supreme Court eventually held, was that acting, they had to be lawful. If the order was obviously unlawful, it was your duty to just not obey them. Apply that in a Security Branch sense, look how we saw things, there was no legal way of fighting somebody or controlling them or whatever.....

(Dylan interrupts, on resumption)

Paul: ...the country won it's freedom but at what cost? It's all, you know the last forty years of history in this country has been a senseless waste. I take it from *my* life sort of, where I saw things...I took an oath that this guy, my son, will never ever carry a gun. I mean we keep guns, we live on a farm but...but with *great* circumspection. But to put on a uniform, never. I dunno, you know I watched those planes fly into the towers and I had a rethink on that, I dunno, it's the old question of violence and non-violence, the old just and unjust war theory.

Amanda: Before you left off you were talking about orders and you were about to tell me how things worked from the Security branch perspective.

Paul: Ja, I never ever said and will say 'Don't blame me, I was simply following orders.' I think the whole thing personally and especially, I always tell friends and colleagues I reckon this whole thing of global tyranny. Talking about Nuremberg, I read, I've got the book here, several times 'The purge of the Swastika' by Lord Russell of Liverpool. Excellent book. And after Nuremberg the same question arose about accountability and the guys had stood up there and said we were acting under orders, legal orders of legitimate sovereign authority. And what Lord Russell attacked was the question of accountability of the German people as a whole. Because, after the First World War, the League of Nations caused the Second World War thank you very much, they had to pay reparations. But the infant mortality rate in those years was 1 in 3, they died like flies, so they didn't solve anything, they just created another Adolf Hitler and another world war. But what he looked at was this whole question of accountability and he sets out to prove in the book and subsequent writing that the German people knew what was happening. The *sheer* immensity and the scope of the way people were disappearing and the camps, it gets bigger, bigger and bigger. I mean you can't really compare that to South Africa but it's interesting.

Amanda Lucey

Amanda: And in South Africa, the TRC never dealt with things like the beneficiaries of apartheid, it was very confined, especially the Amnesty Committee, confined to specific acts.

Paul: Ja, well look a lot of the government, the old government, when the Nats made their submission said sorry.

Amanda: But from your point of view what do you think justice is?

Paul: (Long pause, sigh) Ok, regarding the TRC I think that South Africa came out with a fantastic solution because to the contrary, I once spoke to Winnie Mandela, who said to me before the TRC, she said, we will be happy to negate when they are hanging from lamp boxes. The violence would have carried on and I mean, I don't know. I discussed this afterwards with her and said to her like 'Don't you think that (inaudible), then I told her all about Eugene....

I think even she respected him for his military something, but I think it was an admirable process and the other processes. I must tell you that it worries me, this thing about reopening some of the cases.

Amanda: Do you take the point of view that now it's over, that South Africa to a large extent has moved on?

Paul: Ja, but there's another side to that as well, you see like, Niewould's case. I mean not only did he not apply for amnesty but he lied as well. Terrible tragedy because the guys that were with him, he convinced them to lie as well. And now he can't speak because he died of cancer, those guys, I think the case will be placed on the wrong people. I would have said that he should have been in the cells next to Eugene. *And* there's others, there's a lot of cases, which I think are terrible.

Amanda: But from your point of view, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, it was a good opportunity to reconcile?

Paul: Absolutely

Amanda: And I wanted to know what you thought of reconciliation.

Paul: It was a fantastic process, I mean, the mere fact that you are sitting in this house, if I consider the hatred I had for your dad at that time... (uh) With your dad it was interesting because the music side-I *loved* it, I still do. Although I must tell you that I don't like some of the new stuff, it just hasn't got the...

Amanda: Anger?

Paul: Same...But I mean the mere fact that we can sit here today (inaudible)...amazing. I met hundreds of people, former enemies of the State-terrorists, MK commanders...(inaudible) I wanted to kill them all. I had John Allen here, spent two days here and I said it to his face "you know isn't it ironical that the man that I once planned to kill actually ended up saving my life?" Coz if it wasn't for those guys, and John Allen says it straight: Desmond went to Nelson over this whole question, the Codessa talks were still ongoing and even Nelson said they must pay for what they've done. But they envisaged at that time that the hierarchy of the ANC would look at that straight Nuremberg type situation, court cases, you know, and then they said 'we can't carry on like this, we've got to cut this off somehow or the country will carry on bleeding and bleeding and bleeding. And I mean here John Allen sits, I even show him his father up there in my case books (laughing) and he tells me this. (pause) staggers the mind but

Amanda: Tutu was amazing

Amanda Lucey

Paul: Amazing guy, irritated me. Your dad, I sat at night at Mangles listening to his music, you know his whole sort of fashion (inaudible)

Amanda: So what do you see the future of South Africa?

Paul: You know, I am very positive. I've been through this quite a few times. I had the opportunity to stay overseas as part of the security programme. But I think when you investigate all of it, the one thing we all had in common...was we all fought for this bloody old place so let's make a go of it. I'm very positive. I had to rebuild my life, I was on drugs, I was hospitalised 14 times for stress, I'm not complaining there, I mean I'm here running a business, providing employment for people.

Amanda: and now

Paul: I grow South African botanicals and use them for cosmetics that I developed.

(both laugh)

Amanda: Oh, ok

Paul: They are now being sold all over the world.

Amanda: What kind of cosmetics?

Paul: I'll give you some when you go! The famous African potato, the supposed hypoxias which cures AIDS...I got quite fascinated by the whole thing a couple of years ago. After my divorce, I got, regained custody of Dylan, went back to George, to my roots, and I started teaching art, which I always wanted to do, and then I got into this bloody wonder plant, started selling them in brown paper bags to farmers weekly. So I started with that and it's basically worked out.

Amanda: And you enjoy it?

Paul: Ja, Ja its creative, innovative, entrepreneurial...ja.

Amanda: So if you look at the police today what do you think their role is?

Paul: Straight community policing, failing dismally, it's not that...I've got a lot of cop friends, not even from the old days but some who have been around for thirty years, say it's the same frustration, too, little pay. If I listen to these guys, it's almost like it's worse. You know, so much has been done to correct the old situation, now they are getting other stuff like reverse racism, promotions, um a guy with 15 or twenty years experience and there's a young guy with a different colour and face with authority over him, you know a General lack of interest.

Amanda: and I know from Mowbray that the police understandably are scared for example of the taxis, I'd say it's quite terrifying to want to be in the police in South Africa.

Paul: Absolutely, I think the whole country is awash with violence, it's become like a national sport.

Amanda: A violent society

Paul: It's amongst whites, across the colour, but I don't know, my personal opinion, we need zero tolerance, we can't fight crime on the scale that they do, I mean what happened in New York when they forgot about all those specialised units, you broke a window and you were arrested and charged and that was it. (inaudible) don't exist George, I'll take you there now, Amanda, half the kids...the police need to clear those kids up, there gangs there now, why are those children not in school (ok, now it's school holidays but still) Terrible, terrible (Inaudible) That's where it starts.

Later...whites are starting to now, finding a town like George if I try to verbalise it, more conservative, Afrikaans, they now feel threatened, they've got this victim mentality, they are being discriminated

Amanda Lucey

against and it's crap. I mean here, I am busy starting a business for Dylan who is 18, remedial background, he's got opportunities, for a child with no formal education, and I tell people that across the board. They say 'Nah' People believe and react in ways that they want to or the way that they have been conditioned to. I mean I would probably never have a black girlfriend, I might, but why? It was the way we were brought up.

University of Cape Town

Notes to Chapter 4

ⁱ 'Babalas' is a term for a severe headache following a bout of heavy drinking. 'Terr' is an abbreviation of the term 'terrorist.' 'Skinner' refers to gossip.

ⁱⁱ 'Stratcom' was short for 'strategic communications' and was part of the State Security Council. Its main function was to gather intelligence and be responsible for dirty tricks.

ⁱⁱⁱ Reverend Frank Chikane was the leader of the South African Council of Churches (SACC).

^{iv} The Soweto riots were a revolt by students against Bantu Education imposed by the apartheid state.

^v Eugene De Kock was sentenced to 212 years in prison for the deaths of 11 people during his running of Vlakplaas, the death Squad of the Security Branch. He was nicknamed 'Prime Evil' in South Africa. P.W. Botha was the former State President in the 1980s. He denied all responsibility for actions under apartheid and was never prosecuted.

^{vi} The Pass Laws dictated that black South Africans had to carry a pass to be allowed into certain areas of the country and were only allowed out at certain times.

^{vii} David Webster was a social anthropologist and anti-apartheid activist at the University of the Witwatersrand and was killed in 1989.

^{viii} Neil Aggett was a left-wing activist and medical doctor who was killed during interrogation by the Security Police in 1981. The security police claimed this was a case of suicide by hanging.

^{ix} 'Gene' refers to Eugene de Kock

^x Former British Prime Minister

^{xi} Ovamboland refers to the Namibian outback

^{xii} SWAPO (South West People's Organisation) was formed in 1960 with the aim of gaining independence for Namibia.

^{xiii} Koevoet (Afrikaans word meaning crowbar) was the anti-terrorist unit of the Security Branch. It operated primarily on the border of Namibia and was responsible for finding and interrogating terrorists.

^{xiv} Ferdi Barnard was a member of the Former Civil Co-Operation Bureau (CCB), a hit squad of the South African Defence Force.

^{xv} 'slapgat' literally means 'lazy arse' and is taken to mean 'laissez-faire'

^{xvi} A 'joller' is someone who likes to frequently go out and have fun.

References

Adorno, T.W; Brunswick, E.F; Levinson, D.J & Sanford, R.N. (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York : Harper.

Ainsworth, P.B. (1995) *Psychology and Policing in a Changing World*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-wing Authoritarianism*. Canada: University of Manitoba Press.

Amnesty Committee, Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearing Transcripts
<http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21230.htm>. Last accessed on 12/12/2006

Amnesty Committee, Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearing Transcripts
<http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/2000/201127jb.htm>. Last accessed on 06/02/2006

ANC. "ANC Statement on the Final Report of the TRC."
<http://www.anc.org.za/anedocs/pr/1998/pr1030.html>. Last accessed 04/05/1998

Arendt, H. (1977) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin.

Asch, S. (1952). *Social Psychology*. New York: Prentice Hall.

Bandura, A. (1999) "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities." *Personality & Social Psychology Review*. Vol. 3, 3, 193-209

Bauman, Z. (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Baumeister, R.F. & Vohs, K.D (2004) "Four roots of evil" In Miiler, A. *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*. New York: Guildford Press.

Baumeister, R.F. (1997) *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty* United States of America: W.H. Freeman and Company

Blass, T. (2000) "The Milgram Paradigm after 35 years: Some things we now know about obedience to authority." In *Obedience to Authority- Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm*. Ed. Thomas Blass. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Bizos, G. (2003). *Sunday Independent* 21/02/1999. Quoted by Villa-Vicencio, C. in *The Provocations of Amnesty*. Eds. Villa-Vicencio, C. & Doxtader, E. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

Berkowitz, L. (1999). "Evil is more than Banal: Situationism and the concept of evil." *Personality & Social Psychology Review*, Vol. 3, 3, 246-253.

Borofsky, G.L & Brand, D.J. (1980). "Personality Organization and Psychological Functioning of the Nuremberg War Criminals: The Rorschach Data" In Dimsdale, J.E. *Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust*. New York: Hemisphere.

Browning, C.R. (2000). *Nazi Policy, Jewish workers, German killers*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Browning, C.R. (1992). *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. New York: HarperCollins

Brummer, S. (17/10/1997). "Winnie blames Stratcom" Available online www.mg.co.za. Last accessed on 09/09/2006

Brummer, S. (07/07/1995). "Music to Security Branch Fears" Available online www.mg.co.za Last accessed on 09/09/2006

Brummer, S. (30/06/1995). "You are lucky to be alive Harber" Available online www.mg.co.za Last accessed on 09/09/2006

Brummer, S. (30/06/1995). "The dirty tricks campaign to trash Winnie" Available online www.mg.co.za Last accessed on 09/09/2006

Brummer, S. (30/06/1995). "De Klerk denies it all." Available online www.mg.co.za Last accessed on 09/09/2006

Brummer, S. (23/06/1995). "Front Company is still in business" Available online www.mg.co.za Last accessed on 09/09/2006

Bushman, B.J. & Baumeister, R.F. (1998) "Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Lead to Violence?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75 1, pp. 219-229

Cowell, A. cowell@nytimes.com (2005). Personal correspondence. Personal Email, 14/09/05 to Amanda Lucey amandalucey@hotmail.com

Dicks, H.V. (1972) *Licensed Mass Murder: A Socio-psychological study of some SS killers*. New York: Basic books.

Drewett, M. (producer). Mitchell, D. (director). 2002. *Stopping the Music*. South Africa: Freemuse; Cutting Groves.

Du Toit, A. (1994). "On Ideology." *South African Journal of Philosophy* 13, pp.111-117

Duckitt, John. (1992). *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Duntley, J.D. & Bass, D.M. (2004) "The Evolution of Evil" In Miller, A. *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*. New York: Guildford Press.

Eveleth, A. (23/05/2002). "DA govt hired torture cop." Available Mail and Guardian online www.mg.co.za

Eveleth, A. (14/08/1998). "Stratcom's bogus agency rings news" Available Mail and Guardian online www.mg.co.za

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge : Polity Press.

Feldman, A. (1991) *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foster, D. (2006). "Book Review. Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African amnesty process." In *South African Review of Sociology*, 37 (1).

Foster, D.; Haupt, P. & de Beer, M. (2005) *The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of Protagonists in the South African Conflict*. Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation.

Foster, D. (1991) *Social Psychology in South Africa*. Isando: Lexicon.

Fullard, M. & Rousseau, N. (2003). In *The Provocations of Amnesty*. Eds. Villa-Vicencio & Doxtader. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

Gilbert, S.J. (1981). Another look at the Milgram Obedience studies: The role of the gradated series of shocks. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 7, 4 690-95

Goldblatt, B. & Meintjes, S. (1998) "A Gender Perspective on violence during the struggle against apartheid" p227-250 In Bornman, Elirea, van Eeden, Rene & Wentzel, Maria. *Violence in South Africa: A Variety of Perspectives* Pretoria: HSRC Publishers

Gordin, J. (1998). *A Long night's damage into day*. Saxonwood: Contra Press

Gobodo-Madikizela, P. (2003) *A Human Being Died that Night*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Goldhagen, D.J. (1996) *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. London: Little, Brown

Goodman, David. (1999). *Fault Lines: Journeys into the New South Africa*. London: University of California Press

Haritos-Fatouros, M. (2003). *The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture*. London: Routledge.

Hinton, A. (1998). "Why did the Nazis kill? Anthropology, Genocide and the Goldhagen Controversy." *Anthropology Today*, 14 5 9-15

Hook, D. (2003). "Reading Geldenhuys: Constructing and Deconstructing the Norwood Killer. *South African Journal of Psychology*. (33) 1, pp.1-9.

Huggins, M.K, Haritos-Fatouros, M. & Zimbardo, P.G. (2002). *Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Interim Constitution of South Africa. (1993). Act 200 of 1993

Kelman, H.C & Hamilton, V.L. (1989). *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility*. Yale University Press: New Haven and London.

Kernis, M.K., Grannemann, B.D., & Barclay, L.C. (1989). "Stability and level of Self-Esteem as Predictors of Anger Arousal and Hostility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56 6, pp.1013-1022

Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to Authority*. New York: Harper & Row.

Milgram, S. (1963) "Behavioural Study of Obedience." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. 67, pp. 371-378

Miller, A.G. (2004) "What can the Milgram Obedience Experiments tell us about the Holocaust? Generalizing from the Social Psychology Laboratory." In Miller ed. *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*. New York: Guildford Press.

Miller, A. G. (1986). *The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science*. New York: Praeger.

Mamdani, M. (1998). *When does reconciliation turn into a denial of justice?* Pretoria: HSRC, 1998

Nisbett, R & Ross, L. (1980). *Human Inference: Shortcomings of Social Judgment*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Lifton, R. J. (1986). *The Nazi Doctors*. New York: Basic Books.

Parker, I. (1992). *Discourse Dynamics : Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology*. London : New York Routledge. Chapter 1, pp.3-22

Pauw, J. (1997). *Into the Heart of Darkness. Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins*. Jonathan Ball Publishers. Johannesburg.

Posel, D. (2002). "The TRC Report. What Kind of History? What kind of Truth?" In *Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. Eds Posel, D & Simpson, G., pp.147-171

Posel, D. & Simpson, G. (2002). "The Power of Truth: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Context." In *Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. Eds Posel, D & Simpson, G., pp. 1-13

Rochat, F & Modigliani, M. (2000) "Captain Paul Grueninger: The chief of police who saved Jewish refugees by refusing to do his duty" In *Obedience to Authority- Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm* Ed. Thomas Blass. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Rosenberg, T. (1992). *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*. New York: Penguin

Sabini, J.P & Silver, M. (1980) "Destroying the Innocent with a Clear Conscience: A Sociopsychology of the Holocaust." In J.E. Dimsdale *Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust*. New York: Hemisphere.

Sarkin, J. (2004) *Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African amnesty process*. Antwerp: Intersentia.

Sarkin, J. (1996). 'The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.' *South African Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 17 p.622

Schirmer, J. (1998). *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence called democracy*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

Sereny, G. (1974). *Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder*. London: Pimlico.

Staub, E. (2004) "Basic Needs, Altruism, and Aggression". In Miller, A. *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*. New York: Guildford Press.

Staub, E. (2003). *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Staub, E. (1993) "The Psychology of Bystanders, Perpetrators and Heroic Helpers." *International journal of intercultural relations*, 17, 315-341

Staub, E. (1989). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of genocide and other group violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steiner, J.M. (1980). "The SS Yesterday and Today: A Sociopsychological View." In J.E. Dimsdale. *Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust*. New York: Hemisphere, 405-456.

Steyn, M. (2001). *Whiteness Just Isn't What it Used to Be: White Identity in a Changing South Africa*. New York: State University of New York Press Albany

Theweleit, K. (1989) *Male Fantasies. Volume 2 Male bodies: psychoanalyzing the white terror*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Toch, H. (1996). "The Violence-Prone Officer" In Geller, William, A, and Toch, Hans. *Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thompson, J.B. (1984). "Analysis of Ideology." In *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*, pp.127-147

Amanda Lucey

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vols 1-5 (1998)

Juta: Kenwyn.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vols 6-7 (2003)

Juta: Kenwyn.

Zimbardo, P.G. (2004). "A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Good and Evil: Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators." In Miller ed. *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil*. New York: Guildford Press.

Zimbardo, P.G., Maslach, C. & Haney, C. (2000). "Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences" In *Obedience to Authority-Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm* Ed. Thomas Blass. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 193-237.